Margolis

Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business
Author(s): Joshua D. Margolis and James P. Walsh

Source: Administrative Science Quarterly , Jun., 2003, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jun., 2003), pp.
268-305
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the Johnson Graduate School of
Management, Cornell University
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3556659
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Misery Loves Companies are increasingly asked to provide innovat
Companies: Rethinking solutions to deep-seated problems of human misery,
even as economic theory instructs managers to focus
Social Initiatives by maximizing their shareholders' wealth. In this paper,
Business assess how organization theory and empirical research
have thus far responded to this tension over corpora
Joshua D. Margolis involvement in wider social life. Organizational schol
Harvard University ship has typically sought to reconcile corporate socia
James R Walsh tiatives with seemingly inhospitable economic logic.
Depicting the hold that economics has had on how th
University of Michigan relationship between the firm and society is conceive
we examine the consequences for organizational
research and theory by appraising both the 30-year q
for an empirical relationship between a corporation's
social initiatives and its financial performance, as we
the development of stakeholder theory. We propose a
alternative approach, embracing the tension between
economic and broader social objectives as a starting
point for systematic organizational inquiry. Adopting
pragmatic stance, we introduce a series of research q
tions whose answers will reveal the descriptive and n
mative dimensions of organizational responses to
misery.0
The world cries out for repair. While some people in the
world are well off, many more live in misery. Ironically, the
magnitude of the problem defies easy recognition. With the
global population exceeding six billion people, it is difficult to
paint a vivid and compelling picture of social life. In the
extreme, Bales (1999) conservatively estimated that there are
27 million slaves in the world today, while Attaran and Sachs
(2001) reported that 35 million people are now infected with
the HIV virus, 95 percent of them living in sub-Saharan Africa.
Even more broadly, aggregate statistics both inform and
numb. Compiled from data released by the World Bank
(2002), table 1 represents the kind of snapshot that such sta-
tistics provide. It can be shocking to learn that so many peo-
ple live on less than $2.00 per day, that a quarter of the chil-
dren in Bangladesh and Nigeria are at work in their nations'
labor force, or that some countries have mortality rates for
children under age five more than ten times that of the Unit-
@2003 by Johnson Graduate School, ed States. Access to sanitation, let alone access to a tele-
Cornell University.
0001-8392/03/4802-0268/$3.00.
phone or computer, can be very limited around the world.
The picture in the United States alone is as vivid and com-
We thank Christine Oliver, Linda Johan- pelling. For twenty years, Americans have lived through a
son, our three anonymous reviewers, period of unparalleled prosperity. lbbotson Associates (2000)
Paul Adler, Howard Aldrich, Alan
calculated that in real terms, a dollar invested in large compa-
Andreasen, Jim Austin, Charles Behling,
Michael Cohen, Bob Dolan, Mary Gentile, ny stocks in December 1925 was worth $24.79 by year-end
Tom Gladwin, Morten Hansen, Stu Hart, 1979. Exactly twenty years later, that dollar was worth
Nien-he Hsieh, Linda Lim, Nitin Nohria,
Lynn Paine, Gail Pesyna, Robert Phillips,
$303.09. Nevertheless, the fact that the upper echelon of
Lance Sandelands, Debora Spar, Joe society disproportionately reaped these gains is no longer
White, Richard Wolfe, and the students in
news. Even as debate persists about intercountry income
Jim Walsh's "The Corporation in Society"
Ph.D. seminar for their constructive com- inequality (Firebaugh, 1999), Galbraith (1998), and Mishel,
ments on earlier versions of this paper. Bernstein, and Schmitt (1999) provided a comprehensive pic-
We also thank Marguerite Booker, John
Galvin, and Nichole Pelak for their helpful
ture of wealth inequality in the United States, while Conley
research assistance. The Harvard Busi- (1999) clearly pointed out that many black Americans have
ness School, the Michigan Business been left out of this economic boom. Table 1 provides a com-
School, and the Aspen Institute's Busi-
ness and Society Program provided parative portrait of how the top 10 percent of the people in
invaluable support for this project. each of the world's thirteen largest countries control so much
268/Administrative Science Quarterly, 48 (2003): 268-305

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Social Initiatives by Business
Table 1
A Snapshot of Social Life in the World's Most Populous Nations, 2000

% Share
of % Rural Illiteracy
income pop. % Pop. rate
or con- % Chil- Under- with with among Main-
sump- dren five access access 15-24 line/ Personal
tion: aged mortali- to to year mobile comput-
Popula- % Pop. bottom 10-14 in ty per improved improved olds: phones ers per
tion in living on 10% / labor 1000 live water sanita- % male/ per 1000 1000
Nation millions < $2/day top 10% force birth source tion % female people people
China 1,262.5 52.6 2.4/30.4 8 39 66 38 1/4 112 /66 15.9

India 1,015.9 86.2 3.5 / 33.5 12 88 86 31 20 / 35 32 / 4 4.5
U.S.A. 281.6 * 1.8/30.5 0 9 100 100 * 700 / 398 585.2
Indonesia 210.4 55.3 4.0 / 26.7 8 51 65 66 2/3 31 / 17 9.9
Brazil 170.4 26.5 .7/48.0 14 39 54 77 9/6 82/136 44.1
Russia 145.6 25.1 1.7 / 38.7 0 19 96 * <.5/<.5 218/22 42.9
Pakistan 138.1 84.7 4.1 / 27.6 15 110 84 61 29 / 58 22 / 2 4.2
Bangladesh 131.1 77.8 3.9/28.6 28 83 97 53 39/60 4/1 1.5
Japan 126.9 * 4.8/21.7 0 5 * * * 586/ 526 315.2
Nigeria 126.9 90.8 1.6/40.8 24 153 39 63 10/16 4/0 6.6
Mexico 98.0 37.7 1.3/41.7 5 36 63 73 3/3 125/142 50.6
Germany 82.2 * 3.3/23.7 0 6 * * * 611 / 586 336.0
Vietnam 78.5 * 3.6 / 29.9 5 34 50 73 3/3 32 / 10 8.8
* Data not available.
more of each nation's wealth than those in the bottom 10

percent. Miringoff and Miringoff (1999) chronicled these
same kinds of inequality data but also provided evidence that
child abuse, child poverty, teenage suicide, and violent crime,
as well as the number of people living without health insur-
ance, have all increased in the United States since the 1970s.
These kinds of data serve as a stimulus for outrage and
reform (Korten, 1995; Greider, 1997; Wolman and Colam-
osca, 1997; Kapstein, 1999; Madeley, 1999).
In the face of these broad and deep problems, calls go out
for companies to help. Some organizations exist solely to
fight such problems. There are publicly traded companies
dedicated to cleaning up waste (e.g., Waste Management,
Inc.), private not-for-profit organizations dedicated to treating
the sick in very difficult circumstances (e.g., M6decins Sans
Frontieres), and consortia of development organizations dedi-
cated to fighting poverty, hunger, and social injustice (e.g.,
Oxfam International). The calls for help, however, target prof-
it-making firms that produce goods and services-goods and
services that may have little to do with ameliorating human
misery. For example, all three branches of the United States
government have recognized the role corporations could play
in promoting social welfare. President Bush and Secretary of
State Powell have asked companies to contribute to a global
AIDS fund (New York Times, 2001), while Former President
Clinton used his "bully pulpit" to urge corporations to attend
to social problems (New York Times, 1996) and later advocat-
ed that minimum labor standards be a part of international
trade agreements (New York Times, 1999). With the Econom-
ic Recovery Act of 1981, Congress increased (from 5 percent
to 10 percent) the allowable corporate tax deduction for chari-
table contributions (Mills and Gardner, 1984). Even as a
majority of states were adopting "other constituency
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statutes," statutes that allow directors to attend to factors
other than shareholder wealth maximization when fulfilling
their fiduciary duty (Orts, 1992), the Delaware Supreme Court
endorsed this same idea in 1989 when it allowed Time Inc.'s
management to reject a lucrative tender offer from Para-
mount Communications to pursue other non-shareholder-
related interests (Johnson and Millon, 1990).
Activity beyond the halls of government that focuses on th

corporation's role in society is equally intriguing. Non-govern
mental organizations (NGOs) have worked tirelessly in rece
years to establish worldwide standards for corporate social
accountability-Ranganathan (1998) listed 47 such initia-
tives-and investors have pressured firms to be more
responsive to social problems (e.g., Carleton, Nelson, and
Weisbach, 1998). Major charitable foundations and public
interest groups-the Ford Foundation, the Sloan Foundation
and the Aspen Institute, to name three of the most promi-
nent-have launched major initiatives to investigate and eve
encourage business investment in redressing societal ills.
Public intellectuals, including leading business school acade-
mics whose prior contributions shaped the fields of corpora
strategy and organizational behavior, have joined the call to
encourage and guide firms in taking on a larger role in soci-
ety. Porter (1995) celebrated the competitive advantage of
doing business in the inner city, Kanter (1999) identified wa
in which public-private partnerships advance corporate inno
vation, and Prahalad (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; Prahalad
and Hart, 2002) mapped the untapped economic opportuni-
ties that reside in what he called the bottom of the world's
wealth pyramid.
Business leaders and firms themselves are even responding
to calls for enhanced corporate social responsibility. From
mavens, such as the Body Shop's Anita Roddick, to converts,
such as British Petroleum's John Browne, some business
leaders are preaching-and at least trying to practice-an
approach to business that affirms the broad contribution that
companies can make to human welfare, beyond maximizing
the wealth of shareholders. On a larger scale, the United
States Chamber of Commerce, representing tens of thou-
sands of business interests worldwide, recently founded the
Center for Corporate Citizenship, whose purpose is to pro-
vide an institutional mechanism to assist humanitarian and
philanthropic business initiatives around the world.
The repeated calls for corporate action to ameliorate social
ills reflect an underlying tension. On the one hand, misery
loves companies. The sheer magnitude of problems, from
malnutrition and HIV to illiteracy and homelessness, inspires
a turn toward all available sources of aid, most notably corpo-
rations. Especially when those problems are juxtaposed to
the wealth-creation capabilities of firms-or to the ills that
firms may have helped to create-firms become an under-
standable target of appeals. On the other hand, a sturdy and
persistent theoretical argument in economics suggests that
such corporate involvement is misguided. It may be neither
permissible nor prudent to devote corporate resources to
redress social misery (Friedman, 1970; Easterbrook and Fis-
chel, 1991; Sternberg, 1997). Calls for broader corporate
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responsibility, therefore, constitute an effort to surmount the

