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3Republic of tbe flbilippine9'
~upreme <!Court
;Jffilanila
EN BANC
ROSANNA L. TAN-AND AL, G.R. No. 196359

Petitioner,
Present:
GESMUNDO, CJ,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
HERNANDO,
CARANDANG,
-versus- LAZARO-JAVIER
INTING,
ZALAMEDA,*
LOPEZ, M.V.
DELOS SANTOS,
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO, and
LOPEZ, J.Y., JJ
MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, Promulgated:
Respondent. =:;Z;;J;,~~~~~~~
x--------- .--------------------------------------------
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Given the variability and intensity of intimate human relationships,

Article 36 of the Family Code on psychological incapacity as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage was intended to be humane and evolved on
a case-to-case basis, but resilient in its application. However, diametrically
opposed to this intent, this Court's interpretation of the provision-
f
* no part
Decision 2 G.R. No. 196359
beginning with Santos v. Court ofAppeals 1 and Republic v. Court ofAppeals

and Molina 2-has proven to be restrictive, rigid, and intrusive on our rights
to liberty, autonomy, and human dignity.
It is time to restate the current doctrine in light of the evolution of

science, subsequent cases, and other contemporary circumstances.
This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the
Court of Appeals' Decision4 and Resolution 5 The Court of Appeals reversed
and set aside the Decision 6 of the Regional Trial Court that voided the
marriage between Rosanna L. Tan-Andal and Mario Victor M. Andal due to
psychological incapacity. The trial court likewise awarded the sole custody
of the parties' daughter, Ma. Samantha, to Rosanna.
Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna)

married on December 16, 1995 at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish in
Poblacion, Makati City. 7 On July 27, 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma.
Samantha, the only child of the parties. 8 The family lived in a duplex in
Para:fiaque City, with Rosanna's parents living in the other half of the
duplex. 9
After four years of marriage, Mario and Rosanna separated in 2000. 10

Rosanna has since kept the sole custody of Ma. Samantha. 11
On December 18, 2001, Mario filed a Petition 12 for custody of Ma.

Samantha before the Regional Trial Court. Mario argued that he and his
wife had equal rights to the custody of Ma. Samantha, thus praying that he
be allowed to exercise parental authority over his daughter. 13
On August 6, 2003, Rosanna filed a Petition 14 for declaration of

nullity of her marriage, claiming that Mario was psychologically
3 IO Phil. 21 (1995) [Perl. Vitug, En Banc].

2
335 Phil. 664 (I 997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
Rollo, pp. 8-450.
4
Id. at 71-90. The February 25, 2010 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso
and was concurred in by Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Rodi! V. Zalameda (now a Justice
of this Court) of the Special Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
Id. at 92. The April 6, 2011 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso and was
concurred in by Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Rodi! V. Zalameda (now a Justice of this
Court) of the Former Special Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
6
Id. at 93-102. The May 9, 2007 Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Jaime M. Ouray of the
Regional Trial Court of Parafiaque City, Branch 260.
7
Id. at 73. Court of Appeals Decision.
Id.
9
Id. at 15-16. Petition for Review.
10 Id. at 302. Psychiatric Evaluation.
11 Id. at 108. Petition for Custody.
12
Id. at I 07-I 09. Petition for Custody, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0228.
13
Id. at I 08.
14 Id. at J3 8-164. Docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0384.
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her.
The Regional Trial Court ordered the prosecutor to report on the

parties' possible collusion in filing the Petition. 15 In a February 18, 2004
Report, 16 Prosecutor Gil V. Savedia declared that he found no signs of
collusion between Mario and Rosanna.
The cases for custody and declaration of nullity were then

consolidated in a September 2, 2004 Order. 17
According to Rosanna, she first met Mario in 1975 through the Legion
of Mary at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish in Ma.kati. 18 They wrote each
other letters until 1978, when they lost contact with each other. 19
The parties reconnected in 1995 when Mario sought out Rosanna

through their childhood friends. 20 When they finally met again, Mario was
in the Philippines for a two-month vacation from his work in Italy. 21 He
then persisted in asking out Rosanna for a date. As Mario was set to leave in
June 1995, Rosanna agreed to have dinner with him. 22
Mario then courted Rosanna, declaring that he had been in love with
her for the past 20 years. 23 Rosanna eventually fell in love with Mario and
agreed to be his girlfriend. 24
Mario did not leave for Italy in June, giving him more time to spend
with Rosanna. 25 On June 17, 1995, Mario proposed and Rosanna agreed to
marry him in December that year. 26
While they were together, Rosanna noticed that there were times when
27
Mario "would be unaccounted for a whole night or an entire day[.]'' When
28
asked where he went, Mario would allegedly say that he was working.
Mario also kept postponing his trip back to Italy. When asked why,
Mario would either say that he was with friends or that he was "preparing
15 Id. at 182. Report.

i, Id.
17 Id. at 190.
18 Id. at 138. Petition.
19 Id. at 139.
20
Id.
,1 Id.
22 Id.
'' Id.
24 Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27 Id.
zs Id.
for [his and Rosanna's] future." 29 Since Mario was allegedly affectionate
whenever they were together, Rosanna believed him. 30
According to Rosanna, Mario once told her of a plan to blow up a ship

to get back at a Taiwanese national who had cheated on his friend in a
business deal. 31 Rosanna first thought that Mario had been joking, but when
Mario appeared serious about his plan, she said that she did not want to get
involved in any of his "shady deals." 32
In July 1995, Mario finally left for Italy, promising Rosanna that he
would be back by November for their December wedding. 33 However,
Mario was back by September, barely two months after he had left. It turned
out that Mario had quit his job. 34
After Mario's return, Rosanna noticed that Mario always went out at
night and would come back home at dawn, either alone or with his friends. 35
He also had difficulty in managing his finances, with his siblings allegedly
calling Rosanna and telling her that their brother was financially incapable
of supporting a family. 36 However, Rosanna was already deeply in love with
Mario, so she told his sisters that she accepted Mario for who he was. 37
Nevertheless, there were times when Mario would allegedly be

extremely irritable and moody, causing Rosanna to have second thoughts
about marrying him. 38 However, by November 1995, Rosanna was already
pregnant with their child. 39 When Rosanna told Mario about it, he became
more eager to marry her. He even gave Rosanna US$1,000.00, the only
money he had, before their wedding. 40
Instead of spending the US$1,000.00 for their wedding, Rosanna

returned the money to Mario and encouraged him to open a current account
for his personal expenses. Mario accepted the money back. 41 The parties
eventually married on December 16, 1995. 42
Since Mario had no work, Rosanna taught him to run Design and
Construction l\1atrix, the construction firm she had set up before she married
29 Id. at I 40.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34
Id. at 141.
3s Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 141-142.
39 Id. at 142.
40 Id.
41
Id.
42 Id. at 73.
Decision 5 GR. No. 196359
Mario. She also introduced Mario to firm clients and brought him with her
to client meetings. 43
Mario, however, continued with his "emotional immaturity,

irresponsibility, irritability, and psychological imbalance." 44 He would leave
their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his whereabouts.
Once he returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for
days. 45 Mario was also "hyper-active"46 late at night.
Rosanna confronted Mario about his behavior. To Rosanna's shock,

Mario admitted that he was using marijuana, although he claimed that he
was not addicted and that he could stop anytime. 47 He then promised to stop
using it. 48
Not keeping his promise, Mario continued with his drug use. 49
The day after Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, Mario allegedly
did not assist Rosanna. He left her in the hospital, knowing that she could
not move until the effects of the spinal anesthesia had worn off. He only
returned to the hospital later that evening to sleep. 50
When Rosanna and Ma. Samantha were discharged from the hospital,
Mario showed symptoms of paranoia. He thought everyone was out to
attack him and, at times, would hide Ma. Samantha from those he thought
were out to hurt them. 51
Mario would also take large cash advances from Design and
Construction Matrix every week. 52 Rosanna only learned of Mario's
numerous cash advances when an accounting personnel informed her that
the firm could no longer pay the construction workers' salaries. 53
Rosanna eventually got tired of Mario. She left him, brought Ma.
Samantha with her, and stayed in an inn. She called up Mario to tell him of
her and Ma. Samantha's whereabouts. Mario followed them to the inn and
pleaded Rosanna to give him another chance. After Mario's pleas, Rosanna
returned home with Ma. Samantha. 54
43 Id. at 143.
44 Id.
45
Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at I43-144.
48 Id. at 144.
,, Id.
50 Id.
51
Id.
52 Id. at I44-145.
53
Id. at 145.
54 Id.
Later, an employee at the firm handed Rosanna a packet of shabu that

the employee allegedly found among Mario's office belongings. When she
checked, Rosanna herself found packets of shabu among Mario's
possessions. 55
When Rosanna again confronted Mario about his drug use, he

explained that it was the only way he could normally function due to the
heavy pressures of work at the firm. 56
In October 1998, Ma. Samantha had dengue fever and had to be

confined at the hospital. Mario was not home and could not be reached. He
arrived at the hospital only later that evening. He would then run around the
different floors of the hospital, checking the medications prescribed to other
dengue fever patients. He would also prevent the nurses from administering
the prescribed medications to Ma. Samantha. When Ma. Samantha vomited,
Mario, who was just sleeping by his daughter's side, would not clean her up.
He would instead ignore the ill child, tum to the other side, and continue
sleeping. 57
Having had enough of Mario, Rosanna drove him out of the house.
After several days, Mario returned home and pleaded Rosanna for another
chance. Rosanna accepted Mario back, but kept a close eye on him. 58
Later in November, Mario allegedly asked one of their helpers to

prepare some clothes, feeding bottles, and milk for Ma. Samantha. Ma.
Samantha's nanny noticed the helper fixing the bag, so she asked Rosanna
where they would take the child. Rosanna, who was then working in their
home office, rushed to Mario and asked him where he was bringing Ma.
Samantha. Mario replied that he would only bring the child to Manila
Memorial Park. 59
Rosanna prohibited Mario from bringing Ma. Samantha out. She then
called up Mario's siblings for help. Mario got furious, threatened everyone
in the house, and left without returning home. 60
After he had left, Mario made purchases using his supplementary

credit card. Rosanna discovered that Mario used up the PI0,000.00 credit
limit of his Citibank Mastercard and the PS,000.00 credit limit of his Bank
of the Philippine Islands card. Mario also purchased an Pll,000.00 necklace
55
Id. at 145-146.
56
Id. at 146.
57
Id. at 146--147.
58
Id. at 147.
59 Id. at 147-148.
60
Id. at 148.
at the Landmark Department Store in Makati. 61
Several days after he had left home, Mario tried to return, but Rosanna
turned him away. Mario banged the door, shouting, "Buksan niyo ito kundi
sisirain ko ito!" 62 Fearing Mario, Rosanna called her parents and beeped
Mario's sisters for help. When Rosanna's parents and Mario's sisters
arrived, however, Mario had already left. 63
Later that day, Mario was found loitering near the house. With him
were some travel documents, cash, and a checklist of European countries
with the respective visa requirements for entry of a child for each country. 64
After the door-banging incident, Mario's siblings brought him to the

Medical City for detoxification. On November 29, 1998, Mario was
committed for treatment at the Medical City for 14 days. After conducting
tests on Mario, the doctors found him positive for drug use. Mario's siblings
were then advised to commit him to a drug rehabilitation center for
treatment. However, defying the doctor's orders, they had him discharged
from the hospital without bringing him to a drug rehabilitation facility. 65
Rosanna eventually closed Design and Construction Matrix due to

financial losses. Mario's access to the company funds for his drug use
allegedly used up the funds. 66 To sustain her and her family's needs,
Rosanna searched for a job and eventually worked as an executive assistant
at the Government Service Insurance System Financial Center. 67
Rosanna decided to have a duplex built on a lot in Parafiaque City that

her aunt, Rita M. Tan, had donated on August 25, 1998.68 Rosanna, Mario,
and Ma. Samantha would live in one apartment, and Rosanna's parents
would live in the other apartment. 69
To save rent on the Makati apartment where they used to live, Mario,
Rosanna, and Ma. Samantha moved into the unfinished Parafiaque duplex.
At first, Mario hesitated to move in, but he eventually agreed and asked that
a four-square meter room at the back of the duplex be constructed. The
small room would allegedly be Ma. Samantha's playroom. Rosanna /
opposed Mario as the room would be too small to be a playroom, but Mario
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 149.
66
Id.
67 Id. at 297. Psychiatric Evaluation.
68 Id. at 150. Petition. See also Deed of Donation of Real Property and Acceptance Thereof, ro//o, pp.
268-271.
insisted on its construction.70
The four-square meter room was eventually constructed, and Mario

had an air conditioning unit installed inside. He also brought in a television
set, a computer table, and some personal belongings into the room. He
would then spend days in the room alone and, at times, would even bring
Ma. Samantha with him. He even tinkered with the electrical wires of the
duplex. 71
In July 1999, an electrician working on the wires of the house opened

the door to the small room. He found Mario and Ma. Samantha inside, with
the room filled with smoke that did not quite smell of cigarettes. The
electrician informed Rosanna of what he saw, and Rosanna knew that Mario
relapsed into his drug use. 72
Rosanna confronted Mario and pleaded with him to get treated.

