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Criminal Law Review A

Bar Question and Answer

1978

I.

a. Discuss concisely the cardinal features of principles of criminal law. Give

an exception to each principle and explain the same.

Answer:

The Cardinal principles of Criminal Law are generality; territorially and

prospectivity. Generality means that a penal law applies to all persons
who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of
public international law and treaty stipulations. A penal law does not
therefore apply to duly accredited foreign Ambassadors and Ministers in
the Philippines since under international law they enjoy diplomatic
immunity. Territoriality means that a penal law is enforceable within the
territory of the Philippines. However, under Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, its provisions shall be enforced outside of the jurisdiction of the
Philippines against those, among others, who should commit an offense
while on a Philippine ship or airship. The exception will apply if the
Philippine ship or airship is registered under the laws of the Philippines.
The registered Philippine ship at the time of the commission of the crime
must be in the air space not within the jurisdiction of a foreign country.
Prospectivity means that a penal law does not have any retroactive effect.
Otherwise, it will become an ex post facto law. However, if a penal law is
favorable to the accused, it may be given retroactive effect, unless the
accused is an habitual delinquent or the law otherwise expressly
provides. Penal laws define distinct classes of crimes.

b. Discuss and elucidate on their distinctions.

Answer:

In general, penal laws refer to the Revised Penal Code and special laws.
Crimes punished in the Revised Penal Code are called felonies and those
punished in special laws are called offenses. A felony as a rule is an act
mala in se which is wrongful from its very nature while an offense is an
act mala prohibits, which is a wrong only because of the law punishing it.
The Revised Penal Code also classifies felonies as intentional, if dolo or
malice is present, and culpable, if there is culpa or fault. According to
gravity, felonies are grave, if the penalty is capital or afflictive in any of its
periods; less grave, if the penalty in its maximum period is correctional;
and light, if the penalty is arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00,
or both.

c. Discuss the distinctions between dolo and culpa. Give an example of

each.

Answer:

"Dolo" implies deliberate intent. It is equivalent to malice. "Culpa" means

fault, that is, there is no intent or malice. The wrongful act is the result of
imprudence, negligence, lack of skill or lack of foresight. A felony is
committed by means of dolo or culpa and must be voluntary.
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d. Is malice or criminal intent an essential requisite of all crimes? Explain.

May criminal intent be presumed to exist? Discuss.

Answer:

Malice or criminal intent is not an essential element in all crimes. It is

essential only in crimes which are mala in se. In an offense which is mala
prohibita, criminal intent is not an element.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist if the act is unlawful. However, in

some crimes, a specific intent cannot be presumed because it is an
integral element thereof. For example, in frustrated homicide, the specific
intent to kill is not presumed. If it is not proved, the crime will not be
frustrated homicide but serious physical injuries.

II.

a. Is motive indicative of criminal intent?

Is lack of motive proof of innocence?

When is it necessary to prove motive? Explain your answers.

Answer:

Motive may be indicative of criminal intent. The fact that the accused
were losing heavily in their business operations indicated the motive and
therefore the intent to commit arson for the purpose of collecting the
insurance on their stock of merchandise. (U.S. u. Go Foo Suy, 25 Phil.
125). However, it is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no
reliable evidence from which it may deduced that the accused was the
malefactor. (People vs. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468; People vs. Martinez, 106 Phil
597).
Lack of motive is not necessarily proof of innocence because motive is not
an essential element of the crime. A crime may be committed just for the
sake of committing it due for example to the extreme moral perversion of
the accused. (People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255).

It is necessary to prove motive when the identity of the person accused of

committing the crime is in dispute (People vs. del Rosario Murray, 105
Phil. 591), or when there are no eyewitnesses to the crime and where
suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons (People vs. Mario, CA
G.R. No. 371- R, July 21, 1949).

b. Justifying and exempting circumstances have some similar effects but are
different concepts. Discuss their similarities and distinctions.

Answer:

In justifying circumstance, the act committed is lawful, and the actor does
not incur any criminal nor civil liability. In an exempting circumstance, a
crime is committed but there is absent in the person of the offender any of
the elements of voluntariness, and so he is not criminally liable but is
civilly liable except in the exempting circumstances of accident and lawful
or insuperable cause. To recapitulate, in a justifying circumstance, the
act is lawful and hence, there is no crime committed. In an exempting
circumstance, the actor does not incur any criminal nor civil liability. In

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an exempting circumstance, the offender is not criminally liable because

the act is not committed voluntarily but he is civilly liable because the
source of the obligation which is the crime is present.

c. Discuss the components of civil liability arising from crimes. Do these

components exist in all crimes? Explain.
Answer:

The components of civil liability are restitution, reparation for damages

caused and indemnification for consequential damages. These
components do not exist in all crimes. For example, if the crime is not
against property, like lesser serious physical injuries, there is no
restitution nor reparation for damages caused. In the crime of occupation
of real property, which is a crime against property, these three forms of
civil liability may exist, that is, there must be restoration of the property
occupied, reparation for any damages caused, and indemnification for any
damages suffered by the commission of the crime.

d. Distinguish entrapment from instigation. Give an example of each. Do

they constitute defenses to criminal prosecutions? Explain.

Answer:

In instigation, the instigator practically induces an innocent person who

is the wouldbe accused into the commission of the crime and himself
becomes a principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for
the purpose of trapping and arresting the law-breaker in the execution of
his criminal plan (People vs. Galicia, 40 O.G. 4476).

Example of Instigation — A policeman, representing himself to be a

private person engaged in gambling, approached the accused and induced
him to look for a place where they could smoke opium. The policeman
saw the accused three times to convince him of his desire to smoke
opium. Because of his insistence, the accused after some efforts, was able
to look for such a place, where both of them went. The policeman received
from the owner of the place the opium pipe to be used by him and the
accused. After a while, upon some pretext, the policeman left the place,
then returned, and arrested the accused for smoking opium. The accused
cannot be criminally held liable as he was instigated to commit the crime
(U.S. vs. Phelps, 16 440).

Example of entrapment — The accused had a shipment of opium to be

landed in Cebu which he imported from Hongkong. He informed the Chief
of the Customs Secret Service in Cebu about the shipment, who
pretended to remove all difficulties for the landing of the contraband.
When the accused started landing the opium, he was arrested by the
Customs authorities. The accused is criminally liable. When the Secret
Service Chief pretended to smooth the way for the land of the opium, the
accused had already made the importation of the opium, which is an
indictable offense. He was not induced to import the said opium. What
the Secret Service Chief did was merely to resort to a means to facilitate
the arrest of the accused. Instigation is exempting because it is against
public policy. The crime would not have been committed were it not for
the instigation. On the other hand, entrapment is not an absulotory cause
and is not a bar to the prosecution and conviction of the offender. In
entrapment, a crime has already been committed, and ways and means
are merely resorted to trap and arrest the offender.

III.
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a. An accessory's liability is subordinate to that of the principal. Is it

necessary that the principal should first be found and declared guilty
before the accessory can be held liable? Discuss.

