2

Name: Aashna Sharda

3 Year LLB Batch 2020
Registration No: 44920111001

BEFORE THE
HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

Ms. SUGUNA (Appellant)

v.
Mr. RAMAKANT SHUKLA……. Respondent No. 1
Mr. SHANKAR………………… Respondent No. 2

MEMORIAL FOR APPELLANT

 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..........................................................................................................................................3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................................................................................4
JUDICIAL DECISIONS:-...........................................................................................................................................4
BOOKS........................................................................................................................................................................ 6
ONLINE RESOURCES...............................................................................................................................................6
STATUTES................................................................................................................................................................. 6
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION................................................................................................................................8
STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................................................................................................9
ISSUES RAISED...........................................................................................................................................................11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...................................................................................................................................12
I. THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN FACT................................................12
II. THERE IS LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUGUNA AND MR. RAMAKANT
SHUKLA UNDER TOP ACT...................................................................................................................................12
III. CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS REASONABLE GROUND FOR
WITHDRAWAL FROM CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY SUGUNA.................................................................12
IV. HIGH COURT HAS POWER UNDER ARTICLE 227 TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A
SUBORDINATE COURT.........................................................................................................................................12
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.......................................................................................................................................13
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINBLE BOTH IN LAW AND FACT?...............................13
II. WHETHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MS.SUGUNA AND
MR.RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882?.........................................17
III. WHETHER THE CONCEALMENT OF THE FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF SHANKAR IS JUST
AND REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY
SUGUNA?................................................................................................................................................................. 19
CONCEALMENT OF THE RESPONDENT’S UNEMPLOYMENT.......................................................................19
MENTAL CRUELTY IS REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM CONJUGAL SOCIETY...20
IV. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, INDIA HAS THE POWER TO TAKE UP ANY CASE
FROM A SUBORDINATE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?.................22
SCOPE OF THE POWER UNDER ARTICLE 227..................................................................................................22
NO MANIFESTATION OF GRAVE INJUSTICE....................................................................................................23
CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED IN ORDER TO INVOKE ARTICLE 227...........................................................24
PRAYER....................................................................................................................................................................... 25
 2

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR All India Reporter

Ans. Another

Art. Article

TPA Transfer of Property Act.

HMA Hindu Marriage Act.

SC Supreme Court

HC High Court

Const. Constitution

R/w Read with

SCC Supreme court case

Sec Section

U/A Under Article

U/S Under Section

V. Versus

CPC Civil Procedure Code

Pg. Page

Ld. Learned

Ors. Others
 2

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
JUDICIAL DECISIONS:-

1. Syeda Rahimunnisa v. Malan Bi (Dead) By Lrs. &Anr.Etc AIR 2016 SC 4653

2. Anil Malhotra v.ChanderMalhota And Ors RSA No. 1658 of 2010
3. Nalamati Latchanna vs Masina Sriramulu
4. Bharat Nidhi Ltd., v. Shital Prasad AIR 1981 Delhi 251
5. Bokaro And Ramgur Ltd. v. State Of Bihar AIR 1966 Pat 154
6. Parsun Chakraborty v. Smt. Indira Jaiswal (2016) 4 Cal LT 420
7. Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, (2002) 2 SCC 73
8. Samr Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511
9. Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta, (2002) 5 SCC 706
10. V.Bhagat v. D.Bhagat ,(1994) 1 SCC 337
11. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, AIR 1997 SC 152.
12. Chameli Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1051
13. 4Vijay Kumar v. Suman , (1996) HLR 24 (P&H)
14. Kamaladevi v. Shivakumarswamy, AIR 2003 Karn. 36;
15. Kuladeep Kumar Dogra v. Monika Sharma , AIR 2010 HP 58
16. Kanchanguri v. Chandulal, AIR 1973 Guj.275
17. Satya Devi v. Ajaib Singh , AIR 1973 Raj.20
18. R.Natarajan v. Sujatha Vasudevan , C.M.A.Nos.3769 and 1775 of 2010
19. Wayram Singh v.Amannath,AIR 1954 SC 215
20. . BanarjeeD.N v.P.R Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58
21. AchutanandaBaidya v. Prafullya Kumar Gayen (1997) 5 SCC 76 : AIR 1997 SC 2077
20
22. BanarjeeD.N v. P.R Mukherjee ,AIR 1953 SC 58
23. Surya Dev Rai v. Ram ChanderRai ,(2003) 6 SCC 675
24. Rahul Jain v.SMT. NamrtaJain,WP-705-2017
25. Estralla Rubberv. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97
26. Faquir Chand Anant Ram v.Gopi Chand , AIR 1962 Punj 117 (120)
27. S.Barrow v. State of UP,AIR 1958 All 154 (158) ; ILR (1957) 2 All 88
28. .Rani Mohanraj And Anr. v. P. Rajarathinam , 1999-2-LW 757
29. Amzad AH v. Marfat AH, (1998) 2 Cal LT 462
30. Dharagadhra Chemical Works v.State of Saurashtra, AIR 1957 SC 264 : 1957 SCR 152
 2

