Case Study III - Michelin
Case Study III - Michelin
Case Study III - Michelin
Case Abstract
Educational material supplied by The Case Centre
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
Michelin, a worldwide leader in the tire industry, launched in 2000 a comprehensive tire-
management solution offer for large European transportation companies, called Michelin
Fleet Solutions (MFS). With this new business model, the company ventured into selling
kilometers – instead of selling tires. This decision moves the strongly product-driven firm into
the new world of services and solutions. The shift is intuitively appealing, and it provides
Michelin with an opportunity to differentiate itself in the tire business. After 3 years,
however, expansion is far below expectations and profitability is terrible – despite the outside
help of a strategy consulting firm. The case presents the decision point in 2003, whereby
MFS’s future has to be decided. Should Michelin seek to further develop this solution offer,
and try to repackage the offer yet another time? Or was it just a passing fad that should be
abandoned?
This case investigates the difficulties that industrial groups face when they transition from
selling products to providing service. It enables participants to reflect on the following issues:
What’s industrial groups’ rationale for moving towards solutions? What kind of business
model reconfiguration does it imply? How does moving to solutions raise multiple challenges
throughout the organization (e.g. in terms of sales force management, risk management,
channel relationships etc.)?
*
This case study was written by Chloé Renault, HEC 2006 and PhD Student at HEC, under the supervision of Frédéric Dalsace, Danone
Chair of Social Business/Firm & Poverty and Wolfgang Ulaga, EDF Chair in Marketing/New Business Models in the Energy Industry, both
Associate Professors at HEC Paris. The case was written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective
handling of an administrative situation. We would like to thank Stéphane Mamelle at Michelin for his assistance and support. Some data
have been modified for reasons of confidentiality.
case centre Distributed by The Case Centre All rights reserved e info@thecasecentre.org t +44 (0)1234 750903 or +1 781 236 4510 w www.thecasecentre.org
510-103-1
Case Study
Educational material supplied by The Case Centre
On this gloomy day of January 2003, Jonas Pills hurried to take a cab in Clermont-Ferrand
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
This seemed such a good idea to begin with. With MFS, Michelin had moved from its
traditional business of manufacturing and selling tires toward the new world of service, i.e.
offering transportation companies comprehensive tire fleet management solutions. This
radical move was initiated in 2000 with promising growth perspectives. The new offering was
targeted at large European transportation companies such as Schenker, TNT, Geodis, or
Norbert Dentressangle. However, three years later, the picture had become much darker:
despite substantial investments, geographic expansion was still poor and MFS remained
unprofitable. The situation had deteriorated to a point where International Strategy Consulting
(ISC – name disguised), a well-known consulting firm, had been appointed a few months
earlier to help fix the problem. Clearly, drastic steps were required to keep MFS alive.
As he entered the building, Jonas met Pierre Dupuis, Michelin Fleet Solutions Director in
Europe. They immediately discussed the most recent German sales figures. MFS’s future
critically depended upon its ability to succeed in this key market. They met Jean Baudriard,
who was the European Director of the Truck and Buses (TB) Division. Typical of Michelin
career paths, Jean had joined the company right after graduating as an engineer and had been
working with Michelin for the past 30 years in various functions, including R&D,
manufacturing, and sales. After a quick handshake, he immediately jumped to his main
concern: “The Board members have added MFS on their next meeting’s agenda. It’s an
explosive topic, and we must come up with clear recommendations. Should the company keep
2
510-103-1
on developing this solution business? Should the MFS offer be repackaged? Or should it
simply be abandoned? These are the questions we have to discuss today!”
increase their network, and they are seriously seeking to challenge Schenker and DHL as
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
market leaders.” There were about 1,500 of such large European fleets, rapidly growing, and
evolving in a hyper-competitive market.
