Aprsa 2023

IISS
an strategic dossier THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES an strategic dossier
ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL
ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2023 Key developments and trends

SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2023
Key developments and trends
The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment examines key regional security issues
relevant to the policy-focused discussions of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s
premier defence summit convened by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. It is published and launched at the Dialogue and the issues analysed
within its covers are central to discussions at the event.
Since February 2022, the war in Ukraine has provided a bleak backdrop for
discussions about international security. While the war has affected many aspects
of security and defence in the Asia-Pacific, the region also has its own dynamics,
and important security-related developments have occurred there since the
invasion. Among these, China’s ever-growing power and increasingly assertive
posture remain the leading long-term challenges for the region.
This tenth edition of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment contains an
introduction and six chapters, all authored by IISS experts, which investigate SECURITY ASSESSMENT
important dimensions of the regional security environment, supported by maps,
graphs, charts and tables. Topics include:
the war in Ukraine and the Asia-Pacific balance of power
strained US−China relations and the growing threat to Taiwan
Asia-Pacific naval and maritime capabilities
China’s Belt and Road Initiative
2023
Japanese security and defence policy
the conflict in Myanmar and the international response
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THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

1
an strategic dossier
published by
ARUNDEL HOUSE | 6 TEMPLE PLACE | LONDON | WC2R 2PG | UK
2 AN IISS STRATEGIC DOSSIER I ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT
an strategic dossier
ARUNDEL HOUSE | 6 TEMPLE PLACE | LONDON | WC2R 2PG | UK
DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE Dr John Chipman

EDITORS Dr Tim Huxley, Dr Lynn Kuok
ASSOCIATE EDITOR Jack May
RESEARCH SUPPORT Henry Boyd, Bryan Chang, Nick Childs, James Hackett, Haena Jo,
Ithrana Lawrence, Matthieu Lebreton, Fenella McGerty, Shinsuke Nakano, Meia Nouwens,
Brody Smith, Tom Waldwyn
EDITORIAL Nick Fargher, Jill Lally, Alasdair McKay, Adam Walters, Charlie Zawadzki
GRAPHICS COORDINATOR Nick Fargher
DESIGN AND PRODUCTION Alessandra Beluffi, Ravi Gopar, Jade Panganiban, James Parker,
Kelly Verity
This publication has been prepared by the Director-General and Chief Executive of the Institute and his staff. It incorporates
commissioned contributions from recognised subject experts, which were reviewed by a range of experts in the field.
The IISS would like to thank the various individuals who contributed their expertise to the compilation of this dossier. The
responsibility for the contents is ours alone. The views expressed herein do not, and indeed cannot, represent a consensus of
views among the worldwide membership of the Institute as a whole.
First published June 2023 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
© 2023 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
cover images: (top l) an Indian Air Force Mi-17 helicopter carries a G20 flag during the inauguration ceremony of the Aero
India 2023 aviation exhibition in Bengaluru, India, 13 February 2023 (Prakash Singh/Bloomberg via Getty Images); (top m)
the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge (LIU KAIYOU/Getty Images); (top r) 3D rendering robotic arms with silicon wafers
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Albanese, US President Joe Biden, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio meet
in Tokyo, 24 May 2022 (SAUL LOEB/AFP via Getty Images); (bottom r) an international fleet review takes place in waters off
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About The International Institute for Strategic Studies

The International Institute for Strategic Studies is an independent centre for research, information and debate on the
problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important military content. The Council and Staff
of the Institute are international and its membership is drawn from over 100 countries. The Institute is independent and it
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Contents 3
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Dr Tim Huxley and Dr Lynn Kuok
CHAPTER 1
War in Ukraine and the Asia-Pacific Balance of Power 20
James Crabtree and Dr Euan Graham
CHAPTER 2
Strained US–China Relations and the Growing Threat to Taiwan 42
Nigel Inkster
CHAPTER 3
Asia-Pacific Naval and Maritime Capabilities: the New Operational Dynamics 62
Nick Childs
CHAPTER 4
China’s Belt and Road Initiative a Decade On 90
Meia Nouwens
CHAPTER 5
Japan Steps Up: Security and Defence Policy Under Kishida 116
Robert Ward and Yuka Koshino
CHAPTER 6
Conflict in Myanmar and the International Response 138
Aaron Connelly and Dr Shona Loong
INDEX 160
COMMON ABBREVIATIONS
AI artificial intelligence
ASBM anti-ship ballistic missile
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW anti-submarine warfare
BMD ballistic missile defence
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
CCG China Coast Guard
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the US
CPEC China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
DBP Defense Buildup Program (Japan)
DSR Digital Silk Road
EEZ exclusive economic zone
FONOP freedom-of-navigation operation
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
INDOPACOM US Indo-Pacific Command

Common Abbreviations 5
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
JSDF Japan Self-Defense Forces
MBT main battle tank
NUG National Unity Government (Myanmar)
PAFMM People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia
PDF People’s Defence Force (Myanmar)
PLA (Chinese) People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF PLA Air Force
PLAN PLA Navy
Quad Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RAA reciprocal access agreement
SAC State Administration Council (Myanmar)
THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
UAV uninhabited aerial vehicle
USV uninhabited surface vehicle
UUV uninhabited underwater vehicle

INTRODUCTION
The war in Ukraine has provided a bleak backdrop for discussions about international
security ever since the Russian invasion in February 2022. While the conflict has affected
many aspects of security and defence in the Asia-Pacific, the region has its own dynamics,
and important security-related developments have occurred there since the invasion. As
the Asia-Pacific recovers from the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic, China’s economic
and military power continues to grow. In response to the Chinese leadership’s increasingly
determined rhetoric emphasising the inevitability of Taiwan’s ‘reintegration’ with the
mainland, concerns have mounted over the threat posed to the island’s security. With the
support of some European states, the United States and its close regional allies – Australia
and Japan – have intensified their efforts to balance China by increasing and coordinating
their military power and diplomatic efforts throughout what they call the Indo-Pacific.
Many Asian states have, to a greater or lesser degree, remained ‘on the fence’ as relations
have become increasingly strained between China on one side and the US and some of its
allies on the other. Such ambivalence is evident in the strategic postures of India (despite
its membership of the ‘Quad’ alongside Australia, Japan and the US), most Southeast Asian
states and even South Korea, a major US ally. The latter has remained acutely focused on
the threat from North Korea, which stepped up significantly its missile testing in 2022.
In Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states
have maintained the grouping’s consensus-based approach to regional political and secu-
rity challenges. However, continuing conflict across Myanmar – provoked by the February
2021 military coup – has brought growing intramural strains.
THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND THE THREAT TO TAIWAN

This tenth edition of the annual Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment includes detailed
discussion and analysis of major regional security themes by IISS experts. In their opening
chapter, James Crabtree and Euan Graham argue that the war in Ukraine will likely have
INTRODUCTION 7
long-term global ramifications, not least in the Asia-Pacific. They stress that ‘lessons must
be drawn with caution’ – as much will hinge on the conflict’s outcome, and because the
Ukraine war is primarily land-based, contrasting with the maritime nature of many potential
Asia-Pacific flashpoints. Nevertheless, the war has provided a reminder that ‘unprovoked
aggression and territorial conquest’ by major powers remains a risk; for this reason, the
conflict has deepened perceptions of military threat in the region. This development, they
write, may accelerate existing trends in the Asia-Pacific towards higher military spending
(see Figure 0.1), faster military modernisation and efforts to develop national defence capa-
bilities. Moreover, the failure of Ukraine and the West to deter Russia’s invasion may lead
the US and its international partners to rethink how they deter China, particularly with
regard to its potential use of force against Taiwan. At the same time, Crabtree and Graham
suggest that Russia’s apparently successful use of nuclear threats to deter direct Western
military intervention in support of Ukraine may have ‘compounded existing doubts’ over
the effectiveness of US extended nuclear deterrence in the Asia-Pacific. Crucially, they
argue that the war has strengthened an already widespread conviction in the West that
European security and Asia-Pacific security are linked. However, ‘fiscal constraints and the
overwhelming need to focus on Ukraine’ mean that it is unlikely that European states or
the European Union will be more ambitious in their approaches to the region ‘in the short
to medium term’.
While the war in Ukraine has been a focal point of global attention and concern,
China’s ever-growing power and increasingly assertive posture remain the leading
long-term challenges to the existing international order, particularly in the Asia-
Pacific. As Nigel Inkster emphasises in his chapter, US–China relations have become
ever more strained as a result of ‘trade and technology wars’, major frictions over
Beijing’s stated determination to ‘reunify’ Taiwan with the Chinese mainland and
related US efforts to strengthen ties with Taipei. However, he argues that China’s goal
of achieving ‘reunification’ with Taiwan Figure 0.1: Changes in selected Asia-Pacific defence budgets, 2008–22
in time for the centenary of the People’s
Constant-2015-US$ defence budgets, 2008–22 (2008 values = 100)
Republic of China in 2049 ‘can only be an 250
aspiration’. In Inkster’s view, claims by US
military leaders that China may use mili-
tary force against Taiwan within the next
several years seem to be based not on ‘firm
intelligence’ but rather on an assessment 200
of when China will possess the necessary

military capabilities for such an operation.
He argues that Chinese decision-making
on the matter will be shaped not just by an
assessment of military capability but also 150
by a consideration of likely US and allied

non-military reactions – notably in terms
of the potential impact of economic and
financial sanctions on China. As Inkster
100
states, ‘military defeat or a pyrrhic victory
could prove terminal’ for the Chinese
Communist Party’s (CCP’s) hold on power.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
there has been much international spec-
50
ulation over how the war might affect the
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
likelihood and potential course of a conflict
over Taiwan. Inkster makes the case that, Australia China India Japan
South Korea Southeast Asia* Taiwan US
despite Chinese military thinkers’ analyses
*Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. No data available for Laos (or for
of the implications of Western support for Myanmar in 2008). Timor-Leste is excluded.
Ukraine and the reasons for Russia’s poor
military performance, there is no evidence that the invasion and ensuing conflict have Source: IISS, Military Balance+,
milbalplus.iiss.org
changed Chinese thinking about ‘the timescale or methodology for attacking Taiwan’.
According to Inkster, Beijing’s view of Taiwan as an internal challenge has shaped its
assessment that a Chinese use of force to regain the island would be utterly dissimilar to
the Ukraine war. He notes that such an operation could take various forms, ‘ranging from
a contested amphibious assault to concerted missile attacks and bombardments or a naval
blockade’. While Inkster’s view is that it is ‘impossible’ to say whether Beijing will decide to
use force against Taiwan, he also emphasises that such a decision has ‘become a function of
the dynamic that has evolved between Beijing and Washington’. This point may help explain
why the US has not abandoned its established policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ regarding
whether it would intervene to defend Taiwan: Washington fears that a clear and public US
commitment to come to Taiwan’s aid could precipitate the very Chinese action it seeks to
deter. While US President Joe Biden stated three times between August 2021 and May 2022
that the US was willing to defend Taiwan militarily, on each occasion, White House officials
quickly denied that US policy towards its ‘One China’ policy had changed. Nevertheless,
INTRODUCTION 9
with the intention of boosting Taiwan’s ability A pilot in the cockpit of a F-16V fighter during an air-force
preparedness drill in Chiayi, Taiwan, 5 January 2022
to defend itself, the Biden administration
agreed to a series of major defence-equipment
sales to the island, while official US contacts
with Taiwan intensified after the administra-
tion issued new guidelines on the matter in
April 2021. A visit to Taipei in August 2022 by
Nancy Pelosi, then speaker of the US House
of Representatives, accompanied by five
Democratic Party members of the House, trig-
gered a storm of protest from China that was
accompanied by a set of People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) naval and air exercises around
Taiwan, artillery live-firing into the Taiwan
Strait, and missile test-firings into waters east (Ceng Shou Yi/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
of the island. However, Chinese attempts to

intimidate Taiwan have become a normal feature of cross-strait relations. Notably, incur-
sions by Chinese military aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone – which are
widely interpreted as ‘grey zone’ tactics partly intended to erode the operational readiness of
the island’s air defences – are increasingly frequent and large-scale: during 2022, there were
more than 1,700 incursions by Chinese aircraft, an increase of approximately 80% compared
to the previous year.1
THE WIDER STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FROM CHINA

China’s challenge to the existing Asia-Pacific order is, of course, much broader than its
stated determination to ‘reunify’ with Taiwan. Its growing military power has been particu-
larly manifest in the naval sphere, as it deploys ships throughout the Asia-Pacific and even
further afield. This activity is a focus of the chapter by Nick Childs. The author assesses
that despite the Euro-Atlantic ‘storm’ caused by the war in Ukraine, it is ‘China’s rise that
will in the long term continue to make the strategic weather’. Notably, the October 2022 US
National Defense Strategy focuses on China as the ‘pacing challenge’ for the US military
establishment. Childs notes the June 2022 launch of China’s third aircraft carrier, which he
refers to as ‘a major step in the transformation of the PLAN’s [PLA Navy’s] overall capa-
bilities and aspirations’. In parallel with China’s relentless production of new surface ships
and submarines has been its development of important anti-ship weapons, notably the
DF-21D and DF-26B anti-ship ballistic missiles, sometimes referred to as ‘carrier killers’,
and the YJ-18 cruise missile. Moreover, in April 2022, China was reported to have tested a
hypersonic missile. These new Chinese weapons pose an increasingly significant threat to
the United States’ and its allies’ naval operations in Asia-Pacific waters. Moreover, they are
supported by ‘increasingly comprehensive’ intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
networks, including space-based and underwater systems (a development generally seen
across the Asia-Pacific but particularly in China), which provide a formidable targeting
capability that is likely to be further enhanced by artificial intelligence.
What makes Childs’s chapter particu- Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Wang Wentian with Cambodian
Minister for National Defence Tea Banh at a ground-breaking
larly important is the new light he casts on
ceremony at Ream Naval Base near Sihanoukville, 8 June 2022
the region’s shifting naval balance. He identi-
fies three phases of twenty-first-century naval
competition in the Asia-Pacific. The first phase
saw a striking rise in naval investment and
capability development, particularly by China.
In the second phase, beginning around 2014–15,
the PLAN’s dramatic capability developments
began to mature; ambitious naval plans on the
part of the US and some of its regional allies, as
well as India, also began to deliver results. In
the third phase, dating approximately from the
start of the present decade, the defence strate- (Pann Bony/AFP via Getty Images)
gies of Australia, Japan and the US have seen

a change in tone. While the Chinese fleet has expanded and moved towards true ‘blue-water’
capabilities, the US and its most important regional allies have increased their naval funding
and readiness; importantly, these efforts are ‘coalescing in ways that could facilitate a shift in
the naval balance in their favour’. Childs also highlights an intensification of European naval
efforts in the region, particularly by the United Kingdom and France, which ‘could make a
significant contribution in concert with the greater commitment of other regional players’. In
sum, while China’s maritime power ‘has never been greater’, ‘the US and its allies and partners
may be clawing back some significant advantages’.
Not all forecasts of China’s growing strength and capabilities turn out to be accurate.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was launched in 2013, initially seemed poised
to pose a major challenge to the established international order, particularly in the Asia-
Pacific, due to its potential to improve China’s access to ‘dual-use’ (civilian–military)
strategic infrastructure and simultaneously enmesh Beijing’s economically weaker client
states in alleged ‘debt traps’. However, it has failed to live up to its anticipated potential as
an important instrument of China’s international power. As Meia Nouwens writes in her
chapter, far from being an impressive example of Chinese statecraft characterised by ‘stra-
tegic, coordinated, plan-driven and target-oriented action in pursuit of clear, long-term
goals using the tools of the state and operated by a unitary actor through directed steps’,
the reality of the BRI’s implementation over the last decade has been less than impressive.
Nouwens agrees with the authors of a review essay on China’s BRI, who argue that it and
its related initiative, the Digital Silk Road (DSR), might be seen more accurately as instru-
ments of the CCP’s ‘partycraft’, intended to promote a ‘campaign-style mobilization’ that is
able to ‘create bursts of energy and overcome bureaucratic inertia’.2 Implementation of the
BRI has proven uncoordinated, while ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy is, according to Nouwens, a
myth unsupported by empirical evidence. China’s 99-year lease on the port of Hambantota
in Sri Lanka did not result from Colombo defaulting on a Chinese loan but rather from long-
standing national economic problems. Indeed, she suggests that Beijing itself may have
‘been caught in a debt trap of its own making’: nearly 60% of China’s overseas loans are
INTRODUCTION 11
currently held by countries considered to be in financial distress. Consequently, Nouwens

maintains that China is likely to reduce significantly – or even halt – BRI-related lending.
Although the PLAN has used Hambantota and the BRI-linked port of Gwadar in Pakistan
– and despite the fact that China is reportedly building a naval facility at Ream Naval Base
in Cambodia – there is no sign that Beijing has used the BRI to develop the region-wide
network of dual-use naval logistics facilities that some observers had anticipated.
Moreover, Beijing has shifted its emphasis away from the heavy-infrastructure projects
initially emphasised in the BRI towards what Nouwens refers to as ‘global digital invest-
ment’ through the DSR. China has also launched several new initiatives – including the
Global Initiative on Data Security – which Nouwens argues is directed at what she refers
to as the ‘Global South’. These new initiatives appear to be intended to build on BRI
and DSR investment by promoting ‘Chinese narratives and norms’. Meanwhile, the US,
European Union, Japan and other actors have launched their own strategic infrastructure
initiatives – aimed particularly at the Asia-Pacific – with the intention of providing alter-
natives to Chinese investment. Although the funding for these initiatives does not match
that provided by China during the BRI’s early heyday, their fortuitous timing may provide
their sponsors with ‘a soft-power opportunity’.
JAPAN’S DETERIORATING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: CHINA, RUSSIA AND NORTH KOREA

Despite both the trajectory of the Asia-Pacific naval balance and developments in the
sphere of infrastructure investment suggesting that the strategic tide may not be turning
altogether in Beijing’s favour, the strategic challenges posed by China to the existing order
in the region are tangible and seem likely to persist as long as the CCP remains in power
and the country’s economic expansion continues. As Robert Ward and Yuka Koshino
argue in their chapter on Japan’s security and defence policy under Prime Minister Kishida
Fumio, Japan takes the Chinese challenge seriously. They identify three important triggers
for Tokyo’s growing concern: President Xi Jinping’s strengthening rhetoric about China’s
intention to ‘reintegrate’ Taiwan; China’s ‘territorial needling’ around the Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands, which Japan controls and China claims; and China’s fast-growing military
spending. Ward and Koshino stress that Taiwan’s security has been a particularly important
concern for Tokyo since the previous administration of Suga Yoshihide (2020–21), noting
that Kishida’s assertion at the 2022 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue that ‘Ukraine today may be
East Asia tomorrow’ underlined this concern. They also emphasise that China’s response
to Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August 2022 – which included the firing of ballistic missiles into
waters within Tokyo’s exclusive economic zone – highlighted the close linkage between
the security of Taiwan and that of Japan, as well as the vulnerability of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands and the strategic importance of the Nansei Islands to the west of Taiwan.
China, though, is not the only challenge to Japan’s security. As Ward and Koshino make
clear, relations with Russia have worsened since early 2022 because of Tokyo’s immediate
alignment with the other members of the G7 in condemning and imposing sanctions in
response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Bilateral talks over the Russian-occupied ‘Northern
Territories’ (comprising four islands claimed by Japan) have stalled, leading to a hardening
of Tokyo’s position. The strengthening of China–Russia strategic relations (seen, for example,
in the joint patrols by the Chinese and Russian Table 0.1: Asian countries' votes on Ukraine-related UN General
Assembly resolutions, 2022–23
air forces close to Japan in November 2022)
has also concerned Tokyo. More worrying for
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6
Japan, though, was North Korea’s intensified
missile-testing programme during 2022: as
Australia      
Ward and Koshino note, Pyongyang launched
‘around 90 cruise and ballistic missiles’ – the Bangladesh      
record for a single year. However, while in Bhutan      
March 2022 North Korea ended its self-im- Brunei      
posed moratorium on testing nuclear devices, Cambodia      
a year later it had failed to conduct its China      

much-anticipated seventh nuclear test.
India      
Indonesia      
ASIAN AMBIVALENCE AMID
Japan      
STRATEGIC RIVALRY
Laos      
A significant cross-cutting feature of the
Asia-Pacific strategic environment remained Malaysia      
evident during 2022 and the first half of 2023: Maldives      
the preference of many regional states to try Mongolia      
to avoid taking sides in the growing confron- Myanmar*      
tation between the US (supported by its Nepal      

Western allies) on one side and China (and,
North Korea      
less importantly, Russia and North Korea)
Pakistan      
on the other – the latter group comprising
Philippines      
powers that seek to revise if not overthrow
Singapore      
the existing regional order, which is often
characterised as ‘rules-based’. Interested South Korea      
Western governments and observers often Sri Lanka      
anticipate that traditionally non-aligned Thailand      
states in the region will inevitably prioritise Timor-Leste      
what may appear to be their long-term secu- Vietnam      
rity interests by aligning more closely with

 Yes  No  Abstention
the US and the West as their confrontation
1. Resolution ES-11/1 demanding Russia withdraw forces from Ukraine and reverse recognition of Donetsk and
with China and other revisionist powers Luhansk people’s republics, 2 March 2022
intensifies. Although there has been some 2. Resolution ES-11/2 demanding again Russian forces’ withdrawal, and condemning attacks on civilian populations
and infrastructure, 24 March 2022
indication of movement in this direction, 3. Resolution ES-11/3 suspending Russia’s membership of the UN Human Rights Council, 7 April 2022
there is no region-wide trend towards align- 4. Resolution ES-11/4 declaring Russia’s claimed annexations of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts
invalid under international law, 12 October 2022
ment with the US.
5. Resolution ES-11/5 calling for Russia to pay war reparations to Ukraine, 14 November 2022
Australia stands out in the region because 6. Resolution ES-11/6 calling for a ‘comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’ and demanding again Russian forces’
of its population (still largely European in its withdrawal, 23 February 2023
ethnic origins), its lively liberal democracy *Myanmar’s votes reflect its ambassador to the UN being aligned with the ousted democratic government rather than with the
military one that has de facto replaced it.
and, crucially – notwithstanding its long-term
Source: UN Digital Library, digitallibrary.un.org
investment in developing strong economic,
INTRODUCTION 13
political and security links throughout Asia The three AUKUS leaders – Australian Prime Minister Anthony
Albanese, US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak –
– its strategic alignment with the West and
meet at Naval Base Point Loma in California, US, 13 March 2023
particularly the US through a bilateral alli-
ance. This security relationship has been
underscored by the trilateral AUKUS security
arrangement, which also involves the UK and
has as its primary initial goal the provision of
a nuclear-submarine capability to Australia.
This capability will constitute an essential
part of Australia’s effort to expand its military
power – specifically its long-range capabilities
– in response to what it assesses to be a deteri-
orating regional security environment, largely (Tayfun Coskun/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
due to China’s growing military power and

strategic extroversion. In mid-March 2023, the three AUKUS governments announced details
of Australia’s nuclear-submarine programme, clarifying that the Royal Australian Navy is
expected to receive its first ‘SSN–AUKUS’, a trilaterally developed submarine incorporating
technology from all three countries (including cutting-edge US submarine technologies), in
the early 2040s. In addition, starting in the early 2030s, pending US congressional approval,
the US will sell to Australia up to five Virginia-class submarines.3
No regional country has closer security ties with the US than Australia. Notably, India
has participated more fully in the Quad (as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the regional
security dialogue also involving Australia, Japan and the US, is now usually called) since
2020 following a deterioration in India–China relations after armed clashes along their
un-demarcated land border in the Galwan Valley. However, India’s refusal to condemn
or sanction Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 (Table 0.1 high-
lights India’s abstentions on Ukraine-related UN General Assembly resolutions) was
disappointing from a Western perspective and seemed to vindicate the scepticism of some
observers about the extent to which New Delhi is willing to move away from its tradition-
ally non-aligned posture. It raised the important question of whether, if its foreign policy
was at odds with the West elsewhere, India could still play a significant burden-sharing
security role in the Indian Ocean region (in the face of a growing Chinese challenge there)
and thereby support the Indo-Pacific strategies of the US and its allies. Over the following
year, the answer to this question seems to be a cautious affirmative. Despite New Delhi
maintaining a largely uncritical stance towards Russia’s behaviour in relation to Ukraine
(which is partly explained by India’s heavy reliance on Russian arms supplies), the country
has continued to play a full role in the Quad. In March 2022, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
participated in a virtual summit of Quad leaders, while in May and September he joined
in-person summits in Tokyo and Washington DC, respectively. In March 2023, India hosted
a meeting of Quad foreign ministers. And, significantly, as Nick Childs notes in his chapter,
India is coordinating its naval activities more closely with its Quad partners.
Although a formal ally of the US, South Korea under its former government led by pres-
ident Moon Jae-in pursued security-related policies that diverged significantly from those
of the US in at least three important areas. Figure 0.2: Selected Asia-Pacific trade with China and the US, 2021
Under Moon, Seoul’s posture towards North
Korea was more accommodating than that of Australia
Washington, emphasising dialogue, peaceful
coexistence and economic incentives even
India
after the failure of talks on denuclearisation
between then US president Donald Trump
Indonesia
and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in
2019. The Moon administration also showed
itself reluctant to mend relations with the Japan
other US ally in Northeast Asia, Japan, despite

their common interest with Washington in Malaysia
deterring North Korea. Moreover, the Moon
administration followed an approach of
Myanmar
‘choice avoidance’ in its relations with the
US and China, developing a ‘strategic coop-
Philippines
erative partnership’ with Beijing alongside
its alliance with the US.4 It also established
Singapore
‘three noes’ (no deployment of new Terminal
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missile batteries in South Korea; no trilat- South Korea
eral US–Japan–South Korea missile-defence

system; and no trilateral US–Japan–South Taiwan
Korea security alliance) to appease Beijing.
The Moon administration thought this was
Thailand
necessary partly because of a perceived need
to encourage Beijing to act as a restraining
Vietnam
influence on North Korea. However, the fact
that South Korea’s economy depends heavily
on exports to China (see Figure 0.2) also (US$bn) 0 50 100 150 200
provided an important rationale for main-
Exports to China in 2021 Imports from China in 2021
taining close, cooperative ties with Beijing.
Exports to the US in 2021 Imports from the US in 2021
The election in May 2022 of President
Yoon Suk-yeol, who had emphasised in
his election campaign the need for a ‘comprehensive strategic alliance’ with the US and Note: In the context of this figure, ‘China’
refers to mainland China only, excluding
tougher policies towards North Korea and China, was widely expected to bring significant
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.
changes to Seoul’s regional security policies. However, the Yoon administration has not
Source: Observatory of Economic
adopted a significantly tougher line towards Pyongyang. In his inauguration speech in Complexity, oec.world
May, the new president signalled South Korea’s willingness to present an ‘audacious initi-
ative’ to boost North Korea’s economy, providing the latter embarked on denuclearisation.
Under Yoon, Seoul is trying to improve political and security relations with Japan. South
Korea published its Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region in
December 2022, which stated that with Japan, South Korea would ‘seek a forward-looking
INTRODUCTION 15
partnership that supports our common inter- A Samsung plant that manufactures semiconductors – a key South Korean
export to China – in Hwaseong, South Korea, 5 October 2022
ests and values’ and that improved relations
with Japan were ‘essential for fostering coop-
eration and solidarity among like-minded
Indo-Pacific nations’.5 In the same vein,
in March 2023 Yoon stated that ‘Japan has
transformed from a militaristic aggressor of
the past’ into a ‘partner that shares the same
universal values’.6 South Korea’s posture
towards China has not changed significantly,
however. Its Indo-Pacific strategy described
China as a ‘key partner for achieving pros-
perity and peace in the Indo-Pacific region’
and pledged to ‘nurture a sounder and more (SeongJoon Cho/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
mature relationship’.7 Yoon abandoned an

election promise to deploy new THAAD missile batteries and has followed his predeces-
sor’s stance of avoiding involvement in any US-led regional missile-defence system. Seoul
has also continued to distance itself from US positions on Taiwan: for example, Yoon refused
to meet Pelosi when she visited South Korea after her trip to Taipei.8 Moreover, reflecting
South Korea’s economic interests, Seoul has continued to avoid becoming enmeshed in US
efforts to ‘decouple’ from China.
Across Southeast Asia, strong traditions of non-alignment, flexible diplomacy and
omnidirectional scepticism regarding major powers’ intentions have combined with
economic self-interest to produce a sub-regional strategic culture characterised by a persis-
tent aversion to choosing between China and the US in strategic terms. Beijing’s assertive
behaviour in the security sphere – notably in the South China Sea, where it has physically
expanded for military purposes some of the features it occupies – has impacted the atti-
tudes of some Southeast Asian governments. Importantly, following May 2022 presidential
elections that brought to power the new government led by President Ferdinand Marcos
Jr, the Philippines – a US treaty ally and one of the rival territorial claimants to China
in the South China Sea – has strengthened security relations with the US. The previous
administration led by president Rodrigo Duterte had pursued closer relations with Beijing
and sometimes adopted anti-American postures, including issuing threats to abrogate the
Philippines–US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), agreed in 2014 and
intended to provide a framework for revived bilateral security cooperation. Under Marcos,
Manila’s relations with Washington have stabilised, and in February 2023 they announced
plans to ‘accelerate the full implementation’ of the EDCA and expand the US military pres-
ence in the Philippines.9
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, governments have largely continued to avoid significant
changes in their national strategic postures. For example, Vietnam – a country with a history
of conflict with China and, in effect, Beijing’s most important rival in the South China Sea –
has not shown great enthusiasm for developing the security dimension of its relations with
the US and, meanwhile, has been looking forward to the positive economic impacts expected
to follow China’s return to normality after the Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr speaking at the 126th anniversary of the
Philippines Army’s founding, at Fort Bonifacio in Metro Manila, 22 March 2023
removal of COVID-19-related restrictions.
Tellingly, while China’s Comprehensive
Strategic Cooperative Partnership with
Vietnam is at the apex of Hanoi’s hier-
archy of international partnerships, the US
languishes in the low-level ‘Comprehensive
Partnership’ category, placing it in the same
group as Brunei, Myanmar and South Africa,
among other countries.10 Important changes
in Hanoi’s leadership in late 2022 and early
2023 are unlikely to affect Vietnam’s interna-
tional orientation significantly. Meanwhile,
Singapore has remained a close military
and economic partner of Washington and (Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)
announced in March 2023 that it would

purchase an additional batch of F-35B combat aircraft from the US.11 However, the city-state
has eschewed alliance relations with the US, and in February Minister for Foreign Affairs
Vivian Balakrishnan stated that it would not be a ‘proxy or a stalking horse for any super-
power’. He went on to reiterate that, like other countries in its region, Singapore did ‘not
wish to be forced to choose sides’.12 Such caution over the potential costs of closer alignment
with one or another superpower continues to dominate the outlooks of many – even most –
Asian governments. Largely because of their specifically vulnerable national predicaments
in relation to Chinese pressure on their territorial claims, some states – notably India and
the Philippines – have shown tentative signs of closer alignment with the US. However,
there remain limits on alignment in every case, particularly in the economic sphere; these
apply even to Washington’s closest Asian ally, Japan, which, while increasingly concerned
over Beijing’s regional behaviour, has continued to value economic cooperation with China,
shown by Tokyo’s engagement in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(which came into effect at the start of 2022).
ASEAN AND THE CONFLICT IN MYANMAR

Of course, not all security concerns in the Asia-Pacific involve rivalries and tensions
between states. Some – particularly those in South and Southeast Asia and in the South
Pacific – are focused at the domestic level. The final chapter in this volume analyses the
armed conflict in Myanmar, which has emerged since the military coup there in February
2021 as the most potentially consequential violent internal dispute in Southeast Asia. The
conflict is both long-running – in that some of the country’s ethnic minorities have been
in rebellion against the central government since the country became independent in
1948 – and relatively new because, since the most recent coup, it has also involved large
numbers of supporters of the so-called National Unity Government, which is opposed to
the State Administration Council (SAC) installed by the Myanmar Armed Forces. As Aaron
Connelly and Shona Loong explain in their chapter, since the coup, 310 of Myanmar’s
INTRODUCTION 17
330 townships (third-level administrative divisions) have experienced armed violence,

resulting in the largest humanitarian crisis in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold
War. The authors’ analysis points to seven distinct conflict theatres, which they group into
three broad categories: ‘borderland resistance strongholds’, where ethnic armed organi-
sations (EAOs) collaborate with newly formed anti-SAC forces; ‘central contested areas’,
where anti-SAC forces have been fighting with relatively little support from EAOs; and
‘non-aligned areas’, where EAOs hold territory but stand aloof from the broader resistance
to the coup.
Myanmar’s coup and its violent aftermath prompted a range of responses interna-
tionally. Most Western countries imposed sanctions, though to little practical effect. Some
Asia-Pacific countries were less hostile to the military regime, with Bangladesh, China and
India seeking to ‘build bridges to the SAC’. Australia, Japan and South Korea condemned
the coup but have been ‘reluctant to completely isolate the junta’. Developments in
Myanmar have created a major problem for the governments of other Southeast Asian
states and for ASEAN, which since 2007 has claimed ‘centrality’ for itself as the main
force for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia and also the wider Asia-Pacific. ASEAN
has faced important challenges in living up to this role, having been notably unable, for
example, to foster a coherent Southeast Asian response to China’s activities in the South
China Sea over the last decade. Following the 2021 coup in Myanmar, the foreign ministers
of ASEAN’s nine other member states quickly called for a ‘return to normalcy’. In April
2022, these countries’ leaders met the chairman of Myanmar’s SAC, Senior General Min
Aung Hlaing, in Jakarta and agreed a ‘Five-Point Consensus’ calling, most importantly,
for a ceasefire and an ASEAN-sponsored dialogue aimed at securing a ‘peaceful solution’.
As Connelly and Loong point out, while the Five-Point Consensus has so far failed to
achieve its explicit objectives, it has successfully bridged a divide among ASEAN members
between those favouring isolating the military regime and those arguing for closer engage-
ment with it. However, national elections planned by the regime for late 2023 could reopen
divisions over Myanmar within ASEAN and more widely, as some governments may view
them as ‘an opportunity to turn the page’ while others may see them as justification for
stronger sanctions.
CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION
With the range and seriousness of pressing security challenges in the Asia-Pacific being as
great as they have been since the end of the Cold War – and with the calamity of the war
in Ukraine serving as an ongoing case study of what can happen in a worst-case scenario
where defence and diplomacy fail – the responsibilities of those charged with maintaining
peace and security in the region are huge. Keeping open channels of communication
between policymakers and those who may influence policy constructively will be critical
if defence and security establishments in the region are to play their parts effectively. The
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, which will convene for the 20th time in June 2023, has proven
vital in facilitating such communications through both its public and private elements. It
was on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2022 that the US and Chinese defence
chiefs met in person for the first time and agreed to more talks. As ever, the IISS intends
that the analysis contained within the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment will support
a fruitful exchange of views at the Dialogue on regional challenges and how best to manage
them, and thereby contribute to the making of effective policies for maintaining security in
the Asia-Pacific, during the current year and beyond.
DR TIM HUXLEY DR LYNN KUOK

Senior Adviser, IISS–Asia Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security, IISS
Editor, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment Editor, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment
NOTES
1 Agence France-Presse, ‘China’s Warplane administration-the-challenge-of-defining-mutu-

Incursions into Taiwan Air Defence Zone al-respect/?sh=e49012345cd7.
Doubled in 2022’, Guardian, 2 January 2023, 5 South Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/ ‘Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous
jan/02/chinas-warplane-incursions-into-taiwan- Indo-Pacific Region’, 28 December 2022, p. 14,
air-defence-zone-doubled-in-2022. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.
2 Todd H. Hall and Alanna Krolikowski, do?seq=322133.
‘Making Sense of China’s Belt and Road 6 Jesse Johnson, ‘In Push to Mend Ties, South
Initiative: A Review Essay’, International Korea’s Yoon Says Japan Has Gone from
Studies Review, vol. 24, no. 3, September 2022, “Aggressor to Partner”’, Japan Times, 1
https://academic.oup.com/isr/article/24/3/ March 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
viac023/6654852. news/2023/03/01/national/yoon-anniversary-
3 White House, ‘Joint Leaders Statement speech-japan-partner/.
on AUKUS’, 13 March 2023, https:// 7 South Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ ‘Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous
statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders- Indo-Pacific Region’, p. 14.
statement-on-aukus-2/. 8 James Park, ‘South Korea’s Enduring
4 Scott Snyder, ‘China–South Korea Relations Restraint Toward China’, Diplomat, 18
Under South Korea’s New Yoon Administration: February 2023, https://thediplomat.
The Challenge of Defining “Mutual Respect”’, com/2023/02/south-koreas-enduring-
Forbes, 11 May 2022, https://www.forbes.com/ restraint-toward-china/.
sites/scottasnyder/2022/05/11/china-south- 9 US, Department of Defense, ‘Philippines, US
korea-relations-under-south-koreas-new-yoon- Announce Four New EDCA Sites’, 1 February
INTRODUCTION 19
2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/ www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/

Release/Article/3285566/philippines-us- f35-fighter-jet-mindef-saf-rsaf-air-force-
announce-four-new-edca-sites/. military-defence-3302941.
10 See ‘Arming Vietnam: Widened International- 12 Dewey Sim and Kimberly Lim, ‘Singapore
security Relations in Support of Military-capability Will Feel “Spillover” Effect of Growing US–
Development’, IISS Research Paper, 20 March China Tensions but Won’t Be a “Proxy”:
2023, p. 12, https://www.iiss.org/research- Foreign Minister’, South China Morning
paper//2023/03/arming-vietnam. Post, 27 February 2023, https://www.scmp.
11 Davina Tham, ‘Singapore to Acquire 8 com/week-asia/politics/article/3211688/
More F-35B Fighter Jets, Growing Fleet singapore-will-feel-spillover-effect-growing-us-
to 12’, CNA, 24 February 2023, https:// china-tensions-wont-be-proxy-foreign-minister.
CHAPTER 1
WAR IN UKRAINE
AND THE ASIA-
PACIFIC BALANCE
OF POWER
JAMES CRABTREE DR EUAN GRAHAM
Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow

Executive Director, IISS–Asia for Indo-Pacific Defence and Strategy, IISS
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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given rise

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Its effects have reverberated around the Asia-Pacific,

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providing lessons on the nature of potential future

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armed conflict in the region and prompting geopolitical

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realignments that could substantially alter elements of the

regional balance of power.
DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC LESSONS

The diplomatic response to the conflict has revealed a series of global geopolitical fault lines and
raised issues from the potential use of nuclear weapons and the effectiveness of deterrence to the use
of pre-emptive intelligence disclosure in the run-up to conflicts.
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LESSONS

The war offers potentially important lessons for future conflicts in Asia, in areas including maritime
security, information warfare, logistics and military capacity-building, among others.
GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE REGIONAL BALANCE

Russia’s military fortunes in Ukraine have implications for its status as an Asia-Pacific security actor. Its
rapidly deepening relationship with China and its changing military ties to countries like India and
Vietnam could affect the regional balance of power.
THE US AND EUROPE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

The Ukraine war has sharpened concerns about the ability of the United States and its European
partners to manage commitments in both the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific theatres.
Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio addressing the
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, 10 June 2022
used his keynote address at the 19th IISS
Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022 to deliver a
warning about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,
arguing that ‘Ukraine today may be East
Asia tomorrow’.1 Since the conflict’s outbreak
in February 2022, defence establishments
across the Asia-Pacific have watched it closely
to glean operational and strategic lessons
and assess consequences for the global and
regional balance of power. This chapter
provides a preliminary analysis of those
lessons and consequences. The fact that the (Roslan Rahman/AFP via Getty Images)
war is ongoing means any lessons must be

drawn with caution; its implications, both in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific, will depend on
whether Russia or Ukraine is ultimately seen to have prevailed. Moreover, there are obvious
differences between the two theatres, not least the fact that the conflict in Ukraine is largely
land-based while many Asia-Pacific flashpoints are maritime in nature. Broadly speaking,
however, the lessons offered by the Ukraine war that are relevant to Asia-Pacific states may be
divided into four categories. Firstly, there are diplomatic and strategic lessons – regarding the
role of deterrence, nuclear signalling, capacity-building and intelligence disclosure. Secondly,
there are operational and tactical lessons, including in the maritime and information domains.
Thirdly, there is the geopolitical impact of the war with respect to Russia’s ties to India and
China. In the case of the latter, there are also possible implications with respect to Taiwan.
Finally, there is the likely impact of the war on the Asia-Pacific strategies of the United States
and larger European countries, including France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
DIPLOMATIC AND STRATEGIC LESSONS

Linkages between European and Asia-Pacific security were being asserted in Western policy
debates long before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.2 The war has generally strengthened such
convictions, including concerns about international precedent regarding the future use of mili-
tary force and territorial annexation. However, it has also sharpened pre-existing concerns about
the ability of the US and its European partners to apportion finite defence resources between
the Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific regions. A few non-aligned countries in the region, notably
Singapore, have drawn links between Russia’s actions and their own defence security – and
have therefore supported sanctions against Moscow.3 Japan and South Korea – both US allies –
sent logistical and humanitarian support to Ukraine (see Table 1.1).4 Australia and New Zealand
went further, providing defence equipment (in Australia’s case) and training to Ukrainian
forces.5 Although Seoul has not sent arms to Ukraine, in 2022 it concluded a US$5.8 billion deal
to sell 180 K2 tanks, 212 K9 self-propelled howitzers and 48 FA-50 jet aircraft to Poland.6
Asia-Pacific countries’ varying stances on the war came to light at the United Nations
via a number of Ukraine-related resolutions, including one in early March 2022 criti-
cising Russian ‘aggression’ that passed with backing from 141 states.7 Many in the region
WAR IN UKRAINE AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC BALANCE OF POWER 23
Table 1.1: Major pledges of assistance to Ukraine by non-NATO Asia-Pacific governments
Country Assistance provided
Australia Australia has provided A$475 million (US$317m) in military assistance to Ukraine. This includes 90 Bushmaster IMV
armoured utility vehicles, 28 M113AS4 armoured personnel carriers and demining equipment, six M777A2 155mm
towed artillery and howitzer ammunition, anti-armour ammunition and weapons, tactical decoys, uninhabited
aerial and uninhabited ground systems, rations and medical supplies, as well as other ammunition and missiles.
Australia will also train Ukrainian troops in the United Kingdom in 2023.
Australia has further provided A$65m (US$43m) in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, as well as 70,000 tonnes of
coal and 60 pallets of medical supplies and other personal protective equipment.
New In May, August and November 2022, New Zealand announced three separate deployments of personnel to the
Zealand UK to train Ukrainian military personnel. New Zealand has provided NZ$22.19m (US$13.78m) worth of military
fuel, access to commercial satellite imagery, weapons, and ammunition procurement, as well as an additional
NZ$12.78m (US$7.94m) in humanitarian aid for Ukraine.
Japan As of January 2023, Japan had pledged or contributed around US$703.12m worth of humanitarian aid to Ukraine,
including generators, medical supplies, food and recovery funds. It has also provided Ukraine with civilian vans and
other supplies of unspecified value.
South In 2022, South Korea provided a total of US$100m worth of aid to Ukraine, including generators, vaccines and
Korea medical equipment. In 2023, another US$130m in humanitarian aid is pledged.
China In March 2022, China announced a humanitarian aid package worth CNY5m (US$822,000) for Ukraine via the Red
Cross Society of China, plus another CNY10m (US$1.64m) worth of humanitarian supplies to Ukraine.
Pakistan Pakistan sent 7.5 tonnes of humanitarian cargo to Ukraine in June 2022. It had previously sent 15 tonnes of
humanitarian aid to Ukraine in March 2022.
Mongolia In April 2022, Mongolia announced a humanitarian aid package worth US$200,000 for Ukraine.
Vietnam In May 2022, Vietnam announced US$500,000 in humanitarian aid for Ukraine, to be provided through the
Ukrainian Red Cross and UN agencies.
Singapore In June 2022, Singapore announced humanitarian assistance consisting of nine ambulances and two fire engines,
as well as an assortment of firefighting protective gear, rescue equipment, mine detectors and medical supplies,
to aid Ukraine.
India As of September 2022, India had sent over 97.5 tonnes of humanitarian aid to Ukraine in 12 separate consignments.
Cambodia In January 2023, Cambodia, in cooperation with the Japanese government, trained a group of Ukrainian deminers.
Source: IISS
abstained, including China, India, Laos, Mongolia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.
Generally, most states in South and Southeast Asia have hedged their positions and are
wary of criticising Moscow. A number of countries, including Cambodia, China, India
and Indonesia, have sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine. However, there is also sympathy
in some regional security establishments for the Russian position that NATO’s eastward
expansion constituted a strategic provocation to Moscow, alongside distrust of Western
motivations and actions, including military support for Ukraine.8
Although fought with conventional weapons, the war in Ukraine has raised significant
questions relating to nuclear weapons, with implications for the Asia-Pacific. Moscow’s
repeated nuclear threats set an ominous prec- A UN General Assembly special session takes place at the UN headquarters in New
York City, US to discuss two resolutions related to the conflict in Ukraine, 23 March 2022
edent at odds with the Soviet Union’s largely
responsible approach to nuclear doctrine.9
The threat of a nuclear confrontation with
Russia – personally reinforced in a warning
issued by Russian President Vladimir Putin
on the eve of the invasion – is likely the most
important consideration that has prevented
NATO countries from undertaking a direct
combat role in Ukraine.10 Nuclear deter-
rence has worked in Russia’s favour in this (Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images)
regard. Notably, however, Ukraine has not

been deterred from attacking military targets inside Russia, nor have NATO states and
other countries been discouraged from offering increasingly potent weapons systems to
Ukrainian forces, although they have supplied arms with caution.11
China has publicly expressed its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear
threats in Ukraine.12 The significance of these declarations is unclear, given that Russia
would determine nuclear-weapon use according to its own calculus. Viewed more broadly,
Moscow’s aggression can be seen as one element of a broader challenge to the existing
global order posed by a ‘triple entente’ of geographically contiguous authoritarian states –
China, North Korea and Russia. This growing alignment is particularly concerning given
that all three states possess nuclear weapons. Based on the precedent established by Russia
in Ukraine, in a future crisis or war both China and North Korea could be tempted to
issue their own nuclear threats to ward off third-party intervention. For China, this could
apply to contingencies involving Taiwan, which – like Ukraine – has no formal security
guarantees from the US. In general, the war’s momentum appears to be driving closer rela-
tions between not only Russia and China but also Russia and North Korea.13 In December
2022, Washington accused Pyongyang of directly supplying arms to the Wagner Group, a
Russian private military company operating in Ukraine.14
The failure to deter Russia’s invasion is likely to lead to a re-examination of the United
States’ (and its partners’) approaches to China as they seek new methods to deter Beijing
– including over the use of force against Taiwan.15 This development could have a positive
influence on regional stability providing US allies and partners are persuaded to increase
investment in conventional defence capabilities.16 Conversely, Russia’s nuclear threats over
Ukraine may have compounded existing doubts about the long-term viability of the United
States’ extended nuclear-deterrence framework in the Asia-Pacific. In January 2023, Yoon
Suk-yeol became the first sitting South Korean president to warn publicly that Seoul could
develop its own nuclear weapons in extremis.17 Seoul’s strategic anxiety should be read
primarily as a response to North Korea’s accelerating nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile
capabilities.18 However, Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship and its erosion of nuclear taboos
adds further pressure to the global non-proliferation regime, including in Northeast Asia.
Ukraine’s military successes suggest a further, potentially preventive lesson for the
Asia-Pacific: Western military training and capacity-building efforts – as provided to
Ukraine after 2014 – can bear strategic fruit. While media attention has focused on the
provision of weapons systems since the invasion,19 Ukraine’s armed forces benefitted from
US- and UK-led training, equipment and skills transfer in the pre-war phase, thus fore-
stalling a rapid Russian fait accompli in 2022. Ukraine may come to be seen as one of
the most successful cases in recent history of military capacity-building prior to full-scale
hostilities – with potential lessons for Taiwan.20 In this regard, developments in Ukraine
contrast starkly with those in Afghanistan, where the Western-trained and -equipped
Afghan National Security and Defence Forces promptly collapsed following the depar-
ture of Western forces from the country. While some commentators have complained that
Ukraine has drawn military assistance away from Taiwan and other US regional partners
and therefore undermined deterrence, post-Afghanistan, military-assistance programmes
in the Asia-Pacific might have been less politically supportable in the US absent the galva-
nising experience of Ukraine.21
Finally, many in the Asia-Pacific will learn from the successful pre-emptive intelligence-based
assessments of the US and its security partners – and their public disclosure – which highlighted
Russia’s aggressive intentions and its pre-invasion military build-up.22 This was a high-risk
strategy for Western governments given the reputational consequences had Russia’s build-up
turned out to be a bluff, or had the disclosures themselves changed Putin’s mind about mounting
an invasion. The fact that these warnings were proven accurate spurred a robust diplomatic
response in Europe – despite the scepticism of some European NATO member states’ govern-
ments right up to the invasion.23 Reportedly having discounted Western warnings, some Asian
governments were caught off guard by the invasion and had to hurriedly evacuate diplomatic
staff and nationals.24 The Ukraine war has helped to rehabilitate the international credibility of
Western intelligence organisations, which had been seriously hampered by intelligence failures
in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Although Western intelligence-based warnings did
not prevent Russia’s invasion in February 2022, a clear lesson for would-be aggressors in Asia
is that large-scale military preparations are virtually impossible to disguise, with surprise very
likely to be unattainable except in the case of small-scale operations. As a result of the Ukraine
experience, pre-emptive intelligence disclosure is likely to be factored into the Asia-Pacific strat-
egies of the US and its allies – for deterrence purposes but also with a view to shaping the
diplomatic environment during a major regional security crisis.
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LESSONS

