Marib Urban Profile

Marib
Urban
Profile
«a precarious model
of peaceful co-existence
under threat»
March 2021
3
DISCLAIMER ACKNOWLEDGMENTS FUNDING
The designations employed and the presentation of This document presents the Marib Urban Profile. It has This project was generously funded by the UN
material in this publication do not imply the expression been prepared by UN-Habitat. Data collection and data Development Account (11th tranche). The project would
of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat analysis has been conducted in end 2019-2020. Some not have been possible without the in-kind support from
of the United Nations concerning the legal status of of the data related to population figures may be slightly the UN-Habitat Yemen Office.
any county, territory, city or area or its authorities, or outdated at time of publication.
concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries
regarding its economic system or degree of development. This project was implemented under the supervision of:
Ivan Thung, Regional Office for Arab States, UN-Habitat
Copyright: © United Nations Human Settlements
Programme, unless indicated otherwise. Lead authors: Cameron Middleton, Aseel Saria, Ivan
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN- Thung
Habitat), www.unhabitat.org.
Other contributors from UN-Habitat are Dr. Samira
Excerpts may be reproduced without authorization, on Alshawesh, Elaf Raslan, Nathalie Garner.
condition that the source is indicated. Views expressed
in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the
United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the
United Nations and its member states.
For all images used in this report, we have tried to retrieve and
acknowledge the original source. If your work has been presented
here without adequate acknowledgement, or you wish the work to
be excluded from this publication, please contact us and we will
rectify this immediately. For feedback or questions kindly contact
ivan.thung@un.org
4 Marib Urban Profile
Table of Contents
” Table of Conents Urban Profiling

UN-Habitat seeks to provide up to date, holistic documentation and
1. Executive Summary 8 analysis of the impact of the crisis in key cities, through City Profiles,
synthesising information and insight from existing sources and
2. Methodology 10 priority sectors, supplemented by direct field research by UN-Habitat
teams based in each city. This profile is part of a regional urban
3. Location and urban indicators 13 profiling exercise that aims to develop urban profiles for the cities
of Basra, Sinjar, Derna (Libya), Marib (Yemen) and Dara’a (Syria). UN-
4. Conflict context timeline 18 Habitat’s experience in urban analysis, community approaches and
crisis contexts have informed the development of the City Profiling
5. Civil society & population dynamics 22 process. All City Profiles are developed in close association with the
concerned governorates and municipalities.
6. Urban heritage and social cohesion 38
The structure of the City Profile provides a pre-crisis baseline and
7. Governance 46 data from the current situation to understand the impact of the crisis
accompanied by narrative description and analysis. Furthermore,
8. Housing, land and property 52 City Profiles review the functionality of the city economy and services,
understanding of capacities and coping mechanisms and the
identification of humanitarian or development priorities. They do not
9. Water and sanitation 62
provide comprehensive data on individual topics, but seek to provide
a balanced overview. The City Profile affords an opportunity for a
10. Health Sector 68
range of stakeholders to represent their diagnosis of the situation
in their city, provides a basis for local discussions on actions to be
11. Transportation Sector 74 taken and helps to make local information and voices accessible to
external stakeholders seeking to assist in development responses.
12.
Electricity Sector 76
13. Education Sector 80
14. Economy 84
15. Environment 88
16. Looking ahead for Marib - considerations and implications 92
References 98
Annex 1 - Marib Scorecard Instructions 104

5
List of Figures
” List of Figures
FIGURE 1. Marib Survey Measure of Public Interest in Participating in future Focal Group Discussions 8 FIGURE 28. Marib Old City. (Digital Globe, 2015). Some areas have been damaged, and some new 42
FIGURE 2. Marib’s orange harvest (http://alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-15237) 8 constructions have been observed in a UNESCO / UNOSAT damage assessment in 2018.
FIGURE 3. Planned park 4 million dollar park in the desert outside of Marib. 9 FIGURE 29. Examples of a traditional family home near Marib. Source: https://www.voyagevirtuel.info/ 43
yemen-photo/displayimage-15-619.html
FIGURE 4. Celebrations following peace progress in October 2020 9
(nashwannews.com/218526) FIGURE 30. Granary on the outskirts of Marib, date unknown.Source: https://www.voyagevirtuel.info/yemen- 43
photo/displayimage-15-618.html
FIGURE 5. Respondents scorecard surveys 12
FIGURE 31. Tribes in Marib. Redrawn from Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (2020) 44
FIGURE 6. Key locations in Marib. Image: Google Earth 12
FIGURE 32. KSRelief have rehabilitated 161 child soldiers as part of the initiative of rehabilitating 2,000 45
FIGURE 8. Marib Governorate 14 Yemeni children
FIGURE 9. Districts in Marib 14 FIGURE 33. Governance influence diagram. Based on interviews with local government officials. 47
FIGURE 10. Image on the right: neighborhood names were identified by a representative of the GALSUP. 14 FIGURE 34. Performance and preferences regarding dispute resolution 49
Naming conflcts with other sources may appear in the map. Boundaries are based on masterplan divisions
as provided by GALSUP. FIGURE 35. Committment to paying taxes and utilities per demographic group 49
FIGURE 11. Soldiers on a road in Marib (UN-Habitat) 18 FIGURE 36. Satisfaction with the city municipal services (mail, real estate and civil registration, permits) 49
FIGURE 14. Multiplication of the population in sub-districts, calculated as the new poplation / old population. 23 FIGURE 37. Increase in construction in urban sectors. Urban sectors were defined based on the aggregation 53
of various neighborhood boundaries expressly for the purpose of this analyis.
FIGURE 12. Comparison of key current indicators 23
FIGURE 38. Top 10 of sectors’ increase of structures 2013-2018 and IDPs in 2019 (IOM DTM 2019) sorted 53
FIGURE 15. Population estimations of districts in Marib, taking into consideration 2017 population 23 by absolute increase of amount of structures.
estimations and IDPs in 2019 (IOM DTM 2019)
FIGURE 39. Settlement Type of IDPs in Marib/ Marib CIty 54
FIGURE 13. Governorates of origin (2019) 23
FIGURE 40. Availability, risks and costs of shelter 55
FIGURE 16. IDPs in Marib Governorate. Data based on IOM DTM 2019. 25
FIGURE 44. Drone image of al-Rawdah Camp. The outskirts of the main city center appears in the 56
FIGURE 17. Camps in Marib (IOM 2019) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/en_iom_ 27 background of the image to give a sense of the distance. Source: Ebraheem al-Theefah
yemen_marib_city_displacement_site_overview_aug_to_oct_2019.pdf
FIGURE 41. 56
FIGURE 18. Women wearing abayas working in a fruit processing plant in Marib, 2020. 29 Urban pattern - Al Rawdah
FIGURE 19. Perception of fairness, respect and opportunity in Mareb 34 FIGURE 42. 56
FIGURE 20. Impact of the Conflict on Women’s Lives - comparison national trends with Marib 37 Urban pattern - Al Jufeinah camp (mapped in 2018, growth has increased significantly since)
FIGURE 43. 56
FIGURE 21. Perception of value of heritage 39 Urban pattern - Al Mataar. Growth follows relatively straigth pattern parallel to existing roads.
FIGURE 22. First Independence Day Horse Races on Main Street in Marib City Source: Soliman Al Nowab 40 FIGURE 46. A farming area included in the new Master Plan of Marib. 57
FIGURE 23. “Displaced but creative” Band from the IDP community 40 FIGURE 45. New planned airport 57
FIGURE 26. Plot divisions in the near viciinty of the Old City indicating planned new constructions around the 42 FIGURE 47. From the Office of Cadastral Records in Marib Governorate, studied by UN Habitat Profiling 58
Old City area. Digital Globe 2018 Team, July 2020
FIGURE 48. Masterplan roads projected on Al Jufaineh camp. The masterplan has proved to be irrelevant in 61
FIGURE 24. Marib Northern Old Dam Sluice, Digital Globe 2015, through UNOSAT / UNESCO 42 these rapid urban developments
FIGURE 25. Damage to the Northern Old Dam Sluice. Source: UNOSAT / UNESCO 42 FIGURE 49. Water tower under construction by the Marib 62
FIGURE 27. Old Marib’s Tell Area, Plan of buildings are represented with solid lines and both courtyards 42 FIGURE 50. Traditional well Dam Charity for Community Development 62
and small structures with broken lines, Source: van Beek, Gus W. 1982. “A population Estimate for Marib: A FIGURE 51. Access to drinking water all interviewees and per demographic group 63
Contemporary Tell village in North Yemen.” Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 248(1):
61-67.
List of Figures
FIGURE 52. (Top and bottom image) Current Marib dam 64 FIGURE 80. Employment by economic sector 85
FIGURE 81. Household income 85
FIGURE 79. Employment status by vulnerability group, gender and total. 85
FIGURE 55. Sewage system plan (Provided by local government) 66
FIGURE 82. Optimism due to improving economy 85
FIGURE 53. An example of the large water catchments used to collect flood water. It is the traditional way 66
Marib farmers captured ground water. They also cover these pools to reduce evaporation and pump when FIGURE 83. Perception as to how easy it is to start a business 85
they need irrigation for crops. Source: Profiling Team Researcher Photo FIGURE 84. Market accessibility and availability of households needs 85
FIGURE 54. Charity distributing plastic water reservoirs to households 66 FIGURE 85. New girls school students lining up for class. (UN Habitat Profiling Team) 87
69 FIGURE 87. Perceptions of prospects of agriculture 88
FIGURE 57. Kidney Dialysis Center funded by KSA 71 FIGURE 89. IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis 2019-2021. IPC gives an indication of the level of stress, with 90
FIGURE 59. Marib General Hospital 71 caveats, experienced regarding food security. Mapped from http://www.ipcinfo.org
FIGURE 58. The Inauguration of Marib’s first Medical School in 2019 71 FIGURE 88. IPC Classification 2019 - 2021. 2021 is a projection. 90
FIGURE 60. COVID-19 Public Health Volunteers in Training 72 FIGURE 91. Famous Marib orange trees 91
FIGURE 61. City response to COVID-19 73 FIGURE 90. Spraying for locust infestation, Spring 2020. 91
FIGURE 62. Flooding in the city in 2020. 73
FIGURE 63. Informal housing surrounding the hospital which makes parking or further site expansion 73
impossible. The hospital needed to create a quarantine ward during the COVID-19 response but was unable
to find space due to local resident crowding.
FIGURE 64. Microbuses on “Sana’a” the main through the city 74
FIGURE 65. Asphalting in progress 74
FIGURE 66. Flooding was particularly devastating in Jafeenah Camp, Marib’s largest informal settlement 75
FIGURE 67. Gas Station lines are a major source of grievances, only exacerbated by the lack of public 75
transportation options and impacts of fuel shortages on both water supply and agriculture
FIGURE 68. Satisfaction with present level of electricity supply and access to electricity 76
FIGURE 69. Ceremony to unload new power transformers to upgrade Marib’s gas-fired power station, 77
December 2020, source: https://www.sabanew.net/viewstory/69585
FIGURE 70. Oil fields in the region. 78
Map adapted from Small Arms Survey, with updated information of US Energy Information Administration.
FIGURE 71. Nightlight in Marib in 2020 comparison to 2015. 79
FIGURE 73. Satisfaction with the quality of education services 81
FIGURE 72. New school in Mareb (UN Habitat) 81
FIGURE 74. New girls school students lining up for class. (UN Habitat) 82
FIGURE 75. Schools in Marib (google maps) 83
FIGURE 76. Bilqis Girls School, source: UN-Habitat Profiling team 83
FIGURE 77. UN Habitat Profiling Team Photo of the Wholesale market, October 2020 84
FIGURE 78. Qat Market in Marib: As of May, 2020, the Ministry of Health in Marib and other IRG-held 84
governorates ordered the closure of all Qat markets as a COVID-19 precaution. (https://www.newsyemen.
net/new/53264)
7
List of Figures
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GPC General People’s Congress
HDI Human Development Index
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IOM International Office of Migration
IRG Internationally Recognized Government (of Yemen)
NDC National Dialogue Conference
NLF National Liberation Front
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen STC Southern Transitional Council
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
STC Southern Transitional Council
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
UN-Habitat United Nations Human Settlements Program
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
YAR Yemen Arab Republic
YSP Yemen Socialist Party
Executive Summary
1 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Complaint and the state
If I face any problem, I prefer to resort to law enforcement or an Participation in Focal Group Discussions
official entity rather than to a local leader or mediators
Since Marib was first settled over three thousand years gas has enabled the governorate to resume paying public
ago, it has seen its fortunes rise and fall with the cycles 4%
of salaries when very few local governorates were able to
6%
history. Now, Marib City, the site of the Arab world’s12% oldest do DK/
so.DWTA
3
The revenue stream negotiated by the governor Maybe
kingdom has transformed into one of the fastest growing has enabled a basic level of public service provision for
Strongly disagree No
38%
modern cities in the Arab region. In the past five years,
16% Marib 48% judges,
Somewhat which has ensured a degree of ‘law’ alongside the
disagree Yes
City’s wartime growth in revenue and its 12-fold increase in Somewhat agree by the governorate's security forces. Marib
‘order’ provided 4
56%
population1 has catapulted the city from the periphery 21%to Central
StronglyBank
agree now operates independently from that in
the very core of Yemen’s political, economic and security Aden, which has come with some challenges that are now
dynamics. Marib has become a central hosting destination being addressed.5 Marib’s renegotiated oil revenue, along
for communities primarily displaced by Yemen’s civil war. with investment support from Saudi Arabia6, and a growing FIGURE 1. Marib Survey Measure of Public Interest in Participating in
tax base from many new businesses which have decided to future Focal Group Discussions
Much of the city’s sudden growth has been credited If I face anytoproblem, I prefer torelocate
resort to lawto Marib has
enforcement or angiven the municipality a rare liquidity As a citizen in the city, I think that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of th
the strong stewardship of the governorate. Its success in and ability to pay public salaries in the context of Yemen’s
official entity rather than to a local leader or mediators by demographic group
preserving Marib as a safe haven for internally displaced war. This virtuous cycle has enabled modest public sector
persons (IDP)s and in negotiating natural resource growth and critical provision of basic services. With its
revenue-sharing contracts with the central government2 central location Marib has become a hub once again of
DK/DWTA
6% DK/DWTA
and neighboring countries that elevated Marib’s status Native resident of Marib
trade routes and is in a position
Strongly Disagree to be proactive in investing
16% Strongly Disagree
to the level of a quasi-microstate. This profile
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
seeks to in local electricity, water, and transportation infrastructure,
Somewhat disagree 31%
capture what this growth looks like from the ground; to local security, and established
Somewhat agree its first university. On the Somewhat disagree
look behind the statistics in order to better understand

IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps surface, the list of strategic advantages that have propelled
Strongly agree 20% Somewhat agree
how it has been able to simultaneously rise above the Marib into a privileged position are largely tied to its natural 26% Strongly agree
Marginalized and African migrants
devastation of Yemen’s conflict while also being a product resources and public services management, but there are
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
of it. The profile research process has been designed to other structural, cultural advantages which are more subtle
identify the core factors and patterns for the city and the though equally important to factor into urban development.
The state is facing significant challenges in providing decent quality of services for all
surrounding environs, to develop a clearer picture of how Can you access adequate information to help you manage your daily life and to know the status of
services through websites (including through social media platforms such as Facebook)?
Marib’s distinctive character and culture has turned it into a A major component of Marib’s success is not just its oil
promising case study of how to address urban growth and
Native resident of Marib
wealth but also the distributed, decentralized nature of
DK/DWTA 6% DK/DWTA
displacement during conflict. leadership mechanisms used
Completely by the tribes of Marib, which
unsatisfied
12% 22% Strongly disagree
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods have enabled Marib to maintain a degree of autonomy.
Somewhat unsatisfied
Somewhat disagree
Oil revenue, along with public payments for Marib’s natural Marib’s tribe-state hybrid Satisfied and lack of prominence in the
22%
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Very satisfied Somewhat agree
1 Marib City’s population grew from an estimated 55,000 in 2014 to over 630,000 in 2020, per UN Habitat internal data triangulation and assessment, further analyzed in the Civil Society de-
mography section.
38%
Marginalized and African migrants Strongly agree
2 Ali Al Sakani and Casey Coombs, “Marib: A Yemeni Government Stronghold Increasingly Vulnerable to Houthi Advances”, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, 22 October 2020, https://sanaa-
center.org/publications/analysis/11778. The paper explains that Governor Arada has20%
0% 10% proved
30% adept
40% at
50%negotiating
60% 70% with
80% multiple
90% 100%administrations, though he is most closely allied with both the internation-
ally recognized government of the ROYG aka “Legitimacy” transitional government of Abd Mansur Hadi (exiled Riyadh), Marib’s contracts have been continued under the Houthi-led National Salvation
Government (NSG) as well.
3 Adam Baron, The Marib Paradox: How One Province Succeeds in the Midst of Yemen’s War, Policy Brief, No. ECFR/261 (London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2018), www.
ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_marib_paradox_how_one_province_succeeds_in_the_midst_of_yemens_war
4 Joshua Rogers, Local Governance in Yemen: Theory, Practice, and Future Options (Berlin: Berghof Foundation Operations GmbH, 4 June 2019). FIGURE 2. Marib’s orange harvest (http://alsahwa-yemen.net/en/p-
5 Final report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, 25 January 2019 (S/2019/83). 15237)
6 Baron, The Marib Paradox, p. 11.
As a citizen in the city, I think that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of the
Safety and respsect
city - per age group
e economic hardship for the I feel more respected in Marib than the area I came from or other places I visit
9
past has enabled Marib to be better able to mostly preserve for those who have fled the frontlines of the conflict in search
its neutral status7. Marib mostly stayed above the fray of of neutral territory. Marib’s government is also seen as a
struggles for central power, which has spared the area the relatively neutral political entity, helping it play the type of
worst of the wartime physical and economic destruction. As mediation role that Yemen needs to overcome north-south
a model of what decentralization could look like in Yemen, polarization. Marib’s consultative processes, rooted in its
part of Marib’s key to success is its local autonomy which tribal history, has also been reflected in the strong degree of
shielded it from challenges in other areas that were more civic engagement we saw in our polling of the city. 38% of the
closely tied to central seats of government. Therefore, the participants (576 individuals) committed to participating in
case is made that part of Marib’s ‘paradoxical’ success is future Focus Group Discussions concerning city affairs, with
based on its degree of local autonomy and self-reliance. The a total of 44% of survey respondents expressing interest and
question is whether this dynamic can be maintained as it possible willingness to join public sessions. The majority of
expands its governance capacity in the face of continuing those who expressed this interest were males (70% of those
power struggles. who answered positively were males, 30% were females).
As a testament to the impact of its local mediation efforts However, Marib’s rapid growth, the significant level of informal
and the symbol Marib represented for the country, in October or temporary housing, and looming risk of food and water
2020, the city was selected to be the site of the first major shortages becoming more acute for Marib,11 all underscore
prisoner exchange negotiated between the ROYG and the the urgency of an expansion of the city's governance
NSG. As announced by the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, capacity, including urban planning and service provision,
FIGURE 3. Planned park 4 million dollar park in the desert outside of
Marib’s prisoner release marked one of the most significant to accommodate the city’s growth in a sustainable way.
Marib.
international peacebuilding milestones towards reaching a Because Marib’s growth and the current global transition that
Joint Declaration8 for a national ceasefire since the civil war began in 2020 is so unprecedented, participatory planning is
broke out in 2015.9 Renowned Yemeni human rights lawyer the best way to engage citizens and discover out-of-the box-
and activist Huda al Sarari declared, “Marib is now the nucleus solutions. In this vein, we have approached Marib’s profile as
of the republic we all hope to have.”10 The peace agreement an opportunity to facilitate the urban community’s capacity to
represented a beacon of hope across the desperate frontlines determine and address its own needs, goals, and solutions.
of the conflict-fatigued Yemeni society. The choice of Marib All aspects of the profile were designed and intended to
to be the site of prisoner exchange and delivery signalled an catalyze and mobilize Marib’s residents to contribute to urban
alternative path for Marib beyond the fears many felt that planning dialogue and initiatives.
it had been abandoned by its international allies and would
face invasion by rebel militias. Instead, it reinforced Marib’s
role as a safe haven for the IDPs it hosted, providing shelter
7 While Marib has been called a neutral “Switzerland”, it is seen as the last stronghold of the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG). (: A Yemeni Government Stronghold Increasingly Vulnera-
ble to Houthi Advances | Sana'a Center For Strategic Studieshttps://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11778)
8 https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14328.doc.htm
9 https://twitter.com/alhadath/status/1317085058675638272?s=24; The celebrations in the streets of Marib following the prisoner exchange offered a rare moment of hope in the region’s
protracted conflict, signalling progress towards a peaceful and pragmatic resolution of various destabilizing factors which have kept Marib in limbo. It was a particularly cathartic moment for Marib as
a city and region navigating a new phase of standing on its own and facing security threats without the backing of the Saudi-led Arab Coalition of Hadi supporters. This had made Marib the center of
its fight to push back the Houthi-Saleh forces-Saleh forces towards their stated goal of “restoring the internationally recognized government”# of Yemen under Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, now based in
Aden and Riyadh. While Marib’s future security and the status of hundreds of detainees and prisoners is still not entirely resolved, a tangible step forward in the peace process further underscores the
reasons why Marib has become the safe haven of choice for refugees and IDPs.
10 Huda Al-Sarari (h_alsarare), https://twitter.com/h_alsarare/status/1317129298025848833 FIGURE 4. Celebrations following peace progress in October 2020
11 https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/yemen/ (nashwannews.com/218526)
Methodology
2 METHODOLOGY
Overview challenges. The profile research was designed to be UN-Habitat.

The methodology for the Marib Profile utilized research anchored in ethnographic assessment conducted by a 2. Use the findings from the secondary desk review
and analytic tools in alignment with the UN-Habitat team of local researchers. Access constraints during the to narrow our research down to fundamental questions
Urban Recovery Framework Common Approach to urban period of collection from May to December of 2020) led to that this preliminary urban profile of Marib would need to
profiling in the Arab States region and the mandate to modification of the approach for administering the survey address and baseline. These questions were:
support partners in implementing the 2030 Sustainable of Marib residents (n=1,536). The following briefly describes i) How will conflict likely affect the city and what are
Development Agenda and its Sustainable Development the methodologies attempted and utilized to develop the the power dynamics that we need to understand in order to
Goals (SDGs). In particular, SDG 11 targets concerning Marib city profile in 2020. Further information on any of forecast future security trends?
improving the quality of life in cities and SDG 10 targets these methodologies and the data gathering process is ii) What is the governance model presiding in Yemen,
for reducing inequalities guided underlying indices of the available upon request. and in which ways it evolved to create current stability
research. factors, whether through inter-tribal collaboration or in
The Approach terms of providing improved security situation? What does
The research design was informed by the new Common The research approach was designed around the URF pillars the semi-autonomous governance model in Marib tell us
Analysis framework’s research questions1 to support the which aim to create a comprehensive snapshot at the city’s about the future of Yemen governance post-conflict?
development of an urban profile that examines: 1) How has evolution during the conflict, but with two dominant pre iii) Why did Marib become an IDP magnet, and which
conflict affected the city? 2) What relief phase challenges existing limitations that the profiling team had to adapt to: i) cultural, economic and political roots have featured into its
are present and how they will impact the development the absence of credible baseline information that can create hospitable hosting situation?
phase? 3) What strategic areas or projects require attention a departure point for tailoring our profiling tool, including iv) Is the demographic boom likely to reverse post-
in the short-medium timespan? The research questions due to lack of local capacities, the absence of a geo-spatial conflict, or will Marib retain a portion of the IDPs and
are derived from the core pillars of Housing, Economy, information database, and the incomplete data that the integrate them in its socio-economic fabric?
Infrastructure and Services, Governance, Civil Society, humanitarian assessments were able to provide specifically v) What are the key performance indicators to evaluate
Environment, and Cultural Heritage. at the city level. Ii) we were aware of movement restrictions the living conditions in Marib today, and how to assist in
and the inability of the team to directly access the city building a better future for Marib using UN best practices
Following an initial desk review and assessment of Marib’s and be physically present on the ground, given the military and the will of non-humanitarian donors to invest in Marib
urban context, the profile adopted methodologies which escalation around Marib in early 2020 when the profiling as a stability asset?
best met the conditions and characteristics of the city and preparations began, which in turn was only exacerbated by 3. Use mixed methods to address these questions
its current phase of growth. Cultural Heritage --current the COVID 19 international travel restrictions. along the URF pillars. The methods we used for information
and historic-- emerged as the most salient local pillar we gathering were:
identified because it is the most unique and priceless quality To respond to these two innate limitations, the methodology i) Interviews with knowledgeable sources: known
of the city whose infrastructure and urban sectoral growth approach followed an approach summarized herein: as key informants, mainly to understand supply-side
has been far outpaced by its rapid population growth. 1. Conduct an extensive, thorough and on-going dynamics (how well the services are functioning and
Cultural Heritage (tangible and intangible) therefore guided secondary desk review, to capture all the relevant literature identiy the major gaps and bottlenecks). Using a semi-
how we developed a picture of the relationship between the on the city and on the broader urban and conflict context, structured questionnaire with several open-ended and
people and place of Marib and which research questions and open-source media materials in English and Arabic. opinion questions, we conducted 32 interviews during the
we emphasized to capture core trends in population The desk review also included the collation and archiving month of August 2020. The interviews mainly focused on
dynamics, density, conflict dynamics and development of all humanitarian information that was made available to public officials (the governorate level was more relevant for
1 https://unhabitat.org/urban-profiling-toolbox
11
our research objectives), but we also interviewed several religious center (etc.). The results of the spatial analysis 3. Lack of access to original photographic materials.
tribal and community leaders, intellects and social figures. have been presented on page 16.. 4. Poor government data and records.
We were able to conclude one interview with an activist in 5. The inability to hold focus group discussions given
the area of gender equality and GBV. As UN-Habitat does not have a permanent presence the relatively short research period.
ii) Collation and gathering of primary documents and in the city of Marib, the research depended on mobile 6. Lack of access to broadband internet connection,
evidence pertaining to the local authorities’ functional plans teams supported and managed by our office in Sana’a. which prevented the survey team from providing accurate
and duties. We used this information to create a baseline Additional monitoring and backstopping resources were location information.
understanding of the key services (such as schools and mobilized by ROAS given the challenges that come with 7. Key informants we interviewed were all male. Female
hospitals), city growth management (the master plan remote management. The smaller research unit that was perspective was only captured in our individual survey, as
document and other expansion and ambitious urban established for this profile included: approximately 50% of our sample was females.
infrastructure plans), as well as records of registries and 1. Researcher on ethnographic and demographic
displacement movement. analysis (international, team leader)
iii) Conduct an individual ‘Urban Scorecard’ survey 2. Researcher on urban dynamics in conflict situations,
with a representative sample of the current population: data analyst (international)
to understand demand-driven factors and to poll people’s 3. Two part-time researchers for literature review and
opinions regarding their urban experience. This survey archiving of existing information (international)
was made possible by the transparent and responsive 4. One GIS support officer
collaboration of the local authorities, and specifically 5. One field research team leader (local, investigative
the Governorate. Marib’s government representatives journalism background)
expressed support and interest in polling public opinion 6. A team of four field researchers (2 males and 2
despite the sensitive nature of some of our questions. Our females) working under the local research team leader
sample included 1564 participants, who were personally (college students and fresh graduates).
interviewed by our field research team during the months
of September and October. The samples was designed to To ensure the quality of the field research component,
target the population stratification we have concluded from capacity building and day-to-day monitoring was essential.
our secondary desk review, split into four main groups: the Two urban research training sessions were conducted
muhamasheen (marginalized) and the African migrants, through Zoom to prepare the team for the key informant
ordinary city residents who were present in the city pre- interviews and the individual survey. The team on the
conflict, IDPs living in regular houses, IDPs living in camps ground had access to mobile devices to ensure data entry
and spontaneous slums (see “FIGURE 5. Respondents happens directly (no paper forms were used).
scorecard surveys” on page 12).
iv) Tallying survey data to a geo-spatial database, to Research Limitations:
generate neighbourhood-level functionality maps: as Marib 1. Absence of an urban geo-spatial database and the
never had official neighbourhood limits, we used spaghetti inability to generate one given the access restrictions.
boundaries to identify approximate urban segments that 2. Military escalation and two natural disasters that
people identify with. Each “neighbourhood” had a defining took place during the research period and directly affected
landmark like a government institution, a hospital or a the context and introduced sudden spikes.
12
Marib Scorecards
Marib Urban Scorecards - Making a Traditional Survey

Instrument more Participatory
The urban scorecard polling was designed to capture residents’

perspectives of and satisfaction with the quality, reliability and
affordability of urban services. Because the city’s post-conflict ELECTRICITY STATION AIRPORT LOCATION MARIB CITY AL JUFEINAH CAMP HOSPI
IDP population boom is at the top of all issues facing Marib,
social and cultural dynamics are the anchor for all research
and analysis for the urban profile. The scorecard was pursued
as a participatory research tool which could potentially create
opportunities for Marib residents to voice their own needs,
perspectives and ideas for the new city they are co-creating.
Also, as a city in which growth and decisionmaking have been
generally tacit, informal and driven by relational ties (through
tribal mechanisms), we seek to highlight what is working from
processes which are less visible or clear than if administrative
offices were at full capacity. Marib is succeeding where others
have failed in a number of areas: IDP hosting, paying government
General data Complaint and the state
salaries, new infrastructure development and construction.
If I face any problem, I prefer to resort to law enforcement or an
” Respondents by age group
Responders by age group ” Respondents by gender
Respondents by gender
3% 4% DK/ DWTA
12%
More than 60 Females Strongly disagree
ee
22% 36-60 Males 16% 48% Somewhat disagree

32%
Somewhat agree
25-35 49% 51%
16-24
21% Strongly agree
44%
” Respondents per target population group

Respondents by target population groups
” Displacement status
Displacement status If I face any problem, I prefer to resort to law enforcement or an
official entity rather than to a local leader or mediators by demogra
20% 12%
26% 24%
DK/DWT
21% Strongly
33% 64% IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somew

Somew
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Strongly
The Marginalized and Afican migrants Arrived in the past 6 months only
IDPs living in camps Arrived after the conflict started in 2015
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Resident of Marib before the conflict
Native residents
Can you access adequate information to help you manage your dai
services through websites (including through social media platform
FIGURE 5. Respondents scorecard surveys
Current occupation DK/DWT
FIGURE 6. Key locations in Marib. Image: Google Earth Native resident of Marib
Comple
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somew
Satisfie
ee IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Very sa
3 LOCATION AND
URBAN INDICATORS
ITAL MILITARY AREA MARIB LAKE NORTH MARIB GROWTH AREA EXPANSION AREA
Marib’s significance
Marib City is now the hub connecting its five
neighboring governorates - all representing
Yemen’s different socio-political polarities:
Sanaa, al Jawf, Shabwa, al-Bayda, and
Hadramawt governorates. Marib City is
located 173 km northeast of Yemen’s capital,
Sana’a, and the governorate border just 70
km east of the capital. 1 The Governorate of
Marib has an area of approximately 17,405
km2,2 which includes 14 districts (mudiriya).
According to the national administrative
boundaries established in 2014, the Republic
of Yemen is divided into six regions (aqaleem),
and Marib Governorate is included in the
Saba’a region, with Marib City as a center of
the Governorate and the Region. This has
elevated the administrative role of Marib,
making it a competitor with the capital as a
business and financial hub, due to its diverse
natural wealth and relative stability. The
combination of Marib’s oil riches, its role in
national electricity generation and distribution
network as well as its solid tribal alliances
have all contributed to Marib’s increased
status and influence during the conflict.
Approximately 630,000 residents (nearly half

of the population) of Marib Governorate’s
population live in Marib City. Marib is located
on the eastern N5 road which connects the
capital with the eastern governorates. The N5
is presently insecure and linking connector
roads are only permitted for military purposes,
thus forcing travelers to take long detours to
reach Sana’a (which requires over a day’s
1 This distance represents the on-road travel distance in
normal travel times. Due to road blockages and required detours,
specifically in the areas in Joaf past 2016 has nearly doubled the
travel distance.
2 Yemen National Information Center, ‫“نبذة تعريفية عن محافظة‬
”‫مأرب‬, accessed on 23 February 2021, https://yemen-nic.info/gover/
mareb/brife/
Location and urban indicators
journey). As Marib is located between the populated through Sarwah have strategic military significance, as
areas to the west of the republic, and the sparsely they represent two different approaches to the environs
populated plains and desert regions of the east, the N5 of both cities, giving an advantage to the Houthis
was a substandard national road viewed as low priority especially as both roads descend into Marib.5
because it extended through sparsely populated regions.
Now that Marib is critical to other national interests, Historically, Marib’s strategic significance has always
upgrading roads and highway networks has become a been tied to its location at the crossroads between the Sana’a
Marib
top priority of local and international aid agencies.3 coastal agricultural regions, the vast desert of the Rub al
Khali “Empty Quarter”, and mountain highland systems
Geography to the north (see figure 10). In recent decades, Marib has
The Governorate of Marib has an area of approximately cemented its position as a pass-through for all traffic,
17,405 km2,4 which includes 14 districts [mudiriya]. goods, travel between the North and South. Furthermore,
The mild temperature in Sana'a mountains above its role as a regional hub has been amplified by the FIGURE 8. Marib Governorate
2000 meters is a stark contrast to the intense heat efforts of Marib’s tribes to serve as negotiators between
and humidity that suffocate the Red Sea and Gulf of the political, legal, and trade systems of the North and
Aden coasts to the west and south, respectively. In the the South.
middle mountains south of Sana’a, the Haraaz region,
and around the cities of Taiz, Ibb, and al-Bayda, one Within the context of Yemen’s recent conflict, Marib is Majzar
finds the most fertile farmlands in Yemen. The tropical at the center of the Hadi force’s line of defence flanked Raghwan
green valleys of this midland region stand in complete by Shabweh and Hadramout. These two neighboring Medghal
Marib
contrast to the country’s lifeless interior desert, which governorates are not only rich with oil and gas resources,
extends northward into the great al-Rub’e al-Khali (the but also host the oil export ports, creating essential Sirwah
Marib City
nodes on the national highways that link Yemen with Harib Al Qaramish
vast “empty quarter” of Saudi Arabia). Moving east from
Sana’a in the highlands, the land descends sharply to supply lines to Saudi Arabia and Oman. Al Jubah
a desert floor at approximately one thousand meters
Jabal Murad
above sea level. Yemeni interior desert lies west of the Harib
Rahabah
country’s center line, so there are hundreds of thousands
of kilometers east of Marib, separating today’s densely Al Abdiyah
populated highlands and western midland regions from Mahliyah
the country’s sparsely populated eastern half, further
highlighting how Marib’s location makes it a natural
bridge between Yemen’s highly diverse geographies and FIGURE 9. Districts in Marib
societies. The national road that connect Sana’a with
Marib, and the other road that links Sana’a with Marib FIGURE 10. Image on the right: neighborhood names were
3 An example is the Saudi Development and Reconstruction Program for Yemen (SDRPY). identified by a representative of the GALSUP. Naming conflcts
4 Yemen, National Information centre.”‫ “نبذة تعريفية عن محافظة مأرب‬, with other sources may appear in the map. Boundaries are
5 Perhaps this is what is making the reopening of both roads a recurring Houthi demand in their meetings with the UN Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths.
based on masterplan divisions as provided by GALSUP.
15
Proposed Urban Expansion Area

Area within the tribal customary
property in Jabal el- Desh. Planned
accommodative capacity is 150K
inhabitants
Protected Area Military area
Mountainous areas designated are
militarized zones where construction
is prohibited
Al Sahn
Al Atraan
Informal Housing Harat Altadamun
Scattered clan and tribal lands settlement
consolidated to create IDP host sites
Al Kasaara Al Rawda
Al Shirka
Medina Sabaa’ Al Maghawir settlement
Military area
Al Hasoon
Airport
Al Kahraba’
Al Mataar
Al Mustashfa Al Mujama Military area
Al He’ea Al Zaraa’a
Electricity station
General hospital Dense Urban Core
Highest population and
commercial density
Al Jama’a Al Rameela
Findiq Belqees
Al Rumaylaah settlement
Haweedina Jafeinah
Al Jufainah camp
The highest density hosting
camp, with enormous growth
in the last few years
Farming valley
47 hectare of irrigated farmland dependent
Al Fao on local wells and surface canals. Main
products are: lemons, oranges, potatoes,
wheat and barley. Animal husbandry in the
area is limited to goats, although fish farms
are spreading in the area as well.
Marib Old City
Space and urban indicators
Spatial analysis scorecards Level of Satisfaction with the Basic Services (mail, Perception of Safety in the Current Residence from all Access to Adequate Income Through Decent Means
Internet, Real Estate Registration, Permits) Kinds of Hazards (natural, man-made violence, risk of
eviction)
The scorecard data was spatialized
to display trends in Marib’s growth
and how its rapid demographic
turnover has impacted its ability
to deliver goods and services.
By selecting a few key indicators
and the neighborhoods best
represented by the scorecard
survey, the following maps
help clarify the often invisible
trends of the city’s “winners”
and “losers” as Marib is marked
by both rapid social mobility
“gentrification” opportunities
for IDPs establishing a local
“middle class” along with equally
rapid deteriorating conditions of
vulnerable populations in need.
Access to Job Opportunities for Women Perception of Easiness of Starting New Business Satisfaction with the Number of Electricity Supply
Hours
Electricity station
Airport
Main hospital
1 Marib city centre

2 South new development area
3 East Marib
4 North Marib
5 North-East Marib
Agree / Very satisfied

Somewhat agree / Satisfied
Somewhat disagree / Somewhat dissatisfied
Strongly disagree / Strongly dissatisfied
Masterplan area / No analysis
17
Access to Clean Drinking Water Satisfaction with the Quality of Education Services Access to Complaint Mechanisms
For example neighborhoods

1 and 2 of Marib’s city center
and southern new development
area rate city services far more
favorably than their counterparts
in in the northern and eastern
neighborhoods of the city. This
suggests that, even though
southern plot of land in Jufeineh
is largely a camp/ informal
development area, its proximity
to the commercial center still
confers significant advantages
in comparison to more remote
areas.
Methodology
Twelve key indicators were
selected for the spatial variant
analysis for five neighborhoods
in which representative samples
could be created. Each of these Perception of Respect as a Present Resident of Marib Perception of Safety and Welcome in Most Places in Environmental Situation Negatively Impacting the
neighborhoods zone had four Compared to other Places Marib Wellbeing of Residents
different classes by indicator. The
analysis used standard deviation
to qualify the most dominant
one of the four classes. This
ensured that the results could
display one dominant answer,
highlighted in a specific color on
a map. This offers a baseline for
future research into population
disparities and trends in access
and wealth between cities.
Conflict context timeline
4 CONFLICT CONTEXT
TIMELINE
Marib has been dramatically transformed - and received “union” as the separatist discourse dominated north and inside the Saudi territory, such as the attacks on Bakeek
many windfalls in terms of economic and population south. Many commissions and administrative bodies and Kharees oil facilities to the east of the kingdom
growth as a result of the past five years of conflict. that are normally attributed to central state functions September 2019, and on another set of oil and military
It has become a strategic hub - politically, militarily also operate in Marib City as a quasi government-in- sites in Jazan and Najran. Following these attacks, the
and economically - and has been able to remain exile. While Marib benefits from its relative stability and Houthis advanced with an initiative to stop hostilities
sufficiently independent to permit the IRG Government income from natural resources and a growing middle in exchange of suspending Arab Coalition air attacks,
in exile to relocate most of its administrations to its new class, the influx of population from other governorates and the reopening of Sana’a International Airport to
headquarters in Marib City. Marib City is able to operate and the movements within Marib since 2015 have also international flights.4 The Houthis took advantage of
relatively independently of the Houthi government brought significant challenges for local authorities, who several developments after the secession of the South
occupying Sana’a, and the Southern Transitional struggle to provide sufficient services to the growing led by the Southern Transition Council (STC) and their
Council (STC) in Aden. Marib’s role in recent peace talks population. According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking declaration of a self-autonomy in Aden.
surrounding the prisoner exchange deal of October Matrix, of the approximate 750,000 IDPs residing in the
2020 reveal the important roles that Marib will play in governorate, 16% are living in camp-like settlements Though Marib played a relatively peripheral role prior
any peaceful settlement in Yemen. However, due to with little to no humanitarian assistance.2 to the past decade, the historic patterns which have
proximity of front lines and poor road quality, it took played out on the macro scale of national politics have
over 8 hours to reach by road from Sana’a at the time Military Flashpoints significant bearing on Marib’s political life today. The
of writing. Nearly 90% of the Governorate of Marib is controlled timeline on the next page contextualizes the recent
by the IRG “Legitimacy” Forces, and shares the longest events in Marib in light of past events of contention.
Political Significance administrative borders with the capital when compared
Marib today is a key urban and administrative center to many other smaller governorates surrounding Sana’a.
in the war-torn republic, and it is that socio-economic Along this administrative line, battles relentlessly erupt
renaissance that is inspiring the return of Marib to its since the conflict started in 2015, especially in the
historic glory as Yemen’s capital. At the same time, the districts of Nehm [Sana’a Governorate] and Serwah [Marib
growth and rise in prestige makes the city increasingly Governorate]. These two districts can be considered the
vulnerable as a contested territory which could tip the most approachable entry points to the capital, unlike the
balance of the conflict and have a significant effect on territories in al-Jawf Governorate, which were mostly
the outcome of Yemen’s peace talks.1 When Sana’a captured by the Houthis since 2014.3
fell under the control of the Houthis on September
21, 2014, the Houthi’s expanded the reach of their Looking at the location of Marib, we can also include
administration into the majority of Yemen’s urban the administrative borders that Marib shares with al-
centers. Following their constitutional declaration in Bayda Governorate as a key entry point that the IRG
February of 2015, Marib quickly transformed into a hub forces together with the Popular Resistance often use to
for the political and military factions that remained loyal approach Sana’a, passing through the district of Rudman
to the internationally-recognized authority. The political and through Zamar Governorate. This third approach
significance of Marib increased significantly following to Sana’a made these frontlines prone to constant
the control of the UAE-supported STC of Aden (August, escalation since 2015. The Houthis escalated regionally,
2019), placing Marib as the de-facto capital of the by stepping up their drone attacks on strategic locations
FIGURE 11. Soldiers on a road in Marib (UN-Habitat)
1 Reuters, “Yemen War Shifts Focus to Marib, Thousands of Displaced at Risk”, 5 October 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-marib-idUSKBN26Q0LC
2 United Nations, International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Marib Mission - March 2019”, March 2019, https://yemen.un.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/PU03.pdf
3 Yemen, National Information centre, “‫”نبذة تعريفية عن محافظة الجوف‬, accessed on 23 February 2021, http://www.yemen-nic.info/gover/aljaowv/brife/
4 CNN, “20 ,”‫ ننتظر رد التحية‬:’‫ الحوثيون يعلنون ’وقف استهداف’ األراضي السعودية ويطلقون ’مبادرة سالم‬September 2019, https://arabic.cnn.com/middle-east/article/2019/09/20/yemen-houthis-saudi-arabia-uae-peace
19
Conflict Timeline
» 1962-1970 North Yemen Civil War A coup carried out by Commander social ties. Both presidents also saw it as an opportunity to counter casualties.4
Abdullah Al-Sallal in 1962 against the newly crowned Imam internal opposition.1
Muhammad al-Badr sparked a war in the kingdom that had ruled » Early 2015 shortly before the Houthis pushed out President Hadi,
northern Yemen for decades. Al-Sallal declared Yemen a republic » 1994 Yemeni Civil War Difference quickly emerged between the north Marib local political and security leaders convened an emergency
during his presidency, while al-Badr escaped to Saudi Arabia, from and south. Then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Vice-President meeting to discuss the future of the Governorate and their strategy.
Ali Salim al-Beidh, the last president of the former South Yemen,
which he tried to reinstate his rule. A pattern that would repeat
who accused Saleh of monopolizing power and marginalizing » 2018 Marib’s Master Plan is ratified Marib’s governor along with
itself again with President Hadi of the IRG fleeing to Saudi Arabia. prime minister Mr. AbdulMalik officially ratified the master plan of
A Saudi-sponsored agreement determined terms of reconciliation southerners in former Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen
southern areas as though they were being mistreated as they were Marib into a legal document the master plan covered a sprawling
and power-sharing. area of 20,750 hectares and was intended to address urban growth
not represented well in the upper echelons of the government or the
» 1963-1967 Southern War of Independence In the south, an armed military.2 for the next 30 years (General Administration for Land, Survey and
struggle began against the British occupation in 1963. The conflict Urban Planning - GALSUP).
» 2004-2010 Six wars of Saada Between 2004 and 2010, six conflicts
ended with an agreement calling for South Yemen's independence
erupted between government troops and Shiite Houthi militants, » 2019 United Arab Emirates withdrew funding and KSA withdrew
in November 1967. troops after having provided military aid to ROYG (Republic of
who grew stronger in the northern province of Sadaa despite the
» 1972 North-South Yemen War Tension between the two neighbors death of group leader Hussein al-Houthi in the first conflict. Saleh, Yemen Government) forces since 2014
led to a brief border conflict, but Arab mediation ended the war backed by several southern figures (including current President Abd » 2019 The Houthis successfully implemented a sweeping offensive
before either side was able to claim victory. Rabbu Mansour Hadi) managed to crush the southern forces and “Victory from God.” They were mostly targeting irregular forces
send al-Beidh and his entourage into exile. The deal was rejected by operating under the command of joint coalition (GCC-supported)
» 1978 Ali Abdullah Saleh elected president, the beginning of what Houthis (emerged as an opposition political-military force in 2004
will be a three-decade long rule; Yemeni Socialist Party rule begins fighters who they deemed as illegitimate because they were not
out of Zaidi Shi’a Muslim branch in northern Yemen, on the basis of part of the legitimate military forces or the Ministry of Defense.5
in South Yemen concerns of economic discimination and spread of Sunni ideology.
» 1979 Yemeni War Another conflict between north and south Yemen » January- August 2020 Houthis took advantage of the undeclared
» 2011 Arab Spring and anti-Saleh uprising (February); Saleh steps de-escalation with Saudi Arabia, and the reduced tensions along
erupted seven years later, but this time southern troops managed to down and transferred power to his vice president Abd-Rabu
make major advances into the north. An Arab initiative also ended the borders, to focus their offensive on Nahem and Sarwah fronts,
Mansour Hadi (beginning of plan to divide Yemen into six regions aiming to expand into Marib and Jawwf and eventually to control
this war and brought the two sides to the negotiating table, which under a new federal structure)
resulted in the withdrawal of southern forces. both governorates.
» Fall 2014 Governor Arada emerges as leader in Marib (Fall 2014) »
» 1986 Marib became a major oil producer with daily production In parallel with intensified fighting, the Houthis renewed negotiation
around 80,000 barrels (Hunt Oil company of Texas) » Fearing that Marib would become the next domino to fall to the initiatives channeled through the UN Special Envoy to gain
Houthis, Marib’s governor mobilized powerful local and international diplomatic ground as well as military.6
» May 1990 The Republic of Yemen was founded as the first tribal elites, including senior members of Saleh’s party3. Houthi
democratic country on the Arabian peninsula It was made up of » Conflict around Marib between the Houthis and local tribes
forces began battle with the internationally supported by the internationally recognised Government of Yemen
two former states: the Arab Republic of Yemen to the north and
the Democratic People’s Republic of Yemen to the south. (Yemen’s » March 2015 Saudi-led coalition including the Gulf Cooperation (IRG) and the Saudi-led coalition has increased since early 2020.
unification through a political deal reached between the presidents states, Egypt and Sudan, with backing from the United States and Fighting intensified in August and September with the Houthis
of the north and south. The deal was rushed because Yemen was the United Kingdom, launched military operations, promising swift advancing in southern Marib governorate through Mahliyah and Al
facing an existential economic crisis as a result of the collapse and defeat of the opposition but the conflict continues despite local Rahbah districts. At the end of October, fighting was concentrated
loss of its Soviet patrons. Saudi Arabia was against the unification, and international outcry over indiscriminate air attacks and civilian around Al Rahbah, Jabal Murad, and Al Joubah. From January to
seeing it as too hastily negotiated and not backed by sufficient October, fighting displaced over 98,000 people into the governorate
with 70% of IDPs located in Marib city and Marib Al Wadi.
1 Europa Publications Limited, “Yemen”, in The Middle East and North Africa, 41st edn. (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1995), p. 991.
2 Owen Barron. “Things Fall Apart: Violence and Poverty in Yemen”, Harvard International Review, vol. 30, No. 2 (2008), pp. 12-13. www.jstor.org/stable/42763186
3 Baron, The Marib Paradox, p. 8.
4 90-97% of Yemen’s fuel needs come from imports, and fuel is needed to both pump and transport water. Fuel prices had after only a few weeks of blockade doubled, and have continued to rise ever since. Food prices also increased dramatically, and for water delivered by truck, the price had
increased by as much as 600% as a result of the rise in fuel prices. 60% of the population relied on agriculture as the main source of income. The price increase of fuel has put 85% of farmers in situations without capabilities to operate properly. See, “Missiles and Food: Yemen’s Man-Made Food Security
Crisis”, n.d., accessed March 2, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/bn-missiles-food-security-yemen-201217-en.pdf.
5 BBC News, “28 ,”‫ الحوثيون يعرضون مقاطع مصورة ‘لعملية استهدفت قوات سعودية’ في محور نجران‬September 2019, www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-49865329
6 “Briefing Security Council on Yemen, Special Envoy Calls Upon ...”, n.d., accessed March 2, 2021, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14162.doc.html.
Conflict context timeline
Marib’s descent from Safehaven to Epicenter of the War