“It is not only about consolidation, they have also changed their business model. Large
transportation companies have now become genuine logistics service providers, with a
dedicated logistics division offering a wide array of services from transportation outsourcing,
supply chain management to one-stop shopping solutions,” added Jonas Pills. A great number
of retailers, consumer goods manufacturers, or automotive companies indeed increasingly
relied on so-called “third party logistics” for their non-strategic processes (e.g. product
delivery, inventory management, etc…), thus targeting higher returns on assets and increased
flexibility in their supply chain.
The Truck and Buses tire industry
Truck and Buses tires (TB tires) represent 27% of the tires sold in the world, and are the
second tire market after passenger cars (60%). All tire makers have a broad and deep TB tire
mix, as these tires must to be adapted to various road and usage conditions (e.g., highway,
off-road, city, trailers…). Europe, a relatively mature market, accounts for 29% of the world’s
TB tire business, with 24.5 million tires sold in 2002.
The Truck and Buses tire market is relatively consolidated with Michelin, Bridgestone and
Goodyear accounting for almost 18% of the market each. However, low-cost Asian firms are
increasingly gaining traction. Considering that a tire is a labor-intensive product, competition
from China and/or Korea is indeed a real threat. For example, in the same category, a
Michelin TB tire (400 € / unit) and a Bridgestone tire (350 € / unit) are relatively close in
terms of pricing, at least relative to the Chinese equivalent, aggressively priced below (at 250
€ / unit). In this industry, price is a powerful selling argument, as some customers typically
view tires as highly commoditized “dirty black things”.
3
510-103-1
Though usually considered as a simple commodity, TB tires are highly sophisticated and
complex products (Exhibits 1 and 2). The TB tire market consists of two distinct but
interdependent market segments: the “Original Equipment” market (OE) for truck
manufacturers and the “Replacement” market (RT) for transportation companies.
Replacement is the other avenue for the TB tire market. Tires wear out faster than the vehicle
itself; as such, several replacements are necessary, making this market the most important
with 80% of TB tires sales. On this RT market, price plays a critical role, and Michelin’s
market share in Europe is 21%.
Truck and Buses tires in the eyes of distributors
Michelin addresses the replacement market almost exclusively through professional tire
distributors. These distributors usually sell tires for different vehicles (trucks and cars) and
from different brands. TB tires are service-intensive: they require constant monitoring, regular
maintenance and repair, tasks which are time-consuming and require professional expertise
(Exhibit 2). As a consequence, distributors often have a complementary service business,
performing some tire maintenance activities.
Distributors are independent local or regional entrepreneurs or bigger networks. Among those
distribution networks figures Euromaster, Michelin’s own distribution network created in
1994. It acts as an autonomous entity inside the group, selling both Michelin and competitors’
brands. Euromaster has 1,700 centers in 10 European countries and employs 11,800 people.
Truck and Buses tires in the eyes of end users
Though they only account for 5 % of a truck’s running cost, TB tires play an important role
for road transportation companies for two main reasons. First, tire-related breakdowns (e.g.,
punctured tires) have become the most frequent reason for a truck to stop, as engines’
reliability dramatically increased. Second, tires have a strong impact on fuel consumption, the
second most important cost factor after personnel. 20% to 40% of a truck’s consumption is
directly linked to tires. “Tires are the easiest and most effective way to decrease a truck’s
environmental impact. If legal requirements call for carbon footprint reduction, they will
become even more critical”, observed Jean.
4
510-103-1
“With the most expensive tire on the market, we constantly need to justify our price premium
to our clients”, explained Jean. “Historically, we have always emphasized the longevity of our
tires as our key selling point. Despite the progress made by our competitors we still have an
edge here, as we estimate that our tires last an average of 200,000 kms, vs. 160,000 kms for
competition. However, this advantage only materializes when our tires are properly taken care
of. This is where we have a problem. Whenever service jobs are poorly performed,
transportation companies don’t get the most out of our tires. As a consequence, they are
reluctant to pay a price premium.”
only once, and is possible only because our casings are very robust. Retreading has a dramatic
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
effect; while it costs around 150€, the end product is a tire that looks like new, lasts as long as
a new tire and can later be regrooved again. When this program is correctly implemented, our
tires last 2,5 times more than the average tire lifecycle and are no longer the most expensive
on the market!”, boasted Jean Baudriard.
