I m plementation and

behaviour
E LI SAB ETTA B R I G H I A N D C H R I STO P H E R H I L L

Chapter contents
Introduction 1 47
When actors meet their environm ent-theoretical issues 148
The practical importance of context 157
The instruments of foreign policy 1 61
Conclusion 1 66

Reader's guide
This chapter looks at what is known as the 'implementation phase' of foreign policy
making, i.e. the period in which decisions are translated into action. I mplemen­
tation can lead to very big problems-and surprises-for decision makers, whose
intentions often get left behind in the complexities of practice.
In order to throw light on why this should be so, we first of all look at the theo­
retical problems involved in deciding where a foreign policy acllon ends and its
environment begins, for the difference between the 'inside' of state decision mak­
ing and the 'outside' world of international relations is by no means as clear as has
been traditionally supposed. We then go on to illustrate the variety of problems
that states encounter when trying to implement their foreign policies, and the range
of instruments-diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural-that are available to
them. The chapter finishes by outlining the endless loops that connect-and blur
together-ends and means in foreign policy, and by identifying the key lessons
which practitioners need to keep in mind.1

Introduction
The phase of implementation is that in which actors confront their environment and in
which, in turn, the environment confronts them. In essence, this phase i m plies an interac­
tive strategic process that is very often important when it comes to translating foreign policy
objectives into practice, and decisive when it comes to turning practice i nto desired out­
comes. The first half of this chapter will be dedicated to examining some of the most typical
features and dilemmas of the phase of implementation. This phase requires crossing the
boundary between actors and the outside world if outcomes are to be shaped on the basis of
stated objectives. The second half of the chapter wil l look at the practical choices over means
1 48 E L I S A B ETTA B R I G H I A N D C H R I ST O P H E R H I LL

and modes through which states conduct foreign policy. The exercise of channelling inten ­
tions into outcomes, via the use of instru ments, is complex and rarely a mere technicality;
indeed, it has the power to change foreign policy in the process.
By way of introduction to this set of issues, the chapter will first look at theory and present
some general remarks on the issue of how to conceptualize foreign policy implementation as
a form of strategic and dialectic interplay between a foreign policy actor and its environment
As we shall see, the essential insight of what will be presented here is that a successful imple­
mentation of any foreign policy depends not only on a clear definition of objectives and a
sound choice of instruments ( issues which will be dealt with in the second half of the chapter),
but also, and rather crucially, on the interplay between the actor's strategy and the context sur­
rounding it. Accordingly, it also depends on the actor's ability to adjust to unforeseen circum­
stances. The second section will move on to examine in more detail what we mean by context
when dealing with foreign policy; in doing so, we will present a picture of the 'international' seen
from the perspective of the actor. This will involve two steps: on the one hand, we will draw dif­
ferent pictures of the 'perimeter' of the 'international' (from the regional to the global); on the
other, we will look at the many dimensions of which the 'international' is made and explore their
interconnectedness. Third and finally, we will shift the perspective to consider implementation
from the point of view of both the actor and the context, and will focus on some of the dilem­
mas and synergies inherent in the process of connecting the 'domestic' and the 'international'
while pursuing one's foreign policy objectives. Implementation thus emerges as a complex and
fully political activity: a 'boundary' process that connects actors to their environments via the
pursuit of foreign policy.

When actors meet their environment-theoretical issues

The issue of how social and political actors pursue courses of action and, through actions,
succeed in attaining their objectives is a conundrum of interest not just to foreign policy
analysts, but to all social scientists. How is it that sometimes even the best laid plans do not
succeed i n achieving one's goals? Conversely, what does it take to turn situations to one's own
advantage? These puzzles confront foreign policy makers daily in their efforts to project their
country's interests and goals abroad, and go to the heart of the 'problem' of implementation
in foreign policy. Hardly a technicality, implementation is in fact a fu lly political activity, not
least in the sense of reflecting a clash of wills between different actors, or between actors and
their often intractable environment.
Despite the rather inchoate literature that has developed around it, the best place to start
for considering the question of foreign policy behaviour and i m plementation from a theo­
retical point of view remains the so-called 'agency-structure debate' ( inter alia Wendt 1 987;
Hollis and Smith 1 991 ; Carlsnaes 1 992; Wight 2006; Mouzelis 2008). At its most basic level,
the debate concerns the vexing question of whether action can be explained from the 'inside'
of actors or from the 'outside'. Is it possible to find the roots of actions in the actor's prefer­
ences, interests, and mean ings, or is it, rather, the external context, constraints, and patterns
that steer actors in certain directions and not in others?
As some of the most com pelling literature i n foreign policy analysis has now made clear,
foreign policy can be fully considered as a form of action (Carlsnaes 1 986); indeed, foreign
 C H A PT E R 8 I M P L E M E NTAT I O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 49

policy i s an important site of political agency i n contemporary world politics (H i l l 201 5). I n
this sense, the agency-structure debate does have someth ing to say not only about foreign
policy, but in particular about the phase of behaviour and implementation.
Consider the following counterfactual. If an actor (for instance a state) existed i n perfect
isolation (or, alternatively, if it were all-powerful), it would have su rely n o problem i n trans­
lating i ntentions, motivations, and desires i nto objectives. Indeed, objectives and outcomes
would be practically the same; the process of im plementation would be q uite smooth, either
because it would be accomplished in a vacuum, or because the actor would be fully in control
of the context, able to man ipulate it at will.
World pol itics, however, hardly resembles this picture. The international scene is made u p
of actors: states and non-states, each with thei r own set of i nterests, objectives, and priori­
ties-not necessarily in conflict, but very often distinct from o ne another. Therefo re, for all b ut
the most powerfu l actors, a d egree of resistance is bound to be encountered i n the process
of 'having one's own way' in the system with the intent to produce desired outcomes. Further,
even the most powerful actors might not be i n a position to manipulate the environment
around them ful ly, because of either failures of judgement or disadvantageous asymmetries
in other im portant dimensions besides that of power (e.g. info rmation or legitimacy).
How can one come to an elegant fo rmalization of the set of issues and processes with
which actors on the international scene are confronted when trying to implement their objec­
tives, thus producing foreign pol icy behaviour? The argument advanced here is that in order
to conceptualize behaviour and i mplementation, foreign policy analysis needs to adopt a
strategic-relational approach (for the original statement of the model, see Hay ( 1 995, 2002);
for a full application to fo reign policy, see Brigh i (201 3)). The intuition at the heart of the
strategic-relational model-a type of systems approach-is that foreign policy behaviour is
produced via a d ialectic interplay between the actor's own strategy on the one hand and its
context on the other hand. The approach is called strategic in that actors are conceptualized
as oriented towards the attain ment of stated goals. Furthermore, in the process of elaborat­
ing appropriate courses of action, actors inevitably have to take i nto account the strategies of
all other players. It is also relational because it assumes that actors and their behaviour only
become intelligible when analysed in relation to their proper context. In turn, the context
only becomes truly 'real' when looked at from the perspective of the ind ividual actor in ques­
tion; therefore, it always exists in relation to something, or some other actor.
The strategic-relational model was first i ntroduced in pol itical science in order to rej ect the
view that (political) action could be reduced to either external constraints or internal pref­
erences. If it is reasonable to assume that both elements are in play most of the time, what
becomes interesting is to investigate how constraints and preferences i nteract, sometimes
clashing and sometimes producing virtuous synergies.
If one applies this approach to foreign policy, certain aspects of im plementation become
i ntell igible. Fi rst, the strategic-relatio nal approach tells us that neither strategy nor context
taken i n isolation can explain the success or failure of a certain fo reign policy to deliver an
intended outcome. A n exclusive focus on the domestic pol itical process cannot explain those
i nstances in which outcomes deviate from strategies (which is the ru le rather than the excep­
tion). Conversely, an exclusive focus on context places too much emphasis on the constraints
and opportun ities shaping action and cannot convey any real sense of intentionality. A sche­
matic illustration of the model is provided in Figu re 8. 1 .
1 50 E L I SA B ETTA B R I G H I A N D C H R I S TO P H E R H I L L

actor Ji
\ / ---._.political foreign policy
idea s / Pl'O cess ---- beh
' \/
avio ur
tt.
context '----- !2
----- __./
Figure 8.1 The strategic-relational approach to foreign policy (Brigh i 201 3).