The war in Ukraine has yielded a multitude of military lessons at the operational and
tactical levels. While many are specific to the geography of Ukraine, a few are transposable
to other regions. One example is Ukraine’s ability to adapt its military strategy and tactics
to changing battlefield circumstances while integrating a diverse plethora of donated
equipment. Following announcements by the German, UK and US governments (as well
as others) in January 2023, the Ukrainian army is now in line to receive three different
Western-made main battle tanks (MBT) – the UK’s Challenger II, the US-made M1A2 Abrams
and the German-made Leopard 2A6 – adding to the ex-Soviet tanks it currently operates (as
well as a number of new T-90 MBTs captured from Russia).25 Some Challengers and Leopards
have already arrived in Ukraine, with deliveries of Abrams to start later in 2023. Ukraine’s
eclectic stock of MBTs provides an extreme A Bushmaster vehicle bound for Ukraine is loaded onto a C-17A
transport aircraft at RAAF Base Amberley, Australia, 8 April 2022
example of the integration and logistics chal-
lenges it faces, though the long-term trend
points towards the country adopting NATO-
standard equipment across its inventory. This
ability to integrate mixed-origin equipment
– and its experience of the process of tran-
sitioning away from Russian/Soviet designs
– is likely to be of interest to India, Vietnam
and some other countries in Southeast Asia.
The war in Ukraine has been predom-
inantly fought on land and it is in this
domain that the conflict’s outcome is most (Dan Peled/Getty Images)
likely to be decided. That said, the naval

war in the Black Sea, although some way off the war’s centre of gravity, arguably has
more relevance for many Asia-Pacific countries, not least because instances of actual
naval combat on any scale have been rare in recent history. The naval war has featured a
Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports and the use of sea mines by both sides. Most strik-
ingly, in April 2022, Ukraine sank the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the cruiser
Moskva, with coast-based, domestically developed Neptune anti-ship missiles. Moskva is
the largest warship to be sunk in combat since the Falklands War in 1982. In October
2022, Ukraine also mounted a long-range strike against Russia’s fleet base at Sevastopol
in Crimea using small low-observable remote surface vessels. Ukraine recaptured the
strategically located Snake Island despite losing most of its small navy in the early stages
of the conflict. While ships and submarines from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet have continued
to launch missiles into Ukraine with relative impunity, the naval war has demonstrated
the viability of improvised, asymmetric ‘sea-denial’ capabilities and served as a reminder
of the potential vulnerability of surface ships to land-based missiles. These are important
considerations for force concepts and force design that will be of relevance to several
armed forces in the Asia-Pacific, including those of China and the US.
Turkiye’s ability to control naval movements through the Bosporus Strait during wartime,
under the 1936 Montreux Convention, has become relevant in the Ukraine conflict – a reminder
of the strategic importance of choke-point straits and the leverage that third-party littoral states
can bring to bear through legal as well as military instruments.26 Ukraine’s partial success in
countering Russia’s blockade during 2022 required a subtle blend of diplomatic and military
pressure, demonstrating that non-combatants – in this case including the US and its partners
– can exert meaningful influence through non-military means.27 Russia has conducted unop-
posed amphibious operations to support its offensive against the port of Mariupol on the Sea
of Azov.28 More significantly, however, Russia has not attempted landings anywhere along
Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, despite Odesa being earmarked as one of Moscow’s original military
objectives.29 The various elements that have shaped the naval war in Ukraine are all potentially
relevant to the Asia-Pacific, where blockade is widely assumed to be one of China’s most likely
actions – against Taiwan directly, or against smaller features in the South China Sea.30
One clear lesson from the battlefields of Speaking at a press conference in Taipei, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen
announces the extension of military service in Taiwan, 27 December 2022
Ukraine that is being absorbed by Taiwan’s
armed forces, among others in the Asia-Pacific,
is the importance of reserves for regenerating
combat forces during a protracted conflict.31
Without its effective reserve structure,
Ukraine’s armed forces would have strug-
gled to adjust to the early loss of experienced
personnel, which in turn would have made it
much harder to launch rapid offensive oper-
ations in areas like Kharkiv and Kherson.32
The logic here is broadly similar to the impor-
tance of maintaining a ‘deep magazine’ of (Lam Yik Fei/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
munitions stocks – a need highlighted by the

prodigious consumption rates of both sides in Ukraine, particularly with regard to artillery.
However, trained soldiers, sailors and air-force personnel are much harder to reconstitute
than equipment once hostilities commence unless reserves are already in place. In late
December 2022, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen referenced Ukraine when she announced
a force-realignment plan, extending the minimum term of conscription in Taiwan from four
months to one year and creating a ‘standing garrison force’.33
For several of Asia’s smaller countries and armed forces, the difficultly of resupply
is likely to be compounded by the far greater distances involved compared to those in
Europe. For some, their circumstances mean exclusive reliance on seaborne and airborne
supplies. The risk of regional armed forces being obliged to fight for the duration with the
forces and stocks in place from a conflict’s outbreak is significantly greater than in Ukraine,
which has benefitted enormously from land borders with NATO countries. Before the war,
this vulnerability had already been acknowledged, with Australia for example seeking to
increase investment in onshore weapons storage and production.34 The war in Ukraine
has further underlined the importance of a national defence-industrial base for winning a
protracted, high-intensity conflict. It has also highlighted the related risk that the United
States’ defence industries may not be able to meet the demands of its allies, especially if
there are concurrent conflicts occurring in different regions.35
Finally, in addition to kinetic exchanges on the battlefield, Ukraine’s information-warfare
techniques are certain to be studied and perhaps widely emulated, including in Asia. This
has emerged as another notable and perhaps unexpected strength of Ukraine, helping Kyiv
to garner and maintain international support at the level of the general public as well as
among elites. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s personal leadership style and commitment
to public communication has clearly been a singular asset in this regard, as was the pre-war
existence in Ukraine of a large advertising industry, which the government has been able to
mobilise in order to prosecute a sophisticated communications strategy, making highly effec-
tive use of social media. The Ukrainian government’s mastery of the information domain has
been augmented by a mass of online supporters and sympathisers – adding a spontaneous
and self-organising dynamic to Ukraine’s information operations.36
Russia’s information-warfare efforts have

Indonesian President Joko Widodo meeting his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr
appeared clumsy, antiquated and self-defeating Zelenskyy in Kyiv and Russia’s Vladimir Putin in Moscow, 29 and 30 July 2022
by comparison, though Moscow continues to
invest in disinformation and misinformation
campaigns that find some purchase internation-
ally, including in the Asia-Pacific.37 Ukraine’s
success in the information domain suggests that
this could actually be an area of comparative
advantage for democratic systems (over author-
itarian systems) under the unifying conditions
of an unprovoked external attack, in sharp
contrast to the peacetime trend of open societies
(L: Volodymyr Tarasov/ Ukrinform/Future Publishing via Getty Images. R: Contributor/Getty Images)
more often appearing vulnerable to informa-
tion warfare. If this is indeed a conclusion from Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov meets his Indian
counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in New Delhi, 1 April 2022
Ukraine, it should be of particular interest to
Taiwan and South Korea with regard to their
relations with China and North Korea respec-
tively, where in both contexts the information
‘battlespace’ is already well developed and
where – akin to the Russia–Ukraine dynamic
– relations are characterised not simply by the
dichotomy between democracy and dictator-
(Indian Ministry of External Affairs/Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
ship but also by a high degree of linguistic and
cultural familiarity.
GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE REGIONAL BALANCE

Russia’s military fortunes in Ukraine have implications for its status as an Asia-Pacific
security actor. Its military power has been degraded due to battlefield attrition, while organ-
isational weaknesses and incompetence have been exposed. As Russia is an Asia-Pacific
power, these developments will impact the conventional military balance in the region. It
remains militarily active in its Far East region, where activities in 2022 post-invasion have
included conducting exercises in the southern Kuril Islands38 and mounting long-range
aviation and naval deployments in the vicinity of Japan, South Korea and, occasionally,
further into the Western Pacific.39 Some of Russia’s Pacific units have already been deployed
to Ukraine, raising the possibility that its regional military posture (or at least its ground-
force elements) will become hollowed out as the conflict continues.40
Beyond its own defence requirements, Russia’s regional influence has long rested on
its role as an energy and weapons exporter. Moscow’s strongest defence-supplier relation-
ships in the Asia-Pacific are with India and Vietnam, alongside others including China,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar.41 While China imports weapons from Russia, the value
of those imports has generally decreased in recent decades, meaning Beijing is rarely reliant
on Moscow for supplies.42 By contrast, India’s and Vietnam’s diplomatic caution over the
Ukraine war – indicated by abstentions on Ukraine-related UN votes – is likely influenced
by their ongoing dependence upon Russia Figure 1.1: Selected equipment operated by India’s and Vietnam’s
for imported equipment (see Figure 1.1).43
militaries by country of origin, 2002–22
Moscow’s position as a prime supplier was INDIA

already under pressure prior to the invasion, TACTICAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT
India
as its partners sought more diverse sources of
equipment. For instance, for many decades Russia/Soviet Union
Hanoi bought almost all its weapons systems
from Russia; in the five years to 2021, this
proportion fell to two-thirds.44 The conflict
in Ukraine will likely accelerate this trend in
Vietnam, India and other regional countries.
Russia’s weak performance in Ukraine has
also undermined the reputation of its armed
forces, while the difficulties it has encoun-
UK
tered in replenishing its forces have generated
supplier-reliability concerns.45 In addition,
Other
Western sanctions have made it much harder
for Russian contractors to source components
– a development that will hamper future SUBMARINES AND PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS
deal financing. India
The aftermath of Moscow’s invasion has

Russia/Soviet Union
generated difficult questions for India’s stra-
tegic positioning between Russia and the UK
West. New Delhi and Moscow have long

Other
enjoyed a ‘Special and Privileged Strategic
Partnership’.46 More recently, as its concerns
2002 2012 2022
about China have grown, India has drawn
closer to the West.47 In the Asia-Pacific this VIETNAM
is seen via its membership in the Quad TACTICAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT
grouping alongside Australia, Japan and China
the US. Many in Western capitals assumed

Russia/Soviet Union
these ties would lead New Delhi to join in
the international condemnation of Moscow’s
actions. Instead, Prime Minister Narendra
US
Modi stuck to a carefully calibrated strategy,
avoiding criticism of Russia and abstaining in Other
UN votes (see Figure 1.2, for example). India

has also been robustly critical of assumptions 2002 2012 2022
regarding its stance on the conflict, especially

from European capitals.48 Source: IISS
India’s position on the Ukraine war also reflects a calculation of strategic interests.
India and Russia share some geopolitical assumptions, including support for a future
multipolar global order featuring a less dominant US. Putin made a rare visit to New
8
Total
1 Asia-Pacific
countries
37
28
On 2 March 2022, the United Nations General

Assembly overwhelmingly voted in favour of a
resolution demanding that Russia immediately
cease its military operations in Ukraine
Yes No Abstention
©IISS
Delhi in late 2021 designed to shore up bilateral ties. India welcomed Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov for a high-profile visit in April 2022. New Delhi continues to assess
China to be its primary security threat and is particularly concerned by the risk of further,
more intense clashes in disputed areas along India’s long Himalayan border. A future
confrontation with China would be especially challenging for India without supplies of
Russian arms. Viewed from New Delhi, any Russian defeat in Ukraine would be likely to
push Moscow and Beijing closer together. Maintaining ties with Moscow might blunt that
risk by providing Moscow with options for geopolitical partnership beyond its reliance
on Beijing. India has also benefitted from purchases of discounted Russian oil since the
invasion of Ukraine.49
New Delhi’s ambivalent reaction to Russia’s invasion rekindled doubts among Western
strategists about both India’s reliability and its willingness to be part of a balancing
coalition against China.50 These concerns should not be overplayed, however. Excessive
reliance on Russian arms curtails India’s strategic autonomy with respect to China, a fact
many policymakers in New Delhi recognise. Russia’s share of Indian arms imports had
already dropped from a recent high of 77% in 2018 to around one-third in 2021.51 India has
reportedly suspended plans to purchase Russian systems, including helicopters. Delays
to some existing weapons orders, including temporary hold-ups for a batch of S-400
surface-to-air missiles, have raised reliability concerns.52 Although New Delhi currently
remains reliant on Russian equipment, it is likely to try to reduce its dependence over
time, both by seeking alternative suppliers and by boosting domestic defence produc-
tion wherever practicable.53 India’s patience with Russia has its limits too: in December
2022, Modi cancelled a planned meeting with Putin following concerns in New Delhi over
Russia’s war conduct.54
Figure 1.2: Asia-Pacific countries' votes on UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 (‘Aggression against Ukraine’),
2 March 2022
Country Vote Country Vote Country Vote Country Vote
Australia  Indonesia  Nauru  Solomon Islands 
Bangladesh  Japan  Nepal  South Korea 
Bhutan  Kiribati  New Zealand  Singapore 
Brunei  Laos  North Korea  Sri Lanka 
Cambodia  Malaysia  Pakistan  Thailand 
China  Maldives  Palau  Timor-Leste 
Federated States Marshall Papua New

   Tonga 
of Micronesia Islands Guinea
Fiji  Mongolia  Philippines  Tuvalu 
India  Myanmar*  Samoa  Vanuatu 
*Myanmar’s vote reflects its ambassador to the UN being aligned with the ousted democratic government rather than with the military one which has de facto replaced it. Vietnam 
Source: UN Digital Library, digitallibrary.un.org
Russia’s deepening relationship with China since the invasion of Ukraine also carries
potentially far-reaching strategic implications. Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin
unveiled a manifesto for broader cooperation in February 2022. The document stated:
‘Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no “forbidden” areas of coopera-
tion.’55 In the conflict’s early stages, political leaders in Europe and the US harboured hopes
that China might be persuaded to distance itself from Russia. Indeed, Washington launched
various diplomatic overtures, first asking China to dissuade Russia from invading and
then attempting to dissuade Beijing from sending military equipment to support Russia’s
war aims.56 Beijing, however, generally refused to condemn Moscow. Although China has
mostly avoided providing to Russia the kind of material and military support that might
trigger US-led sanctions,57 in January 2023 the US imposed sanctions on a Chinese company
for allegedly supplying satellite imagery of Ukraine for use by the Wagner Group, via a
Russian third party.58 Media reports subsequently alleged that Chinese companies were
supplying defence equipment to Russia, including via trans-shipment through third coun-
tries.59 China has called for peace talks while blaming the West and NATO expansion for
starting the war.60
Russia’s invasion has at times strained bilateral ties with China. While Beijing has
provided diplomatic support at the UN, it is still not clear to what extent China’s leader-
ship supports Russia’s war aims.61 There has been debate within China’s ruling elite about
how much Beijing should embrace or distance itself from Moscow.62 China’s dilemma
relates in part to Beijing’s long-standing declaratory support for claims of national terri-
torial integrity, while Russia’s weak battlefield performance has also put Beijing in the
awkward position of supporting a military operation that has failed to achieve its central
objectives. China is also concerned about Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship.63 Moreover,
Map 1.1: China and Russia: military cooperation activities, 2022
RUSSIA Sea of
Okhotsk
Sea of
Japan 3
(East Sea)
Western
Pacific
CHINA 6 Ocean
5
1x CGHM 1x DDGHM
East
1x FFGHM 3x FFGHM
China 1x AORH
Sea
Gulf of
Oman 7
2 2x DDGHM 1x CGHM
2x FFGHM 1x DDGHM
1x DDGHM 2x DDGHM South 1x AOR 2x FFGHM
1x AORH 1x AOR China
Sea
Bay of
Arabian Sea Bengal Philippine
Sea
1
Sulu
1x DDGHM 2x DDGHM Sea
1x AORH 1x AOR PHILIPPINES
FLAGS = Equipment reportedly included
JANUARY MAY SEPTEMBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER

1 Peaceful Sea 2022 3 Joint aerial 4 Vostok 2022 6 Joint aerial 7 Joint Sea 2022
Maritime exercise patrol SINGAPORE
One of Russia’s major strategic-level exercises, also patrol Naval exercise
including counter- Joint patrol with including as participants other member countries of the Joint patrol with held (generally)
piracy serials H-6 and Tu-95 Collective Security Treaty Organization and Shanghai H-6 and Tu-95 biennially since
bomber aircraft Cooperation Organisation, among others bomber aircraft, 2012, with
2 CHIRU 2022 reportedly Banda
the Sea maritime serials
China reportedly sent around 2,000 troops, tanks and
Maritime exercise, first time bombers including
armoured fighting vehicles and artillery pieces, 21 aircraft
including counter-piracy from both anti-submarine
and helicopters (including J-10Cs) and three naval vessels
serials and some live firing countries have warfare and
Indian1x AOR)
(1x CGHM, 1x FFGHM,
with participants from landed on each a live-fire
5 Ocean
Joint naval patrol component
China, Iran and Russia other’s airfields
Joint patrol including maritime exercises and live-fire drills
AOR fleet replenishment oiler with replenishment-at-sea (RAS) capability CGHM cruiser with surface-to-surface missile (SSM), DDGHM destroyer with SSM, hangar and SAM
AORH fleet replenishment oiler with RAS capability and hangar hangar, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) FFGHM frigate with SSM, hangar and SAM
©IISS
Source: IISS
existing Sino-Russian pledges to co-develop new technological capabilities have made

little progress and are now likely to be further hampered by sanctions and export controls
on semiconductors and other technologies.
Whatever qualms Xi may harbour about Putin’s modus operandi in Ukraine, Beijing’s
bottom line is that it does not want to see Russia defeated or Putin replaced by a new
Russian leader less amenable to Chinese interests.64 Despite occasional bilateral strains,
China and Russia have also deepened their partnership in several ways since the start of
the war. In economic terms, sanctions have forced Russia to increase its dependence on
its neighbour, which now consumes a larger A Chinese H-6 bomber landing at a Russian air base as part
of the Russian-organised International Army Games, 2018
portion of Russian energy exports.65 Military
cooperation has also deepened (see Map
1.1). In May 2022, the two countries flew a
joint bomber sortie close to Japan, signalling
displeasure at a leader-level Quad summit
being held in Tokyo on the same day.66 In
early November 2022, they flew bombers to
each other’s air bases for the first time during
joint military exercises, hinting at future
reciprocal access arrangements that could
extend their respective operational reach in
the Northwest Pacific.67 The two countries
have also conducted joint live-fire exercises (Artyom Anikeev/Stocktrek Images via Getty Images)
in the East China Sea, while the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) participated in Russia’s Vostok 2022 military exercises.
Asia-Pacific leaders remain concerned that Russia’s actions in Ukraine have lowered
the threshold for armed conflict in Asia – an argument clearly embraced by Japan’s Prime
Minister Kishida. Such worries centre most obviously on China and the prospect that
Beijing might be emboldened to use armed force against Taiwan or its other neighbours.
China’s willingness to pressure Taiwan militarily has grown in 2022 and early 2023, most
clearly evident in its military response to then-speaker of the US House of Representatives
Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in August 2022. Assessing Beijing’s strategic intentions
with any precision remains difficult, however.
At one level it seems reasonable to conclude that Russia’s battlefield frustrations in
Ukraine would give pause to those in Beijing who might be mulling military adventures of
their own. Chinese officials rarely comment on such matters in public, however, so there
is little conclusive evidence as to how Russia’s ‘special operation’ against Ukraine will
affect the odds of any possible future Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Instead of focusing on
the potential for China to engage in military adventurism, it may be more profitable to
examine the broader developmental lessons that the PLA might take from the performance
of Russia’s and Ukraine’s armed forces. In many cases those lessons are likely to support
existing PLA priorities and modernisation plans, for instance concerning the importance
of developing greater expertise in combined arms or joint operations, and how to integrate
new technologies in innovative ways.68 The onus placed on new technologies – such as
drones – in Ukraine also chimes with China’s existing modernisation plans.69
THE US AND EUROPE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

The administration of US President Joe Biden has long denied any tension between US
activities in Europe and its aim of increasingly focusing resources on the Asia-Pacific and
China. The US National Security Strategy published in October 2022 underlined China as
Washington’s primary focus, as did the related National Defense Strategy released in the
same month.70 Senior US officials claim that developments in Ukraine have not altered their
focus.71 In many ways, Ukraine’s military US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin speaks at the launch of the 2022
National Defense Strategy – which focuses on China as the ‘pacing challenge’
success has bolstered the United States’ repu-
for the US despite the war in Ukraine – in Virginia, US, 27 October 2022
tation in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, while the
chaotic military drawdown from Afghanistan
in 2021 dented perceptions of Washington’s
competence, in contrast, the Ukraine war has
highlighted US strengths in alliance manage-
ment, technological leadership, equipment
provision and intelligence disclosure. When
US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin noted
in April 2022 that the US ‘want[s] to see Russia
weakened’, the reasoning was presumably
that Washington would then be more able
to focus on China.72 Pushing back against (Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images)
Russia’s challenge to the international order

could enhance the credibility of US security guarantees in Asia (although the opposite is
likely to be the result if Ukraine loses the war despite US assistance).
Nonetheless, the war risks distracting Washington from its focus on the Asia-Pacific.
Ukraine is a drain on US finances, munitions and policy bandwidth. The US has reportedly
ordered some of its military equipment stockpiled in South Korea to be moved to Ukraine.73
Washington’s allies in the Asia-Pacific have long watched carefully for signals that the US
may not be able or willing to deliver on its existing security guarantees. Successive US
administrations have pledged greater US focus on and resources to the Asia-Pacific for
more than a decade. That shift has happened slowly,74 although one senior US defence
official recently predicted that 2023 would be ‘the most transformative year in US force
posture in the region in a generation’.75
For European powers, the war raises similar questions pertaining to US focus and
resources, albeit on a much smaller scale in terms of military presence and assets that can
be deployed to the region. France, Germany and the UK have unveiled strategies for the
region, although these arguably appear less sustainable following the invasion of Ukraine.
In March 2023 the UK published a ‘refresh’ of its 2021 Integrated Review of Security,
Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, the security strategy that announced its ‘tilt’
to the Asia-Pacific. Echoing earlier statements from officials, the refresh underlined that
the UK’s enhanced focus on the region will continue.76 Other European NATO members,
most notably Germany, have pledged to increase defence spending. These promised steps
could provide additional resources for security engagement in the Asia-Pacific. However,
fiscal constraints and the overwhelming need to focus on Ukraine make it unlikely that
European states will be able to develop more ambitious approaches to the Asia-Pacific in
the short to medium term. In the face of fiscal pressures and competition for extra resources
in Europe, the likes of the UK and France are more likely to focus on maintaining existing
and planned commitments in the region.
The Ukraine war also has implications for US partners in the Asia-Pacific. NATO’s
Madrid Summit in June 2022 was attended by the leaders of Australia, Japan, New
Zealand and South Korea.77 Their deci- Leaders of NATO’s four Asia-Pacific partner countries – Australian Prime
Minister Anthony Albanese, Japanese PM Kishida Fumio, then New Zealand PM
sion to engage NATO more closely reflects
Jacinda Ardern and South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol – with Secretary-
mutual concerns over China but also General Jens Stoltenberg at a NATO summit in Madrid, Spain, 29 June 2022
interest in understanding NATO’s response
to Ukraine. NATO Secretary-General Jens
Stoltenberg visited Japan and South Korea
in January 2023, calling on the latter to do
more to support Ukraine.78 Heightened
perceptions of global insecurity following
Russia’s invasion may be a contributing
element behind increased defence spending
among the United States’ regional allies
and partners. However, this factor should
not be overemphasised: Australia, Japan, (Pierre-Philippe Marcou/AFP via Getty Images)
South Korea and Taiwan were all on a path

to higher defence spending before the Ukraine conflict, largely reflecting their percep-
tions of rising threats within the region. That said, Kishida has cited the Ukraine war as
one of the justifications for his government’s commitment to doubling Japanese defence
spending – to 2% of GDP – by 2027.79
CONCLUSION
Although geographically limited to Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, the war in
Ukraine is a major inter-state conflict that is likely to have long-term global ramifica-
tions, including for the Asia-Pacific. One universal lesson is that unprovoked aggression
and territorial conquest by major powers remains an active risk and a salient feature of
international relations in the twenty-first century. Perceptions of military threat have
thus deepened in the Asia-Pacific. While trends of higher defence expenditure in the
region pre-dated Russia’s invasion, deepening feelings of insecurity, driven in part by
the war in Ukraine, may now accelerate these trends and lead to faster military modern-
isation and capability development. Russia’s failure to achieve a quick victory in the face
of Ukraine’s determined and competent defence – aided by substantial assistance from
Western countries – has also emerged as a fact of the war’s first year. Russia has already
paid a heavy price, on the battlefield and reputationally, while Ukraine’s civilian and
military leadership has consistently outperformed expectations. If Ukraine ultimately
prevails, it will provide a considerable boost for the existing rules-based order in both
Europe and the Asia-Pacific. By contrast, if Russia achieves some measure of victory,
Moscow’s gains in Ukraine will likely lead to a weakening of those same rules and norms
in the Asia-Pacific, setting revisionist precedents from which China and North Korea are
likely to benefit. While the war is unlikely to produce new flashpoints in Asia, it is already
having direct impacts on regional strategic alignments, defence policies, doctrines and
equipment-purchase decisions. Whatever else happens, the growing strategic interplay
between the Asia-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic looks likely to endure long after Russia’s
conflict in Ukraine has concluded.
NOTES
1 Japan, Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Keynote 8 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Ukraine War: Where Are
Address by Prime Minister KISHIDA Fumio the Peacemakers?’, Straits Times, 19 March 2022,
at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue’, 10 June 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/where-
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/ are-the-peacemakers.
statement/202206/_00002.html. 9 Guy Faulconbridge and Felix Light, ‘Putin
2 Ben Barry et al., ‘The UK Indo-Pacific Tilt: Ally Warns NATO of Nuclear War if Russia
Defence and Military Implications’, IISS Is Defeated in Ukraine’, Reuters, 19 January
Research Paper, 8 June 2022, https://www.iiss. 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/
org/blogs/research-paper/2022/06/the-uk- putin-ally-medvedev-warns-nuclear-war-if-
indo-pacific-tilt. russia-defeated-ukraine-2023-01-19/.
3 See Singapore, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 Pierre de Dreuzy and Andrea Gilli, ‘Russia’s
‘Statement by Ambassador Burhan Gafoor, Nuclear Coercion in Ukraine’, NATO Review,
Permanent Representative of Singapore, at 29 November 2022, https://www.nato.int/docu/
the Emergency Special Session of the United review/articles/2022/11/29/russias-nuclear-
Nations General Assembly on the Situation coercion-in-ukraine/index.html.
in Ukraine, 28 February 2022, New York’, 11 Ibid.; and Steve Rosenberg and Jaroslav Lukiv,
28 February 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/ ‘Ukraine War: Drone Attack on Russian Bomber
Overseas-Mission/New-York/Mission-Updates/ Base Leaves Three Dead’, BBC News, 26
General_assembly/2022/10/20220228; and December 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/
Tommy Koh, ‘Ukraine, International Law and world-europe-64092183.
the Security of Small States’, Straits Times, 5 12 Jack Lau, ‘No Nuclear Weapons Over Ukraine,
March 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/ Chinese President Xi Jinping Says, in Clear
ukraine-international-law-and-the-security-of- Message to Russia’, South China Morning
small-states. Post, 4 November 2022, https://www.scmp.
4 See ‘Japan to Offer Protective Masks, com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3198505/
Clothing, Drones to Ukraine’, Kyodo News, no-nuclear-weapons-over-ukraine-chinese-
19 April 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/ president-xi-jinping-says-clear-message-russia.
news/2022/04/00e4cd64dc1c-japan-to-offer- 13 Peter Beaumont, ‘The Ukraine War Is Deepening
protective-masks-clothing-drones-to-ukraine. Russia’s Ties With North Korea as Well as
html; and South Korea, Ministry of Foreign Iran’, Guardian, 7 November 2022, https://www.
Affairs, ‘Korea Sends Additional Medical theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/07/russia-
Supplies to Ukraine’, 20 April 2022, https://www. ukraine-war-iran-north-korea-arms-ties.
mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322033. 14 Steve Holland, ‘Exclusive: US Says Russia’s
5 Australian Government, Defence, ‘Additional Wagner Group Bought North Korean Weapons
Support for Ukraine’, 27 October 2022, https:// for Ukraine War’, Reuters, 22 December
www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/ 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/
2022-10-27/additional-support-ukraine; and us-says-russias-wagner-group-bought-north-
New Zealand, Defence Force, ‘Further Support korean-weapons-ukraine-war-2022-12-22/.
to Ukraine Confirmed’, 14 November 2022, 15 Kathrin Hille et al., ‘Ukraine War Hardens
https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/further-support- Washington’s Asia Allies on China’, Financial
to-ukraine-continued/. Times, 11 March 2022, https://www.ft.com/
6 Soo-Hyang Choi, ‘Poland Buy S.Korean content/bcf45320-78f4-41d4-9ed3-668e29f5bdff.
Rocket Launchers After Tank, Howitzer 16 Ted Gover, ‘Commentary: Even as Taiwan
Sales’, Reuters, 19 October 2022, https:// Boosts Defence Spending, Its Security May
www.reuters.com/world/europe/ Depend on How the Budget Is Spent’, CNA, 27
poland-expected-buy-skorean-rocket-launchers- August 2022, https://www.channelnewsasia.
after-tank-howitzer-sales-2022-10-19/. com/commentary/us-china-taiwan-defence-
7 ‘Aggression Against Ukraine: Resolution / invasion-pelosi-visit-2899971.
Adopted by the General Assembly’, UN Digital 17 Choe Sang-Hun, ‘In a First, South Korea
Library, 2 March 2022, https://digitallibrary. Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option’,
un.org/record/3959039?ln=en. New York Times, 12 January 2023, https://
www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south- China Morning Post, 26 February 2022,

korea-nuclear-weapons.html. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/
18 IISS and Center for Energy and Security Studies, article/3168507/ukraine-invasion-malaysian-
‘DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on diplomats-flee-kyiv-road-government.
the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead’, IISS 25 On the Western-made tanks, see Ellen Francis
Research Paper, 14 July 2021, https://www.iiss. et al., ‘Who’s Sending What to Ukraine: A
org/blogs/research-paper/2021/07/dprk- New Wave of Western Weapons Explained’,
strategic-capabilities-security-korean-peninsula. Washington Post, 2 February 2023, https://
19 David Brown, Jake Horton and Tural www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/02/
Ahmedzade, ‘Ukraine Weapons: What Tanks ukraine-weapons-tanks-leopard-abrams/. On
and Other Equipment Are the World Giving?’, the captured T-90s, see Jake Epstein, ‘Retreating
BBC News, 22 February 2023, https://www.bbc. Russian Troops Are Arming Ukraine With
com/news/world-europe-62002218. Modern T-90 Tanks as Putin’s Army Digs
20 Jerad I. Harper and Michael A. Hunzeker, 60-year-old Armor Out of Storage, Ukraine’s
‘Learning to Train: What Washington and Military Says’, Business Insider, 13 October
Taipei Can Learn From Security Cooperation 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/
in Ukraine and the Baltic States’, War on the ukraine-armed-with-modern-t-90-tanks-
Rocks, 20 January 2023, https://warontherocks. captured-from-russians-2022-10.
com/2023/01/learning-to-train-what-washington- 26 Mark Nevitt, ‘The Russia–Ukraine
and-taipei-can-learn-from-security-cooperation- Conflict, the Black Sea, and the Montreux
in-ukraine-and-the-baltic-states/. Convention’, Just Security, 28 February
21 For an example of such complaints, see Gabriel 2022, https://www.justsecurity.org/80384/
Dominguez, ‘Shrinking US Munition Reserves the-russia-ukraine-conflict-the-black-sea-and-
Could Impact a Taiwan Conflict’, Japan Times, the-montreux-convention/.
31 January 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ 27 Ali Kucukgocmen and Pavel Polityuk, ‘Ukraine
news/2023/01/31/asia-pacific/us-munitions- Grain Export Deal Back on Track as Russia
shortage-taiwan/. On the galvanising impact Resumes Participation’, Reuters, 1 November
of the Ukraine war on military-assistance 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/
programmes in the Asia-Pacific, see, for ukraine-crisis-idAFKBN2RR3VX.
example, Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘US’s Taiwan 28 Dan Sabbagh and Peter Beaumont, ‘Where Has
Security Bill Spurs Debate on Level of Support Fighting Been Focused on Day Two of Russia’s
for Taipei’, Financial Times, 13 September 2022, Invasion of Ukraine?’, Guardian, 25 February 2022,
https://www.ft.com/content/a48ee082-a617-472f- https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/25/
bff2-83f8c6fb2dd9. fight-for-kyiv-russian-forces-ukraine-capital-war.
22 Jake Harrington, ‘Intelligence Disclosures in the 29 Murat Sofuoglu, ‘Art of War: What Does
Ukraine Crisis and Beyond’, War on the Rocks, 1 the Russian Withdrawal From Kherson
March 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/ Signify?’, TRT World, 11 November 2022,
intelligence-disclosures-in-the-ukraine-crisis- https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/
and-beyond/. art-of-war-what-does-the-russian-withdrawal-
23 Shane Harris et al., ‘Road to War: US Struggled from-kherson-signify-62472.
to Convince Allies, and Zelensky, of Risk of 30 Chris Buckley et al., ‘How China Could Choke
Invasion’, Washington Post, 16 August 2022, Taiwan’, New York Times, 25 August 2022, https://
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national- www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/08/25/
security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-war/. world/asia/china-taiwan-conflict-blockade.html.
24 Vishnu Som, ‘Embassy in Ukraine Shuts After 31 Ben Blanchard, ‘Ukraine War Gives
Attempts to Evacuate Indians From Kyiv’, Taiwan’s Military Reservist Reform New
NDTV, 1 March 2022, https://www.ndtv.com/ Impetus’, Reuters, 12 March 2022, https://
india-news/indian-embassy-in-ukraines- www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/
capital-kyiv-shuts-down-sources-2797584; ukraine-war-gives-taiwans-military-reservist-
and Hadi Azmi, ‘Ukraine Invasion: Malaysian reform-new-impetus-2022-03-12/.
Diplomats Flee Kyiv by Road as Government 32 Henry Foy et al., ‘The 90km Journey That
Draws Flak for Evacuation Bungling’, South Changed the Course of the War in Ukraine’,
Financial Times, 28 September 2022, https://ig.ft. russian-chinese-navies-conduct-joint-patrols-

com/ukraine-counteroffensive/. pacific-russian-defence-ministry-2022-09-15.
33 Taiwan, Office of the President, ‘President Tsai 40 John Paul Rathbone, Sam Jones and Daniel
Announces Military Force Realignment Plan’, 27 Dombey, ‘Military Briefing: Why Russia Is
December 2022, https://english.president.gov. Deploying More Troops to Ukraine’, Financial
tw/NEWS/6417. Times, 17 March 2022, https://www.ft.com/
34 Australian Government, Defence, ‘Morrison content/d721718e-37cd-4113-8c2f-489f930991fb.
Government Accelerates Sovereign 41 Ian Storey, ‘The Russia–Ukraine War
Guided Weapons Manufacturing’, 31 and Its Potential Impact on Russia’s
March 2021, https://www.minister. Arms Sales to Southeast Asia’, ISEAS
defence.gov.au/media-releases/2021-03-31/ Perspective, no. 47, 5 May 2022, https://
morrison-government-accelerates-sovereign- www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/
guided-weapons-manufacturing-0. iseas-perspective/2022-47-the-russia-ukraine-
35 Joe Gould, ‘US Defense Industry Unprepared war-and-its-potential-impact-on-russias-arms-
for a China Fight, Says Report’, Defense News, sales-to-southeast-asia-by-ian-storey/.
23 January 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/ 42 See Stockholm International Peace Research
industry/2023/01/23/us-defense-industry- Institute (SIPRI), ‘SIPRI Arms Transfers Database’,
unprepared-for-a-china-fight-says-report/. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.
36 Peter Suciu, ‘Ukraine Is Winning on 43 Christophe Jaffrelot and Aadil Sud, ‘Indian
the Battlefield and on Social Media’, Military Dependence on Russia’, Institut
Forbes, 13 October 2022, https://www. Montaigne, 5 July 2022, https://www.
forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2022/10/13/ institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/indian-
ukraine-is-winning-on-the-battlefield-and-on- military-dependence-russia; and Mike Yeo,
social-media/?sh=e0707ab40082. ‘Vietnam Expo Displays Declining but
37 Hadi Azmi, ‘Ukraine War: How the Battle Ongoing Dependence on Russian Arms’,
on Malaysia’s Social Media Has Become a Defense News, 12 December 2022, https://
Propaganda Tool for Russia and Ukraine’, South www.defensenews.com/industry/2022/12/12/
China Morning Post, 19 March 2022, https:// vietnam-expo-displays-declining-but-ongo-
www.scmp.com/week-asia/article/3171049/ ing-dependence-on-russian-arms/.
ukraine-war-battle-malaysias-social-media- 44 Le Hong Hiep, ‘Will Vietnam Be Able to Wean
propaganda-tool-russia-and. Itself Off Russian Arms?’, Fulcrum, 4 April 2022,
38 Lidia Kelly, ‘Russia Conducts Military Drills on https://fulcrum.sg/will-vietnam-be-able-to-
Isles Disputed With Japan’, Reuters, 26 March wean-itself-off-russian-arms/.
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ 45 Sarosh Bana, ‘India’s Russian Arms Imbroglio’,
russia-conducts-military-drills-isles-disputed- Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 1
with-japan-media-2022-03-26/. November 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.
39 Julian Ryall, ‘Russia Ramps Up Military au/indias-russian-arms-imbroglio/.
Activities Around Japan in “Sabre-rattling” 46 Embassy of India in Moscow, Russia, ‘Bilateral
Move as Tokyo Faces Energy Security Relations: India–Russia Relations’, https://
Dilemma’, South China Morning Post, 14 March indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/bilateral-
2022, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/ relations-india-russia.php.
politics/article/3170413/russia-ramps-mili- 47 Jim Garamone, ‘US, India Ties Continue to
tary-activities-around-japan-sabre-rattling; Strengthen, Austin Says’, US Department of
Hyonhee Shin, ‘South Korea Scrambles Jets as Defense, 26 September 2022, https://www.
China, Russia Warplanes Enter Air Defence defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/
Zone’, Reuters, 30 November 2022, https:// Article/3170929/us-india-ties-continue-to-
www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china- strengthen-austin-says/.
russia-warplanes-temporarily-entered-south- 48 Sourav Roy Barman, ‘Europe Has to Grow
korea-air-defence-zone-yonhap-2022-11-30; Out of Mindset That Its Problems Are World’s
and ‘Russia Says Its Navy in Joint Patrols Problems: Jaishankar’, Indian Express, 4 June
With China in Pacific’, Reuters, 15 September 2022, https://indianexpress.com/article/
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/ india/europe-has-to-grow-out-of-mindset-
that-its-problems-are-worlds-problems- www.wsj.com/articles/china-aids-russias-
jaishankar-7951895/. war-in-ukraine-trade-data-shows-11675466360.
49 Shivam Patel and Krishna N. Das, ‘India Says 60 For example, China’s Foreign Ministry
Russia Oil Deals Advantageous as Yellen Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that ‘NATO’s
Visits Delhi’, Reuters, 8 November 2022, continuous expansion in Europe has led
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/ to the Ukraine crisis. Now it is seeking to
buying-russian-oil-is-indias-advantage- reach beyond its geographical confines and
foreign-minister-2022-11-08/. mission scope by stoking bloc confrontation
50 Mihir Sharma, ‘India Should Stand With the in the Asia-Pacific.’ China, Ministry of Foreign
West Against Russia’, Bloomberg, 22 February Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao
2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/ Lijian’s Regular Press Conference on July 8,
articles/2022-02-22/india-should-stand-with-the- 2022’, 8 July 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
west-against-russia-in-ukraine-crisis. mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202207/
51 SIPRI, ‘SIPRI Arms Transfers Database’. See t20220708_10717764.html.
‘Importer/exporter TIV tables’. 61 Kathrin Hille, ‘Xi Pursues Policy of “Pro-Russia
52 Bana, ‘India’s Russian Arms Imbroglio’. Neutrality” Despite Ukraine War’, Financial
53 Devjyot Ghoshal and Aftab Ahmed, ‘India, Times, 27 February 2022, https://www.ft.com/
World’s Biggest Buyer of Russian Arms, content/bf930a62-6952-426b-b249-41097094318a.
Looks to Diversify Suppliers’, Reuters, 18 May 62 Yan Xuetong, ‘China’s Ukraine Conundrum:
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/india/ Why the War Necessitates a Balancing Act’,
india-worlds-biggest-buyer-russian-arms-looks- Foreign Affairs, 2 May 2022, https://www.
diversify-suppliers-2022-05-18/. foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-02/
54 Sudhi Ranjan Sen, ‘Modi to Skip Annual chinas-ukraine-conundrum.
Putin Summit Over Ukraine Nuke Threats’, 63 Geoffrey Smith, ‘China’s Xi Warns Putin Not
Bloomberg, 9 December 2022, https://www. to Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine’, Yahoo!
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-12-09/ News, 4 November 2022, https://sg.news.yahoo.
modi-to-skip-annual-summit-with-putin-over- com/chinas-xi-warns-putin-not-073636312.html.
ukraine-nuke-threats. 64 Iliya Kusa, ‘China’s Strategic Calculations in the
55 Tony Munroe, Andrew Osborn and Humeyra Russia–Ukraine War’, Wilson Center, 21 June
Pamuk, ‘China, Russia Partner Up Against 2022, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/
West at Olympics Summit’, Reuters, 4 February chinas-strategic-calculations-russia-ukraine-war.
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ 65 Chen Aizhu, ‘Russian Oil Supplies to
russia-china-tell-nato-stop-expansion-moscow- China Up 22% on Year, Close Second to
backs-beijing-taiwan-2022-02-04/. Saudi – Data’, Reuters, 24 October 2022,
56 Edward Wong, ‘US Officials Repeatedly Urged https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/
China to Help Avert War in Ukraine’, New York russian-oil-supplies-china-up-22-year-close-
Times, 25 February 2022, https://www.nytimes. second-saudi-data-2022-10-24/.
com/2022/02/25/us/politics/us-china-russia- 66 Takahashi Kosuke, ‘China, Russia Fly 6 Bombers
ukraine.html. Near Japan Amid Quad Summit’, Diplomat, 25
57 Amanda Lee and Wendy Wu, ‘US Sanctions May 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/
Threat if China Aids Russia Stirs Fear in Beijing china-russia-fly-6-bombers-near-japan-amid-
About Forex Assets’, South China Morning Post, quad-summit/.
7 April 2022, https://www.scmp.com/economy/ 67 Mike Yeo, ‘Chinese, Russian Long-range
china-economy/article/3173273/us-sanctions- Bombers Make Reciprocal Base Visits’,
threat-if-china-aids-russia-stirs-fear-beijing. Defense News, 1 December 2022, https://
58 Kelly Ng, ‘Ukraine: US Sanctions Chinese Firm www.defensenews.com/air/2022/12/01/
Helping Russia’s Wagner Group’, BBC News, chinese-russian-long-range-bombers-make-
27 January 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/ reciprocal-base-visits/.
world-asia-china-64421915. 68 Michael Raska, ‘The Russia–Ukraine War:
59 Ian Talley and Anthony DeBarros, ‘China Aids Lessons for Northeast Asia’, S. Rajaratnam
Russia’s War in Ukraine, Trade Data Shows’, School of International Studies, IDSS paper,
Wall Street Journal, 4 February 2023, https:// 12 January 2023, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/
rsis-publication/idss/ip23007-the-russia-ukraine- publications/strategic-dossiers/asia-
war-lessons-for-northeast-asia/#.Y9tWMexBzdo. pacific-regional-security-assessment-2022/
69 Meia Nouwens, ‘China’s Military aprsa-chapter-1.
Modernisation: Will the People’s Liberation 75 Christopher Woody, ‘The US Military Is
Army Complete Its Reforms?’, IISS Analysis, Planning for a “Transformative” Year in Asia as
7 December 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/ Tensions With China Continue to Rise’, Business
analysis/2022/12/strategic-survey-2022-chinas- Insider, 27 December 2022, https://www.
military-modernisation. businessinsider.com/us-military-transform-
70 Antony J. Blinken, ‘Release of the President’s indo-pacific-force-posture-in-2023-2022-12?op=1.
National Security Strategy’, US Department of 76 UK, Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Prime Minister:
State, 12 October 2022, https://www.state.gov/ The UK Will Be a Firm Friend to the Indo-
release-of-the-presidents-national-security- Pacific’, 15 November 2022, https://www.gov.
strategy/; and C. Todd Lopez, ‘DOD uk/government/news/prime-minister-the-uk-
Releases National Defense Strategy, Missile will-be-a-firm-friend-to-the-indo-pacific; UK,
Defense, Nuclear Posture Reviews’, United Foreign, Commonwealth and Development
States Department of Defense, 27 October Office, ‘UK Minister Travels to Australia
2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/ for Talks on the Indo-Pacific’, 26 November
News-Stories/Article/Article/3202438/ 2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/
dod-releases-national-defense-strategy-missile- news/uk-minister-travels-to-australia-for-
defense-nuclear-posture-reviews/. talks-on-the-indo-pacific ; and UK, Cabinet
71 Mara Karlin and Ryan Evans, ‘Talking Office, ‘Integrated Review Refresh 2023:
Strategy With Assistant Secretary of Defense Responding to a more contested and
Mara Karlin’, War on the Rocks, 31 January volatile world’, 13 March 2023, https://
2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/ www.gov.uk/government/publications/
talking-strategy-with-assistant-secretary-of- integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-
defense-mara-karlin/. to-a-more-contested-and-volatile-world/
72 Missy Ryan and Annabelle Timsit, ‘US Wants integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-
Russian Military “Weakened” From Ukraine a-more-contested-and-volatile-world.
Invasion, Austin Says’, Washington Post, 25 77 NATO, ‘NATO Leaders Meet With Key Partners
April 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ to Address Global Challenges, Indo-Pacific
world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin- Partners Participate in a NATO Summit for the
ukraine-visit/. First Time’, 29 June 2022, https://www.nato.int/
73 Christy Lee, ‘Experts: Arming Ukraine cps/en/natohq/news_197287.htm.
via US Could Worsen South Korea’s Ties 78 Matthew Mpoke Bigg, ‘NATO’s Chief Hints
With Russia’, VOA News, 26 January That South Korea Should Consider Military
2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/ Aid for Ukraine, a Move Seoul Has Resisted’,
experts-arming-ukraine-via-us-could-worsen- New York Times, 30 January 2023, https://www.
south-korea-s-ties-with-russia-/6934625.html. nytimes.com/2023/01/30/world/europe/south-
74 Ashley Townshend and James Crabtree, ‘US korea-ukraine-nato.html.
Indo-Pacific Strategy, Alliances and Security 79 ‘Japan Boost Defence Spending, More
Partnerships’, in IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Acquisition Plans in the Works’, Asian Defence
Security Assessment 2022: Key Developments Journal, 26 December 2022, https://adj.com.
and Trends (Singapore: KHL Printing for the my/2022/12/26/japan-boost-defence-spending-
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CHAPTER 2
STRAINED US–CHINA
RELATIONS AND THE
GROWING THREAT
TO TAIWAN
NIGEL INKSTER
Senior Adviser for Cyber Security and China, IISS

21
20
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US–China relations have become progressively more

ar op
ch lic
at he
it
strained in the past decade, with each state increasingly

( W tary
ili
M
convinced that the other is seeking to undermine it.

