Identity Politics

Challenges to Psychology's Understanding

Edward E. Sampson

A variety of collective movementsincluding women, gay males and lesbians, African Americans, and members of (he third worldin arguing that members have been denied their own voice in establishing the conditions of their lives and tn determining their own identity and subjectivity, pose a serious challenge to psychology's suitability as a discipline capable of responding to the full diversity of human nature. This article explores these claims on behalf of voice, develops a discursive framework as an alternative to current psychological analysis, and suggests how that framework would require a transformation in current psychological theory, research, and practice.

hallenges to psychology's understanding of human nature arise both from sources internal to the discipline (e.g., new scientific discoveries) and from those that are more external (e.g., shifting social priorities). Increasing rather steadily since the 1960s, some of the most significant challenges, especially to psychology in the United States, have come from a variety of collective movements centering around the psychological characteristics of the participants' identities and in whose name and for what purposes those characteristics have become part of our everyday reality. For my present purposes, I refer specifically to movements involving women gay males and lesbians, African Americans, and members of the Ihird world. The politics of these movements is deeply concerned about and focused around issues thai are within the traditional domain of psychology. What they have to say is thereby of profound importance to the discipline. Each movement has seen significant infernal debates among its advocates. Relationships among movements are frequently marked by disagreement, strain, and even neglect. Nevertheless, these several movements generally share in common what might best be termed an identity politics: a politics based on the particular life experiences of people who seek to be in control of their own identilies and subjectivities and who claim that socially dominant groups have denied them this opportunity (eg Fox Genovese, 1991; Young, 1990). Movement advocated have argued that the current understandings of human natureunderstandings that appear both in the wider culture and m the discipline of psychologydo not reflect their own groups' interests or unique identity (specific references follow below). They claim that human nature has been addressed in terms of an implicil standard that December 1993 American Psychologist
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turns out to be primarily White, primarily male and nri manly Western, especially United Statesian (a term bor rowed from Moghaddam, 1987). It almost goes without saying and thus is truly in need of being said: Identity politics is itself a contested concept. The problem as noted especially within feminisi writings is how to use a concept such as identity critical without, as Joan Scott (1992) put it, "essentializing" it As I argue throughout this article, the identilies thai drive identity politics are not in themselves unproblemmatical features possessed by individuals but rather are hisiori cally constructed, shifting political constructs that are as much to be distrusted as they are to be the focal point of various political movements. Perhaps the best policy to follow in dealing with such an idea (as identity politics) therefore is to become the kind of acrobatic tighlrope walker that Braidotti (1991) has described, accepting the dissonance and sustaining the tension between having an identity as defined by the dominant discourses and practices of one's time and place and simultaneously challenging that very identity bv probing its history, its production, and its uses In spite of this problemmatica! quality, however, I will continue to use the idea of an identity politics and its clearcut demand for voice as a guiding force that will enrich our understanding of psychology even as we engage in an Adorno-like (1973) endeavor, holding the concept at arm's length to avoid its seductive qualities.

Voice: Accommodative Versus Transformative

Each of the collective movements central to my concerns claims that it has been denied voice in establishing the conditions of its life and in determining its own identity and subjectivity. Except for psychologists familiar wilh critical feminist works in which the idea of voice has become central, the concept of voice is generally known in more traditional psychology primarily through work on procedural justice (e.g., Cohen, 1989; Lind& Tyler, 1988), where its typical meaning appears: "the ability to express an opinion about an impending decision" (Cohen, p. 36) and to believe Ihat one's voice has been heard and given proper consideration. Under these conditions, people are
Ji!l G. Morawski served as action editor for (his article. Correspondence concerning (his article should be addressed to Edward E. Sampson. Cenier for Critical Studies. 790 Bolinas Road Fairfax, CA 94930