presupposition that such corporate action is illicit. With social
misery and the imperative of corporate involvement, on the
one hand, and the skeptical economic rationale, on the other,
attempts to mobilize corporate social initiatives reach an
intense pitch. Organizational scholarship has confronted the
economic argument head-on.
THE POINT OF TENSION
Appeals for corporate involvement in ameliorating malnut

tion, infant mortality, illiteracy, pollution, pernicious wealth
inequality, and other social ills quickly call to mind a long
contentious debate about the theory and purposes of the
firm. Despite a long history of communitarian protest (M
sey, 1989), Bradley et al.'s (1999) review of these efforts
found that the neoclassical construal of the firm as a nexus
of contracts has prevailed. Although organizational and legal
scholars (Bratton, 1989a, 1989b; Davis and Useem, 2000;
Paine, 2002) have questioned the contractarian model and
sketched alternative views, they have also acknowledged the
purchase this economic model of the firm has had on corpo-
rate conduct, law, and scholarship. The purpose of the firm,
from a contractarian perspective, is perhaps best captured by
the landmark 1919 Dodge v. Ford Michigan State Supreme
Court decision that determined whether or not Henry Ford
could withhold dividends from the Dodge brothers (and other
shareholders). The court famously argued, "A business orga-
nization is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of
the stockholders" (Dodge Brothers v. Ford Motor Company,
1919: 170 N.W. 668). The assumption that the primary, if not
sole, purpose of the firm is to maximize wealth for sharehold-
ers has come to dominate the curricula of business schools
and the thinking of future managers, as evidence from a
recent survey of business school graduates reveals (Aspen
Institute, 2002). Investigating corporate social initiatives pre
sents a rich scholarly opportunity in part because the eco-
nomic account suggests that there should be no so such ini-
tiatives to investigate in the first place.
The contractarian view of the firm or, to be more accurate,
the economic version of contractarianism (cf. Keeley, 1988;
Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999), challenges the legitimacy and
value of corporate responses to social misery. The specific
challenges come in three distinct forms: saying that firms
already advance social welfare to the full extent possible,
saying that the only legitimate actors to address societal
problems are freely elected governments, or saying that if
firms do get involved, managers must warn their constituen-
cies so they can protect themselves from corporate misad-
ventures. The first point of view defends the economic con-
tractarian model by invoking the same aim that stimulates
efforts to enlist companies to cure social ills. For example,
Jensen (2002: 239) argued, "200 years' worth of work in
economics and finance indicate that social welfare is maxi-
mized when all firms in an economy maximize total firm
value." Jensen conceded that companies must attend to
multiple constituencies in order to succeed but, ultimately,
firms must be guided by a single objective function: wealth
creation. He argued that it is logically incoherent and psycho-
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logically impossible to maximize performance along more
than one dimension-calculating tradeoffs and selecting
courses of action become intractable. Although any single
objective could satisfy the logical and psychological require-
ments, Jensen concluded that long-term market value is the
one objective that best advances social welfare. Those sub-
scribing to this view believe that if shareholder wealth is
maximized, social welfare is maximized as well. In the end,
the challenge for firms to invest in social initiatives is no chal-
lenge at all.
Friedman's (1970) well-known criticism of corporate social
responsibility embodies the second form of criticism. He con-
strued these investments as theft and political subversion: in
responding to calls for socially responsible practices, execu-
tives take money and resources that would otherwise go to
owners, employees, and customers-thus imposing a tax-
and dedicate those resources to objectives that the execu-
tives, under the sway of a minority of voices, have selected
in a manner that is beyond the reach of accepted democratic
political processes. Friedman did not deny the existence of
social problems; he simply claimed that it is the state's role
to address them.
The third form of the economic argument against corporate

social initiatives deems them dubious but, provided they are
disclosed, unobjectionable. As long as the contracting parties
are clear about the firm's intentions, even if those intentions
include something other than wealth creation, Easterbrook
and Fischel (1991: 36) argued, "no one should be allowed to
object." They went on to conclude that "one thing that can-
not survive is systematic efforts to fool participants" (Easter-
brook and Fischel, 1991: 37). They were wary of corporate
social investments and, like Jensen, trusted property rights
and the invisible hand of the market to solve most social
problems. If all contracting parties know that the firm plans
to make a social investment, no matter how ill conceived,
however, then those parties can decide if they want to partic-
ipate in the venture. The market will ultimately sort out
whether it is the best use of a firm's resources.
The point of tension between a nexus of contracts approach

to the firm and those who push for corporate social involve-
ment can thus be distilled to two central concerns: misappro-
priation and misallocation. When companies engage in social
initiatives, the first concern is that managers will misappropri-
ate corporate resources by diverting them from their rightful
claimants, whether these be the firm's owners or, some-
times, employees. Managers also misallocate resources by
diverting those best used for one purpose to advance purpos-
es for which those resources are poorly suited. From this
perspective, managers' social initiatives are akin to using a
dishwasher to wash clothes. While economic contractarians
may be as committed to ameliorating human misery as any-
one, they see no reason for a corporation to divert its
resources to solve society's problems directly. Corporations
can contribute best to society if they do what they do best:
employ a workforce to provide goods and services to the
marketplace and, in so doing, fulfill people's needs and create
wealth.
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The challenge facing those who advocate corporate social ini-

tiatives then is to find a way to promote what they see as
social justice in a world in which this shareholder wealth
maximization paradigm reigns. Although a daunting task, it
has attracted many management scholars over the years.
Their scholarship has attempted to sort out the relationship
between shareholders, with their economic interests, and
society, with its interest in broader well-being and human
development. The aim has largely been to demonstrate that
corporate attention to human misery is perfectly consistent
with maximizing wealth, that there is, in the words of United
Nations' Secretary General Kofi Annan (2001), "a happy con-
vergence between what your shareholders want and what is
best for millions of people the world over."
ORGANIZATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP ON BUSINESS IN

SOCIETY
Aware of human suffering and alert to the challenge from

economic contractarianism, organization theorists and emp
cal researchers have sought to identify a role for the firm
both attends to shareholders' interest in wealth creation and
looks beyond it. In this light, empirical research has largely
focused on establishing a positive connection between cor-
porate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial per-
formance (CFP). First appearing in 1972, these studies were
offered as something of an antidote to a public conversation
that was quite skeptical of corporate social responsibility
(Levitt, 1958; Friedman, 1970). The now 30-year search for
an association between CSP and CFP reflects the enduring
quest to find a persuasive business case for social initiatives,
to substantiate the kind of claims that Kofi Annan (2001)
recently made to U.S. corporations: "by joining the global
fight against HIV/AIDS, your business will see benefits on its
bottom line." A dozen years after the publication of the first
CSP-CFP studies, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) began
to take shape as the dominant theoretical response to the
economists' challenge. It aims to establish the legitimate
place for parties other than shareholders whose interests and
concerns can defensibly orient managers' actions. With a
body of empirical work and a rival theoretical model of the
firm, organization studies has tried to respond to the econo-
mists' fundamental challenge by establishing some grounds
to license direct corporate involvement in ameliorating social
misery. The problem is that the resulting empirical findings
and theoretical propositions restrict organizational scholars'
ability to develop a more expansive approach to understand-
ing the relationship between organizations and society. We
briefly appraise the 30-year CSP-CFP empirical research tradi-
tion and the standing of stakeholder theory and use this sum-
mary and critique as a springboard to develop an alternative
scholarly agenda.
The Empirical CSP-CFP Literature

Between 1972 and 2002, 127 published studies empirically
examined the relationship between companies' socially
responsible conduct and their financial performance. Bragdon
and Marlin (1972) and Moskowitz (1972) published the first
studies, with 17 other studies following during the 1970s, 30
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in the 1980s, and 68 in the 1990s. In the most recent 10-year
period from 1993 through 2002, researchers have published
64 new studies. Notwithstanding a long empirical history,
interest in this question seems to be gaining momentum.
Corporate social performance has been treated as an inde-
pendent variable, predicting financial performance, in 109 of
the 127 studies. In these studies, almost half of the results
(54) pointed to a positive relationship between corporate
social performance and financial performance. Only seven
studies found a negative relationship; 28 studies reported
non-significant relationships, while 20 reported a mixed set of
findings. Corporate social performance has been treated as a
dependent variable, predicted by financial performance, in 22
of the 127 studies. In these studies, the majority of results
(16 studies) pointed to a positive relationship between corpo-
rate financial performance and social performance. Four stud-
ies investigated the relationship in both directions, which
explains why there are more results than studies. Table 2
Table 2
Relationship between Corporate Social Performance and Corporate Financial Performance in 127 Studies*
Measure
Study Social performance Financial performance
Corporate social performance as independent
Positive relationship
Anderson & Frankle (1980) Disclosure of social performance Market
Belkaoui (1976) Disclosure of pollution control Market
Blacconiere & Northcut (1997) Disclosure of and expenditures on envi
practices
Blacconiere & Patten (1994) Disclosure of and expenditures on environmental Market
practices
Bowman (1976) Disclosure of social performance Accounting
Bragdon & Karash (2002) Stewardship, systems thinking, transparency, Market
employee growth, financial strength
Bragdon & Marlin (1972) CEP evaluation Accounting
Brown (1998) Fortune reputation rating Market
Christmann (2000) Survey of environmental practices Cost advantage
Clarkson (1988) Ratings of charity, community relations, customer Accounting
relations, environmental practices, human resource
practices, and org. structures based on case studies
Conine & Madden (1986) Fortune reputation rating Perception of value as
long-term investment
and of soundness of
financial position
D'Antonio, Johnsen & Hutton Mutual fund screens Market
(1997)
Dowell, Hart & Yeung (2000) IRRC evaluation of environmental performance Accounting & market
Epstein & Schnietz (2002) Industry reputation for environment and labor abuses Market
Freedman & Stagliano (1991) Disclosure of EPA and OSHA costs Market
Graves & Waddock (2000) KLD evaluation Accounting & market
Griffin & Mahon (1997) Fortune reputation rating, KLD evaluation, charitable Accounting
contributions, pollution control
Hart & Ahuja (1996) IRRC evaluation of environmental performance Accounting
Heinze (1976) NACBS ratings Accounting
Herremans, Akathaporn & Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market
Mclnnes (1993)
Ingram (1978) Disclosure of social performance Market
Jones & Murrell (2001) Working Mother list of "Most Family Friendly" Market
companies
Judge & Douglas (1998) Survey of environmental practices Accounting & market
share
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Table 2 (Continued)
Measure
Corporate social performance as independent
Klassen & McLaughlin (1996) Environmental awards and crises Market

