FSI Briefs

No 5

Public guarantees for bank lending in

response to the Covid-19 pandemic

Patrizia Baudino

April 2020
FSI Briefs are written by staff members of the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) of the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), sometimes in cooperation with other experts. They are short notes on regulatory and
supervisory subjects of topical interest and are technical in character. The views expressed in them are
those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the BIS or the Basel-based standard-setting bodies.

Authorised by Chairman of the FSI, Fernando Restoy.

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ISSN 2708-1117 (online)

ISBN 978-92-9259-374-2 (online)
Public guarantees for bank lending in response to the Covid-19
pandemic 1

Highlights

• In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, governments have launched guarantee programmes to

support bank lending to companies, especially small and medium-sized enterprises. This is essential
to avoid a sharp contraction in bank credit that would exacerbate the pandemic’s adverse impact.
• The design of such programmes needs to strike a difficult balance between responding promptly to
the pandemic and maintaining a sufficient level of prudence. Key features of a sample of
programmes (eg target beneficiaries, coverage of the guarantee, loan terms, length of the
programme) reflect this tension.
• Incentives were created for the banks to join these programmes by exploiting flexibility in existing
prudential requirements, while central banks have often provided liquidity support. Programmes
are, however, subject to operational challenges and, ultimately, fiscal capacity limits.

1. Introduction

The adverse economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic is acute and risks worsening. In order to provide
liquidity to the economy, governments in several jurisdictions are offering guarantees on bank loans to
non-financial companies. These are expected to encourage banks to continue providing credit, and to
prevent an even deeper recession, as discussed in Section 2 of this note.
Section 3 reviews key features of a sample of guarantee programmes, illustrating approaches
taken in response to a systemic crisis such as the current one and highlighting some of the differences
between them. Section 4 reviews some complementary measures, and notes some of the key challenges.

2. Why bank guarantees

The economic contraction caused by the Covid-19 pandemic is already substantial. Uncertainty about
when and how quickly economies will recover has generated concerns that the contraction will not only
create liquidity strains for non-financial companies but also affect their viability more generally.
Under these conditions, companies’ traditional source of credit – bank credit – is likely to dry up.
Given heightened uncertainty about credit quality, banks can become extremely risk-averse. This can lead
to a market failure that will exacerbate the crisis as, while each bank may restrict lending out of prudence,
the cumulative effect will be excess credit rationing. This in turn can worsen the prospects of recovery.
National authorities have responded to this risk by reducing some bank capital requirements and
have encouraged banks to draw down their buffers. At the global level, the move was supported by the

1
Patrizia Baudino (patrizia.baudino@bis.org), Bank for International Settlements. The author is grateful to Iñaki Aldasoro, Greg
Sutton and Raihan Zamil for reviewing the paper, and to Esther Künzi for administrative support.

Public guarantees for bank lending in response to the Covid-19 pandemic 1

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS (2020a)), 2 the Financial Stability Board, the G7 and the
G20. While this has given banks room to lend, it cannot fully overcome their concerns about credit quality.
Several governments have therefore launched programmes of public guarantees on bank loans,
especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 3 The guarantees can preserve incentives for
bank lending, and leverage banks’ credit risk expertise. Fiscal balances are protected if beneficiaries remain
solvent, and in the short term the fiscal impact is limited as the guarantees are only drawn down if a credit
turns bad. 4 This strategy is not without risks, however, as the long-term viability of borrowers can now be
hard to gauge, and fiscal space to support the guarantees may be limited in some cases.