Answer:

It is not necessary that the principal be first found guilty before the
accessory can be held liable provided the evidence is clear as to the
commission of the crime. What is controlling is the Spanish text of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that the principal "may be" found
guilty and not the English translation which speaks of the author being
"guilty" of treason, parricide, murder, etc. (People w. Billon, CA 48 O.G.
1391). This was reiterated in the more recent case of People vs. Inovero,
CA No. 04426-27 CR Feb 5, 1968, 65 O.G, 748, where it was held that the
death of the principal does not preclude the conviction of an accessory in
a murder case. What death extinguishes is the criminal liability of the
principal but not the crime committed, and the accessory, having
something to do with the commission of the crime, must suffer its
consequence. (Also, People vs. Nueva, 74 O.G. 1424),

b. A wealthy 65-year old landed proprietor (haciendero) with failing eyesight

and defective hearing who has been a tubercular patient for the last 10
years, was robbed and killed in cold blood while asleep. A was found
guilty as principal, B and C as his accomplices. In passing sentence, the
judge considered abuse of superior strength as aggravating circumstance
correctly appreciated against the three. Explain.

Answer:

There is no abuse of superior strength since A participated in the

commission of the crime as principal and B and C as accomplices. This is
inconsistent, since the offenders did not take advantage of their combined
strength in the commission of the crime. (People vs. Cortes, 56 Phil. 143).

IV.

a. A bus driver was found guilty of damage to property through reckless

imprudence. He was sentenced "to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs".
The driver was insolvent and could not pay the fine. May the driver be
required to serve subsidiary imprisonment? Explain.
Answer:

No, because subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the

fine, is not expressly provided in the sentence. (People vs. Fajardo, 65 Phil.
639).

b. B repeatedly stabbed A with a kitchen knife. A managed to escape with

minor injuries, and to run away from B who continued to pursue him. A,
upon reaching the safety of his house, took a scythe with which to defend
himself against B. Thus armed, A went out of his house and dared B to
come forward and fight. In the ensuing struggle, A killed B. Charged with
homicide, A claimed self-defense. Is A entitled to the justifying
circumstance? Decide and give your reasons.

Answer:

A is not entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There is no

unlawful aggression on the part of the victim B. There are two stages in
the fight. The first stage was when B stabbed A repeatedly with a kitchen
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knife, who managed however to escape and ran away, pursued by B.

When A reached the safety of his house, he was already safe from the
unlawful aggression of B and so such was deemed to have ceased. When
A took a scythe inside his house and while thus armed he went out of his
house and dared B to come forward and fight, be became therefore the
challenger. From the facts, a struggle ensued, which implies that the
challenge of A was accepted by B, which is an agreement to fight and
hence there can be no unlawful aggression. (People vs. Astilla, CAGR No.
4391 6 Velayo's Digest, page 124).

V.

a. Discuss how the crime of illegal detention is committed. When does illegal
detention become serious? When qualified?

Answer:

Illegal detention is committed by a private person who shall kidnap or

detain another or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty. The
essential element is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim or
the deprivation of his liberty. (People vs. Suarez, 82 Phil. 484; People vs.
Ablaza, 30 Phil. 178).

Illegal detention is serious if any of the following circumstances are

present:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have been more than 5 days

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or if it threatens to kill him shall have
been made
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or public
officer

Illegal detention is qualified if it is committed for the purpose of exhorting

ransom from the victim or any other person.

b. Juan and Pedro harbored a long-standing grudge/ resentment against

Jose who eloped with their sister, Maria, and later abandoned her. They
laid meticulous plans to kill him. After weeks of waiting, their chance
came when late one night, they cornered Jose as he was coming out of a
disco-beer house in Makati, Metro Manila. The two forcibly shoved him
into a waiting car and droved to Tagaytay City, where they kept Jose hog-
tied in a 2 x 3 meter room. Two (2) days later, they killed Jose and
dumped his body into ravine. What was the crime/crimes committed by
Juan and Pedro? Discuss briefly.

Answer:

Murder, since the purpose of Juan and Pedro was to kill the victim. The
detention of the victim for two days before he was killed was merely
incidental. (People vs. Camo, 91 Phil. 240; People vs. Ong, 69 SCRA 174).

VI.

a. Juana was charged with parricide, i.e., poisoning her husband Justo with
whom she had seven (7) children, the eldest, 21 years old and the
youngest, eleven (11). The act of poisoning was proven beyond reasonable
doubt, but the prosecution failed to present the marriage certificate to
prove Juana's marriage to Justo. The trial judge rendered a judgment of

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conviction. Juana appealed on the ground that the marriage was not
proven. Decide with reasons.

Answer:

The appeal of Juana on the ground that the marriage was not proven is
meritorious. The best proof of marriage is the marriage certificate. Failure
of the prosecution to present the marriage certificate to prove Juana's
marriage to Justo was fatal, unless there was oral evidence to prove it and
not objected to (People vs. Remegio Cruz, 108 Phil 288)

b. Bella, a 25-year old owner of a beauty shoppe was sleeping in her house
one afternoon. Her husband was in the office while their children were in
school. Knowing that Bella was alone, Basilio, a former rejected suitor,
went up the house, proceeded to the room where Bella wit asleep. Then,
threatening Bella with a bladed weapon, and in spite of her protests and
resistance, Basilio had forcible sexual intercourse with Bella. During the
trial, no medical certificate was presented since Bella refused to submit to
a medical examination. Basilio was convicted on the strength alone of
Bella's testimony. Basilio appealed and contended that the rape was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt due to the failure of the prosecution to
present the medical certificate to show vaginal lacerations. Decide with
reasons.

Answer:

The sentence of conviction must be affirmed. Medical examination of the

victim is not always necessary in rape cases. Whether the charge will
prosper depends upon all evidence. (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 809).

VII.

a. A boarded a plane at the Manila Domestic Airport bound for Davao City.
While the plane was still on the tarmac, its doors still open and waiting
for the last passenger to board, A ordered the pilot P at gunpoint, to take
the plane to Singapore. When P refused, A shot him to death. What
offense/offenses did A commit? Discuss with reasons.

Answer:

Frustrated coercion and murder. When the crimes were committed, the
plane was not "in flight" as the doors were still open for embarkation. So,
hijacking was not committed (Rep. Act No. 6235, Sec. 1). The facts are
almost similar to the facts of the case of People vs. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil.
475, where the accused was convicted of frustrated coercion because of
the refusal of the pilot to comply with the order of the accused to take the
plane to Amoy, China instead of to Aparri and murder, because the
accused shot the pilot to death.

Alternative Answer:

Murder because when the pilot was shot the plane was still in the tarmac
and the engine had not yet started. Coercion could not be committed, or if
all, would be incidental to the killing.

b. A, not being used to liquor, became drunk at a party. When he reached

home, with the help of his friends, B, and C, his wife .W berated him so
harshly, and a violent quarrel ensued. He squeezed her neck, banged her
head against the wall and kicked her repeatedly in the stomach. The next
day, W vomitted profusely and died thereafter. Cause of death was

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established to be hemorrhage cause by A's assault upon his wife. During

the trial, A's counsel argued that A did not have the intention to kill his
wife and alleged intoxication as an exempting circumstance. Decide with
reasons.