Klassen & Whybark (1999) Survey of environmental practices and TRI Manufacturing cost,
quality, speed, and
flexibility
Konar & Cohen (2001) TRI and environmental lawsuits Accounting & market
Luck & Pilotte (1993) KLD evaluation Market
McGuire, Sundgren & Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market
Schneeweis (1988)
Moskowitz (1972) Observations of charitable contributions, consumer Personal assessment
protection, disclosure, equal employment
opportunity, human resource practices, South Africa
operations, and urban renewal
Nehrt (1996) Timing and intensity of pollution-reducing technologies Accounting
Newgren et al. (1985) Survey of environmental practices Market
Parket & Eilbirt (1975) Survey on minority hiring and training, ecology, Accou
contributions to education and art
Porter & van der Linde (1995) Waste prevention practices Accounting
Posnikoff (1997) South Africa: divestment Market
Preston (1978) Disclosure of social performance Accounting
Preston & O'Bannon (1997) Fortune reputation rating Accounting
Preston & Sapienza (1990) Fortune reputation rating Market
Reimann (1975) Survey of attitudes toward national government, Organizational
suppliers, consumers, community, stockholders, competence
creditors, and employees
Russo & Fouts (1997) FRDC ratings of environmental practices Accounting
Shane & Spicer (1983) CEP evaluation Market
Sharma & Vredenburg (1998) Survey of environmental strategy Operational improvement
Simerly (1994) Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market
Simerly (1995) Fortune reputation rating Accounting
Spencer & Taylor (1987) Fortune reputation rating Accounting
Spicer (1978) CEP evaluation Accounting & market
Stevens (1984) CEP evaluation Market
Sturdivant & Ginter (1977) Moskowitz ratings of social responsiveness Accounting
Tichy, McGill & St. Clair (1997) Fortune reputation rating Accounting
Travers (1997) Mutual fund screens Market
Verschoor (1998) Espoused commitment to ethics in annual report Accounting & market
Verschoor (1999) Explicit statement of an ethics code in annual report Accounting & market
Waddock & Graves (1997) KLD evaluation Accounting
Wokutch & Spencer (1987) Fortune reputation rating, charitable con
corporate crime
Wright et al. (1995) Awards from U.S. Dept. of Labor for exemplary equal Market
employment opportunity
Non-significant relationship
Abbott & Monsen (1979) Disclosure of social performance Accounting
Alexander & Buchholz (1978) Moskowitz ratings of social responsiveness Market
Aupperle, Carroll & Hatfield Survey of social responsibility practices and Accounting
(1985) organizational structures
Bowman (1978) Disclosure of social performance Accounting
Chen & Metcalf (1980) CEP evaluation Accounting & market
Fogler & Nutt (1975) CEP evaluation Market
Fombrun & Shanley (1990) Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market
Freedman & Jaggi (1982) CEP evaluation Accounting
Freedman & Jaggi (1986) Disclosure of pollution Market
Fry & Hock (1976) Disclosure of social performance Accounting
Greening (1995) EIA reports on conservation practices Accounting & market
Guerard (1997a) KLD evaluation Market
Hamilton, Jo & Statman (1993) Mutual fund screens Market
Hickman, Teets & Kohls (1999) Mutual fund screens Market
Hylton (1992) Mutual fund screens Market
Ingram & Frazier (1983) Disclosure of environmental quality control Accounting
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Table 2 (Continued)
Measure
Corporate social performance as independe
Kurtz & DiBartolomeo (1996) KLD evaluation Market

Lashgari & Gant (1989) South Africa: adherence to Sullivan principles Accounting
Luther & Matatko (1994) Mutual fund screens Market
Mahapatra (1984) Disclosure of capital expenditures on pollution control Market
McWilliams & Siegel (1997) Awards from U.S. Dept. of Labor for exemplary equal Market
employment opportunity
McWilliams & Siegel (2000) KLD evaluation Accounting
O'Neill, Saunders & McCarthy Survey of directors' concern for social
(1989)
Patten (1990) South Africa: announcement of signing of Sullivan Market
principles
Reyes & Grieb (1998) Mutual fund screens Market
Sauer (1997) Mutual fund screens Market
Teoh, Welch & Wazzan (1999) South Africa: divestment Market
Waddock & Graves (2000) KLD evaluation Accounting & market
Negative relationship
Boyle, Higgins & Rhee (1997) Compliance with Defense Industries Initiative Market
Kahn, Lekander & Leimkuhler Tobacco-free Market
(1997)
Meznar, Nigh & Kwok (1994) South Africa: withdrawal Market
Mueller (1991) Mutual fund screens Market
Teper (1992) No alcohol, tobacco, gambling, defense contracts, or Market
operations in South Africa; adherence to broad
social guidelines
Vance (1975) Moskowitz ratings of social responsiveness Market
Wright & Ferris (1997) South Africa: divestment Market
Mixed relationship
Belkaoui & Karpik (1989) Disclosure of social performance and Moskowitz Accounting & market
ratings of social responsiveness
Berman et al. (1999) KLD evaluation Accounting
Blackburn, Doran & Shrader CEP evaluation Accounting & market
(1994)
Bowman & Haire (1975) Disclosure of social performance Accounting
Brown (1997) Fortune reputation rating Market
Cochran & Wood (1984) Moskowitz ratings of social responsiveness Accounting & market
Diltz (1995) CEP evaluation Market
Graves & Waddock (1994) KLD evaluation Accounting
Gregory, Matatko & Luther Mutual fund screens Market
(1997)
Guerard (1997b) KLD evaluation Market
Hillman & Keim (2001) KLD evaluation Market
Holman, New & Singer (1990) Disclosure of social performance & capital Market
expenditures on regulatory compliance
Kedia & Kuntz (1981) Interview and survey on charitable contributions, low- Accounting & market share
income housing loans, minority enterprise loans,
female corporate officers, and minority employment
Luther, Matatko & Corner Mutual fund screens Market
(1992)
Mallin, Saadouni & Briston Mutual fund screens Market
(1995)
Marcus & Goodman (1986) Compliance with safety regulations Capabilities & productive
efficiency
McGuire, Schneeweis & Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market
Branch (1990)
Ogden & Watson (1999) Customer service complaints Accounting & market
Pava & Krausz (1996) CEP evaluation Accounting & market
Rockness, Schlachter & EPA and U.S. House of Representatives data on Accounting & market
Rockness (1986) hazardous waste disposal
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Table 2 (Continued)
Measure
Corporate social performance as dependent
Positive relationship
Brown & Perry (1994) Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market
Cottrill (1990) Fortune reputation rating Market share
Dooley & Lerner (1994) TRI Accounting
Fry, Keim & Meiners (1982) Charitable contributions Accounting
Galaskiewicz (1997) Charitable contributions Accounting
Konar & Cohen (1997) TRI Market
Levy & Shatto (1980) Charitable contributions Accounting
Maddox & Siegfried (1980) Charitable contributions Accounting
Marcus & Goodman (1986) Compliance with emissions regulations Accounting
McGuire, Sundgren & Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market
Schneeweis (1988)
Mills & Gardner (1984) Disclosure of social performance Accounting & market
Navarro (1988) Charitable contributions Accounting
Preston & O'Bannon (1997) Fortune reputation rating Accounting
Riahi-Belkaoui (1991) Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market
Roberts (1992) CEP evaluation Accounting & market
Waddock & Graves (1997) KLD evaluation Accounting
Non-significant relationship
Buehler & Shetty (1976) Organizational programs in consumer aff
mental affairs, urban affairs
Cowen, Ferreri & Parker (1987) Disclosure of social performance Accounting
Patten (1991) Disclosure of social performance Accounting
Mixed relationship
Johnson & Greening (1999) KLD evaluation Accounting
Lerner & Fryxell (1988) CEP evaluation Accounting & market
McGuire, Schneeweis & Fortune reputation rating Accounting & market
Branch (1990)
* CEP = Council on Economic Priorities; EIA = Energy Information Association; EPA

Agency; FRDC = Franklin Research & Development Corporation; IRRC = Investor Respons
= Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini multidimensional rating; NACBS = National Affiliation of
OSHA = Occupational Safety and Health Administration; and TRI = Toxics Release Invent
the relationship in both directions but are counted as only one study: McGuire, Schneewe
Sundgren & Schneeweis (1988); Preston & O'Bannon (1997); Waddock & Graves (1997).
contains two separate studies and is therefore counted twice.
captures the basic approaches for measuring soci

financial performance and reports which authors
results, including positive, non-significant, negati
mixed relationships.
A clear signal emerges from these 127 studies. A
compilation of the findings suggests there is a p
ciation, and certainly very little evidence of a ne
ation, between a company's social performance a
cial performance. A recent meta-analysis of 52 C
studies reached this same substantive conclusion
Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003). Concerns about misap
tion, and perhaps even misallocation, would seem
viated. If corporate social performance contribute
rate financial performance, then a firm's resourc
used to advance the interests of shareholders, the
claimants in the economic contractarian model. Concerns
about misallocation recede as well. If social performance is
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contributing to financial performance, then the firm is being
used to advance the objective for which it is considered to be
best suited, maximizing wealth. Although it can be argued that
a company's resources might be used to produce even more
wealth, were they devoted to some activity other than CSP,
studies of the link between CSP and CFP reveal little evidence
that CSP destroys value, injures shareholders in a significant
way, or damages the wealth-creating capacity of firms. The
empirical relationship between CSP and CFP would seem to
be established and the underlying economic concerns about
CSP alleviated. Even as research into the relationship between
CSP and CFP addresses the objections posed by economic
contractarianism, however, a closer look at this research sug-
gests that it opens as many questions as it answers about the
role of the firm in society.
What appears to be a definite link between CSP and CFP may

