ZIMBABWE 2022 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Zimbabwe is constitutionally a republic. The country elected Emmerson
Mnangagwa president for a five-year term in the 2018 general elections. Despite
incremental improvements from past elections, domestic and international
observers noted serious concerns and called for further reforms to meet regional
and international standards for democratic elections. Numerous factors contributed
to a flawed election process in 2018, including: the Zimbabwe Election
Commission’s lack of independence; heavily biased state media favoring the ruling
party; voter intimidation; the unconstitutional influence of tribal leaders; failure to
provide an electronic preliminary voters roll; politicization of food aid; security
services’ excessive use of force; and lack of transparency concerning election
results. Some of these factors reemerged in numerous by-elections during the year
and in the early stages of the electoral process for the 2023 general elections. The
ruling party leads the government with a supermajority in the National Assembly
but not in the Senate.

The Zimbabwe Republic Police maintains internal security. Police and the
Department of Immigration, both under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are
primarily responsible for migration and border enforcement; a group of senior
force commanders may direct police to respond to civil unrest. The Zimbabwe
National Army and Air Force constitute the Zimbabwe Defense Forces and report
to a commander who falls under the minister of defense. The military also has
some domestic security responsibilities. The Central Intelligence Organization,
under the Office of the President, engages in both internal and external security
matters. Civilian authorities at times did not maintain effective control over
security forces. There were reports that members of the police, military, and
intelligence service committed numerous abuses throughout the country.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary
killings, including an extrajudicial killing; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening
prison conditions; arbitrary detention; political prisoners; arbitrary or unlawful

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022

United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
interference with privacy; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary;
serious government restrictions on free expression and media, including violence,
threats of violence, and unjustified arrests or prosecutions against journalists,
censorship, and arrests for libel; substantial interference with the rights of peaceful
assembly and freedom of association; restrictions on freedom of movement;
serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government
corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and
international human rights organizations; deficient investigations of and
accountability for gender-based violence, including crimes involving violence or
threats of violence against women and girls; trafficking in persons; laws
criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although
generally not enforced; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association;
and existence of the worst forms of child labor.

Impunity remained a problem. The government took very few steps to identify or
investigate officials who committed human rights abuses or engaged in acts of
corruption and seldom arrested or prosecuted such persons.

There were credible reports of human rights abuses by criminal gangs in the
artisanal and small-scale mining sector. Authorities did not systematically
investigate or prosecute such abuses.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person

a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically
Motivated Killings
In July, an inquest into the September 2021 death of Sharai Mukaro while in
custody at the Chivhu Police Station concluded that she died after being assaulted
by Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) officers. Media reports characterized the
police assault as torture.

There were reports that political actors engaged in politically motivated killings.
On February 27, a group of youth linked to the ruling Zimbabwe African National
Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party ambushed an opposition rally in
Kwekwe the day after a provocative speech by the vice president, killing one and

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injuring 22 opposition supporters. In March, media reported that suspected
ZANU-PF supporters abducted, intimidated, and threatened to kill the sister of the
deceased opposition supporter if she continued calling for justice.

b. Disappearance
There were no reports during the year of long-term disappearances attributed to
government authorities. There were no reports of authorities punishing any
perpetrators of previous acts of disappearance.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment, and Other Related Abuses
The constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment; however, there were reports that security sector officials engaged in
such practices with impunity. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported
security forces abducted, assaulted, and tortured citizens, including targeted
assaults on and torture of civil society activists, labor leaders, opposition members,
and other perceived opponents of the government. Throughout the year, police
used excessive force in apprehending, detaining, and interrogating criminal
suspects. Police and military officers used excessive force and violent means to
disperse peaceful demonstrations and to disrupt informal trading. On February 26,
police beat opposition supporters with batons and used tear gas and water cannon
spray to disperse crowds at a by-election rally in Gokwe. Prison guards
occasionally beat and abused prisoners. NGOs reported the use of excessive force
but noted prison guards did not employ excessive force systematically.

Impunity for politically motivated violence remained a problem. Impunity was

also a significant problem in the security forces and among civilian authorities who
oversaw them, including police, military, and intelligence officers. Security forces
often acted in the interest of the ruling party.

The government took steps toward establishing an independent complaints

mechanism to investigate allegations of security force misconduct, as called for in
the constitution. In October, a bill to set up the Zimbabwe Independent
Complaints Commission became law. Investigations into violence from previous

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years remained pending, including into state-sponsored violence that resulted in the
deaths of 17 civilians in 2019 and of seven civilians in postelection violence in
2018. Despite the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the 2018
postelection violence and an August High Court ruling demanding respondents pay
three million Zimbabwean dollars (approximately $4,300) to the victim, Zakeo
Mutimutema, the government has not paid significant compensation to the families
of victims. The government appealed court judgments awarding damages to some
victims who approached the courts for redress.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions were harsh and life-threatening due to overcrowding, food

shortages, lack of water, lice infestations, shortage of blankets in the cold season,
physical mistreatment of prisoners, and lack of access to personal hygiene
products, as well as inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.

Abusive Physical Conditions: Conditions in prisons, jails, and detention centers

were harsh. While some prisons operated below capacity, NGOs reported most
were overcrowded due to outdated infrastructure and judicial backlogs. State-run
news reported in March there were 20,898 detainees in facilities designed for
17,000 persons. On September 29, Information Minister Monica Mutsvangwa
announced the cabinet had approved granting amnesty to prisoners due to
overcrowding. As of November, the amnesty timeline and number of prisoners to
be released remained unknown.

Several dozen children younger than age four living with their incarcerated
mothers shared their mothers’ food allocation, rather than receiving their own.
Women inmates reported violence and sexual abuse. Despite support from NGOs,
prison distribution of menstrual hygiene supplies was limited. Women often
lacked access to pre- and postnatal care and emergency obstetric services.
Officials did not provide pregnant women and nursing mothers with additional care
or food rations out of the Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services (ZPCS)
budget, but the ZPCS solicited and received donations from NGOs and donors for
additional provisions.

There was one juvenile prison, housing boys only. Girls were held together with

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women. Authorities also held boys in adult prisons throughout the country while
in pretrial status. Officials generally tried to place younger boys in separate cells,
but NGOs reported older prisoners often physically assaulted the younger boys.
Although the law stipulates juveniles should be sent to reformatory homes,
authorities generally sent juveniles to prison, as there was only one adequate
reformatory home in the country, located in the Harare suburbs. Juveniles were
vulnerable to abuse by prison officials and other prisoners.

Prisoners with mental disabilities were often held with other prisoners until a
doctor was available to make an assessment. Psychiatric sections were available at
some prisons for these individuals but offered little specialized care.

Remand (pretrial) prisons were overcrowded. Authorities often held pretrial

detainees with convicted prisoners until their bail hearings.

The ZPCS, responsible for maintaining prisons and prisoner rehabilitation and
reintegration into society, did not provide adequate food, potable water, sanitary
conditions, or personal protective equipment during the global pandemic. The
ZPCS sometimes allowed faith-based and community organizations to help address
these problems.

Detainees depended on family members for essential dietary needs. Those without
family or community support were forced to rely on other detainees for survival,
although some prisoners identified as malnourished received additional meals. If
available at all, blankets and clothing were often unwashed and soiled. Lice
infestations were common. Although detainees could be transported to hospitals
for medical treatment, unsanitary conditions and cold winters led to severe and
sometimes fatal medical conditions. Detainees who were denied bail were often
held in severely overcrowded remand cells for years while awaiting trial.

According to NGOs, food shortages were widespread in prisons but were not life
threatening. The harvest of prison farm products provided meals for prisoners.
Protein was in short supply. Prisoners’ access to clean water varied by prison.
Diarrhea was prevalent in most prisons. Diseases such as measles, tuberculosis,
and HIV and AIDS-related illnesses were most common in those prisons with the
worst conditions. Lighting and ventilation were inadequate. There were

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insufficient mattresses, blankets, warm clothing, sanitary supplies, and hygiene
products.

Prisoners had access to very basic medical care, with a clinic and doctor at nearly
every prison. The ZPCS tested prisoners for HIV only when requested by
prisoners or prison doctors. Due to outdated regulations and a lack of specialized
medical personnel and medications, prisoners suffered from routine but treatable
medical conditions such as hypertension, tuberculosis, diabetes, asthma, and
respiratory diseases. The ZPCS was at times unable to transport prisoners with
emergency medical needs to local hospitals.

Administration: The ZPCS inspections and audit unit, charged with assessing
prison conditions and improving monitoring of prisoners’ rights, did not release the
results of its assessments. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC)
conducted monitoring visits when conditions allowed and reported it had trained
1,973 correctional officers and 402 ZPCS middle managers in human rights-based
approaches to the care of inmates.

Independent Monitoring: The law provides international human rights monitors

the right to visit prisons. Church groups and NGOs seeking to provide
humanitarian assistance, including the International Committee of the Red Cross,
gained access to prisons. Some organizations working in prisons reported
meetings with prisoners occurred without third parties present and with minimal
restrictions, but some political prisoners reported no privacy for visits, even with
their legal representatives.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, although other
sections of the law effectively weaken these prohibitions. The government’s
enforcement of security laws often conflicted with the constitution. Security forces
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, particularly political and civil society
activists, labor leaders, street vendors, and journalists perceived as opposing the
government.

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Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any
person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court. Police
did not always respect these requirements. The law stipulates that arrests require a
warrant issued by a court or senior police officer and that police inform an arrested
person of the charges before taking the individual into custody. A preliminary
hearing must be held before a court within 48 hours of an arrest. This was not
followed consistently. According to the constitution, only a competent court may
extend the period of detention.

The law provides that bail be made available for most accused persons. The law
allows prosecutors to veto judicial bail decisions and keep accused persons in
custody for up to seven days, despite a prior Constitutional Court ruling declaring
this power unconstitutional.

Authorities often did not allow detainees prompt or regular access to their lawyers
and often informed lawyers who attempted to visit their clients that detainees or
those with authority to grant access were unavailable. The government also
monitored, harassed, intimidated, and arrested human rights lawyers when they
attempted to gain access to their clients. A destitute detainee may apply to the
government for an attorney, but only for capital offenses. Some opposition party
members, civil society activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens had limited or no
access to legal counsel.

Arbitrary Arrest: The government regularly used arbitrary arrest and detention
as tools of intimidation and harassment, especially against political activists, civil
society members, journalists, attorneys, and ordinary citizens asserting their rights.