3. Overview of measures

An effective guarantee programme requires that some key features be spelt out in advance. These include
the specification of the conditions for eligibility, the identification of the target beneficiaries, setting
coverage and pricing terms, and the lifespan of the programme. More stringent conditions (eg relatively
low coverage, short lifetime of the programme, loan collateral requirements) can help limit risks for the
guarantor, but may come at the cost of more limited accessibility to beneficiaries. This balance also needs
to be assessed against the context in which the guarantees are provided. At times of systemic stress such
as now, concerns about reaching out to beneficiaries promptly and commensurately, and resolving a
crucial market failure, may take priority. A sample of loan guarantee programmes launched in the context
of the Covid-19 pandemic highlights this trade-off (see Table 1 for selected features).
Concerning eligibility, all programmes in the sample require that companies be in good financial
standing and have no non-performing loans as of a cutoff date just prior to the onset of the pandemic.
This helps to exclude cases where solvency may be at risk irrespective of the pandemic. However, proof of
direct losses due to Covid-19 is not a prerequisite in all programmes, partly for operational reasons, but
also reflecting the severity of the economic contraction, which will affect most companies at some stage.
The target beneficiaries vary in the sample, but in every country there is a programme for SMEs,
and in some also for larger companies. This suggests the high importance given to SMEs, possibly
reflecting the high proportion of employment they support. Moreover, unlike SMEs, larger companies may
be able to raise funds in capital markets, and the securities they issue may be eligible for central banks’
liquidity facilities. In line with the importance attached to SMEs, programmes addressed to them face
lighter operational requirements and benefit from higher coverage ratios of the guarantee. However, the
latter may also reflect the fact that SME loans have higher default rates, even in non-crisis times.
Incentives for banks hinge upon the coverage of the guarantee and its price, while a coverage
ratio below 100% incentivises banks to exercise due care in their credit risk assessment. Table 1 shows that
in several cases this ratio is below 100%, albeit it may have nonetheless been increased in comparison to
normal times. There is also a relatively high number of programmes with a coverage ratio of 100%, mostly
for smaller loans. The higher ratios may reflect the desire to overcome banks’ proportionally higher

2
For instance, the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) was released in several economies, including Brazil, France, Germany,
Hong Kong SAR, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. However, the CCyB was at zero in several cases at the start of the Covid-
19 pandemic, and even non-zero CCyBs were not necessarily large. See Borio and Restoy (2020) for an overview of measures.
3
The use of government guarantees to encourage lending to some underserved economic sectors, or SMEs, is not unusual.
Honohan (2010) discusses the three types of market failure that guarantees can address outside crisis times: (i) information
asymmetry; (ii) risk diversification; and (iii) regulatory arbitrage to give borrowers access to financial markets.
4
This makes loan guarantees preferable to direct government lending, on top of the operational difficulties of such loans. Grants,
an often quoted alternative to guarantees, would have immediate fiscal implications. Grants may also encourage moral hazard.

2 Public guarantees for bank lending in response to the Covid-19 pandemic

operational costs when dealing with smaller loans, but also the extreme urgency of the crisis situation.
Some programmes even explicitly allow for loan forgiveness. 5 While a very high coverage ratio removes
concerns for banks, it comes at the risk of moral hazard and possible fiscal costs later on.

Key features of selected bank guarantee programmes Table 1

Jurisdiction 6 Beneficiary Coverage ratio/ Closing Terms Loan maturity

maximum loan size date
Australia SMEs 50%; 30 Sep 6-month interest Up to 3 years
Coronavirus SME AUD 250,000 2020 holiday at the start;
Guarantee Scheme rates then vary by
lender
Canada All legal 80%; Extended n/a 1 year
(Export Development businesses, 7 CAD 6.25m mandate
Canada (EDC) Loan irrespective of for EDC to
Guarantee Program) exporting status end-2021

Canada Small businesses 8 100%; n/a 0% interest rate, no Up to 5 years

Canada Emergency and non-profits CAD 40,000 fees or principal
Business Account repayments until
(CEBA) end-2022, then 5%
interest rate
France All types of 70–90% (higher for 31 Dec No payment in the Can repay by
(Bpifrance) company 9 smaller firms); 2020 first year; interest end-2020, or
cap of 25% of 2019 rate set by the extended by
revenue or two years bank, guarantee a maximum
of payrolls cost ranging over of 5 years
25–200 bp
Germany SMEs 100% for loans up to: 31 Dec Loan rate to be n/a
Bundesregelung EUR 500,000 for firms 2020 determined for
Kleinbeihilfen 2020 with 50 employees; each company by
EUR 800,000 for the bank
others 10
Germany Companies of 90% for SMEs, 80% 31 Dec Loan is subsidised Up to 5 years
(Kreditanstalt für all sizes for others; 11 2020 (lower interest rate
Wiederaufbau (KfW)) EUR 1bn per range for SMEs)
company

5
Loan forgiveness is associated with meeting certain conditions, giving the beneficiary an incentive to reach the target set in the
programme. For instance, in Canada’s EDC Loan Guarantee Program, repaying the balance of the loan by
the end of 2022 will trigger forgiveness of 25% of the loan. In the United States, a borrower of a Paycheck Protection Program
(PPP) loan is eligible for loan forgiveness if the loan was used to cover payroll costs and for staff retention.
6
When the guarantee is granted via a public development bank or fund, its name is provided in brackets.
7
At launch, only SMEs fell within the scope of the EDC Loan Guarantee Program.
8
The eligibility criteria were changed in April, eg the wage floor was lowered (to CAD 20,000) and its ceiling raised (to CAD 1.5m).
9
The approval process is more straightforward for companies with up to 5,000 employees.
10
In the March version of the programme, coverage was 80% for larger firms and 90% for others; rates were increased in April.
11
Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, KfW assumed no more than 50% of the financial risk of comparable loans.