While conceptually appealing, mastering the process in real operations is however much more
difficult. The tires’ full potential was indeed only rarely achieved due to poor maintenance.
For instance, determining when exactly a tire needs retreading requires expertise and strong
logistical command. “Trucks are the transportation firms’ key assets, but by design these
assets keep moving throughout Europe. This makes the tire maintenance quite difficult to
organize” said Jean Baudriard. Indeed, transportation companies usually struggle with
implementation, and the observed retreading rate is typically poor (50% vs a potential of
70%). As a consequence, customers were reluctant to pay a price premium.
5
510-103-1
The initial experience gained in both countries raised much attention and was soon seen as a
unique opportunity for growth. As Michelin’s R&D department frequently stated “Our tires
last longer than any other but only if they are well managed. If we take charge of tire
management, we will make sure that our clients can experience our unique value.” Pierre
Dupuis, MFS Director had a complementary view: “As our tires last longer, revenues coming
from tire-related services will also last longer. We may end up making more money from tire-
related services than from our traditional business.”
Michelin Fleet Solution Offer
Considering the great potential ahead, Michelin Fleet Solutions was created in 2000 as a new
division under the supervision of a European Sales Director (Exhibit 4). The objective was to
promote a new business model across Europe: no longer focusing on selling a product – i.e.
tires – but providing customers with a service, that is, the ability to drive.
MFS offered large European fleets (initially fleets with more than 200 vehicles) the complete
management of their tire assets during a three to five year-period. A cutomer could decide to
great way to develop long-lasting relationships with growing transport players and ensure that
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
clients would eventually experience the full value of Michelin tires. Last, offering solutions
was a way to escape the commodity trap by differentiating Michelin’s offer from competition.
MFS charged its clients a monthly fee, which directly depended on the number of kilometers
driven per vehicle. This allowed clients to turn all tire-related costs into a variable cost
directly linked to the vehicle use. Vehicle fare per driven kilometer was contractually agreed
upon and annually revised. Michelin’s profitability depended on its ability to optimize tire
management activities (such as the ‘4-lives program’) and to control costs. “This is very
different from our competitors, who charge customers for ‘time and material’. For a ‘time and
material’ customer, a truck breakdown represents an unforeseen cost factor, whereas with
MFS, Michelin assumes the industrial risk in exchange for a predictable monthly fee. That’s
the reason why we call MFS a ‘solutions offer’. Customers gain in flexibility and
productivity, and we assume the industrial risk,” observed Pierre Dupuis, MFS Director.
2000 deployment
To expand this new promising model throughout Europe, Michelin added dedicated MFS
sales teams to the existing traditional product sales force. To facilitate geographical
expansion, the company adopted a new approach to service operations: Instead of managing
fleets with its own employees placed within the transportation companies’, Michelin decided
to rely on service provider networks to deliver the service to customers (Exhibit 5). In the
meanwhile, an ambitious information system project was launched to support fleet
management operations.
Disappointing results
Within 3 years, fifty contracts were signed in 10 different countries, generating 70 Million €
in annual revenue. These results were however disappointing. The sales force dedicated to
MFS had a hard time selling the new solution offer. As one MFS sales man noted “This is a
new job, and my tire expertise can hardly help me. Our product edge is no longer at the heart
6
510-103-1
of the offer… I find it difficult to show the clients the value of this solution offer. We also
face real problem in pricing: clients don’t immediately see why they should pay more for tire
management solutions as they used to pay when they only bought tires! They do not see the
value brought by the extra activities we perform and the scope is so large that I find it difficult
to list all these benefits. This solution offer is really very complex to sell!”
Difficulties went well beyond the contracting phase. Many fleets under contract were
chronically unprofitable, and it was not uncommon to hear MFS Managers complain “We are
losing our shirt here! We underestimated by far the costs involved. Whatever our ability to
optimize costs, it will never be profitable with such low fees!” Correctly assessing the fee in
the contractual phase was indeed very complex and the long-term implications of contractual
agreement were often underestimated.
