MODULE 1 - CASES 1-19 - Digests

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | COMPILATION OF MODULE 1 CASES
ARTICLE 1-10
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN
VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915

December 29, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause the
publication of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders, in the Official Gazette.
Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a
rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
The SC, in its decision in 1985, affirmed the necessity of the publication of the presidential issuances
which are of general application. Petitioners then moved for reconsideration/clarification asserting that the
clause “unless it is otherwise provided” meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative.
ISSUE:
Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the presidential issuances in
question.
HELD:
YES. Publication of presidential issuances at bar is an indispensable requirement for their effectivity
despite the special provisions as to the date they are to take effect.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one
year after such publication.” The phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. All statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
In the case at bar, the SC held that all presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity.
On the other hand, interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Therefore, the Court declared that all laws aforementioned shall be published in full in the Official Gazette
to become effective in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Ref: https://legalassassins.com/tanada-vs-tuvera/
G.R. No. 80718

January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
respondents.
FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and the death of Bernal’s daughter. De Roy
claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s counsel filed a motion for
extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs
Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because said ruling
was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding.
HELD:
No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of a counsel as
a lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
Ref: https://uberdigests.info/2010/11/de-roy-vs-court-of-appeals/
People vs Que Po Lay Case Digest

G.R. No. L-6791
Facts:
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20. The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of
foreign exchange failed to sell to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt
of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. He appeals basing on the claim that said circular
No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette and that consequently, said circular had no force and
effect.
Issues:
Whether there was a need for a publication of the said circular to make it effective? Whether the
respondent is guilty of violating the said Circular 20?
Held:
The Court agrees that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and
notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that
laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required
by law to be of no force and effect.
Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in
question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this,
on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties. The Court further contends that appellant could not be held
liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign
exchange in his possession thereof.
Ref: http://ayelaxing.blogspot.com/2012/06/persons-and-family-relations-gr-no-l_25.html
National Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo Commercial

G.R. No. 176006 March 26, 2010
Facts:
NPC Circular No. 99-755 dated October 8, 1999 set the guidelines in the “disposal of scrap aluminum
conductor steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC
installations and to generate additional income for NPC.” Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular provide:
3. QUALIFIED BIDDERS
3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this circular are partnerships or corporations that directly use
aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of
aluminum, or their duly appointed representatives. These bidders may be based locally or
overseas.
In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap
ACSR7 cables. Respondent Pinatubo Commercial, a trader of scrap materials such as copper, aluminum,
steel and other ferrous and non-ferrous materials, submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC. Pinatubo,
however, was informed in a letter dated April 29, 2003 that its application for pre-qualification had been
denied. Petitioner asked for reconsideration, but NPC denied it.
The RTC upheld Pinatubo’s position and declared items 3 and 3.1 of the circular unconstitutional. The
RTC ruled that it was violative of substantive due process because, while it created rights in favor of third
parties, the circular had not been published. It also pronounced that the circular violated the equal
protection clause since it favored manufacturers and processors of aluminum scrap vis-à-vis
dealers/traders in the purchase of aluminum ACSR cables from NPC. Lastly, the RTC found that the
circular denied traders the right to exercise their business and restrained free competition inasmuch as it
allowed only a certain sector to participate in the bidding.
In this petition, NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not of general
application. It was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal
committees, heads of offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs. NPC
also contends that there was a substantial distinction between manufacturers and traders of aluminum
scrap materials specially viewed in the light of RA 7832.13 According to NPC, by limiting the prospective
bidders to manufacturers, it could easily monitor the market of its scrap ACSRs. There was rampant
fencing of stolen NPC wires. NPC likewise maintains that traders were not prohibited from participating in
the pre-qualification as long as they had a tie-up with a manufacturer.
Issue:
Whether National Power Corporation (NPC) Circular No. 99-75 had to be published?
Principles:
1. National Power Corporation (NPC) Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published.
In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule or
regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by
the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to
qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the different NPC
personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS.
It also provided for the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the award,
mode of payment and release of awarded scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC
personnel involved in the bidding and award of scrap ACSRs.
It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not involved in the
bidding process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally.
2. Pinatubo’s argument that items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 deprived it of its “right to bid” or
that these conferred such right in favor of a third person is erroneous.
Bidding, in its comprehensive sense, means making an offer or an invitation to prospective contractors
whereby the government manifests its intention to invite proposals for the purchase of supplies, materials
and equipment for official business or public use, or for public works or repair. Bidding rules may specify
other conditions or require that the bidding process be subjected to certain reservations or qualifications.
Since a bid partakes of the nature of an offer to contract with the government, the government agency
involved may or may not accept it.
Moreover, being the owner of the property subject of the bid, the government has the power to determine
who shall be its recipient, as well as under what terms it may be awarded. In this sense, participation in
the bidding process is a privilege inasmuch as it can only be exercised under existing criteria imposed by
the government itself. As such, prospective bidders, including Pinatubo, cannot claim any demandable
right to take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Thus, it has been stated that under the traditional
form of property ownership, recipients of privileges or largesse from the government cannot be said to
have property rights because they possess no traditionally recognized proprietary interest therein.
Ref: https://batasfilipinas.com/case-digest-national-power-corporation-vs-pinatubo-commercial/
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