In th i n k i n g abo ut th i s model as appl ied to fo reign p o l i cy i m pleme ntati o n and behaviour,

th ree considerations seem particularly rel evant. F i rst , with regard to context, we should
avo id the fatalism usual ly associated with the term 'structu re' i n m uch i nternational rela­
tio n s ( I R) l iteratu re. Context is n ot a m o n o l ith ic, i m penetrable entity that pre-exi sts acto rs,
and agai n st wh ich actors stand vi rtually p owerless. Rather, co ntext is here m ai n ly i nte nded
to d e n ote other actors, no m o re and n o less than the set of rel ations that they e ntertai n
and the patterns they h ave ge nerated. Even the mate rial envi ro n ment, which is an i m por­
tant and arguably 'o bjective' part of the co ntext , becomes fu l ly m ean i n gfu l o n ly th ro ugh
the rel ations that acto rs establ ish with one another. The coexiste n ce of d iffere nt actors,
thei r i nteraction and co m plex aggregation of i nterests, is what makes 'the i nternational'
an u n eve n terra i n fo r fo re ign policy. The l i ke l ihood of ach iev i n g an o bjective is d e pendent
on h ow the acto r is strategi cal ly placed on th is terrain; i n oth er wo rds, given its position in
relatio n t o the context , some actions wi l l be m o re successfu l than oth ers. M o reover, and
even m ore fu ndamP.ntr1 l ly, because of its i n h e rently relational natu re, co ntex l m eans d if­
ferent th i n gs to d ifferent actors , depe n d i n g n ot only on where they are placed , but also o n
h ow they i nterpret the featu res of the terrai n su rro u n d i ng them. The cycles of isol ationism
and i nterventio n is m i n U S fore ign p olicy, for i n stance, are to be u nderstood not so m u c h as
resulti n g fro m an o bjective change i n the co u ntry's position in th e world but, perhaps m o re
i m portantly, as a res ult of d ifferent i nterpretations of the same positi o n , with its balance of
co nstrai nts and o p p o rtun ities.
Second, and related ly, there is a co nstant interplay between actors an d context, and it is
th rough th is i nterplay that behaviour is produced. Th is in tu rn does n ot come th rough at the
m aterial level only, but is mediated by the ro le of ideas and d iscourses. Thus, it is i m portant to
take i nto accou nt not o n ly the way the context responds to the actors' behaviour, but also the
way s uch responses are fi ltered through percepti ons, parad igms, and narratives.
Th i rd and finally, j ust as there is a constant interplay, so is there a constant feedback from
the actor to the context and vice versa. Once prod uced th ro ugh an i nteractive process, for­
eign policy behaviour feeds back i nto the context (Figu re 8.1 fi), restructuri ng the envi ron­
ment or leavi ng it u n changed , and i nto the actor itself {Figu re 8.1 f1 ) , b y maki ng adaptation
poss i b le. Th i n k , for instan ce, of the various repercussions of US foreign pol icy actions i n the
M i d d l e East. These have n ot o n ly changed the context at the regional, if not i nternational,
level, b ut have also i m pacted on the US itself, causi ng at ti mes a d o mestic reactio n agai nst
i nvolvem ent and at other ti mes an upsurge of national ism.
Figu re 8.2, b u i l d i ng on the wo rk of M i chael Brecher, among other systems theorists who
have worked on the subject, o utli nes the p rocesses of actio n , reactio n , and feed back that
 C H A P T E R 8 I M P L E M E NTAT I O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 51

t h e perational e n ·r run n l
external internal

de n makers

the p ychol gi 1 e:nvi r nment

image-perc ptlom,-culturc

ormulo.ti n and deci ion

action

ltnplementa ion

Figure 8.2 The theory of implementation In the foreign policy making,process. The arrows represent the flow
of decision making and the main li nes of feedback.
Source: Adapted from Brecher {1 974: 7).

characterize the foreign policy making process, creating endless loops of policy and i mple­
mentation rather than the clear progression of stages, formulation-choice-decision-action,
which a rationalist approach m ight be thought to presu ppose (see Box 8.1 ).
Si nce both _strategy and conte.xt are i m portant i n foreign pol icy, we now take a closer look
at each in turn, starti ng from the latter. 'The international' is the natural context of foreign pol­
icy, and yet there is more than one sense in wh ich this habitat, natural as it may be, provides a
rather complex and challeng1 ng environment for states to operate i n. The section that follows
will look at why this is the case. We then move to the side of strategy in order to examine how
the 'domestic' affects foreign policy in its implementation.
1 52 E L I S A B E T TA B R I G H I A N D C H R I STO P H E R H I LL

eox ·s . 1 Systems tfieory

Systems theory ts the approach-deriving from natural science, but associated in poll ical science mostly
with the work of David Easton-that sees mo� phenomena as interrelated through pmresses of input,
output, and feedback from the environment The system fs characterized primarily by a process of
homeos1asls, or dyn;1mic e9 uillbrium through fnlera�ion o the yd1 luu� farces involved. I his can be as
true of l nternationat po1itics. for example vla the baJance of power, and fo�ign policy. via the instinct for,
political survival, as it is of nawral features such as body tempel'a ure or dihlate.

Ideas of the 'international': a view 'from somewhere'

Th e 'i nternational' means d ifferent things. to d ifferen t actors, depending not only o n wnere
they are placed, but also on how they (actively) interpret the constraints and opportu n ities
offered by co ntext. F ro m the perspective of a si ngle foreign pol icy actor, then, the 'i nterna­
tional' appears a rather varied landscape, with featu res that can be only manipulated in part .
The ecological metaphor is probably a good place to start to consi der d ifferent pictures
of the n ternational 1 (see the pioneeri ng Sprout and Sprout 1 965). I n fact, wh e n d iscus5 ing
I

the reach of a cou ntry's foreign policy, it is custo mary t0 tu rn to geographical/geometrical