Conflict with the traditional product sales force was another big concern. “There is fierce
competition between us. Product sales people can’t stand us chasing after their biggest clients.
I remember a meeting with a prospect client about 6 months ago to promote tire solutions.
In Germany, results for 2002 were disappointing with only 5,000 vehicles under contract out
of an overall potential of 250,000 vehicles. Because this market accounted for 21% of sales in
Europe, it was very important to succeed there. Conversely, failing on this market was simply
Educational material supplied by The Case Centre
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
threatening the mere existence of MFS. Jonas, MFS Manager in Germany, explained “The
clients we approach understand what we offer but they do not see the extra value we bring.
Additionally they see different downsides in this offer such as higher upfront cost, increased
dependence, or high switching cost. To be honest, we don’t do a good job in explaining our
customers the value they gain from working with us!” So far, competition was still quite
scarce: only few local actors were considering offering tire management solutions. However,
it was acknowledged that Goodyear and Bridgestone would soon enter the market with
competitive offers. It was high time to secure a substantial first mover advantage!
Consultants come in
To solve these issues, ISC, a well-known international strategy consultancy firm was assigned
in spring 2002 to investigate the reasons for MFS’s poor performance. The consulting firm
identified four important marketing issues regarding segmentation practices, selling,
contracting and managing the relationships with third parties.
Client Segmentation
To meet profitability targets, ISC encouraged MFS to capture more value from customers by
implementing a needs-based segmentation scheme. The underlying idea was that
transportation companies had different priorities depending on the type of goods they
transported such as bulk material, time pressured goods, or highly dangerous chemicals. MFS,
the consultants said, had to design customized bundles to address these specific customer
needs. ISC stressed that willingness to pay greatly varied according to the segments.
Sales force Support
Michelin’s sales force had a very hard time selling Fleet Solutions. Due to the nature of such
contracts, selling MFS was a more complex process leading to longer sales cycles. As one sales
manager recalled: “MFS is radically different from selling tires. I used to interact with local
tire buyers, now I deal with the national Purchasing Director of large European transportation
companies! These guys talk another language, and we need to roll out other arguments.”
7
510-103-1
The consultancy firm conducted a massive training campaign, providing sales force with new
tools such as consistent contracting process and a new client-focused logic, shifting away
from a historically strong product orientation. “Talk about the client, not about the tire!”
became a guideline.
Contracting process
ISC further encouraged Michelin to clarify its contract structure. The consultancy had found
more than 72 different contract versions, each greatly varying in content. This increased
confusion and complexity. The consultant advised MFS to streamline its contract structure
around a small set of simple and comprehensive standards, with fee estimates, which could be
complemented by additional options. This would facilitate sales people’s job and increase the
profitability of the contracts signed.
Turn Distributors into close service providers
ISC also recommended fostering strong relationships with distributors to motivate them to
cooperate with MFS as true service providers. Distributors were at first pretty unhappy to see
providers, as the consultancy firm clearly stressed, played a critical role in MFS European
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
roll-out model, as they now prescribed and delivered services to clients in the name of
Michelin (Exhibit 5).
A few months after the consultancy work, the situation was still below expectations. Business
expansion was anemic; profitability was terrible, giving voice to internal opponents who
openly criticized MFS’s long-term viability. Additionally, several Board members started to
ask some hard questions about when MFS was to gain traction. It was in this context, that
Jonas Pills, Pierre Dupuis and Jean Baudriard had to review the situation and decide upon
MFS future.
Sales force progress
Pierre Dupuis, MFS Director, started by pointing at the significant progress made by
Michelin’s sales force: “Training programs have brought their first results, and we now
perform much better. Recent contracts should be profitable. Our efforts of educating
customers show results. They now understand much better the benefits of outsourcing tire-
management.”