Answer:

The intoxication was not habitual as A was not used to liquor. He only
became drunk during a party and so the intoxication was not subsequent
to the plan to commit the crime. It is not exempting but an alternative
mitigating circumstance. Since intoxication involves loss of reason and
self-control, A could not have any intention to kill his wife. A is liable for
parricide. The mitigating circumstances of intoxication and lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong as that which resulted cannot, however, be
appreciated in his favor to lower the penalty by one degree because the
penalty for parricide consists of two single and indivisible penalties which
are reclusion perpetua to death. (Art 246; Art. 63, Revised Penal Code;
People vs. Monleon, 74 SCR A 263).

VIII.

a. A was defendant in a collection suit for an unpaid loan extended to him

by B. In his answer under oath, A swore he did not owe B anything, much
less did he borrow any amount from him. The court found A's answer to
be false and rendered judgment for B. A was later charged with, and
prosecuted for, perjury for making a false statement under oath. Decide,
state your reasons.

Answer:

A is not liable for perjury. Verification of the answer is not required by law
(People vs. Tupasi, 36 O.G. 2038). In a recent decision, the Supreme Court
also held that a verified answer pertinent to the issue is absolutely
privileged (Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, et al. L-8088, July 31, 1978). Perjury
is any sworn false statement on any material matter made before a person
authorized to administer oath whenever the law so requires, (Art. 183,
R.P.C.)

b. Upon examination of the accounts of a municipal treasurer of Valenzuela,

Metro Manila (formerly Bulacan), the auditor found a shortage of
Pl,000.00. When informed of the shortchange, the treasurer took out
P1,000.00 from his wallet and turned over the amount to the auditor, who
accepted the same. One month later, the treasurer was charged with, and
prosecuted for, malversation. His defense was that he had balanced his
accounts. Decide with reasons.

Answer:

The treasurer is not liable for malversation. Because, when the

shortchange of Pl,000.00 was discovered and the treasurer was notified,
he at once took out Pl,000.00 from his wallet and turned over the amount
to the auditor who accepted the same. There is, therefore, no prima facie
evidence of malversation. (U.S. vs. Feliciano, 15 Phil. 149).

IX.
a. Juan came upon his wife and Isabelo in a secluded place covered with
underbush. His wife was getting up while Isabelo was standing and
zipping up his pants. Isabelo took to his heels when he saw Juan, who
chased him with a balisong knife. Unable to catch up with Isabelo, Juan
returned to his wife and, completely obfuscated by what he had seen,

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stabbed her repeatedly with the knife, killing her immediately. Juan's
defense at the trial was his having surprised his wife under
circumstances indicative of carnal intercourse with Isabelo, and claimed
that he should be acquitted. Decide with reasons.

Answer:

Parricide is committed. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is not

applicable as the wife was not surprised committing sexual intercourse
with Isabelo. When Juan came upon his wife and Isabelo, his wife was
getting up and Isabelo was standing zipping up his pants, (People vs.
Gonzalez, 39 Phil 66).

b. AB accidentally left her purse with P500.00 inside a taxi cab. The driver
brought the purse and money to the police station and handed them to
the desk sergeant with the request that they be delivered to AB, the
owner, whose name and address were on a piece of paper inside the
purse. The sergeant did not do as requested but spent the money. What
was the offense/offenses committed by the sergeant? Discuss.

Answer:

The offense committed is theft. The sergeant had only the physical
possession of the money although he received the same from the finder.
The possession of the money by the finder, who was the driver of the
taxicab, was physical. When the driver handed the money to the sergeant
with the request that it be delivered to AB, the owner, what was
transferred to the sergeant is the physical possession which the driver
had on the money. The sergeant assumed by voluntary substitution, as to
both property and its owner, the same relation as was occupied by the
finder, (People vs. Avila, 44 Phil. 720).

X.

a. What do you understand by the term "subversive associations and

organizations" contemplated by Presidential Decree (PD) 885, otherwise
known as the "Revised Anti-Subversion Law"?

Is membership in such associations and organizations illegal per se?

Discuss fully. When does subversion become a qualified offense?

Answer:

Subversive associations or organizations refer to any association,

organization, political party or group of persons organized to overthrow
the government of the Republic of the Philippines with the open or covert
assistance and support of a foreign power by means of violence, force,
deceit, or any other illegal means.

Membership is not illegal per se because it must be made knowingly,

willfully and by overt acts. (People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382).

Subversion becomes qualified if a member is an officer or ranking leader

or takes up arms against the government. Art 210; Bribery; immunity
from liability of bribe-giver 1978 No. X-a
b. A public official is liable for prosecution under the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act" if he directly or indirectly requests or receives any
gift or other pecuniary benefit from any person for whom he has secured
or will secure any government permit or license in consideration of such
help. In a case, the fiscal prosecuted both the bribe-giver and the public

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official under the Act. The bribegiver engaged your services as his
counsel. What action will you take in his defense? Explain.

Answer:

As counsel of the bribe-giver, I would advise him to take advantage of the

immunity given to the bribe-giver under Presidential Decree No. 749 by
testifying for the prosecution. Art 80; PD 603; confidentiality of records of
minor offenders 1978

c. Jose, a teenager of 16 years, was found guilty of homicide. Because of his

age, he was held to be a youthful offender pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 603, as amended, and instead of passing sentence, the judge ordered
him committed to the government rehabilitation center in Tanay, Rizal.
Jose was released after a year and a half because of good behavior. He
later applied for and was appointed to the position of clerk in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. Among the papers he submitted was an
application form under oath in which Jose stated he had never been
charged with, much less convicted of, any crime, in complete disavowal of
his previous conviction. What offense/offenses did Jose commit? State
your reasons.

Answer:

Jose did not commit any offense. Under Presidential Decree No. 603 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179, the records of his case are
deemed privileged, and there is no liability for perjury or for concealment
or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to acknowledge the case or
recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him for
any purpose. (Art. 200)

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I.

X and Y had been married for 5 years. They had no child due to X's impotence. X
learned that Y was having an affair with Z. In a confrontation, X came to know
that Y was pregnant. In a fit of rage, X pushed down Y, shoved his knee to her
abdomen, and slapped her several times until she lost consciousness. Y was
rushed to a hospital where she had a caesarian operation. The fetus was
examined in utero, its head was fractured and it was delivered stillborn. The
evidence was in conflict as to the age of the fetus; the expert testimony, however,
concluded "with reasonable medical certainty" that the fetus had developed to
the stage of viability, i.e., that in the event of premature birth on the date of X's
assault, it would have had a 75% to 96% chance of survival. Y wants to know if X
can be charged with murder. Please give your opinion.

Answer:

X cannot be charged with murder. Murder is the killing of a person with the
attendance of any of the qualifying aggravating circumstances provided in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender not related to the victim as in
parricide. If the person killed is a child less than three (3) days old, the crime
committed is infanticide, whoever the offender may be. (Art. 255, Revised Penal
Code). The facts of the problem refer to a fetus which was delivered stillborn. The
cause was the fracture of the head undoubtedly due to the acts of violence of X
in shoving his knee on the abdomen of his pregnant wife and slapping her
several times. Murder is not committed but abortion. The death of the fetus when
expelled violently from the mother's womb, irrespective of its age, in legal
contemplation is abortion. (Viada, V, page 13. 5th ed.)

II.

