FLIGHT COMMENT

SEPTEMBER " OCTOBER " 1968

 CANADIAN FORCES DIRECTORATE OF
HEADQUARTERS FLlGHT SAFETY

Co~n`nerat~
COL R. D . SCHULTZ
DIRECTOR OF FLIGHT SAFETY
We welcome the formation in June this year of a A Flight Safety has been examined in all its aspects and from
many points of view in the last few issues of Flight Comment .
CONSTANT
group calling themselves the Human Factors As- MAJ M. D. BROADf00T LCOI H. E BJORNESTAD
sociation of Conada . We wish it well ; there's much FUGHT SAFETY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION We have seen how its aims must be subjectively applied by those
to be done, The group will represent the interests
of many disciplines concerned with man's function-
CHALLENGE directly associated with aircraft, and read of the indirect appli-
cation of these aims by those responsible for the conditions in
ing in his physical and machine environments . Its which men live and work, for the eq~ipment they use or for the
findings will no doubt hove significant implication training they receive in the use of that equipment . We have also
in the achievement of flight safety . seen how these aims are compromised by environmental hazards
of many descriptions .
_2_ Witness for the Board This edition features 1 Air Division . To introduce it, I
intend not to philosophize, but to highlight briefly the effect on
A group of Canadian aircrew visiting a USN training Flight Safety thinking of the circumstances peculiar to this
centre recently were surpri sed to find that one-third
5 ASI - Aircraft Sam P lm9 Ins P ection Command.
of their numbers were unable to meet the minimum It is not necessary to dwell on the hazards implicit in low-
safe swimming standards required by the USN for 6 Good Shows level flying, Our men are well trained, If proof of this is
aircrew overflying water . Last year a 104 pilot required, one need only refer to Tactical Evaluation results or
punched out over water and found that his ability 9 Some thou 9 hts on water survival to our achievements at recent AFCENT Tacticpl Weapons
Meets and Royal Flush Competitions . In producing these
as a swimmer undoubtedly saved his life . . . By the - from AETE Prestwick results however, and in maintaining the standards of combat
way, one-twelfth of Canada i s water, and there are
18000 miles of coastline . effectiveness for which Canadians are respected throughout
10 Y our radar set as an altimeter NATO (and without which our silverware cabinet would be a
meaningless symbol), our men are exposed to conditions which
11 Lahr - Downslo Pe Winds are a Flight Safety Officer's nightmare . Long working hours,
fast turn-arounds, speedy mission preparation, maximum
Flight Safety Foundation reports an accident which
mission production and mass launches and recoveries are
the wearing of shoulder straps in the cockpit would 14 DOWN TO THE SEA . . . m chutes anly a few of the adverse conditions encountered . The roles
probably have prevented . A pilot suddenly collapsed
of strike and reconnaissance demand the capability to
over the controls on final approach ; the captai~ was 16 Exercise "To p Guns" navigate at low-levels, in all weather, in a hostile environment -
unable to regain sufficient control to prevent severe
and with precise results in weapons delivery or in the pro-
damage on touchdown, In another instance, a co- 17 On the Dials duction of intelligence . Our geographic training area, already
pilot, tuning radios on taxi-out, would not have been
too small, is shared with six other national forces attempting
rather uncomfortably draped over the yoke when
brakes were suddenly applied to avoid hitting a
18 the heart of the matter to achieve the same aims . It is also shared with helicopters,
light aircraft, birds, gltders and even the occasional balloon
ground vehicle .
20 Birdstnkes or parachutist . Look-out was never more important . Add the
vagaries of European weather, and we have the recipe for
~I
22 In case You were wonderin 9 . . . potential disaster .
Such a situation presents a constant challenge to all 1 Air
A report came in the other day, relating the circum-
stances causing an important component to be 25 Gen from 210 Division personnel . Temptations to take short cuts or to
press-on in doubtful weatherto complete a mission are strong,
damaged . In the orders, the operator is cautioned not
to use "excessive" pressure . With nothing more 27 Comments to the Editor so realistic pnonties must be established and continually
applied to ensure we can maintain the stondard of training
explicit to guide the reader than a caution of this
and preparedness required to perform our tasks without
sort, it was inevitable that excessive pressure was compromising our resources . Thts is the ~ob of Fl~ght
applied . The offending passage is being rewritten ; Safety, and F I ight Safety i s a ~ob for everyone .
we mention it only to caution against the excessive Editor Capt J . T . Richards
employment of vague words like "excessive" . Assistant Editor Capt J . G . Christison
Art and layout CFHQ Graphic Arts

Flight Comment is produced by the CFHQ Dir-

ectorate of Flight Safety . The contents do not
A package of bad meat was recently placed aboard necessarily reflect official policy and urless
an aircraft as part of the flight rations . From our otherwise stated should not be construed as
regulations, orders or directives. Contributions,
records there seems to be an almost statistical comments and criticisms are welcome ; the pro-
certainty that thiswill recur withpossible disastrous rnotion of flight safety is best served by disse- MAJ-GEN R .J . LANE
minating ideos and on-the-job experien<e, Send
consequences - unless each unit has a foolproof COMMANDER, 1 AIR DIVISION
submissions to : Editor, Flight Comment, CFHQ!'
system for the safe handling of in-flight food . DFS, Ottawa 4, Onlario . Svbscriptions available
from Queen's Printer, Hull, P .Q . Annual sub-
cont'd on page 5 scription rate is a1 .50 far Canada and USA.

ROGEA DUAAMEL, F.R.S .C .

Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery
Ottawa, 1968
 .ro y~u're a. . .

~ Witness
. . . the board members themselves may be a little frayed
around the edges at this stage of the game . . .
. . . two passes at the SAME speed and height!
wish - ,~iven help in writin~ it ciown after takin~ the
oath . '1'hc q uestions aren't meant to makc vou , lc-~ok fool- aircraft make tvvo passrs at thc sarnc spced and hei,~ht!
ish . lf vou are unsure ar don't know - sav so . '~o one's If com l~arison fli hts cannot be arran ~ed ask the witness
toin to bilc vour
, head off - in fact the v~'re ,k11 ad t o ha v e to givc his estimates relative to some other aircraft hc
Capt D.W . Rumbold y~our assistancc . If .vou are in doubt or if it's onlv, }~ ca
sav, admit it openly ; you'll feel less embarrassed in the
° r- mav havc secn (say, at an air display) . And the roughest
sketch drawn hy a witnc5s is oftcn most uscful in clari-
lon nrn . fvin,~
. a Point . '1'he interviewer should have a Erlastic
Probably the most cc~mmcrn problem fa~ed by investi- model c~f thc airrraft - cvcrv crash baK should havc onc .
The member~ of a 13oard of Inquiry into an Oh, so yau werc one of the pcoplr who saw thc air- rators is that of the "red herrin g "', ~ver y ~ in yuir y us u all y Sur ( ~risin K,lv cnou K~
h chilurcn are oftcn the hcst ancl
Aircraft Accident are not prosecutors at a craft pass overhead? Where wcre vou stanJin~;? hho was has thrcc or four promisin,t; lcat3s w}uch turn out to be most r cai~a hle wit n es5cs . T he y u s u all y~ have no axe to
with vou? Most of your crc~c wcrc~ at thc windc~w ancl the
trial . Their job is to get ALL the available falsr . Thc: best coursc availablc to invcstiKators and ;;rind, nor are they out to impres~ anyonc . E3ut likc most
aircraft w~as hcadin K awav, from vou?
, Lct's 'ol
J that down . witncsscs alikc is to keep an open mind . If vou are a witncsses (particularly elderly pcoplc), they must he
evidence and let the chips fall where they '~iow, could vou see if the aftcrburner was lit? How about witncss, confinc your statcment to what vnu artuaflv treated with res P ect and not confused .
may . If you are ever a witness, don't think thc fla p, k~ divebrakcs?
s unclerc~arria-le . :1nv external tanks su~c anrl hearc~~ don't trv. to k~uess what the Board wants Pcrsons who have suf fered property damage or undcr-
anci stores? Better rnention it was rn a ~~l`=6ank clirnhin `"T, ~one a severe shock as a result of the crash mav be
you are on trial - co-operate, give all the
turn to starboard . About what time was that? Remember
vou to sav,. or to im p ress them with y~our manv. ~bserva-
facts and don't hic~e anything or colour ttons . tem P ted to embroidcr the trut}r . The Board should not
anvthink else? l4'as there anythin~ unusual likc smokc, make overt attcmpts to discredit their evidencc but
(If vou are a Board mcmbcr and require furthcr
your evidence . Remember, the aim of the flarnes, lack of noise, elc? ilell, you've
. certainlv ?ot a information from a witness don't scare him and don't suhstantiation should bc souKht from other sources . ln
lot nf informatic~n tlrere - what's the phone nurnhcr uf
g ame is to make sure that such an acci3ent ask leading questions . lf you need his opinion, phrase F.urope there is also the lanyuaRe problcm ; it's vital to
that flir~ht safety c~fficer?
can never happen again . . . thc question accordin~ly, or you may burn many morc ohtain a 1~recise translation of all lhe small shades of
The FS() will probably be ver~~ busv rihht about this unncccssarv, hours of midni K ht oil sortin K the whcat from mcanin,; whirh can so oflcn bc c~f vital importance . If
time hut not toc~ busv to welcome vour help . fle knows thc chaff . h;vcrvone know~s that wrecka K e must bc carc- witnesses are hard to find, thc: local police can provc
l ou'vc probablv never seen aa aircraft crash into tl~at (;athcrin,r; crvidence from an aircraft crash is a lone fully siftcd classified analvzed
. and sub~cctcdJ to most helpful, as can mavc,rr~ and innkeepers in thc
the ~round - anci are never likelv to . tio, what's all this anu involvcci task which must bc painstakin~lv. cc>nciuct- exhaustive tests to find the truth . Similarlv, evidence :;~>>aller -rf~mmunities .
about "witncsscs"? . cd . Ilc knows that in a fcw ciay~s' timc t}rc: invc:sti,;;ators from wrtnesses rs }ust as sensrtrve and must be examrned
titol~ and think a momcnt . will bc back from thc craslt sccne and will hc lookin,,; Ic~r in thc same thorou~h and unbiascd manncr as othcr The Pilot
Ilas that vou in the cantPen wlro said "C~osh, I was rcliablc, unbiasc~ witncsscs . cvidcncc .)
talkin-~ to the p ilot onlv, last ni~ht"? ()r, were .vou thc l~ou may fccl vour c:vidcnce is lrarcllv worth n~cntion- Thc: most important witness of all is of course, the
ch~,~ p who hel p ed start his aircraft , or one of a whole in k~
~ hut let t!rc hoard membcrs be t}rc~ I'uel~~c of that . pilot . Here, the most freyucnt problem ts to have hrm
Witnesses, Irate and Otherwise
bunch of peoplc who heard or saw it pass overhcau ju5t Sometimes it's the seenun~ly insi~;nificant facts vti!uch ovcrcomc a fcclin~ of guilt - most pilots sccm to suffcr
before it crashed? i'erha P, s vou do havc a small itcm of hclp to pinpoint or confirm t}re cras!r causc . ln the crash site vicinity anothcr problcm awaits the from it whether the crash was their fault or not . To solve
information to contrihutr which ccnrlcl havc a hearint; ~oard . Not onlv mav witnesses be verv difficult to find this prohlcm, h~th thc B~ard memhers and the pilot rnust
upun thc accidcnt . hack alon the~fli?ht -t}r b t thev will r~rel ~ have anv rmaRrne therr p~srtions rcversed . The Board must bear
Coffee and questions . K k. p`c ' u , ~ ! .
If so, sit cio«n anu tlrink . I~c~n't cliscuss it w~ith ~our cxpencnce in cstimatint; aircraft s P eed, het K ht, dircction, in mind that jet aircraft speeds leavc little time for
huddies . 'l~akc a 1~iecc c?f 11~a ~cr riul;< <t ;r~~. anci 'ot
l down Recollecting all that wasn't too difficult . tiow, etc . 1";stinrates of sound and noise can often be verv use-
vo u r rcrollcctions c~f thc I . 1('l y . [ 'id thc c~n~~inc sound a what sori of cross-examination can vou cx~cct
I from that ful lothc in y uirv but someoneunfamiliar wilh the aircraft
hit odd or was it I~ust an c~rl~~~r canunt.~ from tlre other snarlv. old president of the Board? Firstlv,
. the )3oard is may have ciifficultv assessin,~ or describint ; what he
han k~ar w~all? Pcrha P s . '~ettcr ~+ritc it all u 1~ ~ahilc it's not thcre to give you a hard tirne . Vo, it's not like a heard . Wcather cnnditions also fall into tl7is cate ~>or ti~ at
fresh in v+~ur rnind - befcrre rumours and your own ima ;,Ti- court martial at all . 1'ou'll Probablv. be invited to have a times .In such cases, it is hest to use a practical demon-
nation Iravc hiascci vour mcmor~~ . coffec: and smokc if vc.>u wish . And don't bc afraid if vou 5tration whe ;rcver possible, or to ask for a comparison
Let'S see vou .werc with the p ilot for thrce (or was aren't w~earin K vour . best uniform ; the Board memhcrs t~~ith known or prcsent ronditions . Trv flyin,r; an aircraft
it four?1 hours last ni~ht? lle wasn't drinkin~;, eh? lou themselvcs mavlbe a little fraved around the edees at of the same tv:t~e over lhe arca at various hei Khts and
remernber he complaine ;l of a heaclache and went homc this sta~e of ,the amc havin~ worked lon K into thc speeds and have the ~citnesses view it and listcn to it
early . Thev mi~ht bc interested in his car problems - hc prcvious ni~ht and rn~re of the same to look forvvard to . from their ori~inal positions . ,'~ word of caution : confirm
w~as sure pavinr ;; thrcru~;h the nosc for that pile of junk . ti'ou vvill be asked to tcll vour storv and - if vou thc: rcliabilitv of w~itnesses' cstimates by havinK thc . . . small shodes of meaning . . .