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said to feel that justice has been done. This understanding to have one's own groups' interests, point of view, or of voice also harkens back to the earlier Lewinian traspecificity represented in a genuine dialogue. If, in order dition in which participation in decision making was to be heard, I must speak in ways that you have proposed, considered an effective process for introducing change then I can be heard only if I speak like you, not like me. procedures because participation gave voice to the indiRather than being an equal contributor, I remain enclosed viduals affected by the change (e.g., Coch & French, 1948; in a discursive game that ensures your continuing advanLewin, 1952). tage. The clear message is that current forms of cultural and psychological practice deny certain groups any posMovement advocates, however, insist that this unsibility of being heard in their own way, on their own derstanding of voice tends to be an accommodative, addterms, reflecting their own interests and specificities, and on strategy that continues serving the interests of the that this condition does not reflect mere chance but rather dominant groups rather than being a genuinely transforreflects the operation of the power of those in charge to mative response to those who seek to have their own voices dictate the terms by which psychological and social reality count. This idea of an accommodative add-on appears will be encountered. in a diverse range of works. Let me present a few examples that illustrate this The feminist critique, for example, has been directed argument: against the view that psychology's years of neglecting women can be remedied by simply adding women to the 1. The women's movement has sought to counter existing pot and, as one author put it, simply stirring what it claims is the oppressive domination of patriarchy, (e.g., Flax, 1990). Much the same message appears in the a culture and psychology that is sexist to its core. Some multiculturalist critique directed against the reigning of its adherents have argued that psychology today is pricanon of scholarly work. Advocates insist that the problem marily a male fantasy (e.g., Weisstein, 1971), whereas is not simply that an ethnic and multicultural perspective others have sought remedies designed to eliminate the has been ignored in the dominant canon, "but that it sexism currently embedded in a great deal of psychologtreats race and ethnicity as an 'add-on' to the traditional ical work (e.g., Denmark, Russo, Frieze, & Sechzer, 1988). study of white, Anglo-American culture" (Winkler, 1992, The argument is that psychology predominantly "speaks p. A6). Similar arguments have also been developed by male." If women are to be heard, they must speak like critical race theorists who challenge the ability of current men, constructing themselves in the very manner in which legal doctrine to achieve justice for all simply by adding they have been constructed by dominant male interests, nondominant racial and ethnic groups to the current laws desires, and fears and thereby losing their own particu(e.g., Williams, 1991). larity and specificity (see Braidotti, 1991; Flax, 1990; Gannon, Luchetta, Rhodes, Pardie, & Segrist, 1992; GaAlthough not concerned with identity politics as such tens, 1991; Gilligan, 1982; Irigaray, 1974/1985, 1977/ but clearly with changing the dominant model of psy1985; MacKinnon, 1989; Riger, 1992; Tavris, 1992). chological understanding, a similar argument has also 2. The African-American movement has chalbeen raised by proponents of a socially shared underlenged what it sees to be the racism inherent in prevailing standing of cognition. They caution against simply adding cultural and psychological understandings. The prevaon the social dimension to what is retained as a fundalence of this bias in psychology was made evident in part mentally nonsocial cognitive model (e.g., Cole, 1991; at least in Graham's (1992) recent examination of psyLave, 1991). chology journals. She demonstrated both the dearth of Adding on is said to be accommodative rather than studies on African Americans and a pattern of decline in transformative, therefore, because the new element is not such work in the period from 1970 to 1989. And, as Caseen to be constitutive of the phenomenon of interest (e.g., plan and Nelson (1973) suggested years earlier, even when Broughton, 1987). Rather, as the very words suggest, the psychology does address the issues of African Americans, new is simply added on to the old without fundamentally it tends to adopt an analytic framework that seeks answers changing the old. Denning voice as having access to repwithin the character of the individual rather than within resentation without changing the terms of discourse in features of the social structure, thereby advancing, argued which such representation itself is obtained gives persons Caplan and Nelson, the interests of the dominant White permission to speak, but only within the dominant dismajority at the expense of the African-African minority. course. The dominant discourse is thereby shielded from Once again the argument is that the African Americans' transformation. Existing arrangements of power are not own perspective is lost, not merely by their underreprefundamentally challenged. Although voice in this accomsentation in research but by the fact that whenever they modative, add-on sense may appear to be a real advance are represented, they are presented in the terms controlled over having no representation at all, it fails to satisfy in by the dominant groups rather than in their own terms that it offers a representation of self in the terms denned and with their own voice (see Gordon, 1973; Morrison, by the dominant groups and so only advances their in1992; Nobles, 1973; Williams, 1991). terests, not those of the less dominant. 3. Third world movements have challenged what Insofar as the speaking parts that are available to they claim is the domination of a Eurocentric worldview, the cast of humanity have already been scripted in ways recommending a more indigenous approach to psychothat implicitly represent the standpoint of dominant sological analysis. Moghaddam (1987, 1990), for example, cietal groups, merely to have a speaking part is still not 1220 December 1993 American Psychologist

has argued on behalf of an indigenous third world psychology to counter the prevalence of "United Statesian psychology" (1987, p. 917), a message captured as well by Sloan (1990), who called for a psychology "in and of the Third World" (p. 3). Others have reached similar conclusions (e.g., Ibrahim, 1989; Malgady, Rogler, & Costantino, 1987; Montero, 1990). Developments within ethnopsychology (e.g., Lutz, 1988; also Rosaldo, 1989; White & Kirkpatrick, 1985) have similarly questioned the universality of findings based on research conducted in the United States as well as traditional cross-cultural research based on concepts derived from the U.S. context. The argument is that the unique specificity of the indigenous voice is lost once it is forced to fit Euro-American categories of understanding (also see Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991; Schwartz, White, & Lutz, 1992). 4. The gay and lesbian challenge has sought to counter what it sees to be the oppressive domination of heterosexism in both the larger culture and in psychology. Morin (1977, 1978), for example, wrote of psychology's heterosexist bias: "a belief system that values heterosexuality as superior to and/or more 'natural' than homosexuality" (1977, p. 629). This is the bias that Kitzinger (1987) likewise described, in contrasting the earlier treatment of the homosexual as pathological with the currently more "enlightened" view of homosexuality as an alternate lifestyle. She argued that both the pathological and the enlightened views are flawed because they avoid addressing the politics of homosexuality, in particular its fundamental challenge to the patriarchy that undergirds the heterosexist ethic (also see Committee on Lesbian and Gay Concerns, 1991; Garfinkle & Morin, 1978; Garnets, Hancock, Cochran, Goodchilds, & Peplau, 1991; Herek, Kimmel, Amaro, & Melton, 1991; Morin & Rothblum, 1991). In making these claims, most movement advocates are not accusing psychology of operating in an intentionally oppressive manner. Indeed, it is generally recognized that mainstream psychology has often sought to be responsive to these movement challenges, actively seeking remedies for some of the most egregious biases. Many of the preceding references, for example, appear in American Psychological Association (APA) publications and include proposals for eliminating sexism, racism, homosexist biases, and so forth. The amicus briefs or direct testimony from the APA on behalf of both women's rights and gay rights (e.g., Bersoff & Ogden, 1991; Fiske, Bersoff, Borgida, Deaux, & Heilman, 1991) offer further illustrations of the field's ongoing efforts to remedy a historically questionable record. And yet, movement protests continue, focusing on psychology's accommodative add-on strategy and on the failure of this approach not only to hear the missing voices but, in being so accommodative without fundamentally transforming psychology's basic frameworks for understanding, to exacerbate the very issues to which these challenges have been addressed. Psychology is accused of December 1993 American Psychologist