turn out to be more illusory than the body of results suggests.
The steady flow of research studies reflects ongoing efforts
both to resolve the tension between advocates and critics of
corporate social performance and to shore up the methodologi
cal and theoretical weaknesses in past studies. There have
been 13 reviews of this CSP-CFP research published since
1978, nine in the past ten years alone (Aldag and Bartol, 1978;
Arlow and Gannon, 1982; Cochran and Wood, 1984; Aupperle,
Carroll, and Hatfield, 1985; Wokutch and McKinney, 1991;
Wood and Jones, 1995; Pava and Krausz, 1996; Griffin and
Mahon, 1997; Preston and O'Bannon, 1997; Richardson, Welk-
er, and Hutchinson, 1999; Roman, Hayibor, and Agle, 1999;
Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes,
2003). The reviewers see problems of all kinds in this
research. They identify sampling problems, concerns about the
reliability and validity of the CSP and CFP measures, omission
of controls, opportunities to test mediating mechanisms and
moderating conditions, and a need for a causal theory to link
CSP and CFP. The imperfect nature of these studies makes
research on the link between CSP and CFP self-perpetuating:
each successive study promises a definitive conclusion, while
also revealing the inevitable inadequacies of empirically tack-
ling the question. As the acceleration in the number of studies
reveals, research that investigates the link between CSP and
CFP shows no sign of abating.
This continuing research tradition produces an ironic and, no
doubt, unintended consequence. The CSP-CFP empirical liter-
ature reinforces, rather than relieves, the tension surrounding
corporate responses to social misery. By assaying the finan-
cial impact of corporate social performance, organizational
research helps to confirm the economic contractarian model
and accept its assumptions. Meanwhile, the work leaves
unexplored questions about what it is firms are actually doing
in response to social misery and what effects corporate
actions have, not only on the bottom line but also on society.
The parallel conceptual work in the area of stakeholder theory
arrives at the same disquieting destination.
The Theoretical Stakeholder Literature
Freeman (1984) brought a formal consideration of stakeho

relations to a burgeoning field of management scholarship
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twenty years ago. Tracing its indirect roots back to Adam

Smith's work in the eighteenth century and a 1963 internal
memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute, Freeman's
ideas provided a language and framework for examining how a
firm relates to "any group or individual who can affect or is
affected by the achievement of the organization's objective"
(Freeman, 1984: 46). Looking at the business corporation
through something other than the eyes of its equity holders
has inspired great efforts to translate that intuitive appeal into a
theory. Donaldson and Preston (1995) counted more than a
dozen books and 100 articles devoted to stakeholder theory;
Wolfe and Putler (2002) counted 76 articles on the stakeholder
theme published in just six journals in the 1990s. The promise
of stakeholder theory to offer a cogent alternative to the eco-
nomic account of the firm, however, is impeded by a set of
assumptions designed to accommodate economic considera-
tions.
Taking stock of stakeholder theory, Donaldson and Preston

(1995) introduced an influential taxonomy that sorts it into
three types: descriptive, normative, and instrumental. Descrip-
tive stakeholder theory focuses on whether and to what extent
managers do in fact attend to various stakeholders and act in
accord with their interests. Normative stakeholder theory
explores whether managers ought to attend to stakeholders
other than shareholders and, if so, on what grounds these vari-
ous stakeholders have justifiable claims on the firm. Instru-
mental stakeholder theory delineates and investigates the con-
sequences-most notably, the economic benefits-that follow
from attending to a range of stakeholders. Instrumental ver-
sions of stakeholder theory can either be descriptive, positing
and investigating the beneficial consequences that accrue to
the firm, such as efficient contracting (Jones, 1995), or norma-
tive, justifying the claims of stakeholders on the basis of the
benefits that accrue to the firm from attending to those claims
(Freeman, 1999; Freeman and Phillips, 2002; Jensen, 2002).
Whereas Donaldson and Preston encouraged greater attention
to normative questions about stakeholders, the scholarship
devoted to stakeholder theory has focused largely on instru-
mental considerations. Jones and Wicks (1999) formally pro-
posed a convergent stakeholder theory to blend instrumental
considerations with the ongoing efforts to create a normative
theory. Although Freeman (1999: 235) eschewed Donaldson
and Preston's tripartite division of stakeholder theory as well as
the subsequent integration, he also concluded that to buttress
any normative injunction for managers to attend to key stake-
holders, "it is hard to see how such an argument can be con-
nected to real firms and real stakeholders without some kind
of instrumental claim." Revealing the grip that instrumental
reasoning has on stakeholder theory, Post, Preston, and Sachs
(2002: 19) recently defined stakeholders explicitly by the contri-
bution stakeholders make to wealth creation or destruction:
"The stakeholders in a corporation are the individuals and con-
stituencies that contribute, either voluntarily or involuntarily, to
its wealth-creating capacity and activities, and are therefore its
potential beneficiaries and/or risk bearers."
It is taken to be a practical necessity that stakeholder theory

revolve around consequences, financial consequences
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substantive enough to convince managers that stakeholders
are worthy of attention (Freeman, 1999; Jones and Wicks,
1999). When those beneficial consequences are not contin-
gent on a certain standard of stakeholder treatment, or when
that treatment fails to produce those consequences, howev-
er, the range of corporate conduct that is required, or even
permissible, becomes much less clear. What happens when
attention to stakeholder interests yields results that diverge
from the wealth maximizing ambitions of its shareholders?
This is precisely what may happen when attention is directed
at the effects of organizations on society and whether, for
example, companies should divest their investments in South
Africa (Meznar, Nigh, and Kwok, 1994), diversify the demo-
graphic composition of their boards of directors (Carleton,
Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998), or join the fight to combat
AIDS. Paradoxically, a stakeholder theory conceived to be
practical may have left managers bereft. As Gioia (1999: 231)
argued, the central challenge for managers is "how to arrive
at some workable balance" between instrumental and other
moral criteria. Managers confront difficult dilemmas when
normative and instrumental claims do not perfectly align.
There are normative reasons to respect stakeholders, inde-
pendent of the ensuing financial benefits. Those reasons m
be grounded, for example, in the beneficial consequences
that result for specific stakeholders. Concerns about emplo
ee dignity and self-efficacy may prompt certain kinds of m
agerial behavior (Shklar, 1991; Hodson, 2001). Normative ju
tification of stakeholder claims may also be grounded in
principles of fairness and reciprocity (Applbaum, 1996;
Phillips, 1997, 2003), fundamental rights (Donaldson and P
ston, 1995), or respect for the intrinsic worth of human
beings (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). How do these
grounds for action inform our perspective on the place of
firm in society? How can their implications for action, in th
face of calls for corporate responses to ameliorate social m
ery, be sorted out alongside the compelling instrumental pu
pose of the firm to enhance material welfare and maximize
wealth?
A preoccupation with instrumental consequences renders a

theory that accommodates economic premises yet sidesteps
the underlying tensions between the social and economic
imperatives that confront organizations. Such a theory risks
omitting the pressing descriptive and normative questions
raised by these tensions, which, when explored, might hold
great promise for new theory, and even for addressing practi-
cal management challenges. How do firms navigate their
way through these tensions? How ought they to do so?
Organizational inquiry must go beyond efforts to reconcile
corporate responses to social misery with the neoclassical
model of the firm. Rather, this social and economic tension
should serve as a starting point for new theory and research.
Exploring the Antinomy

Organizational scholars and managers alike find themselves
in the clutches of an antinomy (Alexander, 1988; Poole and
Van de Ven, 1989). That antinomy is captured in a question
Merton (1976: 88) believed every executive must face:
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"Does the successful business try first to profit or to serve?"

From society's perspective, creating wealth and contributing
to material well-being are essential corporate goals. But
restoring and equipping human beings, as well as protecting
and repairing the natural environment, are also essential
objectives. Companies may be well designed to advance the
first set of objectives, yet they operate in a world plagued by
a host of recalcitrant problems that hamper the second set.
These vying objectives place claims on the firm that are often
difficult to rank and reconcile. Where economic contractari-
ans see instrumental inefficiency and illicit conduct in direct-
ing corporate resources toward redressing social misery,
those who advocate broader corporate social initiatives see
instrumental efficiency and duties fulfilled.
The antinomy reveals itself more explicitly in the face of

appeals for companies to take a more active and expanded
role in society. Some line up to warn of the danger in heed-
ing these appeals, while others point to empirical findings to
relieve concern. Both avenues of intellectual response,
already reviewed in this paper, attempt to remove the antino-
my in one of two classic ways (Nussbaum, 1986: 67), either
through invalidation or through reconciliation. For example,
declarations of what the role and purpose of a firm "really" is
attempt either to validate or disqualify certain activities by
suggesting that a theory of the firm renders certain functions
and practices defensible and others not (e.g., Berle, 1931;
Dodd, 1932). Theoretical and empirical attempts at synthesis,
reflecting the second avenue of response, seek to demon-
strate the mutual reinforcement of colliding conceptions of
the firm (e.g., Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Jones and Wicks,
1999). Despite these differing efforts to resolve the antino-
my, declarations of what a firm's purpose truly is and efforts
to demonstrate convergence among competing conceptions
do not erase the fundamental tension.
The effort to relieve the antinomy through synthesis and rec-

onciliation has fueled organizational scholarship for many
years. By adopting the underlying assumptions of economic
contractarianism, both instrumental stakeholder theory and
the empirical research connecting CSP and CFP offer an allur-
ing way to ease the tension with economics. The problem,
as Tetlock (2000: 23) pointed out, is that no concession to
the instrumental and wealth-enhancing model of the firm wil
reconcile economic contractarians to stakeholder theory:
Disagreements rooted in values should be profoundly resistant to

change .... Libertarian conservatives might oppose the (confiscato-
ry) stakeholder model even when confronted by evidence that con-
cessions in this direction have no adverse effects on profitability to
shareholders. Expropriation is expropriation, no matter how pretti-
fied. And some egalitarians might well endorse the stakeholder
model, even if shown compelling evidence that it reduces profits.
Academics who rely on evidence-based appeals to change minds
when the disagreements are rooted in values may be wasting
everyone's time.
Aside from failing to win over opponents, substantiating the