Flight Comment, Sep Oct 1968

cmcr~~c:nc~y procedures, and that a quick decision to offender5. llave them usc thcir terms by all means, but
ejcct causcs thc pilot much later soul-searchinx . Could also ask them to i~~e the fet~~ words of transl-tio
a n or
hc have saved the aircraft bti~ sta~~ing with it a bit lon~er' ex i~lanation . If an ex ~rert throti~~s numbers at ,vo u, fi nd out ~D~~e/'Z~'.j (cont'd)
1
~~'here did he o wron ' Of course he feels >uiltv. - what he means -- rf rt hafflcs the tvprst you can bet that
there's a multi-million dollar hole in the t;round that somew~here alonK, the line, someone is k~oinc~5 to miss the We discovered too late that the articles for the ADC The Mar Apr issue contained an article "Reach for
perhaps he could have prevented . si ;:,mificance of the Point . May Jun issue were authored, as follows : the right can" pointing out the hazardous similarity
He's checked out the action~ he taok with all the ,~'It some time or other, most of u~ ~cill he associate~ "Aircrew Survival Refresher Training at Cold of containers with dissimilar fluids . The solution
EOs and fc:rund not}iinK wrong, but hc feels those craftv with an inquirv into an aircraft accident, either a5 a Lake" - Capt W.T, Floyd promised in the article has not been achieved and
in~etitiKators arc surc to nail him for it somehow . On the member of the Koard or as a ~ti~itne,~ . hee thfae hints in
. p "Aircraft Technical Research and Investigation - has been shelved as too costly . But, as the article
other hand, the pilot mu5t rememher that the Board are mrnd and keep ~~our min~' ()~'F\ . and the BFSO" - MWO A.G . Morran . states, "In the meantime, the hazard's there - keep
only too plea5ed to scc him alive . 'l'here are pilots
Our thanks to these literary gentlemen . ® alert," ®
arnon ~ them who know J'ust how he feels . l;ven tlrat
snarlv old president himsel( ma~~ have leaped out of a
1lustan K a few~ .vears back . The members are not the
pilot's prosecators - in fact, thev are often his best
F~ossible defence counsel : The ~ ~ are J'ust as anxious as Crash ambulance personne) were unable to obtain clear
the pilot to determine ~~~hat problcms there were with the
aircraft ; it'S their job to recommend wavs to prevent a
Unserviceable Ambulance instructions from the contro) tower due to an unservice-
able radro headset. Thrs, on a practrce alarm.
rccurrcncc .
- Flight Safety Committee

The "expert witness"

.And finally, lhcre's thc "cxpert ~~~itness" . He can he
a grcat deal of help but his advice is a hundred timcs
more vseful if it can be put into la)~man's lan~,~uat,~e to he
understoad hv all . 1ledical "experts" are c~ften the worst
Air Spc~cd Izulic~tor? - No!
Capt Rumbc,ld ~Nc~ :; l~rn in h'ntglan~, vrher~-~ Ir~,
~graduatcd rs an engineer can+J wotked for severcal
ASI - Aircraft Sampling Inspection
year : in aircraft re~F~nr~-h ana, rlc~velopment befare
ernigratin :g to Can~ada in :y`_,t3 . P~ " .asucrlly" of
the Arrow cancellation he loinecl the Fii._".~1,r ~:~s
a Tech/IlE Gfficer in 19~`~ . F'nllowinc~ 'our :, at A program of rc;~il interest to Air Div is th~
. . . if it baffles Uawrrsview , the f;iateriel Labarator y,~ and ~1 h1_,1
( .~,
Aircraft Sampling Inspectiun underway at
the typist . . . he was tran :~ferred tr~ Air h~iv ~~~~here he ~,~ns
engine?ring officer of the winnin-t RGAE' tYar : . :~t Scottish Aviation Ltd on hi~h-tim~ CrlO~s .
the 196~ ('haunrant Air '+ti'en Pans Mf~ct . He wtnte
thi : art;clc~ w}-iile cn !he SOF'S ~taff at air ?)iv
i-l~~ - a position w}-~ich n~ade hin; an ex.-offici_~ ()vcr two ~~ears ako the win~;s were requircd to sclcct
:uernber of rnar:~~ 6c~nrd : -r in~uir~ . r-.,rr~t Eirrrr~f~-l-I aevcral 1(1~s and cleliheratelv. flv. thenr tocrealc a ~ inra-
i~ rn_-~w on thc: f } ;' :. : .
pi~; ,t;roup c>f 1<~~J-chc-,fl~cc aircraft . Thcsc aireraft are
then suhjectc~ci to the Aircraft 5amplin,t,> Inspc:ction - the
ASI .
Tirc phcrtokraphs takcn at ticottish show thc cxtent
of ~lismantlin~,~ tc.r enahlc tcchniral staffs to du visual
and V`D'f ('Jon-llcstructive 1'cstin K ) chccks crn tlrc E~ri-
mary .~tructurc . ~lany comix~ncnt~ arc inspcrtcd, tiuch as
ti~~in~s, main and nosc landins; ~ear, Irorizontal and verti-
ral stahilizcrs and othcr suh-assemhlic~s .
'1'hcse inspertiony give us a readinr; on the strtictur-

two points al inte ,t,rritti. of the fleet ~ and hcl I~ u5 establish a rcalistic
airframc ,cKe for thc fir;~t airframe cwerhaul pr-o,kram to
commcnce . Also, ins P rctin~ tlre }ri,~hest-time aircraft
of view
/
cstablrshes a lead-trme 1?actern for an ordcrl~~ ~orreitrorr
of the faults uncovered durinr; the ~1SI . To date , ninc
('1" '1(1~~ have been ins P ected at ticottish and ('anadair .
At the moment, it appcars t} ;at an airfrarnc~ overhaul
prui;ram may bc ncecicd on the CF10~ at 16()fl airframe
hours . To confirm this, the ASl prot;ram has becn in-
creased ftom ~ to i air~raft in this fiscal vcar . Thc
econurrr .~ a rhie~~ed from this t~ro krram i~ larTe~
k , nearl~~, all
Fli!~Gs have ha~ t~~~o complcte airframe overhauls bv
i ~ti00 airframe hour :, .
Capt Collison, Air Div
4 Flight Comment, Sep Oct 19b8
 inspection on all squadron aircraft before the next flight

Good Show uncovered fifteen more unserviceable plugs which were

found either cracked or elongated beyond limits .
The fact that this cable lock plug is an item which
is not normally inspected demonstrates Cpl Stevens'
thoroughness and integrity . This continuing vigilance
during the so-called routine inspections is at the heart
of the flight safety program .