metaph o rs such as 'ci rcles' or 's pheres'. Winsto n Chu rch ill's image of the 'th ree circles' of B rit­
ish post-war foreign pol icy is p ro bably the best known case in po·i nt. but one o n ly has to
th i n k about how d iffu se the expression 'sphere of Infl uence' is to understand how thts mode
of l anguage is i n grained in the exercise of representing the 'outside'. or 'abroad' {Dodds and
Atki nson 2000)
From the perspective of a si ngf e foreign policy actor, the 'i nternatinnal' has at least two
d i mensions: horizontal and vertical. Horizontally, the i nternational unfolds on the continuum
from proxi m ity to distance, from 'near' to 'far', from regional to global. Vertical ly, the inter­
national is stratified i nto a n u m ber of fu nctional layers: po l itica,l , social , economic, m i l itary,
normative, and so on. With out any doubt, when cal led to form ulate i nterests and i m plement
objectives, the greatest chal lenge for fo reign pol icy makers Is to harmonize the two d i men­
sions and keep a certa in degree of i nternal consistency with in each.
In h orizo ntal terms, the i m plementation of fo rei gn policy o bjectives starts from th e envi­
ro n ment closest to the actor, which m eans the n eigh bouri n g states usually grou ped in a
regi on. Regional enviro n me nts are specific to where actors are placed , and depend on how
con centrated o r widely spread thei r i nterests are. For m ost conti nental European cou ntries,
for instan ce, the regi onal envi ro n m ent coi ncides with the borders of Europe. However, as the
case of Europe wel l testifies, the regional borders of an actor's foreign pol icy are far from fixed.
They are constantly suscepti ble to bei ng renegotiated fol l owi ng historical, po litical. or s i m p ly
ideological developm ents. Witness the fate of Eastern Europe, hard ly a foreign policy p rior­
ity fo r most Eu ropean states before 1 989 (with a few notable exceptions such as Germany,
France, or Italy) and n ow considered to be part of a single Euro pean region (Wal lace 1 990).
Co nsider also how geographical proxim ity does not by definrtion ensure incl usion i n the
region of interest to foreign policy; geography must always be read i n conju ncti o n wit h
pol itics (Mouritzen and Wive! 201 2). Thus, for i nstan ce,. despit,e erupti ng at the heart of the
continent geograph ically, the Bal kan wars were at fi rst dealt with as if at the peri phery of
 C H A P T E R 8 I M P L E M E N TATI O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 53

Europe. Conversely, it was the political and ideological bond of communism that connected
geographically distant states (as with Cuba's or North Korea's relations with the fo rmer Soviet
Union) in a relatively homogeneous environment.
If all states have a region of priority for the1r foreign policy, only a few can really aspire to
have a genuinely global frame of reference. That the 'international' is more and more fre­
quently equated with the 'global' testifies to the success of the globalization paradigm. but
does not de facto imply the possibiJity f o r all actors to exercise a wide-ranging foreign policy.
Yet, given the technological revolution and the power of ideas, foreign policy as a political
activity has the potential to be global ln both its causes and its effects-and has not, contrary
to expectations, become obsolete. In fact, there is a sense in which, in conditions of globaliza­
tion, all polftics has become foreign policy in one way or the other.
And yet, not m any actors can elaborate, let alone afford, a truly global foreign policy. The
USA has most notably laid claim to this status, particularly since t he end of the Cold War.
reinforced in the wake of the 2001 attacks. However, despite its ovecwhelming military and
economic power, America's vision of an effective global reach has been only partly fulfilled,
suffering a number of i mportant setbacks.
Interestingly enough, it is precisely in the phase of implementation that the USA's foreign
policy designs have most frequently failed. If we look back at the strategic-relational model
presented earlier in the chapter, this is not at all surprising. A failure to take into account the
strategic and interactive nature of fo reign policy means a h igh likelihood of problems in
the implementation phase. As analysts have noted, many of the difficulties encou ntered by
the USA in its foreign policy (let alone military) projection are because of a poor appreciation
of the crucial relation between ends and n,eans, on the one harid. and between fo reign pol icy
actions and context, on the other. This alone would explain much of the frustration encoun­
tered, without considering the additional failure to take into account the mediation of ideas
and their i mpact on such an interplay. At another level, it simply means that even the USA
cannot dominate everything in a complex world, a fact that it does not always acknowledge.
For m iddle and small states, the 'global' remains but an aspiration, or a rhetorical com­
m itment. The case of Britain is instructive here: despite the New Labour pledge of a foreign
policy informed by global normative com mitments, and the succeeding Cameron govern­
ment's determination to keep Britain i n the first rank, the difficulties of implementing such a
grand design have been countless over the last two decades, in economic, military, and politi­
cal terms (Dunne and Wheeler 1 999; Gaskarth 201 3; H annay 201 3). More generally, as some
of the literature has made clear, one of the paradoxical effects of globalization has been that
of reinfo rcing the regional dimension, pushing middle to small states especially to strengthen
the regional scope of their foreign policy (on the rise of regionalism, see Hurrell 1 995; also
Shambaugh and Yahuda 201 4).
Thus, the perimeter of the 'international' varies greatly depending on the actor considered,
and especially on its position in the context, on the resources at its disposal, and on the strate­
gic value of these resources. But there Is also a second dimension along which actors measure
the 'intemational', and that is the vertical axis of functional differentiation. Thus, the 'interna­
tional' results not just from its horizontal extension, but also from its stratification in different
layers, the most important being political, econom ic, military, normative, and cultural. Two
qualifications must accompany such a characterization, however. First, the hierarchy among
layers is by no means fixed; indeed, the traditional distinction between 'high politics' and 'low
1 54 E L I S A B ETTA B R I G H I A N D C H R I S TO P H E R H I L L

politics', which claimed a primacy for political and military issues (Hoffmann 1 966), is increas­
i ngly problematic in a world in which issues such as culture have become (or rather, have
returned to be) the terrain of greatest contestation. At the very least what counts as 'high' or
'low' pol itics changes from actor to actor, and is inevitably subject to political, let alone idi­
osyncratic, considerations. Second, while analytically separable, lhese layers are at least mar­
ginally interlinked, partly because any given foreign policy has effects at many different levels
and partly because layers overlap i n important ways, empirically as well as conceptually.
The political layer of the 'international' is formed by the complex web of interrelations that
bind actors together. Diplomacy is the traditional but critical expression of the existence of
such a web, which consists of far more than just international Institutions or 'regimes'. More­
over, in conditions of globalization, the political dimension of the 'international' acqui res,
at least potentially, further depth in three directions (Held and Archibugi 1 995). First, the
domestic politics of states, especially large ones, becomes a factor in this interdependence,
affecting other actors through their foreign policies and sometimes also their own domes­
tic politics. Second, the progressive formation of a 'global public sphere' means that politi­
cal interdependence gradually comes to feature processes of normative adjudication and
contestation, until recently exclusive to life inside states. Third, a variety of actors, state and
non-state, participate in the Interdependence that makes up the political layer of the 'inter­
national'. However, this does not happen in a condition of parity, as states still express their
agency through channels that are far more institutionalized, accountable, and varied than
those at the disposal of non-state actors.
The political dimension of the 'international' has i mportant areas of overlap with the social
and normative layer. Diplomacy is in fact one of the key institutions of what the English School
of international relations theory calls the 'society' of states, or 'inte, national society' (t3ull and
Watson 1 982). Norms are another Important component, in both their more codified ver­
sion (international law) and their informal variety (customs). More generally, this is the level
at which ethical concerns play themselves out. The extent to which these have come to affect
foreign policy Is nowhere more apparent than in the wave of 'humanitarian interventions'
that was initiated i n the early 1 990s (Wheeler 1 997). This practice provides evidence that
foreign policy must now confront an environment that has elements of society-and a society
com posed of individuals and social movements as well as states (Linklater 1 998).
The economic layer is, if possible, even more pluralistic in its inclusion of a variety of actors
of different nature. Not surprisf ngly, here the superiority states enjoy ls far less marked than at
the political level, partly because of the less hierarchical nature of economic transactions and
partly because economic interdependence has often thrived irrespective of the international
political systems in place (Strange 1 988). However, economic issues are constantly suscepti­
ble to being highly politicized: witness the case of natural resources and how this issue has
become a matter of greatest concern for the foreign policy of states, especially emerging
powers such as China (Alden 2007).
At yet another level, foreign policy must take into acco unt the existence of patterns of
military alignments, both cooperative and adversarial. Accord Ing to some theories of IR, most
notably neorealism, this is the layer that is ultimately the most significant in foreign policy
terms. Whi le this may be true in the sense that m ilitary affairs carry wi th them the great­
est threat, that of physical annihilation (Aron 1 966), security problems are usually multifac­
eted and often derivative of political, economic, or cultural conflicts (Omand 201 0). Still, the
 C H A P T E R 8 I M P L E M E NTAT I O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 55

