Sentencing Modules
Sentencing Modules
Sentencing Modules
Table of Contents
MODULE 1: THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT...................................................................................................2
IMPACTS OF CONVICTION................................................................................................................................11
SENTENCING ORDERS WITHOUT CONVICTION...............................................................................................12
Dismissal (s 10(1)(a))..................................................................................................................................12
Conditional Release Order (CRO) without Conviction (Section 10(1)(b))...............................................13
Conviction without Further Penalty (s 10A)..............................................................................................13
Court Fine....................................................................................................................................................14
Community Correction Order (CCO): s8, Part 7.......................................................................................14
Intensive Correction Order (ICO): s7, Part 5............................................................................................15
Imprisonment (s5, Part 4)...........................................................................................................................15
SEVERITY OF SENTENCE..................................................................................................................................16
Module 1: Theories of Punishment
Leading legal theorist HLA Hart conceded, theories of punishment do not necessarily
explain what punishment is or achieves, but rather constitute “moral claims as to what
justifies the practice of punishment-claims as to why, morally, it should or may be
used”
o Therefore, discussions of punishment is highly normative.
Deterrence
Deterrence is concerned with preventing crime
o It is “forward-looking” in the sense that it views punishment in its capacity to
prevent individuals from breaking the law
o Most agree that punishment is not legitimate unless it serves as an effective
deterrent
o It is an ideology that is sustained by political “law and order” campaigns that
tougher punishments work to prevent crime.
Deterrence is modelled on particular assumptions about human nature
o People are rationally motivated to maximise pleasure and avoid pain
Therefore, it is the threat of pain and punishment, as opposed to their
own moral “goodness”, that ensures compliance.
o To motivate rational people, the punishment must also be proportionate to
both harm and culpability
o It is measured to have maximum individual and general deterrent effect
AKA, it prevents both recidivism for the individual as well as the
general effect of deterring other members of society
Punishment can only have a deterrent effect on people who have freely chosen to
break the law
o You should not apply punishment to conduct that was involuntary.
o This would excuse “individuals who could not know the law, who have acted
without intention, who have done the evil innocently, under an erroneous
supposition, or by irresistible constraint”
AKA people who have made a honest and reasonable mistake
o Also, for the law to be effective as a deterrent, it must formulated in advance
in clear and accessible terms, and there must be certainty and consistency of
enforcement.
The deterrent effect of the law is dependent on a wide range of factors:
▪️The publicity of the offence ▪️The nature of the offence
For example, in white collar crimes the deterrent effect may be reasonably high for a
number of reasons:
o The potential offenders are generally successful corporate players
They are economically rational, self-interested, knowledgeable about
the law and occupy a high social standing
The stigma of conviction involves significant social and professional
costs
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is also concerned with the prevention of crime, however, it differs from
deterrence in that it seeks to modify behaviour by changing or reforming the moral outlook of
the offender, rather than simply threatening or imposing a measure of pain to induce
compliance.
Incapacitation
Walker suggests that the “incapacitation” of dangerous individuals should be regarded as a
justification that is just as sound as all the other reasons for punishment. The modern idea of
incapacitation, removing the means and opportunity for future criminal offending, is linked
with assessments of risk and dangerousness.
The scope of preventative detention has expanded further with the introduction of
laws that permit detention beyond the term of the original sentence for preventative as
opposed to punitive purposes.
o “Such a statutory system could, one would hope, avoid the disadvantages of
indeterminate prison sentences by being based on periodic orders for
continuing detention in an institution other than a gaol and provide a
guarantee of regular and thorough review by psychiatric and other experts."
(Veen)
Restorative Justice
There is growing international social movement in favour of reconstructing criminal justice to
promote “restorative justice”.
There is no one singular definition for “restorative justice” since it emerged as a “unifying
banner”, encompassing a wide range of different methods and goals.
One definition is “a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific offence
collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications
for the future”
“Put simply, the focus of restorative justice is inclusive participation, reparation and
resolution”
Most restorative justice practices include an element of a meeting which brings together those
affected by a particular offence to decide how to deal with it.