CPL J . NOVAK
Cpl H .G . Murphy
Pte R .K . Gordner
LI'hile completing a BFI and tumaround on a CF101,
Cpl Novak discovered a bolt missing and another partial-
PTE . R .K . GARDNER ly extending from the inner portion of the right aileron
hin g e . Followin g this discoverY a s P ecial ins P ection
Capt R .A . HaU Approaching the GCA unit and still several hundred disclosed another aircraft with the same unservice-
_yards from it, Pte R .K . Gardner noted smoke comin g abrlrty . Had one of these bolts remamed loose it could
from the auxiliary power diesel . Hurrying to the scene, hcwe come free, jamming the controls and causing a
CPL A.1 . MARTINEAU he found the unit spewing smoke and flame - although major accident .
with no noticeable noise or change in rpm or oil pres-
While performing dye penetrant inspections of a sure . After running to the office to spread the alarm, he
speedbrake actuator component, Cp111artineau discovered grabbed a fire extinguisher and returned to the fire, When
SLT S.D. RUSSELL 18 cracked . 'I'his meant placing some aircraft unservice- the fire vehicles arrived, Pte Gardner had the fire under
able, adversely affecting flying training . As a double- control .
At the controls of his Sea King helicopter, SLT check the suspect components were sent to specialists Pte Gardner's quick thinking and commenda6le
Russell had performed a normal approach to the hover at a non-destructive testing centre for confirmation ; they initiative in a potentially dangerous situation averted
above the DDH destroyer for hook-up . Satisfying him- disagreed with Cpl lliartineau . Not satisfied with this a fire which could havc destroyed the GCA unit - a
self that the aircraft was centered in a stable hover the development Cpl Martineau visited the NDT centre and piece of equipment vital to operational effectiveness .
Landing Signals Officer applied power to the hauldown achieved confirmation of his earlier diagnosis . The
cable, As the wheels touched the deck the starboard cracked components were replaced .
landing gear and sponson collapsed inboard causing Under the circumstances, Cpl Martineau had the CPL H .G . MURPHY
the aircraft to lean sharply to starboard and to nose opportunity to accept the centre's decision but his tech-
down . nical competence and loyalty overruled such an atfitude . As Cpl 19urphy was working on a CF104 during a
SLT Russell's immediate res~onse
1 to the command In defending his conviction he was responsible for the periodic inspection he knew that on this aircraft no
from the Landing Signals Officer averted further dam- elimination of a P otentiall Y serious accident cause . fewer than 33 separate rectifications in the previous 12
age . Ilis quick reaction and flying skill saved the months had been made in an unsuccessful attempt to fix
helico P ter and undoubtedl Y the aircrew and deck crew fluctuations in the position and homing indicator and the
fmm injury in what came close to being a most serious CPL W.E . HODGKINSON main attitude indicator . Cpl Murphy devised a series of
accident . tests to narrow the problem area . He was able, after a
While checking a CF100, Cpl Hodgkinson noticed a great deal of time and effort, to pinpoint a transformer
steel hook lying on the iarmac . Rather than dismiss this reclifier unit as causing the snag .
CAPT R .A . HALL as another foreign object to be picked up, he took it for In devising and performing a series of troUble-shoot-
identification on fhe chance that it was a missing part . ing tests, Cpl Murphy was able to solve a problem which
On landing his CH113 at a site in hilly terrain, Capt The hook was actually a link toggle that secures the had defied solution . In doing so, he displayed a high The fact that these bolts are difficult to see dem-
llall kept theengines running while the crew chief climb- fillet assembly between the engine and the fuselage . stc~ndard of professional competence and initiative . onstrates Cpl Novak's competence and thoroughness .
ed out to look for a level spot so that the helicopter R'ithout this hook the P anel could have come off in f1i ght . His commendable attention-to-detail made a substantial
could be shut down . The rotor wash had chumed up a Cpl Hodgkinson's alertness and commendable initia- contribution to flight safety .
flurry of wet dead leaves, cavering the engine intake tive resulted in the elimination of a potential hazard . CPL C .M . STEVENS cont~d on next page
screens . 'fhe en g ines be gan to run hot . Realizin g that to This act exemplifies the benefits of our having alert and
increase power to fly away could cause the engines to well-motivated technicians . Du rin g a periodic inspection on a CF100 Cpl
Stevens discovered a cracked lock plug in the throttle
compressor stall from the lack of airflow, he directed the
teleflex cable, As a result of his discovery, a local
crew chief to remove the leaves from one of the engine
intakes . As the aircraft was on a steep slope Capt Hall Fire Safety
was hesitant to shut down and held the aircraft level
while the leaves were being removed . This accomplished, Every technician should know :
he flamed out the other engine and the leaves were taken " How to give an alarm
from its intake screen . These screens had actually been " How to col I the fire department
dented bv the suction . " Where the fire alarms and extinguishers are
Faced with three wa 5~s of combattin g this emer- located in his work area
gency - two of which would have been natural, yet " Which extinguisher to use on different type
disastrous - Capt Hall displayed excellent judgement in fires
a very challenging situation . " How to use each type of extinguisher

DO YOU?
6
Good Show
Some thoughts on water survival
- from AETE Prestwick
PTE D .J . DALY
Pte Daly, an air technician, was walking between
han g~ars when he noticed a Tracker on the tarmac , belch- From the he~;inning of the ( F 10~1 era in :1ir Div (and
hc~fore that, the F~'~6), ticottish .aviation l .td, Prestwick,
ing smoke from an engine . Ele went over to the aircraft
and rnfomred the prlot, then examrned the engrne and have helped kccp thc mod status of the 10~1 f leet u p to
exhaust areas . Having been unable to locate a cause, date and relievcd lhc prcssure on ,~roundcrews at the
Pte Da1y cautioned the pilot to keep a close check on ~Iinc;}s . In the process, a considerable amount of test and
the engtne . As rt happened, the prlot retumed to the ferrv~. fli ~>hts are made - the J~oh of thc small AE :TF.
line after a pre-takeoff run-up . The engine was found I)etachment in Scotland . B~~ now, each 104 has been
damaged and had to be removed . throu K h thc p lant seti~eral tirnes', this has involveti the
Although not a duty member of the line crew, Pte lleta~hmrnt in nearlv. '000 fli g hts - handled tl~rorr r,>hout
Capt D .W . Rhodes
Daly demonstrated commendable initiative in waming hti an avcrak~e of tvvo prlots .
the prlot oF a suspected malfunctron whrch was later 'I'he o P eratin-~k environmc~t of Prcstwick is different
wards base, Capt Rhodes quickly realized he could not
proven to have been a serious flight safety hazard . make an into-wind landing on the active runway . Declar- from the ,~ir pivision necessitatinh thc use of flight
safety cquipnrent with ~ome local innovations . 'I'hc de-
ing an emergency he advised the tower that he would
tachrnent's flit;ht arca is over cold watcr, and we cmploy
CAPT D .W . RHODES attempt a downwind landing . The tower cleared the run-
a U5'V ~ne-piece ruhher aircrctia~ suit . ~1lthouKh dcsiKncd
way and Capt Rhodes successfully forced-landed his
for air to be circulatec~ inside the suit, it is satisfactorv
Following a touch-and-go landing, Capt Rhodes was ai rcraft .
in thc~ cool tem~eraturca at I'restwick . SARBE stowage
climbing thtough 1000 feet at one and one-half miles from W'ith only 50 hours flying time Capt Rhodes demon- I
1 mc~re intcrc5tin ; ; piccc of fli,t;ht safctv cyuipmcnt
the runway when the Tutor ingested a large gull causing strated a hi gh de g ree of skill and 'ud
J g ement in savin g a
uni ue to tliis ~lctactrmcnt , is the tiAIZRE radio . ~AP :'~11
complete engine failure . After irnmcdiately tuming to- valuahle ai_rc_raft .
bc~came oh ;oletc° in tl-~e l'l; area in 1`)66, at which tirue
thr' dttac}~ment received tfie~e sets wluch arr ~ompatible-
with the i'h search and rescue environment .
The 1+1RBh: h~:aron and battery arc exceptionally
compact and li~htweight . h'or this reason thc dctachmcnt
commander felt stron ;,~lv that it should be carricd on tlie
1~ilot's 1 rcrson rathcr than buricd in the scat 1~ark . This
was possihlc w~itl~ a ver~~ Slit,~ht modification to thc~

ACHTUNG! stanc]ard mae west . 1'hese modified vests havc: heen

thorou~hly tetited in fli~;ht and - as ,hown in the photo-
graph - in watc:r . No parachute or seat harness inter-
ferirncc_, anci no pilot discomfort was esperienced .
Havin~; the survival radio in the mae west ha ;
advantage5 over the seatpack installation - tlrc most
obvious bein~; the immediate availability of thc cquil}
On track, and on an approved route, one of our pilots wos ment - particularly whcn onc rc~alls thc~ tw~o rec,ent
treated to this dramatic moment . CF10~ cjec:tions into the sca where the seatpaeks and
their rontents were lo5t! Thc ti,'~(;B( ; is alrcadv in
Shown here are two of a group of parachutisis .
nperatin,~ position on the mae west and rcquircs only
$hould have seen the facial expression on onr small motion to activatc it . ;'1 pull on a tot;t,~le
the one who was camera sh Y - of a nine-ton camera, that is! cre~ts thr aerial and sets thc bcacon opcratinX . For a
Rubber suit in use and SARBE erected
sca ejection where quick res~~ue mav be vital to prevent
cic~t t h from cxxas 1 trre ~ this set-u P seems hi K hl ti ~ desirable ,
esperially if the downetl airqr,in is unahle or inrapable
of kettin ~ into that seat P ark .
As vou
, mav havc k7ucsscd, wc're tiAhBl~ : su <-~lx~rtcrs ;
and wonder if .others in the ('ana~ian Frrrc-e5 wuuldn't
hc, also . Torque, torque, torque
. . . SOMEONE DIDN'T GET THE MESSAGE .
An aircraft engine's crankshaft centre main
.~~~,
bearing journal failed due to incorrectly torqued
studs . The guilty torque wrench was found to
have o 55 inch-pound error.