G.R.No. 180643, March 25 2008
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she instructed him
not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, he
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions
on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him
to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covered by executive privilege.
RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications privilege. It pertains
to “communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and
deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of
separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
- i.e., the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the
President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President
or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and
by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is
no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Ref: http://skinnycases.blogspot.com/2013/10/neri-vs-senate-committee-on.html
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information

G.R. No. 170338, 23 December 2008
FACTS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the Senate to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the wiretapped communication of then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. Respondents justify
their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never
been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page, invoking R.A. No. 8792.
ISSUE
Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is a
substantial compliance of the constitutional requirement of publication.
RULING
NO. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of
a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure.
Ref:
https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2015/07/31/garcillano-v-house-of-representatives-committee-on-public-inf
ormation-g-r-no-170338-23-december-2008/
G.R. NO. 187714; MARCH 8, 2011

CASE DIGEST: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
FACTS:
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics
Committee to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5
Extension Project. After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics
Committee was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee,
prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee
in another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and
not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved
that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole,
which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the
application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also
questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on
the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUES:
[1] Is Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, an indispensable party in this
petition?
[2] Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort?
[3] Is the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection?
[4] Is the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art.
VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution?
[5] Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their effectivity?
HELD:
[1] An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In this case,
Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court. While it may be true that
she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution 706, the issues in this
case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which
can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.
[2] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented here do not
require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary,
the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.
[3] While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members alleged irregular or unethical conduct is
within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the
investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the
investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics
Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate, and not violative of the right to
equal protection.
[4] The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not
violate Senator Villar's right to due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own
rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution, which states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
[5] The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules
of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules
need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take
effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that
the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Ref: https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2017/05/pimentel-v-senate-committee-gr-no-187714.html
Valeroso vs. People

546 SCRA 450
G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house of his children
located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was roused from his slumber when four
(4) heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. They trained their guns at him and pulled him
out of the room.
They then tied his hands and placed him near the faucet. The raiding team went back inside and
searched and ransacked the room. SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him. Moments later, an
operative came out of the room and exclaimed, “Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!”
Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that “we are authorized to shoot you because there’s a shoot to kill
order against you, so if you are planning do so something, do it right now.” He was also told that there
was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, he was not shown any proof when he asked for it. Neither
was the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.
According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The gun seized from him was
duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He was, however, unable to present the documentation
relative to the firearm because it was confiscated by the police.
Petitioner further lamented that when he was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of
a counsel. Neither was he allowed to see or talk to his family.
Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still with the Narcotics
Command, he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-related investigation
involving friends of the said police officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the head of the unit that conducted the
search in his boarding house.
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to petitioner a Memorandum Receipt
dated July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction
of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature34 on the said receipt.
Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested, testified that on July
10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered his room as he was preparing for school.They grabbed his
shoulder and led him out. During all those times, a gun was poked at him. He was asked where petitioner
was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioner’s room.
Four (4) policemen then entered the room. He witnessed how they pointed a gun at petitioner, who was
clad only in his underwear. He also witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner out of his room. While a
policeman remained near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went back inside the room. They
began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker, which yielded the subject firearm.
Issue: Whether penal laws may have a retroactive application?
Principles:
1. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character
of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the
accused.
According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of the offender, “but founded on the very
principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and
regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of
strict justice.” Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in
its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D.
No. 1866.
2. Elements of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition:

In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the twin
elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused
who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it.
3. Either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of illegal firearms.
As for petitioner’s lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification of the
Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp
Crame revealed that the seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a
certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.
As proof, Deriquito presented a certification signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the same office.
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification
from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a
licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution more than complied when it presented both.
4. Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like policemen are accorded
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties, it is only a presumption; it may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it proved that the issuance to petitioner of
the Memorandum Receipt was anything but regular. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the
Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col.
Moreno.
However, a reading of Timbol’s testimony on cross-examination would reveal that there was an
unusual facility by which said receipt was issued to petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual
necessary bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under questionable
circumstances.
5. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even without its
presentation at trial. There may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented during
trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered
in evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as to its existence.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were offered in evidence
by the prosecution. Even assuming arguendo that they were not offered, petitioner’s stance must still fail.
The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even without its presentation at
trial. In People v. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82 (1994), the non-presentation of the pistol did not prevent the
conviction of the accused.
The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao, 423 SCRA 34 (2004). As previously
stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were established through the
testimony of SPO2 Disuanco. Yuson also identified said firearm.
Petitioner even admitted its existence. We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an
unlicensed firearm is presented during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for
example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as to its
existence.
Ref: https://batasfilipinas.com/case-digest-valeroso-vs-people/
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB),
ALFONSO MAGLAYA, ANGELINA MAGLAYA P. REYES, JORGE C. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE
LEON, VICTORIANO ACAYA, FLORENCIA CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTO,
SANTIAGO TAMONAN, APOLONIA TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON, NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ,
NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO, FELICIDAD GARCIA, ANA ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE
NARAWAL, represented by their duly authorized Attorney-in-Fact, CORAZON DE LEON AND
SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND CARMEN SEBASTIAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 104528