31. Khalil v.Tufel, AIR 1989 SC 184

32. .Satyanarayana Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjuna
33. Bhavanappa Tirumale,AIR 1960 SC 137 (142) : 1960 (1) SCR 890
34. Santha v. state of kerala, 2019 SCC.
 2

BOOKS

1. DR. J. N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India (Central Law Agency ,Allahabad ,55st
edn., 2018)
2. Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla,The Transfer Of Propert Act (Lexis Nexis, Haryana, 12th
edn., 2015) DR. S.R. Myneni ,
3. Code Of Civil Procedure & Limitation Act (Asia Law House, Hyderabad ,3rd edn,.
2016)
4. DR. Paras Diwan, Family Law (Narender Gogia & Company , Hyderabad , 10th
edn., 2018)
5. S.N. Misra, The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (Central Law Publication, Uttar
Pradesh, 20th edn., 2016)
6. DR. Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of India (Wadhwa And Company, Nagput
13th edn., 2001

ONLINE RESOURCES

1. http://www.indiankannon.org/
2. http://www.scconline.com/
3. http://www.manupatra.com/
4. http://www.lesixnesix.co.in/

STATUTES

1. LIMITATION ACT, 1963

2. HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955
3. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882
4. PUNJAB RENT ACT, 1995
5. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,1950
6. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
7. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellant humbly submits this memorandum as an appeal filed by the appellant before the Hon’ble
High Court of Karnataka against the decision of the Tribunal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure
1908 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Appellant set forth the facts, issues and laws on
which the respective claims are based.
 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Mysore is a town in the state of Karnataka located in the country of India. Bengaluru is
another city in Karnataka state, India. Both Mr. Shankar and Ms. Suguna are residents of
Ambridge and are Hindus who got married under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in February
of 2011. After marriage, they moved to Bengaluru where Mr. Shankar had been working
since 2009 and earning a salary of Rs 20,000/- per month.
II. The couple rented a flat from Mr. Ramakant Shukla (landlord) who made an agreement
for 11 months with Mr. Shankar and Suguna and fixed the rent at Rs.10, 000/- per month.
Soon, Suguna started working in a KidZee in Bengaluru as she get bored at home and was
paid Rs.5000/- per month. In the last week of May, 2011, Mr. Shankar lost his job due to
which the rent of the property remained due for 6 months consecutively. His spouse was
unaware of the reason for delay in the payment of rent.
III. In November, 2011 the landlord sent a notice expressing his desire to not continue the
agreement with the couple and requested the couple to vacate the premises within one month.
Following this, the unemployed status of Mr. Shankar was revealed to Suguna. She left the
shared flat on 01st December, 2011. Several futile attempts were made by her spouse to talk
to her. During the absence of Suguna, repeated requests were made to Mr. Shankar to pay the
rent, but the payment remained irregular in nature.
IV. On 22nd April, 2015, Suguna came back to the shared flat and expressed her desire to
divorce Mr. Shankar. Further, she asked Mr. Shankar to leave the flat and informed the
landlord that from then onwards she would be staying in the flat and paying the rent. The
landlord refused and issued a notice for eviction to the couple in May,2015
V. When the couple did not vacate, the landlord filed a suit for eviction against the couple before
the Controller in June 2015 contending that he needed the suit property for his personal use.
Simultaneously, a suit for Restitution of Conjugal Rights was filed by Shankar before the
District Court. The Controller in the suit for eviction decided in favor of the landlord
following which Shankar left the suit property. However, Suguna continued to stay on
and filed an appeal before the Tribunal where the Controller’s decision was upheld. The
 2