8 Fl~ght Comment, Sep Ocr 1968

your Ca t E.J . All~son
" ~f'
~`i ~h:= , r .
Lahr - Downslope Winds ro :+` . "~
'

radar set 1500 AGL Lahr hes at the ed9 e of a small re 9 ton
Ca P t P, Scholefield
Meteorolo 9 ist

as an
Normal operating conditions ; in the immed- havin 9 the enviable re P utation of bein 9 the driest
iate area the aircraft has 1000-foot clearance
in Western Euro Pre north of the AI Ps and P Y renees
above terrain spot heights . The nearest
hill - located at 5nm on the nose - gives a
lnyone from lletz or llarville who has just cndured airfield situated on the Rhine plain only three milcs

altimeter
ground clearonce of 1500 feet .
thecr fu-st winter in Lahr realizes, be~'ond a d~ubt, that east of the fabled rivcr . Of great importance to the w~ind
the weathcr is much better than in France . Ilavin~ rnoved tra~ectorv
J , arc thc surroundin mountains~ thc mountain
scrmc distance and into another eountrv, manv are perhaps ran~es to the southeast, south, and southwest exceed
not as sur P rised bv, this chan Ke in weather Ias a re thos e 4,000 feet in altitudc . It is evident that winds which
fcw who have come the shorter distance to Lahr from hlow from anv.q uadrant cxce P t the northeast will be
Zweibnrcken . Pilots here, who must check the Zwei- downslope winds . '1'he more pronounced downslope
To appreciate the moral to this
brucken wc:ather daily, arc cspecially aware c~f the effects occur when the wind is blowink from the SE or
story - and to make it meaningful -
let's listen in on a hypothetical
1000 AGL difference in weathcr betw'cen the two bases, which are till` tivhere the mountains are hi~hest .
This happens when the hill clearance at onlti~ Eti air milcs apart . Only the careful observcr of
conversation between St Peter and
Hotshot (a pilot) : 5nm is reduced to 1000 feet . The shadows weather would lx able to detect the very sli~ht advantat;e 1~'ind Direction
hov len _9 thened onl Y verY sli 9 htl Y . in weather conditions that I,ahr cnjoys over Soellin~en . T}ietc~po~raphy greatly influences the wind direction
1t 1'c~ter : ) ou u~ere lnst?
At Lahr the two C F104 squadrons havc found that over thc Lahr airfield ; the movement usuallv follows the
Ilotshat : i1'er~er thev arc ablc to put in more davs of flvinQ per year .
1~ath of lcast rcsistance - u P and down the Rhine valle y~ .
5t Peter : }~ou r~~ere flv'irrt; in c~loud? l'ukon ana Hercules aircrews fl y-in k~ to Euro Pe frorn In fact, IZ3 ~ of thc timc thc wind is blowing, it is up or
Hotshut : Veuer Canada are now~ more certain of landin~; at their destina- dow~n the valley (Fi,~, ,,) . IIowcvcr, the airfield is not in
tion rather than divert to an alternate . Golfers need not an exposed location ; this partly accounts for the Ere-
St f'eter : lou dr'd~n't clr'mh to vour
put away their clubs ciurin~ thr winter anci housewives
sa fetv. rtltitr~de~ 9 uency. of calm conditions .
Ircqucntly arc ablc ~o hang up a wash and havc it drv
Ilc~tshot : ()f course . 1 did.
bcforr sunsct .
St I'etcr : Then rc~hv rtrc~ ~'nu ltere? l,ahr lies on the ed,~e of a small region havin~ thc
IlotShot : 4'o c>nrrnc~rct, enviablc re P utation crf bein~k thc: drirsc in ll'estern Euro P e
If you admit to the press-on- A drastic change occurs as this clearance north of thc Al 1~s anc3 Pvrenees
. .
regardless attitude then it is wise i s reduced to 500 feet - ond i s a warning Ahv is thc wcather at Lahr - and in particrlar thc
to know and appreciate some of that the aircraft is approaching the danger tcrminal aviation weather - often so much bettcr than at
its limitations . The five predictions region . rnost othcr airfields in France, Germany and the Bcnclux
which could easily be scope photos cotmtrics?
were made from the same spot at
different altitudes in average rolling Topugraphy
terrain typical of Europe . For this Thc frequent downslopr winds acc~ount for many of
t YP e of environment the P ictures the more favourable wcather situations . The term dn~wn-
portroy an important fact : the lower slo~~~~ rc~inds is self-explanatory . lfowever, understandin~
Y ou 9o the blacker will be your this phenomenon calls for some lcnowled~e of thc sur-
scop e. roundin~ topo~raphy . Thc skctch, (Fi~ 1), sl7otivs I_ .ahr
A word ot caution here . In very 100 AGL
flat terrain it is possible to reach S
A very darrgerous situation - at 100 feet
100 feet AGL getti ng sol i d return s clearance, obstacle heights represent an Fig 2 - Wind Rose For Lohr
on the scope with no shadow area .
unknown .
The chances of this in Europe are h1ap5 of annual avera~e pressure distributions over
small - but must not be discounted . I!:uro P e shotiv rclativelv, lowrr I~ressures ov'er northern
If you're chargingaround Eurape Germany and higher pressurcs to thc south ovcr thc Alps .
in the cla 9 , and a little uncertain, .'Is uneqcral atmospheric prcssurc distributic~n is the
remember these pictures . Look at basic cause of air motion - with air moving from areas
your scope - not only in terms of of hi >her P ressure to thosc of lowcr Prcssurc: - mc~re
positive information - but in terms winds blow from thc south and suuthw~est than from the
of absalute ground clearance . If north, as illustratcd bv thc w~ind rose . ~~'inds from the
you have returns at a reasonoble MINUS south and southwest arc, of course, downslo P e wind5 .
range along your azimuth cursor, 100 AGL
you are safe, If your scope is be- With no returns olong the azimuth cursor 1lindsp~ed
coming overly black, be a wise ~outhvti~est (downslopc~) winds are thc stronKrst, thc
beyond 5nm, the aircraft will impact shortly
B. avcra K c s Peed bein ~ 1 .S m P h . Downslo~e winds from the
unless climbed immediately . }
M west and south are the next strongest, avera~;ink 6 .~~

pi lot and C
L
Flight Comment, Sep Oct 1968 ~i
mph . ['pslopc winds from the north avera~e about S mph . exceeds four inches . The maximum ?4-hour snow~fall over la`~crs reducrn~ the visibrlrtv rn hazc . a verv stron~; tendency to lotiv ceilings with an upslope
It i ;, diffic_ult to dclermine at what spced w'inds be- a thirty-year period w~as 14 inches . l,ahr's mcagrc snow- There is a remarkable .dilfcrcncc bctween the P er- wind - which blows onlv, one ei hth of the time .
come hazaruous . Ccrtainly, windspecds above 3S mph fall can be attribsrted to tlte foehn eEfect oI downslo P e i centa~e of poor visibilitics in upslope vs do`cnslope These c:onditions are undcrstandable . The prime
create widcs~rread low-level t urlulcnce ~ necessitatin~ winds which sap a ~;crod deal of moisture from snowstorms winds . l' P slo Pe wind, brin ~ air which is hi K hlv, 'tolluted requiremcnts for low ccilin~s are: high moisture content
r
carc in ~ arkini,T aircraft . In the last ten vears
. winds E~eeds pa ;sin~ over the Rhinc plain . bv the ~iant industrial basins of thc Ruhr and laar in ihe low levels andlor enou >; h coolin ~ to P roduce
exceeded i~ mph on an avera,ke of onlv li days per Frcquentl~~, within a few dav~ - c-~r sometimes im- situated to the north . C P slo P e winds ( which blow onlv, a condensation . '1'he dryin~ and warming effect of down-
vear
. . ~9ost of these w~inds werc downslo pe winds from mediatel` -after a snowfall,drti~, rclalivcl`~warm dotvn- small propc~rtron of the trme) have a ~reater rncrdence of slope wtnds keeps low-level clouds to a mr nimum . An
the southwest . slope winds develop anc the snow~ quickl`~ vanishes . poor visibility ; however, the wind is blowin~; ducen the upslope wind forces thc air to rise, thereby coolinK it
The stronkesl wind recorded over the past tcn years '1'here are on the avera,;e onlti~ 3-1-' cia~ ~ c~ach ~~car whcn Rhine ~allev most of the time . sli~htl)- ; often this is enough to produce condensation
w'as durin~ a thunderstorm in 1960 - i3y mph . 'I'here are snow cover i~ four irtches or rnorc .
)n tllr ,c~t} te C hand, ,50 uth and southwest winds brin~ and low ccilinks . . Thc stron~cr
, downslo~c
l- winds oEtcn
no records of thc darna,~;e on that dav, but on ?3 Fc~b bi, crcate cnough turbulcncc and mixinK in thc lower lcvcls
air to the Rhine E~lain Irom thc industriallv. clean and
sections of a main han~>ar roof werf~ blow~n off bv, north- visinility
h sparscly populated areas of the French and Swiss Alp~ . to kee p the ceilin q abave ~`;00 fcet .
west winds at i'6 mph, during a thunderstorm . 1'isibilities in 1';urope are ;x-~,~rer than in C'anada due Downslopc w ind speeds are Xenerally hi~her ; dust For a large percenta~c of thc timr - cspcciallti~ in
Stron~ crosswinds- the partic~.ilar concern to C'F104 mainlv to the hi~her c:oncentrations of people and in- particles are thus more evenlv dispersed throu~hout the the winter - winds blow downslo~e in a direction w'}uch
1
pilots - arc usuallv associated t~~ith a thunderstorm and dustrv, . Tc~nti of minute P articles are P ttm p ed into the most often follows the Rhine vallev . 'I'he foehn cffect oE
lower levels of the atmosphere . :Ilso, the drvin~ efEect
likely to be short-lived . Fortunatcly thc Lahr ntnw~ay atmosphere dailv. llue to their weit,>ht these particles these winds is res P onsible for kee P in g the number of
of dow~nslopew~inds deters fog formation and persistence .
parallels the Rhin e valley ; most of the stron~; winds usuallv accrunulate rn the atmo>phere below 1000 fcet ; poor weather situations to a minimum . ?~ot onlv is this a
b owin,~ lor considerable len,Kths of timc blow at an therc forc the lowland areas of F.urope sullcr most from Lu~~ Ceilings benefit to 1 Ilin~ and its o P erations but to all of tltc Air
an~lc favourable for larrdink . visibilitv, restrictions in haze . The Rhine vallev is onc Four s)'noptic situations produce lotv ceilin~s at Division . I~.