8
510-103-1
getting the most out of existing tires, thus potentially harming the sales of new tires. This was
a thorn in the eye of Michelin’s traditional sales force, which was compensated on the basis of
the number of tires sold. The fact that MFS allowed Michelin to gain new customers and
secure existing accounts did little to appease product sales people.
Operational Excellence
It was generally accepted that both sales and marketing were the key leverage to MFS success
as advocated by ISC. Pierre Dupuis was however not at ease with such a quick conclusion.
“Out of the 700 MFS employees, only 25 are Key Account Managers. It is not just about
sales!” Having a professional background in the service industry, he was convinced that
service execution was at the heart of turning MFS into a success. “In a solution business,
signing a contract is not enough. It is just like getting married: it is only once you have signed
that the real life starts. Therefore, I am not sure we should focus so much on the sales stage
only.”
“I think our success will depend upon operational excellence. If you investigate our past
“From a strategic perspective, developing very close relationships with service providers
could bring far-reaching strategic advantage. As we start bringing them business, we will
increase our bargaining power by building a partnering relationship, where we both depend on
each other. Service providers will perceive the value of working with Michelin, and not only
for the solution business,” thought Jean Baudriard.
Jonas provided some insight from his operational experience: “I have some clients telling me
that our solution’s biggest weakness is our own distribution network. This is because
distributors sometimes do not fully comply with contract settings. It is true that I cannot fully
guarantee the consistency of the service we provide throughout the country. It would require
massive investments in quality control, reporting tools, and training of service providers. To
be honest, we have underestimated these aspects, thinking that most of the job was done once
we signed a contract. This is actually only the emerging part of the iceberg.”
“It might however be feasible in the future”, added Jonas Pills. “We have already adopted the
policy of paying their performed service a little more than market value to encourage quality
standards and compensate for the possible decrease of business due to a drop in replacement
tires sales.” Pierre Dupuis reacted: “It is a good start… but this may not be sufficient. We do
not only entrust them with service execution, but also with an important part of our cost
structure.”
9
510-103-1
Managing costs
As Pierre further explained, “Since we rely on service providers to optimize tires, it also
means that we rely on them to optimize our cost structure. For instance, we lose money
whenever the ‘4-lives program’ is not managed properly, for example if tires are not
regrooved at the right time, or if casings disappear... We have service providers with only
45% retread rate instead of the 70% target. We need to change the key performance indicators
(KPI): it is no longer about tire sales but about the retread rate! If we can’t control these
issues, we are bound to be unprofitable. Furthermore, if we consider that the average
millimeter (mm) of rubber potential per new tire is 15 mm to 20 mm, don’t forget that
anytime we are missing to exploit one single mm of rubber means adding 5% to 7% on our
costs. Jonas and Jean were bewildered at the financial implication of such a figure.
Another unexpected phenomenon further deteriorated MFS margins: signing a contract had a
tendency to change drivers’ behavior: “There is a temptation that truck drivers behave less
carefully, once they know that tires are handled by us. This can make quite a difference, as
one can leave a lot of millimeters of rubber on the road.”
MFS invoices coming from the service providers. She says that one invoice out of three
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
comes from your teams while you represent only 5% of the company business! It is
incredible.”
Feeling the criticism, Pierre tried to better explain why so many invoices needed processing.
“That’s quite unfortunate, but there is not much we can do about this. Every time a service
provider performs any act on a vehicle under contract, he addresses us an invoice. Just
imagine the amount of invoices coming in”. Jonas discretely smiled. Relationships between
MFS teams and service support were always complicated because of their specific needs. Jean
had not even mentioned the specific key performance indicators MFS people kept asking for.
The geographical expansion would for sure only further add to existing frictions. In addition,
Michelin’s legal experts would have to help assess and hedge for legal risks involved.
Information System
“I guess, it is also time to bring up the difficulties we have in running our information
system,” Jean added. “Do we now have a functioning tool?” “Not yet”, moaned Pierre. “So
far, we really failed; we do not have a thorough enough command of the process and therefore
do not fully understand what the information system should provide us with. We will have to
reconfigure everything, and this will take time. Part of our challenge is that it is no longer
about selling tires. It is about managing complex selling and delivery processes.”