Sources of Conflict and Possible Consequences of the Current Escalation in Marib
In the few short months since Marib’s residents poured was met with a skeptical response, claiming that it North less reliant on the external supplies and far more
into the streets in October 2020 to celebrate the prisoner brings nothing new to the table and circumvents the impervious to pro-government/Arab Coalition siege
release as a milestone in the peace process, Marib was Houthis minimum requirements and prerequisites for a tactics.
besieged by the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah). The sustainable ceasefire.
most recent escalations to gain control of Marib broke 2. Debilitating energy supply interruptions: In
out on February 4. Since January, the Houthis renewed The battle to control Marib is far from being over, even the event that Houthi encroachments threaten the
their intermittent offensive on Marib, abandoning if a swift victory by the Houthis was largely halted. The power station at Safer and Marib’s strategic oil supply,
the pretense of upholding commitments within the diplomatic effort led by the UN Special Envoy is attempting the defensive battles and the fierce tribal resistance
negotiated political settlement process in pursuit of an to reach a containment strategy by addressing the key will likely leave these strategic sources of supplies
all-out military endgame strategy. Houthi actions signal underlying factors that made Marib a priority target for nonfunctional. Moreover, even the supplies through
a determination to secure a decisive victory, by capturing the Houthis in the first place. The scope for diplomatic the pipelines coming from Shabwa and Hadramout
Marib as the government’s final stronghold in the north. efforts is much broader than the limited frontline along Governorates will be interrupted, and will struggle
Sirwah Mountains, and includes all the regional actors to access the consumers now that they have been
The following summary is based on local media reports involved in this military standoff. Should Marib change deprived from refining and electricity thermal generation
with some verification of local sources: after a month of hands and fall under Houthi control, the Yemen war services located in eastern Marib. Such an outcome will
the most deadly fighting seen in years, both sides have would enter a new phase, and perhaps decisively turn completely change the humanitarian landscape, and
incurred significant casualties: hundreds of fighters have the tide. Here is what is at stake for Marib: will have severe consequences felt by every household
been killed as well as scores of senior command and in Yemen, including the North. This will in turn give the
control officers. The Houthis claimed some territorial 1. Thwarting the Arab Coalition supplies Houthis greater latitude in negotiating the lifting of siege
gains against the government’s defensive outposts, embargo: although the primary objective of the military over the ports on the west coast, and provide them with
capturing Nofal Military Base to the east of Sirwah front, siege around Marib is territorial gain, the immediate a source of liquidity in available cash reserves when the
less than 20 km to the west of Marib city. The campaign objective of the Houthi’s assault, is to counter months exchange of crude oil with consumption areas elsewhere
then attempted to approach the city from Balak Mountain of restriction of access to supplies coming from Iran to can be restored.
which overlooks Marib Dam, to secure a geographic the North. For several months, the access of oil supplies
advantage and to threaten vital water resources. This coming through the Strait of Hurmuz and Hodeida Port 3. Humanitarian
attack failed as a result of fierce resistance by, the was stalled. No-fly-zone restrictions were also imposed, Crisis of a mass second displacement wave: The
tribal factions of the Popular Resistance who were both forbidding international flights from reaching Sana’a hosting situation in Marib is characterized by the fact
assisted with numerous sorties by the Arab Coalition International Airport, and offering the possibility to aof that the majority of the IDP population in Marib has
air forces. Now, local media and informant allege that allowing international travel only under strict monitoring nowhere else to go. Although internal displacements
there has been the indiscriminate firing of dozens of guidelines and from a certain set of destinations. This have been ongoing throughout the Yemen conflict,
missiles on military and civilian targets inside Marib, semi-siege situation has been suffocating the North and large-scale displacement has not occurred since 2017
including attacks on IDP camps. These missile strikes causing serious humanitarian consequences felt by the when the two dominant conflict parties consolidated the
left dozens of civilians dead, and have reportedly led to population under the Houthi control as supplies became primary zones of control. Of the more than one million
the displacement of nearly 14 thousand people. KSA in serious shortage in the market. A successful attack IDPs hosted in Marib governorate, almost all originated
announced a ceasefire initiative in partnership with the on Marib would mean that the governorate’s possession from Houthi controlled areas, and serious protection
UN Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of energy and water resources vital to the majority of concerns will likely instigate a mass displacement
for Yemen that included an invitation to a political the population of the Republic would fall under Houthi and evacuation process from Marib further into the
dialogue to end the entire conflict, signaling some control, which in turn will improve the resilience and eastern provinces. The humanitarian implications will
willingness to address several immediate humanitarian self-sustaining capacity of the group. Houthi control of be enormous, and exacerbated by the UN’s limited
issues that the Houthis were demanding. The initiative Mari’s natural resources and agriculture would make the response capacity in the southeast. The UN only
21
recently established a humanitarian hub in Marib (mid- governance model and diverse political inclinations to
March) after years of lobbying, but the UN and the entire mutually coexist. Marib’s successful tribe/state formula
humanitarian response network are not prepared to deal will also be undermined, further emphasizing the conflict
with the shockwave of a displacement deep into the narrative between the north and the south.
less-accessible eastern region of the Republic. Houthi
battles in the South in al-Bayda have effectively cut off b) Disrupting the delicate tribal balance: Marib
the access of future IDPs to leave to the areas under has been developing a balance of powers between the
the Southern Transitional Council. Unless humanitarian tribes to use their influence in positive ways such as
corridors are quickly negotiated to ensure that gas, oil and food supply. Marib’s loss would mean the
vulnerable IDPs can access STC areas if the siege on loss of this crucial model for Yemen. The Abidah tribal
Marib continues, displacement threatens to take place confederation in Marib has been playing an essential
to areas under control of extremist groups. This push of stabilization role under dire conflict dynamics. They are
civilians into less secure areas controlled will usher in a tribe of negotiators, preferring to avoid direct military
a new logistical and humanitarian challenge on a scale confrontation inside the Popular Resistance, in order to
beyond what the international community has faced in focus on protecting the oil and energy interests for the
Yemen. entire Republic. In a division of labor within the tribal
confederation, the Abidah focus on trade and lucrative
These combined factors highlight the high stakes of business development while other tribes inside the
the immediate battle to control Marib, but the long term alliance provide fighters and shoulder the security and
consequences and implications of the macro dimensions defense responsibilities, which are subsidized by Abidah
of the Marib conflict will have dire consequences for the funds. The approach has afforded the Abidah tribe a level
republic. of neutrality which enables it to play the role of good-
will mediator on necessary supply deals directly with
a) Losing Marib as a political asset and model: the the Houthis, and to ensure that even oil-rich areas under
federal constitution of Yemen that was agreed upon in al-Qaeda control in Shabwa and Hadramout would still
Riyadh in 2015 still represents Yemen’s best hope for have trade relations across the conflict zones. This trade
conflict transformation and future stability, allowing model has allowed the tribes to present themselves as
access to national wealth and economic opportunities a credible caretaker of natural resources coming from
to expand beyond the limits of the centralized state their customarily-owned territories, something that the
that the civil war produced in the 90s. Marib emerged pre-conflict centralized authorities didn’t thought was
as a significant center during the war, accepting the possible in the first place.
task of hosting some of the most essential functions of
Hadi’s government (including the Ministry of Defense),
while distinguishing itself politically under Islah Party’s
local administration and the convention between
the confederation of tribes. Maintaining Marib as a
potentially successful economic pole and magnet for
population relocation would mean that north/south
checks-and-balances dynamic will be broken for the
first time in the last century, promoting a multi-polar
Civill Society and Population Dynamics
5 CIVIL SOCIETY &

POPULATION DYNAMICS
Civil Society and Population Dynamics there in 1981.8 In 1985 when oil was discovered in Marib,
i) Pre-conflict: sparse population it was just a “dust-blown town of cinder block houses” that
The modern historic record has little information on Marib emerged next to the old Marib village.9 After the discovery ” The (population) numbers do not
until 1947 when a population estimate listed the number of oil, the village’s population increased to around 1,900 account for several transient populations
of inhabitants as 800,1 living in approximately 100 houses inhabitants, and the population may have also increased who fall outside of official counts such
(yielding an inhabitant to house ratio of 8 people).2 due to returnees coming home following the civil war of as African migrants, military forces, and
the 60s. In the mid-1990s the Saleh government backed undocumented laborers.
Marib had gained international attention for its historic sites, the US-led counterterrorism operations against Salafi-jihadi
and was referred to by archeologists as a ‘piggy-back tell’3 extremists, leading to a backlash among the tribes, protesting - Interview with local officials in August 2020
(mound) village of Old Marib Village; it was one of the rare civilian casualties and damages. As one mother in Marib
examples of a contemporary settlement being located atop recounted, “Every time the village children hear a drone, they
the ancient ruins from the pre-Islamic settlement.4 However, run home from school...yelling “the Americans are coming
the first archaeological expedition to Awwam Temple and the to kill us!” Then, the village’s inhabitants will get in their cars
throne of Queen Bilqis (Mahram Bilqis)5 was cut short due to and evacuate into the desert.”10 The fear and damages from
the CT campaign created a security vacuum which further Marib’s location off the main western roads connecting
the archaeologists’ kidnapping by local tribesmen.6 Tell sites
hampered Marib’s growth. the conflict areas, protected by mountains and sparsely
of pre-Islamic (Jahiliyya) ruins such as Marib’s were generally
populated desert, give it a unique geographical attraction for
avoided with the rise of political Islamism in the 1960s,7 but
ii) Population changes during the current war and current a safe haven for IDPs, and others avoiding the conflict to the
the main cause of Marib being abandoned was the outbreak of
estimates west. The current conflict led to the dramatic demographic
Yemen’s Civil War in 1962 between the Royalist Mutawakkilite
As of 2004, the census count for Marib Governorate was transformation of Marib governorate, and its capital’s
(Zaidi) Kingdom and supporters of the Yemen Arab Republic
238,522. By the year 2014 the total population was estimated emergence as a full-fledged city. The current conflict led to the
(allied with Nasser’s Egyptian forces).
to be around 360,000,11 representing an average annual dramatic demographic transformation of Marib governorate,
cumulative growth of 2.8%. Marib City itself had a marginal and its capital’s emergence as a full-fledged city. As of 2019,12
Another factor for Marib’s sparse urban population prior to
population of 16,794 residents. By the time Marib’s current Marib City’s estimated population was approximately 630,000
the dramatic change arising from the current conflict was
civil war broke out, Marib had shifted from a frontline for inhabitants, of which 577,000 (or 91%) are IDPs.
that Marib was an agrarian economy. Tribal families preferred
to either remain on their estates or move instead to the urban counterterrorism to being a safe haven for populations fleeing
hub of Sana’a. Researchers noted only 15 families were living military operations west of Marib. As previously described,
1 Ahmed Fakhry and Gonzague Ryckmans, An Archaeological Journey to Yemen: March-May, 1947 (Cairo: Service des Antiquités de L’Egypte, 1952).
2 The ratio of the original town of Marib before it was destroyed and abandoned during in the 1962 civil war, twas 286 persons per hectare, with a density of 302 per hectare. See, Gus W. Van Beek, “A Population Estimate for Marib: A Contemporary Tell Village in North Yemen”, Bulletin of the American
Schools of Oriental Research, No. 248 (Autumn 1982), pp. 61–67. www.jstor.org/stable/1356674
3 Tell (or tel), “Arabic for “hill” or “small elevation”, in Middle Eastern archaeology, a raised mound marking the site of an ancient city.” “Tell”, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, last revised 12 November 2004, www.britannica.com/science/tell-mound
4 For more on this topic, see R. Michael Feener, “Muslim Cultures and Pre-Islamic Pasts: Changing Perceptions of ‘Heritage’”, in The Making of Islamic Heritage. Heritage Studies in the Muslim World, Trinidad Rico, ed. (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 23–45. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-
4071-9_3
5 “The focus of this expedition was the Awwam Temple (Mahram Bilqis), the largest of its kind on the Arabian Peninsula. According to legend, Marib was the capital of the Sabaean kingdom, ruled by the biblical Queen of Sheba. Sabaean inscriptions refer to it as the Temple of Almaqah, the moon god
who was the principal deity at Marib.” National Museum of Asian Art, “Excavations: Awam Temple”, accessed 23 February 2021, https://asia.si.edu/exhibition/awam-temple/
6 Max Kutner, “Unearthing America’s Lawrence of Arabia, Wendell Phillips”, 20 October 2014, www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/unearthing-americas-lawrence-arabia-wendell-phillips-180953059/
7 For more on this topic, see Feener, “Muslim Cultures and Pre-Islamic Pasts”.
8 Rosalind Wade quoted in ibid.
9 Adam Baron, “The Marib Shaibani”, 11 June 2020, https://adammbaron.com/2020/06/11/the-marib-shaibani/
10 Camilla Molyneux, “Made in Marib: A Local Response to Instability and Violence”, Oxford Research Group, 19 October 2020, www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/made-in-marib-a-local-response-to-instability-and-violence
11 Ba-Haj (Ishar Muhammad), “The Demographic Developments in Yemen between 1900 and 2000, and the Forecasts for 2024,” University of Koufa.
12 ACAPS, “Marib Governorate - Marib City and Marib Al Wadi District Profile”, 19 November 2020, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20201119_acaps_yemen_marib_district_profile.pdf
23
Key Indicators Marib City Governorate Governorates Number %

of origin
Estimated pre-crisis popu- 40,000 360,000
lation (2014) Sana'a 125,232 16%
Current international com- 630,000 1.5 million Al Hudaydah 103,398 13%
munity estimate (2019) Raymah 102,936 13%
Official Government esti- 1.5 million 3 million Amanat Al Asimah 91,476 12%
mate (2020) Hajjah 65,328 8%
Marib 56,322 7%
Taizz 55,710 7%
Ibb 51,396 7%
Dhamar 40,794 5%
Amran 37,170 5%
Majzar Sum 770,028
Medghal
Marib FIGURE 12. Comparison of key current indicators FIGURE 13. Governorates of origin (2019)
"District District Name Population estimation 2017 IDPS 2019 Total population Multiplication
Harib Al Qaramish Sirwah P-Code" (OCHA) (IOM)
2612 Marib City 52,664 577,854 630,518 12.0
Marib City
2602 Raghwan 5,819 8,484 14,303 2.5
2613 Marib 55,029 71,742 126,771 2.3
Al Jubah 2601 Majzar 14,456 18,540 32,996 2.3
Jabal Murad 2603 Medghal 14,575 16,188 30,763 2.1
2606 Sirwah 26,782 29,154 55,936 2.1
Rahabah Harib 2611 Al Abdiyah 18,017 14,826 32,843 1.8
2604 Harib Al 11,237 6,858 18,095 1.6
Qaramish
Al Abdiyah
Mahliyah 2608 Rahabah 10,388 2,646 13,034 1.3
2607 Al Jubah 29,217 6,900 36,117 1.2
2605 Bidbadah 24,959 5,154 30,113 1.2
2610 Mahliyah 12,768 2,442 15,210 1.2
2609 Harib 46,721 7,386 54,107 1.2
2614 Jabal Murad 14,226 1,854 16,080 1.1
Total 311,342 736,815 1,106,887 3.4
FIGURE 14. Multiplication of the population in sub-districts, calculated as the FIGURE 15. Population estimations of districts in Marib, taking into consideration 2017 population estimations and IDPs in
new poplation / old population. 2019 (IOM DTM 2019)
Marib City’s Growth Rate as Outlier Challenges in Tracking Marib’s Transient Populations Challenging Population Estimates
Marib City now comprises half of the governorate’s 1.4 Population estimates in Marib are primarily based on The governorate’s population estimates for Marib fluctuate
million inhabitants. These numbers indicate that Marib city displacement tracking from various UN and relief agencies13 widely and a lack of reliable data means assessments involve
alone has taken in nearly 82% of all the IDPs hosted in the but are contested by the governorate and local authorities. a significant margin of error. This unreliability of population
entire Governorate. Other sub-districts in the Governorate These estimates, based on displacement data from various data needs to be understood within Marib’s context as a
also witnessed a significant increase, but the governorate’s UN Agencies, were challenged by the Governorate and the local highly constrained data collection environment, with limited
average 3.4-fold population increase of (i.e. above natural authorities in the city. According to a local official interviewed means for researchers to access and verify key data points.
growth baseline estimates) is dwarfed when compared with by the profiling team mid-August, these numbers do not take The Governorate’s office responsible for statistics reported
the 12-fold increase of Marib City. into account several factors and transient populations who that an estimated three million individuals presently live in
fall outside of tracking entities, notably migrants and irregular Marib,17 of which 2.5 million are IDPs.
security forces. Additionally, Marib has seen an increase in
return migration from Saudi Arabia of Yemenis working there. As Marib has rapidly taken on the greatest hosting burden of
Lastly, the unpredictable presence of African migrants, which any city in Yemen, skyrocketing population estimates must
experienced an uptick as Marib became a passageway and be approached with a degree of caution. There is no doubt
a temporary station for thousands coming from Somalia14, that such speculative population projections are common in
Ethiopia, Mali and Djibouti15 further contributes to the erratic conflict-affected cities in the Middle East, as local authorities
population picture. and service providers are incentivized to inflate their resident
population numbers for intra-national negotiations and capital
Non-resident Security Forces allocations. Another factor at play in inflation of Marib’s
A key informant in Marib suggested that the city is a waystation population numbers is related to the demographic change
for fighters and soldiers transiting to the frontlines, who are aspects that are featured into Marib’s displacement, which
rarely considered as population or captured in population has given more political latitude to the Governorate that now
tracking. According to this source, some 20,000 fighters are “represents” a broader constituency-- at least on paper. These
considered permanent residents of Marib,16 and they consume combined factors all contribute to Marib’s population uptick
and benefit from the city's utilities and services without narrative. For the purposes of this urban profile, several of
contributing to the local tax revenue. This information and the these estimates are analyzed, and take away points proposed.
final breakdown of formal/irregular security forces present in The implications and considerations proposed are intended
Marib was not verified by the security actors interviewed from to support local planning development actors responsible for
the Ministry of Security in Marib City. next steps in Marib, humanitarian actors responsible for relief
planning, as well as Yemen researchers focused on post-
conflict development and how the urban growth phenomena
13 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “Yemen”, 20 December 2018, http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Yemen_AcuteFI_2018Dec2019Jan.pdf
14 The first major wave of migrants from the Horn of Africa came in the 1990s as a result of deteriorating security in Somalia and the civil war. According to Marina de Regt’s (2010) research, Yemen’s demographics (and subsequent muwalladeen population of mixed-descent children produced mostly
by marriages between Yemeni men and Ethiopian women hundreds of thousands of refugees crossed the Gulf of Aden by boat but Yemen had the most permissive migration laws so more African migrants settled there. de Regt, “Ways to come, ways to leave: Gender, mobility, and il/legality among Ethiopian
domestic workers in Yemen”, Gender & Society, vol. 24, No. 2 (2010), pp. 237–260.
15 Marib’s proximity to the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia places it which has historically been identified by human trafficking researchers as “a transit node in a wider clandestine and criminal circuit.” Run by large criminal syndicates on both sides of the border, “child trafficking has been found
to mainly affect two distinct groups: Yemeni male and female minors from rural backgrounds and asylum-seeking minors from the Horn of Africa.” Hélène Thiollet and Helen Lackner, “From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis: The Changing Dynamics of Contemporary Migration in Yemen” in Why Yemen Matters: A
Society in Transition, Helen Lackner, ed. (London: SOAS Middle East Issues, 2014), p. 278
16 UN Habitat Profiling Team Interview, June 2020.
17 UN Habitat Profiling Team Interview, August 2020.
25
Around 16.000 IDPs arrived in

Around 18.000 IDPs arrived Meghdal through 2015-2017
in 2018 in Majzar from from Al Bayda, Sana’a and
Hudaydah, Amran and Marib. 75% indicate Shelter as
Marib. main need in Ragwhan and
Meghdal
630.000 IDPs arrived mostly throughout

2015-2016 in Marib/ Marib City.
Around 28.000 IDPS arrived

in Sirwah in 2015-2016
largely from within Marib.
Approximately 5,000 appear
to be displaced internally in
the district
GOVERNANCE
MAP 1 - REGIONAL MAP
Major roads
Urban Agglomerations
IDPs per location

6-50
50 - 100
Around 14.000 IDPs arrived in 2016 in Al 100 - 500
Abidyah, almost 80% from Sana’a. 500 - 1000
1000 - 2500
2500 - 8500
FIGURE 16. IDPs in Marib Governorate. Data based on IOM DTM 2019.
in Marib can serve as a case study of how the war will Governorate of Yemen. patterns and incidents, which casts doubt on the reliability
permanently alter both the physical space and political of population estimates.
economy of Yemen. Lack of a Property Database
The Office of Cadastral Records stated that Marib IDPs by Origin
In 2017 UNOCHA estimated the population of Marib doesn’t maintain an active database of properties, estate According to DTM database, 62% of the IDPs hosted
Governorate based on natural growth projections to be transactions/sales or lease registry,19 let alone an account in Marib come from just five governorates: Sana’a, Al-
336,859, and Marib City to be 52,500. These estimates did of the largely random urban growth that underpins the Hudaydah, Raymah, Amanat Al Asimah and Hajjah, which
not take into account the displacement factor, but were present hosting situation. The lack of a baseline of formally are all northern Governorates largely under the control
proposed as a “working number” for baseline residents. recorded properties combined with a restrictive security of the Houthi militias. The fact that Marib received 21%
The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) environment for conducting informal housing services of all Yemen IDPs raises the question of why was Marib
suggested in 2018-19 that 1.4 million inhabitants live in the makes quantifying the haphazard and largely informal specifically attractive to IDPs. While still a relatively smaller
Governorate. IPC data also suggests that most of the IDPs urban growth underpinning the present hosting situation a city, Marib City received many more IDPs when compared
in Marib came from Sana’a (amanat al-asima) and from the significant challenge. to the larger centers such as Adas, Ibb, Shabwa and al-
other northern governorates, accounting for the additional Mukallah. The other dimension is that the increased
~1.1 million inhabitants. IPC says very little about the Settlement Trends among Transient Groups population numbers help justify Marib’s higher share of the
methodology used to make this estimate, but they cited IDPs governorate’s oil revenue.
that the “population estimates are based on official figures This estimate is further verified through IOM’s DTM, which
provided by the Central Statistical Organization based on estimated in March 2019 that 770,000 IDPs were hosted Marib’s ‘Social Infrastructure’
a projection for 2019”, and added that “the accuracy of the in Marib Governorate. Added to the baseline estimates, the As rapidly as Marib’s population is growing it is also
estimation of population in need of urgent action in 2020 combined number of IDPs and full time residents using diversifying. Assessing the impact of social hierarchy and
might be affected by these estimates.”18 DTM data comprised a total of 1.1 million inhabitants, equity in Marib requires adopting a local frame of reference
which is still 300K short of IPC estimate. A review of DTM’s regarding how locals understand civil society and to what
As previously noted, the last national census in Yemen progressive displacement tracking data suggests highly extent is civil society synonymous with tribalism, are they
from 2004 listed the population of Marib governorate at volatile displacement patterns within Marib itself, both as two parallel forces in society, or mutually antagonistic.
about 240K inhabitants, of which 44K were reportedly living a result of movement within the governorate as the battle Tribalism has been historically undermined by the modern
in Marib City, the second largest city in the Governorate over Marib rages, and as a result of the recent flooding. state but attempts to replace tribal institutions with a rigid
of Marib at the time. The city-specific number from the According to the most recent DTM August update, some notion of the social contract failed in both north and south
statistics bureau was essentially a breakdown of the 9,404 families were displaced from Marib as a result of Yemen.
governorate figure by the sub-districts (mudeereiat), and the flooding (some 65,000 people), but the update does
thus at least part of this city population was conflated not refer to the destination, and most probably those who Tribes and the State Context for Civil Society in Yemen
with the population in its rural countryside. This fact might lost their temporary shelters in camps created on steep Marib’s rapid demographic shifts have an inevitable bearing
have inflated the baseline estimate by at least 20%, but not mountainous areas around Marib city are still within the on the nature of the social contract in Marib. Marib’s
more, as the vast area of Marib subdistrict is essentially a governorate, but are hard to track to decide their current government has the revenue to function, pay salaries,20 and
sparsely populated desert that extends to the east to merge situation. Such fluctuation in the displacement tracking administer services when much of the country is unable
with Hadramout, Yemen’s largest and least populated is further exacerbated by a lack of information on return to address protection needs in the context of the conflict
18 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “Yemen”, 20 December 2018, http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Yemen_AcuteFI_2018Dec2019Jan.pdf

20 UNOCHA, “Yemen: 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview”, December 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2019_Yemen_HNO_FINAL.pdf
informal site due to its close proximity to the road.
CAPACITY OF DISPLACEMENT SITES EXPERIENCING ARRIVALS 27
Only seven of the 13 displacement sites in Marib city are currently receiving IDPs.
3 Sites with capacity to expand 4 Sites with limited space and low expansion capacity
IOM YEMEN CCCM MARIB CITY Al
DISPLACEMENT
Rumaylah SITES OVERVIEW
Al Jufainah Al Rawdah Aljadida Harat Altadamun
Kuliyat Al-Mujtama Al Muasasa

Al Maghawir
Particularly overcrowded
TOTAL NUMBER OF SITES TOTAL NUMBER OF HH NUMBER OF SITES AT RISK OF EVICTION

MAP 2 - CAMP LOCATIONS
12 6,975 12/8 AL RAWDAH ALJADIDA SCHOOL
” When I first arrived in this town, MARIB CITY

SETTLEMENT / 180 HH
PRIVATE LAND
although
AGGREGATED we can’t call
TOP 3 GOVERNORATES it a ACROSS
OF ORIGIN townSITES
anymore,
YEARI OF ARRIVAL ON SITE
did not feel safe, which
Number of sites 8
paralyzed
10 6 4
me
2
and
0
DISPLACEMENT
2015
my family for a while. Now, my daughter is 6 sites
JAWA AL NASIM HARAT ALTADAMUN
SANA’A
in college, engaged to her colleague who SITES COLLECTIVE CENTRE /641 HH SETTLEMENT /147 HH
SETTLEMENT /249 HH
PRIVATE LAND
is from al-Hudaydah, and I have started2017
AL HUDAYDAH INSTITUTION PRIVATE LAND
1 site
the same business I used to have in
DHAMAR
2014
Sana’a. Alhamdulillah, this is my city and
AMRAN 1 site Note that:
the city of my Cildren. Marib governorate
HAJJAH AL MAGHAWIR
SETTLEMENT /606 HH

RAYMAH - Business owner who arrived from Sana’a in 2017 hosts42016additional
sites PRIVATE LAND
IBB displacement sites to AL NAJAH SCHOOL
INTENTION IN THE NEXT 3 MONTHS
AL BAYDA thoseWANT present inside COLLECTIVE CENTRE /76 HH
%100
PRIVATE LAND
AL MAHWIT
MaribTO city
STAY
MAKTAB ALZIRAAH
and political instability, currency crisis, and displacement. COLLECTIVE CENTRE /66 HH
Therefore, Marib’sIN leaders
ASSISTANCE RECEIVED 2019 / % OF are
SITES inREGULAR
the unique position of INSTITUTION AL MUTAHAF
having choices but also managing new volatilities of COLLECTIVE CENTRE /137 HH
FOOD SAN./HYG. WATER EDUCATION HEALTH NFI SHELTER INSTITUTION
unpredictable currents within the quality of social relations
at a horizontal level (between citizens) and vertically
AL MUASASA
regarding
%100 the relationships
%69 between and
%23 %8amongst citizens
%77 %8 %38 AL NASR SPONTANEOUS SETTLEMENT /101 HH
with one another. COLLECTIVE CENTRE /145 HH PUBLIC LAND
INSTITUTION AND PRIVATE LAND
The North provided
The information Yemen in this Civil
section is War between
aggregated and only meant royalists
as an of the Does not indicate current gaps, as part of the AL RUMAYLAH
overview. For detailed information on each site, kindly refer to the site snapshots. SETTLEMENT /324 HH
Mutawakkilite Kingdom of North Yemen supported by
needs have been covered in previous years
PRIVATE LAND
Saudi Arabia, but the major outcome was that the previous
separation
PRIORITY NEEDS between
REPORTED BY theCAMP state and tribal institutions
COMMITTEES no
LEGEND
longer existed as sucg. In fact, the state became virtually an MASNA' ADHBAN
1
embodiment
WASH & of the bothtribes.
reported During
EDUCATION needs by %85 of the sites
as primarythe civil war, some tribessites boundaries
aligned with the royalists against the republicans whilesites at risk of eviction
SETTLEMENT /169 HH
PRIVATE LAND
YEMEN
2
othersHEALTH
joined theboth other side. Members of the Bakil tribalreceiving
reported as primary MARIB AL JUFAINAH
new arrivals
CAMP /4,010 HH
confederation (Al-Jawf and Dahm) had initially rebelled
& SNFI needs by %62 of the sites
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAND
against the Zaidiyya Imam Yahya in the tribal revolts ofnot receiving new arrivals
1959 while the Madhaj confederation tribes (such as the Al-
Data collected between August and September 2019. Marib (IOM 2019) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/en_iom_yemen_marib_city_
FIGURE 17. Camps in 3KM 1/2
Google Earth 18/12/12
displacement_site_overview_aug_to_oct_2019.pdf
Bayda) remained loyal to the monarchy and its allies Marib’s new Urbanite IDP Middle Class efforts of the Association of Abductees’ Mothers and
in Riyadh.21 The animus tribes had felt against Imam In Marib’s IDP communities there is ample evidence other human rights activists were rewarded with the
Yahya dissipated after his death and the Ashraf tribes of how people are spontaneously creating social largest prisoner exchange in over five years of conflict
rallied behind his son, the new Imam Muhammad (“Sayf solidarity networks in these contexts of state absence between the Houthis and IRG forces.
al-Islam“) al-Badr, at the same time that war was seen out of necessity, a natural adaptation to circumstances.
primarily as a financial opportunity for the primary While Marib’s success in establishing a nascent social Marib’s exceptionalism has often been reduced to some
actors. As one sheik said of their realpolitik alliances contract for iets people in the midst of Yemen’s civil version of oil, decentralization and displacement. In
and incentives,”The Imams have ruled us for a thousand war is framed as bringing order into the chaos of a order to go beyond what a local analyst in Marib has
years. Some were good and some were bad. We killed lawless, conflict-impacted society, Marib is populated called the “monochromatic”22 narratives of the city’s rise,
the bad ones sooner or later, and we prospered under by people from all corners of Yemen now, and the model this profile emphasises the socio-cultural dimensions
the good ones.” represents something more significant as a hybrid of tribes and cultural heritage as they influence urban
experiment between tribal revival, local government, and sectors, and thereby explores the way that linkages
The tribal influence remains ubiquitous but there is still the state. Some tribal leaders have noted that in Marib, between people and the built environment of Marib
a question of whether a tribal is an entity or an adjective this hybrid form of customary and formal governance is have taken shape. This social “landscape lens”23 of
for certain types of behavior. As such, there is a lack its winning formula. Much of Marib’s development has geographical and archaeological perspectives can help
of consensus among academics and local leaders in been determined by the lack of presence of the central reveal the “social determinants of state structures.”24 to
Yemen as to the role of tribes and their relationship to state and being shielded from the political culture and explain how the land and access to natural resources
the state ranges widely between two extremes: some the military figures (ghalaba) in politics, though Marib created a core DNA defining the patterns in relationships
see tribes as entities which, by definition, oppose and still suffered at the hands of unaccountable state between individuals, communities and the state. Most
compete with the state, while others see tribalism as a violence in the form of drone campaigns and often being importantly, this approach can offer a helpful lens for
mechanism for supporting or complementing the state, neglected from nationalized social services, as detailed understanding the contradictions within Marib and what
as an intermediary institution between the state and elsewhere in the profile. aspects of the Marib Model could inspire organisation
village-level communities. in the rest of the country, and which are unique to its
In Marib following the reforms opened up by the 2011 socio-political ecology. Marib is a compelling case
Tribal leaders and confederations have been on all sides youth-led protests of the Arab Spring, a number of civil for the assertion that tribal social structure can offer
of the struggle between decentralization (bottom-up, society groups emerged and continued to organize in solutions as much as it presents problems for the state
"periphery") and centralization (top-down, "core") forces Marib. To highlight examples of civil society merging in Yemen.
in Yemen. While the dance between central authority with tribes, the Sheba Movement (al-Harak al-Saba’ie)
and decentralized tribal rule has always shifted based emerged to address community issues and combined Social Vulnerability and Protection--Marib’s Role
on its context and key drivers, Marib and the eastern tribal gatherings with street protests to protest Saleh as a ‘Sanctuary City’
region of Yemen is unique because it rarely experienced but continued to organize other events for Maribi local Uniting against a Common Enemy
the effects of strong central government rule. youth involving young leaders from Marib’s main tribes Marib’s community mobilization against Houthi military
demanding a share of oil and gas revenues for local incursions in 2015 appears to have deepened the resolve
development projects. In the fall of 2020, the longtime
21 Fouad Mussed,”Six decades of instability in Yemen—politics (sic) conflict and proxy war”, May 2020, https://abaadstudies.org/news-59840.html
22 Al Sakani and Coombs, “Marib”.
23 Applying the research‘ methodolog of examining “linkages between people and the environment in landscapes… can help (utilize) knowledge about past and current landscape patterns, process and dynamics guidance for developing visions to support the sustainable steward-
ship of social-ecological systems under future conditions.” Tobias Plieninger and others, “Exploring Ecosystem-Change and Society Through a Landscape Lens: Recent Progress in European Landscape Research”, Ecology and Society, vol. 20, No. 2 (2015), pp. 1–5. https://doi.org/10.5751/
ES-07443-200205
24 Catherine Boone, Property and political order in Africa: Land rights and the structure of politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
29
of its leadership to coalesce to form a unified front to keep

Marib strong and protected. Political unity was established
between rival parties and factions within the local authority,
political parties and tribes against a common enemy.25
Marib’s governor is credited with leading a concerted effort
to focus on governance and civil society following Marib’s
liberation. The governorate committed to focusing on
restoring stability,26 strengthening relations with the central
government and also designing the foundation of a social
welfare program (supported by Marib’s natural resource
wealth) which established the unique form of social
contract still prevalent in Marib today.
Complexities and Contradictions of Social Infrastructure

and Marib’s Tribes
Marib’s social programs and efforts that make up the sum
of its complex civil society picture can only be understood
through the lens of its tribes to the extent that they represent
the embodiment of community power structures most
influential in shaping Marib’s social values, norms, and
priorities. Identifying how Marib’s most vulnerable groups
are faring reveals a range of contextual factors that indicate
Marib is a place which offers certain classically vulnerable
groups such as IDPs, women and, to a certain extent,
Marib’s Muhamasheen unique opportunities and liberties
compared to other areas in Yemen while, at the same
time, containing all of the challenges of representation and
inequality characteristic of hierarchical orders of haves
and have-nots reinforced by Yemen’s tribalism. While this
profile examines the influence of tribalism from multiple
dimensions, with respect to Marib’s civil society, tribes are FIGURE 18. Women wearing abayas working in a fruit processing plant in Marib, 2020.
viewed as the core DNA of Marib’s ‘Social Infrastructure’27
25 According to Al Sakani and Coombs, In January of 2015, Marib’s two rival political parties
(Islah and GPC) having fled to Marib from Houthi controlled areas, many as members of the armed resistance and national army, issued a joint declaration of their support for Marib’s tribes in repelling the Houthi offensive and resolve to prevent Houthis from taking over the governorate (Al Sakani and
Coombs, “Marib”). Recently, there are increasing reports of the breakdown between Saudi Arabia and the Islah Party, with the Saudi Council of Senior Scholars listing the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group in November of 2020, along with other rifts that have hindered the anti-Houthi coalition.
Karim Al-Yemani, “A Widening Schism between Saudi Arabia and the Islah Party Prolongs Yemen’s War,” Washington Institute Fikra Forum, December 18, 2020, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/widening-schism-between-saudi-arabia-and-islah-party-prolongs-yemens-war.
26 Baron, Adam, “The Marib Paradox” European Council on Foeign Relations, June 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_marib_paradox_how_one_province_succeeds_in_the_midst_of_yemens_wa
27 Social infrastructure is defined in contrast to “hard infrastructure” as the “soft services which encompasses services that support the social environment, to include schools, health centres, leisure and recreation facilities, libraries, community centres, religious facilities, local shops, open
spaces, transport and utility services and emergency services which promote new and existing residents by bringing them together and reinforcing a sense of community, as defined by Brown and Barber (2012) and Williams and Pocock (2010). Julie Brown and Austin Barber. “Social infrastructure and
sustainable urban communities.” Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers-Engineering Sustainability, vol. 165. No. 1 (2012), pp. 99–110; Philippa Williams and Barbara Pocock, “Building ‘Community’ for Different Stages of Life: Physical and Social Infrastructure in Master Planned Communities”,
Community, Work & Family, vol. 13, No. 1 (2010), pp. 71–87, https://doi.org/10.1080/13668800902903300.
(Civil Society, Education, Governance) and intangible IPDs in Tented Settlement

category (social cohesion, trust, mutual respect, sense of The wave of displacement in Marib started in 2014, but ” There were no places for women
belonging, safety. expanded rapidly following a joint declaration made by to gather comfortably, no places
tribal leaders in 2016 permitting the opening of more lands belonging to the female community:
Though Marib is just 173 km northeast of Yemen’s capital, for settlements.30 There are now 28 IDP sites in Marib
where the team from administration
Sana’a, its political and social realities seem to be a world City and a total of 38 sites in Marib Al Wadi surrounding
to the youngest employee is female.
away. Much of its distinct social and urban trends are region. The governorate does not officially permit IDPs to
attributed to Marib’s population has a strong tribal identity build permanent stone or concrete structures but IDPs in Traditional, conservative attitudes
which has filled the vacuum of the absent state and helped Yemen tend to relocate to areas near communities where held by many locally against women
shelter Marib from corrosive central state politics.28 As they have established tribal ties and some degree of social working outside the home mean
a whole, the tribal influence is a mix of progressive and affinity or trust, which seems to influence choices in shelter this project is new and strange for
conservative tendencies which has a historic precedent arrangements.31 This pattern can be seen in the way that some people...the word ‘cafe’ can be
for generations in which tribes of the north and east exert Marib’s tribes have helped IDPs by sharing their unused associated with negative ideas and
a more laissez-faire, light touch governance approach to (less valuable land) to support temporary settlements and convictions … every new idea will have
social but emphasized social influence instead. The tribes shelters and other resources needed. IDPs who came its supporters and opponents,”
of Marib were described as “indirectly regulating social from outside the governorate are reportedly viewed by host
behavior”29 in lieu of establishing sophisticated institutions communities as competitors for jobs, housing, education - Um feras, founder of the morning icon
with a modernizing agenda. Tribes are credited with backing and health facilities32 though our survey revealed that this cafe
and facilitating various social policies--being supportive of may be shifting to a less contentious relationship. There is a
reforms which benefit vulnerable groups and working with strong social media advocacy base of support for IDPs, as
the government to enable space for civil society groups to represented by the hashtag created by activists in Marib to
emerge. Research in other regions of Yemen has shown raise awareness for IDPs in Marib as it fell under increasing
that development programs are often in competition with Houthi attacks last spring. To convey and the criticality 2. Women And Shifting Gender Norms In The
local hierarchies and social norms. (See Cultural Heritage of maintaining Marib as the last safe haven for those who Conflict
section on Asabiyya and Social Cohesion). have experienced multiple displacements there was an On the one hand, women in Marib are bound by stricter
extensive campaign for #Yemen_IDP_ Lives Matter.33 gender norms typically associated with conservatism which
is more prevalent in rural areas of Yemen.34 This meant
that women were subject to early marriage (considered
a problem “among IDPs”) and were considered unable to
protect themselves against harassment in public due to
28 The tribes in Marib still maintain their old patriarchal system of earned leadership and respect of kinship-based hierarchical authority. Years of neglect in their areas left them with limited economic options, and successive governments dealt with them as a pariah and land of lawlessness.
Employing the “weapons of the weak” of protest, road closures, kidnappings and sabotage (as with Safer pipelines and siding with AQ elements in the 1990s could be seen as primitive behavior justifying its stigmatization but logically, when Marib’s tribes received almost none of the revenue from its oil
and gas wealth from Sanaa prior to 2011, and had limited access to political means of recourse. When presented with new policies and incentives, Marib’s tribal system snapped into quite a different mode taking on a huge volume of IDPs, and making halting steps toward gender equity.
29 UN Habitat Profiling Team Interview, June 2020
30 UN Habitat Profiling Team Interview, June 2020
31 Sana’a Center and Oxford Research Group, “Local Visions for Peace in Marib”, 1 August 2019, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/mainpublications/7903
32 Sana’a Center, January 2019, quoted in ACAPS, “Marib Governorate”.
33 Mareb Press, “5 ,”‫ حملة الكترونية للضغط على األمم المتحدة والمنظمات الدولية إليقاف الهجوم على مأرب على غرار ما حدث في الحديدة وتساؤالت عن سر الصمت الدولي‬September 2020, https://marebpress.org/news_details.php?sid=166962
34 Nathalie Peutz, Islands of Heritage: Conservation and Transformation in Yemen. Yemen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018).
31
Marib Outreach to Local Muhamasheen