asym metrical distri bution of military power, and in particular of n uclear weapons, i s a major
fact for foreign policy makers i n all states.
Final ly, there is an important cultural di mension to the 'international' that decision makers
cannot afford to leave out in their effort to im plement foreign policy objectives. It is not just
that cu ltu ral factors such as religion have come back, supposedly to ignite fundamental­
ism and terrorism, but that these factors today play an i ncreasingly important role i n all l R
(Petito and Hatzo poulos 2004). This is d ue, on the one hand, to the forced contiguity among
different cu ltures brought about by globalization, and on the other, to the decl ine of that
modern parad igm that margi nalized all forms of culture (religion in primis), confining them
to the realm of the private. Foreign pol icy now finds itself deal ing with these issues as pri­
orities, and with the compl ications produced by their entanglement with all the remain i ng
di mensions.
To sum up, the context of foreign policy means d ifferent thi ngs to different actors, accord ­
ing to who and where they are. The 'i nternational' is a kaleidoscopic formation that develops
both horizontal ly, extend i ng from local to regional to global, and vertical ly, layering political,
econ omic, military, normative, and cu ltural di mensions. Despite its varied complexion, con­
text is often perceived as a whole, as a 'system', by foreign policy makers. And yet, interestingly
enough , the greatest challenge for them is precisely how to ensure that all these di mensions
do not contradict each other. There is, in fact, a natural centrifugal tendency that threatens
consistency and coherence in foreign policy. Complexity breeds special ization, if not frag­
mentation. Thus, it is very frequent for economic foreign policy to deviate from that officially
played out at the political level; this in turn is often in tension with the principles governi n g
the normative di mension of the 'i nternati onal', and so on. The exercise o f making these dif­
ferent logics work in synergy in the pursuit of coordinated objectives is certainly one of the
most daunting challenges for all foreign pol icy makers.

Balancing 'inside' and 'outside': implementing foreign policy

If i m plementation is about reaching out i nto the environment to transfo rm one's objec­
tives into outcomes, one should not think of this process as exclusively di rected to, let alone
from, the outside. On the contrary, the i mplementation of goals in foreign pol icy involves an
im portant domestic or 'i nternal' component. More specifically, it i nvolves an act of balancing,
and indeed a process of interplay between what goes on inside the actor and its projection
towards the outside. As the strategi c-relational model presented above illustrates, all of these
dialectical processes take place in the pol itical process and are mediated by the impact of
ideas and discourses.
There are at least two general ways in which the 'd om estic' is i m plicated in foreign policy
i m plementation, aside from the very fu ndamental role of deciding which objectives to pur­
sue i n the first place. To start with, i m p lem entati on presupposes not only the capacity to
pursue goals with effective means, but more generally the abil ity of governments to extract
and mobilize resou rces from their audiences, both m aterial and immateri al, and chan­
nel them i nto the pursuit of given objectives (Mastanduno et al. 1 989). The most classic
example of mobil ization happens, of course, when states go to war. In the kinds of 'total
wars' experienced i n the twentieth century, entire societies were involved in sustai ning the
war effort (nations go to war, as the expression has it), with their economy and culture
1 56 E L I S A B ETTA B R I G H I A N D C H R I S TO P H E R H i l l

transformed by the will t o attai n war aims. But, more prosaically, either simply through the
collection of taxes or th rough more specific actions, societies take a direct or indirect part
in realizing foreign policy aims. Second, but relatedly, at least in democratic societies, the
'domestic' enters the picture of implementation in the form of the consensus needed to
sustain the foreign pol i cy projection necessary to attain o bjectives (Lamborn 1 99 ' 1 ). When
a modicu m of consensus is missing, foreign pol i cy is undermined from helow; as a result,
implementation is potentially much weaker, or can be even at risk. In fact, if consensus
breaks down entirely, a crisis can erupt to threaten not only the foreign policy in action, but
the survival of the government itself.
In general, therefore, i mplementation always develops on two levels, 'domestic' and 'inter­
national', which are in constant interaction. This is what the pol itical scientist Robert Putnam
had in mind when he imagined foreign pol icy as a 'two-level game' (Putnam 1 988; Evans
et al. 1 993). Using this metaphor, Putnam focused on the issue of how democratic foreign
policy tends to be international ly and domestically constrained i n the specific context of
multilateral economic bargaining. As the literature in foreign pol icy analysis (FPA) has made
clear, this intu ition can be applied to foreign policy lato sensu, and indeed encapsulates an
essential feature of the process of implementation. In the words of Wolfram Han rieder, the
fi rst foreign policy analyst to exam ine this issue i n detail, i m plementation hinges on a 'com­
patibility-consensus' balance and unfolds within a 'double constraint' (Hanrieder 1 971 ). In
order to be successful in achieving their objectives, actors need to pursue a foreign policy
that is com patible with the context and, at the same time, supported by a reasonable degree
of agreement inside the state. Thus, implementation cal ls for an attention to both fronts,
domestic and international, and foreign policy makers need to make them work i n tandem
as much as possihle.
But the exercise of balanci ng the domestic and the international does not exhaust the
ways in which these am bits can be connected in the phase of foreign policy implementation.
In fact, it can be the dynamic interplay, or synergy, between them which 1s of most interest.
This happens, for instance, whenever the attai nment of a foreign policy goal has domestic
i m plications, or vice versa. In fact, sometimes domestic objectives are achieved via particular
foreign policies, whereas foreign policy objectives are pursued via domestic policies. When this
happens, the synergistic (or dialectic) nature of foreign policy manifests itself most clearly,
and the process of interplay between actor, context, and foreign policy at the heart of the
strategic-relational model seen above comes full circle.
As for the first possibility, the decisions of many countries to join the EU provide a good
case in point. Naturally, entry into the EU is portrayed pri marily as a foreign pol icy issue;
negotiations, after all, take place initially at the level · Of the foreign policy apparatus. And yet,
taking an historical perspective, entry into the EU (or the European Community before Maas­
tricht) was pursued by policy makers primarily for domestic purposes. Think of the pursult of
enlargement by Spain or Greece during the 1 970s and 1 980s and how this was functional to
the overriding domestic objective of democratic consolidation. The same logic applies today
to some of the applicants from Eastern Europe (Tovias and Ugur 2004), although here the
Wfsh for a sanctuary against Russia was also important. Further, there is no doubt that part of
the controversy surrounding the accession of Turkey to the EU-in both parties-originates
from concern over the set of domestic objectives that accession is supposed to facilitate, most
notably political and social reform.
 C H A PT E R 8 I M P L E M E N TATI O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 57

Examples of the opposite case are also frequent, and indeed very relevant to the cu rrent
predicaments of some democratic states. Today's conditions of globalization, and especially
multiculturalism, mean that mi norities become the focus of concern as the result of foreign
policy entanglements that then blow back into one's own society {Hill 201 3). For instance,
the high degree of suspicion, and accompanying restrictive policies, attaching to M uslim
citizens in the USA, Britai n, and France after the terrorist attacks of 200 1 , 2005, and 201 5,
respectively, are not uncon nected to foreign policy engagements in the Middle East and
reverberate in their turn on relations with major Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan. Therefore, as argued in this section, a degree of interplay between the d omes­
tic and the international in the process of foreign policy implementation is inevitable, and
indeed necessary for its success. This is true in at least two ways: first, domestic participa­
tion features in the implementation phase in terms of both the need for consensus and the
mobilization of specific resources; second, the 'domestic' can become the channel by which
the 'international' is pursued , and vice versa.