Foehn Effect of these areas . I .ahr . In ordcr of im ~ortance :

Fog is the more serious problem ; haze seldom re- ~ ~tratu~ in thc Rhine vallev from temperature inver-
ln Europe, modcrate or hi5h downslope winds are
duces visibility~ helow 3/4 milc - fo~ frequentl)~ docs . sron
termed l~oehn zc~ind .~. T'.~eir inllucnce on weather is c~~i 11 c~ cl
Lahr's shelterc:d valleti~ bottom location is conducive to ~ stratus from liftin~_,~ foK_
tlre ~oehn e(~ect, and i~ most ptonounced on the lec sidc
the formation of radiation fo~ on clear caln-~ ni~hts .
of a mountain ran,r;Jc when thc wind is blowini; across thc ~ sllOtii' Celllrl~,'ti
To asccrtain a correlation betwccn low visibilitv ~ stratus in P rcci p_itation
thc mountarns . In Canada, thrs effect rs most pronounccd
and wind direction a composite ,~raph was drawn (Fig 3) 1'hc composite graph
rn rllberta to tlte lee of the Rorkics . (Fi,~ i), shows a corrclalion
comparin~~ wind direction and visibilities of a mile or
A rclurn to the topo,~raphic map shows l,ahr in a }_x~tween low ceilinQs and low visibilities, (Nere a-lain, k
less . One mile vis is si Kn ificant in Air Div~, it's the cut-
positic~n lo experiencc sorne foc}tn cffcct whenever the tl~e critical ceilin~ hei,t ;}rt for alternate limils is useci .)
off point when 3 Nin ;; and ~ Iti'in,~ cannot usc I,ahr as an
winds blow from anv direction in the southeast or scruth- A very. hi,~h~, P ercenta ¬,~e of the low ceilin K s - usuallv
altemate . '~ote t}tat t}te pcrcenlat;es of wind dircclron stratus tra>>ed under a tcm?erature inversion - occurred
west . 1>,hat is the, cffect of thcsc downslo P e winds? lI 1
corres pond with the wind rosc (FiK ?l . In winter one when tfic wind was calm .
liriefl`~, air movin~; from hi~;h clcvations whcrc thc atmo-
would expeca a srnaller percenta~e of calrn conditions ; in
spheric pressure is lower, to low elevations whcre the As with low visibilitics, upslopc and downslope
fact, alrnost half the tirne downslcipe south and southwest winds ca~rsecl a pronounced difference in the low ceilin~;
prcssurc is higher, is comprcsscd . Cornprc:ssin~ air
tivinds wcrc blowing .
rarses its tcmperature, and hence becomes drier . Percenta,i,>es . ~~''hen downslo Pe winds were blowin-~k there
Over one-half of thc }xtor visibilities occurrcd in no werc seldom ccilinc;s below 800 fect ; howevcr, there was
,~ good rndrcator of how varrous locatrons are
wind, which is under,tandahle because much of the
affec~ted by Eochn winds is the avcraRe annual precipi-
radiation Eo,~ develops when the air i, calm . r'11so, with
tation . Lahr is at the ed~;e of one irf the driest arcas on
the continent, t}te driest spot in this small zonc bein~ nn wind blowin~, dust particles sink into the surfacc
Colmar at thc foot of the vc>s k~es'llountains (Fi K 1), ',tiith
?0 .0 inches of 1~rcci E~itation annuallv. . Lahr -~ets 0
WINp pIREl;lllkr CEILINCS LESS THAN OR VISIE{ :U11E5 LESS THAN OR

inches and Soellin~en 31 .Q inches . This indicates that E~IIIAL 10 BUI rr. E~1UAL TQ 1 UILE

the foehn effect is most P ronounced at Colmar due to its

closer proximity to the Gos~es !~1ountains,
Does your hangover hurt? It will
A yooci example of Eoehn winds at Lahr was in 1y6~
from 16-1c! Uecc°rnber, when moderatel~~ stron~; winds from and so will your eyes should you
tfie south and southwc st blcw continuouslv. . 'I'hc tcm ~cra- not study the jet departure 7E
turc~ rose front ~~°F at noon on thc li=~th lo a I~i ~h of b3"F (simplified here), before attempt-
in the afternoon of thc 19th . TLc rc lative hurniditv de-
ing to fly it, Depicted here is the
creased over thc trcriod from a lti~,~h of clct°~ on the~ 16th
to a low uf SQ`~i on the lc~th . Thc fochn winds also deterioration of the legendary
brou ;;ht 30 hours crf rain in this period, ?1 of tiv}tich were clean-cut, square-jawed, caol,
onlv. 1i ht and intcrmittent .
colm-and-collected jet jock into a
confused, bumbling idiot muttering
Snow
$esides the lrlfrc'yucrlt stront,~ winds, there arc: thrc:e at frequent intervals the cry of the
c~ther factors which restrict operations ; snow, low visi- true fi 9 hter P ilot "Lemme loose!
vilitie~ anci low reilint;~ . Lemme loose! I'm VMC on top!
}lea~~v. snowfalls and lar R e accumulations of snow~ do
I'm VMC on top!"
nr~t crrmpare w ith thosc that beset manv Canadian air- Fig 3 - Percentage Occurrence Of Winds, Low Ceilings
fields in the winter . ()n the avera X~
e it .snows on 'S ciavs
. And Low Visibilities Based OnNourly0bservations Over
hut crnlv once per year iti there a ?~-hour snow~fall that A Six-Month Period From 1 Sep 67 to 29 Fe6 68

12
 e. ~

Each pilot is suspended in this rig to learn how to Pilot leaps into water for submerged chute training . It's N ROUGH WATER ENTRY
, . .
t}l -~
.
maneuver the parachute . easy - if you don't panic. _ - 0
- '~ - -_ "You har~e forgotten or were unable to open the quick-
-= _ - _. -_ _
r~~- ~ release box on water contact ; now, cn a strong surface
wind, the parachute canopy has not collapsed but begins

DOWN TO THE SEA . . . in chutes ,r?~wk;

to Pull You ra P idlY throu h the water. lUhat actioas must
be taken?"

~-~'~i~~;~,~.~ ..-~ 1 IMMEDIATELY ASSUME THE DRAG POSITION by maneuvering

Yov have just ejected from a CF104 at 1000 feet over water Capt G.E.S. Miller r.=~~+p.~ti.:~-~ -
_ ~~~. onto the back, holding the feet as wide apart as possible and
_,-__ -~.,__,..- _ _
on a bombing run at Capo Frasca range. hending at the waist . Try hard to look at the feet by keeping the
You get a good chute. head forward . Arms may initially be widespread to gain balance
before putting the thumbs underneath the quick-release box,
Show me the four mandatory actions you will fake 2 MAINTAIN THE DRAG IF IN TROUBLE or to complete your
prior to wafer entry . . . descent checklist . Remember, you must have the mae west in-
flated and the right-side clip released prior to opening the
quick-release box . Concentrate on maintaining the drag position
'I'he pilot, wearing a G suic, wool swcater, a one- An over-water ejection from a ('F104 without a prc- until free of the parachute harness.
P iece immersion suit , helmet ~ rnae west and P arachute planncd action sequence would be extremely hazardous, 3 OPEN THE QUICK-RELEASE BOK AND ROLL OUT OF THE
harncss, is poised ready to dcmonstrate thosc vital so here's a positive ~uide for CFlO~I aircrcti~~ covering PARACHUTE HARNESS. The boz will not release easily due
actions bcforc stcpping off thc platform . Ile knows that the most frecuent
1 tV.P ical situations and some romments : The pilot, tethered to boat on left, leaps in water. Then to the pull on the top two lugs, You may try putting back pres-
once in the water any items missed will be many times the drag begins . . . sure on the boz with one thumb and giving it a swift tap with
more difficult to p erform - P articularlv, as he i~ about the free hand, To egress from the harness, grab one shoulder
to hc towcd up to 10 knots to simulate bein~ pulled by a THE PARACHUTE DESCENT _ ._ _ -. :: - t ."
. - ~ ,..~- -~ ,..~ .~-er-
:
strap with the opposite hand and tuck the other arm under the
, _,~,^ .
=~_ .. ,. -..:
~.,,
wind-blown parachute! _
- slrap, then simply roll out of the harness.
The survival school instructor n~tes that in about HIGH ALTITUDE 4 CLIMB IN THE DINGHY and pull your survival pack aboard .
+" ~.
four sec~nds the pilot has inflated his mae west, de- Stay aftached to your dinghy at all times via the dinghy lanyard .
"Your BS pararhute has just opened by the aneroid timer
ployed hrs survtval seat pack, released the rrght-srdc
at 15,000 feet, a fter e.ject.iorr `rorn a CF104 at high altt'-
clrp of hrs parachute harness, and has turned the qurck-
tude . Lt~hat arc vour actions?"
release box fully to clockwise (unlocked) position . The CALM WATER ENTRY
pilot leaps off thc platform and splashes into the ~4edi- 1 UISOR UP AND CHECK PARACHUTE CANOPY for full de-
terranean where he will demonstratc assuming the proper "Yna open the quick-release box on wat,er contact but in
ployment . If shroud lines are over top of canopy, up to four
drai; position while being towed and, on a signal, gct the calm air tfre canopy settles over you. What must,
can be cut with your shroud~line knife .
out of the parachute harness and climb into a one-man you do?"
2 DISCARD THE MASK . Remernber: all mask dot-fasteners are
dinKhy . 1 REMOVE THE PARACHUTE HARNESS with slow, deliberate
pulled from the fop. To discard the mask you must first unplug
'1'his is but onc of three basi,c drills that are taut;ht movemenfs to avoid entanglement.
the radio cord and bailout bottle and pull the dot-fastener on
on thc: water entry phase of the Air I)iv Sca Survival 2 KEEP FEET STILL until free of the parachute canopy.
the main oxygen hose . (The main ozygen hose will make an
School at Decimomannu, Sardinia . 5incc opcnin~ in excellent toumiquet if needed .) 3 GRAB A WIDE SHROUD-LINE SEAM and propel yourself back-
June 66, ('F104 pilots who fly to Sardinia for weapons wards by pulling on the seam . They all radiate from the chute
3 VISOR DOWN to protect eyes from blinding salt spray.
training must annually mect the school's requirernents . apex and you will soon come to the centre or the oufside . If the
4 CHINSTRAP FASTENED
Now, T~3 pilots and safcty systems techs from the centre, simply pick another seam and continue backwards until
5 INFLATE MAE WEST AND BLEED OFF OVER-INFLATION .
~1'in~s are attendinR . Before flight always check that ihe C02 toggle flap is un- free of the chute . Don't fry to move forward under the chute by
The school was crcated in rcsponse to a lon~-felt piling the canopy behind you as this will most likely cause
fastened and that the toggle is not hidden by the right para- Pilot and dinghy . He must feel at home in this environ-
nced for water survival training . Over thc years rnany
chute legstrap, Always fly with the oral inflation valve open ment - it could be just that, for a day or two . . .
entanglemenl .
pilots after a surcessful bailout, had Iost their lives 4 CLIMB IN THE DINGHY and pull your survival pack aboard .
to enable rapid bleed-off of the excess air to enable you to put
because of inadequate experience and traininK . In those Paddle a safe distance from the parachute to prevent future
ttoth thumbs underneath the parachute quick-release hoz.
days, the water survival traininq a pilot received had Remember, once in the drag, the quick release boz is much
fi CLOSE OFF AND STDW ORAL INFLATION UALVE complications in rough water .
bcen given in the calm, fresh water of the base swim- harder to open due to the pull on the top two lugs, eg, a 10-knot
1 DEPLOY SURVIVAL SEAT PACK by pulling the yellow handle
min~ pool . 5uch training conducted in wann weather or wind will give a 250-Ib pull .
on the nght side and squeezrng the black tngger . Discard the C,apt Miller enrolled for pilot
indoors ill-prepares a pilot to face the hazards and handle . NOTE: Steps 2 - 11 are performed below 10,000 feet, iraining in the RCAF in 1953,
cxtx~sure of the open sea. Surviva) at sea depends on 8 RELEASE RIGHT-SIDE CLIP . The left-side clip unfastens his first tour was on F86s wilh
the knowlcdKe and experience gained in realistic train- automatically. The radar reflecting shield, dinghy and survival
4?4 Sgn at 3 Wing, Nexl came
LQW ALTITUDE four years as a fiyhter controller
in q - hence the em Phasis at Deci's Survival School . pack will now be hanging from a 76-foot line from the dinghy at Falconbridye, Moi:ie anci
'I'he complexities of deploying CF104 water.survival lanyard connection over the yoke ot the mae west . "Your parach.ute has just opened ~olloror,'rcg ejecti.on. at St Margarets - intcrrupted by a
equipmcnt prior to bailout arc often misunderstood by 9 QUICK-RELEASE BOX UNLOCKED but do not open until water 1000 feet above water . you har~e time ~or mi.nimum
year's tour in 1962 as a saln
aerobatic pilat with the Calden
p ilots Prior to attcndin~ the school . Howevcr, the para- contact . The box is unlocked when fully clockwise, artions only. R''hat are the~y?" liawks . He was no stranger to
",- ~
chute descent, water entry and sea survival have been his next unit ; alter Cf~104 train-
10 REMOVE SPURS AND BOOTS and discard . I INFLATE MAE WEST
evolved into a simple sequence - once the pilot learns ing at Cold Lake, he returne~i to
11 FACE UPWIND so that you will be dragged on your back rather 2 DEPLOY SURVIVAL SEATPACK Iweibrucken in 1965, to the new
what to expect of hi's equipment and how to use it prop-
than face-down . 3 RELEASE RIGHT-SIDE CLIP ~trike/attacb: 434 Sqn . After two
erly . The experience gained in training over 600 l~est
12 SQUEEZE OPEN THE QUICK-RELEASE BOX IMMEDIATELY 4 QUICK-RELEASE f30X UNLOCKED year~ Capt Miller rnoved to Sar-
;erman r'lir Force and over 300 Canadian 1~ilots has dinia, where he is Weapons
ON WATER CONTACT . This is the most advantageous time as 5 SQUEEZE OPEN THE QUICK-RELEASE BOX IMMEOIATELY
resulted in a number ~f straiRht-forward checklists and Training Offirer and OC of the
fhere is bound to be a momentary slackening of shroud lines, ON WATER CONTACT . Sea Survival Training School .
actions .