Public guarantees for bank lending in response to the Covid-19 pandemic 3

 Hong Kong SAR SMEs 100%; 12 Available Optional principal Up to 3 years
Special Financing up to total amount of for 12 moratorium for 1
Guarantee Scheme employee wages and months year; rate is Prime
(SFGS) rents for six months Rate minus 2.5%;
or HKD 4m no guarantee fees
Italy SMEs 80–90%: loans up to 17 Dec Guarantee cost n/a
(Fondo di Garanzia EUR 1.5m 13 2020 waived; loan rates
PMI) 100%: loans up to set by lenders
EUR 800,000 14
Italy Companies of all 70–90%; 15 31 Dec Loan rate to be 6 years
(Cassa Depositi e sizes – SMEs cap of 25% of 2019 2020 determined for
Prestiti) must first apply revenues or twice each company by
for the SME plan payroll costs the bank 16
Spain Any Spanish 60–80% (varies with End-Sep Guarantee fees of Up to 5 years
(Instituto de Credito company 17 company size and 2020 20–120 bp (to be
Oficial) new/renewed loan); borne by the bank)
no explicit cap
Switzerland Companies with 100% up to 30 July 0% interest rate up Up to 5 years
turnover below CHF 500,000, 2020 to CHF 500,000;
CHF 500m 85% up to CHF 20m; portion over
cap of 10% of annual CHF 500,000: 0.5%,
turnover and never plus a premium on
above CHF 20m the remaining 15%
of the loan
United Kingdom SMEs 100% up to n/a Interest holiday in Up to 6 years
Coronavirus Business GBP 250,000, 80% first 12 months; 18
Interruption Loan above GBP 250,000; guarantee fee
Scheme (CBILS) up to GBP 5m waived, lenders pay
a fee; loan terms
set by each lender
USA SMEs 100% to end-2020; 19 20 June 1% interest rate; 2 years
Paycheck Protection up to the lesser of 2020 optional interest
Program (PPP) – USD 10m or a payment holiday
CARES Act payroll-based for first 6 months
amount
Source: Publications by national authorities. This table reflect publicly available information as of 16 April 2020.

12
In April, the SFGS was expanded, eg both the maximum loan size and the application period were doubled.
13
The fund can guarantee 80% of loans up to EUR 5m, under terms and conditions that existed prior to the Covid-19 outbreak
and that continue to hold (before the outbreak, the maximum loan size was EUR 2.5m).
14
The 100% coverage for smaller loans was added in the April revisions to the programme. The revisions also envisages that, for
loans up to EUR 25,000, the bank can grant the loan without prior confirmation from the fund.
15
The guarantee rate is higher the smaller the company is. The programme also envisages a 100% guarantee for loans below
EUR 25,000 without requiring a risk assessment of the loan, as well as for loans up to EUR 800,000 under additional conditions.
16
The loan rate has an upper bound determined according to credit default swap values for banks and the Italian Republic (with
five-year maturity), and an average of rates on public debt, published by the central bank.
17
Fifty per cent of the first EUR 10bn tranche is reserved for loans to SMEs and the self-employed.
18
The government also pays the first 12 months of interest and any arrangement fees charged by the lender.
19
At the start of 2021, coverage will return to 75% (85%) for loans above USD 150,000 (up to USD 150,000).

