PNNESSEE IN THE CRIMINAL COURT OF HAMILTON COUNTY, STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) No. 310584 ) ) DIVISION I vs. ) ) JUDGE B. STEELMAN ) SANEL DURAKOVIC. ) NOTICE OF FINAL RI IR EXCULPATORY EVIDENC) D EXTRAMARITAL AFFAIRS OF DECI COMES NOW defendant Sanal Durakovie, pursuant to the 5", 6" and 14% Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 6, 8, 9 of the Tennessee Constitution’s Declaration of Rights; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); U. S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Hartman v. State, 896 8.W.24 94, 101 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Marshall, 845 S.W.2d 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), and moves to be provided any and all evidence in possession of the State or any agent that might fairly be termed. “favorable.” that has not previously been provided. Specifically requested, at least fourteen (14) days prior to trial or, if later revealed, as soon as known to the State is: 1) any information, statements, investigatory material revealing or exploring Patrick Godwin’s extramarital affait(s) which may have provided a motive or reason for people other than the defendant to cause him harm, Such evidence should be disclosed whether it be completely exculpatory in nature or simply tends to reduce the degree of the offense or punishment therefore, or whether that evidence might be termed “favorable” in the sense that it might be fairly used by the defendant to impeach the credibility of any witness the government intends to call in this matter. See generally Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (Sth Cir.1968).Notwithstanding the ‘open file’ policy of the Hamilton County District Attorney's Off and its good faith efforts to comply with Brady, it occasionally oceurs that certain items are not tured over promptly to the prosecutor by the police, rendering the ‘open file” incomplete. As noted in the decisions below, this situation is not uncommon but requires that prosecutors be proactive in comprehensively reviewing the files of their agents for exculpatory information, the nature of which might not be immediately apparent to someone without specialized legal training. As stated in Moldowen v, City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 379 (6 Cir. 2009), Although the prosecutor undoubtedly plays a “special role” in “the search for truth in criminal tials,” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936. the police also play a unique and significant role in that process, and thus also are bound by the government's constitutional obligation to “ensure that a miscartiage of justice does not occur,” U.S. v, Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 8.Ct. 3375. ‘As the Fourth Circuit explained persuasively in Barbee v, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir.1964), “{t]he police are also part of the prosecution, and the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the State's Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure... The duty to disclose is that of the state, which ordinarily acts through the prosecuting attorney; but if he too is the victim of police suppression of the material information, the state's failure is not on that account excused.” fd. at 846. In other words, because the police are just as much an arm of the state as the prosecutor, the police inflict the same constitutional injury when they hide, conceal, destroy, withhold, or even fail to disclose material exculpatory information. Accordingly, immediate action by the prosecutor in securing and reviewing al case material from all State agents is absolutely critical to protect the defendant’s rights to exculpatory, as well as merely discoverable, evidence. See also United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2nd Cir. 1968) (holding that once a request for production is made, the “prosecution knows of the defense's interest and, if it has failed to honor this even in good faith, it has only itself to blame.”)In addition to information required under case law and the rules, specifically, counsel seeks, but does not limit, his request to the following: ‘a, Any and all information in the possession of the state regarding the mental condition of the State’s witnesses which would reflect or bring into question the witnesses’ credibility. State v. Brown, 552 S.W.2d 383 (Tenn. 1977), ». The original statement and any amendment thereto, of any individuals who have provided the government with a statement inculpating the defendant, who later retracted all or any portion of that statement where such retraction would raise a conflict in the evidence which the state intends to introduce. See U.S. v Enright, $79 F.2d 980, 3 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 284 (6th Cit. 1978). c. Any and all interview memoranda or reports, recordings, or the contents of any statements not memorialized, which contain any information, whatever the sources, which might fairly be said to contradict or be inconsistent with any evidence which the government intends to adduce in this matter. See U.S. v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 3 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 284 (6th Cir. 1978). . The names and addresses of any witnesses whom the State believes would give testimony favorable to the defendant in regard to the matters alleged in the indictment, even though the state may not be in possession of a statement of this witness and regardless of whether the state intends to call this witness. See U.S. v Eley, 335 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ga. 1972). e. The results of any scientific tests or analysis done on any person or object in connection with this case where the result of that test or analysis did not implicate, or was neutral to the defendant. See Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964); Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241 (4th Cir.1976). £ Any documentary evidence in the possession of the State which contradicts, or is inconsistent with any testimony the State intends to introduce in this cause. Rule 613, Tenn. Rules of Evidence (Impeachment with Prior Statements).WHEREFORE, itis the duty of the prosecutor to review by the prosecutor of all ‘materials held in the custody, control, or possession of the State or any of its agents, Kyles v. Whitley, $14 U.S. 419 (1995), for exculpatory evidence. See State v. Foster, 942 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1996), recalled on other grounds, (Brady obligations include “a duty to search possible sources” [where] ‘non-trivial prospeetfs]’ of material exculpatory information” exist). Such action is necessary to, infer alia, a fair trial, compulsory process, confrontation, and assistance of counsel, and due process under the 5", 6" and 14" Amendments and Article I, §§ 6, 8,9 of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights. Respectfully submitted, SUMMERS, ILO & RODGERS, P.C., By: fenjaminrb-WcGowan, BPR No. 25560 The James Building 735 Broad Street, Suite 800 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 (423) 265-2385; (423) 266-521 1/fax. bmegowan@summersfirm.com CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been duly served upon: KEVIN LOPER, Exec. Asst. District Attomey ADDIE NESTER, Assistant District Attorney 600 Market Street, Room 310 Chattanooga, TN 37402 either by hand delivery or by placing a copy of same in the United States mail, properly addressed with sufficient postage affixed thereto to carry same to its destination, This Zt day of August 2023