However, Mario got furious and Ma. Samantha, who saw her parents
fighting, started crying. To protect Ma. Samantha, Rosanna brought the
child to her parents on the other side of the duplex. 73
Mario followed them to his parents-in-laws' house, forcing himself in

to get Ma. Samantha. Rosanna had to call for police assistance to pacify
Mario. 74
Mario eventually calmed down when the police arrived. The police
then searched Mario, finding packets of shabu in his person. They were
about to bring Mario to the police station for detention when Rosanna
pleaded with them not to take Mario. The police agreed, but they released
Mario to his sister, Ma. Socorro. 75
The next day, Rosanna tried to call Ma. Socorro to ask about Mario,
but her calls were unanswered. Rosanna later learned that Mario had
escaped from Ma. Socorro's house earlier that moming. 76
It was after these incidents that Rosanna petitioned77 the Regional

Trial Court to voluntarily commit Mario for drug rehabilitation at the
National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, and,
f
78
eventually, at the Seagulls Flight Foundation (Seagulls).
70 Id. at 150-151.
71
ld.atl51.
Tl Id.
73
Id. at 151-152.
74 Id. at 152.
75 Id.
76
Id.
77 Id. at 126. Petition for Confinement of a Drug Dependent in a Center.
78 Id. at 128. July 28, 1999 Letter.
On February 14, 2000, Mario escaped from Seagulls,79 returning home

and pleading with Rosanna to take him in again. Rosanna took her husband
in, but Mario would again relapse into his drug use. He was also jobless and
could not support his family. 80
In June 2000, Ma. Samantha had to be rushed to the hospital for

frequent vomiting. Mario, who was at home, did nothing, and Rosanna had
to absent herself from work to rush the child to the hospital. Rosanna, who
had no money with her that time, had to borrow money from Ma.
Samantha's nanny. Rosanna's parents and siblings also shared in the child's
hospital bills. 81
In August 2000, Ma. Samantha again had severe upper respiratory

tract infection and frequent vomiting. When her nanny was about to give
her medicine, Mario prevented the nanny from doing so, saying that
mangoes would cure Ma. Samantha. 82
Two days later, Mario insisted on bringing Ma. Samantha to Makati

Medical Center. Rosanna suggested that they instead bring Ma. Samantha
together the next day, which was a Saturday. Mario suddenly yelled out,
"Magnanakaw!" Rosanna, already exasperated, drove Mario out of the
house. Mario, however, dashed to the second floor, still yelling,
"Magnanakaw ! Magnanakaw !" 83
Police officers later arrived at their home, having been called by

Rosanna and Mario's neighbors who had heard the screams coming from
their house. Rosanna explained that it was her husband who was yelling and
that he was a drug dependent who failed to complete his rehabilitation
program. The police then brought Mario to the police station for
questioning. 84
Ma. Samantha saw her father screaming and the police taking him
with them. The child cried and had to be brought to her grandparents' house
to be pacified. 85
Already at a loss with what to do, Rosanna phoned the director of

Seagulls, who recommended that Mario be recommitted to the rehabilitation
f
center to complete his rehabilitation program. 86 ·
79 Id. at 130. August 4, 2000 Order.
so Id. at 154-155. Petition.
81 Id.at 156.
82
Id. at 157.
83 Id. at 157-158.
84
Id. at 158.
85
Id.
86 Id.
Thus, Rosanna informed the trial court of Mario's relapse, causing the
trial court to order87 Mario's recommitment to Seagulls. Mario remained
confined there until December 24, 2000, when the rehabilitation center
released Mario without completing his rehabilitation program. 88
Rosanna wrote the trial court as to Mario's premature release from the
rehabilitation center. 89 Since Mario's release on December 24, 2000,
Rosanna and Mario had separated and had not lived together. Mario also
failed to give support to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha. 90
These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario's psychological

incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. Rosanna
contended that Mario's drug use was the manifestation of a grave personality
disorder "deeply rooted within [Mario's] adaptive system." 91 She thus
prayed that the trial court nullify their marriage and that she be declared the
sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land donated to her by her aunt as
well as the duplex built on it. 92
To prove Mario's psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr.

Valentina Del Fonso Garcia (Dr. Garcia), a physician-psychiatrist, as expert
witness.
In her Judicial Affidavit, 93 Dr. Garcia declared that she interviewed

Rosanna and gathered data on Rosanna's family, educational, and
employment history. She likewise conducted mental status examinations on
Rosanna.
For data on Mario's social, sexual, and marital history, Dr. Garcia
interviewed Rosanna, Ma. Samantha, and Jocelyn Genevieve L. Tan
(Jocelyn Genevieve), Rosanna's sister. 94
After evaluating the data, Dr. Garcia found Rosanna "psychologically

capacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations." 95 According to
Dr. Garcia, Rosanna "has adequate social, interpersonal and occupational
functioning." 96
87 Id. at 130. August 4, 2000 Order.

89 Jd. at 13 I. January I 1, 2001 Letter.
90 Id. at I 59. Petition.
91 Id. at 160.
92 Id. at 163.
93
Id. at 283-288.
94 Id. at 296-297. Psychiatric Evaluation.
95 Id. at 286. Judicial Affidavit.
96
Id.
- - - ------- --~----·----------- ... -- . ---- ---
As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic antisocial

personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features.
Dr. Garcia characterized the disorder as:
... an abnormality in behavior known to have a pervasive pattern of

grandiosity in fantasy or behavior, need for admiration, and lack of
empathy, beginning by early childhood. People suffering from this
disorder may have a grandiose sense of self-importance or may be
preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success and power. They likewise
believe that they are special and can be understood or should associate
with high-status people. They also require excessive admiration, have a
sense of entitlement and are envious of others or believe that others envy
them. 97
Mario's narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia

found to be grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable, allegedly
rendered Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential
marital obligations to Rosanna. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario's personality
disorder was grave and "deeply rooted" in his character. 98 Dr. Garcia added
that persons suffering from personality disorders are "impermeable to any
form of psychiatric therapeutic modality" 99 because of "the presence of
denial and cognizance on the basic pathology of the person [suffering from
the disorder]." 100
As to the juridical antecedence of Mario's personality disorder, Dr.

Garcia said that Mario "does not have enough ego strength to effectively
self-regulate and face the marital task and relational stressors" 101 and "there
were substrates in [Mario's] development which made him feel inadequate
and bitter." 102 Mario allegedly "[needed] to have power over others to save
face." 103 Dr. Garcia thus recommended that the trial court void Mario and
Rosanna's marriage due to Mario's psychological incapacity.
On cross-examination, Dr. Garcia admitted that the data she gathered

all came from Rosanna, Ma. Samantha, and Jocelyn Genevieve. She
likewise admitted diagnosing Mario without interviewing him, 104 because,
despite several invitations from Dr. Garcia, Mario did not appear for an
interview. 105
Countering Rosanna, Mario contended that it was she who was

psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
f
97
Id.
98 Id. at 287.
99
Id.
100 Id.
JOI Id.
ro2 Id.
103 Id.
104 CA rol/o, pp. 1286 and 1292-1293. Original Transcript of Stenographic Notes.
105 Id. at 1281-1282.
obligations.
Mario alleged that he had worked in Switzerland, Germany, and Italy

before returning to the Philippines in April 1995. In May 1995, he was
issued a Canadian visa set to expire in September that year. 106
While on vacation in the Philippines, he met his childhood friend,

Rosanna, whom he had not seen in 17 years. They then frequently went out,
dining and drinking in bars, and would go to Rosanna's office afterward to
"spend the night and share intimate moments[.]" 107
In August 1995, Mario went back to Italy to resign from his job as he
had already decided to work in Canada. 108
When Mario returned to the Philippines a month later, Rosanna told

him that she was pregnant and was planning to abort their child. Mario
believed her, as Rosanna allegedly had an abortion in 1991. To prevent
Rosanna from undergoing abortion, he proposed to her. They were married
on December 16, 1995. 109
The spouses then loaned P500,000.00 from the Elena P. Tan

Foundation to increase the capital of Design and Construction Matrix, a one-
year-old construction firm under Rosanna's name. Part of the loaned
amount was used as down payment for a Mitsubishi FB L300 van. 110
By January 1996, the spouses were already frequently fighting.

According to Mario, Rosanna would box and kick him whenever they
argued. To avoid any untoward incident, Mario would leave the house to
keep his cool. 111
In 1997, Rosanna allegedly became uncontrollable. She would bang

her head on tables, doors, concrete walls, and closets, and would even inflict
corporal punishment on Ma. Samantha. 112
Opposing Rosanna's claim, Mario said that he worked to support the

family. He worked as the operations manager of Design and Construction
Matrix, and his duties included hiring and supervising firm employees, and
procuring construction materials, tools, and equipment. Because of his hard
work at the firm, he and Rosanna were able to pay their P500,000.00 loan
I
106
Rollo. p. I 66. Answer.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 166-167.
110
Id. at 167.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 168.
and save money for the construction of their conjugal home. 113
Mario claimed that he always went home and never slept out, except
that one time in December 1998, when he and Rosanna had a big fight.
Mario maintained that he was a good father to Ma. Samantha such that,
when the child was confined in the hospital for dengue fever, he took care of
her. One time, when the nurse on duty failed to replace Ma. Samantha's
empty dextrose bottle, Mario voluntarily asked the nurse to replace it with a
new one. He and Ma. Samantha would also spend quality time together,
going to malls and visiting relatives. 114
Sometime in 1998, Mario, Rosanna, and Rosanna's parents jointly

loaned P2,500,000.00 from the Elena P. Tan Foundation. They deposited the
amount in Metrobank-Legaspi Branch in Makati under the name of Rosanna
and her father, Rodolfo M. Tan. The loaned amount would serve as funds
for the construction of the duplex house in Parafiaque. 115
In December 1998, Mario and Rosanna fought again and this time,
Rosanna drove Mario out of the house. Since he had no cash with him,
Mario used up the credit limits of his credit cards totaling P40,000.00.
When he returned home, Mario allegedly returned the P40,000.00 to
Rosanna. 116
By 1999, when the duplex was semi-finished, Mario, Rosanna, and