Fli g ht Co mm e n t, Sep OcI l 9 68 15

 In our travels we are oflen faced with "Ifey you're o UICP, whot obout such-

On the Dials
and-sucht" Usuolly, these questions connot be answered out of hand ; if it
were that easy the question wouldn't have been asked in the first place. In
answering fhese questions any con of worms opened up in the process con be
sorted out for everyone's edification. Questions, suggestions, or rebuttals
will be happily eMertained and if not answered in print we shall ottempl to
give a personal answer . Please direct any communicotions to Commander,
Conadian Forces Base Winnipeg, Westwin, Maniloba, Attenlion : UICP 5chool .

Holdings - cont'd
:'1 previous "On the Uials" article covered some of Problems With Your Annual Met Exams?
the pilot techniques employed whilc flyinK thc new~ hold-

Exercise 'Top Guns'

ink_P rocedures . To com P lete the I>icture let's brieflv. look
The book "1~cather Guide" (TC110), was written
at the protected airspace, or holding arcas .
several years ago by Trarnrng Command as a study gurde
Noldin~ areas have bcen devcloped by the FAA to
for the Kraduate aircrew . It contains a comprehensive
accornmodate such factors as the elfects of altitudc, air-
h:xcrcise Top Guns Kives CF104 strike pilots the ~raphs of thc EQ, is ,given to the pilot for target study . condensation of material contained in N~eather w~avs and
speed, wrnd, and anKle of bank, as well as the numcrous
opportcmrty for frrendl`' competrtron tvhrle carn'rng out He Is then allocated a bomb Impact trme ; from thrs he N~eather 11'ork, Each to P ic: i5 reviewed and ya few
navigation aid and airbornc systcms tolcrances . 'Chc final
their prirnarti~ duty of low~-level navigation to a simulated must compute his takeoff time and the exact time he questions (with the answcrs) are givcn. 'Chc book con-
result was thc dcvelopment of 31 templates representing
nuclear weap<~ns release point . The '~ombing phases of will pass over the EQ enroute to the bombing range . cludes with an old mcteorolo g,v exam that was in use at
the basic area sizes and shapes . '['he area template used
the c:xercise are at ran~;es in Belgium, !lolland, France A P ilot's score is cieterminec~ b' his time -- carlv nr one time - and for obvious reasons is not used now .
in a particular situation takes into account the holding
and Gcrmanv, , usin g~ 111;106 l~ractice bc>mbs . Two low~- late - at the E and bv the bomb sc:ore at the bombine 'I'here are sufficient books in the supply depots now for
levcl naviKation routcs arc cm~lo~ed, alctn~; which an ran g e . The Ain~g Technical 5taff are awarded a score altitude and the highest speed group of the aircraft that individual issue~ we recommend that all aircrew obtain
_ 1 }
svill utilize the hold . Unce selected, this area is suitable their copy .
h;quivalent 'harget (h;Q) is selectcd . 'lhc 1~ :Q is usually for each successful mission . 'hhe exercise results are
difficult to icientifv frorn the air and gives an excellent compiled accordinK to : for use by all aircraft in that speed group or a slower
readin g on a P ilot s low-levcl navi~ation skill .
. ~ top pilot perforrnance spced Kroup, and for all altitudes at or belaw t}lat select-
,~ vehicle w'ith two-wav radio is positioncd at the ~ top squadron performancc cd . Althou g h thcrc is a holding area for all the even
EQ ; a referee identifies the aircraft and checks the ~ top wint; performancc . thousand-foot altitudes and cach spccd group, for simpli-
timinK arrd navi,gation accuracv as it passcs overhraci Thc compclitivc spirit of aircrcw and Kroundcrcw is city only a few of the larger holdin~; areas are used at
kccn - as rt rs wrth all ~'11r I)rv compctrUons . each fix . This normall
, y~ will P rovide more than thc mini-

FOD Receptacle . .
cnroulc lo lhc tar~;et . ,qnother referee at the bombing
ran g c scores ihe bomh dro P s for timin g and accuracy . Top Guns is a highly successful air operation mum required alrspace protection for the lower, slower
h:ach pilot is hriefed on the route and the exercisc because we are able to prove our capability in a clirt~ate fly'ing aircraft .
restrictions . A detailcd cicscriptinn including photo- of spirited rivalry an~ cornpetition . .~1 typical holding area template is shown here, to
illu5trate its general appcarancc . Thc hatched pnrtions
.
at the front and rear are entrv reduction areas, desi, led - a good idea
from Shearwater
Shearwater is rightly pleasedwith the instal-
nr N~e 0 lation of their FOD containers . They're on
all aircraft hangars and located next to the
line servicing office so that anyone working
on the ramp can see them . The background i s
yellow and black stripes ; the can is yellow
with red letters . The container (unpainted)
AIRSPEED can be obtained through normal supply chan-
GROUPIKj ALTITUDE A~C A~B Ei-G D-E D~F E-F nels.

Oxygen Mask Problem Sol ved l I5

115
?00-230
6000
taooo
6000
12 .5
16 .9
15 .5
3 .8
5 .6
4 .9
8 .1
11 .3
10 .6
4 .S
6 .4
5 .1
2 .9
4 .2
3 .8
7 .4
10 .6
9 .S
200-230 2U000 31 .6 9 .9 21 .1 11 .6 1 .5 19 .1
310 ?000~ 46 .1 15 .5 30 .6 11 .6 11 .2 2& =
Pilots were complaining about difficulty in from which the complaint oriRinated . Of the ?~ valves, 10 310 ~6000 55_5 19 .? 36 .3 21 .7 13 .7 35 ~
were found to have been manufactured in 1956 bv an
exhaling . . .
unknown company ; no onc knows how thcy ~ ;ot into thc.
to proviJr tht' pilot ~a~ith a larger area for his entr~~
The Institutc of Aviation ~ledicine at Toronto in~~csti- wsten~ . 11hat is known, how~ever, is that ull 1( of these rnaneuvers . ()nce established in the pattern, protcction
gated a UCR on sticking valves which suggested that the failed tca meet militar~~ specifications . Thc rcmainin>_; within these areas mav bc ~iscontinued . Thc: chart shows
finish (chrorrur anodi~e vs sul P huric anodizel was the valves were acce P table . the ~nrnrmum srze (rn nautlcal mrles) of a ternplate applr-
source of the problem . Thc suggested discarding of the 1' stimates are that a few~ of thesc mav still bc around . cable for somc of tlie more ~ommonlv used altitudes and
chromic anodizcd ~~alves would be prohibitivelv cxpcn- Pil osad
t n safet~~
. , e q ui~ment
f technicians should kec P a s P eeds .
,;ive, so ~S_ v a lves were sent for testin g from ~the base sharp lookout Eor these unac~eptable valvcs .