traditional “seclusion” roles enforced in society. But, on the Elderly and People with Disabilities
other hand, women are more involved in public institutions A breakdown of the number of elderly residents of Marib Marib was included in ethnographic research
and more involved in the workforce. As noted in focus is not known at this time. However, Recent research has (2015-2017) of Muhamasheen communities
groups conducted35, women were generally positive about demonstrated that the elderly remain uniquely vulnerable which identified the same trends in discrimina-
new economic roles and opportunities, and more women and challenging for services to access. The mental health tion (noted to be worst in Marib in the areas of
are going to university than before. and psycho-social well-being of the elderly has notably education, housing, ……)
deteriorated with ongoing conflict.39 Advocacy groups seen on a national level. Marib’s strong tribal
The greatest source of tension residents mentioned was have identified approximately 1.65 million older people in identity may help somewhat mitigate the dis-
increased tension between husbands and wives due to Yemen as being in need of humanitarian assistance. Of crimination. According to tribal urf policies, it is
women becoming breadwinners in Marib, there is a high these, 50% are older women and over 60% of the older an obligation to protect weaker and more vulner-
proportion of female-headed households among the men surveyed are unable to access healthcare. The able people from violence. There are numerous
displaced.36 Women are more included in public roles but situation is further worsened by more than 95% not having inherent contradictions as tribal leadership are
still generally excluded from decision making or positions access to healthcare, struggling to access information also obligated to ensure the needs of their mem-
of authority. The flip side of that was that women were sources. bers are met first.
becoming increasingly important in conflict resolution at Most recently, Marib’s governor launched a proj-
various levels of society. Participants in the discussions also Data on the number of people living with a disability is ect to house over 100 Muhamasheen families in
discussed increased incidents of gender-based violence, not available. There are currently no disability-focused Al-Jufaynah camp. Some houses have already
early marriage and women’s mobility being restricted by response initiatives in Marib. Some people with disabilities been completed and families have begun to
heightened insecurity. Many women have taken on new reportedly must rent apartments in Marib city because move into the new houses and received food
roles and responsibilities, primarily due to the injury or the the displacement sites are dangerous are “unsuitable for and financial assistance, while construction of
absence of men. And while these changes for some women them.”40 other units is ongoing. The project includes the
have been empowering, for others they are an additional provision of water tanks, power supply and sani-
burden.37 Women and children make up three-quarters of The Muhamasheen are most visibly marginalized of all of tation for the housing complex.
the displaced. And one-fifth of households of IDPs and host Marib’s social groups are the Muhamasheen. These Yemenis The Governor said these housing units provided
communities are headed by girls younger than 18 years of of mixed African and Arab origin are distinguished by their by the local authority Marib’s framework to ad-
age.38 relatively darker skin color and shared heritage which dates dress the welfare needs of the most vulnerable
back to the (Ethiopiam) Aksum Kingdom (around 550 AD). The for citizens, and to provide the necessary living
Muhamasheen are “virtually segregated” throughout Yemen conditions to facilitate their social integration
and the subject of systemic discrimination, though Marib’s into society.1
35 Heinze and Stevens conducted interviews and discussion sessions in Marib, Taizz and Lahj. . Marie-Christine Heinze and Sophie Stevens, Women as Peacebuilders in Yemen (Sana’a: Yemen
Polling Center and Social Development Direct, 2018), http://www.sddirect.org.uk/ media/1571/sdd_yemenreport_full_v5.pdf
36 ACAPS, “Marib Governorate - Marib city and Marib Al Wadi District profile (19 November 2020)” https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/marib-governorate-marib-city-and-marib-al-wadi-district-pro-
file-19-november-2020
37 Heinze and Stevens, “Women as Peacebuilders in Yemen”.
38 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Yemenis displaced by conflict now face threats of looming famine”, 11 December 2020, www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/brief-
ing/2020/12/5fd337994/yemenis-displaced-conflict-face-threats-looming-famine.html
39 Relief and Development Peer Foundation, “Children Are Hungry for Education”, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-mental-health-and-psychosocial-support-monthly-report-ju-
ly-2020
40 ACAPS, “Marib Governorate - Marib city and Marib Al Wadi District profile (19 November 2020)” https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/marib-governorate-marib-city-and-marib-al-wadi-district-pro-
1 http://marib-gov.com/nprint.php?lng=english&sid=2833
file-19-november-2020
government appears to be taking initial steps to address knowledge, experience, or social status. Muhamasheen Man’s Employment Experience
their welfare needs, such as with the governor’s opening of in Marib
a new Muhamasheen housing project.41 According to law all Although the Muhamasheen are well integrated in terms
Yemeni citizens are considered equal, but the institutional of language and social habits and they remain distinct “I was transported through Yemen by smugglers I had
discrimination against this group remains systemic. The from African migrants. They were deprived historically paid to help me reach the UAE or KSA. I was initially
status of the Muhamasheen demonstrates how informal from accessing land ownership, and thus remained offered work as a mercenary, but feared for my life.
mechanisms continue that exclude those deemed to be outside any tribal affiliation. They also rarely socialized Once I ended up in Marib, I finally felt safe. I started
of “low status” from accessing the protection of the police or intermarried with Yemenis of lighter skin color which working in Marib to save the 1200 dollars needed to be
and the law, agricultural land, as well as attending school perpetuated their descent-based marginalization. As a smuggled over the border. Work is available and pays
and running for public office.42 Through these exclusionary result, a de facto appartheid system of exclusion and well, as long as you don’t mind living in a shed with
mechanisms, low status groups are rendered invisible to property ‘red lining’ of Mohamasheen communities are dozens of other migrants.
service providers, employers, judges, politicians, as well relegated to informal settlements scattered around Yemeni I do not know of any other migrants fighting now. In any
as international donors and development agents. Many urban areas, surrounded with fences and locked gates. case, those Muhamasheen who have been recruited
negative, racially motivated stereotypes have been used to These gated communities on the fringe of town further by the tribes in Taez and Mukalla end up working as
justify institutional exclusion and even violence against the entrench the marginalization and drove recent generations servants for the tribal fighters, or at best they use them
Mohamasheen.43 to Yemen’s major urban areas such as Sana’a, where they as workers to fortify or dig trenches.
can access low paying jobs and have greater personal
Those of darker skin color who fall outside of the tribal freedom than in more provincial communities. The Working as a laborer in Marib pays less yet it’s safer. I
federations have been relegated to a “caste-like” status caste-based discrimination of the al-Muhamsheen is so have given up on going to the Gulf. I have seen many of
known as al-Muhamasheen (the marginalized), more akin normalized and institutionalized that it has rarely featured our friends who went there get deported and brought
to Dalit (untouchables) than to a classic apartheid society. into public debates or political dialogues, and is rarely back to Marib after a few months. Many also died on
This is why IDPs are technically ascribed more rights within championed by many local advocacy groups through there the way or the smugglers took advantage of them then
Marib than al Muhamasheen and this also means that IDPs has been growing international mobilization44 to redress never helped them cross. My hope now is to work for
are relatively far less vulnerable than the Muhamasheen. the significant welfare gap between average Yemenis and a company that serves an oil field. There, you can earn
Comparatively, IDPs have been able to carve out privileged the excluded al Akhdam.45 The Mohamasheen number as 150 dollars a month. They cover all meals, plus they
roles for themselves, especially those who come with many as 3 million according to some estimates. Salih’s offer sleeping space and bathing facilities as if you are
living in your home. I also know how to drive but these
41 Yemen, Marib Governorate, “Marib Governor Launches Accommodation Project for 102 IDPs Families”, 28 December 2020, http://marib-gov.com/nprint.php?lng=english&sid=2833 types of jobs are not usually offered to Muhamasheen.
42 Before the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic and the PDRY in the early 1960s, marginalized groups included members of low status groups mazayina (barbers, musicians,
healers, heralds), ahl al-Suq (people of the market), atraf (the marginal), nuqas (the deficient), and khadam (servants) were not permitted to own land, bear arms, or marry with tribesmen and the My current employer in a construction site has worked
sada. Elham Manea, “Yemen, the Tribe and the State”, paper presented to the International Colloquium on Islam and Social Change at the University of Lausanne, 10–11 October 1996. in Saudi for decades and he hires a lot of Africans
43 Equal Rights Trust, From Night to Darker Night Addressing Discrimination and Inequality in Yemen, The Equal Rights Trust Country Report Series: 9 (London: Stroma Ltd, 2018), pp.
21–29, www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Yemen_EN_online%20version.pdf. Afra Nasser, Yemen researcher at Human Rights Watch, recently stated that “Yemen’s caste system put and Muhamasheen who speak the same language
Al-Muhamasheen at the very bottom of the social hierarchy...Their suffering has only worsened since war broke out. It’s like hell on Earth.” AFP, “Black Yemenis Remain in Shadows, Far from Global which is very good. Given the risks on the way for us
Protests”, France24, 16 July 2020, www.france24.com/en/20200716-black-yemenis-remain-in-shadows-far-from-global-protests.
44 The International Dalit Solidarity Network has worked in coordination with UN treaty bodies to combat de facto discrimination against the Muhamasheen community and drafted the and the many stories of death and youths being taken
following letter calling for national abolition of the apartheid system to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, advantage of, I thank God I am lucky enough to be in
“General Recommendation on Descent-Based Discrimination”, International Dalit Solidarity Network, 22 August 2002, https://idsn.org/wp-content/uploads/user_folder/pdf/New_files/UN/CERD_
GR29.pdf Marib with a good boss.”
45 From 2015-2017 the largest field research of the Muhamasheen (N=6,143) was conducted by the Equal Rights Trust, finding that discrimination occurred across multiple different
domains and confirming that Afro-Arab communities self-identifying as Muhamasheen remain the lowest ranking group in Yemen’s social hierarchy and bear all characteristics of a caste system
perpetuated by the relative colour of their skin impacting the following areas: Discriminatory violence, Freedom of residence and movement; Fair trials and access to justice; Right to privacy; Free-
dom of opinion and expression; Freedom of association; Freedom of Assembly; Marriage and family life; Education; Employment; Social security and social services, and so forth.
33
government attempted to dismantle one of their major which is at least signalling that Marib seeks to have a better instinctively migrant-friendly environment than the fact
slums around Sana’a, and in 2015 moved hundreds of track record than the government in Sana. that many marriages happened between the resident
thousands of al-Muhamsheen from their gated community tribal community and the incoming IDPs. Although rarely
into small residential units built by the state. The pre-conflict As the access through western Governorates became exceeding caste barriers (especially among the Ashraaf),
government also stimulated their integration by subsidizing constrained, more migrants are arriving to Marib aiming marriages across tribal and rural/urban affiliations were
an education and higher-education programme specifically to reach oil-rich countries in the north and the east, and a great indicator of a dynamic society, who saw in the
designed for this marginalized group, and these efforts they often end up in Marib’s slums and camps. Moreover, displacement crisis a gift to revisit many of the social norms
were mostly successful. many Yemenis repatriated from Saudi Arabia in 2015 and ideas.
many of which chose to settle in and around Marib.47 So
The war put the Muhamsheen at a still greater disadvantage. far, the numbers cited by the local government have not Several key informants and media accounts expressed
Although most did not join the fighting, they mostly lost been independently corroborated by UN organisations, similar sentiments. There is no more robust factor for making
their jobs and were thus forced to dislocate. While the although the trek for African migrants starting their journey Marib attractive to IDPs who continue to unfortunately
capacity of Sana’a to hire them in low-paying municipal in the ports of Bosaso and Obock has been noticed and depart their origin areas, other than this hospitality and
jobs was significantly reduced, thousands of them fled to acknowledged.48 liberal working environment, which also contributed to the
the “legitimacy controlled”46 areas and especially Marib. city’s security, guarded by its hosting situation.49 IDPs
Travelers on the roads leading to Marib can see their tented Relaxing of Strict Social divisions and hierarchies in continued to arrive to Marib in 2020, most noticeably
settlements along the road, living under severe conditions Marib’s new chapter as a host city? were the following incidents.50 During 2020, approximately
and absence of basic services. They however are filling The in-group/out-group conceptions of social status were 36K IDPs (6,008 households) arrived in Marib city, mostly
thousands of municipal jobs in the governorate and the challenged and effectively reversed when Marib became a from regional hotspots, but at least 315 households were
city of Marib, which is underreporting their numbers, both key hosting destination for displaced northerners, including displaced within Marib as a result of the August flooding. IDP
in formal housing and hosting areas. To a certain degree, many from urban centers. The profile of these IDP arrivals arrivals spiked in March and April 2020, mainly as a result of
the city of Marib’s growth has reached a point at which it is to Marib challenged the stereotypes of IDPs and refugees the intensive fighting in al-Jawf, but also due to the fighting
dependent upon a large pool of low-paying day laborer jobs. as many were comparatively wealthier and had more in Lahj, Dhale’e, Hudaydah and Sana’a. Most of the 1500
The Muhamasheen have filled many of the low-wage jobs professional education, cultural exposure, and other forms IDPs (250 households) who arrived in April came from Aden,
like a permanent guest worker class and along with IDPs of social capital than the local residents. Hosting and following the Southern Transitional Council declaration of
staffing public jobs, constitute the bulk of the workforce hospitality created new social stereotypes within Marib. autonomous administration. Slowed displacement since
behind the city’s expanding construction and services. The city now is seen by the new population as a welcoming mid-May and during June and July might be attributed to
Social media posts indicate that the rights and exploitation place for people of all backgrounds, and for their businesses the impact of coronavirus on the priorities of the fighting
of the al-Muhamasheen is on the radar of local government, too. No other fact demonstrates the welcoming, almost forces, as well as the severe impact of the flooding incidents
46 The “Legitimacy” Bloc in Yemeni politics refers to the IRG Yemeni government backed by the Saudi-led coalition by the majority of the international community (outside of the Iranian axis powers) supporting the exiled IRG president, who remains the main symbol of the legitimacy and the
coalition’s justification for war.
47 Since the 1990s transnational migration movements have been constrained by the national security agendas of Saudi Arabia. Following commencement of the War on Terror in 2002, transnational mobility in the region has come to be viewed suspiciously, or used as political leverage, by
regional states. In practice, restrictions have resulted in migration becoming undocumented. Undocumented migrants have increased in number despite efforts by Ethiopian and Saudi governments to deter migration. Fargues, Philippe, Shah, Nasra M. (editor/s), Migration to the Gulf : policies in sending
and receiving countries, Jeddah ; Geneva ; Cambridge : European University Institute, Gulf Research Center, 2018, pp. 252. Because these activities have gone underground, human rights violations have increased and in the past five years, abduction and torture of migrants transiting through Yemen
has increased. “Forced and economic migration are connected in Yemen, as the country plays a strategic role in the migration of migratory and trafficking flows between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.” pp. 267 Thiollet. Helene Thiollet. From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis: The Changing
Dynamics of Contemporary Migration in Yemen. Helen Lackner. Why Yemen Matters. Saqi Books, pp. 265-285, 2014.
48 IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), “Flow Monitoring Points | Migrant Arrivals and Yemeni Returns _ January - June 2020”, 2020, https://displacement.iom.int/system/tdf/reports/YE-Migrants_FMR_%20Biannual%20Dashboard_%20January%20to%20June%202020_0.pdf?file=1&-
type=node&id=9507
49 Al Arabiya, “16 ,”‫ استمرار الهجوم على مأرب غير مقبول ويقوض فرص السالم‬:‫ غريفثس‬July 2020,https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/amp/arab-and-world/yemen/2020/07/16/%D8%BA%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%AB%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D
9%87%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%88%D8%B6-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-
50 ring 2020, Marib was consistently the leading hosting destination in Yemen, accounting for exactly 50% of the hosted IDPs until August. IOM DTM, “Flow Monitoring Points”.
Strongly Disagree 5% You are satisfied with the quality of education services in the city
DK/DWTA disagree
Somewhat
80 14%
DK/DWTA
Strongly Disagree
Safety and respsect DK/DWTA
Strongly disagree Somewhat disagree Native resident of Marib
Strongly Disagree city - per age group Strongly Disagree
Somewhat
g the economic
agree
hardship
60 36% DK/DWTA
I feel more respected in Marib than the area I came from or other places I visit
Somewhat
Strongly disagreefor the
agree
somewhat disagree Somewhat agree Native resident of Marib
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat disagree
34
Somewhat agree
40 20%
16-24 F Strongly agree DK/DWTA Completely unsatisfied
Marib
Somewhat Urban Profile
agree
Somewhat agree
M Strongly Disagree IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods 5% DK/DWTA
Strongly agree IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Strongly agree
25-35 25%
20
DK/ DWTA F Strongly agree Somewhat disagree 14% Satisfied

M Strongly disagree
23% IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps
0 Very satisfied
Strongly disagree Female
36-60
Male
F
Somewhat agree Marginalized and African migrants
36%
somewhat disagree
Strongly agree
Somewhat disagree M Marginalized and African migrants 0% 20%
10%
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
I feel
More more
than F
60 respected in Marib than the area I came from or other places I visit, by gender Somewhat agree
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Somewhat agree
3%
nd should be considered to form the future of the I feel safe and welcomedMin most places in Marib 25% Strongly agree
100 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Strongly agree
SCORECARD - Social Cohesion
100
DK/DWTA
DK/DWTA
You are satisfied with the quality of education services in the city
DK/DWTA 80 Strongly Disagree
80 Strongly
Somewhat Disagree
disagree I feel more respected in Marib than the area I came from or
Strongly Disagree
sagree Strongly disagree In the Marib
Urban Scorecard
DK/DWTA 60
survey when participants between
Somewhat 16 and 24) had the lowest sense of security and Native resident of MaribImy
Somewhat disagree
agree
feel
other
I can
I feel moreaccess
skin places
different
respected opportunities
in Marib
I visitstatus)
or my social
than the in Marib,
area regardless
I came from or of my places
other
DK/DWTA appearances (such
I visit, by as the color of
gender
Somewhat disagree 60
VID-19 were asked whether they feel40their voices heard and they in the city, I thinkfreedom
As a citizen that my voice
Somewhat ofagree
movement.
matters and should be considered to form the future of the Completely unsatisfied
Somewhat agree city - per demographic group Strongly agree 100
DK/DWTAunsatisfied
disagree
Strongly agree
matter for the future of the 20city. Echoing findings from 40
Strongly agree IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
Somewhat
DK/DWTA
DK/DWTA Strongly
Satisfied Disagree
fieldwork conducted in 2018 20 by various researchers1, When asked about the sense of respect residents feel in
Native resident of Marib F 80 Strongly Disagree
DK/ DWTA
5% 0 M Strongly Disagree IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Somewhat
Very satisfied
Somewhat disagree
disagree
Absent respondents who felt mostly 0disenfranchised
IDPs living in the city's
Female
traditional neighbourhoods
were
Male
F
adult Marib compared to other places in Yemen, IDPs respondents
living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods 60
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Poor females (age 36 to 60), as well asFemale junior females Male
M (age 16 expressed agreement with this notion (36% strongly
Marginalized and African migrants 40
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Strongly agree
to 24). The sense ofIDPs representation also featured
living in slums, informal settlements or camps F strongly agreed, and only 14% strongly disagreed), with the
43%
0%
20 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Average II feel Strongly agree
into the responses of the males feel Isafe
can and
access different
inopportunities
M in Marib
Marib, regardless of my appearances (such as the color of
my who are native residents males in the different age groups leaning to a positive
welcomed most places in Marginalized and African migrants
Marginalized skin
andor my social
African migrantsstatus)
F
Strong
of Marib, perhaps as a result 100 of the strong role of the perception than females. Respondents were split in half
0
M 0% 10%Female 20% 30% 40% 50% Male60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
DK/DWTA
tribes in decision-making and 80
wealth distribution rules. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% however
DK/DWTA
60% 70% 80% in their evaluation of access to equal opportunity
90%
Strongly Disagree
100%
sagree Strongly disagree The
DK/DWTA marginalized groups and African migrants felt the (regardless
Strongly Disagree of cultural or tribal affiliation, or displacement
Somewhat disagree
I feel I can access different opportunities in Marib, regardless of my appearances (such as the color o
I feel safe and welcomed in most places in Marib
60 my skin or my
Satisfaction social
with the status)
basic state services (mail, internet, real estate registration, permits, etc.)
most disenfranchised
IDPs living (both males and females) followed
in the city's traditional neighbourhoods status),
Somewhat
Somewhat with
agreethe marginalized demographic group and
disagree I feel safe and welcomed in most places in Marib
ddisagree by the
necessary resources to protect people from IDPs living in camps.
40
African
Stronglymigrants
Somewhat agree
agree having the lowest perception of access Native resident of Marib 100 DK/DWTA
DK/DWTA
DK/DWTA
s masks, medical stations, awarenessDue to access limitations 20 and working within the
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps
campaigns)? to opportunity. Native residents and IDPs in camps wereNative resident of Marib 80
Strongly agree Strongly Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Completely unsatisfied
parameters approved
Marginalized and Africanby the 0local government,
migrants ouragree
Strongly the Somewhat the agree most satisfied
Somewhat demographic
disagree groups with
Strongly disagree DK/DWTAIDPsthe access
living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat disagree
Somewhat disagree
Somewhat
Marib Urban Scorecard Survey focused
Female
on urban Male
sectors to opportunity. IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods 60
Somewhat
agree
agree
DK/ DWTA
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Satisfied
Strongly agree
and functionality. We approached the questionStrongly of shifting
agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps
40
Strongly agree
Very satisfied
24%
31% Strongly disagreegender by seeking to first establish a
I feel I can access baseline of trust
different opportunities in Marib, regardless of my appearances (such as the color of
Marginalized and African migrants 20
my skin or my social status)
Somewhat disagree through ongoing relationship and recurring Strongly interactiondisagree DK/DWTA Marginalized and African migrants
0% 0 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Somewhat agree or the creation of a “safe space” setting
to cleanfor exchange of 0% 10%Female
Access drinking water per demographic group 20% 30% 40% 50% Male60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
DK/DWTA
Strongly agree
sensitive personal and familial information.
Strongly Disagree
Perception of Respect as a Present Resident of Marib Compared to other I Ifeel I can access
Satisfaction access
feel I can with
different
thedifferent
basic opportunities
state ininternet,
services (mail,
opportunities
Marib,
in Marib,
regardless
real estate
regardless
ofappearances
my
registration,
of my permits,
(suchetc.)
as the colo
Somewhat disagree appearances (such as the color of my skin or my social status)
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Places
DK/ DWTA
As a citizen in the city, I think
my skin or my social status) that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of th
Local understandings Nativeof peace could be understood
residents Somewhat agree city
Strongly disagree
through a broad human security framework emphasizing
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Strongly agree
DK/DWTA
DK/DWTA
Somewhat disagree DK/DWTA
basic services and jobs. Efforts by women to address poor
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Native resident
Native resident of
of Marib
Marib Completely unsatisfied
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Marginalized and African migrants Somewhat agree Strongly
living conditions, livelihoods and
IDPs living in camps
humanitarian needs are IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
Somewhat disagree
Somewhat disagree
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Strongly agree IDPs living
IDPs living in
in the
the city's
city's traditional
traditional neighbourhoods
neighbourhoods
Satisfied
understood as contributions to peace and stability. Somewhat
Somewhat agree
agree
- females
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Very satisfied
The Marginalized and Afican migrants IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Strongly agree
agree
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Strongly
males to access jobs

As a hosting city with a high 0% 10%number of 50%
20% 30% 40% potentially
60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Marginalized and African migrants
Marginalized
Marginalized and
and African
African migrants
vulnerable female IDPs (one inAccess four todisplaced
clean drinkingfamilies is
water per demographic group
migrants
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
a women-headed household), the Marib urban scorecard

0%
0% 10% 20%
10% 20% 30%
30% 40%
40% 50%
50% 60%
60% 70%
70% 80%
80% 90%
90% 100%
100%
questions focused on shedding light on public perceptions As a citizen in the city, I think my voice matters
As a citizen in the city, I think that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of th
DK/ DWTA of whether or not the city was a safe and welcoming DK/ DWTA
city
4% Native residents
Strongly disagreeplace. Respondents to our survey generally reflected on
Strongly disagree
Access to clean drinking water per demographic group
Somewhat disagree
the positive
IDPs living in thesecurity
city's traditionalsituation
neighbourhoods in the city which has been
Somewhat agree Strongly Disagree
34% progressively improving since the beginning of 2020.
Somewhat agree IDPs living in camps Strongly agree Somewhat disagree
Women over 60 reported feeling the least safe, however, IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
DK/ DWTA
Strongly agree Native residents Somewhat agree
in contrastThewith their
Marginalized male
and Afican peers who had the opposite
migrants
Strongly disagree
Strongly agree
feeling. Overall, female and0% male 10% 20% adolescents
30% 40% 50% 60% (age
70% 80% 90% 100% IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat disagree
Marginalized and African migrants Somewhat agree
1 Marie-Christine Heinze and Sophie Stevens, “Women as Peacebuilders
males to access jobs per gender IDPs living in camps Strongly agree
in Yemen” (Yemen Polling Center and Social Development Direct, 2018), http://www. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
sddirect.org.uk/ media/1571/sdd_yemenreport_full_v5.pdf
FIGURE 19. Perception of fairness, respect and opportunity inAfican
The Marginalized and Mareb migrants
DK/ DWTA 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree
35
on many governorates during August. Social Inclusion and Vulnerable Groups

Marib has demonstrated the art of the possible for
In Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula more broadly, the reconciliation, NDC-guided decentralization paired with ” (Displaced households) from the
tribe (qabila) is the fundamental building block of social long-term efforts to support state-building through natural northern governorates feared that they
structures.51 Tribes adhere to the Sunni (Shafii) Islam or resource revenue sharing agreement, as well as a degree of would not be accepted in the southern
Shiite (Zaidi) Islam. have been described as representing stability between government, civil society and the tribes. governorates. Despite Marib’s reputation
the “best” and the “worst” of Yemen’s political revolutions, This responsiveness of local leadership to public needs as a lawless, vindictive and uncivilized
but, in many respects the same can be said of governments and civil society mobilization seems to have emerged from territory, they found our doors open. After
in Yemen and it is just a question of whether it is the state or Marib’s own process of integrating lessons learned from all, we are nomads, proud Arab tribes, and
tribes who wield the local monopoly of force or violence.52 past conflicts. This makes the city a singular case study we cherish our generosity and tradition of
The case of Marib demonstrates the many generative and of how urban recovery can model ways to interrupt the offering refuge to fugitives.
constructive ways that tribes can function under the right violence and conflict cycles that have plagued Yemen’s
conditions. modern history. - UN Habitat Profiling Team Interview with
regional tribal leader, June 2020
While most tribal identities have been subject to massive It has been a long journey for Marib. Previously lacking
changes and upheavals, family-based networks of pre- either agricultural wealth or political clout, the way that
modern societies naturally morph and adapt when grafted Marib progressed, the primary grievances voiced by Marib’s
into urban, modern contexts, the fundamental socio-cultural population in the early 2000s were rooted in the lack of
aspects of tribal structures persist. In daily life, the lines stability, security, and representative civil society and
between tribal affiliation, trade cartels, militias, and the state governance. Because of the accountability mechanisms
are semi-permeable but remain rooted in common shared of tribes, the relative local peace on the ground points to cross-community support and trust, consensus-seeking
stories and references to past lineage, such as the Qahtan, underlying levels of equality and justice (though measuring policymaking accountable to the people.54
who claim to be descendants of the family of Noah.53 These and quantifying evidence of these categories in income
confederations of tribes mostly sought to settle in certain disparity and discriminatory practices is outside of the As the scorecard responses reflected, Marib has made
areas and almost completely abandoned the nomadic scope of this profile’s research) there are multiple signs noteworthy progress in overcoming patriarchal gender
lifestyle. This feature allowed these tribes to create early that point to promising trends in Marib’s current baseline. barriers in support of women’s advancement. It is
agricultural civilizations in South Arabia, centuries before Despite the increasing threat of the conflict engulfing Marib, laudable but not without its own potential risks. As Marib’s
any other part of Arabia took measures to statehood. many report evidence of goodwill, mutual aid networks, policymakers walk the fine line of being progressive while
51 To address the semantics and politics of representation in the fraught and loaded term ‘tribe’, for the purposes of this profile we distinguish between family and state.The usage of the term ‘tribe’ inliterature of the Middle East is a loaded and contentious topic within the field of social anthro-
pology. The discipline has sought to distance itself from colonial origins, in particular the social evolutionary concept of ‘tribal’ as a primitive or less advanced stage in the teleological progress of civilization. Many scholars influenced the move of anthropology to abandon use of the term ‘tribe’ altogether.
By discontinuing the use of the terms, tribe and tribalism, we assert that previous research into the influence of tribalism in the form of kinship network in social and political life of Yemen (and the broader Middle East) must still be of value. With these caveats in place, the authors of this profile attempt
to bridge the gap in have found the term “tribe” has been misapplied and used as such a broad brush to describe various cultures and geographies as to be rendered nearly contexts throughout the world that the word has been rendered nearly meaningless as an analytical term. However, for anthro-
pologists in the Middle East, there is no way to avoid the phenomenon of tribalism. From, Peter Ekeh, “Social anthropology and two contrasting uses of tribalism in Africa.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 32, no. 4 (1990): 660-700 and Talal Asad, “The idea of an anthropology of Islam.” Qui
parle17, no. 2 (2009): 1-30).
52 For example, both the state and tribes have used violence to coerce the other into acting in their interests. In the case of the Mutawakili Kingdom (1911-1961), the state used its legitimacy over tribal “subjects” by creating hierarchical divisions between al-Ashraf and non-Ashraf families, and
Imam Yahya kept a brother or head of the tribe (Sheikh) hostage in Sana’a as leverage on the issues of taxation, tribal rebellions, and so forth. The tribal relative would be assassinated if the tribes did not comply with the wishes of the kingdom. Tribes, in turn, sabotaged pipelines, blocked roads or
kidnapped foreigners to extort funds from the government.
53 Helen Chapin Metzed.. Persian Gulf States: Country Studies, 3rd edn. (London:: Library of Congress-Federal Research Division, 1994) pp. 37-38; Fathel Abu Ghanem and Ali Ahmed, The Tribal Structure in Yemen: Between Continuance and Change, In Arabic, 2nd ed., Sana’a: Dar Al-Hikmah Al
Yemania, 1991, p. 89.
54 Molyneux, Camilla. “Made in Marib: A Local Response to Instability and Violence,” Oxford Research Group, October 2020, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/made-in-marib-a-local-response-to-instability-and-violence; Nagi, Ahmed, “Rising Above the Conflict,” Carnegie Middle East Center,
July 31, 2020, https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/07/31/marib-yemen-rising-above-conflict-pub-79593; Nagy, Ahmed, “Marib, Yemen: Rising Above the Conflict” July 31, 2019, https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/07/31/marib-yemen-rising-above-conflict-pub-79593); Salisbury, Peter, “Behind the Frontlines in
also not violating values and beliefs defining norms for gender norms in ways that the tribes may not directly
Marib’s traditional social values held by key stakeholders. support but are also not actively protesting. There is
It is important to factor sensitivities and potential cultural growing evidence of women wearing recognizable tribal
landmines of identity politics into the social infrastructure abayas attending events in public, attending school, visiting
aspect of planning within the city. This will require a careful Marib’s amusement park, shopping mall, and even making
appraisal of where Marib is today and the attitudes people fledgling inroads into the workforce. It is also important to
feel towards its more progressive social reforms. How can note that Marib’s tribes have maintained close relationships
Marib’s civil society-tribe hybrid serve to create a community with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but the
inoculation to cycles of violence reveal the positive social degree to which this has influenced social policy requires
contract the government and the tribes can maintain within further exploration. Findings thus far reflect the prevailing
the context of Marib’s relative autonomy. attitudes shaping social capital and in-group/out-group
categorization in Marib reflects numerous anomalies and
Shifting Tribal and Social Norms inherent contradictions.
Intangible but consequential attitudes and choices, feelings
of trust and optimism in the midst of a devastating conflict
are an invisible driving force behind Marib’s unparalleled
growth. The ways that Marib’s customary codes, political
influence, and dispute resolution mechanisms influence
social protection and various groups in Marib is further
detailed in the Cultural Heritage section, with the caveat that
this only captures the superficial contours of embedded
social and cultural dynamics influencing the city’s growth
and development which merit further exploration and
research due to the significant role of Marib’s strong tribal
and civil society traditions in influencing government policy
and planning.55 Marib’s tribal precedent in the form of tribal
councils and consultative conflict resolution also played
an important role in Marib’s recent social developments,
but how the community defines vulnerability remains an
open question as it seems to be a persistent gap in conflict
research of Yemen.56
In Marib, the hosting situation seems to have relaxed
Yemen’s Marib,” International Crisis Group, April 17, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/behind-front-lines-yemens-marib

55 This adapts the idea of tribal norms influencing government decision making as a “pre-given set of rules or codes… that need to be unearthed (if not explicit) and identified as key mechanisms of the urban landscape which shape how governance and civil society emerge in parallel. (Wittek,
Rafael, Uwe Schimank, and Thomas Groß. "Governance–A sociological perspective." New forms of governance in research organizations. Springer, Dordrecht, 2007. 71-106.)
56 Mohammad al Sabahi and Fausto Aarya De Santis, “The Role of Cultural Norms and Local Power Structures in Yemen,” October, 2016 www.fmreveiew/org/community-protection; Reuters, “A Cafe in Yemen Run by Women, for Women”, 1 November 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-
security-cafe/a-cafe-in-yemen-run-by-women-for-women-idUSKBN27H1KN; [1] UTV Pakistan, “A Cafe in Yemen Run by Women, for Women”, 3 November 2020, https://utv.com.pk/a-cafe-in-yemen-run-by-women-for-women/
37
Adapted from qualitative research conducted with women in civil society or community organizing roles by Heinze and Stevens in
Marib, Tai’z and Lahij: Marie-Christine Heinze and Sophie Stevens, “Women as Peacebuilders in Yemen” (Yemen Polling Center and
Social Development Direct, 2018), http://www.sddirect.org.uk/ media/1571/sdd_yemenreport_full_v5.pdf; UNOCHA, “Yemen: 2018
Humanitarian Needs Overview” (United Nations OFfice for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, December 2017), https://
www.unocha.org/sites/ unocha/files/dms/yemen_humanitarian_needs_overview_ hno_2018_20171204.pdf; Gressmann, “From
FIGURE 20. Impact of the Conflict on Women’s Lives - comparison national trends with Marib the Ground up: Gender and Conflict Analysis in Yemen.”§
Sector National Trends Women in Marib

Economy Women are more economically active than they were before Women are in a number of industries, including the police.
the war, as men have been injured, killed or lost their jobs. This
has brought a sense of empowerment for women but has also
caused ten-sions between men and women, leading to more
domestic violence. There is a risk that positive changes will be
reversed once conflict ends if not proactively supported.
Religion Changes in the religious environ-ment have had particular ef- In Marib women do not report as many threats or violence as
fects on women, especially a rise in radical religious rhetoric and women do in other areas (such as Ta’iz and Lahj) but still report
greater influ-ence of Islamist actors. that changes in the religious environment and rises in radical
religious rhetoric and greater influence of Islamist actors has an
impact on their lives in terms of influencing their dress, increase
in Qur’an education sessions and lec-tures discussing what is
and is not permissible for women. Increase in radical rhetoric
opposing women working, style of dress or going out without a
guardian. (Many attribut-ed this to Islah Party control and influ-
ence on imams).
Humanitarian response Women are playing an essential role in delivering an impres- Greater focus on longer-term de-velopment work and in re-
sive local humanitarian response and sustain-ing community building basic services. Many women in Ma-rib are involved in
services and struc-tures, even under direct threat and with assessing needs in the community and collaborating with local
extremely limited resources. This is considered an acceptable, authorities to deliver ser-vices and aid. Particular discussion of
“natural” role for women in public life across Yemen, although supporting IDPs who have en-tered the area. Culture of compe-
the sig-nificance of their contributions is not always recognised ti-tion between NGOs described.
nor sufficiently supported, which women activists perceive as an
obstacle.
Conflict Resolution Women are engaged in resolving conflicts, promoting peace, In Marib the strongest positive im-pact of the war was the
and providing security in a limited way in some areas. This role for women in conflict mediation. Many positive stories of
includes directly mediating inter-tribal conflicts and conflicts women influenc-ing or negotiating agreements be-tween tribal
over public resources, working as police officers (a few in ur- groups, sometimes over resources (e.g. water). Wom-en capi-
ban centres), screening women at checkpoints, and supporting talising on local norms through symbolic acts to call for cease-
re-sistance fighters with food, money and moral support. fires/peace. Women helping at local checkpoints and fighting
highway robbery. Women police reported to be present in Ma’rib
city.
Participation in Government Women activists are often cooper-ating effectively with local In Marib there was generally a posi-tive picture of local govern-
govern-ance structures and local leaders are receptive to wom- ment continuing to operate and cooperate with women activists.
en’s involve-ment in public institutions, although women are still Some women presented in provincial government offices and
generally excluded from formal decision-making and political there is a proposal to move to a gender quota for women in
structures. government.
Urban Heritage
6 URBAN HERITAGE
AND SOCIAL COHESION
Culture as the entry point for urban planning Marib’s tangible cultural heritage
Marib’s ability to rise from devastation of Yemen’s war has Ancient Ecology and Social Origins
been studied from political, military and economic angles, Marib is considered the cradle of the oldest Arabian civilization,
but not from a cultural perspective in the limited literature the Kingdom of Saba (between 1200 BCE and 275 CE), with ‫لكل منا مأرب والمأرب االرب واالرب الحاجة او الحاجة‬
available. This profile explores the growing evidence base territory extending into northern Yemen. The Sabaean kings ‫الشديدة والبغية واالمنية يقال بلغ أربه ونال أربه أما مآرب‬
that sustainable development policies responsibly rooted built their capital near present-day Marib City, whose remains ‫فهى جمع مأرب وفيها اكثر من مأرب انها مجتمع الغايات‬
within the specific characteristics of their cultural contexts can still be seen in the Awwam and Barran temple ruins.4 Marib’s ‫واالهداف اما مأرب بكسر الراء فهى مدينة كانت باليمن اقيم‬
will yield more sustainable outcomes, and will improve status in its former era as the cultural capitalof Yemen and the ‫ سد مأرب‬:‫بها السد المشهور وهو‬
inclusion and reconciliation.”1 For a city with roots in one of center of the kingdom of Saba was directly tied to its location
the oldest civilizations on earth, it is importantto base the at a geographic crossroads home to highly prized incense. ” They say when a man has reached his
city’s future planning and development on its unique cultural The kingdom controlled the export of frankincense, which was goal, that is Marib. Marib is the meaning of
resources. This rich historic heritage can inspire opportunities used in temples from the far east to Rome. The area rose to where all purposes converge, all interests
for creativity in future planning. Marib has many advantages regional prominence as a storage area for aromatic resins and aspirations. It is the city in Yemen
in terms of natural resource wealth, a growing middle class gathered from the bark of myrrh and incense trees gathered
where the famous dam was built, the Marib
and a baseline of law and order. Marib’s most difficult urban from nearby valleys.5 The dynamism and international interest
dam.
challenges lie ahead and will require creative planning and in the incense trade as a commodity is even tied to expansionist
coordination to leverage the city’s cultural and historic legacies
to address looming urban growth problems.2 The following
drives from the Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian empires as
goods made the long journey to the Levant’s Mediterranean
- anonymous
section attempts to tease out some of these strands to spark coast for distribution to Egypt and beyond.6
discussion for Marib residents to build upon.
Marib’s central role in the incense trade so significant to pagan
As the site of the legendary Throne of Bilqis, historically linked belief systems may have also been the reason for it being the
the Sabaean kingdom. The temple was apparently dedicated
to the Queen of Shebaand the iconic Baran and Awwam site of one of the major temples of the region. The Awwam
to the moon god Almaqah, and is considered the finest
Temple ruins, Marib is considered one of the engineering temple of Marib, (Arabic: Haram Bilqis or Mahram Bilqis)
architectural achievement of the ancient Arab peoples. It was
wonders of the ancient world. Marib has been nominated as a was reportedly built by Mukarrib Yada`'il Dharih I between the
partially excavated by the American archaeologist Wendell
future UNESCO World Heritage Site.3 7th and 5th century BCE. The largest part of the temple is
Phillips and his expedition in the 1950s until tribal conflicts
occupied by an unguarded yard that is enclosed by a massive
abruptly halted the excavation.7 Today, the Awwam Temples’
stone wall with an irregular oval ground plan. On the inner wall
eight symmetrical pillars that have become the iconic symbol
of the hall were multiple inscriptions from the late period of
of Marib Governorate, seen on insignias and advertisements.
1 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “Culture as Source of Sustainable Development and Social Cohesion”, accessed 23 February 2021, https://en.unesco.org/news/culture-source-sustainable-development-and-social-cohesion-0
2 Charles Landry, The Creative City – A Toolkit For Urban Innovators (London: Earthscan, 2012); Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, and How It’s Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life (New York, Basic Books, 2002)
3 According to sources inside UNESCO, the archeological tel mound site of Marib including ruins in and around the city of Marib are on the tentative list since 2002 and is still considered for nomination.
4 In fieldwork conducted in 2019 by Ahmed Nagi of the Carnegie Middle East Center, the historic site was found in sad disrepair. Nagi noted: “Queen of Sheba, the Awam temple, and the old Marib Dam, which are the most famous monuments to ancient Yemeni civilizations...(were)abandoned
because of weak governance and tribal disputes over ownership, the sites are in bad condition. I could not even get close to the Awam temple because the road was buried by desert sand”. Nagi, Ahmed, “Marib, Yemen: Rising Above the Conflict”.
5 Miranda Morris, “The Harvesting of Frankincense in Dhofar, Oman”, in Profumi d’Arabia, Alessandra Avanzini, ed. (Rome: L’Erma Bretschneider, 1997), pp. 231–247. The growth in early settlements in southern Arabian peninsula was directly tied to the scarcity of incense found only in the Arabian
peninsula and isolated pockets of the western coast of Africa (van Beek, 1960).
6 Michaël Jasmin, “The Emergence and First Development of the Arabian Trade across the Wadi Arabah”, in Crossing the Rift. Resources, Routes, Settlement Patterns and Interaction in the Wadi Arabah, Levant Supplementary Series 3, P. Bienkowski and K. Galor, eds. (London: Oxbow Books,
2006), pp. 143–150.
7 In their haste to leave, Phillips and his colleagues had to abandon all their equipment and archaeological discoveries. The team’s written records were later incorporated into scholarly publications, including an archaeological report published by Johns Hopkins University Press. Phillips died before
he was able to return but almost a half-century later, in 1998, the government of Yemen invited Merilyn Phillips Hodgson to continue her brother’s work in Marib. National Museum of Asian Art, “Excavations”.
39
Influence of extenral powers Public Spaces General data

SCORECARD - Significance of Marib’s cultural urban uses over farming lands, gentrification, densification
External powers (such as other government or corpora-
heritage and building violations, degradation There are placesofintourist attractions),
the city that I like and enjoy due to
tions)and itspowers
use their preservation
to the disadvantage of the living their cultural or natural beauty (suh as parks, squares,
conditions for the residents. the Urban Scorecard suggests mosques, water that public
sources, etc.) support The temple has a pure abstraction and geometric forms
UNESCO describes culture as “the set of distinctive, spiritual, for preservation policies is likely, if framed around the Responders by age group
which can be seen even in contemporary Yemeni structures. Responde
material, intellectual and emotional features of a society or a preservation of cultural heritage. With such aspirations DK/DWTA 3%
Influence of extenral powers
social group that encompasses art Strongly
and literature, lifestyles, comes Public the greaterSpaces
ability to commit to making improvements TheDisagree
Strongly General data
vast wealth of Saba funded engineering marvels, among
8% agree
ways of living together, value to
IDPsquality oftraditional
life, but also with an eye on long-term recovery Somewhat disagree More than 60
them was the Marib Dam in the~8th Century BC. It is claimed
19% 13% systems, traditions and beliefs.” living in the city's neighbourhoods
Somewhat agree
External powers (such as other government or corpora-
Marib’s urban heritage can be viewed as the sum of socio- of theThere tourismare placessector.
in the city that I like and enjoy due to by some
Somewhat agree as the world’s oldest dam,
22% and was 32% one of the
36-60
tions) use their powers to the disadvantage of the living Somewhat disagree their cultural
informalor natural orbeauty
camps (suh as parks, squares,
engineering feats of the ancient world. The end of Marib’s
IDPs living in slums, settlements Strongly agree
cultural and historical values that have been interpreted
conditions for the residents. mosques, water sources, etc.) 25-35 49%
21% Strongly disagree The Marib Urban Scorecard Poll revealed highly supportive Respondents by gender
founding civilization was inextricably tied to the great dam,16-24
Responders by age group
as
and passed on39% by successive generations. Marib’s historic Marginalized and African migrants
sites are in a dialogue with its present DK/DWTA realities and both Native resident ofthe public placed high value on cultural 60% heritage.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% DK/DWTA
An
70% 80% 90% 100% illustrated by the3% apocryphal story of 44%
the disintegration ofthe
overwhelming majority (72%) of the respondents expressed
Marib
8%are exceptional andagree

Strongly worth appreciating so the best can be Strongly Disagree dam marking the flight of its prominent families throughout
19% preserved andSomewhat
not lost in the fog of war, like so many IDPs living other in support for Marib’s cultural heritage. This same
Somewhatmajority
disagree the Arabian peninsula.8 More than 60 Fem
13% agree
in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
of those surveyed expressed their appreciation Cultural heritage of agree

public
antiquities and traditional cultures that have often been Somewhat 22% 32%
36-60 Mal
Somewhat
If I could not
lost in conflict
disagree
get my needs from the state institutions, I spaces..
A majority of all social groups
I consider polled
the preservation unanimously
Strongly
of agree
Marib's cultural heritage an Three thousand years ago the former
25-35 byinhabitants
Respondents ofgroups
target population Marib Displaceme
can accesszones.
assisstanceUrban
from my heritage in the context of this
friends and neighbours important issue
49% 51%
21%
profile is broken down
Strongly
into
disagree
two categories: valued green spaces, parks, and public cultural events. There used the dam to create irrigated agriculture . They famously
39% who live in my area Marginalized and African migrants 16-24
DK/DWTA was 0% only marginal divergence of opinion
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 3%
among migrants made the edges 44% of the Yemeni desert bloom with beautiful 1
and IDPs (10% or less) who did not
100%
value these as highly as 20%
1) Tangible Cultural gardens until the dam burst centuries 26% later. The dam was
3%Heritage Strongly agree
Urban elements (infrastructure, morphology and built form, other, more essential urban 12% services. 7% Strongly agree the centerpiece of an irrigation system which archaeologists
12% Cultural heritage 21%
open and green 34%spaces); Architectural Somewhat agree
elements (buildings, 19%
Somewhat agree estimate went as far back as 1750 and 1700 BC to collect
If I could not get my needs from the state institutions, I
monuments) and intangible 20%elements.
Somewhat disagree I consider the preservation of Marib's cultural heritage an
I consider the preservation of Marib’s64%cultural heritage an important Somewhat
issue disagree water Respondents
from the Balaq Hills
by target by thegroups
population Wadi33%Adanah that would later
Displacement status
can access assisstance from my friends and neighbours important issue
who live in my area Strongly disagree Strongly disagree
become built up into the full dam structure in late 7th Century
2) Intangible Cultural 39% Heritage 3% 26% BC. According to legend and Quranic sources,9 a large mouse
DK/DWTA DK/DWTA 20% The Marginalized and Afican12% migrants Arr
The sum of what cultural traits make a people who they burrowed under
26% the Marib dam, loosening its foundations 24%
3% Strongly agree Arr
are and helps keep the heartbeat of community. A defining 12% 7% Strongly agree and causing the dam to collapse inIDPs theliving
lateinsixth
camps
century C.E,
12%
34% Somewhat agree
part of culture: the practices, representations, expressions, Somewhat agree near the birth date of Islam’s
21% prophet, IDPsMuhammad.
living in the city's 10 Prophet
traditional neighbourhoods Res
19%
knowledge,
20% skills
Somewhat – disagree
as well as the instruments, objects, Somewhat disagree Muhammad referred
33% to Marib as the center
Native of an early higher
residents 64%
64%
artefacts andStrongly cultural spaces associated therewith – that
disagree Strongly disagree 8 Some historians postulate that it was the cataclysmic collapse of the Marib
39% communities, Residents ingroups and,
the
DK/DWTA
city today in in some
are living peace andcases,
harmo-
ny regardless of tribal, cultural and social backgrounds
individuals 26% I consider the preservation of Marib's cultural heritage an
DK/DWTA
Dam led these peoples to migrate north (and spread their hydro, administrative and
The Marginalized and Aficanpeninsula.
migrants Arrived in the past 6 months only
important issue defense technologies throughout the Arabian As Islamic source Ibn
Current occupation Katheer
recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible recounted, the dam’s collapse may have been attributed to rats burrowing in it. The
IDPsthe
living in camps Arrived
Amer after
on the conflict started in 2
cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, collapse precipitated
DK/DWTA
migration of legendary Adnan tribal patriarch Amr bin
to Saudi Arabia (Yathrib), Jordan
in theand Oman. Other families left in the directionResident
of Oman.of Marib before the conflic
is constantly recreated 4% by communities and groups in
Strongly agree Native resident of Marib
9 Disagree
Strongly
IDPs living city's traditional
http://mquran.org/content/view/8350/2/
neighbourhoods
response to their environment, 14% theirSomewhat

interaction
agree with nature
10
Somewhat
Ibn Katheer
disagree
story
Native of the Marib dam: According to Ibn Katheer’s book “The
residents
36% IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Beginning of the End”, when mice burrowed in the structure, the dam started to collapse
and their history, and provides themsomewhat with a sense of identity and theagree
Somewhat Arabs' oldest kingdoms in Sheba started to crumble. They tried to restore it over
19% disagree
andarecontinuity,
Residents in the city today living in peacethus promoting
and harmo- respect for cultural diversity IDPs living Iinconsider the settlements
slums, informal preservation of Marib's
or camps cultural heritage an several
Strongly agree
hundred years, but the dam kept crumbling. According to the myth, the patriarch
ny regardless of tribal, cultural and social backgrounds Strongly disagree of all Arabs: Kahtan (founder
Current of the al Azd Tribe from which the Bani Shehr Tribe branch-
occupation
and human creativity. important issue
es, full name: Shehr Ibn Rabi'a Ibn Aws Ibn Hinu Ibn Al-Azd Ibn Al-Ghoth Ibn Nabit Ibn
27% DK/DWTA Marginalized and African migrants
Malik bin Zaid Ibn Kahlan Ibn Saba'a (Sheba ) Ibn Yashjub Ibn Yarab Ibn Qahtan Ibn Hud
DK/DWTA (prophet) (Eber). He said a mouse going in and out of the body of the great dam, and he
4%As the city’s cultural heritage and natural assets are falling
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Strongly Disagree
90% 100%
knew it was a sign he had to migrate north and leave Marib. The collapse of the dam led
14%
under pressures that
Somewhat the war generated (expansion of
agree Somewhat disagree
to the patriarch of the Qahtan ultimately meeting Hajar in Mecca.
36% IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
FIGURE 21. Perception of value of heritage Somewhat agree
19% somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
27% DK/DWTA Marginalized and African migrants
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Services Housing
Urban Heritage
civilization that was more advanced than the Bedouin tribal the announcement of a new cultural center and museum.13
regions around Mecca (Yathrib). Historic references however They called for stricter measures to prevent attacks on
record that the dam was damaged and rebuilt several times cultural heritage and ancient archaeological sites, as well as
during the Sabaean Kingdom. Early damages to the dam stopping looting of national treasures. A Marib Museum has
reportedly brought about the first Arab migration from Yemen been proposed in the past as it would be a significant tourist
to Levant and Mesopotamia (led by the Adnan tribal patriarch draw and way to incentivize preservation and recovery of
Amr bin Amer), while the complete collapse of the dam nearly local antiquities. The Marib museum did not have a chance
200 years later instigated the second migration of the other to advance beyond the conceptual stage but ia proposal from
major tribe (Qahtan) from Yemen, who settled in the desert 2010 made a strong case for a regional museum’s multiple
region of Hijaz, and reportedly intermarried with returning benefits - both culturally and economically (creating jobs and
FIGURE 22. First Independence Day Horse Races on Main Street in
migrants from Adnan in Mecca.11 Some historians postulate aiding in poverty alleviation).14 But, eyewitnesses reported15 Marib City Source: Soliman Al Nowab
that it was the migrations brought about by the cataclysmic that a Saudi airstrike profoundly damaged the historic site
collapse of the Marib Dam that led to the spread Marib’s in the spring of 2015. Bombs left a deep gash in the well-
hydro, administrative and defense technologies throughout preserved northern sluice gate. Advocacy groups began
the Arabian Peninsula. to raise awareness of the war destroying Yemen’s special
heritage.
The complex hydrological engineering involved made the
dam’s restoration a formidable task. The hydrological system From Prosperity to Scarcity
of the dam was designed to increase the level of trapped water, Historically, the establishment of Marib’s irrigation system had
so that a cluster of several large, near and remote valleys will be compelled the dominant tribes to adopt the stable, feudal-
filled with water and become summer reservoirs. Attempts to settler system. This enabled the tribal confederations from
restore the dam resumed only in 1982 following a devastating this region to preside over a strong state of Yemen during the
flood that ravaged the country. Sheikh Zayed bin-Sultan al- Sabean and Himyarite kingdoms. Marib dam was a formidable
Nahyan of the United Arab Emirates financed the construction engineering achievement, as it controlled seasonal rainfall in a
FIGURE 23. “Displaced but creative” Band from the IDP community
of a new dam for Marib in 198412, but the modern dam was less complex watershed network of valleys, and created achain of
hydrologically sophisticated. The Sheikh himself is reportedly artificial lakes that provided stable irrigation during the long small-scale tribal wars to acquire resources needed for for
a descendent from the tribes who migrated from the area of desert summer. The collapse of the dam and failure to restore survival. The relative remoteness of Marib from the main trade
Marib to territories now included in modern UAE borders. All it until the late 20th century also destroyed the paradigm of routes, and the relatively limitedagricultural resources without
Arabs historically trace their lineage to those two migrations, social stability and prosperity that had dominated Marib’s first the benefit of the dam meant that the security capability of
and the blood lines from these ancient migrations are kept as chapter. The following years saw the society shift towards Marib’s tribes was weaker compared to other northern tribes,
a matter of pride and reference by tribal leaders to date. political-military models based more on scarcity. Over the since they were more segmented and had not established
In October of 2020, Yemen’s Minister of Culture and Director of following centuries Marib transitioned into the model tribal raids large tribal confederations.
Culture and Tourism visited sites in Marib in conjunction with more typical of Yemen’s northern tribes. This model entailed
11 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2002.02.0006%3Asura%3D34%3Averse%3D15
12 UN-H Profiling Team interview with Marib KII, June 2020e
13 https://www.arabnews.com/node/1743631/middle-east
14 https://www.archernet.org/en/2018/10/25/ayda-a-digital-register-of-heritage-monuments-for-yemen-interview-with-dr-iris-gerlach/
15 Citing the organization Mwatana for Human Rights, lists 34 sites—some up to 3,000 years old—that have suffered severe damage in apparent violation of the 1954 Hague Convention treaty for the protection of cultural property during armed conflict. Titled “The Degradation of History,”Kate
Brown, A War on ‘Collective Memory’: A Sober Report Reveals the Extent of the Damage to War-Torn Cultural Sites in Yemen, Nov 21, 2018, https://news.artnet.com/art-world/yemen-war-cultural-sites-1399402
41
Medghal
MAP 3 - HERITAGE SITES
Damaged sites (UNOSAT/UNESCO