Ma. Samantha moved in. Since construction was still ongoing, Mario
insisted that a four-square meter room be constructed to protect Ma.
Samantha from construction dust and debris. 117
Mario denied that he was ever a threat to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha.
He voluntarily corrunitted himself for detoxification at the Medical City and
completed his six-month rehabilitation in Seagulls. When he returned home,
however, Rosanna remained violent and would always drive Mario out of
the house. 118
Between him and Rosanna, Mario argued that it was his wife who was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations to him. Rosanna insisted on living with her parents despite
f
having her own family, resulting in her parents constantly intruding into
their marital life. 119
113
Id.
114
Id. at 168-169.
115
Id. at 169.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 169-170.
118
Id. at 170-171.
119
Id. at 170.
As to the parcel of land allegedly donated by Rita M. Tan, Mario

claimed that the donation was a "manipulative device" to make it appear that
Rosanna exclusively owned the lot. 120
In sum, Mario prayed that the trial court nullify his marriage to
Rosanna due to her psychological incapacity, and that the properties they
had acquired during their cohabitation be divided equally between them.
He, however, prayed that the custody of Ma. Samantha be awarded to
him.121
In its May 9, 2007 Decision, 122 the Regional Trial Court found that
Rosanna discharged the burden of proving Mario's psychological incapacity:
It was clearly shown from [Mario's] actuations that he never really cared
about the well-being of his family. He never commiserated with
[Rosanna] during her difficult times. Despite [Rosanna's effortsJ to keep
the marriage intact, [Mario] showed no interest in mending his ways.
These acts, to the mind of the Court, manifested [Mario's J total disregard
of the basic tenets of marriage. 123
The trial court thus voided Mario and Rosanna's marriage. It awarded
the custody of Ma. Samantha to Rosanna, with Mario having visitation
rights. As to the Parafiaque duplex, the trial court declared Rosanna as its
sole and absolute owner, including the parcel of land on which it was built.
The dispositive portion of the May 9, 2007 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit to the petition, judgment is hereby

rendered:
I. Declaring null and void ab initio the marriage between

ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL and MARIO VICTOR M.
ANDAL solemnized on DECEMBER 16, 1995 in Makati City
on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent;
2. Ordering the Local Civil Registrars of Makati City and the

National Statistics Office to cancel the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent as appearing in their respective
Registry of Marriage;
3. Allowing petitioner to resume the use of her maiden name;
4. Awarding petitioner the absolute custody of the parties' only

child, Ma. Samantha T. Anda!, with visitation rights given to
the respondent; and
5. Declaring the petitioner to be the sole and absolute owner of

the parcel of land with improvements covered by TCT No.
120
Id. at 171.
121
Id. at 172-173.
122 Id. at 93-102.
123 Id. at 99-100.
139811.
On the matter of suspension of respondent's parental authority over

Ma. Samantha T. Anda!, the Court holds that there is no sufficient ground
in granting the same.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars

of Makati City and Para[fi]aque City, the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Office of the Civil Register General (National Statistics Office) and the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Para[fi]aque City.
SO ORDERED. 124 (Emphasis in the original)
Mario moved 125 for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its
August 29, 2007 Order. 126
Reversing the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals found Dr.
Garcia's psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be "unscientific and
unreliable" 127 since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Dr. Garcia "was working on pure suppositions
and second-hand infonnation fed to her by one side." 128
On the trial court's finding that Rosanna exclusively owned the house
and lot in Parafiaque, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court violated
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." To the Court of
Appeals, the trial court did not state the facts and the law on which it based
its ruling that Rosanna solely owned the house and lot. 129
Thus, the Court of Appeals declared Mario and Rosanna's marriage

valid and subsisting. The dispositive portion of its February 25, 2010
Decision 130 reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed

May 09, 2007 decision is SET ASIDE, and the marriage between Mario
Victor M. Anda! and Rosanna L. Tan-Anda! is hereby declared as VALID
and SUBSISTING.
SO ORDERED. 131 (Emphasis in the original)
Rosanna moved 132 for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
i24 Id. at 100-101.

125 Id. at 331-336.
126
Id. at 370-371.
127
Id. at 84.
128
Id.
129 Id. at 86 and 88.
130
Id. at 71-90.
131
Id. at 89.
denied in its April 6, 2011 Resolution. 133
On May 25, 2011, Rosanna filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 134
before this Court. Mario filed his Comment, 135 to which Rosanna filed her
Reply.136
In the August 20, 2019 Resolution, 137 this Court resolved to set the
case for oral arguments. However, the oral arguments were postponed
indefinitely, 138 and the parties were instead ordered to file their respective
memoranda. 139 Further, Dean Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, M.D., Ph.D., 140 Dean
Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., 141 and Fr. Adolfo Dacanay, S.J., 142 were
appointed amici curiae, and they were all required to submit their amicus
curiae briefs. 143
The parties 144 and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General, 145 have all filed the required Memoranda.
The amici curiae, to whom this Court is grateful for their expertise and
invaluable insights on the important issues for resolution here, have each
submitted their respective Amicus Curiae Briefs.
The issues for this Court's resolution are:
First, whether or not the marriage between Mario and Rosanna is void
due to psychological incapacity. Subsumed in this issue are the following:
a. Whether or not the guidelines for deciding cases for

declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological
incapacity, as laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 146 violate the right to liberty, personal autonomy, and
human dignity of Filipinos;
132
!33
134
135
CA rollo, pp. 251-286.
Rollo, p. 92.
Id. at 8---450.
Id. at 463---478.
!
136
Id. at 479---494.
137
Id. at 523-524.
138 Id. at 557-558. September 24, 2019 Resolution.
139 Id. at 567-570, November 5,2019 Resolution.
140 Dean Estrada-Claudio is the Dean of the University of the Philippines College of Social Work and
Community Development.
141 Professor Sta. Maria is the Dean of the Far Eastern University lnsti~te of Law and Professor of Civil
Law at the Ateneo Law School.
142 Fr. Dacanay is a Doctor of Canon Law and Judge of the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila.
143 Rollo, pp. 567-570. November 5, 2019 Resolution.
144 Id. at 849-921, Memorandum for Petitioner, and pp. 691-721 Memorandum for Respondent.
145
Id. at 591-08 l.
146 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
Decision 17 CiR. No. 196359
b. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos v. Court of

Appeals, 147 psychological incapacity has juridical antecedence
and its root cause medically or clinically identifiable at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Ifit is so identifiable, then:
1.should it be grounded on a particular

psychological illness;
may it be established without

11. a
psychological assessment or clinical diagnosis;
iii. may it be established on the basis of

testimonial evidence attesting to the behavioral pattern of
the spouse with the psychological incapacity during the
marriage;
c. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos,

psychological incapacity is truly incurable. If it is, must it be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable to
warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code;
d. Whether or not Article 36 of the Family Code 1s

violative of the separation of Church and State;
e. Whether or not the expert opinion on a party's

psychological incapacity is competent evidence if it is solely
based on collateral information from the other spouse;
f. Whether or not the existence of grounds for legal

separation precludes a finding of psychological incapacity on
the part of one or both of the spouses;
g. Whether or not psychological incapacity may be

relative to each couple.
Second, whether or not half of the duplex and the lot on which it is
situated are community properties of Mario and Rosanna; and
Third, whether or not Ma. Samantha's custody was rightfully awarded

to Rosanna.
147 3 1O Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

Rosanna maintains that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in

reversing the trial court's Decision, claiming that the totality of evidence she
presented was sufficient to prove Mario's psychological incapacity. With
respect to Dr. Garcia's findings, Rosanna claims that they are reliable,
having been subjected to cross-examination by Mario's counsel and were
based on documents written by Mario himself, among others. 148 Citing
Suazo v. Suazo, 149 Rosanna adds that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated need not be personally interviewed by the
clinician or psychiatrist for a court to nullify the marriage. So long as the
totality of evidence presented proves that the spouse is psychologically
incapacitated, as in this case, she insists that a decree of nullity of marriage
should be issued. 150
Rosanna concedes this Court's good intention behind imposing the

Molina guidelines, which was to prevent parties from filing frivolous or
capricious petitions for declaration of nullity. However, Rosanna argues, the
guidelines have unintentionally made "it complicated and burdensome for a
party to be released from a marriage that has legitimately broken down." 151
For Rosanna, the State's protection of the institution of marriage "should not
be ruthless nor unjustifiably intrude into a person's rights to autonomy and
human dignity." 152
Psychological incapacity need not be grounded on a particular

psychological illness, argues Rosanna, as this is allegedly more consistent
with psychological incapacity being a "liberal ground" 153 for nullifying
marriages. She cites cases 154 where this Court held that competent evidence,
not necessarily expert opinion, may establish psychological incapacity, and
that what matters is the totality of evidence presented.
Rosanna adds that psychological incapacity is incurable, but not

necessarily in a medical or clinical sense. For her, incurability is manifested
by ingrained behavior manifested during the marriage by the psychologically
incapacitated spouse. 155
As to whether Article 36 violates the Constitution on the separation of

Church and State, Rosanna argues that the provision does not. She cites
Molina, where this Court explained that the provision is meant to harmonize f
148 Id. at 28-34. Petition.
149 629 Phil. 157 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
150 Rollo, pp. 882-883 and 876-877, Memorandum for Petitioner.
151 Id. at 890. Memorandum for Petitioner.
152 Id.at893.
153
Id. at 895.
154 Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, 807 Phil. 31 (2017) [Per J. Leanen, Second Division]; Mendoza v.
Republic, 698 Phil. 241 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]; Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil.
602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division]; Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676 (2009) [Per J.
Nachura, Third Division].
155 Rollo, p. 899. Memorandum for Petitioner.
our civil laws with the religious faith of the majority ofFilipinos. 156
Rosanna submits that even if solely based on collateral information,

expert opinion on a spouse's psychological incapacity may be considered as
competent evidence. An expert "does not accept the information relayed by
a party about his/her spouse 'as is'." 157 A psychological evaluation is only
made after a "verification process is conducted by the
psychologist/psychiatrist," assuring that the expert opinion is reliable. 158
Rosanna adds that the existence of grounds for legal separation does
not preclude a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of one or both
of the spouses. Citing Republic v. Mola Cruz, 159 she demonstrates that a
ground for legal separation may be considered a symptom or manifestation
of psychological incapacity. 160
With respect to psychological incapacity being relative, Rosanna again

cites Molina, where this Court said that the "incurability [of the
psychological incapacity] may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against every one of the same
sex."161
On the duplex that served as the family home, Rosanna argues that the
house, though it may be considered community property, should still be
exclusively retained by Rosanna as Mario made no contribution for its
construction. As for the lot on which the duplex was built, Rosanna
maintains that it is her exclusive property, having been donated solely to
her_ 162
Countering Rosanna, Mario maintains that she failed to prove that his
past drug use was a manifestation of a personality disorder which rendered
him psychologically incapacitated. 163 Mario argues that his past drug use is,
at best, only a ground for legal separation, 164 not for nullity of marriage due
to psychological incapacity. 165
156 Id. at 899-900.

157
Id. at 900.
158
Id. at 900-903.
159 836 Phil. 1266 (2018) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
160 Rollo, pp. 902-903. Memorandum for Petitioner.
161 Id. at 903-904.
162
Id. at 904-912.
163 Id. at 466-468, Comment, and pp. 702-712, Memorandum for Respondent.
164 FAMILY CODE, art. 55(5) provides:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent[.]