using a framework of understanding that implicitly represents a particular point of view, that of currently dominant social groups, all the while acting as though its own voice were neutral, reflecting reason, rationality, and, with its ever expanding collection of empirical data, perhaps truth itself.

The Discursive Framework

A receptive reading of movement claims about voice directs us to the heart of the issue that continues to separate mainstream psychology from these challengers. The issue rests on two conceptually linked foundations: (a) a discursive analysis of all social and psychological phenomena and (b) a concern with the relation between discourse and power. The Discursive Construction of Reality Numerous recent developments have offered an alternative understanding of social and psychological phenomena using a discursive framework of analysis (e.g., Billig, 1987; Bowers, 1991; Bruner, 1987, 1990; Edwards, 1991; Edwards & Potter, 1993;Gergen, 1987, 1989; Harre, 1984, 1992; Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Sampson, 1983, 1993; Sarbin, 1986; Shotter, 1990, 1992; Shotter & Gergen, 1989; Wertsch, 1991: Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Discourse involves "meanings, conversations, narratives, explanations, accounts and anecdotes" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, pp. 2-3). The discursive framework gives conversations a central role in our everyday lives. Harre (1992), for example, argues that conversations provide the "intransigent background to all human action" (p. 157), introducing us to "as robust a world as that of the flow of electromagnetic energy" (p. 157). Shotter (1992) argues that talk and conversation are "the primary human reality" (p. 176). It is clear that precursors to this way of understanding psychological concepts can be found in the writings of Mead (1934), Vygotsky (1978), and Wittgenstein (1953, 1958). Discourse theorists maintain that talk is constitutive of the realities within which we live, rather than expressive of an earlier, discourse-independent reality. As Wetherell and Potter (1992) stated it, "Discourse. . . is not partially constitutive or only constitutive under some conditions, but is thoroughly constitutive" (p. 62). This understanding departs rather dramatically from the more conventional and to most of us familiar account. Discourse theorists maintain that talk and language do not serve simply nor primarily an expressive function, nor does communication involve merely the transmission of a preformed message from a transmitter to a receiver. They argue that both language and communication are cultural practices within which the various realities one encounters are constituted. They include those parts of reality commonly considered to be social (e.g., the social categories of persons organized by race, sex, age) as well as those we commonly consider to be psychological (e.g., persons' identity, motivation, thinking). Shotter (1992), for example, argued that "the primary function of our speech is to 'give shape' to and to 1221

coordinate diverse social action. . .. it is not the primary function of our talk to represent the world" (p. 176). Edwards (1991) contrasted the typical cognitive approach, for example, which takes "discourse as a realization of, and therefore as evidence of, underlying processes and structures of knowledge" (p. 517), with the discursive framework that "treats talk and text not as representation of pre-formed cognitions . . . but as forms of social action" (p. 517). Even the talk of science is not exempt. Both Potter (1992) and Edwards (1991; also Edwards & Potter, 1993) argued, for example, that the talk of science is designed to create a sense of a talk-independent reality. That is, one of the social performances achieved by science is to use talk and other rhetorical devices to create the sense of a world that is independent of the very processes of talk by which this sense is constituted (also see Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Latour, 1987; Shotter, 1990). It is important to note that the discursive framework does not deny reality nor reduce everything to mere words. New Zealand is no less real for being constituted discursively
you still die if your plane crashes into a hill whether you think that the hill is the product of a volcanic eruption or the solidified form of a mythical whale. However, material reality is no less discursive for being able to get into the way of planes. How those deaths are understood . . . and what caused them is constituted through our systems of discourses. (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 65)

As Wetherell and Potter took great pains to make clearand as other discourse theorists would agree words are deeds, not only in the sense that what we say about what we do gives meaning to what we do (e.g., see Bruner, 1990) but also that the very objects of our world are constituted as such in and through discourse. There is no meaning to reality behind discourses that discourse represents; in the representation lies the constitution of what we come to accept as the real. When we create the categories of our world and experience the world in terms of those categories, we are not applying category labels to distinctions that preexist those very labels. Rather,
Category terms, for both objects and persons, are used in ways designed to perform social actions (p. 526). . . . It would not be possible to establish the existence of named objects, bodily actions and significances in the physical world, or in behaviour, prior to the construction of such naming practices, since it is essentially through and for those practices that the categories are brought into existence." (Edwards, 1991, p. 527)