In Australia, this occurs through a “conference” where the offender, victims, families
and a facilitator meet to discuss the impact of their actions and ways to repair the
harm done.
o E.g. Circle Sentencing or diversionary conferencing for young offenders
Restorative justice practices may reduce Because more than 90% of crimes are
some forms of crime more and rehabilitate untouched by State processes, it may have
offenders better no significant impact on the crime rate
Conferences are structurally fairer due to the In some cases, it may increase victims’ fears
nature of participation of revictimisation
Engenders greater procedural justice, which It can make victims props for attempts
in turn communicates respect towards offender rehabilitation
Conferencing is more cost-effective It can be a ‘shaming machine’ that worsens
stigmatisation
Restorative justice practices enrich freedom It may widen nets of social control (though
and democracy Braithwaite found this not be the case in
Australia or New Zealand)
It fails to redress structure problems
inherent in liberalism, like unemployment
and poverty. It may disadvantage women,
children, racial minorities. It may “trample
rights because of impoverished articulations
of procedural safeguards”
Conclusion
While theories of punishment have influenced the shape of the modern law, it is important to
recognise that the criminal law need not necessarily be tied to the search for the legitimacy of
State punishment.
These options acknowledge that the punitive effect of condemnation is neither always
needed, nor in fact desirable.
Common Law Purposes of Sentencing
Veen v The Queen sets out the common law approach to multiple purposes:
'… sentencing is not a purely logical exercise, and the troublesome nature of the sentencing
discretion arises in large measure from unavoidable difficulty in giving weight to each of the
purposes of punishment. The purposes of criminal punishment are various: protection of
society, deterrence of the offender and of others who might be tempted to offend, retribution
and reform. The purposes overlap and none of them can be considered in isolation from the
others when determining what is an appropriate sentence in a particular case. They are
guideposts to the appropriate sentence but sometimes they point in different directions.'
PURPOSES OF SENTENCING
The purposes for which a court may impose a sentence on an offender are as follows:
(a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence,
(b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar
offences,
(g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and the community.
Note that there is no guidance on how to rank or interpret the purposes in s 3A however the
HCA ruled that the common law approach to multiple purposes still applies:
A sentencing judge or magistrate has a range of sentencing options to choose from depending
on circumstances:
Type of offence
Prior offences
Jurisdictional limits applicable to the court
Impacts of Conviction
The impacts of sentence and conviction are far-ranging and long-lasting, and may impact on
a person’s ability to fully participate in the community for many years after the sentence
imposed.
Consider this in light of the pressures to plead guilty and the prevalence of
‘convenience pleas’
Criminal records may be accessed by a variety of stakeholders such as prospective
employers.
Some of the non-legal and non-criminal law impacts of conviction may include:
o implications in family law proceedings involving the custody of the person's child.
Dismissal (s 10(1)(a))
Even if an offender pleads or is proven guilty, the sentencing court has a discretion to
make an order under s 10(1)(a) where the offence is ‘proven’ but the relevant charges
are dismissed without a record of conviction or the imposition of any further penalty.
Usually reserved for minor summary offences for people who have no, or a very
limited, prior record.
There is also a range of optional additional conditions that may be imposed at the court’s
discretion:
(The conditions imposed will depend on the person’s circumstances and their relationship to
the offending.)
Court Fine
o Fines, or pecuniary penalties, developed at common law as an alternative to
imprisonment. In NSW, sentencing courts do not have the power to impose a fine
on an adult without also recording a conviction – even if the fine is imposed for a
trivial offence such as offensive language.
o Some offences are ‘fine only’ offences, while other offences carry a maximum
penalty of a fine, a period of imprisonment or both. The maximum fine available
for an offence is specified in the relevant legislation as a number of ‘penalty
units’. The current value of 1 penalty unit in NSW is $110.
A CCO requires a person to comply with certain conditions for a specified period of
time, up to a maximum of 3 years.
There are two mandatory conditions that a person subject to a CCO must comply
with:
1) They must not commit any offence
2) They must appear before the court if called on to do so at any time during the
term of the CCO
There is also a range of optional additional conditions that may be imposed at the
court’s discretion. The available conditions are the same as those available in respect
of CROs, as well as the following, more restrictive conditions: a curfew; and/or
community service work.
If a person fails to comply with conditions of the CCO, the sentence may be re-
determined
Severity of Sentence
As well as deciding upon the type of sentence, the court must also decide upon the
appropriate severity of the penalty imposed.
For imprisonment and fines, the maximum penalty is set by legislation.