165 Rollo, pp. 466-468, Comment, and pp. 708-709, Memorandum for Respondent.
As to whether Article 36 of the Family Code can be violative of the

right of Filipinos to liberty, personal autonomy, and human dignity, Mario
failed to respond to this specific issue. However, echoing this Court's
pronouncement in Molina, Mario argues that psychological incapacity 1s
truly incurable, which means it is medically or clinically permanent. 166
In addition, Mario submits that Article 36 is not violative of the

separation of Church and State. For him, Article 36 is "an example of the
government pursuing an important state policy, i.e. protection of the
family." 167
Like Rosanna, Mario argues that the expert opm10n on a party's

psychological incapacity may be considered as competent evidence even if
based solely on collateral information. Citing Marcos v. Marcos 168 and
Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 169 Mario submits that in proving psychological
incapacity, what is essential is the totality of evidence presented. 170
Similarly, he argues that the existence of a ground for legal separation does
not preclude a finding of psychological incapacity if the ground is shown to
be a "manifestation of some other serious psychological illness which ...
renders the party unable to comply with his [or her] essential marital
obligations." 171
Mario contends that psychological incapacity is absolute, consistent

with it being incurable. He submits that "a party's incapacity should relate
not only to the present relationship with his [or her] spouse but should also
continue to any relationship he [or she] may subsequently enter into." 172
Considering that the Court of Appeals found his marriage to Rosanna

valid and subsisting, Mario argues that the house and lot in Paraii.aque is
community property, having been acquired during the marriage. 173
This Petition must be granted. With clear and convincing evidence,

Rosanna proved that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations to her. Their marriage is void ab initio.
I f
Psychological incapacity as a ground for voiding marriages 1s
provided in Article 36 of the Family Code:
166 Id. at 712-713, Memorandum for Respondent.
167
Id. at 714.
168
397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
169 612 Phil. 1061, 1078 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
170
Rollo, pp. 714-715. Memorandum for Respondent.
171
Id. at 715-716.
172
Id. at 716.
173 Id. at 472, Comment, and 716-718, Memorandum for Respondent.
·····-·--·-- ------------------------
ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time

of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Article 36 was first interpreted in Santos v. Court ofAppeals, 174 a case

where the wife, after three years of marriage, left for the United States, never
to return to her husband and son. Despite the wife's abandonment of the
family, this Court in Santos refused to void the marriage after outlining the
history of the provision and defining the term "psychological incapacity."
This Court initially noted how the Family Code Revision Committee
(Code Committee) deliberately refused to define psychological incapacity
"to allow some resiliency" 175 in applying the provision. Article 36 provides
no examples of psychological incapacity so that "the applicability of the
provision [would not be limited] under the principle of ejusdem generis." 176
After reviewing the Code Committee deliberations, this Court

determined that psychological incapacity should mean "no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage." 177 It added that "psychological incapacity"
must refer to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage." 178
In reference to the Catholic roots of Article 36, it being derived from

the New Canon Law, this Court cited the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso (Dr.
Veloso), a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila. Dr. Veloso was of the opinion that
psychological incapacity "must be characterized by (a} gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." 179
Building on these three criteria, this Court promulgated Republic v.

Court ofAppeals and Molina 180 in 1997. Molina involved a wife who, after
five years of marriage, filed a case for declaration of its nullity due to her
husband's psychological incapacity. In her petition, she alleged that her
husband preferred to spend his time and money on his friends, failing to
support the family. If the husband had any money, it was because he
174
310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
175
Id. at 36.
176 Id., citing Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994. See also Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina, 335 Phil. 664,677 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
177
Id. at 40.
11s Id.
179
Id. at 39.
180
335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J_ Panganiban, En Banc].
·--·· ......... ------------------------
allegedly depended on his parents for aid. The husband eventually left her
and their child when she had to resign from work.
It was in Molina where this Court laid down the guidelines for
interpreting and applying Article 36. In formulating the guidelines, this
Court invited two amici curiae: Rev. Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar Judicial or
Presiding Judge of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Philippine Catholic Church; and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee. The Molina guidelines are as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and

the fan1ily and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ''the time of

the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

I
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise· of a profession or employment in
a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
I 095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting

marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code

is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -
subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and

purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of
I
protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation. 181 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
181 Id. at 676--679. The eighth guideline on the certification from the Solicitor General briefly stating his
or her reasons for agreeing or opposing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity has been dispensed with under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC{Re: Proposed Rule
on _Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriage). See
Padilla Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061, 1078 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Nava/es v.
Nava/es, 578 Phil. 826, 839 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Tango! v. Tango!, 562
Phil. 725, 735 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 358
(2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, 484 Phil. 396,410 (2004) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
---------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Molina guidelines were applied in subsequent cases. 182 Since

Molina's promulgation in 1997 until 2008, only Antonio v. Reyes 183 was
found to have satisfied all the requirements of Molina. 184 Antonio involved
a wife whose pathological lying rendered her psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Because of the restrictive interpretation resulting from the application

of the Molina guidelines, this Court pronounced in the 2009 case of Ngo Te
v. Yu-Te 185 that "jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a
perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed," a view
that is "totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated[.]" 186
In Ngo Te, this Court remarked that the Molina guidelines worked like a
"strait-jacket" in which psychological incapacity cases are forced to fit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to

impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by
the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, _and was
sensitive to the [Office of the Solicitor General's] exaggeration of Article
36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to
live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation
of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended
by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit and
be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. 187 (Citations omitted)
In its 2015 Resolution in Kalaw v. Fernandez, 188 this Court made a

similar statement:
182 Nava/es v. Nava/es, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Navarro, Jr. v.
Cecilio-Navarro, 549 Phil. 632 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tonga! v. Tango!, 562
Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, 545 Phil. 725
(2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga,
Third Division]; Republic v. lyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division];
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004 [Per J. Corona, Third Division];
Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Choa v. Choo, 441
Phil. 175 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001) [Per J.
Vitug, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 391 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
183 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
184 Another case where the parties successfully obtained a decree of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity was Chi Ming Tsai v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres,
Jr., Second Division]. However, Chi Ming Tsai was not decided under the Molina guidelines. This
Court had yet to promulgate Molina when Chi Ming Tsai was decided. In Chi Ming Tsai, this Court
ruled that "[a party's] refusal [to consummate his or her marriage] is ... psychological incapacity,"
procreation being "the basic end of marriage."
185 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
186 Id. at 669.
187 Id. at 695--096.
188 750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
The [Molina] guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied
given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of
"less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application."
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to
its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all
fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court." 189 (Citation omitted)
This Court's statements in Ngo-Te and Kalaw notwithstanding, the

tendency to rigidly apply the Molina guidelines continued. Apart from Chi
Ming Tsai v. Court ofAppeals, 190 Antonio v. Reyes, 191 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 192 and
Kalaw v. Fernandez, 193 only the parties in Azcueta v. Republic, 194 Halili v.
Santos-Halili, 195 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 196 Aurelio v. Aurelio, 197 Tani-De
La Fuente v. De La Fuente, 198 Republic v. Javier, 199 and Republic v. Mola
Cruz2° 0 were granted a decree of nullity by this Court via a signed decision
or resolution since the Family Code was signed into law. 201 That only a few
189 Id. at 499-500.

f
190 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per.J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
191 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
192 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
193 750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
194 606 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division].
195 607 Phil. I (2009) [Per J. Corona, Special First Division].
196 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
197 665 Phil. 693 (201 l) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
198 807 Phil. 31 (2017) [Per J. Leanen, Second Division].
199 G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018 [Per J. Reyes, Jr. Second Division].
200 G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018 [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
201 As of date, the following are the cases on psychological incapacity resolved via a signed decision or
signed resolution by this Court. Simundac-Keppel v. Keppel, G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65677> [Per C.J. Bersamin, First
Division]; Eliscupidez v. Eliscupidez, G.R. No. 226907, July 22, 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65547> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division];
Cahapisan-Santiago v. Santiago, G.R. No. 241144, June 26, 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/docmonth/Jun/2019/1> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second
Division]; Cortez v. Cortez, G.R. No. 224638, April 10, 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65 I 03> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division];
Go-Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 230443, April 3, 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65062> [Per J. Peralta, Third Division];
Republic v. Deang, G.R. No. 236279, March 25, 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65071> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second
Division]; Republic v. Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64764> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second
Division]; Republic v. Mola Cruz, G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018,
<http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64585> [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division];
Republic v. Javier, 830 Phil. 213 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr. Second Division]; Espina-Dan v. Dan, 829
Phil. 605 (2018) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division]; Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico, 823 Phil. 672
(2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division]; Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz, 820 Phil. 62 (2017) [Per J. Del Castillo,
First Division]; Bakunawa Ill v. Bakunawa, 816 Phil. 649 (2017) [Per J. Reyes, J., Third Division];
Gar/et v. Gar/et, 815 Phil. 268 (2017) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]; Tani-De La Fuente
v. De La Fuente, 807 Phil. 31 (2017) [Per J. Leanen, Second Division]; Del Rosario v. Del Rosario,
805 Phil. 978 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Castillo v. Republic, 805 Phil. 209 (2017)
[Per J. Peralta, Second Division]; Matudan v. Republic, 799 Phil. 449 (2016) [Per J. Del Castillo,
cases were found to have satisfied the Molina guidelines is, supposedly, in
accordance with the Constitution on the inviolability of marriage, 202 to the
extent that this Court often reversed the factual findings of psychological
incapacity by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. 203
II
It is time for a comprehensive but nuanced interpretation of what truly
Second Division]; Republic v. Pangasinan, 792 Phil. 808 (2016) [Per J. Velasco, Jr. Third Division];
Republic v. Spouses Romero, 781 Phil. 737 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Ma/Ii/in v.
Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; Vinas v. Parel-Viiias, 751 Phil.
762 (2015) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division]; Ka/aw v. Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin,
f
Special First Division]; Republic v. De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second
Division]; Republic v. Ence/an, 701 Phil. 192 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Mendoza v.
Republic and Mendoza, 698 Phil. 241 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]; Republic v. The Hon.
Court of Appeals (Ninth Division) and De Quintas, Jr., 698 Phil. 257 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division]; Republic v. Galang, 665 Phil. 658 (201 I) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Ochosa v. Alano
and Republic, 655 Phil. 512 (201 I) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division]; Yambao v. Republic
and Yambao, 655 Phil. 346 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division]; Marable v. Marable, 654 Phil.
528 (201 I) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division]; Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, 652 Phil. 49
(2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Baccay v. Baccay and Republic, 0651 Phil. 68 (2010) [Per J.
Villarama, Jr., Third Division]; Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura,
Second Division]; Taring v. Taring and Republic, 640 Phil. 434 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division];
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, 632 Phil. 326 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]; Suazo v. Suazo, 629
Phil. 157 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Pazv. Paz, 627 Phil. I (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second
Division]; Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, 625 Phil. 407 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Aspillaga v.
Aspil/aga, 619 Phil. 434 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,
612 Phil. I 061 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Najera v. Najera, 609 Phil. 316 (2009) [Per J.
Peralta, Third Division]; Ha/iii v. Santos-Ha/iii, 607 Phil. I (2009) [Per J. Corona, Special First
Division]; So v. Valera, 606 Phil. 309 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Azcueta v. Republic, 606
Phil. I 77 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]; Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676 (2009)
[Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Ngo-Te v. Yu Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third
Division]; Nava/es v. Nava/es, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division];
Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, 549 Phil. 632 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tango/ v.
Tango!, 562 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose,
545 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006)
[Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Republic v. /yoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second
Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004 [Per J. Corona, Third
Division]; Dede/ v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 226 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division];
Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249
(2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919 (I 999) [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban,
En Banc]; Chi Ming Tsai v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second
Division]; and Santos v. Court ofAppeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
202 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
203 See Republic v. Deang, G.R. No. 236279, March 25, 2019 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division];
Republic v. Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division];
Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico, G.R. No. 2 I 860, January I I, 2018 [Per J. Tijam, First Division];
Republic v. Spouses Romero, 781 Phil. 737 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Republic v.
De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Pangasinan,
G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016 [Per J. Velasco, Jr. Third Division]; Republic v. Ence/an, 701 Phil.
192 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and De Quintas, Jr, 698
Phil. 258 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]; Republic v. Galang, 665 Phil. 658 (201 I) [Per J.
Brion, Third Division]; Nava/es v. Nava/es, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third
Division]; Tonga/ v. Tango!, 562 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v.
Quintero-Hamano, 472 Phil. 807 (2004) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404
Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per
J. Panganiban, En Banc].
---~---------------------------
constitutes psychological incapacity.
II (A)
The first Molina guideline reiterates the fundamental rule in evidence

that one who asserts a claim must prove it. Specifically, in psychological
incapacity cases, it is the plaintiff-spouse who proves the existence of
psychological incapacity. 204
Molina, however, is silent on what quantum of proof is required in

nullity cases. While there is opinion that a nullity case under Article 36 is
like any civil case that requires preponderance of evidence, 205 we now hold
that the plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case with clear and
convincing evidence. This is a quantum of proof that requires more than
preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. 206
The reason is that this jurisdiction follows the presumption of validity

of marriages. As was held in the 1922 case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee: 207
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