January 18, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondents were the buyers on installment of subdivision lots from the subdivision developer,
Marikina Village Inc. Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the
subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, PNB. Unaware of this mortgage,
private respondents continued to pay and constructed their houses on the lots in question. The
subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage and became the new owner of the
said lots.
Private respondents filed suits before the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs
(OAALA) which ruled that PNB, as the new owner, can collect only the remaining amortizations from the
private respondents in accordance with the agreements entered into with the subdivision developer and
cannot compel them to pay all over again for the lots they bought, without prejudice from seeking relief
from the subdivision developer.
The HLURB affirmed the decision. The Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with
the HLURB. Petitioner argued that P.D 957 cannot be applied as the said law was enacted only on July
12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975.
ISSUE:
Whether P.D. 957 may be applied to the mortgage contract which was executed prior to its enactment.
HELD:
YES. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision
developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers
deal with, it is obvious that the law -- as an instrument of social justice -- must favor the weak. Indeed, the
petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities,
and therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual due diligence checking and ascertained (whether
thru ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and
occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had
been built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to
discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was
precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and
intendment being to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers.
Ref: https://legalassassins.com/pnb-vs-office-of-the-president/
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 168129

April 24, 2007
FACTS:
The Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., a corporation whose purpose is to establish, maintain, conduct
and operate a prepaid group practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance organization
and to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the organization, filed a protest
questioning the assessment made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
E.O. 273 was issued amending the NIRC by imposing VAT on the sale of goods and services. Before the
effectivity of the said E.O., Philhealth inquired whether the services it provides to the participants in its
health care program are exempt from the payment of the VAT. On June 8, 1988, CIR issued a ruling
stating that respondent, as a provider of medical services, is exempt from the VAT coverage.
However, on October 1, 1999, the BIR sent respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency in
its payment of the VAT and documentary stamp taxes for taxable years 1996 and 1997. Subsequently,
respondent filed a protest with the BIR.
Petitioner argued that it is entitled to the benefit of non-retroactivity of rulings guaranteed under Section
246 of the Tax Code, in the absence of showing of bad faith on its part.
The CIR did not take any action on the protests. Hence, a petition for review was filed with the CTA. The
CTA declared CIR ruling coverage null and void.
ISSUE:
Should a revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated be given a
retroactive effect?
HELD:
NO. It shall not have retroactive application. Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended, provides
that any revocation, modification or reversal of rulings, circulars, rules and regulations promulgated by the
CIR have no retroactive application if it would prejudice the taxpayer. The exceptions to this rule are: (1)
where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document
required of him by the BIR; (2) where the facts subsequently gathered by the BIR are materially different
from the facts on which the ruling is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
There is no showing that respondent deliberately committed mistakes or omitted material facts when it
obtained VAT Ruling from the BIR. Respondent’s failure to describe itself as a health maintenance
organization, which is subject to VAT, is not tantamount to bad faith. Respondent’s letter which served as
the basis for the VAT ruling sufficiently described its business. When the CIR ruling was issued the term
health maintenance organization was yet unknown or had no significance for taxation purposes.
Respondent, therefore, believed in good faith that it was VAT exempt for the taxable years 1996 and
1997. The CIR is precluded from adopting a position contrary to one previously taken where injustice
would result to the taxpayer.
Therefore, the VAT assessment against respondent for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 is hereby
withdrawn and set side.
Ref: https://legalassassins.com/cir-vs-philippine-health-care-providers-inc/
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 137873

April 20, 2001
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. The victim was rushed to Rizal Medical
Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where investigation disclosed that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death
when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due
to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain
block and platform but without a safety lock. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M.
Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. The petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of
the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the
deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code, the election being equivalent to a waiver.
ISSUES:
Does the election made by the private respondent of one of the two inconsistent remedies equivalent to a
waiver of the other?
Is there a valid waiver by the private respondent?
HELD:
Yes, the choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, a
claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course
of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the
other.
No, there is no valid waiver made by the private respondent in the case at bar because there was a
mistake of fact. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of understanding that
presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally
shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which
they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.
Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact. It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a
mistake of fact.
In this case, the “fact” that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s
employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution
stating that there may be civil liability. There is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband
died in the elevator crash when she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. There is also
no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC
was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights. The case is
remanded to the Regional Trial Court to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than
that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC,
payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom to
prevent double recovery.
Ref: https://legalassassins.com/d-m-consunji-inc-vs-ca/
EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. 15127