The practical importance of context

All foreign policy, by definition, is about the outside world. While the issues of the defini­
tion of 'outside' and the boundaries between 'us' and 'them' are h ighly contested, they are
discussed elsewhere in this book. The purpose of this section is to exam ine the practical
problems that occur when foreign policy making processes coll ide with the world for which
they are intended. Intention, however, is itself a variable phenomenon in this context. Some
foreign policy 1s initiated at home, whether by a new government, a strong-mi nded leader,
or pressures from below, such as those represented by nationalism. But many other foreign
policy positions are reactions to events beyond borders, and thus either to the initiatives of
others or to chains of events that have spiralled beyond any single actor's control. Either way,
a policy can be rational or not, and compati ble or not, with other aspects of the govern ment's
programme. Yet, whatever its internal logic, it still has to face up to the problem of implemen­
tation, i.e. the putting of a policy i nto practice through engagement with other independent
actors, which are often physically beyond reach.
I m plementation has several meanings in FPA, two of which are focused on here: on the
one hand is the issue of the channels through which foreign policy aims are translated into
practice, involving the often complex relationship between ends and means; on the other
are the difficulties that states have in operating in what is literally a 'foreign' and quite often a
high ly intractable world, and how they adapt their behaviour o n the basis of the interacti on
with, and feedback from , that outside world. Those who work more on the policy-related
side of FPA have always written about the challenges represented by a particular instrument,
particularly diplomacy and mil itary force. Detailed research has also been conducted o n
propaganda and the use o f economic sanctions, Wh ile such key figures as Alexander George
have u nderscored the l i n ks that exist between instruments, as i n his i nfluential work on
'coercive diplomacy', which has now spawned the subfield of 'defence diplomacy' (George
1 994). More di rectly, however, theoretical work is also vital to an understandi ng of imple­
mentation, whether relating to the bureaucratic dimension or to the underlying problems of
plan n i ng and rationality. G raham Allison has been the most influential figure on both counts,
1 58 E L I S A B ETTA B R I G H I A N D CH R I S TO P H E R H I L L

providing a bridge, as h e does, into the work of economists and administrative theorists such
as Herbert Simon and Charles Lindblom (Al lison and Zelikow 1 999; see also Chapters 6, 7,
and 1 1 ).
The above two meanings of implementation will be explored by looking at the following
in turn.

• The variety of relationships that exist wilh the outside world because of the many
different kinds of states conducting foreign policy and the varying challenges that their
external activities involve. For instance, the implementation of British policy towards
New Zealand is a rather more straightforward matter than its conduct towards Belarus.
Despite the much greater geographical d istances between the parties to the first
relationship. the degree of 'foreignness' (i.e. pol itical and cultural distance) is far less than
i n the second.
• The foreign policy instruments available to decision makers as they contemplate
the best way to translate their intentions i nto actions that have a chance of success
i n the i nternational environment. The main i nstruments fall i nto four categories:
pol itical, mil itary, economic, and cultural/ideological. Yet, any analysis of them
soon encounters com plex problems, in the first i nstance with the choice of which
instrument to use for what pu rpose, and in the second instance with the relationship
between the instruments themselves and the u nderlying capabilities which make
them possible.
• The theoretical issues raised by any discussion of the ends-means relationship in foreign
policy. I n the context of implementation, this means the issues of rationality, slippage,
and r:omplexity. It also means some particular reflections un one of the central concepts
in all l R , namely power. The key issue here is the distinction between power as a means,
and as a context.

Great powers, small powers

FPA is a comparative field of study that generates observations of varying degrees of general­
ity. Sometimes its insights will need to be heavily qualified through the particularity of period
and circumstances, while others will amount to propositions of wide applicability. In terms
of implementation, it is unarguable that the follow-through phase of decision making (which
i n this case is more properly termed action, or agency) always has the capacity to raise new
problems and to derail the original i ntentions. If this now seems an unremarkable statement,
it was not always the case. Even today, rationalists often do not make allowances for the fact
that choices and trade-offs are not the only determinant of outcomes-choices are not self­
executing. For their part, i n their enthusiasm, politicians very often neglect to factor in either
the 'foul-up' factor or the i nconvenient unwillingness o.f outsiders to conform to the roles
expected of them. It is enough to mention the gap between i ntentions and outcomes on the
part of the proponents of the Iraq war to make the point. Decision makers can often get stuck
on a path that they come to regret, but cannot easily extract themselves from. This we might
term the 'implementation trap'.
However, this kind of high-level generalization is only a start. To understand implementa­
tion more fully, we also need fine-grained work on the basis of distinctions between the kinds
 C H A PT E R 8 I M P L E M E N TAT I O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 59

of actors producing foreign policies and between the kinds of relationship i n which they are
engaged. On the first count, for example, it might be thought that great powers (to say noth­
i ng of the world's only superpower) would have fa r fewer problems in implementing their
external policies than small and/or weak states, but this is not necessarily the case. It depends,
crucially, on what aims are being sought. Despite its status as a middle power, and the con­
siderable array of means at its disposal, Britain is torn between aspiration and {in)capacity. It
has, for instance, fa iled to fulfil many of the foreign policy aims dictated by its 'new' global
agenda. This is only in part attributable to the fact that 'the global' has been used primarily as
a rhetorical strategy, as mentioned above. More i nterestingly, it was the very nature of some
foreign policy aims, most notably those of a normative kind, that were difficult to match with
the means used to pursue them.
A small country that overreaches itself, in terms of seeki ng to change the whole character of
the international system (as Fidel Castro's Cuba occasionally tried to do, and as Hugo Chavez
became fixated on in Venezuela) risks even greater complications, if not outright failure. On
the other hand, this is not to say that such states will ach ieve nothing. If they have already
discounted the risks and the unlikelihood of achieving the stated goals, they may still fulfil
lesser, and probably unstated, goals of a satisfying kind. Thus, for four decades M uammar
Gaddafi in Li bya managed to defy predictions of his demise and, despite his undoubtedly
erratic behaviour and the hostility of the USA, exerted a d isproportionate degree of i nfluence
in the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. By extension, a small country that remains modest i n
its goals may have relatively few problems of implementation because it will be too cautious
to attempt anything which antagonizes the more powerful, or exposes it to other kinds of
potentially destructive blow-back.
Conversely, the USA often encounters serious problems of implementation with its foreign
policies precisely because it has global i nterests and is active on almost every front. As the
'hegemon'/'leader of the free world', it has a forward stance on so many issues that almost
inevitably it runs into difficulties in some of them. Overstretch is a term that refers to a struc­
tural condition over a historical period (Kennedy 1 988). It refers to the tendency of great
powers to take on imperial commitments that they cannot sustain, financially or militarily. In
particular circumstances, it may take the form of a foreign policy that is undertaken without
the available resources to follow it through, even if in principle the state in question should
have no problem in doing so. The USA discovered this truth in Somalia in 1 993, from where
it withdrew after only a few casualties, concluding {possibly with undue haste) that there was
not the domestic support for a long engagement. The Soviet Union suffered the same fate
in Afghanistan, after m uch longer and much greater losses, during the years fol lowing their
invasion in December 1 979.
Thus, the foreign policy designs of great powers have most frequ ently failed in rela­
tion to implementation. This result, though puzzling, can be illuminated through the
strategic-relational model presented in the fi rst part of the chapter. Two of its insights
must be kept particularly in m ind. First, given the constant interplay between strategy
and co ntext, successful implementation requ i res a certain degree of flexibility to accom­
modate ongo i ng feedback processes. A foreign policy that is projected to the outside
without much understanding of such i nterplay is l i kely to backfire, as recent American
foreign policy has vividly demonstrated. Second, a successful implementation depends
also on the crucial relation between ends and means. No matter how powerful or big a
1 60 E L I S A B ETTA B R I G H I A N D C H R I S TO P H E R H I L L

state is, the pursuit of foreign policy aims is contingent on the ever-important choice of
the appropriate means.