maniage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every internment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28.)
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio - Always presume marriage. zos
(Citation omitted)
I
As with any presumption-such as the presumption of regularity in
the issuance of public documents, 209 regularity in the performance of duty, 210
of good faith, 211 or of sufficient consideration212-it can only be rebutted
204 Republic v. Court ofAppeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664-693 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
205 Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
206 See Spouses Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, 290 Phil. 3 I l (1992) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
207 43 Phil. 438 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc], cited in J. Perlas-Bernabe, Concurring Opinion, p. 34.
208
Id. at 43-58.
209 Alcantara-Daus v. Spouses De Leon, 452 Phil. 92 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], cited in
J. Perlas-Bemabe's Concurring Opinion, p. 34.
210 See Yap v. Lagtapon, 803 Phil. 652 (2017) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division], cited in J. Perlas-Bemabe's
Concurring Opinion, p. 34.
211
See Spouses Espinoza v. Spouses Mayan doc, 812 Phil. 95 (2017), cited in J. Perlas-Bemabe's
Concurring Opinion, p. 35.
212
See Sepe v. Heirs of Kilang, G.R. No. 199766, April 10, 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/65300> [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division],
cited in J. Perlas-Bemabe's Concurring Opinion, p. 35.
with clear and convincing evidence.
In any case, inasmuch as the Constitution regards marriage as an

inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family, courts must not
hesitate to void marriages that are patently ill-equipped due to psychic
causes inherent in the person of the spouses. In the past, marriages had been
upheld solely for the sake of their permanence when, paradoxically, doing so
destroyed the sanctity afforded to the institution. Courts are reminded of
Antonio, where this Court said:
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal

guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These
provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects
of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it,
based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject
of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres
to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present
through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the
family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations
that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear
that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective
of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant,
Sections I and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
!
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages

contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should
be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage.
Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation
of the family, which in tum serves as the foundation of the nation, there is
a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36
do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family,
as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of
their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential
obligations ofmarriage. 213 (Emphasis supplied)
Reflecting a similar sentiment, this Court in Ngo-Te 214 said:
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's

psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of
families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from
remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of
physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or
addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article
will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage. 215 (Citations
omitted)
In the Kalaw Resolution, 216 this Court said that "[i]n declaring a
marriage null and void ab initio, ... the Courts really assiduously defend
and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The
foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid." 217
Further, as the "basic autonomous social institution," 218 the family

should be protected under the Constitution regardless of its structure. This
means that a family can be founded, whether or not the parents choose to
marry or subsequently choose to dissociate, and this arrangement should be
equally entitled to State protection. The right to choose our intimate partners
is part of our right to autonomy and liberty, an inherent part of human
dignity. Ultimately, should the State interfere with these choices, it should
do so only when public interest is imperiled:
The Family Code provides that the "nature, consequences, and

incidents [of marriage] are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation," but this does not go as far as reaching into the choices of
intimacy inherent in human relations. These choices form part of
autonomy, protected by the liberty and human dignity clauses. Human
dignity includes our choices of association, and we are as free to associate
!
and identify as we are free not to associate or identify.
Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in

our individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to
responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges,
and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of society. The state's
213 Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337,371 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
214 Ngo-Te v. Yu Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
215 Id. at 698---099 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
216 750 Phil. 482,501 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
217
Id. at 501.
218 CONST., art. II, sec. 12.
interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual

liberties. 219 (Citations omitted)
II (B)
To recall, the term "psychological incapacity" was first defined by this

Court in Santos as a "mental (not physical) incapacity" 220 to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The term was confined to "the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage." 221 This
characterization became the basis of the second Molina guideline, where
parties to a nullity case are required to present evidence of the root cause of
the psychological incapacity. In particular, this root cause must be medically
or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts.
By equating psychological incapacity to a "mental incapacity" and to

"personality disorders," this Court went against the intent behind Article 36.
The Code Committee was clear that psychological incapacity is not a mental
incapacity. Among the earlier wordings of the provision on psychological
incapacity included "mentally incapacitated," 222 and "mentally" is obviously
absent in the present Article 36. This means that for the Code Committee,
"mental" is not synonymous with "psychological."
The reason for deleting "mental" was given by Justice Eduardo P.

Caguioa, a member of the Code Committee. He said that "mental" would
give the wrong impression of psychological incapacity being a vice of
consent. 223 If psychological incapacity was to be an acceptable alternative to
divorce, 224 as was intended by the Code Committee, it cannot be a mere vice
of consent. Psychological incapacity must consist in a lack of understanding
of the essential obligations of marriage, making the marriage void ab initio.
Psychological incapacity is also not a personality disorder, as

explained by amicus curiae Dean Sylvia Estrada-Claudio (Dean Estrada-
Claudio ). Psychological incapacity cannot be found in the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
f
219 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158, 203-204 (2015) [Per J.
Mendoza, Second Division].
220 Santos v. Court ofAppeals, 3 JO Phil. 21-49 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
221
Id. at 40.
222 Id. at 30. One of the earlier drafts of Article 36 read as follows:
Article 36. ~ ...
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
223 Id. at 35.
224
Id. at 34.
Disorders (DSM-V), the authoritative listing of various mental, including

personality, disorders recognized by the scientific community. 225
Yet, to comply with the second Molina guideline, psychologists and

psychiatrists, when serving as expert witnesses, have been forced to assign a
personality disorder and pathologize the supposedly psychologically
incapacitated spouse. 226 This cruelty could not have been the intent of the
Code Committee.
It took time before this Court, in the 2000 case of Marcos v.

Marcos, 227 declared that "a medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to." 228 Instead, as this Court said, "the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity[. ]"229
This pronouncement seemed to do away with the requirement of

expert opinion on the root cause of the psychological incapacity, but this
Court was not categorical with this. It even said in Marcos that the "root
cause may be 'medically or clinically identified"' 230-implying that
although medical opinion may be done away with, a clinical identification,
which is still expert opinion, must nevertheless be presented.
For this reason, this Court was inconsistent in requiring expert

evidence in psychological incapacity cases. Not all cases promulgated after
Marcos required the totality of evidence rule. Even as recent as 2019, this
Court dismissed a nullity case because "[t]he root cause of [the respondent
spouse's] alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by
experts [. ]" 231
In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the

second Molina guideline. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental
incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert
opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects
of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests
itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The
spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to
understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital
obligations.
"' Amicus Curiae BriefofDean Estrada-Claudio, p. 1.

226 Id. at 6.
227 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
228
Id. at 850.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See Eliscupidez v. Eliscupidez, G.R. No. 226907, July 22, 2019, 909 SCRA 607, 222 [Per J. Peralta,
Third Division].
---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert.

Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before
the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have
consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From
there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and
serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.
In this way, the Code Committee's intent to limit the incapacity to

"psychic causes" is fulfilled. Furthermore, there will be no need to label a
person as having a mental disorder just to obtain a decree of nullity. A
psychologically incapacitated person need not be shamed and pathologized
for what could have been a simple mistake in one's choice of intimate
partner, a mistake too easy to make as when one sees through rose-colored
glasses. A person's psychological incapacity to fulfill his or her marital
obligations should not be at the expense of one's dignity, because it could
very well be that he or she did not know that the incapacity existed in the
first place.
II (C)
Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity case is still required

to prove juridical antecedence because it is an explicit requirement of the
law. Article 36 is clear that the psychological incapacity must be existing "at
the time of the celebration" of the marriage, "even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization." This distinguishes
psychological incapacity from divorce. Divorce severs a marital tie for
causes, psychological or otherwise, that may have developed after the
marriage celebration.
According to Dean Estrada-Claudio, "it is an accepted principle of all

major and recognized theoretical schools within psychology that a person's
behavior is determined by the interaction of certain genetic predispositions
f
232
and by his or her environment, working in iterative loops of influence."
From this, proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may
consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly
incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. For
instance, violence against one's spouse and children can be a manifestation
of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity when it is shown that the
violent spouse grew up with domestic violence or had a history of abusive
romantic relationships before the marriage.
The same can be said for child abuse. Trauma research shows that our
past, if not properly healed, heavily affects our present. 233 As such, evidence
232 Amicus Curiae BriefofDean Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, p. 2.

233 See B. VAN DER KOLK, M.D., THE BODY KEEPS TI-IE SCORE, BRAIN, MIND, AND BODY IN THE HEALING
OF TRAUMA (2014).
~-----·------------
of the juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of

testimony on the spouse's past experiences that may have led him or her to
become a child abuser.
Furthermore, not being an illness in a medical sense, psychological

incapacity is not something to be cured. And even if it were a mental
disorder, it cannot be described in terms of being curable or incurable. Dean
Estrada-Claudio explained that true mental disorders follow a probable
course or outcome, called "prognosis," that can either be self-limited or
remain "stable across time and consistent in situations." 234 If self-limited,
the disorder is, in layperson's terms, "curable." If it has poor long-term
prognosis, the disorder is said to be "incurable."235
That psychological incapacity is "incurable," but in a legal sense, is

evident in the deliberations of the Code Committee. This was explained by
Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, when he said that '"incurable' has a different
meaning in law and medicine." 236
Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, in his concurring opinion, 237 added

that characterizing psychological incapacity as "incurable"238 is antithetical,
because the law does not prohibit a person whose former marriage had been
nullified under Article 36 to remarry. If psychological incapacity were truly
incurable, then remarriage should not be allowed as it would only result in
another void marriage. 239
Reading together the deliberations of the Code Committee and our

rulings in Santos and Molina, we hold that the psychological incapacity
contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the
medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended
accordingly. This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent
with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the
couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and
antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage. "[A]n undeniable pattern of such
persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive
f
spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a
psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other." 240
With respect to gravity, the requirement is retained, not in the sense

that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be a serious or dangerous
234 Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Estrada-Claudio, p. 4.

235
Id. at 4.
236 Santos v. Court ofAppeals, 310 Phil. 21, 33 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
237 J.M. V. Lopez, Concurring Opinion, p. 4.
238
Id. at 5.
239 Id.
240 J. Perlas-Bernabe, Concurring Opinion, p. 26.
------------------------·-"------"·-----
illness, but that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,

occasional emotional outbursts" 241 are excluded. The psychological
incapacity cannot be mere "refusal, neglect[,] or difficulty, much less ill
will." 242 In other words, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a
genuinely serious psychic cause.
II (D)
Molina provides that the essential marital obligations are "those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 [,] and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children." 243 These provisions are reproduced below for
reference:
ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.
ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons
for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is
not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support
of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of
insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be
satisfied from the separate properties.
ARTICLE 71. The management of the household shall be the right

and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority

shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children or wards the
following rights and duties:
!
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct
them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,

companionship and understanding;
241 Republic v. Court ofAppeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
242 Id.
243 Id.
....... ---···------·-··----·------
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in

them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and
thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational

materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with
others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the

circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon

parents and guardians.
ARTICLE 221. Parents and other persons exerc1smg parental

authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the
acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law.
ARTICLE 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the
father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the
child exceeds PS0,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a
bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per
centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee
the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the

proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in
a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or
any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in

which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations
referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and
resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory

except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the
guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the
ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
--------~--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - · - - - - · -
Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Perlas-Bernabe) makes an

enlightening point in her opinion that the essential marital obligations are
limited to those between the spouses, as these are the only provisions
"relevant to the finding of a spouse's psychological incapacity [with respect
to] to his or her specific partner." 244 She cites the legal definition of
marriage, which is primarily a contract between a man and a woman.
Therefore, according to her, if a marriage is to be declared void "due to
psychological incapacity, it must be so primarily due to the failure to assume
the essential marital obligations as a spouse, and only incidentally, as a
father or mother." 245
It is true that marriage is a contract primarily between the spouses; but

its cause remains to be the establishment of not just conjugal but also family
life. The Constitution treats marriage as the foundation of the family. 246
Furthermore, Article 70 of the Family Code provides that the spouses are
jointly responsible for the support of the family. As such, once the parties
decide and do have children, their obligations to their children become part
of their obligations to each other as spouses.
This interpretation is more consistent with the canonical concept of

marriage and psychological incapacity from which Article 36 of the Family
Code was drawn. For Article 36 to be a true accommodation, 247 as Justice
Perlas-Bernabe submits, 248 the State, through this Court, might as well
consider "the theoretical and operational system which ... is inextricably
and inherently ... part of [the concept of psychological incapacity] - the
Canon Law on Marriage." 249
Under Christian doctrine, specifically the teachings of St. Augustine,

marriages embody three traditional values or bonum matrimonii: (1) bonum
jidei, or "the faithful exclusiveness of the marital commitment"; 250 (2)
bonum savramenti, 251 which refers to the permanence of marriage; and (3)
bonum prolis, 252 that is, that marriage is primarily for procreation or, at the
very least, openness to having children. The Family Code definition of
marriage reflects all of these Christian values, specifically, the exclusivity of
a marital relation between "a man and a woman," the characterization of
marriage as a "permanent union," and its purpose being "for the /
establishment of conjugal and family life." 253
244 J. Perlas-Bernabe, Concurring Opinion, p. 32.

