REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1938 OF 2010

MOHAMMED YOUSUFF @ MOULA & ANR.      …APPELLANTS

       
Versus

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA                  … RESPONDENT

     
 J U D G M E N T 

 N. V. RAMANA, J. 

1. The   instant   appeal,   by   way   of   special   leave,   is   directed

against judgment and order dated 11.09.2008 passed by the

High   Court   of   Karnataka   at   Bangalore   whereby   the   High

Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal No. 128 of 2005 filed

by the appellants herein (accused nos. 1 and 2) and affirmed

the order passed by the trial court.

2. Brief   facts   of   the   case   are   as   follows:  The   appellants­

accused were tenants of PW­7 (complainant). Accused no. 1

Signature Not Verified is the brother of accused no. 2 and accused no. 3 is the wife

Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2021.01.12
16:51:37 IST

of accused no. 2. When accused no.1 expressed his desire to
Reason:

marry  PW­8  (victim­  the daughter of the PW­7), they were

evicted from the house.  On 13.07.2002 at 8.00 P.M., while

the victim had gone to the market to purchase a notebook,
 2

the   appellants   forcibly   took   her   to   Punganur   (Chittoor

District)   where   allegedly   accused   no.1   married   PW­8   in   a

mosque.     The   father   (PW­7)   got   a   telephone   call   from

accused   no.2   and   accused no.3 that  they  have kidnapped

his   daughter   and   marriage   ceremony   has   been   conducted

between PW­8 (victim) and accused no. 1. Pursuant to the

same,   PW­7   lodged   a   complaint   before   the   police   on   the

same day.

3. On   22.07.2002,   accused   no.   1   was   apprehended   while   he

was in the company of the victim and later on accused no.2

and   accused   no.3   were   also   apprehended.     Accused   no.4

and accused no.5 were the persons who had given shelter to

accused no.1 and the victim. The accused were charged for

committing   offences   punishable   under   Sections   366,   343,

323 and 506 read with Sections 114 and 34 of IPC.

4. The trial court convicted the appellants and sentenced them

to   undergo   Rigorous   Imprisonment   for   3   years   for   offence

punishable under Section 366 IPC, Rigorous Imprisonment

for 3 months for offence punishable under Section 323 IPC,

Rigorous Imprisonment for 6 months for offence punishable

under Section 343 IPC and Rigorous Imprisonment for one

year   for   offence   punishable   under   Section   506   IPC.

Aggrieved,   the   appellants   preferred   an   appeal   before   the

 3

High   Court   and   the   same   was   dismissed   vide   impugned

judgment dated 11.09.2008. Hence, the present appeal. 

5. Learned   counsel   for   the   appellants   vehemently   contended

that   the   victim   was   of   18   years   of   age   at   the   time   of   the

incident,   and   she   had   willingly   accompanied   the   accused

persons.     It   was   further   submitted   that   the   eye­witnesses

have not stated that the victim was forced into the rickshaw.
  
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent­State

supported the impugned judgment passed by the High Court

and argued that the victim was a minor at the time of the

said offence. 

7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length  it is

pertinent for us to have a look at Section 366 which reads as

follows:

366.   Kidnapping,   abducting   or

inducing   woman   to   compel   her
marriage,   etc.—Whoever   kidnaps   or
abducts any woman with intent that she
may   be   compelled,   or   knowing   it   to   be
likely that she will be compelled, to marry
any   person   against   her   will,   or   in   order
that   she   may   be   forced   or   seduced   to
illicit   intercourse,   or   knowing   it   to   be
likely that she will be forced or seduced
to   illicit   intercourse,   shall   be   punished
with   imprisonment   of   either   description
for a term which may extend to ten years,
and   shall   also   be   liable   to   fine;   and
whoever,   by   means   of   criminal
intimidation as defined in this Code or of
abuse of authority or any other method of
 4

compulsion,   induces   any   woman   to   go

from any place with intent that she may
be,   or   knowing   that  it is  likely  that she
will   be,   forced   or   seduced   to   illicit
intercourse   with   another   person   shall
also be punishable as aforesaid.

8. Chapter   XVI   of   IPC   contains   offences   against   the   human

body.   Section   366,   which   is   the   pertinent   provision,   is

contained   within   this   Chapter.   Kidnapping/abduction

simpliciter  is   defined   under   Section   359   and   maximum

punishment for the same extends up to seven years and fine

as provided under Section 363. However, if the kidnapping

is done with an intent of begging, to murder, for ransom, to

induce   women  to  marry, to  have  illicit  intercourse stricter

punishments   are   provided   from   Section   363A   to   Section

369. 