Police continued to press criminal charges against street vendors arrested under
selectively enforced COVID-19 safety regulations. Human rights NGOs reported
street vendors in urban areas were often targets of arbitrary arrest and allegations
of operating illegal businesses. The law absolves individual security agents from
criminal liability regarding unlawful arrests and detention.

Security forces frequently arrested individuals during and following protests. In

March, police arrested four opposition activists in Kadoma District for criminal

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nuisance while permitting ruling party activists to campaign in the same ward.

Amid the June 14 clashes between ruling party and opposition supporters in the
Chitungwiza suburb of Harare, police arrested opposition members of parliament
Job Sikhala and Godfrey Sithole for public order offenses. In September,
Sikhala’s wife alleged that he had been poisoned while in custody. Police arrested
14 more local opposition members between June and September and as of year’s
end continued to hold Sikhala without bail at Chikurubi Maximum Security Prison.

Pretrial Detention: Although the constitution provides for the right to bail for
detained suspects, prolonged pretrial detention for government critics, including
journalists, ordinary citizens, student activists, labor, and opposition leaders, was
common. The government routinely opposed bail for political detainees, and
judges generally upheld these motions. Cases involving human rights defenders
also involved lengthy pretrial detentions. When judges issued bail rulings, they at
times delayed announcing their rulings until after the court cashier closed on
Fridays to ensure political detainees remained in prison over the weekend. Delays
in pretrial procedures were common, however, due to a shortage of magistrates and
court interpreters, poor bureaucratic procedures, and an insufficient number of
court officials to hear many cases.

Other prisoners remained in prison because they could not afford to pay bail.
Magistrates rarely exercised the “free bail option” that authorizes them to waive
bail for destitute prisoners. Defendants commonly faced prolonged pretrial
detention as well as unnecessary hurdles that inconvenienced and humiliated the
defendant. There were no reports of pretrial detention equaling or exceeding the
maximum sentence for the alleged crime.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The constitution provides for an independent judiciary, but the government often
did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. The government intensified
executive influence over the courts and executive interference in court decisions.
The government, however, denied that the courts had the authority to hear an
appeal of a dismissed justice who resisted executive pressure.

The government often refused to abide by judicial decisions and routinely delayed

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payment of court costs or judgments awarded against it in civil cases. Government
officials at times ignored court orders, delayed bail and access to medical care, and
selectively enforced court orders related to land disputes favorable to those
associated with the government.

Judicial corruption was widespread. NGOs reported that during the past several
years, senior government officials gave homes, farms, agricultural machinery, and
other perks to numerous judges as part of its corrupt Command Agriculture
program.

NGOs reported that the president of the High Court often routed cases involving
human rights defenders to specific anticorruption magistrates in the lower courts
even if the cases were unrelated to corruption. Legal experts claimed defendants in
politically sensitive cases were less likely to receive a fair hearing from
magistrates, who heard most cases, than from higher courts. In lower courts,
justices were more likely to make politicized decisions due to the use of threats and
intimidation to force magistrates to rule in the government’s favor, particularly in
rural areas. In politically charged cases, other judicial officers such as prosecutors
and private attorneys faced pressure from high-ranking judges and officials of the
ruling party, including harassment and intimidation.

Certain high court justices made apparently independent rulings and granted
opposition party members and civil society activists’ bail. Some observers,
however, believed the decisions in those cases were motivated by ruling party
infighting rather than judicial independence.

Trial Procedures

The constitution provides for the right to a fair and public trial, but corruption and
executive control over the judiciary increasingly compromised this right. By law,
defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, although courts often did not respect
this right. Government and ruling party officials used social media to imply guilt
ahead of a court ruling in politically charged cases. Trials were usually open to the
public except in cases involving minors or state security matters. Government
officials liberally interpreted state security matters to include trials and hearings for
defendants who protested the government or reported on government corruption.

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Defendants have the right to a lawyer of their choice, but most defendants in
magistrates’ courts did not have legal representation. In criminal cases, a destitute
defendant may apply to have the government provide an attorney, but requests
were rarely granted except in capital cases in which the government provided an
attorney for all defendants unable to afford one. The Zimbabwe Women Lawyers
Association also provided some free legal assistance to women and youth. The
right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense is also provided for by law
but was often lacking. Any person arrested or detained for an alleged offense has
the right to remain silent and may not be compelled to confess. Authorities did not
always respect these rights. Authorities sometimes denied or significantly delayed
attorneys’ access to their clients or falsely claimed the attorneys’ clients were
being held at another facility.

Lower courts commonly denied bail based on previous arrests, including for
defendants never convicted of an offense.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

There were reports of individuals arrested for political reasons, including

opposition party officials and their supporters, NGO workers, journalists, civil
society activists, and labor leaders. In July, a local journalist reported 80
opposition supporters were arrested while campaigning in Masvingo City during
March by-elections. Charges against government critics included incitement to
violence and illegal gatherings. Authorities sometimes detained such individuals
for one or two days and released them without charge. Political prisoners and
detainees did not receive the same standard of treatment as other prisoners or
detainees. There were reports police physically abused political activists and
journalists while in detention. For example, on May 7, police assaulted journalist
Blessed Mhlanga in Chitungwiza during his arrest.

Unlike normal criminal proceedings, which move from investigation to trial within
months, prosecutors regularly took abnormally long to submit cases involving
members of the political opposition or civil society critics of the government for
trial. Hearings were sometimes scheduled when presiding judges were on
vacation. Prosecutors in political cases were often “unprepared to proceed” and
received numerous extensions. When authorities granted bail to government

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opponents, they often did not conclude investigations and set a trial date but chose
to “proceed by way of summons.” This left the threat of impending prosecution
remaining, with the accused person eventually being called to court, only to be
informed of further delays. Magistrates sometimes delayed making case records
available to deliberately delay appeals for bail in the High Court.

In March 2021, a court sentenced youth activist Makomborero Haruzivishe to

prison for inciting violence and resisting arrest. Authorities said he blew a whistle
to alert opposition protesters to pounce on police during a protest in February 2020
and that he incited violence in a protest demanding the government provide more
support to the poor. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, which represented
Haruzivishe during his trial, said only circumstantial evidence was used to convict
him of inciting violence and resisting arrest. While outside the courthouse during
Haruzivishe’s trial, one journalist witnessed indiscriminate police brutality against
his supporters. Although the High Court dropped a separate charge against
Haruzivishe in September, his trial for inciting violence and resisting arrest
remained pending at year’s end.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Civil judicial procedures allow for an independent and impartial judiciary, but the
judiciary was subject to political influence and intimidation, particularly in cases
involving high-ranking government officials, politically connected individuals, and
individuals and organizations seeking remedies for abuses of human rights.

Property Seizure and Restitution

The constitution stipulates the government must compensate persons for

improvements made on land taken by the government, but it does not set a timeline
for providing compensation. The government rarely provided restitution or
compensation for the confiscation of private property, and police generally did not
act against individuals who seized private property without having secured
authorization from the state to do so.

Most commercial farmers reported the government had still not compensated them
for losses suffered from the land resettlement program in the early 2000s. In 2020
the government, the Commercial Farmers Union, and other farmers’ groups signed

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a $3.5 billion compensation deal for farms expropriated in the decades following
independence. The deal promised half of the payments after one year and the
remainder over the course of the next four years. In June 2021, the government
made a one-million-dollar token payment to commercial farmers but continued to
delay additional compensation payments as of year’s end. Despite the negotiated
agreement, government officials continued to seize and downsize farms without
fair compensation.

The Commercial Farmers Union estimated there were fewer than 400 active white
commercial farmers still living in the country. Those remaining continued to be
targeted, harassed, threatened with eviction, and evicted by unemployed youth and
individuals hired by politically connected individuals standing to benefit from farm
seizures.

High-level ZANU-PF officials, meanwhile, registered numerous farms in the

names of family members to evade the government’s policy of one farm per
official. The government continued to allow individuals aligned with top officials
to seize land not designated for acquisition. Media commonly reported high-level
government officials possessed large farm holdings. The government began a
comprehensive land audit in 2018 to reflect land ownership accurately, but as of
year’s end, the commission had not completed the exercise.

f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home,

or Correspondence
The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary interference with privacy, family, or
home, but local NGOs reported the government did not respect this right.

The law permits intercepting or monitoring any communication (including

telephone, postal mail, email, and internet traffic) transmitted through a
telecommunication, postal, or other system in the country. Civil liberties
advocates claimed the government used the law to stifle freedom of speech and
target political and civil society activists (see section 2.a.). On June 6, the Postal
and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe launched a
monitoring system capable of monitoring incoming and outgoing calls.

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Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties
a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and
Other Media
The constitution provides for freedom of expression, including for members of the
press and other media, but the law limits these freedoms in the “interest of defense,
public security or professional confidentiality, to the extent that the restriction is
fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society.” The
government continued to arrest, detain, and harass journalists, critics, and
opposition politicians.

Freedom of Expression: There were restrictions on individuals criticizing the

government or discussing matters of public interest. Authorities were sensitive to
criticism in general, particularly when directed at President Mnangagwa or his
family. Persons accused of insulting the president and his office can be charged
under a law that makes undermining the authority of or insulting a president
criminal acts. On May 26, police detectives raided the home of ZimLive.com
publisher and editor Mduduzi Mathuthu in Bulawayo. He turned himself in to
police on June 6, where he was detained for more than an hour on allegations of
insulting President Mnangagwa following a social media post alleging the
president had conducted government business under the influence of alcohol.
According to the Media Institute of Southern Africa Zimbabwe, Mathuthu was
charged with undermining the authority of, or insulting, the president.

Violence and Harassment: Security forces, officials, and supporters of the ruling
party routinely harassed journalists. On May 7, police arrested journalists Blessed
Mhlanga and Chengeto Chidi after they photographed police attempting to arrest
the opposition member of parliament Job Sikhala in Chitungwiza, a suburb south
of Harare. Police responded by attempting to break the journalists’ phones to
destroy the footage. Police also arrested Moses Hakata, a bystander, for attempting
to dissuade the officer from assaulting Mhlanga during the arrest. Their trial was
pending as of year’s end.