Multilateralism and the complexity of action

The military dimension is not the only one in which problems of implementation arise. Tony
Blair apparently succeeded in getting the G8 to commit to a policy of debt cancellation in
Africa during the Gleneagles Summit of J uly 2005, only to find that many of his partners sim­
ply failed to live up to their promises. This is one example among many which demonstrates
that, almost by definition, any foreign pol icy action depends on others for its full implemen­
tation. If being pursued bilaterally or multilaterally, it will require the cooperation of partners;
but even then, and certainly in all unilateral actions, it depends on how the majority of actors
affected, whether hostile, supportive, or just indifferent, respond to the action. If they choose
to take an interest in the subject, for whatever reason (and the indifferent may decide to
take a stance just to give themselves leverage on something else), these actors are likely to
create friction, add costs, or at least complicate the implementation of the policy. Even if they
are neutral on the substance, their technical assistance may still be needed, as with the con­
troversial (and therefore secret) rendition flights of US aircraft in ferrying presumed terrorists
to and from their detention centres. Geographical position is also important. The US was
able to bomb ISJS from aircraft carriers in the Gulf, but its task was made easier when Turkey
gave permission for the use of its bases close to the zone of combat.
Despite the controversy of recent years between the USA and its allies as to whether uni­
lateralism, m ultilateral ism, or 'effective multilateralism' (the compromise position) is the pre­
ferred approach to IR, the reality is that most implementation entails some or other form of
multilateralism. Occasionally, states indulge themselves in myopic solipsism, as with the wild
calls of Iranian President AhmadineJad tor Israel to be wiped off the map. Even then, their real
aim is usually to ral ly support in a particular quarter or to provoke reactions in another. But
for the most part, states take for granted the fact that success in foreign policy will require
mobilizing su pport, neutralizing hostility, shaping the balance of influence, and (increasingly)
winning the rhetorical wars that characterize the modern m u lti-layered international system.
Often, this work takes place within formal international organizations, whether universal,
through the U N system, or partial, in the form of networks of allies, regional partners, or
the 'like-minded'; but just as m uch is ad hoc, cutting across institutional boundaries and not
restricted by formal rules or agreements. Even in its moment of maximum self-assertion,
when it disregarded the Article 5 offer of help from its NATO allies immediately after 9/1 1 ,
the USA was collaborating pragmatically with a wide range of countries involved in the hunt
for al-Qaeda members. The 'War on Terror' could not have been other than a collective affair,
even if it also divided the world crudely into 'those who are for us, and those against us'. I n
other words, the deployment of the im mense national power that the USA has at its disposal
is in itself no guarantee of effective implementation. The very use of the famous 'axis of evil'
image was an attempt to mobilize the international community on one side by 'othering',
or scapegoating, a small nu mber of seemingly irresponsible states. That it proved counter­
productive was another lesson in the politics of implementation.
Putting foreign policy into practice thus usually requires the simultaneous use of
various levels and techn iques of international cooperation: bilateral, multilateral, and
 C H A P T E R 8 I M P L E M EN TAT I O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 61

transgovernmental; that is, links between parts of one state's machinery and parts of another,
as with the 'embedded bilateralism' of the French and German political and administrative
systems (Krotz and Schild 201 3). Not all of these will be visible to the public; indeed, many,
perhaps most, will operate at the level of what used to be called 'secret diplomacy'. Secrecy
is an overrated quality these days as relatively few activities require the absolute darkness
associated with the preparation of, say, a surprise attack. Even in those cases, it is impossible to
maintain absolute surprise. There were plenty of indications of Hitler's impending attack on
the USSR in June 1 941 , of Israel's on Egypt in 1 967, and of Argentina's on the Falkland Islands
in 1 982 for those who wanted to listen or were capable of reading the signs correctly. In the
contemporary environment of satellite reconnaissance and 24/7 news cycles, it is especially
difficult to keep something secret for long. It is thus the more surprising that the sudden Rus­
sian move into the Crimea in 201 4 caught the United States unprepared, revealing that the
qualities of alertness and j udgement are as important to foreign policy as the possession of
high technology and sophisticated alliance systems.
All this is to say that most foreign policy i mplementation involves a tangled web of con ­
nections with other states, o r at least parts of other states, which i s unavoidable but also a
serious complication of agency as it can com promise the aspiration towards a single rational
strategy as well as the control of outcomes. If foreign policy inevitably means su bcontracting
out various parts of the endeavour to different parts of the state bureaucracy and to outside
entities, then those subcontractors have the capacity to refract, d istort, and even subvert
the policy's original i ntentions. This is the strategic-relational approach in practice- looking
inside as well as outside the state. One might adapt Truman's famous remark about General
Eisenhower as the latter prepared to take over the Presidency: 'He'll sit here, and he'll say,
"Do this! Do that!" And nothing will happen. Poor I ke-it won't be a bit l i ke the Army' (cited
in Neustadt 1 960: 9).
Inside any political machinery, and even more so in the complex world of IR, 'orders' may
easily be issued, but that is only the beginning of the process of attem pting to achieve one's
goals. M oreover, this is true for all kinds of states, whatever their size or level of sophistication.

The instruments of foreign policy

When it comes to choosing the instruments with which to act, the differences between states
do come into play. The wide variation in state capacities is a key determinant of what can even
be attempted in the outside world. The larger states will possess the full portfolio of potential
instruments, from the hardest of hard power to the most subtle and indirect cultural influ­
ences. They will also have the capacity to act well beyond their own locality, perhaps globally.
They simply have more people, more contacts, and more money than the others. It is, indeed,
a plausible definition of a superpower that it can expect to determine outcomes in any geo­
graphical arena and via any available instrument. At the other end of the spectrum, it will be
a major challenge for a m icro-state just to preserve its autonomy. Its foreign policy will have
no further ambition than to assist i n the achievement of basic domestic policy goals through
diplomacy alone. Between these two extremes, most states su rvive on the basis of a limited
and patchy range of instruments, possessing armed services of highly variable size, q uality,
and scope, embassies in some parts of the world but not all, the ability to exert economic
1 62 E L I S A B ETTA B R I G H I A N D C H R I STOPH E R H I L L