Roles in Sentencing
Role of Defence
Defence lawyers have a duty to raise matters at sentence that are relevant and in their
client’s favour (KAB)
Unlike prosecutors, the defence can make submissions to the court about an
appropriate sentence (EF v R)
“Intuition” or “instinct” suggests the idea that there is some innate force, talent or
expertise that resides within the judge that cannot be “learnt” or “taught”
However, sentencing is a social, legal and political practice embedded in a specific
professional context.
As Hutton explains, it is woven from “a sentencer’s experience both as a judge and
as counsel, from the local working culture of the court, from the informal
professional culture of the various branches of the judiciary, and from the training
judges receive”
o “judicial wisdom and experience”
The acceptance of the role of instinctive synthesis in the judicial sentencing process is not
opposed to the concern for predictability and consistency in sentencing that underpins the
rule of law and public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The synthesising
task is conducted after a full and transparent articulation of the relevant considerations
including an indication of the relative weight to be given to those considerations in the
circumstances of the particular case. The instinctive synthesis approach does not prevent the
use of adjectives or adverbs or indications that this or these factors makes or make the case
more or less serious than other cases or are the critical features of the case.And judicial
instinct does not operate in a vacuum of random selection. On the contrary, instinctive
synthesis involves the exercise of a discretion controlled by judicial practice, appellate
review, legislative indicators and public opinion. Statute, legal principle and community
values all confine the scope in which instinct may operate. Thejudicial wisdom involved in
the instinctive synthesis approach is therefore likely to lead to better outcomes than the
pseudo-science of two-tier sentencing. At all events, I am not satisfied that two-tier
sentencing is a better method or process than the instinctive synthesis method that has been
the traditional approach of common lawjudges. (at [84))
Kirby J: With all respect to those of the different opinion, the phrase "instinctive synthesis"
sends quite the wrong signals for the law of sentencing in Australia. Who are those who have
the "instincts" in question? Only the judges. This is therefore a formula that risks
endorsement of the deployment of purely personal legal power. It runs contrary to the
tendency in other areas of the law, notably administrative law, to expose to subsequent
scrutiny the use of public power by public officials. It is contrary to the insistence of
Australian courts, including this Court, thatjudicial officers must give reasons for their
decisions. At this stage in the development of the Australian law of sentencing, this Court
should be encouraging, not impeding, transparency and accountability ofjudicial decision
making. I remain of the view that "[i]t is too late (and undesirable) to return to unexplained
judicial intuition". Talk of "instinctive synthesis" is like the breath of a bygone legal age. It
resonates with a claim, effectively, to unexplainable and unreviewable power.
So analysed, the residue of this judicial debate over twenty years - in this Court over the past
five years - is revealed for what it is.Australianjudges must now express their obeisance to an
"instinctive synthesis" as the explanation of their sentencing outcomes. It might be prudent
for them to avoid mention of "two stages" or of mathematics. Yet in many instances (and
increasingly by statutory prescription) ifjudges do so, no error of sentencing principle will
have occurred. Such mention may, in fact, sometimes even be required. The lofty and
absolute prescriptions of Williscro.ft and Young remain in place like the two vast and
trunkless legs of stone of Ozymandias. But, with all respect, they are now beginning to look
just as lifeless. One day, I expect that travellers to the antique land of this part of the law of
sentencing will walk this way without knowing that the two proscriptions once were there. (at
[129), [139))
Nicholas Cowdrey
“The modern historical objective of sentencing in our system is to make the
punishment fit the crime and the criminal. It is not possible for the relevant sentencing
considerations to be identified accurately and comprehensively in advance of the
offending (as Parliament would have to do in order to be able to fix just sentences in
legislation). There must be left scope for discretion, to be exercised in a judicial
fashion (and not arbitrarily or capriciously). The alternative is not justice.”
Maximum Penalties
The maximum penalty for an offence is reserved for those cases that are considered so
grave as to warrant the maximum penalty for the offence. But there is no ‘worst
instance’ of offending for a particular offence (Veen v The Queen)
The maximum penalty should be considered a yardstick or guide (set by parliament)
that compares the current court case and the worst category of case for that offence
(Markarian v The Queen)
Objective seriousness is like a spectrum on which the offending falls – the maximum
penalty is reserved for offending at the most serious end of that spectrum.