Tribunal asked. Suguna to vacate the suit property. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal
Suguna is on appeal before this Hon’ble Court.
VI. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, Ms. Suguna filed an appeal before the hon’ble
high court of Karnataka , India contending that the order of trial court regarding eviction of
Suguna from the premises amounted to grave injustice . Therefore, the appellate court should
consider the situation and order accordingly.
VII. During the pendency of appeal before the high court of Karnataka, India, the issue of
matrimonial dispute between Ms. Suguna and her husband Shankar came up this also led
to the disclosure of the pendency of suit for restitution of conjugal rights before the district
court. Considering the dispute between Shankar and Suguna and important issue, the high
court of Karnataka has suo motu up the case taken up the case of restitution conjugal rights
from district court for adjudication under article 227 of the constitution of India.
VIII.The high court of Karnataka has clubbed up the appeal and suit for restitution of conjugal
rights.
 2

ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN

FACT?

ISSUE II: WHETHER THERE IS A LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN SUGUNA AND MR. RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER THE TRANSFER OF
PROPERTY ACT, 1882?

ISSUE III: WHETHER CONCEALMENT OF THE FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF

MR.SHANKAR IS JUST AND REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM
THE CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY SUGUNA?

ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, INDIA HAS THE POWER
TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A SUBORDINATE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?
 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN FACT.

It is humbly submitted in Hon’ble Court that the present in not maintainable both in law and
in fact and the Hon’ble High Court has erred in clubbing these two cases.

II. THERE IS LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUGUNA AND

MR. RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER TOP ACT.

It is humbly submitted that there is a landlord and tenant relationship between Ms. Suguna and
Mr. Ramakant Shukla under the Transfer of Property Act as Suguna comes under the
definition of the term ‘lessee’

III. CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS REASONABLE

GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY SUGUNA.

It is humbly submitted that the concealment of fact of unemployment by Shankar constitutes

mental cruelty and thereby provides reasonable ground for withdrawal from conjugal
relationship by Suguna.

IV. HIGH COURT HAS POWER UNDER ARTICLE 227 TO TAKE UP ANY CASE
FROM A SUBORDINATE COURT.

It is humbly submitted that Article 227 of the const. does not confer upon the High Court
power to take up any case from a subordinate Court where grave injustice would be done by
the interference of the High Court.
 2

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINBLE BOTH IN LAW

AND FACT?

1. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka, India that the
present suit, Suguna V. Ramakant Shukla and Shankar is not maintainable both in law and
in fact as this Hon’ble High Court has erred in Suo motto clubbing two suits of different
nature, having no common remedy.
2. In the case of Syeda Rahimunnisa vs Malan Bi (Dead) By, it was held that “Since all
the aforementioned five suits were in relation to one suit- land and were between the same
parties pending in different Courts, all the five civil suits were clubbed together for
disposal in accordance with law. Parties adduced common evidence in all the five civil
suits”
3. Further it is mentioned that since the five suits filed were in relation to one suit – land and
were between the same parties pending in different Courts it was clubbed together.
4. On the other hand in our present case of Suguna V. Ramakant Shukla and Shankar the two
suits namely the one filed by Shankar for Restitution of conjugal rights and the other
appeal being the one filed by Suguna before the High Court of Karnataka, India against
the landlord Ramakant Shukla aggrieved by the decision of the tribunal. Hence in this
instance both these suits have no common relation and hence no common remedy as well.
Hence it is contended before this Hon’ble High Court that clubbing of these two suits are
not at all relevant and hence this clubbing is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed
in limine.
5. In the case of Anil Malhotra vs Chander Malhotra And Ors, the Hon’ble High Court
of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh held that, “This judgment will dispose of two appeals
bearing RSA Nos. 1658 and 1795 of 2010, as common questions of law and facts are
involved. Both the suits were clubbed and were decided by a common judgment by the
trial Court and even the appeals were also consolidated and decided by a common judgment, as
the suit property is same. Both the appeals have been preferred by Anil Malhotra, as the suit filed
by him seeking partition of the property was dismissed and the suit filed against him for
mandatory injunction and possession was decreed. The submission is that the primary question in
the present litigation is as to whether the Will projected by the brothers of the Petitioner is a valid
document and in case it is not, the property will have to be shared amongst all the legal heirs,
 2

Vidya Rani having died intestate. If the Petitioner succeeds, then automatically the second suit
filed by the brothers of the Petitioner will have to be dismissed as the Petitioner will not remain
in possession

of the property merely as a licensee, rather, in his own right. Even if for arguments' sake, the Will
is upheld, still the Petitioner, being in possession of part of the suit property since long and having
made substantial improvements by spending huge amount, even if he is a licensee, the same
cannot be revoked”
6. Reliance has been placed on this case as in this case it has been explicitly stated that both
the suits were clubbed and were decided by a common judgment by the trial Court and
even the appeals were also consolidated and decided by a common judgment, as the suit
property is same. But in our present case the nature of both the suits being entirely
different, (Suit for matrimonial relief and an Appeal for Rent control) cannot be clubbed
and is liable to be dismissed in limine
7. In our present case, the two suits mentioned therein are distinct and unique. They are not
inter-related in any way and hence it is humbly submitted that the Hon’ble High Court of
Karnataka India has erred in clubbing both the suits.

8. In the case of Nalamati Latchanna vs Masina Sriramulu (Andhra High Court): Brief
Facts: Respondent herein is the Plaintiff is O.S.No. 464/83 and 372/88 on the file of the
Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Kakinada. Originally, the respondent filed O.S.No.
178/83 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif's Court, Kakinada for declaration of
his fishing rights in Chintalacheruvu and consequently to restrain the defendants therein
from interfering with the said rights. A temporary injunction was also obtained by the
respondent-plaintiff restraining the defendants therein from obstructing him from catching
fish. It is under the background that the defendants therein have obstructed the plaintiff
from catching fish and thereby caused damages to the tune of Rs. 60,000/-, the respondent-
Plaintiff filed O.S.No. 464/83 before the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Kakinada against
the defendants therein for recovery of the said damages. Later on, he filed O.P.No. 174/88 before
the III Additional District Judge, Kakinada for transferring O.S.No. 178/83 to the Court of
Principal Subordinate Judge, Kakinada for transferring O.S.No. 464/83 was pending and sought
indulgence of the Court for trying the suits together. Pursuant to the transfer order, the suit was re-
numbered as O.S.No. 372/88.
9. Judgment Briefing - It is seen that the learned III Additional District Judge while passing
order in O.P.No. 174/88 observed that the matters could be tried together by one and the
same Court in order to avoid conflicting judgments. The learned District Judge further
 2

observed that whether all the matters will be clubbed together or may be tried separately
and simultaneously, is the matter to be decided by the Principal Subordinate Judge,
Kakinada. Under this background, the respondent plaintiff filed I.A.No. 3341/89 in
O.S.No.