This situation was thrown into stark relief during the Trump
administration, which initiated the United States’ trade and technology wars with China and
enhanced relations with Taiwan. While both countries are seeking to put a floor under their
deteriorating relationship, the prospects for sustained improvement are remote given their
differences in ideology, values and geopolitical ambitions.
NO CHANGE UNDER BIDEN

The Biden administration has not merely maintained the policies of the previous US administration:
it has systematically sought to build alliance relations in the Indo-Pacific to constrain China’s room
for manoeuvre.
TECHNOLOGY WARS
The US president has also imposed major restrictions on the sale to China of advanced
semiconductors – and the equipment required to manufacture them – in order to maintain US
dominance in technologies deemed critical for national security. Decoupling is a reality, although
its pace and impact remain unclear.
TAIWAN: THE PLACE WHERE IT ALL COMES TOGETHER

Sino-American tensions have become focused on Taiwan, a critical source of advanced
semiconductors, with Beijing perceiving Washington’s increased engagement with the island as
hollowing out the United States’ long-standing ‘One China’ policy and reducing the prospects for
peaceful reunification.
The US–China relationship has been Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden
meet at the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, 14 November 2022
characterised by cultural and political misper-
ceptions and mismatches of expectations
ever since the two countries first came into
contact in the mid-nineteenth century. The
result has been a dynamic that has seesawed
between periods of close approximation and
intense antagonism. Even during the best of
times, relations were never straightforward;
as China has grown in wealth and power it
has become increasingly competitive and
confrontational, while the US perceives
China’s rise as a threat to its global standing.
The 2008 global financial crisis proved to (Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images)
be a major tipping point in the relationship

as Beijing sought, not without justification, to blame Washington for failing to prevent it
while overlooking its own role in precipitating the crisis through mercantilist behaviours
that led to an unmanageable global savings glut.
The second major tipping point was the 2012 appointment of Xi Jinping as secretary-general
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Shortly after assuming office, Xi made it clear that China
had effectively abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s policy of keeping a low profile (‘hide and bide’)
in favour of a more assertive posture commensurate with the country’s growing wealth and
power.1 Xi began promoting internationally the concept of a ‘Community of Common Destiny
for Mankind’, a deliberately vague formulation first used in 2012 by then Chinese president
and CCP secretary-general Hu Jintao that amounts to a significant revision of the post-Second
World War US-led global order in ways favourable to China’s interests. Such a revision would
include recognition of the validity of different political and values systems and would preclude
the establishment of alliances and blocs based on shared political and values systems – a feature
of the US-led global order.2 The trope that ‘the East is rising, the West is in decline’ began to
feature in leadership speeches, reflecting the belief in historical determinism and Chinese excep-
tionalism that form the basis of ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
for a New Era’, an amalgamation of Marxism–Leninism with aspects of traditional Chinese
concepts of statecraft.
While believing that the West (and particularly the US) is in terminal decline, Chinese
leaders are also seized of the conviction that this decline may translate into ever more
desperate actions by the US to maintain its hegemonic status. A particular concern is
the threat of subversion through US attempts to encourage ‘peaceful evolution’ and to
promote colour revolutions in authoritarian states. This concern was articulated by Hu in
a 2011 speech in which he stated that ‘hostile foreign powers are intensifying strategies
and plots to Westernize and divide our country, the ideological and cultural sphere is the
focus sphere in which they conduct long-term infiltration’.3 This message was reiterated in
a video produced by China’s National Defence University in 2013 with the title ‘Jiaoliang
Wusheng – Silent Contest’, which focuses on the West’s supposed unremitting hostility
STRAINED US–CHINA RELATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT TO TAIWAN 45
to China and its determination to subvert it Figure 2.1: US semiconductor sales to China, 2016–21
through the introduction of Western values.4
Current US$ (billions)
Moreover, the CCP’s Central Party Document
16
Number Nine, formally entitled ‘Briefing
on the Current Situation in the Ideological 14
Realm’, amounted to a comprehensive rejec-

12
tion of universal values.5
10
MATTERS COME TO A HEAD

8
After a long period during which both
Washington and Beijing played down their 6
differences, matters came to a head midway

4
through the tenure of US president Donald
Trump. Though Trump’s initial attitude to 2
China was ambivalent, by the end of 2017

0
his administration had published a National
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Security Strategy that described a new era of
great-power competition and characterised
China as the United States’ primary strategic threat. It was followed in 2018 by the Note: In the context of this figure, ‘China’
refers to mainland China only, excluding
imposition of 25% tariffs on some Chinese imports, with the threat of more tariffs to come. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.
Washington’s behaviour was driven by frustration with Beijing’s perceived gaming of Source: Enodo Economics,
the international trading system to the detriment of the US economy, as well as China’s www.enodoeconomics.com
pervasive acquisition of US intellectual property (IP) both through industrial-scale cyber

espionage and by compelling US and other Western companies to hand over proprietary
technology as a condition of access to Chinese markets. Trump sought to address both
the chronic US trade deficit in goods with China (see Figure 2.2) and the decline in US
domestic manufacturing. According to a report by the Economic Policy Institute, the
growing trade deficit with China resulted in the loss of 3.7 million US jobs between 2001
and 2018.6
Though arguably incoherent in both conception and execution, the Trump approach to
China reflected a growing perception within the US policy community that engagement
with Beijing had been a failure. Far from bringing China more in line with Western norms
of behaviour and values, engagement was perceived as having empowered an authori-
tarian regime that was irremediably hostile to such norms and values in ways detrimental
to US interests.7 China seems either to have been unaware of such sentiments or to have
discounted them in the conviction that the gravitational pull of Chinese markets would
prove irresistible to Western entrepreneurs and investors. And it was and remains the case
that Silicon Valley and Wall Street are heavily invested in maintaining the best possible rela-
tions with China, for understandable reasons. In the case of the former, in 2020, 15 publicly
traded US chip manufacturers derived, on average, 31% of their revenues from sales to
China; in the following year, the US sold US$14 billion worth of semiconductors to China
(see Figure 2.1).8 Also in 2021, major US financial institutions, including Goldman Sachs,
Blackstone and JP Morgan, made substantial investments in China’s financial sector.9
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Senior Chinese and US officials meet
in Alaska, US, 18 March 2021
A Phase One trade agreement signed between the two countries at the beginning of
2020 did little to address the underlying causes of tension, which were themselves a func-
tion of profound differences of ideology and values – differences that had always been
present but which had been brought into sharp relief by China’s growing geostrategic
ambitions. Nor would it prove to make a significant difference to the US trade deficit
with China. Relations were further exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic, the effect
of which on a hitherto buoyant US economy cast doubt on Trump’s re-election prospects.
Thereafter relations entered what appeared to be an uncontrollable downward spiral:
the US sanctioned China’s actions in Xinjiang and Hong Kong; imposed restrictions on
Chinese technology companies, notably Huawei; promoted the concept of ‘clean’ networks
(networks free from Chinese technology); restricted visas for Chinese students, journalists
and CCP members; and closed China’s Houston consulate, which stood accused of acting
as a collection hub within the US for stolen US technology.
By the end of the Trump administration, senior US officials, including then-secretary of
state Mike Pompeo and then-deputy national security adviser Matt Pottinger, were making
speeches that sought to distinguish between the CCP and the Chinese people in ways that
Beijing interpreted as a policy of regime change.10 The hawks in the Trump administration
appeared determined to put US–China relations beyond any possibility of recovery. Meanwhile,
Congress achieved a rare consensus on the need to get tough on Beijing, initiating a range of
anti-China and pro-Taiwan legislation, an approach that was to continue under President Joe
Biden. By late 2020, China’s leaders were convinced that the Trump administration – in a ‘final
stage of madness’, to quote the state-backed Global Times11 – was using its last days in office to
provoke Beijing, and it subsequently transpired that China feared the US military would seek
to provoke the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into launching an armed attack on US forces.12
Figure 2.2: US trade balance with and goods imports from China, 1994–2021
Current US$ billions (US trade balance with China) % (of total US goods imports)
50 25
-50 20
-100
-150 15
-200
-250 10
-300
-350 5
-400 Trade balance in services Trade balance in goods

% of total US goods imports that came from China, per year
-450 0
1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 2021
Note: In the context of this figure, ‘China’ refers to mainland China only, excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.
Source: Enodo Economics, www.enodoeconomics.com
NO CHANGE UNDER BIDEN

Chinese leaders did not expect the relationship to improve following Biden’s arrival
in office. Veteran US watcher Yuan Peng, the president of the China Institutes of
Contemporary International Relations – a respected think tank that is also the open-
source research institute of China’s Ministry of State Security – had provided the
Chinese leadership with a series of analytical pieces on US–China relations in which
he compared the US to the United Kingdom after the First World War: diminished
and unable to exercise effective hegemony but still powerful enough to prevent any
would-be competitor from displacing it.13 In the US–China context this analysis high-
lighted the risk that relations could tip over into confrontation. In an initially unreported
exchange with a provincial cadre in early 2021, Xi referred to the US as the biggest threat
to China’s security.14
Early interactions between Biden’s top national-security and foreign-policy staff and
their Chinese counterparts amounted to little more than a recital of each country’s griev-
ances with the other. At a March 2021 meeting in Alaska between senior US and Chinese
officials, in a departure from standard protocols, Secretary of State Antony Blinken
upbraided China in front of the assembled press corps. State Counsellor Yang Jiechi
responded by publicly accusing the US of abusing ‘so-called notions of national security to
obstruct normal trade exchanges, and incite some countries to attack China’.15 The Chinese
position was that the US should revert to ‘correct’ behaviour, with Beijing offering no
concessions. Biden indicated that he was in no hurry to lift the Trump-era tariffs and tech-
nology restrictions. He stated in his first press conference as president that he would not
allow China to become the world’s leading and wealthiest country.16 It became apparent
that Biden, whose room for manoeuvre was limited by the hawkish stance of Congress and
the Republican Party, would essentially continue Trump’s policies but in a more struc-
tured and focused way (Figure 2.3 highlights the continuity in US legislation on China
across the administrations).
Over the course of 2021 China became progressively more vocal and specific in setting
out its grievances with the US and demanding action to address them. In July 2021, then
minister of foreign affairs Wang Yi told US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman
that ‘the US must not challenge, slander or even attempt to subvert the path and system
of socialism with Chinese characteristics’.17 That same month, Vice-Foreign Minister Xie
Feng presented Sherman with two sets of demands: a ‘List of US Wrongdoings that Must
Stop’, and a ‘List of Key Individual Cases that China Has Concerns With’. These included
demands that the US revoke visa restrictions on CCP members and their families; revoke
sanctions imposed on Chinese leaders over Xinjiang and Hong Kong; cease suppressing
Confucius Institutes; revoke the requirement for Chinese media organisations to register
as foreign agents; and revoke the extradition request for Huawei’s chief financial officer,
Meng Wanzhou (who is also the daughter of Huawei’s founder), whose detention on
alleged breaches of US sanctions on Iran had become a cause célèbre.18
In March 2021 the Biden administration published its Interim National Security
Strategy. In his introductory message, the president spoke of a world at an inflection
point involving a contest between democracy and authoritarianism. He continued that for
democracy to prevail at a global level the US would need to
build back better our economic foundations; reclaim our place in international insti-
tutions; lift up our values at home and speak out to defend them around the world;
Figure 2.3: US legislation on China and Taiwan, 2018–22
01 2018: the Taiwan Travel Act 04 2019: the Hong Kong Human Rights and considered the product of forced labour
This act encourages and permits US officials Democracy Act unless the Commissioner for US Customs
at all levels to travel to Taiwan to meet their Signed into law following protests in and Border Protection determines
Taiwanese counterparts and permits high- Hong Kong against the introduction of an otherwise. It also provides for sanctions
level Taiwanese officials to travel to the US extradition law, this act requires the US on individuals who knowingly benefit
and conduct meetings with US counterparts. State Department to determine annually from forced labour in Xinjiang.
whether Hong Kong retains enough
02 2018: the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act autonomy from China to justify the 07 2021: the Taiwan Fellowship Act*
This is a broad-ranging act dealing with favourable trading terms with the US it Also incorporated into the 2023
US policy in the Indo-Pacific region, with has enjoyed since 1997. National Defense Authorization Act,
a particular focus on the promotion of this act provides support for ten US
democracy, civil society, human rights, the 05 2021: the US Innovation and Competition Act federal-government employees per year
rule of law and transparency. Though not This act makes broad-ranging provisions to undertake two-year language and
expressly directed at it, China has seen this to enhance US competitiveness in areas of regional-issues studies in Taiwan.
act as a provocation. technology where China poses a challenge
to US dominance. The Chinese government 08 2022: the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act
03 2019: the Taiwan Allies International Protection has characterised it as a direct challenge (formerly entitled the Taiwan Policy Act)
and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act and has threatened unspecified retaliation. A version of this act, introduced to the
Signed into law in 2020, this act aims to Senate in 2022 by senators Marco Rubio
increase the scope of US relations with 06 2021: the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and Chris Smith, was incorporated into
Taiwan and incentivise other states and Signed into law in 2021, this act the United States’ National Defense
international organisations to strengthen stipulates that all goods manufactured Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023. It
their official and unofficial ties with Taiwan. in China’s Xinjiang region are to be authorises US$10 billion in military aid
modernize our military capabilities, while leading first with diplomacy; and revitalize
America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships.19
These points were broadly repeated in the 2022 National Security Strategy released
in November that year, which stated: ‘The People’s Republic of China harbors the inten-
tion and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that
tilts the global playing field to its benefit, even as the United States remains committed to
managing the competition between our countries responsibly.’ The strategy also repeated
the juxtaposition between democracy and authoritarianism.20
ALLIANCE RELATIONS
Though the Biden administration placed the reinvigoration of US alliances at the heart of
its security policy, it was Trump who initiated this policy – despite his professed disdain
for alliances. His administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, declassified in 2020 years ahead of
normal schedules, advocated the creation of a latticework of alliance and partnership rela-
tions as a means to contain China. The strategy involved a reactivation of the Quadrilateral
Security Dialogue (the Quad), bringing together Australia, Japan, India and the US in a
loose partnership. This grouping has subsequently held two summits, one virtual and
another face to face. The Quad was first launched in 2007 and followed the four coun-
tries’ cooperative response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. However, the format did
not progress in subsequent years due to Australian fears that China would see its existence
as provocative. While its revival was made possible in large measure by India’s desire to
develop closer links with the US to hedge against China’s more assertive posture – particu-
larly in the wake of the 2020 Sino-Indian border clashes – New Delhi has
been at pains to ensure that the Quad presents itself not as a military
alliance but as a means of ensuring security and
stability in the Indo-Pacific region.21
Another major alliance initiative
for Taiwan
by the Biden administration was
(including
US$2bn in annual the AUKUS pact, which aims
grants for 2023–27),
US$2bn in loans for arms, (among other objectives) to
and a regional contingency provide Australia with
stockpile for Taiwan of up to
US$100 million a year in munitions
for use in the event of a conflict.
09 2022: the CHIPS (Creating Helpful Incentives

to Produce Semiconductors) and Science Act*
Signed into law in August 2022, this act provides
for US$280bn to promote domestic research and
manufacturing of semiconductors and related technologies.
(Ki
The act addresses the challenge posed by China to US technology

oeb
con
dominance and is designed to enable decoupling in key areas of

tor
via
technology and to reduce dependence on Chinese manufacturing.

Pix
ab
ay)
*Held in abeyance until incorporated into the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act
Note: Years appearing before the title of a piece of legislation indicate when it was first
introduced as a bill to Congress.
Source: IISS
nuclear-powered submarines. Washington’s Quad leaders – Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese,
US President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and
maladroit handling of the initiative, which
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi – meet in Tokyo, 24 May 2022
saw Canberra terminate a 2016 deal – worth
US$60bn – with Paris to supply it with 12
conventionally powered submarines, had the
unintended effect of alienating France, a conse-
quential Indo-Pacific power in its own right.22
The AUKUS project goes far beyond just the
provision of nuclear submarines, which are
unlikely to be operational until well into the
2030s; it extends to uninhabited underwater (Zhang Xiaoyu/Xinhua/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
vehicles, quantum sensing, artificial intelli-

gence (AI), cyber capabilities, hypersonic weapons and electronic warfare. The ultimate goal
is to provide Australia with a comprehensive advanced defence-industrial capability such
that it can meet its own defence requirements and contribute to wider regional security.23
The Biden administration’s engagement with allies has contributed to public shifts in
position by Japan and Australia, with leaders in both countries expressing concern regarding
China’s more confrontational posture and identifying Taiwan as key to their national secu-
rity.24 The government of Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio aspires to double Tokyo’s
defence budget – from 1% to 2% of GDP – by 2027 and, in a significant departure from
decades of pacifism, to develop counterstrike capabilities.25 European states have also been
encouraged by the US to undertake assertions of maritime rights and freedoms in waters
claimed by China, namely the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, China
has become a more pressing issue on the agendas of both the European Union and NATO.
China’s relationship with the EU has undergone a significant deterioration since 2019,
driven by Europe’s frustration over its restricted access to Chinese markets and China’s
predatory efforts to acquire European technology. Values have also come to the fore,
driven by China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, resulting inter alia in
the European Parliament’s refusal to ratify a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
with China that had taken years to negotiate. Such collective decisions, however, mask
significant disparities between individual EU member states over China policy, a situation
Beijing has sought to exploit by urging Europe to exercise ‘strategic autonomy’ – code for
divergence from US positions.26
More consequential than the EU’s changing policy has been NATO’s new focus on China.
At a June 2021 summit, for the first time the Alliance acknowledged that ‘China’s stated
ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based interna-
tional order’.27 A year later, NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept identified China, together with
Russia, as a major strategic challenge. The Strategic Concept stated that NATO would
work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by

the PRC [People’s Republic of China] to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s
enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies. We will boost our
shared awareness, enhance our resilience and preparedness, and protect against the
PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared
values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation.28
This shift in focus can be seen as a product of US efforts to indicate that continued
American commitment to European security – NATO’s fundamental raison d’être – will
henceforth be a function of the organisation’s willingness to provide concrete support for
US objectives in the Indo-Pacific.
TECHNOLOGY WARS
Technology has become a critical issue area in US–China relations and one that is inex-
tricably linked with the other primary source of contention: Taiwan. Prior to the Trump
administration, the US had adopted a broadly collaborative approach with regard to
providing technology to China. This policy was to some degree based on a complacent
and – as it proved – mistaken conviction that China could copy US technology but not
innovate.29 The Trump administration’s efforts to constrain China’s technical development
appeared to be somewhat haphazard and lacking in coherence but did serve to recognise
and begin to address the challenges China presented.
The United States’ initial focus was China’s efforts to become the dominant global force
in fifth-generation (5G) mobile technology. This reflected the fact that China’s national tele-
communications champions Huawei and ZTE had assumed a globally leading position in
5G manufacture and systems integration while the US, though responsible for much of the
technology that enabled 5G, had nothing comparable to offer. Through a combination of
applying pressure on US allies to exclude China from their 5G networks and denying the
likes of Huawei and ZTE access to US technologies by placing them on the US Department
of Commerce Entities List, the business models of these companies were substantially
eroded, buying time for the US to concentrate on the development of alternative 5G solu-
tions, such as Open-RAN.30
The Trump administration applied a variety of instruments to constrain China’s tech-
nology development. Chinese technology companies were added to the Entities List on
the basis that their technologies might have military applications. The result was that US
companies wishing to export to these companies had to apply for an export licence – with
a presumption of denial. Other measures adopted by the Trump administration included
application of the Foreign Direct Product Rule, first introduced in 1959 to control trading
of US technologies, to limit the amount of US technology in any given system that Chinese
firms could acquire; a more rigorous application of Committee on Foreign Investment in the
US (CFIUS) rules, to limit Chinese acquisitions of US technology companies; visa restric-
tions imposing limits on the number of Chinese graduate and research students and denying
access to those with links to China’s civil–military fusion programmes; and law enforcement,
in the form of an ill-conceived and since abandoned effort to identify and prosecute US-based
academics involved in unauthorised research collaborations with Chinese institutions.31
The Biden administration’s early focus was addressing the United States’ own short-
comings through investment in human capital and the creation of incentives for US
companies to ‘re-shore’ or ‘friend-shore’ manufacturing capabilities to reduce exposure
to China. The most egregious example of the A TSMC facility under construction in Arizona, US, 6 December 2022
latter policy was the CHIPS and Science Act

of 2022, which made provision for US$280bn
in spending between 2023 and 2027. Of this,
US$200bn is slated for scientific research and
development (R&D) and commercialisation,
while US$52.7bn is allocated for semicon-
ductor manufacturing, R&D and workforce
development. US$24bn is earmarked for
chip production – in the form of tax credits.
Moreover, US$3bn has been allotted for (Caitlin O’Hara/Bloomberg via Getty Images)
programmes focused on leading-edge tech-

nology and wireless supply chains.32 Other initiatives included persuading the Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) to invest approximately US$40bn to
build two advanced microprocessor foundries in Arizona.33
Initially, Biden did little to impact the situation he had inherited from his predecessor,
beyond adding some Chinese technology companies to the Entities List. However, a debate
between his administration’s security and economic constituencies was, over the course
of 2022, resolved in favour of the former. A series of statements by senior US officials
followed. In May 2022, Blinken gave a speech at George Washington University entitled
‘The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China’, stating that because the
US could not change China, ‘so we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing’.34
In September 2022, in a speech to the Special Competitive Studies Project established by
former Google chairperson Eric Schmidt, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan identi-
fied export controls as a strategic tool of national security:
On export controls, we have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining ‘relative’

advantages over competitors in certain key technologies. We previously maintained a
‘sliding-scale’ approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead.
That is not the strategic environment we are in today. Given the foundational nature of
certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as
large of a lead as possible.35
The practical application of the approach outlined by Sullivan became clear the
following month when the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security
issued new rules restricting the sale of advanced semiconductors – and the equipment
needed to make them – to Chinese entities. The rules restricted specifically the sale of logic
chips with non-planar transistor architectures (i.e., FinFET or GAAFET) of 16 nanometres
or 14 nm, or below; dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) chips of 18 nm half-pitch
or less; and NAND flash memory chips with 128 layers or more.36 In effect, the US govern-
ment was not only making it impossible for China to acquire or produce semiconductors
at the most advanced production nodes but also making it impossible for the country to
maintain existing production at less advanced nodes.
The new regulations targeted in particular the sale of advanced graphics processing
units used to train and run AI algorithms and enable small-scale high-performance
computing applications. As a result, they will significantly restrict China’s ability to
become a major AI power. The new regulations also prohibited ‘US persons’ – not merely
citizens or green-card holders but anyone resident in the US – from assisting China in the
development of advanced semiconductors, a move that resulted in the immediate repatri-
ation of hundreds of US engineers working on projects in China.
The new regulations, accompanied by a decision to place a further 31 Chinese
companies on the Entities List, targeted a key Chinese vulnerability. For all the talk
within China’s leadership of the need for technological self-sufficiency – a focus reit-
erated in Xi’s work report to the CCP’s 20th Party Congress – China has consistently
lagged behind the most technically advanced economies in the production of advanced
semiconductors, most of which are designed in the US and manufactured in Taiwan
and South Korea. In early 2022, a report produced by Peking University’s Institute of
International and Strategic Studies, which was removed from the internet after just
a few days, assessed China’s competitiveness and weakness – relative to the US – in
information technology, AI and aerospace. The report concluded that in the event of
a technology decoupling between the US and China, both sides would lose but China
would suffer more: ‘In the future, China may narrow the technological gap with the U.S.
and achieve “autonomous control” in some key sectors. But China faces a long uphill
battle surpassing the US in technology.’37
In recent years, China has spent in excess of US$100bn trying to stimulate its indig-
enous semiconductor industry, with at best mixed results.38 China’s flagship initiative
for promoting indigenous semiconductor manufacture – the China Integrated Circuit
Industry Investment Fund (CICF, also known as the ‘Big Fund’) – is a case in point. Set up
in 2014 and backed by the Ministry of Finance, the Big Fund has received over US$40bn of
capitalisation. A 2022 review conducted by Vice Premier Liu He confirmed that there was
little to show for this investment. Those heading the fund are now under investigation for
corruption. Notwithstanding this failure, it has been reported that the Chinese government
is preparing an investment of US$143bn to develop China’s indigenous semiconductor
industry, though this has not yet been officially confirmed.39
China’s efforts have not been totally without success. It has achieved significant
progress in areas such as memory-chip design, produces substantial quantities of less
sophisticated semiconductors (24 nm upwards) and has effectively cornered the global
market in semiconductor assembly, testing and packaging. One of the country’s national
champions, the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, has managed to
produce semiconductors at the 7 nm node, although it has done so only in small quanti-
ties using a highly laborious process that is unlikely to prove commercially viable.40 These
achievements being acknowledged, the US retains a stranglehold on the production of
electronic design automation tools (EDAs), while the amount of US IP that informs the
most advanced etching tools – extreme ultraviolet lithography (EUV) machines, for which
the Dutch company ASML has a global monopoly – means that Washington is able to veto
their export to China.
Even if China were able to circumvent TSMC headquarters in Hsinchu, Taiwan, 12 October 2022
the US embargo and acquire EUV machines,

it would still need to address a shortage of
skilled workers. It would also lack access to a
complex supply chain of chemicals that have
to be refined to the highest levels of purity,
as well as valves, pipes, lenses and mirrors
machined to the highest levels of precision
(99.9999% is the industry standard). These
considerations would apply in the event
that China was, by invading Taiwan, able to
secure control of TSMC, whose ‘pure-play’
foundries (foundries that only manufac-
(Bloomberg via Getty Images)
ture to clients’ designs) account for roughly
50% of global semiconductor production.41 This share rises to 92% in the case of the most
advanced production nodes.42 In 2020, the US and China accounted for 60% and 20% of
all TSMC sales, respectively.43 The fact that the TSMC foundries are situated just 150 kilo-
metres off China’s coastline has led to speculation that the opportunity to acquire them
might constitute an incentive for Beijing to invade sooner rather than later. However, for
the reasons outlined above, that is an unlikely prospect and fails to consider what are likely
to be the real drivers for Beijing to take such action – China’s perception that the recovery
of Taiwan is necessary to restore a sense of national honour impugned by the ‘century of
humiliation’ and, more pragmatically, the CCP’s need to be seen by the Chinese people
to deliver on its commitment to realise the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’.
Conversely, Taiwan’s globally dominant role in semiconductor production has been cited
by Taiwanese leaders as a reason why the US and its allies would have to intervene to
prevent China’s occupation of the island – the so-called ‘silicon shield’ – a perception that
is likely to prove equally misplaced.44 Beijing may well conclude that if it cannot benefit
from the TSMC foundries then no one can, and that without them China would still be in a
relatively strong global position by virtue of its ability to manufacture lower-end semicon-
ductors at a scale others cannot match.
The effectiveness of the United States’ new technology-containment measures will
depend on Washington’s ability to persuade other major Western technology powers to
apply similar sales embargoes. For example, though the precise details have yet to be
announced, both the Netherlands and Japan have agreed to match US restrictions and it has
become clear that this outcome was never in serious doubt. However, it remains to be seen
whether other states, notably South Korea, will follow suit. US technology companies are
manifestly unhappy with the new measures, which will deprive them of significant reve-
nues and have implications for their ability to invest in innovation. While the US has seen
the beginnings of a move away from ‘fabless’ semiconductor production – which has seen
design taking place in the US and manufacture outsourced overseas – towards indigenous
manufacture, the limited scale of these efforts means they are unlikely to prove an effective
substitute for current arrangements. Nor will it be straightforward to decouple from the
US–China technology relationship, which has Employees work on the production line of solar panels for export
at a factory in Hefei, Anhui province, China, 24 December 2021
developed over the course of several decades
and is characterised by deep entanglement.
To date, China’s reaction to the US restric-
tions has been relatively restrained. A case
has been brought before the World Trade
Organization alleging that the US is guilty
of protectionism.45 However, Beijing has not
brought to bear a range of Chinese legisla-
tion developed in recent years to counter
the effect of sanctions and embargoes,
including the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law,
which empowers the Chinese state to seize
the assets of entities implementing sanc- (Visual China Group via Getty Images)
tions against China and imposes liabilities on

firms that refuse to help the country counter sanctions; an Unreliable Entity List, similar to
that of the US; and the Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of
Foreign Legislation and Other Measures, which bar Chinese persons and companies from
complying with extraterritorial applications of foreign laws. Nor has China yet sought to
embargo the sale of rare earths to the US and its allies, possibly mindful of its earlier efforts
to apply such an embargo against Japan, which proved counterproductive and simply
reduced China’s market share as Japan found alternative sources of supply. China has
however declared a ban on the export of solar-energy technology (a field in which China
already occupies a dominant position) – an action which may have been intended as a
retaliatory measure, although it was not announced as such.
The US has made it clear that in addition to advanced computing-related technologies,
biotechnology and clean technology are also viewed as ‘“force-multipliers” throughout
the technology eco-system’, such that ‘leadership in each of these is a national security
imperative’.46 It therefore seems likely that – notwithstanding China’s efforts to pose as
an advocate of globalisation and open trade – a degree of US–China technology decou-
pling has become both a reality and an inevitability. The US approach to decoupling has
been described as ‘small yard, high fence’, meaning that small amounts of key technol-
ogies should be heavily protected while trade in less sensitive technologies continues
as normal.47 It is unclear how effective this approach will prove, especially given that in
biotechnology and clean technology there is no obvious single point-of-failure technology
that equates to advanced semiconductors. Nor is it clear how far the process of decoupling
will go or what its practical effects will prove to be.
TAIWAN: THE PLACE WHERE IT ALL COMES TOGETHER

Geopolitical rivalry and technology competition between the US and China have become
focused on Taiwan, which since 1949 has been a de facto independent entity but which has
always been claimed by the PRC. Since the US and China established diplomatic relations
in 1979 the status of Taiwan has been the subject of a diplomatic fudge whereby the United
States’ ‘One China’ policy acknowledges – Then-speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi
and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen meet in Taipei, 3 August 2022
but does not recognise – China’s claim to the
island. Per the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act,
Washington has maintained a commitment to
supply Taiwan with arms for its own defence
while maintaining a policy of strategic ambi-
guity regarding its readiness to come to the
island’s assistance in the event of a conflict
with China.
Until relatively recently the prospects
of such a conflict were not high. Though
tensions had arisen following Taiwan’s
transition to democracy and the emer-
gence of the pro-independence Democratic (Chien Chih-Hung/Office of The President via Getty Images)
Progressive Party during the 1990s, China

has remained committed to peaceful reunification on the basis of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘one
country, two systems’ model, a commitment most recently repeated by Xi in his 2022
work report to the 20th Party Congress. However, there are indications that Xi may have
concluded that this model is no longer viable and has charged CCP Politburo Standing
Committee member and chief ideologue Wang Huning with devising a new theoretical
framework for reunification.
Concurrently, China has refused to renounce the use of force to achieve reunification
and has implemented a major military-modernisation strategy that has, at its heart, the
development of the capabilities needed to keep US forces out of theatre long enough for
China to accomplish a military takeover of Taiwan.48 As a result, the PLA has developed
a broad suite of military capabilities that comprehensively overmatch those of Taiwan.
Moreover, in some areas, such as numbers of naval and paramilitary vessels and ballistic
and cruise missiles, these capabilities exceed those of the US. The PLA has also focused
relentlessly on practising the kind of joint operations it would need to conduct to invade
Taiwan, while also building up amphibious-assault capabilities that involve the use of
civilian roll-on roll-off ferries.
What has arguably been more consequential in altering the long-standing status quo over
Taiwan has been the shift in Washington’s level of engagement with the island. Since estab-
lishing relations with the PRC in 1979, the US has effectively served as a guarantor of peace in
the Taiwan Strait, reining in Taiwanese ambitions to declare independence while providing
reassurances to successive Taiwanese administrations in relation to the island’s defence
needs. This pattern ended in 2018 when the Trump administration began using Taiwan as a
means to antagonise and undermine China, introducing a succession of measures that have
been continued under Biden. These measures have included enhanced political relations
through high-level visits to Taiwan by both congressional delegations and senior US officials,
most notably then-speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi in August 2022, and
an invitation to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen to speak at the December 2021 Summit for
Democracy; legislation designed to enhance Taiwan’s international space; a major increase in
levels of military assistance (the Trump admin-

Map 2.1: The Taiwan
istration provided US$18bn in arms over four Strait median line and
years, while Biden has made provision in the Taiwan’s Air Defence
Identification Zone
2023 National Defense Authorization Act for
US$10bn in arms sales over five years49); and
regular freedom-of-navigation transits by US
and allied warships through the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan Strait
For China, the cumulative effect of such

Taipei
actions is seen as a ‘hollowing out’ of the US CHINA Xiamen
Kinmen
‘One China’ policy calculated to encourage islands
Taiwan in the direction of independence.50 In Taiwan
interactions with US counterparts, Chinese

leaders – most recently Xi during his meeting
with Biden on the margins of the Bali G20
summit – have emphasised that Taiwan is
‘at the very core of China’s core interests … ©IISS
and the first red line that must not be crossed

in China–US relations’.51 More consequen- Taiwan Strait median line Km 100 200 300
Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone Miles 50 100 150 200
tially, China has responded to US actions by
progressively ratcheting up its ‘grey-zone’
pressure on Taiwan via cyber attacks, selective trade embargoes, military incursions into Sources: IISS
Taiwanese airspace and naval exercises in the waters around the island that have included
simulations of a naval blockade. These developments have resulted in a ‘new normal’
whereby the PLA Air Force now regularly dispatches large contingents of fighters, stra-
tegic bombers and aerial-reconnaissance aircraft across the median line into Taiwan’s Air
Defence Identification Zone (see Map 2.1) with the aim of both intimidating Taiwan and
imposing attrition on Taiwan’s air force and air-defence systems.
The increased military activity around Taiwan carries obvious risks of accidents leading
to escalation, although it is worth noting that, to date, China has never allowed itself to be
drawn into a conflict unless it was ready for one. Whether it is ready now remains a moot
point. It has long been an article of faith that the attainment of China’s second centen-
nial goal of ‘becoming a strong, democratic, civilised, harmonious and modern socialist
country by 2049’ is dependent on achieving national reunification.52 However, realisti-
cally, achieving this by 2049 can only be an aspiration; there is no evidence that China
has a fixed timetable for invading Taiwan. US military leaders have claimed that China
may move as early as 2027 or even 2023 – though such statements appear to have been
based not on firm intelligence but rather on an assessment of the date by which China
will have in place all the military capabilities it will need.53 In fact, a decision on whether
to achieve reunification by force is likely to be a function not just of military capability
but also of a calculation of likely US and allied sanctions and non-military responses,
in particular with regard to the potential impact of economic and financial sanctions on
China’s economy. Chinese leaders will be aware that military defeat or a pyrrhic victory
could prove terminal for their hold on power.
US civilian leaders, most recently Biden following his November 2022 meeting with Xi, have
played down the risk of military action.54 Nor is there any evidence to indicate that Russia’s inva-
sion of Ukraine in February 2022 has altered Chinese thinking on the timescale or methodology
for attacking Taiwan. It is clear that Chinese military thinkers have analysed both the impli-
cations of Western support for Ukraine – in the form of weaponry, enhanced cyber defences,
intelligence sharing, information operations and the imposition of economic and financial sanc-
tions – and the factors that have contributed to Russia’s poor military performance.55 However,
Taiwan is seen as a separate case on the basis that the Chinese leadership has always considered
it to be part of China’s national territory. Therefore, Chinese officials bridle at the suggestion
that there may be any similarity between the Ukraine war and a potential invasion of Taiwan.
It is impossible to determine whether China will use force to take Taiwan at some point
in the future. Such force might take a variety of forms, ranging from a contested amphib-
ious assault to concerted missile attacks and bombardments or a naval blockade. China has
prepared for all these options, including via ‘lawfare’ by claiming that the Taiwan Strait is not
an international waterway.56 In any case, the decision on whether to resort to armed force is
arguably no longer just in China’s hands; rather, it has become a function of the dynamic that
has evolved between Beijing and Washington. As such, the US must walk a fine line, taking
measures to reduce the risk of a Taiwan conflict while avoiding actions that either encourage
Beijing to conclude that peaceful reunification is no longer an option or back China into a
corner such that it feels obliged to strike out. This context may well account for Washington’s
reluctance to abandon its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity in relation to an inter-
vention in Taiwan despite the fact that a US military intervention is considered a given in PLA
planning. The formal abandonment of US strategic ambiguity may well be the action that tips
China over the edge. The stakes are high, not just for the region but for the world as a whole:
Rhodium Group has estimated that a war in the Taiwan Strait would result in an immediate
US$2 trillion hit to the global economy as a result of massive disruption of global supply
chains, with the most serious disruptions being to supplies of semiconductors from Taiwan.57
CONCLUSION
Towards the end of 2022, the US and China took steps to renew top-level communications with
the explicit aim of putting a floor beneath the rapid deterioration in their relations. However, it
is difficult to envisage how such a tactical pause can address the intractable issues that divide
these two major powers. When presidents Biden and Xi met in November 2022, each sought
to reassure the other: Biden that the US did not seek to constrain China, and Xi that China did
not seek to displace the US. Both statements were at odds with objective reality, begging the
question of whether the two countries can find a modus vivendi without tipping into conflict.
NOTES
1 China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Central zzjg_663340/xws_665282/xgxw_665284/201412/

Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs t20141201_600270.html.
Was Held in Beijing’, 29 November 2014, 2 Jacob Mardell, ‘The “Community of Common
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/ Destiny” in Xi Jinping’s New Era’, Diplomat, 25
October 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/ seen) in the past hundred years], Aisixiang, 17 June
the-community-of-common-destiny-in-xi- 2020, http://www.aisixiang.com/data/121742.html.
jinpings-new-era/. 14 Mark Moore, ‘Xi Jinping Calls US “Biggest Threat”
3 ‘China Targets Entertainment TV in Cultural to China’s Security’, New York Post, 3 March 2021,
Purge’, NPR, 11 January 2012, https://www.npr. https://nypost.com/2021/03/03/xi-jinping-calls-
org/2012/01/11/144994861/china-targets- us-biggest-threat-to-chinas-security/.
entertainment-tv-in-cultural-purge. 15 ‘US and China Trade Angry Words at High-level
4 The video was removed from the internet and Alaska Talks’, BBC News, 19 March 2021, https://
is no longer available. However, Chinascope www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-56452471.
has produced a translation of the narrative. See 16 Robert Delaney, ‘Biden Pledges to Prevent China
‘Silent Contest II’, Chinascope, 21 April 2014, from Becoming the World’s “Leading” Country’,
http://chinascope.org/archives/6449. South China Morning Post, 26 March 2021,
5 ‘Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation’, ChinaFile, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/
8 November 2013, https://www.chinafile.com/ article/3127051/biden-pledges-prevent-china-
document-9-chinafile-translation. becoming-worlds-leading-country.
6 Economic Policy Institute, ‘The Growing Trade 17 Xinhua, ‘Chinese FM Meets US Deputy Secretary
Deficit with China Eliminated 3.7 Million US of State, Urging Rational China Policy’, China.
Jobs Between 2001 and 2018’, 30 January 2020, org.cn, 27 July 2021, http://www.china.org.cn/
https://www.epi.org/press/growing-china-trade- world/2021-07/27/content_77653268.htm.
deficits-eliminates-us-jobs/. 18 ‘China Puts Forward Two Lists During Talks
7 James Curran, ‘How America’s Foreign Policy with Visiting US Deputy Secretary of State’,
Establishment Got China Wrong’, National Interest, China.org.cn, 26 July 2021, http://www.china.
17 December 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/ org.cn/world/2021-07/26/content_77652538.htm.
feature/how-america%E2%80%99s-foreign- 19 White House, ‘Interim National Security
policy-establishment-got-china-wrong-39012. Strategic Guidance’, March 2021, p. 3,
8 ‘Mapping US Chip Company Exposure https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
to China’, Semi-Literate, 19 September uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
2021, https://semiliterate.substack.com/p/ 20 White House, ‘National Security Strategy’,
mapping-us-chip-company-exposure. October 2022, p. 3, https://www.whitehouse.
9 Thomas Hale et al., ‘Wall Street’s New Love gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-
Affair with China’, Financial Times, 28 May 2021, Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf.
https://www.ft.com/content/d5e09db3-549e- 21 Akshay Ranade, ‘How India Influences the Quad’,
4a0b-8dbf-e499d0606df4. Diplomat, 30 May 2022, https://thediplomat.
10 Speech by then US secretary of state Michael com/2022/05/how-india-influences-the-quad.
R. Pompeo, ‘Communist China and the Free See also Tanvi Madan, ‘India and the Quad’,
World’s Future’, US Department of State, 23 July in International Institute for Strategic Studies,
2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/communist- Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2022: Key
china-and-the-free-worlds-future/index.html. Developments and Trends (Hampshire: Hobbs The
11 Hu Xijin, ‘China Fully Prepared, Including Printers for the IISS, 2022), pp. 198–221.
Militarily, for Any Final Trump Madness’, Global 22 Zoya Sheftalovich, ‘Why Australia Wanted Out of
Times, 6 December 2020, https://www.global- Its French Submarine Deal’, Politico, 16 September
times.cn/page/202012/1209086.shtml. 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/why-
12 Kyle Morris, ‘Milley Secretly Called Chinese australia-wanted-out-of-its-french-sub-deal/.
Officials Out of Fear Trump Would “Attack” 23 Andrew I. Park and Steven Wills, ‘The
in Final Days, Book Claims’, Fox News, 14 Land Down Under the Sea: AUKUS Is
September 2021, https://www.foxnews.com/ About Submarines, not Bombers’, Hill, 27
politics/milley-secretly-called-chinese-officials- November 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/
out-of-fear-trump-would-attack-in-final-days- national-security/3747130-the-land-down-under-
book-claims. the-sea-aukus-is-about-submarines-not-bombers/.
13 Yuan Peng, ‘Yuan Peng: xinguan yiqing yu bainian 24 See Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense of
bianju’ 袁鹏：新冠疫情与百年变局 [Yuan Peng: Japan 2021’, July 2021; and Demetri Sevastopulo,
The new coronavirus epidemic and changes (not ‘Australia Vows to Help US Defend Taiwan from
Chinese Attacks’, Financial Times, 13 November project-global-emerging-technologies-summit/.

2021, https://www.ft.com/content/231df882- 36 US, Department of Commerce, Bureau of
6667-4145-bc92-d1a54bccf333. Industry and Security, ‘Commerce Implements
25 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense New Export Controls on Advanced Computing
Strategy’, 16 December 2022, https://japan. and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items
kantei.go.jp/content/000120034.pdf. to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’, 7
26 ‘China Urges Europe to Uphold Strategic October 2022, p. 3, https://www.bis.doc.gov/
Autonomy, Practice True Multilateralism’, index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/
Xinhua, 6 December 2021, https:// press-releases/3158-2022-10-07-bis-press-release-
english.news.cn/europe/20211015/ advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-
C9A06E8593D000018138F31D1F3A17B3/c.html. manufacturing-controls-final/file.
27 NATO, ‘Brussels Summit Communiqué’, 14 37 ‘Jishu lingyu de zhongmei zhanlue jingzheng:
June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ fenxi yu zhanwang’ 技术领域的中美战略竞
news_185000.htm. 争与展望 [US–China strategic competition in
28 NATO, ‘NATO 2022 Strategic Concept’, p. 5, the field of technology: analysis and perspec-
https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html. tives], Peking University International and
29 Regina M. Abrami, William C. Kirby and F. Strategic Studies Institute report no. 123, 30
Warren McFarlan, ‘Why China Can’t Innovate’, January 2022.
Harvard Business Review, March 2014, https://hbr. 38 Figure is author’s rough approximation of the
org/2014/03/why-china-cant-innovate. combined spending by central government,
30 Brandon Vigliarolo, ‘US Defense Department provincial and municipal administrations.
Wants to Fund Open, Interoperable 5G’, 39 Julie Zhu, ‘Exclusive: China Readying $143
Register, 10 April 2022, https://www.theregister. Billion Package for Its Chip Firms in Face
com/2022/04/10/us_govt_has_3m_to/. of US Curbs’, Reuters, 14 December 2022,
31 Jon Bateman, ‘Opinion: The Fevered Anti-China https://www.reuters.com/technology/
Attitude in Washington Is Going to Backfire’, china-plans-over-143-bln-push-boost-domestic-
Politico, 15 December 2022, https://www.politico. chips-compete-with-us-sources-2022-12-13/.
com/news/magazine/2022/12/15/china-tech- 40 Nigel Inkster, Emily S. Weinstein and John Lee,
decoupling-sanctions-00071723. ‘Ask the Experts: Is China’s Semiconductor
32 ‘The CHIPS and Science Act: Here’s What’s In It’, Strategy Working?’, LSE Blogs, 1 September
McKinsey, 4 October 2022, https://www.mckinsey. 2022, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2022/09/01/is-
com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-in chinas-semiconductor-strategy-working/.
sights/the-chips-and-science-act-heres-whats-in-it. 41 Yen Nee Lee, ‘2 Charts Show How Much the
33 TSMC, ‘TSMC Announces Updates for TSMC World Depends on Taiwan for Semiconductors’,
Arizona’, 6 December 2022, https://pr.tsmc.com/ CNBC, 15 March 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021
english/news/2977. /03/16/2-charts-show-how-much-the-world-
34 US, Department of State, ‘The Administration’s depends-on-taiwan-for-semiconductors.html.
Approach to the People’s Republic of 42 Antonio Varas et al., ‘Strengthening the
China’, 26 May 2022, https://www.state.gov/ Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an
the-administrations-approach-to-the- Uncertain Era’, Boston Consulting Group and
peoples-republic-of-china/. Semiconductor Industry Association, April 2021,
35 White House, ‘Remarks by National Security https://bcgxsia-strengthening-the-global-
Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special Competitive semiconductor-value-chain-april-2021.pdf.
Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies 43 Eleanor Olcott, ‘TSMC Faces Pressure to Choose
Summit’, 16 September 2022, https://www.white a Side in US–China Tech War’, Financial Times,
house.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/ 16 April 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/
2022/09/16/remarks-by-national-security-advisor- b452221a-5a82-4f5d-9687-093b9707e261.
jake-sullivan-at-the-special-competitive-studies- 44 Christopher Vassallo, ‘The Silicon Shield Is a
Danger to Taiwan and America’, National first-red-line-that-must-not-be-crossed-2022-11-14/.

Interest, 15 May 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/ 52 ‘CPC Q&A: What Are China’s Two Centennial
feature/%E2%80%98silicon-shield%E2%80%99- Goals and Why Do They Matter?’, Xinhua,
danger-taiwan-and-america-202363. 17 October 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/
45 Arjun Kharpal, ‘China Brings WTO Case Against english/2017-10/17/c_136686770.htm.
US and Its Sweeping Chip Export Curbs as Tech 53 Mallory Shelbourne, ‘China’s Accelerated
Tensions Escalate’, CNBC, 14 December 2022, Timeline to Take Taiwan Pushing Navy in the
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/13/china-brings- Pacific, Says CNO Gilday’, USNI News, 19
wto-case-against-us-chip-export-restrictions.html. October 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/10/19/
46 White House, ‘Remarks by National chinas-accelerated-timeline-to-take-taiwan-
Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special pushing-navy-in-the-pacific-says-cno-gilday;
Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging and Mallory Shelbourne, ‘Davidson: China
Technologies Summit’. Could Try to Take Control of Taiwan In “Next
47 Du Zhihang and Matthew Walsh, ‘US Shifts Six Years”’, USNI News, 9 March 2021, https://
from “Decoupling” to “Small Yard, High Fence” news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-
on China’, Nikkei Asia, 16 February 2021, https:// try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years.
asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/US-shifts-from- 54 See Mark Moore and Steven Nelson, ‘Biden
decoupling-to-small-yard-high-fence-on-China. Says Taiwan Invasion by China Not “Imminent”
48 Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air–Sea Battle: The After Xi Meeting’, New York Post, 14 November
Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia, IISS 2022, https://nypost.com/2022/11/14/
Adelphi, no. 444 (Abingdon: Routledge for the biden-says-taiwan-invasion-by-china-not-
IISS, 2014), pp. 20–38. imminent-after-xi-meeting/.
49 ‘Trump’s Ten Arms Sales to Taiwan, Military 55 Exchanges between author and Chinese
Rebalance in the Taiwan Strait’, Institute for scholars, September 2022; and Thomas Corbett,
National Policy Research, http://inpr.org. Ma Xiu and Peter W. Singer, ‘What Is China
tw/m/412-1728-93.php?Lang=en; and ‘Taiwan Learning from the Ukraine War?’, Defense
in the National Defense Authorization Act One, 3 April 2022, https://www.defenseone.
(NDAA), 2023’, Taiwan Defense & National com/ideas/2022/04/what-lessons-china-taking-
Security, 23 December 2022, https://www. ukraine-war/363915/.
ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-in-the-national- 56 Peter Martin, ‘China Alarms US with Private
defense-authorization-act-ndaa-2023/. Warnings to Avoid Taiwan Strait’, Bloomberg, 12
50 ‘US on Collision Course if It Keeps Hollowing June 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
Out One-China Principle: China Daily articles/2022-06-12/china-alarms-us-with-new-
Editorial’, China Daily, 26 December 2022, private-warnings-to-avoid-taiwan-strait?sref=
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202212/26/ EgYNCHYw&leadSource=uverify%20wall.
WS63a980a7a31057c47eba63a4.html. 57 Charlie Vest, Agatha Kratz and Reva Goujon,
51 ‘China’s Xi Tells Biden: Taiwan Issue Is “First Red ‘The Global Economic Disruptions from a
Line” That Must Not Be Crossed’, Reuters, 14 Taiwan Conflict’, Rhodium Group, 14 December
November 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/ 2022, https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-
asia-pacific/chinas-xi-tells-biden-taiwan-issue-is- economic-disruptions/.
CHAPTER 3
ASIA-PACIFIC NAVAL
AND MARITIME
CAPABILITIES: THE
NEW OPERATIONAL
DYNAMICS
NICK CHILDS
Senior Fellow for Naval Forces and Maritime Security, IISS

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operating postures in important ways.
THE PACING MARITIME ARENA

Notwithstanding the war in Ukraine, which, though broadly perceived as a land war, has significant
maritime aspects, the Asia-Pacific remains the ‘pacing’ maritime arena in terms of technological
change, as well as the scale and scope of capability and operational development across the spectrum
of activities at sea by navies and other maritime forces.
MANOEUVRING FOR ADVANTAGE

Capability developments in the Asia-Pacific are imposing new operational requirements and patterns
of activity on naval forces. These new requirements and patterns are themselves having a strategic
effect, adding to the complexity of managing naval competition in the coming years.
AN ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME PARADOX?

The growth of China’s maritime power has been remarkable and continues apace. However, the US
and its allies and partners may be clawing back some significant advantages – with the result being
that the Chinese navy may find it needs to adjust its ambitions and programmes.
A new phase of naval and maritime competi- The launch ceremony for China’s third aircraft carrier, Fujian, in Shanghai, 17 June 2022
tion is under way in the Asia-Pacific. Among

the most attention-grabbing regional naval
developments of 2022 was the 17 June launch of
China’s third aircraft carrier, Fujian. The event
was notable because the vessel is Beijing’s first
fully indigenous carrier design. It will also be
considerably more capable than its two prede-
cessors in service with the People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN). As a result, it represents a
major step in the transformation of the PLAN’s
overall capabilities and aspirations.
When Fujian enters operational service –
probably in 2024 or 2025 – it will likely find
itself in a regional maritime environment that
is in the midst of a significant transformation. (Li Tang/VCG via Getty Images)
As well as the continuing dramatic develop-

ment of the PLAN and Beijing’s other maritime forces, perhaps equally important are step
changes in the naval and maritime capabilities and postures of other regional countries.
Greater interactions, interoperability and even integration have all been notable, especially
since 2021 and into 2023. As a result, a naval balance that may have appeared to some to
be shifting inexorably in China’s favour may be starting to swing back towards the United
States and its allies and partners. However, assessing how these dynamics are developing
– and how to judge their impact on regional stability and the broader Asia-Pacific strategic
balance – is a significant analytical challenge.
Notwithstanding the geopolitical storm raging in the Euro-Atlantic area as a result of
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 – and the lessons being learned,
including in the naval sphere, from the grim conflict that has ensued – in the long term
it is China’s rise that will continue to make the strategic weather. The latest version of
the United States’ National Defense Strategy, the public version of which appeared in
October 2022, continues to focus on China as the ‘pacing challenge’ for the US Department
of Defense.1 Likewise, the Asia-Pacific remains the ‘pacing maritime arena’. That is true
not only in terms of potential high-intensity confrontation but also in the ‘grey zone’ of
competition short of armed conflict. Meanwhile, rapid technological change and shifting
strategic dynamics are adding to the potential unpredictability of an increasingly complex
regional maritime domain. These dynamics are generating new and challenging capability
requirements as well as novel operational patterns.
China’s rise as a competitor and potential adversary presents structural challenges for the
US that it has not experienced since the Second World War, particularly because in impor-
tant areas – such as shipbuilding infrastructure – China can outmatch the US (see Figure
3.1). Consequently, the path ahead for the US Navy remains the subject of heated debate
in Washington. The role of the United States’ allies and partners may well change the game
in the maritime arena, as these actors readjust their policies and plans and seek to integrate
ASIA-PACIFIC NAVAL AND MARITIME CAPABILITIES: THE NEW OPERATIONAL DYNAMICS 65
these more closely with the US and each other. Figure 3.1: Major new naval tonnage launched for selected navies
In the past, Washington has occasionally
active in the Asia-Pacific, 1999–2022
paid little more than lip service to the notion Tonnage
of cooperation with allies and partners; 1,750,000

1999–2022 2013–2022 2019–2022
the inverse has also sometimes been true.
1,500,000
However, there is a new understanding in
the US that these partnerships are now crit-
1,250,000
ical, especially those with Australia, Japan
and South Korea. Further, these three states 1,000,000
share this understanding and are them-

selves growing closer together.2 US officials 750,000
have asserted that such cooperation can

500,000
provide an asymmetric advantage (although
at present, efforts to assert this advantage 250,000
remain a work in progress).
Perhaps the most striking new instrument 0
in service of the United States’ reinvigorated China Russia India South Japan France UK Australia US
Korea
approach to regional cooperation is the stra-
1999–2022 2013–2022 2019–2022
tegic capability agreement between Australia,
China Russia China Russia China Russia
the United Kingdom and the US known as
ce n
Fra
1 UK
1
2 1
AUKUS. Announced in September 2021, Total Au
s
Total
2
Total 2
3 3 3
tonnage: US
tonnage: tonnage:
4
the agreement’s centrepiece is an ambition 5,116,850
4
2,695,250 1,093,250 4
5
5 5
to jointly deliver a nuclear-powered subma- 7
6
7
6
7
6
rine capability to the Royal Australian Navy.