A sentencing court must acknowledge the maximum penalty for the offence, and
considering the wrong maximum penalty will be an error (R v Mason)
Objective Seriousness
A sentencing court must make an assessment about where the offending before it sits
on the range of objective seriousness for offences of that type. In other words, a
court is to consider the gravity of the offending viewed objectively; that is, looking at
the objective circumstances of the offending.
Objective factors are found under Section 21A(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)
o Including the degree of planning (s 21A(2)(n))
o the offending committed in the company of one or more other persons (s
21A(2)(e))
o was committed in the presence of a child (s 21A(2)(ea))
o the offender used or threatened to use violence or a weapon (ss 21A(2)(b),
(c)),
o the offending caused substantial loss or damage (s 21A(2)(g)).
"Assessment of the objective gravity of an offence forms a significant part of the
sentencing process with respect to all offences... In sentencing for an offence … a
court should make an assessment of the objective gravity of the offence applying
general law principles, so that all factors which bear upon the seriousness of the
offence should be taken into account (unless excluded by statute). Factors such as
motive, provocation or non-exculpatory duress may be taken into account in this way.
Regard may be had to factors personal to the offender that are causally connected
with or materially contributed to the commission of the offences, including (if it be
the case) a mental disorder or mental impairment." (Tepania v The Queen)
A court should indicate if the offending before it is in the lower, middle or upper
range of objective seriousness.
Setting a NPP
The NPP should not be less than 75% of the head sentence (s 44(2))
o There are many instances where a court will depart from this (i.e. “special
circumstances” that warrant that departure: s 44(2))
o That could include that the person requires a longer period on parole to assist
in rehabilitation, usually given to young offenders
Guideline Judgements
Guideline judgements basically provide clear parameters from parliament when
sentencing a person for a particular offence.
A guideline judgement might set out an appropriate sentencing range where the
objective seriousness of the offending and the defendant’s subjective circumstances
are of a particular nature.
There are only a few guideline judgements in NSW, covering the following offences or
sentencing processes:
i) high range PCA (drink driving);
ii) taking into account offences on a Form 1;
iii) taking into account guilty pleas (although this is slightly affected by later
legislative amendments referred to earlier in this module);
iv) break, enter & commit an indictable offence therein;
v) armed robbery
vi) dangerous driving
In the short comments below, Russell Hogg reminds us that mandatory penalty laws
don’t obliterate discretion – they shift it from judges to prosecutors.
Julia Quilter also points out that appellate courts are not always simply resisting the
legislature’s pushes towards more punitive sentencing and being responsive to public
opinion – they are sometimes leading the way.
Discounts
S22 deals with a guilty plea being taken into account
S25D sets out discounts
Any discount for a guilty plea should bbe applied after the otherwise sentence has
been determined
S22A allows for lesser penalties for conducing their case in a way that ‘facilitates the
administration of justice’ – ie the degree which the cooperated in pre-trial processes
Disadvantaged
In recognising that a background of disadvantage “may leave its mark on a
person throughout life” and “is a feature of the person’s make-up”, the High
Court in Bugmy addressed one of the key constraints that had limited the
application of the Fernando principles: the plurality emphatically stated
that the impacts of such a background do not diminish over time, nor
with repeated contact with the criminal process, and must be given “full
weight” in every sentencing exercise (at [44]).
The High Court was careful to point out, however, that any such reduction in
moral culpability will not be inevitable or automatically lead to a more
lenient sentence. The relevance of the person's background will always be
determined in the context of all of the facts and circumstances of the case,
including the need to give weight to the other purposes of sentencing (such as
protection of the community).
As noted above, at [44], the High Court pointed out that a finding that the relevant
principles apply does not automatically lead to a more lenient sentence:
“Giving weight to the conflicting purposes of punishment is what makes the exercise
of the discretion so difficult. An offender's childhood exposure to extreme violence
and alcohol abuse may explain the offender's recourse to violence when frustrated
such that the offender's moral culpability for the inability to control that impulse may
be substantially reduced. However, the inability to control the violent response to
frustration may increase the importance of protecting the community from the
offender.”