The government used accreditation laws to monitor international media journalists’

entry into the country, requiring foreign journalists to obtain permits 60 days prior

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to arrival. Foreign reporters paid more for permits and accreditation than their
local counterparts. International media outlets such as al-Jazeera and the BBC
continued to operate in the country. On June 14, Bulawayo magistrate convicted
New York Times stringer Jeffrey Moyo of contravening the Immigration Act by
allegedly producing fake media accreditation cards for two foreign New York
Times journalists deported in May 2021 after three days in the country. The court
fined Moyo 200,000 Zimbabwean dollars (then valued at $600) and gave him a
two-year suspended prison term, which can be imposed if he is convicted of a
similar crime in the next five years. Police arrested Moyo together with Zimbabwe
Media Commission registrar Thabang Manhika, acquitting Manhika of the same
charge in March.

On July 7, antiriot police assaulted journalist Anyway Yotamu for filming an

altercation outside an opposition party’s headquarters. Between October 6 and
October 10, five journalists – Dunmore Mundai, Godwin Mangudya, Gadaffi
Wells, Moreblessings Nyoni, and Desmond Chingarande – were assaulted for,
harassed at, or blocked from covering events in the country, according to the
Committee to Protect Journalists.

Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other

Media, including Online Media: The government maintained censorship through
media registration and accreditation laws, although many provisions of the law are
inconsistent with the constitution. The law provides the government with
extensive powers to control media and suppress free speech by requiring the
registration of journalists and prohibiting the “abuse of free expression.” On
March 31, the Zimbabwe Media Commission published accreditation and
registration fees for journalists and media houses, drawing its authority from the
Data Protection Act, which was no longer in force. Government-controlled and
independent media outlets and journalists practiced self-censorship.

On August 3, police charged journalist Desmond Chingarande and editor Wisdom

Mdzungairi with transmitting “false data messages” for their coverage of a legal
dispute involving local authorities in Harare. This was the first case prosecuted
under a 2021 data protection law.

Libel/Slander Laws: The constitution prohibits criminal defamation. Although

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libel, slander, defamation, and blasphemy should be treated only as civil offenses,
there were occasional arrests for insulting the president or his family. Civil
defamation laws remained in force. On June 6, authorities temporarily detained
ZimLive editor Mududuzi Mathuthu on charges of undermining the president after
he tweeted Mnangagwa was at a drinking party before he announced new fiscal
measures on May 7. On June 7, freelance journalist Simbarashe Sithole filed a
report with police after receiving threats over a story he wrote on alleged
corruption in the constituency of Home Affairs Minister Kazembe. A recorded call
circulated online quoted ZANU-PF member and political activist Isheanesu
Dzimbiti threatening to assault Sithole, expressing his displeasure with the stories
Sithole published, and asking Sithole to disclose his location.

National Security: The law grants the government a wide range of legal powers
to prosecute persons for political and security crimes that are not clearly defined.
For example, the extremely broad Official Secrets Act criminalizes the divulging
of any information acquired by government employees in the course of official
duties. Authorities used these laws to restrict publication of information critical of
government policies or public officials.

Internet Freedom

The Interception of Communications Act permits the government to monitor all

communications in the country, including internet transmissions. The government
regulated internet and mobile phone communication to curb dissent and increased
its share of the information and communications technology market and
international gateways.

While the post and telecommunications authority reportedly is barred from

monitoring content, communications laws permit eavesdropping and call
interception by state security personnel. The laws allow authorities to apply to the
responsible minister or director of the Cybersecurity and Monitoring of
Interception of Communications Center housed in the Office of the President,
without legal oversight from the judiciary, for a warrant authorizing them to
intercept communications, including calls, emails, and other digital messages.
Regulations allow officers to apply for interception warrants if they know the
identities of individuals whose calls and messages they want to intercept. There

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were no reported applications of this provision.

London-based internet watchdog Netblocks found internet service disruptions

surrounding opposition rallies on February 20 and March 13 were “potentially
consistent with the slowing, or throttling, of service.”

Restrictions on Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

The government did not explicitly restrict academic freedom; however, the law
more broadly restricts the independence of universities, subjecting them to
government influence and providing university authorities with disciplinary
powers over staff and students. President Mnangagwa is the chancellor of all eight
state-run universities and appoints their vice chancellors. The government has
oversight of higher education policy at public universities through the Ministry of
Higher and Tertiary Education. On September 10, the government implemented
the Amendment of State Universities Bill, which further extended ministerial
approval to the appointment of finance officers and librarians.

The Censorship and Entertainment Controls Board approves scripts by

playwrights. Artists who violate provisions of the Censorship and Entertainment
Control Act can receive fines and prison sentences.

b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association,
but the government continued to restrict these rights, particularly for political
opposition and government critics.

Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

The government restricted the right to peaceful assembly. The law requires
organizers to notify police of their intention to hold a public gathering, defined as
15 or more individuals, seven days in advance. Failure to do so may result in
criminal prosecution as well as civil liability. The law allows police to prohibit a
gathering based on security concerns but requires police to file an affidavit in a
magistrate’s court stating the reasons behind the denial. The government must
respond to notifications to demonstrate within three days. On April 16, police

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arrested 14 opposition activists holding car rallies in Mutare for engaging in public
activities without police clearance, ahead of a May 7 by-election.

Rallies in support of the ruling party were generally unimpeded, as were religious
assemblies by groups seen as loyal to the ruling party. Meanwhile, opposition
members, unions, civil society activists, pastors perceived to be aligned with the
opposition, and street vendors often faced arrests, and in some cases police
violence. In March, police arrested 10 student leaders protesting a 163 percent fee
hike. In May, police fired tear gas into a crowd of students protesting tuition hikes
in Harare, reportedly assaulting the organizers and seizing their cellphones.

Freedom of Association

The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the government
restricted this right. Ruling party supporters, sometimes with direct government
support or tacit approval, intimidated and harassed members of organizations
perceived to be opposed to the government. See section 7.a. for additional
freedom of association restrictions on trade unions.

c. Freedom of Religion
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at
https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.

d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country

The constitution and law provide for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation, but the government restricted these rights.

Foreign Travel: The constitution provides the right for citizens to enter and leave
the country and for the right to a passport or other travel documents. White
citizens, however, routinely faced additional bureaucratic hurdles and requests for
bribes to obtain a passport. Although dual citizenship was recognized, there were
reports the Office of the Registrar General sometimes imposed administrative
obstacles in the passport application process for dual citizens, particularly
Malawian, Zambian, and Mozambican citizens. In September, a magistrate issued
a warrant of arrest for Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) Spokesperson Fadzayi

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Mahere after she failed to appear in court for a pending case, although she had
been granted leave by the courts for international travel. The courts later canceled
the arrest warrant.

e. Protection of Refugees
The government often cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing
protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, and other
persons of concern.

Access to Asylum: The law provides for granting refugee status and the
government has established a system for providing protection to refugees. As of
September, Tongogara Refugee Camp hosted 15,431 refugees and asylum seekers,
despite being designed to host only 3,000.

Abuse of Migrants and Refugees: Migrants reported that border officials

routinely accepted bribes in exchange for border crossings. Migrants reported
arbitrary detention and deportation. Security forces routinely detained migrants
who lacked identity documents or permission to be in the country and held them in
prisons with convicted criminals. Prolonged detention for undocumented migrants
was common. Migrants complained of mistreatment by other prisoners.

In February, six refugees sued the Department of Immigration for unlawful

detention and loss of property after being detained in August 2021. The refugees
were alleged to have been protesting the reported refoulement of Congolese
refugees but deny participating.

Freedom of Movement: The government maintained a formal encampment

policy requiring refugees to live at Tongogara Refugee Camp. Nevertheless, as of
October, approximately 900 refugees lived in urban areas, including Harare and
Bulawayo, and more than 6,500 Mozambican asylum seekers lived among host
communities along the porous border with Mozambique. An unknown number of
refugees were held in criminal detention facilities.

Employment: There were credible reports that the government imposed

restrictions on refugees’ ability to work. The government maintains an exception

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to the right to work under the UN refugee convention. Refugees working in the
informal sector had limited employment options in Tongogara Refugee Camp.
UNHCR, NGOs, and the Julia Taft Fund supported organizations that provided
camp residents employment opportunities, including banana farming, livestock
production, and soap production.

Durable Solutions: The government facilitated the voluntary repatriation of

refugees to their home countries and recognized the Voluntary Repatriation
Declaration Form as a valid document for travel purposes.

f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons

International organizations estimated there were more than 41,500 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) as of August. The government evicted an unknown
number of persons who built homes on contested land, leading to their
displacement. In 2019 Cyclone Idai displaced thousands of persons in
Chimanimani and Chipinge. The Cyclone Idai IDP camps remained in place
during the year. Urban evictions displaced persons, but the precise numbers were
unknown.

Many IDPs from earlier emergencies continued to live in dire conditions, lacking
basic sanitation. IDPs were among those at greatest risk of food insecurity.
Several generations of undocumented farm workers from neighboring countries
resided in insular commercial farming communities in the country.

g. Stateless Persons
The country has a significant number of habitual residents who are legally or de
facto stateless. In 2015 international organizations estimated a minimum of
300,000 persons in the country were stateless. Longstanding migrant labor
populations from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia lacked documentation. Many
migrant workers and their families who had lived in the country for generations,
along with thousands of those impacted by the Gukurahundi killings of mainly
Ndebele persons in the country’s southwest between 1983 and 1987, remained
blocked from accessing national identity documents. One in four such persons was
not registered at birth.

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The country contributed to the risk of statelessness, including through
discrimination against women in nationality laws and discrimination on other
grounds. Mothers may register their child’s birth only if the father or another male
relative is present, although the government reportedly suspended this requirement
during a national identification registration campaign from April to September.
Otherwise, if the father or other male relative refuses, the child may be deprived of
a birth certificate, which limits the child’s ability to acquire identity documents,
enroll in school, and access social services.

Citizenship transmission requirements established in the 2013 constitution were

not widely understood or enforced. Beginning in 2013, foreigners born and
ordinarily resident in the country with at least one parent who was a citizen of a
Southern African Development Community member state qualified for citizenship
by birth. Many, however, were not aware of their eligibility. As a result, they
retained their old identity cards with the restrictive “alien” status. Descendants of
victims of the Gukurahundi killings in the 1980s had difficulty securing a birth
certificate because they often could not obtain their parents’ death certificates, as
required. Due to stringent documentation requirements, many IDPs did not
possess evidence of their nationality following the destruction and displacement
resulting from Cyclone Idai in 2019.

Discriminatory practices often prevented persons born in the country from

registering for citizenship when they had foreign relatives.

Stateless persons were often unable to enroll or remain enrolled in school, access
formal health care facilities (including the COVID-19 vaccination program), or
obtain a passport to travel to neighboring countries for work or to visit family.

Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process

The constitution provides citizens the ability to choose their government in free
and fair periodic elections based on universal and equal suffrage and conducted by
secret ballot. The indefinite suspension of by-elections due to COVID-19
remained in effect until March. Routine by-elections subsequently continued to fill
vacancies until November.

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Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: Most international and local independent observers
characterized the 2018 presidential, parliamentary, and local elections as largely
free of violence but not meeting standards for credible elections. The Southern
African Development Community, the African Union, and the Common Market
for Southern and Eastern Africa, however, declared the elections free and fair.

Political parties and civil society organizations complained of widespread voter

disenfranchisement, including of foreign-born and diaspora voters, and the
inability to compete under equal conditions. State media coverage was heavily
biased in favor of ZANU-PF and provided almost no access to or positive coverage
of the opposition. There were reports of voter intimidation, including the
collection of voter registration slips by party and tribal leaders to undermine the
secrecy of the vote. These circumstances continued in by-elections conducted
during the year, particularly leading up to 150 by-election contests in March.

In February, an activist group reported an unexplained shift of 170,867 voters

between constituencies based on Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) data. In
some cases, ZEC reassigned voters living at the same address to different wards up
to 106 miles from their residence.

While the law obliges traditional chiefs to be impartial, in 2018, traditional leaders
mobilized voters and canvassed support for ZANU-PF in rural areas. In return,
traditional leaders continued to receive agricultural, material, and financial
benefits. Chiefs Council President Fortune Charumbira continued to be in
contempt of a 2018 High Court order to withdraw public comments made in
support of ZANU-PF. In 2020 he delivered a partisan political speech at the
annual ZANU-PF party conference in support of ZANU-PF and President
Mnangagwa. In March, President Mnangagwa made a public statement
undermining the ancestral legitimacy of chiefs who did not support the ruling
party. In January, ZANU-PF pressed all village heads in the Chivi South
constituency to accompany voters to polling stations and emphasize that voting for
ZANU-PF would avoid post-election violence.

Civil society organizations indicated the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency

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(ZIMSTAT) deliberately recruited ZANU-PF supporters as enumerators in the
census process. ZIMSTAT reportedly told teachers trained in census methods they
were no longer needed, after the teachers participated in demonstrations against
government policies.

Political Parties and Political Participation: An unprecedented number of

presidential candidates and political parties contested the 2018 elections. Elements
within ZANU-PF and the security forces intimidated and committed abuses against
other parties and their supporters and obstructed their activities. NGOs reported
ZANU-PF youth members and so-called war veterans threatened communities with
violence, telling them that the violence of the 2008 elections would return if
ZANU-PF candidates lost.

Traditional leaders and government officials often distributed food aid based on
perceived political affiliation, according to local NGOs. Through politicized food
distribution, the government punished communities that elected opposition
councilors by denying them assistance while rewarding communities that voted for
ZANU-PF. In January, reports that officials distributed benefits from the
president’s agricultural scheme on a partisan basis were widespread. For example,
the ZANU-PF Zaka district chair required attendance at ZANU-PF meetings to
receive assistance, and opposition supporters were removed from the list of
beneficiaries at Manica Bridge Community Hall. In September, Chief Andrew
Bvute reportedly instructed residents in Mberengwa to vote for ZANU-PF in the
2023 general election. In November, Agriculture Minister Anxious Masuka told
villagers in Chipinge they must “remember” President Mnangagwa, who gave
them agricultural inputs, and “return the favor” in the 2023 election.

Ahead of the March 26 by-elections, opposition supporters faced harassment and

attacks across the country. On February 4, ZANU-PF supporters attacked the car
of CCC Kwekwe Central candidate Judith Tobaiwa and assaulted her driver. On
February 6, riot police reportedly arrested 12 supporters of recalled member of
parliament Amos Chibaya in the Mkoba constituency near Gweru. On February
16, three CCC supporters reported ZANU-PF members attacked and tortured them
in Harare East. On February 18, after police arrested 13 CCC supporters in Harare,
a prominent human rights activist shared two videos described as footage of CCC
arrests at Harare Central Police Station. One shows police beating screaming

Page 22
individuals in the dark. The other shows police forcing detained youths to crawl
across pavement on their knees. On February 14, police detained CCC Vice
President and former Finance Minister Tendai Biti without charge as he met with
party members in his Harare East constituency, releasing him when his lawyer
arrived. On March 2, four men armed with a gun, an axe, and machetes invaded
Biti’s home in Harare and severely wounded a security guard (see also sections
1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e., Political Prisoners and Detainees).

Despite being granted citizenship under the constitution and having voted
previously, some persons were denied the right to vote during by-elections because
they could not adequately demonstrate their citizenship. Undocumented
individuals could not vote, run for office, or serve as an election agent. Large
numbers of youth lacked the national identification cards needed to register to vote.

Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No laws limit

participation of women or members of historically marginalized or minority
groups, including persons with disabilities and Indigenous persons, in the political
process, and they fully participated as voters and candidates. Nevertheless, laws
that criminalize lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+)
identities had the effect of prohibiting LGBTQI+ persons from participating in the
political process. Transgender persons encountered difficulties when registering to
vote because of changes in their appearance, disenfranchising them from the
political process.

Women candidates across multiple political parties faced particularly vitriolic

gender-based insults regarding appearance, sexual proclivity, accusations of
involvement in sex work, and gender-based stereotypes. They also faced
challenges within their party if running against a male candidate in a primary.
Some observers believed traditional and cultural factors also limited women’s
political participation. During the 2018 elections, some persons associated with
the opposition reported their family members were instructed to declare themselves
blind or illiterate to enable a biased “disabled voter assistant” to vote on their
behalf.

Minority groups such as the San, Tonga, and Doma, as well as communities
affected by Cyclone Idai and Gukurahundi, remained undocumented. A wide

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range of factors contributed to this problem including clerical errors, limited
registration windows, inaccessibility for persons with disabilities, undocumented
home births, distance to registrar offices, parental deaths and imprisonment,
illiteracy, and onerous age requirements for witnesses.

Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in

Government
The law provides criminal penalties for conviction of corruption; however, the
government did not implement the law effectively or impartially. Despite
government pronouncements, there were numerous reports of government
corruption during the year. Experts described the problem as “catch and release,”
where the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) arrested some corrupt
officials, often those out of favor with President Mnangagwa, but did not secure
convictions through the National Prosecuting Authority, which was responsible for
referring all cases to the anticorruption courts. Government anticorruption efforts
were highly politicized.

Although the country has specialized anticorruption courts in all 10 provinces,

challenges persisted, including perceptions of political interference, delays in
concluding high-profile cases, and a low quality of investigations. Additionally,
the anticorruption courts often displayed political bias and were assigned cases
involving activists, journalists, or opposition leaders even though the cases did not
relate to corruption. In fact, the establishment of the courts specified they would
adjudicate on matters including “criminal trials and other matters arising out of or
connected with criminal trials.” Independent governmental oversight entities were
often constrained politically, and the government ensured they lacked the funding
and staffing to carry out their mandates.

ZACC and other government agencies continued to implement the National Anti-
Corruption Strategy and actively included civil society and international partners
in steering committee meetings. Multiple public and private officials signed
integrity pledges. The country’s chapter of the African Parliamentarians’ Network
Against Corruption actively met and called out corruption, including corruption
committed by other government officials. ZACC increased its presence at the

Page 24
provincial level. The constitution mandates that ZACC conduct corruption
investigations. In June, ZACC Vice Chair Kuziwa Murapa reported the
commission had received 1,501 complaints of suspected corruption in 2021,
reflecting a 32 percent increase from 2020. While ZACC has the power to arrest, it
does not have the power to prosecute.

Corruption: Corruption in both the public and private sectors persisted and was
highly institutionalized. The country continued to experience both petty and grand
corruption, defined respectively by Transparency International Zimbabwe as an
“everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- to mid-level public officials” such as
by police and local officials and “an abuse of high-level power by political elites.”
In April, a Transparency International Zimbabwe report identified bribery as
rampant and existing within most public institutions. The report identified the
ZRP, Registrar General’s Office, and Vehicle Inspection Department as the top
three bribe-seeking institutions. On April 22, President Mnangagwa dismissed
ZACC commissioner Frank Muchengwa on findings of corruption and gross
misconduct, without providing additional details to the public.

Cabinet officials, including Local Government Minister July Moyo, were involved
in several high-profile corruption cases. Moyo was accused of diverting $55
million in public funds and compelling local authorities in a June 14 memo to
purchase firefighting trucks from Belarus at inflated prices. Press reports indicated
presidential associate Alyaksandr Zingman secured the deal without following
public procurement processes. Moyo also is alleged to have pushed an unduly
expensive contract for a Harare City Council dump site without following
procurement processes or obtaining mayoral approval.

Corruption concerns over the country’s COVID-19 response continued. In May,

parliament’s Public Accounts Committee concurred with the auditor general’s
2021 findings that government officials breached the Public Finance Management
Act, the Social Welfare Assistance Act, and the Public Procurement and Disposal
of Public Assets Act by misusing public funds meant to combat COVID-19. The
committee issued a series of recommendations following its investigation which
have not been implemented as of year’s end. Corruption also permeated the
government’s Command Agriculture program and other agricultural programs such
as the President’s Input Scheme.

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On June 2, President Mnangagwa fired Deputy Agriculture Minister Douglas
Karoro, citing allegations Karoro stole more than 700 tons of fertilizer and maize
seed intended for farmers under the president’s Input Scheme. An investigative
report released in March by The Sentry detailed extensive corruption by a
benefactor of President Mnangagwa, Kudakwashe Tagwirei, who received treasury
bills at a favorable exchange rate while running the Command Agriculture
program.

Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and

Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human
Rights
Several domestic and international human rights groups operated in the country,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.

Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: The government harassed NGOs

and specific persons it believed would expose abuses by government personnel or
oppose government policies. NGOs reported surveillance missions by unidentified
individuals visiting and occasionally raiding NGO offices. According to many
human rights NGOs, the state viewed governance, human rights, and media NGOs
as regime-change agents supported by the West. In March, youth reportedly
aligned with ZANU-PF disrupted NGO and citizen participation in public
parliamentary hearings on the Private Voluntary Organizations Amendment Bill,
which would result in increased government control over civil society, in the
Highfield suburb of Harare.