instrumental benefits of corporate social performance may
well be immaterial for another, equally salient reason. Compa-
nies already invest in social initiatives. Moreover, these com-
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panies often invest for reasons that have nothing to do with
instrumental consequences. Beyond the obvious point that
researchers could not investigate the CSP-CFP relationship
without evidence of CSP, companies' philanthropic contribu-
tions more than quadrupled, in real terms, between 1950 and
2000 (Caplow, Hicks, and Wattenberg, 2001). The cross-
industry organization Business for Social Responsibility would
not be able to count 1,400 members and commission a book
to document the benefits that purportedly accrue from social-
ly responsible practices (Makower, 1994) were such practices
unknown. In keeping with Tetlock's (2000) insight, the rea-
sons executives give for these social initiatives typically have
more to do with an ineffable sense that this work is the right
thing to do (Holmes, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1997; Donnelly,
2001), rather than with how these investments will increase
shareholder value. These corporate practices even seem to
challenge the empirical claims of economic theory. Why does
corporate social performance persist despite the disadvan-
tages that economic theory suggests it imposes on firms?
The existence of CSP begs empirical explanation rather than
empirical justification.
Efforts to reconcile organizational research on corporate

social performance with the economic model of the firm may
ultimately turn out to be counterproductive. To make room
for corporate responses to societal ills, organizational theo-
rists and researchers have acceded to economic contractari-
anism, relinquishing their own ideas about the problems to
be investigated, the variables on which to focus, and the
methods to use for gaining insight (Alexander, 1988; Hirsch,
Friedman, and Koza, 1990). For example, if corporate
responses to social misery are evaluated only in terms of
their instrumental benefits for the firm and its shareholders,
we never learn about their impact on society, most notably
on the intended beneficiaries of these initiatives. Nor do we
investigate the conditions under which it is permissible to act
on stakeholder interests that are inconsistent with sharehold-
er interests. The corporate initiatives that were the focus of
Meznar, Nigh, and Kwok's (1994) event study of firms
announcing their divestment from South Africa and the event
study of TIAA-CREF's board diversity initiatives (Carleton, Nel-
son, and Weisbach, 1998) were both met with negative mar-
ket reactions. Does that mean that firms should have stayed
to work with an apartheid government or that attempts to
add African Americans to boards of directors should be halt-
ed? Financial performance may not be the final arbiter of
questions that implicate a range of values and concerns,
even when firms are the actors. Rather than theorizing away
the collision of objectives and interests, organizational schol-
ars would do well to explore it (Alexander, 1988).
By adopting economic assumptions, organization theory and
research handicaps itself in yet another way. It leaves organi-
zations that seek to respond to these calls for social involve-
ment bereft of prescriptive guidance for how to do so. Sim-
ply knowing that the economic tide is with them does not
provide managers with insight about how to respond properly
and effectively. Organizations face a troublesome reality, in
which specific requests to help fight AIDS, support homeless
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shelters, or improve local schools may or may not generate

economic gains for the firm. The field of organization studies
has largely been silent about how to consider and manage
the tradeoffs and dilemmas that arise when companies con-
front dueling expectations.
A Reorienting Perspective
The grip of economic assumptions must be released in favor
of an alternative premise, one that expands the focus of
organizational scholarship. We suggest adopting a pragmatic
stance toward questions about the firm's role in society, one
articulated most clearly by William James (1975: 97): "Grant
an idea or belief to be true," it [pragmatism] says, "what con-
crete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual
life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences will be
different from those that would obtain if the belief were
false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential
terms?"
The first step of James's pragmatic approach is to assume

that an idea is true. In this case, we need to begin with the
idea that organizations can play an effective role in ameliorat-
ing social misery. From that beginning, pragmatism then
instructs us to look at the consequences of acting on this
belief. Do companies really make a concrete difference in
curing social ills when they act as though they can do so?
The lens of research shifts away from confirming the consis-
tency between corporate actions and economic premises
about the firm. Research would instead focus on unearthing
the effects that corporate actions to redress social ills actual-
ly have. The pragmatic perspective poses a second ques-
tion: How can the assumed truth that companies can be
effective agents, not just of economic efficiency but of
social repair, be realized? How can the concrete differences
be achieved? This lays out a new direction for theory. What
are the conditions under which, and the processes through
which, the intended beneficiaries and institutions central to a
healthy society indeed benefit from these corporate actions?
Systematic descriptive research is just as necessary to
examine the consequences of corporate actions as it is to
identify their antecedents and the processes that bring them
about.
Although we are proposing an alternative starting point for

inquiry into the role of the firm in society, we are not making
a steadfast normative claim about the appropriate role for the
firm in society. The pragmatic stance does not require that
other beliefs be relinquished. Those who believe that society
is best served if companies focus solely on maximizing
wealth can adhere to their convictions, as can those who
believe that other stakeholders beyond the shareholder
deserve attention, whatever the repercussions for profitabili-
ty. The aim here is to test a pragmatic belief to determine if
acting on the basis of that belief produces the desired conse-
quences. How those consequences are to be weighed and
pursued relative to others is a matter for normative theory.
Here too, organizational scholarship must extend its efforts.
The challenge for those who study organizations is to investi-
gate what happens when it is assumed that instrumental effi-
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ciency and human beneficence, wealth maximization and the
amelioration of social misery, and shareholder rights and
stakeholder rights all matter. A normative theory of the firm
will acknowledge these competing conceptions and accom-
modate the tension. Instead of trying to assert the legitimacy
of one set of claims and deny the legitimacy of the other, or
to imagine that all of these competing interests can some-
how be synthetically reconciled, theorists must undertake the
task of working out the principles and guidelines for manag-
ing tradeoffs. A starting point for building such a theory
requires a systematic descriptive inquiry into corporations'
responses to calls for an expanded role. These insights can
then combine inductively with a rigorous philosophical analy-
sis to construct a normative conception of the firm and its
purpose. A descriptive research agenda lays the foundation
for the inductive development of a normative theory of the
firm. As we investigate how corporations do or do not
respond to misery, we can think about how they ought to
respond to misery.
TOWARD A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE FIRM
The antinomy poses a fundamental question for organiza

theorists and managers: How can business organizations
respond to human misery while also sustaining their legit
cy, securing vital resources, and enhancing financial perf
mance? This question may best be addressed through a p
nership between systematic descriptive research and
inductive normative theory. We need to paint a clear and
comprehensive portrait of how firms navigate these comp
ing objectives in their responses to social ills. To do this,
nomic assumptions about business organizations must be
dislodged, though not discarded or discounted, in favor o
pragmatic assumption that permits examination, before
cross-examination, of corporate responses to misery. Her
we echo a recent call in psychology to investigate compl
social phenomena as they occur in the real world before
moving to tests of theoretical propositions (Rozin, 2001)
portrait of corporate responses to social misery then info
normative inquiry into the antinomy itself.
Rather than stating the firm's preeminent role and purpo

defending it, and deductively deriving principles of action
follow, our inductive approach begins with the complex in
play of vying objectives, duties, and concerns. Inductive n
mative theorizing asks the question, How might the role,
pose, and function of the firm be specified so as to
acknowledge a range of inconsistent concerns and still fac
tate action? While acknowledging the conflict between s
misery and economic efficiency, an inductive normative t
ry seeks not to resolve the conflict but to clarify the com
ing considerations, probe what gives them weight, and
explore their relationship. The goal is to craft a purpose a
role for the firm that builds internal coherence among co
peting and incommensurable objectives, duties, and con-
cerns (Richardson, 1997). While the aim of our descriptiv
agenda is to survey the state of corporate responses to
social misery, and thereby ascertain how companies do
indeed navigate through the antinomy, the aim of our nor
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tive agenda is to craft a framework for how companies

should navigate that antinomy.
A Descriptive Research Agenda

Firms make social investments in the face of compelling eco-
nomic reasoning not to do so. The discrepancy between
actual practice and the theoretically espoused purpose of the
firm prompts a quest for explanation. It is a classic sense-
making situation. To make sense of corporate conduct, it is
especially appropriate to follow Weick's (1995: 183) counsel
to "talk the walk": "To 'talk the walk' is to be opportunistic in
the best sense of the word. It is to search for words that
make sense of current walking that is adaptive for reasons
that are not yet clear." To make sense of corporate respons-
es to misery and discern the function of those responses, we
need to understand which firms respond to which social
problems, with what consequences, for both the firms and
society. It is best to explore this kind of broad research ter-
rain with a map in hand (Weick, 1995: 54-55, 121). Used as a
retrospective sensemaking guide, the core theories of organi-
zational decision making and action provide a useful map for
this descriptive exploration (Janis and Mann, 1977; Weick,
1979; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Cyert and March,
1992). Five areas of inquiry invite descriptive research: how
companies extract and appraise the stimuli for action; how
companies generate response options; how companies eval-
uate these options and select a course of action; how the
selected course is implemented; and, finally, what conse-
quences follow from corporate efforts to ameliorate social
ills. We outline orienting research questions in each of these
five areas.
Appraising the stimuli. Researchers first need to under-

stand which social ills garner attention by which firms. Orga-
nizations observe feedback from their context (Cyert and
March, 1992) or enact their context in such a way (Weick,
1979) that a stimulus for action is recognized and assessed
(Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). What then explains which set of
issues catch a firm's attention? Janis and Mann (1977)
observed that these stimuli for action often come in two
forms: communications and events.
Communications to act in the social domain can come both