Assessment October 2015)
Cultural heritage site
Marib
Marib Old City
Sirwah Northen Dam Sluice

Marib City Barran Temple / Throne of Queen Sheba
Awam Temple
Southern Dam Sluice
Al Jubah
Urban Heritage
FIGURE 24. Marib Northern Old

Dam Sluice, Digital Globe 2015,
through UNOSAT / UNESCO
FIGURE 27. Old Marib’s Tell Area, Plan of buildings are represented
with solid lines and both courtyards and small structures with broken
lines, Source: van Beek, Gus W. 1982. “A population Estimate for
Marib: A Contemporary Tell village in North Yemen.” Bulletin of the
FIGURE 25. Damage to the American Schools of Oriental Research 248(1): 61-67.
Northern Old Dam Sluice.
Source: UNOSAT / UNESCO
FIGURE 26. Plot divisions in the near viciinty of the Old City FIGURE 28. Marib Old City. (Digital Globe, 2015). Some areas have been damaged, and some new constructions have been observed in a UNESCO /
indicating planned new constructions around the Old City area. UNOSAT damage assessment in 2018.
Digital Globe 2018
43
It is important to note that cultural heritage techniques diffused buildings were generally more cost-effective.18 Yemen and
through social networks and family ties have a strong evidence Marib, inparticular, have been uniquely shielded from various
base of success compared to more top-down, institutional modernizing initiatives associated with neoliberal development
approaches to community development16 in Yemen--whether reforms in the Arab region. Heritage building techniques and
from the central state or external development actors. Yemeni locally situated knowledge has not been lost entirely at a time
people have had a strong cultural heritage of inherited building when ’Cradle to Cradle’ sustainable building techniques are
skills since ancient times. Apart from some demonstration making the brick and mortar construction models of the late
projects, most new house construction is carried along 20th Century increasingly obsolescent as well as being cost-
traditional lines, by private individuals. The result is the prohibitive in a place like the IDP camps surrounding Marib
achievement of a functional and harmonious architecture city.
suited to the life of the Yemeni people. Urbanization, urban
planning and land management, however, have often been Agricultural heritage is another important aspect of intangible FIGURE 29. Examples of a traditional family home near
disproportionately shaped by outside actors. cultural heritage. According to some social scientists Marib. Source: https://www.voyagevirtuel.info/yemen-photo/
displayimage-15-619.html
and agronomists, current food insecurity, increased
Another important observation about the current impact of impoverishment and desertification are in part attributable to
development interventions on more traditional and sustainable development policies. In retrospect, food security analysts
cultural practices, and the related local economic ripple note that Yemen’s abandonment and destruction of rain-fed
effects, is that with the introduction of new building materials, terrace agriculture was a mistake as it was more resource-
a large proportion of the profits goes into the pockets of a few efficient in the Yemeni context.19 As arid, mountainous terrain
contractors, with only about 25% remaining in the district. If such as the surrounding regions of Marib City were viewed as
local communities are to benefit from construction, money incapable of producing high quality grain for the international
must be spent locally, on local materials and labor. Furthermore, market so they were less penetrated by these green revolution
imported building methods usually prove to be unsuited to the agriculture technologiess to scale policies.20 Understanding
climate, as insufficient mass reduces the ability of buildings what agricultural practices work best in Marib is critical as it
to regulate temperatures.17 As concrete and building permits still makes up 60% of Marib’s economy and has far-ranging
were introduced, the ‘usta’— master masons, designers, implications for how Marib’s Master Plan balances urban, built
and builders— were replaced by ‘muqqawal’—contractors space with agricultural territory. At one time Marib was one of FIGURE 30. Granary on the outskirts of Marib, date unknown.Source:
skilled in the “assembly of industrial components”, marking the key breadbaskets for Yemen, helping support the country’s https://www.voyagevirtuel.info/yemen-photo/displayimage-15-618.html
one of the ways that vital traditions are erased from public food sovereignty in which it only imported 18% of its food
memory by homogenized built forms even though traditional products in 1978 (when Saleh came to power). Yemen is now
16 As anthropological research by Peutz (2018) conducted in Yemen both imported western (“neoliberal”) endogamous and non-western (primarily examining the implementation of a Government of
Yemen and UNDP-led Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP) on the Soqotra Archipelago) between 2004 and 2011, various development projects focused on “opening” (Ar.: infitah) and Western
models of social transformation failed when they did not incorporate “relational matrices” of how familial relations and kin-based networks operated within decisions impacting social development.
17 Matthews, Derek, Journal of the British Yemeni Society, November 1996 (accessed at: https://al-bab.com/commentary-yemeni-traditional-architecture)
18 Varananda, Fernando. 1998. “Twenty years of Change in the Built Environment of Yemen.”!Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review 9 (2): 63-78, p. 69.
19 Mundy, Martha, al-Hakimi, Amin, and Pelat, Frédéric (2014), ’Neither security nor sovereignty: the political economy of food in Yemen’. (p. 105); The authors lay out the implications of shifting food
sovereignty for food security and famine risk in Yemen discussing how the change in food sovereignty is clearly visible in the fact that the country imported 18% of its consumption of staple cereals in the 1970s,
whereas this number had risen to 75% in 2014. Staple foods generally consist of 90% imports today.12 Food prices have risen, poverty has spread and Yemen’s population has increased by 350% since the 1980s,
putting further pressure on resource use.13, 14, 15 For these reasons, control over water and food resources is important for both sides of the conflict - it is even a tactic employed by them.
20 Ibid.
Urban Heritage
up to 75% as a net importer of food and the current conditions

surrounding rapidly declining food security in Yemen make MAP 4 - TRIBES IN MARIB
it even more important to recognize local opportunities for
reversing the trend. 21 Agricultural heritage awareness can
help policymakers move away from devaluing indigenous
knowledge of farming as “static”, “inefficient” and “backward” Al Jawf Govenorate
- without sufficient knowledge of how some of the traditions
had evolved and adapted within the unique context of Yemen
in conditions of resource scarcity and environmental variability. Majzar
Intangible Cultural Heritage Raghwan
Leadership and conflict resolution approaches have been a

key intangible asset in the transformation of the fate of Marib, Medghal
and is widely acknowledged as key to ushering in Marib’s latest Marib City
positive chapter. It has contributed to trust among residents and
a sense of being welcome and safe. In the context of the “tribe” Harib Al Qaramish Serwah
Husoun Al Hilaal
(framed in this profile as an example of salient living cultural Sana’a Governorate
Bidbadah
heritage), it may help explain certain trends in the city which

have contributed to urban management and governance.
Even while Marib City municipal capacity is notably thin and Shabwa Governorate
operating through a hybrid cooperation of humanitarian/
Juba
development actors with governorate and informal tribal Jabal Murad
decision-making processes, nevertheless it is evident that
certain patterns of tribal culture and collective decision Rahabah
Harib
making have influenced positive trends in the city, and can be
viewed as cultural assets which merit the consideration of city
planners . This is especially true as Marib’s City attempts to Al Abdiyah
ensure its influx of new residents does not lead instigate future Mahliyah
conflict cycles and social cleavages. Therefore, it is important
Pipeline Tribes Murad
for planners to articulate core aspects of the city on a cultural
Military camp
level where the intangible qualities of effective decentralized Al Sharif group Jeda’an
government can be found. For example, tribal mechanisms Al Bayda Governorate Marib gas station Bani Jabr Abidah
for hosting asylum seekers have contributed to the political Safer oil reﬁnery Jahm Bani Abd
economic fabric of the city.
21 RIKO,”Food as a weapon in Yemen,” The Council for International Conflict Resolution, December
2020, https://uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5f22849d8d2ee9c5bf758a91/5fdc890a65657e424e61fe45_FoodAsAWeap- FIGURE 31. Tribes in Marib. Redrawn from Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies (2020)
onLayout2.pdf
45
Merging Past with Present Heritage a sense of shared purpose23 and social cohesion was originally
The local authorities have prioritized opportunities to connect used in the context of tribalism and ’clan’-ism but presented
the next generation of Marib with their heritage while also a prescriptive model for all social orders and governments.24
providing opportunities for camaraderie and recreation. In As the first major social cohesion meta-analysis conducted
November 2020, Marib had its first equestrian championship for the Arab world concluded,25 social cohesion is a moving
in the governorate, organized by the Youth and Sports Office target and can be used to describe patterns of relationship
of the City Directorate. The sporting events in the governorate and social ties that relate to social cohesion can include
and the diversity in tournaments and youth and cultural events a range of positive and negative associations; "asabiyya,
organized for national holidays in September, October and cooption, friendship, kinship, partisanship, and partnership".26
November for Yemen’s Independence Day. Marib spokespeople In the context of Marib, its urban experiment of exercising
organized the event as a way to celebrate the living cultural sovereignty along the lines of a ‘city-state’ makes identifying
heritage of Marib’s forefathers along with strengthening a the ”formula” for maintaining positive social cohesion in
sense of national identity. Events like this are organized by this dynamic context is increasingly critical and may be the
Marib’s government to support vulnerable youth and provide differentiator determining whether Marib’s growth could be FIGURE 32. KSRelief have rehabilitated 161 child soldiers as part of
a good outlet for youth expression and development. As an either an engine driving the emergence of the fastest growing the initiative of rehabilitating 2,000 Yemeni children. (Al Arabiya.net)
example of how Marib’s history and symbolism is used as emerging Arab city or it could prove to be a ticking time bomb
a healing space, its archaeological heritage site has been of an unsustainable growth bubble leading to inevitable strain
incorporated into a rehabilitation program for former child and implosion. Because much of Marib’s capital at this stage
soldiers in the Houthi militias from different areas in Yemen.22 is “human capital” on the edge of making its first major capital city that the tribes were better able to preserve their neutral
investments in infrastructure, there is tremendous opportunity status, sparing Marib from destruction and providing a safe
Tribes and Social Cohesion to demonstrate how Marib‘s cultural strengths can help the haven (albeit, intermittently amidst intermittent attacks). This
Seeing Social Cohesion in Marib through lens of Asabiyya city’s growth continue to defy the odds. safety created the context for an economic explosion as IDPs
Marib’s social patterns indicate that, at least at the local meso- The tribe-state dynamic which has operated throughout have brought new wealth and jobs to the region. However,
and micro-levels of society, tribal influence appears to have a Yemen, took a unique form in Marib. Notably, the governorate the advantage is fragile, and it is contingent on many factors
positive impact on social cohesion thus far through the value leadership was successful in matching short-term military beyond Marib’s control. It may be compromised if the attacks
of extending hospitality in the context of Marib, supporting victories with longer-term efforts at governing and community on Marib’s mountain ranges continue.
theories of trust, cohesion and social capital. The patterns building. This included responding to the humanitarian crisis
evident in Marib seem to conform to many of the traits by negotiating hosting sites for the IDPs, many of which
described in Ibn Khaldun’s foundational sociological theory were established on tribally administered land. Furthermore,
of Asabiyya from the Arabic root word asab meaning “to bind as Marib has become the pass-through for all traffic, goods,
together.” Supporting Ibn Khaldun’s theory of Elm Al Umran travel between North and South, its tribes are positioning
(the science of social life) of Muqaddimah and, the concept of themselves to become central mediators between the North
social solidarity emphasizing unity, group consciousness, and and the South. All this has created the perception within the
22 https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2018/07/12/IN-PICTURES-KSRelief-takes-27-ex-child-soldiers-in-a-tour-in-Yemen-s-Marib-.html
23 Manoochehri, Abbas, “Ibn Khaldun on “Political Change,” International Journal of History and Cultural Studies, Volume 2, Issue 4, 2016, PP 1-9., https://www.arcjournals.org/pdfs/ijhcs/v2-i4/1.pdf
24 Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiyya is applied within his conceptual reality of the Umran. The Umran represents a psycho-social dynamic character of social reality in which "sociology" is inseparable from "history", and also from “politics”. He has linked his umran to Aristotle’s notion of Eudaimonia. As
such umran is the core of an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the complexity of human experience. Sumer, Beyza. “Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiyya for Social Cohesion , Elektronik Sosyal Bilimler Dergisis 11, no. 41 (2012)
25 Harb, Charles,”Developing a Social Cohesion Index for the Arab Region” UNDP, January 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322570041_Developing_a_Social_Cohesion_Index_for_the_Arab_Region.
26 de Elvira, Laura Ruiz, Christoph H. Schwarz, and Irene Weipert-Fenner, eds. Clientelism and patronage in the Middle East and North Africa: Networks of dependency. Routledge, 2018.
7 CURRENT
GOVERNANCE
This section presents key facts surrounding the local level plays a dominant role. The governorate system has played the key regulatory
administration system and progressive “leaps'' it has made role when it comes to oil and gas contracts. Because the
to increase its capacity throughout the conflict, specifically Four Levels of Local Administration governorate system is intimately linked to the local tribal
since 2015. These leaps were happening against the The profiling team interviewed several local administration confederation alliance in Marib, as well as to the security
backdrop of several factors, which primarily include: officials, both at the municipal and the provincial setup that safeguards the oil and gas operations, all the
(governorate) levels to understand the practical operation key decisions are now taking place within the governor’s
» The massive population growth, which also brought
of the governance system. The interviews point and other office. A thin layer of bureaucratic oversight, enabling a
administrative, bureaucratic and technical skills to the
supporting evidence point to a gap between what is in LAL more streamlined decision-making process also made
formerly marginalized governorate. This population
No. 4 (issued in August 2000) and the actual operational the governorate more attractive to investors. For example,
growth required parallel growth in the capacity of
reality, suggesting that more administrative and financial the investment decisions are supposed to be taken by the
institutions. Marib’s urban and population growth
powers than formally intended have been decentralized central state through the General Investment Commission،
required new services to keep up with the demand, also
and practiced through executive powers and tribal privilege which operates under the Prime Minister’s Office. This
fostered by its presentation as a safe haven for capital
norms at the following four levels: commission issues the decision for land uses, and has
investments from across the Republic;
tremendous executive powers that supersede the local
» The pattern of de-facto decentralization, which 1. The central state oversight and budgetary role level authority, or even legal documents such as master
empowered the provincial level , but at the same time The Ministry of Local Administration (MoLA) is supposed plans. However, all investment decisions in Marib are now
helped the governorate consolidate powers from the to manage the local administrative units at all levels, and processed through the Governorate’s Department of Trade
lower administrative levels such as the districts and the provide the necessary oversight as to how the budget and Industry, with the Governor’s Office retaining the final
municipalities; allocated through the Ministry of Finance is being spent. authority on investment approvals. The governorate level,
Increasingly since 2017, Marib began to sever its financial through the Department of Finance also has the powers
» The last local elections under the Local Authority Law
ties with the central government, reducing the transfers to allocate budgets for the different district councils and
(LAL) no. 4 of 2000 happened in 20081, so that elected
of financial revenues both from tax collection and more to the municipalities of the larger cities, and to manage the
district and provincial councils since 2011 are performing
importantly from the oil revenues to the Central Bank in revenues and local taxes with no functioning system of
under mandate extension terms, which in turn reduced
Aden. Not only did this mean that the role of MoLA became checks and balances from central state authorities. Finally,
their legitimacy, helping the governorate rule through
rather performative (the governorate still needs the stamp the governorate has replaced the elected provincial council
executive powers. And finally;
of MoLA on certain executive decrees), but much needed with a smaller ‘Executive Bureau’ (maktab tanfeezi), which
» The financial autonomy that Marib started in the Republic, monetary oversight is now missing. MoLA is still invited to performs some level of oversight and veto authority over
and has since became its defining modus operandi, some opening ceremonies and inaugural events, such as at the different provincial departments (mudeeriyat) which
enabling the governorate to use its natural wealth to out- the announcement of new plans for the international airport, hold the power for provincial decisions. These eleven
perform other governorates possessing comparatively or the ratification of the master plan, but in practice the executive bureau members are also a reflection of a state-
more advanced administrative experience. Ministry is no longer acting as a capacity that can overrule tribe alliance that stands behind the sustainability of Marib’s
These factors combined require thorough analysis of the executive orders or endorse local budgets. model and stability. Although the provincial system clearly
administrative system to address the dynamics at the lacks independent monitoring and oversight, and has almost
different local administration levels, in which the governorate 2. Autonomy of Governorate-level Decision Making entirely severed its meaningful ties with the central state, it
1 As noted by Stadnicki (2014) Yemen’s LAL of 2000 was the culmination of decentralization reforms begun under the “auspices of the World Bank.” This law focused on reducing the size of central government by delegating planning and administrative responsibilities to municipal
and district councils. In 2008 Yemen held its first elections for governors by council members. Despite the fact that most seats were won by the ruling party, Yemen’s decentralization effort was still one of the most ambitious in the Arab world. Roman Stadnicki, “The Challenges of Urban
Transition in Yemen: Sana’a and Other Major Cities”, Journal of Arabian Studies, vol. 4, No. 1 (2014), pp. 115–133.
47
Provincial Departments Oil and Gas Revenues

General
• Coordinate the entire Investment • Revenues are collected
local administration Commission Oil Revenues by the central bank
Supports the tribal branch in Marib, but
system through the Central Police and
Bank Disaster confederations, the
Office of the Governor. Law some revenues go
Management military effort, and the
• The Finance Enforcement governorate budget
directly to the war effort
Finance and and Camps
Department manages and the tribal
resources allocated in Budget Department confederations in Safer.
(under the nominal Trade and
the Central Bank’s • The generated fuel
supervision of the Industrial
branch in Marib, and Investments
helps operate the Safer
Ministry of Finance)
collect local taxes. Thermal plant that
• The technical Services supplies the national
Departments manages District electricity grid.
construction and Council • Remaining resources
Technical
maintenance contracts Services are used by the
with private sector (planning, governorate through the
Governor’s Office District
providers in all the MoLA health, edu., Council
finance and budget
districts and the cities. etc.) Assuming with the department
executive bureau all the
powers of the provincial
Marib Municipal Office District 14 District Councils
Municipal council Council
• Non-elected body with Offices (in • Extending their
limited jurisdictions, central cities mandate since 2016.
operates under the Marib only) District
• Coordinate basic
provincial department of Municipal Council
services with the
Municipal Offices. Office
• Manages basic urban provincial departments.
District
services, including WASH, • Most of their service
Council
parks, and maintenance. offices only exist on
Joubah
• Collects municipal taxes. Safer paper, and those that
Hareeb
• Recently increased its do exist are under
planning role through the Solid Parks Master Permits capacitated and have
Master Plan office. Waste Plan no financial powers.
• Issues building permits. • Structure reflect strict
tribal confederation
Health Edu. WASH Culture dominance within the
district.
FIGURE 33. Governance influence diagram. Based on interviews with local government officials.
arguably has a track record of performing as a governing body Public perceptions of accountability and government
that is capable of making decisions on the spot, perform with 4. The municipality of Marib services
agility and responsiveness to a tough reality, and to also lessen Like all other central cities in Yemen, the larger cities in Mareb Another factor to consider when assessing the effectiveness
the administrative procedures that investors always complained have a municipality headed by the City Manager, a career of Marib's administrative system is the nascent social contract
about when dealing with the central state’s Commission and the official appointed by the governor. Furthermore, the municipality the governorate appears to have begun to establish with the
Office of the Prime Minister. itself has no elected council, and performs as a Provincial population, regardless of their origin or how long they have
Department. In recent years, the municipality of Marib became a resided in Marib. The foundation of this civic relationship is
3. The District Councils as the lowest elected governing key department due to the massive population growth, the need that Marib’s residents currently benefit from the best electricity
bodies in Marib to coordinate humanitarian response and to manage camps. supply nationwide with the lowest cost. Many households in the
Even though each of the 14 districts in Marib have an elected Within the past few years, the municipality grew from few staff city report not being charged a power bill to access the public
council, as of 2020, it has been nearly 15 years since the last who manage minor duties to a fully-staffed department with grid. They also have access to the cheapest energy sources such
local elections were organized in Yemen (in 2006). The District tens of engineers, planners, operations managers, contracts as gas for their cars and cooking. Our survey suggests that this
Councils have since been operating under an executive order and fiscal officers, as well as full-time inter-departmental basic level of access to services drives local satisfaction about
extension. Each district is supposed to manage District Offices, coordination staff. the administration. This could partially explain the generally
which are in turn supposed to coordinate the provision of tolerant-to-favorable view of taxation expressed by residents
services and the planning responsibilities with the mirroring polled in Marib.
departments at the provincial level. However, most of these
offices only exist on paper, and only in few of the 14 districts, Despite the limited municipal capacity noted above and the
one can find semblance of a functioning District Administration strong tribal nature of Marib’s socio-political identity, in the urban
office. While the councils themselves continue to exist as a scorecard survey residents generally displayed a favorable
reflection of tribal confederations with the largest manpower in attitude towards government performance and a desire for
the different district locales, these councils do not have actual expanded government services. They also expressed support
powers so long as they are not capacitated with professional for a robust local government law enforcement capacity. On
bureaucracy or sufficient budgets. This lack of empowerment the question of whether citizens preferred a civil state system
is not a product of deliberate provincial consolidation of power of government over customary, tribal models, respondents
as such, but merely reflects the reality in remote and sparsely overwhelmingly supported a central state system (with a total
populated regions such as Marib. Both the central state and the of 65% voicing some level of agreement). It may be that Marib’s
provincial authority in Marib did not move to staff and activate residents do not see state and tribal governance systems as
all the de jure bureaucratic structures that exist at the district mutually exclusive but as a whole package that addresses a
level. Instead, bureaucratic resources were directed to where the wide range of different needs depending on the context.
demands were greatest. The operational district councils have
staffed offices in the more densely populated districts such
as Hareeb and Jobah, as well as Safer (Sector 18) where the The one consistent finding across all secondary research and
presence of wealth and presence of international corporations residents’ perceptions was that public satisfaction with the
requires the district level to play a role.2 government seemed to be closely tied to peoples’ sense of its
2 According to the Berghof Foundation, “The local council in Marib did have 14 councilors at one time. Two seats have remained vacant since the 2006 elections, as no elections could be held in the districts in question. Two councilors have passed away. One of them was the secretary general;
the other was the head of the services committee of the local council. This leaves the actual composition of the governorate’s local council at 10 councilors (as of January of 2020). However, they do not meet regularly and have been largely stripped of their function.” This further confirms why the gover-
nor and his executive bureau retains most of the local governance authority. Berghof Foundation, “Mapping of Local Governance in Yemeni Governorates”, 30 January 2020, https://berghof-foundation.org/library/mapping-of-local-governance-in-yemeni-governorates
34%
Satisfied
32%
Complaint and the state Very satisfied
oice matters and should be considered to form the future of the

Safety and respsect 49
If I face any problem, I prefer to resort to law enforcement or an Participation in Focal Group Discussions
I feelthan
official entity rather moretorespected in Marib
a local leader than the area I came from or other places I visit
or mediators
You can access clean drinking water
DK/DWTA
Strongly Disagree 5% DK/DWTA
Somewhat disagree 4% 14% DK/ DWTA 6% Maybe
DK/DWTA
Strongly disagree Native resident of Marib
Somewhat agree 12% 36% disagree Strongly Disagree
Strongly somewhat disagree No
Somewhat disagree
Strongly agree
20% 38%
16% 48% Somewhat disagreeSomewhat agree Yes Somewhat agree
SCORECARD - Satisfaction related to dispute Public commitment to paying taxes and utility bills Challenges
56%
facing the state in providing services
25% Somewhat agree Strongly agree
70% 80% 90% 100% resolution mechanisms 21% Strongly agree
The commitment to paying taxes and utility bills shows Majority of the respondents across demographic groups
A significant majority of respondents strongly agreedI that strong differences across the demographic groups. expressed the ability to0%access information on the status of
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
feel more respected in Marib than the area I came from or other places I visit, by gender
they prefer to resort to law enforcement rather than any Native residents seem to have the highest level of services from various information sources, with the native
hat my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of the
other alternative dispute resolution option, such as100local commitment. The marginalized community and the residents having the highest level of information access.
DK/DWTA
leaders, armed groups or notables and heads ofany
If I face families.
problem,
IDPs living in the neighbourhoods voiced the most
I prefer to resort to law enforcement or an
Specialized Facebook You pages werewith
are satisfied volunteer and
the quality of random
education services in the city
As a citizen in the city, I think that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of the city.
DK/DWTA 80 Strongly Disagree
Only a narrow opposition
official entity rather than to a local leader or mediators to taxes. 54%
by demographic of the respondents strongly or
group contributions from subscribers frequently publish updates
Strongly Disagreeminority disagreed (12%). A majority of 43% Somewhat disagree
however strongly
60
somewhat agreed that the public is committed to paying on serviceNative provision, or sudden interruption, might have DK/DWTA
Somewhat disagree agreed, with the native residents having Somewhat agree resident of Marib
theSomewhat
strongest agreepreference to the civil state model.
40 their taxes to the state, as well as the utility bills to the
Strongly agree
contributed to these results Completely unsatis
Strongly agree 20
local authorities who provide the services. A remaining Respondents
IDPs living to our survey expressed their satisfaction
in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat unsatisf
DK/DWTA
Native resident of Marib relatively high Strongly
proportion of the respondents strongly in the quality 6% of municipal services they are getting: 23%
DK/DWTA Satisfied
Disagree
Complaint and the state Female 0
disagreed (15%)
Male or somewhat disagreed (18%), and as were 16%
very satisfied, 34% Strongly
were Disagree
satisfied, and only 15% Very satisfied
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat disagree 31%
% 70% 80% 90% 100% many as 13% did not have a view on this matter or did
Somewhat agree
expressed Marginalized strong dissatisfaction.
and African migrants Respondents generally
Somewhat disagree
Participation in Focal Group Discussions If I face any problem, I prefer to resort to law enforcement or an People in the city pay their taxes and utility Participation
bills in Focal Group Discussions
not want to answer. Strongly agree expressed
20% a very high0%level of
20% acknowledgement
Somewhat
10% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% when
30%agree 90% 100%it
I feel safe and welcomed in most places in Marib comes to the 26% challenges faced by
Strongly agree
the state authorities
Complaint and the state
100
DK/DWTA
in providing decent services, while only 12% thought that
6% Maybe 4% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
DK/ DWTA DK/DWTA 6% these challenges Maybe were completely unjustified.
80 Strongly Disagree 13%
up
reeDiscussions
Somewhat disagree If I face any problem,
disagree I prefer 12%to law enforcement or an
to resort People in the city pay their taxesSomewhat
and utilityParticipation
bills I feel I can access different opportunities in Marib, regardless of myPeople
appearanc
Strongly
No
DK/DWTA
official entity rather than to a local leader or mediators Strongly
60 disagree 27% in Focal Group
disagree Discussions
Strongly disagree No my skin or inmy social status)
in the
The state is facing significant challenges providing decent quality of services for all
38%
If I face any problem, I prefer to resort to law enforcement oryou
Can an official
access adequate information to People in the
help you city pay
manage yourtheir
dailytaxes 15%
and
life and to utility
know the
Somewhat billsstatus of
agree 38%
The state is facing significant challenges in providing decent quality of
entity rather thanYes 16%
to a local leader or mediators 48% services Somewhat through disagree
40 websites (including through social media platforms such as Facebook)? Somewhat disagree services for allYes DK/DWTA
agree Somewhat disagree Strongly agree
56% Somewhat agree 56%
Somewhat agree Native resident of Marib
Strongly Disagree
4% 20 DK/DWTA 18% 26% 6% 6% DK/DWTA
Maybe 21%
DK/ DWTA
Strongly agree 13% Completely unsatisfied DK/DWTA
Strongly agree
Maybe
13%
Somewhat disagree
12% 0
12% 22%
No Strongly disagree Female Male 27% Strongly disagree
No Strongly disagree Somewhat agree
% IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
15% 38% IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Strongly15%
agree
Yes 16% 48% Somewhat disagree Satisfied Somewhat disagree Yes Somewhat disagree
I feel I can access different opportunities in Marib, regardless of my appearances (such as the color of
22%
Somewhat agree
Very satisfied Somewhat agree56% Marginalized and African migrants Somewhat agree
18% 26% 38% 18%
21% Strongly
Marginalized agreemigrants
and African Strongly agree 0% Strongly
10% 20% agree
30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
As a citizen in the city, I think that my voice matters and shouldIf I facebeanyconsidered
problem, to form the
I prefer futuretooflaw
to resort theenforcement
city. or an People in the city pay their taxes and utility As
billsa -citizen
per demographic
in the city, I group
think that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of the city.
official entity rather than to 0%a local leader
10% 20% 30% or 40%
mediators by demographic
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% group
100% DK/DWTA
Strongly Disagree
Satisfaction with the basic state Satisfaction with the
services (mail, basic state
internet, real services (mail, internet, real estate registration
estate regis-
tration, permits, etc.)
Somewhat agree
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps DK/DWTAPeople in the city pay their taxes Strongly agree DK/DWTA DK/DWTA
6%
hink that my voice matters and should
If I facebe considered
any problem, Itoprefer
DK/DWTA formto
the futuretoof
resort theenforcement
law city. or an Native resident of Marib
and utility bills
As - per demographic
a citizen groupthat my voice6%
in the city, I think matters and should be considered DK/DWTA to form the future of the city.
People in the
official entity rather than to a local leader or mediators by demographic group Strongly Disagree Strongly disagree Completely unsatis
16% Strongly Disagree 16% Strongly Disagree
31%
Somewhat
IDPs living indisagree
the city's traditional neighbourhoods 31%
Somewhat disagree
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat
IDPs unsatisf
living in the city's tra
Somewhat disagree 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Somewhat agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Satisfied
20% IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or
Somewhat camps
agree IDPs living agree
Strongly in slums, informal settlements or camps
20% IDPs livingagree
Strongly in slums, informal settlements or camps
Somewhat agree Very
IDPs satisfied
living in slums, inform
DK/DWTA DK/DWTA
26%
DK/DWTA
Native resident of Marib Strongly agree Native resident of Marib 6% 26%
DK/DWTA
Marginalized and African migrants Strongly Disagree Marginalized and African migrants Strongly disagree Marginalized and African migrants Marginaliz
Strongly Disagree 16% Strongly Disagree Safety and respsect0%
%g in the city's traditional neighbourhoods 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% As 50% a 60%
citizen 70%in
Somewhat
IDPs theindisagree
80%
living city,
Access
90%
the I 100%
think
city's that neighbourhoods
to clean
traditional my voice matters
drinking and
water per should be considered
demographic group 0% to10%
form20%
the 30%
future of the
40% 50% 60% 31%
Somewhat
70% 80% disagree
90% 100% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% IDPs 70% 80%
living in 90% traditional
the city's 100% neighbourhoods
Somewhat disagree city - per age group
Somewhat agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree
c hardship for the I feel more respected in Marib than the area I came from or other places I visit
in slums, informal
The state
settlements or
Somewhat camps
is facing agree
significant challenges in providing decent quality
Can you of services
16-24
access adequate
IDPs livingagree
allStrongly
forinformation
F
in slums, informal settlements or camps
to help you manage your daily life and to know the status DK/DWTA
of
20% Strongly agree Somewhat
The state is facingagree
significant challenges in providing decent quality of services for all
As a citizen in the city, I think that my voice matters and should be considered
DK/ DWTA 26%
Strongly agreeFIGURE 34. Performance and preferences regarding FIGURE5%
services through websites (including through social media platforms such as Facebook)? Strongly Disagree
Marginalized and African migrantsFIGURE 35. Committment to paying taxes and utilities per
M Strongly agree
Marginalized and African migrants Native residents 36. Satisfaction with
city the city municipal services
DK/DWTA Marginalized and African migrants
DK/ DWTA dispute resolution
25-35 F Strongly disagree 14%
6% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
M DK/DWTA demographic group
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Somewhat disagree
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Somewhat disagree 6% (mail, real estate and civilStrongly registration,
disagree permits) DK/DWTA 0% 10% 20
DK/DWTA
Native resident of Marib IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat agree DK/DWTA
Native36%
Strongly disagree 36-60 F Completely unsatisfied
resident of Marib
Somewhat agree
Strongly agree 12% 22% Strongly disagree
somewhat disagree Strongly Disagree
ficantSomewhat
challengesdisagree
in providing decent
IDPs living in the quality
city's of services
traditional for all
neighbourhoods
Can you access adequate information to help you manage your
M
IDPs living in camps Somewhat unsatisfied Strongly The
agree state is facing significant challenges in providing 20%
decent quality of services for all Somewhat disagree
F daily life and to know the status of
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree More than 60 Somewhat disagree
services through websites (including through social media platforms such as Facebook)? Satisfied Somewhat agree
22%
Somewhat agree
M
The Marginalized and Afican migrants 22% 25%settlements or camps Strongly agree
Somewhat agree 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Very70%
satisfied
80% 90% 100%
IDPs living in slums, informal
Somewhat agree Strongly agree
Strongly agree
DK/DWTA 38%
DK/DWTA 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 6% DK/DWTA 38%
Strongly
Marginalized agree
and African migrants Strongly andagree
Completely unsatisfied Marginalized African migrants
12% 22%
Basic Services
responsiveness. which overtly rejected northerners fleeing Houthi control. IDPs provisions of goods and services.6
were initially reluctant because Marib had a bad reputation as
When asked about the facility to make a complaint in the city a place with a weak economy and poor security conditions. In Marib, this has increasingly meant serving as an intermediary
today about all sorts of issues, residents generally expressed Once IDPs started arriving and the government’s strategy for between aid agencies and/or the government and tribal
content with the access to complaints that they have, with even growth proved effective, a virtuous circle was set in motion that beneficiaries. The fact that many of Marib’s local qabila leaders
the marginalized and African migrants as the most vulnerable has continued to drive Marib’s transition from a small town to a such as the current governor have alternated between serving in
group feeling that they had channels they could access to significant city. a formal government capacity and a non formal tribal capacity,
submit formal complaints and needs for services. Still, critical appears to have helped them better lobby for more strategic
basic services for the growing population are in shortage, The strong Yemeni tribal social structure derives its legitimacy resource allocations.7 Previous research (conducted by Oxfam
most important of which are sewage networks, clean and by meeting the needs of its fellow tribesmen, but tribal influence in 2016) found that 65% of IDPs within Yemen turned to their
affordable drinking water, and health services. These sectors was deepened in Marib by the inter tribal alliances forged local tribal leaders for safety or conflict resolution,8 and that
need substantial improvements, which in turn requires a through the intense fighting to repel the first major Houthi number is likely far higher in Marib as of 2020, considering that
coherent approach to taxation and public investments, as well offensive in 2015.4 These tribes (notably the dominant Abayda roughly 90% of the urban population of Marib City is categorized
as capable institutions that can lead the planning, construction tribe-, followed by Murad, Al Jadaan, Bani Jabr and Bani Abd) as IDPs. The rise of the tribes in Marib indirectly benefited
and operational responsibilities of such utilities. effectively transitioned the military alliance they had formed from the previous government neglect so that in the post-2011
during the Houthi siege into civilian affairs. Whereas other tribal groundswell of popular disenchantment and “loss of faith” with
Tribal and Non-Tribal representation confederations in other regions of Yemen seemed unable to government institutions across Yemen created a natural niche
A key area where tribes have taken the lead over the government transition from fighting to governing, Marib’s tribes have been for the tribes to feel on a local level. However, now the tribal role
in Marib is their role in brokering Marib’s transformation into relatively effective at functioning as the unified front to fill the in Marib faces questions of sustainability, scalability (with a
Yemen’s largest IDP sanctuary city. The tribes appear to have vacuum of absent state functions to meet the immediate needs population that has grown 12-fold) as well as equitability.
approached the IDP influx from a combination of customary of the region’s conflict-affected population.5
hospitality and pragmatism. According to tribesmen in The tribes employ different strategies for participation in the The flip side of the tribal advocacy role is that it has been shown to
government and the business community,3 most of Marib’s war economy and IDP influx. The Abayda tribe have prioritized create challenges of access for vulnerable communities. This is
prominent tribal elders and their community members investments and new ventures and dominate the “landlord” particularly true for the elderly and the Muhamasheen. Because
preferred to remain based on their rural land holdings and Marib class in Marib City either directly or through real estate corporate of the tribes’ role in brokering aid, for those who are not part of
did not experience a significant rural-urban migration, which is holdings while the second largest tribe of the Murad prefer to the qabila order, they can become further marginalized. When
also why there was minimal resistance to IDPs establishing focus on fighting. One unifying trait is that all fall under the ‘al- international aid organizations intervene to provide resources
residences in Marib City. Marib’s tribes made a conscious Urf’ legal, social, and political code, the tribes’ responsibilities or services to these displaced populations, these groups
decision to open their doors to IDPs, unlike Ta’az, Aden or Ibb, primarily involve the settlement of disputes and ensuring often rely on the regional social structure through “approval
3 UN Habitat Profiling Team Virtual interview with prominent regional sheikh, May 2020; UN Habitat Profiling Team Focus Group Discussion with Security officials, June, 2020.
4 UN Habitat Profiling Team Virtual Interview with prominent regional sheikh May 2020; Baron, The Marib Paradox.
5 As Camilla Molyneux pointed out in “Made in Marib: A Local Response to Instability and Violence, October 2020, the tribes of Marib have demonstrated unique motivation to govern and apply civilian as well as military leadership. She speculates that this may have partly been a product of the
community-oriented concern that arose from witnessing the way community grievances drove jihadist recruitment and the devastation of being ground zero for the devastation of terrorism and counterterrorism campaigns, which led to antipathy both towards the Saleh government coordinating drone
strikes with the Americans and the AQAP elements controlling territory without providing essential services. As Nadwa Dawsari’s fieldwork documented (“Foe not Friend: Yemeni Tribes and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” February 2018, https://en.eipss-eg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Dawsa-
ri_FINAL_180201.pdf) key AQAP leaders were killed and conflict fatigue set in, Marib experienced its own form of DDR in which the tribes absorbed former fighters and focusing on a common cause of being “Yemenis concerned about issues that matter to their communities, such as defending their
region from Houthi incursion or improving and delivering more just governance.”
6 Abaad Studies and Research Center, Tribe and Oil in Yemen’s War: The Battle of Marib, November 18, 2020 Casey Coombs & Ali Al-Sakani, Marib: A Yemeni Government Stronghold Increasingly Vulnerable to Houthi Advances
7 As research conducted by Baron found, Marib governor’s role in amending the pre-2011 terms of natural energy revenues to secure a sizable 20% share of oil and gas revenues for Marib was a major achievement for both local government and the tribes (most prominently, the Abida tribe on
whose tribal lands Safer Sector 18 is located). Through establishing this revenue stream and its own independent Marib Central Bank, the tribal federation has helped engineer the evolution of Marib into a full-fledged microstate. Baron, The Marib Paradox.
8 Al-Sabahi and De Santis, “The Role of Cultural Norms”, pp. 55–56.
51
of sheikhs ” before intervening in the local communities. balances, and female participation such order is still not enforce building regulations as his staff aren’t accompanied
However, this can lead to an uneven distribution of resources, tolerated. The recently increased participation of women by a policing force. Despite the massive growth in traffic
as illuminated by a study undertaken by Oxfam and published in the bureaucratic structure is at least partly a product and traffic violations, the municipality is unable to organize
by the Yemen Community Engagement Working Group.9 In the of surplus administrative capacity that the displacement a trained policing force to manage such basic management
study, “48% of respondents felt that humanitarian aid in Yemen movement brought into Marib, and it will take years to see and security functions necessary for urban sector growth
was not reaching the most vulnerable populations. Arguably this translating to political representation in local councils at the scale Marib now requires.
the most vulnerable or marginalized populations, such as the within the community of Marib itself. Moreover, the electoral
» Lack of Master plan oversight: the municipality does not
elderly, disabled, or illiterate people, have difficulties accessing map will not enable the participation of the IDP community
have the mandate to enforce the master plan, and still
information about humanitarian assistance and consequently due to Yemeni election laws, and will thus exclude the voice
does not possess the legal documents and authorization
accessing the direct assistance. Marginalized groups, which of the majority of the current population which represents
to ensure compliance with its building codes. The master
often do not belong to a more organized “tribe” or have a sheikh, the bulk of the potential tax base. This means that the
plan to date functions as a guidance document providing
are overlooked when aid organizations come into the country to progressive dynamics that the displacement brought to
unspecific directives, and housing expansion specifically
offer humanitarian assistance. Marib as a “demographic gift” will not necessarily translate
on private properties only gets generic guidance from
Marib’s context, therefore, requires a context-based assessment into new state-tribe relations that Marib’s future depends on
the master plan to obtain a building permit. Investments
of vulnerability due to its unique anomalies. Unlike other hosting in the near term.
and large-scale housing projects only get the permit from
communities, IDPs in Marib report relatively little discrimination
» The bureaucracy in the administrative system creates a the governorate, and little to no regard is usually given to
and as they now constitute 70% of the population of Marib City,
realistic entry point for technical support: good governance the master plan itself, which the provincial authorities
many are themselves fully integrated into the host community
relies on capable and empowered administrations that do recently ratified. A coherent approach to implementing and
(as owners of homes and businesses), many women are heads
their job on a day-to-day basis, and recent steps taken by managing urban growth needs to be prioritized in one of the
of household with full decisionmaking authority, it appears that
Marib municipality need to be celebrated and supported. For fastest growing cities in Yemen, and linking the municipal
a key determining factor of vulnerability is tribal membership.
instance, the growth in the Solid Waste and Parks Offices system with technical bodies such as the syndicate of
in Marib has been astonishing, and the capacity of such engineers will be essential.
Recommendations for stakeholders seeking to offices to build, maintain and operate such basic services
understand and engage the formal and informal » Need to improve risk and disaster management: as the
has been improving in earnest. Expanding the bureaucracy,
city is growing rapidly, little attention is being given to the
governance system in Marib: while improving the technical skills for the technical
management of new construction, including in transitional
departments to manage other key services that are lagging
shelter and camp projects. The recent flood incidents
behind is essential for the future of the city. Some key
» Recognize the challenge of representation: A long time provided yet another illustration of the need to have
sectors include traffic management and road maintenance,
elapsed since the last election, undermining the legitimacy emergency management and response capacity in the
sewage network construction and maintenance, drinking
of the existing representation councils. Even if local elections city. As conflict and is still unfortunately a factor in the near
water supply, as well as departments that provide electronic
are to be held in Marib tomorrow, there are major hurdles future, Marib will also need to be prepared for sudden sparks
services and registration.
that impede substantial improvement in representation. of violence and security incidences, which the security
Women, who have become much more visible in key » Limits of local law enforcement: the municipality does not actors alone are incapable of handling. Fire departments,
bureaucratic positions in the decision-making structure are operate its own police force, which reduces its capacity to emergency first responders and civil defense organizations
less likely to have access to elected councils. The political exercise its mandate. For instance, a municipality manager in Marib virtually do not exist, even though the municipal
order that governs local elections relies on delicate tribal reported to us frequent cases where his staff were unable to level is best positioned to cater for these essential functions.
9 https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1425&context=focus
Housing, Land, Property
8 HOUSING, LAND,
PROPERTY
If we assume that the most practical estimate of the current exist in the form of freeholdings, the customary land use lands (pastoral lands claimed by specific tribes through
population in Marib is 650K inhabitants, this represents a agreements between the tribes in Marib were documented customary entitlements) and are quite remote from the
12-fold increase of the population within a few years while by the British, giving them a form of lasting land use city, but hosted IDPs rely primarily on the city, its services
the country is in conflict as we have stated earlier. documentation to prevent inter-tribal attacks. This brief and markets for their basic needs and livelihoods. Activists
moment in history which was a transactional means to an in the city counted over 90 of these settlements in the
Historic Trajectory: Land Tenure, Development, end for the British introduced a strategic advantage for the immediate surrounding of Marib.3 These camps evolved
Management tribes which no authority in Yemen had the power to revoke. over a very short period of time from small gatherings
With the discovery of oil and natural resources these once hosting tents for a few dozen households, to major
Tribal Land Rights: Grandfathered Clauses from British relatively insignificant treaties (both to the British and the settlements that are constantly evolving into permanent
Mandate tribes) became increasingly valuable and pivotal in creating structures, although they lack all the essential services and
The tribal families of the northern and eastern areas of a form of checks and balances between Yemeni central still depend on collective service points (such as communal
Yemen (to include Marib) did not consolidate as much government and tribal authorities. water reservoirs). The fact that many of these settlements
power as those in the south, due to the absence of were created on steep mountainsides, and not serviced by
extensive agricultural production holdings and other New population pressures asphalt roads or drainage networks made them susceptible
economic resources. Tribal leaders in these northern and The arrival of nearly 640K IDPs since 2015 to the Governorate to various natural hazards, and they were the areas most
eastern areas were an essential buffer zone for British has put tremendous pressure on the city, which alone has devastated by seasonal floods.
interests: maintaining access to the feudal south and hosted 82% of all IDPs according to our analysis of DTM
securing coastal trade. These tribal leaders were offered data. With an added 108K households to the city’s residents, b) Nearly 10,500 households still live in public
treaties by the British in return for their role in safeguarding Marib’s hosting situation remains dire, and housing and buildings turned into collective shelters (approximately
trade security.1 These treaties kept the peace but would shelter conditions are vastly underreported. UN-Habitat 63K IDPs, making nearly 10% of all households). They have
also create conditions which led to the unique status and attempted to portray the hosting situation by analyzing been identified in the locations of Kuliya, Al Najah School, Al
influence of Yemen’s tribes in two ways: DTM-supported shelter data. While information on current Mutahaf, Al Nasr and Maktab Alziraah. Although occupants
occupants of camps and collective shelters are easier of these collective centers move there for comparatively
1) The colonial land “documentation” counterintuitively to track, the majority of IDP households reside in private better housing conditions than the camps in terms of basic
reduced conflicts between tribes and helped maintain some homes and rented shelters which are more challenging to WASH and protection from the elements, the offer a
degree of a balance of power between the tribes.2 monitor and leave many data gaps. Through approximation mix of advantages and risks. While they are categorized
from data linkages, and by analyzing the urban expansion by humanitarian actors as “IDP hosting sites” which means
2) By ensuring a mutually beneficial arrangement for trends through satellite imagery forensics, the following occupants access to some of the welfare assistance and
both sides: the colonial authority introduced the foreign IDP housing trends were observed: services that the local authorities and the relief actors
concept of property rights, and formal declarations of the continue to provide, they often lack suitable privacy and
tribes’ right to autonomy in governing their own regions, a) Camps and Transient Rural Settlements host up to proper sanitation conditions. An IDP occupant of one of
along with entitlements to all its land through binding 24% of all residents in Marib (roughly 140k IDPs or 26K these centers reported to the profiling team that while he
agreements. Although property ownership of land did not households). Some of these camps were placed on tribal stays with his family in a separate classroom changed into
1 Europa Publications Limited, “Yemen”, p. 982.