MFS, lipstick on a pig?
“Precisely, Jean snapped. “Let me set some things straight. “This company was not designed
to manage invoices or conduct never-ending IT development projects. We have been
manufacturing and selling great tires successfully for decades. Our new ‘Energy’ tire line has
unmatched fuel saving performance. I don’t understand what this is all about. MFS gives us
all a headache, and hurts the profit of our division. I’m not sure our Board members want to
hear that story any longer.” He leaned back in his chair and added: “Even if these solution
10
510-103-1
offers were working properly, don’t you think this is far beyond our core business? Michelin
is a tire manufacturer. Full stop!”
Pierre knew that this argument would be brought up at some point. Jean had not even insisted
on quoting MFS’s terrible financial results in detail. After substantial investments, MFS had
never been profitable once in three-year time! People legitimately started questioning the
reason of supporting the program any longer… He had overheard recently some of his
colleagues talking of the “MFS abyss”, which was only due to the big boss having a crush on
the project. Some of his MFS team members had also reported they felt looked down upon by
colleagues. Even worse, one of the Board Members officially referred to MFS as putting
“lipstick on a pig”. Pierre felt unsure: he, too, had considered the possibility of getting out, but
he still believed that MFS had a great potential ahead.
Was Michelin’s strategic move to enter solutions business with Michelin Fleet Solutions the
Educational material supplied by The Case Centre
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
right decision? Should the company pursue this painful path? Should it repackage its existing
“solution offer” and charge for “time and material” in the very same way its main competitors
were doing? Or even go back to its traditional business model, i.e. manufacturing and selling
tires?
If they recommended pursuing the MFS Program, how could the current turmoil be
overcome? Was it mostly, as advocated by ISC, a marketing issue or were larger issues at
stake?
These were some of the questions the three men had to decide upon in the coming hours,
which promised to be tense and intense.
11
510-103-1
What is a tire?
FFirst the CASING. FThen a TREAD WEAR is placed
This is the around the casing.
structure This is the flesh of the tire.
of the tire. It is a mixture of rubber and silica.
It is its backbone. A tire= 20 millimeters thick
FThe GROOVING is FThe REFERENCE number written on
the pattern sculpted the tire side is unique for each tire.
on the tire ’s tread
wear to ensure
optimal driving
LOAD
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
SPEED
Tires undergo much tensions. They are complex and sophisticated products !
F They are the main factor of rolling resistance, limiting speed and increasing
fuel consumption
F Additionally tires need to be strong enough to bear important lo ad and
flexible enough to absorb obstacle shock.
12
510-103-1
Services to be regularly
performed on TB tires
FMONITOR : visually control how tires wear
out to decide if one of the following action is needed.
Every four months, it is necessary to measure remaining
rubber millimeters thickness to ensure safe driving
’ pressure,
out, they are regularly moved to different inflation level needs to be monthly controlled
axles
FMoving TB tires is a complicated and time consuming job ,
requiring professional equipment.
It is a 2 ‐step process:
1. FIT / UNFIT : take the wheel off the truck
2. MOUNT / UNMOUNT : take the tire off the wheel
13
510-103-1
4‐lives of a tire : increase performance and durability
redesign the pattern on the tire
‐ Fuel savings
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
Step 3 ‐ Retreading Michelin tires
Process : Outcomes :
Tire is sent to Michelin factory ‐ Tire just like new!
New tread wear is applied on the ‐ Less expensive than
casing brand new tire
‐ Same mileage
performance
Step 4 ‐ Regrooving retreaded Michelin tires
Process : Outcomes:
When only 3 mm of tread ‐ Cover 25% more
remaining, there is a need to kilometers
redesign the pattern on the tire ‐ Better grip potential
‐ Fuel savings
14
510-103-1
Managing Partners
Edouard Michelin & René Zigraff
TB Europe – Director (…)
Jean Baudriard
Bold boxes display protagonists in this case study.
Orange boxes represent MFS team members.
15