from internal agents (Andersson and Bateman, 2000; Bansal,
2003) and external agents, whether solicited (Adkins, 1999)
or unsolicited (Mannheim, 2001). Chronicling who these
agents are, what communication tactics they employ, and
how the different agents use different communication strat
gies for greater and lesser effect are all ripe research ques-
tions. More must be learned, as well, about the kind of
events that trigger, or fail to trigger, corporate action. Why do
firms respond to some communications and events and not
others? Perhaps a set of features of triggering stimuli
increase the likelihood of response. Extant theory suggests
that an appellant's power, legitimacy, and urgency might
determine the extent to which managers attend to a claim
(Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997). Alternatively, problems and
solutions may simply attach themselves to organizations in
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nearly inexplicable fashion (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972;
Cyert and March, 1992: 96).
Once the features of the stimulating problems and the orga-
nizations involved are better understood, we can then exam-
ine how companies appraise this information. Organizations
might frame these stimuli as a cost or investment, a burden
or responsibility, a threat or an opportunity (Jackson and Dut-
ton, 1988), or some combination of these kinds of polar
extremes (Gilbert, 2003), to greater or lesser effect. In the
end, descriptive inquiry can unearth the criteria that qualify
certain problems for action and guide managers to select, or
discard, problems to address.
Generating response options. Once a problem has been
identified and enacted as warranting a response, a search
ensues for a solution (Cyert and March, 1992). How do com-
panies generate response options? The classic dichotomy
between behavioral processes, in which an action option is
tried and either selected or discarded based on the ensuing
feedback (Levitt and March, 1988; Gavetti and Levinthal,
2000), and cognitive processes, in which options are generat-
ed and weighed in advance of behavioral trial (March and
Simon, 1958; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), provide one lens
for diagnosing how companies generate responses to social
ills. Whether options are tried out first behaviorally and then
assessed or cognitively formulated and then assessed before
they are executed, we also need greater insight into how the
plausible options are generated.
Why do companies end up considering the set of options
they do? At least three possible approaches can be identified.
First, a firm may deliberately appraise its assets and capabili-
ties and then generate options that tap into these resources
(Dunfee and Hess, 2000). UPS, for example, drew on its
logistics capabilities when it created a technical service man-
ual for food rescue programs (www.community.ups). Second,
a firm may look to potential partners in civil society and
develop a relationship that might even grow over time
(Sagawa and Segal, 2000). The relationship between Timber-
land and City Year represents how these collaborations can
deepen through the years (Austin, 2000). Finally, the process
may be more externally driven and nearly automatic. Compa-
nies may identify widely practiced options that adhere to
standards of accepted conduct. Galaskiewicz (1991) illuminat-
ed the deliberate construction of philanthropic institutions
and ideology in Minneapolis-Saint Paul. Once established,
the charitable contributions flowed at the same rate each
year, regardless of who was leading the firms (Galaskiewicz,
1997).
In addition to identifying the process of generating options,

the content of those options begs for systematic descriptive
research. Just as the problems that stimulate corporate
responses to social ills can be catalogued and analyzed for
patterns, so can the content of potential corporate respons-
es. What are companies doing in response to social ills, and
what is the range of activities they consider? Two fundamen-
tal questions, bearing on the definition of the phenomenon
itself, arise at this point for descriptive research. For simplici-
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ty, we have operated with the assumption that responses to

misery are appendages to companies' core productive activi-
ty and that corporate social performance consists of respons-
es to human misery. In examining the responses companies
actually consider, both of these assumptions open them-
selves to inquiry. First, to what extent are companies
responding with for-profit initiatives, initiatives that treat
social ills akin to any other set of business opportunities, dis-
cerning a market (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002) or an emer-
gent product class (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) to be
entered or a cost to be reduced? Alternatively, to what
extent, and when, do companies respond with charitable
activities decoupled from their core for-profit activities, donat-
ing some sort of resource? Second, to what extent is corpo-
rate social performance truly a response to human misery?
The options companies consider, and even the problems that
get pressed upon them, may invoke a role that extends
beyond a narrow economic function and yet does not touch
upon human misery. What is the actual proximity between
corporate responses classified as social performance and
efforts to redress human misery?
Evaluating options. What assessment criteria are applied to
corporate efforts to ameliorate social ills? In making deci-
sions, managers tend to follow a logic of consequences,
weighing costs and benefits, or a logic of appropriateness,
weighing the fit of potential options with conceptions of their
(and the company's) role identity and its implications for the
given situation (Cyert and March, 1992; March, 1994).
Research can reveal when the criteria are applied: do compa-
nies weigh and evaluate potential options in advance of act-
ing (March and Simon, 1958), or do they make sense of their
social initiatives retrospectively (Weick, 1979, 1995), assign-
ing a meaningful (but retroactive) explanation for why the
selected course was taken?
In unearthing the criteria companies use to assess respons

to human misery, descriptive research can reveal how com
panies wrestle with the competing expectations that conte
ed conceptions of the firm's role and purpose impose. If c
sequences are used to evaluate response options, the set
consequences may reflect the ways in which conflicting c
ceptions of the firm's role are being negotiated. For examp
what sort of return is assessed when companies evaluate
options by calculating a return on investment? Perhaps com
panies try to calculate the financial benefits to the firm, m
icking the research conducted for over 30 years, or perhap
they employ a more expansive definition of return and foc
their attention on worker morale and commitment, corpor
reputation in capital and product markets, or the legitimacy
gained with regulatory authorities. Alternatively, companie
may evaluate the benefits for society, estimating, for exam
ple, the greatest humanitarian gain per dollar spent. If so,
how is the humanitarian gain assessed? Conflicting concep
tions of the firm's role and purpose may also be reflected
how the appropriateness of corporate social initiatives is e
uated. In the face of the shareholder wealth maximization
ideology, using criteria of appropriateness permits consisten-
cy between this ideology and corporate social initiatives.
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Enlightened self-interest (Galaskiewicz, 1991) is one such cri-
terion. It provides economic grounds on which to validate the
fit of the economic identity of the firm with virtually any
option selected.
Implementation. Once problems have been identified and
selected, and once response options have been generated
and evaluated, a response must be implemented. How then
do companies play their social role? How are such contested
acts managed? Cyert and March (1992: 164) argued that
"most organizations most of the time exist and thrive with
considerable latent conflict of goals." Quasi-resolution of con-
flict is made possible, in their view, through satisficing deci-
sion rules and sequential attention to goals. Corporate efforts
to respond to social ills, however, are not only in conflict with
other objectives, they are themselves inherently provocative,
highlighting in their very purpose their inconsistency with the
firm's economic objective. Therefore, these corporate efforts
pose distinct management challenges. Ameliorative initiatives
are simultaneously legitimacy-seeking and legitimacy-threat-
ening acts, adhering to one set of expectations, social in
nature, while violating another, economic in nature. In addi-
tion, as companies find themselves with an elaborated moral
personality (Paine, 2002), corporate social initiatives are
simultaneously identity-bridging and identity-begging activi-
ties: corporate efforts to redress social ills are a means of
accommodating a new construal of companies as social insti-
tutions while raising fundamental questions about the firm's
purpose. Corporate social initiatives are complicated even
more by their mixed motives. Managers may seek to relieve
normative and coercive calls for involvement; secure their
companies' legitimacy, reputation, and ability to function; and
actually aid society. How are corporate efforts to redress
social ills managed-executed, controlled, monitored, and
disciplined-amid this crossfire of competing purposes,
expectations, identities, and motives? If companies approach
prospective action with cognitive maps that outline the
course of action and anticipated consequences (Gavetti and
Levinthal, 2000), how is the plan converted into action and
directed toward the desired consequences? If companies fol-
low a process resembling experiential search (Gavetti and
Levinthal, 2000), how is that search-the trial and error
process-navigated through the mixture of expectations and
motives, so that the firm's intended aims are met or
readjusted?
If one way of navigating equivocal situations is to design
equivocal (Weick, 1979: 223-224), ambivalent (Merton,
1976), or ambidextrous responses (Tushman and O'Reilly,
2002), then companies might navigate conflicting expecta-
tions and colliding perspectives on their role with an equivo-
cal response. Creative allocation of control and resources
may provide business organizations with this sort of dexteri-
ty, enabling companies to acknowledge the social ill and gain
the benefits of response while sustaining flexibility and mini-
mizing the risks of response (Weick, 1979: 223-224). Design
options include make, buy, and hybrid arrangements, each of
which entails different types and degrees of investment and
control.
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Companies may create the responses themselves, the

"make" option, when they have a distinctive capability that
fits a specific, evident social need (Dunfee and Hess, 2000).
Charitable contributions, the "buy" option, may be the select-
ed design option either when a firm lacks any specific capa-
bility to address a social need, yet the need is pressing, or
when existing institutions have excellent capabilities in the
area in which the firm seeks to invest. A "hybrid" strategy, or
public-private partnership, may be the option of choice when
the firm has something to give and gain from others when it
makes its social investments (Austin, 2000). A highly recog-
nizable partner, such as Amnesty International, may reduce
uncertainty for managers and increase the likelihood of repu-
tational benefits for the firm. Examples of such partnerships
abound (Sagawa and Segal, 2000) and seem to be increasing
(Zadek, 2001: 91). Categorizing corporate responses using
this scheme of make, buy, or hybrid can provide insight into
the factors that shape companies' investment and control
decisions surrounding responses to social ills.
Beyond their design, little is known about how companies
internally control, monitor, and discipline their social initia-
tives. First, how much do companies choose to invest, in
total and as a percentage of available investment capital, in
ameliorating societal ills? Economic logic suggests a level
that meets a bare minimum for deriving benefits for the firm
(Friedman, 1970), whereas behavioral research suggests that
standards of fairness (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986),
irrational by economic standards, may shape allocation deci-
sions. Second, corporate responses to social misery have
aims distinct from other corporate activities, so corporate
control of these initiatives warrants scrutiny as well. Under-
standing the forms of control used to steer social initiatives
toward their aims and exploring how those forms of control
commingle with traditional forms of financial control is central
to a descriptive research agenda. The calls for the Securities
and Exchange Commission to regulate disclosure of philan-
thropic contributions (Kahn, 1997; Bagley and Page, 1999;
Gillmor and Bremer, 1999) suggest that monitoring and con-
trol mechanisms are underdeveloped. With a variety of
instrumental, moral, political, and institutional considerations
motivating social initiatives, we need to know how corporate
social initiatives are monitored and disciplined.
Consequences. Although the financial effects of corporate
social performance have been extensively studied, little is
known about any other consequences of corporate social ini-
tiatives. Most notably, as calls for corporate involvement
increase, there is a vital need to understand how corporate
efforts to redress social misery actually affect their intended
beneficiaries. Again, a first step is simply to ascertain the
consequences and discern salient patterns. What are the
conditions under which positive consequences result for ben-
eficiaries? As firms become involved in fixing societal prob-
lems, we also need to know what happens to public political
processes. Kahn (1997: 635), for example, was concerned
about "the dangers implied by the concentration of not only
the factors of production, but also communal resources in
the hands of corporate management." The street protests
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against the work of the World Trade Organization (Economist,
1999) and both the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank (Economist, 2000) suggest that members of soci-
ety are asking these same kinds of questions. Some may
consider Friedman's (1970) concerns alarmist, but asking
companies to advance educational reform, assist with repro-
ductive health, and fund cancer research does give firms and
their executives significant influence over public policy, typi-
cally considered to be the domain of elected officials. How
do these investments affect the political sphere, most
notably democratic processes and accountability? Even if
these investments meet their intended humanitarian goals,
they might carry unintended consequences for government
functioning (Reich, 1998).
Looking beyond the content of corporate programs, the
processes through which corporate activities are generated,
selected, and implemented may have differential effects
worth uncovering. Understanding the consequences of cor-
porate involvement-the impact on targeted problems and on
the functioning of other civil and political institutions, as well
as on the firm itself-lies at the heart of questions about the
relationship between organizations and societies. Research
into those consequences can help highlight the tradeoffs of
seeking corporate involvement, inform decisions about when
to involve and when to limit such corporate involvement, and
guide policies for managing the consequences when compa-
nies do get involved. Examining and evaluating these conse-
quences, however, invites another line of inquiry, normative
in nature.
A Normative Research Agenda