influence according to levels of development and/or the lottery o f geographical position, and
probably very lim ited cultural outreach.
Any understanding of how states approach the problem of deciding on the best means
of implementing their foreign policy must remember two dicta: first, instruments are them­
selves dependent on underlying capabilities, which are in turn a function of the resources
at the disposal of the society in question; second, decision makers do not choose instruments
as Lhe surgeon selects the scalpel-rather, the nature of the available instruments tends to
shape their policy choices in the fi rst place. These points are expanded i n what follows.
The concept of resources refers to what the French School referred to as the 'basic forces'
of foreign pol icy (Renouvin and Duroselle 1 968; Merle 1 987), i.e. a cou ntry's sum total of {dis)
advantages derived from climate, position, geography, popu lation size, education, tradition,
and level of development. These things are not unchangeable-the Law of the Sea Treaty
expanded territorial waters from 1 2 to 200 miles in the 1 970s, and the Channel Tu nnel was
finally built in 1 994-but for the most part they change slowly. This is on the assumption
that territorial expansion is not generally acceptable. Where it does occur, as with Israel's
conquests of 1 967, the parameters of both security and access to raw materials {in this case
water) can change dramatically. Resources are a critical factor in determ ining a state's choices
in foreign policy, although there is no simple correspondence between the possession of an
asset and the ability to exert influence, as with Nigeria's wasting of its oil revenues or Indone­
sia's failure to translate its status as the world's fourth most populous country (c. 238 million)
into an equivalent political ran king. Conversely, states with no apparent resou rce advantages,
such as Singapore and Switzerland, have managed to achieve both security and prosperity.
Thus, resources have to be managed effectively. What really makes possible the pursuit of an
effective foreign policy are capabilities, which in turn determine the ranef' nf possible instru­
ments at the disposal of decision makers.
Capabilities are resources made operational but not yet translated into the specific instru­
ments (such as propaganda or the use of force) that may be applied in practical politics (see
Figure 8.3). Some are inherently difficult to translate into instruments and indeed may be
damaged if governments try to harness them (Hill and Beadle 201 4). An intelligent govern­
ment will always seek to i mprove these elements of 'soft power' to give itself a better chance
of im plementing an effective foreign policy, but they should be seen more as a long-term
investment than as providing an immediate pay-off. Into this category fall such factors as the
strength of the national currency, the size and proficiency of the armed forces, and, particu­
larly, culture and educational infrastructure.
Such capabilities are of im portance in themselves and to the well-being of any society;
their role in underpi nning foreign policy is incidental, except i n cases where leaders see
them as providing their primary goals. This was evidently true for Hitler and M ussolini,
who provided fu ll employment as a means to pursuing their cou ntry's international great­
ness, rather than the reverse. In such cases, foreign policy and its implementation is to a
large extent at the mercy of factors beyond its control and of long-term developments. It is
for this and other reasons that the second dictum referred to above applies: that decision
makers cannot choose on an abstract rational basis the instrument that would best serve
their i mmediate purpose. They are lim ited not only by the size and wealth of their cou ntry
{i.e. by basic resources), but also by the decisions of their predecessors in office to develop
(or not) a particular capability that would have made possible the preferred instru ment;
 C H A P T E R 8 I M P L E M E N TAT I O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 63

Capabilities

armed strength of agricultural

GDP
productivity

deterrence diplomacy cultural

economic
and military diplomacy
sticks and
intervention
carrots

Instruments

Figure 8.3 Li nks between the principal capabilities and instru ments of foreign pol icy.

and that , i n tu rn, wi ll have depended on the pri ority given to external policy. France i n the
1 880s was determ i n ed to reve rse the h u m i l iatio n it had suffered at the hands of Germ any
in 1 870- 1 87 1 , and foc used on e d u cational refo rm and popu latio n growth (but not with
great success) as the m eans of d o i n g so. I s rael h as m ade foreign and defence policy the
overri d i n g priority throughout its exi ste n ce, although it has also rel i ed o n unwave ri n g US
support. But for many states foreign policy i s l i ke an expensive i ns u rance pol icy whose
d u es seem d i s proportionate to the risks they face. They th us m ay n eglect the relevant
capa b i l ities or d ivert them in oth er d i recti ons, especially if they are able to free-ride o n
more activist al l i es. They m ay also m isund erstand t h e l i n k between capab l ili es a n d i nstru ­
ments, ass u m i n g m o re cho ice when it comes to i m p l e m enti n g a fo reign policy than they
i n fact possess. To put it at its s i m plest, if they have al l owed weapons p roc u rem ent to ru n
down or have closed e m bassies fo r fi nancial reasons, they wi l l have m uch less l everage
availab l e to them when the need arises. I n such c i rc u m stances m is pe rceptio n s are com ­
m o n , and may b e fatal.
The actual instruments of foreign policy, that is to say the forms of pressure and i nflu­
ence available to d ecision makers, represent an ascend ing scale of seriousness in terms of the
co m m itment of resou rces, the i mpact on thi rd parti es, and the accord ing degree of ri sk i n
use (see Figu re 8.4). Th is scale is aki n to the spectrum from soft to hard power now fam i li ar i n
the d i scussion of i nternational pol itics (Nye 2004; Parmar and Cox 201 0). I f a problem occu rs
that req ui res a fo reign policy response, it would take a particularly i rrational leader (it can
happen) to go straight fo r the h igh - risk option (i nteresti ngly n ow referred to as the 'nuclear
option' in everyday speech). The pragmatic i n itial response is to d i scuss the issue with other
relevant states, i.e. to employ d i plo macy. If that is u n productive, there may be som e attempt
to incentivize compl iance by vari ous forms of positive or negative sanctions, not all of them
economic. Appeals to an adversary's own domestic opi n ion, through public d i plomacy or
employing civil society in d i rect cu ltu ral l i n kages, may have some c hance of weakening h i s/
her pol itical base, b ut only i n a longer time-frame.
1 64 E L I S A B E TTA B R I G H I A N D C H R I ST O P H E R H I L L

military action
(pun itive; invasive; occupation)

,.

political intervention
(propaganda; subversion; interference)

J�

negative sanctions
(boycotts; embargoes; laser sanctions;
restrictions on cultural contacts)
,.

positive sanctions

I
(aid; trade agreements; public diplomacy)

"

diplomacy
( discussion/negotiation)

Figu re 8.4 The ,b1.e1 1J i 1 1g scale of foreign pol icy instruments.

Fail u re at the first level leaves the initiati ng state with a serious choice. Does it go on to escalate
the d ispute by exerti ng punitive measures (assuming it has that opportunity), which will almost
certai nly raise the level of tension between the two parties to the point where it might as eas­
ily spiral out of control as produce com pliance, or does it decide to cut its losses and back off,
with the possible conseq uences of i nternational humiliation and domestic criticism? The same
choice, but of an even more serious kind, awaits further down the road if and when sanctions turn
out to have been i n effective. This was the dilemma faced by the USA and Britain in 1 998 as they
attem pted to enforce the no-fly zones in southern I raq on Saddam Hussei n, and to press him to
renounce the suspected p rogrammes of biological and chem ical weapons production. The eco­
nomic sanctions that had been i n place since 1 991 seemed not to be worki ng, and indeed were
attracti ng ever more criticis m on the grounds of their damaging i mpact on I raqi civi lians. Yet, to
abandon them without any alternative course of action would have been to hand a d iplomatic
victory to Saddam, and perhaps to encourage him to develop fu rther 1 weapons of mass destruc­
tion1 (WM Os}. Tt,is reasoning produced Operati on Desert Fox: namely, the major air attacks on
southern I raq lau nched by the USA and UK in December 1 998. In time, catalysed by 9/1 1 , it led
to the ai m of regi me change and the ful l -scale invasion of l raq (Kampfner 2004).
The ladder of escalation i n the use of foreign policy instruments is a tendency rather than
an absolute ru le. It conforms to a rational ideaJ type that may only be honoured in the breach.
 C H A P T E R 8 I M P L E M E NTAT I O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 65

Powerful states are able to use different instruments simultaneously or in rotation. They are
certainly able to benefit from the law of anticipated reactions by keeping the mere possibility of
escal ation in the minds of their weaker adversaries, who may decide that prudence is preferable
to any kind of risk. Lesser powers have fewer options, and not just in relation to hard power.
Their embassies may be restricted to a few maJor capitals plus the UN network, their economic
weakness will rule out any use of sanctions. and their ability to project themselves abroad cul­
turally will be very limited. This does not mean that they are totally hamstrung; if prepared to
take risks, like Castro or Kim Jong-ii, they may have surprising degrees of success, even over long
periods, by being prepared to defy all their opponents' instruments, short of regime change
itself. If, conversely, they do not wish to attract hostility, they may still have some capacity to
implement effective policies so long as they show creativity and do not become over-ambitious.
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania fitfully displayed these characteristics in the 1 960s and 1 970s, giving
his country an influence on African politics that it has not had since his departure (Nzomo 1 999:
1 84-1 86). More recently, President Evo Morales of Bolivia raised his similarly weak country's
profile with a shrewd mixture of diplomatic activism and dignified restraint.