AUKUS also involves a second pillar of 1 India 2 South Korea 3 Japan 4 France 5 UK 6 Australia 7 US
collaboration – on key emerging defence tech-

nologies, many of them central to maritime-domain operations – which could ultimately Notes: Tonnage figures are based on
approximate full-load displacements. Vessel
prove at least as important as the submarine pillar. categories included are submarines, principal
The extent to which this potential tapestry of increasingly interoperable and even surface combatants, corvettes, principal
amphibious ships, mine-countermeasures
interchangeable allies and partners comes together in the face of significant challenges vessels and minelayers, and fleet-
and potential frictions will be critical for the regional naval and maritime balance over replenishment auxiliaries. The UK’s figures
include Tide-class replenishment tankers
the next several decades. In this context, extra-regional players, especially European built in South Korea. Australia’s figures
powers, may also prove to have crucial roles – in a way that might not have been envis- include Canberra-class LHDs and Supply-class
replenishment ships built in Spain.
aged even a few years ago.
Source: IISS
The expectation across the region, as well as in Washington and Beijing, is that compe-
tition between China and the US will intensify.3 Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s
new National Security Strategy, announced in October 2022, describes the world as being
in the early years of a ‘decisive decade’.4 All this suggests an added urgency in terms of
naval and maritime capability developments, which is a factor that represents a major chal-
lenge, including for regional states, given the traditionally long-term character and slow
progress of naval procurement. In what will almost inevitably become a more complex and
highly charged maritime environment, managing the evolving naval balance is also likely
to become even more challenging.
THE PACING MARITIME ARENA

The war in Ukraine has caused a profound security shock in the Euro-Atlantic area and
beyond. Perhaps most notably, it has prompted a paradigm shift in perceptions of the like-
lihood of the return of major war. It is also delivering important operational lessons that
are being analysed globally, including in the naval and maritime sphere. And while the
conflict is most broadly perceived as predominantly a land war on Europe’s doorstep, its
maritime aspects are significant.
The naval and maritime lessons include the underscoring of the interconnectedness
of the global trading system and its reliance on maritime arteries or sea lines of commu-
nication, and therefore the continuing relevance and effectiveness of naval blockade, as
witnessed by the swirl of international concern around the blocking of Ukrainian grain
exports. The dramatic loss in April 2022 of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva –
although possibly in part the result of some very particular operating circumstances – was
a reminder for maritime forces (including major navies) of the risks of operating in littoral
areas in the presence of even relatively modest but accurate anti-ship systems and the
means to target such forces. This set of capabilities continues to proliferate among both
state and non-state actors, including some in the Asia-Pacific.5
Equally, Ukraine’s combined use of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and uninhab-
ited surface vessels (USVs) to strike at the Black Sea Fleet in its Sevastopol base on 29
October 2022 set alarm bells ringing in naval circles worldwide, even if it may have simply
involved the leveraging of emerging technology in pursuit of age-old asymmetric tactics.6
More broadly, its human tragedy apart, the war in Ukraine has provided a reminder of
the cost of high-intensity conflict in material terms – in the inevitable loss of and damage
to key platforms and equipment, the very high expenditure of weaponry, and the huge
requirements for sustainment and supply. All this clearly has applicability in the Asia-
Pacific context, not least in the maritime domain.7
Notwithstanding all the lessons that have
An Australian Collins-class submarine and, behind it, the visiting
emerged from Ukraine, it is still the Asia- UK nuclear-powered attack submarine HMS Astute, at the Royal
Australian Navy Base HMAS Stirling in Perth, 29 October 2021
Pacific that is setting the pace of development
of maritime competition. Whether it is in the
scale and comprehensive nature of capability
development, the reach of precision systems
that can hold naval formations at risk or the
speed of technical change, it is in this region
that benchmarks are being set. Perhaps most
notably, China has been developing anti-ship
ballistic missile (ASBM) capabilities in the
shape of the DF-21D and the DF-26B systems,
which have estimated maximum ranges of
1,500 kilometres and 3,000 km, respectively.8
Beijing is also fielding an array of other long-
range anti-ship capabilities, such as the YJ-18
cruise missile, which arms surface ships, (Richard Wainwright/AAP/PA Images)
submarines and aircraft. Meanwhile, because for many years much of the attention of the
US and its allies and partners was diverted to fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, they
have to some extent been playing catch-up in this area of military technology.9
The introduction of increasingly comprehensive intelligence, surveillance and recon-
naissance (ISR) networks – including space-based systems – and thus more formidable and
far-reaching targeting capabilities, combined with the prospect of applying artificial intelli-
gence (AI) to systems and data analytics, implies that more capable anti-ship missiles will
pose increasing challenges to naval formations, especially those that are forward deployed.
For maritime forces, determining the most effective balance between delivering opera-
tional effect and the risks involved is becoming ever more difficult.
These developments could change the character of at least the opening exchanges of
a future naval confrontation. Indeed, they have been prompting debate on whether the
lethality and reach of the threats facing forward-deployed naval forces in particular are so
changed that countries now require a different set of capabilities to deliver effect on and from
the sea. This debate extends even to the question of whether naval forces themselves are the
most effective instruments, at least in the initial stages of any confrontation, or whether alter-
natives – such as long-range, land-based airpower – could be a major part of the solution.10
Compounding these challenges is the advent of new types of hypersonic-weapons
capabilities and the threats they pose in a naval context. This new operating environment
may have been heralded with the reported first test of a hypersonic weapon from one of
the PLAN’s new Type-055 Renhai-class cruisers in April 2022.11 The US Navy, for its part,
has confirmed that it is pressing ahead with plans to modify its Zumwalt-class cruisers to
accommodate hypersonic weapons from 2025 and to deploy them aboard its Virginia-class
nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines from 2029.12
Adding to the proliferation of faster, more precise, more manoeuvrable and longer-range
anti-ship weapons is the trend towards increased use of uninhabited or autonomous systems,
including their employment in swarming tactics. They may be used especially in the increas-
ingly contested and significant underwater and seabed spaces. China is building a range
of uninhabited and autonomous systems, including ‘glider’ submersibles, to gather general
information on the maritime environment but also increasingly for more active surveillance
as part of a network of deployable and fixed sensor systems.13 Here, China is to some extent
following in the footsteps of the US, which has also been developing its uninhabited under-
water vehicle (UUV)-based capabilities. In addition to China and the US, other countries,
such as Australia, India, Japan and South Korea, are developing or considering increasingly
sophisticated UUVs in response to elevated threat perceptions and the prospects offered by
new technology, including AI.14 This trend goes hand in hand with the continuing devel-
opment of submarine capabilities. These developments highlight the sub-surface domain’s
increased strategic significance in regional naval and maritime calculations.
The Asia-Pacific has been setting the pace of challenge not only in terms of high-end
naval capability development efforts and confrontation but also in the context of grey-
zone operations just below the threshold of armed confrontation. Such operations are
being undertaken to apply incremental coercive influence intended to change the maritime
status quo, most notably and relentlessly in the South China Sea. This activity has been
testing the doctrinal, operational and tactical The Royal Australian Navy’s HMAS Adelaide docked at Vuna Wharf
to deliver post-tsunami aid in Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 26 January 2022
approaches of maritime security forces as
they seek to respond effectively. It is also
driving changes in capability requirements,
while technological change is also playing its
part in this area of competition.
Of course, the Asia-Pacific is not a mono-
lithic region, something which is as true in
the maritime domain as it is in any other.
Not all regional states see their neigh- (Mary Lyn Fonua/Matangi Tonga/AFP via Getty Images)
bourhood through the lens of growing

major-power competition, or at least they still seek to avoid choosing sides and prefer to
pursue regionally orientated solutions. Many have a very different perspective on what
are the critical security priorities.
For some regional states, the overarching security concerns relate to the environment
and the impact of climate change. The Asia-Pacific is among the regions most affected
by this challenge. The US intelligence community and many analysts and commentators
identify the small island states of the Pacific as highly vulnerable,15 and the Asia-Pacific
will be in the vanguard of naval adaptation to climate change in terms of the develop-
ment of capabilities and operational tasking. These capabilities will include platforms to
support disaster relief that are able to operate in more extreme conditions, comply with
environmental and emissions targets and be crewed and tasked with an increasing focus
on environmental response. Tackling climate and environmental challenges and their
impacts will also provide opportunities for greater international collaboration. However, it
could also be an area where competitive impulses play out: international responses to the
January 2022 tsunami in Tonga provided a case study of the challenges, shortfalls, cooper-
ative opportunities and risks of competition.16
THE SHIFTING NAVAL BALANCE

The Asia-Pacific is predominantly a maritime theatre. This may not be how it appears in the
threat perceptions of all regional states, nor is it always reflected in the position of naval forces
in the hierarchy of national military establishments. However, it is in the Asia-Pacific that
inter-state frictions seem more likely than ever since 1945 to flare up in the naval and maritime
domain. Therefore, the regional naval balance and how it unfolds are of growing importance.
Since the turn of the century, the Asia-Pacific has been through two distinct phases
of naval development. It has now entered a third. The first phase saw a striking rise in
naval investment and capability development, particularly by China, and a decided shift
in the global centre of gravity of naval power towards Asia, fuelled in no small part by the
pendulum swing of economic power in the same direction. A second, more hard-edged
phase of state-based competition became apparent in the region around 2014–15, as the
PLAN’s dramatic capability developments began to mature and Beijing’s growing asser-
tiveness was becoming increasingly manifest (not least in its spurt of island development
and fortification in the South China Sea). Ambitious plans by Australia, India, Japan, South
Korea and the US to bolster their naval capacity were also beginning to deliver results,
leaving the regional naval balance in flux.17
The third and latest phase of naval development dates from approximately the start of
the present decade, signalled by the change of tone in a number of defence-strategy docu-
ments produced by the US and other countries, including Australia and Japan, as well as some
shifts in plans and postures in the region. The PLAN has continued to make major strides in
expanding its fleet, with new, high-capability surface units and other important platforms
entering service. China’s navy also seems set to move to a new level of potential capability,
including the capacity to deploy as a fully fledged blue-water force beyond the island chains,
perhaps with an initial focus on the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, facing a significantly more
combative political and diplomatic environment, the US and some of its key allies and part-
ners have also increased their naval investment and operational readiness. Moreover, their
efforts are coalescing in ways that could facilitate a shift in the naval balance in their favour.
At the same time, all the major players’ deployments and operations have become more asser-
tive, making it harder to predict how events at sea in the region might evolve – with particular
regard to deployments, the likelihood of a growing incidence of close naval encounters and
prospects for elevated levels of a modern incarnation of ‘gunboat diplomacy’.
Perhaps at least in part for budget-related reasons, the US Department of Defense now
routinely refers to the PLAN as the largest navy in the world, at least in terms of ship
numbers. The department’s November 2022 report to Congress on China’s military power
spoke of a Chinese fleet with a ‘battle force’ (aircraft carriers, destroyers and other major
surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, mine-warfare vessels and fleet auxil-
iaries) of some 340 vessels. By a similar measure, the US Navy currently has some 294
vessels,18 though these tend to be larger and more capable – if older – than their Chinese
counterparts. The report added that it expects the PLAN’s battle force to grow to 400 ships
by 2025 and 440 by 2030.19 However, at least as significant as the number of ships is the
considerable improvement in the quality and capability of PLAN units in service. It is also
widely acknowledged that any assessment of Beijing’s burgeoning maritime power must
also factor in the China Coast Guard – numerically the largest force of its kind in the world
– and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).
China’s development of ASBMs and its array of other anti-ship missiles and anti-access/
area denial (A2/AD) capabilities have provided significant ammunition in the debate over
the future utility of aircraft carriers in a high-intensity confrontation and, therefore, the
role of the US Navy’s carriers (or, indeed, other countries’ carriers) in any major scenario
involving China. As such, it is perhaps ironic that a major talisman of Beijing’s naval ambi-
tions has been its investment in carrier airpower.
It is just over a decade since the PLAN’s first carrier, Liaoning, was declared operational. (It
was originally built by the Soviet Union and sold by Ukraine in unfinished form to China in
2002.) Along with a slightly improved and domestically built sister ship, Shandong, the PLAN
has been amassing carrier operating experience, including via the deployment of increas-
ingly capable groups of accompanying warships. It has also been extending the ranges at
which its carriers have been operating out into the Philippine Sea and to the edge of the
Western Pacific, though still cautiously only around 1,000 km from the Chinese mainland.20
Figure 3.2: US and Chinese US NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIER

aircraft carriers compared
NAME: USS RONALD REAGAN
r.)
lixJ
Fe
ald
sw
sO
as
Cl
d
t3r
lis
cia
e
Overall length
Sp
n
333 metres
tio
ica
un
m
Commissioned 2003
om
sC
as
Full-load
/M
103,000 tonnes
vy
displacement
Na
S
(U
Design Nimitz class, nuclear powered, catapult-assisted
take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR)
Capacity Aircraft [55]: F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
fighter/ground attack (FGA) aircraft;
[4] EA-18G Growler electronic
warfare (EW) aircraft; Hawkeye
AEW aircraft
Helicopters [6]: MH-60R/S
Seahawk/Knight Hawk
The US Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft
Notes Forward deployed
to Japan carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), in the
Philippine Sea, May 2022
These carriers offer the prospect of the PLAN conducting enhanced independent task-
group missions further afield. However, their relatively modest size of some 65,000–70,000
tonnes full-load displacement and their configuration for short take-off but arrested
recovery (STOBAR) air operations limit their strike and power-projection potential. For
offensive power, they would probably rely more on the missile armaments of their accom-
panying escort ships than on their own aircraft. The third Chinese carrier, Fujian, is a
different proposition. It is larger than its predecessors – at an estimated 80,000 tn or more
– and equipped for catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) operations
(using electromagnetic rather than old-style steam catapults) (see Figure 3.2). The vessel
will be able to accommodate a more powerful air group. It more closely resembles, albeit
still at a somewhat lower level of capability, the US Navy’s current force of carriers (though
these are nuclear-powered).
Importantly, an even larger Chinese aircraft carrier, most likely with nuclear propul-
sion, is expected to follow and potentially be operational by the end of the decade, with
still more possibly following. As well as significantly bolstering China’s ability to present
a ‘360-degree’ challenge to Taiwan’s air defences, one or more additional carriers would
add considerably to the PLAN’s blue-water power-projection capacity.21 In any event, a
‘break-out’ of a Chinese carrier group on a significantly more far-reaching deployment
– perhaps into the Indian Ocean, as a signal of intent to project greater global influence –
probably cannot be delayed much longer.
In addition to the continued commissioning of highly capable principal surface combat-
ants, such as Type-055 cruisers and Type-052D (Luyang III-class) destroyers, the rapid
construction and induction into service of the Type-075 Yushen-class large-deck amphib-
ious ships (LHDs) also suggests that China’s efforts are focused on rectifying shortfalls in
CHINESE AIRCRAFT CARRIER DEVELOPMENT
NAME: LIAONING NAME: SHANDONG NAME: FUJIAN
Overall length Overall length Overall length

306 metres 316 metres est. 316 metres est.
Commissioned 2012 Commissioned 2019 Commissioned 2024 or 2025 est.

Full-load Approx. 65,000 tonnes Full-load Approx. 70,000 tonnes Full-load Approx. 80,000–85,000 tonnes
displacement displacement displacement
Design Type-001 Kuznetsov class, Design Type-002 Kuznetsov mod class, Design Type-003 indigenous design,
short take-off but arrested STOBAR configuration CATOBAR configuration
recovery (STOBAR) configuration
Capacity Aircraft [32]: J-15 Capacity Aircraft [40+ est.]: including
Capacity Aircraft [18–24]: J-15 Helicopters [12]: Ka-28/Ka-31/ J-15/J-35/KJ-600 airborne
Helicopters [17]: Ka-28/Ka-31/ Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW early warning (AEW) aircraft
Z-8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW Helicopters [12+ est.]
Notes Built to improved Kuznetsov
Notes Bought as incomplete hulk from design in China Notes CATOBAR configuration allows for
Ukraine, completed in China greater variety of aircraft types and
improved aircraft performance
Sources: IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org; Janes Fighting Ships; US Office of Naval Intelligence, www.oni.navy.mil
areas of relative weakness. In addition to amphibious capabilities, these shortfalls include

anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Moreover, significantly, the reported US assessment that
the PLAN has now equipped its Type-094 Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
submarines with a longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) – the JL-3
– suggests that these vessels can now potentially threaten the continental US from the
relative safety of a protected bastion in the South China Sea, thus altering the strategic
dynamics of the underwater battlespace.22
While the US Navy remains overall the most capable globally by a significant margin,
the gap with the PLAN has clearly narrowed, and it continues to struggle with the ques-
tion of how to meet the challenge posed by China. Since around 2019, there has been an
increasingly tortuous debate in the US over the desirable and achievable size and shape
of the navy’s future fleet given domestic shipbuilding constraints as well as priorities for
capability development. The Department of Defense and the navy have often been at odds
with Congress, with the navy looking to pension off older units to free up resources for
new vessels and systems, while Congress has been more anxious to expand the fleet by
retaining older ships as well as by seeking to add new requests for additional construction.
US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael Gilday has emphasised the need
to improve current readiness, including with parts and weapons stocks, and by servicing
and updating the most useful current platforms.23 Even so, the fleet still faces significant
readiness and maintenance challenges.
In his updated Navigation Plan 2022, the CNO set out an ambition for a hybrid US
fleet by the 2040s comprising more than 350 crewed vessels and 150 uninhabited surface
and sub-surface platforms.24 The path for achieving that target, however, remains unclear.
Indeed, projections suggest that the number of ships and – most notably – submarines will
continue to decline gradually until at least the The US large-deck amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli trialling the ‘Lightning
carrier’ concept with 20 F-35B Lightning II fighters aboard, 7 April 2022
early 2030s.25 The retirement of platforms like
the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Ohio-class
guided-missile-armed submarines (SSGNs)
will result in a significant fall in numbers of
operationally valuable vertical launch system
(VLS) missile cells, which new ship construc-
tion may fail to mitigate.26
However, the arming of the Zumwalt- (U.S. Department of Defense Archive/Alamy Stock Photo)
class destroyers and Virginia-class SSGNs

with hypersonic weapons is not the only offensive missile enhancement that the US Navy
is urgently introducing to increase range and lethality, chiefly in response to the Chinese
threat. Other enhancements include the stealthy LRASM (long-range anti-ship missile,
initially an air-launched weapon) and various LRASM developments and upgrades, as
well as a follow-on hypersonic air-launched offensive anti-surface warfare weapon, dubbed
HALO.27 There is also a maritime strike variant of the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile.
The requirements of the Asia-Pacific theatre are also the primary motivation for another
US Navy priority: extending the reach of its carrier air wings. Key to achieving this aspira-
tion is the rapid introduction of the MQ-25 Stingray UAV, initially as an air-to-air refueller
but potentially also for ISR missions28 and eventually even as a weapons carrier. In another
potentially significant move, the US is also exploring a more ‘distributed’ approach to
deploying sea-based airpower with the ‘Lightning Carrier’ concept of operating the short
take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B variant of the Lightning II combat aircraft from
the navy’s large-deck amphibious ships. To that end, during 2022 the aviation-capable
amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli undertook a trial deployment with some 20 F-35Bs
aboard.29 This distributed approach could potentially be extended even to forward deploy-
ment of US F-35Bs aboard large-deck platforms, including those operated by US allies
Australia, Japan and South Korea. Such a deployment has already been tested operation-
ally aboard the British carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth.
Similarly, the requirements of the Asia-Pacific theatre are an important influence on
the US Navy’s effort to develop a family of directed energy weapons, such as high-energy
lasers, to counter UAV and USV swarm attacks and high-speed missiles.30 A San Diego-
based destroyer has become the first operational US Navy combatant to be fitted with
such a new system to counter UAVs and fast-attack craft: the high-energy laser and optical
dazzler and surveillance system known as HELIOS.31 Furthermore, it is clearly in the Asia-
Pacific that the US Navy most wants to press ahead with plans to integrate USVs and UUVs
into its fleet, with the aid of an experimental task force based in the Middle East to help
gain support for and experience of some of these capabilities.32
Perhaps more profoundly, and in some ways more controversially, the US Marine Corps
(USMC) is undergoing a dramatic transformation intended to create lighter, more agile and
more dispersed units to provide ‘stand-in’ forces able to operate within China’s missile
engagement zones.33 Pursuing the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO)
concept of rapidly switching between temporary footholds on islands and shorelines
would refocus the USMC (absorbed for many years in counter-insurgency operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq) on naval and maritime operations, enabling it to conduct anti-ship
and even ASW missions.34 As a result, the USMC is divesting itself of significant elements,
such as its main battle tank units, and reorganising into lighter, more versatile formations
designated as Marine Littoral Regiments, the first of which was formed in March 2022.35 The
transformation has given birth to the idea for a new light amphibious warship, a develop-
ment that has led to frictions with the US Navy over shipbuilding priorities.36 Amid doubts
about whether the transformation plan can deliver the effects promised, the reforms have
also prompted significant concern and criticism from some of the USMC’s most senior
retired officers.37
For the US Navy, the concept underlying its posture for countering high-intensity
threats is ‘distributed maritime operations’, under which widely dispersed units and offen-
sive capabilities pose challenges to an adversary.38 At the same time, it seeks to concentrate
firepower, including by undertaking more frequent multi-carrier operations involving
two or three carrier strike groups (although these groups are to be sufficiently dispersed
to aid survivability).39 However, this approach poses considerable demands in terms of
command and control and the need for robust networking capacity.40
It remains a subject of intense debate whether these measures, taken together, form
a credible US response to the challenge from China. For all China’s apparent capability
advances, questions remain as to whether Beijing can translate these achievements fully
into combat effectiveness, particularly in light of the PLA’s relative lack of recent opera-
tional experience.41 Equally, it is argued that many assessments underestimate unique US
strengths, including its undersea capabilities, high-quality training and the value of its
alliances.42 Indeed, this last factor is becoming increasingly important as other major naval
players in the region adjust their plans to meet a transforming strategic environment.
In 2020, Australia indicated its sense of urgency regarding developing strategic threats
in the region via the publication of its Defence Strategic Update. It was released under
a conservative coalition government, which was replaced by a Labor administration
following the May 2022 federal elections.43 Among the priorities identified was a need to
enhance long-range-strike capabilities, a goal reinforced by the new government in pursuit
of ‘impactful projection’.44 The Royal Australian Navy was already well on the way to
significantly upgrading its capabilities, particularly following the commissioning of two
Canberra-class LHDs and three Hobart-class Aegis-equipped guided-missile destroyers,
thus reviving its ability to conduct power-projection missions based on task groups. In
addition, highly capable Hunter-class frigates (built to a significantly enhanced British
Type-26 design) will start entering service in the 2030s. However, the most striking signal
that Canberra anticipated an increasingly challenging security environment was the
September 2021 AUKUS announcement, with its central pillar of building at least eight
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The submarine delivery plan revealed on 13
March 2023 will see a phased build-up of capability leading ultimately to Australian indig-
enous SSN-AUKUS vessels based on a new UK SSN design. It will be hugely challenging
for all the partners but should enhance submarine capability for all three, with significant
potential impact for the Asia-Pacific.
Perhaps just as important as the subma- Japan’s naval power on display as ships of the Maritime Self-
Defense Force form the bulk of the Japanese international fleet
rine pillar is the agreement’s focus on
review held in waters off Japan, 6 November 2022
collaboration on other advanced defence
technologies, many with a clear maritime
application, including undersea capabilities,
hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capa-
bilities, AI and autonomy.45 Australia has
confirmed that it will buy Tomahawk cruise
missiles for its Hobart-class destroyers.46
These missiles are also likely to be fitted to
the current Collins-class submarines pending
the arrival of the new nuclear-powered boats
at the end of the 2030s. (STR/JIJI Press/AFP via Getty Images)
Something of a similar step change has

been under way – and gaining momentum – in the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
(JMSDF). Tokyo set out its new defence approach in important defence and security docu-
ments released in December 2022. It includes the planned introduction of enhanced stand-off
counterstrike capabilities based on the purchase of Tomahawk cruise missiles and deployment
of an extended-range version of the locally developed Type-12 surface-to-surface missile.47
These plans seem set to bolster further the JMSDF’s transition to a force with improved
defence-in-depth capabilities, greater ability to carry out independent power-projection
missions at range, and greater potential to support US-led integrated operations. The
JMSDF is, overall, becoming a significantly more robust and capable force in equipment
terms and is pressing ahead with modification of its two largest large-deck aviation-capable
platforms, the Izumo-class ships, to accommodate the F-35B. As a result, they will be able to
operate in effect as STOVL light aircraft carriers.48 Izumo itself has already carried out trials
with USMC F-35Bs aboard.49
The JMSDF also has a formidable flotilla of eight Aegis-equipped cruisers and
destroyers capable of undertaking ballistic missile defence (BMD).50 The number of these
ships is planned to increase to at least ten with the commissioning of two vessels being
procured to replace the abandoned Aegis Ashore programme – though these may focus
on fixed territorial-defence missions. Some of the new ships are also to be equipped with
the Standard SM-6 missile, providing enhanced BMD capability but also a surface strike
role.51 The rapid series production of the Mogami-class multi-mission frigates – currently
under way – will further strengthen the surface fleet.52 It is expected that this class will
ultimately number some 22 vessels. The JMSDF submarine force has also been expanding
and has reached its target of 22 operational boats. The latest vessels – including the new
Taigei class – are fitted with lithium-ion batteries for extended underwater endurance.53
The Republic of Korea Navy has also been significantly expanding its blue-water capa-
bilities. In particular, it has been building up an impressive surface fleet, currently centred
on Sejong-class (KDD-III) Aegis-equipped cruisers. A second batch of Sejong-class ships
– able to undertake BMD – is under construction; six of these vessels are likely to be in
service by the end of the decade.54 The new Daegu class of frigates has also been entering
service, with plans for improved ships of Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and German Chancellor
Olaf Scholz at the naming ceremony for two new Republic of Singapore
this class. Together, these developments
Navy Type 218SG submarines in Kiel, Germany, 13 December 2022
represent a considerable increase in not just
the tonnage but also the capability of South
Korea’s surface fleet.
North Korea’s fleet of midget and
patrol submarines poses particular chal-
lenges for South Korea and is forcing the
country to improve its ASW capabilities,55
while Pyongyang’s apparent pursuit of a
nuclear-armed SLBM capability is raising
wider alarms in the region and beyond.56
Seoul has made strenuous efforts to trans- (Marcus Brandt/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images)
form its submarine flotilla, including by

introducing the Chang Bogo III (KSS-III) class outfitted with conventionally armed
SLBMs. Larger and more capable variants of these submarines are under construction
and planned, promising to provide Seoul with significant additional naval capability.57
For the time being, South Korea’s ambition to procure a STOVL-equipped light aircraft
carrier of around 30,000 tn under the CVX programme appears in abeyance. There are
suggestions, however, that some form of carrier programme may eventually proceed,
possibly involving a larger design and with a domestically developed carrier-borne combat
aircraft.58 The focus on carriers may be connected to the continued and growing interest in
and commitment to carrier capabilities across the region. Moreover, further modification
of the navy’s plans – with renewed focus on blue-water, task-group-orientated operations
– is possible given the constantly evolving regional strategic dynamics, not least in relation
to China and mounting concerns about a Taiwan contingency, growing unease regarding
the security of sea lines of communication, and Seoul’s desire to reinforce security and
defence relations with the US and even Japan.59
Other regional navies have also been making significant strides in modernising and
enhancing their capabilities. While some belong to states anxious to avoid becoming
embroiled in the increasing frictions of great-power competition, the reality of an increas-
ingly tense regional environment is adding extra impetus to many naval procurement plans.
The potential advent during the current decade of Taiwan’s first indigenous subma-
rines,60 combined with its growing inventory of missile-armed corvettes, will increase
Taipei’s sea-denial capabilities (although there are still doubts about the submarine project’s
viability and cost-effectiveness).61 As well as seeking to build up its asymmetric forces,
including the corvettes, Taiwan has begun to modernise its larger surface forces, with the
arrival of a new and heavily armed amphibious assault ship (with others to follow) and
plans for a new frigate class.62 However, delivering on these ambitions will be challenging;
again, questions abound regarding the cost-effectiveness of some of these investments in
light of the challenges Taiwan faces.
Amid much fanfare, in December 2022 Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems
launched the second and third of four new-generation Type 218SG submarines for
Singapore’s navy.63 Singapore is also planning to modernise its naval patrol forces with
a new design of multi-role combat vessels intended to serve as motherships for various
uncrewed platforms, while there is a long-standing ambition for a new Joint Multi-
Mission Ship that would bolster Singapore’s amphibious and power-projection capacity.64
Indonesia, meanwhile, is planning major enhancements of its warship inventory, with
orders for six Italian FREMM frigates and two UK-design Arrowhead 140 vessels, the latter
to be built locally. Reports also indicate the possibility of ordering frigates from Japan as
well as ongoing ambitions to purchase Scorpene submarines from France. Further enhance-
ments in the navy’s smaller patrol forces are perhaps no less significant, with continuing
construction of patrol craft in considerable numbers.65
The Philippine Navy is also attempting to bolster its maritime-patrol and -surveillance
capabilities, notably with South Korean-built vessels, including two new corvettes and
six new offshore patrol ships.66 Meanwhile, the Vietnamese Navy remains a force to be
reckoned with, boasting as its main equipment six Russian-built Improved Kilo submarines
armed with Klub-S anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, and four Gepard 3.9 (Project
11661E) corvettes – also supplied by Russia – with 3M24E Uran-E (RS-SS-N-25 Switchblade)
anti-ship missiles.
On 2 September 2022, India commissioned its first domestically produced aircraft
carrier, INS Vikrant, meaning it now possesses two operational carriers, although they
are configured for STOBAR operations and therefore have some limits on their capacity.
There are also ambitions for a third carrier to enter service within the next decade.67 While
India’s naval expansion has been slow to materialise, the commissioning of the second
Project 15B Visakhapatnam-class guided-missile destroyer in December 2022,68 followed by
its fifth Scorpene-type submarine in January 2023, shows that its capabilities are developing
steadily, with significant implications for the naval balance in the Indian Ocean and India’s
potential capacity to project power further afield. Concurrently, Pakistan is undertaking a
naval-modernisation programme that is raising the stakes. It includes plans to acquire a
class of four Chinese-built Type-054AP frigates, four Turkish-designed Babur-class light
frigates, and eight planned Hangor-class submarines (export versions of China’s Type-039B
Yuan class).69
MANOEUVRING FOR ADVANTAGE

When it comes to addressing and assessing changing strategic dynamics and frictions,
capabilities developments are important. However, also critical (and closely connected to
capability) are shifting patterns and postures of operational deployment. These have also
evolved significantly in the Asia-Pacific.
Notwithstanding the relatively cautious development of the PLAN’s carrier opera-
tions and the fact that the preponderance of China’s naval power remains concentrated
close to its coasts and within the first island chain, Beijing’s naval and maritime activities
– involving all China’s military maritime agencies – have grown increasingly ambitious.
The PLAN’s continuous deployments since 2008 into the Indian Ocean, though primarily
in a counter-piracy role, have long been seen as a signal of intent to extend its reach while
also serving the strategic purpose of boosting its experience of long-range deployments.
Other notable indicators of Beijing’s Chinese navy ships prepare to depart for the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia to
maintain Beijing’s long-standing presence and escort mission in the area, 18 May 2022
intent and the PLAN’s expanding hori-
zons include naval forays north of Alaska
(on at least one occasion in company with
Russian warships70) and increasingly in
waters close to Australia – in the latter case
raising particular frictions when Canberra
claimed that a Chinese warship had used
a laser device to dazzle the crew of a Royal
Australian Air Force surveillance aircraft.71
The security agreement forged between
China and Solomon Islands in 2022 fuelled
debate over potential Chinese naval-basing
ambitions in the Southwest Pacific (and the
attendant strategic implications).72 The pros-
pect of Chinese access to an enhanced base (VCG/VCG via Getty Images)
facility in Cambodia will also provide the

PLAN’s deployment capacity with additional options, including particularly into the
Indian Ocean, supplementing its first foreign support facility in Djibouti.73 Meanwhile, the
increasing assertiveness and coercive tactics of the China Coast Guard and the PAFMM
have also raised concern, while apprehensions remain over the China Coast Guard Law of
2021 and how Beijing might apply it to support more forceful action in waters that China
disputes with others.74
The PLAN’s patterns of activities serve an operational purpose in addition to geopolit-
ical aims, while the increasingly complex character of its exercises is apparently intended
to improve skills applicable to more complex operations.75 The challenge for all interested
parties (including Beijing’s leadership) – particularly in light of what has been revealed about
the performance of Russian forces in Ukraine – is assessing just how much progress is being
made and how that might translate into operational performance against a peer adversary.
China has not been the only actor elevating its naval activity in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed,
the transformation in the maritime posture and practice of the US and its allies and partners
may prove to be equally telling in terms of how the regional naval balance will play out.
The drumbeat of US Navy freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs) and transits of key
waterways like the Taiwan Strait has been one element of this evolving posture.76 The latest
US maritime strategy, released in late 2020, notably referred to a ‘continuum’ of competition
and highlighted the incremental, sub-threshold character of the challenges to the rules-based
international order being faced at sea, calling for US naval power to adopt ‘a more assertive
posture’ in day-to-day operations and accept calculated risk to confront ‘malign behavior’.77
This was reinforced by the published version of the 2022 US National Defense Strategy,
which placed new emphasis – for all the US armed services – on a ‘campaigning’ approach
of persistent activities to address grey-zone challenges in particular.78 The US Third Fleet,
based on the west coast of the US, is also now taking on a more operational role in support
of the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific.79 US Navy carrier-strike-group deployments
have been enhanced to include multi-carrier The US uncrewed trials vessel Sea Hunter arrives at Pearl Harbor
to take part in the Rim of the Pacific exercises, 29 June 2022
exercises. The US Navy has also boosted the
number of SSNs it forward deploys to Guam
– to five, from two just a few years ago – and
is planning to expand its facilities to support
such deployments there.80
Nevertheless, it is a huge challenge for
the US Navy to deliver an enhanced forward
presence while also sustaining the fleet and
seeking to transition from legacy to emerging
capabilities and technologies. In this context,
the third element of the regional naval-
balance equation – the increasing integra-
tion of the other major regional naval players
with each other and with the US – assumes (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Aiko Bongolan via AP)
greater significance.
While multilateral naval exercises have taken place in the region for decades, in the
early 2020s they are evolving in new ways, with participants according such exercises
greater significance. For example, in 2022, the US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise
involved five large-deck aviation-capable platforms from four states – Australia, Japan,
South Korea and the US. It also featured a greater number of more realistic, ‘free-play’
activities than previous RIMPACs. There was also a significant contribution from uncrewed
vessels and other uninhabited platforms.81 Meanwhile, the Malabar series of exercises has
developed from a bilateral US–India arrangement into a four-state framework involving
Australia and Japan, while its activities have increasingly included more complex tasks.
The November 2022 Malabar exercise, hosted by the JMSDF and conducted off Japan in the
Philippine Sea, included the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group. The exercise under-
scored the increased emphasis being placed on the integration of operations between US
carriers and allies and partners, including in key operating areas like the Philippine Sea.82
Both Australia (since 2017) and Japan (since 2019) have instigated regional task-group
deployments, usually led by one of their large-deck aviation-capable warships.83 As well
as projecting influence, such deployments have enhanced participants’ ability to engage in
multilateral manoeuvres aimed at both training and strategic signalling. October 2022 saw
a notable first, with a four-state exercise involving Australia, Canada, Japan and the US in
the South China Sea.84 In terms of dispositions, the Royal Australian Navy has drawn back
from its long-standing engagement in the Middle East to concentrate on the Asia-Pacific.85
The Royal Canadian Navy, in light of a new national Asia-Pacific strategy, aims to increase
its deployment pattern in the region to three frigates during each year, ideally with a
support ship also in the region.86 Canadian vessels transited the Taiwan Strait in company
with US Navy ships in October 2021 and September 2022 and there are plans for further
such missions.87 Meanwhile, growing concern about North Korea’s nuclear and missile
activities has seen a renewed emphasis on combined naval BMD exercises involving Japan,
South Korea and the US.88
Another significant aspect of this trend The Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS Vancouver transits the Taiwan Strait
in company with the US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Higgins, 20 September 2022
towards greater interconnectedness and
cooperation has been the growing number
of support agreements between key players.
Among these have been a reciprocal access
agreement between Japan and Australia and
a similar one between Japan and the UK,
while Manila and Washington have agreed
to boost base support in the Philippines for
US forces under their Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement.89
Reflecting a US campaigning approach
that increasingly acknowledges that grey-zone
challenges across the spectrum of competi-
tion require a response, the latest US maritime (Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Donavan K. Patubo/U.S.Navy via AP)
strategy emphasises the importance of integra-

tion between the US sea services, including the US Coast Guard. The profile and presence of
the US Coast Guard in the Western Pacific has been increased, notably through some impor-
tant demonstrative missions, again including transits of the Taiwan Strait since 2019.90
Nevertheless, it remains the case that the US Navy’s focus (and that of some other major
Western navies) on high-end war-fighting capabilities has resulted in a deficit in lower-end
maritime-security capacity. While some of these deficiencies are being addressed, a number
of commentators argue that the US Navy should adopt an even more disaggregated force
structure and even more ubiquitous deployments, with larger numbers of smaller crewed
and uncrewed platforms that can also respond more comprehensively to different levels of
challenge. Another criticism is that the US strategy of periodic, high-level demonstration
missions, such as FONOPs, has not produced the desired deterrent effect and that even
more persistence is needed, with a range of other regional actors playing more prominent
roles with the US Navy in support.91
Indeed, some other allies and partners may be better placed to take a leading role in
areas where the great-power dynamic is second to other security concerns and where
capacity-building for maritime constabulary work or disaster relief will produce more
influence. Of note in this regard is Australia’s Pacific Maritime Security Program, intended
to generate improved maritime-security capacity, notably through the supply of new
patrol craft to Pacific Islands states.92
HOW GREAT A GAME AT SEA?

For some observers, these evolving dynamics of naval and maritime manoeuvre and
investment are starting to resemble something of a ‘great game’ at sea that is – while global
in nature – focused particularly on the Asia-Pacific.93 Indeed, the increasing naval engage-
ment (or, in some cases, re-engagement) of important external players is one aspect of the
broader recognition of the region’s growing significance as a centre of gravity of global
economic development and strategic challenge.
In this context, the return of a British naval presence to the region has perhaps attracted
most attention and debate. A re-engagement was already under way before the 2021 roll-out
of the UK’s ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and
Foreign Policy and the accompanying Defence Command Paper: these steps reinforced an
impulse that already existed.94 Added to this was the operational debut of the UK’s regen-
erated carrier-strike capability via the Carrier Strike Group 2021 (CSG21) deployment to
the region led by the carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth.
In defence and particularly naval terms, the message has been that this renewed British
engagement will include a mix of forces. To provide a persistent lower-level capability
in the maritime arena, two River-class Batch 2 offshore patrol vessels have already been
forward deployed – essentially for defence diplomacy. These vessels are to be supple-
mented by new Type-31 frigates. The UK also foresees the more periodic deployment
of slightly more capable forces, such as a small amphibious formation dubbed a Littoral
Response Group, and the episodic deployment of high-level capability, such as a carrier
strike group. A striking feature of the CSG21 deployment was an exercise bringing together
HMS Queen Elizabeth, two US carriers and the Japanese Hyuga-class ship Ise – a formation
of four ‘flat-tops’ from three states.95
An important question is whether this revived British interest will be credible and
sustainable, not least in light of the UK’s other defence commitments. The ambition appears
to be there, with talk even of the extended forward deployment of one of the UK’s carriers,
although this would probably only be possible in an even wider multinational format than
the CSG21.96 Depending on what is decided regarding Australia’s new nuclear-powered
submarine capability, another possibility could be the periodic forward deployment into
the region of a Royal Navy Astute-class SSN.
A major challenge for the UK will be how to sustain the operational effectiveness of its
lower-level forces as regional developments raise the bar on what constitutes minimum cred-
ible capability. This will also be an important question for France, which regards itself as a
regional power in the Asia-Pacific by virtue of its territories there and maintains a signifi-
cant permanent presence. The French Navy is grappling with this challenge as it seeks to
renew its naval patrol and surveillance assets, not least its long-serving Floreal-class light frig-
ates.97 Following an Asia-Pacific deployment by the carrier Charles de Gaulle in 2019, France
is aiming for a further such mission in 2025.98 In early 2023 the carrier undertook its longest
power-projection display yet, launching aircraft from the Indian Ocean to forward deploy to
Singapore, a distance of 4,000 km.99 This followed the navy’s 2021 forward deployment to the
region of the SSN Emmeraude with a support ship.100 These developments are indicators of
France’s ambition to expand its naval operations and presence in the Asia-Pacific.
The German Navy’s dispatch of the frigate Bayern to the region on a seven-month
deployment during 2021 and 2022 was further evidence of increased European interest
and naval ambition in the Asia-Pacific. It was the first such mission for nearly two decades,
with a further plan to deploy two more ships in 2024. Likewise, the Netherlands, having
attached its frigate Evertsen to the UK’s CSG21 deployment, has set out plans to deploy a
warship to the Asia-Pacific every two years – a significant commitment given the Dutch
navy’s limited resources.101
In its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo- Figure 3.3: Magazine depths of selected principal surface combatants
Pacific published in September 2021, the European
Union stated that it ‘will explore ways to ensure
enhanced naval deployments by its Member States
in the region’.102 Just what that will mean and how
it might deliver it are open questions, given the
limited success of the EU in the defence and secu-
Class Type-055 Renhai cruiser
rity field so far and in light of the renewed focus CHINA
Full-load displacement 13,000 tonnes
on Euro-Atlantic security following the outbreak 180 metres
Missiles [14] 8-cell VLS (112 cells)
of the war in Ukraine. Given resource constraints
and a probable lack of political consensus among Class Ticonderoga cruiser
US
Full-load displacement 10,100 tonnes
EU member states regarding long-range deploy- 173 metres
Missiles [16] 8-cell Mk 41 (of which
ments, the northwestern Indian Ocean may be [2] 5-cell with reload crane) (122 cells)
the most likely area to see an enhanced European

Class Maya cruiser
JAPAN
maritime security role. Furthermore, the UK has Full-load displacement 10,250 tonnes
170 metres
maintained a long-standing naval presence in and Missiles [12] 8-cell Mk 41 (96 cells)
around the Gulf, and there is a limited European

Class Sejong (KDD-III) cruiser
SOUTH KOREA
maritime monitoring operation there (European Full-load displacement 10,500 tonnes
166 metres
Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz – Missiles [10] 8-cell Mk 41 (80 cells),
[6] 8-cell LACM, A/S missile (48 cells)
EMASOH) and an EU Naval Force mission off the
Horn of Africa – EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta Class Project 15 A/B Kolkata/Visakhapatnam destroyer
INDIA
– although the long-term sustainment of the latter Full-load displacement 7,300 tonnes
164 metres
Missiles [4] 8-cell SAM (32 cells),
may be in question. [2] 8-cell AShM (16 cells)
An enhanced European maritime-security

Class Type-052D/Type-052D mod Luyang III/
role in the northwestern Indian Ocean may not be Luyang III mod destroyer
CHINA
insignificant if it relieves allies and partners of a Full-load displacement 7,500 tonnes
162 metres
Missiles [8] 8-cell VLS (64 cells)
burden, thereby allowing them to concentrate their
efforts elsewhere in the region. However, for some Class Arleigh Burke Flight IIA destroyer
US
European capitals, notably London and Paris, there Full-load displacement 9,300 tonnes
154 metres
Missiles [12] 8-cell Mk 41 (96 cells)
is at least an implicit commitment to go further if a
crisis were to erupt in the Western Pacific, although Class Forbin destroyer
FRANCE
possibly by responding on a limited scale with Full-load displacement 7,000 tonnes
153 metres
niche capabilities. Nevertheless, their efforts could Missiles [6] 8-cell Sylver A50 (48 cells)
make a significant contribution in concert with the

Class Type-45 Daring destroyer
UK
greater commitment of other regional players. For Full-load displacement 8,000 tonnes
152 metres
all European powers, a clue to the fact that they Missiles [6] 8-cell Sylver A50 (48 cells)*
would need to adjust their threat perceptions –

Class Hobart destroyer
AUSTRALIA
currently focused on the Euro-Atlantic area – when Full-load displacement 6,350 tonnes
147 metres
operating in the Asia-Pacific can be gleaned from Missiles [6] 8-cell Mk 41 (48 cells)
the relative lack of magazine depth (in terms of VLS SAM: surface-to-air missile, LACM: land-attack cruise missile, A/S: anti-submarine,
AShM: anti-ship missile, VLS: vertical launch system
cells) of major European-design naval platforms,
Note: Missile figures for each vessel are based on the number of VLS cells.
compared to those of the more regular Asia-Pacific *To be fitted with additional 24 cells for Sea Ceptor SAM
Sources: IISS, Military Balance+, milbalplus.iiss.org; Janes Fighting Ships
naval operators (see Figure 3.3).
Balancing these developments is the fact that Russia cannot be counted out as a Pacific
naval power. Its 2022 Maritime Doctrine appears to place the Pacific second only to the
Arctic in terms of priority, while Moscow has referred previously to the enormous signifi-
cance of the Pacific Ocean for Russia. The new doctrine spelled out ambitions for developing
Russia’s naval presence and maritime industrial capacity (including, perhaps unrealisti-
cally, aspirations to construct aircraft carriers).103 The Russian Pacific Fleet has received
some significant enhancements in recent years, including submarines and modern surface
vessels, although its main oceangoing surface combatants remain legacies of the Soviet era.
There have been notable recent joint exercises with China, including some in waters near
Japan. While these exercises may have been limited in scope and perhaps demonstrated
more show than substance, signalling is important in the context of how Sino-Russian rela-
tions might develop.
In addition, the recent signs of naval cooperation between China, Iran and Russia
in the northwestern Indian Ocean could prove a complicating factor in the region in
the context of a crisis elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific.104 The Iranian navy appears to be
extending its own reach – with a transit by two vessels through the South Pacific as
part of a long-range deployment – in another sign of the continuing changes in regional
naval dynamics.105
AN ASIA-PACIFIC MARITIME PARADOX?