NGOs reported increasing demands from local “development coordinators” set up

by the government without a legal basis for “right to operate” fees ranging from
$200 to $5,000. Government-controlled media as well as government-associated
social media handles disparaged and attacked human rights groups, especially
those believed to communicate with western embassies or governments.
Unidentified groups spread false stories as part of a misinformation campaign,
attributing those stories to civil society organizations to influence voters during the
March by-elections.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The ZHRC managed to fulfill some of its

Page 26
constitutionally mandated functions despite government efforts to constrain its
funding and staff. Through its website, a hotline, and mobile legal clinics, which
resumed after being suspended because of COVID-19, the ZHRC conducted public
outreach and accepted complaints from the public for investigation. The
government, however, did not provide the ZHRC with sufficient personnel to
investigate the number of complaints it received. Some NGOs questioned the
ZHRC’s independence and effectiveness.

The government did not overtly attempt to obstruct the ZHRC’s work that was
critical of government or security service actions.

The National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), which has the
constitutional mandate to handle matters related to the Gukurahundi killings, made
no significant progress, in part due to the government declining to allocate
sufficient funds to the NPRC. The government asserted resources would be made
available to finance outcomes developed by chiefs with their communities,
including access to documentation, counseling and psychological support,
exhumations, burials, memorials, reparations, and social security benefits
(including pensions, social welfare, education, and health services). The National
Transitional Justice Working Group, a coalition of legal, religious, and civil
society actors, asserted that the government usurped the work of the NPRC. The
working group called instead for public apologies by Mnangagwa and his
administration for abuses perpetrated during Gukurahundi. It also demanded a
retraction from Justice Minister Ziyambi Ziyambi’s statement in August that the
government had no mandate to prosecute human rights abuses related to
Gukurahundi because of a broad amnesty declared by President Mugabe in 1990.

Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses

Women
Rape and Domestic Violence: While the law criminalizes sexual offenses,
including rape and spousal rape of women, these crimes remained widespread.
Almost a quarter of married women who had experienced domestic violence
reported sexual violence, while approximately 8 percent reported both physical and
sexual violence. A high proportion (43 percent) of adolescent girls aged between

Page 27
13-17 years reported that their first incident of sexual intercourse was unwanted
and unplanned. This was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic which led to a
significant increase in gender-based violence, domestic violence, and child
marriages. Women were sexually assaulted while seeking treatment in public
hospitals, collecting water from communal boreholes, in religious settings, and
riding in public transportation. An NGO reported an increase from 500 to 600
cases of gender-based violence per month before the COVID-19 pandemic to 700
to 800 cases per month during the pandemic. Approximately 94 percent of calls on
the NGO’s gender-based violence hotline were from women. Violent gender-
based offenses were often committed in private and without any witnesses.
Moreover, police and hospitals did not have sufficient training or facilities to
collect and store physical evidence of gender-based violence. The lack of evidence
hampered the effectiveness of the justice system and demotivated survivors to
report these cases. Justice for survivors of violence and particularly gender-based
violence remained elusive, and was worse for children and adolescents, especially
girls. According to UNFPA, one in three women aged 15 to 49 in the country
experienced physical violence and approximately one in four women experienced
sexual violence since age 15.

Although sexual offenses are punishable by lengthy prison sentences, women’s

organizations stated that convictions were rare and sentences were inconsistent.
Rape survivors were not consistently afforded protection in court. During the year,
the July 2021 case of a teenager charged with murder who claimed she was
defending herself against a sexual predator triggered a debate regarding women’s
rights and the prevalence of sexual violence in the country. Women’s rights
activists declared the country’s self-defense law was too weak to protect women
because the courts can decide whether harm was intended. Women political
leaders and human rights activists were targeted physically and through threats and
intimidation via social media. Rape and sexual violence were generally under-
reported. Social stigma and societal perceptions that rape was a “fact of life”
continued to inhibit reporting of rape. Women were less likely to report spousal
rape, due to fear of losing economic support or of reprisal, lack of awareness that
spousal rape is a crime, police reluctance to engage with domestic disputes, and
bureaucratic hurdles. Many rural citizens reported being unfamiliar with laws
against domestic violence and sexual offenses. A lack of adequate and widespread

Page 28
services for rape victims also discouraged reporting.

Children born from rape suffered stigma and marginalization. Mothers who gave
birth after rape were sometimes reluctant to register the births. Without
registration, these children did not have access to social services or national
identification cards. The adult rape clinics in public hospitals in Harare and
Mutare were run by NGOs and did not receive significant financial support from
the Ministry of Health. The clinics received referrals from police and NGOs.
They administered HIV tests and provided medication for HIV and other sexually
transmitted diseases. Although police referred most reported rapes of women and
men who received services from the rape centers for prosecution, very few
individuals were ultimately prosecuted.

Domestic violence, especially intimate partner violence perpetrated by men against

women, was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and frequent government-
mandated lockdowns. Domestic violence is punishable by a modest fine, a
maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. Authorities, however,
generally considered it a private matter and rarely prosecuted.

Government-controlled media implemented various initiatives to combat gender-

based violence through radio programming and a national hotline. Several
women’s rights groups also worked with law enforcement agencies and provided
training and literature on domestic violence as well as shelters and counseling for
women. NGOs reported most urban police stations had trained officers to deal
with domestic violence survivors but lacked capacity to respond on evenings and
weekends. The law requires victims of any form of violence to produce a police
report to receive free treatment at government health facilities. This requirement
prevented many rape survivors from receiving necessary medical treatment,
including postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) to prevent HIV. The sparse trauma
counseling resources for persons who suffered sexual violence were provided
almost exclusively by NGOs.

Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): There were no national statistics

available regarding FGM/C, but the practice of labial elongation occurred in at
least one minority ethnic community. The country has many different cultures that
have incorporated this practice in beliefs and ceremonies. Some parts of the

Page 29
population practiced harmful procedures such as pricking, piercing, incising,
scraping, and cauterization.

Other Forms of Gender-based Violence: Virginity testing is prohibited by the

law. Although reportedly decreasing, it continued to occur in some regions and in
some faith communities. In December 2021, police in Marondera charged a
woman with aggravated indecent assault against her daughter in one incident of
reported virginity testing. Also widows, when compelled to relocate to rural areas,
were sometimes forcibly married off to an in-law.

Sexual Harassment: No specific law criminalizes sexual harassment, but labor

law prohibits the practice in the workplace. The government did not effectively
enforce the labor law. The constitutionally established Gender Commission
lobbied for legislation criminalizing sexual harassment and gender-based violence
at the workplace. Media reported that sexual harassment was prevalent in
universities, workplaces, and parliament, where legislators routinely and publicly
body shamed, name called, and booed women members of parliament. In
December 2021, the High Court awarded US$180,000 in damages to Rita Lunga-
Mbatha for a 2003 workplace sexual harassment case against her supervisor. In
July, the Public Service Commission introduced a Public Service Sexual
Harassment Policy.

In a 2017 study conducted by a student advocacy group, women college students

reported they routinely encountered unwanted physical contact from male students,
lecturers, and nonacademic staff, ranging from touching and inappropriate remarks
to rape. Of the students interviewed, 94 percent indicated they had experienced
sexual harassment in general, 74 percent indicated they had experienced sexual
harassment by male university staff, and 16 percent reported they were raped by
lecturers or other staff.

Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary

sterilization on the part of government authorities.

Adolescents, rural residents, LGBTQI+ persons, and survivors of gender-based

violence lacked consistent access to reproductive health services. The
contraceptive prevalence rate for women 15-49 years of age seeking contraception

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was 67 percent. Contraceptive use among adolescents, both married and
unmarried, was 46 percent, compared with the national average of 67 percent.
Barriers affecting access to contraception included supply chain and commodity
problems, limited access to health facilities in remote areas, religious skepticism of
modern medicine among some groups, and ambiguity on the age of access to
contraception. Access to contraception became more difficult due to COVID-19
lockdown measures. The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in disruptions to
contraceptive supply chains. As part of COVID-19 mitigation measures, the
government, private sector, and NGOs were at times forced to close health
facilities, mobile clinics, and community-based interventions, reducing access to
health services.

Emergency contraceptives were not readily available in the public sector. Some
public-sector facilities did not have enough commodities to provide youth with the
free family-planning method of their choice. Women could purchase emergency
contraceptives at private pharmacies or obtain them from NGOs, but the cost was
prohibitive, and availability limited. The law, the policy on sexual abuse and
violence, and the creation of one-stop centers for survivors of gender-based
violence were designed to provide survivors access to sexual and reproductive
health services. Resources constrained access, with state funding limited to NGOs
operating adult rape clinics in Harare and Mutare. Limited police capacity to
provide victims with the police report needed to access treatment at government
health facilities was an additional constraint on access to services.

The 2019 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey estimated maternal mortality at 462
deaths per 100,000 live births, down from 651 deaths per 100,000 live births in the
2015 Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey. Nonetheless, the rate was high
despite high prenatal care coverage (93 percent), high institutional deliveries (86
percent), and the presence of a skilled health worker at delivery (86 percent).
Although these rates of maternal mortality were partly explained by the high
prevalence of HIV, maternal and neonatal quality of care were areas of concern.

Ministry of Health guidelines provided for post-abortion care to rape survivors,

including PEP, emergency contraception, and psychosocial support. These
services were not uniform across facilities and were not routinely available.
Psychosocial support services for women who experienced abortion were largely

Page 31
unavailable.

Young girls and women increasingly relied on traditional healers and midwives to
address health problems due to the difficulty of accessing doctors during COVID-
19 lockdowns. This increased severe health complications. Girls and women
faced challenges while giving birth due to a fragile health system with degraded
infrastructure and shortages of basic health supplies and staff. Many individuals
could not afford to pay for private hospitalization, relying on traditional healers
and midwives.

Few families could afford menstrual hygiene products. Some girls failed to attend
school when menstruating, while others used unhygienic rags, leading to infections
and illness.

Discrimination: The constitution provides the same legal status and rights for
women and men, stating all “laws, customs, traditions, and practices that infringe
the rights of women conferred by this constitution are void to the extent of the
infringement.” There is an institutional framework to address women’s rights and
gender equality through the Ministry of Women Affairs and the Gender
Commission, one of the independent commissions established under the
constitution. The commission received minimal support from the government and
lacked sufficient independence from the ministry. The law recognizes a woman’s
right to own property, but very few women owned property, due to the customary
practice of patriarchal inheritance. Fewer than 20 percent of women farmers were
official landowners or named on government lease agreements. Divorce and
alimony laws were equitable, but many women lacked awareness of their rights. In
traditional practice, property reverts to the man in case of divorce or to his family
in case of his death. When women were not listed on lease agreements, they could
not benefit from most government programs that provided agricultural inputs as a
form of economic assistance.