Power and the ends-means relationship in foreign policy

The concept of power is a common thread not only in the story of implementation, but also
in the analysis of fo reign policy more broadly. All action implies the exercise of power to a
greater or lesser extent, both as a means and as a context. In the former sense, power, and thus
foreign policy, is an inherently relational activity in that it only exists in relation to some object
or some other party (Baldwin 1 985). In the latter sense, as context, power impinges on fo r­
eign policy through its unavoidability; if decision makers behave as if the power of others, or
their own lack of lt, is not relevant, they will soon suffer some unpleasant shocks. Conversely,
if they become overconfident about their power position, or interpret it too narrowly, they
risk the usual result of hubris-a hostile coalition and probable failure. Complacency is also
a routine danger. The European states engaged in the Barcelona Process after 1 995 assumed
that , while they might not be able to solve the Israel-Palestine dispute, their diplomatic and
economic engagements with the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean were
sufficient to promote stability. This p roved, in 201 1 , to be a fundamental miscalculation.
In a theoretical sense, power is often defined as getting A to do what they might not oth­
erwise do, or even consider doing. Yet, in order to understand the way in which power both
works in the implementation process and how it can be drained away during this crucial
phase, it needs to be disaggregated and contextualized. In the inevitable shorthand talk of
'great powers', 'power politics', and the like, FPA provides a useful corrective by employ­
ing middle-range theory to explore the different levels and processes beneath the surface
of events. As we saw In Section 1 , the FPA perspective allows us to unpack the interplay of
structures with agency, and in a much more concrete way than the usual discussion of that
relationship. It tends to be sceptical of single-factor explanations, whether at the level of
the motivations, actions, or effects of foreign polfcy. Equally, it shows-and most clearly in
the particular context of i m plementation-how ends and means exist in a perpetual loop of
interconnectedness, with the latter often determining the former.
The rational model, which stresses setting one's goals in line with available power and
then choosing the most appropriate instrument to achieve them, rarely conforms to actual
1 66 E L I S A BETTA B R I G H I A N D C H R I STO P H E R H I L L

foreign policy practice. I n confronting an unexpected problem, decision makers often turn
to the first potential solution to hand, bearing ln mind the need to build a coalition of sup­
port withi n the government and (at times) to carry domestic public opinion with them. They
may then be sucked into an unforeseeable tunnei of events that throw up yet further choices
over ends and means. This was evident in the Balkans during the ·1 990s, as the Western states
grappled with the complex consequences of the disintegration of Yugo!;l.lvia, finally taking
on commitments to de facto protectorates i n three countries (Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo),
and (in the case of the EU) accepting a major enlargement of membership across the whole
region. The many complex instruments thus deployed were ostensibly a means towards the
ends of stabilization and pacification, but the longer they stay in place the more difficult it is
to d istinguish the two. Indeed, most foreign policy implementation is best judged not via a
snapshot in the moment, but over the long term in relation to changing goals and the flexible
use of a range of means. This is why Joseph Nye's seductive concept of 'smart power' must be
approached with caution-the best choice of i nstrument or instruments for a particular situa­
tion is indeed context dependent, but the most important consequences of an action are not
always immediately evident (Nye 2008b).
Certainly, leaders need to be clear and reflective about their goals and about the ends­
means relationship, but in foreign policy they should not be under any illusion that the latter
can be held steady, or that any given means can be relied upon to deliver results. The imple­
mentation phase of policy n1aking always involves some loss of momentum through transac­
tion costs, political friction, and disillusion. Because decisions are never self-executing (except
ih the case of Saddam Hussein, who is said to have literally executed one death sentence on a
ministerial colleague), leaders rely on subcontracting to bureaucratic agents, some of whom
may take thP opportun ity to slow down or under mine the policy, or even to run their own
policies i n competition, under the cover of agreement. More likely, they will just be guilty of
inefficiency, but this can still endanger the original policy. As John Kennedy famously said
during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1 962, after one of his spy planes had strayed over Soviet
territory, strictly against his orders: 'There's always some son-of-a-bitch who doesn't get the
word' (Allison and Zelikow 1 999: 241 ).2

Conclusion
The key points that emerge from the analysis of the confrontation between foreign policy and
the world in which it has to operate all qualify rationalist notions of power and the ends-means
relationship. They stress the importance of understanding the Interplay between context and
policy, as between structures and actors. They also highlight the huge potential for slippage
between intentions and outcomes, between actions and consequences. Indeed, foreign policy
decisions should be seen primarily as heightened moments of commitment in a perpetual
process of action, reaction, and further action at many different levels, involving a range of dif­
ferent actors, inside and outside the state, all of which need to be taken into account. In short,
they are best understood through the strategic-relational model. The most important thing for
practitioners to remember is that the point of decision i n foreign policy is usually only the start
of a long process of immersion in a fluid and unpredictable external environment. The onset
of implementation denotes not the end of politics, but simply a new phase of it.
 C H A P T E R 8 I M P L E M E NTAT I O N A N D B E H AV I O U R 1 67

Key poi nts

• The international environment is fluid and difficult to manage. Foreign policy makers should be
alert to the constant feedback it provides and adapt to its changing circumstances, however clear
their i nitial objectives.
• Foreign policy is not self-executing; the implementation phase is critical to success.
• The implementation phase may turn out to be much longer than anticipated, and to shade into
new rounds of policy making.
• The means of foreign policy can distort and even transform its original ends.
• The implementation of foreign policy needs to be highly flexible-it is self-defeating to rely on one
instrument alone, or one strategy for too long.
• I mplementation takes place in several different arenas simultaneously-the local, the states system,
the global/transnational, and even the domestic (of both the acting and the receiving state).
• I mplementation can be a purely technical executive matter. Yet, it too can entail major decisions
that may turn out to have strategic implications. Potentially, therefore, implementation is as
political-and therefore as ethical-a dimension as any other aspect of foreign policy.

Further readi ng
George, A. and Simons, W.E. (eds) (1 994), The Limits ofCoercive Diplomacy, 2nd edn (Boulder, CO:
Westview).
The best discussion of how force and diplomacy are often combined, if not always to good effect.

Haass, Richard N. {2013), Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in
Order (New York: Basic Books).
A senior American scholar-practitioner argues that US foreign policy is being undermined by its
neglect of its domestic capabilities base.

Hill, C. (201 5), Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century (London: Palgrave Macmillan).
A wide-ranging discussion of the conduct of foreign policy, with much attention given to the problems
of acting in an intractable environment.

Jervis, R. (2010), Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
A sophisticated discussion of one of the key issues in foreign policy implementation from one of the
world's leading analysts.

Nye,J.S. (2004), So� Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs Books).
The fullest statement of the argument that even major powers need the full range of foreign policy
instruments.

Wolters, A. (1 962), Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics {Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press).
A classic, contai ning several essential essays, on the nature of goals and the ends-means problem.

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www.oxfordtextbooks.eo.uk/orc/smith_foreign3e/