X was awakened by a loud noise coming from the first floor of his house. He went
down and discovered that the screen door to the kitchen had been cut and the
door itself opened. He called the police. When they arrived, they saw Y lying on
the sala. They arrested Y but found no weapon, burglary tool or stolen goods in
his person. They examined the whole house and found everything in order. No
valuable was missing. Can the crime of attempted robbery be charged against Y?
If not, what crime did he commit?

Answer:

The crime committed is consummated qualified trespass to dwelling. (Art. 280,

Revised Penal Code). The-intention of Y in entering the house of X was
indeterminate. For this reason, it cannot be attempted robbery because the overt
acts committed had no direct and immediate relation to robbery. (People vs.
Lamahang, 61 Phil. 703). Since the screen door of the kitchen had been cut and
the door opened, the entrance was against the will of the owner.

III.

X called up Y, proprietor of a restaurant, and inquired how much would he

spend for a party of 20 people where 6 specific viands were to be served. Upon
information that the cost would be P600, X and his party proceeded to Y's
restaurant and ordered the food as agreed upon. When the bill came, X found
that he was being charged P700.00. Y told him he committed a mistake in
informing him that the cost was only P600.00. X refused to pay. After an
 altercation, Y said he would accept P600 but X replied that the incident had
embarrassed him. X refused to pay a single centavo and threatened to sue Y for
damages, Y filed an estafa case against X. Will the charge prosper?

Answer:

The case will prosper. The refusal of X to pay the amount of P600.00 which Y
already agreed to accept would constitute defraudation of the owner of the
restaurant since X and his party obtained the food served therein. (Art. 315, par.
2(5), Revised Penal Code). The embarrassment suffered by X during the
altercation regarding the correct price of the food is not any justification for him
to refuse payment. If at all, to vindicate his injured feelings, he has another
remedy other than refusal to pay the price.

IV.

X is charged with (1) assaulting a policeman, and (2) serious physical injury thru
reckless imprudence. The prosecution evidence shows that X, while driving his
car, ran through a red light, hit a bystander along a street curve that caused his
hospitalization for more than 30 days and when arrested by a policeman,
assaulted the arresting officer. The defense evidence shows that three (3) days
before the incident, X saw a doctor for treatment of a recurring back problem. He
was prescribed valium. X declared that on the day of the incident, the valium
had strange effects on him and that he completely lost control of himself. A
medical expert testified that drowsiness, fatigue, ataxia, and confusion are the
normal side effects of valium. He added that hyperexcitability, though rare, was a
possible side effect. If you were the judge, how would you decide the case?

Answer:

If I were the judge, I would hold X criminally liable. Loss of control of X as a

result of the administration of the valium is not an exempting circumstance since
there is no deprivation of freedom of action nor of intelligence. At most X would
be entitled to a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or illness since
there is loss of self-control and reason. (Art. 13, par. 10).

V.

X, engaged in illegal gambling, was accused of bribing Y, a policeman. X's

defense was fear of reprisal from the police in case of non-payment of bribe
money. He testified that when he attempted to stop giving bribe money to Y, the
police raided his establishment without warrant for half a dozen times. Y also
threatened to plant incriminating evidence on him. X was also manhandled by Y
on the pretext of resisting arrest. X would park his police jeep in front of his
house obviously to drive away his regular customers. X's defense is that he
bribed Y under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. Please decide.

Answer:

X's defense that he bribed Y, a policeman, under the impulse of an

uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is untenable. This exempting
circumstance can be appreciated if a person is compelled to commit a crime by
another through intimidation. It is also essential that the person intimidated
must not have any opportunity for escape or to avoid the threat. The facts of the
problem show that X could have easily reported to the authorities the alleged
acts of harassment committed by the policeman. Lastly, the fear must not be
speculative or fanciful but must be actual or real. All the acts testified to by X do
not show any actual or direct intimidation on the part of Y in case of non-
payment of the bribe.
VI.

X, a private citizen, saw two masked men break into a drug store across his
home. He telephoned the police to come. Without waiting for the police, he went
outside his house with a pistol and tried to intercept the thieves. He told them to
stop but they did not. He fired several shots at them, wounded them and caused
their hospitalization for 20 days. May the thieves file any criminal case against
X?

May X invoke the defense of the person or rights of a stranger?

Answer:

The thieves can file a criminal action against X. In defense of the person or
property of a stranger, the elements of (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) that the person
defending must not be induced by revenge, resentment or any other evil motive,
must be present. In self-defense of property, the doctrine is that the attack on
the property must be coupled with an attack upon the person of the possessor of
the property. (People vs. Apolinar, CA 38 O.G. 2870).

The same rule should apply to defense of the property of a stranger since the first
two elements of defense of a stranger are also the first two elements of self-
defense, that is unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or to repel it. The means employed by X in firing several
shots at the thieves was not reasonable as there was no attack upon the person
of the owner of the drugstore or of any person present therein. Nor can there be
defense of the person of a stranger since unlawful aggression is absent.

VII.

While on patrol, X, a policeman, spotted Y standing in a dark street corner, X

accosted Y suspecting him to be a long-wanted criminal on the basis of
appearance. Y had no identification papers, but he gave his name and address. X
told Y he would be brought to headquarters for questioning. When Y refused, X
told him to remove his coat so he could find if he has a tattoo on his left forearm,
a mark of the wanted criminal X was hunting, Y refused again and resisted all
efforts of X by pushing and pulling him. X charged Y with assault. Do you agree?

Answer:

The crime committed is not assault but simple resistance. The policeman was on
patrol when he spotted Y standing in a dark street corner, where he had no
reason to be. X was hunting a wanted criminal. A duty of a policeman is to arrest
lawbreakers in order to place them at the disposal of judicial or executive
authorities. One means to achieve this end is the identification of the alleged
lawbreaker. (U.S. vs. Sanches, 27 Phil. 442). A peace officer might arrest for
examination persons walking in the street at night when there's reasonable
ground to suspect that a felony is committed although there is no proof thereof
(People vs. Santos, 36 Phil, 853). Y was not arrested but only accosted on
suspicion of being a long-wanted criminal because of his appearance. X's request
that Y would be brought to the headquarters was refused and Y also refused that
he removes his coat to find out if he has a tattoo in his left forearm, a mark of
the wanted criminal whom X was hunting. X was therefore acting in the
legitimate performance of his duties. Y pushed and pulled X in resisting his
efforts to find out whether he has a tattoo. The acts committed by Y however do
not" constitute assault but simple resistance because such do not indicate
manifest defiance to the authority of the law (US, vs. Tabiana, 37 Phil. 515, People
vs. Baesa, CA 55 O.G. 10291).
VIII.

Madam X was approached by Y after she had parked and locked her car near her
home. Y grabbed her arm and with a screwdriver told her to unlock her ear. Y
told X “We are going in my car". Frightened, X instead handed her car key to Y.
While Y was looking for the right key, the police came, and arrested Y. Y was
charged with attempted kidnapping. Is the charge correct?

Answer:

The charge of attempted kidnapping is not correct. Kidnapping or illegal

detention implies deprivation of the liberty of another. The facts of the problem
do not show any manifest intention on the part of Y to kidnap Madam X. The
acts performed by Y are not direct overt acts indicative of intent to deprive
Madam X of her liberty. The utterance of Y to X that "we are going in my car"
maybe for a purpose other than to restrain X of her liberty. Coercion is
committed because grabbing the arm of X by Y and telling her to unlock her car
with a screwdriver are acts of violence or intimidation which caused fear in the
mind of X, which made her act against her will.