May 30, 1961
FACTS:
Emetrio Cui (plaintiff) took up preparatory law course in Arellano University (defendant) and pursued his
law studies in the said university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the
time he was studying law in defendant university, plaintiff’s uncle was the dean of the College of Law and
Legal counsel. Also, he was awarded scholarship grants for scholastic merit so that his semestral tuition
fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to
him. He was made to sign a contract covenant whereas he waived his right to transfer to another school
without refunding the equivalent of his scholarship in cash.
When he enrolled for the last semester of his law studies, he failed to pay his tuition fee because he had
to transfer to Abad Santos University where his uncle accepted deanship and chancellorship of the
College of Law. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University, he applied to take the bar
examination. Plaintiff petitioned the defendant to issue his transcript but the latter refused not until he paid
back the P1003.87- the amount refunded by Arellano University. As he could not take the bar examination
without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which
plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.
ISSUE:
WON the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his
right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash,
is valid or not.
HELD:
The provision is not valid. If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and
the motives which prompted the issuance of Memorandum No. 38, it should have not entered into a
contract of waiver with Cui which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the
authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and
civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, In order to declare a contract void as against
public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes
some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly
to undermine the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is
sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school
to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme
designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals.
Manresa defines morals as good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have
received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract
students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and
practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the
Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of
free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also, with the leading colleges and universities of the
United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions
scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine
but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
Ref: https://legalassassins.com/cui-v-arellano-university-case-digest/
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 103982

December 11, 1992
FACTS:
Antonio Mecano is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for
cholecystitis on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of
which he is claiming from the Commission on Audit.
Mecano requested for reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) which is a provision covering allowances of
government employees in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty.
Undersecretary of Justice Bello III denied Mecano’s claim reasoning that the RAC being relied upon was
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Admin. Code). Mecano then re-submitted his claim with a
copy of the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the Admin. Code did not operate to
repeal or abrogate in its entirety the RAC, including the particular Section 699 of the latter as the
repealing clause of the Admin. Code is merely a general repealing provision. The request was approved
by the Department of Justice and forwarded to the Commission on Audit.
However, COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo denied Mecano’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of
the RAC had been repealed by the Admin. Code, solely for the reason that the same section was not
restated nor re-enacted in the Admin. Code.
In the present petition, Mecano argue Sec. 699 of the RAC remains operative despite the enactment of
the Admin. Code. On the other hand, COA contend that the enactment of the Admin. Code operated to
revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC as such was the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the
Admin. Code.
ISSUE:
Did the Admin. Code repeal or abrogate Section 699 of the RAC?
HELD:
NO, the Admin. Code did not repeal or abrogate Sec. 699 of the RAC. The Repealing Clause of the
Admin. Code provides that “All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” This is a general repealing
provision (implied repeal) for it failed to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed. There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts
on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of
the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
It is clear that there can be no implied repeal of Sec. 699 of the RAC by the Admin. Code. Under the first
category, it was not established that there is any irreconcilable conflict between the two codes.
Irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter;; they are
so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized;;
and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. The
new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code In fact, there is no
provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner in the Admin. Code. Nor is there
implied repeal under the second category for such is only possible if the revised statute or code was
intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself and that it is clear intent
of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior act. As stated in the opinion of Secretary
Drilon, the Admin. Code cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration,
organization and procedure.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
Hence, Sec. 699 of the RAC remains operative.
Ref: https://legalassassins.com/mecano-vs-commission-on-audit/
G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL LICERA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and
Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.
Facts:
On December 3, 1965, Rafael Licera was charged with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle by the
Chief of Police on the municipal court of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro. On August 14, 1968, the court
acquitted Licera on the charge of assault upon an agent ofa person in authority but convicting him of
illegal possession of firearm under the Mapa rule (1967). In 1974, Licera appeal to the Court of Appeals
invoking his legal justification to possess the Winchester rifle because he was appointed as secret agent
by Governor Feliciano Leviste on December 11, 1961, pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in People
vs Macarandang. People vs Macarandang (1959) – the appointment of civilian as “secret agent” whom
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm
licenses.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in the application of Mapa rule retrospectively?
Held: Yes, at the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his
apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit thereof in 1965,
the Macarandang rule formed part of the jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal system.
Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.
Art. 8 of the Civil Code decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not law, constitute
evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the courts upon a law is part
of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect.
Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates and old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only
and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and
acted on the faith thereof.
Ref:
https://sheyiligan.wordpress.com/2017/09/05/g-r-no-l-39990july-22-1975-the-people-of-the-philippines-vs-
rafael-licera-art-8/
CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 10010