Business organizations operate in the face of a sometimes
irreducible conflict between humanitarian needs and econom-
ic objectives. As descriptive research begins to capture what
companies are doing to respond, the pressing normative
question is, How should companies respond? Merton (1976:
88) recognized the problem almost thirty years ago: "Leaders
of business have only begun to wrestle with the problem of
how to do both in appropriate scale. For they are at work in a
rapidly changing moral environment which requires them to
make new assessments of purpose." When contrasted with
the clear normative positions evident in economic theories of
the firm, and when seen in the shadow of the stark antinomy
confronting organizations, organizational scholarship seems
conspicuously quiet, in need of a line of systematic philo-
sophical investigation. This integration of philosophical inquiry
into organization theory is long overdue (Zald, 1996).
Normative questions prompt two different types of inquiry
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995), one reflecting the common
social scientific use of the term "normative," and another, its
philosophical use. The social scientific use of normative
refers to instrumental and hypothetical guidance, grounded in
empirical findings and theories about cause-and-effect rela-
tionships. If one wishes to bring about certain outcomes,
then research suggests a set of actions that increases the
likelihood of those outcomes. In light of prior findings and
theoretical models that assemble those findings into orderly
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causal associations, normative guidance prescribes advisable

behavior if an actor wishes to achieve certain outcomes.
In its philosophical sense, and the way we use it here, nor-

mative refers to the underlying justification that gives moral
weight (Korsgaard, 1996b): the source of value that makes
certain options, decisions, and courses of action those wor-
thy of selection. The instrumental benefit of some courses of
action is one source of philosophically normative justification
but it begs the deeper question of why those outcomes
themselves are to be sought. Normative inquiry of the philo-
sophical sort investigates how we ought to act in light of
why, weighing various considerations, that is the right, just,
or good course of action (Scanlon, 1992).
Normative theory is directed toward actors on the cusp of
taking action. It is about clarifying and constructing the rea-
sons and grounds that ought to inform the actor's choice of
action, rather than discovering the causal explanations of
what will occur as a result of the action (Putnam, 1994; Kors-
gaard, 1996a, 1996b). It is not about advising a course of
action based on what will happen to air quality, profitability,
corporate reputation, or the docility of regulators if the com-
pany lowers factory emissions. Rather, it is about why, upon
considering options for action and their potential outcomes,
air quality and stock price are worthy of orienting action in
the first place and what the actor is to do if a course of
action will damage one of those objectives. Putnam (1994:
168) concisely captured the essence of this research orienta-
tion: ". . . the agent point of view, the first-person normative
point of view, and the concepts indispensable to that point of
view should be taken just as seriously as the concepts indis-
pensable to the third-person descriptive point of view." The
best way to meet this challenge is to build on our descriptive
work and follow a philosophical path to this new theory.
The approach to normative inquiry we propose starts with a
given situation and asks the question, How should I act?
(Moody-Adams, 1990; Korsgaard, 1996a: 205). An inductive
approach to normative theory begins with the set of consid-
erations-objectives, duties, and concerns--that arise in try-
ing to answer that question. From the start, an inductive
approach takes seriously the conflict among those considera
tions (Nussbaum, 1986: 81). The aim is to clarify each of the
salient objectives, duties, and concerns in light of one anoth-
er, permitting further specification of each and greater under
standing of the relationship among them (Richardson, 1997)
Tensions are not irritants to be removed by dismissing certai
considerations or justifying the preeminence of others.
Instead, the inductive approach uses tensions and inconsis-
tencies between considerations to prompt elaboration and
clarification of each objective, duty, and concern. The induc-
tive route travels from identifying a core set of consideration
(Rawls, 1971; Scanlon, 1992) to juxtaposing them so as to
elaborate their moral weight and refine them (Nussbaum,
1986; Richardson, 1997), especially in light of the specific sit
uation being examined. A framework for action is then form
lated by exploring how these considerations interact with fea
tures of the situation, specifying what is obligatory,
permissible, and prohibited.
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To take up our specific antinomy, a first step is to identify and
probe the set of objectives, duties, and concerns that arise
when business organizations confront the question of
whether to help redress human misery. We need to identify
the central considerations underlying the initial concerns and
judgments provoked by the question (Rawls, 1971; Scanlon,
1992). For example, at least three economic arguments
against corporate efforts need to be explored. The first repre-
sents the claims of property (Hsieh, 2003), claims that give
rise to concerns about misappropriation. The rightful
claimants to certain resources ought not to have those
resources used for purposes they neither license nor receive
compensation for. Second, there are concerns surrounding
efficiency (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999). Resources should
be devoted to purposes for which they are designed and not
misallocated to purposes for which they are not well suited.
Third, there are concerns of due process, which require that
even justifiable actions be taken in accord with procedures
that respect rights and afford subsequent accountability.
Juxtaposed to these three concerns are three forms of the
duty to aid and respond. First, there is the duty to respond
that attaches to a company when it contributes to the condi-
tions that necessitate a response, conditions that create
some form of cost, violation, or degradation that others bear.
This is the intuitively sensible but intellectually complex ter-
rain in which causal responsibility gives rise to moral respon-
sibility (Hart and Honor6, 1985; Schoeman, 1987). Second,
there is the duty to respond to deleterious or unjust condi-
tions from which a company benefits, but to which it has not
contributed (Hsieh, 2003). This is an acute extension of the
domain of fair play (Rawls, 1971; Applbaum, 1996; Phillips,
1997), in which the derivation of benefits (even from unwit-
ting parties) calls for some compensatory exchange. Even
when a company compensates those from whom it has
derived immediate benefits, such as assembly workers in
low-wage countries, further duties may exist because those
benefits are made possible by the persistence of unjust con-
ditions (Kant, 1963: 194-195; Herman, 2002). Third, there is
the duty of beneficence (Murphy, 2000; Herman, 2002): the
duty to promote the well-being of others, in particular to pro-
vide aid to prevent or relieve suffering or dire conditions
(Murphy, 2000: 3; Herman, 2002). The immediate fear is that
this last source of duty has no limit. Although seemingly insa-
tiable, the duty of beneficence has been circumscribed by
philosophers (Elster, 1989: 56; Murphy, 2000; Herman, 2002;
Hsieh, 2003) through what one philosopher has termed "the
collective principle of beneficence" (Murphy, 2000: 7): an
individual need only aid others to the extent that would be
required were everyone to comply with the duty to aid
others.
The purpose of inductive theory is to provide neither a way to

reconcile the two sets of considerations nor a method, theo-
ry, or argument that demonstrates the dominance of one set
of claims over another (Nussbaum, 1986; Richardson, 1997).
It is certainly possible that when cast in one another's light,
juxtaposed considerations might suggest means of reconcilia-
tion or illuminate the clear priority of some considerations
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over others. That would be a propitious product, but not the

intended purpose of inductive normative theorizing. The aim
is to understand the compelling grounds that exist for taking
alternative courses of action and to refine those grounds in
light of one another. To illustrate, when concern with efficien-
cy and misallocation is juxtaposed with the duty to aid, coun-
terintuitive conclusions may emerge. It may well be true that
companies are poorly suited to respond to illiteracy or conta-
minated water, problems to which, in addition, a company
has not contributed. But it may nonetheless be that corporate
efforts to ameliorate these problems are at least permissible,
if not obligatory. Under a duty of beneficence (Herman, 2002)
or assistance (Hsieh, 2003), firms have grounds for assisting
those in need, regardless of corporate culpability for the prob-
lem. If no other institutions are positioned or equipped as
well as business organizations to respond, then concerns
with misallocation look quite different from the classic case
in which a more efficient response is available. The converse
may also be true. For example, if the release of mercury into
water can be traced directly to a company, the strongest
grounds for obligatory response may exist. But concerns with
efficiency and proper allocation of institutional instruments
might suggest that, under some conditions, companies be
left as unencumbered as possible to fulfill a wealth-producing
purpose. As a result, even in those instances in which com-
panies either have a justifiable responsibility or their involve-
ment in redressing social misery would be valuable, society
should find alternative ways to fulfill the responsibility and
meet the need, so as not to dilute companies' capacity to
produce wealth. The duty to aid, in this case, looks quite dif-
ferent in the light of concerns for the efficient allocation of
societal resources.
This brief example can only outline the process of inductive

normative analysis, highlighting two of its features. The firs
is that normative inquiry of the inductive sort requires a sy
tematic process of setting competing objectives, duties, an
concerns side by side and exploring the range of conclusion
that can be drawn when interaction effects are explored. T
second is that this juxtaposition and analysis requires a retu
to the specific content of the situation that posed the ques-
tion of how to act in the first place. But then how does one
proceed with the motivating question, how should the firm
act? One proceeds by scrutinizing the conditions under wh
the vying considerations have been invoked.
If articulating the central considerations that bear on a norm
tive question is the first step of the inductive approach, and
juxtaposing those considerations in order to refine them ind
vidually and explore their relationship is the second step,
then a third step consists of working out how competing
considerations are to be integrated into a course of action.
Integration clarifies what is to be done, formulating a fram
work for action by exploring how the colliding consideratio
interact with features of the situation. For corporate social i
tiatives, three sets of features will interact with normative
considerations to shape the framework for action. How a
company should respond will be a function, in part, of fea-
tures of the problem, features of the company-in particular
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the company's relationship to the problem-and features of
the impact the company's response would have.
Features of the problem. Features of the specific societal ill
to which a company is considering a response include its
depth and breadth. The proper corporate response to a soci-
etal ill will hinge in part on the severity of the ill's effect on
essential human functioning (Herman, 2002). What is consid-
ered essential to human functioning is of course subject to
debate, so it is helpful to draw on the idea of human capabili-
ties advanced by Sen (1985, 1992, 1993) and Nussbaum
(1988, 2000). Based on Aristotle's conception of the virtues,
economic and anthropological research on developing coun-
tries, and political philosophy, Sen and Nussbaum identified
ten domains of human capability vital "to truly human func-
tioning that can command a broad cross-cultural consensus"
(Nussbaum, 2000: 74). They include such factors as bodily
health (having adequate nourishment, medical care, and shel-
ter), control over one's environment (effectively participating
in the political choices that govern one's life, holding proper-
ty, and access to employment), emotions (experiencing the
range of emotions essential to human life), and affiliation
(having meaningful personal and work relationships of mutual
recognition and dignity).
Whether the vying objectives, duties, and concerns intersect