IX.

X, a police captain, arrested Y on suspicion of robbery. X interrogated Y bat Y

denied knowledge and participation in any crime of robbery, X then ordered Z,
his assistant, to torture Y. As a result of the torture, Y confessed despite his
innocence. What crime, if any, was committed by X?

Answer:

X is liable for grave coercion. He is a principal by inducement. The person

arrested on suspicion of robbery was not yet a prisoner since the facts do not
show that he was already booked and detained in jail at the time of his
investigation. So, maltreatment of a prison is not committed. Since Z, the
assistant of X, was ordered to torture Y and as a result Y confessed despite his
innocence, grave coercion is committed, as the order is unlawful.

X.

X is serving a 6-year prison term. In his fourth year in prison, he discovered that
the judge committed a mistake in giving him a 6-year sentence when the law he
violated called for a 3 years’ imprisonment only. Y, the jail guard and a law
student chucked X's contention and found it correct X did not want to go to
court anymore as he did not have any money to hire a lawyer to file habeas
corpus and he had lost faith in the competence of judges. X then informed Y he
would just escape, and the latter did not object. As soon as Y turned his back X
sprinted out of his cell. What crime was committed?

Answer:

Y, the jail guard, is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner and X, for
evasion of sentence. The jail guard is a public officer who has the custody of X,
as prisoner. But not objecting to the intention of X to escape, who in fact did as
soon as Y turned his back, Y either connived or consented in the escape of the
prisoner X, (U.S. vs. Bandino, 29 Phil. 429). The presumption is that the sentence
by final judgment which was being served by X was correct. If the court
committed an error in sentencing him to an erroneous prison term, that must be
remedied according to law. Surely, the remedy is not to commit an act which is
felonious as that will disesteem any final judgment rendered by the court.
XI.

X was slapped by Z in front of many people. X went to his house, got a knife and
waited for Z who was gambling in the upper floor of a house. When Z came down
the house, X approached him from behind to stab him. Somebody shouted to
warn Z and Z was able to turn around on time to parry the stab of X. The two
fought each other until Z, while in process of retreating, fell in a canal, face
upward. X then mounted him and succeeded in stabbing Z fatally. Is there
treachery?

Answer:

Treachery is not present. While it is true that X approached Z from behind to

stab him, Z, however, was not deprived of any opportunity to defend himself
because of the warning from somebody and as a matter of fact because of it he
was able to turn around in time to parry the stab of X. He was not deprived of an
opportunity to defend himself. The stabbing of the victim by X who mounted him
when he fell in a canal face upward as a result of the fight which followed when
the victim was able to parry the stab of X does not constitute treachery since it
was a mere continuation of the fight. It was spontaneous and a mere incident of
the fight.

XII.

Adan and Eve were lovers but their relationship turned sour. Adan tried to win
back Eve but to no avail. Almost hopeless, Adan went to see two of his friends,
Bruno and Cora. Adan asked the two to accompany him to the house of Eve. He
told the two: "This is my last attempt of reconciliation. I must succeed even if I
have to rape Eve." The trio proceeded to the house of Eve using the car owned
and driven by Bruno. When they reached the house, Adan went up, Cora stayed
near the gate as lookout and Bruno remained in the car, Adan failed to win back
Eve and true to his threat raped her. He went down the house, informed Bruno
and Cora about the incident and they thereafter went to a Disco Club and
danced the night away. Will a charge of rape prosper against the three?

Answer:

Adan, Bruno and Cora can be charged with rape. Adan as a principal by direct
participation, Bruno and Cora as accomplices. When Bruno and Cora brought
Adan to the house of Eve, they knew of the criminal design of Adan which is to
rape Eve if there would be no reconciliation. Cora acted as a look-out and Bruno
remained in the car while Adan went inside the house. They there-lore performed
acts showing their approval or concurrence to the criminal design of Adan, which
facilitated the commission of the crime. There is no conspiracy because
concerted acts have not been performed to realize the same criminal objective.

XIII.

X, a beauty queen was raped by three American Blacks. Out of extreme shame
and after 3 months, X went to Dr. YES and asked for an abortion. Dr. YES
steadfastly refused until X produced a bottle of iodine and informed him that if
he would not abort her baby, she would right then and there commit suicide.
With hesitation but pitying X, Dr. YES performed an abortion on X which was
successful. Dr. YES was charged with intentional abortion. Decide.

Answer:

Dr. Yes is criminally liable for abortion, X's threat that if Dr. Yes would not abort
her baby, she would commit suicide is not an uncontrollable fear from which Dr.
 Yes could not escape. As a matter of fact, Dr, Yes performed the abortion not
because he feared that X would commit suicide but because of pity. Such is not
exempting because what Dr. Yes performed was not involuntary.

XIV.

X, is a death convict. On the day set for his electrocution, a power failure
occurred. The Director of Prisons then ordered that X be executed by firing
squad. A, B and C were chosen by him to constitute the firing squad. A, B, and C
shot to death X as per order of their Director. What crime, if any, was committed
by the Director and A, B and C?

Answer:

Homicide is committed. Since the victim was a death convict, he therefore

expected his death. However, the order of the Director of Prisons that X be
executed by a firing squad was unlawful. Although there was no criminal intent
to kill the convict M the Director of Prisons was performing a duty for the
execution of the convict, the means employed was not as provided by law.
Presumably, the order that the convict be executed by a firing squad was made
at the spur of the moment because of the power failure. It was spontaneous and
not deliberate. A, B, C chosen to constitute the firing squad are liable as
principals by direct participation since the order being clearly unlawful, they
were not bound to obey it. The Director of Prisons is liable as principal by
inducement.

XV.
X and Y had a heated altercation and then exchanged blows. X pulled out a knife
and stabbed Y in the abdomen. Y ran away but before he could reach his house
was struck by lightning and died. The Fiscal filed homicide against X. Decide.

Answer:

X is not liable for homicide but for the crime constituting the stabbing of Y in the
abdomen. Since the injury was mortal, the liability of X is for frustrated
homicide. The death of the victim was caused by the lightning which struck him.
Although a felony was committed by X such was not the direct and proximate
cause of the death of Y. The lightning was an efficient intervening cause (People
vs. Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503). The rational of the rule is that the cause of the cause
is the cause of the evil caused (People vs. Ural, 56 SCRA 138).

1980
I.

a. "A", a stranger, and "B", son of "C", connived with each other in stealing "C's"
carabao. May "A" and "B" be held criminally liable for Theft of Large Cattle?