sustain male domination over females (also Braidotti, 1991; Gatens, 1991). A similar understanding has also been developed with regard to the categories and distinctions of race (e.g., see Fairchild, 1991; Zuckerman, 1990). As Zuckerman (1990) put it, "At what point is White Black or Black White? It is not a 'black and white' question, but depends on legal-cultural definitions" (p. 1298). Recent confrontations over the definition of specific national groups in former Eastern European countries, as well as the cases carefully documented in Dominguez's (1989) study in Israel involving the definition of a Jew and in Clifford's (1988) study of the Mashpee court case on Cape Cod involving the definition of membership in the Mashpee tribe, add further support to the discursive understanding of these seemingly "basic" categories of persons' identity. The discursive framework challenges the prevailing understandings of psychological science. Not only does it question the possibility of our ever obtaining a pure, specially privileged (i.e., discourse-free) description of the phenomenon of interest to us (e.g., persons' identities), but it transforms our view of the nature of science itself. We become less concerned with trying to fathom the fundamental principles whereby the universe of human nature operates, the pure facts of the case as it were, than interested in determining the prevailing ideas about what counts as facts, how such facts are generated and justified, and the consequences that follow from any particular "factual" constructions (see Edwards, 1991; Edwards & Potter, 1993;Foucault, 1979, 1980; Potter, 1992; Shotter, 1990, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Discourse theorists are less interested in discovering the truth in some abstract, universal sense, than in uncovering the discursive processes by which certain matters are considered true while others are considered false. Those practices are of interest both to discourse analysts and to advocates of identity politics. This then brings me to the relationship between discourse and power and the reason why the several identity movements I am considering have found such great appeal in the discursive framework with its challenge to current psychological thinking and practice. Power and Discourse Because the social and psychological worldand indeed even the division into the social and the psychological is discursively constructed, any particular arrangement that is found at any one time and place is more open, fluid, and nonessential than we may typically believe. As I previously commented, this statement applies to the categories of identity by which our world has been currently organized into a dualistic, opposed division of male and female, heterosexual and homosexual, as well as the divisions by which racial and ethnic groups have been identified. These "social" divisions of persons' identity are not seen to be natural categories covered by the story of either biology or genetics, even though the latter have increasingly become the discursive means by which such diviDecember 1993 American Psychologist

In brief, discourse provides us with "not just a way of seeing, but a way of constructing seeing" (Edwards, 1991, p. 523). Several feminist authors have been especially interested in this aspect of the discursive framework (e.g., Butler, 1990; MacKinnon, 1989), noting for example how even the seemingly most natural categories, male and female, are better understood as constructed through the discursive practices of society, designed, in their view, to 1222

sions gain their current legitimacy (see Buss & Schmitt, 1993, and Wilson, 1975, for some examples). These divisions are seen as the effects of discursive processes involving power rather than the prediscursive inputs into such processes. How those divisions are constituted as well as the consequences of such divisions becomes the central problem for investigation. In other words, not probing or challenging the categories, divisions, and objects that we encounter (including the very categories of identity reflected in identity politics), but rather treating them as "givens" of the world, is to participate in a political act that helps affirm current formulations by never examining how they became current and whose interests they serve (see Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Discourse theory likewise does not treat the categories of psychological subjectivity as features of nature independent of the very discursive processes of power by which these too are made factual:
The process of categorization, and thus the psychology of categorization, reside, not just in the mind, but . . . within discourse as part of a collective domain of negotiation, debate, argumentative and ideological struggle. (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 77) The same argument extends to other areas of subjectivity motives, personality, intentions. Identitywho one is and what one is likeis established through discursive acts. (pp. 77-78)

The discursive construction of these phenomena of central interest to psychology leads us to see that any given arrangement is nonessential except within a particular sociohistorical regime of practice. Advocates of the several identity-based movements are thereby motivated to ask about why current arrangements of identity and personality have been instantiated, for what purposes, and for whom. In other words, the discursive framework leads us inexorably toward inquiries about the power that some groups have to manage the very discursive practices by which their own groups' identity is constituted on the basis of their ability to manage the identity of others (see Sampson, 1993). The preceding considerations make it apparent that power does not operate quite as French and Raven's (1968) theory about its bases would lead us to believe. Power more closely follows Foucault's (1979, 1980) analysis and involves control over the very terms by which the discourses about identity and subjectivity are held and persons' psychology developed; power involves the manner by which persons are given a location and a subjectivity as actors within discourse. Therefore, we look for power within "policy statements, in the statements of political spin doctors, in memos, in speeches, in documents, in newspapers, in conversations, accounts, explanations, versions, anecdotes and stories" (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 61). We look for power within everything about ourselves and our world that we take for granted. In short, power appears throughout the culture as well as within the sciences such as psychology that engage in research on cultural members. Power resides within the very forms of knowledge December 1993 American Psychologist

and understanding that traditional research and scientific practices generate. These conditions of power make an identity politics eminently rational. Because power is exercised psychologically, in and through the manner by which persons' identities and psychology are constituted, some groups are dominated through the very characterization of their identities and personality. They cannot even enter into conversations without sustaining their dominated position because their speaking positions have been defined on the basis of the very domination they hope to challenge. Several feminist writers, for example, have argued that the very categories, male and female, as well as the grouping of identity characteristics into masculine and feminine, do not express some natural, prediscursive arrangement onto which culture writes its message (e.g., see Butler, 1990;Connell, 1987;Eisenstein, 1988). Rather, these categories are discursively constructed so as to carry within them the power differentials whose purposes they serve. Those who contend that the division (male vs. female, masculine vs. feminine) is based on genitals, chromosomes, or hormones miss the point. These characteristics have been discursively selected so as to keep the sexual boundary closely linked with matters of reproduction, thereby keeping women and men in their "proper places." Similar arguments have been made by advocates of the other identity-based movements I consider in this article. To have a homosexual identity, then, is not to be defined by some natural, inherent, essential property of the person as, for example, Adler (1991) contended. Rather, it is to be constituted as a person on the basis of certain socially marked characteristics defined in relation to and in the service of the dominant heterosexist ethic. In other words, the categorization is discursively constructed presumably with the dominant groups' interests in mind. At this point, it should be clear why identity movements are seeking a voice for themselves in their own terms and why they challenge the uncritical understandings developed by traditional psychological and social science. Without their own voice, whenever they speak, they would do so in a manner that keeps their positioned disadvantage vis-a-vis the dominant groups who have constructed them for this purpose. The form of domination that these identity movements challenge, then, is built into the very order of things (e.g., Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). As long as members of such groups use the voice of those who have constructed them, they will continue to be complicit in their own domination. Only by finding, declaring, and effectively using their own voice can they hope to break from the trap.