2 Ali Al Sarraf, South Yemen: From Colonization to Unification, in Arabic (London: Riad El-Rayyes Books Ltd, 1992), pp. 36–37, 52; Ahmed Al Siad, Salih, Authority and Opposition in Contemporary Yemen, in Arabic (Beirut: Dar Al Sada QAH, 1992), pp. 38, 48; Ahmed Al Massry, Attiah, The Red Star
Over Yemen, in Arabic, 3rd edn. (Beirut: The Institute for Arabic Research, 1988), pp. 24, 30, 36, 38; Europa Publications Limited, “Yemen”, pp. 982–985.
3 Mareb Press, “‫”حملة الكترونية للضغط على األمم المتحدة‬
53
MAP 5 - NEW CONSTRUCTIONS
Sector Structures Increase % Total IDP

number in 2013 2018 growth IDPS Housholds
1 14 889 1,542 173% 113,628 22,726
2 6 98 1,217 1242% 37,572 7,514
3 23 473 689 146% 11,502 2,300
4 15 556 684 123% 52,560 10,512
5 25 7,528 601 8% 41,574 8,315
6 13 1,096 572 52% 78,786 15,757
7 12 78 195 250% 4,008 802
8 22 112 195 174% 3,000 600
9 9 296 138 47% 82,134 16,427
10 26 66 116 176% - -
FIGURE 37. Increase in construction in urban sectors. Urban sectors were defined based on the aggregation of various FIGURE 38. Top 10 of sectors’ increase of structures 2013-2018 and IDPs in 2019
neighborhood boundaries expressly for the purpose of this analyis. (IOM DTM 2019) sorted by absolute increase of amount of structures.
Settlement Type People Households %

a temporary accommodation, most of his fellow occupants
Rented Accomodation 343,386 57,231 53% Despite the subsidized, low-cost electricity for
are individuals who are either African migrants, or males
that deserted the military service in Houthi-controlled Settlements Urban and Rural 94,938 15,823 15% residents of Marib City and reality for those living
areas. This is why the collective centers have reportedly Other Public buildings 61,902 10,317 10% ‘off-grid’ in camps struggling to cobble together
begun to differentiate their centers to offer special facilities utility solutions. As one IDP camp official stated:
Dispersed Settlements 58,206 9,701 9%
” “We have more than 1,500 families in
for select groups: migrants centers, women-headed
households and female-only centers, family centers, and Other private buildings 46,644 7,774 7%
male-only centers and so on, although they all represent a Host Families 24,864 4,144 4% this camp and they have already moved
key challenge to the city’s capacity to afford other essential Host Families (rent free) 17,070 2,845 3% three times ... because the fighting keeps
services in those occupied spaces. Second home 1,068 178 0%
following them. They don’t have water,
electricity, a hospital and the nearest
School 876 146 0%
town is 10 km away. Just bringing water
c) The remaining IDPs (71K) live in the urban areas, Health Facilities 366 61 0% is enough hardship.”
either in “inner Marib” (i.e. the small town and the city Religious buildings 252 42 0%
center area), or in “outer Marib” (which is a minor city
Total 649,572 108,262 100%
- Director of al-Sowaida camp, October
expansion in the north that has seen a massive growth 2020
over the past five years). A staggering 71K households live
FIGURE 39. Settlement Type of IDPs in Marib/ Marib CIty
inside the urban areas of Marib (approximately 430K IDPs,
making nearly 67% of all households). To put that growth in
perspective, for every 5 people currently live in Marib city,
only one is a resident originally from Marib, and that does the significant urban expansion and growth in the city is still
Our ability to understand the shelter conditions through short to provide decent and adequate shelter conditions for
not include the remaining IDPs that are living outside the
direct observation was limited, as the profiling team’s the IDPs, regardless of the legal arrangements and the rent
urban center as we have previously shown.
access to the city was restricted by many factors (see the costs.
methodology section for more information). Secondary
Marib’s nearly twelve-fold increase in growth has led an
information, witnesses and key informant interviews led The Office of Cadastral Records stated that most rental
informality boom that requires immediate action
us to believe that at least three families live in each rented agreements are not documented: both landlord-to-
Housing numbers were further broken down by shelter type
accommodation, and households have taken measures to occupant arrangements, as well as the occupant-to-
as per the percentages shown in the table on the right, but the
subdivide each unit they are collectively renting and share occupant arrangements (in a unit occupied by more than
urban growth to accommodate 57K households in rented
WASH facilities in order to ensure minimum standards one household) remain undocumented, which can be
accommodations for instance challenges common-sense
of privacy. Despite these efforts, overcrowding was still considered a major source of protection concern. As the
and urban densification possibilities. The key question here
considered by many of the key informants we interviewed as rental market is highly competitive, increase in rents has
is how Marib in the course of only a few years was able to
a serious protection concern. As noted in recent nationwide been a source of household income instability, and many
accommodate a five-fold population increase if we leave
assessments in Yemen, housing supply and affordability evictions happen on a regular basis.
aside those IDPs hosted in public spaces and improvised
are viewed as the most critical problems facing urban areas
camps? Even more importantly, what kind of services and
in Yemen.
shelter conditions the IDPs are living under even in privately
These are all speculations merit further research in a
rented accommodations?
comprehensive shelter profile, but the bottom line is that all
Residents in the city today are living in peace and harmo- The Marginalized
Somewhat agree and Afican migrants Arrived in the past 6 months only
19% somewhat disagree
If I could not get my needs from nyinstate
the
IDPs living regardless ofsettlements
informal tribal,
slums,institutions, I cultural and social backgrounds
or camps
IDPs living
I consider theinpreservation
the city's traditional I consider
of Marib's
the preservationResident
neighbourhoods
culturalissue
heritage an
of Marib'sofcultural heritage
Marib before thean
conflict Respond
Strongly agree
IDPs living in camps important Arrived after the conflict started in 2015
Strongly disagree can access assisstance from my friends and neighbours important issue
Native residents
who live in my area
27% DK/DWTA Marginalized and African migrants IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Resident of Marib before the conflict
DK/DWTA
4% 0% 10% Strongly
20% 30%agree
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Native residents 3%
55
Strongly Disagree
e city today are living in peace and harmo- I consider the preservation of Marib's cultural heritage an
14% 2
of tribal, cultural and social backgrounds 3%important issue Strongly
36% agree Somewhat agree Current occupation Somewhat disagree
7%
12% Strongly agree
y today are living in peace and harmo- 12% the preservation
I consider of Marib's cultural heritage an somewhat disagree Somewhat agree
bal, cultural and social backgrounds 34% important issue Somewhat agree 19% Current
living in occupation
Somewhat agree
4% Native resident of Marib
DK/DWTA IDPs 19%
slums, informal settlements or camps Strongly agree
Strongly agree Strongly disagree
20% Somewhat disagree Strongly Disagree
64% Somewhat disagree
14% Somewhat agree 27% DK/DWTA
DK/DWTA
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
4% Strongly agree
IDPs living in the city's traditional
Native neighbourhoods
resident of Marib
Strongly Disagree
Strongly disagree
14% 19% somewhat disagree 39% DK/DWTA

Somewhat agree 26% 0% 10% 20%
DK/DWTA
30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
T
Somewhat agree IDPsIDPs living
living in city's
in the slums, informal neighbourhoods
traditional settlements or camps Somewhat disagree
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
27%19% Services
somewhat disagree
DK/DWTA Marginalized
IDPs living in slums, informal and African
settlements migrants
or camps
Housing
Somewhat agree I
Strongly agree I
Strongly disagree
Access to 12 hours or less of daily electrcity supply 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% Perception
90% 100% of improving shelter conditions in terms of affordability and Perception of stability in the current shelter (against natural haza
% DK/DWTA Marginalized and African migrants adequacy comapred to previous year violence, or risk of eviction) N
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Residents in the city today are living in peace and harmo- 7% I consider the preservation of Marib's cultural heritage an 4%
Native residents
New Master Plan DK/ DWTA Rawdah.
ny regardless of tribal, cultural and social backgrounds
DK/ DWTA
important issue 15%
DK/ DWTA
Cur
Urban Growth and the New Master Plan on Marib Strongly disagree Services
Before the war and up until 15% 2015,32% Rawdah was a disagree
Strongly Housing 34%
Not stable
remote suburb of Marib that was less attractive Somewhat disagree SCORECARD - Housing
n the city's traditional neighbourhoods The urban profiling team has relied on remote sensing Somewhat disagree
DK/DWTA Somewhat stable
Somewhat agree 4% Access toStrongly
12 hoursagree or less of daily electrcity supply Native resident of Marib
21%
Perception of improving shelter conditions in terms of affordability and
techniques to observe the urban growth that took place in for people to live in. Although
19% it included someSomewhat agree Strongly
adequacy comapred to previous year Disagree Stable
IDPs living in camps Strongly agree 14% 26%
the city. For purely analytical purposes, we have subdivided 36% 800 housing
Somewhat agree units, it remained underserviced Somewhat
26%
disagree
Housing and
Strongly agree Very stable
The Marginalized and Afican migrants Marib city and its setting into 26 “sectors” (see: FIGURE 37
19% was
somewhat only
disagree sparsely populated (most
DK/ DWTA
housing 7% Somewhat agree
DK/ DWTA
urs or less of daily electrcity supply 0%on10%page
20% 30%53),
40% aligning
50% 60% 70% with80% 90%the100% neighbourhood boundaries Housing
Native residents
Perception of improvingunitsStrongly were
shelter
disagree vacant).
conditions in termsMoreover, Rawdah
of affordability Strongly
and disagree was
Perception of stability in the current shelter (against natural hazards, Strongly disagree
15% 32%
in the new Master Plan of the city as IDPs welivingshall see.27% The adequacy comapred initially
DK/DWTA
an year
to previous informal housing expansion, Somewhat disagree taking violence, or risk of eviction)
I feel safe in my current residence from
Marginalized and African migrants Providing for my current residence cost
in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat disagree
r less of daily electrcity supply Perception of improving place shelteroutside
conditionsthe city’s
in terms master
of affordability andplan andtoagree away a house anywhereall kinds Perception of stability
of hazards in theman-made
(natural, over 50%
current shelter (against of myhazards,
natural average income
initial quantitative assessment was then triangulated by 7%
Perception of being welcomed
Somewhat rent
4%
Satisfaction with present level of electrcity supply adequacy comapred to previous year DK/ DWTAin the city (regardless of displacement status)
0% 10%or20%
violence, risk
violence, risk of eviction)
30%
of 19%
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
eviction) DK/ DWTA
Cost of accessing shelter over 50% agree
Somewhat of household income
the qualitative
DK/ DWTAinformation we have gathered throughIDPs key living in camps from the attention of the local authorities, Strongly agree though 26%
15%
informant interviews to understand urban growth
Strongly disagree
dynamics, 15% 7% construction
32% was
Strongly only loosely
disagree
8% regulated at best 4% Not stable
5% Strongly agree
DK/ Somewhat
DWTA The Marginalized and Afican migrants DK/ DWTA DK/ DWTA 34% DK/ DWTA DK/ DWTA
and to evaluate 2%
disagree
the MasterVery Plan proposals against the anywhere in Marib Somewhat City.
disagreeThis suburb 16% became 15% Somewhat stable 26%
satisfactory
supply/
Strongly disagree
Somewhat
demand
agree
trends. 15% 32% a major attraction
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% Strongly
60% 70% disagree
for 17%
IDP communities, who
80% 90% 100% Strongly disagree 21% Not stable Strongly disagree
Somewhat
13%
disagree Satisfactory
19% Somewhat agree 34% Stable 27%
36%
Strongly agree
26% wanted to invest Somewhat indisagree
a permanent residence and Somewhat disagree Somewhat stable Somewhat disagree
Somewhat agree Strongly agree 28% 21% 26% Very stable
Perception of being welcomed to rent a house anywhere
Marib’s urban 21% Somewhat satisfactory 19% Satisfaction sought affordability when they compared rental
agree growth can broadly be defined under three
with present level of electrcity
Somewhat agree supply Somewhat agree Stable Somewhat agree
in the city (regardless of displacement status)
Strongly
26% 32% 17% 26%
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% functional categories: Unsatisfactory or purchaseStrongly prices in the inner Marib area. Land
agree Strongly agree 26% Very stable Strongly agree
28% Services was randomly subdivided by a handful of owners Housing 8% DK/ DWTA
a) residential and shelter growth which includes both the
DK/ DWTA
16%
, who come 2% from the major tribes
Very satisfactory that continue
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
slums and the improvised settlements and camps, as well Perception of being welcomed to rent a house anywhere
It is harder
Cost oftoaccessing
find an adequate and anof 17%
affordable residence for my and
Strongly disagree
h present level of electrcity supply Access to 12 hours or less of daily electrcity supply
in the city (regardless of displacement 13% status) Perception shelter
of improving over
shelter 50% household
conditions in termsincome
of affordability P
as the rather regular urban densification and expansion to protect
36% the city and form its
Satisfactory cohesive social household
adequacy thiscomapred
year compared to last
to previous yearyear Somewhat disagree v
sent level of electrcity supply b) Services, businesses and markets growing Perception of beingalliance,
to welcomed to
8% of displacement status) and rent aconstruction
house anywhere accelerated as a result
21% Somewhat satisfactory Cost of accessing 5%shelter over 50% of household income 28% Somewhat agree
in the city (regardless DK/ DWTA DK/ DWTA
2% accommodate the new demand and population increase of 16%
displacement waves. Over 1500 new building 7% 32%
Very satisfactory
Access to clean drinking water
DK/ DWTA Perception of being
Unsatisfactory
Strongly disagree
welcomed to rent a house anywhere 26% DK/ DWTA Access
Strongly disagree
to affordable housing in Marib
Strongly agree
13% such as the remarkable healthcare sector growth; Native residents 17%
8% units were added
DK/ DWTA in Rawdah
in the city by up until
demographic 2018,
group and 27% 5% DK/Strongly
DWTA disagree
Satisfactory 16% 28% Strongly disagree
DK/ DWTA 15% 32%
2% c) Public and government
Very satisfactory administration centers. construction continues
Somewhat to
Somewhat disagree
disagree date in spite of the 26% Somewhat disagree
13% 21% Somewhat satisfactory

17% 28% Strongly disagree Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Somewhat agree 3%
Satisfactory regulatory framework Somewhat agreeof
Somewhat the new Master Plan.
agree DK/ DWTA 27% DK/ DWTA
4% 32% NativeSomewhat
residents disagree 19% 17% 26% Somewhat
Somewhat disagree
agree
Jobah and Rawdah: Examples of Secondary City Growth
Unsatisfactory StronglyIDPs agree
living in camps Rawdah
28% introduced
Strongly agree
StronglyMarib
agree to previously unseen Strongly disagree
26% Strongly agree 19% 34% Unsatisfactory
28%21% 17%
Somewhat satisfactory
DK/Driven 29%
by the displacement crisis
Somewhat agree
and coping needs, IDPs living intransport
Somewhat agree
modalities. Before the war, any land or Somewhat disagree
Somewhat
Stronglyagree
agree
DWTA
Unsatisfactory The Marginalized and Afican migrants 32% the city's traditional neighbourhoods
17% 26% Somewhat satisfactory
the residential and shelter Somewhat growthdisagree mostly occurred on Accessresidence
to clean drinking that is notagree
Strongly
water walking distance or reachable Somewhat agree Strongly agree
in the city by demographic
19% group
% DK/ DWTA
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
fairly easily on a motorbike was considered
IDPs living in camps Strongly agree Satisfactory
relatively cheap land, 26% sometimes Strongly several
disagree kilometers away I feel that I can rent a house anywhere in the city 22%
from the23% city. For instance, DK/ areas DWTAsuch as Jufaineh have
unlivable
The Marginalized and for most
Afican migrants of Marib’s residents. To date, Perception of being welcomed to rent a house anywhere
Very satisfactory
DK/ DWTA
grown significantly during the war, and Satisfaction with present level of electrcity
evolved from farm Perception of being 80% supply of 4%
welcomed Rawdah
to rent a houseoccupants
10% Strongly
0% anywhere
are
20% 30%agree
IDPs who are
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
in the city
Access to (regardless
affordable ofresidents
Native displacement
housing in Marib status) Strongly disagree
drinking water
lands with sporadic residences near Marib Dam, to a in the city by demographic renting29% small
group17% housing units (averaging
Somewhat agree 60 square
8%
densely populated area, co-existing with farming activities. Perception of beingmeters) welcomed to fromrent a locals who found an opportunity in
house anywhere Access to affordable housing in Marib DK/ DWTA
king water
2% in the city by demographic group Somewhat disagree 16% Somewhat agree
Secondary cities such as Jobah also grew significantly, theVery new satisfactory
market. Most of theDK/ units
DWTA in the area are 17% 3% IDPs living in camps DK/Strongly
DWTA disagree
Strongly agree
4% Native residents 13%
Strongly agree
and as residents made daily commutes into Marib 36% center, built from rammed
Satisfactory
23% 26% earthStrongly and disagree
mud,
Strongly but the area
disagree 19% 34% Somewhat disagree
Unsatisfactory
% 17% Economy 3% and Afican 28%
4% the
Somewhat two
agreetwo cities came to function IDPs livingalmost asNativeone
in the city's traditional urban 21%
neighbourhoods
residents
also hostssatisfactory
Somewhat multi-story concrete DK/ DWTAapartment
DK/DWTA
Somewhat disagree units.
The Marginalized migrants DK/ DWTA
Somewhat
Somewhat agree
satisfactory
Strongly agree
The occupants rely on Strongly
the citydisagree
center
agree or inner 19% 32% 34%
17% conglomeration.
Somewhat disagree However, the most substantial growth Unsatisfactory
Somewhat 0%Unsatisfactory
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Somewhat Conditions
agree to start up a new business (perception of OptimismSomewhat
due to improving
disagree economy 19% Perception
Strongly
Satisfactory agreeof impact of conflict on household economic
actually
easy) occurred in the areas IDPs
howdisagree
Strongly on the city outskirts
such
living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
28% as Marib for jobs and markets, commuting
Strongly agree by car 22% Somewhat potential
satisfactory
% 26% Somewhat disagree
DK/ DWTA Somewhat agree FIGURE 40. Availability, risks and Verycosts of shelter
satisfactory
DK/ DWTA The Marginalized and Afican
IDPs living migrants
in camps Strongly agree 19% Satisfactory
26% Strongly disagree 7% DK/ DWTA 22% 4% DK/ DWTA
6%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
14% Very satisfactory
DK/ DWTA DK/ DWTA The Marginalized and Afican migrants
Economy 13%
14% 21% 24% Strongly disagree 24%
32% Strongly disagree
Strongly disagree 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Somewhat disagree Perception of being welcomed to rent a house anywhere Somewhat disagree
27% Access to clean drinking water Conditions to start up a new business (perception of29% 18%
Optimism due
in the city by demographic group
to improving economy
24%
Somewhat disagree how easy) 28% Somewhat agree 28% Somewhat agree
Somewhat agree 30% Strongly agree 33% Strongly agree
and by locally-initiated collective transport modes such as FIGURE 41. FIGURE 42. FIGURE 43.
microbuses. Urban pattern - Al Rawdah Urban pattern - Al Jufeinah camp (mapped in Urban pattern - Al Mataar. Growth follows relatively
2018, growth has increased significantly since) straigth pattern parallel to existing roads.
Rising Property Values
During the conflict, land prices skyrocketed (according to
an interview with a real estate dealer, prices for a piece
of land to build a small residential unit had risen to YR
12 million, from only YR 500K before 2015). The State
of Yemeni Cities Report assessed that property values
had risen by 300% from 2015-2019.4 Services are also
gradually coming, and the area is now accessible by road,
although inner streets and footpaths are not asphalted.
The area does not have a water or a sanitation network,
and relies completely on water trucking from nearby wells,
and on domestic septic tanks, while electricity has recently
reached the area through private providers. Residents of
Rawdah were estimated to be about 113K inhabitants,
4 UN Habitat State of Yemeni Cities Report
FIGURE 44. Drone image of al-Rawdah Camp. The outskirts of the

main city center appears in the background of the image to give a
sense of the distance. Source: Ebraheem al-Theefah
57
which highlights how rapid this urban expansion happened

in Marib over the past few years. Similar to Raqdah, areas Prioritizing Transportation Investments and Question of
such Shuraika and Jufaineh have seen a massive urban
the “Marib International Airport”
expansion, and the key statistics for this growth (structures
and IDP population) are provided in figure 38.
As stated earlier, the city has plans to invest in a new international
airport to serve Marib and central Yemen. According to local sources,
The new Master Plan of Marib
the only work that has been done so far is the construction of a
The new Master Plan is supposed to accommodate the
30km-long fence around the airport plot. While an airport would
city’s growth for the next 30 years according to the General
provide access to a much needed transportation option for many
Administration for Land, Survey and Urban Planning, which
in the region, upgrading road networks will remain the primary need
also stated in June 2019 that up to 30% of the Master Plan
for millions of users in Yemen.
demarcations on land features and road network have been
implemented.5 Through our interviews with local officials,
In a recent interview on al-Arabiya news network, the Saudi
as well as with several real estate developers and regular
Ambassador to Yemen, focusing on the “development and
residents, we have come up with an initial list of issues that FIGURE 46. A farming area included in the new reconstruction” explained the steps that have been taken to
might improve the context for implementing the Master Master Plan of Marib. commence the construction of Marib’s International Airport. The
Plan, keeping in mind that we fully understand the motives,
new airport will presumably have an annual passenger capacity
the practical necessity and the ambitions that are involved
of 2 million, and will provide 1,000 permanent jobs according to
in this grand scheme. But perhaps the most substantial
the Ambassador.1 Such announcements for major infrastructure
announcement in that regard came in November 2018,
projects in Marib are happening against the backdrop of looming
when the Governor, along with the Prime Minister, Mr.
risks, especially that the city of Marib is now effectively surrounded
Abdulmalek, officially ratifying the Master Plan of Marib into
on three sides by Houthi forces.
a legal document. The Master Plan had a staggering area
of 20,750 hectare (the built-up city up until 2015 was only
630 hectare)6.
FIGURE 45. New planned airport
5 Yemen Shabab, 20 ,”‫ ألف هكتار‬02 ‫ من المخطط الحضري لعاصمة المحافظة بمساحة‬%03 ‫ انجاز‬:‫ “مأرب‬July 2020, www.yemen-shabab.com/news/48216
6 Office of Cadastral Records in Marib Governorate 1 https://www.alarabiya.net/ar/arab-and-world/yemen/2018/11/10/-‫العربية‬-
‫الجديد‬-‫مأرب‬-‫مطار‬-‫مشروع‬-‫مخططات‬-‫تعرض‬
MAP 6 - MARIB MASTERPLAN
FIGURE 47. From the Office of

Cadastral Records in Marib
Governorate, studied by UN Habitat
Profiling Team, July 2020
59
Type of issues Details Ways to address them

Limited publicization Although the Master Plan itself was made public through the Greater information on the Master Plan key assumptions (such
municipal billboard, several information gaps lessen the amount as the population growth projections, market demand, guide-
of knowledge that observers, investors and the public can ac- lines for subdivisions, implementation period, etc.) need to be
cess, which weakens its utility and the public trust and buy-in. publicized, including through the municipal webpage and other
social media outlets.Local officials can organize public displays
and hearings, so that residents, businesses and investors can
get to hear directly from the local officials about the different
aspects of the Master Plan.
Pacing of growth The vast area included in the Master Plan can only be justified We frequently see how excessively ambitious local plans can
if the city could sustain the unnatural annual growth brought become counterproductive when they fail to predict future
about by the conflict. We might see in the future some growth trends, specifically in terms of population growth and the busi-
as a result of further displacement, but we might also see re- ness environment. It is always possible for the local authorities
turns and population drop happening in the city despite the to partner with academia and research centers to revisit the
protracted nature of the hosting situation, and in any case, the population projections, IDPs plans for the future, and introduce
assumption that the growth from 2015 to 2018 will be sustained amendments or phasing to physical plans so that they are more
is unrealistic and can’t be used as a baseline for planning. compatible with needs.
Proposed population density According to GALSUP, the average density of the master plan is A phased approach, coupled with housing typology studies and
55 capita per hectare. This assumes that another 930K inhabi- prototypes can examine ways to increase the urban density
tants will live in Marib (on top of the existing population assum- by at least a double fold. Studies have shown that densities
ing that none of the IDPs will leave the city). Regardless of the between 120 to 170 capita per hectare can reduce initial and
growth estimate underpinning such low density proposes many operational costs quite substantially. Yemen has a long standing
challenges: it increases cost of a residence, as well as the cost tradition of building high-rise residences even when traditional
of the basic infrastructure and networks, it complicates services building materials are used, and some of this traditional experi-
and maintenance requirements, and it increases reliance on pri- ence can be featured in modernized prototypes that fit Marib’s
vate vehicles and cost of operating a public transport system. cultural and market requirements.
Complementary planning work requirements The Master Plan as a document does not deal with relevant and The Master Plan merely provides the key development and
related issues that are pressing on Marib, such as the housing spatial guidelines for urban growth. Housing typology, detailed
demand and supply dynamics. The number one issue facing neighbourhood designs, and building codes can all be informed
most residents of Marib (including the IDPs) is how the future through a housing action plan, which considers the market
growth will provide accessible and affordable housing for all. demand and supply forces, purchase and income capacity,
predominant options for renting, minimum living space require-
ments, and optimal building materials to lessen dependency
on energy sources. Moreover, several prototypes and models in
partnership with different private sector providers can help local
authorities determine the best housing options for the different
income groups in the city.
Biting valuable land Growth of concrete over farmland is an environmental misfor- The master plan needs to avoid the encroachment on farming
tune and may cause irreversible damage, given the scarcity of areas and protect them from the direct, as well as the indirect
arable and cultivated lands in Marib. This expansion will have impacts of urban growth. Farming areas can be incorporated in
consequences on the food security and affordability in Marib’s the master plan as protected lands, with strict building codes
markets. The urban planning law (Law 20, 1995) clearly requires (and other land use restrictions) to prevent illegal building,
the preservation of agricultural and other natural assets under transformation of land for recreational and tourism purposes,
all circumstances. and to service them to maintain their links to growing markets.
Avoiding indirect consequences of urban growth involves waste
water management, allowing the passage of service roads only
(not bypasses), preventing the transformation of accommoda-
tions to villas that alternates the use of the land (for instance, by
preventing fencing up to a certain height, and protecting perenni-
al trees, etc.).
Reality undermining plans on paper As the Master Plan was being prepared, large urban slums, Because Marib is now functioning as a city, with no previous
spontaneous settlements and camps have grown inside the experience in managing massive growth and planning require-
planning area, which will complicate implementation. Marib now ments, it is realistic to assume that significant capacity building
has an informal settlement problem to deal with similar to most efforts must go to managing the informal housing problem,
major cities in the Middle East, as informality occupies roughly including the informal building activities over agricultural lands.
a quarter of the new Master Plan area, and specifically in the Existing informal housing can be used to analyze the supply
immediate expansion areas close to existing inner city core. and demand of the housing market and to enhance an inclusive
housing strategy. Measures to protect the Master Plan from
further illegal expansion can only realistically succeed if access
to equitable housing and land uses is provided to all residents.
City growth needs to consider operational challenges and Bigger cities require greater resources to manage, to serve and Phased approach to implementation can look at ways to im-
requirements to sustain. Specific shortages in the system development in prove and increase administrative, monitoring and maintenance
Marib such as the poor taxation system, lack of monitoring and capacity as the master plan gets gradually implemented. Start-
building regulations enforcement capacity, poor record in en- ing where demand on new urban land is the highest, where
forcing construction regulations, and lack of capacity and expe- current transport systems can possibly accommodate, and fo-
rience to manage large infrastructure and networks operations cusing on municipal capacity building and institutional arrange-
will hamper the outcome. ments are the key elements of a successful phased approach.
Expansion over private lands According to sources in GALSUP, the urban expansion as The local authority’s capacity to include publicly owned land
planned will mostly take place over privately owned land. Re- (even if remote from the city core) can enable affordable hous-
gardless of the expropriation measures (mainly taking the form ing programmes to compete in the market, and gives the local
of land deductions for public right of way), expansion over authorities a bargaining power they need to ensure equitable
privately-owned land often reduces the capacity of government urban growth. The centricity of the Master Plan as it stands can
authorities to intervene in the market and to ensure different cause increased strain on the inner city core, while a multi-polar
groups and income levels’ access to the urban expansion areas. model that develops suburbs on public lands can reduce the
demand on centralized services and provide more equitable
opportunities to all residents.
61
MAP 7 - MASTERPLAN VS JUFAINEH REALITY
FIGURE 48. Masterplan roads projected on Al Jufaineh camp. The masterplan has proved to be irrelevant in these rapid urban developments (Google Earh 2021)
Water and Sanitation
9 WATER AND
SANITATION
Marib’s government provides municipal services such SERVICES - WATER AND SANITATION
as water, sanitation, health, electricity, and education.
Marib’s basic service provision has been transformed in Overview of Pre-Conflict Impact of National Water Sector
the past six years by its increased financial resources and Policies
investment budget enabling the governorate to pay salaries Marib has an arid climate but Marib City’s proximity to the
and staff to operate independently of central government mountains give it the benefit of water runoff. According
support since late 2015.1 The influx of IDPs into Marib has to a visiting archaeologist2, rain-fed farming was not an
put pressure on these services. The variable flows of the option in Marib. Irrigation was necessary for agriculture
population count has led to an unpredictable demand for at a scale that would sustain a city. The ancient dam of
basic service provision. In an effort to compensate for the Marib functioned as a diversion barrage rather than as a
shifting context on the ground, and the general absence of proper dam (as in an artificial lake for water storage). The
reliable data, the Marib City urban scorecard survey helped main source of water came from Wadi Dhana, which is a
provide insight into public perceptions of basic services dry stream beds that contain water only when rain falls on
in Marib. The scorecard gives a needs assessment for higher ground in its catchment area.
essential services that can help planning stakeholders:
1) Highlight pain points which can guide follow up focus The background of water and sanitation service provision
groups addressing service needs, support local knowledge in Marib is particularly complex and fragmented involving
exchange and participatory planning. multiple authorities with blurred boundaries between
2) Obtain atmospherics on the range of perceptions government, tribal customary law (Urf), and International
of a dynamic population in flux, including highly vulnerable Humanitarian Organizations.3 Marib’s recent history of being
individuals are often not easy to locate or for municipal and neglected by the government prior to the current conflict
government authorities to engage at this time. had left it outside of any central system without a local water FIGURE 49. Water tower under construction by
3) Integrate traditional/customary knowledge into corporation or autonomous utility or local National Water the Marib
municipal planning, documentation, and laws, particularly and Sanitation Authority (NWSA). Instead, the activities that
regarding the use of traditional water use and access rules would usually be executed under NWSA’s planning capacity
(of surface, subsurface flow and groundwater). was transitioned to independent water authorities such as
4) Raise awareness on the formal water use regulations, the local water corporation that was established in Marib.
impact of water consumption practices, and implications Prior to 2015, Marib did not have infrastructure for a piped
for human settlements, agriculture, and the economy. potable water network. Furthermore, local institutions did
1 At the end of 2015, the governorate’s conflict with the Houthi-led authorities in Sana’a led Marib to cease depositing income from gas in the Central Bank, keeping the revenue in its Marib branch. In 2016,
Marib signed an agreement with President Hadi granting Marib 20% of the total revenues from gas extracted in the governorate, in addition to the revenue granted by Local Authorities Law. According to the local
authority’s 2014 budget, grants and central subsidies constituted 96% of the total general revenue for Marib, while local revenues covered only 4%. The most significant sources of local revenue were local shared
revenues, selling goods and services, and levying fines, penalties, and taxes, Republic of Yemen, Ministry of Finance, Budget Sector: estimated local authority budget for the 2014 fiscal year. See, Berghof Founda-
tion, “Mapping of Local Governance in Yemeni Governorates,” January 2020”.
2 Ingrid Hehmeyer, “Irrigation Farming in the Ancient Oasis of Mārib”, Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, vol. 19, no. 33 (1989), pp. 33–44.
3 As Najwa Adra stated, “Although Yemen is economically the poorest country in the Middle East, it may be the wealthiest in social capital. Yemen’s limited experience with colonialism has left largely
intact important tribal institutions that still prioritise mediation, egalitarian ethics, cooperation and respect for women, all of which can be effectively harnessed in rebuilding the nation. (https://www.files.ethz.ch/
isn/173204/ca9106951a2408f79cdadbf30fc9c244.pdf); Meta Analysis of the formal and informal political economy of water disputes found that most rules derived from five major legal sources: 1) Islamic Law
(Shariah); 2) Customary Law (‘urf), 3) The Constitution 4) The Water Law and 5) The Civil Code https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Water-Management-in-Yemen.pdf, p.
91
FIGURE 50. Traditional well Dam Charity for

Community Development
Somewhat agree
18% 26%
Strongly agree
63
Services Housing
Access to 12 hours or less of daily electrcity supply Perception of improving shelter conditions in terms of affordability and Perception of stability in the current shelter (against natural hazar
future of the city. People in the city pay their taxes and utility bills - per demographic group adequacy comapred to previous year violence, or risk of eviction)
DK/ DWTA
7% DK/ DWTA 4% DK/ DWTA
Native residents
Strongly disagree Strongly disagree
15% Not stable
15% 32% 34%
the city's traditional neighbourhoods
Somewhat disagree Somewhat stable
Somewhat agree Strongly disagree 21%
19% Somewhat agree Stable
Strongly agree Somewhat disagree
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods 26% 26%
Somewhat agree Strongly agree Very stable
he Marginalized and Afican migrants
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

not have a role in the provision, monitoring or quality control
of the drinking water, and could not collect taxes or fees on
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Perception of being welcomed to rent a house anywhere
Scorecard - Access to water
Satisfaction with present level of electrcity supply either strongly agreed or insomewhat agreed
the city (regardless that clean
of displacement status) water supply and distribution. The Costcurrent coverage
of accessing shelter overrate
50% offor
household income
While a majority of the respondents to our survey drinking water was accessible. Some 20% of the city water services is 24.7%, of which 19% is a governmental
8% 5%
expressed ability to access clean drinking water (30% IDPs and marginalized groups strongly16% disagreed with DK/ DWTA network. However, as the city’s rapid growth has increased DK/ DWTA
2% 26%
strongly agreed,13%
Very satisfactory
32% somewhat agreed, and only 17% the notion that clean drinking17%water was accessible.Strongly disagree the demand for drinking water, the municipality has become Strongly disagree
27%
strongly
36%disagreed), disparitySatisfactory
along the demographic Somewhat disagree dependent on privately supplied delivery trucks. According Somewhat disagree
groups shows that21%this generally positive
Somewhat perception is
satisfactory 28% Somewhat agree
to a World Bank assessment in 2020, private water supply, Somewhat agree
mostly true for the native residents. Displacement and
Unsatisfactory 32% which was already meeting about 17% half of26% Yemen’s urban
Strongly agree Strongly agree
place of residence
28% in the city seem
DK/ DWTA to strongly influence demand before the conflict, has expanded to fill the gap left
the degrees by which residents are accessing clean by the inability of the public utilities to deliver water services.
drinking water. Nearly 80% of the native residents Private tanker prices vary widely. Tankers operate in an
informal and unregulated market, leaving local authorities
at city and neighborhood levels with little control over the
You are satisfied with the quality of education services in the city Perception of being welcomed to rent a house anywhere Access to affordable housing in Marib
Access to cleansufficient
I can access drinking water
drinking water Access to Clean Drinking Water in the city by demographic group quality, pricing, or usage of the water.
6%
10% DK/DWTA There have been conflicting reports on3%Marib city’s ability DK/ DWTA
DK/ DWTA
4% 18%
Strongly agree Completely unsatisfied Native residents to maintain its public water supply prior 34% to the conflict.
Strongly disagree 19% Unsatisfactory
29% 17% Somewhat agree Somewhat unsatisfied Some interviewees working in the water sector indicated
Somewhat disagree
thatagree
Marib’s water supply meets the needs of 600K families Somewhat satisfactory
Somewhat disagree Satisfied Somewhat
32% IDPs living in camps inagree
Strongly the city and governorate4 under 19%
the supervision of theSatisfactory
26% Strongly disagree Very satisfied 22%
23% Marib Local Water and Sanitation Corporation (LWSC). Very satisfactory
DK/ DWTA The Marginalized and Afican migrants
One common challenge noted for all the LWSCs is the
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
unavailability of skilled staff needed to run and operate
critical infrastructure. Because Marib has been able to pay
salaries, there is the possibility that it has benefitted from
DK/DWTA
Native resident of Marib “brain gain” as qualified and experienced staff who had to
Strongly Disagree
Economy leave their homes of origin have settled in Marib.
Somewhat agree
Conditions to start up a new business (perception of
IDPs how
living in slums, informal settlements or camps
Optimism due to improving economy On one level, Marib’s local stakeholder complexity
Perception of impact of conflict on mirrors
household economic
easy) Strongly agree potential
the national level of ‘hybrid-sovereignty’ of state and
Marginalized and African migrants tribal entities coexisting in a symbiotic relationship.5
7% DK/ DWTA 4% DK/ DWTA
14% Marib, like many other rural areas
6% 13% suffered as a result of
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
DK/ DWTA
14% 21% 24% Strongly disagree
national laissez faire policies ranging from 24%
32% benign neglect
Strongly disagree
Strongly disagree
FIGURE 51. Access to drinking water all interviewees and per demographic group Somewhat disagree of under-resourced bureaucratic entities to systematic Somewhat disagree
27% 29% 18%
24%
Somewhat disagree
You are satisfied with the quality of education services in the city 28% Somewhat agree 28% Somewhat agree
Somewhat agree 30% Strongly agree 33%
5 Eric Jeunot, “Why Do We Keep Misunderstanding Yemen?”, Diplosphere, 15 February 2021, agree
Strongly
28% Strongly agree DK/DWTA
https://www.diplosphere.org/post/yemen
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat unsatisfied
Imporving agricultural prospects and market demand Satisfied Ability to access adequate household income Residents satisfied with the proximity of residence to
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Very satisfied places of work

5% DK/ DWTA 7%
Water and Sanitation
privatization.6 This decentralization trend added another cost that a well-owner would incur to pump the water up,
layer of complexity to the pre-existing customary system of but not for the water itself (from aquifers), as it was seen
patchwork water governance of multiple actors and parallel as a universal right to access under Islamic and customary
structures7 including strategic involvement of international laws of ala’ala-fa-ala’ala11 which guided water management
donors in policy design at the ministerial level to aid in terms of upstream and downstream land and water
implementation on the ground.8 rights. As of late 2016, approximately 69% of households in
Marib had access to potable water in Marib.12 Now, the local
Customary Water Governance authority is actively working with donors to provide drinking
A combination of tribal codes, Islamic and Yemeni state law water for the population, expand the sanitation treatment
governed an estimated 90% of water supply from individual plant in the city of Marib, and provide sanitation projects for
wells and water catchment areas.9 This effectively meant IDP camps, such as Al-Khaniq and Al-Jafinah.13 According
that residents of the city depended entirely on privately to local water authorities, in the past Marib’s tribes had
owned water sources, relying on a local network of domestic equitably managed water in the eyes of the general public
wells, transporting and storing water in jerry cans or as there were relatively few disputes or complaints over
medium-size containers, at little cost. Some local sources pre-war water issues, as local interviewees recalled.14
attributed the guarantee of access to water to the tradition
of sikhaya, or the offering of water for the thirsty, which Water Disputes as a microcosm of the broader conflict
is considered a moral duty and part of the path to God’s Other secondary research within areas in and near Marib
blessings, just as karam or “hospitality”, as an obligatory suggested a more nuanced and contentious picture,
part of offering refuge.10 Before the conflict, buying water indicating that water disputes over the ownership or
meant that a household would pay a minimal charge for the control of springs and wells are common. According to one
6 Yemen Observer, “Supply of Urban Water and Sanitation to Be Decentralized”, 4 December 2007, http://www.yobserver.com/environment/10013378.html
7 The internationalization of Yemen’s water policy began in the late 1990s there was a concerted effort led by an international Donor Core Group to decentralize water governance under the umbrella
of the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP) and shift to a commercial model of local water corporation as ultimately formalized in the Water Resources Management 2002
Water Law.
FIGURE 52. (Top and bottom image) Current Marib dam 8 According to the Republic of Yemen’s Water Sector Support Program “Sector Wide Environmental and Social Assessment” report, in 2003, the government invited international advisors to supple-
ment its limited capacity to address the severe water and sanitation service challenges. Through a $436 million Water Sector Support Program facilitated by Yemen’s Donor Core Group (World Bank/IDA,
The modern dam that was built in the 1980s, about 3 KM from the ancient Great Dam Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) “the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) initiated a multi-stakeholder participatory process of preparing and launching a consolidated strategy, action plan and
site. The 100-million dollar project was personally funded by UAE’s Sheikh Zayed bin investment program for the water sector as a whole--the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program 2005-9 (later extended to 2015). See Republic of Yemen Ministry of Water and Environment
Sultan Al Nahyan. As an example of the symbolic significance Marib holds within the and Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Sector Wide Environmental and Social Assessment (SwESA) (Sana’a: Consulting Engineering Services, December 2008),https://static1.squarespace.com/stat-
region, the Sheikh claims to have sponsored the dam project because his al-Nahyan clan ic/5eb18d627d53aa0e85b60c65/t/5eeb6a99ed5aad22f6a7ae42/1592486572828/SwESA_Report.pdf
traced its origins back to Ma’rib. (https://almashareq.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_am/ 9 World Bank, “Dire Straits : The Crisis Surrounding Poverty, Conflict, and Water in ...”, n.d., accessed March 4, 2021, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/27531.
features/2018/02/28/feature-02) The new dam is 38 m (125 ft) high, 763 m (2,503 ft) 10 UNH Profiling Team interview, May 2020.
long, spanning the Wadi Dhana at 15°23′47″N 45°14′36″E, creating a storage capacity of 11 World Bank, 1996; Herzberg, “Urban Water Scarcity in Sana’a, Yemen”. However, due to Yemen’s arid physical geography and climate, Yemen relies on groundwater aquifers for 70% of the water
398 million cubic meters but recent floods have The dam site is located 3 km (1.9 mi) supply, in which cases ala’ala-fa-ala’ala would not apply (Al-Weshali and others, “Diesel Subsidies and Yemen Politics: Post-2011 Crises and Their Impact on Groundwater Use and Agriculture”, Water Alterna-
upstream of the ruins of the Great Dam. The new dam, like the old, was designed to store tives, vol. 8, No. 2, p. 216). According to these customary laws, groundwater is an equally distributed resource because it is below ground and any successful well can reach the aquifer, whereas surface water
water for irrigating the Ma’rib plains. However, the wadi bed at the new dam site consists makes access unequally distributed due to geographic proximity near the water source. “Islamic principles treat [groundwater] as a communal property with a possibility of private ownership under special
of alluvial sand and gravel material 30–50 m thick. Seepage that emanates from this circumstances,” according to Yemen water expert al-Hamdi (2000) based on research conducted near Marib (Mohammed I. Al-Hamdi, Competition for Scarce Groundwater in the Sana’a Plain, Yemen. A Study
dam does not threaten its structure, but results in the loss of water. As a way of capturing of the Incentive Systems for Urban and Agricultural Water Use (London: CRC Press, 2000)). Water management remains a contested issue of overlapping local, national, and tribal governance authorities and
the seepage, some are calling for rebuilding the ancient Marib Dam, both to serve as a will remain a critical determining factor of whether future urban planning in Marib’s growth becomes a catastrophic bubble or can be sustained.
functioning structure as it contains hydrological solutions even more sophisticated than 12 UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018: Yemen”, December 2017,
the current, and as a historic monument and tourist attraction. ( Al-Qalisi, M.; Vela, J. 13 Yemen, Marib Governorate, “15 ,”8102 ‫ ألف خدمة طبية وعالجية قدمتها مستشفيات مأرب خالل‬216‫ مليون و‬January 2019, http://marib-gov.com/news_details.php?sid=1250; UNICEF, “A Report on the Humanitarian
(2015-09-30). “The dam that Sheikh Zayed built”. The National) Situation in Yemen”, October 2018, p. 7. See Berghof Foundation, “Mapping of Local Governance in Yemeni Governorates”.
14 The “tribal social structure” was seen as integral to public water law and management in Yemen, responsibility and power is considered a region-specific issue following a system, “based on the
collective responsibility and accountability of tribal leaders (sheikhs) to their communities”. Al-Sabahi and De Santis, “The role of cultural norms”, p. 56.
65
ethnographic assessment in 201715: largely market-driven system characterized by the following barrels of water is Marib today is roughly USD 30, which
“…some conflicts that appear to be tribal or due to other trends: is significantly higher than the cost for a similar amount
causes may well have water shortages as their fundamental of water in Sana’a for example (around USD 14).
» Informal well proliferation: As wells multiplied, an entire
underlying reason for conflicts. They include a wide range
business of water trucking and distribution emerged in
of incidents, of varying degrees of seriousness. These range Water quality
response to the demand, operated by local residents.
from women and children squabbling over pipes, irrigation According to our key informant interviews, the authorities
When asked about the number of wells in the city and the
pumps and other sources, after waiting long hours in the also currently do not systematically monitor the quality of
nearby farming areas, the Water Department in Marib
hot sun.” the drinking water, or the hygiene standards followed by the
Governorate stated that there is no active record for
system operators such as the trucks and the large water
the number of wells, but they can state with confidence
In addition to the severe water access challenges for IDPs containers put in the markets and next to shopping centres.
that “every land, whether urban or rural, has its own well
in Marib’s 13 camps, conflicts over payment of fees to a Even during cholera season, the spread of waterborne
now.”18
management group for domestic water do occur, even when diseases from flooding or during the COVID-19 pandemic
these are ‘community-based’. Conflicts between small- » Large reservoirs of water were built in the temporary response, the role of the local authorities in terms of water
holders dependent on shallow wells and large landowners settlements and camps housing the refugees, and quality monitoring was largely absent, even though local
who have drilled boreholes that have depleted the shallow water is pumped either from wells or brought by trucks health officials have year-round public health awareness
wells are also common, and have further disadvantaged to these reservoirs, which create a distribution point for campaigns to promote best practices for water storing
smallholders who depend on them for their livelihoods.16 households which is nominally free of charge. These and domestic treatment. Following a spike of illnesses and
temporary systems are usually operated by charities, diarrhea cases received in Marib hospitals January 2019,
Overall, it is unclear whether the decentralization of such as the Marib Dam Charity for Community inspectors attributed the contamination to a distribution
water governance has led to more or less effective water Development, but often rely on market vendors and network that is connected to Al-Kawthar Commercial Well.
management. One challenge in Environmental Impact truck owners for supplies. Most houses also have small Al-Kawthar commercial well supplies many tanks that are
Assessment (EIA) needed to properly manage water plastic tanks to store 500 liters of water, while IDP camp used in the markets, as well as unmonitored bottled water
resources in Marib is that tribal authorities have only residents rely on jerry cans and kitchen containers for businesses. According to health officials interviewed by the
recently stepped into more inter-tribal coordination17 which water storage. profiling team, the conditions for trucking and distributing
may have forced by the necessity springing from the city’s water are substandard, and containers are often left
» Local institutions started to collect minor tariffs from
rapid growth over the past few years, which created a great uncovered and in the sun in plastic bottles for days. A
owners of wells, but only inside the city core, and
demand for the delivery of drinking water, and highlighted minimal response that has been reported was that local
especially from the wells that supply businesses,
an immediate need to enhance and monitor the clean authorities, through the Office of Trade and Consumer
such as hotels and shopping centers. However, the
water supply as a critical aspect of ensuring a minimal level Protection, started to inspect the hygiene condition of the
marginal tariff is in most cases not linked to the amount
of basic hygiene. Just as in the early days of the Marib trucks and the large reservoirs installed in the markets.
of consumption, and wells are still not equipped with
dam, human settlements in Marib are inextricably tied to Dozens of these assets were seized, and owners were
counters to monitor the amounts of pumped water.
water management, which is again under pressure to asked to sign a certificate of compliance to guarantee the
Water has increasingly become a costly commodity
rapidly evolve to meet the challenge of the conflict-driven quality and hygiene standards if they want to continue their
for private individuals and businesses alike, unless
population boom. As a sector, water management is now a business.
subsidized by a charity. To illustrate this, the cost of 50
15 Helen Lackner, “Extreme Environmental Challenges in the Context of Lasting Political Crisis: The Case of Yemen”, in Environmental Challenges in the MENA Region, Hamid Pouran and Hassan Hakimian, eds. (London: Gingko, 2018), pp. 108–126.
16 Ibid, Lackner, p. 178
17 Louise van Loon, et al, and others, “An analytical frameworkAnalytical Framework for capacity developmentCapacity Development in EIA--—The cCase of Yemen”, Environmental Impact Assessment Review (2009). , vol. 30, No. 2 (2010), pp. 100–107.
18 Interview local official by UN-Habitat 2020
Chapter text
and human activities.