to obligate, permit, or proscribe a corporate response will
hinge, in part, on the magnitude, the depth and breadth, of
the problem's consequences for these central human capabil-
ities. The preliminary assessment of depth focuses on
whether the problem plagues an essential human capability.
Then assessments of degree must be made. The severity of
the problem must be considered: does the problem entail
active impairment of a capability or failure to promote, but
not active impairment of, the capability? Alongside these two
assessments of depth, the breadth of the problem must also
be considered. How many capabilities are affected, and how
many people are affected? Sizing up the problem opens
many questions. For example, it can be difficult to distinguish
between an impairment and absence of enhancement. Illiter-
acy can be seen in either light. The line between essential
capabilities and less-than-essential capabilities can also be dif-
ficult to draw. Support for the arts may reasonably fall on
either side of that line. Our aim here is to sketch the process
of inquiry; the absence of clear answers underscores the
importance of dedicated attention to these questions.
Features of the firm. The features of the firm's relationship
to the problem also bear on how a company ought to
respond to a societal ill. First, there is the company's contri-
bution to the problem. Presumably, a problem created by the
firm, or one to which it has contributed sizably, will impose a
stronger duty to act than a problem not of the firm's making.
Second, the company's potential contribution to the prob-
lem's solution must be considered. The relevance of the
firm's capabilities and resources to the societal ill being con-
sidered bears on the efficiency and effectiveness of the com-
pany's response, which in turn shape the strength of an
imperative to respond. Third, the response required may vary
in strength with a company's proximity to, or extent of mem-
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bership in, the community in which the need arises (Herman,

2002). Finally, the duty to respond may also vary with the
benefits the corporation derives from the aggrieved con-
stituency (Hsieh, 2003). Chevron Texaco may have limited
firm-specific capability to provide what Nigerian communities
demand of it, but the integral presence of the company in
Escravos, Nigeria and the benefits the company derives from
its oil extraction facilities, even if those benefits are the result
of explicit legal contracts, may obligate or at least license the
firm to do more to redress societal problems there (Moore,
2002). Only systematic normative analysis can work out the
imperative of a response under these conditions.
Features of the impact. The anticipated impact of a corpo-
rate response will also determine the ethical standing of that
response. Features of the impact include the effects a corpo-
rate response is likely to have on the problem, on the larger
society, and on the firm itself. The results of our descriptive
research agenda should help decipher these impacts. These
likely consequences will bear on the determination of
whether a firm's response is permissible, prohibited, or even
obligated. Exploring how negative consequences are to be
weighed against positive consequences requires a thorough
normative analysis. A company that can provide a quicker
solution than a government agency to a problem may also, in
so doing, weaken (or retard the development of) political
institutions essential to representative democracy. How are
these consequences to be weighed, not only in determining
whether corporate action is permitted but, if it is permitted,
in shaping how a response is selected, designed, and imple-
mented?
Boundaries. Understanding the impact that a corporate

response might have is also essential for understanding where
the boundaries to corporate responses are erected. Contrary to
the fears of some and the hopes of others, the moral founda-
tions for corporate responses to misery do not necessarily dic-
tate that social objectives be given as much attention as eco-
nomic objectives. Business organizations may have duties and
responsibilities that reach beyond economic ones, but this
does not itself imply that those duties and responsibilities
require comparable attention, advancement, or resources.
There are two sorts of boundaries to consider. One set pro-
tects the recipients of aid, reflecting the negative conse-
quences that can result from efforts to provide assistance. For
example, the type and delivery of aid must aim to reverse
dependence rather than reinforce it (Herman, 2002; Hsieh,
2003; Rawls, 1999: 111). The second set protects the firm's
capacity to perform its primary function, or functions, reflecting
the potential impairment that responding to misery can entail.
If a primary function of a business organization is to produce
goods and services and, in so doing, generate wealth, then the
firm's capacity to perform that function receives special protec-
tion. Again, contrary to the hopes of some and fears of others,
this boundary is capacious. To be clear, it is the capacity of the
firm to perform one of its central functions that cannot be sac-
rificed, not actual performance of the function itself. If a com-
pany reduces its profitability or productivity in order to amelio-
rate misery, that is more likely to lie within the permissible
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boundary, whereas efforts to ameliorate misery that impair the
company's capacity to be profitable or productive would more
likely be prohibited.
CONCLUSION
Managers face a vexing reality. They must find a way to

their work even as seemingly rival financial and societal
demands intensify. To make matters worse, each deman
be justified or explained away by a particular conception
firm. These dueling conceptions have inspired a generati
organizational scholars to posit and demonstrate the econ
benefits of corporate responses to social misery. This ha
a considerable gap in our descriptive and normative theo
about the impact of companies on society. The scholarly
da we envision accepts this tension as a starting point. T
dispute among justifiable but competing demands reflect
reality that firms face in society today. By honoring the dis
and exploring the tension, we offer a different starting poi
organization theory and research. In the end, this new sc
ship can inform managers and citizens alike as we strugg
meet these daunting challenges.
The practical significance of the research agenda before
no less weighty than its theoretical implications. Public
sure to satisfy each set of responsibilities, to sharehold
and to other stakeholders, continues to mount (Useem,
1996; Paine, 2002). Accountability, however, can distort
behavior as much as it can enhance it (Lerner and Tetlock
1999). Organization theory and research may illuminate
organizations can move closer to actual fulfillment of th
responsibilities, rather than offering the mere appearan
doing so (King and Lenox, 2000). What organizational sc
ars have to say about corporate involvement in societal
affairs seems essential, for the risks of involving compa
in broad societal problems may match the risks of exclu
them: corporate involvement in addressing targeted prob
lems is no guarantee of improvement, and organization
only further insinuate themselves into all aspects of hum
life (Rosen, 1985; Kunda, 1992; Willmott, 1993). Corpora
involvement may well make problems worse, or even cr
new ones, while reducing companies' effectiveness as
nomic instruments.
What is being asked and expected of corporations today is

increasing even as the economic contractarian model of the
firm itself has revealed clear practical limitations (Gordon,
2002). The free market may not produce the inexorable
march toward worldwide prosperity and well-being that is so
often anticipated (Stiglitz, 2002). Even as business organiza-
tions may be imperfect instruments for advancing a narrowly
construed wealth-maximizing objective, ironically, they may
also be the entities of last resort for achieving social objec-
tives of all stripes. In the face of these challenges, organiza-
tion theory and research can contribute to the construction,
reform, and assessment of the organizations and institutions
that play such an essential role in society (Stern and Barley,
1996; Perrow, 2000; Hinings and Greenwood, 2002).
Manifest human misery and undeniable corporate ingenuity
should remind us that our central challenge may lie in blend-
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ing the two. The many organizational scholars who have

investigated the relationship between social and financial per-
formance have been eager to develop empirically informed
theory that stimulates, if not guides, practice. Paradoxically,
by acknowledging the fundamental tension that exists
between the roles corporations are asked to play, organiza-
tional scholars have the opportunity to inform practice-and
thereby help society-where past efforts to remove the ten-
sion have fallen short. Before rushing off to find the missing
link between a firm's social and financial performance, all in
hopes of advancing the cause of social performance, we
need to understand the conditions under which a corpora-
tion's efforts benefit society. This asks us to question corpo-
rate social performance and competing conceptions of the
firm down to their very roots. Personal values and commit-
ments will no doubt orient the theories we prefer and the
research questions we ask. To honor those values and com-
mitments, however, we must acknowledge and question
them. Such appraisals ensure the quality of our research and
the integrity of our commitments.
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Misery Loves Companies: Rethinking Social Initiatives by Business

Author(s): Joshua D. Margolis and James P. Walsh

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3556659

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268/Administrative Science Quarterly, 48 (2003): 268-305

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A Snapshot of Social Life in the World's Most Populous Nations, 2000

China 1,262.5 52.6 2.4/30.4 8 39 66 38 1/4 112 /66 15.9

more of each nation's wealth than those in the bottom 10

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Activity beyond the halls of government that focuses on th

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responsibility, therefore, constitute an effort to surmount the

THE POINT OF TENSION

Appeals for corporate involvement in ameliorating malnut

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The third form of the economic argument against corporate

The point of tension between a nexus of contracts approach

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The challenge facing those who advocate corporate social ini-

ORGANIZATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP ON BUSINESS IN

Aware of human suffering and alert to the challenge from

The Empirical CSP-CFP Literature

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Study Social performance Financial performance

Corporate social performance as independent

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Study Social performance Financial performance

Corporate social performance as independent

Klassen & McLaughlin (1996) Environmental awards and crises Market

275/ASO, June 2003

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Study Social performance Financial performance

Corporate social performance as independe

Kurtz & DiBartolomeo (1996) KLD evaluation Market

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Study Social performance Financial performance

Corporate social performance as dependent

* CEP = Council on Economic Priorities; EIA = Energy Information Association; EPA

captures the basic approaches for measuring soci

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What appears to be a definite link between CSP and CFP may

The Theoretical Stakeholder Literature

Freeman (1984) brought a formal consideration of stakeho

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twenty years ago. Tracing its indirect roots back to Adam

Taking stock of stakeholder theory, Donaldson and Preston

It is taken to be a practical necessity that stakeholder theory

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A preoccupation with instrumental consequences renders a

Exploring the Antinomy