Flighf Comment, Sep Oct 1968

16
 squig~ly lines on paper . lf there is death of heart muscle Ilence, what can we do for our own preventive main-
(infarction), either recent or old . it w'ill cause chanRes in tcnance? Stav lean! Stay physicallv active (you can't
the pattern of thcse tracin s that mean somethin K to the beat runnin g '.I) . Lay off the ci~arettc.s . Thi .r .rhould he a
cardiolokist . There have been normal variations to the ~on .ri .ctent and lif r-lon 9P rvc~ ram )'vr a lon 9 fi e .

the heart of the matter

P attern and such thin K-s as sevcre viral diseases c a n as
1 ~o This is not just to insure the Armed Force's invcst-
cause chan~e in the pattern, which adds to the confusion . ment in you and ta keep you from clobberinK a shiny new~
44hat the electrocardio g ram will not do is te11 us the bird due to a suddcn coronarv occlusion, but for vour own
dcgree of arteriosclerosis of the coronary arteries . The en'ovment
} , and active lon g evit ti~ . A n t'te m of 'rnte
. r est in

~%
only test that will do this is "coronary an~io~raphy" the history oE our young fi~hter pilot mentioned at the
which is a com p le x and slightly dangerous non-routine he ~innin g of this article , i~ that rn ' thc thrcc~ y~ ears pre -
procedure . These arteries can be plugged to a remarkable cedin ;; his death he had become more sedentar v and had
It's the most vital P um P de~ree without any symptoms or demonstrable defccts in ained 30 Pounds .
the EKG . It is only when there has been da ma g e to the Coronarv arterv disease is not one of upper middle
m the manned aircraft sY stem heart muscle that the )~:hG will show evidence of coro- a~e, but it dcfinitcly starts in the twenties . l4hile many
and there isn't even a safisfp~f~rY method narv heart disease . 'hhe reserve of the coronarv arterv individuals having sevcrc roronarv artery disease may be
systern is rcmarkable and it is hard to visualize~a P um~P
of Periodic rns P ectron ~ ~, ; in an aircraft that rould have its fuel or lubrication
wtthout syrnptoms, certarn manrfestattons may become
apparent . 'Che classic syrnptom is crushing chest pain
~~iF ft~Qr~ nrQ mQnnt nF ~~ U supply so restricted and yet check out normally . Hence radiating down the left arm, but the symptoms may mas-
we have no rcallv adequate practical method of perform-
preventive maintenance . . . q uerade as a sudden onset of indi ~ estion . Usuallv. if the
ing a periodic inspecti~n on the heart . process is severe cnou~h to cause svmptoms, there will
, .
Rhat about preventive maintenancc? R'hile the most be EKG changes. Thc << baseline ~~ EhC on file for every
important itcm is selectink our ~randparents for their rated P ilot is of K reat value here becausc minimal chan es
longevit Y~, there are effective thin K s that can be done . can he com P.ared with the bascline . llon't be afraid of
Prubablv. first in P rioritv, is to stav, lean ( even minimal hein ;:,~ ~rc~undcd unneccssarily . The School of rlviation
Lt Col F. W. lovell obcsity counts a~ainst you) and in top physical shape .
The inter-relation of diet and cxercise to a lowered inci-
'tledicine consultation P ro K ram has extensive ex P erience
in evaluating these cases . If you've ~ot the disease you
USAF dence of coronary disease is not rlear cut, but there is a don't want to be flying, and if you haven't, they'll keep
strong statistical correlation . A hiKh intake of animal fat vou in the air . In the meantime, stav lean, physically
products also is correlated with a hi K her incidcncc . of active, and think twicc about how badly you nced that
coronary artcry discasc . Physical activi ty, in my opinrc~n, cigarettc .
A flight of F}02s is makin~ a fly-over when5uddenly I he heart receives its own nourishment and oxy~en is the most cffcctive 1-~rcventive measure , . Re 9ufar and
reprinled irom
supply by two small arteries, called coronary arteries, c~n .cTSt~rct physical exercise to the pornt of stressin~ the
a win K aircraft Pulls u P and rolls over slowly, to the ri ~ht .
system w'ill result in a rnarked lowering in the incidcncc USAF/ADC "Interceptor"
The pilot makes no attempt at egress and the aircraft which arise from the aorta ( the main lar ~ e arterv, leadin
strikes the ~round with the pilot in his seat . Post-martem out of the left sidc of thc heart) . 'I~hese blood vessels of coronary artery disease . Just how this is done is not
arc about 3/lbths r~f an inch in diameter and branch and clear . There is evidence that the exercise will create
examination of the ~~oun (less than 30 ~cars old) pilot Lt Col F . W'arren f .ovell, AFRes, MC, cur-

showed marked coronary artery arteriosclerosis and thc spread over the heart . ln the normal heart, these branches "anastomosis" (hooking Up of cnds of arteries that don't rently a reservi ~t, is both a rated pilot and a

norrnally meet with each other) that will by-pass a focal Eliql-it surqeon . Iie was a B2~ pilot in the
investi~atin~ board ruled that this accidcnt was due to don't anastomose (hook up with each other) so a block in Pacifie-,World W'ar I1 . He then attended Nortli-
coronar Y occlusion in the P ilot . one of them will cause death of the heart muscle sup- block . flowever, exercise also actually cuts dow~n the
western University Nedical School . Ir~ 19~7
plied by this branch . (14'hat actually happens during a amount of deposits in~idc~ t}7e artery, but the mechanism
The hurnan heart is a remarkable or~an and can be he re-entered the reqular Air Forcr- cmd later
}~c:art attack is bcyond our scope here, but t}rere rnay be is not clear . became Chief of Aerospace Patholoqy at the
considered the most vital structure in the manned aircraft .
focal death of muscle with ~raciual recovery by scarring, Smokin ;.~ rit,~arettc~s iu iar,t;e numlxrs will dclinitcly Armed Forces Institute of Fatholoqy . Co1
Yet thc avera~e fi~hter jock has less understanding of Lovell teturned to civiliarr life in 1960 and
Its structure and functcon than he has of the hydraultc ar therr: mav he sudden death due to the develo P ment of increase the death rate from coronarv attacks . Emphasis
currentlv is a patholoqist . He also serves as
abnormal rhvthms in the conductor system .) }ras bcen placcd on thc cancerogenic praperties of ci~ar-
system on his aireraft . Much of this is due to vocabulary . a ~on ;ultani toI'Ar~ in patholoqy and tearhc~ :;
ettes, but in the middle-aKed malc, the hcavy smoker will
The medrcal mumbo-lumbo ts confusrn~ and often appltes A rtenosclerosis , atherosclerosi~s, or lus~t p 1 atn
' h-r
a d- in the FAA-NTSB aecident investiqation
have twice the incidence of coronarv attarks that thc
difficult terminolo~y to fairly simple hydro-dynamic enirr~ of t}re arteries is a disease of unknown cause that sehool at the F'ecleral Aernnnu! ;cal .'_'enter in
non-smoker will have . Oiclahama City .
problems . results in thickcnin S of the walls of artcries and dc I~osits
The heart is a two-sidcd pump . It wei~hs about ?/3 of material that narrow the lumcn (passage) of these
of a pound and makcs about 3i~,000,000 strokes a year vcsscls cuttin down thc blood flow' . l)cs P ite voluminous
without missing a Ixat . The smaller rit:;ht side pumps research westill don't know the cause . lt is more common
blood to the (un,~s for exchange of oxygcn and carhon in Americans (it is quite rar~ in Asiatics) ; it starts in
dioxide . The lar Ker left sidc receives the hlood from the men at a much earlier age than in women ; it occurs with
lun~s and pumps it out to all functionin~ parts of the much greater frequency in the obese, the physically
is in i ;enious and has its own .
bodv, . 'rhc valve svstern
.
discase problems . These are, howcv~cr, primarily con~en-
inactive, and in the heavy ci~;arette smoker . (t can be the
cause of an aircraft accident . A real problem is that we
wc~ a . . .
' 1 ( occ u rrin K at the time of birth ) ~r due to rheumatic
rta have no practical method of detectin~ the de~;ree of
fever which is P rimarilv a childhood disease ; hence they coronary artery diyease unless there has been previous
would preclude the individual g cttin K on flvin
, g status and heart muscle dama g e ..
do not concern ua here . ~'here is an electronic conduction w'hat about the electrocardio~ram (h:CG, )!:KG)? This . . . my dinghy!
system that spreads the contraction siKnals from a "pace- valuablc tool was invented around the turn oI the centur Y .
maker" to the muscle bundles . I(owcver, the kev to our It measures the electrical forces caused by the cootrac-
story herc° lies in the coronary artery system . tr'o n and re l axation oE the hc: a rt b y tr a c'rng a p ath nf