Answer: Only A is criminally liable, B, being the son of C, the owner of the
carabao, is not liable, because of relationship, which in cases of theft, estafa and
malicious mischief is an absolutory cause. (Art 332, R.P.C.) The term "theft"
includes qualified theft, as it is understood in its generic sense. (People vs.
Marciano, CAG.R. 13818-R, April 21, 1956.) However, under Presidential Decree
No. 533 the stealing of a carabao is punished as cattle rustling, in which case A
and B will be criminally liable because of conspiracy. Relationship is not an
absolutory cause.

b. Hilario, common-law husband of Gloria, stole the wrist watch of the latter
valued at P 2,QOO.OO. May Hilario be held criminally liable for the crime of
Theft? Answer: Hilario cannot be criminally liable for theft of the wrist watch of
his common-law wife. The term "spouse" in Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
embraces common law relationship. (People vs. Constantino, CA 60 O.G. 3603).
The properties acquired by common-law spouses are governed by the rules of co-
ownership. A co-owner cannot commit theft. (U.S. vs. Canta, 6 Phil. 342.)

II.

"D and "E" intended to steal two bags of cement from a "bodega". They placed the
cement in a jeep and left with their loot. After travelling some distance, they
changed their minds and decided to take the two bags of cement back. While in
the compound of the "bodega", they were apprehended by a police officer. Are "D"
and "E" liable for any crime?

Answer:

D and E are liable for consummated theft. When they placed the two bags of
cement in a jeep and left with their loot, they had already performed all the acts
of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the crime of theft. (U.S, vs.
Adiao, 38 Phil. 754) Theft was already consummated when after travelling a
certain distance, they changed their minds and decided to take the two bags of
cement back. In theft, the offender must have the possession and dominion of
the thing taken coupled with the intention at the time of taking of withholding it
with the character of permanency. (People vs. Solis et al, 12 CA Rep. 202)

III.

"F" and "G" quarreled. "F" attacked "G" with a club two or three times, but "G"
was able to parry the attack. "G" did not move backwards but struck back hitting
"F" on his head with a lead pipe which he picked up from the ground, causing
"F's" death. "G" was charged with Homicide. If you were the Judge, would you
find "G" guilty as charged?

Answer:

If the term "quarreled" implies an agreement to a fight, G would be guilty of the

crime charged. He cannot invoke, self-defense because if there is an agreement to
fight there would be no unlawful aggression. Any attack is considered as a mere
consequence of the agreement to fight. On the other hand, if the word "quarreled"
involves only a verbal altercation, G would not be guilty because F committed
unlawful aggression when he attacked G three times with a club. When G struck
back hitting F on his head with a lead pipe which he picked up on the ground, he
acted in self-defense because the aggression of F was still present, and the pipe
was the only means available to him in defending his person as he was acting
 under the instinct of self-preservation. The assumption is that G did not give any
sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the attack made by F.

IV.

"H" made a bet of P10 with "I" in a game of "beto-beto". "H" won but "I" refused to
pay the amount. A dispute arose between them, which culminated in a fist fight.
"J", the father of "H", and "K", the brother of "H", intervened. When the fight
began, "H" held the hand of "I", "J" seized the front part of "I's" shirt, and while
they were dealing blows on one another, "K" came with a "balisong" and stabbed
"I" inflicting upon him a mortal wound. "H", "J", and "K" were charged with
Homicide. Is it proper to hold all the accused responsible for the fatal wound
inflicted upon the victim by "K"?

Answer:

It is not proper to hold H and J liable for the fatal wound inflicted upon the
victim by K because of the absence of conspiracy. He and J are not co-principals
of K in the killing of the victim. The liability of H, J and K is not collective but
individual they have not acted conceitedly for the realization of a common
criminal objective. H and J who dealt blows on the victim without causing any
physical injury could be liable for ill-treatment. (Art. 266, par. 3, R.P.C.)

V.

"L" pointed a .45 caliber revolver at "M" without good reason. There ensued a
struggle between the two for the weapon. "N", a female companion of "L"
approached the combatants and quickly wounded "M" in the chest with a knife,
as a consequence of which "M" died almost instantly. Can "L" be convicted as an
accomplice?

Answer:

L is not liable as an accomplice. An accomplice must be aware of the criminal

design of the principal and must perform acts, whether previous or
simultaneous, showing his approval or concurrence to said criminal design. The
facts of the problem clearly show that while L and M were struggling for the
possession of the revolver, N, the female companion of L, approached the
combatants and wounded M in the chest with a knife which caused his death. L
had no knowledge of what N would do, and he did not perform any act
subsequent to the stabbing to show that he approved of what N did. (People vs.
Cajandab, 52 SCRA 161)

VI.

a. Under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, offenders who have undergone
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment. An accused was sentenced to "destierro"
for having killed his wife under exceptional circumstances. He had been
preventively detained for a period of almost twelve years. Would he be entitled
to the benefits of Art. 29 in so far as his preventive imprisonment is concerned?

Answer:

Article 29 as amended by R.A. No. 6127 provides that an offender who has
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time of the period of his
preventive imprisonment if he has agreed in writing to observe the rules of
discipline applied to convicted prisoners and four-fifth if there is no written
 commitment. The penalty of destierro involves also deprivation of liberty (People
vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172). The problem does not show whether there is a written
commitment. So, the deduction of the full period of preventive imprisonment
cannot technically be applied. However, the period of preventive imprisonment is
almost 12 years. Hence, even if four-fifth thereof of 12 years is applied, the result
will be more than 8 years. The duration of destierro is from 6 months 1 day to 6
years. The accused therefore is entitled to be released because the period of his
preventive imprisonment exceeds the penalty of destierro imposed upon him.

b.An accused was found guilty of double murder and was meted out two
sentences of reclusion perpetua. How would the accused serve the sentences?
Answer:

The rule is if two or more penalties in view of their nature cannot be served
simultaneously, such must be served successively in the order of severity in
accordance with the scale of the severity of penalties provided in Art. 70 R.P.C.,
but in no case is he to serve more than three times the most severe penalty, and
which is not to exceed 40 years. If the penalties are the same, such is to be
considered as the most severe penalty. (Aspra vs. Director of Prisons, 85 Phil. 737)
In the problem, two penalties of reclusion perpetua were imposed upon the
accused. In view of their nature, these penalties cannot be served
simultaneously. Reclusion perpetua has a duration of thirty years, multiplied by
3 (three times the most severe penalty) the result is 90 years. The accused should
serve however imprisonment not exceeding 40 years, (Art. 70 R.P.C.)

VII.

Convicted of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, an accused was
sentenced to death. On automatic review to the Supreme Court, his counsel
pleaded the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender
which were not offset by any aggravating circumstance and prayed that the
penalty be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The existence of said modifying
circumstances was, in fact, established. Is the contention legally tenable?

Answer:

The intention is not legally tenable. Death is a single and indivisible penalty.
Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, it could be applied regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the
crime. (People vs. Amit, 32 SCRA 95). The mitigating circumstances of plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender cannot have the effect of reducing the death
penalty to reclusion perpetua.

VIII.

"P" was sentenced from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day, and ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00. May "P" be compelled to serve
subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine?

Answer:

P cannot be compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment. Art. 39 par. 3 (R.P.C.)

provides that there is no subsidiary imprisonment if the principal penalty is
higher than prision correccional. The penalty of 6 years 1 day to 12 years and Art
217; Malversation thru falsification of public document 1980

IX.

"Q", a postmaster, stole a treasury warrant payable to "R" valued at P30,

increased the amount to P230.00 by adding the figure "2" before "3", and forged
 "R's" name as well as that of "S", making it appear that "R" had endorsed the
warrant to "S" and then later cashed it. "Q" thereafter misappropriate the amount
represented by the altered warrant. Of what complex crime would you hold "Q"
liable?