245
Id. at 26.
246 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2.
247 See Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
248 J. Perlas-Bernabe, Concun-ing Opinon, p. 3.
249 M.A.C. Dizon, Psychological Incapacity and the Canon L= on Marriage: An Exegesis on the
Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, 75 P.L.J. 365 (2000).
250
Id. at 367.
251
Id. at 367-368.
252 Id. at 368.
253 FAMILY CODE, art. I.
Both under canon and secular law, bonum prolis is as essential as

bonum .fidei. This only shows that the spouses' obligations to their children,
once children are conceived, is as much a part of the spouses' obligations to
each other. Failure to perform these obligations to their children may be a
ground to nullify a spouse's marriage.
But not all kinds of failure to meet their obligations to their children
will nullify the vinculum between the spouses. In each case, it must be
clearly shown that it is of such grievous nature that it reflects on the capacity
of one of the spouses for marriage. The easy cases are when one of the
spouses sexually abuses one of their children; or, when unknown to the other
spouse, a child is subjected to domestic violence; or when due to the
spouse's refusal to go through counseling or rehabilitation, his or her
substance abuse puts a child through a situation of neglect or outright
danger. As in all cases, the context of the whole case, shown by clear and
convincing evidence, should be taken into consideration.
II (E)
The persuasive effect of the decisions of the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines on nullity
cases pending before secular courts is retained. 254 Without prejudice to the
ponente's view on the separation of Church and State,255 the inescapable
reality is that Article 36 of the Family Code was lifted from canon law,
specifically, Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law. 256 As such, Canon
1095 should be taken into account in interpreting Article 3 6 and in deciding
psychological incapacity cases.
Canon 1095 provides:
Canon I 095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
I) those who lack the sufficient use ofreason;
2) those who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment

concerning the essential matrimonial rights and duties mutually to be
handed over and accepted;
f
3) those who are not able to assume the essential obligations of
marriage for causes of a psychic nature. 257
254 This guideline only applies to spouses married under Catholic rites.
255 See J. Leanen, Dissenting Opinion in In Re: Letter of Valenciana, Holding of Religious Rituals at the
Hall ofJustice Bldg. in Q.C., 806 Phil. 786 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
256 Santos v. Court ofAppeals, 310 Phil. 21 (I 995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
257 See Code of Canon Law, available at <https://www.vatican.va/archive/cod-iuris-
canonici/eng/documents/cic_lib4-cann998-l I 65_en.html#TITLE~VII> (last accessed on April I,
202 !).
This persuasive effect is especially true in cases where the Catholic

Church had already voided the canonical marriage, because it is the explicit
intent of the Code Committee to solve "the problem of marriages already
annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law." 258 In
Antonio, this Court even reproached the Court of Appeals for failing to
consider the prior church annulment of the parties' marriage as indicative of
the void nature of the secular marriage. This Court even called the error a
"deliberate ignorance. " 259
It is true that the wording of Article 36 of the Family Code was lifted
almost verbatim from the third paragraph of Canon 1095, and there are
views that only those decisions on canonical marriages voided under this
paragraph should be considered persuasive by our secular courts.
A review of the deliberations of the Code Committee, however,

reveals that lack of due discretion under the second paragraph of Canon
1095 is actually a part of the concept of psychological incapacity as
envisioned by the Joint Committee. This was the subject of the article,
Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on
the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent (Exegesis). 260
A canonical marriage, like a secular marriage, is special, albeit for a

different reason. Under the teachings of the Catholic Church, a contract of
marriage requires a special kind of consent, called "matrimonial consent," to
be valid. 261
The New Code of Canon Law characterizes the "matrimonial

covenant" as "a partnership of the whole life." 262 Catholics believe that in
marriage, the spouses "are no longer two, but one flesh" 263 and "render
mutual help and service to each other through an intimate union of their
persons and their actions." 264 Hence, it is said that the subject and object of
a contract of marriage are one and the same: the very persons of the
spouses. 265 It is this concept of mutual self-giving for the establishment of a
conjugal and family life that a party to a canonical marriage consents to.
Matrimonial consent, in turn, consists of three elements: (1) the

cognitive element, which corresponds to truth; 266 (2) the volitive element,
J
"' Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337,354 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
259
Id. at 371.
260 M.A.C. Dizon, Psychological incapacity and the Canon law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the
Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consenl, 75 P.L.J. 365 (2000).
261 Id. at 366.
262
Id. at 369.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265
Id. at 376.
266
Id. at 372.
which corresponds to freedom; 267 and (3) the psychosomatic element, which
corresponds to maturity. 268 Canon 1095 refers to the psychosomatic or
psychological element of matrimonial consent. The absence of any of these
three elements renders a canonical marriage void.
The first paragraph of Canon 1095 refers to those who lack the
sufficient use of reason due to a mental illness. 269 The second paragraph on
lack of due discretion refers to "the lack of capacity to bind oneself to the
rights and obligations of marriage." 270 A person who lacks due discretion
"[gives] the appearance of enjoying full use of his [or her] faculties, but ...
by reason of some psychic defect he [or she] may not be capable of
assuming the obligations of marriage, even if he [or she] may have a
notional and conceptual understanding of them." 271 Lastly, the third
paragraph on lack of due competence contemplates a situation where the
person, while having intellect and ordinary capacity to consent, cannot
deliver the object of the marital consent-his or her very person. 272 The
incapacity, like in the second paragraph, is due to psychic causes, which is:
... something in the psyche or the psychic constitution of a person which

impedes his [or her] capacity to assume three (3) general obligations of
marriage:(!) consortium of whole life between a man and a woman; (2) a
consortium which is directed towards the good of the spouses; and (3)
towards the procreation and upbringing of children. 273
From this discussion, the concept under the first paragraph of Canon
1095 is explicitly outside the realm of psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code as envisioned by the Code Committee. To recall, the
Code Committee did not view psychological incapacity as a mental disorder.
However, psychological incapacity under Article 36 is actually closer,

concept-wise, to lack of due discretion under the second paragraph of Canon
1095, rather than lack of due competence contemplated in the third
paragraph. This is strange, because while Article 36 of the Family Code is
similarly worded to the third paragraph of Canon 1095, its meaning is
similar to that embraced in the second paragraph.
To add to the confusion, and as was previously discussed, this Court's 0

conceptualization of psychological incapacity became medically oriented, [
discussing psychological incapacity in terms of mental disorders that have to
be medically or clinically identified. This is the concept of lack of sufficient
use of reason under the first, not the third, paragraph of Canon 1095.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269 Id. at 374.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272 Id. at 376-377.
273 Id. at 377.
-----·-··---·-··--""-~------· ------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
Therefore, while Article 36 of the Family Code is similarly worded to

the third paragraph of Canon 1095, canonical decisions based on the second
paragraph should likewise have a persuasive effect in secular decisions on
psychological incapacity, if we are to avoid anomalous situations where
canonically void marriages remain valid under civil law.
The above discussions notwithstanding, canonical decisions are, to

reiterate, merely persuasive and not binding on secular courts. Canonical
decisions are to only serve as evidence of the nullity of the secular marriage,
but ultimately, the elements of declaration of nullity under Article 36 must
still be weighed by the judge.
To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of

dysfunctionality that show a lack of understanding and concomitant
compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic causes. It
is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified;
hence, expert opinion is not required.
As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity

must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure,
one that was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be
shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological
incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its
existence.
III
Considering the foregoing, this Court finds Mario psychologically

incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.
Rosanna discharged the burden of proof required to nullify her

marriage to Mario. Clear and convincing evidence of Mario's psychological
incapacity consisted mainly of testimony on Mario's personality structure
and how it was formed primarily through his childhood and adult
experiences, well before he married Rosanna. In addition to Rosanna's
testimony, Dr. Garcia recounted how Mario developed traits exhibiting
chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, lack of
empathy, and sense of entitlement-behaviors manifesting his inherent
psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations:
In summary, there is a Partner Relational Problem (code

V61.1), which is secondary to the psychopathology of Mario Victor M.
Anda! who gravely failed in providing his family the love, support,
dignity, understanding and respect. He has the essential features of a

personality disorder as per criteria set in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV).
His psychopathology has its root causes. There were childhood

and adolescent precursors which had led to the development of his
psychological deficits.
Mario, the youngest in a brood of eight was born on December 7,

1961. His sedate father, a known businessman died when Mario was 6
years old. His mother, (sic) had to take over the family business; however,
she was unable to cope so they had to sell the company. She became a top
performer as a sales executive. She migrated to the U.S. His maternal
grandmother, who lived with Mario and bis siblings, played favorites and
was very obvious about it.
His eldest brother, Alfonso the favored grandson was dominant and
opinionated. Alfonso had to quit schooling due to his father's death.
Alfonso was supposed to take charge of the family business but he was
heavy on alcohol intake. He possessed a temper that would lead to the
physical abuse of the two youngest siblings (Mario and Alberto). Another
brother was also physically aggressive like Alfonso, (sic) was unable to
complete college because of his heavy alcohol intake. The intelligent,
generous and the talented Socorro stood as the mother to the younger
siblings. Alberto, who was unable to complete his college degree in UST,
is a substance user who is jobless and irresponsible.
The older siblings had difficulty coping with the change from a
relatively prosperous life to a life of near poverty and difficulty coping
with major responsibilities like running a company which they were not
prepared for. Mario was their baby. His sisters were extra loving and
patient with him. Mario is athletic and excels in swimming, football/soccer,
and basketball. But[,] he is an introvert[,] i.e.[,] he wasn't vocal about his
innermost feelings. He was the obedient son who was made to do errands.
He adores his mother and is demonstrative of his affections towards her.
Mario, (sic) is an "electronics [whiz]" whose intelligence matches

the eldest brother's. He completed his primary and secondary education
with the highest honors. But he messed up bis tbird year in UP. He had
very few friends in his college days. He hang (sic) around with a buddy
who was heavy into drugs and alcohol even when he was still in bigh
school. He could not concentrate on his job; although there were periods
when he worked as a technician in a wire company in Switzerland. He
was heart-broken when he returned to Manila in 1995.
To sum up, Mario does not have enough ego strength to effectively
self-regulate and face the marital the (sic) tasks and relational stressors.
Indeed, there were substrates in his development which made bim feel
inadequate and bitter; thus[,] the need to have power over others to save
face.
Mario has a narcissistic-antisocial personality disorder. He

exhibits chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse,
Jack of empathy and a sense of entitlement. In addition, he has the
propensity to be emotionally constricted and evasive. Superimposed on
his personality disorder is substance use disorder with psychotic
features (paranoid delusions and bizarre behavior) and aggression
against people in his environ[ment]. While he may have satisfactorily

endeared himself to his lone child, he miserably failed to comply with
his vital marital obligations.274 (Emphasis in the original)
Dr. Garcia reiterated these findings in her Judicial Affidavit, 275 with
Mario's counsel cross-examining her on her statements.
It is true that Dr. Garcia gave the expert opinion-which, we reiterate,

is no longer required but is considered here given that it was offered in
evidence-without having to interview Mario. Even Dr. Garcia herself
admitted during cross-examination that her psychiatric evaluation would
have been more comprehensive had Mario submitted himself for
evaluation. 276 However, the Court of Appeals erred in discounting wholesale
Dr. Garcia's expert opinion because her methodology was allegedly
"unscientific and unreliable." 277
Unlike ordinary witnesses who must have personal knowledge of the

matters they testify on, 278 expert witnesses do not testify in court because
they have personal knowledge of the facts of the case. The credibility of
expert witnesses does not inhere in their person; 279 rather, their testimony is
sought because of their special knowledge, skill, experience, or training280
that ordinary persons and judges do not have. 281 Rule 130, Section 49 of the
Rules of Court on the opinion of expert witness provides:
SECTION 49. Opinion of expert witness. - The opinion of a

witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
Standards for admitting expert opinion were discussed in Tortona v.