Proportionality (s 3A(a))
This is a reflection of the common law principle of
proportionality: R v Scott
While a person must be adequately punished for an offence
they are found to have committed, a sentencing court must
also be careful not to impose an unduly harsh sentence (such
as one that is crushing on the person). Proportionality dictates
that the sentence should reflect the objective gravity, or
objective seriousness, of the offending – the sentence should
be proportionate to that gravity: Veen v The Queen (No
2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472.
Consistency
It is essential that sentencing courts are consistent in the application of
relevant legal principles. Sentencing courts should be concerned
with "consistency in the application of the relevant legal principles, not
some numerical or mathematical equivalence": Hili v The Queen
Parity
Similar to consistency, parity is also concerned with treating like cases alike: Green
v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462 [28]. However, ensuring parity focuses more on
consistency among related defendants, whether they are co-offenders in the same
criminal enterprise, or had some involvement in that enterprise leading to a particular
charge (i.e., they do not need to be co-offenders for parity to be in issue: Jimmy v
R [2010] NSWCCA 60 [245]-[246]). The parity principle was perhaps best
summarised by Dawson J in Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606, 623:
"There is no rule of law which requires co-offenders to be given the same sentence
for the same offence even if no distinction can be drawn between them. Obviously
where the circumstances of each offender or his involvement in the offence are
different then different sentences may be called for but justice should be even-
handed... [A]ny difference between the sentences imposed upon co-offenders for
the same offence ought not to be such as to give rise to a justifiable sense of a
grievance on the part of the offender with the heavier sentence or to give the
appearance that justice has not been done"
The best way is for the same judge or magistrate to sentence each related
defendant. This practice is strongly encouraged by the High Court and NSWCCA:
see, for example, Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; Adams v R [2018]
NSWCCA 139 [81].
Setting a Sentence
Imprisonment
There are a number of important steps a court must take when imposing a sentence
of imprisonment, including:
o setting a non-parole period, unless the court decides not to (s 45) or the
sentence is six months or less (s 46): s 44(1).
The court may also decide to impose what is known as an aggregate sentence of
imprisonment. This is where the court imposes an overall sentence for two or more
offences. Section 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) sets
out the process the court is required to follow when imposing such a sentence,
including by indicating what sentences would have been imposed for each of the
individual offences (known as the 'indicative' sentence): s 53A(2)(b). For a useful
(albeit thorough) explanation of the purpose of aggregate sentences and the
intention behind s 53A.
Totality
When a court is sentencing a person for multiple offences, the court must ensure
that the aggregation of all of the sentences is a "just and appropriate measure of the
total criminality involved": Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295, 307-308
(McHugh J). The need to maintain an appropriate relationship between the totality of
the criminality involved in a series of offences and the totality of the sentences to be
imposed for those offences is critical to avoid crushing sentences.
The NSWCCA explained the need to avoid this eventuality in R v MAK [2006]
NSWCCA 381 (at [17]):
"[A]n extremely long overall sentence may be crushing on an offender in the sense
that it will induce a feeling of hopelessness and destroy any expectation of a useful
life after release. This effect both increases the severity of the sentence to be served
and also destroys such prospects as there may be of rehabilitation and reform. Of
course, in many cases of multiple offending, the offender may not be entitled to the
element of mercy entailed in adopting such a constraint."
The severity of a sentence is not simply the product of a linear relationship. As
Malcolm CJ said in R v Clinch (1994) 72 A Crim R 301, 306:
"... the severity of a sentence increases at a greater rate than any increase in the
length of the sentence. Thus, a sentence of five years is more than five times as
severe as a sentence of one year. Similarly, while a sentence of seven years may be
appropriate for one set of offences and a sentence of eight years may be
appropriate for another set of offences, each looked at in isolation. Where both sets
were committed by the one offender a sentence of 15 years may be out of proportion
to the degree of criminality involved because of the compounding effect on the
severity of the total sentence of simply aggregating the two sets of sentences."
A sentencing court must, however, take care when applying the totality principle.
Public confidence in the administration of justice requires the Court to avoid any
suggestion that what is in effect being offered is some kind of a discount for multiple
offending: R v Knight (2005) 155 A Crim R 252 [112].
For similar reasons, in a case where an person who is already serving other
sentences comes to be sentenced for additional offences, the impression must not
be given that no, or little, penalty is imposed for the additional offences.
There may also be specific implications for people convicted or sentenced for certain
offences that a court must explain, including that they may be subject to the Crimes
(High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) regime (see s 25C(1) of that Act).