Which crime would control the penalty to be imposed on him, assuming that he
is found guilty?

Answer:

The facts of the problem are similar to those in the case of People vs. Silvallana,
61 Phil. 636 altho in this case the postmaster Q was the one who stole the
treasury warrant payable to R and who raised the amount stated therein from
P30.00 to P230,00 and forged R's name as well as that of S making it appear that
R had endorsed the warrant to S. In the problem, the fact is stated that the
postmaster cashed the forged treasury warrant and misappropriated the amount
represented in the altered warrant.

Falsification of a public document (treasury warrant) is committed because of the

alteration of the amount appearing in the treasury warrant, a genuine document
am] by causing it to appear that "R", the payee, endorsed the document to "S"
and "S" encashed it which is false. (Art. 171 pars. 2 and 6, R.P.C.) The falsification
was committed to facilitate the misappropriation by Q of the proceeds of the
treasury warrant, which are public funds, Q, therefore, committed the complex
crime of malversation thru falsification of public document. The more serious
crime, which in this case is the falsification, will control the penalty, which is to
be imposed in its maximum period. In a complex crime, the penalty is for the
more serious crime, to be imposed in its maximum period. (Art. 48 R.P.C.)

X.

"T" was charged in an Information with the complex crime of Reckless

Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property in the sum of P700.00 and Slight
Physical Injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence. The incident
which gave rise to the quasi-offense occurred on November 14, 1979. The
accused was charged on March 14, 1980. Should the resulting offenses be
considered a complex crime subject to one penalty?

Answer:

The resulting offenses cannot be considered as a complex crime. The slight

physical injuries which resulted from a single act of imprudence which occurred
on Nov. 14, 1979, prescribed already when the accused was charged on March
14, 19SO. Slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months,
(Art. 90, R.P.C.). Another reason is that a complex crime exists if a single act
results in two grave or less grave felonies. If one of the resulting felonies is light,
like slight physical injuries, as stated in the problem there can be no complex
crime. (Lontok vs. Gorgonio, L-37396 April 30, 1979)

XI.

Patrolman Cruz, acting under orders of the Municipal Mayor, who wanted to put
a stop to the frequent occurrence of robbery in sitio Masukal, patrolled the place.
At about midnight, seeing three persons acting suspiciously in front of an
uninhabited house and entering the same, he arrested them without warrant and
took them to the municipal building where they were detained in jail for about
five hours before they were released. Patrolman Cruz was accused of arbitrary
detention. If you were the Judge, would you convict him of the crime charged?

Answer:
 Patrolman Cruz cannot be accused of arbitrary detention. Since the three
persons acted suspiciously in front of an uninhabited house at midnight, and
entered the same, the policeman was justified to arrest them even without a
warrant, considering the circumstances of the case, mainly, since he was
patrolling the place upon orders of the mayor to put a stop to frequent
occurrences of robberies therein. The three persons were arrested in a suspicious
place at midnight and under suspicious circumstances that they were about to
commit a crime or breach of peace. Good people do not ordinarily lurk in
uninhabited places at midnight. (U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 853)
XII.

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, what is the controlling criterion to
determine whether or not an accused is a youthful offender so as to entitled him
to suspension of sentence? Is there any difference between the Revised Penal
Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code in so far as suspension of the
sentence of a juvenile offender is concerned?

Answer:

Under the Youth and Child Welfare Code, the youthful offender must be under
eighteen years old not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at
the time of the trial so as to be entitled to suspension of sentence. (People va.
Casiguran, L-45387, Nov. 7, 1979) Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the
youthful offender who is found guilty after trial, must file an application for the
suspension of the pronouncement of the sentence, which the Court may grant if
the interest of the minor and of the public so requires. Under Article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code which covers a minor under 16 years of age at the time of the
commission of a grave or less grave felony and at the time of the trial, which was
expressly repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1179, the suspension of the
pronouncement of the sentence upon the minor where there is evidence of guilt is
automatic.

XIII.

While "U", a 60-year-old barber, was sweeping the yard of his shop in a barrio,
his cousin dropped by and left his bolo (cousin's) for safekeeping. "U" put the
same behind a mirror in his barber shop. Later, "V" came around and threatened
him by saying "come out old man and I'll kill you." It appears that they had a
prior altercation relative to a grandson of "U". Incensed, "U" got the bolo from
behind the mirror and chased "V" for about 20 meters. At this point, a policeman
intercepted "U", told the latter to put down his bolo and arrested him.. "U" was
subsequently charged with Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon under
Presidential Decree No. 9 which makes it unlawful to carry outside of one's
residence any bladed weapon except where such article is being used as a
necessary implement to earn a livelihood. If you were the trial Judge, would you
find "U" guilty of said crime?

Answer:

If I were the judge, I would not find U guilty of illegal possession of deadly
weapon under Presidential Decree No. 9. U got the bolo from behind the mirror in
his barber shop to chase V who threatened him that he will kill" him. Presidential
Decree No. 9, punishes the offense of carrying a bladed weapon outside of one's
residence if not being used as a necessary implement to earn a livelihood either
in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder. (People vs.
Purisima,, 87 SCRA 542). The offense punished in Presidential Decree No. 9 is
primarily linked with the political purposes with which martial law was declared.
(Bermudez vs. Court of Appeals, L-417121, July 30, 1979).
XIV.

At about 11:30 A.M., "W" noticed that the nipa roof of their house was on fire. He
got up to get water with which to extinguish the fire. While putting out the fire
"W" noticed "X" near the house carrying a pole to the end of which was attached
a rug soaked with gasoline. "W", shouted "fire! tire" and started to put out the
fire. With the help of some neighbors, "W" succeeded in putting out the fire but
only after a small portion of the roof had been burned. Is "X" liable for frustrated
or consummated arson?
Answer:

X will be liable for consummated arson. The mere burning of a portion of the
house, which in the problem is the nipa roof, is consummated arson. All the
elements of the acts of execution and accomplishment are present (People vs.
Hernandez, 54 Phil. 122). It cannot be frustrated arson because in frustrated
arson the offender sets on fire gasoline-soaked rags to burn a building, but the
fire is put out by a cause independent of the will of the offender before any
portion of the building is burned. (U.S. vs. Valdez, 39 Phil. 240).

XV.

In the course of a fight, the accused assaulted the victim with a knife inflicting
upon the latter a serious- cut on his left arm prompting the said victim to run
and flee. He was pursued by the accused. After having fled for a short distance,
the victim fell on the ground, face downward, and before he could stand, the
accused delivered a fatal stab with his knife on the back of the victim. What
crime did the accused commit?

Answer:

Since the accused assaulted the victim with a knife in the course of a fight, it
cannot be said that the attack was treacherous because the victim would have
been placed on his guard. (People, vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473; People vs. Ardisa,
55 SCKA 345). Besides, from the location of the wound of the victim, which was
on his left arm, it can reasonably be inferred that the attack was frontal.
Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved conclusively as the crime
itself. So, the inception of the attack was not attended by treachery. When the
victim after having been seriously wounded ran and was pursued by the accused,
fell on the ground, face downward, was fatally stabbed on the back, the accused
acted spontaneously. The stabbing at the back was a continuation of the fight,
and if the fight is continuous, even if treachery is present at the latter stage of
the fight, treachery cannot be appreciated as attendant (People vs. Canete, 44
Phil. 478).