August 1, 1916
FACTS:
The CFI rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to costs on the ground that:
(1) the court has always dismissed cases of this nature;; (2) that he is not familiar with the rules governing
cockfights and the duties of referees thereof;; (3) that he does not know where to find the law on the
subject, and (4) that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights in questions concerning
cockfights.
ISSUE:
May the court dismiss a case for lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case?
HELD:
NO. The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case submitted
to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is the
subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to
the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by
dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing
that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the second
paragraph of article 6 (now Art. 11), provides that the customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the
absence thereof, the general principles of law. Therefore, the judgment and the order appealed from,
hereinbefore mentioned, are reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from
whence they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard
to costs.
Ref: https://legalassassins.com/chu-jan-vs-bernas/
COMMENT (from Civil Code of the Philippines annotated by E. Paras, 2008 Edition):
(1) Duty of a Judge if the Law is Silent A judge must give a decision, whether he knows what law to apply
or not. Thus, even if a judge does not know the rules of cockfighting, he must still decide the case. (Chua
Jan v. Bernas, 34 Phil. 631).
(2) Old Codal Provision Under the old Civil Code, we had the provision that “when there is no law exactly
applicable to the point in controversy, the custom of the place shall be applied, and in default thereof, the
general principles of law.” (Art. 6, par. 2, old Civil Code).
This provision is no longer found in the new Civil Code. The question has therefore been asked: if the law
be silent, obscure, or insufficient, what should the judge apply in deciding a case?
Apparently, the judge may apply any rule he desires as long as the rule chosen is in harmony with general
interest, order, morals, and public policy. Among such rules may be the following: (a) Customs which are
not contrary to law, public order, and public policy. (See Art. 11, Civil Code). (b) Decisions of foreign and
local courts on similar cases. (c) Opinions of highly qualifi ed writers and professors. (d) Rules of statutory
construction. (e) Principles laid down in analogous instances. (See Cerrano v. Tan Chuco, 38 Phil. 392).
Thus, it has been said that where the law governing a particular Art. 9 CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 86 matter is silent on a question at issue, the provision of another law governing another
matter may be applied where the underlying principle or reason is the same. “Ubi cadem ratio ibi eadem
disposito.’’
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH
VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR.,
JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M.
ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V.
ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42050-66

November 20, 1978
FACTS:
Pursuant to P.D. 9, penalizing the illegal possession of deadly weapons, a total of 26 people were
charged for the mere act of carrying deadly weapons. Respondent Judge Purisima, et. al. dismissed or
quashed all the informations filed in their respective courts for failing to allege that the carrying outside of
the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance of or on the occasion of,
connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder. Based on the literal import P.D. 9, the People argue that the prohibited acts need not be related
to subversive activities as such are essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere carrying of deadly weapons constitute a crime under P.D. 9.
HELD:
No, it is not the intention of P.D. No. 9 to punish the mere carrying of deadly weapons. In the construction
or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and
spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within
the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions.
In this case, when P.D. No. 9 was promulgated, there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive
result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose
hardship on another, and so on. The act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon must be with a motivation
connected with the desired result of Proclamation 1081 (suppressing criminality, etc.) that is within the
intent of P.D. No. 9. As regards the purpose of P.D. 9 contemplated in its preamble, the carrying of deadly
weapons outside the residence must be related to subversive or criminal activities to constitute a crime.
Penalizing the mere act of carrying deadly weapons would lead to injustice, hardships and unreasonable
consequences, never intended by a legislative measure. Hence, the mere carrying of deadly weapons do
not constitute a crime under P.D. 9.
Ref: https://legalassassins.com/people-vs-purisima/
TOYO VS. TOYO

G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were
married in Quezon City. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement. It
was later recorded in Tetsushi’s family register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu. On
May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment denying
Genevieve’s Petition. It decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented by Genevieve proved that
their divorce agreement was accepted by the local government of Japan, she nevertheless failed to prove
the copy of Japan’s law. The Supreme Court ruled that the rule in actions involving the recognition of
foreign divorce judgment is that it is indispensable that the petition prove not only the foreign judgment but
also the alien spouse’s national law. In this case, the documents petitioner submitted to prove the divorce
decree have complied with the demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. However, the copy of the
Japan Civil Code and its English translation are insufficient to prove Japan’s law on divorce. These
documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in
Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner
is not an official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication. Neither can the English
translation be considered as a learned treatise. However, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were
married in Quezon City. They bore a child whom they named Keiichi Toyo. After 19 years of marriage, the
two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan
received on February 4, 2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi’s family register as certified by the Mayor
of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu. On May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition
for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a Judgment denying Genevieve’s Petition. It decreed that while the pieces of evidence
presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was accepted by the local government of
Japan, she nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan’s law. The Regional Trial Court noted that the
copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly
authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of
Foreign Affairs. Aggrieved, Genevieve filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the
Regional Trial Court’s June 11, 2014 Resolution. Thus, Genevieve filed before this Court the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry filed by petitioner – NO, but the case was referred to CA for
petitioner to have an opportunity to prove the foreign law
RULING AND DOCTRINE:

When a Filipino and an alien get married, and the alien spouse later acquires a valid divorce abroad, the
Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry provided that the divorce obtained by the foreign
spouse enables him or her to remarry. Nonetheless, settled is the rule that in actions involving the
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the foreign
judgment granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse’s national law. This rule is rooted in the
fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Both
the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse’s national law, purported to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, can be established by complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25
of the Rules of Court.
Here, the documents petitioner submitted to prove the divorce decree have complied with the demands of
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. However, the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation are
insufficient to prove Japan’s law on divorce. These documents were not duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Petitioner argues that the English translation of the Japan Civil Code is an official publication having been
published under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and, therefore, is considered a
self-authenticating document. Petitioner is mistaken. The English translation submitted by petitioner was
published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., a private company in Japan engaged in publishing English translation
of Japanese laws, which came to be known as the EHS Law Bulletin Series. However, these translations
are “not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese laws;” Rather, it is in the KANPŌ or the
Official Gazette where all official laws and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese. Accordingly, the
English translation submitted by petitioner is not an official publication exempted from the requirement of
authentication. Neither can the English translation be considered as a learned treatise.
The Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the translator’s and advisors’ qualifications. Nor
was an expert witness presented to testify on this matter. The only evidence of the translator’s and
advisors’ credentials is the inside cover page of the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence,
the Regional Trial Court was correct in not considering the English translation as a learned treatise.
Finally, settled is the rule that, generally, this Court only entertains questions of law in a Rule 45 petition.
Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan’s law on divorce, are not within this Court’s ambit to resolve.
Nonetheless, in Medina v. Koike, this Court ruled that while the Petition raised questions of fact,
“substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the [Court of Appeals] for further
appropriate proceedings.” Thus, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case was
referred to the Court of Appeals.
Ref: https://lepitenbojos.org/arreza-vs-toyo/
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. ABIGAIL R. RAZON ALVAREZ