Amid the swirl of cross-currents that characterise the new phase of Asia-Pacific maritime
competition, it is difficult to determine precisely where the naval balance now stands and
the trajectory of its evolution. This challenge is compounded by the shadow of the Ukraine
war and the need to digest the implications and lessons of that conflict, many of which
have created new uncertainties. Nevertheless, it is possible to contend that although the
PLAN’s transformation has produced a critical mass of naval power both for operations
close to home and incipiently for blue-water operations, the coming together of the plans
and new postures of the US Navy and its allies and partners – combined with the increased
urgency and ambition of many of their procurement programmes – may be swinging the
strategic pendulum back in the latter’s favour. The result is something of an Asia-Pacific
maritime paradox: while China’s maritime power has never been greater and the PLAN
continues to grow at a remarkable rate, the US and its allies and partners may be clawing
back some significant advantages such that the PLAN itself may find that it needs to adjust
its own ambitions and programmes.
In the absence of recent high-intensity naval warfare, attempts to assess regional
naval developments are bound to be somewhat theoretical. The fact of rapid techno-
logical change is adding another layer of complexity. Questions also remain about
whether the US and its allies and partners can devise and enact the kind of comprehen-
sive campaigning strategies that they seem to acknowledge are necessary to counter the
persistent challenges to the status quo. The upshot of all these developments is a general
increase of assertiveness at sea – not just by China but also by the US and others in the
region – that may yet deliver strengthened deterrence but also carries increased risk and
a greater danger of miscalculation.
NOTES
1 US, Department of Defense, ‘2022 National warontherocks.com/2022/09/defeat-chinas-navy-

Defense Strategy’, 27 October 2022, defeat-chinas-war-plan/.
p. 4, https://media.defense.gov/2022/ 11 Minnie Chan, ‘Chinese Navy Shows Off
Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL- Hypersonic Anti-ship Missiles in Public’, South
DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF. China Morning Post, 20 April 2022, https://www.
2 John Grady, ‘CNO Gilday: Expanding scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3174946/
Military Cooperation between South Korea, chinese-navy-shows-hypersonic-anti-ship-
Japan “a Necessity”’, USNI News, 13 January missiles-public.
2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/01/13/ 12 Sam LaGrone, ‘Navy Details Hypersonic
cno-gilday-expanding-military-cooperation- Missile Plan for Zumwalt Destroyers, Virginia
between-south-korea-japan-a-necessity. Submarines’, USNI News, 3 November
3 See, for example, James Crabtree, ‘US–China 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/11/03/
Rivalry Set to Intensify in 2023’, Straits Times, 12 navy-details-hypersonic-missiles-on-zumwalt-
December 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/ destroyers-virginia-submarines.
opinion/us-china-rivalry-set-to-intensify-in-2023. 13 Ryan Martinson, ‘Gliders with Ears: A New Tool
4 White House, ‘National Security Strategy’, in China’s Quest for Undersea Security’, Center
October 2022, p. 6, https://www.whitehouse. for International Maritime Security, 21 March
gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/ 2022, https://cimsec.org/gliders-with-ears-a-
Biden-Harris-Administrations-National- new-tool-in-chinas-quest-for-undersea-security/.
Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf. 14 Oishee Majumdar and Nishant Kumar, ‘Making
5 Douglas Barrie and Nick Childs, ‘The Moskva It Big: Asia-Pacific’s Increasing Focus on Large
Incident and Its Wider Implications’, IISS and Extra-large UUVs’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22
Military Balance Blog, 29 April 2022, https:// November 2022.
www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2022/04/ 15 US, Office of the Director of National
the-moskva-incident-and-its-wider-implications. Intelligence, ‘Climate Change and International
6 Nick Childs, ‘Ukraine: Unconventional Responses Increasing Challenges to US National
Impact at Sea?’, IISS Military Balance Blog, 11 Security Through 2040’, 21 October 2021,
November 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/ https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/
military-balance/2022/11/ukraine-unconventional- assessments/NIE_Climate_Change_and_
impact-at-sea. National_Security.pdf.
7 See, for example, Brent D. Sadler, ‘Applying 16 Joanne Wallis, Henrietta McNeil and Anna
Lessons of the Naval War in Ukraine for a Powles, ‘Tongan Disaster Highlights Lack of
Potential War with China’, The Heritage Co-ordination in Regional Response’, Strategist,
Foundation, Backgrounder no. 3743, 5 January Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 28 January
2023, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/
files/2023-01/BG3743_0.pdf. tongan-disaster-highlights-lack-of-coordination-
8 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US in-regional-response/.
Department of Defense, ‘Military and 17 See IISS, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment
Security Developments Involving the People’s 2016: Key Developments and Trends (East Sussex:
Republic of China 2022’, 29 November 2022, Hastings Print, 2016), pp. 145–61.
pp. 64–5, https://media.defense.gov/2022/ 18 ‘USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker’, USNI
Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY- News, 13 February 2023, https://news.usni.
AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS- org/2023/02/13/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-
INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF- tracker-feb-13-2023.
CHINA.PDF. 19 Office of the Secretary of Defense, US
9 Tim Fish, ‘Decisive Development: The Build-up of Department of Defense, ‘Military and Security
Long-range Naval Missile Capabilities in the Indo- Developments Involving the People’s Republic
Pacific’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 January 2022. of China 2022’, p. 52.
10 See, for example, Robert Haddick, ‘Defeat 20 Commander Michael Dahm USN (Ret.),
China’s Navy, Defeat China’s War Plan’, War ‘Lessons from the Changing Geometry of
on the Rocks, 21 September 2022, https:// PLA Navy Carrier Ops’, US Naval Institute,
Proceedings, vol. 149/1/1,439, January 2023, Congress’, 21 December 2022, https://sgp.fas.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/ org/crs/weapons/R44175.pdf.
proceedings/2023/january/lessons-changing- 31 Joseph Trevithick, ‘Here’s Our First Look at a
geometry-pla-navy-carrier-ops. HELIOS Laser-armed Navy Destroyer’, War
21 Patrick M. Cronin, ‘The Significance of China’s Zone, 23 August 2022, https://www.thedrive.
Fujian Aircraft Carrier’, Straits Times, 5 July 2022, com/the-war-zone/heres-our-first-look-at-a-
https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-sig- helios-laser-armed-navy-destroyer.
nificance-of-chinas-fujian-aircraft-carrier. 32 Jon Gambrell, ‘US Navy Launches Mideast
22 Anthony Capaccio, ‘China Has Put Longer- Drone Task Force amid Iran Tensions’, AP News,
range ICBMs on Its Nuclear Subs, US Says’, 8 September 2021, https://apnews.com/article/
Bloomberg, 18 November 2022, https://www. middle-east-iran-dubai-united-arab-emirates-
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-11-18/ bahrain-fe5517a7979e037ae6e266b885cc7719.
us-says-china-s-subs-armed-with-longer-range- 33 US Marine Corps, ‘Force Design 2030:
ballistic-missiles. Annual Update’, May 2022, https://
23 Richard R. Burgess, ‘CNO Holds Fast www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/Force_
on Ship Decommissionings, Fleet Design_2030_Annual_Update_May_2022.
Readiness’, Seapower Magazine, 19 October pdf?ver=7ul-eyF6RcSq_gHU2aKYNQ%3d%3d.
2022, https://seapowermagazine.org/ 34 Gen. David Berger, ‘Marines Will Help Fight
cno-holds-fast-on-ship-decommissionings- Submarines’, US Naval Institute, Proceedings,
fleet-readiness/. vol. 146/11/1,413, November 2020, https://
24 US, Chief of Naval Operations, ‘Navigation www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/
Plan 2022’, 26 July 2022, p. 10, https://media. november/marines-will-help-fight-submarines.
defense.gov/2022/Jul/26/2003042389/-1/-1/1/ 35 US Indo-Pacific Command, ‘Redesignated: 3rd
NAVIGATION%20PLAN%202022_SIGNED.PDF. Marine Regiment Becomes 3rd Marine Littoral
25 US, Congressional Research Service, ‘Navy Regiment’, 4 March 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/
Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2955826/
Background and Issues for Congress’, 21 redesignated-3rd-marine-regiment-becomes-3rd-
December 2022, p. 13, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/ marine-littoral-regiment/.
weapons/RL32665.pdf. 36 Caleb Larson, ‘Kill It or Build It? Navy and
26 Michael Fabey, ‘USN Shipbuilding Plan Could Marines Don’t Agree on the Light Amphibious
Cut Total Number of Missile VLS Cells, CBO Warship’, National Interest, 6 October 2022,
Says’, Jane’s Navy International, 17 September 2021. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/kill-it-or-
27 Lee Willett, ‘HALO Programme Accelerates US build-it-navy-and-marines-don%E2%80%99t-
Navy Hypersonic Capability Drive’, Naval News, agree-light-amphibious-warship-205207.
5 September 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/ 37 Jim Webb, ‘Momentous Changes in the
naval-news/2022/09/halo-us-navy-hyper US Marine Corps’ Force Organisation
sonic-capability/. Deserve Debate’, Wall Street Journal, 25
28 Megan Eckstein, ‘Boeing Demonstrates MQ-25’s March 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
Utility as Surveillance Drone’, Defense News, 16 momentous-changes-in-the-marine-corps-
September 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/ deserve-debate-reduction-david-berger-general-
naval/2022/09/16/boeing-demonstrates-mq-25s- 11648217667?mod=opinion_lead_pos10.
utility-as-surveillance-drone/. 38 See references in US, Chief of Naval Operations,
29 Maj. Mason Englehart, ‘3rd Marine Aircraft ‘Navigation Plan 2022’.
Wing, Expeditionary Strike Group 3 39 See, for example, US Navy, ‘US Indo-Pacific
Demonstrate Lightning Carrier Concept’, Command Joint Force Conducts Dual
US Marine Corps, 11 April 2022, https:// Carrier Operations in South China Sea’,
www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/ 24 January 2022, https://www.navy.mil/
Article/2995310/3rd-marine-aircraft-wing- Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2910170/
expeditionary-strike-group-3-demonstrate- us-indo-pacific-command-joint-force-conducts-
lightning-car/. dual-carrier-operations-in-south-c/.
30 US, Congressional Research Service, ‘Navy 40 Bryan McGrath, ‘Carrier Air Power Is Essential
Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for to Distributed Maritime Operations’, 1945, 25
July 2022, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/ usni.org/2022/12/29/f-35b-upgrades-near-

carrier-air-power-is-essential-to-distributed- completion-aboard-japanese-warship-kaga.
maritime-operations/. 49 Capt. Marco Valenzuela, ‘Marine Corps F-35B
41 See, for example, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Conducts First Landing Aboard JS Izumo’,
‘China’s Huge Exercises around Taiwan Were US Marine Corps, 14 October 2021, https://
a Rehearsal, Not a Signal, Says Oriana Skylar www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/
Mastro’, The Economist, 10 August 2022, https:// Article/2810746/marine-corps-f-35b-conduct-
www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/08/10/ first-landing-aboard-js-izumo/.
chinas-huge-exercises-around-taiwan-were-a- 50 Kosuke Takahashi, ‘JMSDF Commissions
rehearsal-not-a-signal-says-oriana-skylar-mastro. Second Maya-class Guided-missile Destroyer’,
42 US, Congressional Research Service, ‘China Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 March 2021.
Naval Modernization: Implications for US 51 Jon Grevatt, ‘Japan Plans SM-6 Deployment from
Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for 2026’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 November 2022.
Congress’, 1 December 2022, pp. 44–5, https:// 52 Xavier Vavasseur, ‘Japan’s MHI Launches
sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33153.pdf. “Agano” Sixth FFM Mogami-class Frigate for
43 Australia, Department of Defence, ‘2020 Defence JMSDF’, Naval News, 21 December 2022, https://
Strategic Update’, 1 July 2020, https://www. www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/12/
defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/ japans-mhi-launches-agano-%E3%80%8C%E3%
2020-defence-strategic-update. 81%82%E3%81%8C%E3%81%AE%E3%80%8Ds
44 Ben Packham, ‘Richard Marles Has Vowed the ixth-ffm-mogami-class-frigate-for-jmsdf/.
ADF Will Get Long-range Weapons to Hold 53 Takahashi Kosuke, ‘Japan Launches Third Taigei-
Enemies at Bay’, Australian, 8 November 2022, class Submarine for JMSDF’, Diplomat, 12 October
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/ 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/japan-
defence/richard-marles-has-vowed-the-adf-will- launches-third-taigei-class-submarine-for-jmsdf/.
get-longrange-weapons-to-hold-enemies-at-bay/ 54 Song Sang-ho, ‘S. Korea Launches New 8,200-
news-story/e154115e67fcca2135ee8c6659ee8b40. ton Aegis Destroyer, Jeongjo the Great’, Yonhap
45 White House, ‘FACT SHEET: Implementation of News Agency, 28 July 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/
the Australia – United Kingdom – United States view/AEN20220728003000325.
Partnership (AUKUS)’, 5 April 2022, https:// 55 Dr Lee Willett, ‘Doubling Down: North and South
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements- Korea Pursue Improved Underwater Capabilities’,
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation- Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2 November 2021.
of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states- 56 Choe Sang-Hun, ‘North Korea Tests a
partnership-aukus/. Submarine-launched Missile’, New York Times, 7
46 Australia, Department of Defence, ‘Joint May 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/07/
Media Statement: Australia to Pursue world/asia/north-korea-missile-submarine.html.
Nuclear-powered Submarines through New 57 Juho Lee, ‘South Korea Conducts Second SLBM
Trilateral Enhanced Security Partnership’, Test from KSS-III Submarine’, Naval News,
16 September 2021, https://www.minister. 25 April 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/
defence.gov.au/statements/2021-09-16/ naval-news/2022/04/south-korea-conducts-
joint-media-statement-australia-pursue-nuclear- second-slbm-test-from-kss-iii-submarine/.
powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral- 58 Sakshi Tiwari, ‘Irony or What? After
enhanced-security-partnership. “Dumping” Aircraft Carrier, South Korea Plans
47 See Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Security to Develop Naval Variant of F-21 Fighters’,
Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, https://www. EurAsian Times, 26 September 2022, https://
mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/pdf/ eurasiantimes.com/aircraft-carrier-in-sight-
security_strategy_en.pdf; and Japan, Ministry of south-korea-kf-21-fighter-jet/.
Defense, ‘National Defense Strategy’, 16 December 59 For the context on South Korean security strategy,
2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/ see Government of the Republic of Korea, ‘Strategy
guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf. for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific
48 Yoshihiro Inaba, ‘F-35B Upgrades Near Region’, 28 December 2022, https://www.mofa.
Completion Aboard Japanese Warship Kaga’, go.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=20221228060752073.
USNI News, 29 December 2022, https://news. pdf&rs=/viewer/result/202301.
60 Keoni Everington, ‘Taiwan to Launch 1st 69 Usman Ansari, ‘Pakistan Receives New Chinese-
Indigenous Submarine in September 2023’, made Frigate: How Will It Fare Against India’s
Taiwan News, 27 December 2022, https://www. Navy?’, Defense News, 9 November 2021, https://
taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4763111. www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/11/09/
61 Holmes Liao, ‘Taiwan’s Risky Submarine pakistan-receives-new-chinese-made-frigate-
Aspiration’, Diplomat, 10 September how-would-it-fare-against-indias-navy/.
2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/ 70 Mark Thiessen, ‘Patrol Spots Chinese, Russian
taiwans-risky-submarine-aspiration/. Naval Ships off Alaska Island’, AP News, 27
62 Thomas Newdick, ‘Taiwan’s New Amphibious September 2022, https://apnews.com/article/
Assault Ship Bristles with Anti-air Missiles’, War russia-ukraine-china-alaska-honolulu-coast-
Zone, 30 September 2022, https://www.thedrive. guard-54638cccc30d5a0f8879022f493a6302.
com/the-war-zone/taiwans-new-amphibious- 71 ‘Australia Accuses China of Shining Laser at
assault-ship-bristles-with-anti-air-missiles; and Warplane’, BBC News, 19 February 2022, https://
David Axe, ‘With Old and New Frigates, the www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-60446928.
Taiwanese Navy Could Be Sailing into a Big 72 Euan Graham, ‘Assessing the Solomon Islands’
Mess’, Forbes, 17 November 2021, https://www. New Security Agreement with China’, IISS
forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/11/17/with-old- Analysis, 5 May 2022, https://www.iiss.org/
and-new-frigates-the-taiwanese-navy-could-be- blogs/analysis/2022/05/china-solomon-islands.
sailing-into-a-big-mess/?sh=22528ca54a78. 73 Jack Detsch, ‘US Looks to Check Chinese
63 ‘TKMS Launches Singapore’s Second and Third Advances at Cambodian Naval Base’, Foreign
Type 218SG Submarines’, Naval Technology, 14 Policy, 5 December 2022, https://foreignpolicy.
December 2022, https://www.naval-technology. com/2022/12/05/us-china-cambodia-ream-
com/news/tkms-singapores-second-third- naval-base/.
type218sg/. 74 Wataru Okada, ‘China’s Coast Guard Law
64 Mike Yeo, ‘New Report Forecasts Singapore’s Challenges Rule-based Order’, Diplomat, 28 April
Defence Market Growth’, Australian Defence 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/chinas-
Magazine, 4 November 2021, https://www. coast-guard-law-challenges-rule-based-order/.
australiandefence.com.au/defence/general/new- 75 Liu Xuanzun, ‘China’s “Most Powerful” Carrier
report-forecasts-singapore-s-defence-market-growth. Group Enters West Pacific for Drills Amid
65 Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, ‘Scrutinizing Japan’s Breakaway from Defense-only Principle’,
Indonesia’s Naval Modernisation Plans’, Asia Global Times, 17 December 2022, https://www.
Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for globaltimes.cn/page/202212/1282043.shtml.
Strategic and International Studies, 10 March 76 Idrees Ali, ‘US Warships Transit Taiwan Strait,
2022, https://amti.csis.org/scrutinizing- First since Pelosi Visit’, Reuters, 28 August 2022,
indonesias-naval-modernization-plans/. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/
66 Daehan Lee, ‘Philippines Awards Contract to exclusive-us-warships-carrying-out-taiwan-
South Korean Shipbuilder for Six Offshore Patrol strait-passage-first-since-pelosi-2022-08-28/.
Vessels’, Defense News, 30 June 2022, https:// 77 US, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard,
www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/06/30/ ‘Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with All-domain
philippines-awards-contract-to-south-korean- Naval Power’, Tri-Service Maritime Strategy
shipbuilder-for-six-offshore-patrol-vessels/. 2020, 16 December 2020, pp. 9–14, https://media.
67 Nick Childs and Douglas Barrie, ‘India’s defense.gov/2020/Dec/16/2002553074/-1/-1/0/
Aircraft Carrier Arrival: The Limits of TRISERVICESTRATEGY.PDF.
Ambition?’, IISS Military Balance Blog, 30 78 US, Department of Defense, ‘2022 National
September 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/ Defense Strategy’, pp. 12–13.
military-balance/2022/09/indias-aircraft- 79 Mallory Shelborne, ‘US 3rd Fleet Expanding
carrier-arrival-the-limits-of-ambition. Operational Role in Indo-Pacific’, USNI
68 Xavier Vavasseur, ‘Indian Navy Commissions News, 3 August 2022, https://news.usni.
Second Project 15B Destroyer’, Naval News, 19 org/2022/08/03/u-s-3rd-fleet-expanding-
December 2022,https://www.navalnews.com/ operational-role-in-indo-pacific.
naval-news/2022/12/indian-navy-commissions- 80 Mallory Shelborne, ‘Navy Expanding Attack
second-project-15b-destroyer. Submarine on Guam as a Hedge Against
Growing Chinese Fleet’, USNI News, 2 89 See Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Japan–
November 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/11/02/ Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement’, 6
navy-expanding-attack-submarine-presence-on- January 2022, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/
guam-as-a-hedge-against-growing-chinese-fleet. ocn/au/page4e_001195.html; Japan, Ministry
81 US Navy, ‘RIMPAC 2022 Concludes’, 5 August of Foreign Affairs, ‘Signing of Japan–UK
2022, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News- Reciprocal Access Agreement’, 11 January
Stories/Article/3118649/rimpac-2022-concludes/. 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/gb/
82 US Embassy and Consulates in India, ‘Japan page1e_000556.html; and Rene Acosta,
Hosts Australia, India, US in Malabar Naval ‘US, Philippines Add Four More Sites to
Exercise 2022’, 14 November 2022, https:// EDCA Military Basing Agreement’, USNI
in.usembassy.gov/japan-hosts-australia-india-u- News, 2 February 2023, https://news.usni.
s-in-naval-exercise-malabar-2022/. org/2023/02/02/u-s-philippines-add-four-more-
83 See Australian Government, Defence, ‘Indo- sites-to-edca-military-basing-agreement.
Pacific Endeavour Returns to Australia’, 2 90 Adam Stahl and Bradley A. Thayer,
December 2022, https://www.defence.gov.au/ ‘The Coast Guard Is Vital to Defending
news-events/releases/2022-12-02/indo-pacific- Taiwan against China’, Hill, 31 October
endeavour-returns-australia; and ‘With Eye on 2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/
China, Japan Deploys MSDF Flotilla to 11 Indo- national-security/578615-the-coast-guard-is-
Pacific Countries’, Japan Times, 18 June 2022, vital-to-defending-taiwan-against-china/.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/06/18/ 91 See, for example, Bryan Clark, ‘Build a Fleet that
national/msdf-pacific-flotilla-china/. Contests Every Inch’, USNI Proceedings, July
84 Commander, Task Force (CTF) 71 Public 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceed
Affairs, ‘US Navy Support Australia’s Indo- ings/2022/july/build-fleet-contests-every-inch;
Pacific Deployment Alongside Canada, and Captain Joshua Taylor, ‘A Campaign Plan for
Japan in the South China Sea’, US Navy, the South China Sea’, USN Proceedings, August
17 October 2022, https://www.navy.mil/ 2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceed
Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3189914/ ings/2022/august/campaign-plan-south-china-sea.
us-navy-supports-australias-indo-pacific- 92 Australian Government, Defence, ‘Pacific
deployment-alongside-canada-japan-in-t/. Maritime Security Program’, https://www.
85 Stephen Dziedzic and Andrew Greene, ‘Australia defence.gov.au/programs-initiatives/pacific-
No Longer Sending Navy to the Middle East, engagement/maritime-capability.
Shifts Focus to Asia-Pacific, China’, ABC News, 93 Geoffrey F. Gresh, ‘The New Great Game
23 October 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/ at Sea’, War on the Rocks, 8 December 2020,
news/2020-10-23/australia-will-stop-sending- https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/the-new-
navy-to-middle-east-to-shift-focus/12808118. great-game-at-sea/.
86 Maritime Security Challenges Conference 2022, 94 See UK Government, ‘Global Britain in a
November 2022, remarks by the Commander, Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of
Royal Canadian Navy, Vice-Admiral Angus Security, Defence, Development and Foreign
Topshee, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x Policy’, 16 March 2021, https://www.gov.uk/
PNOYnWsFOY. government/publications/global-britain-
87 Demetri Sevastopulo, ‘Canada to Send More in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-
Warships through Taiwan in Signal to China’, review-of-security-defence-development-
Financial Times, 5 December 2022, https:// and-foreign-policy; and UK, Ministry of
www.ft.com/content/b19721e8-7bfc-44f2-9f72- Defence, ‘Defence in a Competitive Age’, 30
971a63d2bfac. July 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/
88 US Indo-Pacific Command Public Affairs, publications/defence-in-a-competitive-age.
‘US, Japan and Republic of Korea Conduct a 95 Harry Adams, ‘CSG21: Japanese, UK and US
Trilateral Ballistic Missile Defence Exercise’, Carriers Join Forces for Exercise’, Forces.net, 4
6 October 2022, https://www.cpf.navy. October 2021, https://www.forces.net/news/csg21-
mil/Newsroom/News/Article/3182274/ japanese-us-and-uk-carriers-join-forces-exercise.
us-japan-and-the-republic-of-korea-conduct- 96 See UK, Ministry of Defence, ‘Chief of the
a-trilateral-ballistic-missile-defen/. Defence Staff RUSI Lecture 2022’, 14 December
2022, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ Defence’. See speech by Netherlands Minister of

chief-of-the-defence-staff-rusi-lecture-2022. Defence Kajsa Ollongren, 12 June 2022, https://
While the bulk of the CSG21 deployment was www.youtube.com/watch?v=aK3bRVsaFr8.
made up of UK naval assets, it also included a 102 European Commission, High Representative of
US Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II squadron as the Union for Foreign and Security Affairs, ‘The
part of the carrier air group, a US Navy destroyer EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’,
and a Dutch air-defence frigate. 16 September 2021, p. 13, https://www.eeas.
97 See France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign europa.eu/sites/default/files/jointcommunica
Affairs, ‘France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy’, tion_2021_24_1_en.pdf.
February 2022, particularly pp. 9–10, https:// 103 For an English translation, see Anna Davis
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/en_dcp_a4_ and Ryan Vest, ‘Maritime Doctrine of the
indopacifique_022022_v1-4_web_cle878143.pdf. Russian Federation’, US Naval War College,
98 Xavier Vavasseur, ‘French Navy Plans Aircraft Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 31 July
Carrier Mission to the Pacific in 2025’, Naval 2022, https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.
News, 22 July 2022, https://www.navalnews. net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20
com/naval-news/2022/07/french-navy- Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/20220731_
aircraft-carrier-mission-pacific-in-2025/. ENG_RUS_Maritime_Doctrine_FINALtxt.
99 ‘French Rafales Conduct Navy’s Longest Fighter pdf?sv=2017-04-17&sr=b&si=DNNFileMan
Projection into Asia’, Aviation Week, 20 January agerPolicy&sig=2zUFSaTUSPcOpQDBk%-
2023, https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/ 2FuCtVnb%2FDoy06Cbh0EI5tGpl2Y%3D.
budget-policy-operations/french-rafales-conduct- 104 Brendan Cole, ‘China, Russia and Iran Team
navys-longest-fighter-projection-asia. Up for Joint Naval Exercises’, Newsweek, 18
100 Sébastian Seibt, ‘France Wades into the January 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/
South China Sea with Nuclear Attack russia-ukraine-vladimir-putin-kyiv-pacific-fleet-
Submarine’, France24, 12 February iran-china-1670278.
2021, https://www.france24.com/en/ 105 ‘Iranian Warships Tracked Passing through
france/20210212-france-wades-into-the-south- South Pacific’, RNZ, 3 January 2023, https://
china-sea-with-a-nuclear-attack-submarine. www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/481838/
101 IISS, ‘IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022: Common iranian-warships-tracked-passing-through-
Challenges for Asia-Pacific and European south-pacific.
CHAPTER 4
CHINA’S BELT AND

ROAD INITIATIVE
A DECADE ON
MEIA NOUWENS
Senior Fellow for Chinese Security and Defence Policy, IISS

China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) has served
as an avenue for Chinese
infrastructure development across
the Asia-Paci fic. However, not all
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Following a 2018 peak, BRI investments

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alternatives. While concerns of ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy –

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due to indebtedness to China – may not have been borne

lia
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out, Beijing seems to be moving towards promoting Chinese-

centric norms of security, development and digital governance.
THE BRI IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND ITS EVOLVING THEMATIC FOCUS

The BRI’s focus in the Asia-Pacific has shifted in line with Beijing’s strategic interests, with most
investment being directed towards Southeast Asia and South Asia. The BRI has also shifted from hard-
infrastructure projects to digital-infrastructure projects. New diplomatic initiatives build on Chinese
infrastructure and connectivity investments to promote Chinese narratives and norms.
BRI IMPLEMENTATION: CHINESE RHETORIC VS WESTERN APPREHENSIONS

Beijing has espoused the BRI as a project to increase connectivity and infrastructure. Western concerns
have focused on China’s intentions and the potential for debt-trap diplomacy. However, Beijing might
find itself in a debt trap of its own making following the BRI’s early years of unregulated investment
and recipient countries’ economic difficulties.
RIPOSTES TO THE BRI: INITIATIVES BY OTHER POWERS

Western actors have tried to offer alternatives to BRI infrastructure projects. And while even taken
together such efforts do not equal the BRI’s funding so far, their timing may be fortuitous: due to
China’s economic downturn, its spending on such projects is unlikely to increase in the near term.
THE BRI’S FUTURE AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

Beijing seeks to build on the BRI through new initiatives that promote Chinese concepts of security.
Consequently, the Asia-Pacific will become a battleground for norms and values of relevance to the
future of the international order. It will be important to observe the extent to which, and how, China
manages to convert its BRI and digital investments into useful influence.
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Sri Lankan labourers work along a
road in Colombo, 5 August 2018
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has evolved significantly since its launch in 2013. Chinese
President Xi Jinping announced the BRI in two speeches in 2013, outlining plans for a ‘Silk
Road Economic Belt’ – involving overland routes for rail and road transportation – intended to
deepen China’s connectivity with Eurasia and boost trade between China, Eurasia and Europe;
and a ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’, expected to deepen maritime links between China,
Southeast Asia, South Asia and Europe. The stated ambition was to build closer economic ties
with China’s neighbouring regions, ultimately linking it to the West, through five priority
areas: coordinating policy, improving connectivity, reducing impediments to trade, integrating
financial structures, and building people-to-people ties through exchanges and dialogues in
various sectors. Over time, however, the BRI expanded in scope to become an umbrella term
for any Chinese project in developing or emerging economies. The BRI also became a useful
way for Beijing to expend its industrial overcapacity (through trade development) and promote
its industrial strategy in new sectors (such as digital technology) beyond its national borders.
The BRI’s geographical reach and thematic priorities have changed since its launch. So
too has the scope of BRI projects. At first, the initiative concentrated on China’s immediate
neighbouring regions – Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Its focus has gradually extended
westward, with projects linking China with Africa and South Asia and, ultimately, linking
China to markets in Europe. Since 2018, the BRI has been used to deepen China’s relations
with Latin America and the South Pacific. However, within the Asia-Pacific, the initiative’s
scope and implementation have also been diverse. While Southeast Asia, Central Asia,
South Asia and the South Pacific have all been foci for the BRI (see Figure 4.1), Beijing’s
prioritisation between and within these sub-regions has changed over time. For example,
an initial focus on projects in Central Asia was quickly supplanted by greater emphasis on
projects in South and Southeast Asia.
Figure 4.1: BRI projects in 1 52
the Asia-Pacific, 2013–21 No. of official BRI projects by country
Total projects by sub-region, 2013–21

Southeast Asia South Asia Central Asia South Pacific
131 91 43 33
Status of projects, 2021*
195 60 40
Completed Under way Planned
*Three projects were cancelled and are therefore not counted as either completed, under way
or planned.
Note: In the context of this figure, Australia has been included as part of the South Pacific.
Source: IISS, China Connects, chinaconnects.iiss.org
In thematic terms, there was a boom in BRI physical-infrastructure projects around

2016, with Chinese companies building new rail, road and pipeline networks (or modern-
ising existing networks) and investing in port infrastructure. Such investment raised
concerns in the West, primarily because of China’s alleged potential ability to exploit debt
incurred from infrastructure-project loans in order to gain political influence in recipient
countries. (Subsequent studies have indicated that the empirical evidence does not suggest
this has been a widespread practice.) As a result of China’s domestic economic downturn,
Beijing has sought to exert greater central control over the initiative in recent years, and the
number of new BRI infrastructure projects has slowed since 2019. While Beijing focuses on
completing infrastructure projects that are already under way, the future of the BRI seems
to lie in a related initiative: the Digital Silk Road (DSR). Initially branded as a subset of the
BRI, the DSR has gained momentum since its launch in 2015 and differs from the BRI – not
only in terms of its thematic focus but also its Chinese stakeholders, contract types and
geographical reach. However, the roll-out of further Chinese digital investments abroad
could be complicated by Beijing’s desire for greater control over Chinese private-sector
technology companies at home (to redirect business focus to the development of advanced
components) and Washington’s introduction of greater controls on the export of semicon-
ductor and supercomputing technologies to China.
In 2021 and 2022, China launched several efforts to increase its influence along the BRI
and DSR, announcing three new initiatives centred on Chinese values. While thin on detail,
they outline the government’s views on security (including data security) and develop-
ment and are particularly focused on gaining influence in the Global South, building on
Beijing’s perception that the United States is a declining power and presenting a Chinese
view of the rules-based international order.
While the US, its allies and other international partners have attempted to push back
against China’s global infrastructure and connectivity initiatives, alternatives to the BRI
and DSR have not succeeded overall. Although countries are open to alternatives to the
BRI and DSR, the US and its allies and partners have been unable thus far to provide infra-
structure at the scale required to rival the BRI. Despite their changing nature, the BRI and
the DSR remain important elements of China’s foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific.
THE BRI IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND ITS EVOLVING THEMATIC FOCUS

The geographic and thematic foci of the BRI in the Asia-Pacific have shifted since 2013 in
line with Beijing’s strategic interests. While the initiative was launched in 2013 in Central
Asia, over the last decade most BRI investment in the Asia-Pacific has been directed towards
Southeast Asia and South Asia, with an uptick in investments in the South Pacific since
2018. Australia, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have remained outside the BRI due
to either bilateral political tensions with China or their alliance with the United States. The
following assessment examines the geographical and sectoral emphases of the BRI in four
Asia-Pacific sub-regions (Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and the South Pacific),
presenting IISS data on officially branded BRI projects in each. It also assesses challenges to
the BRI in each sub-region, as well as new Chinese initiatives that build on the BRI.
Southeast Asia
For trade, security and geopolitical reasons, Southeast Asia is likely to remain the Asia-
Pacific sub-region that is most strategically important for Beijing. Many countries in
Southeast Asia have strong trading relationships with China and play an important role in
its supply chains. China has ranked as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN)
largest trading partner since 2009, while ASEAN has been China’s largest trading partner
since 2020. Additionally, vital maritime trade routes to China run through Southeast
Asia; despite attempts to decrease reliance on maritime trade by expanding regional rail
networks through the BRI, Chinese imports and exports remain dependent on shipping.1
Moreover, Beijing seeks to foster the continuing non-alignment of Southeast Asian coun-
tries as a bulwark against greater regional alignment with the US, in what Beijing views as
an era characterised by ‘Cold War mentality’ on the part of the US.2
In Southeast Asia, official BRI projects have been concentrated predominantly in
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Vietnam (see Figure 4.2). Chinese invest-
ment in Southeast Asia peaked in 2017, when nearly six times the number of projects
were launched in the sub-region compared with 2013. Between 2013 and 2015, most BRI
projects concerned transport and energy infrastructure. From 2016, they were diversi-
fied to include special economic zones and trade agreements with recipient countries.
By 2020, the largest category of BRI investments in Southeast Asia focused on ‘Health
Silk Road’ projects, which included the donation and sale of protective equipment and
Chinese vaccines, as well as people-to-people connections through medical-expert visits
and exchanges. Southeast Asia has also been a key destination for DSR investments, with
Chinese firms playing a dominant role in telecommunications-infrastructure provision in
poorer countries, including Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. In more sophisticated markets
– Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Figure 4.2: BRI projects in Southeast Asia, 2013–21
Singapore – China’s role has not been so
dominant. While there has been much contro-
Airport
versy in Western countries over the adoption
Bridge
of Chinese-owned next-generation network
Energy-transmission infrastructure
infrastructure, in Southeast Asia similar
Health Silk Road
debate has often been absent. In Indonesia,
Highway
for example, the government has prioritised
Industrial park
bridging the ‘two Indonesias’ – that is, the Investment in extractive industry
highly connected part of the country centred Memorandum of understanding/
trade agreement
on Java, and the less connected eastern part Metro/subway system
of the country – and has favoured Chinese Port
investment because of its low cost and fast Power generation (fossil fuel)
roll-out.3 Aside from investments in phys- Power generation (low carbon)
ical infrastructure, Southeast Asia presents a Railway
growth market for Chinese digital platforms Road
and services due to its large, growing and Special economic zone
Transfer of knowledge
‘tech-savvy’ population.4
Challenges to the BRI in Southeast Asia 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
include concerns about economic depend-

Number of projects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
encies on China (such as in the Philippines),
ethnic tensions (in Indonesia, for example),
2021 status 2013–21
and corporate social responsibility issues Vietnam 16 Brunei 8
relating to the standards of projects (such Timor-Leste 6

Cambodia 21
as in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 90 Thailand 3
Completed
Vietnam).5 These concerns have at times Singapore 3 Total
number of
impacted governments, as protesters have projects
Philippines 16
claimed that their governments have become
25 Indonesia 24
Under way Myanmar 8
too favourably disposed towards China
16
Malaysia 7 Laos 19
and placed maintaining favourable bilateral Planned
relations ahead of wider national interests.

Ethnic tensions have at times been fuelled by the view that China-led BRI projects only Source: IISS, China Connects,
chinaconnects.iiss.org
benefit migrant workers from China. In Indonesia, for example, the number of Chinese
guest workers residing in the country rose from 17,515 in 2015 to 30,000 in 2018, while
domestic unemployment remained around 5% during that time.6
China’s growing economic clout in Southeast Asia is reflected in public-opinion polls
about economic influence in the region. According to the State of Southeast Asia 2023
Survey Report published by the Singapore-based ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, over 59.9%
of respondents considered China the most influential economic power in Southeast Asia
(of this number, 64.5% were worried about China’s economic influence), while 41.5%
regarded China as the most influential political and strategic power in the region (of this
number, 68.5% were worried about China’s expanding influence in these areas).7 The most
indebted countries to China in Southeast Asia are Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, which
are also three of the top five countries that Protesters march towards the Chinese consulate in Metro
Manila on the Philippines’ Independence Day, 12 June 2019
have received the most BRI funding. Several
countries in Southeast Asia, including
Myanmar and Vietnam, have sought alter-
natives to BRI investment. For example, in
2018, Thailand proposed a regional effort to
create alternatives to Chinese infrastructure
funding through the establishment of an
Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic
Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) fund
worth US$500 million.8 This was ultimately
funded by Thailand, with contributions from
Australia, Japan, South Korea and the US. In (Jes Aznar/Getty Images)
Vietnam, the EU Global Gateway initiative is

funding the Tra Vinh nearshore wind farm.9 Myanmar, in turn, has looked to India for
infrastructure financing, such as in the India–Myanmar Border Area Development project,
including for the construction of roads, bridges and schools in Chin State and the Naga
Self-Administered Zone.10 Alternatives to BRI funding have been successful in limited
cases, although such endeavours have not yet been able to match the BRI’s offer at scale.
Controversies pertaining to Chinese firms’ alleged lack of corporate social responsi-
bility when implementing BRI projects in Southeast Asia have led to disputes over land
ownership, labour rights, corruption and environmental impact. Ethnic tensions have also
arisen, with concerns sometimes voiced by local populations that Chinese workers on BRI
projects have received higher pay. For example, a high-speed-railway project linking the
Thailand–Laos border to the Thailand–Malaysia border faced pushback from Bangkok,
with the government denying China’s request for development rights on the land on either
side of the railway. Thai policymakers also pushed back on the issue of whether Chinese
engineers would be allowed to work in Thailand, though a compromise was ultimately
reached.11 This pushback should be seen within the context of the domestic criticism
levelled at the Thai government at the time for its perceived close relationship with China
and overreliance on Beijing for diplomatic and strategic support.12
South Asia
Of the countries in the South Asia sub-region, Pakistan has received the largest share of
BRI investment, while smaller states there have attempted to use Chinese investment to
hedge against India. Sri Lanka, under then-president Mahinda Rajapaksa, saw Chinese
investment through the BRI as an economic opportunity but also as a ballast to its fractious
relationship with India.13 Similarly, Nepal and Maldives have alternated between prior-
itising China or India in their foreign relations, depending on the governments in power
at the time. Chinese investments in the region have not necessarily created more favour-
able conditions for Beijing’s influence. Chinese investment in South Asia has been one
factor encouraging India to align more closely with the West, notably through the Quad
(a grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US); India has also agreed to the potential
establishment of the US–India Gandhi–King Figure 4.3: BRI projects in South Asia, 2013–21
Development Foundation, as well as to
Academic programmes
collaborate with the US to provide joint
Airport
development finance where possible –
Bridge
including through a partnership between the
US Agency for International Development
Health Silk Road
and India’s Development Partnership
Highway
Administration, which seeks to expand
Industrial park
development activity in third countries.14 Investment in extractive industry
More than half of official BRI projects Memorandum of understanding/
trade agreement
in South Asia have been in Pakistan (see Metro/subway system
Figure 4.3). Almost one-quarter have been People-to-people
connection programmes
in Nepal. While also recipients of BRI invest- Port
ment, taken together Sri Lanka and Maldives Power generation (fossil fuel)
accounted for less than one-seventh of BRI Power generation (low carbon)
projects in the sub-region. Between 2013 and Railway
2021, China invested in 18 different catego- Road
ries of BRI projects in South Asia.15 These Special economic zone
included energy, real estate, transport infra- Transfer of knowledge
structure, digital infrastructure and services,

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
trade agreements, special economic zones
and industrial parks. From 2013–16, Chinese Number of projects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
BRI investment in South Asia focused

2021 status* 2013–21
primarily on energy and transport infrastruc- Bhutan 1
Bangladesh 6
ture. However, from 2016 it widened in scope India 1
Sri Lanka 7
to include special economic zones, industrial 44
Completed
Maldives 5
parks and new trade agreements.

Total
The BRI in South Asia has achieved its number of
Nepal 19
24 projects
intended goal of exporting Chinese indus- Under way
trial overcapacity abroad. From 2010–18, for

20
example, the value of Chinese industrial-goods Planned
Pakistan 52
exports to Pakistan increased from US$3.1
*Three projects were cancelled and are therefore not counted as either completed, under way or cancelled.
billion to US$8.2bn.16 Nevertheless, South
Asian BRI projects have faced security, polit-
ical, economic, geographical and governance
challenges. Since 2018, the number of new BRI projects agreed to in South Asia has slowed Source: IISS, China Connects,
due to worsening economic conditions in Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In addition, some
of the existing projects are located in geographically challenging locations, such as Pakistan’s
Himalayan interior, which is seeing construction of railway infrastructure and pipelines as part of
the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. The costs of transporting via these infra-
structure projects once finished would far exceed the cost of the maritime-shipping options to
which they supposedly provide an alternative. According to one study, ‘if a Chinese oil company
chose to move 200,000 bpd [barrels per day] of crude [oil] through the Burma–China pipeline
and 250,000 bpd through the Pakistan–China The Chinese-operated Gwadar Port in Balochistan, southwest Pakistan
line, it could lose roughly a billion dollars a year

compared to what it would have paid to move
the oil by sea to eastern China’.17 Other esti-
mates claim that shipping oil from the Persian
Gulf to the east coast of China would cost just
US$2 per barrel, compared to potentially US$15
per barrel to move it overland from Pakistan
to western China and then through further
distribution centres to China’s eastern region.18
Bureaucratic and governance challenges also
exist, as countries like Nepal do not have the
bureaucratic capacity to get large-scale infra- (SM Rafiq Photography/Getty Images)
structure projects off the ground. For example,

the Trans-Himalayan railway project has been on hold since 2014 as Nepal lacks the technical
expertise and engineers to conduct a feasibility study of the project or review any study that
would be carried out by China. Further stalling the project is the fact that neither Nepal nor China
wishes to fund the feasibility study.19 Meanwhile, in Pakistan the BRI has faced some of its most
severe security challenges so far, with numerous terrorist attacks targeting infrastructure projects
or Chinese personnel working on them. The CPEC runs through insecure parts of Pakistan, and
Chinese nationals have been targeted by extremists in Quetta and Karachi.20 In June 2017, the
Islamic State (ISIS) claimed that it had killed two Chinese nationals who were abducted from
Quetta.21 In December 2017, Beijing warned Chinese nationals publicly that more attacks on
Chinese nationals in Pakistan could be imminent. In 2018, gunmen opened fire on employees
of Cosco Shipping Lines Pakistan, killing one Chinese national.22 In September 2022, a Chinese-
Pakistani national was killed at a dental clinic in Karachi, while in April that year three Chinese
teachers were killed in Karachi by a suicide bomber.23
Central Asia
By the time the BRI was launched, bilateral relations between China and countries in Central
Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) were already
extensive. Beijing sought to strengthen economic ties with the region, particularly to help
boost the economic development of China’s less wealthy western provinces. Indeed, in 2013,
China was the top trading partner of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and the second-largest
trading partner for the other countries in the sub-region.24 Central Asia has also played an
important role in expanding China’s access to energy imports from the region and Russia.
Energy and transportation projects had already started prior to the launch of the BRI, as
China became a net importer of oil in 1993 and turned to Russia and Central Asia for energy
imports.25 In the late 1990s, China National Petroleum Corporation acquired the rights to
two major oilfields in Kazakhstan and constructed a Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline.26 BRI
energy-focused projects thus expanded on an existing network of oil and gas pipelines.
Chinese investments were welcomed by Central Asian governments and have focused on
energy, transport corridors and, since 2018, helping Central Asian countries to diversify
their economic bases, notably through invest- Figure 4.4: BRI projects in Central Asia, 2013–21
ments in digital infrastructure.
Bridge
Large flagship BRI projects for Central Asia
Health Silk Road
were announced soon after the BRI’s launch,
Highway
focused primarily on power-generation projects,
Investment in extractive industry
extractive industries and railway networks to Memorandum of understanding/
trade agreement
carry gas and oil to China while also facilitating
Power generation (fossil fuel)
the export of goods from China. In addition Power generation (low carbon)
to signing numerous memoranda of under- Railway
standing and trade agreements, Chinese-built Road
and -operated special economic zones (such as Special economic zone
those in Kazakhstan) were intended to facilitate
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
trade with China. However, from 2017 onwards
Chinese investment in the sub-region through Number of projects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
the BRI diversified to include greater investment

2021 status 2013–21
in roads and highways, as well as in low-carbon
Uzbekistan 9 Afghanistan 2
power-generation infrastructure through solar
and wind parks and hydroelectric power plants.
Kazakhstan 17
From 2020 onwards, new BRI projects focused 35
Completed Tajikistan 1
Total
almost entirely on health initiatives (see Figure number of
4.4) – in line with China’s health diplomacy projects
during the coronavirus pandemic. Though 6

Under way
Chinese tech companies have been invested in 2
Planned Mongolia 9 Kyrgyzstan 5
Central Asia since the early 2000s, such firms
have expanded into the sub-region more signif-
icantly since 2018, taking leading shares in
national ICT network infrastructures and rolling out surveillance-related technologies, as well Source: IISS, China Connects,
as ‘smart city’ projects.27
New Chinese-built transport-connectivity infrastructure in the sub-region has increased
rail traffic between Europe and Asia, particularly since the coronavirus pandemic. From 2016–
21, the annual number of China–Europe freight trains increased from 1,702 to 15,183, with
an increase of nearly 80% in the first quarter of 2021 compared to the same period in 2020.28
However, the vast majority of trade between Europe and China is still carried out by shipping:
in 2019, over 95% of trade in goods between Germany and China was transported by shipping.29
Future investment in Central Asian rail networks connecting Europe and China is doubtful. In
2022, China–EU rail freight saw a 34% drop in volume via the ‘Northern Corridor’ due to the
Russian war of aggression in Ukraine and as ocean freight costs fell back to pre-pandemic
levels.30 Even if the war in Ukraine were to end, the future of Europe–China freight transport
would not look positive. Economic and political developments in Europe could lead to a drop
in demand for freight from China, while the greater fragmentation of global supply chains
that exclude China could continue to impact the demand for freight transport between China
and Europe. Moreover, the BRI has not been spared in Central Asia from political concerns
over undue Chinese influence, or from corruption scandals, which in some cases have led to
the cancellation of Chinese projects.31 In 2019, Then Chinese premier Li Keqiang and Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh
Sogavare inspect honour guards during a welcome ceremony in Beijing, 9 October 2019
former prime minister of Kyrgyzstan Sapar
Isakov was charged with corruption following
his attempted lobbying for the interests of a
Chinese company in a project to modernise
the Bishkek Thermal Power Station.32 In 2019,
Kazakhstan decided to end infrastructure
financing from China for a light-railway transit
project, due to embezzlement of the funds.33
South Pacific
While Chinese agreements with certain
countries in the Pacific Islands have raised
concerns in some Western capitals since 2018
– a notable example being the 2022 China– (Wang Zhao/AFP via Getty Images)
Solomon Islands security agreement – the

sub-region is only a minor destination for BRI investment.34 Despite this, Western anxiety
over the potential for greater Chinese influence has led to increased infrastructure funding
from Western countries, notably Australia, New Zealand and the US.35
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Federated States of Micronesia
have received the largest shares of BRI projects in the South Pacific, with Papua New
Guinea accounting for almost a quarter of the projects in the sub-region between 2013 and
2021 (see Figure 4.5). BRI investment was slow to gain momentum in the South Pacific;
the number of projects agreed per year only picked up significantly in 2018. While early
projects were focused on airport infrastructure and low-carbon power-generation infra-
structure, in 2017 multiple trade agreements were signed. Additionally, BRI projects
diversified to include investments in extractive industries, bridges, energy-transmission
infrastructure and ports. In 2020, during the coronavirus pandemic, Health Silk Road
projects were signed with eight Pacific Island states.36
Despite Chinese loans and grants to the sub-region, China and the BRI have made only
a minimal impact in recipient Pacific Island states. There has not been any significant shift
in Chinese investment or trade towards the sub-region, with the exception of Papua New
Guinea. Exports from China to the South Pacific have increased twelvefold in value between
2000 and 2018, though the numbers for exports from Pacific Island countries to China have
grown at a much less impressive rate.37 Papua New Guinea, however, has continued to
have significantly stronger trade ties with Australia than with China in both imports and
exports.38 In Australia, concerns of debt-trap diplomacy in the South Pacific have been
prominent.39 Such concerns have proved an obstacle for the BRI, despite these claims being
largely unproven empirically. Of the South Pacific countries, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu are
the most indebted to China, with Tonga owing roughly 25% of its total annual GDP to the
Export–Import Bank of China (Eximbank).40 This has prompted Pacific powers – including
Australia, New Zealand and the US – to pay closer attention to the Pacific Island states and
consider providing alternatives to the BRI by supporting socio-economic development
projects. Further major Chinese investment in Figure 4.5: BRI projects in the South Pacific, 2013–21
the form of large-scale physical-infrastructure
Airport
projects is unlikely given the existing debt
Bridge
burdens and the lack of demand for Chinese
loans. In 2021, Samoa scrapped a China-
Health Silk Road
backed port-development project, while a Investment in extractive industry
road project with Papua New Guinea has Memorandum of understanding/
trade agreement
been stalled since the contract for the project Port
was signed in 2017. Only two countries signed Power generation (low carbon)
up to new loans with China between 2017 and Road
2021: Solomon Islands, for the 2023 Pacific
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Games Stadium, and Kiribati, for agricultural
and technology support.41 Instead, the BRI Number of projects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
is likely to focus on its existing connectivity

2021 status 2013–21
projects in sub-regions closer to China and
Australia 1
with greater economic potential. Vanuatu 5
Cook Islands 1
Tonga 2 Federated States

New diplomatic initiatives 26 of Micronesia 4
Completed
In addition to the BRI initiatives and DSR Total
Solomon Islands 4 Fiji 2
number of
investment in these countries, in recent projects
Kiribati 2
years China has launched three new initia- 5 Samoa 2
Under way
tives directed at the Global South: the Global 2
Niue 2
Planned Papua New Guinea 8
Initiative on Data Security – also referred to
as the Global Data Security Initiative (GDSI)
– the Global Development Initiative (GDI)
and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). These initiatives, revealed in documents offering Note: In the context of this figure,
Australia has been included as part
different levels of detail, appear to be intended to build on the past decade of Chinese infra-
of the South Pacific.
structure and connectivity investments to promote Chinese narratives and norms in line
Source: IISS, China Connects,
with Beijing’s view of the international order and its national interests. chinaconnects.iiss.org
The GDSI was launched in 2020 and proposes a framework for data security, data storage
and digital commerce (see Figure 4.6). It adds a normative layer to China’s half-decade of
global digital investment through the DSR. China organised a diplomatic roadshow across
Central Asia, Africa and Europe to garner support for the initiative, through speeches by
Xi and presentations by ministers and high-level officials from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. While the relevant official document is light on detail, the GDSI has been viewed
in the West as China’s riposte to the US ‘clean network initiative’ (launched in 2020) and
expounds principles of ‘multilateralism’, security development and ‘fairness and justice’.42
When mentioned by Chinese officials, the GDSI’s emphasis oscillates between security and
digital economy. For example, when the initiative was discussed at the China–Germany–EU
leadership meeting in 2020, it was framed as a way to develop a global digital economy.
However, when speaking at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit two months
later, Xi framed the GDSI through a lens of security and stability, presenting it as a way to
build a more ‘peaceful, secure, open, cooperative, and orderly’ cyberspace.43 The GDSI is
Figure 4.6: China’s Global Initiative on Data Security: eight tenets
Take measures
to prevent and end
Require companies
personal information harms,
Treat data security Oppose the use of to respect local laws
and not abuse information
objectively and rationally, information technology to and do not force domestic
technology to conduct
and work to maintain open, damage other countries’ companies to store data
large-scale surveillance of other
secure and stable global critical infrastructure or generated or collected
countries or illegally collect
supply chains steal important data overseas in their own
personal information of
country
citizens of other
1 2 countries 3 4
Respect the
sovereignty,
Needs for cross-border Information technology Information
jurisdiction, and
data retrieval by law product and service technology companies
data-management rights of
enforcement should be providers should not set up must not use users’
other countries, and do not
addressed through judicial backdoors in their products dependence on their
directly access data located
assistance and other or services to illegally products to seek
in other countries from
channels obtain user data illegitimate gains
companies or
individuals
5 6 7 8
Note: The eight tenets are as translated by DigiChina, from the original Chinese-language speech in 2020 by then-foreign minister Wang Yi.
Source: DigiChina, digichina.stanford.edu
seemingly promoted in different ways to different audiences, focusing on narratives that

might garner the most support from different partners.
The GDI was launched by Xi in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly
in September 2021. The initiative aims to represent China as a leader of the Global
South, offer an alternative to the ‘Western-led’ international order, and build on Beijing’s
narrative that the US and the wider West are in decline. The GDI includes as priority
areas ‘poverty alleviation, food security, COVID-19 response and vaccine, development
financing, climate change and green development, industrialization, digital economy
and connectivity’.44 Launched at a time when the global coronavirus pandemic was
slowing down, the GDI was also framed as a way for China to help the Global South
recover from the social and economic challenges caused by the pandemic. Despite a lack
of detail on the initiative, over 50 countries have joined the ‘UN Group of Friends of
the Global Development Initiative’, established by China less than four months after the
GDI’s launch. However, in addition to outlining support for socio-economic develop-
ment, the GDI also seeks to promote Chinese views on human rights and the ‘collective’,
in line with Beijing’s efforts to reshape global rules and governance. With regard to the
former, the GDI frames ‘development’ as a prerequisite for human rights. Effectively
positing that human rights are a secondary matter runs counter to the UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and suggests that human rights are voluntary, while also
leaving vague the definition of ‘development’, the supposedly necessary precondition
for respecting human rights. The GDI also makes numerous mentions of the ‘collective’
and the ‘greater good’, in line with Beijing’s views that the preferences of the state should
override individual rights.45
Initially proposed in April 2022, the President Xi Jinping announces the Global Development Initiative in a virtual
address to the UN General Assembly in New York City, US, 21 September 2021
GSI was formally launched with a concept
paper on 21 February 2023. The document
outlines core concepts and principles for
global peace and security, offering some
detail on China’s plan for the initiative. The
GSI lists China’s commitment to six princi-
ples: ‘common, comprehensive, cooperative
and sustainable security … respecting the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
countries … abiding by the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter … taking the
legitimate security concerns of all coun-
tries seriously … peacefully resolving (Mary Altaffer/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
differences and disputes between countries

through dialogue and consultation … [and] maintaining security in both traditional and
non-traditional domains’.46 The GSI also offers broad plans for priority areas of coopera-
tion. Listed first is putting forward a ‘New Agenda for Peace’ and other proposals in the
UN. The initiative also outlines China’s position on the need for peaceful coexistence
between major countries, preventing nuclear war and avoiding arms races. Additionally,
the initiative seeks to promote regional security solutions for and by regional states in
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. It is likely
that Beijing seeks to replicate its concept of ‘Asia for Asians’ in other regions, which
could potentially weaken the existing world order as well as US capacity to help
manage or resolve crises in other regions. In addition to listing existing and new plat-
forms for cooperation and dialogue, the GSI also mentions detailed examples of Chinese
programmes, such as China’s offer to ‘provide other developing countries with 5,000
training opportunities in the next five years to train professionals for addressing global
security issues’.47
These three initiatives aim to promote Chinese-centric norms and values in the
Global South. This ambition will be particularly relevant in developing and emerging
economies where China has invested heavily in development aid or infrastructure
projects through the BRI and DSR. It also allows Beijing to continue to shape the inter-
national system in its favour at a time when large-scale infrastructure projects are not
feasible due to economic conditions in China and questions of demand (as outlined
earlier in this chapter). Beijing has previously argued that the BRI is ‘an economic
cooperation initiative, not a geopolitical or military alliance’.48 However, these three
initiatives indicate that Beijing’s engagement with the Global South is not just based on
the provision of aid or helping to develop local economies; it is now expanding more
formally to promote Chinese concepts of security, based closely on China’s own concept
of comprehensive national security, its ‘golden prescription for global challenges’ and
development, and the storage, processing and transfer of data globally according to
Chinese norms.49
BRI IMPLEMENTATION: CHINESE RHETORIC VS WESTERN APPREHENSIONS

Official Chinese and Western rhetoric on the BRI present similar interpretations of both the
role of the Chinese government and the ambition behind the initiative. They differ, however,
on China’s intent. While Beijing has espoused the BRI as a project to increase connectivity
and infrastructure, linking regions and benefiting recipient countries’ economic growth,
Western views of the BRI have tended to be more suspicious of China’s intentions. Indeed,
in 2017, then US secretary of defense James Mattis stated that ‘no one nation should put
itself in a position of dictating “one belt, one road”’.50 In 2021, the G7 expressed concern
about China’s ‘coercive’ economic policies and ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy towards developing
countries.51 That same year, then US secretary of state Rex Tillerson criticised the BRI for
burdening recipient countries with job losses for local populations – due to the import of
Chinese labour to manage and work on BRI projects – and ‘enormous levels of debt’.52
Judging BRI implementation: statecraft vs ‘partycraft’

By 2021, over half (64%) of the BRI projects in Southeast Asia, the South Pacific and South
Asia had been completed, while 22% were ongoing and 14% were still at the planning
stage.53 These statistics give the impression – at least, at first glance – that implementation
of the BRI has been and continues to be largely successful.
However, judging implementation against these metrics risks overlooking both the fact
that the last decade of BRI implementation has in some ways proved to be chaotic and also
the question of recipient countries’ agency. The BRI’s roll-out in the last ten years has lacked
central bureaucratic oversight and control and a coherent implementation strategy. It was
originally advertised by Beijing as a systematic project intended to ‘promote the connectivity
of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen
partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multi-
tiered and composite connectivity networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced
and sustainable development in these countries’.54 However, the BRI’s early years were
marred by a lack of leadership and structure. Instead of being led by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Ministry of Commerce, as might have been expected for a major foreign-policy
initiative focused on socio-economic development and connectivity, managing the BRI was
instead delegated to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which
sought to fold China’s domestic economic planning agenda into the BRI. The initiative also
lacked concrete policies that directed how, where and by whom projects would be imple-
mented. Instead, the BRI has been run according to vague action plans issued by the Chinese
Communist Party’s (CCP) BRI Leading Small Group and the NDRC. Existing infrastructure
projects were rebranded as BRI projects, while various Chinese stakeholders at different
levels of government and industry used the initiative as a vehicle for pursuing their own
interests – with the incentive of government financial support.
This apparent lack of coordination calls into question whether the BRI is the example
of Chinese statecraft that both the Chinese government and Western commentators have
claimed it to be: a strategic, coordinated, plan-driven and target-oriented action in pursuit
of clear, long-term goals using the tools of the state and operated by a unitary actor
through directed steps. The reality of the BRI is that ‘propaganda exceeds implementation,
activity overtakes purpose, and actors further down the hierarchy have much latitude in
interpreting the terms of their involvement’.55 Instead of being seen as effective tools of
statecraft, the BRI and DSR should perhaps be viewed as tools of the CCP’s ‘partycraft’: ‘a
campaign-style mobilization’ that is able to ‘create bursts of activity and overcome bureau-
cratic inertia, working simultaneously through state institutions, the party structure and
popular participation’.56 This would explain why the BRI has not had the large-scale effect
anticipated by Western politicians and officials at the peak of BRI investments globally in
2016. Importantly, the idea of debt-trap diplomacy turned out to be unproven and China’s
investment in nearly 60 ports worldwide has not – contrary to the expressed fears of some
commentators – provided it with immediate access to a global network of dual-use ports,
let alone naval bases.57
Debt-trap diplomacy for whom?

