Schmeck (1988) Learning Strategies and Learning Styles
Schmeck (1988) Learning Strategies and Learning Styles
Schmeck (1988) Learning Strategies and Learning Styles
An Introduction to Strategies
and Styles of Learning
RONALD RAY SCHMECK
WHAT I5 LEARNING?
authors of this text would agree that teachers should consider ways of
stimulating greater varieties of neural activity (e.g., thinking and prob-
lem solving) in the classroom—perhaps focusing less on literal repeti-
tion and recitation. Sim ple repetition is deceptively rewarding since
something observable is accomplished, but what is might,
in reality, contribute very little to the overall development of the indi-
vidual, In this latter regard, all of the authors argue in one way or
another for a definiton of learrung that includes integration of mental
contents and functions to promote versatility and formation of indi-
viduality
and personal identity.
quiet;
I cannot hear the performers.” It is often the case that the student
already knows how to say “Sir, will you please,” etc. The real problem
is, because of dependence and fear of rejection, he or she doesn’t really
want to make that statement. This then is a higher-level tachcal and
strategic problem rather than a skill problem, and traming programs
alten failed to recognize the distinction. When individuals are already
capable of employing a skill, they don’t need training, they need educa-
tion concerned with plans, strategies, and responsibility. Kirby points
out that sometimes the problem is indeed one of insufficient practice
with a skill, and then training
is in fact called for In this regard, Wein-
stein (Chapter 11) provides an excellent description of a proven behav-
ioral training program for developing learning skills.
Before turning to the labels style, approack, and orientation, we need
to consider the berm process, as used by Das and Kirby. A process occurs
at the most specific, neurological level of analysis and is even more
specific, or less molar, than a behavior Styles, strategies, tactics, and
skills are all, theoretically, composed of processes. The question is, what
level of analysis does one prefer? At the most differentiated and ana-
lyzed level we have processes, and at less differentiated and more gen-
eral levels we have strategies and styles.
Both Das and Kirby dishnguish between coding and Planning pro-
cesses, with coding involving the more literal recording of experience
and planning involving integration of codes. Das and Kirby als
also dis-
tinguish between simultaneous and successive coding processes, with
simultaneous
coding processes being more gestaltic
or global and suc-
cessiie processes being more sequential
or serial. Also, both Das and
Kirby suggest that individuals may be more proficient in the more-
analytic successive processes or the more-global simultaneous processes
and that this can contribute to the style-hke quality of them behavior.
There is yet another term more general than strategy. That term is
style, and | turn now to its definihon and then to an important distinc-
tion between style and approach.
COGNITIVE STYLES
Escalona and Heider (1959) state with regard to their extensive de-
velopmental
study of behavior:
As one notes behavioral alterations from infancy to—in the case of our
study—later preschool ages, one knows that not a single behavior has re-
mained
the same, yet one ia strock
with the inherent continuity of behavioral
style and of the child's pattern of adeptation (p 9 italies added)
lf ever we observe that an individual has an inclination to use the same
CHAPTER 4
Learning Strategies,
Teaching Strategies, and
Conceptual or Learning Style
GORDON PASK
From the mid- to late 1960s, Bran Lewis, Bernard Scott, and | conjec-
tured that learning strategies, teaching strategies, and even plans of
action have characteristic types which can be differentiated (Lewis &
Pask, 1964, 1965; Pask, 1961, 1970, 1972; Pask & Lewis, 1968, Pask d&
Scott, 1971, 1972, 1973) Individual difference psychologies have main-
tained a similar stance and with greater precision regarding the nature of
strategies. An overview of the approach taken by my own group in the
1960s is described in the remainder of this section. Learning
and teach-
ing strategies can, under appropriate circumstances, be substantially
exteriorized
or externalized for observation. Protocols
can serve this
purpose, but we used maplike representations of what may be known or
learned. These representations were open to continuous evolution as
further topics and relations between them were added by learners,
Later, these representations were seen to be marupulable systemat-
ically and without the imposition of rules that insult freedom of thought
or creativity (about mid-1970s). The maps and representations of topics
(communicable, shared, or public concepts, rather than personal con-
consist
of simple trees, a hierarchical
branching and looping, and they
may or may not employ analogies as structures They often involve the
creation of analogies, and they may employ or create generalizations.
A styleis a disposition bo adopt one class of learning strategy or one
class of teaching strategy in the conversation of a butorial. In an art
school, this 5 usually by demonstration. Ina high school, it 15 usually by
verbal communication or laboratory experience. The question remains,
to whom does this stylistic disposition belong? Individual difference
psychologists seem to take it for granted that the unitary, partly autono-
mous unit “owning” a disposition and opting for one or the other class
of strategy
is a person. Of course, this may be so, but a broader perspec-
tive is needed if we are to make sense of the facts. Conversation Theory
offers one such broader perspective. In this theory, we speofy an indi-
vidual (a psychological individual, or P-Individual) as partly autono-
mous. The P-Individual is ‘only partly autonomous because he or she is
open to the information transfer of a concept-sharing conversation be-
tween persons
or between mental organizations in one person (both, in
our sense, P-Individuals),
“P-Individual” may appear chimsy, but the idea is essential because
it allows one of the symmetries of Conversation Theory to exist. There
can be many P-Indrviduals within one person (when | take different and
possibly conflicting viewpoints) as well asa P-Individual that 1s made up
of many persons, such as a school of thought or a religion.
The techmcal cntena of “organizational closure’ and “informa-
tional openness,” underlying this distinction, are hardly in the province
of this paper. Likewise, there are very thorough technical criteria that
underlie the theory's usage of the term wndersianding, already noted as a
specific indicator of concept sharing. The interested reader will find a
review in Pask (1983), which also gives reference to expositions in cyber-
netic, mathemabcal and logical terms. The basic ideas are, however,
quite familiar in ordinary language. A P-Individual is a personna; an
understanding is the ability of two or more P-Individuals to exchange
“what,” “how,” and “why by that method” questions and to provide
mutually satisfactory replies. Such a transaction, which embodies the
shghtly refined common meaning of understanding, is a concept-shar-
ing act Of course, the agreement over an understanding need not be
and often is not complete; for example, your concept of “tortoise” or
“knitting” may be quite different from mine, Hence, agreement must be
taken to include agreement to disagree, with some knowledge of why
and how we disagree. [f there is some agreement and some concept
sharing, then your personal concept of “tortoise” and my personal con-
cept of “tortoise” are mutually ennched by whatever is shared in di-
alogue. Further, a shared or public concept of “tortoise,” some of it