464/83 praying for clubbing both the suits, recording common evidence and pronouncing
common judgment. The learned Principal Subordinate Judge by order dated 14-2-1990 has
allowed I.A.No. 3341/89 and directed clubbing of the suits together, recording common
evidence and passing common judgment in both the suits. As against this order, the
present revision petition is filed by defendant No. 14 in O.S.No. 464/83. 83.
10. Sri P.Venkataramana Sarma, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff, has
contended that in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and conflicting decisions, it is
better the suits could be clubbed together, common evidence could be recorded and
common judgment could be pronounced and, therefore, he justified the order passed by
the learned Subordinate Judge in I.A.No. 3341/89. Sri C. Subba Rao, learned Counsel
appearing for the Petitioner, who is defendant No. 14 in O.S.No. 464/83, has, on the
contrary, contended that these suits cannot be tried together inasmuch as the first suit -
O.S.No. 372/88 - is filed by the respondent herein for the declaration of his fishing rights
in Chintalacheruvu and for a consequential relief of restraining the defendants therein
from interfering with the said rights, whereas O.S.No. 464/83 is filed for recovery of
damages said to have been caused by the defendants therein. He further contended that
the first suit is for a different relief, that is to say, for a declaration and the second suit is
for damages, it is admitted that the plaintiff and some of the defendants in both the suits are
common and some of the defendants are strangers. It is under this background, Sri Subba Rao
contended that the respondent herein has to first establish his rights in O.S.No. 372/88 and
secondly the extent of damages said to have been caused by each of the defendants in O.S.No.
464/83 has to be separately assessed. He has further contended that some of the defendants are
admittedly different and, therefore, the two suits cannot be clubbed and tried together and
common judgment cannot be passed.
11. No doubt, in cases where parties are common and matter is absolutely similar, to avoid
multiplicity of suits and to eliminate chances of conflicting decisions on the same point,
consolidation of two or more suits can be ordered. Where, however, suits brought by the
same plaintiff are prima facie based on different and independent transactions, the
consolidation cannot be ordered, as there cannot be conflicting decisions.
 2

12. It is seen that the Trial Court admits that issues are though different and yet, felt that
the subject-matter as well as the oral and documentary evidence that could be let in
would probably be same and, therefore, directed that the above suits should be clubbed
and tried together.

13. In` another case of Bokaro &Ramgur Ltd. v. State, the Patna High Court, held that it
has to be seen whether or not the non-consolidation of two or mere suits is likely to lead,
apart from multiplicity of suits, to leaving the door open for conflicting decisions on the same
issue, which may be common to the two or more suits sought to be consolidated. It also held that
the convenience of the parties and the expenses in the suits are subsidiary to the more important
consideration viz., whether it would lead to rendering conflicting decisions on the same point if
the suits are not clubbed together.
14. As discussed by the counsel above, when the issues and nature of the suits are different,
It is difficult to accept the contention of Sri Venkataraman Sarma, learned Counsel for
the respondent-plaintiff that if the suits are not clubbed and tried together, it would lead
to rendering of conflicting decisions. In the present case, the first suit is for declaration of
fishing rights and the second suit is for recovery of damages and tine question of
rendering conflicting decisions, in my opinion, would not arise at all, as the issues are
different and some of the defendants figured are also different in the two suits. Under
these circumstances, the order dated 14-2-90 in I.A.No. 3341/89 in O.S.No. 464/83 was
set aside on the file of tine Principal Subordinate Judge, Kakinada.
15. Thus from the above judgments it is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High
Court of Karnataka, India that two or more suits can be clubbed together only when the
following conditions are satisfied: 1) Having Parties in Common. 2) Ability to record
common evidence and deliver common judgement, being the cases of similar nature. 3)
The primary matter or the subject matter around which the suits (mentioned to be
clubbed) revolve must be common. As in, if suit 1 is regarding a land dispute then suit 2
must also be in relation with the same land for the two suits to be clubbed together. 4) If
the suits proposed to be clubbed are not clubbed then there must be no conflicting
decisions arising from the different Courts in which they are being tried.
16. In the case of Suguna v. Ramakant Shukla and Shankar none of the above conditions
comes into play and moreover there cannot be any conflicting decisions arising if they
are not being clubbed as both the suits are of entirely different nature.
17. Thus it is contended that Clubbing of these two cases cannot be done and hence they are
to be dismissed in limine.
2
 2

II. WHETHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN MS.SUGUNA AND MR.RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER THE
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882?