Four Themes
This overview of the discursive framework establishes the conceptual context within which identity movement claims for voice is a reasonable endeavor. The remainder of this article will unpack these claims further by examining four key themes. These themes should not be
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considered as either separate from the discursive frameworkfor they flesh out further detailsnor entirely distinct from one another. Rather, my intent is to provide a more comp'ete basis for the reasonableness of the claims of movement advocates as well as the importance of their challenge to our current understandings and practices in psychology. Description and the Absent Standard Most psychologists understand the key role that ground plays in shaping our experience of figure. Early Gestalt principles emphasized this feature of our perception of physical objects (e.g., see Osgood, 1953, for an overview), and others extended this idea to attitudes and social perception as well (e.g., Krech & Crutchfield, 1948). Lutz (1985, 1988) offered a useful illustration from anthropology. Lutz observed how our description of another culture as being indulgent in their child rearing practices (the figure), for example, implicitly assumes some group's standardusually the anthropologist's home culture as the basis or ground for this description:
If, for example, the handling of children in one culture is described as "indulgent," that statement is equally one about the nonindulgence of Euro-American children. If the Japanese are said to be quick to "shame," that is also a description of how the ethnographer does not see her or himself. (1985, p. 37)

judgment is the conclusion of a process and yet appears as a statement of pure, impartial description (also see Adorno. 1973; Derrida. 1974, 1978, 1981). We can press this idea further by taking an example from Gatens' (1991) analyses that is representative of the claims of the identity-based political movements (also see Tavris, 1992, on a similar point). Gatens challenged the apparently neutral, objective quality of descriptions that divide the world into categories, such as mind versus body, male versus female. Gatens noted that "social and political values may be contained in dichotomies that present themselves as objective distinctions" (p. 93). She illustrated this point by examining the distinction typically made between mind and body in Descartes's thinking, the heritage of which still dominates much contemporary work in psychology:
What appears to be a distinction between A (mind) and B (body), in fact, takes the form of A (mind) and Not-A (Body). . . . In this way a dichotomy may function to divide a continuous field of differences . . . into an exclusive opposition with one term being singled out to define all the rest: A defines the entire field of Not-A. A is here defined in positive terms, as possessing x, y, z properties whereas its "opposite" is negatively defined. NotA becomes defined by the fact that it lacks the properties x, y. z, rather than being defined in its own right. Not-A becomes the privation or absence of A: the fact that it is Not-A is what defines it rather than the fact that it is B. (Gatens. 1991. p. 93)

When Lutz wrote that we describe the child rearing practices of Culture X as indulgent, her point was not that they are in fact, that is, essentially or intrinsically, indulgent, as though indulgence were a property they possessed. Rather, she was asking us to adopt a relational understanding of all descriptions, seeing how indulgence in this case is built on a comparision with an implicit standard. As this example illustrates, the figure is usually seen, noticed, and described, while the ground remains hidden, implicit, and absent from our view. This leads all too easily to the kind ofjudgment that Lutz's example illustrates, that is, the idea that we are describing Culture X's actual characteristics as though they possessed in themselves what is in fact an outcome of a comparative process made against an "absent" standard. Lutz also asked us to be aware that the absent standard is not absent in the neutral way that we have come to think the ground is missing from our awareness of the figure. Rather, historical relations of power between various groups have rendered the standard absent, an unmarked but controlling feature of our understanding of ourselves and others. When we describe Culture X as indulgent, we are not only implicitly making a comparison with Culture Y but granting privilege to the implicit (but absent) standard represented by Y. The standard becomes the unexamined, privileged term that provides the evaluative frame or ground within which comparisons are made while it itself does not come under our scrutiny. As Lutz reminded us, we judge Culture X as being an inferior representation of the superior qualities contained in Culture Y. This 1224

Both Gatens and Lutz argued that the discursive construction of objects typically conceals the privileging granted to the implicit, absent standard. Both argued that descriptions privilege one term over another by treating the other term as an inferior, negative manifestation of the dominant term. So for Lutz, the indulgence of Culture X was reflected against the background of the EuroAmerican standard that is implicitly brought to bear: Culture X is an inferior form of that standard; it lacks what the standard possesses rather than being defined positively in its own right. Likewise for Gatens, body becomes what mind is not; woman is an incomplete man. Mind and the male are the implicit standard defined affirmatively, whereas body and the female are reflected as inferior forms because they lack what the former possesses. It is clear that for Lutz, Gatens, and others (e.g., Adorno, 1973), this process was political. It is also clear that reclaiming voice for those who are represented negatively, as what the affirmatively defined standard lacks, can occur only when and insofar as those others can speak in terms of their own positions and specificities, that is, positively, rather than invariably occupying the inferior position in discourse. The evidence in support of the Lutz-Gatens view as applied to psychology's understanding of these identity movements is rather striking. In each case, the absent standard is the White heterosexual male of Western origins and of the dominant social classes. All others are not only defined in terms of this standard but come off as a poor second. Denmark et al. (1988) offer case after case of this in psychology's treatment of women (also see December 1993 American Psychologist