9. Section   366   clearly   states   that   whoever   kidnaps/abducts

any  woman with the  intent that she may be compelled or

knowing that she will be compelled, to either get her married

or   forced/seduced   to   have   illicit   intercourse   they   shall   be

punished with imprisonment of up to ten years and fine. The

aforesaid Section requires the prosecution not only to lead

evidence   to   prove   kidnapping  simpliciter, but  also  requires

them   to   lead   evidence   to   portray   the   abovementioned

specific   intention   of   the   kidnapper.   Therefore,   in   order   to

 5

constitute an offence under Section 366, besides proving the

factum of the abduction, the prosecution has to prove that

the said abduction was for one of the purposes mentioned in

the section. In this case at hand the prosecution was also

required to prove that there was compulsion on the part of

the accused persons to get the victim married. [See Kavita

Chandrakant Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6

SCC 664]. 

10. After carefully perusing the material placed before us, we are

of   the   considered   view   that   the   thrust  of   the   submissions

made by the appellants on the age of the victim. The father

of the victim had specifically stated that, the victim was aged

around 15 years at the time of the incident. It is pertinent to

note that the investigating officer had collected the original

marksheet, which was duly attested by the headmistress of

the school where the victim was enrolled and thereafter, the

same was annexed to the charge sheet. Even while deposing

before the court, the investigating officer had produced the

original   certificates   along   with   the   office   file.   On   the

contrary,   the   accused   appellants   failed   to   produce   any

evidence rebutting the validity of the aforesaid contention.

11. The counsel on behalf of the appellants further relied upon

the   earlier   decision   of   this   Court   in  S.   Varadarajan   v.

 6

State of Madras, (1965) 1 SCR 243 to argue that the victim

voluntarily  joined   the  accused. However, we are unable to

agree with the aforesaid contention raised by the appellants

as the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable.

12. In the present case, the victim (PW­8) has clearly deposed

that   accused   nos.1   to   3   took   her   forcibly,   and   wrongfully

confined her in a house where the sister of accused nos.1

and 2 was residing.  In the course of cross­examination, the

defense   has   not   brought   out   anything   much   less   any

contradictions to disbelieve or discard her evidence in this

regard.

13. Furthermore,   the   appellants   have   argued   that   the   actual

performance   of   the   marriage   could   not   be   proved   as   the

nikah   certificate   was   incomplete   and   did   not   contain   the

relevant information and the signatures. However, it ought

to   be   noted   that,   the   language   of   Section   366   does   not

require   the   factum   of   marriage   to   be   proved,   in   order   to

constitute   an   offence   under   Section   366,   the   prosecution

has   to   show   that   the   kidnapping/abduction   was   done   in

furtherance   of   an   intent   to   compel   the   victim   to   marry

against her will.

14. The facts of the present case indicate that, PW­2 (Khazi) had

recognized   both   the   accused   no.1   and   victim   (PW­8).

 7

Moreover, the complainant (PW­7) has clearly stated that on

13.07.2002,   when   the   victim   did   not   return   to   the   house

after   purchasing   the   notebook,   he   lodged   a   missing

complaint   the   very   next   day   after   enquiring   from   all

relatives.   He   deposed   that   three   days   after   lodging   of   the

missing   complaint,   on   17.07.2002,   accused   nos.   2   and   3

spoke to him over the telephone that they had performed the

marriage of the victim with accused no.1. The complainant

had   further   stated   that,   the   accused   person   on   prior

occasion   used   to   tease   the   victim   and   had   expressed   the

desire to marry her. The appellants could not produce any

material   contradiction   so   as   to   render   his   statements

unworthy. Lastly, statements of PW­7 find support from that

of PW­8 (victim).  

15. In the light of the admitted facts, it could be understood that

appellants­accused   had   intentionally   kidnapped   PW­8   to

perform the marriage. Lastly, considering the fact that, the

victim was pushed by the accused persons and was made to

forcibly board the autorickshaw. The victim also stated that

she was forcibly confined in house of the sister of accused

no.1,   with   legs   tied,   beyond   three   days.   Moreover,   during

this entire ordeal, the victim was under constant threat of

her physical safety. She has cited multiple instances where
 8

she was physically harmed by the accused persons. Thus, it

is   evident   that   the   ingredients   of   offences   under   Sections

343, 323 and 506 of I.P.C are also satisfied. In view of the

above,   we   see   no   reason   to   interfere   with   the   impugned

order passed by the High Court affirming the order passed

by the trial court, especially when the sentence awarded is

already on a lenient side.

16. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

17. Consequent upon dismissal of the appeal, the bail bonds of

the   appellants,   who   were   granted   bail   by   this   Court   vide

order   dated   05.10.2010,   stand   cancelled   and   they   are

directed to surrender before the concerned trial court within

a period of two months from the date of communication of

this   order,   to   serve   out   the   remaining   period   of   sentence,

failing which the concerned police authorities are directed to

take them into custody for the said purpose.

 
                      .........................J.
(N.V. RAMANA)

      ........................J.
 (S. ABDUL NAZEER)

 ........................J.
 (SURYA KANT)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 22, 2020.