4 Public guarantees for bank lending in response to the Covid-19 pandemic

 Pricing conditions are less easily comparable across programmes, but in general the cost of the
loan and of the guarantee (if any) is subsidised, while still attractive to the banks. In some cases the
programme fixes the loan interest rate, in others this is determined by the lending bank, with in-between
cases where rates are fixed for the first part of the life of the loan and can vary thereafter. Some
programmes also offer interest payment holidays for the first months, reflecting the expectation that the
brunt of the economic impact will materialise at the start of the programme. Some programmes envisage
a waiver of the guarantee fee that would have applied under normal economic circumstances. Separately,
some programmes treat new loans and renewal of pre-existing loans differently, offering a lower
guarantee rate for the latter, presumably because the banks’ incentives in continuing the business
relationship is higher in this case. 20
Under the assumption that the Covid-19 pandemic can affect firms’ liquidity but not their viability,
limits to both the lifespan of these programmes and the loans’ duration are to be expected. In particular,
a limited lifespan can avoid introducing distortions in the financial sector once conditions return to normal.
In the sample, some programmes have no explicit end date yet, and they may remain available until the
dedicated funds run out, 21 while for many of the programmes with an explicit end date this is the end of
2020. In a similar vein, the maturity of the loans is relatively short, although across the sample it varies
from one to six years. The shorter the original maturity of the guaranteed loan, the more likely that it will
address only the most pressing liquidity needs. In some cases, programmes explicitly state that the loans
are available only for working capital purposes. 22
Finally, the intensity and speed of the crisis required a high level of flexibility in the design of the
guarantee programme, with some features becoming less stringent overt time. This was the case for the
eligibility criteria, 23 the coverage ratio 24 and the programme’s lifespan. 25 Some jurisdictions, such as Hong
Kong, Italy, Switzerland and the United States, also increased the size of the programme.

4. Complementary measures and challenges

Loan guarantee programmes can benefit from complementary measures that increase their appeal to
banks and their customers. While in normal circumstances these measures may not be needed, pressure
to implement the Covid-19-related guarantee programmes rapidly and on a large scale has driven
authorities to introduce such complementary measures. Some challenges, however, remain and can affect
the overall success of the guarantee programmes. 26

20
In Spain, for non-SMEs the guarantee rate is 70% for new loans and 60% for refinancing (it is always 80% for SMEs).
21
Depending on how effectively the programme disburses funds, this may occur very quickly. In the United States, the funds
available for the programme described in Table 1 were exhausted by mid-April and replenished thereafter.
22
At the opposite end of the spectrum are programmes that allow the use of public funds to recapitalise companies. For instance,
Germany announced that the fund (Wirtschaftstabilisierungsfonds, Economic Stabilisation Fund (WSF)) it created as part of its
response package would be allowed to participate in firms’ recapitalisation. The WSF can also issue loan guarantees to firms
meeting minimum size criteria.
23
For instance, this is the case for both programmes in Canada, as well as the SFGS in Hong Kong.
24
This was the case in, for instance, Germany and Italy. This may have also reflected a softening of the conditions set by the
European Commission. This happened first in March, via a communication introducing some common requirements for state
guarantees in the context of the Covid-19 emergency and exceptions from State Aid Rules, and again in April.
25
For example, in Hong Kong’s SFGS, this was increased from six to 12 months.
26
As discussed in OECD (2017), ex post evaluations of guarantee programmes are not frequent. In the current circumstances,
success can be narrowly interpreted in terms of fund availability for the target beneficiaries without impairing banks’ resilience.

Public guarantees for bank lending in response to the Covid-19 pandemic 5

 Central bank funding

Banks need funding to provide the additional credit envisaged by the guarantee programme, especially if
the new loans are expected to be granted quickly and in large amounts. To that end, several central banks
have extended their collateral pools, and included credit claims issued under the guarantee programmes
(eg the ECB). They have also created new, temporary standing facilities (eg Switzerland, or the United
States for PPP loans), which allow liquidity to be drawn against credit claims issued under the guarantee
programmes. 27
A bolder approach has been adopted in the United States, with a new programme under which
the central bank funds a special purpose vehicle that acquires loans from banks, at par value (see Box 1).

Box1

A hybrid programme – the Main Street Business Lending Program in the United States

As part of the CARES Act, the Federal Reserve announced the establishment of the Main Street Business Lending
Program (MSLP), complementing the PPP covered in Table 1. As an emergency loan programme to support lending
to SMEs, the MSLP is similar to loan guarantee programmes in some respects, but in others it is rather unique.