The 2022 Marriage Act affords civil partnerships or common law marriages the
same remedies as legal marriages but recognizes only heterosexual civil unions or
common-law marriages. The new law does not address property rights during
marriage.

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Discrimination against women in employment occurred despite being prohibited
by law (see section 7.d.). Women received fewer loans and other forms of
financial support, even in informal economic sectors where they outnumbered
men, such as in micro and small-scale enterprises and agricultural production.
This disparity was partly explained by deficiencies in access to loan collateral and
documented years of business experience.

Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination

The constitution uses strong language to provide for the protection of members of
racial and ethnic minorities from violence and discrimination. Implementation,
however, was less strong, with some serious gaps in access to personal identity
documents for certain ethnic minority groups, and consequent impacts on
statelessness and access to services. Discrimination based on race and tribe
continued to exist.

According to government statistics, the Shona ethnic group made up 82 percent of

the population, the Ndebele 14 percent, whites and Asians less than 1 percent, and
other ethnic and racial groups 3 percent. Historical tension between the Shona
majority and the Ndebele minority resulted in marginalization of the Ndebele by
the Shona-dominated government. Senior political leaders refrained from
attacking each other along ethnic lines. In January, however, unidentified
individuals reportedly damaged a memorial plaque to honor victims of the
Gukurahundi killings in Matabeleland South and local press reported the
government did not pursue an investigation.

Observers expressed concern over Mnangagwa’s perceived favoritism towards his

own Shona subclan, the Karanga, in senior government appointments, saying the
appointments came at the expense of other Shona subgroups and the Ndebele.

Police seldom arrested government officials or charged them with infringing upon
minority rights, particularly the property rights of the minority white commercial
farmers or wildlife conservancy owners, who continued to be targets of land
redistribution programs.

Government development projects reportedly excluded some ethnic minorities in

border areas, such as the Tonga people living in Binga. Those living in these areas

Page 33
faced food insecurity and lacked modern infrastructure.

Children
Birth Registration: The 2013 constitution states citizenship is derived from birth
in the country and from either parent, and all births are to be registered with the
Births and Deaths Registry. According to the 2012 census, only one in three
children younger than age five possessed a birth certificate – 55 percent in urban
areas and 25 percent in rural areas. An estimated 39 percent of school-age children
did not have birth certificates. Lack of birth certificates impeded access to public
services such as education and health care, resulting in many children being unable
to attend school and increasing their vulnerability to exploitation (see section 2.g.).
In July, the Supreme Court ruled in Matemera v. Chirimuuta that children born out
of wedlock are entitled to paternal care and responsibility.

Women have the right to register their children’s births, although either the father
or another male relative must be present. If the father or other male relative
refuses to register the child, the child may be deprived of a birth certificate, which
limits the child’s ability to acquire identity documents, enroll in school, and access
social services (see section 2.g.). The registrar general’s office relaxed the
requirement of two witnesses to obtain a birth certificate during its April to
September national identity campaign. In October, Ministry of Home Affairs
Permanent Secretary Aaron Nhepera reported that the registrar general issued
1,300,573 national identification cards, 1,758,322 birth certificates, and 44,590
death certificates during this campaign.

Education: Basic education was not free or universal. The constitution states that
every citizen and permanent resident of the country has a right to a basic state-
funded education but adds a caveat that when the state provides education, it “must
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within the limits of the resources
available to it.” According to the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)
conducted by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency in 2019, 91 percent of all
children attended primary school. UNICEF found in 2021, however, that many
children do not attend, particularly girls due to pregnancy, early marriage, and
gender-based violence (see section 6, Women, Reproductive Rights). According to
the 2019 MICS, only 53 percent of children in rural areas attended lower secondary

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schools, compared to 80 percent in urban areas. For upper secondary schools,
attendance was 3 and 21 percent for rural and urban children, respectively. In
April, UNICEF reported the number of youths not enrolled in school increased to
47 percent due to exacerbating poverty due to the pandemic and shortfalls in
government education spending.

Primary school attendance was only slightly higher in urban than in rural areas.
Rural secondary education attendance (44 percent) trailed behind urban attendance
(72 percent). A May ZIMSTAT survey found only 26 percent of parents could
afford their children’s education expenses.

Child Abuse: Child abuse, including incest, infanticide, child abandonment, and
rape, is illegal but continued to be a serious problem. In 2018 the NGO Childline
received more than 15,000 reports of child abuse via its national helpline and
managed more than 10,000 in-person cases at its drop-in facilities across the
country. Approximately 26 percent of all reported cases of abuse involved sexual
abuse; 28 percent involved physical or emotional abuse; 18 percent involved
neglect; and 7 percent involved forced marriage. Of the 25,000 total cases, 93
percent involved girls. One widely reported case of rape and incest involved a
nine-year old girl whose father allegedly raped her multiple times. She gave birth
in November.

Corporal punishment is illegal. Government efforts to combat child abuse were

inadequate. The government continued to implement a case management protocol
to guide the provision of child welfare services. Additionally, there were facilities
that served underage victims of sexual assault and abuse.

Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The constitution declares anyone younger
than age 18 is a child. Although the government enacted a new Marriage Act in
September to abolish child marriage and align the country’s marriage laws with the
constitution, NGOs reported teenage pregnancies and child marriages increased
sharply during the COVID-19 pandemic. The marriage law prohibits anyone
underage from marriage or entering a civil partnership. The law also criminalizes
assisting, encouraging, or permitting child marriages or civil partnerships.

Despite legal prohibitions, some rural families and religious groups continued to

Page 35
force girls to marry. Child welfare NGOs reported evidence of increased underage
marriages, particularly in isolated religious communities or among AIDS orphans
who had no relatives willing or able to take care of them. High rates of
unemployment, the prevalence of girls dropping out of school, and the inability of
families to earn a stable income were major causes of child marriage. Child
marriages remained common, with 34 percent of girls younger than 18 married
before reaching the age of 18 years, compared with 2 percent of boys.

Families gave girls or young women to other families in marriage to avenge spirits,
as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes, or to provide economic
protection for the family. Some families sold their daughters as brides in exchange
for food, and sometimes if a wife died, her family offered a younger daughter as a
“replacement” bride to the widower.

A December 2021 research study published by the Gender Institute at Midlands

State University in Gweru found that virginity testing persisted and was viewed by
some as a necessary customary rite, despite its prohibition in the Domestic
Violence Act. An NGO study published in 2014 found the cultural emphasis
placed on virginity meant that any real or perceived loss of virginity – whether
consensual or forced – could result in marriage, including early or forced marriage.
In some instances, family members forced a girl to marry a man based on the mere
suspicion the two had had sexual intercourse. This cultural practice even applied
in cases of rape, and the study found numerous instances in which families
concealed rape by facilitating the marriage between rapist and survivor.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: Conviction of statutory rape, legally defined as

sexual intercourse with a child younger than age 18, carries a fine, up to five years’
imprisonment, or both. In May, the Constitutional Court ruled that laws defining
the age of consent as 16 within marriage were unconstitutional. In September,
legislation definitively outlawed child marriage, defined as including any person
under age 18. A person in possession of child pornography may be charged with
public indecency; convictions result in a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or
both. There was no information available on whether authorities enforced laws
against child pornography. A conviction for procuring a child younger than age 16
for purposes of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct results in a fine, up to 10
years’ imprisonment, or both. Persons charged with facilitating child sex

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trafficking often also were charged with statutory rape. Child sex trafficking
carries a fine, up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. A parent or guardian
convicted of child sex trafficking may face a fine, up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or
both.

Girls from towns bordering Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia
were forced into commercial sexual exploitation in brothels that catered to long-
distance truck drivers. Increasing economic hardships contributed to higher rates
of child sex trafficking.

Displaced Children: The proportion of orphans in the country remained very

high. Many orphans were cared for by their extended family or lived in
households headed by children.

Orphaned children were more likely to be abused, homeless, not enrolled in school,
suffer discrimination and social stigma, and face food insecurity, malnutrition, and
HIV and AIDS. Some children engaged in commercial sex for survival. Orphaned
children often were unable to obtain birth certificates because they could not
provide enough information regarding their parents or afford to travel to offices
that issued birth certificates.

Antisemitism
An estimated 300 to 350 long-term residents identified as Jewish. There were no
reports of antisemitic acts.

Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at
https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.

Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on

Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex
Characteristics
Criminalization: According to the criminal code, any consensual act between
men “involving physical contact … that would be regarded by a reasonable person

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to be an indecent act” is deemed sodomy; conviction carries a fine, one year in
prison, or both. Discrepancies between gender presentation and officially
designated gender can lead state officials, police, and potential employers to
determine that an individual is committing identity fraud, potentially leading to
criminal arrest. LGBTQI+ organizations reported several arrests as well as severe
mental health consequences to members of the community because of
criminalization, including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and suicidal
ideation.

Violence against LGBTQI+ Persons: LGBTQI+ community leaders reported

cases of state-sanctioned violence targeted at members of their community were
lower than in the previous administration, although the penal code continued to
outlaw homosexuality. LGBTQI+ community members, however, continued to
report homophobic attacks by the public, which the police did not investigate.

Discrimination: LGBTQI+ persons do not have legal protections against

discrimination. Leading NGOs noted harassment and discrimination against
LGBTQI+ persons seeking employment, housing, and health services. Trans
Smart, an LGBTQI+ group, reported their members believed they were unsafe and
unwelcome in churches due to deeply held religious and social stigmas in society.
Another LGBTQI+ organization, Sexual Rights Centre, faced increased scrutiny of
their activities by police and denial of services to their members at public clinics.

LGBTQI+ persons were vulnerable to blackmail because of the criminalization of

and stigma against same-sex sexual conduct. LGBTQI+ advocacy organizations
reported blackmail and being “outed” as two of the most common forms of
repression of LGBTQI+ persons. It was common for blackmailers to threaten to
reveal a victim’s sexual identity to police or to their church, employers, or family if
the victim refused to pay. NGOs reported hate crimes against LGBTQI+ persons.

LGBTQI+ persons often left school at an early age due to discrimination. Higher
education institutions reportedly threatened to expel students based on their sexual
orientation. LGBTQI+ persons had higher rates of unemployment and
homelessness than the general population. They were also less likely to seek
medical care for sexually transmitted diseases or other health problems due to fear
that health-care providers would shun them or report them to authorities. Health

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care workers commonly discriminated against and refused service to LGBTQI+
persons.