Proponents of the theory that the BRI is a tool for China’s debt-trap diplomacy (such as the
former Trump administration in the US) often point to China’s control over Hambantota
Port in Sri Lanka.58 Following unsuccessful efforts to gain investment from the US and India
for the port project, in 2015 Chinese construction firm China Harbour Group Engineering
Company and China Eximbank agreed to fund a contract to build, own, operate and transfer
the port following heavy lobbying by the Chinese firms. While some commentators have
attributed China Merchants Port Holdings Company and China Harbour’s 99-year lease as
proof that the Chinese project was a ‘debt-for-equity’ swap (as a result of Sri Lanka’s deep
indebtedness to China), research has shown the opposite. Colombo’s need to refinance the
port project came about due to complex and long-standing national economic and finan-
cial problems in the Sri Lankan economy – and there was never a default. Furthermore,
rather than being used to pay off China Eximbank, the US$1.12bn cash infusion was used
to strengthen Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves.59
China is the world’s largest private lender. However, the notion that Beijing can leverage
global debt as a strategic means to gain access to any and all strategic equity is a myth.
Rather, it could be asked whether, instead of trapping sovereign countries in Chinese debt
for strategic value, Beijing has inadvertently been caught in a debt trap of its own making.
Nearly 60% of China’s overseas loans are currently held by countries considered to be
in financial distress, compared with just 5%
in 2010.60 This phenomenon has only been
Workers welcome a port visit from China’s space- and missile-tracking
exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic ship Yuan Wang 5 in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, 16 August 2022
and the war in Ukraine, which have put
China’s overseas-lending portfolio at higher
risk than ever before. Russia was China’s
largest foreign debtor, accounting for over
15% of BRI lending in the first five years of
the initiative. Russia, Belarus and Ukraine
together accounted for 20% of China’s over-
seas lending over the last two decades.61
Moreover, countries involved in the BRI
(Ishara S. Kodikara/AFP via Getty Images)
are requesting debt restructuring from China. For example, in 2022 Pakistan sought to
reschedule US$27bn of bilateral debt, mostly owed to China.62
China’s lending boom has already largely ended, however, and the outbreak of full-
scale war in Ukraine in 2022 added additional risk of contagion to its other loans. China is
therefore likely to reduce significantly – or halt – lending in the near term and to be hesi-
tant to renegotiate existing debts. It is also noteworthy that while China has in the past
two decades focused on bilateral debt restructuring involving Chinese state-owned banks,
in February 2023 it called on the G20 to multilateralise the debt burden that China faces,
calling for ‘joint action, fair burden’ in debt settlement.63
The question of some countries’ indebtedness to China – as a consequence of Beijing’s BRI
investments – has been linked to several Western governments’ concerns that Beijing seeks to
invest in ports funded under the BRI in order to build dual-use facilities that could be used
to support its naval-expansion programme. So far, the Chinese navy has used the ports of
Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, while China is reportedly building a naval
facility at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. The US Department of Defense has suggested that
in the Asia-Pacific, China ‘has likely considered’ Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan,
Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand as potential locations for military-logistics facilities.64
While at present the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has just one official overseas mili-
tary base (in Djibouti), it is reasonable to assume that the PLA may consider expanding its
access and potential ownership of military bases across the Asia-Pacific in the future in order
to provide logistic support that could better enable its international projection of military
power. However, speculation in the US, India and elsewhere from 2004 onwards that China
seeks to develop a chain of naval bases across the Indian Ocean, sometimes referred to as the
‘string of pearls’, has so far not materialised in any clear-cut form.
Analysis of the BRI has tended to focus more on perceived Chinese intent than on
recipient states’ agency in decision-making on BRI projects. Countries that receive Chinese
investment usually understand very well the geopolitical context in which they are situ-
ated and, as a result, are hesitant to make overt choices between strategic alignment with
the US or with China. They understand that joining the BRI could be seen as acquiescing to
Chinese geopolitical strategy. When counter-offers to the BRI have been available, Chinese
influence has appeared to have had a limited impact in determining a recipient country’s
choice. For example, in 2018 the government of Papua New Guinea chose to uphold a
deal with the Chinese company Huawei to build its internet infrastructure and submarine
cables, calling an 11th-hour counter-offer by Australia, Japan and the US ‘a bit patron-
ising’ as Huawei had already completed over half of the project.65 Since then, Australia,
Japan and the US have successfully won contracts for submarine-cable projects intended
to connect Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.66
RIPOSTES TO THE BRI: INITIATIVES BY OTHER POWERS

In the Asia-Pacific, a significant amount of funding is required to develop infrastructure. In
2017, the Asian Development Bank assessed that developing countries in Asia would require
US$26 trillion in infrastructure between 2017 and 2030.67 Since 2013, it is estimated that China
has spent between US$1trn and US$2trn on the BRI.68 China likely lacks the capacity to respond
Table 4.1: China and the West: global-connectivity initiatives announced, 2013–22
Year Initiative Countries/organisations
2013 Belt and Road Initiative China
2015 Digital Silk Road China
2018 Strategy for Connecting Europe and Asia European Union
2018 Funding for Indo-Pacific infrastructure development US
2019 Blue Dot Network US, Japan, Australia
2020 Global Initiative on Data Security China
2021 Build Back Better World G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US (+EU))
2022 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment G7 (including EU)
2022 Global Gateway European Union
2022 Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement, 24 May 2022 – US$50 Quad (India, Japan, Australia, US)
billion of infrastructure assistance and investment in the
Indo-Pacific over the next five years
2022 Jointly Advancing the Global Development Initiative and China

Writing a New Chapter for Common Development
2022 Global Security Initiative concept paper China

Source: IISS
comprehensively to the demand for new infrastructure across Asia. In principle then, Western
and Japanese alternatives to the BRI may have useful and welcome roles to play.
Initially, Western countries (and countries with complicated relationships with China,
such as India) were ambivalent about the BRI. However, in 2017, then US National Security
Council senior director for East Asia Matt Pottinger led the US delegation to the first Belt
and Road Forum.69 Some Western views verged on the positive. While addressing the EU
Parliament in 2018, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and
European Commission Vice President Federica Mogherini stated: ‘only if we engage together
with China, we can make our interests, our goals and our vision on connectivity converge’.70
However, the European Union, Japan and the US have subsequently made multiple
efforts to provide alternatives to Chinese infrastructure projects (see Table 4.1). Some of
these initiatives have yet to result in a single successful project, while others have been too
slow to get off the ground, or to expand geographically, to offer realistic options to recip-
ient countries seeking infrastructure investments.71
In September 2018, the EU launched its Strategy for Connecting Europe and Asia (known
as the EU–Asia Connectivity Strategy).72 It focuses on transport, energy, digital-network
and people-to-people projects, as well as G7 leaders meeting at their summit in Cornwall, United Kingdom, 11 June 2021
promoting sustainable finance. The US was

quick to follow, with Congress passing the
Better Utilization of Investments Leading to
Development (BUILD) Act in October 2018,
which sought to restructure the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation into a new
agency – the US International Development (Karwai Tang/Pool/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Finance Corporation – with a doubled

investment cap of US$60bn.73 The agency was authorised to invest equity in develop-
ment projects instead of just providing loans through private-sector participation. In July
2018, the Trump administration announced that it would also make US$113m available
for infrastructure-development programmes in the Asia-Pacific.74 Even taken together,
these funds stood in stark contrast to the estimated US$1trn that China had already spent
on the BRI. The announcement of the Blue Dot Network in 2019, a joint agreement by
Australia, Japan and the US (and, later, with Indian participation) to collaborate on the
promotion of quality infrastructure investments, made the lack of Western financing in the
face of Chinese spending even more obvious.75 The agreement had no funding attached
to it, instead seeking to compete with the BRI by acting as a certification process for infra-
structure investment to assure projects were of high quality and sustainable and that their
funding’s origin was transparent. To date, these efforts have had little success in competing
with the BRI’s global reach across multiple sectors.
Perhaps having recognised that greater financing would be required to provide
genuine alternatives to the BRI’s offerings, the US and EU have both launched reformu-
lated infrastructure initiatives. In June 2021, the US, together with other members of the
G7, launched the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative, intended to provide ‘hundreds
of billions of dollars of infrastructure for low- and middle-income countries in the coming
years’.76 Just over a year later, the G7 relaunched the B3W as the Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), this time providing more details of what it entailed.
The US planned to provide US$200bn through the PGII over the following five years –
through grants, federal financing and private-sector investment.77 The other G7 countries
would provide an additional US$400bn by 2027.78 Unlike in previous efforts, examples
of pilot projects were provided at the launch of the partnership, such as a US$2bn solar
project in four southern Angolan provinces, disbursing a US$3.3m technical grant for a
multi-vaccine manufacturing facility in Senegal, building the Southeast Asia–Middle East–
Western Europe 6 submarine telecommunications cable, and financial support to renovate
or construct over 100 hospitals and clinics across Côte d’Ivoire, among others.79
In 2022, the EU also relaunched its previous connectivity strategy, this time through the
EU Global Gateway. The previous connectivity initiative was focused predominantly on
Asia; the Global Gateway expands this effort to other regions. Similar to the G7’s PGII in its
intentions and scope, the Global Gateway had by early 2023 allocated roughly US$10.8bn
in sustainable connectivity, energy and green-transition projects in Southeast Asia. Far
more (some US$162bn) has been allocated to Global Gateway activity in Africa, where
the EU seeks to finance projects in green transition, digital transition, sustainable growth,
health systems, education and training, energy and agri-food systems.80
Even taken together, the EU and G7 initiatives will not equal the funding that has been
spent so far by China on the BRI. Their timing may be fortuitous, however: Chinese spending
on global infrastructure projects peaked in 2018 and, as a result of China’s economic down-
turn, is unlikely to pick up again anytime soon.81 Furthermore, China’s unwillingness (and
perhaps inability) to renegotiate existing BRI debt in developing countries may provide other
countries with the opportunity to boost their soft power if they are able to help mediate
low- and middle-income countries’ negotiations with China, or to provide financing where
Beijing cannot.82
THE BRI’S FUTURE AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

Viewed in its entirety, over the past decade the BRI has had some impact in the Asia-Pacific,
though the levels of activity and challenges vary at the sub-regional and national levels.
Domestic and regional political contexts in recipient countries have been important factors
influencing how the BRI has evolved. Fears that the BRI was a systematic plan by which China
would increase its influence on governments and control of strategic infrastructure across
Asia arose from overestimations of China’s capacity – and an underestimation of the impor-
tance of national and regional political contexts. While some countries, such as Pakistan, have
turned to Beijing for large-scale infrastructure projects through the BRI and for economic,
political and military support, others, such as Australia, India and Japan, have opted not to
join the BRI at all. Most countries in the region find themselves in between these two poles, as
members of the BRI (and recipients of Chinese investment and loans) that are – in the context
of US–China competition – unwilling to make geopolitical choices in favour of China.
Over the past decade, the BRI has slowed down. The focus on hard-infrastructure
projects apparent in its early years is unlikely to return. Instead, greater focus is being
placed on digital-infrastructure projects, as well as the expansion of Chinese ICT platforms
and services across the Asia-Pacific, as countries in the region seek either to increase their
digital connectivity through roll-outs of next-generation ICT networks or to expand their
digital economies. While in the West China’s digital expansion has faltered due to concerns
about data security, surveillance and intelligence-gathering risks, similar concerns are
not as widespread in the Asia-Pacific, where Chinese internet companies still find strong
market demand. However, the state of China’s domestic economy and its restricted access
to the core advanced components needed for infrastructure roll-out (due to US export
controls on semiconductors) could complicate China’s appetite for lending to high-risk
countries and its ability to supply advanced technologies.
Finally, although the BRI’s expansion has slowed, Beijing is seeking to build on the
BRI and DSR through the promotion of new initiatives that promote Chinese norms and
values. Consequently, the Asia-Pacific, and particularly countries in the region that have to
date hedged between the US and China, will become a battleground for ideas, norms and
values of relevance to the future of the international order. As a result, it will be important
in the coming years to observe the extent to which, and how, China manages to convert its
BRI and digital investments into useful influence.
NOTES
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25 Sergei Troush, ‘China’s Changing Oil Strategy 36 IISS, ‘China Connects’.
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44 China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Position newsinfo.inquirer.net/897003/chinas-xi-seeks-
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45 Mercedes Page, ‘Unpacking China’s Global na-belt-road/587902/.
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the-interpreter/unpacking-china-s-global- Belt and Road’.
development-initiative. 53 IISS, ‘China Connects’.
46 China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Global 54 China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Vision and
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47 Ibid. topics_665678/2015zt/xjpcxbayzlt2015nnh/
48 Tom Mitchell, ‘Beijing Insists BRI Is No Marshall 201503/t20150328_705553.html.
55 Todd H. Hall and Alanna Krolikowski, ‘Making reuters.com/article/us-papua-huawei-tech-id

Sense of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A USKCN1NV0DR.
Review Essay’, International Studies Review, vol. 66 Anthony Bergin and Samuel Bashfield, ‘Australia
24, no. 3, September 2022, https://academic.oup. Must Do More to Secure the Cables that Connect
com/isr/article/24/3/viac023/6654852. the Indo-Pacific’, Strategist, Australian Strategic
56 Ibid. Policy Institute, 2 August 2022, https://www.
57 IISS, ‘China Connects’. aspistrategist.org.au/australia-must-do-more-to-
58 Anthony Rowley, ‘China’s Belt and Road: secure-the-cables-that-connect-the-indo-pacific/.
“Sour Grapes” Claims of Debt-trap Diplomacy 67 Asian Development Bank, ‘Meeting Asia’s
Are Not Supported by Evidence’, South China Infrastructure Needs’, February 2017, https://www.
Morning Post, 2 November 2020, https://www. adb.org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs.
scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3107835/ 68 Jonathan E. Hillman, ‘How Big Is China’s
chinas-belt-and-road-sour-grapes-claims-debt- Belt and Road?’, Center for Strategic and
trap-diplomacy-are-not. International Studies, 3 April 2018, https://www.
59 Deborah Brautigam and Meg Rithmire, ‘The csis.org/analysis/how-big-chinas-belt-and-road.
Chinese “Debt Trap” Is a Myth’, Atlantic, 6 69 ‘US to Send Delegation to China’s Belt and
February 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/ Road Summit’, Reuters, 12 May 2017, https://
international/archive/2021/02/china-debt-trap- www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-usa-
diplomacy/617953/. idUSKBN18816Q.
60 Tom Hancock and Matthew Hill, ‘Debt 70 European Union, External Action Service, ‘Speech
Defaults Are a Stress Test for China’s Soft by HR/VP Mogherini at the Plenary Session
Power Strategy’, Bloomberg, 26 September of the European Parliament on the State of the
2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ EU–China Relations’, 11 September 2018, https://
articles/2022-09-26/debt-crisis-puts-scrutiny-on- www.eeas.europa.eu/node/50337_en.
china-soft-power. 71 Asian Development Bank, ‘Developing
61 Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart and Asia Needs to Invest More Than 5% of GDP
Christophe Trebesch, ‘China’s Overseas Lending Over Next Decade for Infrastructure’, 29
and the War in Ukraine’, VOXEU/ Centre for October 2019, https://www.adb.org/news/
Economic Policy Research, 11 April 2022, https:// developing-asia-needs-invest-more-5-gdp-over-
cepr.org/voxeu/columns/chinas-overseas- next-decade-infrastructure.
lending-and-war-ukraine. 72 European Commission, ‘EU Steps Up Its Strategy
62 David Lawder and Jorgelina Do Rosario, for Connecting Europe and Asia’, 19 September
‘Pakistan Seeks Rescheduling of $27 Billion 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
in Bilateral Debt’, Reuters, 15 October 2022, presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5803.
https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/ 73 Gan and Delaney, ‘United States Under
pakistan-seeks-rescheduling-27-bln-bilateral- Donald Trump Is Veering Away from China’s
debt-finance-minister-2022-10-15/. Belt and Road’.
63 Joe Cash, ‘China Calls for “Joint Action” in 74 ‘US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to Visit
Debt Settlements at G20’, ZAWYA, 24 February Singapore This Week, Plans S$154m Worth of
2023, https://www.zawya.com/en/projects/bri/ Investments in Indo-Pacific’, Straits Times, 31
china-calls-for-joint-action-in-debt-settlements- July 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/world/
at-g20-dnvcysri. united-states/us-plans-s154-million-worth-of-
64 US, Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military investments-in-indo-pacific-pompeo.
and Security Developments Involving the 75 Jerre V. Hansbrough, ‘From the Blue Dot
People’s Republic of China’, 29 November Network to the Blue Dot Marketplace: A Way
2022, p. 144, https://media.defense.gov/2022/ to Cooperate in Strategic Competition’, in
Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND- Alexander L. Vuving (ed.), Hindsight, Insight,
SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING- Foresight: Thinking About Security in the Indo-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF. Pacific (Honolulu, HI: Daniel K. Inouye
65 Tom Westbrook, ‘PNG Upholds Deal with Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2020).
Huawei to Lay Internet Cable, Derides Counter- 76 White House, ‘FACT SHEET: President Biden
offer’, Reuters, 26 November 2018, https://www. and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better
World (B3W) Partnership’, 12 June 2021, 80 European Commission, ‘EU–Africa: Global

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ Gateway Investment Package’, https://
statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet- commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/
president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build- priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/
back-better-world-b3w-partnership/. global-gateway/eu-africa-global-gateway-
77 White House, ‘FACT SHEET: President Biden investment-package_en.
and G7 Leaders Formally Launch the Partnership 81 Christina Lu, ‘China’s Belt and Road to
for Global Infrastructure and Investment’, Nowhere’, Foreign Policy, 13 February
26 June 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/13/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/26/ china-belt-and-road-initiative-infrastructure-
fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders- development-geopolitics/.
formally-launch-the-partnership-for-global- 82 Shivangi Acharya and David Lawder, ‘US,
infrastructure-and-investment/. China to Hold Deputy-level Bilateral Talks on
78 Ibid. Debt – Sources’, Reuters, 24 February 2023,
79 White House, ‘Additional PGII Projects’, https://www.reuters.com/business/us-china-
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ hold-deputy-level-bilateral-talks-debt-sou
uploads/2022/06/Other-PGII-projects.pdf. rces-2023-02-24/.
CHAPTER 5
JAPAN STEPS UP:

SECURITY AND
DEFENCE POLICY
UNDER KISHIDA
ROBERT WARD YUKA KOSHINO
IISS Japan Chair; Director of Research Fellow for Security

Geo-economics and Strategy and Technology Policy, IISS
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thus marks an historic break with the norms that have governed
Japan’s defence policy since the end of the Second World War.
JAPAN’S DETERIORATING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Tokyo’s updated NSS paints a bleak picture of Japan’s strategic environment, which it describes
as being the most ‘severe and complex’ it has been since 1945. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has
aggravated Japan’s concerns about threats to the Indo-Pacific status quo, particularly with regard
to China’s intentions towards Taiwan. The recent chill in Japan’s relations with Russia, the evolving
China–Russia strategic relationship and North Korea’s accelerating development of weapons of mass
destruction have added to Tokyo’s concerns.
JAPAN’S RESPONSE
Key changes posited by the new NSS include a doubling of the defence budget in the next five
years; acquisition of counterstrike capabilities; enhancing capabilities in new domains, such as space;
the establishment of a Permanent Joint Headquarters to unify command over the armed services; a
strategic focus on the islands in Japan’s southwest, which would be most immediately threatened by
a Taiwan contingency; and boosting Japan’s war-fighting sustainability and resilience.
CHALLENGES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Notwithstanding the ambition of the new NSS, Japan faces a number of implementation challenges,
including capacity shortages in terms of human resources and defence-technological capabilities,
and the question of how to pay for the defence-budget increase.
Viewed from Tokyo, 2022 brought a marked A shipwreck on a beach in the Russia-occupied southern Kuril Islands,
claimed by Japan as the Northern Territories, 16 March 2022
deterioration in the security environment
around Japan that has widened the geopolit-
ical fault lines in its immediate neighbourhood
and beyond. The Japanese government’s bleak
assessment of the strategic environment was
evident in the historic new National Security
Strategy (NSS) and two related documents,
the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the
Defense Buildup Program (DBP), which were
all published on 16 December 2022.1 Replacing
the 2013 NSS – Japan’s first such document – (Natalia Zakharova/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
the 2022 NSS speaks of ‘historical changes in

power balances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region’ that are ‘defining an era’, recognising
that Japan’s security environment is ‘as severe and complex as it has ever been since the
end of World War II’.2 This assessment contrasts with the previous NSS, which, while for
example flagging concerns about threats to the global commons from unilateral attempts to
change the status quo, took a relatively benign view of Japan’s strategic challenges.3
JAPAN’S DETERIORATING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Deteriorating relations with Russia
An important trigger for Japan’s rising alarm was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February
2022. Japan’s alignment with the other members of the G7 in terms of condemning and
imposing economic sanctions in response to Russia’s war of aggression, together with finan-
cial and material support for Ukraine, chilled already tepid Japan–Russia relations.4 The
immediate impact was to stall bilateral negotiations over the four disputed islands north
of Hokkaido (the southern Kuril Islands, annexed by Soviet forces in 1945 and claimed by
Japan as the Northern Territories) and for Russia to suspend related talks with Japan on a
bilateral peace treaty.5 Consequently, Tokyo’s position regarding the islands has also hard-
ened, signalling the end of the more emollient Russia policy pursued under the late Abe
Shinzo’s second premiership from 2012–20. In March 2022, Tokyo reverted to its description
of the islands as ‘inherent territories of Japan’ that are ‘under illegal occupation’, replacing a
formulation describing them as ‘islands over which Japan has sovereignty’.6
Abe’s engagement strategy towards Russia was premised in part on Japan’s strategic
need to prevent cooperation between Russia and China. However, securing significant
concessions from Moscow always appeared an optimistic ambition, particularly given
Russia’s strategic need to retain the islands and the changes to its constitution in July
2020, which, inter alia, prohibited the ‘alienation’ of Russian territories.7 Notwithstanding
China’s concerns over Russia’s prosecution of its war against Ukraine and, notably,
Moscow’s threats to use nuclear weapons, the rapid evolution of Sino-Russian strategic
relations is adding more fuel to Tokyo’s strategic concerns. Examples of the operationali-
sation of these relations around Japan include the Sino-Russian aerial patrols over the Sea
of Japan (East Sea) and the East China Sea in November 2022 – in which Russian bombers
JAPAN STEPS UP: SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY UNDER KISHIDA 119
Sea of
Map 5.1: China and Russia: selected joint patrols and exercises, 2019–22 Okhotsk
1 2 3 5
Date Location Activity Country Equipment 3 Sep 2022 4 Sep 2022 8 Sep 2022 26 Sep 2022
3x FFGHM 3x FFGHM 1x DDGHM 1x CGHM
1x CGHM 1x CGHM 1x FFGHM
1x FFGHM 1x FFGHM 4 1x AORH
23 Jul East China Sea; Aerial Russia 2x Tu-95 bomber ac 9 Sep 2022
2019 Sea of Japan patrol
1x AORH 1x AORH
1x A-50 AEW&C ac
(East Sea) 1x DDGHM 6
China 2x H-6 bomber ac 27 Sep 2022
22 Dec East China Sea; Aerial China 2x H-6 bomber ac* 1x DDGHM
2020 Sea of Japan patrol 3x FFGHM
2x H-6 bomber ac**
(East Sea) Russia 2x Tu-95MS bomber ac
7
27 Sep 2022
18–23 Tsugaru Strait; Maritime China 1x CGHM
Oct offshore SW patrol and 1x DDGHM RUSSIA 1x CGHM
2021 Okushiri Island exercise 4 2 1x FFGHM
2x FFGHM 2
(Hokkaido); 1x AORH
1x AORH
Pacific Ocean 3
Russia 2x DDGHM
8
2x FFGHM 1 28–29 Sep 2022
1x AGM 1x CGHM
1x FFGHM
19 Nov Sea of Japan (East Aerial China 2x H-6 bomber ac 1x AORH
2021 Sea); East China patrol Russia 2x Tu-95 bomber ac Sea of 1x DDGHM
Sea; Pacific Ocean
Japan 3x FFGHM
25 Jan Arabian Sea Maritime Russia 2x DDGHM (East Sea)
2022 exercise 1x AOR
China 1x DDGHM
1x AORH
24 May Sea of Japan Aerial China 2x H-6 bomber ac***

2022 (East Sea); East patrol 2x H-6 bomber ac****
China Sea Russia 2x Tu-95MS bomber ac JAPAN
1x Il-20 ELINT ac 6
1–7 Russia; Sea of Vostok Russia, China reportedly sent around

Sep Japan (East Sea) 2022 China 2,000 troops, tanks and 6
2022 exercise (and SCO armoured fighting vehicles
and CSTO and artillery pieces, 21 aircraft
states) (reportedly including J-10C ac)
and helicopters, as well as three 5
naval vessels, reportedly 1x 7
CGHM, 1x FFGHM, 1x AOR 8 Western
8
East Pacific
3–29 Sea of Japan Maritime Russia 1x DDGHM 8
China Ocean
Sep (East Sea); patrol and 3x FFGHM Sea ©IISS
2022 Pacific Ocean exercise China 1x CGHM
CHINA
1x FFGHM Maritime patrol: Sep 2022 Aerial patrol: 24 May 2022
1x AOR
and vessels 2x H-6 bomber ac (aircraft 1, 2)
30 Nov East China Sea; Aerial China 2x H-6 bomber ac 2x H-6 bomber ac (aircraft 3, 4)
2022 Tsushima Strait; patrol naval vessels
Russia 2x Russian combat aircraft, (replacing aircraft 1 and 2)
Sea of Japan type n.k. naval vessels
(East Sea) 2x Tu-95 bomber ac
Live-firing location 1x Il-20 ELINT ac
Sea of Japan (East China 2x H-6 bomber ac
Sea); East China 2x J-16 FGA ac
Sea; Pacific Ocean; ac aircraft CGHM cruiser with ELINT electronic intelligence
2x Chinese combat aircraft, surface-to-surface missile
bomber landings AEW&C airborne early FFGHM frigate with SSM,
type n.k. (SSM), hangar and
at airbases in warning and control hangar and SAM
Russia 2x Tu-95 bomber ac AGM space tracking vessel surface-to-air missile (SAM)
Russia and China FGA fighter/ground attack
AOR fleet replenishment oiler CSTO Collective Security n.k. not known
21–27 East China Sea Maritime China 2x DDGHM with replenishment-at-sea Treaty Organization
(RAS) capability SCO Shanghai Cooperation
Dec exercise 2x FFGHM
AORH fleet replenishment oiler DDGHM destroyer with Organisation
2022 1x AORH with RAS capability and hangar SSM, hangar and SAM SW southwest
Russia 1x CGHM
1x DDGHM Notes: While China and Russia likely use this military cooperation as a form of political signalling, its depth, and utility for
2x FFGHM developing combat capability and interoperability, remain unclear. The two activities on 30 November 2022 may be part
of the same overall flight mission.*around Sea of Japan (East Sea) **around East China Sea ***from East China Sea to Sea
South of Japan (East Sea) ****from East China Sea to Pacific Ocean.
China
Sea
landed in China for the first time and Chinese aircraft then flew to Russia – and a joint Sources: IISS; Japan, Ministry of Defense,
www.mod.go.jp
maritime patrol in October 2021 that cruised around Japan’s Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu
islands en route to the East China Sea (see Map 5.1).8
PHILIPPINES
Philippine
Sea
Okhotsk
Map 5.2: Chinese and North Korean ballistic-missile launches into or over Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 2019–Feb 2023
RUSSIA
CHINA
Sea of
Japan
(East Sea)
4
Mupyong 5
6 2
NORTH KOREA
Beijing
Sunan 1
Pyongyang Wonsan
Seoul
JAPAN
SOUTH Oki Islands
KOREA Tokyo
Western
NORTH KOREA Pacific
Ocean
1 2 Oct 2019
x1 Pukguksong-3 SLBM/MRBM
2 24 Mar 2022
x1 unconfirmed ICBM
4 4 Oct 2022 East
x1 Hwasong-12 mod 1 IRBM China
5 18 Nov 2022 Sea
x1 Hwasong-17 ICBM
6 18 Feb 2023 Zhejiang
x1 Hwasong-15 ICBM
x4
CHINA
Fujian
3 4 Aug 2022 Taipei Yonaguni Island ©IISS
x4 DF-15B (CH-SS-6 mod 3) SRBMs City
Iriomote Island
x1 DF-15B or DF-16 (CH-SS-11) SRBM
Ishigaki Island
3 Japan’s EEZ
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile Taiwan Hateruma Island
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile Taiwan Strait median line
SRBM short-range ballistic missile Missile landing zone
SLBM/MRBM submarine-launched/ Kaohsiung
medium-range ballistic missile City Indicative missile trajectory
Rising tensions around Taiwan Note: North Korea also launched a modified
KN-23 SRBM on 25 March 2021, which
Particularly since the 2020–21 administration PHILIPPINES
South
of prime minister Suga Yoshihide, Japan
Japan initially assessed not to have landed
China
has been more willing to articulate its concerns about Taiwan’s security. A joint statement in its EEZ – however, South Korea’s reas-
Sea
sessment indicates that it may have.
following a summit between Suga and US President Joe Biden in April 2021 included
Sources: Japan, Ministry of Defense,
a reference to the ‘importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait’. It was the mod.go.jp; IISS
first time that Taiwan had been mentioned in a US–Japan leaders’ statement since the 1969
summit between then US president Richard Nixon and then Japanese prime minister Sato
Eisaku.9 It was followed in July 2021 by the first mention in a Japanese defence white paper
Philippine
of the importance of the stability of the ‘situation surrounding Taiwan’ for Japan’s security.10 Sea
Concurrently, Japan has sought to strengthen its international partners’ interest in partic-
ipating in efforts to preserve Taiwan’s security. Thus, in his keynote address to the June
Sulu
2022 Shangri-La Dialogue, Japanese Prime MinisterSeaKishida Fumio linked European and
East Asian security, asserting that ‘Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow’.11 Kishida’s
subsequent attendance at a NATO summit – becoming the first Japanese prime minister to
do so – in Madrid in June further underscored his linking of European and Asian security.
Triggers for Japan’s greater willingness to voice its concerns about the stability of its
southern flank include the increasingly strong rhetoric from Chinese President Xi Jinping
regarding Beijing’s intent to absorb Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China; China’s
intense territorial needling around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which Japan controls and
China claims; and the rapid rise in China’s military spending, which is now estimated to
be some five times larger than that of Japan.12 Moreover, in a belligerent response to then-
speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022,
China conducted its largest-ever live-fire military exercises around the island, firing five
Pacific
ballistic missiles into Japan’s
Oceanexclusive economic zone (EEZ) (See Map 5.2).
13
This crisis
focused Japanese attention on both the vulnerability of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which
lie just 170 kilometres east of Taiwan, and the strategic importance of the Nansei Islands,
which lie close to the disputed territory and would be a key staging post for any joint
response by the United States and Japan to a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
Intensification of North Korean missile launches

In 2022, there was also a ratcheting up of the threat to Japanese security posed by North
Korea. Pyongyang fired around 90 cruise and ballistic missiles, notching up a record for the
number of missiles fired in one year. Indeed, one assessment indicated that 2022 accounted
for some one-quarter of the 270 missiles fired and nuclear devices tested by North Korea since
1984.14 Pyongyang’s activities included the resumption of intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) tests for the first time since 2017. Of particular concern to Japan were the launch of
an ICBM on 24 March (Pyongyang claimed this was a Hwasong-17, which would allow it to
strike the US mainland with a large payload); the launch of an intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) over Japan on 4 October – the first anniversary of Kishida’s becoming prime
minister – marking the first time since 2017 that a North Korean missile had overflown
Japanese territory; a Hwasong-17 launch on 18 November (the missile landed in Japan’s EEZ
some 200 km off the west coast of Hokkaido); and the launch on 18 December (shortly after
Japan’s release of its new NSS) of two ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japan, which
landed in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) outside Japan’s EEZ.
As of February 2023, North Korea had not yet resumed testing nuclear devices despite
scrapping in March 2022 a self-imposed moratorium on such tests in effect since November
2017. However, the intensity of Pyongyang’s ballistic-missile tests in 2022 and early 2023
(a Hwasong-15 ICBM launch took place on 18 February, landing in Japan’s EEZ off the
west coast of Hokkaido) suggests that it continues to prioritise development of asymmetric
capabilities. US intelligence reports in late 2022 suggesting that North Korea was supplying
Russia with materiel for its war against Ukraine added further to Tokyo’s perception of the
vulnerability of Japan’s western flank.15
JAPAN’S RESPONSE
Against this background, the 2022 NSS represents an historic break with the norms that
have governed Japan’s defence policy since 1945. One important initiative mentioned in
the document is that Japan will develop ‘comprehensive national power’, which includes
diplomatic, defence, economic, technological and intelligence capabilities and reflects the
‘comprehensive’ nature of the security chal- Japan Ground Self-Defense Force troops at Camp Asaka in Tokyo, 27 November 2021
lenge from China.16 The articulation of these

capabilities is in itself a major advancement
from the 2013 NSS, which attempted to take
a cross-governmental approach to national
security for the first time but remained
primarily focused on diplomatic and
defence capabilities. The most transforma-
tive element of the 2022 NSS, however, was
the government’s commitment to bolster its
national defence capabilities to an unprece-
dented level to take ‘primary responsibility’ (KIYOSHI OTA/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
to defend itself in the event that Japan is

invaded.17 This is a step change from Japan’s previous defence and security policy, which
relied on US security guarantees, and has broader implications for Japan’s role in the US–
Japan Alliance as well as in regional security more generally in the event of conflict, for
example over Taiwan.
Shift in approach, unprecedented spending increases

Although the second Abe administration laid out much of the groundwork for this shift to
occur, Kishida’s administration deserves credit for revamping Japan’s defence and security
posture in two ways. Firstly, it has developed Japan’s first post-war NDS, positing ends,
means and ways to deter aggression and to disrupt and repel an invasion of Japan in the next
decade. The NDS, modelled after the US National Security Strategy, was a structural break
from previous recommendations made through the National Defense Program Guidelines
(NDPG), which were first introduced in 1976 amid the Cold War detente between the Soviet
Union and the US and were updated most recently in 2018. The purpose of the NDPG was
to define the size of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF, Japan’s de facto armed forces) and
to inform the five-year procurement plan – the Mid-Term Defense Program – needed to
meet the ‘minimum necessary’ capability standard suggested by Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution, which renounces ‘war as a sovereign right’ and prohibits the country from
possessing land, sea and air forces.18 Therefore, the NDPG was not based on a war-fighting
strategy per se. Indeed, the first NDPG in 1976 recommended building a ‘Basic Defence
Force’ sufficient to prevent a power vacuum from emerging in East Asia; therefore, the
force structure it described was not meant to counter particular threats. In contrast, the
NDS seeks to respond to an ‘opponent’s capabilities and new ways of warfare’ to inform
the five-year DBP.19
Secondly, the Kishida administration has committed Tokyo to doubling defence-related
spending to 2% of GDP and to invest ¥43 trillion (US$325 billion) to cover Japan’s ‘funda-
mentally reinforced defense capabilities’ in fiscal years 2023/24 to 2027/28.20 For Japan, the
unparalleled size and speed of this defence-spending increase is an historic departure from
the ceiling (1% of GDP) adopted by the Miki Takeo government in 1976 and continued even
under the second Abe administration, which pursued robust security reforms to respond
to growing security challenges from North Figure 5.1: Japan’s Defense Buildup Program, 2022
Korea and China.21 If realised, this increase
PREVIOUS PLAN CAPABILITY NEW PLAN
will make Japan’s defence budget the third
Total Total
largest globally after the US and China. Stand-off defence
126.93bn 334.84bn
1.56 capabilities
1 38.93
Important influences on the planned
increase in defence spending were the Integrated air and
7.79 23.36
missile defence (IAMD)
2
Japanese government’s threat assessments
and simulations, which revealed that the Uncrewed defence
0.78 capabilities
3 7.79
JSDF would not be ready to deter aggres-
sion and respond to the threats potentially 23.36
Cross-domain
62.30
operational capabilities
4
posed to Japan by 2027/28.22 Referring to
Mobile deployment
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the 2.34 capabilities and protection 15.57
of civilians
5
NDS claimed that unilateral changes to the
Command and control (C2)
status quo by force could also happen in the 2.34 and intelligence-related 7.79
capabilities 6
Indo-Pacific and that intentions of aggres-
Sustainability and
sion are difficult to assess.23 It may not be a 46.72
resilience 7
116.80
coincidence that the NSS’s target coincides Strengthening the defence

7.79 production base, research 10.90
with former commander of US Indo-Pacific and development
Command (INDOPACOM) Admiral Philip
Base
18.69 20.25
Davidson’s assessment – conveyed in March measures
2021 – that China could invade Taiwan as Education and

15.57 31.15
early as 2027.24 training, fuel costs
The government’s effort to implement step

changes in JSDF capabilities focuses on seven 60 40 20 0 US$bn 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
key areas (see Figure 5.1 for more detail):

1
5
stand-off defence capabilities - Procurement of Joint Strike Missile (JSM) to arm the F-35A and - 34 CH-47J/JA heavy transport
Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) to arm the F-15 helicopters, 77 UH-2 (Bell 412EP)
integrated air and missile defence - Tomahawk Block V land-attack cruise missile procurement multi-role helicopters
- Improved Type 12 anti-ship missile production - 6 C-2 medium transport aircraft
(IAMD) - Hypersonic-missile development and production - 10 aerial refuelling/transport
- Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) production aircraft (KC-46A etc.)
uncrewed defence capabilities - Utilisation of civilian maritime-
transport capacity (private
cross-domain operational capabilities
2 finance initiative (PFI) vessels)
- 5 E-2D Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft
- 8 transport vessels
mobile deployment capabilities and - 14 Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air missiles
- SM-3 Block IIA and PAC-3 MSE surface-to-air missiles
protection of civilians - SM-6 long-range surface-to-air missiles
6
- Enhancements to the Defense
command and control (C2) and - 2 Aegis-equipped destroyers
Information Infrastructure (DII)
- 3 RC-2 electronic
intelligence-related capabilities intelligence aircraft

3
- Attack, multi-purpose, intelligence, surveillance, reconnais-
the sustainability and resiliency of sance and targeting (ISRT) uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs)
- Uninhabited surface, ground and underwater vehicles (USV,
7
JSDF operations during wartime25 - Increasing quantity and ensuring
UGV and UUV) adequate inventory of
ammunition and guided missiles
- Maintenance of equipment, and
Implications for JSDF posture and operations
4
- Space-related capabilities, including the establishment of a expansion of storage facilities
satellite constellation to improve detection and tracking - Improving the resilience of
Drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, - Cyber-related capabilities, including development of defence facilities
education infrastructure and expansion of the Self-Defense
these capabilities are expected to enhance
Forces’ Cyber Defense Command
Japan’s defence and security posture in - 12 destroyers, 5 submarines, 10 patrol vessels, 19 P-1
fixed-wing patrol aircraft, 40 F-35A, 25 F-35B fighter jets,
the three areas most relevant to poten- upgrades to 54 F-15s, 1 Stand-off Electronic Warfare Aircraft,
2 Network Electronic Warfare Systems (NEWS) Source: Japan, Ministry of Defense,
tial contingencies around Japan. The first mod.go.jp
is Japan’s response to the diverse missile A Type-12 anti-ship missile on display during a symposium
at Kisarazu Air Field in Chiba Prefecture, Japan, 16 June 2022
threats posed by China and North Korea.
The 2022 NSS established the ambition for
the JSDF to possess the capability to ‘mount
effective counterstrikes against the oppo-
nent to prevent further attacks’ in the case of
attacks against Japan or a third country.26 The
documents are vague regarding the specific
targets (and whether to include the oppo-
nent’s C2 structure) and they are expected
to be decided on a case-by-case basis.27
This is a major shift from Japan’s existing
missile-defence architecture, which relies on (David Mareuil/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
intercepting missiles through ballistic missile

defence (BMD) systems rather than possessing a counterstrike capability.28 The debate over
acquiring counterstrike capability is not new – the constitutionality of the capability was
first stated by then-prime minister Hatoyama Ichiro as early as 1956.29 However, political,
budgetary and technical challenges prevented successive governments from acquiring the
capability, despite growing public support for this since 2017, when North Korea increased
its missile launches.30
To develop this counterstrike capability, Tokyo seeks to deploy indigenous stand-off
missiles that are currently under development. It is also consulting with the US over the
purchase of Tomahawk land-attack missiles for earlier deployment in 2026.31 First outlined
in the 2018 NDPG, stand-off defence is defined by the government as ‘capabilities to deal
with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan including remote islands from
the outside of their threat envelopes’.32 Three types of indigenous missiles are under devel-
opment: upgraded Type-12 anti-ship missiles with their range extended from 200 km to
900 km and with a new capacity to attack mobile targets; Block 1 hyper-velocity gliding
projectiles; and hypersonic cruise missiles.
Developing a counterstrike capability to pursue a US-like ‘integrated air and missile
defence’ (IAMD) would strengthen Japan’s deterrence against the emerging missile chal-
lenges posed by highly manoeuvrable Chinese hypersonic-weapons systems, as well
as saturation attacks from both China and North Korea. Rapid development and mass
production of diverse stand-off missiles could also help reduce the growing discrepancy in
IRBM numbers between China on the one hand and the US and Japan on the other, adding
credibility to deterrence.33
The second area of enhancement is cross-domain operational capability, including
the relatively new domains of space, cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum. Under the
2018 NDPG, Japan established several new units to enhance capabilities in these domains,
such as Space Domain Mission Units for space situational awareness; a Cyber Defense
Command to enhance the defence of JSDF networks across its branches; and electron-
ic-warfare units within the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF, Japan’s de facto
army) to monitor radar and other emissions from potential adversaries. However, the NDS
goes further by recognising these domains as A Japan Air Self-Defense Force C-130 plane departs from Iruma Air Base in Saitama
Prefecture to evacuate Japanese nationals from Afghanistan, 24 August 2021
‘vitally important’ for carrying out cross-do-
main operations in response to the complex
threats facing Japan.34 In particular, it under-
scores the importance of the role of space in
information gathering, communications and
positioning functions in support of Japan’s
new counterstrike capability.35 It also calls for
a major expansion of the number of personnel
working in the cyber-related units – such as
the JSDF Cyber Defense Command – from
800 to about 4,000 by 2027, to enhance protec-
tion of its critical networks. The total number (STR/JIJI PRESS/AFP via Getty Images)
of defence-ministry and JSDF personnel

engaging in cyber is expected to grow to 20,000 by the end of fiscal year 2027.36
The 2022 NSS emphasised the need to strengthen Japan’s cyber security through
a whole-of-government approach. Among the most innovative measures in this regard
was the introduction of an ‘active cyber defence’, which allows the relevant government
authority, including the JSDF, to use a limited offensive capability to ‘penetrate and
neutralize attacker’s servers’ in advance of potential attacks against Japan’s networks.37
This makes strategic sense for Japan, given that the current porosity of its cyber defences
and the weakness of its security-clearance frameworks are barriers to closer security coop-
eration with the US and like-minded partners. The NSS also calls for a restructuring of the
National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (known as NISC),
which, inter alia, coordinates intra-government cyber-policy formation, to create a new
centralised organisation to implement these cyber-security policies.38
Highly significantly for cross-domain operations is the establishment of the Permanent
Joint Headquarters (PJH) headed by a joint-service commander, which will unify the
command of the JGSDF, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF, Japan’s de facto
navy) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF, Japan’s de facto air force) to conduct
joint operations in times of conflict as well as in peacetime.39 This is a breakthrough
from organisational and operational standpoints. Under the existing Japan Self-Defense
Forces Law, the JSDF can form joint task forces (JTFs) temporarily to conduct specific
missions, such as BMD. However, in practice JTFs have not operated comprehensively
across domains despite being joint units (formed by units from two or three branches of
the JSDF). Moreover, JTFs have been led by senior commanding officers from different
branches of the JSDF. As a result, the chain of command has been complex – undermining
efforts to develop a unified approach for cross-domain operations.40 The new PJH and its
commander will be indispensable as Japan seeks to operationalise the envisaged coun-
terstrike capabilities, given that the relevant missile systems are expected to be deployed
across the three JSDF branches.41
The third area of enhancement is the defence of the southwestern region, where Japan’s
Ryukyu Islands are located, to prepare for a potential contingency in the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands or the Taiwan Strait. Since 2016, Japan has been rapidly expanding JSDF units in
the Ryukyu Islands – as well as deploying new units there – to enhance its capabilities to
defend this relatively remote territory.42 In light of growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait
and increased naval activities by China in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and the Western
Pacific, which China accessed through the Ryukyu Islands, the three documents take further
steps to ensure that, from peacetime to contingency, preparations for a potential conflict
in the southwest region of Japan are informed by a whole-of-government approach. For
example, the JSDF, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the police will conduct training and
exercises to practise responses to potential ‘grey-zone’ and wartime challenges, including
the protection of critical infrastructure, such as nuclear-power plants.43 The JSDF and the
JCG will further enhance coordination by establishing an information-sharing mechanism
and by developing new procedures so that the Ministry of Defense may exercise opera-
tional control over the JCG in the event of an armed attack against Japan.44
The document also calls for Japan to increase investment in transport capabilities and to
conduct a major military reorganisation in order to facilitate the mobile and rapid deploy-
ment of JSDF and civil-protection capabilities. To help achieve this aspiration, Tokyo
seeks to expand the use and functions of existing airports and seaports as well as civilian
aircraft and vessels.45 In addition, major procurement for the JSDF under the DBP includes
eight transport ships, six C-2 transport aircraft and 13 KC-46A aerial refuelling/transport
aircraft.46 To make JSDF units more mobile across the Japanese archipelago, the DBP calls
for the reorganisation of 14 ground divisions and brigades based outside Okinawa into
deployable mobile units.47
The government has also earmarked one-third (approximately US$112bn) of the total
new investment in defence for war-fighting sustainability and resilience, such as procure-
ment of ammunition stocks and fuel, development of storage facilities, and improvement
of the operational availability of defence equipment in Japan’s southwestern region.48
It also seeks to enhance the hardening of JSDF bases and to expand the functions and
capacity of JSDF hospitals in the region.49
Developing other elements of ‘comprehensive national power’, such as economic
and intelligence capabilities, will also be important for Japan as it seeks to implement its
defence goals and shape a favourable security environment. For example, the NSS outlines
an ‘all-of-economy’ response to threats of economic coercion that includes promoting the
rules-based economic order under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership and enhancing economic security through supply-chain resil-
ience and dual-use-technology protection and promotion. These steps serve to continue
the efforts made by the Japanese government to enhance inter-agency coordination of
economic-security policy under the 2022 Economic Security Promotion Act.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US AND LIKE-MINDED PARTNERS