1. It is humbly submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that there exists a landlord tenant
relationship between Suguna and Mr. Ramakant Shukla under the Transfer of Property
Act,1882. Firstly, it is clarified that the rental agreement in the present case denotes a
lease falling under the definition of lease under section 105 of the transfer of property act.
Along with lease, section 105 also defines Lessor, lessee, premium and rent. It is as
follows:
2. SECTION 105. Lease defined. A lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to
enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in
consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any
other thing of value, to be rendered, periodically or on specified occasions to the
transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.
3. Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined. The transferor is called the lessor, the
transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, service or
other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.
4. In the present case, Shankar and Suguna took a flat on rent in Bengaluru after shifting to
the new city. Mr. Ramakant Shukla is their landlord who stays on the 2nd floor and gives
the 1st floor on rent to Shankar and Suguna. Mr. Ramakant Shukla makes an agreement
for 11 months (i.e. from 1st March, 2011 to 28th February, 2012) with Shankar and
Suguna regarding renting the flat and handing over the premises to both of them at
Rs.10,000/- per month. This confirms that there was a transfer of right to enjoyment of a
property. The transferor in the present case being Mr. Ramakant Shukla.

5. According to the facts, the rental agreement mentioned that both Ms.Suguna and her
spouse would live within the premises as a married couple and to that effect the id proof
of both of them was taken. This implies that both of them would be liable in case any
disputes arise with relation to the lease or the lease property and such. By recognizing both of
them as liable the landlord has impliedly recognized both of them as tenants.
6. It is further argued that, when the landlord issued a notice of eviction in May 2015 and
filed a suit for eviction before the controller in June 2015, he did so against the couple
and not just one of them. This indicates that both of them were recognized as tenants by
 2

the landlord.
7. In the case of Parsun Chakra borty V Smt. Indira Jaiswal, the person against whom
an eviction notice was served under section 6 (4) of the Punjab rent act 1995 was held to
be a tenant. The reasoning for this was that since the eviction notice was served upon him
it Indicated that he was recognized as a tenant by the landlady.
8. It is further submitted that Ms. Suguna will be considered as a tenant under Section 2 (m)
of the Punjab Rent Act, 1995 which mentions that, among other things, a tenant is any
person on whose behalf the rent of any premises is payable. In the facts of the present
case, Ms. Suguna is dependent on her spouse for her maintenance, and her spouse, Mr.
Shankar, used to pay the rent on behalf of both of them. This would bring Ms. Suguna
under the purview of the term “tenant” as defined under Section 2 (m) of The Punjab
Rent Act, 1995.
9. It is therefore most humbly submitted that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship
between Suguna and Mr. Ramakant Shukla under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
 2

III. WHETHER THE CONCEALMENT OF THE FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF

SHANKAR IS JUST AND REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL
FROM THE CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY SUGUNA?

1. It is humbly submitted that the concealment of the fact of unemployment of Shankar (

hereinafter referred as "The Respondent” ) is just and reasonable ground for withdrawal
from the conjugal relationship by Suguna (hereinafter referred as "Petitioner” ) It is
contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the Respondent has subjected her to mental
trauma and therefore shall not be entitled to a decree under Section.9 of the Hindu
Marriage Act (hereinafter referred as “the Act”.

CONCEALMENT OF THE RESPONDENT’S UNEMPLOYMENT

HAS CAUSED MENTAL TRAUMA TO THE PETITIONER.

2. The Respondent, by concealing the fact of his unemployment from his spouse has
caused significant mental trauma to the Petitioner. To begin with, the Petitioner would
like to clarify that the words torture, agony, and trauma are synonyms and can be used
interchangeably. In the present scenario, these words Indicate a cruel disposition or
conduct that causes serious bodily harm or mental suffering by one spouse to the other.
3. Mental Cruelty is the conduct of the spouse that causes mental suffering or fear to the
matrimonial life of the other. According to facts of the present case, though questioned
repeatedly by the Petitioner as to the reason for the delay in the payment of rent, the
Respondent kept trying to avoid confronting the Petitioner. It has to be noted that, such
studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal
kindness causes injury to the mental health of the person subjected to such treatment.