Broverman. Vogel, Broverman. Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Eagly & Kite, 1987; Gilligan, 1982; Morawski & Steele, 1991; Tavris, 1992. for additional examples). In a similar manner, heterosexuality becomes the implicit standard for judging homosexuality; White America, the standard by which African Americans are judged; Western society, the implicit standard by which nonwesterners are understood. In each case, the standard is implicit and unmarked, even though it is the basis on which the description itself is made. To adopt the heterosexual standard, or the western pattern of child rearing, or the White male socialization story as the implicit norm and then to measure everything against this norm while loudly proclaiming neutrality and impartiality in one's descriptions is to forget the relational judgments that are necesssarily implicated in making any description in the first place. It is also to fail to see the power that permits one standard to become the only standard by which the world and persons' experiences of it are evaluated. The argument then is not simply that our descriptions are evaluative judgments, but that the implicit standard by which such judgments are made is the outcome of power and serves to maintain that power. To adopt the male, the White, the heterosexual, the Euro-American westerner as the implicit, absent standard by which others are judged is not only to see the world through one set of eyes but, in so doing, to help sustain the very power that this group historically and currently possesses to define the world in their terms, to serve their interests. Point of View Versus Point of Viewlessness As the preceding account suggests, and as both historical and contemporary evidence indicates, the implicit standard that has dominated human understanding (at least in the Western world) has been based on the point of view of primarily educated, heterosexual, White males from the more dominant social and economic classes. This same evidence also suggests that this standard has been so sufficiently implicit (and absent) that it has not even been noted as a standard at all; it has been taken as a neutral description of the way the world really is. Although it is tempting to develop the full details of this historical account, I will bypass this temptation, referring the reader to othersprimarily feminist analystswho have developed this case in greater detail than space permits (e.g., de Beauvoir. 1949/1989; Fabian, 1983; Lerner, 1986; Merchant, 1980; Noble, 1992; Scott, 1988; Sedgwick, 1990). The key point is that one group's perspective on knowledge has set the terms of human understanding. This includes both how best to achieve knowledge and how to distinguish between good and bad knowledge. In all of these endeavors, this dominant group has followed a route that affirms its own particularistic interests, desires, and fears, even as it insists that its views on knowledge represent no particular point of view at all. The issue and the debate go back far in Western history, including, as Nussbaum (1986) suggested, the difDecember 1993 American Psychologist

ferent routes proposed by Plato and Aristotle. The former, argued Nussbaum. sought to conquer all contingency in knowledge so that people could live with less human vulnerability than was otherwise possible. This required seeking a pure knowledge defined as those forms that were far removed from the affairs of everyday life. Nussbaum argued that Aristotle allowed those very affairs along with the contingencies they introduced to be an intimate part of the kinds of knowledge that were humanly possible. The Platonic ideal that saw good knowledge to be distanced and disembodied set forth a tradition that would wend its way through early church battles over asceticism and purity; through Cartesian doctrines that separated disembodied, good knowledge from the dangerously false, embodied forms; to come finally to those forms held in highest esteem in the 17th century and to this very day. when modern science began its hegemonic rise. The central idea in this historical trajectory that links the past with the modern scientific worldview lies in the argument that good knowledge, that is, reliable and practical knowledge, is derived from a process that removes the knower from the things to be known in order to know them better as they, the objects, really are. As it turns out, these men of philosophy, of religion, and finally of science, connected good knowledge with their own familiar world. Thus knowledge gained a gender. As numerous authors have agreed (e.g., Code, 1991: Harding, 1986; Keller, 1985; Merchant, 1980; Noble, 1992), the historical trajectory not only defines good knowledge as that which is distanced from the particularities of the everyday worldfor good knowledge is anonymous and presumably available to anyone properly trainedbut also sees an intimate link between what is good and what is masculine, whereas what is bad is located on the side of the feminine. When the early church fathers defined heresy, for example, they linked it with all things feminine. The latter were said to reflect disorder and chaos in contrast to the right-thinking orthodoxy the church advocated (e.g., Noble, 1992; Pagels, 1981). When the Scientific Revolution began in earnest "within the male enclaves of the universities" (Noble, 1992, p. 171), scientists also fought against heresy; and once again heresy was represented by all things feminine. Good knowledge was thereby masculine, removed "from the unruly particulars of time and place, person and experience, a depoliticized, impersonal, disembodied, universal, absolute, and authoritative God-likeknowledge" (Noble, p. 241). As Noble commented, when the British Royal Scientific Society was founded in 1660, its followers were urged to resist all heresy: "And since heresy had come to be associated . . . with women, they had ernestly to emphasize that theirs was, above all, a reliably 'masculine' endeavor" (p. 229), furthering the Baconian pursuit of a virile science (Keller, 1985; Noble, 1992). The historical association between gender and knowledge has served as a paradigmatic model for all forms by which good knowledge can be distinguished 1225