GR No. 179408, 2014-03-05
Facts:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) is the grantee of a legislative franchise[5] which
authorizes it to carry on the business of providing basic and enhanced telecommunications services in
and between areas in the Philippines and... between the Philippines and other countries and territories,[6]
and, accordingly, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase telecommunications
system for both domestic and international calls.[7] Pursuant to its... franchise, PLDT offers to the public
wide range of services duly authorized by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
During a test call placed at the PLDT-ACPDD office, the receiving phone reflected a PLDT telephone
number (2-8243285) as the calling number used, as if the call was originating from a local telephone in
Metro Manila. Upon verification with the PLDT's Integrated Customer Management (billing) System, the
ACPDD learned that the subscriber of the reflected telephone number is Abigail R. Razon Alvarez, with
address at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound, Barangay Don Bosco, Parañaque City. It further
learned that several lines are... installed at this address with Abigail and Vernon R. Razon (respondents),
among others, as subscribers.[10]
On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003, Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the PLDT's Quality Control
Division, together with the operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP), conducted an ocular
inspection at 17inspection, St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision -
both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City - and discovered that PLDT telephone lines were
connected to several pieces of equipment.[16] Mr. Narciso narrated the results of the inspection, Judge
Mendiola found probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants applied for. Accordingly, four
search warrants[20] were issued for violations of Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of the RPC (SW
A-1 and SW A-2) and of PD No. 401, as... amended (SW B-1 and SW B-2) for the ISR activities being
conducted at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living
Subdivision, both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City.
On February 18, 2004, the respondents filed with the RTC a motion to quash[24] the search warrants
essentially on the following grounds: first, the RTC had no authority to issue search warrants which were
enforced in Parañaque City; second,... the enumeration of the items to be searched and seized lacked
particularity; and third, there was no probable cause for the crime of theft.
In a July 6, 2004 order,[26] the RTC denied the respondents' motion to quash. Having been rebuffed[27]
in their motion for reconsideration,[28] the respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA."[29]
The CA, however, nullified the ensuing paragraphs, 7, 8 and 9, for lack of particularity and ordered the
return of the items seized under these provisions. While the same stock phrase appears in paragraphs 7
and 8, the properties described therein - i.e., printer and... scanner, software, diskette and tapes - include
even those for the respondents' personal use, making the description of the things to be seized too
general in nature.
Issues:
Quality Control
Laurel cannot be cited yet as an authority under the principle of stare decisis because Laurel is not yet
final and executory.
The respondents counter that while Laurel may not yet be final, at least it has a persuasive effect as the
current jurisprudence on the matter. Even without Laurel, the CA's nullification of SW A-l and SW A-2 can
withstand scrutiny because of the novelty of the... issue presented before it. The nullification of
paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of SW B-l and SW B-2 must be upheld not only on the ground of broadness but for
lack of any relation whatsoever with PD No. 401 which punishes the theft of electricity.
Ruling:
We partially grant the petition.
Taking off from the basic rule that penal laws are construed strictly against the State, the Court ruled that
international long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone services
by PLDT are not personal properties that can be the subject of... theft.
One is apt to conclude that "personal property" standing alone, covers both tangible and intangible
properties and are subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the words "Personal property"
under the Revised Penal Code must be considered in tandem with the... word "take" in the law. The
statutory definition of "taking" and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all personal properties may
be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only movable properties which have physical or
material existence and susceptible... of occupation by another are proper objects of theft.
First, the Laurel En Banc ruling categorically equated an ISR activity to theft under the RPC. In so doing,
whatever alleged factual variance there may be between Laurel and the present case cannot render
Laurel inapplicable.
Second, and more importantly, in a Rule 45 petition, the Court basically determines whether the CA was
legally correct in determining whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Under this premise,
the CA ordinarily gauges the grave abuse of discretion at the... time the RTC rendered its assailed
resolution. In quashing SW A-l and SW A-2, note that the CA relied on the Laurel Division ruling at the
time when it was still subject of a pending motion for reconsideration. The CA, in fact, did not expressly
impute grave abuse of... discretion on the RTC when the RTC issued the search warrants and later
refused to quash these. Understandably, the CA could not have really found the presence of grave abuse
of discretion for there was no Laurel ruling to speak of at the time the RTC issued the search... warrants.
These peculiar facts require us to more carefully analyze our prism of review under Rule 45.
Requisites for the issuance of search warrant; probable cause requires the probable existence of an
offense.
The constitutional requirement for the issuance of a search warrant is reiterated under Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. These sections lay down the following
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the existence of probable... cause; (2) the probable
cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to... them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.[44] Should any of these requisites be absent, the party
aggrieved by the issuance and enforcement of the search warrant may file a motion to quash the... search
warrant with the issuing court or with the court where the action is subsequently instituted.
Principles:
With the Court En Banc's reversal of the earlier Laurel ruling, then the CA's quashal of these warrants
would have no leg to stand on. This is the dire consequence of failing to appreciate the full import of the
doctrine of stare decisis that the CA ignored.
Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, the decisions of this Court form part of the country's legal system. While
these decisions are not laws pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, they evidence the laws'
meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same binding... force as the laws themselves.[57]
Hence, the Court's interpretation of a statute forms part of the law as of the date it was originally passed
because the Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
interpreted... law carries into effect.[58]
Article 8 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle established matters) that enjoins adherence to judicial precedents
embodied in the decision of the Supreme Court. That decision... becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis, in turn, is based on
the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further... argument.[59] The doctrine of (horizontal) stare decisis is one of policy, grounded
on the necessity of securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions.[60]
In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the status of a "decided" case that is "deemed
settled and closed to further argument" if the Court's decision is still the subject of a motion for
reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving... party. Under the Rules of Court, a party is expressly
allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision within 15 days from notice.[61] Since
the doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the necessity of securing certainty and stability in... law, then
these attributes will spring only once the Court's ruling has lapsed to finality in accordance with law. In
Ting v. Velez-Ting,[62] we ruled that: the principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and... closed to further
argument.
In applying Laurel despite PLDT's statement that the case is still subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration,[63] the CA legally erred in refusing to reconsider its ruling that largely relied on a
non-fmal ruling of the Court. While the CA's... dutiful desire to apply the latest pronouncement of the
Court in Laurel is expected, it should have acted with caution, instead of excitement, on being informed by
PLDT of its pending motion for reconsideration; it should have then followed the principle of stare...
decisis. The appellate court's application of an exceptional circumstance when it may order the quashal of
the search warrant on grounds not existing at the time the warrant was issued or implemented must still
rest on prudential grounds if only to maintain the limitation of... the scope of the remedy of certiorari as a
writ to correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment.
Ref: https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cddf8?user=8298
AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 134284