4. Further, for assessing mental cruelty, it is the facts and circumstances that are crucial.
T his stance has been substantiated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Parveen Mehta where the Court held that “A feeling of anguish, disappointment and
frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other can only be appreciated on
assessing the attending facts and circumstances in which the two partners of
matrimonial life have been living.”
5. Reliance is also placed the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
V.Bhagat, where the Court has held that, “What is cruelty in one case may not amount
to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to
 2

the

facts and circumstances of the case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard
must also be had to the context in which they were made.”
6. Hence, on assessing the facts of the present case, it is inferred that the Respondent has
acted irresponsibly by not revealing the fact of his unemployment to the Petitioner. It
has to be noted that the disregardful attitude of the Respondent has resulted in the
eviction of the couple from their matrimonial home. This event has rightfully led the
Petitioner to question the stability of their living condition and has strained their
matrimonial tie.
7. It is further argued that the Respondent’s actions have ultimately violated one of the
Petitioner’s basic needs- shelter, since the basic needs of man have traditionally been
accepted to be three – food, clothing, and shelter.
8. Therefore, it is most humbly submitted the Respondent has subjected the Petitioner to
mental trauma by disturbing her state of mind in addition to violating one of her basic
needs.
MENTAL CRUELTY IS REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM
CONJUGAL SOCIETY

9. In the present factual matrix, the Respondent has filed a petition under Section 9 of the
Act for the restitution of conjugal rights. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that
the suppression of the fact of unemployment by the Respondent has caused mental
trauma to the Petitioner due to which the Petitioner left the conjugal society of the Respondent.
10. It is humbly submitted that the Petitioner has withdrawn from the conjugal society on
the just and reasonable ground of mental cruelty. In the case of Vijay Kumar, the
Hon’ble Punjab-Haryana High Court has held that “…mental torture is a reasonable
ground for the wife to withdraw from the society of the husband”.
As in the present case, Shankar has been working in Bengaluru city since 2009 and got
married in 2011, After marriage, Suguna started working at Kidzee in Bengaluru
because she used to get bored at home. This indicates that she was financially stable at
her parental house and she was working just for the time pass and not for the sake of
earning. All of sudden, when she came to know that her husband was unemployed and
was not able to fulfil her basic needs, she went into a severe shock which caused her
mental trauma.
11. Further, it is a well-established principle of law that a husband is not entitled to a decree
 2

under Section 9 of the HMA if he is found to have treated his wife with cruelty. It has
been held in a couple of cases that even ill-treatment falling short of legal cruelty is
sufficient ground for withdrawal from conjugal society. Since, in the present case the

negligent behavior of the Respondent led to the eviction of the couple from their
matrimonial home, such behavior constitutes cruelty on the part of the Respondent.
12. It is contended that material concealment of the fact of unemployment by the
Respondent has caused mental trauma to the Petitioner and the Petitioner cannot
reasonably be expected to live jointly with Respondent. A wronged party cannot be
required to put up with the other. Therefore, it is most respectfully submitted that the
concealment of the fact of unemployment by the Respondent is just and reasonable
ground for withdrawal from the conjugal relationship by the Petitioner.
 2

IV. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, INDIA HAS THE

POWER TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A SUBORDINATE COURT
UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?