Gregorio. 282 In Tortona, a parcel of land was extrajudicially partitioned
based on a deed of absolute sale bearing the thumbmark of the purported
seller. The seller's heirs contested the deed for being a forgery because the
seller, allegedly illiterate, could not have executed it without the knowledge
and assistance of her children. As evidence, they presented the expert
opinion of fingerprint examiner Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez) of the
National Bureau of Investigation, who testified that the thumbmark on the
deed of absolute sale, indeed, did not belong to the purported seller.
f
In their attempt to discredit Gomez and his competence, the buyer's
274 Rollo, pp.315-316.

275 Id. at 286-288.
276 Original Transcript of Stenographic Notes, p. 1287.
277
Rollo, p. 84.
278 RUl.ES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 20.
279 Tortonav. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J. Leanen, Third Division].
280 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 49.
281 SeeV.C.RAMIREZ,THELAWONMARRlAGE 181 (3''ed.,2011).
282
823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
heirs contended that the examiner was "just an ordinary employee" 283 in the
National Bureau of Investigation who collected fingerprints from applicants
for clearance and took the fingerprints of those involved in crimes. In other
words, Gomez allegedly lacked the necessary skill, experience, or training to
be an expert on fingerprints. 284
The trial court nevertheless relied on the expert testimony of Gomez,

declaring the deed of absolute sale a forgery. 285 However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision, finding that the seller's heirs failed to
overcome the presumption of regularity accorded to the deed. 286 It
highlighted that the deed was a notarized document and, therefore, should be
presumed genuine, and its execution due and voluntary. 287
In reinstating the trial court's decision, this Court gave credence to

Gomez and his expert opinion. We first discussed opinions in general.
According to this Court, opinions are products of personal interpretation and
belief and, therefore, inherently subjective and generally inadmissible in
evidence. 288 Thus, to qualify as an expert and the opinion admitted as expert
opinion, the witness must be shown to possess a special knowledge, skill, or
training relevant to the matter they are testifying on, and that the opinion
was rendered on the basis of any of these special criteria. 289 This is apart
from the requirement that the testimony, in itself, must be credible; that is, it
must be based on "common experience and observation . . . as probable
under the circumstances." 290
This Court in Tortona went on to discuss the standards for evaluating

expert opinion in the United States. In Frye v. United States, 291 James
Alfonso Frye (Frye) was charged with second-degree murder. During trial,
he offered as evidence expert testimony on the results of a systolic blood
pressure deception test, or the polygraph test, to which he was subjected
before trial. The prosecution objected to the offer, and it was sustained by
the trial court. On appeal, Frye maintained that the trial court erred in
refusing to admit the expert testimony offered in evidence.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the trial

court's judgment, ruling that the systolic blood pressure test was not
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
!
field in which it belongs": 292
283
Id. at 993.
2s4 Id.
285
Id. at 987.
286 Id. at 988-989.
287 Id. at 989.
288 Id. at 994.
289 Id. at 995.
290 Id. citing Borgui/la v. Court ofAppeals, 231 Phil. 9 (1987) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
291 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923) cited in Tortona v. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J.
Leonen, Third Division].
292 Tortona v. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980, I 00 I (20 I 8) [Per J. Leon en, Third Division].
.. -- ------· - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 293
For a time, the general acceptance test in Frye had been the standard
for admitting expert opinion, until 1993, when it was overturned in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Jnc. 294 Daubert involved minors Jason and
Eric Daubert who, assisted by their parents, sued Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of a prescription anti-nausea drug called
Bendectin. According to them, they were born with serious birth defects
caused by the drug, which their mother ingested while pregnant with
them. 295
After discovery, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals moved for summary

judgment, submitting in evidence expert opinion saying that Bendectin does
not cause malformation in fetuses. The expert, a well-credentialed
epidemiologist specializing in risks from exposure to chemical substances,
arrived at his conclusion by reviewing all the literature on Bendectin and
human birth defects. 296 The Dauberts opposed the motion, presenting as
evidence the testimony of eight experts who were likewise well-
credentialed. These experts were of the contrary opinion that Bendectin
actually caused human birth defects, conducting in vitro and in vivo animal
studies that showed a link between Bendectin and malformations. 297
The District Court granted summary judgment. Applying the Frye

test, it held that in vitro and in vivo animal studies have not been generally
accepted by the scientific community as scientific procedures for
determining causation between the ingestion of Bendectin and birth defects
in humans. It thus rejected the expert opinion offered by the Dauberts.
The District Court's ruling was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 299
298
f
Reversing the lower courts' judgments, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Frye test, introduced in 1923, has been overturned by the
300
Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by the legislature in 1975. Rule 702
293 Id.
294 509 U.S. 579, I 13 S.Ct. 2786 (1993) cited in Tortona v. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J. Leanen,
Third Division].
295 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
296 Id.
297
Id. at 583.
298 Id. at 583-584.
299 Id. at 584.
300
Id. at 586-589.
of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 301
The United States Supreme Court noted how Rule 702 does not
require general acceptance for admissibility of expert opinion. Instead, the
rule requires the following: first, the "knowledge" testified on must be
"scientific," that is, it must be "more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation"; 302 second, the specialized knowledge must be of such character
that the trial judge is "able to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue"; 303 and third, the trial judge, like a "gatekeeper," must take a
firsthand look on "the scientific validity ... [or] the evidentiary relevance
and reliability. . . of the principles that underlie" 304 the testimony being
offered as expert opinion. "The focus ... must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions they generate." 305
On hearsay, Daubert echoed the rule in our jurisdiction that such

evidence is generally inadmissible. However, if "the expert opinion [is]
based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, [it is] to be admitted only if the
facts or date are 'of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."' 306 The United
States Supreme Court thus remanded the case "for further proceedings
consistent with [its] opinion" 307 in Daubert.
After discussing the standards for admitting expert opinion, this Court
in Tortona ultimately held that Gomez qualified as an expert and his
testimony, necessarily, as expert opinion. According to this Court, his work
as a fingerprint examiner at the National Bureau of Investigation qualified
him as an expert on fingerprints. Further, his conclusion-that the seller's
fingerprint in the deed of absolute sale and that appearing on the specimen
documents were different-was arrived at using a three-part examination
done for determining whether a thumbmark was impressed by the same
person. 308 The methodology he used was not shown to be unscientific and
unreliable; thus, this Court relied on his expert opinion that the thumbmark
on the deed did not belong to the purported seller.
Applying Tortona here, we find that Dr. Garcia was sufficiently
301 Id. at 588 as cited in Tortonav. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J. Leanen, Third Division].
302 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
303
Id. at 591.
304
Id. at 595-596.
305
Id. at 595.
306 Id.
307
Id. at 598.
308
V.C. RAMIREZ, THE LAW ON MARRIAGE 181 (3ni ed., 2011).
qualified as an expert in psychiatry. She possesses the special knowledge to

practice her profession, holding degrees in medicine and special
education. 309 She has been practicing her profession as a physician-
psychiatrist since 1990, including working at the Philippine Mental Health
Association_as a psychiatrist for 11 years. 310
On the principles and methodology Dr. Garcia applied in evaluating

Rosanna and Mario, she conducted a psychiatric clinical interview and
mental status examination of Rosanna. She likewise interviewed Ma.
Samantha and Jocelyn Genevieve, Rosanna's sister. The psychiatric clinical
interview and mental status examination remain to be the principal
techniques in diagnosing psychiatric disorders. 311 While ideally, the person
to be. diagnosed should be personally interviewed, it is accepted practice in
psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on collateral information, or
information from sources aside from the person evaluated. 312 This is usually
done if the patient is not available, incapable, or otherwise refuses to
cooperate, as in this case.
In any case, it cannot be said that the psychiatric evaluation of Mario

was exclusively based on collateral information. Dr. Garcia likewise based
her diagnosis on a personal history handwritten by Mario himself while
staying at Seagulls, an "independent evidence."313
At any rate, this Court said in Marcos 314 that personal examination of
the allegedly psychologically incapacitated spouse is "not [required] for a
declaration of [nullity of marriage due to] psychological incapacity. " 315 So
long as the totality of evidence, as in this case, sufficiently proves the
psychological incapacity of one or both316 of the spouses, a decree of nullity
of marriage may be issued. 317
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to Dr.

Garcia's expert opinion just because Mario did not appear for psychiatric
evaluation.
309
!
Rollo, p. 283. Judicial Affidavit.
310 Id. at 284.
311 See B.J. SADOCK, M.D. AND V.A. SADOCK, M.D. KAPLAN & SADOCK'S SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE/CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 229-245 (9"' ed., 2003).
312
Id. at 229.
313 Rollo, p. 85, Court of Appeals Decision.
314 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. See also V. C. RAMIREZ,
JR., THE LAW ON MARRIAGE 170-172 (3"' ed., 2011), where a clinical psychologist explained how a
personal examination of one spouse is sufficient to evaluate "the psychological capacity to contract
marriage of the other spouse." Through projection, identification, and introjection, a spouse "would
reveal the interpersonal relations between the spouses... [and] the characteristics each spouse has
acquired from the other." The expert would then "distinguish which of the characteristics are not
acquired and, therefore, inherent, and which are acquired and therefore, not inherent."
315
Id. at 850.
316 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
317 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
That drug addiction is a ground for legal separation318 will not prevent
this Court from voiding the marriage in this case. A decree of legal
separation entitles spouses to live separately from each other without
severing their marriage bond, 319 but no legal conclusion is made as to
whether the marriage is valid. 320 Therefore, it is possible that the marriage is
attended by psychological incapacity of one or both spouses, with the
incapacity manifested in ways that can be considered as grounds for legal
separation. At any rate, so long as a party can demonstrate that the drug
abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
the marriage, this should be enough to render the marriage void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Here, the totality of evidence presented by Rosanna clearly and

convincingly proved that Mario's drug abuse was of sufficient durability that
antedates the marriage. Admittedly, part of marriage is accepting a person
for who they are, including their addictions. However, in Mario's case, his
persistent failure to have himself rehabilitated, even bringing his child into a
room where he did drugs, indicates a level of dysfunctionality that shows
utter disregard of his obligations not only to his wife, but to his child.
We agree with the trial court that Mario failed to render mutual help
and support to his wife, failing to find gainful employment and even driving
to bankruptcy the construction firm founded by Rosanna by siphoning its
funds for his drug use. He failed to exercise his rights and duties as a parent
to Ma. Samantha. In the words of the trial court:
... [Mario] is incapable of performing his marital obligations, particularly

to observe love and respect for his wife and to render mutual help and
support. [Mario] had shown utter disregard for his wife. Throughout their
life together, it was [Rosanna] who mostly provided for the needs of the
family. [Mario J hardly contributed to their expenses because he never
bothered to look for a job. [Mario] was also using prohibited drugs. A
responsible husband would not commit acts which will bring danger,
dishonor or injury to [his spouse or to his family}. (Art. 72, Family Code
of the Philippines). The safety and security of the family at all times is a
primordial duty of the spouse. 321
Even assuming that Mario has since lived a drug-free life, he only did
so after separating from Rosanna. This confirms Dr. Garcia's finding that
his psychological incapacity was enduring relative to his long-estranged
wife 322 and can manifest again ifhe is forced to stay with her.
318 FAMILY CODE, art. 55(5) provides:

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent[.]