December 1, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner, Ayala Corporation, was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro Street,
Salcedo Village, Makati City with an area of 840 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 233435 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa
Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers contained special conditions of sale and
deed restrictions. The Deed Restrictions contained the stipulation that the gross floor area of the building
to be constructed shall not be more than five (5) times the lot area and the total height shall not exceed
forty-two (42) meters. The restrictions were to expire in the year 2025.
The buyers Sy and Kieng failed to construct the building in violation of the Special Conditions of Sale.
Notwithstanding the violation, in April 1989 they were able to sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana Realty
and Development Corporation with Ayala’s approval and with the same special conditions and
restrictions.
In consideration for Ayala to release the Certificate of Title of the property, Rosa Diana, on July 27, 1989,
executed an Undertaking promising to abide by the special conditions of sale executed by Ayala with the
original buyers. Upon submission of the Undertaking together with the building plans for a condominium
project, known as “The Peak”, Ayala released title to the lot, thereby enabling Rosa-Diana to register the
deed of sale in its favor and obtain Certificate of Title No. 165720 in its name. The title carried as
encumbrances the special conditions of sale and the deed restrictions. Rosa-Diana’s building plans as
approved by Ayala were ‘subject to strict compliance of cautionary notices appearing on the building
plans and to the restrictions encumbering the Lot regarding the use and occupancy of the same.
Rosa-Diana submitted to Ayala for approval envisioned a 24-meter high, seven-(7) storey condominium
project with a gross floor area of 3,968.56 square meters. It, however, submitted a different set of building
plan of “The Peak” to the building official of Makati that contemplated a 91.65-meter high, 38-storey
condominium building with a gross floor area of 23,305.09 square meters. The construction of the building
ensued.
Thereafter, Ayala prayed for rescission of the sale of the subject lot to Rosa-Diana Realty. The lower court
denied Ayala’s prayer for injunctive relief, thus enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the construction of the
building. Undeterred, Ayala tried to cause the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on Rosa-Diana’s title.
The Register of Deeds of Makati, however, refused registration of the notice of lis pendens on the ground
that the case pending before the trial court, being an action for specific performance and/or rescission, is
an action in personal, which does not involve the title, use or possession of the property. The Land
Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the ruling of the Register of Deeds saying that an action for specific
performance or recession may be classified as a proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting title to
the land or the use or occupation thereof for which a notice of lis pendens may be held proper.
The decision of the LRA, nevertheless, was overturned by the Court of Appeals citing its decision under
the doctrine of stare decisis in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, a case similar
to the present case. Ayala however contended that the pronouncement by the CA in its case with Ray
Burton Development Corporation is merely an obiter dictum in as much as the only issue raised in the
present case was the propriety of the lis pendens annotation on the Certificate of Title of the subject lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Ayala’s appeal based on its decision on Ayala vs.
Ray Burton Development Corporation under the doctrine of stare decisis.
HELD:
Yes. There is no reason how the law of the case or stare decisis can be held to be applicable in the case
at bar. If at all, the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Ayala is barred from
enforcing the deed of restrictions can only be considered as an obiter dicta. As earlier mentioned, the only
issue before the Court of Appeals at the time was the propriety of the annotation of the lis pendens. The
additional pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that Ayala is estopped from enforcing the deed of
restrictions even as it recognized that the said issue is being tried before the trial court was not necessary
to dispose of the issue as to the propriety of the annotation of the lis pendens. A dictum is an opinion of
the judge, which does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without
argument, or full consideration of the point, not the proffered deliberate opinion of the judge himself. It is
not necessarily limited to the issues essential to the decision but may also include expressions or opinion,
which are not necessary to support the decision reached by the court. Mere dicta are not binding under
the doctrine of stare decisis.
The appellate court’s decision in Ayala vs. Ray Burton cannot also be cited as a precedent under the
doctrine of stare decisis. It must be pointed out that the time the presently assailed decision of the CA
was rendered, the Ayala vs. Ray Burton case was on appeal to the Court. As held by the Court in Ayala
vs. Ray Burton, the CA went beyond the sole issue raised before it and made factual findings without any
basis in the record to rule inappropriately that Ayala is in estoppel and has waived its right to enforce the
subject restrictions. Thus, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals was reversed and
set aside. Rosa Diana was also ordered to pay Ayala development charges and damages.
Ref:
http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/07/case-digest-ayala-corporation-v-rosa-diana-realty-and-develop
ment-corporation/

MODULE 1 - CASES 1-19 - Digests

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | COMPILATION OF MODULE 1 CASES

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

G.R. No. L-63915

G.R. No. 80718

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

People vs Que Po Lay Case Digest

National Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo Commercial

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committee on Public Information

G.R. NO. 187714; MARCH 8, 2011

Valeroso vs. People

Issue: Whether penal laws may have a retroactive application?

2. Elements of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition:

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 104528

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168129

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,

G.R. No. 137873

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,

G.R. No. 15127

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,

G.R. No. 103982

Hence, Sec. 699 of the RAC remains operative.

G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Romeo Mercado (as Counsel de Oficio) for defendant-appellant.

CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. 10010

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

G.R. No. L-42050-66

TOYO VS. TOYO

RULING AND DOCTRINE:

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY v. ABIGAIL R. RAZON ALVAREZ

AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

G.R. No. 134284

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