Through these defence reforms, Tokyo seeks to play a greater role – in conjunction with the US
and other like-minded partners – in responding to the spectrum of security threats, ranging
from peacetime and grey-zone challenges to outright conflict. In relation to the US–Japan
Alliance, the new strategic documents emphasise their alignment with the national-security
and -defence strategies released by the Biden Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and US President Joe Biden shake
hands during their summit in Washington DC, 13 January 2023
administration in 2022 and call for the alli-
ance to enhance ‘joint deterrence capabilities
of both countries in an integrated manner’.50
The NDS states that Japan will play a larger
role in regional security and that the govern-
ment’s approach is supported by the Japanese
public.51 The US administration welcomed
Japan’s new security-policy documents imme-
diately after their release and held a series
of high-level meetings – such as the Biden–
Kishida summit and the US–Japan Security
Consultative Committee (also known as the
Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting, or
‘2+2’) – within a month of their publication to (MANDEL NGAN/AFP via Getty Images)
deepen cooperation.52
There are several areas of opportunity for enhancing joint deterrence and response
capability under the new Japanese posture. One is counterstrike capability. The NDS
states that Japan will gain support from the US in the realm of information gathering to
make Japan’s counterstrike capability more effective.53 Japan’s development of a US-style
IAMD – a concept that seeks to respond to airborne threats through ‘unified and opti-
mized operation of various sensors and shooters through networks’ – leaves room for
Japan to become integrated into the US IAMD if the two forces develop a joint C2 struc-
ture like that of NATO.54 The JSDF’s new PJH commander is expected to serve as a direct
counterpart to the INDOPACOM commander, enabling enhanced operational coordi-
nation and bilateral planning for a potential regional conflict.55 An increase in joint and
shared use of Japanese and US military facilities is expected to further enhance readiness
for such a contingency.
Beyond cooperation under the US–Japan Alliance, the NSS further states ambitions to
‘build a multilayered network’ among US regional alliances and like-minded countries
in pursuit of both Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework and enhanced
deterrence.56 In particular, the NSS calls for increased military-to-military engagement;
intelligence exchanges through signing information-protection agreements; acquisition
and cross-servicing agreements; reciprocal access agreements (RAAs); joint develop-
ment and transfer of defence equipment and technology; provision of capacity-building
support; cooperation and coordination of strategic communication; and the expansion
and deepening of joint Flexible Deterrent Options with Japan’s partners through diplo-
matic, intelligence and economic means.57 The signing of regional RAAs with Australia in
2021 and the United Kingdom in 2022, the second and third countries, respectively, with
which Japan has such agreements (after the US), were historically significant and further
demonstrated Tokyo’s willingness to intensify security cooperation with like-minded part-
ners. Following the first Japan–Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting in
2022, Tokyo is also deepening military exchanges with the Philippines, both bilaterally
)
to
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to
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am
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(D
Japan Ground Self-Defense
Force soldiers make an amphibious
landing and distribute aid as part
of the KAMANDAG exercise in the
Philippines, 6 October 2018
and trilaterally with the US (see Figure 5.2).58 Due to the Philippines’ geographical loca-
tion, this cooperation has strategic importance in the context of preparations for potential
regional contingencies.
The promotion of defence-equipment and -technology transfer is another area where
Tokyo seeks to make progress in cooperation with like-minded countries. As of February 2022,
Japan had signed defence-equipment and -technology transfer agreements with 12 countries.59
However, the only major agreement on the transfer of equipment to another country’s armed
forces (rather than to coastguards or other paramilitary forces) so far has been a 2020 contract
to sell three fixed long-range radar systems and one mobile air-surveillance radar system to
the Philippines for deployment in the Bashi Channel.60 Tokyo sees its collaboration with the
UK and Italy on joint next-generation fighter development – through the Global Combat Air
Programme (GCAP) – as a major opportunity to integrate its defence businesses into global
defence-industrial supply chains and to develop Japan’s advanced defence-industrial base
and increase its opportunities for international sales. The GCAP intends to produce a replace-
ment for Japan’s F-2 combat aircraft by 2035.
CHALLENGES FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Japan, however, faces a number of challenges in implementing its defence- and security-reform
agenda. One challenge will be whether Japan can overcome its shortages of funding, manpower
and defence-technological capabilities. The Kishida administration is seeking to increase taxes
to support the defence-budget increase. However, there is no political consensus on such meas-
ures. While Japanese public opinion seems broadly supportive of the need to bolster national
defence, polls suggest some 60–80% of the public wants Kishida to hold a snap general elec-
tion before any defence-budget tax increases are implemented.61 JSDF capacity will also face
Figure 5.2: Japan: selected joint combat and non-combat exercises with partner countries, 2012–21
Annual no. of exercises with partner countries Annual no. of partner countries Japan's top-five
partners for joint
200 20
exercises, 2012–21
US Multilateral** Others No. of partners
MAJOR MULTILATERAL EXERCISES

150 2021: Cobra Gold, ARC21, Southern Jackaroo 15
2020: RIMPAC, SEACAT, Pacific Vanguard
2019: Khaan Quest, Pacific Reach
2018: KAMANDAG, RIMPAC
100 10 US (400 exercises)
India (31 exercises)

50 5
Australia (30 exercises)
0 0
Philippines (21 exercises)
FY* 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021
*FY starts on 1 April and ends on 31 March in the following year. **This includes exercises with NATO and EU. Sri Lanka (21 exercises)
Source: Japan, Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan (volumes 2014–22), www.mod.go.jp
constraints as the government does not plan to increase the number of JSDF personnel in order
to implement new initiatives, such as counterstrike capability and cyber defence. Tokyo seeks to
accelerate investments to develop and use uncrewed naval, aerial and ground systems to miti-
gate personnel shortages. However, this approach will still require skilled personnel capable of
developing and operating the new systems. Former senior JSDF personnel have claimed that
Tokyo has to increase JSDF personnel numbers to 300,000 – from the current 247,000 – but the
JSDF continues to face serious recruitment challenges.62 The challenge is exacerbated by the
rapid ageing of Japanese society and the country’s declining population.63
Japan’s defence-industrial and -technological base may also struggle to meet the JSDF’s
requirements. Major Japanese defence businesses are generally only small parts of much
larger conglomerates, contributing an average of just 4% of total group revenue and with
only a single customer, Japan’s Ministry of Defense.64 According to Japan’s Ministry of
Finance, the operating profit margin for defence equipment was 7.7% in the 2020/21 finan-
cial year, compared with 10% in major Western defence industries.65 Although Tokyo
eased its arms-export restrictions in 2014, overseas sales have remained minimal due to
the costly procedures of going through multiple approval processes across governments
and the unpredictability of the government’s decision-making process.66 The lack of over-
seas sales reflects Japan’s dearth of experience in selling defence equipment abroad, one
leading example of which was its unsuccessful bid in 2016 to sell Soryu-class submarines
to Australia.67 Tokyo is preparing to introduce a series of new measures, including new
legislation by mid-2023 to reinforce its defence industry through cash injections; support
for cyber-security protection to prevent technology outflow; and further revisions to
the arms-export guidelines to facilitate third-country transfers of defence equipment.
Government and public efforts to improve the predictability of sales opportunities abroad
will be a vital factor in maintaining and expanding the domestic production and tech-
nology base.68
Another set of challenges is the administration’s need to overcome sectionalism across
government as it attempts to meet its comprehensive national power development targets.
The new defence and security documents call for close cooperation between the Ministry
of Defense, the JSDF and civilian agencies – such as the police, JCG and local govern-
ments – to enhance Japan’s national security (such as through closer coordination across
government to ensure the security of the Ryukyu Islands), cyber security and intelligence
activities. It will not be an easy task to overcome cultural and organisational differences
to improve the stove-piped nature of communications between them. Enduring section-
alism within the JSDF is a good example, and may be an obstacle to effective and timely
implementation of the daunting list of goals included in the NDS and DBP. A report has
suggested that the JGSDF, the JMSDF and the JASDF are struggling to reach agreement on
the location of the PJH, leading its establishment to be postponed to 2024 or 2025.69 A delay
could have major implications for Tokyo’s push to improve cross-domain operations and
for US–Japan defence cooperation.
The new documents also call for close coordination with civilian research institu-
tions and commercial technology firms to facilitate the JSDF’s adoption of advanced
dual-use technologies in the realms of space and cyber. Interactions between the civilian
sector and defence agencies have improved following, for example, new government
initiatives to better coordinate strategy-making for dual-use-technology protection and
promotion. These include sending defence-ministry officials to the Cabinet Office to offer
expertise for inward-direct-investment screening and information management, and the
government’s ¥500bn (almost US$3.73bn) investment fund for advanced technologies,
such as artificial intelligence and quantum technologies.70 However, there remains a
significant gap between defence and civilian research and development and there is
room for improvement in non-military agencies’ understanding of future war-fighting
trends and techniques – a shortcoming that threatens to undermine Japan’s potential in
defence-relevant advanced technology.
The last set of challenges for implementation concerns Japan’s ability to manage
relations with and control the expectations of domestic and external stakeholders and part-
ners. High public support for a defence build-up and for deepening Japan’s role within
the US–Japan Alliance – demonstrated in poll surveys – signals strong support for Japan
to play a greater role in maintaining regional stability, including in the event of conflict.
However, the sustainability of this support is still in question. While the government seeks
to enhance ammunition stockpiles and facilities for wartime resiliency and sustainability
in the Ryukyu Islands, the plan risks resistance from local governments, as in the case of
Tokyo’s failure to deploy surface-to-ship and surface-to-air missiles on Miyako Island after
establishing a new base there in 2019.71 Experts from the US and Japan have speculated
about a possible nuclear threat from China, for example, as a scenario that could constrain
Japan’s course of action in the event of regional conflict.72 Thus, discussions with local
stakeholders and US counterparts will be critical to foster greater understanding of and
support for Tokyo’s policies among local stakeholders and to manage the expectations of
the US regarding a realistic role for Japan in a Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and his British counterpart Rishi Sunak
sign the Japan–UK Reciprocal Access Agreement in London, 11 January 2023
potential Taiwan contingency.
Tokyo will further need to be attentive to
extra-regional partners’ capacity and political
will to engage in Indo-Pacific security. Since
2018, for example, several European countries
have launched Indo-Pacific policy documents
– which echo elements of Japan’s FOIP – to
demonstrate their interest in preserving the
rules-based order and stability in Asia. These
include France (2018), Germany (2020) and
the United Kingdom (2021). The EU also
published such a document in 2021. These
actors have also been increasing their military
(Carl Court/Getty Images)
engagement in the region to help deter any
coercive attempts to challenge the status quo. However, Russia’s war on Ukraine and the
robust military assistance from Europe to help Ukraine defend itself are raising questions
about their ability to continue their engagement, especially given post-coronavirus-pan-
demic budget constraints and economic pressures.73 The signing of an RAA with the UK in
January 2023 was significant for Tokyo. However, whether the two countries’ militaries can
significantly enhance practical defence cooperation will depend on the UK’s political and
financial capacity to commit a larger persistent presence to the region or, at least, to under-
take a major military deployment to the region on the scale of the 2021 Carrier Strike Group.
Active diplomacy may therefore be required from Tokyo to encourage its European partners
to maintain the momentum of deeper defence and security involvement in its region.
CONCLUSION
The security policies of the Kishida administration represent a structural break in Japan’s
security posture. In effect, they put an end to the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, under which
Japan relied on the US for its defence, maintained a ‘low posture’ in international affairs
and pursued an economy-first domestic-policy stance, and which dominated Japan’s
security discourse for most of the post-war period.74 If successful, the reforms outlined
in the new NSS will increase significantly Japan’s role in its security alliance with the
US and thereby reinforce Tokyo’s deterrence capabilities in terms of lethality and range.
Moreover, Tokyo’s efforts to build and reinforce friendly coalitions and networks in
the region are designed to further amplify Japan’s influence there. The discussions in
February 2023 between Japan and the Philippines on deepening their bilateral secu-
rity cooperation are yet another example of this.75 By extension, Tokyo hopes that these
reforms will provide a credible security underpinning for the foreign-policy activism
that gathered pace under the second Abe administration, with an emphasis on deploy-
ment of Japanese geo-economic power.
Japanese public opinion is largely supportive of the planned changes. This support is
all the more striking given the intensity of the negative public reaction to the legislation
the Diet passed in 2015 to enable ‘collective self-defence’ in situations in which Japan’s
survival was threatened. The Liberal Democratic Party’s policy platform for the July 2022
upper-house election, which led on foreign and security policy, was another sign of how
much the public debate in Japan has changed with regard to security issues.76 The focus in
the new NSS on ‘reinforcing the social base’ suggests the government is aware that it will
have to continue to proselytise on the need for further security reforms.77 However, rising
public concern about China’s intentions in the region suggests that a return to the Yoshida
Doctrine is now highly unlikely. Notwithstanding political differences over how to pay for
the expansion of Japan’s security role, the coming decade is likely to bring with it further
profound changes in Japan’s security posture that will be transformative both for Japan
and for the broader Indo-Pacific.
NOTES
1 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security Affairs, December 2020, p. 5, https://www.ui.se/

Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, https:// globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publica-
www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenho- tions/2020/ui-brief-no.-5-2020.pdf.
shou/nss-e.pdf; Japan, Ministry of Defense, 8 Dzirhan Mahadzir, ‘Japanese, Korean Fighters
‘National Defense Strategy’, 16 December 2022, Scrambled in Response to Joint Russia–China
https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/ Bomber Patrol’, USNI News, 30 November
guideline/strategy/pdf/strategy_en.pdf; and 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/11/30/
Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense Buildup japanese-korean-fighters-scrambled-in-re-
Program’, 16 December 2023, https://www.mod. sponse-to-joint-russia-china-bomber-patrol;
go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/plan/pdf/ and Hatano Tsukasa and Kuwamoto Futoshi,
program_en.pdf. `Chū Ro ga Hatsu no Gōdō Junshi Katsudō,
2 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security Nihon Rettō wo Shūkai’ [China and Russia
Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, pp. 1–2. conduct their first joint patrol, circle Japanese
3 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security archipelago], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 23
Strategy of Japan’, 17 December 2013, https:// October 2021, https://www.nikkei.com/article/
www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/ DGXZQOGM233DF0T21C21A0000000/. See
nss-e.pdf. also Kentaro Shiozaki, ‘China, Russia Military
4 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Response Activity Near Japan Up 2.5 Times Since
to the Situation in Ukraine’, 10 March 2023, Ukraine’, Nikkei Asia, 14 July 2022, https://
https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/c_see/ua/ asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/
page3e_001171.html. China-Russia-military-activity-near-Japan-up-
5 Kamata Tomoko, ‘Japan–Russia Peace Treaty 2.5-times-since-Ukraine.
Talks Suspended’, NHK World-Japan, 5 April 9 White House, ‘US–Japan Joint Leaders’
2022, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ Statement: “US–Japan Global Partnership
news/backstories/1958/. for a New Era”’, 16 April 2021, https://
6 Miki Okuyama, ‘After Ukraine, Japan Reverts www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
to Old Line on Russian-controlled Islands’, statements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-
Nikkei Asia, 10 March 2022, https://asia. leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-partnership-
nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ for-a-new-era/; and ‘Joint Statement Following
After-Ukraine-Japan-reverts-to-old-line-on- Discussions with Prime Minister Sato of Japan’,
Russian-controlled-islands. 21 November 1969, The American Presidency
7 Anna Zotééva, ‘From the Russian Constitution Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
to Putin’s Constitution: Legal and Political documents/joint-statement-following-discus-
Implications of the 2020 Constitutional Reform’, sions-with-prime-minister-sato-japan.
UI Brief no. 5, Swedish Institute of International 10 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense of Japan
Pamphlet’, 2021, p. 19, https://www.mod. 18 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Other Basic

go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2021/DOJ2021_ Policies’, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_policy/
Digest_EN.pdf. See also ‘“Taiwan Jōsei no basis/others/index.html; and Japan, Prime
Antei Juyō” Bōei Hakusho ni Hatsu Meiki’ Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, ‘The
[Defence white paper refers for the first time to Constitution of Japan’, 3 November 1946, https://
the importance of the stability of the situation japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_govern-
surrounding Taiwan], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, ment_of_japan/constitution_e.htm.
13 July 2021, https://www.nikkei.com/article/ 19 Yuka Koshino, ‘Japan’s Transformational
DGXZQOUA093K00Z00C21A7000000/. National-security Documents’, IISS Analysis,
11 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Keynote 21 December 2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/
Address, Friday 10 June 2022, Fumio Kishida, analysis/2022/12/japans-transformational-na-
Prime Minister of Japan’, Keynote Address tional-security-documents.
at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2022, 10 20 Japan, Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Press Conference
June 2022, p. 7, https://www.mofa.go.jp/ by Prime Minister Kishida’, 16 December 2022,
files/100356160.pdf. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/state-
12 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Trends in ment/202212/_00006.html. The Japanese fiscal
China Coast Guard and Other Vessels in the year starts on 1 April and ends on 31 March.
Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and 21 ‘Japan’s Defense Budget and the 1% Limit’,
Japan’s Response’, 9 September 2022, https:// Nippon.com, 18 May 2018, https://www.nippon.
www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html. com/en/features/h00196/.
In 2022, Japan’s defence budget was US$48.1bn, 22 ‘Kishida Naikaku Sōri Daijin Kisha Kaiken’
compared with US$242bn for China. See IISS, [Prime Minister Kishida press conference],
The Military Balance 2023 (Abingdon: Routledge Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, 16 December
for the IISS), pp. 237, 257. 2022, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/101_kishida/
13 ‘China Sends Missiles Flying over Taiwan’, statement/2022/1216kaiken.html.
The Economist, 4 August 2022, https://www. 23 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense
economist.com/china/2022/08/04/china- Strategy’, p. 8.
sends-missiles-flying-over-taiwan; and 24 Mikio Sugeno and Tsuyoshi Nagasawa, ‘Xi’s
Ryo Nemoto and Rieko Miki, ‘5 Chinese Potential 2027 Transition Poses Threat to
Missiles Land in Japan’s EEZ: Defense Chief’, Taiwan: Davidson’, Nikkei Asia, 18 September
Nikkei Asia, 4 August 2022, https://asia. 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/
nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/ Interview/Xi-s-potential-2027-transition-poses-
Taiwan-tensions/5-Chinese-missiles-land-in- threat-to-Taiwan-Davidson.
Japan-s-EEZ-defense-chief. 25 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense
14 Carlotta Dotto, Brad Lendon and Jessie Yeung, Strategy’, p. 12.
‘North Korea’s Record Year of Missile Testing Is 26 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security
Putting the World on Edge’, CNN, 26 December Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, p. 19.
2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/26/asia/ 27 ‘Japan Ruling Bloc Agrees on Acquiring
north-korea-missile-testing-year-end-intl-hnk/ “Counterstrike Capability”’, Kyodo News, 2
index.html. See also Choe Sang-hun, ‘Tracking December 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/
North Korea’s Missile Launches’, New York news/2022/12/3054d5b15ef4-japan-ruling-bloc-to-
Times, 9 March 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/ agree-on-acquiring-counterstrike-capability.html.
article/north-korea-missile-launches.html. 28 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Missile Defense’,
15 Julian E. Barnes, ‘Russia Is Buying North https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/
Korean Artillery, According to US Intelligence’, missile_defense/index.html.
New York Times, 5 September 2022, https:// 29 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security
www.nytimes.com/2022/09/05/us/politics/ Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, p. 19.
russia-north-korea-artillery.html. 30 James L. Schoff and David Song, ‘Five Things
16 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security to Know About Japan’s Possible Acquisition
Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, p. 3. of Strike Capability’, Carnegie Endowment
17 Ibid., p. 4; and Japan, Ministry of Defense, for International Peace, 14 August 2017,
‘National Defense Strategy’, p. 10. https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/08/14/
five-things-to-know-about-japan-s-possible-ac- Strategy’, p. 17.

quisition-of-strike-capability-pub-72710. 44 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense Buildup
31 ‘Kishida, Biden Vow to Boost Japan Defense Program’, p. 30.
Capabilities, Eyeing Taiwan’, Kyodo News, 45 Ibid., p. 16.
14 January 2023, https://english.kyodonews. 46 Ibid., pp. 15–16.
net/news/2023/01/ac73810d2f43-japan-us-lead- 47 Ibid., p. 19.
ers-to-confirm-importance-of-taiwan-peace. 48 For budget breakdown, see Japan, Ministry of
html?phrase=Tomahawk%20&words=Tomahawk. Defense, ‘Bōei Seibi Keikaku ni tsuite’ [About
32 Yuka Koshino, ‘Japan to Accelerate the Defense Buildup Program], p. 3, https://
Its Acquisition of Stand-off Defence www.mod.go.jp/j/policy/agenda/guideline/plan/
Capabilities’, IISS Analysis, 27 September pdf/plan_outline.pdf.
2022, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/ 49 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense Buildup
analysis/2022/09/japan-to-accelerate-its-acquisi- Program’, pp. 45–46.
tion-of-stand-off-defence-capabilities. 50 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense
33 For further details on missile gaps, see, for Strategy’, p. 19.
example, David Lague, ‘Special Report: US 51 Miki Okuyama, ‘More Japanese Want Bigger
Rearms to Nullify China’s Missile Supremacy’, Role in US Security Alliance: Poll’, Nikkei Asia,
Reuters, 6 May 2020, https://www.reuters. 25 January 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/
com/article/us-usa-china-missiles-specialre- Defense/More-Japanese-want-bigger-role-in-
port-us-idUSKBN22I1EQ. For examples of U.S.-security-alliance-poll.
opinion polls, see ‘Over 60 Pct Say Japan Needs 52 White House, ‘Statement by National Security
Counterstrike Capabilities: Jiji Poll’, Nippon. Advisor Jake Sullivan on Japan’s Historic
com, 16 June 2022, https://www.nippon.com/en/ National Security Strategy’, 16 December 2022,
news/yjj2022061600753/. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
34 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defence statements-releases/2022/12/16/statement-by-na-
Strategy’, p. 16. tional-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-ja-
35 Ibid., p. 5. pans-historic-national-security-strategy/;
36 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense Buildup US Department of Defense, ‘Joint Statement
Program’, pp. 11–12. of the 2023 US–Japan Security Consultative
37 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security Committee (“2+2”)’, 11 January 2023, https://
Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, p. 24; and www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/
Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense Article/3265559/joint-statement-of-the-2023-us-
Strategy’, p. 26. japan-security-consultative-committee-22/;
38 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security and White House, ‘Joint Statement of the
Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, p. 24. United States and Japan’, 13 January 2023,
39 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
Strategy’, p. 30. statements-releases/2023/01/13/joint-statement-
40
Ogi Hiroto,‘Jieitai “Jōsetsu Tōgō Shireibu” of-the-united-states-and-japan/.
Wa “Okujō Oku Ka” (Jō) Sutando Ofu Bōei 53 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense
Nōryoku No Tōgō Unyō Kara Kangaeru’ [Is Strategy’, p. 19.
the Japanese Self-Defense Force’s “Permanent 54 Ibid., p. 24. For US IAMD, see, for example, Col
Joint Headquarters” necessary? Part 1: Thinking Lynn ‘Riddler’ Savage, ‘US INDOPACOM’s
from the perspective of integrated operation Integrated Air and Missile Defense Vision
of stand-off defence capabilities], Foresight, 2028: Integrated Deterrence Toward a Free
12 January 2022, https://www.fsight.jp/arti- and Open Indo-Pacific’, Air University,
cles/-/49473. 28 January 2022, https://www.airuniver-
41 Ibid. sity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2915508/
42 See, for example, Japan, Ministry of Defense, us-indopacoms-integrated-air-and-missile-de-
‘Defense of Japan 2022’, August 2022, p. 249, fense-vision-2028-integrated-deterre/.
https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/ 55 Rieko Miki, ‘Japan to Establish Self-Defense
wp2022/DOJ2022_EN_Full_02.pdf. Forces “Joint Command” in 2024’, Nikkei Asia,
43 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘National Defense 29 October 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/
Japan-to-establish-Self-Defense-Forces-joint- ‘maintaining defence industry is security

command-in-2024. policy itself’], Nikkei Business, 29 November,
56 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security 2021, https://business.nikkei.com/atcl/
Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, p. 13. gen/19/00179/112500082/?P=2.
57 Ibid. 67 IISS, Arms Sales and Regional Stability: An
58 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘First Japan– Assessment (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS,
Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial 2022), December 2022, p. 142, https://www.iiss.
Meeting (2+2)’, 9 April 2022, https://www.mofa. org/publications/strategic-dossiers/strategic-dos-
go.jp/press/release/press4e_003111.html. sier-arms-sales-and-regional-stability.
59 Japan signed the agreement with Australia, 68 ‘LDP OKs Bill to Nationalize Defense
France, Germany, Indonesia, India, Italy, Equipment Factories’, Jiji Press, 5 February
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK, US 2023, https://japannews.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/
and Vietnam. See Japan, Ministry of Defense, defense-security/20230205-89015/.
‘Rēwa Yonen Ban Bōei Hakusho’ [Defense of 69 ‘<Dokuji> Tōgō Shireibu, Rainendo Sōsetsu
Japan 2022], August 2022, p. 463, https://www. Miokuri, Basho Meguri Tairitsu mo’ [Exclusive:
mod.go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2022/pdf/wp2022_JP_ Permanent Joint Headquarters will not be
Full_01.pdf. established in the next fiscal year due to
60 Daishi Abe, ‘Philippines Radar Deal Marks competition over location], Sankei News, 29
Japan’s First Arms Export’, Nikkei Asia, 29 December 2022, https://www.sankei.com/
August 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/ article/20221229-4XIS73AZQVPONKLMKNX-
Aerospace-Defense-Industries/Philippines- ZCH2CSQ/.
radar-deal-marks-Japan-s-first-arms-export. 70 Japan, Ministry of Defense, ‘Defense of Japan
61 Eric Johnston, ‘Parliament Begins Budget Talks 2022’, p. 481.
amid Focus on Kishida’s Tax Plans’, Japan Times, 71 ‘Miyako-jima e no Danyaku Hanyū ni “Beigun
30 January 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ Shien no Misairu Iranai” Shushō Kantei Mae
news/2023/01/30/national/budget-debates-kishi- de Shimin ga Demo’ [‘We do not need missiles
da-polls/. supported by the US’, residents protest in front
62 Kaneko Kaori and Tim Kelly, ‘Japan’s of the Prime Minister’s Office regarding ammu-
Manpower-light Defence Strategy Is nition deployment on Miyako Island], Tokyo
a Flawed “Paper Plan”, Officers Say’, Shimbun, 11 November 2021, https://www.
Reuters, 20 December 2022, https:// tokyo-np.co.jp/article/142242.
www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ 72 ‘Japan’s Defence and Security Roles in a Taiwan
japans-manpower-light-defence-strategy-is- Contingency with Satoru Mori and Zack
flawed-paper-plan-officers-say-2022-12-20/. Cooper’, Japan Memo podcast, season 2 episode
63 ‘Japan’s Aging Population Poses Urgent Risk 11, IISS, 13 December 2022, https://www.iiss.
to Society, Says PM’, Guardian, 23 January 2023, org/blogs/podcast/2022/12/japan-s-defence-and-
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/ security-roles-in-a-taiwan-contingency.
jan/23/japans-ageing-population-poses-urgent- 73 Alice Billon-Galland and Hans Kundnani,
risk-to-society-says-pm. ‘How Ukraine Will Change Europe’s Indo-
64 ‘Bōeisangyō, “Bōei” Uriage wa 4%, Shijō Kibo Pacific Ambitions’, Chatham House, 25 April
Chiisaku: Bōeihakusho wo Yomu (12)’ [Defence 2022, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/04/
industry, sales of ‘defence’ are 4%, small how-ukraine-will-change-europes-indo-pacif-
market size], Nikkei Shimbun, 14 September ic-ambitions.
2022, https://www.nikkei.com/article/ 74 For further details on the Yoshida Doctrine,
DGXZQOUA3075M0Q2A830C2000000/. see Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward, Japan’s
65 Takahashi Kosuke, ‘Japan Ups Profits for Its Effectiveness as a Geo-economic Actor: Navigating
Defense Industry’, Diplomat, 31 January 2023, Great-power Competition, Adelphi 481–483
https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/japan-ups-prof- (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2022), p. 19.
its-for-its-defense-industry/. 75 ‘Philippines’ Marcos Open to a Troop Pact with
66 Mori Eisuke, ‘Matsukawa Rui ni Kiku Japan’, Reuters, 13 February 2023, https://www.
“Bōeisangyō no Iji wa Anzenhoshōseisaku reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-mar-
Sonomono Da”’ [Asking Matsukawa Rui, cos-open-troop-pact-with-japan-2023-02-13/.
76 Robert Ward (@RobertAlanWard), form&src=typed_query&f=top.

tweet, 17 June 2022, https://twitter.com/ 77 Japan, Cabinet Secretariat, ‘National Security
search?q=robertalanward%20kishida%20plat- Strategy of Japan’, December 2022, p. 34.
CHAPTER 6
CONFLICT IN
MYANMAR AND
THE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE
AARON CONNELLY DR SHONA LOONG
Senior Fellow for Southeast Asian

Politics and Foreign Policy, IISS Associate Fellow, IISS
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2023) could split the international community.
THE JUNTA AND ITS FORCES

The military has not been able to suppress the uprising. Although it has an advantage in arms, it is
fighting on numerous fronts, sustaining significant casualties and struggling to recruit new cadets.
DIVERSE GROUPS FIGHTING THE JUNTA

Those fighting the military – including new groups formed after the 2021 coup and decades-old
ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) – have forged new alliances that are challenging the junta’s
authority. While some EAOs have aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG), formed by
elected members of parliament and their allies among ethnic-minority groups, others have prioritised
their survival over supporting the NUG or the junta.
CONFLICT THEATRES IN POST-COUP MYANMAR

Myanmar’s seven conflict theatres can be grouped into three categories. Borderland resistance
strongholds, where EAOs and anti-junta forces coordinate closely; central contested areas, where
ethnic Bamar majority areas – untouched by conflict in recent decades – have experienced high-
intensity conflict post-coup, and where anti-junta forces have been fighting with relatively little
support from EAOs; and non-aligned areas, where local EAOs focus on their own goals and challenge
the junta without coordinating with the NUG.
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The junta’s April 2021 agreement to ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus has become the basis for
international diplomacy regarding the conflict. However, disagreements remain both inside and
outside ASEAN over whether to engage the junta or further isolate it.
In the early hours of 1 February 2021, the Myanmar Armed Forces launched a coup d’état
that deposed the elected government and prevented legislators elected in November 2020
from taking office. Over the following weeks, opponents staged demonstrations against the
coup. When those protests were suppressed by force – resulting in the deaths of more than
600 people in two months – many survivors took up arms against the junta.1 Thousands
pledged allegiance to the National Unity Government (NUG) formed by elected members
of parliament (living in hiding or abroad) and their allies among ethnic-minority groups. In
September 2021, the NUG declared it would wage a ‘people’s defensive war’ against the State
Administration Council (SAC), as the junta is known. Since the coup, 310 of the country’s 330
townships have experienced one or more instances of armed violence.2 Although Myanmar
has experienced persistent clashes in ethnic-minority areas since the country gained inde-
pendence from the United Kingdom in 1948, the scale of the current conflict is unprecedented.
The resultant humanitarian crisis has led to displacement of people and humanitarian need
on a scale greater than has been seen in Southeast Asia since the Cold War.
The nature and intensity of the conflict in Myanmar varies across seven theatres (see Map
6.1), which may be grouped into three broad categories. In the borderland resistance strongholds
of southeast Myanmar, Kachin State and northwest Myanmar – ethnic-minority areas where
established ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) have worked in concert with forces formed to
challenge military rule since the 2021 coup – the resistance has successfully confronted junta
forces and expanded the territory under its administration. In contested areas in the centre of
the country with a Buddhist-Bamar majority, including the Dry Zone and lower Myanmar,
these newer resistance forces have fought with less EAO support in some of the most brutal
engagements since the coup. In non-aligned areas in Shan State and Rakhine, EAOs hold sway
over large areas of the countryside, opposing rule from the centre but standing aloof from the
broader resistance to the coup.
The international response to the conflict has centred on the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has taken a harder line towards the SAC than it did
towards Myanmar’s previous military governments. A ‘Five-Point Consensus’, agreed in
April 2021 between ASEAN leaders and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of
the junta, has become the basis for international diplomacy to address the crisis. Min Aung
Hlaing’s refusal to meet the terms of the consensus, combined with questions over the
legitimacy of his government, prompted ASEAN to exclude his regime from the bloc’s
summits and some ministerial meetings. Only Russia has offered unreserved support for
the military government. Yet even Moscow chose not to veto a December 2022 United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution (UNSC Resolution 2669) expressing ‘deep
concern’ at the ‘limited progress on the implementation of ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus’
and calling for its full implementation.3
The junta has announced plans to hold elections in the second half of 2023. If these
go ahead, they are unlikely to be competitive and will probably not be held in the large
parts of the country affected by conflict. Election infrastructure, including polling places,
may come under attack from opponents of the military regime, making them flashpoints
for greater violence.4 Yet even unsuccessful elections could split ASEAN and the broader
international community between those prepared to maintain a hard line towards the junta
CONFLICT IN MYANMAR AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 141
on the one hand and those that are wary of leaving Map 6.1: Conflict theatres in post-coup Myanmar
the Myanmar Armed Forces isolated for too long –
for fear of losing what limited influence they have Country borders
Township borders
NEPAL over the military – on the other. If they occur, elec-
State/region borders
tions are therefore likely to determine the course of
both the conflict and the international response to it
during 2023 and into 2024.
Ka c h i n St a t e
INDIA
ORIGINS OF THE UPRISING
Non-violent demonstrations against the coup began
days after the SAC seized power. At their peak in CHINA
mid-February 2021, tens of thousands of people

came onto the streets in cities and towns across the
country. Shortly thereafter, the military began to fire No r t h we s t
My a n ma r
rubber bullets and live rounds at protesters.5 On 14
March, 80 people were killed in Yangon – 50 of them
at a demonstration in the light-industrial estate
of Hlaing Tharyar, which had become a centre of Mandalay
Sh a n St a t e
working-class resistance to the coup. In late March, T h e Dr y Z o n e
the first armed clash between protesters and the LAOS
Ra k h i n e
SAC occurred in Kalay town, Sagaing Region, with
protesters using homemade weapons to fend off an Naypyidaw
attack on a protest camp. They held off SAC forces

for ten days, although 12 protesters were killed
THAILAND
in the process.6 On 9 April, demonstrators in the
L o we r My a n ma r
city of Bago, 90 kilometres northeast of Yangon,
defended barricades with slingshots, fireworks and
homemade airguns against an assault by soldiers Yangon
from the 77 Light Infantry Division; 82 protesters

were killed.7 By mid-2021, skirmishes between
the SAC and its opponents had developed into a
bloody conflict encompassing areas of the country
t heast
So u theast
untouched by armed clashes for decades. Former My a nmar
protesters organised into local cells, which have
attacked urban targets and waged guerrilla warfare
in more remote areas. Many – but not all – of these
No. of violent events reported by
cells are allied with the NUG, which was established con ict theatre, Feb 2021–Jan 2023
two months after the coup by ousted lawmakers, 443 Rakhine
representatives of ethnic-based political parties 1,310 Kachin
1,421 Shan
and armed groups, protest leaders, and democracy 2,709 Lower Myanmar
activists.8 More than 95,000 civilians are estimated 3,247 Northwest
3,578 Southeast
to have joined armed-resistance cells formed after
7,112 Dry Zone
the coup, of which 65,000 troops operate under the ©IISS
Source: IISS
SRI LANKA
NUG’s command.9 The proportion of troops controlled by the NUG has generally risen
over the past two years.10
EAOs, which have controlled territory and operated paramilitary forces in Myanmar’s
peripheries for decades, are also pivotal to the ongoing conflict. However, the EAOs vary
significantly in terms of their military capacity and capability, their relationship with
neighbouring countries, and their positioning vis-à-vis the wider anti-coup resistance.
On one hand, some EAOs – particularly those close to Myanmar’s borders with Thailand
and India – are vocal supporters of the NUG. These EAOs have provided military training
to former protesters and launched joint attacks against SAC targets. The NUG and its
EAO allies have also formed joint command structures to coordinate their military oper-
ations, which are becoming increasingly cohesive as a result.11 Other EAOs, located near
the Myanmar–Bangladesh and Myanmar–China borders, are more equivocal towards
the NUG, although they largely oppose the coup. Because EAOs oversee minority popu-
lations and local economies adjacent to Myanmar’s international borders, their stances
towards the SAC have been a significant factor in determining how Myanmar’s neigh-
bours have approached the conflict.
Myanmar’s conflict is not a monolith. While the military is opposed by a range of
actors, these actors’ strategies and ultimate goals differ. NUG-allied EAOs see their partic-
ipation in the wider anti-coup movement as a means of achieving their ethno-national
goals within a future federal union. This differentiates them from the mostly ethnic-Bamar
armed groups formed after the coup, whose primary goal – at least initially – was to oust
the SAC and restore a civilian government to power. These latter groups could not have
sustained their resistance to the coup, however, without the support of sympathetic EAOs.
To account for these complexities, Myanmar’s civil war is best understood by disaggre-
gating conflict dynamics into seven interrelated theatres: the Dry Zone, Rakhine, Shan
State, Kachin State, southeast Myanmar, northwest Myanmar and lower Myanmar.12 In
each theatre, combatants wage war in distinct configurations, although military outcomes
in each shape the conflict’s overarching dynamics.
THE JUNTA AND ITS FORCES

Myanmar is no stranger to military rule. The armed forces first assumed civil power in
1958, at the invitation of then-prime minister U Nu, in response to factionalism within
the elected government. The then-commander of the army, General Ne Win, relinquished
power after 18 months but overthrew the elected government again in 1962, this time
without its consent.13 For the next 49 years, Burma (renamed Myanmar in 1989) was ruled
by successive juntas. In the years before the 2021 coup, Myanmar experienced a reprieve
from military rule: following the 2010 general elections, it was governed first by the
military-linked Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP, 2011–16) and then by
Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD, 2016–21). However, the mili-
tary never gave up its involvement in politics. Myanmar’s putative ‘transition’ to civilian
rule occurred within the bounds of the junta-drafted 2008 constitution, which reserved
one-quarter of parliamentary seats for the military. This gave the Myanmar Armed Forces
a veto over constitutional change.
The day after the 2021 coup, Min Aung Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attends a ceremony in Naypyidaw
marking the 75th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence, 4 January 2023
Hlaing established the SAC. The SAC initially
consisted of 11 members – eight military offi-
cials and three civilians. The senior general
appointed six more civilians to the SAC there-
after but it continues to be dominated by the
military.14 The majority of the SAC’s military
members have led regional military commands
and directed counter-insurgency campaigns
against EAOs.15 Its military members are
also all Bamar and Buddhist – reflecting the
Myanmar Armed Forces’ overall ethnic and
religious makeup.
By numbers, the Myanmar Armed Forces (STR/AFP via Getty Images)
remains the strongest fighting force in the

country. Estimates of its personnel strength vary widely, though reports of recruitment
shortfalls and regular understaffing suggest that there are unlikely to be more than 120,000
infantry troops.16 It has a clear edge over other armed groups in terms of equipment
and firepower, evidenced by its airstrikes using both attack helicopters and fixed-wing
combat aircraft throughout 2022.17 It operates equipment sourced – almost entirely before
the coup – from China, Israel, Russia, Singapore, South Korea and Ukraine, as well as
from a domestic defence industry run by the military itself.18 However, it is fighting on an
unprecedented number of fronts – including in central Myanmar’s Dry Zone, where there
had been minimal armed violence prior to the coup and where the military’s supply lines
were underdeveloped – and sustaining significant casualties in each.19 In addition, there
have been reports of thousands of defections.20 As the war wears on, the military is likely
to suffer from further attrition. Its inability to recruit new cadets has resulted in forced
recruitment drives in some areas.21
The SAC is also able to deploy the Myanmar Police Force and pro-military militias
against the opposition. The police force, which even before the coup was under the indi-
rect control of the military’s commander-in-chief rather than the civilian government, was
deployed to crack down on protests immediately after the coup. In central Myanmar, the
SAC has also hastily recruited and trained local militias (‘Pyusawhti’).22 Undertrained and
under-resourced, the Pyusawhti have not made a significant impact on conflict dynamics
writ large. However, it has contributed to an overall climate of fear as its members abduct
and attack civilians suspected of siding with the resistance. Moreover, plain-clothed
Pyusawhti provide the military with intelligence in areas in which it is not accustomed to
fighting – predominantly the Dry Zone.23
DIVERSE GROUPS FIGHTING THE JUNTA

Two types of armed organisations have opposed the SAC: anti-SAC groups, formed
specifically to oppose the military rule established following the 2021 coup; and
EAOs, which existed before the coup and which justify their existence in defence
of ethno-national goals. New, post-coup Members of a People's Defence Force unit training in Kayin State, 24 November 2021
alliances have formed between anti-SAC

groups and EAOs, with these alliances
helping both types of armed organisations
to undermine the SAC’s authority, particu-
larly in rural and ethnic-minority areas.
In May 2021, the NUG coined the term
‘People’s Defence Force’ (PDF) to refer to
NUG-allied groups using arms to protect
protesters.24 In 2023, the term is often used by
observers to refer to three types of anti-SAC (Kaung Zaw Hein/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)
groups, all of which formed after the coup:

PDFs, which are larger units formed or recognised by the NUG; People’s Defence Teams
(PDTs), which are smaller units formed by the NUG to provide security at the village or
neighbourhood level; and Local Defence Forces (LDFs), which are smaller units that fight
the SAC but are not allied with the NUG.25
Estimates suggest that there are at least 95,000 PDF troops in total, consisting of
approximately 65,000 PDF fighters allied with the NUG, 30,000 LDF fighters operating
independently and an unknown number of PDT members.26 These numbers are also
fluid – 25% of LDF fighters converted to NUG-allied forces in the second half of 2022.27
The general trend is towards the consolidation of anti-SAC forces under the NUG, even
if the NUG is unlikely to ever bring them all under its command.
Anti-SAC forces have exhibited remarkable resilience. At the start of the conflict they
were inexperienced, disorganised and under-resourced. For the most part, their fighters
had not experienced war before the coup; they were mostly civil servants, civil-society
workers, students and teachers responding to the SAC’s crackdown on non-violent
protests. However, whereas the military has continued to employ old strategies in use
against dissidents for decades, anti-SAC forces’ battlefield tactics have evolved. At first,
anti-SAC forces often launched one-off attacks against SAC targets before disbanding.28
They assassinated people suspected of links to the junta or destroyed junta-linked infra-
structure, such as police stations and electricity offices, using improvised explosives,
sometimes claiming the attacks on social media shortly after.29 However, clashes between
the SAC and anti-SAC forces lasting hours have become more common. In February 2023,
a PDF in Sagaing Region reportedly held off SAC attacks for three days before retreating
across the Chindwin River.30
Anti-SAC forces – and the NUG – have successfully raised funds for weapons. The latter
claims to have raised more than US$100 million through the sale of ‘Spring Revolution
Special Treasury Bonds’, the auction of military-linked properties, donations and volun-
tary taxes.31 Anti-SAC troops have collected donations and taxes (the line between the two
can be blurred) from supporters, businesses, landowners and road users.32 Doing so has
allowed many anti-SAC units to sustain themselves autonomously. Nonetheless, while the
anti-SAC opposition has been able to support itself financially, it has not been able to raise
enough money to procure the weapons that would give it a decisive military edge over the
junta. Indeed, it faces significant challenges: Kachin Independence Army recruits take part in
field exercises in Laiza, Kachin State, 7 July 2014
funds from the diaspora and local popula-
tions could deplete as the war continues;
the SAC seeks to stem funds flowing to the
resistance, for example by shutting down
the internet in opposition strongholds; and
distributing funds raised can be difficult in
contested areas.33
Moreover, anti-SAC forces have sustained
themselves through increasingly formalised
alliances with select EAOs. There are two (Taylor Weidman/LightRocket via Getty Images)
command structures that are jointly led by

the NUG and EAOs: the Central Command and Coordination Committee (C3C), and the
Joint Command and Coordination (J2C). Formed in October 2021, the C3C brings the NUG
and three EAOs – in the northwest, the Chin National Front (CNF); in the northeast, the
Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO); and in the southeast, the Karenni Army (KA) –
under a joint command structure.34 The J2C is a bilateral structure that coordinates between
the NUG and the Karen National Union (KNU), the largest southeastern EAO, which over-
sees eight ‘columns’. Each of the columns is led by a KNU commander and a PDF deputy
commander.35 Military cooperation between anti-SAC forces and battle-hardened EAOs
compensates for the former’s relative inexperience in combat.
Not all EAOs, however, are aligned with the NUG. Some EAOs reject both the SAC’s
and NUG’s claims to authority. The Arakan Army (AA), which currently controls large
stretches of Rakhine, is one example. The AA sees its goals as distinct from those of the
SAC and the NUG and it remains sceptical of the latter as a result of the NLD’s repres-
sion of Rakhine nationalism during its term in government.36 The AA was the Myanmar
military’s most belligerent opponent from 2018 to late 2020, when it agreed to an informal
ceasefire three months before the coup. After nearly 18 months of a tense truce – during
which the AA extended its influence throughout the Rakhine countryside, taking advan-
tage of the pressure on the Myanmar Armed Forces in other parts of the country – fighting
resumed in August 2022. Another informal ceasefire was agreed in late 2022.37
There are also EAOs that prioritise their own survival – which hinges on their control
of local economies and relations with neighbouring countries’ governments – over the
nationwide goals articulated by the anti-SAC resistance. This group chiefly comprises
Shan State EAOs, among them the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Ta’ang National
Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). Beijing fears that
closer alignment between these EAOs and the NUG might result in greater Western
influence on its border with Myanmar (as well as bring the fighting to this area). As a
result, it has discouraged these groups from participating in the wider anti-coup resist-
ance. However, Beijing has also sought to use its influence over these EAOs as leverage
in its relationship with the junta. Should that relationship suffer, then Beijing might offer
tacit approval for these groups to attack the SAC, though not as part of the broader anti-
coup resistance.38
Finally, a small number of EAOs have engaged directly with the SAC, though these actors
have had little impact on the overall conflict so far. Most prominent among these has been
the UWSA, which sent an official without any significant decision-making power to talks in
mid-2022, after which it released a statement saying that it would remain outside the ongoing
conflict.39 However, most EAOs that accepted invitations to such talks did not hold signifi-
cant – if any – territories and could only muster a combined force of several hundred troops.40
The SAC’s pursuit of peace talks reflects a long-standing conflict-management strategy
practised by successive military rulers in Myanmar. In the past, by pursuing ceasefires with
some opponents, the military has been able to undermine solidarity among ethnic-minority
groups and reduce the number of fronts on which it has had to fight.41 This strategy has not
achieved political stability; rather, it has engendered successive waves of ceasefires and conflict
in ethnic-minority areas. The current conflict is a turning point not only because some of the
junta’s strongest opponents – namely the KIO and KNU – are fighting the military at the same
time but also because they are coordinating their attacks with one another via the NUG and the
anti-SAC forces allied with it.
CONFLICT THEATRES IN POST-COUP MYANMAR

Due to the range and configurations of actors in Myanmar, the conflict is best understood as
the sum total of the dynamics in seven theatres, which can be grouped into three categories:
Borderland resistance strongholds (southeast Myanmar, Kachin State and
northwest Myanmar)
Central contested areas (the Dry Zone and lower Myanmar)
Non-aligned areas (Shan State and Rakhine).
Borderland resistance strongholds

Southeast Myanmar, Kachin State and northwest Myanmar – which border Thailand,
China and India, respectively – see the closest coordination between EAOs and anti-SAC
forces (see Map 6.2). The main EAOs in these theatres – the CNF, KIO, KNU and Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP) – have been among the NUG’s most vocal EAO allies.
These actors have not only sent their own forces to fight the junta but have also trained
former protesters willing to join the armed resistance. Joint operations between these
EAOs and anti-SAC forces have allowed the combined resistance movement to launch
assaults on military bases, particularly in Kayin State.42 There have been near daily clashes
in all three theatres.
Local populations have often paid a heavy price for their opposition to the SAC. Since
the coup, Hpapun in southeast Myanmar – a KNU stronghold – has endured the most
airstrikes out of all Myanmar’s 330 townships.43 There were 365 airstrikes and drone strikes
throughout Myanmar between 1 February 2021 and 31 August 2022 – 29 of which took
place in Hpapun.44 Airstrikes have also wracked other parts of the southeast; together with
ground offensives by the Myanmar Armed Forces, they have displaced approximately
296,000 people in the region.45 A significant proportion of those displaced are believed to
have crossed the border with Thailand, joining 91,000 refugees already living in camps in
Thailand who were displaced by clashes between the KNU and Myanmar’s military that
took place before the coup.46 In October 2022, Kachin Map 6.2: Borderland resistance strongholds in post-coup Myanmar
State endured the single deadliest air attack since
the coup: the military bombed a concert organised Country borders
Township borders
NEPAL by the KIO, killing at least 50 people.47
In northwest Myanmar, as well as in the neigh- Theatre boundaries
bouring Dry Zone, local populations have been

subject to scorched-earth campaigns. In September
2021, the northwest drew international attention Ka c h i n St a t e
INDIA
when shelling by the Myanmar Armed Forces
displaced nearly all 12,000 residents of Thantlang
town, which was set on fire and looted.48 Over CHINA
50,000 people have crossed into India from the

northwest and approximately 40,000 have been
internally displaced.49 No r t h we s t
My a n ma r
Nonetheless, EAOs in these theatres continue to
stand behind the anti-coup resistance. The two main
EAOs in the southeast – the KNU and KNPP – had
been at war with Myanmar’s military for more than Mandalay
Sh a n St a t e
six decades by the time of the 2021 coup. Both signed T h e Dr y Z o n e
ceasefires in the decade before the coup, with these LAOS
Ra k h i n e
deals becoming increasingly unpopular with local
populations as peace negotiations stalled. Seeing Naypyidaw
negotiations as a dead end and riding the wider

resistance movement’s appetite for federalism, the
THAILAND
KNU and KNPP joined forces with the NUG and
anti-SAC forces in their armed uprising. Even so,
there are subtle differences between the KNU’s and
KNPP’s approaches to anti-SAC forces. The KNU, Yangon
the stronger of the two, subsumes anti-SAC forces

under its control through the J2C, whereas the KNPP
coordinates its attacks with anti-SAC forces via the
C3C. The two EAOs have expanded their admin-
So u theast
istrative systems in territories they have wrested No. of violent events reported monthly My a nmar
by conflict theatre, Feb 2021–Jan 2023
from the SAC, which they use to provide humani-
tarian assistance, healthcare, and law and order.50 In 500
Kachin State
Northwest Myanmar
so doing, they seek to demonstrate the viability of 400 Southeast Myanmar
EAO-led governance systems that exclude the SAC.
300
From its strongholds in Kachin State in north-
east Myanmar, since early 2021 the KIO has pushed 200
southwards into northern parts of the Dry Zone 100

with the assistance of anti-SAC forces.51 Formed in
0
1961 to advance Kachin ethno-nationalism, the KIO
Feb 21
Apr 21
Jun 21
Aug 21
Oct 21
Dec 21
Feb 22
Apr 22
Jun 22
Aug 22
Oct 22
Dec 22
quickly became one of the Myanmar government’s ©IISS
Source: IISS
SRI LANKA
most formidable opponents. Over the following two decades, it gained control of and
began to administer territory in Kachin and northern Shan states, which both border
China. After a 17-year ceasefire (1994–2011) the KIO returned to combat re-energised by
a new generation of leaders less willing to compromise with the central government.52
After the coup, the KIO was one of the first EAOs to intensify offensives against the mili-
tary, by seizing camps and outposts in March 2021.53 The KIO now appears to have full
command over PDFs in Kachin State and coordinates its attacks with the NUG and its
allies as a member of the C3C.54
The main EAO in the northwest, the CNF, has fought for Chin self-determination since
1988. However, unlike the KNU, KNPP and KIO, it was relatively insignificant before the
coup because it had not actively fought since the mid-2000s.55 The CNF’s recent inactivity
has been partly attributed to the difficulties encountered in trying to unite the Chin polity,
due to northwest Myanmar’s sparse population and rugged, mountainous terrain; the lack
of a common language; and poor roads and telecommunications infrastructure in rural
areas.56 A common enemy – the SAC – re-energised the CNF and stimulated interest in a
unified front against the military regime. Camp Victoria – the CNF headquarters – became
an epicentre for resistance activities. It is where thousands of former protesters have
undergone military training – by the CNF – before being deployed elsewhere in north-
west Myanmar and even central Myanmar.57 The camp, located only a few kilometres from
the Indian border, was the target of SAC airstrikes in January 2023. As with southeast
Myanmar and Kachin State, resistance actors – comprising the CNF, ousted lawmakers,
members of civil-society groups and protest leaders – have cooperated to establish govern-
ance systems in areas they control.58 They claim, for example, to have reopened schools,
allowing 2,800 primary students to return to the classroom.59
Central contested areas

The Dry Zone and lower Myanmar (see Map 6.3) are atypical insofar as they are the only
two theatres that did not see armed violence in the decades before the 2021 coup. Due
to their predominantly Buddhist-Bamar populations, these areas had been relatively
untouched by the conflicts between EAOs and the Myanmar Armed Forces. Yet the Dry
Zone on the border with Chin State and the commercial centre and former capital Yangon
in lower Myanmar have become central to the post-coup conflict. In the absence of EAOs,
the conflict here is driven by anti-SAC forces – both those allied with the NUG and those
working independently.
In the first year of the conflict, PDFs deployed three main battlefield tactics: the use of
improvised explosive devices, assassinations and ambushes. Their targets were not only
SAC soldiers and police officers but also junta-linked assets, such as businesses owned
by SAC members60 and people associated with the junta, such as suspected informants.61
However, the SAC is better equipped to crack down on its opponents in large towns and
cities, making urban warfare costly for the resistance.62 Consequently, anti-SAC forces
rely on remote attacks rather than armed clashes and, particularly in lower Myanmar
(including Yangon), have used remotely triggered explosive devices.63 Nonetheless, in both
theatres, anti-SAC forces have grown more organised and their weapons more advanced.
Due to their distance from cross-border black Map 6.3: Central contested areas in post-coup Myanmar
markets, many have begun to produce their own
light weapons, including sub-machine guns.64 Still, Country borders
Township borders
NEPAL in comparison with forces in southeast and north-
west Myanmar, anti-SAC forces in the Dry Zone and Theatre boundaries
lower Myanmar struggle to hold pockets of territory.