XVI.

Five men, one of them armed with a carbine, entered the hut of an octogenarian,
who was living by himself, ransacked his things and took his carpentry tools and
cash worth P100. "Y" saw them going towards the hut and sensing their evil
intentions called some friends to act as a rescue party. As the five men were
going out with their loot, the rescue party opened fire and there was an exchange
of gunshot between the two groups. Killed were one in the five-man team, and
another in the rescue party. The articles taken were recovered. Four of the 5 men
were charged with Robbery in Band with Homicide. Their common defenses were
that they could not be convicted of the crime charged because (a) the killing
occurred after the consummation of the robbery; (b) the octogenarian victim of
the robbery was not the victim of the homicide; and (c) the crime was committed
by a band. Evaluate the different defenses of the accused.
 Answer:

a. Although the killing was committed after the consummation of the robbery,
robbery with homicide is committed because the killing was committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. If the killing is prior or
subsequent to the robbery so long as it is directly related to the robbery, the
crime committed is robbery with homicide, (People vs. Hernandez, 48 Phil. 48).

b. Even if the victim of the robbery is not the victim of the homicide, robbery
with homicide is committed because the law does not require that the person
killed is the victim of the robbery. (People vs. Barut, L-42666, March 13, 1979).
As a matter of fact, even if the victim killed is a mere bystander robbery with
homicide is committed. (People vs. Disimban, 88 Phil. 120).

c. There seems to be a typographical error in the question. That band is a

defense does not make sense. Obviously, the question would refer to the
defense that the accused did not constitute a band. This is tenable because of
the five accused, only one was armed with a carbine. There is a band if more
than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery. (Art.
296, R.P.C.; People vs. Barut, supra). This is not, however, a defense because
there is conspiracy among the five accused as shown by the facts of the
problem that "as the five men were going out with their loot, the rescue party
opened fire and there was an exchange of gunshots between the two groups."
When homicide takes place on the occasion of the robbery, all who took part
in the robbery are guilty as principals of the complex crime of robbery with
homicide whether or not they actually participated in the killing, unless they
had endeavored to prevent the killing. (People vs. Berudes, L-30966, Dec. 14,
1979)

XVII.

“AA” was the owner of a jeepney for hire. When his driver was hospitalized,
he hired “BB” as driver on a temporary basis and entrusted to him the
vehicle for transporting passengers to Quiapo to Taft-Baclaran with a
compensation of P30.00 a day. “BB” never returned the vehicle and after a
search, the vehicle was found in Ternate, Cavite, about to be sold. “BB”
was charged with Qualified Theft and was convicted.

Appealing the judgment of conviction, defense counsel contends that “BB”

may have committed Estafa but not Qualified Theft on the theory that
possession of the vehicle was obtained with the consent of “AA”, the
owner, and therefore, there was no illegal taking.

Decide the case.

Answer:

The crime committed by BB is qualified theft. Estafa cannot be committed

although the possession of the vehicle as obtained with the consent of AA,
the owner. BB was hired as a temporary driver and therefore was an
employee of the owner of the jeepney for hire. So he had only the physical
or material possession of the jeepney. The established rule is that when
the delivery of a chattel does not have the effect of transferring the
juridical possession thereof, the act of disposing it with intent to gain and
without the consent of the owner constitutes the crime of theft. (US vs. De
Vera, 43 Phil. 100) In this case, the juridical possession of the vehicle
remained with AA, the owner. (People vs. Isaac, 96 Phil. 931)
XVIII.

"Z", a reporter of a certain daily newspaper known as "Bulalakaw", published an

article concerning an account of a successful raid by two P.C. officers upon a
gambling den and the arrest of several people. The article also stated that a
certain Madame "X", the complainant, was among the persons arrested and that
her name was stricken from the information. It turned out that the complainant
was neither caught, arrested, nor prosecuted, hence, she instituted an action for
libel against "Z". Will the charge against him prosper?
Answer:

The charge of libel will not prosper. As long as the publicists of the news item
was not prompted by ill-will or spite as there was intention to do harm, libel will
not prosper because of the absence of malice. In Quisumbing vs. Lopez et al., 96
Phil. 510, the Supreme Court held that "newspapers should be given such leeway
and tolerance so as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their
important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters
and editors usually have to race with their deadlines, and consistently with good
faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account to a point for
suppression for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of words." The
ruling in the case of U.S. vs. Bostos et al., 37 Phil. 731 is more to the point,
where it was held that "even when the statements are found to be false, if there is
probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good
faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual". As
long as good faith exists, libel cannot prosper.

XIX.

On June 10, 1974, a Provincial Governor of a certain province bought a bulldozer

valued at P200,000 out of provincial funds for the use and repair of provincial
roads, when actually one could be bought for P100,000.00, which transaction
was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to his province. In the last local
elections, he ran for reelection. During the height of his political campaign, his
opponents raised said questionable transaction as an issue before the electorate,
but nonetheless, he was elected by a comfortable margin. Would his reelection be
a bar to a prosecution for the crime committed prior to his reelection, for
violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act?

Answer:

The reelection of the Provincial Governor is not a bar to his prosecution for
violating the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed
prior to his reelection. Reelection cannot condone previous criminal acts of an
elective official, punishable under the Anti-Graft law prior to his reelection. The
doctrine established in the case of Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,
106 Phil. 466 and Lizares vs. Hechanova, 17 SCRA 58 that a reelected public
officer is no longer answerable to administrative sanctions for acts committed by
him during his former tenure does not apply to criminal prosecution under a
special statute like the Anti-Graft Law. If after the reelection of a public officer,
no crime committed by him prior thereto becomes punishable, even if it has not
yet prescribed, will be patently offensive to the objectives and letter of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, (Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, 28 SCRA 617).

XX.

A check for P20,000.00 was drawn by the Federal Financing Corporation in favor
of "CC", duly signed by "DD", the corporate President, and "EE", the corporate
Treasurer. On the date of the presentation of the said check with the drawee
bank, the check was dishonored but the aforesaid corporate officials were no
longer connected with the corporation. Charged with violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, the "Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing of Check without
Sufficient Funds and for Other Purposes", "DD" and "EE" contend that they can
no longer be held liable for the offense charged because they are no longer
officials of the said corporation. Decide the case.

Answer:

DD, the Corporate President and EE, the Corporate Treasurer, who signed the
check for the Federal Financing Corporation as drawer, are liable under Batas
Pambansa No. 22 if the check, when presented to the drawee bank, was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds, even though when the check was presented
for payment and was dishonored, the said corporate officials were no longer
connected with the corporation. Batas Pambansa No. 22 is explicit about the
liability of the officers of a corporation who signed the bouncing check for the
corporation although they had ceased to be officers of the corporation when the
check was dishonored. As a matter of fact, an amendment introduced, during the
deliberations of the bill in the Batasang Pambansa, to exempt from liability the
officers of a corporation or association who were no longer officers when the
check was dishonored was not approved by the body.