Sanitation
» Minimize negative environmental impacts.
Another dimension of Marib’s rapid urban growth in Marib
is the widespread adoption of lavatories. Initially, most » Avoid and mitigate effects of land development around
houses, especially in the family gatherings outside the city the selected location.
core, rarely had private lavatories or bathrooms, and some
» Allow for a buffer zone to absorb possible future
informants state that “plumbing as such did not even exist
expansion
as a profession”. New housing units, even those built from
makeshift materials in the new settlements now often have » Ensure close coordination with the officials of Local
private lavatory spaces despite the tiny space they occupy. Water Corporation in Marib
However, the city does not have a sufficient sanitary
network (the coverage by sanitation services is 33.0% ) to Nevertheless, progress on finalization of plant location
support these lavatories, and instead largely depends on pit has been hampered by ‘Not in My Backyard’ (NIMBY)
latrines through holes bored in the ground locally known as
“bayarat.”
Marib Treatment Plant- 2030 Plan19

At the time of writing, there was neither a wastewater
collection system nor wastewater treatment plant in Marib
Center. All the houses drain wastewater into privately FIGURE 53. An example of the large water catchments
managed cesspits. However, a sewage system has been used to collect flood water. It is the traditional way
planned, the general layout and the pipe sizing of which has Marib farmers captured ground water. They also cover
been determined according to the population distribution these pools to reduce evaporation and pump when
in the project area, anticipated for the year 2030. The they need irrigation for crops.(alarabiya.net)
construction includes one Pump Station with a maximum
capacity of 50 m3/h, and work to include all related
Civil, Mechanical and Electrical Works. The Wastewater
Treatment Plant (Wastewater Stabilization Pond System)
aims to create an inflow handling capacity of 1224 m3/d
including all associated Civil, Mechanical and Electrical
Works. The selection of the treatment plan was determined
so as to:
» Maintain the “flow by gravity” in all parts of the collection
system to the treatment plant.
» Locate the treatment site far from residential, agricultural
19 UN-Habitat State of Yemeni Cities 2020
FIGURE 55. Sewage system plan (Provided by local FIGURE 54. Charity distributing plastic water reservoirs to
government) households
67
disputes over the location of the station and will require

continued coordination between the concerned authorities
to end deliberations and launch the project.
Challenge of expanding sewerage and water networks

with urban expansion.
According to our interviews with local officials , there is
no realistic outlook on the expansion of potable water
and sanitation networks, even though some plans are on
the table for sewerage. In particular in light of the ongoing
city expansion, this is a challenge and an opportunity. For
example, the streets that are presently being developed in
the northern expansion area do not feature underground
networks, which could be planned from the onset to prevent
the significantly higher costs of retrofitting networks after
road implementation. Unfortunately, the adherence to a
diligent planning process is challenged by the clear incentive
to prioritize fast development of roads and housing units
over a ‘future-proofing’ of the water and sewerage system.
Health Sector
10 HEALTH
SECTOR
One of the most dramatic changes Marib has witnessed is Expansion of healthcare capacity post 2011
the rapid transformation from the essentially nonexistent
healthcare sector in the city only a few years ago, to an
Political changes around 2014 accelerated the
transformation of Marib’s healthcare system. In March, ” Many doctors who are originally
entire system of supplies, along with nascent efforts to 2014, Marib secured infrastructure and capacity financing from Marib (abna’a Marib or “children
establish regulations, management and human resources. from LNG Yemen (a natural gas liquefaction company) of the tribes”) had seldom considered
to provide YR 1.4 billion in financing for 40 community coming back to their small towns after
Although Marib is one of Yemen’s largest governorates development projects, including ambulances and 8 health- finishing medical school in Sana’a, for
whose rich natural resources make it one of the most related projects, including the construction of a cardiology example, but we now see many of them
significant contributors to Yemen’s GDP1, Marib’s health center within Marib General Hospital, training programs choosing to return and opening their
system has historically been relatively weak. Before the for health workers, provision of medical equipment and medical practice closer to their homes
war, local sources reported that less than 50 health-related ambulances.4 and communities.
services were available for the entire governorate of Marib.
This included medical dispensaries (clinics) and primary The arrival of hundreds of thousands of IDPs elevated the - Prominent local physician who has
health care units, as well as a limited number of home-based health care needs to a new level, driving local authorities to been practicing medicine for over a
private general practice clinics. Residents reminisced that act with greater local autonomy to improve health sector decade in Marib.
as late as 2014, people who needed any level of health care capacity, under the management of the Governorate’s Office
intervention beyond basic care for communicable diseases of Health and Population (OHP). Several new hospitals were
had to travel for seven hours to Sai’oon, or even go as far established in 2014 along with a Hospital Administrative
as Sana’a.2 A combination of factors undermined Marib’s unit, the Commission of Marib Hospital (CMH).5
health system, including: profiling team (operating under the administration of Marib
» Brain drain of local medical professionals: the low However, arguably the largest increase in local healthcare University) has recently celebrated the graduation of the
population density in the years before 2014 meant local capacity is attributable to the significant expansion of first nursing class in Marib (32 graduates, 21 of whom were
medical professionals who left to pursue their medical private healthcare staff and services, made possible by females).
studies in Sana’a or Aden did not have local jobs to draw professionals within the IDP community in Marib. According
them back.3 to the OHP Deputy Manager6 over 200 new health care This new cohort of healthcare workers has proved to
facilities were opened in Marib between 2018 and August be essential in staffing the surge of frontline healthcare
» A lack of national funding in Marib’s healthcare sector. 2020.7 These new services include 8 new private hospitals, workers as part of the city’s coronavirus preparedness plan.
and a network of private clinics and dispensaries distributed There are multiple social dimensions of the emergence of
across the Governorate. A majority of these services are the healthcare sector in the local workforce. A prominent
located in the larger cities including Marib in the center of local figure explained how this increased sector capacity
the governorate. A medical training center visited by the has meant the community has access to affordable local
1 In the aftermath of Arab coalition efforts to drive out Houthi-Saleh forces from southern territory under their control, many of the liberated provinces mirror microstates, including the Al-Mahra and Marib provinces, which refuse to supply revenue to the government. Muneer Binwaber, “Oil’s
Impact on Tensions in Southern Yemen”, The Washington Institute, 9 August 2019, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/oils-impact-on-tensions-in-southern-yemen
2 Interviews with various community members in Marib, 2020.
3 Adel Aulaqi, On the Edge: The Challenges of Yemen’s Healthcare System. (London: Saqi Books, 2014).
4 LNG Industry, “Yemen LNG Helps Community Development Projects”, 5 March 2014, https://www.lngindustry.com/liquid-natural-gas/05032014/yemen_lng_helps_community_projects_247/
5 CMH currently has 107 staff, of which 42 are healthcare professionals (including 18 specialist care physicians and 24 nurses). CMH also has 105 hospital beds, six ICUs, and 2 operating rooms.
6 UN Habitat Profiling Team Interview with the Health Administrator for Marib Governorate.
7 WHO noted there are 88 operational health care centers throughout Marib as of August 2018, WHO, “Statistics and Themes”, accessed 23 February 2021, https://rho.emro.who.int/Set-of-themes.
69
MAP 8 - HOSPITALS healthcare services. These recently fight the spread of the virus. A smaller group (15%) of
arrived “migrant” doctors have attained the respondents who were also critical of other urban
a respected status in the community conditions, expressed less worry about the pandemic and
and are welcomed as “key assets, strong disagreement with the idea that more measures
lifesavers and helpers during this should be taken by the local authority in response.
time of great adversity.”8 These new
healthcare workers have helped reduce Access and Affordability
the exceptionally long wait times Marib Another key aspect to the healthcare system is affordability:
locals had to endure just a few years while health insurance options do not yet exist in Marib,
ago for even the most routine doctor’s even for health care workers or other public government
visit. To a large degree, the health care employees, the overall costs are low for public as well as
system in Marib now relies on the private health options. Wait times are longer for public
medical expertise and the specialization health care as is the case in other nationalized healthcare
that the IDPs brought with them, and systems. Public costs were compared with inpatient or
the treatment protocols offered by the outpatient services offered at a private hospital visited by
dispensaries that they staff. the profiling team in Hareeb city (see box above).
By late fall, 2020, survey respondents The disparity in affordability between private and public
reported that fears of contracting the healthcare provider options shows the degree to which the
coronavirus were increasing as cases public option is subsidized, and the popularity of this option
rose in Yemen. A majority of those despite its longer wait-times, limited intake capacity, and
interviewed expressed some degree of dependence on humanitarian supply chains that are often
fear of catching COVID-19 (58%), while outside of the control of local medical authorities.
only 16% expressed that they’re not
worried at all. Respondents generally Alternative Medicine
expressed approval of the measures Some local residents as well as many rural societies in
taken in their communities in response Marib still rely on alternative therapies and herbal medicine
to COVID-19, although the measures (al-teb el-shaabi) for most illnesses. These therapies are
that the local authorities have taken administered from the homes by well known “healers” and
are limited to curfew in the afternoon sheikhs. However, the expanding prescription drug market
hours (which in turn lasted for a short and the cultural cross pollination between the residents and
period of time), restrictions in places of the incoming IDP communities are now shifting the norms
worship, and several public awareness of how they see their healthcare options. Modern medicine
campaigns. However, a majority (33%) and treatments are now becoming the preferred method of
strongly agreed that the local authorities choice. One local leader mentioned for instance that a few
in the city should be doing more to years back, a little boy with a bone fracture “would be taken
FIGURE 56. Hospitals and health facilities in Marib (google maps)
8 UN Habitat Profiling Team Interview (virtual), August 2020
Health Sector
donors, and private sector: an interview with a local doctor

a) Gap between official data and current capacity on that operates a private clinic demonstrated that these
Healthcare cost comparison the ground. clinics are not formally registered at the health office
Many assessments of capacity are based on the reported (OHP) and are still untaxed.10 Despite the fact that most
Private Healthcare Costs capacity rather than accurate surveys of the “informal private commercial businesses in Marib pay taxes, health
Outpatient doctor’s visit/medical consultation: health care marketplace” that is barely regulated or care offices are either exempted or allowed to operate
300 YR (approx. 1.2 USD), monitored by the local health care authorities. For under the radar, which results in an informal healthcare
Lab work: Blood or urine analysis test 1500 YR example, according to WHO’s HeRAMS dashboard (last subsidy for patients as providers are able to keep the
(approx. 5.99 USD) published in 2018), Marib had 7 doctors for each 10,000 costs of services lower. However, the unregulated nature
habitants in the governorate. According to the health of the Marib healthcare marketplace often results in dire
Outpatient doctor’s visit/medical consultation: experts interviewed in the governorate’s office and CMH, shortages of medicine and medical supplies, with life
2,000 YR (approx. 8 USD) this reported figure only includes the physicians operating threatening consequences.11
Lab Work: Blood or urine analysis test 3,000 YR under the official capacity of CMH, which implies that
(approx. 12 USD) there is no way to evaluate the accuracy of this ratio given d) Harmonize local programming with the UN
the large number of unregulated/unregistered medical Health Cluster. Donors need to mobilize for long-term
service providers currently in practice. humanitarian health sector presence on the ground.
» The Health cluster has improved its coordination with
b) Lack of healthcare administration capacity.
Marib health authorities especially during COVID-19
When asked about the lack of legal guidelines regulating
response.
the private health care system, the OHP informant
to a reputable sheikh in Safer who would have operated indicated that officials had prioritized building capacity9 » Authorities are hopeful that the current health sector
on the broken leg, masterfully repositioning the bones to meet exponentially increasing healthcare demand at coordination for the crisis will continue and carry over
if dislocated, and set the injury with a homemade mixed the expense of developing a healthcare administrative into ongoing health coordination, so that Marib is treated
cast. Instead, people today rush to get an X-Ray and to see capacity. The absence of updated data on the sector as a health priority given the strain on its services, its
an orthopedist, and to put one of those pleasantly-looking outside CMH was noted to also undermine the capacity medical needs for vulnerable displaced households,
plaster casts.” of OHP to plan and prioritize, as they are missing critical and the unpredictability of humanitarian supplies.
data on existing services which further challenges
» The ongoing security situation adds further pressure.
Issues and Challenges administrators’ ability to manage the coordination
For example, in February 2020, Houthi forces violated
A number of emerging issues in the evolving healthcare between the public and the private service provision.
international humanitarian law by attacking two
landscape need to be incorporated into humanitarian hospitals about 75 kilometers north west of Marib City
programming to complement current initiatives to support c) Medical services are under-regulated.
(Al Jafra Hospital and Al Saudi Field Hospital) that serve
the system that is now coping with tremendous stressors. The lack of healthcare regulation and oversight
about 15,000 people - mostly displaced - in Majzer
Challenges that were identified include: undermines coordination between the government,
District, causing severe damage to the intensive care
9 In particular, they are focused on building capacity in areas ofburn treatment, dialysis, and oncology.
10 Process for registering as a service provider: the doctor interviewed by the profiling team mentioned that he was required to sign a few papers at the municipality before he could start his office, and he had to submit authorized versions of his diploma degrees along with the application.
11 According to OHP, CMH often suffers from shortages of medical supplies, and despite its overland access to border crossings (such as with KSA). When probed about the reason for these interruptions, CMH official attributed this situation to lack of coordination, and the unpredictability of as-
sistance coming from the two main donors to the health care system: UAE Red Cross and Muhammad Ibn-Salman Humanitarian Centre. CMH is often uncertain when to place procurement orders for supplies and medications leading to frequent gaps in supplies, while private market suppliers already
ignore many subsidized medicines leading to serious interruptions (specifically for cancer patients and diabetes).
71
unit, among other facilities. The challenges will likely

further strain the health system and demand better
coordination to weather the challenges.
FIGURE 57. Kidney Dialysis Center FIGURE 58. The Inauguration of Marib’s first Medical School in 2019
funded by KSA
FIGURE 59. Marib General Hospital

Health Sector
Marib’s Coronavirus Conundrum recently received PCR testing equipment and thousands
of testing kits through WHO.
The response to the coronavirus pandemic consisted of
a patchwork of piecemeal preparations and preventative ” These (Coronavirus) measures
measures and an overall lack of social responsiveness. However, despite the restrictions, the response amounted came too early to follow the models in
Since March 2020, news of the global pandemic became to a half-heartened lockdown, as it was accompanied by more connected societies in the West
a headline story in major Arab media outlets and began inept enforcement measures outside of city centers. The and in the Arab Gulf. They did not seem
to occupy a large part of the public discourse. Following net result of four weeks of the first lockdown and curfew justified for Marib’s context and people
the lead of other Arab countries in adopting measures to measures were not taken seriously by the public. Due to did not relate to them.”
counter the virus, the Legitimacy Government initiated the limited spread of the virus or reported deaths, people’s
a National Committee for the Coronavirus Response, frustration mounted and few members of the public heeded - Local leader
which remotely monitored the spread of the virus and the social distancing requirements or wore face masks.
” The city curfew reminds me of how

issued recommendations virtually, although with limited
enforcement capabilities. Because Marib, like other According to law enforcement officials and other community
governorates, was proactive in taking early action to limit notables, a limited curfew was still being enforced in Marib calm and simple life was in Marib before
the spread of the virus by enforcing several measures they as of November, 2020, strictly banning the entry to and the war.”
were able to keep their curve relatively low. the exit from the city between 8 pm and 6 am. The curfew
also restricts movement inside the city, and enforces the - Longtime resident of Marib
Efforts to contain the virus closure of all businesses and markets with the exception of
» A partial curfew was declared by the Governorate on
dispensaries and pharmacies.
” This curfew has nothing to do with
April 3, 2020. 2020 Flooding the coronavirus, but more with the
» Public and religious gatherings, including weddings and During the past months of the COVID-19 response, other security fears as the battles with the
other social events were banned. communicable and water-borne diseases such as cholera Houthi-Saleh forces are only a few miles
have claimed many more lives than the pandemic. The two to the west of the city.”
» Markets were shuttered except for a few core hours recent flooding events around Marib City have claimed the
each day and businesses permitted to remain open
lives of 103 people (July-August 2020), and displaced over - Marib resident
were restricted to those selling essential items (mainly
5400 people including 2300 from collective IDP camps.13
fresh foods and basic groceries and pharmacies).
Under these dire shelter and weather conditions, the risk
» To date, reported COVID-19 cases in Marib are still very of COVID-19 is viewed as just one crisis among many.
limited despite the high population density. The official The COVID-19 preparedness added pressure to an already
reports speak of 32 cases, and 10 deaths as of August stretched medical infrastructure in Marib now dealing with a
21, 2020.12 This may indicate that Marib is beginning to surge in intensive care cases, which is beyond the capacity
show signs of epidemic spike, but such speculation is of the Marib health system. The worsening health conditions
hard to verify amidst the absence of adequate testing are beyond the resources available in the governorate’s
measures. The profiling team learned that CMH has current operational, administrative, and financial capacities.
12 National Committee for the Coronavirus Response, on their Facebook news feed.
13 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/killed-yemen-floods-200805083059633.html
FIGURE 60. COVID-19 Public Health Volunteers in Training

DK/DWTA
DK/DWTA 6%
Nativeresident
Native residentof
ofMarib
Marib
6% DK/DW
DK/D
Strongly Disagree 12%
16% 22% Strong
Stron
IDPsliving
IDPs livingininthe
thecity's
city'straditional
traditionalneighbourhoods
neighbourhoods Somewhatdisagree
Somewhat unsatisfied 31%
73
Satisfied agree Some
Som
Somewhat 22%
IDPsliving
livingininslums,
slums,informal
informalsettlements
settlementsor
orcamps
camps Very satisfied
IDPs Strongly agree 20% Some
Som
nths only 38%
26%
Marginalizedand
andAfrican
Africanmigrants
migrants Strong
Stron
Marginalized
t started in 2015
Covid 19
0% 10%
0% 10% 20%
20% 30%
30% 40%
40% 50%
50% 60%
60% 70%
70% 80%
80% 90%
90% 100%
100%
Safety and respsect
e the conflict
COVID-19 worsening the economic hardship for the I feel
Themore respected
state is facing in Marib than
significant the area Ii
challenges
Can you access adequate information to help you manage your daily life and to know the status of
household 16-24 F DK/DWTA
services through websites (including through social media platforms such as Facebook)?
M Strongly Disagree 5% DK/DW
5% DK/ DWTA 25-35 F DK/DWTA
Somewhat disagree 14%6%
Native resident of Marib DK/DW
Strong
M
Completely
Somewhatunsatisfied
agree 12% 36%
22%
36-60 F Strong
somew
Strongly agree
Somewhat disagree
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods M 20% Somew
Satisfied Somew
24% FIGURE 62. FloodingFin
More than 60 22%
Somewhat agree
33%
the city in 2020. (www.
M Very satisfied 25% Somew
Strong
Covid 19 Strongly agree
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Safety and respsect
38%
independentarabia.com/) Strong
SCORECARD / COVID-19
COVID-19 worsening the economic hardship for the 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% I feel more respected in Marib than the area
household 16-24 F DK/DWTA I feel more respected in Marib than the area I
Fear of catching COVID-19 M As a citizen in the city, I think that my voice matters and should
Strongly Disagree to form the future of the
be considered 5%
I don’t leave5%
my house often due to fear of COVID-19 FIGURE25-35 63. Informal Fhousing DK/DW
DK/ DWTA city - per demographic group Somewhat disagree
100 14%
surrounding the hospital M which Strong
15%2% 23% Strongly disagree F Somewhat
DK/DWTA agree 80 36%
DK/ DWTA makes parking or further site
36-60 F somew
16% 15% M
M Strongly
Strongly agree
Disagree
20%
IDPs living in theexpansion impossible. The
Somewhat disagree
Absent 60
city's traditional neighbourhoods
More than 60 FF Somewhat disagree Some
24% Somewhat agree hospital needed to create M a
Poor 25%
40
M
33% quarantine ward during the20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps F
Somewhat agree Strong
24% 43% Strongly agree
Average M
0% 10%
Strongly agree 20
COVID-19 response Fbut was
Strong
Covid 19 unable to find space Mdue
As a citizen
to
in the city, I think that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of the
0
Safety
Femaleand respsect
Male
I feel more respected in Marib than the area
local resident crowding.
city - per0%age10% 20%
group 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Fear of catching
COVID-19 COVID-19
worsening the economic hardship for the As a citizen in the city, I think that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of the I feel more respected in Marib than the area I
household city - per demographic group 100
The COVID-19 crisis made it harder to generate income 16-24 F DK/DWTA I feel safe and welcomed in most places in M
2% DK/ DWTA Native resident of Marib MF DK/DWTA
Strongly Disagree 80 5% DK/DW
16% 5% 15%
Has the city provided necessary resources to protect people from
DK/ DWTA 25-35 FM Strongly Disagree
Somewhat disagree
100
14%
coronavirus (such as masks, medical stations,
Absentawareness campaigns)? MF
60
Strong
Somewhatagree
Somewhat disagree 80
36%
Poor 36-60 FM
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Somewhat
Strongly disagree DK/DWTA 40 somew
agree
Strongly agree
24% Somewhat disagree IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps MF 60
20%
43% Average Strongly agree Somew
24% 3%
20
DK/ DWTA More than 60 FM
Somewhat agree 40
15% 33% Strong Marginalized and African migrants Strongly
MF agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree 0 25% Strong
24%
Strongly agree
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
M 20 Female Male
Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree
0% 10% DK/DWTA
20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
18% 0
28% Somewhat agree
Female Male
IIfeel more respected in
feel safe and welcomed Marib thanplaces
in most the area I
in M
34% Strongly agree
Fear
Theofcity
catching COVID-19
has done a lot to find the resources needed to help pro- As a citizen in the city, I think that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of the
Has the city provided necessary resources to protect people from 100I feel I can access different opportunities in M
tect the people from the cornoravirus (provision of masks, social city - per demographic group 100
coronavirus (such as masks, medical stations, awareness campaigns)?
distancing 2%
measures, awareness campaigns) DK/DWTA 80
80
DK/ DWTA Native resident of Marib F
15% Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree DK/DWTA
16% Absent
M Strongly Disagree 60
Native resident of Marib 60
F
3% DK/ DWTA
Somewhat disagree
Poor M 40
40
15% Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree
Somewhat agree IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
24% 24%
31% Strongly disagree IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps F
43% Average Strongly agree 20
20
Economy - females
M
Strongly disagree
F
DK/DWTA IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps
Strong 00
28% Somewhat agree M
Female
Female Male
Male
How easy for females to access jobs Marginalized and African migrants
34% Strongly agree
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0% 10% I 20%
I feel 30% 40%different
can access 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
opportunities 1
in M
I feel safe and welcomed in most places in M
FIGURE 61. City response to COVID-19
9%
Has the city DK/to
provided necessary resources DWTA
protect people from 100
coronavirus (such14%
as masks, medical stations, awareness campaigns)? Native resident of Marib
Strongly disagree 80 Access to clean drinking water per demograp
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree DK/DWTA
60
34%
3% - females DK/
Economy
23%
15%
DWTA agree
Somewhat
Strongly agree Somewhat agree Somewhat disagree IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps 40
24%
31% Strongly
Stronglydisagree
agree Native residents
20
How easy for females to access jobs Marginalized and African migrants
Somewhat disagree Strongly disagree DK/DWTA
18% IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods 0
28% Somewhat agree

0% 10% 20% 30%
Female 40% 50%
Male60% 70% 80% 90%
Transport Sector
11 TRANSPORT
SECTOR
Because Marib was long viewed as a marginal governorate Public and private transportation
- both demographically and economically - Marib’s Private transportation dominates the options available to
infrastructure has historically been neglected by Yemen’s locals. There are limited regional transportation options as
successive governments. Upgrading Marib’s transport Marib does not have public bus terminals. A few private bus
infrastructure was not considered a priority at the national companies offer small microbuses that shuttle passengers
level until its recent economic growth and vital role as a between main roads and unpaved roads. Big coaches no
domestic and international shipping hub with coastal ports longer operate on the national highways and regional roads,
closed raised the stakes, and needs for an upgrade in the because the current road conditions are not favorable to
road infrastructure in order to accommodate the transport heavy transport vehicles.
of goods and individuals became apparent. Presently
however, the isolated governorate still suffers from poor Locals have begun to rent out 4WD cars to take passengers
road connections and disorganized mass transport through rough terrain to destinations such as Sana’a and
solutions. According to a senior governorate transportation Shabweh. Because these routes require long detours, with FIGURE 64. Microbuses on “Sana’a” the main through the city
official, the governorate has prioritized expansion of the high security risks on most roads, the cost of a regional
roads and highways network, as this infrastructure upgrade trip per passenger has increased significantly. For instance,
“will pave the way for Marib’s future image as a city and the trip between Marib and Sana’a (the most common
economic hub, ensuring it goes beyond being seen as just destination for Marib City residents) now takes up to 12
a big temporary camp in the middle of the nowhere.” hours (increased three-fold from the previous four hours
before the conflict), passing through over 29 checkpoints
Transportation network which include two major personal property searches and
The network of Yemen’s main roads is concentrated along individual inspection, where men are frisked and women
the north-south N1 corridor, linking the capital Sana’a with often harassed. The cost of this trip per passenger increased
Aden through Ibb, and is moving closer to the western, from 2000 YR (~USD 10) up to 15000 YR (~USD 30). While
more populated governorates. Marib is located on the Marib residents continue to require key services that do not
eastern N5 road which connects the capital with the eastern exist in the city (such as emergency and critical health care),
governorates. The N5 is presently insecure and its linking the trip to the capital, Sana’a, and the closest nearby city is
connector roads are only permitted to be used for military overwhelming and highly costly for the average Yemeni.
purposes, thus forcing travelers to take long detours to
reach Sana’a. As Marib is located between the populated The problems and hazards of degraded and poorly
areas to the west of the republic, and the sparsely populated maintained roads is a critical issue. Hundreds lose their
plains and desert regions of the east, the N5 was always a lives every year on these roads, as roads are not clearly FIGURE 65. Asphalting in progress (yemen-press.net)
substandard national road viewed as low priority. Due to marked in many sections, and fallen rocks and craters fill the
years of lack of maintenance, flooding has washed away paths. The road to Hadramawt is specifically deteriorated,
most of its surfaces. Presently, most primary and regional infamously dubbed the “Road of Death” by locals. Locals dangerous potholes. Several social media campaigns were
road connections are not asphalted though some efforts often organize demonstrations following major automobile organized to protest road conditions, as students coming
are underway to resurface. accidents and deaths to protest current road conditions from Hareeb for instance need two hours to get to Saba’a
and call for repairing specific sections of the road and filling University, a trip that should normally take just 50 minutes.
75
Transport Sector
Such demonstrations only underscore the need to mobilize Transport in and around the City Center - Post-Conflict
massive government investments. Status
Public transportation within the city of Marib also faces
The national road that connects Sana’a with Marib, and significant constraints. Despite the significant expansion
the other road that links Sana’a with Marib through Sarwah in the city, and the creation of new businesses and jobs,
have strategic military significance, as they represent two the city is still lagging behind in terms of transport
different approaches to the environs of both cities, giving an upgrading. The city has no asphalted streets except for
advantage to the Houthis especially as both roads descend the three main roads, no paved sidewalks, and no street
into Marib. Perhaps this is what is making the reopening lighting. This is specifically problematic in high-density IDP
of both roads a constant demand by the Houthis in all settlements, which are particularly vulnerable to security
their meetings with the UN Special Envoy, Martin Griffiths. risks and the impacts of natural disasters such as flooding,
Looking at the location of Marib, we can also include the particularly on sewer systems. Government management
administrative borders that Marib shares with al-Bayda of urban growth in Marib has focused more on building and
Governorate as a key entry point that the Legitimacy Forces construction and supporting private sector initiatives, and
together with the Popular Resistance often use to approach less on managing basic public infrastructure and network -
Sana’a, passing through the district of Rudman and through specifically upgrading public street networks.
Zamar Governorate. This third approach to Sana’a made
these frontlines prone to constant escalation since 2015. Motorcycle Restrictions and Minibuses
Scrutiny and regulation of the use of motorcycles in Marib
Even though the governorate has made significant City has increased following
allocations to improve the road conditions, it focused several security incidents involving motorcycles. The use
primarily on energy and security imperatives by prioritizing of this vital means of transportation is now restricted
the link between SAFER Exploration and Production to soldiers and policemen. As the city expanded, the FIGURE 66. Flooding was particularly devastating in Jafeenah
Operations Company oil field in Marib and where the most IDPs coming from larger cities began to operate minor Camp, Marib’s largest informal settlement (almasdaronline.com)
strategic outpost of the Coalition Forces some 20 km east microbuses routes, and the municipality regulated their
of Marib is located, the coastal ports in the south, and work and collected small taxes from the private operators.
the Saudi borders in the north. The other roads that serve These microbuses only operate on the few asphalted routes,
civilians and goods’ transport are still largely degraded. but they serve residents who need to reach the government
Moreover, the implementation of several contracts to administrative center, the university, and the market areas.
improve the road conditions on regional connections has This is especially important for those who live far from the
either been slow or nonexistent. This highlights that the city centre.
construction capacity of the local authorities to manage
road construction and maintenance contracts is currently
limited even if the financial resources were allocated.
FIGURE 67. Gas Station lines are a major source of grievances,

only exacerbated by the lack of public transportation options and
impacts of fuel shortages on both water supply and agriculture.
Somewhat can access assisstance from my friends IDPs
disagree 12%
andliving
neighbours
in slums, informal settlements or camps
Somewhat agree
who live in my area 34%
39% 20% Marginalized andSomewhat disagree
African migrants
DK/DWTA
3%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Strongly disagree
76 Strongly agree Marib Urban Profile
12% 39%Somewhat agree DK/DWTA
34% Cultural heritage
Electricity sector

If I could not get my needs from the state institutions, I I consider the preservation of Marib's cultu
12
can access assisstance from my friends and neighbours Strongly disagree important issue
ELECTRICITY 39%
who live in my area
DK/DWTA
3%
SECTOR 3% Strongly agree
Residents in the city today are living in peace and harmo-
12%
ny regardless of tribal, cultural and social backgrounds 7% Stro
12% Somewhat agree
34% 19%
Som

4% Strongly agree 64% Som
Residents in the city today are living in peace and
Strongly disagree 14% harmo- Stro
36%
ny regardless of tribal, cultural and social backgrounds Somewhat agree
39% DK/DWTA 26% IDPs livi
DK/D
A Vital Service and a Social Contract 19% somewhat disagree
IDPs livin
For decades prior to the conflict, Marib’s electricity was SCORECARD / Acces to Electricity the electricity
4% for their homes
Strongly agree free of charge. These
Strongly disagree Native residen
supplied by a chain of diesel-powered electricity generation results14%

are also expected
27% to improve, as
DK/DWTA the local
36% Somewhat agree
stations that spread across the republic, providing power authorities in Marib recently reported a significant
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighb
A majority of 64% of the respondents to our survey
to major cities. Diesel was trucked to the stations by road, 19%of newsomewhat
procurement equipment disagree
that will be used for a IDPs living in slums, informal settlements
expressed satisfaction with the level of electricity
and resource constraints led to fuel rationing which often Residents in the city today are living in peace and harmo- major expansion in Safer
StronglyThermal
disagree Station.
supply they’re presently getting,
ny regardless including
of tribal, cultural and 36% of
social backgrounds
I consider the preservation of Marib's cultu
prioritized the larger centers and the economic hubs at the 27% DK/DWTA important issue Marginalized and African
the respondents who were very satisfied. Only 13%
expense of smaller and less significant municipalities such According to a December 15 report, the new expansion
were unsatisfied with the supply rate. Most of the
as Marib. This meant that the city used to get only a few 4% receiving more of the thermal station will increase theof Marib
electricity
respondents also reported they are Strongly agree Native resident
hours of daily electricity supply. Residents of Marib primarily 14% supply in the Governorate from 126 MV to 166 MV.
than 12 hours of electricity 36% supply per day, which Somewhat agree
used electricity as a non-essential commodity. As a result, IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods
As the needs in the entire governorate were estimated
is true across the different demographic 19% groups,somewhat disagree Services
Marib’s residents carefully limited their consumption and to be around 130 MV, a surplus ofsettlements
nearlyor camps36 MV will
with 72% of the native residents reporting such IDPs living in slums, informal
limited their lifestyle needs to energy efficient options - Strongly disagree
be generated, which if exported to other regions,
satisfactory evaluation. The supply of electricity in the Access to 12 hours or less of daily electrcity supply
from the way they conducted business, operated health 27% DK/DWTA can provide new source of financial revenues to the
marginalized and African migrant communities seem
and education facilities, to the way they used televisions governorate, or even be used for future economic and
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
to be the worst, with more than 57% reporting less Services
and refrigerators in their homes. residential expansion. DK/ DWTA
than 12 hours of daily supply. Native residents
Access to 12 hours or less of daily electrcity supply Strongly disagree
In 1986, Marib became an oil producer [sector 18] after 1 Somewhat disagree
These results reflect both the fact that current rates
making significant discoveries2 three years earlier, and the Somewhat agree
of grid supplies in the city were among the best
daily production was around 80K barrels.3 When the conflict IDPs living in camps
DK/ DWTA Strongly agree
throughout Yemen, and that households mostly get
Native residents
started in 2015, the same sector was only producing 8K The Marginalized and Afican migrants
Strongly disagree
barrels daily, a 90% decrease in production.4 As the war Somewhat disagree

Services
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Housing
raged, oil production completely stopped, and it was until Somewhat agree
IDPs living in camps Strongly agreewhich you are receiving
2019 that some 20K barrels daily were back to production. You only have access to 12 hours
Accessortoless of electricity
12 hours or less ofsupply
daily electrcity supply You are satisfied with the number of hours during Perception of improving shelter conditio
electrcitiy
Satisfaction with present level of electrcity supply adequacy comapred to previous year
Most of Yemen’s oil is exported as crude, and only 8K to The Marginalized and Afican migrants
1 Sector 18 also includes the largest natural gas field in Yemen, with reserves 0% 10% 20% 30%
DK/ DWTA
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
7% DK/
estimated at 9.15 trillion ft3. Other estimates put the gas reserves in the larger Marib area at
15 trillion ft3.# Present production is processed through a central unit, at As’ad Kamel station,
Native residents
Strongly disagree
2% Very satisfactory Stro
with a daily production capacity of 1.8 billion ft3. Balhaf LNG port receives 1.140 million ft3 Satisfaction with present level of electrcity 13%
supply
15% 32%
Somewhat disagree Satisfactory
daily, while another 1 trillion ft3 were reserved for local consumption.# In terms of transpor- IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods 36% Som
tation of gas, there are two pipelines that start in Marib, one leads to As’ad Kamel station and Somewhat agree
to the liquefaction facility in Balhaf [320 km, reaching Shabweh governorate], and the other IDPs living in camps
21% 19%
Somewhat satisfactory Som
Strongly agree
is only used for the distribution in the local market, linking Marib with Ma’abar city in Zemar 26%
2% Very satisfactory
Unsatisfactory Stro
governorate.
2 1980s: Discovery of oil deposits by a local subsidiary of Texas based Hunt Oil.
The Marginalized and Afican migrants
13% 28%
Satisfactory
DK/ DWTA
Subsidiary soon bought out by Exxon and a South Korean Consortium (Sheila Carapico, 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
36%
“Yemen between revolution and counter-terrorism”, in Lackner, Why Yemen Matters: A Society 21% Somewhat satisfactory
in Transition). Large-scale re-cultivation of the ancient oasis (Hehmeyer, “Irrigation Farming in
the Ancient Oasis of Mārib”). Contemporary Ma’rib dates to this period. Unsatisfactory Perception of being welcomed to rent a
Satisfaction with present level of electrcity supply
3 Yemen Ministry of Oil and Minerals, “‫“نبذة تاريخية عن استكشاف النفط في اليمن‬, March 2020, in the city (regardless of displacement s
https://bit.ly/2Je1qUv
28%
FIGURE 68. Satisfaction with present level of electricity supply and access to electricity
DK/ DWTA
Access to clean drinking water
4 Yemen Marib Governorate, “31 ,”‫ نبتة الفطر التي تنمو سرا ً و بهدوء في ركن الصحراء‬.. ‫مأرب‬ 8% D
March 2018, https://marib-gov.com/news_details.php?sid=345
2% 16%
Very satisfactory S
13% 17%
36% Satisfactory
4% Strongly agree S
21% Access
Somewhat to clean drinking water
satisfactory 28%
29% 17% Somewhat agree S
Unsatisfactory 32% IDPs li
Somewhat disagree S
28% DK/ DWTA
4% 26%
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree Native
77
10k barrels daily are refined for local consumption. An and even suburban areas with new accommodations and
oil pipeline with an approximate length of 430 km links street names, traffic signage and traffic lights. This new
Cost of electricity per kilowatt hour Marib with the port of Ras Issa.5 Other strategic natural vocabulary, which was alien to the locals only a few years
gas discoveries and a rapid upgrade of production led to a ago, is a by-product of the demographic gift, the flip side
Average price in Yemen: 300 YR. shift in the electricity production modality nationwide. The of the displacement coin and the underlying story of Marib
In Marib, supply for industrial users is priced at Safer Exploration & Productions (SEPOC) thermal station, within Yemen’s protracted social conflict.
70 YR (the local exchange rate is averaging 800 Yemen’s largest electricity source, began production in
YR for 1 US dollar), and for commerce at 30 YR. 2008, mainly to serve the capital and the northern, densely To accommodate the economic growth that the new
As for households, the price is only 12 YR. It was populated governorates. Safer TS is only a few kilometers arrivals brought into the city, Marib needed a quick fix to
also reported that most households do not pay away from Marib, and had a production capacity of its endemic electricity deprivation. The fact that the fossil-
their electricity bills, a practice condoned by the nearly 250 megawatts, but neither the city, nor the entire fuel-rich governorate and its tribes were essential to the
local authorities for various reasons including the governorate of Marib had access to the thermal-generated thwarting of Houthi-Saleh forces since 2015 enabled the
limited bill collection capacity, and the revenue electricity generated by the plant. Locals viewed this ambitious local authority to obtain special treatment when
insignificance, but this can also be viewed from large industrial installation in their area, along with mega it comes to sharing of oil products, and the Governor has
the perspective of its significance in assuring pipelines to bring the natural gas and rising transmission been able to use the oil revenues to build the governorate’s
public satisfaction. towers passing through their city to transport power to the water, electricity, and transport infrastructure, and to use
west, with resentment as it did not benefit local households it for local economic development. However, operating
who had a few hours of power each day. These grievances the damaged Safer TS was an overwhelming task that the
might have factored into the destruction of both the fuel governorate officials weren’t prepared to take on its own,
station and power grid which occurred a few years later.6 and they needed a tactical solution they could manage on
their own without heavy involvement in national politics.
Energy consumption increase with rapid urbanization The local government signed a concessionary deal with
This significant loss did not have a direct impact on Marib a private company that pledged electricity generation to
per se, but the city’s population and economic boom that most locales by importing and operating a mesh of small
happened also around that period increased the demand, generation units distributed across the vast governorate.
and electricity became a crucial necessity. The much-
touted urban renaissance is best exemplified by the sharp Jerico
increase in electricity consumption in the city. Prior to 2014, A group of Yemeni businessmen with ties to the Ministry
Marib City literally had just one main street covered with a of Planning and International Cooperation launched an
thin layer of asphalt. A traveler approaching the city from electric utility generation company by the name Jerico. The
Sana’a could cross the entire city by car in just 7 minutes. company however needed secure diesel supplies, which had
Visitors to Marib today can clearly recognize they are visiting been provided by the local authorities since 2016. Through
a crowded and thriving urban center, with many streets this production agreement, the company was able to provide
and numerous businesses. When asking for directions, a flexible generation solution that was also quick to evolve
people would point to neighbourhoods, university campus and expand to accommodate any new urban expansion or
FIGURE 69. Ceremony to unload new power transformers to 5 Ras Issa is primarily an oil export port, located 60 km north of Hudaida commercial port on the Red Sea
upgrade Marib’s gas-fired power station, December 2020, 6 The first acts of sabotage targeting Safer TS began in 2011, and ultimately brought TS to a complete production halt in 2016.
source: https://www.sabanew.net/viewstory/69585
Electricity sector
rise of demand on the spot. Although sub-optimal in net

economic terms and less durable, this solution proved to
be appropriate for both the unique pattern of economic
growth and security in Marib. The central government had
been pushing to restore Safer TS since 2016, which led to
its re-operation in 2020 at 40% capacity proved to be less
durable, as immediate sabotage attacks came after to
cripple the production again. By contrast, Jericho’s model of
smaller-scale, distributed power generation closer to urban
locales was much easier to secure and made the supply
less susceptible to damage and production interruptions.
Jericho’s privately owned infrastructure fell under the
protection of the locals who decided local power generation
was worth safeguarding.
We have seen similar models of generation emerging

across the republic, although less less common in
Houthi-held areas, who favored centralized solutions and
attempted to repurpose the old diesel stations to supply
the northern governorates. Marib’s example is unique in
that electricity as a utility is heavily subsidized, specifically
for domestic consumption, in what constitutes a major
component of the social contract struck between the local
International boundary
authority and the newly arrived society that the war brought
Governorate boundary
to Marib. The Marib government decided that it was in Pre-1990 North-South
their interest to provide free diesel to Jerico as a subsidy boundary (approximate)
for Marib residents of roughly 10% of the cost of service Capital city
compared to other Yemeni governorates. Jerico relied on Governorate capital
the existing network but expanded it when necessary, and Oil field
on the increased operational capacity of the Fee Collection Gas field
office at the governorate, to operate a full system. Oil pipeline
Gas pipeline
Due to the perceived party affiliation of Jerico and its business
partnerships, the company fell under increased scrutiny
and political pressures, and the local authority decided to FIGURE 70. Oil fields in the region.
call for proposals to seek more neutral alternatives. Intrax Map adapted from Small Arms Survey, with updated information of US Energy Information Administration.
company inherited the operation from Jerico and won the
79
conflict event
January 2015
new government contract. This competition over generation
benefits did not affect the consumers, as the management 35000
of distribution was completely removed to the Commercial
Office within the Department of Electricity.7 As stated earlier,
30000
the supply to citizens is heavily subsidized, especially for
consumption, and less so for commercial and industrial
users that are easy to monitor and to enforce tariffs on. 25000
But even for industrial and commercial users, electricity
in Marib is much more affordable as compared to other 20000
major and small centers across the republic, which could
be considered a major factor behind the competitiveness
15000
and the business-appeal of the economy of Marib.8
10000
5000
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
City Light value Change from January 2015