Whereas it has invited EAOs to peace talks, the
SAC regards anti-SAC forces as ‘terrorists’ unde- Ka c h i n St a t e
INDIA
serving of dialogue and negotiation.65 Instead, it has
dealt with them using counter-insurgency tactics
that it had previously reserved for the most bellig- CHINA
erent EAOs. Six of the ten townships with the highest

incidence of infrastructure destruction – primarily
houses and buildings burned down by the SAC – No r t h we s t
My a n ma r
are in the Dry Zone. The other four are in northwest
Myanmar.66 Within the Dry Zone’s Sagaing Region
alone, in the two years following the coup, 684,300
people were internally displaced as a result.67 In Mandalay
Sh a n St a t e
Yangon, suspected resistance fighters are subject to T h e Dr y Z o n e
raids, abductions and arrests. In July 2022, the junta LAOS
Ra k h i n e
executed four anti-regime activists accused of abet-
ting the armed resistance, having charged them Naypyidaw
under counter-terrorism laws. These were the first

executions in Myanmar in more than three decades.68
THAILAND
In late 2022, the SAC also deployed heavily armed
soldiers to evict an estimated 60,000 residents from
their homes in Yangon and reissued these lands to
regime loyalists.69 Yangon
Although the resistance has been less successful

in these theatres, the military’s behaviour in its
historic strongholds may have lasting effects on
Myanmar’s politics. The home villages of tens of
So u theast
thousands of anti-SAC fighters have been destroyed. No. of violent events reported monthly My a nmar
For them, the fight against the SAC will now be an
existential matter. In the event of a SAC victory, these 500
Dry Zone
fighters are likely to remain deeply resentful towards 400
Lower
Myanmar
Myanmar’s military commanders.70 Furthermore, the
300
conflict has caused the Myanmar Armed Forces to
turn against part of its traditional support base. Since 200
Myanmar’s independence, the military has declared 100

that its raison d’être is to protect the Buddhist-Bamar
0
population; since the coup, such rhetoric has rung
Feb 21
Apr 21
Jun 21
Aug 21
Oct 21
Dec 21
Feb 22
Apr 22
Jun 22
Aug 22
Oct 22
Dec 22
hollow with anti-SAC forces and their supporters.71 ©IISS
Source: IISS
SRI LANKA
Non-aligned areas Map 6.4: Non-aligned areas in post-coup Myanmar

Finally, there are two theatres in which local
actors are more ambivalent towards the NUG-led Country borders
Township borders
NEPAL resistance: Rakhine on the border with Bangladesh,
and those parts of Shan State bordering China Theatre boundaries
(see Map 6.4). Most EAOs in both theatres have

denounced the coup and have clashed with the mili-
tary but are not coordinating their activities with Ka c h i n St a t e
INDIA
anti-SAC forces, instead focusing on achieving their
own goals.
The Brotherhood Alliance, consisting of the CHINA
Rakhine-based AA together with the Shan-based

TNLA and the Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (MNDAA), has denounced the coup No r t h we s t
My a n ma r
and clashed with the SAC but insists on pursuing
its constituent elements’ shared causes.72 There
are three possible reasons why these groups have
distanced themselves from the NUG. Firstly, they Mandalay
Sh a n St a t e
associate the NUG with ousted NLD lawmakers, T h e Dr y Z o n e
whom they mistrust. The AA has been especially LAOS
Ra k h i n e
sceptical of the NLD as it led the suppression of
Rakhine nationalists, which sparked the conflict Naypyidaw
there between the Myanmar Armed Forces and the

AA in 2018.73 As for the TNLA and the MNDAA,
THAILAND
there had been no lasting reprieve to fighting in the
northeast during the NLD’s term in office. Secondly,
more than in any other theatre in Myanmar, conflict
in Shan State has been shaped by illicit economies, Yangon
profiteering and factionalisation. This context has

led local EAOs to prioritise survival and territorial
autonomy over countrywide reforms.74 Thirdly,
China looms large in these groups’ strategic calcu-
So u theast
lations. Beijing has strategic interests in both Shan No. of violent events reported monthly My a nmar
State, where it is involved in resource-extraction
projects and where it seeks to secure its border, and 500
Rakhine
Shan State
Rakhine, where it had planned to build a deep-sea 400
port and a special economic zone.75 Furthermore,
300
these EAOs access Chinese-made weapons through
the UWSA, whose partnership with China has 200
allowed it to develop into the strongest armed force 100

of any EAO in Myanmar.76
0
These non-aligned areas are potential flashpoints
Feb 21
Apr 21
Jun 21
Aug 21
Oct 21
Dec 21
Feb 22
Apr 22
Jun 22
Aug 22
Oct 22
Dec 22
in the conflict. Tensions persist between the SAC ©IISS
Source: IISS
SRI LANKA
and all members of the Brotherhood Alliance Members of a People's Defence Force unit near Demoso, Kayah State, assemble
homemade guns to be used in fighting against security forces, 4 June 2021
as well as other, smaller EAOs in Shan State.
The situation in Rakhine is perhaps the most
volatile, as in the past three years the AA has
twice oscillated between signing ceasefires
with the military and intense conflict. The
AA used previous ceasefires as opportuni-
ties to expand its administration, acquiring
influence over two-thirds of Rakhine and
triggering retaliation from the Myanmar
Armed Forces.77 The Brotherhood Alliance
EAOs are likely to remain aloof from resist-
ance movements in the rest of Myanmar.
However, if these groups were to change tack
and challenge the SAC, in response to new
SAC offensives or tacit approval from China,
their combined strength could stretch the
military in unprecedented ways. (STR/AFP via Getty Images)
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The international community is often characterised as being divided over the question
of how it should respond to the overthrow of Myanmar’s elected government as a result
of the 2021 coup d’état. However, there is broad consensus on several key points. On the
day of the coup, condemnation was nearly universal: nine ASEAN foreign ministers
quickly reached consensus on a statement calling for a ‘return to normalcy’, which was
issued the same day by the then-chair of the organisation, Brunei.78 In the weeks that
followed, the foreign ministers of the G7 group and the Quad (Australia, India, Japan
and the United States) issued statements condemning the coup, while the UN Human
Rights Council adopted without a vote a resolution ‘deploring’ the coup and calling for
an end to the state of emergency – the legal instrument that allowed Min Aung Hlaing
to seize power.79
ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus

As violence in Myanmar escalated, the broader international community looked to
ASEAN, as the relevant regional organisation, to determine a way out of the crisis. In April
2022, the nine leaders of the other ASEAN member states agreed to hold an extraordi-
nary meeting with Min Aung Hlaing at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. Protesters in
Myanmar criticised ASEAN leaders for inviting the senior general to join them, and burnt
ASEAN flags.80 While some leaders took pains to stress that they were merely meeting with
Min Aung Hlaing and not including him among their number as a fellow leader, the junta
repeatedly ran the footage of the meeting on state television in an attempt to convey the
impression that Min Aung Hlaing had been accepted as Myanmar’s leader by the interna-
tional community.
)
es
ag
Im
tt y
Ge
via
cy
en
Ag
lu
do
na
/A
i at
r
te
re
ec
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tia
en
id
es
Pr
i an
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ne
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(In
Leaders of ASEAN member states meet
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to discuss
the Myanmar crisis at the ASEAN Secretariat in
Jakarta, 24 April 2021
At the meeting on 22 April, the Five-Point Consensus was agreed between the nine
ASEAN leaders and Min Aung Hlaing (see Figure 6.1). Though governments around the
world voiced support for the Five-Point Consensus, Min Aung Hlaing quickly reneged on
his commitments, indicating that he regarded them as merely advisory. Over the following
two years, Myanmar accepted a small amount of humanitarian aid through the AHA
Centre. After much negotiation, the special envoys of the ASEAN chairs Brunei (2021) and
Cambodia (2022) have made visits to Myanmar (although they have not been allowed to
meet with NLD leaders). Otherwise, the lack of meaningful progress on the Five-Point
Consensus has led many to criticise it as a failed approach.
Although the Five-Point Consensus has not been successful in pushing the junta to
cease violence or engage in dialogue with its opponents, it has played an important role
in bridging divisions between the remaining nine member states. The maritime states of
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have favoured isolating the
junta, while the mainland states led by Thailand and including Cambodia, Laos and
Vietnam argue for greater engagement with the junta. In October 2021, these divisions
came to a head in two meetings between ASEAN foreign ministers over whether to invite
Min Aung Hlaing to the ASEAN summit at the end of the month. Brunei, acting on its
authority as the chair, opted not to issue an invitation to Min Aung Hlaing. Although
Thailand objected to the decision, it found it difficult to make a case for the inclusion of Min
Aung Hlaing given that he had failed to fulfil any of the terms of the Five-Point Consensus.
Bangkok ultimately chose not to insist on his inclusion.
Over the following year, ministers from Myanmar were also excluded from ASEAN
foreign and defence ministers’ meetings. Moreover, the ASEAN Secretariat, acting as the
depositary for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership free-trade agreement,
Figure 6.1: ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus on the situation in Myanmar, April 2021
Constructive A special envoy of

There shall be dialogue among all the ASEAN Chair shall ASEAN shall provide
The special envoy and
immediate cessation of parties concerned shall facilitate mediation of the humanitarian assistance
delegation shall visit
violence in Myanmar and commence to seek a dialogue process, with the through the AHA
Myanmar to meet with
all parties shall exercise peaceful solution in assistance of the [ASEAN Humanitarian
all parties concerned.
utmost restraint. the interests of Secretary-General Assistance] Centre.
the people. of ASEAN.
1 2 3 4 5
Source: ASEAN, asean.org
has refused to accept the junta’s instrument of accession. Though the junta’s officials still
participate in the work of ASEAN at a lower level, these steps amount to a de facto suspen-
sion of Myanmar from ASEAN at the bloc’s most important meetings and with regard
to its most important functions. While exclusion from ASEAN summits may not be Min
Aung Hlaing’s greatest challenge, it has deprived him of the opportunity to convey images
to Myanmar’s population that would suggest he has been accepted by the international
community as the country’s leader.
Neighbours offer limited engagement

Thailand is not the only neighbour of Myanmar that has sought to engage rather than
isolate the junta. Bangladesh, China and India have all sought quiet ways to build bridges
to the SAC despite joining in early statements condemning the coup. For each, concerns
over a porous border lined with autonomous armed groups is the top priority in their rela-
tions with Myanmar. Officials from the three countries say that they must engage the junta
if they are to manage the border and the challenges that emanate from it – particularly with
regard to migrants and criminal activity. However, China, India and Thailand have also
sought to hedge their bets on the outcome of the conflict by establishing discreet lines of
communication with the NUG.
Despite allegations emerging in the weeks immediately following the coup that China
had backed the military’s seizure of civil power, no evidence has emerged to support such
claims.81 Indeed, the coup ran contrary to China’s interests: Beijing had enjoyed good rela-
tions with the NLD government. Min Aung Hlaing, by contrast, had criticised Beijing’s
relationship with the AA and was thought to favour closer relations with India. Beijing
has nevertheless sought to engage the new regime to secure its interests in infrastructure
projects in Myanmar and security along the border. However, it has been disappointed by
the junta’s escalatory approach to the conflict.
For its part, New Delhi had become concerned over the course of Aung San Suu Kyi’s
first term that the NLD government was becoming too close to China. Given Min Aung
Hlaing’s stated antipathy towards China, Indian officials have seen the coup as an oppor-
tunity to beat back Chinese influence in Myanmar and make inroads of their own. Naval
cooperation between India and Myanmar is a particularly bright spot for the junta. In
October 2020, before the coup, India donated a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar. Since
the coup, regular talks between naval commanders from India and Myanmar in the Bay of
Bengal have continued, while India invited Myanmar to participate in its Milan biennial
regional naval exercise in February 2022.82
Further afield, few friends

Beyond Myanmar’s immediate region, Russia has been the junta’s only significant
supporter. It has become the leading arms supplier to the military regime; its substan-
tial training programmes for Myanmar Armed Forces personnel have continued
despite the coup; and it included Myanmar in the Vostok military exercise in Russia’s
Far East in September 2022. A deal on the sale of Russian petrol to Myanmar has sought
to provide a new market for Russian energy while lowering oil prices in Myanmar. In
August 2022, Min Aung Hlaing travelled to Vladivostok for a meeting with Russian
President Vladimir Putin – the senior general’s most significant diplomatic engage-
ment since the coup. However, even the close relationship between Russia and the
junta was not enough to secure a Russian veto of UNSC Resolution 2669 in December
2022 – the first UNSC resolution on Myanmar since the country was admitted to the
UN as Burma in 1949.
European and North American govern-
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing meets Russian President Vladimir Putin on the
ments have followed through on their sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia, 7 September 2022
early condemnations of the coup by down-
grading their diplomatic representation in
Yangon, meeting with NUG officials and
levying economic sanctions against the
regime. Most of these governments have
chosen not to replace their outgoing ambas-
sadors to Myanmar, rather than have a new
ambassador present their credentials to
Min Aung Hlaing as chairman of the SAC.83
Canada, the European Union, the United
Kingdom and the US have sought to coor-
dinate their implementation of sanctions to
increase their effectiveness. Yet these sanc-
tions appear to have had little effect on
Myanmar’s economy, particularly compared
to the damage inflicted by the nationwide
(Valery Sharifulin/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images)
strike known as the ‘Civil Disobedience Movement’ – which gripped the economy for
months following the coup – or the military regime’s macroeconomic mismanagement.
It is possible that the sanctions’ effectiveness could have been greater if they had been
implemented more quickly; the relatively slow escalation ladder used by the administra-
tion of US President Joe Biden afforded the junta and its supporters time to adjust to the
prospect of renewed economic isolation.
Three important middle powers in the Asia-Pacific – Australia, Japan and South
Korea – have condemned the coup but remain reluctant to completely isolate the junta.
Only Canberra has levied sanctions, although these came two years after the coup and
were limited to basic financial sanctions and travel bans on high-ranking SAC officials.
The relationship with Japan is particularly important for Myanmar, which has bene-
fitted from substantial Japanese investment. Tokyo’s approach is framed by an interest
in protecting these investments and – like India – blocking deeper Chinese engagement
in the country. Of the three middle powers, Australia and South Korea have chosen not
to replace outgoing ambassadors, while Japan’s ambassador, Maruyama Ichiro, has
remained in place since the coup.84
Elections could split the international community

Though there is broad international agreement that the conflict in Myanmar should
be resolved through negotiations and that any stable settlement must include some
element of democratic participation, the junta’s announced intention to hold an elec-
tion in the second half of 2023 has proved divisive. The NLD would probably boycott
the polls if given the opportunity, although regulations issued by the junta in January
2023 suggest that it will not be given the chance to do so. The polls are likely to be
cancelled in much of the country where the conflict makes voting impossible and, even
in other areas, polling stations could still come under attack from opponents of the
military regime.
ASEAN and the broader international community are split between those prepared
to maintain a hard line towards the junta and those that are wary of leaving the military
isolated for too long. An election designed to supplant the results of the freely conducted
2020 election – which the Myanmar Armed Forces’ proxy party lost – and marred by
violence could be seen by governments in favour of isolating the military regime as a
trigger for stronger sanctions. At the same time, some in China, India, Japan and Thailand
might see the election as an opportunity to turn the page on the preceding two years in the
hope that a new political equation in Myanmar will open up opportunities for progress
in resolving the country’s internal conflict and make engagement with the regime appear
less objectionable. The resulting disagreement would bring into sharp relief disagree-
ments within the Quad between the US and Australia on one side and India and Japan
on the other. By contrast, ASEAN member states are likely to continue to find creative
ways to bridge their differences, as any split in the bloc would threaten the organisation’s
convening role at the centre of the regional diplomatic architecture and thereby jeopardise
its influence over major-power diplomacy in the region. Once lost, this influence would be
difficult to regain.
NOTES
1 Amy Chew and Reuters, ‘Myanmar Coup: June 2022, https://myanmar.iiss.org/analysis/

Death Toll Passes 600 as Crackdown introduction.
Continues and Security Forces Detain 13 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the
Celebrities’, South China Morning Post, Politics of Ethnicity (New York: St Martin’s
8 April 2021, https://www.scmp.com/ Press, 1999), p. 121.
news/asia/southeast-asia/article/3128824/ 14 Htet Myet Min Tun, Moe Thuzar and Michael
myanmar-coup-death-toll-passes-600- Montesano, ‘Min Aung Hlaing and His
crackdown-continues-and. Generals: Data on the Military Members of
2 IISS, ‘Myanmar Conflict Map’, https://myanmar. Myanmar’s State Administration Council Junta’,
iiss.org/. Accessed March 2023. ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, ISEAS Perspectives,
3 UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 2669 (2022 no. 97, 23 July 2021, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/
Adopted by the Security Council at its 9231st articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2021-
meeting, on 21 December 2022’, S/RES/2669, 21 97-min-aung-hlaing-and-his-generals-data-on-
December 2022. See also ‘UN Security Council: the-military-members-of-myanmars-state-
Historic Censure of Myanmar Junta’, Human administration-council-junta-by-htet-myet-min-
Rights Watch, 21 December 2022, https://www. tun-moe-thuzar-and-michael-montesano/.
hrw.org/news/2022/12/21/un-security- 15 Ibid.
council-historic-censure-myanmar-junta. 16 Anthony Davis, ‘Prospects for a People’s War
4 See Noeleen Heyzer speaking at the 2022 IISS in Myanmar’, Asia Times, 6 August 2021, https://
Shangri-La Dialogue: IISS, ‘Special Session asiatimes.com/2021/08/prospects-for-a-peoples-
2: Myanmar: Finding a Way Forward’, war-in-myanmar/.
YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/ 17 Anthony Davis, ‘Myanmar’s Junta in a Serious
watch?v=KldI75Yzq1Y. but Not Desperate Fight’, Asia Times, 31 August
5 ‘Myanmar Coup: “Everything Will Be OK” 2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/08/myanmars-
Teenage Protester Mourned’, BBC News, 4 junta-in-a-serious-but-not-desperate-fight/.
March 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world- 18 Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, ‘Fatal
asia-56277165. Business: Supplying the Myanmar Military’s
6 ‘500 Days of Spring: The Kalay Protesters Who Weapon Production’, 16 January 2023, https://
Never Quit’, Frontier Myanmar, 3 June 2022, specialadvisorycouncil.org/wp-content/
https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/500-days- uploads/2023/01/SAC-M-REPORT-Fatal-
of-spring-the-kalay-protesters-who-never-quit/. Business-ENGLISH-1.pdf.
7 Joyce Sohyun Lee et al., ‘Anatomy of a 19 Davis, ‘Myanmar’s Junta in a Serious but Not
Crackdown: How Myanmar’s Military Desperate Fight’.
Terrorized Its People with Weapons of War’, 20 ‘“Around 1,500” Soldiers Have Defected and
Washington Post, 25 August 2021, https://www. Joined the Civil Disobedience Movement
washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/ Since Coup’, Myanmar Now, 17 August
myanmar-crackdown-military-coup/. 2021, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/
8 Joanne Lin and Moe Thuzar, ‘The Struggle for around-1500-soldiers-have-defected-and-joined-
International Recognition: Myanmar After the the-civil-disobedience-movement-since-coup.
2021 Coup’, Fulcrum, 12 December 2022, https:// 21 ‘Desperate Junta Recruitment Drive Leaves Delta
fulcrum.sg/the-struggle-for-international- Villagers Fearful – and in Debt’, Frontier Myanmar,
recognition-myanmar-after-the-2021-coup/. 19 August 2022, https://www.frontiermyanmar.
9 Ye Myo Hein, ‘Understanding the People’s net/en/desperate-junta-recruitment-drive-leaves-
Defense Forces in Myanmar’, United States delta-villagers-fearful-and-in-debt/.
Institute of Peace, 3 November 2022, https:// 22 These new militias are separate from and addi-
www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/under tional to militias formed before the coup, which
standing-peoples-defense-forces-myanmar. were largely splinter factions of EAOs. See John
10 Ibid. Buchanan, ‘Militias in Myanmar’, The Asia
11 Ibid. Foundation, July 2016, https://asiafoundation.
12 Shona Loong, ‘Post-coup Myanmar in Six org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Militias-in-
Warscapes’, IISS Myanmar Conflict Map, 10 Myanmar.pdf.
23 International Crisis Group, ‘Resisting the frontiermyanmar.net/en/cooperation-in-kayin-

Resistance: Myanmar’s Pro-military Pyusawhti turns-a-corner/. The number of troops in each
Militias’, Crisis Group Asia Briefing, no. 171, 6 column is unclear, and likely to be variable.
April 2022, https://www.crisisgroup. 36 Shona Loong, ‘Rakhine: A Precarious Ceasefire
org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/ Hangs in the Balance’, IISS Myanmar Conflict
resisting-resistance-myanmars-pro-military- Map, 26 July 2022, https://myanmar.iiss.org/
pyusawhti-militias. analysis/rakhine.
24 ‘Myanmar’s Anti-junta Unity Government 37 RFA Burmese, ‘Despite Rakhine Cease-
Forms “Defence Force”’, Reuters, 5 May 2021, fire, Myanmar Military Blocks Shipments
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/ of Aid, Fuel and Goods’, Radio Free Asia
myanmar-state-media-says-five-killed-blast- (RFA), 28 December 2022, https://www.
were-building-bomb-2021-05-05/. rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rakh-
25 Ye Myo Hein, ‘Understanding the People’s ine-blocked-12282022101234.html.
Defense Forces in Myanmar’. 38 Jason Tower, ‘The Limits of Beijing’s Support
26 Ibid., pp. 3–4. for Myanmar’s Military’, US Institute of Peace,
27 Ibid., p. 4. 24 February 2023, https://www.usip.org/
28 IISS, ‘Myanmar Conflict Map’. publications/2023/02/limits-beijings-support-
29 ‘Electricity Boycott Buckles in Yangon myanmars-military.
but Powers On in the Dry Zone’, 39 David Scott Mathieson, ‘Myanmar’s “Peace
Frontier Myanmar, 11 November 2022, Talks” a Dangerous Diversion’, Asia Times,
https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/ 7 July 2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/07/
electricity-boycott-buckles-in-yangon-but- myanmars-peace-talks-a-dangerous-diversion/;
powers-on-in-the-dry-zone/. Agence France-Presse (AFP), ‘China-backed
30 Khin Yi Yi Zaw, ‘Anti-Junta Forces Retreat After Myanmar Rebels Call on Junta to Embrace Peace
Holding Strategic River Village for Several Talks’, South China Morning Post, 31 May 2022,
Days’, Myanmar Now, 6 February 2023, https:// https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-
myanmar-now.org/en/news/anti-junta-forces- asia/article/3179904/china-backed-myanmar-
retreat-after-holding-strategic-river- rebels-call-junta-embrace-peace-talks.
village-for-several-days; and Anthony Davis, ‘Is 40 Mathieson, ‘Myanmar’s “Peace Talks” a
Myanmar’s Military Starting to Lose the War?’, Asia Dangerous Diversion’.
Times, 30 May 2022, https://asiatimes.com/2022/05/ 41 Shona Loong, ‘Northeast Myanmar: Three Axes of
is-myanmars-military-starting-to-lose-the-war/. Conflict’, IISS Myanmar Conflict Map, 16 August
31 ‘Myanmar Shadow Government Raises $132m 2022, https://myanmar.iiss.org/analysis/northeast.
to Oppose Junta’, Straits Times, 16 January 2022, 42 Linn Htin and May Yu, ‘Myanmar Junta Suffers
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/ Heavy Losses in KNLA–PDF Attacks on Bases
myanmar-shadow-government-raises-131m-to- in Karen State’, Myanmar Now, 10 January
oppose-junta; and Zachary Abuza, ‘The NUG’s 2023, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/
Economic War on Myanmar’s Military’, Stimson myanmar-junta-suffers-heavy-losses-in-knla-
Centre, 27 September 2022, https://www. pdf-attacks-on-bases-in-karen-state.
stimson.org/2022/the-nugs-economic-war-on- 43 Shona Loong, ‘Southeast Myanmar: A Shared
myanmars-military/. Struggle for Federal Democracy’, IISS Myanmar
32 International Crisis Group, ‘Crowdfunding a Conflict Map, 23 September 2022, https://
War: The Money Behind Myanmar’s Resistance’, myanmar.iiss.org/analysis/southeast.
Asia Report no. 328, 20 December 2022, https:// 44 IISS, ‘Myanmar Conflict Map’.
www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/ 45 ‘Myanmar Emergency Overview Map’, UN
myanmar/328-crowdfunding-war-money- High Commissioner for Refugees, 16 January
behind-myanmars-resistance. 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/
33 Ibid. details/98182.
34 Ye Myo Hein, ‘Understanding the People’s 46 See ‘Thailand’, UN High Commissioner for
Defense Forces in Myanmar’, p. 5. Refugees, https://www.unhcr.org/thailand.html.
35 ‘Cooperation in Kayin Turns a Corner’, Frontier 47 Emily Fishbein et al., ‘“Our Hearts Are on Fire”:
Myanmar, 12 January 2023, https://www. Hpakant Airstrikes Fuel Kachin Revolutionary
Spirit’, Frontier Myanmar, 2 November 2022, Now, 9 July 2021, https://myanmar-now.org/en/

https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/ news/jewellery-store-owned-by-junta-minister-
our-hearts-are-on-fire-hpakant-airstrikes-fuel- bombed-in-yangon.
kachin-revolutionary-spirit/. 61 Shona Loong, ‘The Dry Zone: An Existential
48 Meg Kelly, Shibani Mahtani and Joyce Sohyun Struggle in Central Myanmar’, IISS Myanmar
Lee, ‘“Burn It All Down”: How Myanmar’s Conflict Map, 5 July 2022, https://myanmar.iiss.
Military Razed Villages to Crush a Growing org/analysis/dryzone.
Resistance’, Washington Post, 23 December 62 Ye Myo Hein, ‘One Year On: The Momentum of
2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ Myanmar’s Armed Rebellion’, Wilson Centre,
interactive/2021/myanmar-military-burn- May 2022, pp. 60–61, https://www.wilsoncenter.
villages-tatmadaw/. org/publication/one-year-momentum-
49 ‘Myanmar Emergency Overview Map’, UN myanmars-armed-rebellion.
High Commissioner for Refugees. 63 IISS, ‘Myanmar Conflict Map’.
50 Ibid. 64 Ye Myo Hein, ‘Understanding the People’s Defense
51 Loong, ‘Northeast Myanmar: Three Axes Forces in Myanmar’, p. 5. For sub-machine guns,
of Conflict’. see Nora Aung, ‘Myanmar Resistance Groups Get
52 David Brenner, Rebel Politics: A Political Sociology Creative to Manufacture Weapons’, Irrawaddy, 31
of Armed Struggle in Myanmar’s Borderlands (Ithaca, May 2022, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/
NY: Cornell University Press, 2019), pp. 75–96. burma/myanmar-resistance-groups-get-
53 ‘KIO/A Seizes Prominent Burma Army creative-to-manufacture-weapons.html.
Mountaintop Camp in Kachin State’, Burma 65 Loong, ‘The Dry Zone: An Existential Struggle
News International, 26 March 2022, https://www. in Central Myanmar’.
bnionline.net/en/news/kioa-seizes-prominent- 66 Loong, ‘Northwest Myanmar: A Quiet Corner
burma-army-mountaintop-camp-kachin-state. Transformed by Resistance’.
54 Billy Ford and Ye Myo Hein, ‘For Myanmar, 67 Myanmar Emergency Overview Map’, UNHCR,
the Only Path to Stability Runs Through Its 13 February 2023, https://data.unhcr.org/en/
Web of Resistance Forces’, US Institute of documents/details/98862.
Peace, 1 December 2022, https://www.usip.org/ 68 Zubaidah Abdul Jalil, ‘Myanmar: Military
publications/2022/12/myanmar-only-path- Executes Four Democracy Activists Including
stability-runs-through-its-web-resistance-forces. Ex-MP’, BBC News, 25 July 2022, https://www.
55 Shona Loong, ‘Northwest Myanmar: A Quiet bbc.com/news/world-asia-62287815.
Corner Transformed by Resistance’, IISS 69 ‘How Myanmar’s Coup Has Left Thousands in
Myanmar Conflict Map, 15 November 2022, Yangon Homeless’, Myanmar Now, 10 January
https://myanmar.iiss.org/analysis/northwest. 2023, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/
56 Emily Fishbein, ‘Chin Nationalism “Blossoms” how-myanmars-coup-has-left-thousands-in-
on Northwestern Front Against Junta’, Frontier yangon-homeless.
Myanmar, 9 January 2023, https://www. 70 Loong, ‘The Dry Zone: An Existential Struggle
frontiermyanmar.net/en/chin-nationalism- in Central Myanmar’.
blossoms-on-northwestern-front-against-junta/. 71 Ibid.
57 Loong, ‘Northwest Myanmar: A Quiet Corner 72 ‘Arakanese, Kokang Groups Pledge Support
Transformed by Resistance’. for Fellow Alliance Member TNLA on Ta’ang
58 Ibid. National Revolution Day’, Burma News
59 ‘Mindat PAF Reopens Primary Schools in International, 14 January 2023, https://www.
the Shadow of Conflict’, Democratic Voice of bnionline.net/en/news/arakanese-kokang-
Burma, 27 October 2021, https://burmese.dvb. groups-pledge-support-fellow-alliance-member-
no/archives/496592. tnla-taang-national-revolution.
60 See, for example, ‘Jewellery Store Owned by 73 Loong, ‘Rakhine: A Precarious Ceasefire Hangs
Junta Minister Bombed in Yangon’, Myanmar in the Balance’.
74 Loong, ‘Northeast Myanmar: Three Axes documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/

of Conflict’. G21/031/62/PDF/G2103162.pdf?OpenElement.
75 Andrew Nachemson, ‘China’s Xi Turns to 80 Tan Hui Yee, ‘Myanmar’s Anti-coup Groups
Myanmar as He Pushes for “Belt and Road” Denounce Asean Consensus’, Straits Times, 26
Plan’, Al-Jazeera, 17 January 2020, https:// April 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/
www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/1/17/ se-asia/myanmars-anti-coup-groups-denounce-
chinas-xi-turns-to-myanmar-as-he-pushes-for- asean-consensus.
belt-and-road-plan. 81 ‘China’s Ambassador to Myanmar Says
76 Bertil Lintner, ‘Why Myanmar’s Wa Always Situation “Not What China Wants to See”’,
Get What They Want’, Asia Times, 18 September Reuters, 16 February 2021, https://www.reuters.
2019, https://asiatimes.com/2019/09/why- com/article/us-myanmar-politics-china-idUSKB
myanmars-wa-always-get-what-they-want/. N2AG1AA.
77 Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, ‘Arakan Army Extends 82 Kallol Bhattacherjee, ‘India to Handover Kilo Class
Administrative Grip on Rakhine State’, Attack Submarine to Myanmar’, Hindu, 16 October
Frontier Myanmar, 6 August 2021, https://www. 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/
frontiermyanmar.net/en/arakan-army-extends- india-to-handover-kilo-class-attack-submarine-
administrative-grip-on-rakhine-state/. to-myanmar/article32866535.ece; and Dinakar
78 ASEAN, ‘ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on the Peri, ‘Indian Navy’s MILAN Exercise to Be Held
Developments in the Republic of the Union of in Visakhapatnam from February 25’, Hindu, 23
Myanmar’, 1 February 2021, https://asean.org/ February 2022, https://www.thehindu.com/news/
asean-chairmans-statement-on-the-developments- national/warships-from-quad-various-other-
in-the-republic-of-the-union-of-myanmar-2/. countries-to-take-part-in-indian-navys-largest-
79 See France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign multilateral-exercise-milan/article65077573.ece.
Affairs, ‘Myanmar – G7 Foreign Ministers’ 83 Gwen Robinson, ‘Diplomatic Snubs Isolate
Statement (03 February 2021)’, 3 February 2021, Myanmar’s Military Regime’, Nikkei Asia, 9
https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/ May 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/
myanmar/news/article/myanmar-g7-for- Myanmar-Crisis/Diplomatic-snubs-isolate-
eign-ministers-statement-03-feb-2021; ‘Japan, US, Myanmar-s-military-regime. Malaysia and the
India, Australia Call for Return of Democracy in Philippines have likewise chosen not to replace
Myanmar’, Reuters, 18 February 2021, https:// outgoing ambassadors, while Brunei sent a new
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-blinken- ambassador in 2022 then withdrew the diplomat.
quad-myanmar-idUSKBN2AI20K; and UN 84 Sebastian Strangio, ‘Australia to Downgrade
Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights Diplomatic Representation in Myanmar: Report’,
Implications of the Crisis in Myanmar’, Human Diplomat, 19 May 2022, https://thediplomat.
Rights Council Twenty-ninth special session, com/2022/05/australia-to-downgrade-diplomatic-
A/HRC/S-29/L.1, 12 February 2021, https:// representation-in-myanmar-report/.
INDEX
A Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 92–109, 93, 95,

97, 99, 101, 107
Abe Shinzo 118, 122
Central Asia 93, 98–100
Afghanistan 25, 34, 67, 73, 99 South Asia 93, 96–98
aircraft carriers 64, 69–70, 70–71, 72–73, 75–78, 80 South Pacific 93, 100–101
anti–ship missiles 66–67, 69, 72, 76, 81, 123, 124 Southeast Asia 93, 94–96
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASE- Coast Guard 69, 77

AN) 6, 94, 140, 151–153, 152–153, 155 Digital Silk Road (DSR) 93–94, 105, 107
AUKUS pact 13, 49–50, 65, 73 Global Development Initiative (GDI) 101–102
Global Initiative on Data Security (GDSI)
Australia 6, 8, 13, 14, 22, 23, 49–50, 65, 79, 100,
101–102, 102, 107
101, 107, 108, 127, 129, 129, 155
Global Security Initiative (GSI) 101, 103
Royal Australian Navy 13, 65, 73–74, 77–79, 81
Maritime Silk Road 92
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 64,
B 68–71, 70–71, 76–77, 82
ballistic missile defence (BMD) 74, 78, 124 Russia, relations with 31–33, 82, 105
Bangladesh 97, 153 US sanctions, response to 55
western investment in 45
Bhutan 97
Chinese Communist Party 44–46, 48, 53–54, 56,
Biden administration 33–34, 47–50, 51–52,
104–105
57–58, 126–127
climate change 68, 102
Blinken, Antony 47, 52
Cook Islands 101
Brunei 95, 152
COVID-19 46, 99–100, 102, 105
C cruisers 32, 67, 70, 72, 74, 81 see also Renhai–class
cruisers; Zumwalt–class cruisers
Cambodia 23, 77, 94, 95, 95, 106
Canada 78, 154

D
China 6, 8, 12–16, 23, 24, 31–35, 32, 44–58,
destroyers 32, 70, 72–74, 76, 81
64–65, 65, 81, 92–109, 107, 119, 120, 145, 150,
153–154 Duterte, Rodrigo 15
INDEX 161
E Huawei 46, 48, 51, 106
Entities List (US Department of Commerce) human rights 102–103

51–53
hypersonic weapons 50, 67, 72, 74, 123, 124
European Union (EU) 50, 81, 154
Global Gateway 107, 108–109 I
Strategy for Connecting Europe and Asia
India 6, 8, 13, 14, 23, 29, 65, 68–69, 76, 108, 129,
107–108, 107
153–154
Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
Belt and Road Initiative and, 96–97, 97
(2021) 81, 131
Russia, relations with 22, 23, 29–31,
29
F
Indonesia 14, 76, 94–95, 95
F–35s 16, 72, 74, 123
integrated air and missile defence (IAMD)
Fiji 101 123–124, 123, 127
France 34, 50, 65, 80, 81, 81 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 120,
121
freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs)
57, 77, 79 Iran 82
frigates 32, 73–76, 80
Fujian aircraft carrier 64, 70, 70–71

J
Japan 6, 8, 14, 14–15, 16, 22, 23, 35, 50, 54–55, 65,
65, 78–79, 106–108, 107, 118–132, 123, 129, 155
G
counterstrike capability 50, 74, 124–125,
G7 104, 107, 108–109, 151 127, 129
Germany 25, 34, 80, 99 exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 120, 121
Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) 128 Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) 74, 78,
81, 125
Guam 78
National Security Strategy (NSS) (2022) 118,
121–122
H Self-Defense Force (JSDF) 122–126, 129–130
Hambantota Port 105–106 Yoshida Doctrine 131–132
HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier 72, 80

K P
Kazakhstan 98, 99, 100 Pakistan 23, 76, 96–98, 97, 106
Kiribati 101, 101 Papua New Guinea 100–101, 101, 106
Kishida Fumio 22, 35, 50, 118–132 Pelosi, Nancy 33, 56, 121
Kuril Islands 28, 118 Philippines 14, 15, 76, 79, 95, 95, 127–128, 129
Kyrgyzstan 99, 100 Putin, Vladimir 24, 30–32, 154
L Q
Laos 94, 95–96, 95 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) 6, 13,
29, 33, 49, 96, 107, 151, 155
Large-deck amphibious ships (LHDs) 70–74, 78
Liaoning aircraft carrier 69, 70–71

R
Renhai-class cruisers 67, 81
M
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise 78, 129
main battle tanks (MBTs) 25–26, 73
rules–based international order 12, 35, 50–51,
Malabar exercises 78
77, 93, 131
Malaysia 14, 95, 95
Russia 12, 13, 22–35, 31, 58, 65, 82, 105, 118, 119,
Maldives 97, 97 140, 154
Marcos, Ferdinand Jr 15 Asia–Pacific arms sales 28–30, 29

Asia–Pacific military activities 28, 32
Micronesia, Federated States of 100, 101
Maritime Doctrine (2022) 82
Min Aung Hlaing 140, 143, 151–154
Modi, Narendra 13, 29, 31 S

Mongolia 23, 99 Samoa 100–101, 101
Moon Jae–in 14 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 121, 125–126
Moskva, sinking of 26, 66 Shandong aircraft carrier 69, 70–71
Myanmar 6, 14, 95–96, 95, 140–155, 141 Singapore 14, 16, 22, 23, 75–76, 95, 95
Dry Zone 141, 143, 147, 148–149, 149
Solomon Islands 77, 100–101, 101
ethno-national movements in 140, 145,
147–148, 150–151 South China Sea 15, 27, 50, 67, 68, 71, 78
international sanctions on 154–155 South Korea 6, 8, 14–15, 14, 22, 23, 24, 28, 34–35,
Rakhine 145, 150–151, 150 54, 65, 65, 75–76, 78, 81, 155
see also United Nations: resolutions on Sri Lanka 96–97, 97, 105–106, 129
Myanmar
SSNs see nuclear–powered attack submarines
(SSNs)
N
submarine–launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)
NATO 23–24, 34–35, 50–51 71, 75, 120
Madrid Summit 35, 120 Suga Yoshihide 120
Nepal 96–98, 97
Netherlands, the 54, 80 T

New Zealand 22, 23, 35, 100 Taiwan 6, 8, 14, 15, 25, 27, 33, 48–49, 50, 54,
55–58, 75, 120–121, 123
Niue 101
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
North Korea 6, 14–15, 24, 28, 75 Company (TSMC) 52, 54
missile testing 24, 78, 120, 121, 124
Taiwan Strait 50, 56–57, 57, 58, 78–79, 120, 120, 126
nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) 13,
Tajikistan 99
50, 65, 73, 78, 80
INDEX 163
Thailand 14, 95, 96, 146, 152–153 trade policies 45–47, 45, 47
Tomahawk cruise missiles 72, 74, 123, 124 Ukraine war (2022–present) 6, 13, 22–35, 58,
105–106, 118, 121, 131
Tonga 68, 100, 101
aid to Ukraine 22–23, 23, 25–26
Trump administration 45–46, 49, 51, 56–57, 108
information war 27–28
Tsai Ing–wen 27, 56 intelligence disclosures 25
Turkiye 26 maritime sphere 26, 66
nuclear deterrents in 23–24
U see also United Nations: resolutions on Ukraine
uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) 23, 66, 72, 123 USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier 70–71, 78
uninhabited surface vessels (USVs) 66, 71, 72, 123 Uzbekistan 98, 99
uninhabited underwater vehicles (UUVs) 67

V
United Kingdom 13, 25, 34, 65, 65, 79, 80–81, 81,
127, 131 Vanuatu 100, 101
‘Indo–Pacific tilt’ (2021) 34, 81 Vietnam 14, 15–16, 23, 29, 29, 76, 94, 95, 96
United Nations Virginia-class submarines 13, 67
Myanmar, resolutions on 140, 151, 154
Ukraine, resolutions on 12, 13, 22–23, 30–31 W
United States 6, 8, 12–16, 25, 33–35, 44–58, Wagner Group 24, 31
48–49, 64–65, 65, 81, 104, 107, 107–108,
126–127, 129
Coast Guard 79
X
Marine Corps (USMC) 72–74 Xi Jinping 31, 44, 47, 53, 56, 57–58, 92
National Defense Authorization Act 48, 57
National Defense Strategy (2022) 64, 77 Y
Navy 67, 69–71, 70–71, 73, 77–79, 82 Yoon Suk–yeol 14–15, 24
‘One China’ policy 56–57
sanctions by 29, 31–33, 48, 55, 57–58 see Z
also Entities List (US Department of
Commerce) Zelenskyy, Volodymyr 27
technological rivalry with China 45, 46, Zumwalt-class cruisers 67

48–49, 50–51, 51–55 see also Huawei
IISS
an strategic dossier THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES an strategic dossier
ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2023 Key developments and trends

The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment examines key regional security issues
relevant to the policy-focused discussions of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s
premier defence summit convened by the International Institute for Strategic
Studies. It is published and launched at the Dialogue and the issues analysed
within its covers are central to discussions at the event.
Since February 2022, the war in Ukraine has provided a bleak backdrop for
discussions about international security. While the war has affected many aspects
of security and defence in the Asia-Pacific, the region also has its own dynamics,
and important security-related developments have occurred there since the
invasion. Among these, China’s ever-growing power and increasingly assertive
posture remain the leading long-term challenges for the region.
This tenth edition of the Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment contains an
introduction and six chapters, all authored by IISS experts, which investigate SECURITY ASSESSMENT
important dimensions of the regional security environment, supported by maps,
graphs, charts and tables. Topics include:
the war in Ukraine and the Asia-Pacific balance of power
strained US−China relations and the growing threat to Taiwan
Asia-Pacific naval and maritime capabilities
China’s Belt and Road Initiative
2023
Japanese security and defence policy
the conflict in Myanmar and the international response
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

The IISS, founded in 1958, is an independent centre for research, information and debate
on the problems of conflict, however caused, that have, or potentially have, an important
military content.

Arundel House | 6 Temple Place | London | wc2r 2pg | UK
t. +44 (0) 20 7379 7676 f. +44 (0) 20 7836 3108 e. iiss@iiss.org w. www.iiss.org
The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Americas

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The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Asia
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t. +65 6499 0055 f. +65 6499 0059 e. iiss-asia@iiss.org
The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Middle East
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t. +973 1718 1155 f. +973 1710 0155 e. iiss-middleeast@iiss.org
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THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

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IISS

ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 2023 Key developments and trends

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

The International Institute for Strategic Studies – Americas

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

DIRECTOR-GENERAL AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE Dr John Chipman

© 2023 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

Printed and bound in the UK by Hobbs the Printers Ltd.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

ISBN 978-1-03-259444-6 (pbk)

About The International Institute for Strategic Studies

ASBM anti-ship ballistic missile

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASW anti-submarine warfare

BMD ballistic missile defence

BRI Belt and Road Initiative

CCG China Coast Guard

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the US

CPEC China–Pakistan Economic Corridor

DBP Defense Buildup Program (Japan)

DSR Digital Silk Road

EEZ exclusive economic zone

FONOP freedom-of-navigation operation

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

INDOPACOM US Indo-Pacific Command

IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile

JSDF Japan Self-Defense Forces

MBT main battle tank

NUG National Unity Government (Myanmar)

PAFMM People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia

PDF People’s Defence Force (Myanmar)

PLA (Chinese) People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF PLA Air Force

PLAN PLA Navy

Quad Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

RAA reciprocal access agreement

SAC State Administration Council (Myanmar)

THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense

UAV uninhabited aerial vehicle

USV uninhabited surface vehicle

UUV uninhabited underwater vehicle

THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND THE THREAT TO TAIWAN

of when China will possess the necessary

by a consideration of likely US and allied

of the island. However, Chinese attempts to

THE WIDER STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FROM CHINA

gies of Australia, Japan and the US have seen

currently held by countries considered to be in financial distress. Consequently, Nouwens

JAPAN’S DETERIORATING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: CHINA, RUSSIA AND NORTH KOREA

record for a single year. However, while in Bhutan      

March 2022 North Korea ended its self-im- Brunei      

posed moratorium on testing nuclear devices, Cambodia      

a year later it had failed to conduct its China      

evident during 2022 and the first half of 2023: Maldives      

the preference of many regional states to try Mongolia      