1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that High Court of Karnataka,
India is not conferred with the power to withdraw or take up any case from the
Subordinate Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

SCOPE OF THE POWER UNDER ARTICLE 227

2. It is submitted that the scope of article 227 is confined only to supervisory
jurisdiction and not to original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction. It is now
settled that the power of “superintendence” conferred upon the High Court by
article 227 is not restricted to administrative superintendence only but includes
the power of judicial superintendence also even where no appeal or revision lies
to the High Court under the ordinary law. But this judicial superintendence or
the power under article 227 does not vest the High Court with any unlimited
prerogative to correct all hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of
the jurisdiction of the Court or tribunal.
3. In the case of Surya Dev, it was held that, “Though the power is akin to that of
an ordinary Court of appeal, yet the power under article 227 is intended to be
used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the
subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for
correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave
injustice or failure of justice such as when
(i) the Court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction that it does not have,
(ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning
a failure of justice, and
(iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner tantamount to
overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.
4. In the case of Santha v. State of Kerala, the Kerala High Court held that it is not
proper for a High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Art.227 of the constitution
 2

of India even before a petitioner had approached the court below in that regard.

NO MANIFESTATION OF GRAVE INJUSTICE

5. It is well known that the supervisory power must be restricted to cases of grave
dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice,
where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.23
6. In Shankar Jain V. Jai Singh & Ors vs M.C.D. & Anr on 23 September, 2010
Undoubtedly, the High Court has the power to reach injustice whenever, wherever
found. The scope and ambit of article 227 of the Constitution of India had been
discussed in the case of The Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., wherein it
was observed as follows:
“The scope and exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the High
Court to keep inferior Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority
and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The
High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of
hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
subordinate Courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the
orders of the Courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty
and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the
High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. The High
Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior Court or tribunal, if
there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable
person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the Court or tribunal
has come to."
7. It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the instant case of the
matrimonial dispute is pending before the District Court and not been decided and
disposed off yet. There is no judgement rendered as such, let alone an examination
could be made as to whether there was any grave injustice caused or not, and hence,
does not warrant any intervention of the High Court.
8. Article 227 can be invoked on an application of the aggrieved party or suo motu by
the High Court. The High Court may, in proper cases, interfere under this article, suo
 2

motu, i.e., without any application of the party aggrieved.

9. In the case: Rani Mohanraj And Anr. vs P. Rajarathinam on 11 February, 1999:
“In a recent decision of Calcutta High Court reported in (1998) 2 Cal LT 462
(Amzad AH v. Marfat AH)it was held that, "Power under article 227 of the
Constitution involves a duty on the part of the High Court to keep all Courts within
the bounds of their authorities and to see that they do what their duty requires." In
paragraph 45 of the same Judgment, their Lordships further went on and said that,
"When the High Court finds that the inferior Court, civil or criminal, has not acted
according to the mandate of law resulting in gross abuse of the process of the Court,
the extraordinary power of the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution can
always be exercised."

10. Thus, it is staunchly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the suo motu power
under Article 227 can be exercised only in extreme circumstances resulting in gross
injustice or where there is “error apparent on the face of record”, which can be
prompted only when the inferior Court has in any way travelled and acted beyond the
scope of its jurisdiction or have erroneously refused to perform its duty imposed
upon itself by law. In the case at hand, the District Court hasn’t acted yet and hence
no conclusion as to the occasion of flagrant violation of law can be drawn, which
would warrant intervention by the High Court under article 22.
CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED IN ORDER TO INVOKE ARTICLE
227
11. The power would not be exercised by the High Court to substitute its own
judgement, whether on the question of a fact or of law, in place of that of the
Subordinate Courts or to correct an error not being an ‘error of law apparent on the
face of the record’.
12. Hence, under Article 227 – the power of Supervision – being an extraordinary
power, must be exercised most sparingly and with utmost caution. The High Court
cannot, on the drop of a hat, in the exercise of its power of superintendence under
article 227 of the constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts
inferior to it, nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the
orders of Court of Tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory
 2

mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the
exercise of this power by the High Court.

PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
the counsel for the Appellant humbly prays that the Hon’ble Court be pleased:

1. To declare that the present suit is not maintainable both in law and in fact, as the
clubbing of the both suits may lead to the injustice ,

2. To set aside the order of the Rent Control Tribunal,

And pass any order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice
and good conscience.

And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the appellant shall be duly bound and
forever pray.