Public medical services did not offer hormone treatment or gender-confirmation

surgeries to transgender and intersex individuals. A small number of private
clinics provided testosterone therapy, but estrogen therapy required patients to
purchase treatment privately and self-administer the drugs or travel to neighboring
countries where treatment was available.

Transgender individuals continued to face challenges when seeking government

services. They often encountered difficulties when registering to vote because of
changes in their appearance, disenfranchising them from the political process.

Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: There is no legal option to change

the gender designation on state identity cards, creating identification and travel
difficulties. A discrepancy between gender presentation and designated gender can
lead state officials, police, and potential employers to believe the individual is
committing identity fraud, potentially leading to criminal arrest.

Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices Specifically

Targeting LGBTQI+ Individuals: Some parents treated their children’s identity
as an intellectual disability and forced transgender youth into mental health
institutions.

Freedom of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There

were no reports during the year of government restrictions on those speaking out
about LGBTQI+ issues or attempting to legally register or convene events.

Persons with Disabilities

Persons with disabilities could not access education, health services, public
buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others. Several
parliamentarians remarked during the year that services such as schools and clinics
were located prohibitively far from villages in their constituencies, hindering
access for those with physical disabilities. The constitution and law prohibit
discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, access to public
places, and the provision of services, including education and health care. A

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constitutional amendment mandates the Public Service Commission employ
persons with disabilities as 10 percent of its workforce, although government
offices continued to have limited accessibility and other accommodations for
persons with disabilities. The constitution and law do not specifically address
access to transportation. They do not distinguish between physical, sensory,
mental, or intellectual disabilities.

In 2021 the government adopted a national disability policy that expands the
definition of “disabled persons” based on standards set by the UN Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Informed by NGO lobbying efforts, the
policy incorporates albinism and epilepsy. In July, the government launched a
Technical National Coordination Committee to implement the new national
disability policy. Prevailing law stipulates government buildings must be
accessible to persons with disabilities, but implementation remains slow. Two
senate seats are designated for persons with disabilities. Persons with disabilities
faced discrimination in employment (see section 7.d.).

The National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped reported
difficulties in courts for persons with hearing disabilities due to a lack of sign
language interpreters.

Persons with disabilities living in rural settings faced even greater challenges. For
example, they faced discrimination based on a belief they were bewitched. In
extreme cases, families hid children with disabilities from visitors. Mothers of
children with disabilities in rural settings were often viewed negatively and
discriminated against.

There were very few government-sponsored schools for persons with disabilities,
thus necessitating NGOs to compensate for this in their communities.
Organizations such as the Zimbabwe Parents of Handicapped Children Association
rotated classroom space and hours to accommodate children with physical and
mental disabilities. Sunshine Zimbabwe, the only accredited center offering skill-
based training for adults with disabilities, was poorly supported. Some schools
refused to accept children with disabilities.

Essential accommodations such as sign language interpreters, braille materials, and

Page 40
ramps were commonly unavailable, which prevented children with disabilities
from attending school. Many urban children with disabilities obtained informal
education through private institutions, but these options were generally unavailable
for children with disabilities in rural areas. Government programs intended to
benefit children with disabilities, such as the Basic Education Assistance Module,
only provided for rudimentary instruction.

Persons with disabilities were often unable to access food assistance distribution
sites and were unaware of services available to them. NGOs noted an increase in
the number of persons with disabilities turning to begging during the COVID-19
pandemic. Women with disabilities faced compounded discrimination, resulting in
limited access to services, reduced opportunities for civic and economic
participation, and increased vulnerability to violence. Persons with mental
disabilities also experienced inadequate medical care. As of year’s end, there were
20 mental health institutions, including four hospitals, three-day treatment
facilities, three outpatient facilities, and 10 community residential facilities in the
country with a total capacity of more than 1,500 residents. Residents in these
government-run institutions received cursory screening, and most waited for at
least one year for a full medical review.

A shortage of drugs and adequately trained mental health professionals resulted in

improper diagnoses and inadequate therapy for persons with mental disabilities.
There were few certified psychiatrists working in public and private clinics and
teaching in the country. NGOs reported that gaining access to mental health
services was slow and frustrating. They reported persons with mental disabilities
experienced extremely poor living conditions, due in part to limited access to food,
water, clothing, and sanitation.

Prison doctors were required to confirm a mental disability and recommend an

individual for release or return to a mental institution. More than 400 inmates with
mental disabilities, however, remained at ZPCS centers across the country,
following delays by the Mental Health Board in reviewing their cases for possible
release. Some of the prisoners were eligible for release and reintegration into
society. The Mental Tribunal Board, which has the mandate to determine the
release of these inmates through fitness evaluation, however, did not sit for the past
10 years.

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There were minimal legal or administrative provisions for participation in the
electoral processes by persons with disabilities. Administrative arrangements for
voter registration at relevant government offices were burdensome, involving long
queues, several hours or days of waiting, and necessary return visits that
effectively served to disenfranchise some persons with disabilities (see section 3 on
voter assistance). Ballots were not provided in braille or large text.

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

The government has a national HIV and AIDS policy that prohibits discrimination
against persons with HIV, and the law prohibits such discrimination in the private
sector and within parastatals. Despite these provisions, societal discrimination
against persons with HIV remained a problem. Local NGOs reported persons with
HIV faced discrimination in employment, health services, and education.
Although there was an active information campaign to destigmatize HIV –
organized by international and local NGOs, the Ministry of Health, and the
National AIDS Council – ostracism and discrimination continued. In the 2015
Demographic Health Survey, 22 percent of women and 20 percent of men reported
they held discriminatory attitudes towards persons with HIV.

The Marriages Act enacted in May repealed section 79 of the Criminal Law Code,
thereby decriminalizing willful HIV transmission. According to NGOs,
criminalization of willful HIV transmission had been misused as a form of
blackmail, particularly in divorce cases.

Section 7. Worker Rights

a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
The law provides for the right of private-sector workers to form and join unions,
conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. Public-sector workers may not
form or join trade unions but may form associations that bargain collectively and
strike. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, provides that the labor court
handle complaints of such discrimination, and may direct reinstatement of workers
fired due to such discrimination. Other legal provisions and the government’s
application of the law effectively abrogated these rights.

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The law provides for the registrar of the Ministry of Public Service and Labor to
supervise the election of officers of workers’ and employers’ organizations, to
cancel or postpone union elections, and to change the venue of a union election.
The law also provides the registrar with the authority to decide on the registration
of a union based on the findings from the accreditation proceedings. During the
accreditation proceeding, the registrar reviews representations from anyone
including the employers, on whether the union under consideration should be
registered. The minister may choose to not approve or to rescind recognition of a
union on the grounds that it does not represent the interests of its members.

The law gives the registrar authority to amend the geographic scope and the topics
of interest submitted by the union seeking registration. The law also grants the
minister extensive powers to regulate union activities such as collecting dues and
paying staff salaries, and to make decisions concerning the equipment and property
that may be purchased by trade unions. The minister has the authority to veto
collective bargaining agreements perceived to be harmful to the economy as well
as to appoint an investigator who may, without prior notice, enter trade union
premises, question any employee, and inspect and copy any books, records, or
other documents. The law empowers the minister to order an investigation of a
trade union or employers’ organization and to appoint an administrator to run its
affairs.

Unions are not required to register, but registered unions have additional rights,
such as negotiating for its members at the National Employment Council, calling
for a strike, and filing a lawsuit. The law limits registration of new unions in
enterprises or industries that already have a union.

The law significantly limits the right to strike. Strikes are limited to disputes
regarding work matters. The law provides that a majority of employees must agree
to strike by voting in a secret ballot. Strike procedure requirements include a
mandatory 30-day reconciliation period and referral to binding arbitration. This
applies to essential and nonessential services where the parties agree or where the
dispute involves rights enshrined in law, by contract, or by previous agreement.
Following an attempt to resolve a dispute regarding interests not already subject to
agreement and a labor officer’s issuance of a certificate of no settlement, the party
proposing a collective job action must provide 14 days’ written notice of intent to

Page 43
resort to the strike or labor action, including specifying the grounds for the
intended action, to call a strike legally. Failure to notify authorities regarding a
strike or public gathering is punishable with a prison term of one year. No
provisions prohibit employers from hiring replacement workers in the event of a
strike.

Strikes were commonly met with police brutality, force, and dismissals. The
government enacted punishment and retaliatory action against teachers who
participated in continued strikes regarding the right to a living wage. In May, the
Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education deducted money from the salaries of
teachers who participated in a January strike, leaving some with net salaries that
were the equivalent of less than one U.S. cent. The Ministry of Education
suspended more than 1,220 teachers, seized the salaries of 530 teachers, and
arrested others.

In January, police arrested 18 teachers and Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of

Zimbabwe (ARTUZ) President Obert Masaraure for demonstrating for teacher
wages to be fully paid in U.S. dollars. In June and July, after ARTUZ received the
2022 Frontline Human Rights Award, authorities arrested Masaraure and ARTUZ
Secretary General Robson Chere on murder charges for a man who died in 2016; a
previous investigation reportedly found no foul play. Masaraure was granted bail
after two weeks, while Chere was granted bail after eight days. Police arrested
Masaraure again in July in connection with the 2016 death of his friend, releasing
him on bail on August 4. The court reportedly denied access to key records related
to his case and then stated those records were missing. The government
consistently subjected ARTUZ leaders to harassment including abductions, arrests,
and beatings.

In late June, citing a devaluation of their earnings in Zimbabwean dollars and

continued challenges in working conditions, including difficulty procuring
medication for patients, the Zimbabwe Professional Nurses Union and Zimbabwe
Nurses Association initiated a health care strike. The government deployed the
ZRP to monitor and contain the protests. Media alleged on June 23, ZRP officers
wielding batons stormed Bindura General Hospital and indiscriminately attacked
health-care workers participating in the strike.

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Police and army members are the only legally recognized essential services
employees and may not strike, but the law allows the Ministry of Public Service
and Labor to declare any nonessential service an essential service if a strike is
deemed a danger to the population, such as one by health-care workers. The law
also allows employers to sue workers for liability during unlawful strikes, with
penalties for conviction that include a fine, up to five years’ imprisonment, or both.

Collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers in an industry, not just union
members. Collective bargaining can take place at the enterprise and industry
levels. At the enterprise level, workers councils negotiate collective agreements,
which become binding if approved by 50 percent of the workers in the bargaining
unit. Industry-level bargaining takes place within the framework of National
Employment Councils. Unions representing at least 50 percent of the workers may
bargain with the authorization of the minister of public service and labor. The law
encourages the creation of employee-controlled workers’ committees in enterprises
where less than 50 percent of workers are unionized. Workers’ committees existed
in parallel with trade unions. Their role is to negotiate shop-floor grievances,
while that of the trade unions is to negotiate industry-level grievances, notably
wages. The minister and the registrar have broad powers to take over the direction
of a workers’ committee if they believe it is mismanaged. Trade unions regarded
the existence of such a parallel body as an arrangement that allows employers to
undermine the role of unions.

For a collective bargaining agreement to go into effect, the ministry must announce
it, thus giving the minister the power to effectively block the agreement
indefinitely by failing to announce it officially. The law allows the minister to veto
a collective bargaining agreement if the minister deems it “contrary to public
interest.” The law further gives the minister authority to issue regulations on a
wide array of matters including conditions of employment, thereby restricting
collective bargaining. The minister also has the authority to issue an amendment
or direct parties to negotiate an amendment to a collective bargaining agreement on
grounds of legislative compliance, reasonableness, and fairness. Workers and
employers at the enterprise level who come to an agreement outside of the official
framework can submit it for registration by the minister, which makes it legally
binding.

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The Ministry of Public Service and Labor did not effectively enforce labor laws.
Penalties for conviction of violations of freedom of association or collective
bargaining laws were not commensurate with those for similar violations. Those
charged with violating the law were subject to lengthy judicial delays and appeals.
Penalties were regularly applied to violators. The government demonstrated an
unwillingness to implement collective bargaining rights enshrined in the 2013
constitution, including through its limited participation in social dialogue under the
Tripartite Negotiating Forum.

The Tripartite Negotiating Forum, a body established by law, formalizes dialogue

efforts among government, labor leaders, and employers on social and economic
policy. Labor unions, under the leadership of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU), stated the forum did little to address their demands for wage
increases and labor law reform, and the government showed little progress in
supporting workers’ protections, fairness in addressing labor and national
problems, or the peaceful resolution of labor disputes.

Government interference with trade union activity was common, including

infiltrating unions to hamper their effectiveness and introducing new unions
affiliated with the ruling party. Police and state intelligence services regularly
attended and monitored trade union meetings and other activities. Police or
ZANU-PF supporters sometimes prevented unions from holding meetings with
their members and carrying out organizational activities. Although the law does
not require unions to notify police of public gatherings, police demanded such
notification.

Parastatal unions were generally perceived as progovernment. The Zimbabwe

Federation of Trade Unions was regarded the largest progovernment trade union
and a rival to the ZCTU, which had a history of alignment with opposition parties.
The federation was launched in October 1996 with the stated purpose of providing
an alternative to the ZCTU. It claimed more than 40 affiliates and to be the largest
labor body in the country; however, precise membership numbers were not known.

The International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Committee on the Application of

Standards has noted serious violations of fundamental rights by government
security forces, including a clear pattern of intimidation, arrests, detentions,

Page 46
violence, and torture of union and opposition members. The committee has also
noted persistent allegations of violations of the rights of freedom of assembly of
workers’ organizations.

b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including by children, with
exceptions for work for the national youth service and forced prison labor.
Prisoners may be required to work in any type of employment but not for the
private benefit of any person, except on the order of the prison commissioner.

The law does not clearly define forced labor. The government significantly
decreased investigations and prosecutions and did not identify a single victim of
forced labor or trafficking during the year, while NGOs assisted more than 60
victims of forced labor and trafficking. The government did not provide funding to
implement its own national action plan against trafficking.

The government did not effectively enforce the law. No cases of forced labor were
prosecuted. Forced labor, sometimes facilitated with official complicity, occurred
in prisons, agriculture, mining, street vending, and domestic servitude. In 2021 the
ILO expressed longstanding concerns regarding the use of forced labor as a penal
sanction for expressing political views, and participation in peaceful assemblies
including labor strikes, all of which are inconsistent with the country’s obligations
under ILO conventions on forced labor.

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at

https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.

c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at
http://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings.

d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation

The law prohibits employment or occupational discrimination based on race, color,
gender, tribe, political opinion, creed, place of origin, disability, HIV status, and

Page 47
pregnancy. The law does not expressly prohibit employment discrimination based
on age, language, citizenship, social origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
communicable diseases other than those related to HIV. The government did not
effectively enforce antidiscrimination laws. Discrimination in employment and
occupation occurred with respect to race, gender, disability, sexual orientation,
HIV status and, for civil servants, political affiliation.

The constitution provides the same legal status and rights for women and men.
Labor legislation prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, and an employer
may be held liable for civil remedies if found to be in violation of provisions
against “unfair labor practices,” including sexual harassment. The law does not
specify penalties for conviction of such violations. Women commonly faced
sexual harassment in the workplace (see section 6).

There were no known formal complaints of wage discrimination filed with the
Ministry of Public Service and Labor; however, women’s salaries lagged those of
men in most sectors. Unions expressed their concern regarding gender-based wage
disparities.

Women faced discrimination because of gender when seeking maternity leave

provided for by law, and other gender-based benefits. A 2018 Oxfam study
revealed societal views that women should have overall responsibility for domestic
work but also participate in productive or income-generating activity. Demands on
women were heightened during the farming season from October to March.
Outside of the farming season, women often took part in the informal sector,
including as artisanal miners. Women’s participation in the labor force was
viewed as necessary due to economic hardship. Women were underrepresented in
decision-making positions, despite a constitutional requirement that the
government make efforts to have equal representation of men and women in all
governmental institutions and agencies at every level.

Employment discrimination against migrant workers occurred, especially those

employed in the informal sector. Persons with HIV, AIDS, or albinism faced
discrimination in employment. Employers discriminated against members of
minority ethnic groups whom they often perceived as opposition supporters.
Persons with disabilities faced social and employment discrimination and lack of

Page 48
access to many workplaces. LGBTQI+ persons faced discrimination in
employment. Opposition officials reported employment discrimination based on
political affiliation, in both governmental and nongovernmental employment.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work

Wage and Hour Laws: Parliament-mandated National Employment Councils set
the minimum wage for all industrial sectors through agreement between employers
and labor unions. The minimum wage, when paid, seldom exceeded the poverty
line due to inflation. Employers paid many agricultural and domestic workers less
than minimum wage. Many public servants, including in the education and health
sectors, earned salaries that put them below the poverty line due to rampant
inflation and currency depreciation.

The law does not provide for a standard workweek, but it prescribes a minimum of
one 24-hour continuous rest period per week. Unions and employers in each sector
negotiate the maximum legal workweek. No worker may work more than 12
continuous hours. The law prescribes that workers receive not less than twice their
standard remuneration for working on a public holiday or on their rest day. The
law provides workers paid public holidays and annual leave upon one year of
service with an employer.

Occupational Safety and Health: The government sets occupational safety and
health (OSH) standards on an industry-specific basis. Occupational safety and
health standards were up to date and appropriate for the main industries in the
country. The law provides for workers to remove themselves from situations that
endanger health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.

Abuses by management at certain enterprises and companies owned by People’s

Republic of China (PRC) parastatals and private PRC citizens were commonly
reported, including reports of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of workers;
unsafe working conditions; underpayment or nonpayment of wages; unfair
dismissals; firings without notice; failure to abide by collective bargaining
agreements; and failure to report health and safety incidents. According to a report
released in January, multiple sources alleged PRC-linked granite mining
companies engaged in human rights abuses, poor working conditions, and violence

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against employees, including Jinding Mining Company and Shanghai Haoyang
Mining Investments. One villager reported witnessing a beating with a steel rod
and the breaking of a 17-year-old’s arm for arriving late to work at the mine.

In May, a publication reported the deaths in 2020 of three miners at Kunyu Mine in
Banze were the result of unsafe working conditions. Representatives from the
Progressive Mining and Allied Industries Workers Union of Zimbabwe alleged the
incident was never investigated due to close ties between PRC enterprises and
Zimbabwean authorities. In February, PRC-owned Freestone Mines closed a
quarry following a public backlash when investigative journalists documented
labor rights abuses and attempts to bypass environmental laws in companies owned
by PRC parastatals and private PRC citizens.

The Zimbabwe Occupational Safety and Health Council reported 3,718 injuries
and 55 fatalities from January through September, though one labor organization
advised this number does not include all workers outside of factory-related
environments. Most work-related injuries and deaths occurred in the mining sector
due to low investment in occupational safety and health, noncompliance with rules
and regulations, and poor awareness of safety and health practices due to lack of
training. The growth of the informal mining sector led to increased exposure to
chemicals and environmental waste for artisanal miners, including children. The
Zimbabwe Environmental Law Association estimated 190 miners died in mining
accidents in 2020.

Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Ministry of Public Service and Labor
is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage and work hours laws for each
sector. The government did not effectively enforce these laws, particularly in the
farming and domestic service sectors. The number of labor inspectors was
insufficient to enforce labor laws, including those covering children. Penalties for
violations of wage or working hour restrictions were not commensurate with
penalties for comparable offenses. Penalties were sometimes applied against
violators.

The government did not enforce occupational safety and health laws. Penalties
were less than those for similar crimes, such as fraud or negligence. Penalties were
sometimes applied to violators.

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The quasi-governmental Zimbabwe Occupational Safety Council regulated
working conditions. It reported conducting 3,397 factory inspections between
January and September. Staffing shortages and a limited mandate, however,
rendered the council largely ineffective. The law permits unannounced
inspections, but the ZCTU charged in 2020 that proper workplace inspections had
not been carried out for a long time. Poor health and safety conditions in the
workplace were common in both the formal and informal sectors, affecting both
workers and nearby residents. Environmental hazards in the gold mining sector
included the use of cyanide, including river pollution.

Informal Sector: An estimated 80 to 90 percent of the country’s workers labored

in the informal sector. Labor laws technically apply to informal sector workers but
were not observed or enforced. Most informal workers worked in agriculture,
trading, or mining. An estimated 500,000 persons worked in small-scale or
artisanal mining, according to the Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and
Research Unit, an independent think tank. Police frequently clashed with and
arrested vendors in Harare’s central business district. The district restricts the
number of vendors to 6,000 per day but in practice, more than 100,000 vendors
operated daily as of June. Vendors reported authorities arbitrarily confiscated their
goods. In January, a town clerk linked to ZANU-PF in the Harare City Council
ordered the demolition of informal vendor stalls in Mbare, a township located in
the south of Harare. According to a civil society organization, this effort destroyed
more than 500 stalls supporting thousands of families.

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