In the MSLP, the Treasury will make a USD 75bn equity investment in a special purpose vehicle (SPV),
established by the Federal Reserve. The Fed lends to the SPV on a recourse basis, providing leverage that is expected
to result in up to USD 600bn in loans. The SPV will purchase, at par value, 95% participations in these loans from the
banks. Operationally, the MSLP will consist of two facilities. One, for unsecured loans; the other, the Main Street
Expanded Loan Facility (MSELF), for “add-on” loans under existing loan facilities. Contrary to PPP loans, MSLP loans
are not forgivable. The MSLP is also different from liquidity programmes for larger companies, where the Federal
Reserve buys higher-rated corporate bonds.

Under the MSLP, banks benefit from a 95% guarantee of the par value of the loan. For the Treasury, losses
are capped at USD 75bn. For the Federal Reserve, risk would be mitigated by collateral, under the MSELF and if
collateral was attached to the original loan.

Accounting, disclosure and prudential treatment

The regulatory treatment of guaranteed loans directly affects banks’ incentives to offer them. The BCBS
clarified that the capital requirement for these loans should be aligned with that of the corresponding
sovereign, as the latter guarantees the loans (BCBS (2020b)). This risk assessment implies a low capital
charge for banks. 28 The BCBS also clarified that the fact the loans benefit from public guarantees should
not automatically lead them to being categorised as forborne (BCBS (2020b)). 29
On the accounting side, a crucial decision concerns the calculation of expected credit losses, given
their impact on the profit and loss statement of banks. The provision of public guarantees can reduce the
level of provisions that banks may otherwise have to make, particularly when the guarantee coverage ratio

27
Central banks also activated programmes directly aimed at providing liquidity to the larger non-financial companies,
irrespective of guarantee programmes – for instance, the Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF) at the Bank of England and
the Commercial Paper Funding Facility at the Federal Reserve, both of them for commercial paper.
28
Some jurisdictions have taken additional regulatory measures. For instance, the US agencies decided that PPP-eligible loans
will not be included in a bank’s leverage ratio requirement if they are pledged as collateral to the PPP-dedicated facility at the
central bank. See Zamil (2020) for an in-depth discussion of accounting issues in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic.
29
Borio and Restoy (2020) show how authorities have provided additional guidance on asset classification.

6 Public guarantees for bank lending in response to the Covid-19 pandemic

is at 100%. For countries applying International Financial Reporting Standards, the International
Accounting Standards Board stressed that disclosure can provide essential transparency to users of
financial statements. 30

Operationalisation challenges

Granting the guaranteed loans requires that a number of practical steps are taken. Implementing acts are
necessary for the banks to price the loans correctly, select eligible companies and meet due diligence
requirements. Importantly, banks need to be sure of the loan requirements that make these contracts
eligible for the government guarantees; otherwise, they would bear the credit risk themselves, in full. For
their part, companies also need clarity about the application procedure. Finally, where central banks have
activated corresponding liquidity programmes, their terms must mirror those of the matching guarantee
programmes to avoid some loans turning out to be ineligible.
In addition, limits in operational capacity of both banks and agencies issuing the guarantees can
create bottlenecks. Such constraints will be tested by the high number of applications banks and agencies
are likely to receive. Speed will also be of the essence, as these programmes have a finite budget, and
applicants are under severe liquidity pressure.

Limits in fiscal backstops

The success of the guarantee programme also hinges on the size of the fiscal backstop in each country.
Countries in better fiscal condition at the onset of the crisis can offer larger guarantee programmes, as a
proportion of their economy, facilitating the recovery once the emergency is over. Moreover, as some of
the guaranteed loans will inevitably fail to perform, public funds will have to be disbursed.
Any doubt about a country’s fiscal capacity to absorb losses on guaranteed loans could damage
the profitability or even the viability of banks, possibly engulfing them in a negative bank-sovereign loop.

References

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2020a): Basel Committee coordinates policy and
supervisory response to Covid-19, March.
――― (2020b): Measures to reflect the impact of Covid-19, April.
Borio, C and F Restoy (2020): “Reflections on regulatory responses to the Covid-19 pandemic”, FSI Briefs,
no 1, April.
Honohan, P (2010): “Partial credit guarantees: principles and practice”, Journal of Financial Stability, vol 6,
issue 1, April, pp 1–9.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2017): Evaluating publicly supported
credit guarantee programmes for SMEs.
Zamil, R (2020): “Expected loss provisioning under a global pandemic”, FSI Briefs, no 3, April.

30
For instance, the Swiss Financial Supervisory Authority FINMA requires separate reporting of the loan’s part covered by the
guarantee.

Public guarantees for bank lending in response to the Covid-19 pandemic 7