from bad knowledge. This distinction, however, does not exist "in the world," but rather in the discursive practices of those whose particular interests it serves. In other words, to maintain a point of viewlessness about what both historically and currently has been associated with one group's particular point of view is to operate politically while denying that any politics is involved. It is to deny voice to those whose experiences are rooted in a different culture of practice or to grant them voice but only if they speak in ways that undo their own particularities. Although the issues involved here are very complex and open to much debate even among advocates (e.g., see Keller, 1992), there is a reasonableness to the challenges mounted by proponents of identity politics for whom the game seems too stacked against them ever to issue in fair outcomes. At minimum, the lengthy association between the desire for a neutral standpoint and the interests of one particular segment of humanity should give pause to the extensive claims made in its behalf. Constructing Serviceable Others I have borrowed the term serviceable other from Toni Morrison's (1992) examination of how several major White authors construct African Americans as the kind of person required for Whites to have the identity they wish for themselves. Her case is clearly not just about authors and literature but about the larger issues of racism in our own society. Here is how she put it: Africanism is the vehicle by which the American self knows itself as not enslaved, but free; not repulsive, but desirable; not helpless, but licensed and powerful; not history-less, but historical; not damned, but innocent; not a blind accident of evolution, but a progressive fulfillment of destiny, (p. 52) Although operating in a different context, Fabian (1983) offered us a similar analysis of how the European managed to preserve "his" own identity by constructing a serviceable primitive as his other: A discourse employing terms such as primitive, savage (but also tribal, traditional, Third World or whatever euphemism is current) does not think, or observe, or critically study, the "primitive"; it thinks, observes, studies in terms of the primitive. Primitive being . . . is a category, not an object of Western thought, (pp. 17-18) And, as any review of feminist writers will reveal, woman is not a category of nature as much as a category created by dominant male groups with the kind of characteristics required so that males can have the identities they desire (see Riley, 1988, for an especially useful analysis). A similar case has been made for other Others, all of whom h#ve become serviceable to the dominant groups' interests, desires, and fears. To create a serviceable other, then, is to use representation in a powerful manner designed to accomplish desired qualities for one's own group by constructing a contrasting other who will be serviceable to that mission. Ralph K. White's (1966) analysis of what he referred to as processes of misperception involved in World Wars
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I and II and the Vietnam War, plus Holt and Silverstein's (1989) more recent examination of the distorted images of the enemy that all nations seem to adopt, offers further illustration of how the other is constructed so as to be serviceable to the needs and interests of those in charge of the construction. In the case of nations at war, of course, each sideat least among its own peopletypically plays its hand in this game, creating a portrait of the enemyother that serves its own national needs. White, for example, examined the manner by which each side constructed the other as a diabolical enemy while denning itself as holding the moral high ground and operating in a virile manner: "to be and to seem strong and courageous" (p. 5). In choosing to locate their analyses in terms of distorted misperceptions, both White and Holt and Silverstein have adopted a nondiscursive framework. In using the terminology of distortion and error, they imply that there is some accurate perception from which these selfserving images depart. By contrast, in locating my analyses in the discursive framework, I emphasize the point that the process of constructing a serviceable other does not refer either to errors of perception or to ideology as a mask that disguises something nondiscursively real behind it. Rather, we are dealing with the manner by which reality itself is constructed. As Wetherell and Potter (1992) noted in illustrating this point, both the political concept of ideology and the psychological concept of a cognitive distortion or misperception carry two erroneous implications along with them: first, that there is a possibility of getting behind the error and touching truth itself, and second, that someone, usually the expert analyst, knows how to uncover this underlying, true picture. These two implications describe a discursive tactic that intends to privilege the experts' worldview while casting others as somewhat doltish dupes. Both implications also operate on the assumption that there is a discourse-free zone in which at least some forms of expertly knowledgeable humankind can ideally operate. White's approach, as well as Holt and Silverstein's, thereby misses at least two important points. First, there is nothing behind and beyond the construction; the construction is what reality is. The second and even more important point is that some groups' power to define reality and construct serviceable others does produce a distortion. In this case, however, the distortion cannot be corrected by finding a true picture. Rather, the distortion stems from the domination of one group's version over all others. The correction, then, requires a political process, an identity politics, rather than the intervention of psychological experts, be they social psychologists, cognitive scientists, or psychotherapists. By this point, it should be apparent that the concept of a serviceable other rests on a discursive framework. It requires an awareness of the degree to which a person's identity is not a fact independent of the social processes by which that identity has been constructed, including the purposes for which any particular construction is realized. The concept directs our attention to the devices December 1993 American Psychologist

by which dominant groups create a desired identity for themselves on the basis of their ability to set the terms by which others are denned. I am not describing a purely "mental" process far removed from the ongoing life of the persons involved. The terms by which an identity is realized also describe the actual material realities within which those lives are lived. MacKinnon (1989) has made this point most clearly. It is her contention that those who have the power to construct serviceable others also have the power to create realities congruent with those images. In other words, we are dealing here simply not only with internal forms of representation as ideas but as well with the power those ideas have to shape material reality to fit them. MacKinnon (1989) has been especially concerned to apply this argument to men and women as constructed through pornography:
Pornography is not imagery in some relation to a reality elsewhere constructed. It is not a distortion, reflection, projection, expression, fantasy, representation or symbol either. It is sexual reality . . . The way pornography produces its meaning constructs and defines men and women as such. (p. 198)