Aden 9,429 - 53.3%
Zinjibar 438 - 55.1%
Hodeidah 1,491 - 84.1%
Sana’a 3,756 -86.8%
Taiz 180 - 95.2%
Sa’dah 418 - 76.2%
7 Interview with the Head of the Commercial Office.
8 Across most Yemen governorates, the price of one Kilowatt of electricity av- Al Hawtah 735 - 50.2%
erages 300 YR. In Marib, supply for industrial users is priced at 70 YR [the local exchange
rate is averaging 800 YR for 1 US dollar], and for commerce at 30 YR. As for households, Marib 2,221 +63.5%
the price is only 12 YR. It was also reported that most households do not pay their elec-
tricity bills, a practice condoned by the local authorities for various reasons including the
limited bill collection capacity, and the revenue insignificance, but this can also be viewed FIGURE 71. Nightlight in Marib in 2020 comparison to 2015.
from the perspective of its significance in assuring public satisfaction.
Education Sector
13 EDUCATION
SECTOR
Information about education in Marib is limited and shortage in schoolbooks are the major logistical
incomplete. Developing a comprehensive picture for the challenges, and resources that are annually allocated Education in Marib
education sector in Marib requires additional research for the education system can’t meet these needs, while
and dedicated resources which exceeded the scope of aid from humanitarian institutions has been extremely The Ministry of Education1 provided the following
the urban profile. The information we have was gathered limited. data:
from interviews with the head of the Marib Governorate
» The need to make the education system more
Department of Education, several KIIs with school Schools: 41 public schools in the city, up from 18
attractive to young people and to their parents,
principals, and through visits to three schools in the city schools as of 2014.
which requires new methods to link the education and
itself. 19 new Private schools (private education
certification process with the market demand. Although
the technical institutes in the city are expanding to fit institutions did not receive authorization to
Two annual exams are supervised directly by the ministry operate until 2017 when local authorities began
the youth in the labor market, secondary education in
of education, the rest are run by the local department in issuing permits)
Marib (and Yemen in general) does not offer technical
the city. Both the preparatory and the secondary degrees
and skill education to students, who see less interest
rely on national supervision to receive certificates. As Total School enrollment: 190,000 students
in continuing in any academic path following the
schools had to close down last year due to the pandemic enrolled in K-12 public and private schools
preparatory level.
measures, exams for the preparatory and secondary Public schools: 106,635 students are currently
degrees were canceled, and schools used previous year’s » Teachers receive their salaries from the Marib local registered in public schools.
records to give students their scores, a process that administration instead of the Ministry of Education.
wasn’t properly supervised by the ministry. Teachers: There are 2,016 teachers currently
» Gender: There are no official school enrollment
statistics breaking down numbers by gender. Our field in Marib City, employed by the governorate’s
Through our conversation with local authority officials, education department in the public schools alone.
inquiry helped us locate only two all-girls’ secondary
community leaders, business owners, and average parents The teacher/ student ratio is now 1:52, which
schools and identify that in local schools 49,372 of the
of Marib, the following issues and concerns were raised: represents a huge increase from the decline in
students are females (46% of the registered students)
» Female drop-out is a major problem, prompted and 57,263 are males (54% of the registered students). teachers in the early years of the conflict when the
both by social habits allowing early marriages, and city’s human resources were under pressure.
» Dropout Rate: To estimate the school drop-out rate in
tribal traditions, but also poverty and lack of female
Marib, we have used the 2004 national census data Salary: The local minimum salary is YR 50K per
participation in the labor force. Female education
and age pyramid,1 and estimated that 269,297 school- month (roughly USD 60) and salaries progressively
in primary school is slightly better but drop-out in
aged children presently reside in the city alone. This increase based on the number of years of
secondary education is a serious problem. In the words
means that nearly 79,279 school-aged children are not experience up to YR 120K. By comparison, the
of one key informant who participated in the interviews,
registered in school (roughly 41% of children in Marib minimum teacher’s salary in Sana’a and Houthi-
his main wish for Marib was to “wake up tomorrow and
City), and the rate increases even more when the low Saleh controlled areas is about USD 90 per month.
find all women in Marib are educated.”
attendance rates (mainly in public schools) are also
» Overcrowding, lack of school equipment including taken into account. Drop-out is specifically problematic
basic lavatory and sanitary facilities, as well as the for the secondary school-aged students, and for female
1 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population Bulletin Of The United Nations Economic Commission 15, 15 October 2012, sec. 1, https://www.unescwa.
org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/uploads/bulletin15-section1-population_15_10_2012.xlsx

up Discussions People in the city pay their taxes and utility bills
DK/DWTA
6% DK/DWTA Native resident of Marib 81
Strongly disagree
16%Maybe Strongly Disagree 13% DK/DWTA
No
31% 27%
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Strongly disagree
Somewhat disagree
Somewhat disagree
% 15% Somewhat agree
Yes Somewhat disagree
20% Somewhat agree IDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps Strongly agree
26% Somewhat agree
Strongly agree 18% 26%
Strongly agree
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
The state is facing significant challenges in providing decent quality of services for all
ink that my voice matters and should be considered to form the future of the city. People in the city pay their taxes and utility bills - per demographic group
6% DK/DWTA
students according to our key informant interviews,
22% although we coulddisagree
Somewhat not identify the exact attendance/
DK/DWTA drop-out rates for this
Somewhat agree education year. SCORECARD / Education DK/DWTA
38% Native resident of Marib
Strongly disagree
» Teacher
Strongly Disagree
Strongly agree
Training: Intensive professional development Somewhat disagree
courses were arranged for uncredentialed paraeducators
Somewhat disagree
Of all of the services surveyed, there was
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods the most
Somewhat agree
and teachers who mostly did not hold university degrees
dissatisfaction expressed with current education in Marib.
Somewhat agree Strongly
You are satisfied with the quality agree
of education services in the city
in order to surge the capacity as of 2017. : Nearly half of the respondents to our survey (49%) were
Strongly agree Marginalized and African migrantsnot satisfied with the quality of education services in the
» Overcrowding in classes was also reportedly a significant 6%
city.
0% Only 11%
10% 20% 30% were
40% 50%very satisfied,
60% 70% 80% 90%10% and another 34%
100% were
DK/DWTA
concern. The average number of primary students per somewhat satisfied. 18% Completely unsatisfied
class is 56 students. The majority of primary schools
icant challenges in providing decent quality of services for all When looking at the same indicator by demographic Somewhat unsatisfied
have been forced to operate on two-shifts, including group and gender type, the male native 34%residents Satisfied
of Marib
private schools. 32%
had the highest level of satisfaction with the quality of
Very satisfied
Safety and» respsect
DK/DWTA
Lack of Standardized School curricula: in Marib the the education services, whereas the males from the
national curriculum of the republic from the pre-conflict
Strongly disagree IDP community groups who live in camps and informal
I feel more respected period is currently still being used. The administration
in
Somewhat disagree Marib than the area I came from or other places I visit shelters expressed the strongest level of dissatisfaction.
reportedly
Somewhat agree introduced several amendments in the
5% FIGURE 72. New school in Mareb (UN Habitat)
Strongly agree current educational year, but Marib schools still deliver
DK/DWTA
14% DK/DWTA
education Strongly
using disagree
the school books used elsewhere in Native resident of Marib
Strongly Disagree
36%
the ‘Legitimacy’ areas
somewhat disagreeand there has been a shortage Somewhat disagree
20%
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Satisfaction with the Quality of Education Services
of textbooks according
Somewhat agree to the Marib Department of YouYou
areare
satisfied with
satisfied the
with thequality
qualityof
ofeducation servicesininthe
education services thecity
city Somewhat agree
25% Education.Strongly agree

6%
» Textbooks: This year alone, the local authority had 10%
DK/DWTA
to procure the printing of over 1 million books. Books 18% 0% 10%

20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
I feel more respected inare reportedly

Marib than the area Ito befrom
came used by places
or other students for
I visit, by at least three
gender Somewhat unsatisfied
consecutive years, and are kept in the property of the 34%
Satisfied
32%
governorate. During this DK/DWTA year’s seasonal floods, many
100
You are satisfied
Very with the quality of education services in the city
satisfied
sect
80 books warehouses were affected,
Strongly Disagree and losses were
60 massive. However, as COVID-19 caused

Somewhat disagree an early closure
DK/DWTA
Somewhat agree
rib than the area I came from
40
oforschools, itIprovided
other places visit the department of education with Native resident of Marib
You can access clean drinking water Completely unsatisfied
Strongly agree
enough lead time to recover the number of books it IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somewhat unsatisfied
needed for this educational year.
20
DK/DWTA Satisfied
DK/DWTA
0
Strongly disagree Native residentIDPs living in slums, informal settlements or camps
of Marib Very satisfied
Female Male Strongly Disagree
Higher Education Development
somewhat disagree
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Marginalized and African migrants Somewhat disagree
SomewhatAagree
public college was opened in Marib in 2006, and as of 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% Somewhat agree
60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2015, inamost
I feel safe and welcomed
Strongly agree
single School
places in Marib of Education (Teachers College) wasinformal settlements or camps
IDPs living in slums, Strongly agree
FIGURE 73. Satisfaction with the quality of education services

100
DK/DWTA Marginalized and African migrants
80 Strongly Disagree 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
I feel I can access different opportunities in Marib, regardless of my appearances (such as the color of
rib60than the area I came from or other places I visit, by gender Somewhat disagree my skin or my social status)
Somewhat agree
40 DK/DWTA
DK/DWTA Strongly agree
You are satisfied
Native with the
resident of quality
Marib of education services in the city
20 Strongly Disagree Strongly Disagree
Education Sector
delivering a limited offering of classes (Arabic literature, trending across the republic, students became more
Islamic and Quranic Studies) to 298 students 28 of which interested in this type of education when compared to Sab’a Regional College
are females. 2 In 2016, President Hadi issued a decree to more conventional education institutes. The new legal
authorize the development of the Sab’a Regional college framework that reflected the government’s interest in 11,000 students enrolled (of which 3,000 are
to be based in Marib city, as the central city of the region. expanding the trained labour force in the society was female students, many of which are Maribi locals)
Since the decree was issued in 2016, 17 different schools coupled with serious investments and government budget 234 professors and teachers offer courses at this
within the regional college network have opened in Marib, allocations.3 A student in any of these colleges would get public university, 92 of which have fixed tenure.
offering higher education programs for engineering, free education for 2 to 4 years, graduating as building 57 new lecture halls were added in the last two
humanities, science, and the newly added medical school and construction professionals, land surveyors, nurses years.
as well as pharmaceutical studies. Existing school and health care delivery professionals, as well as human
infrastructure was also expanded. resources needed for office duties. As of the time when
the conflict started in 2015, the society college in Marib
A huge expansion of Sab’a regional college was possible was still under construction.
due to the local authority’s initiative and substantial
budget allocations annually, while the higher education Since 2016, new steps were taken to support vocational
administration capacity remains underdeveloped. To training, this time under direct influence and buy-in from
date, the Ministry of Higher Education hasn’t authorized the provincial authorities, prompted by real needs in the
an office in the region to issue certified degrees or to market for new human resources. The vocational training
regulate private higher-education. According to local center reopened in 2017 after minor repairs, and later
business leaders interviewed for this profile, investment expanded to include an industrial vocational training
in private higher education is an area of potential growth, section fully equipped to receive 250 students yearly.
but remains restricted due to regulations only permitting Demand also pushed the vocational training department
public institutions. at the Governorate to open classes for commerce-
related capacity development, as the labor market
Vocational Education started to demand cashiers and staff to place orders
Despite the rapid expansion of the vocational training and importation inventories, etc. During the educational
sector throughout the republic during Saleh’s years in year 2019-2020, over 750 students graduated from the
office, Marib was not regarded as a priority for this public vocational training center.
funding. As of 2015, only one technical institute was
opened in Marib, providing male students with basic When asked about the female participation in vocational
training to become computer maintenance technicians skill development, the head of the department in the
and electricians. governorate did not have a clear idea, for instance about
the number of female students currently attending. When
Another project was intended to build the first “community the profiling team checked directly with the vocational
college” in Marib. As community colleges were training center management, they pointed out that they
FIGURE 74. New girls school students lining up for class. (UN
2 UN Habitat Profiling Team Interview with Education Sector Expert, June 2020
3 For more on the legal framework that governs the vocational training and society colleges in Yemen, see the link: https://yemen-nic.info/db/laws_ye/detail.php?ID=11474 Habitat)
83
had a successful nursing training course in the past year.

MAP 9 - SCHOOLS IN MARIB
Budget shortfalls meant that not enough funding was
allocated to the nursing center this year, new expenses
” Girls in Marib are determined to
were directed to COVID-19 preparedness. Only a handful become active participants in all
of women joined the inaugural classes of this first fields, and I am proud that three of the
program offering female-only courses. The classes are outstanding students in my department
usually limited in time and scope, and strictly focused are from Harib district.1
on traditionally accepted vocations such as nursing and
sewing. According to a trainer we interviewed, females -
Eman Mohamed, a mathematics
“are hardly allowed to go to primary school, and while student
the openness to female education brought about by the
IDPs is improving female access to primary education,
vocational training is still looked at unfavorably among the 1 On traveling over 2 and a half hours from Harib
tribes as an unacceptable breach of gender norms, even district to Saba University, one students said that attend-
ing university every day is a statement – a response to
if it is just catering to outsiders.” The community college the negative perception many hold toward rural, tribal
remained under construction, but the profiling team girls and their capabilities https://al-masdaronline.net/
observed that it was almost finished, but it is still occupied national/430
by displaced families who introduced many changes to
the internal partitions and other facilities. New temporary
structures were also added to accommodate for the needs
of hosted IDPs around the main center, transforming the
facility plot into a small informal settlement, and restoring
it to its original educational use will probably require
substantial resources. Several other training facilities in the
city were also occupied by temporary hospitals to rescue
soldiers wounded in combat, and others by command-
and-control posts for the military or the tribal factions.4
FIGURE 75. Schools in Marib (google maps)
4 For more on this, see the recent study by Musaala Organization for Human
Rights https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Cu3eCWvX6GBpt9sv5VXKXSuWmB042ZD-/
view?usp=drivesdk
FIGURE 76. Bilqis Girls School, source: UN-Habitat Profiling

team
Economy
14 ECONOMY
Contextual Overview professional services, as new opportunities have been

Marib has become the pass-through for all traffic, goods, created by new businesses started by professionals from
travel between North and South to the degree that Marib’s the IDP community. This has been particularly true for the
tribes are negotiating to become central mediators between healthcare sector (as further detailed in the profile’s health
the North and the South. In Marib, there is the perception section).
that the tribes were better able to preserve their neutral
status, sparing their area from destruction and protecting Everyday customs and means of livelihoods in Marib have
them economically, while trade and IDPs have brought new been analyzed under the four broad categories of:
wealth and jobs to the region. These factors enabled the
region to benefit from both the wartime and humanitarian » Employment Sectors;
economies. However, this advantage is fragile and
contingent on many factors beyond Marib’s control and will » Perceptions of Economic Opportunity;
be compromised if the attacks on Marib’s mountain ranges » Gender disparities, and
continue. Despite suffering from its own internal population
displacement due to ongoing attacks from Houthi-Saleh » Urban Growth
forces and from recent flood events, while other municipal
governments are struggling to survive and sustain monthly From an economic standpoint, the fragile stability
salaries, Marib was able to secure a budget surplus from oil achieved in Marib serves as a prototype for how a FIGURE 77. UN Habitat Profiling Team Photo of the
and gas revenues. The city is now in a position of making functional decentralized system can evolve into a modern, Wholesale market, October 2020
strategic investments and updating the previous city plans heterogeneous society, specifically in Marib City. The
to accommodate a five-fold increase in population. city itself is almost entirely run by members of the IDP
community, including members of the IRG government,
Since the 1980s, the oil industry has dominated Yemen as internal security and the majority of those serving public
well as Marib governorate’s local economy. After the 2011 functions.1 The tribes themselves seem to be less keen to
protests, Marib secured 20% of all oil and gas revenues. work in the bureaucratic institutions, and perhaps lack the
Previously the entire amount went to the central government. interest and the training required for functional roles in state
Discussions on Marib’s economy have focused on how it affairs. They have willingly accepted that the rising urban
has diversified as a result of its population boom and the class of average Yemeni IDPs will fulfill these roles, who, as
impact of its urban conditions on socio-economic inclusion. discussed earlier, find it less relevant to define themselves
The interdependence between urbanization’s challenges by their tribe. This rise of an urban class of unaffiliated
and opportunities have created unique conditions within citizens virtually did not exist a few years ago.
Marib which include: large and rapid increases in the
number of IDPs in the midst of a war; pressure on existing While the tribes have effectively decentralized the economy
insufficient services but also bottom-up creation of new of Yemen by controlling local natural wealth, the bureaucratic
economic opportunities; particularly within healthcare and middle class is leading the administrative decentralization.
FIGURE 78. Qat Market in Marib: As of May, 2020,
1 UN-Habitat profiling team observation: According to one of the field research team members, while visiting a security administration in Marib, when the researcher met dozens of law enforcement the Ministry of Health in Marib and other IRG-
officers, policemen, and emergency first responders inside the centre, and only one or two individuals were originally from Marib governorate.
held governorates ordered the closure of all Qat
markets as a COVID-19 precaution. (https://www.
newsyemen.net/new/53264)
ervices Housing
Economy
Perception of being welcomed to rent a housePerception
Access to 12 hours or less of daily electrcity supply
anywhere of improving shelter conditions in terms of affordability and
Perception of improving shelter
Fear of catching COVID-19
adequacy comapred to previou
ess to 12 hours or less of daily electrcity supply
in the city (regardless of displacement status)adequacy Imporving agricultural
comapred to previous year prospects and market demand Cost of accessing shelter over 50% of Perception
household income Ability
violence, or risk of eviction) to access adequate Economy - females
of stability in the current shelter (against natural hazards,
household income
Conditions to start up a new business (perception of Optimism due to improving economy Perc
how easy) 7%
85
2% pote
Optimism due to improving economy 8% DK/ DWTA
7%
Perception
potential
of impact of conflict on household 5%
economic
Economy
DK/
Economy DK/DWTA
DWTA
4%
How easy for females to access jobs
16% 15%
DK/ DWTA 16% Native residents
DK/ DWTA
26%
DK/ DWTA
atisfactory Strongly disagree
15% 5% 15%
DK/ DWTA 32%
Strongly disagree 17% Strongly disagree
7% DK/ DWTA Conditions 7%
Strongly
to
disagree
start up a new business (perception
DK/ DWTA of
6% 15% 32%
IDPs living in the city's Strongly disagree
traditional neighbourhoods 27% Somewhat
Conditions up a new business (perception of Not stable
14%
to start disagree 18%
ctory 7% DK/ DWTA DK/ DWTA
Somewhat disagree 4% DK/ DWTA how easy)Somewhatagree
disagree 34% 24% Strongly disagree 1
Somewhat 14% disagree
14% 14% 31%24% SomewhatStrongly disagreedisagree how easy)Somewhat 24% Strongly25%
disagreeSomewhat stable 19% 24%
what satisfactory 28% 13% 21% 21% 9% DK/ DWTA 43%
Somewhat agree
21%Strongly agree 24% Strongly disagree Somewhat agree
19%
Strongly disagree IDPs living in camps 24%
32% Strongly disagree Somewhat
Strongly agree
agree
Somewhat disagree Stable 24%14%
Somewhat disagree
26%
32% 27% Somewhat Somewhat
agree disagree
17% 26% 29% 28% Strongly disagree 1
sfactory Somewhat disagree Strongly agreeSomewhat 26%
18% disagree
28%and Somewhat disagree 28%
6%
Strongly agree
26%
Somewhat agree
29% 24% The Marginalized 18%Afican migrants Somewhat agree
Strongly agree 6% 14% DK/ DWTAagree
Somewhat
DK/ DWTA 28% 20%
Very stable
WTA 28% Somewhat agree Somewhat agree 28% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% Somewhat agree 30% 14% Somewhat disagree
Strongly agree
29% Strongly agree 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Stronglyagree
Strongly disagree 34%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 30% Strongly agree 28% Strongly agree 33% Strongly agree 27%
Strongly disagree Somewhat agree
27% Somewhat disagree 23%
24% Somewhat disagree Strongly
Perception agreewelcomed
of being
SCORECARD / Economy affected by the displacement status
as per
Satisfaction the survey’s
with present level of electrcity supply economy of Marib 24% is improving. Somewhat
Somewhat
Only
agree14% of respondents in Has
the city
the (regardless
city ofnecess
provided displa
sfaction with present level of electrcity supply key demographic groups. Some 83% of the marginalized expressed optimism.
Cost of accessing shelter over 50%agree
of household income
in the city (regardless
Agricultural activityofisdisplacement
strong aroundstatus)the city 28% Strongly agree coronavirus (such as masks,
Imporving to rent
agricultural a house
prospects anywhere
and market demand Access to affordable housing in Marib
Ability 28%adequate household income
to access 8% Resid
The Marib scorecard Ability tosurvey data shows householdthat in the majority
the city by demographic group groups and African migrants are unemployed, which • 15% of the respondents
Strongly agree
Employment status also expressed place
access adequate income 8% Residents satisfied with the proximity of
2% residence to 5% How easy for females to access jobs per gender 16%
of those who identify themselves as employed work in speaks to the reality 16% of IDPs
places of workin camps as 76% of which
DK/ DWTA dissatisfaction with markets accessibility
Very satisfactory DK/ DWTA and the 17%
2% 13% to 26% 8% 3%
Very satisfactory
unidentified sectors (51%), mostly as daily labourers group identified
17%DK/ DWTA themselves
7% as unemployed,
Strongly disagree compared
36% 3% affordability
Satisfactory
Imporving DK/ 5% of prospects
agricultural
DWTA
their household
and market needs,
demand whiledisagree
Strongly 23% expressed Continuing education
13% 7% DK/ DWTA Imporving agricultural27%
prospects and
DK/ DWTA
market demand 15% IDP
y agree36%
(moyawem) Satisfactory or in simple 5% andNativerandom residents
occupations
DK/ DWTA 42% among DK/ DWTAnative
13%disagree
Strongly residents, 7% 50% among
Somewhat IDPs
disagree DK/
hosted
19%
DWTA21%
in 34% Somewhat satisfaction.
satisfactory As the business environment
18% Somewhat was
24% worsening
disagree Unemployed 28%
24%
31%
D
18% the city’s neighbourhoods. 28% 24% Strongly disagree
due25%
Unsatisfactory 24%
to COVID-19 impacts, prices
Strongly disagree
of Somewhat
goods agreewere climbing
36% 16%
14% S
2
what agree depending
21% on IDPsmarket
Somewhat satisfactory demand 24% (fawael). Other
disagree key 24%
Somewhat disagree Somewhat agree 31%Males Employed 32%
living in the city's
25%
traditional neighbourhoods Strongly
21% 24% Strongly disagree Unsatisfactory Somewhat satisfactory 26% Somewhat 18%
employmentUnsatisfactory
sectors include education Somewhat (12%), disagree
building 32%
SomewhatSomewhat disagreeagree
Somewhat disagree while the7% value 17%of the currency wasdisagree
dipping.
28% 61% It is still difficult 28%
S
what disagree
19% 28% Strongly agree 28% 19% DK/ DWTA 28%
7% 24% DK/ DWTA Strongly agree S
18% 28% • 51% of the agree respondents to our survey
Somewhat agreeexpressed
Somewhat disagree
for 55% of the residents toSomewhat
Satisfactory start
DK/ DWTA a business,
agree while only 15%
y disagree 28% and construction DK/ DWTA(8%), 28% public24% services and local state
IDPs living in camps Strongly
Somewhat agree
27% situation, 22% 34%
their dissatisfaction 26% with the28% Very28%
14% 24% S
employees (9%), and The commerce andmigrants
Somewhat agree
finance, insurance, economic of which
Strongly agreeSomewhat agree thought
14% it was
satisfactoryeasy to start
31%
24%
31%
aFemales
Strongly
Stronglybusiness
Strongly disagree
agree
disagree at the time when
21% strongly disagree with 30%
WTA Marginalized and Afican
real estate (FIRE) jobs (6%). Strongly agree the general perception that
Strongly agreethe the survey was conducted.Somewhat Somewhat disagree
disagree
18% 28%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Somewhat agree
18% 28% Somewhat agree
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
A majority of those interviewed identified themselves as Access to clean drinking water 29% Strongly agree
ess to clean drinking water Agricultural activity is strongAre Perception
you the
around currently of being welcomed
Marketemployed?
city accessibility to rent a house
and availabilityof anywhere
household needs 29%
Access
Are you currently to affordable housing
employed? Stronglyinagree
Employment Marib
status - male / female
in the city by demographic grou
Emp
unemployed (61%), in addition to students (8%), while only in the city by demographic group
Employment status per demographic group How easy for females to access jobs
Employment status
31% of the respondents identified themselves as employed.
Employment status
100
Continuing education
Native residents
Economy - fem
90
This can help us estimate a dependency rate of 6.56 among 4% Continuing education
Strongly agree 3% the80city Native residents
Unemployed
6%
Native residents DK/ DWTA Agricultural 8% is strong around
activity Continuing education DK/ DWTA
4% the city residents (every 7% Native residents DK/ DWTA
17% UnemployedAgricultural activity is strong around the70 city
Strongly agree
8%income generating individual
Continuing education in DK/ DWTA
29%Strongly disagree
on household economic19%
Somewhat agree 34% Unsatisfactory
Employed
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods D
13%economy 24%
on of Optimism due to improving Perception of impact ofEmployed
conflict 60 Native residents How easy for females to
disagree 23%
15% Unemployed
29% 17%
Marib is providing
Somewhat for at least 5 other dependents).
agree 24%
Strongly 24% Strongly disagree
Somewhat
potential disagree 50 S
Unemployed 24%
31% 40
Employed Somewhat satisfactory IDPs living in camps
S
SomewhatSomewhat
disagree agree IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods IDPs living in camps
Somewhat disagree
31%
Somewhat disagree
IDPs living in camps 7% 61% 30
By looking at other aspects of the employment

7% status,
19% 28%
Employed
IDPs living in camps 28% 23%Strongly 26%
agree agree 4%
Strongly disagree
7% 19%
28% DK/
20 DK/ DWTA
DWTA Satisfactory S
Strongly disagree 28% 61% Somewhat
13% 22%
DK/ DWTA DK/ DWTA The Marginalized and Afican migrants
26% 14% Somewhat 28% agree
29% DK/ DWTA 13% 24%
10
IDPs living in campsThe Marginalized and Afican migrants
Strongly disagree S
23% the data suggests that 30% of the employed are females, Strongly agree 13%
Very satisfactory 9%
Marginalized26% Strongly disagree 24%
WTA The Marginalized and Afican migrants 0 Strongly disagree
DK/ DWTA 24%
The Strongly
and Afican migrantsdisagree Strongly agree 24%
32% 36% Males Females 14%
0% 10
y disagree
21%
indicating an increased level of female participation in 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 36% The Marginalized and Somewhat
Afican migrants disagree 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 7
Somewhat disagree
Somewhat 0%disagree Somewhat disagree
the labour force despite the low employment rate across
29%
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
18% 19% 28% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 20%
what disagree 28% 28% 19% 28% Somewhat agree
Somewhat agree
80% 90% 100%
all groups. Moreover, the employment status is directly Somewhat agree

FIGURE 79. Employment status by vulnerability group, gender and total.
Somewhat agree 26% 34%
what agree
Strongly agree 33% Strongly agree
Strongly agree
Market accessibility and availabilityof household needs Employment status - male / female 23%
y agree
Employment status - male / female
You can access enough income through The economy is imporving and I am Economy
It is easy for me to start a new 100 Markets are accessible in my area and most
Female employment status
Economy Field 100
% decent means to provide for yourself and optimistic about the future
business 90
of the households needs are avaialble
your family Conditions to start up a new business (perception
80 of Unemployed C
Optimism due to improving econo
Other 90
51% Unemployed
6% DK/ DWTA how easy)
Market accessibility and availabilityof household needs
Market accessibility and availabilityof household
70 needs
Native residents
onditions
mand to start up a new business (perception
80 of Ability to access adequate household income Optimism due to improving economy Perception
Residents satisfied with the proximity of residence to Employed
of impact of conflict on household economic How easy for females toU
Education 60 12%
60
ow easy) 70
Employed 15% 23%24% Strongly disagree places of work 50
potential
IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods E
Public services 50 9% 40
7%
Somewhat disagree
6%
30 6% DK/ DWTA 14%
40
5% 28% DK/ DWTA 7% DK/ DWTA 7% DK/ DWTA 6% 4% DK/ DWTA DK/ DWTA
WTA 6% Building and 30construction 8% 14%
Somewhat agree 14%
20 DK/ DWTA IDPs living in camps
24%
DK/
20 DWTA 18% 28% 29% 16% 10 15% 13% 23%24% Strongly disagree 21%
14% Intellectual professions 6% 24% Strongly disagree 24% Strongly disagree
24% Strongly 15%disagree23%
0 disagree 24% 24% andStrongly
32% disagree
Strongly disagree Males
y disagree 10
25% 21%Strongly agree 27% 21% Strongly The Marginalized Afican migrants
Strongly disagree Males Females Somewhat disagree 29%
27% Commerce and Males
0
FIRE Females 5% Somewhat disagree
29%
Somewhat disagree
24%
Somewhat disagree
18%
Somewhat disagree Somewhat disagree disagree
Somewhat 28%
what disagree 24% 28% Somewhat
0% 10% 20% 30%
agree
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
24%
Somewhat disagree
28% 28% 28% 27% Somewhat agree 28% 28% 28% Somewhat agree 30%
what agree Agriculture, livestock and 4% Somewhat agree Somewhat agree 29%
28% agree 29%
Somewhat Somewhat agree
Females
Somewhat agree 28% 30% 28% 30% 33% Strongly agree
fishery Strongly agree Strongly agree Strongly agree Strongly agree
Strongly agree Strongly agree
y agree 28% Strongly agree
Transport 4% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50
Communications 1% Imporving agricultural prospects and market demand Ability to access adequate househo
Miningand
mporving agricultural prospects and energy
market demand 1% Ability to access adequate household income Employment status per demographic group Residents satisfied with the proximity of residence to How easy for females to
places of work
FIGURE 80. Employment by
Employment status
FIGURE 81. Household income FIGURE 82. Optimism due to FIGURE 83. Perception as to how FIGURE 84. Market accessibility and
availability ofUnemployed
households needs 5%
economic sector improving
5% economy easy it 7%
is to start a business
Native residents
DK/ DWTA
8% Continuing education DK/ DWTA 7% 18%
WTA 7% DK/ DWTA 18% IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Employed
DK/ DWTA Native residents
24%
14% 24%
31% Strongly disagree 16% 25%
24% Unemployed
25% 24% Strongly disagree 24% Strongly disagree
14%
y disagree 24%
Somewhat disagree
31% Employed IDPsdisagree
Somewhat living in camps
Somewhat disagree 28% 24%
Somewhat disagree 24% 18% 28%
28% 61%
what disagree
28% Somewhat agree
Somewhat agree
28% 27% IDPs living in camps
28%
18%
what agree 28% Somewhat agree The Marginalized and Afican migrants
29%
Somewhat agree
28% Strongly agree
Economy
SCORECARD / SPATIAL ANALYSIS
Access to
The tribes, on their part, are also increasingly worried about and training of Yemeni nationals. Prior to 2015, Marib’s Adequate Income
the increased authority in the hands of newcomers. inhabitants were primarily tribesmen working in the Through Decent
agricultural sector. The oil refinery does not appear to have Means
Post-Conflict Economic Changes been a source of direct livelihoods, as local labor was not
Changes to Marib’s economy since 2015 include the considered to possess the necessary capacity and skills.
establishment of a large number of small and medium
sized business enterprises. Fuel and gas prices have risen According to research conducted on informal commercial
considerably since 2015 throughout Yemen but have activities in Sanaa leading up to 2010 3 qat trade in urban
remained significantly lower in Marib due to the proximity areas is controlled by large producers or regional investors
of Safer sector 18. who belong to prominent tribes. They have been able to
invest large sums in developing transportation networks
During the past five years, the economic activity in Marib from the countryside where qat is grown, to urban markets Perception of
massively expanded, and capital and businesses moved to where it is sold. Easiness of
take advantage of the fairly stable business environment, Starting New
specifically due to the rapidly expanding real estate and trade With an increase in women-headed households witnessed Business
sectors to keep up with the population increase.2 According due to male heads having experienced death, disappearance
to a local group observing economic activity in Marib or migration without remittances, women have been placed
reporting to the profiling team, over 800 new businesses with a double burden according to recent research by
opened up in Marib between March and May 2020, despite international development agencies. In addition to becoming
fears of COVID 19 and the few lockdown measures taken. the primary provider, they remain primary caregivers. These
Confidence in the local authority was also a driving factor conditions appear to have facilitated increased openness
to this boom, despite security setbacks and frequent rocket to women working outside of the home in factory jobs, food
and drone attacks on the surrounding military settings. production, education, and even in police jobs in Marib and
beyond. Access to Job
Smaller investments expanded into new markets in the Opportunities for
city, mainly through makeshift and temporary structures as Women
revealed by the profiling team’s interviews with several of
them, to “increase supply but to minimize investments in
fixed assets at the same time.” Whether these businesses Electricity station
will permanently become part of Marib’s urban rise or be Airport
forced to relocate will determine the fate of this unlikely
Main hospital
economic gift the war presented.
Agree /
The oil industry and hotels are primarily staffed by
Somewhat agree 1 Marib city centre
expatriates, despite Yemeni laws requiring employment 2 South new development area
Somewhat disagree
3 East Marib
2 Qantara, “‫ المدينة الملجأ في حرب اليمن‬- ‫”أرض سد مأرب وملكة سبأ‬, April 2020, https://ar.qantara.de/content/‫اليمن‬-‫حرب‬-‫في‬-‫الملجأ‬-‫المدينة‬-‫سبأ‬-‫وملكة‬-‫مأرب‬-‫سد‬-‫أرض‬-‫القتال‬-‫جبهات‬-‫خلف‬-‫مدينة‬-‫اليمنية‬-‫مأرب‬ Strongly disagree 4 North Marib
3 Roman Stadnicki. 2014. "The Challenges of Urban Transition in Yemen: Sana'a and Other Major Cities." Journal of Arabian Studies 4(1): 115-133.
5 North-East Marib
Masterplan area
87
FIGURE 85. New girls school students lining up for class. (UN Habitat Profiling Team)
23% 26%
DK/ DWTA T

Environment
Economy
Economy
15
Conditions to start up a new business (perception of
how easy)
ENVIRONMENT Conditions to start up a new business (perception of
how easy)
6% DK/ DWTA
14%
6% Strongly
DK/ DWTA disagree
27% 14%
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
27% 24%
Somewhat agree
disagree
24%
28% Strongly
Somewhat agree
agree
The environmental challenges in Marib are a microcosm Agriculture
28% Strongly agree
of the severe ecological risks in the country, as Yemen’s Marib has historically been one of the top-five producing
ecological degradation has become even more acute governorates in Yemen for fruit and cash crops but its SCORCECARD
Imporving agricultural -prospects
Agricultural
and market prospects
demand
on farms and natural resources. The combination of agricultural regions are exhibiting signs of distress and lost
Imporving agricultural prospects and market demand
population growth and displacement, climate change, and crops and livelihoods,3 with about 41% of croplands in Marib Agriculture and livestock activities are improving in and
the inability to respond to or mitigate natural disasters in in distress. To understand the changes in agriculture areas around Marib due to market demand
7% DK/ DWTA
an active conflict may pose greater risks than the current pre- and post-crisis, a Normalized Difference Vegetation
military conflict. The environment has been described as Index (NDVI) analysis conducted by UNH (2013-1019) 14% 7% 24%
31% Strongly
DK/ DWTA disagree
a “silent victim” of armed conflicts;1 analysts in Yemen revealed that the total agricultural area decreased in Marib 14% 24%
Strongly disagree
now predict that the looming environmental crisis poses over the past 6 years by almost 40% for a total of 30km2 18% 28% Somewhat agree
disagree
an even greater risk than the current civil war.2 Marib is lost. Imagery also suggested a significant shrinking of 18% 28%
29% Strongly
Somewhat agree
agree
no exception to this environmental tragedy, with limited water bodies, indicating an increasing trend of draught.
29% Strongly agree
entry points for programming solutions in the midst of
deteriorating conflict and the need to give more attention to Climactic stressors notwithstanding, Marib’s agricultural
Agricultural activity is strong around the city
short-term humanitarian responses (as of late 2020). production has increased relative to the other major
To my knowledge,
activity agriculture is presently
the city thriving
producing governorates, possibly as a result of Marib Agricultural is strong around
The year 2019 was a turning point for Marib, in which being outside of the active conflict frontlines prior to the
it went from a hosting city success story to a city with a escalation of Houthi attacks around Marib in 2020.4 This 7% DK/ DWTA
hosting crisis. The environmental factors underlying the is also reflected in the urban scorecards, where 62% 13%7%
24% Strongly
DK/ DWTA disagree
fragility of the city have become serious priorities for future of respondents somewhat or strongly agree with the 13% 36%
Strongly disagree
government and international organizations recognizing statement that agriculture is currently thriving. Nevertheless, 19% 28% 36% Somewhat agree
disagree
that food and water shortages, floods, locusts, and other agricultural production remains an area of grave concern, 26%
19% 28% Strongly
Somewhat agree
agree
climate change-related disasters will require top-level as food insecurity remains an acute risk in the governorate, 26%
coordination and response in 2021 and beyond. This is with the IDP community being particularily vulnerable. Strongly agree
especially relevant as Marib city is the only city within the In the governorate as a whole, the food insecurity has
governorate of Marib with significant agricultural resources, progressively worsened; where in 2019 outright famine was Market accessibility and availabilityof household needs
and an important reliance the Marib dam. There is now a averted by high levels of international support, a projection FIGURE 87. Perceptions of prospects of agriculture
Market accessibility and availabilityof household needs
growing sense of crisis and strain as a result of shrinking for 2021 by the Integrated Phase Classification for food
water bodies and the rapid decline in agricultural output seen insecurity is that over 60% of the population in Marib will 6% DK/ DWTA
by Marib’s farmers. Furthermore, as a primary destination fall under “Phase 3” (crisis) or higher (See FIGURE 88 on
15% 6% 23% 24% Strongly
DK/ DWTA disagree
for IDPs, the adverse effects of climate will continue to put page 90). As Yemen now enters into the worst famine
destabilizing pressures Marib and its capacity to manage conditions yet5 seen, ensuring the sustainability of the 15% 23%
Strongly disagree
related to food insecurity.
the displacement crisis on its hands. agricultural production will be critical for programming 28% Somewhat agree
disagree
28%
28% 29% Strongly
Somewhat agree
agree
1 UNEP, Protecting the environment during armed conflict. An inventory and analysis of international law. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, 2009. 28% 29%
2 Helen Lackner, Abdulrahman Al-Eryani, “Yemen’s environmental crisis is the biggest risk for its future”, The Century Foundation, https://tcf.org/content/report/yemens-environmental-crisis-biggest-risk-future/?session=1 Strongly agree
3 Darbyshire, Eoghan, (2020) Yemen’s agriculture in distress. Conflict and Environment Observatory. Available from: https://ceobs.org/yemens-agriculture-in-distress/
4 Ibid.
5 IOM Concerned about Impact of Yemen Famine Predictions on Displaced Persons, Migrants.” 2020. International Organization for Migration. December 4, 2020. https://www.iom.int/news/iom-concerned-about-impact-yemen-famine-predictions-displaced-persons-migrants.https://www.iom.
int/news/iom-concerned-about-impact-yemen-famine-predictions-displaced-persons-migrants
89
Raghwan
MAP 10 - AGRICULTURE IN MARIB

Vegetation (NDVI Class 2, 4, 5) in 2013
Vegetation (NDVI Class 2, 4, 5) in 2019.
Medghal
Water bodies in 2013
To understand the changes in agricultural areas pre- and
Water bodies in 2019 post the crisis, a Normalized Difference Vegetation Index
(NDVI) analysis was done for Marib region for March
2013 and March 2019 with Landsat-8 imagery 2013
and 2019. The analysis results showed differences in
agricultural areas both in area size and crop type.
The analysis illustrated 5 classes:

Class 1 ( -1 – 0): Water Bodies
Class 3 (0.18 – 0.3): Vegetables, the NDVI is less than
0.20.
Class 4 (0.3 – 0.6): Olives or Fruit trees as they have a
stable profile with nearly constant value (>0.50) while
new farms of olives will have a stable NDVI that is in the
range of 0.20 to 0.30
Marib The initial analysis suggests that the total agricultural

area decreased from 2013 on 2019 by almost 40% for a
total 30 km2.
Furthermore, the imagery suggests a significant shrinking

Sirwah of the water bodies from 2013 to 2019 with almost 47%,
Marib City likely indicating an increasing trend in drought. This could
cause major challenges to food security in the region.
Over the last thirty years, Yemen experienced four periods

of drought, 1979-1981, 1983- 1984, 1990-1991, 2007-
2009 which have caused severe damage to the Yemeni
economy, which largely relies on agricultural resources.
Yemeni researcher Dhaifallah (Dhaifallah, 2018), has

earlier shown that there is a gradual transition of
agricultural areas from mild to moderate drought by
64% and from moderate to severe drought by 26%
from 1985 to 2015, and suggests that this will cause
a major threat and challenges to both food security
and overall development of the country. (https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/326727607_Drought_
Risk_Assessment_Using_Remote_Sensing_and_GIS_in_
Yemen)
Al Jubah
0 3 6 12 18 24
Kilometers
Environment
and irrigation density.7 Marib is also increasingly vulnerable

The loss of agricultural land is attributed in large part to to flooding. Analysis of the past twenty years reveals
the rising temperatures in Marib’s desert regions, combined that of the environmental crises facing Marib, flooding
with decreased sunlight in the uplands. In response, Marib’s now far outweighs the other environmental risks. 2020
local planners must recognize the city faces some of the was marked by unprecedented flooding and downpours
greatest vulnerabilities to climate change,6 and in addition causing significant damage. Furthermore, the swelling of
to voicing determination to make the environment a priority, the reservoir of the Marib dam, built in 1986, have raised
they will also have to take the lead in adjust local plans to concerns it might collapse and requires “quick solutions to
protect its own natural and agricultural resources. face potential dangers.”8 Flooding is a crisis that also can Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Higher than
present an opportunity for Marib, supporting an argument Minimal Stressed Crisis Emergency Phase 3
Water resources that the area is not necessarily “running out of water” but in 2019 27% 29% 27% 17% 44%
Water scarcity has been identified as one of the most critical need of better systems to manage its water.9 2020 15% 35% 35% 14% 49%
threats to Marib, and is exacerbated by the higher population
2021 10% 29% 42% 19% 61%
6 https://gain-new.crc.nd.edu/country/yemen
7 UN Habitat, Rapid City and Neighborhood Profiling for Yemen - State of Yemen Cities , 2020 FIGURE 88. IPC Classification 2019 - 2021. 2021 is a projection.
8 “Several Killed in Yemen Floods | Climate News | Al Jazeera”, n.d., accessed March 4, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/8/5/several-killed-in-yemen-floods.
9 Stephen Caton, “The paradox of Qat”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2010/9/20/the-paradox-of-qat
2019 2020 2021
Majzar
Majzar Raghwan
Raghwan Majzar
Raghwan
Medghal
Medghal Marib
Marib Medghal
Marib City Marib
Sirwah
Sirwah Marib City
Marib City Harib Al Qaramish Sirwah
Harib Al Qaramish
Harib Al Qaramish
Al Jubah
Al Jubah
Al Jubah
Jabal Murad
Jabal Murad Harib
Rahabah Jabal Murad
Harib
Rahabah Harib
Rahabah
Al Abdiyah Phase 2 - Stressed
Al Abdiyah
Mahliyah Al Abdiyah
Mahliyah
Mahliyah Phase 3 - Crisis
Phase 4 - Emergency
FIGURE 89. IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis 2019-2021. IPC gives an indication of the level of
stress, with caveats, experienced regarding food security. Mapped from http://www.ipcinfo.org
91
Environment and stress on human health. national and local ability to respond to current and projected
Water-borne diseases such as cholera have been on the changes in climate. Yemen has been a signatory to the United
rise10 due to a number of factors contributing to groundwater Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change since
contamination. These include the lack of consistent WASH 2009, but it will now be incumbent upon local authorities such
services-- particularly sewage networks-- as well as the lack as Marib’s government to take the initiative in developing its
of solid waste removal and recycling programs. In addition own climate adaptation plan. An international consortium of
to water pollution, Marib residents are also at greater risk scientists and policymakers recently proposed that efforts
of air pollution due to living in proximity to hydrocarbon to tackle the environment need to begin with coordination of
extraction areas.11 People in nearby settlements complain of local stakeholders from the government and tribes.
unusually high rates of cancer and other previously unknown To support better knowledge sharing and harmonization
or rare diseases.12 Additionally, widespread use of pesticides of efforts related to water and environmental management,
increases a wide range of documented health risks--from type programs would ideally include a combination of the following
2 diabetes13, childhood poisonings14 to other comorbidities stakeholders:15
that put communities at risk of worsening COVID-19 effects
» Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and branch
. Prior to the conflict, there were renewed efforts to tackle the
offices
problem – for example in discussions at the National Dialogue
Conference. However, in 2019 it was reported in Yemen’s sixth » National Water Resources Authority (NWRA) and branch
national report to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) offices
that ‘weak law enforcement related to pesticides and fertilizers
» Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project (UWSSP)
use’ remains one of the key obstacles preventing sustainable
agriculture. » Urban Local Corporations FIGURE 91. Young sweet orange tree (FAO)
» General Authority for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation

Current governments capacity to manage the
environmental challenges » Project (GARWSP) and branch offices
From a technical-managerial perspective, Marib’s government
» General Directorate of Irrigation (GDI) and branch offices
must overcome economic challenges (weak capacity, security
and regional coordination constraints, lack of reliable data » Improved Irrigation Project (IIP)
and monitoring and a range of other factors that hamper the
» Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project (GSCP)
10 ReliefWeb. 2021. Fighting Cholera in Yemen - Yemen. [online] Available at: <https://
reliefweb.int/report/yemen/fighting-cholera-yemen> [Accessed 4 March 2021]. » Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs),
11 https://www.google.com/url?q=https://hrmars.com/papers_submitted/6831/
impact-of-oil-wells-drilling-process-on-human-health-in-hadhramout-yemen.pdf&sa=D&- » Women’s groups, and student and youth groups
source=editors&ust=1614287284206000&usg=AOvVaw09XqmIRJFRWIjMyCxeFO9Y
12 Saleh Mohammed Altamimi, Radieah Mohd Nor, and Mohd Sayuti Hassan, “Impact
of Oil Wells Drilling Process on Human Health in Hadhramout, Yemen,” International Journal of
Academic Research in Business and Social Studies 9, no. 12 (2019): 924–39, https://hrmars.
com/papers_submitted/6831/impact-of-oil-wells-drilling-process-on-human-health-in-hadh-
ramout-yemen.pdf. See, Helen Lackner, Abdulrahman Al-Eryani, “Yemen’s environmental
crisis is the biggest risk for its future”, The Century Foundation, https://tcf.org/content/report/ FIGURE 90. Spraying for locust infestation, Spring 2020.
yemens-environmental-crisis-biggest-risk-future/?session=1
13 http://www.lifesciencesite.com/lsj/life150118/10_33260lsj150118_56_59.pdf 15 https://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
14 https://ijshr.com/IJSHR_Vol.5_Issue.2_April2020/IJSHR0036.pdf Water-Management-in-Yemen.pdf
Considerations and implications
16 LOOKING AHEAD FOR MARIB

CONSIDERATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Marib has been transformed by the conflict and plays an landscape from one that relies on the polarity of Sana’a in
increasingly significant role in Yemen as a bridge between the north and Aden in the south, by adding a third pole with
the divided regions of the country. Marib's ability to defy significant population weight. This state of tripolar centrality
the odds of the war in Yemen by remaining an island of serves as an asset to test Yemen’s constitutional reforms
relatively functional governance and prosperity will require of 2015, which rightly pointed out to a decentralized Yemen,
proactive and careful policymaking to manage this growth. and to decentralization as an end-state solution to the
Civilians in Yemen face increased hardships on the horizon. conflict. While Sana’a will always rely on its capital status,
With about 24 million of Yemen’s 30 million people needing and Aden in the south on its vibrant trade relations and
some form of humanitarian aid, the country is now on the fertile land fortunes, Marib has leveraged the oil resources
brink of a full-scale famine. Localism has its limits and to restore its status as a city-state which was lost centuries
Marib’s ability to remain an island of relative stability is at back. The unsustainability however stems from multiple
least partly dependent on its ability to maintain revenue. competing factors that may determine the future of Marib
However, there is a chance for Marib to use its current as a city-state. It is difficult to conceive how Marib will be
relative wealth and prosperity to act proactively in shaping able to maintain its privileged access to oil revenues should
future urban development outcomes. a national unity be reestablished, and the distribution of
natural resources become in the hands of central powers
The socio-economic development of the city is inextricably again. Moreover, should the Houthi-Saleh forces eventually
tied to its security environment. If the breakthroughs control Marib, they have already issued laws that would
achieved in the fall of 2020 with the prisoner release and take the control of natural resources completely out of the
steps towards a peace deal can be sustained and built hands of the peripheries or the decentralized authorities.
upon, then an improved Master Plan has a foundation and
window of feasibility. With the visit of the UN Secretary The following needs are also offered for consideration:
General’s envoy Martin Griffiths to Marib in March of
20201 and subsequent statements, the UN has already
strongly urged all parties to halt actions which perpetuate
the deteriorating security environment. All future urban
development is contingent on a mutual agreement between
all sides on this and a commitment from national actors in
Yemen and stakeholders within the region come to realize
that Marib’s role as a safe haven and potential engine of
economic growth is too vital to fail, planning for the city and
peri-urban areas can be implemented.
This model in Marib is both significant and unsustainable.