319 FAMILY CODE, art. 63(1).
320 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Sta. Maria, pp. 19-20.
321
Rollo, p. 99. RTC Decision.
322 Id. at 288. Judicial Affidavit.
All told, we find that Rosanna proved with clear and convincing
evidence that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
essential marital obligations. Their marriage, therefore, is void under Article
36 of the Family Code.
IV
Void marriages are no marriages. Thus, the provisions of the Family

Code on property relations between husband and wife-the systems of
absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, and separation of
property-do not apply in disposing of properties that may have been
acquired during the parties' cohabitation. 323 Instead, the property regime of
parties to a void marriage is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code, depending on whether the parties have no legal
impediment to marry. 324 Article 147 provides:
ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to

marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while

they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the farmer's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivas of his or

her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,

the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to their respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
On the other hand, Article 148 provides:

I
ARTICLE 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
323
Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1299-1304 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
324
Id. at 1295.
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall

be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in

the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both

parties are in bad faith.
On what "capacitated" in Article 147 means, this Court in Valdes v.

Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City 25 said:
The te1m "capacitated" in [Article 147] (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male
or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. 326 (Emphasis
in the original, citation omitted)
Article 37327 refers to incestuous marriages, while Article 38 328 refers

to void marriages due to public policy.
Here, Mario and Rosanna are parties to a void marriage due to

psychological incapacity. When they were married in 1995, Mario was 33
years old while Rosanna was 31. There is no showing that the marriage was
incestuous or void due to public policy. They likewise lived exclusively
with· each other as husband and wife until they separated in 2000. Being
capacitated to marry each other and having lived exclusively with each other
albeit under a void marriage, Article 147 of the Family Code governs their
325 328 Phil. 1289 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].

326
Id. at 1296.
327
FAMILY CODE, art. 37 provides:
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(I) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
328
FAMIL y CODE, art. 3 8 provides:
Art. 38. The following maiTiages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between pai·ents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Betvveen parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, kiiled that other person's spouse,
or his or her own spouse.
property relations.
Under Article 147, wages and salaries earned by the parties during
their cohabitation shall be equally divided between them. This is regardless
of who worked to earn the wage or salary.
With respect to properties acquired during their cohabitation, the rules

on co-ownership under the Civil Code govem. 329 Therefore, a property
acquired during the parties' cohabitation shall be presumed to have been
acquired through the parties' joint efforts. For purposes of Article 147,
"joint efforts" includes a party's care and maintenance of the family and of
the household. With this presumption, the parties are deemed to own the
property in equal shares.
However, if a piece of property was obtained through only one party's

effort, work, or industry, and there is proof that the other did not contribute
through the care an4 maintenance of the family and of the household, the
property acquired during the cohabitation shall be solely owned by the party
who actually worked to acquire the property. 330
In this case, there is proof that the Parafiaque lot was not obtained by
Mario and Rosanna's joint efforts, work, or industry. Rita M. Tan,
Rosanna's aunt, donated the 315-square meter lot to Rosanna and her father,
Rodolfo M. Tan. The Deed ofDonation331 dated August 25, 1998 provides
that Rita M. Tan donated 157.50 square meters to "Rodolfo M. Tan, married
to Josefina G. Leafio" 332 and to "Rosanna L. Tan-Anda!, married to Mario
Andal" 333 each. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 139811 covering 157.50
square meters of the Parafiaque lot is under the name of "Rosanna L. Tan-
Andal, of legal age, Filipino, married to Mario Andal." 334 In Salas, Jr. v.
Aguila,335 this Court held that "married to" only refers to the civil status of
the property's registered owner. 336
Thus, Rosanna exclusively owns half of the 315-square meter

Parafiaque lot. Mario has no share in this property because he did not care
for and maintain the family and the household.
As for the half of the duplex house that served as the parties' family
home, there is evidence that the funds used to construct the house were
f
obtained solely through Rosanna and her father's efforts. In a promissory
329 Valdes v. RTC, Br. /02, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
330 Id.
331 Rollo, pp. 268-271.
332
Id. at 268.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 272.
335 718 Phil. 274 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division).
336
Id. at 283.
- ----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
note337 dated July 13, 1998, Rosanna and her father jointly loaned
P2,400,000.00 from the Elena P. Tan Foundation for the construction of a
house on the Parafiaque lot. Although Mario signed the promissory note to
give "marital consent" to Rosanna, he has no proof that he participated in
acquiring the funds. He cannot be deemed to have contributed jointly in
acquiring the funds since he did not care for and maintain the family and the
household.
As the funds to construct the house were obtained solely through

Rosanna and her father's efforts, and Mario did not care for and maintain the
household, he has no share in the duplex.
In resolving issues of custody of minors whose parents have

separated, Article 213 of the Family Code govems. 338 It states:
ARTICLE 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental

autholity shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The
Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the

mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
In Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, 339 this Court held that the

"separation of parents" contemplated in Article 213 may either be legal
separation or separation in fact. 340 In deciding cases involving custody of a
minor, the courts must consider, among others, "the previous care and
devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral
uprightness, home environment and time availability; [and] the [child's]
emotional and educational needs." 341
Here, Mario and Rosanna have been separated in fact since 2000.
Between them, Rosanna showed greater care and devotion to Ma. Samantha.
Even when they still lived together, Rosanna had been more available to her
child. She raised Ma. Samantha on her own since she and Mario separated.
Mario has not supported both mother and child since he separated from 0
Rosanna, even after he had claimed that he has been living "drug-free." f
With these considerations, the trial court did not err in awarding Ma.
337
Rollo, p. 274.
338 Pab/o-Gualberto v. Gualberto, 500 Phil. 226 (2005) [Per J_ Panganiban, Third Division].
339 Id.
340
Id. at 246.
341
Id. at 250.
Samantha's custody to Rosanna, without prejudice to Mario's right to visit

his daughter.
Nonetheless, Rosanna's parental authority over Ma. Samantha was

already terminated in 2014342 when the child reached the age of majority. 343
Ma. Samantha is now qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life344
and, therefore, is at liberty to choose how to relate with her father.
VI
Love is founded on a promise: to seek beyond ourselves in order to

enable and ennoble the other to continue to become the best version of
themselves.
Being in love can be carried on the wings of poetry, announced

publicly through each other's gazes. It is made real and felt with every act
of unconditional care and comfort that the lover provides. Love can be
beyond labels.
Marriage is not compulsory when in love; neither does it create love.

Nonetheless, it remains an institution designed to provide legal and public
recognition that may be well deserved not only for the couple, but also for
their families existing or yet to come.
To be clear, our collective hope is that one who chooses marriage

realizes that the other deserves more caring, more compassion, more
kindness in the daily and banal grind of their relationship. It is in these same
values of sacrifice and empathy that we will have the chance to evolve into a
society that is more humane and, eventually, more just.
Yet, we are not blind to the reality that a person may be truly
psychologically incapable for the other from the beginning. Should there be
grave need to part for the reasons we have stated, courts can lead the way to
make parting less bitter, minimize animosity, and make lives more forward- /
looking for those most affected.
'" Ma. Samantha was born in 1996. See rollo, p. 73, Court of Appeals Decision.
343
FAMILY CODE, art. 234, as amended by Republic Act No. 6809 (1989), provides:
Article 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided,
majority commences at the age of eighteen years.
344 FAMILY CODE, art. 236, as amended by Republic Act No. 6809 (1989), provides:
A1ticle 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child
who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by
existing laws in special cases.
Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and
guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
------------------~- .....------,- .. , .. ,.,, __ ,,,_
Parting is already a sorrow. It need not be more than what it already is.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.

The Court of Appeals' February 25, 2010 Decision and April 6, 201]
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 90303 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The May 9, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parafiaque City,
Branch 260, in Civil Cases 01-0228 and 03-0384 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
E~ R G. GESMUNDO
{/ c Chief Justice f11. t~
:r1,p("J.e.-
.Pb.D/J.- ~. ~~ ~W"f
pt'-r.lft- 7~
ESTELAM. ~ R N A B E A .,=,u..LN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
,y--,...._e ~~.....,At Un\~ ""''T
e)~'vo.'-v,..
Associate Justice Associate Justice ,

Pt~ .Su ~ c . 4 c-~· .I'~~ ¥111/4tt
tl'lltt11/Vlt/ (p_/7///IP
i.,!Ja_J__Of•n1'"' 0
AMY c.qyAzAiii=iAVIER HE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(no part)
RODIL V. ZALAMEDA
Associate Justice
-----~-------------------------------
~~-:
RICA JHOSE~OPEZ
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the court.
AT~ R G. GESMUNDO
/ _ . , , ~Chief Justice

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ROSANNA L. TAN-AND AL, G.R. No. 196359

MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, Promulgated:

Given the variability and intensity of intimate human relationships,

beginning with Santos v. Court ofAppeals 1 and Republic v. Court ofAppeals

It is time to restate the current doctrine in light of the evolution of

Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna)

After four years of marriage, Mario and Rosanna separated in 2000. 10

On December 18, 2001, Mario filed a Petition 12 for custody of Ma.

On August 6, 2003, Rosanna filed a Petition 14 for declaration of

3 IO Phil. 21 (1995) [Perl. Vitug, En Banc].

incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her.

The Regional Trial Court ordered the prosecutor to report on the

The cases for custody and declaration of nullity were then

The parties reconnected in 1995 when Mario sought out Rosanna

15 Id. at 182. Report.

According to Rosanna, Mario once told her of a plan to blow up a ship

Nevertheless, there were times when Mario would allegedly be

Instead of spending the US$1,000.00 for their wedding, Rosanna

Mario, however, continued with his "emotional immaturity,

Rosanna confronted Mario about his behavior. To Rosanna's shock,

Later, an employee at the firm handed Rosanna a packet of shabu that

When Rosanna again confronted Mario about his drug use, he

In October 1998, Ma. Samantha had dengue fever and had to be

Later in November, Mario allegedly asked one of their helpers to

After he had left, Mario made purchases using his supplementary

at the Landmark Department Store in Makati. 61

After the door-banging incident, Mario's siblings brought him to the

Rosanna eventually closed Design and Construction Matrix due to

Rosanna decided to have a duplex built on a lot in Parafiaque City that

insisted on its construction.70

The four-square meter room was eventually constructed, and Mario

In July 1999, an electrician working on the wires of the house opened

Rosanna confronted Mario and pleaded with him to get treated.

Mario followed them to his parents-in-laws' house, forcing himself in

It was after these incidents that Rosanna petitioned77 the Regional

On February 14, 2000, Mario escaped from Seagulls,79 returning home

In June 2000, Ma. Samantha had to be rushed to the hospital for

In August 2000, Ma. Samantha again had severe upper respiratory

Two days later, Mario insisted on bringing Ma. Samantha to Makati

Police officers later arrived at their home, having been called by

Already at a loss with what to do, Rosanna phoned the director of

These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario's psychological

To prove Mario's psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr.

In her Judicial Affidavit, 93 Dr. Garcia declared that she interviewed

After evaluating the data, Dr. Garcia found Rosanna "psychologically

87 Id. at 130. August 4, 2000 Order.

Decision 11 G.R. No. 196359

As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic antisocial

... an abnormality in behavior known to have a pervasive pattern of

Mario's narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia

As to the juridical antecedence of Mario's personality disorder, Dr.

On cross-examination, Dr. Garcia admitted that the data she gathered

Countering Rosanna, Mario contended that it was she who was

Mario alleged that he had worked in Switzerland, Germany, and Italy

While on vacation in the Philippines, he met his childhood friend,

When Mario returned to the Philippines a month later, Rosanna told

The spouses then loaned P500,000.00 from the Elena P. Tan

By January 1996, the spouses were already frequently fighting.