The powerful have not only the idea but the power to make the idea their own and others' reality. Those constructed to be serviceable to the powerful know this all too well. Only the powerful can insist on a neat separation between the thought and the reality. This is a separation that serves them well, permitting them to claim that what they say or how they represent others makes little difference in reality and, furthermore, is a constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech and expression. This minimizes the role that their power plays in creating a real world inhabited by people who become their representations and whose lives take on the realities they depict. Dialogic Partners We are now in a better position, I believe, to understand the claims of movement advocates regarding voice. To have voice when one is required to speak in the forms allowed by the dominant discourse is still not to have voice, that is, not to have self-determining self-representation. It is merely to speak as the dominant discourse permits, which means either to speak as one has been constructed by that discourse or to speak through its gaze, perspective, and standpoint. It is not to have one's own voice but rather to be restricted to the voice that is given. Furthermore, given the relation between voice and action that I previously noted, to be without voice means to be without impact in shaping persons' very lives. Yet, merely speaking, even in one's own forms, is not by itself sufficient if that voice does not access the corridors of power. An especially poignant example is presented in Scheper-Hughes's (1992) account of the medicalization of hunger in Brazil. Scheper-Hughes's analysis reveals the degree to which the medical and psychological establishment has December 1993 American Psychologist

taken up the agenda of the political and economic interests of the wealthy and has transformed the extreme poverty and hunger of sugarcane workers and their families into a nervous illness to be treated medically (with pills) and psychologically (with a calming of the disturbed nerves) but not with food. To have voice in this context, then, is not merely to be able to speak nor even to recognize that one's suffering is the outcome of systematic policies that create disadvantage for some and advantage for others. Voice is meaningful only if it produces collective action that transforms the very system that produces the hunger. What good is it to have voice if one still lacks food? As I previously noted, having any voice at all may seem better than having none. The insistent claims of many movement advocates, however, oppose this view, arguing that its apparent liberalism oppresses them, all the while claiming to be operating in a nonoppressive manner. If I believe that I have fulfilled my moral function merely by allowing you to speak, then I might wonder why you remain so deeply disturbed and unsatisifed. Perhaps pathology, as in the Scheper-Hughes example, is the answer to your persistent lack of gratitude. On the other hand, if I can become aware that the voice that you seek is yours, not the one I have made for you, then I might better see how the latter only perpetuates your bondage, not your freedom. And, if I can listen now to you speak, perhaps I can join with you in changing our circumstances. The goal, then, of identity politics is to transform the relations of power that permit some to determine the voice and the life of others. The implications of this change for psychology are dramatic. Researchers and their subjects as well as therapists and their clients would have to form a new relationship so that a discourse partnership could be realized. As Clifford (1986) argued in a somewhat different but relevant context, psychologists would have to become coauthors with their subjects and clients, taking neither their own view nor the view of others to be specially privileged but entering into a genuine dialogue in which the various standpoints remain intact. As we learn from Bakhtin (1981, 1986; also Clark & Holquist, 1984; Morson & Emerson, 1990), the Russian analyst of dialogism, a genuine dialogue demands that persons neither melt so much into one another that they lose their own standpoint, nor so transform others into an image designed to serve their own purposes, thai they can only hold a monologue masquerading as a dialogue. A genuine dialogue requires a meeting among variously positioned standpoints, among persons who have an equal say in the discursive processes out of which their joint realities are constructed. Experts can neither abandon their perspective nor presume it has primacy. In either case, they lose the opportunity for a genuine dialogue among partners.

Conclusion
Identity politics sets forth a task that is by no means easy for psychology to accomplish. This is not a task for which
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we have been trained, nor one that we alone can accomplish, nor one that will simply leave our current power in place. Most of us have been trained not to encounter others' unique specificity but to reduce them to one of our discipline's categories, while ignoring the social, historical, and political roots of those very categories. Because the task set for us is political, and because our traditional science has taught us that the psychological must be separated from the political, we will need to reconsider a separation that sustains the privilege of some at the expense of the many. Because much of our power, prestige, and income rests on our expertise in deciphering the secrets of human nature, the task and challenge will require giving up much of that power and entering into a different alliance with the people we serve. It is clear to almost everyone in psychology that if we failed to be responsive to new scientific discoveries, our legitimacy as a scientific enterprise would be significantly reduced. The thrust of identity politics, I believe, makes it equally clear that our failure to be responsive to the claims of the people who seek their own voice will also undermine our legitimacy. In the long run, the legitimacy of any scientific enterprise rests in the hands of the people it serves. If psychology hopes to avoid the kind of crisis of legitimation described by Habermas (1973), it cannot long remain smugly the same when the people whose interests we purport to serve insist that we do not represent their voices. Under such conditions, the legitimacy we currently have will lessen; the power, the prestige, and the money will disappear; and we will not have even the moral pleasure of arriving at the Gates of Heaven feeling good about what we have done. Identity politics tells us that psychology's legitimacy will not be sustained merely by collecting more data, even on more inclusive samples. Nor will legitimacy long endure if all we can say when the people bang on our doors is that the logic of positivist science justifies our continuing to do what we have always done. In the long run, psychology's legitimacy resides in the hands of the people. These people have become both more diverse and more restless. Their differences are showing and will not be silenced by appeals to ideas that continue to speak in the voice of their dominators. Either psychology will listen and change, or it will lose its thrust as an important contributor to the tasks of our time.
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