It is significant because it is changing Yemen’s political
1 In March of 2020, the UN Secretary General’s Envoy visited Marib in an attempt to urge parties to halt the deteriorating security environment.# Armed attacks had escalated in the wake of the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani in January, 2020 (viewed as retribution by the
Iranian proxy forces believed to be responsible for armed incursions in the Marib region such as attacks on the oil pipelines in the governorate). Griffiths’ visit was considered a historic moment in Marib as it marked the first time a UN envoy visited Marib since the conflict broke out in 2014.
93
Demography and displacement:
Considerations Implications conflict socio-economic model.

Marib’s status as a hosting magnet is significant on many
» Population boom and the ‘wet cement’ of Marib’s » Give special attention to Marib’s most marginalized
levels, and should urge policy makers to:
currently undefined population, which is still forming groups (specifically al-Muhamasheen and African
and reshaping the identity of the city. migrants). The protection of their rights must be
» Understand the nation and the world is watching Marib. advocated for and affirmed in any humanitarian and
» Marib has already challenged negative stereotypes
The city represents an asset for Yemen and for the resilience response
which cast tribalism as reactionary to progressive ideals
entire conflict resolution discourse, by showing a model
of pluralist and inclusive societies. Instead, Marib’s tribal
of tolerance and hospitality akin to the true nature of
committees have maneuvered skillfully by avoiding
Yemeni history and culture.
many pitfalls of the conflict.
» Plan that the population boom is likely irreversible. The
» There is an urgent need to consider trends related to the
nearly half a million new residents in Marib are not just a
likelihood of communities to stay in Mareb according
transient population but likely here to stay (even though
to different political and economic scenarios, and to
we don’t predict new major displacement waves having
ensure that needs for all the population are met.
direct impact on the city itself), and push/ pull dynamics
» New IDP Managerial Class, encouraged by tribal elite: in similar protracted displacement situations indicate
the city is now almost totally run by the IDPs, including the majority of the IDPs in Marib will likely settle and are
the internal security and the entirety of the public already in the process of establishing long-term roots.
functions.2 The local tribes prefer to have the IDPs staff
» Marib will constitute a new demographic and economic
the bureaucracy, and demonstrate a lack of interest and
pole in Yemen. This will have a positive impact on the
training roles in the state affairs, but many in the IDP
post-conflict governance model, as rising poles with
community have the necessary skills. IDPs have eagerly
an undeniable historic weight and living tradition can
filled the roles in Marib and those who came from urban
further stress the movement to a decentralized, multi-
regions are less inclined to define themselves by their
polar administration in the republic.
tribal affiliation.
» The city’s accommodative capacity in terms of urban
» New IDP Middle Class: The rise of the IDP urban middle
systems and services key functions must transform
class as unaffiliated members of this newly created
to durable solutions. Forward looking planning that
host-IDP hybrid community is a key building block of a
considers investment in fixed infrastructure assets
sustainable future for Marib.
capable to serve the current population will play an
» Decentralization in a nutshell: While the tribes have important part in this.
effectively decentralized the economy of Yemen by
» Build on the existing emergency-propelled environment
controlling local natural wealth, the bureaucratic middle
of tolerance and solidarity to support inter-communal
class is leading the administrative decentralization. The
dialogue during the transition to an inclusive post-
tribes on their part are also increasingly worried about
the increased authority in the hands of foreign influence.
2 According to the observations by one of the field research team who contributed to this section, and while visiting a security administration in Marib, the researcher met scores of law enforcement officers, policemen, and rescue first responders inside the centre, and only found one or two
individuals who are originally from Marib governorate.
Governance and growth of technical capacity
Considerations and connected policing force, for example mirroring management of high-profile urban growth projects
the social structures and community groups, including ahead of addressing the basic housing and livelihood
» Local government has the greatest visibility on its
the tribal alliances and marginalized groups. Such needs of the majority of the city. There is a need to
residents’ needs and now the city is best positioned to
mirroring is essential in structuring a policing force that rapidly focus on small-scale planning and management
manage crucial services.
can gain the confidence of the residents regardless of capacity that Marib needs.
» Marib is Yemen’s most advanced model of provincial their background, and to ensure the independence of
» Rapidly support capacity development to deal with
and regional administration, as envisioned in the the force from external influences.
camps and spontaneous hosting neighbourhoods
proceedings of the National Dialogue Conference in
» Delegate more authority to the municipal level to lead turning into slums, and to make affordable housing
2015. In fact, Marib is leading other, less-advantaged
daily functions, to manage part of the local budget, solutions and shelter transformation (preferably reviving
and less-populated regions in their calls for further
and to promote a conversation over the urban and traditional housing techniques and organic materials).
decentralization and subsidiarity reforms. The UN-led
economic future of the city. While a full-fledged These actions will determine whether public institutions
peace process is invited to give greater attention to
municipal administration in Marib remains unrealistic retain public support and maintain legitimacy by turning
these bottom-up transformation processes as a key
and lacks legal grounds, the governorate authority can the informal settlements into zones of opportunity and
component to conflict resolution.
significantly benefit from expanding localized authority engines of the city’s growth.
» The lack of technical and scientific skills in Marib and accountability.
» Build awareness among local authority officials and
represents the greatest governance challenge, as the
» Support with capacity development initiatives focusing planning entities of the importance and value of
institutions are struggling to attract adequate skills for
on leadership programmes such as: information protecting the city’s cultural and natural legacies, which
their purposes, leading major capacity-development
technology and e-services, integrated civil and property might be at jeopardy. This holds the keys to the city’s
programmes, or expanding its bureaucracy and policing
services, one-stop-shop, procurement and PPP, building sustainable economic growth and sense of identity and
force commensurate with the growth of its functions.
regulations oversight and adherence to structural ownership.
safety codes, and emergency response and disaster
Implications » Conduct environmental feasibility and water
management.
assessments before large infrastructure commitments
» Expansion of bureaucracy to only the bare minimum
» Avoid the traps of urban growth that only benefits a are made considering the sensitive area the master
level of demand will ensure institutional effectiveness.
privileged elite minority. With rapid growth and myriad plan covers.
Systematically increase the “thickness” of institutional
of economic opportunities emerging, the local authority
capacity and their positive engagement in the daily
will be under increasing pressure to adopt a modernist
lives of the residents.3 Capable institutions can
urban agenda leading to rapid, unsustainable urban
have transparent and written laws and procedures,
growth, exemplified by the city’s new master plan.
manage budgets and taxes, transparently manage
investments and procurements, create jobs and » Formulate the urban priorities of Marib around the
involve the private sector. Priorities to this end include: management of the looming informal housing crisis.
Marib officials need to rapidly revisit assumptions
driving the city’s master plan which currently places
» Support the development of a credible, accountable
3 By ‘thickness’ we suppose that large and adequately resourced institutions tend to have an advantage in coordinating and managing large-scale projects, challenging agile or lean theories of management. In public institutions a critical mass is needed to run the bare minimum of state or
local authority functions. While thickness and resources alone is no guarantee of effectiveness, coordination and leadership and some evidence shows that agile and slim institutions (small government) can lead to better effectiveness so balance is needed based on how essential capacities are locally
defined. Examples of empirical research: Beer, A., & Lester, L. (2015). Institutional thickness and institutional effectiveness: developing regional indices for policy and practice in Australia. Regional Studies, Regional Science, 2(1), 205-228, Zukauskaite, E., Trippl, M., & Plechero, M. (2017). Institutional thick-
ness revisited. Economic Geography, 93(4), 325-345
95
Economy
Considerations Implications those nascent agencies can play a critical role in the
area of civic engagement and expanding the interest
» Marib’s rentier economy serves the few, but many » Conduct market and employment assessments of
and participation in public affairs.
opportunities to create job opportunities are left out, current businesses to better determine what is serving
causing deprivation and widespread poverty. the population and generating the most value (revenue,
employment, prestige) for Marib and for the various
» Oil as a mixed blessing. The discovery of oil in Marib
demographic groups.
in 1984 provided new opportunities for exploitation
but also became a new source of grievance for the » Access to cheap energy sources and reliable electricity
marginalized populations of the North and the midlands. supply (which is improving to date as the local authorities
are making substantial and timely investments in this
» As it is unlikely for Marib to maintain the present level
critical sector) is serving as a positive indicator for an
of consolidation of oil revenues, political dialogue over
economy that is offering opportunities for all. The local
natural wealth rights must be included in the political
authority, by readily ensuring such state-run supplies,
peace process before it evolves into a driver to conflict.
is succeeding where many regions and countries in
Acknowledging the role of the formerly marginalized
conflict have faltered. The promotion of Marib as a
governorate in sustaining oil and electricity supplies
heaven for small and medium businesses should be
should not mask the problematic nature of the
further supported by a capable local authority that can
exploitation of natural wealth as the basis of future
issue permits, give incentives to business start-ups, and
stability.
collect taxes to improve other critical services (such as
» Even though anecdotal information on the growth transportation, water and sanitation, and vocational
of businesses suggests an explosion of economic education).
activity, there is a lack of sufficient data on economic
» While sectors such as tourism, banking and
fundamentals to determine how the city’s local economy
communications are facing overwhelming conflict-
is functioning, its overall health and what is needed to
induced challenges in the foreseeable future, other
make the economy more robust and inclusive.
sectors have real chances of success and can be
promoted through resilience and non-humanitarian
interventions. Support to agriculture, livestock and
fishery has serious potentials and direct food-security
benefits, if sustainable water management and irrigation
solutions are adequately supported. The real estate and
construction sector will continue to grow, and skills
development specifically on indigenous and climate-
conscious practices will seed invaluable knowledge in
support of a transition to sustainable urbanisation of
the city. The non-governmental sectors and the CSOs
in Marib have been expanding given the space that the
local authorities and security actors are offering, and
Cultural Heritage - past is present
Considerations Implications preservation responsibility of the state institutions.

» All powers involved or intervening in Yemen militarily must » The responsibility to preserve the cultural and natural » The master plan and the enforcement of building
take all necessary measures to ensure the safety and heritage in Marib lies in the hands of all concerned regulations should provide for the protection of
integrity of Marib’s heritage, as the deliberate decimation authorities, whether local or central, civil or military. cultural and natural assets. Organizing events
of the country’s past undermines Yemen ancient history. Degrading and undermining Marib’s heritage not and seminars jointly with the local authorities can
only hampers future economic opportunity and local create the space to discuss the challenges and
» The near-destruction of Marib’s Sabean-era ancient dam
revenues when cultural heritage tourism can gradually the various sources of risks, and to determine
was decried as a deliberate attack on one of Yemen’s
recover. Marib’s heritage as the former capital of feasible short-term fixes to stop the deterioration.
most celebrated heritage sites. The same ideologies
the oldest Arabian Peninsula kingdom (Kingdom of
by which the Islamic State justified its destruction of
Saba) is also directly tied to the prestige and legacy
cultural heritage sites may have influenced such attacks
of Yemen as the cradle of Arab-speaking sedentary/
against precarious physical evidence of Yemen’s great
urban civilization. Because many of the most besieged
ancient civilizations, as that detracted from the deficit
countries in the Arab world (Syria, Iraq, Yemen) are also
narrative with which various powers have sought to
home the richest repositories of archaeological as well
undermine Yemen’s cultural legacy.4 Preserving cultural
as living cultural heritage, Marib’s ability to resist the ‘fog
heritage from all sorts of violations, including due to
of war’ from obscuring the urgency of cultural heritage
wear and tear, human indifference and infringement, is
protection can set a precedent for other regions.
an immanent source of threat as well. The absence of
central or local oversight in this regard is both unjustified » Cultural heritage protection should be prioritized at
and bears future implications. many levels, and should include the following actions:
» Marib’s history is preserved not just in its ruins but also » Drive institutional capacity development, adequate
through its “political DNA”: while many have noted the staffing and equipment as the most serious priority,
paradox of Marib as a “Switzerland” in a sea of conflict, specifically as lines of responsibilities are presently
the underlying causes and social systems which blurred between local and central agencies.
contributed to this outcome have been under examined.
» Prioritize building capacity among youths to preserve,
While many commentators have explained the causes as
document and defend their heritage as a focal area for
circumstantial (neutrality as a byproduct of geographic
civil society empowerment.
location just outside of conflict lines while still accessible
to IDPs, or to “Great Man Theory” about Marib’s leadership » Build public awareness during the process of a step-
being responsible for deft maneuvering between blocs), up of institutional presence and protective safeguards.
historical social trends in Marib related to tribe-state The future economic benefits from heritage tourism
relations, cultural heritage, and historic standing of the should help mobilize public opinion and build a critical
city should also be considered as important factors in mass of responsible citizens in Marib, to shoulder the
creating this status.
4 Leverage culture as a defense of Marib’s fragile success: Cultural heritage was “weaponized” in Marib which experienced attacks on its historic dam among other damages in Yemen’s civil war was has seen “cultural crimes (proliferating) in the vacuum of political instability following the 2011
Arab Spring”, (Frederick Deknatel, “Tearing the Historic Fabric: The Destruction of Yemen’s Cultural Heritage”, Los Angeles Review of Books, 21February 2017, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/tearing-the-historic-fabric-the-destruction-of-yemens-cultural-heritage) This dynamic can be reversed as there
is widespread public support in Marib as our polling revealed for cultural heritage as a great asset to protect the area and draw in much needed tourist economy as well as international funding for further preservation.
97
Health sector
The health response in Marib requires much greater group hosted in Marib.
international attention given the hosting strain and the
» Supporting all additional components of the Minimum
several health hazards emanating from an under-resourced
Service Package including child and maternal health
and unprepared urban and health infrastructure.
care, non-communicable disease prevention and care,
mental health and psychosocial services.
Healthcare Sector Recommendations
» Strengthening Coordination:
» Minimum Service Packages Needed to Enhance Core
Health Sector Components: » Training for doctors, nurses and midwives.
» Procuring and positioning essential services at PHC » Upgrading drug supply and health information system.
across the governorates in high density neighbourhoods
» Capacity-building to health administration, specifically
within Marib City.
in terms of monitoring medicine quality and pricing,
» Focus on bolstering trauma care capacity, specifically registration and taxation for the private suppliers and
for the newly arriving IDPs and those affected by natural services, and data maintenance and upgrade.
disasters.
» Inpatient care for people suffering from Severe Acute
Malnutrition (SAM).
» Initiate specialized units at CMH for cancer renal failure
patients.
» Support vaccination supply and delivery chains for
vulnerable IDP groups against OCV, diphtheria, OPV, and
measles.
» Communicable disease prevention and control capacity
needs enhancement, including through public services
and infrastructure upgrade measures.
» Supplies to CMH and PHC need to be ensured (including
fuel), as well as incentives to staff.
» Highly Vulnerable People Need to Have Access to a
Range of Services that are Affordable, Reliable and
Accessible:
» Expanding the capacity of the public option in
collaboration with OHP is essential for a wide population
References
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Insight, 12 May. Beyond the Business as Usual
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https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/07/31/marib-yemen-rising-above-conflict- Sana›a and Other Major Cities. Journal of Arabian Studies, vol. 4, No. 1,
pub-79593 Reuters (2020). A Cafe in Yemen Run by Women, for Women. 1 pp. 115-133.
November. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-cafe/a-
National Dialogue Conference: Outcomes Document 2013-2014. cafe-in-yemen-run-by-women-for-women-idUSKBN27H1KN Steinbeiser, Stephen (2018). Can the “Old Yemen” Survive the “New
Yemen”? The Depredations of War and Other Threats to Yemen’s Cultural
National Museum of Asian Art. Excavations: Awam Temple. Accessed 23 __________ (2020). Yemen war shifts focus to Marib, thousands of Heritage. In Yemen and the Search for Stability: Power, Politics and
February 2021. https://asia.si.edu/exhibition/awam-temple/ displaced at risk. October 5, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us- Society After the Arab Spring, Marie-Christine Heinze, ed. pp. 278-305.
News Yemen (2020). Health Decides to Close Qat Markets in All yemen-security-marib-idUSKBN26Q0LC London: I.B. Tauris.
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Williams, Philippa and Barbara Pocock (2010). Building ‘Community’
Sumer, Beyza (2012). Ibn Khaldun’s Asabiyya for Social Cohesion. United Nations, Panel of Experts on Yemen (2019). Letter dated 25 for Different Stages of Life: Physical and Social Infrastructure in Master
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World Health Organization (2020). Yemen: Mental health and
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Thiollet, Hélène and Helen Lackner (2014). From Migration Hub to Asylum __________ (2018). Yemen: 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview. Yadav, Stacey Philbrick (2010). Segmented Publics and Islamist Women
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Report_en.pdf Van Beek, Gus W (1982). A Population Estimate for Marib: A ‫اليمن‬. March. https://bit.ly/2Je1qUv
Contemporary Tell Village in North Yemen. Bulletin of the American
UN-Habitat (2019). The State of Yemeni Cities: Development Report. Schools of Oriental Research, No. 248, pp. 61–67. www.jstor.org/ Yemen National Information Center (1996).‫م بشأن‬6991 ‫) لسنة‬5( ‫قانون رقم‬
UNICEF (2018). A Report on the Humanitarian Situation in Yemen. stable/1356674 31 .‫كليات المجتمع‬February. https://yemen-nic.info/db/laws_ye/detail.
October. php?ID=11474
van Loon, Louise and others (2010). An analytical framework for
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United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 63-78. 4 .)‫مجدية (تقرير‬October. https://yemen.sahafahn.net/news6604555.html
(UNESCO). Culture as Source of Sustainable Development and Social
Cohesion. Accessd 23 February 2021. https://en.unesco.org/news/ Varisco, Daniel Martin (2018). Agriculture in the Northern Highlands of Yemen Shabab (2020).‫ من المخطط الحضري لعاصمة المحافظة بمساحة‬%03 ‫ انجاز‬:‫مأرب‬
culture-source-sustainable-development-and-social-cohesion-0 Yemen: From Subsistence to Cash Cropping. Journal of Arabian Studies, 02 .‫ ألف هكتار‬02 July. https://www.yemen-shabab.com/news/48216
vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 171-192.
United Nations Environment Programme. (2009). , Protecting the Yemen, Marib Governate (2018).‫ نبتة الفطر التي تنمو سرا ً و بهدوء في ركن‬.. ‫مأرب‬
environment during armed conflict. An inventory and analysis of Vela, Justin and Mohammed Al Qalisi (2015). The dam that Sheikh Zayed 31 .‫ الصحراء‬March. https://marib-gov.com/news_details.php?sid=345
international law. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, 2009. built. The National, 30 September. https://www.thenationalnews.com/ __________ (2019)‫ ألف خدمة طبية وعالجية قدمتها مستشفيات مأرب خالل‬216‫ مليون و‬.
United Nations, International Organization for Migration (2019). Marib world/the-dam-that-sheikh-zayed-built-1.128295 15 .2018 January. http://marib-gov.com/news_details.php?sid=1250
Mission - March 2019. March. https://yemen.un.org/sites/default/
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July. for 102 IDPs families. 28 December. http://marib-gov.com/nprint.
United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs World Health Organization. Statistics and Themes. Accessed 23 February php?lng=english&sid=2833
103
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Accessed on 23 February 2021. https://yemen-nic.info/gover/mareb/
brife/
__________ (n.d.).‫ نبذة تعريفية عن محافظة الجوف‬. Accessed on 23 February 2021.

http://www.yemen-nic.info/gover/aljaowv/brife/
Zovighian, Diane (2013). Public Employment Programs in the Republic

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Zukauskaite, Elena, Michaela Trippl, and Monica Plechero (2017).

Institutional thickness revisited. Economic Geography, vol. 93, No. 4, pp.
325-345.
Annex - Scorecard instructions
ANNEX - MARIB SCORECARD 16-24

25-35
53-52
06-63
INSTRUCTIONS 36-60
Over 60
06 ‫أكثر من‬
.2 :‫الجنس‬
2. Your gender - ‫أنثى‬
Female - ‫ذكر‬
MARIB: Scorecard Instructions ‫التعليمات الخاصة بملئ استطالع واقع الخدمات والظروف المعيشية في مأرب‬ Male
‫ومحيطها‬
Purpose of Survey and Instructions: .3 ‫أي من العبارات التالية تصف إقامتك الراهنة في مأرب ومحيطها؟‬
3. Which best describes your current “presence” in Marib - .‫أنا من سكان مأرب قبل الوضع القائم حاليا ً في اليمن‬
:‫الغرض من االستطالع والتعليمات األساسية‬ today?
--This urban scorecard will serve to help the government - ‫ وبرامج‬،‫يساعد هذا االستطالع الجهات العامة المحلية الموفرة للخدمات‬ - 5102 ‫وصلت مأرب بعد تطور األوضاع القائمة في العام‬
I have been a resident of Marib since before the current - ‫ أشهر‬6 ‫وصلت لتوي لمأرب أو من مدة تقل عن‬
of Marib and the UN better understand the current needs of ‫األمم المتحدة الداعمة من فهم الواقع واالحتياجات‬ situation began.
residents. I arrived in Marib after the current situationstarted in 2015.
--The survey is completely voluntary and we are grateful - ‫ ونحن نشكر كل من سيساهم في تعبئته‬،‫هذا االستطالع تطوعي بالكامل‬ I just arrived in Marib in the past six months.
for you time in this critical effort. It consists of 50 very brief ‫ ويستغرق ما بين‬،‫ سؤال مبسط‬05 ‫ يتألف االستطالع من‬.‫والوقت والجهد المبذولين‬
questions and should take 10-20 minutes of your time. .‫ دقيقة إلنهائه‬02 ‫ وحتى‬01 .4 ‫حدد لنا المنطقة التي تعيش فيها في مأرب (التزويد بخريطة عليها‬
4. Select which best describes where you live in Marib
--The survey is open to anyone currently living in Marib ‫ يمكن اللجوء للوسيلة التقنية‬.‫تموضع األحياء التقريبي والريف في محيط المدينة‬
((Programmers: Need to include best image of Marib here
over the age of 16. - ،‫يمكن لكل من يعيش في مأرب أو في محيطها المشاركة باالستطالع‬ )‫األفضل لتحديد الموقع التقريبي‬
with shape files for key neighborhoods))
--There are no right or wrong answers. Only answer .ً‫ عاما‬61 ‫على أال يقل سنه عن‬
from your experience and know that your needs, and Neighborhood A, etc….. ‫مثالً الحي «أ» أو غير ذلك‬
ideas matter which is why we are asking for your views. .5 :)‫عملي الحالي هو في مجال يقع ضمن قطاع (يمكن اختيار عدة إجابات‬
- ‫ تفضل باإلجابة‬.‫ال توجد إجابات صحيحة أو خاطئة في االستطالع‬
--Thank you for making a difference. By rating your - ‫الزراعة‬
.‫بحسب معرفتك باالحتياجات وشاركنا بآرائك كلما كان ذلك متاحا ً في متن االستطالع‬ 5. My current work is in the general field of:
satisfaction with services in the city, you are supporting Agriculture - ‫تربية الحيوان‬
- ‫ من خالل تقييمك ألداء الخدمات ومدى‬.‫شكرا ً لك لسعيك لخلق الفارق‬
a new effort to identify new ways to improve Marib for Animal husbandry - ‫الثروة السمكية‬
‫ أنت تسهم في تحديد خيارات الجهات المعنية في وضع الحلول التي‬،‫رضاك عنها‬
all and reach the global Stability Development Goals for Fishing - ‫البناء والتشييد‬
sustainable, safe, and inclusive cities. Your answers will ‫ إجاباتك ستدل‬.‫ وصوالً ألهداف التنمية المستدامة‬،‫ستؤدي لتعزيز النهضة في مأرب‬
.‫المدينة على أفضل التوجهات الملبية الحتياجات سكانها وتأمين ازدهار مستقبلهم‬ Building and Construction - ‫المعلوماتية واالتصاالت‬
guide city upgrading efforts to best support its residents IT services and Communications - ‫التجارة‬
need now and into the future. Trade and Commerce - )‫ مهندس‬،‫ طبيب‬،‫المهن الفكرية (محاماة‬
»‫ عندما يفتح األشخاص «صفحة البداية‬:‫((تعليمات الصفحة الرئيسية للمطورين‬ Highly skilled professional (Medical physician, engineer, - ‫التعليم‬
((Home page Instructions for developers: When people etc.) - ‫الخدمات العامة لدى الجهات الرسمية‬
open the scorecard survey “splash page” on mobile or ، ‫الخاصة باستطالع بطاقة النقاط على األجهزة المحمولة أو أجهزة سطح المكتب‬
‫ وستتم‬، ‫سيرون هذه الشاشة أوالً تطلب موافقتهم وتوضح أنه ال يوجد سؤال مطلوب‬ Education - ‫النقل‬
desktop devices, they will see this screen first asking for Public Sector Service provider
)).‫ وهم الحق في إلغاء االشتراك في أي وقت‬، ‫حماية بياناتهم‬ - ‫التعدين والطاقة‬
their consent and stating that no question is required, their Transportation - ‫غير ذلك‬
data will be protected, and they have the right to opt out at Mining/ Energy
any time.)) ً ‫ ولتحسين فهمنا جميعا‬،‫شكرا ً النضمامك معنا في خلق مستقبل أفضل لمدينة مأرب‬
Other
!‫ كل شيء يبدأ معك‬.‫لالحتياجات بغية تقديم خدمة أفضل لعموم سكانها‬
.6 ‫هل تعاني حاليا ً من البطالة؟‬
Thank you for joining the effort to help Marib City better 6. Are you currently unemployed?
understand and serve the real needs of its residents. It all - ‫نعم‬
Yes - ‫ال‬
starts with you! No - ً ‫أتابع تعليمي حاليا‬
01 ‫ من‬1 ‫القسم‬ I am still a student
Section 1 of 10:
Marib City and UN Habitat will convene community focus ‫مدينة مأرب وبرنامج الموئل سيعمالن على تحليل نتائج هذا االستطالع وتوضيح‬ Section 3 of 10
groups to discuss the findings of this poll and identify ‫ هل تود المشاركة بتلك الجلسات‬.‫النتائج من خالل جلسات نقاش تتبع االستطالع‬ 01 ‫ من‬3 ‫القسم‬
COVID-19 Public Health )91 ‫الصحة العامة وفايروس كورونا (كوفيد‬
needs and solutions. Would you like to participate in a ‫النقاشية؟‬ 1. I do not leave my home often now for fear of getting
future focus group? ‫نعم‬ .1 91 ‫ال أغادر المنزل كثيرا ً مؤخرا ً لخوفي من التقاط فايروس كوفيد‬
COVID-19.
Yes ‫ال‬ ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Agree
No ‫ربما‬ ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Agree
Maybe ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Disagree
‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Disagree
If you selected “Yes,” or “Maybe” please include the best ‫ يرجى تزويدنا بأفضل طريقة‬،‫إذا كانت اإلجابة على السؤال السابق بنعم أو ربما‬ Don’t know/no opinion ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
way (Phone/Email) the Focus Group organizers can follow
.‫ سواء عبر الهاتف أو البريد االلكتروني‬،ً‫يمكننا بواسطتها التواصل معكم الحقا‬
up with you. 2. The city has done a lot to provide resources to help .2 ‫لقد قامت المدينة بالكثير لتوفير الموارد الالزمة لمساعدة الناس وحمايتهم‬
people stay safe from COVID-19? (face masks, new clinics, ‫ حمالت‬،‫ نقاط طبية‬،‫ (من قبيل توفير الكمامات في األسواق‬91 ‫من فايروس كوفيد‬
Section 2 of 10: training, etc.) )‫ إلخ‬،‫توعية‬
01 ‫ من‬2 ‫القسم‬
Identity Strongly agree ‫أتفق بشدة‬
‫التعريف بالمشارك في االستطالع‬
Consent and Personal Information: This survey is optional. Somewhat Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Only answer the questions you feel comfortable with. ‫ بمقدورك‬.‫ هذا االستطالع اختياري‬:‫الموافقة على المشاركة والمعلومات الشخصية‬
‫ يمكن لبعض األسئلة أن تكون حساسة أو تخرج‬.‫اإلجابة على األسئلة التي ترغب بها‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Some of the questions in this poll may be of a personal or Strongly Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
sensitive nature and you may choose to opt out of the poll ‫ ولهذا يمكنك التوقف عن ملئ االستبان عند الرغبة وفي‬،‫عن إطار خبرتك الخاصة‬
.‫أي وقت أحببت‬ Don’t know/no opinion ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
at any time. .3 91 ‫أعتقد بأن على المدينة أن تتغير كثيرا ً استجابةً لفيروس كوفيد‬
.1 :‫عمرك الحالي‬
42-61 3. I believe the city needs to change a great deal of its )‫ العناية الصحية وسوى ذلك‬،‫ النقل‬،‫ الخدمات العامة‬،‫(المحال التجارية‬
1. Your current age is:
105
current structures (stores, services, transportation, ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
healthcare, etc.) in response to COVID. ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Disagree
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Don’t know/no opinion
Strongly Disagree 01 ‫ من‬5 ‫القسم‬
Don’t know/no opinion Section 5 of 10 ‫االقتصاد وفرص العمل‬
Pillar 2: Economy+Jobs .1 ‫تأثر نشاطك االقتصادي سلبا ً بسبب الوضع القائم في اليمن‬
Section 4 of 10 01 ‫ من‬4 ‫القسم‬ 1. Your work has been impacted by the current situation in ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Pillar 1: Housing ‫السكان‬ Yemen. ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
The overall survey is weighted towards housing-related .1 ‫إلى أي مدى تلبي مأرب الحاجة لتوفير المسكن الرخيص لقاطنيها؟‬ Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
questions as a reflection of UN-Habitat mandate and ‫مرضي للغاية‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
profiling objectives. ‫مقبول‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
1. How satisfied are you with options for finding affordable Strongly Disagree
‫غير مقبول لحد ما‬
housing in Marib? ً ‫غير مقبول بتاتا‬ Don’t know/no opinion
Very satisfied
‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ .2 ‫بإمكانك أسرتك الحصول على دخل كافٍ عبر وسائل مرضية تكفي‬
Somewhat satisfied 2. You are able to find good ways of earning enough to
‫إلعالتك وأسرتك‬
Somewhat dissatisfied support yourself and your family.
‫أتفق بشدة‬
Very dissatisfied Strongly Agree
Somewhat Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Don’t know/no opinion .2 ‫ من دخلي الشهري بصورة‬%05 ‫يكلفني البقاء في مسكني الحالي ما فوق‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
.‫وسطية‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
2. The cost of staying in your current residence/home takes Don’t know/no opinion ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
up more than 50% of your current income/earnings. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ 3. The health crisis has made the conflict even more .3 ‫األزمة الصحية األخيرة صعبت من واقع العمل والنشاط االقتصادي‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ difficult for local business. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Don’t know/no opinion .3 ‫أشعر باألمان بمكان إقامتي الحالي من مختلف المخاطر (الطبيعية منها‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
)‫ أو خطر اإلخالء‬،‫أو العنف من صنع اإلنسان‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
3. You feel safe in your current home from dangers (natural ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Don’t know/no opinion
/manmade violence /risk of eviction). ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ .4 ‫االقتصاد في حالة من التحسن وأنا متفائل بمستقبل أفضل‬
Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ 4. The economy is getting better and you have more hope ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ for the future. ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Don’t know/no opinion .4 ‫يشعر الجميع بما في ذلك الوافدون اليوم بالترحيب وإمكانية استئجار‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
.‫المسكن في أي موقع كان في المدينة‬ Strongly Disagree
4. Everyone feels welcome to rent a residence in any ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Don’t know/no opinion
location in the city including the IDPs. ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ .5 ‫هنالك الكثير من فرص العمل للنساء‬
Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ 5. There are many opportunities for women to work. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Don’t know/no opinion Strongly Disagree
.5 ‫تشعر بالرضى لقرب مسكنك من مكان عملك أو من نشاطك االقتصادي‬ ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Don’t know/no opinion
‫أو التعلمي‬
5. You are satisfied with how close your home is to job
‫أتفق بشدة‬ .6 ‫األسواق متوفرة في منطقتي وتتوفر فيها غالب احتياجات الناس‬
opportunities. 6. Markets are open in your area, offering most of what
‫أتفق لحد ما‬ ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Agree people need.
‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Don’t know/no opinion Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
.6 ‫تزداد صعوبة توفير المسكن المالئم والرخيص في مأرب مقارنة بالعام‬ Don’t know/no opinion
6. It has been getting more difficult to find affordable places .‫المنصرم‬
to live in Marib in the past year. ‫أتفق بشدة‬ 7. As far as you know, local agriculture is doing well at the .7 ‫ فإن الزراعة الحالية نشطة في الوقت الراهن‬،‫على حد علمي‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ present time. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Don’t know/no opinion .7 ‫ أو تتجاوز ضوابط البناء‬،ً‫الناس في الحي الذي أقطن به تبني عشوائيا‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
.‫المعمول بها‬ Don’t know/no opinion
7. People in the neighborhood are building randomly, and ‫أتفق بشدة‬ .8 ‫الزراعة وتربية الحيوان تشهد تحسنا ً في محيط مأرب نتيجة ازدياد‬
many are violating building rules and norms. ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ 8. Agriculture and animal husbandry has been improving ‫الطلب المحلي في األسواق‬
Annex - Scorecard instructions
in the surrounding areas of Marib as a result of increasing ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
local demand. ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Don’t know/no opinion
Strongly Disagree .8 ‫الخدمات تتحسن بشكل عام‬
Don’t know/no opinion 8. Services are generally improving. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
.9 ‫ي القيام بذلك‬
ّ ‫إذا رغبت في البدء بمشروع فإن من السهل عل‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
9. If you want to start a business it is easy for you to do so. ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Don’t know/no opinion
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ .9 ‫هل تستطيع الحصول على معلومات وافية تحتاجها في إدارة شؤون‬
Don’t know/no opinion 9. Are you satisfied with the information you can access
‫حياتك ومعرفة واقع الخدمات عبر المواقع االلكترونية (بما يشمل وسائط التواصل‬
about the city on local websites (including social media
01 ‫ من‬6 ‫القسم‬ ‫االجتماعي مثل صفحات فيس بوك)؟‬
Section 6 of 10 such as Facebook pages) to answer any questions you
‫البنية التحتية والخدمات‬ ‫مرضي للغاية‬
Pillar 3: Infrastructure and Services have about city services?
.1 ‫تشعر بالرضى عن عدد الساعات التي تتزود بها بالكهرباء خالل اليوم‬ ‫مقبول‬
1. You are satisfied with your daily access to electricity. Very satisfied
‫مرضي للغاية‬ ‫غير مقبول لحد ما‬
Very satisfied Somewhat satisfied
‫مقبول‬ ً ‫غير مقبول بتاتا‬
Somewhat satisfied Somewhat dissatisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied ‫غير مقبول لحد ما‬ Very dissatisfied ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
ً ‫غير مقبول بتاتا‬
Very dissatisfied Don’t know/no opinion
Don’t know/no opinion ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ .01 ‫أعرف إلى أين علي التوجه أو االتصال في حال حدوث الطوارئ‬
10. I know where to go in an emergency (security incident, )‫ المرض‬،‫ حوادث طبيعية‬،‫(حصول جريمة أو نزاع‬
2. You can only access electricity for half of the day or less. .2 ‫ ساعة أو أقل‬21 ‫يمكنك التزود بالكهرباء لفترة ال تتجاوز‬ natural disaster, illness).
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Don’t know/no opinion ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Don’t know/no opinion ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
.3 ‫بإمكانك الحصول على مياه شرب آمنة بصورة سهلة‬ .11 ‫يقوم السكان في المدينة بدفع الضرائب والرسوم المترتبة عليهم‬
3. You can easily access safe and drinkable water. ‫أتفق بشدة‬ 11. People in the city pay taxes. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Don’t know/no opinion Don’t know/no opinion
.4 ‫هل تشعر بالرضى حيال نوعية ومستوى التعليم الذي تتلقاه أو يتلقاه أي‬ .21 ‫ أو عبر االنترنت‬،‫من السهل التقدم بالشكاوى (إما باالتصال الهاتفي‬
4. Are you satisfied with the quality and type of education ‫من أفراد أسرتك حالياً؟‬ 12. It is easy to make a complaint (In person, over computer ‫أو شخصياً) في المدينة عندما تتعطل خدمة ما أو عندما تحتاج تلك الخدمة للتحسين‬
children in your family can receive? ‫مرضي للغاية‬ or phone) in the city when a service or area needs to be ‫والصيانة‬
Very satisfied ‫مقبول‬ improved. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat satisfied ‫غير مقبول لحد ما‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat dissatisfied ً ‫غير مقبول بتاتا‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Very dissatisfied ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
.5 ‫ما مدى رضاك عن الخدمات المدنية األساسية المقدمة في المدينة (مكتب‬
5. How satisfied are you with basic civic services (post
)‫ التراخيص وسواها‬،‫ السجالت المدنية والعقارية‬،‫البريد‬ 01 ‫ من‬7 ‫القسم‬
office, registration, operational licenses)? Section 7 of 10
‫مرضي للغاية‬ ‫الحوكمة‬
Very satisfied Pillar 4: Governance
‫مقبول‬
Somewhat satisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied ‫غير مقبول لحد ما‬ 1. I am satisfied with how the city of Marib is improving life .1 ‫أشعر بالرضى حول الطريقة التي تتطور بها ظروف الحياة في مدينة‬
ً ‫غير مقبول بتاتا‬ ‫ بالرغم من كل التحديات التي تواجه اليمن في الوقت الراهن‬،‫مأرب‬
Very dissatisfied in the city, despite the many challenges facing Yemen at
Don’t know/no opinion ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ this time. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
6. The current situation has damaged or interrupted a lot of .6 ‫أدى الوضع القائم إلى تعثر الكثير من الخدمات في المدينة‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
services in the city. ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Don’t know/no opinion
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ .2 ً‫ أفضل اللجوء لألجهزة الحكومية والرسمية بدال‬،‫إذا كانت لدي مشكلة‬
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ 2. If I have a problem, I am more likely to go to the ‫للوسطاء والشخصيات المحلية‬
Don’t know/no opinion government than to a tribal council. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
.7 ‫تواجه الحكومة الكثير من التحديات لتأمين الخدمات األساسية المالئمة‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
7. The government faces a lot of pressures to provide ‫لجميع المواطنين‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
adequate services in the city for all of the people. ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
107
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Don’t know/no opinion

Don’t know/no opinion .5 ‫أشعر بالترحاب واأللفة في أكثر األماكن في مأرب‬
.3 ً ‫ فأنا أفضل الدولة المدنية طبقا‬،‫إذا فكرت بأفضل نمط حوكمي في مأرب‬ 5. I feel welcome to go to most places in Marib. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
3. If I think of an ideal model for government in Marib it .‫لدستور الجمهورية اليمنية عن أي نموذج آخر‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
would be the civil state the way it is described in the current ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
constitution of Yemen Republic, rather than any other form ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
of government. ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Don’t know/no opinion
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Somewhat Disagree .4 ً ‫ أعتقد أن رأيي وصوتي يمكن أن يصنع فارقا‬،‫بوصفي مواطنا ً في المدينة‬ 01 ‫ من‬9 ‫القسم‬
Strongly Disagree .‫في مستقبل المدينة‬ 6. Section 9 of 10 ‫البيئة‬
Don’t know/no opinion ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Pillar 6: Environment .1 ‫ مما‬،‫الواقع البيئي أسوأ مما كان عليه من حيث أثر التبدالت المناخية‬
‫أتفق لحد ما‬ 1. The environment is worse than it used to be because of ‫يصعب ظروف العيش في المدينة أو محيطها‬
4. As an average citizen, I believe that my voice and opinion climate change, and is making life in the city more difficult.
‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ ‫أتفق بشدة‬
can make a difference in the city. Strongly Agree
‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Agree Somewhat Agree
‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Agree Somewhat Disagree
‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Disagree Strongly Disagree
‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Strongly Disagree Don’t know/no opinion
2. Natural assets such as trees and riversides are respected .2 .‫المعالم الطبيعية كاألشجار وضفاف األنهار تحظى باالحترام والحماية‬
.5 ً ‫القوى الخارجية (كالشركات والحكومات األخرى) تستخدم قدرتها أحيانا‬ .‫ثمة جهود تبذل للمحافظة على البيئة وحمايتها من التعديات العمرانية‬
5. Outside powers (such as other governments, here. There are efforts to preserve the environment and
corporations, etc.) use their power to make life more .‫بما يصعب من شروط الحياة في المدينة‬ protect it from buildings and development. ‫أتفق بشدة‬
difficult in the city sometimes. ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Don’t know/no opinion
Don’t know/no opinion .3 ‫الناس في المدينة يقومون بإيجاد الحلول للمشاكل البيئية كالتعامل مع شح‬
01 ‫ من‬8 ‫المحور‬ 3. In our city people are finding local solutions to address ‫ أو استعمال سبل البناء الجديدة أو التقليدية‬،‫ أو تحسين طرق استهالك الوقود‬،‫المياه‬
Pillar 8 of 10 ‫المجتمع والترابط االجتماعي‬ environmental problems, such as solutions to water ‫التي تحمي البيئة‬
Pillar 5: Civil Society and Social Cohesion shortages, improving energy usage, and exploring new ‫أتفق بشدة‬
.1 ‫ فبإمكان‬،‫إذا عجزت عن الحصول على مساعدة من الجهات الرسمية‬ building methods. ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
1. If I can’t get help from the government, I can get help .‫محيطي االجتماعي أو جيراني في الحي تقديم المساعدة الالزمة‬ Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
from others in my neighborhood or my social network. ‫أتفق بشدة‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Strongly Disagree
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Don’t know/no opinion
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ 01 ‫ من‬01 ‫القسم‬
Don’t know/no opinion Section 10 of 10 ‫التراث الثقافي‬
.2 ‫الناس في مأرب متالئمة ومتعيشة بغض النظر عن خلفياتها االجتماعية‬ Pillar 7: Cultural Heritage
2. People from different groups and backgrounds generally ‫والثقافية والعشائرية‬ .1 ‫أعتبر أن حماية إرث مأرب واليمن الثقافي هام بالنسبة لي‬
get along in Marib. ‫أتفق بشدة‬ 1. Protecting Marib and Yemen’s cultural and ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ archaeological heritage is important to me. ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree
‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Disagree Somewhat Agree
‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree
‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
.3 ‫ أو في‬،‫أشعر باالحترام في مدينة مأرب أكثر من المكان الذي قدمت منه‬
3. I feel more respected in Marib than where I lived before I
came here, or more than when I visit other places. .‫األماكن األخرى التي أزورها‬ 2. There are places in the city that you value because they .2 ‫هنالك مواقع بالمدينة محببة لدي نظرا ً لقيمتها الثقافية وجمالها األخاذ‬
Strongly Agree ‫أتفق بشدة‬ are historic or beautiful (such as parks, plazas, oases, )‫(كالحدائق والمقاهي والساحات والجوامع ومناهل المياه‬
Somewhat Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬ mosques, or water sources.) ‫أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬ Strongly Agree ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬ Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Don’t know/no opinion ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬ Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
.4 ‫أشعر أنني قادر على الحصول على فرصتي في مأرب بغض النظر عن‬ Strongly Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
4. I feel there is opportunity for me in Marib regardless ‫سماتي الشكلية (كلون البشرة أو االنتماء) أو خلفيتي األسرية‬ Don’t know/no opinion
of my appearance (skin color or ethnicity) or family ‫أتفق بشدة‬
background. ‫أتفق لحد ما‬
Strongly Agree ‫ال أتفق لحد ما‬
Somewhat Agree ‫ال أتفق بشدة‬
Somewhat Disagree ‫ال أعلم\ ال رأي لدي‬
Strongly Disagree
UN-Habitat seeks to provide up to date, holistic documentation
and analysis of the impact of the crisis in key cities, through City
Profiles, synthesising information and insight from existing sources
and priority sectors, supplemented by direct field research by UN-
Habitat teams based in each city. This profile is part of a regional
urban profiling exercise that aims to develop urban profiles for the
cities of Basra, Sinjar, Derna (Libya), Marib (Yemen) Deir-ez-Zor and
Dar’a (Syria). UN-Habitat’s expertise in urban analysis, community
approaches and crisis contexts have informed the development of
the City Profiling process. All City Profiles are developed in close
association with the concerned governorates and municipalities.
The structure of the City Profile provides a pre-crisis baseline and

data from the current situation to understand the impact of the crisis
accompanied by narrative description and analysis. Furthermore,
City Profiles review the functionality of the city economy and
services, understanding of capacities and coping mechanisms
and the identification of humanitarian or development priorities.
They do not provide comprehensive data on individual topics, but
seek to provide a balanced overview. The City Profile affords an
opportunity for a range of stakeholders to represent their diagnosis
of the situation in their city, provides a basis for local discussions
on actions to be taken and helps to make local information and
voices accessible to external stakeholders seeking to assist in
development response.
Marib Urban Profile

Regional Office for Arab States ROAS
87 Tahrir st, Dokkie, Giza, Egypt
Telephone: +2(02) 37618812, Fax: +2(02) 37618813
www.unhabitat.org

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Marib

DISCLAIMER ACKNOWLEDGMENTS FUNDING

” Table of Conents Urban Profiling

13. Education Sector 80

16. Looking ahead for Marib - considerations and implications 92

Annex 1 - Marib Scorecard Instructions 104

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

look behind the statistics in order to better understand

Overview challenges. The profile research was designed to be UN-Habitat.

Marib Urban Scorecards - Making a Traditional Survey

The urban scorecard polling was designed to capture residents’

22% 36-60 Males 16% 48% Somewhat disagree

” Respondents per target population group

33% 64% IDPs living in the city's traditional neighbourhoods Somew

Approximately 630,000 residents (nearly half

Proposed Urban Expansion Area

Medina Sabaa’ Al Maghawir settlement

1 Marib city centre

Agree / Very satisfied

For example neighborhoods

Marib’s descent from Safehaven to Epicenter of the War

5 CIVIL SOCIETY &

Key Indicators Marib City Governorate Governorates Number %

Around 16.000 IDPs arrived in

630.000 IDPs arrived mostly throughout

Around 28.000 IDPS arrived

IDPs per location

18 Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “Yemen”, 20 December 2018, http://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Yemen_AcuteFI_2018Dec2019Jan.pdf

CAPACITY OF DISPLACEMENT SITES EXPERIENCING ARRIVALS 27

Kuliyat Al-Mujtama Al Muasasa

TOTAL NUMBER OF SITES TOTAL NUMBER OF HH NUMBER OF SITES AT RISK OF EVICTION

12 6,975 12/8 AL RAWDAH ALJADIDA SCHOOL

” When I first arrived in this town, MARIB CITY

of its leadership to coalesce to form a unified front to keep

Complexities and Contradictions of Social Infrastructure

(Civil Society, Education, Governance) and intangible IPDs in Tented Settlement

Marib Outreach to Local Muhamasheen

DK/ DWTA F Strongly agree Somewhat disagree 14% Satisfied

males to access jobs

a women-headed household), the Marib urban scorecard

on many governorates during August. Social Inclusion and Vulnerable Groups

In Marib, the hosting situation seems to have relaxed

Yemen’s Marib,” International Crisis Group, April 17, 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/behind-front-lines-yemens-marib

Sector National Trends Women in Marib

Influence of extenral powers Public Spaces General data

8%are exceptional andagree

of those surveyed expressed their appreciation Cultural heritage of agree

response to their environment, 14% theirSomewhat

Damaged sites (UNOSAT/UNESCO

Cultural heritage site

Marib Old City

Sirwah Northen Dam Sluice

FIGURE 24. Marib Northern Old

up to 75% as a net importer of food and the current conditions

Intangible Cultural Heritage Raghwan

Leadership and conflict resolution approaches have been a

heritage), it may help explain certain trends in the city which

Provincial Departments Oil and Gas Revenues

oice matters and should be considered to form the future of the