Flight Comment, Sep Oct 1968

 CROW
CONTROL
BIRDSTRIKES - The first two summers met wilh little suc-
cess, The odd wandering crow or hawk
would pass through the trap, consume the
food, leave a few droppings, and pass on . . ,
(The plons for this bird trap are ovaila6le from DFS.j
After two disappointing years at trapping birds, 4
15'in g ac q uired the drawin g s for a Norwegian crow trap ting, therefore, we planted a tall tree beside the trap ."
Wein6crq which was reputed to be effective . "Uur success has been rewarding . The bird-filled
One of the malor contnbutors to atrcraft damage and losses '~4a~or T.C . l;elly,
J , WCEO r re p orts that "Armed with cage has becn oI great interest to visitors, a subject of
has been birdstrikes ; this category accounts our new trap and the siting experience wc had gained
Ma'1 J . Laskoski conversation during coffee break and a great satisfaction
for approximately 50' ; of the total accidents, with our previous model, we commenced our winter and to the people involved, because with very limitcd know-
incidents and special occurrences! Staff Ofticer Operational Research spring birdstrike opcrations" . He continues, "We knew led ge and lots of enthusiasm a si gn ificant r edu c tron
' in
it was essential that the trap be sited in an area of the birdstrike hazard has been achieved at 4 U~'in g ."
Air Div has been particularly vulnerable to bird- short grass attractive to crows, away from vehicles and !11ajor Kelly points out that there is an essential
strikcs, A lar ;;e portion of their flvin, ;; is bclo«~ 1000 persons , as ne a r as possible to a normal fecding area ingredient to the whole operation - the enthusiasm of
~fakeoff and Landing
feet . It's hardlv sur 1 trisin K therefore rI that in sharin the for the birds, and away from aircraft movements . l~'e those participating . 'I`he trap is apparent(y successful
airspace with the birds, birdstrikes result . To determine The ( ) numhers in the tahle arc occurrences not
chose an area which seemed to satisfy all oI our require- enou gh to kee p those associatf:d with the pro'ect
) b usy -
at one of the thrcc ~tiinKs, and are includcd in the totals .
methods of avoiding bird ;;trikes a study was undertaken ments except for a tall tree on which birds could roost
Obviouslv, in 1Qb~-196~ not all strrkes wcrc bctn~ but satisfied tn the knowledge that the birdstrike hazard
to determine under what conditions the majority of these prior to their assault on our bait . To c:omplcte the set- has been substantiaIl Y reduced at their base .
strikes occurrc d . The problem was approached from rc: p ortcd!,
various aspects : 1 YJing 3 Wing 4 Wing Tolal
. staKc of flight - enroutc, and takeoff and landing
" time of year 1964 (hraakdowr hy Wings not available) 6
~ time of dav
196~ 1 1 1 3 dcserves close attenticin ; mcasurcs to limit the bird T'imc of Dav
" altituLe
population on the airport can reduce the strike rate . No strikes bctween the hours of ?030 to 0630 have
19G6 3 4 1 16(2)
Enroute October rates arc particularly hi,;h . been reported . Thc: hi~hest proportion of birdstrikcs
'hhe enroute birdstrike was considered se P arate 1961 12 5 5 2614i occurs from 0830-1030 - the period of the most sorties .
Time of Year
from those occurrin~ at takeoff ane~ landin~ because the ()ver S~°~ of birdstrikcs occur between i :30 and 11 :30 .
latter is linked c:losely ti,ith thc airport environmenr . In 16 l0 l3 51 f,6y 'hhe lar,~cst numbcr of ,trikes arc: expcctccl in ~1arch,
However, the schedulinK docs not fullv account for the
four years, c~f ?~() birdstrikes over i0°t~ oceurreci en- tifav, Junc, Julv and October, The lprin~; ancl Fall mit;ra-
Table 2 - Birdstrikes on Takeoff and Londing rnctdence of birdstrikes .
tionperiods are prominent . The Surnmer increa~c no doubl
route ; another 10°~ were reported "unknown" and assttmed
rhhe exception to note hcre is l Ilin,~ aftcr thc movc stcms irom the increase in bird population as the vounger ~1ltitude
1 Wing 3 Wing ~ Wing Total to l,ahr . ( onarttons at Lahr wcrc conduc<<~e to brrdstrtkes birds hatched in the ~p ~_rin~r, become more ac~t'v
r e . ~"Ihn1Kh
c 'I1re rcKion 0-??0 feet represents the strikcs ocur-
tivhich is reflectc:d in thc statistics . Contn~l mcasurcs not as exlcnsive as in mi k ration P eriods, suntmer activitv, rin ;; mainly on takcoff and landin~ . During 196i a grcatcr
19fi4 i breakdo°r~n by Wings nol available) 28 (9)
tntroduced last Fall and ?Ltis ~prinK should drop chc lcvcl certainlv bcars increasc:d attention .
P ercenta ~ e of the strikcs wcte re E>orted in the band
1965 311) 2U (4) 4 21 j5) to that of tbe other yin~s . Takeoff and landin~, althou,Kh i 50-1~~0 feet wltereas in thc previous r'car the bulk of
not as estcnsive as the enruute pr~blem, ncvcrthclcss the strikes occurred between ?~0-iS0 ic:et . This was due
1966 24 ( 2) 26 l l ) 23 13 f 31
lar~el)~ to the influence of flyin~; restrictions imposed
1961 i2(1) 33 16(1) 11 j21 in 196`r r when a minimum altitude of H00 feet w a s intro-
duced durin,r; the ~prin~,~ and h'all migration periods .
49 f~) 191~1 43111 199 (19) Des 1~ite thi s 1~recaution and the si ~,~nif icant g ains achieved r
most of the strikes ocrurred durinK this perio~ .
Table 1 - Enroute Birdstrikes
The ma~oritv
J . of the sUikes occurred between _' ~U-1 ~'. SO
to have been enrc~utc . The ( ) numbers in thc table are feet, accountin,~ for 60"I of the strikes in lc)66 and 66°(
lan r¢h Mat An~ Stay Jun Ju~ Aug S¢p Ocl Nov Oec
unknowns - these are included in the total under thc Al_1 1UDE - r¢el of the strikes in 1 96i . In view of this we r c xamined the
prcmise that they are more likelti~ to have occurred en- F~q I - Percnfoge oF Dndstukes by Month Fig 3 - Percentnqe ol Birdslnkes wiih Altitude strikes in this band in grcater detail - bv the vcar and
route since a hi~her p ercenta?et, of the strikes occurred rnonth in which the Y orcurred (Fi~k 41 . . .
there . Also, a much hiKhcr pcrcentagc of the airbornc The hiKhest strike rate in 1967 oc<:urred in ~4arch ,
time is enroute . The numbcr of strikes re p orted in 1y66 1 ulv, and Uctober, whereas in lyb6 thc months were
;
and 146i increased considerablv over the 1c~64-1U6~ F ebruarv , , J un e and U ct ob er . The mal'o rrtti
' ~ of .~_ trtkc
' s in
w
P eriod . ~ome of this is attributable to increased fl~'in
, gr Februarv 66 were late in the month ; that vear, the birds
U

W
r (~-

hut t}rc higher numbers lari;ely reflect hetter reporting . mi g rated earlier . ~irnilarlv.r the carlicr summer ( with the
11uch of our carlier data did not includc nil-dama K c I I I 1---, xrowth of vounQ birdsl sho~ted up carlicr in thc statis-
strikes ; at t}~at time these were generally not reported . 093G 1030 1 .30 1430 r3i~ Jao Feb Mat Ap~ 'i~, lul Aug $ep Ocl Nov Ete~ tic5 that vcar
. . ~ont'd on P a 9 e 2 4
I)N3C 113C 1330 1~10 1'3U
Fig 4 - Percentoge of Brrdstrikes at 150 to 1250 Feer
20 F~y i - Percen!oqe of B;rdslnkes w~th Time of ~ay 6y Month
21
In case Here's another chopter in the never-ending dialogue
between the producers ond consumers of flying clothing and
8430 21-805-5260
Doofs, flying Ifelt
winter hootsj
No good on snow, useless in wef weather ;
slippery on some surfaces . Aequires an
overboot which is nol available .
The boot is des~gned for use in cold dry weaiher. The answer
for wet snow is ihe low blue nylon mukluk and efforls are heing
made lo ensure adequate supplies for jef aircrew.

you were
personal safety equipment . The comments reflect the
feelings of many users, but notice how areas of contention 8440-21-104-2859 Very coarse mafenal . $hnnks when laundered . A uscr trial is be~ng conducfed on a new wool nylon shrink-
often stem from the user not knowing the Socks, men's grey res~stanl nien's sock .
current status of ecuipment design ond procurement, Iwool socksj

wondering . . .
Notice also, how vital is the UCR in this process . 8465-21-802-4310 Big, bulky and heavy on nose . Very painful Ref 8465-21-520-0004 - CFIAM has produced a new design io
Moybe thera's an answer here to your questions . . . if Sun glasses around Uie ears when used wiih headset . Spatula overcome the deficiency reparled on lhe present issue. The new
typo frames needed . design is lighiweight and ulilizes plastic lenses and spatulaie
not, SUBMIT YOUR IDEAS BY UCR!
temple bars . A small number, made by two drfferent manu~
faclurers, rs ezpec(ed in the near future for iesl and evaluafion
on limifed use iriafs,

6230-00-146-6605 Duiky, unreliable . generally o1 poor qualily 6645-21-801-9410 Not rugged enough . Being withdrawn in favour of C4 watch 6645-21~114-5982 which
A new flashlighf, Mallory Model 80GD, will become available in ihe
Flashlighi . slraight Wrisfwatch is being builf lo a military specification, wiil belter meel aircrew
nezf fcw months . Only 2200 are on orrfer so Ihai periodic and more
frequenf slock lurnover will saleguard agamsl batteries becoming (not chronometerl requiremenis and will be available within Ihe nezt 12-18 monihs .
time-ezpired before they reach lhe user .
1340-21-806-2615 Won't hold edge . Superseded in 1961 by the knrfe, hunling,1340-21-844-5956
6230-21-812-3001 Inadequale I~ghting, especially for ezfernal Users can make a coniribufion by raising l1CRs supporterl hy Kn~fe, huniing IScale 15, CAP 602) . This is an excellent kn~fe and will be
Flashlighf . penlighi io>peci~on . Faulty swifches . not rugge~ proper identificalian and pholographs if necessary, io convioce availahle in quanlity within ihe nezf 12-18 months .
enuugh ; ofien u s procuremenl agercy fhat the type suppl~ed is nof accepiahle .
15zo-zl-aoz-la~5 Tco bulky . This is the firsl complaint received . UCR aclion is requested .
623D-21-800-8?56 Tao hulky, ponr switches ~;124 aircrew un~ This problem cao best be resolveci by UCR acUon. Clipboard, pilot's
Flashlighf, fami iar with lhis item because they cannot
90~ angled head obtain if irom supply!. IS20-21-802-8911 Dulky . Light poor, unretiable and flimsy, Peneil This item was introduced a numher of years ago in limited
Clipboard, piloi's holder nof canvenient . Glue fram undersides geis quantities . Present opinion is that lhe unhghted letdown card is
84~~5-21-808~2693 Taa hulky ; connecling zipper wurks ifself open ; Bemg superserierl 5y type IV soif . Zipper juncture at waisf ha5 fwith light) on clathing . preferred by the majority of pilots . There is no work being done
Trousers, flying, nsen's ~~eeds deeper pockefs in legs ; definite preierence been eli~iinaied . Flying suitdcvelopmenf program sla~fed wth ai ihis lime io improve this item . UCR action is required if
rype III - side-zippered for "one-piece" suie . one-prece suitwhich was unsatislacfory because of eKCessive improvements necessary .
pockefs bulk at wais( when seated . New type IV truusers are
cwinter flying trousers'i Ref 841S-i1-841-5864!Masteii . 8415-21-805-3181 Improper sizing Requesi UCR action if lhe prohlem is serious.
Toque, a~rcrew
341 ~-21801-4335 Relate 1o above ; too shori in body. Mosf usc toially Type IV suil I'Iwo plece) w~ll be issued as a single unit s~nce it is
Jacket, flying . men's differeof size io achieve fif with irousers . Allnws incompalible wifh lype III bo',h for colour and method of juncture .
8415-21-802-0292 Cerfain individuals have greaf difficulty in CFIAM has nof encounfered any difficullies in fitting helmels.
~wiafcr flying jackel colrl air lo eoler across sfomach, Much (oo bul'~y . Three thousand will be availahle for issue iicKt winler . New
Hehnel & mask securing a comforiahle fif . Cerlam "hol spofs" This is a matler of SE Tech Trainiag. As a result oi UCR action,
type III as above) Sho~~ld have place for rank insignia . lypc IV lackei is Ref 841S~21-84i-58521.Maslerl .
assembly cause ezcrucialing pain afler a shorl iime . I,A improved filting mcihod is bemg issued in EOs. This should
a415-21-BD0~1601 Poor stitchiog - con~es aparl tou eas~ly . Have to Acceleraled weai trials of siK weeks durafion with new lype ol UCR has been suhmitted on fhis .l answor this requirement.
Glove shel!s get replacements too often because of stitching. sewmg ihread revealed no weapness or deferioralion . A
~ leather flying pulyeslei cnt(on fhread ~s now berng specifierl ;n lieu ol nylon, Ear Seal isound Uncomforlable, seal too hard, glycerine seal Glycenne-f~lled ear seals give best sound atteauation . To remove
glovesl since fhe resuit of the frials indicaied a markcd improvemonf atfenuafors) hreaks ; foam seal OK . any discomlort ihe ear musi bo inside the seal . Foam-filled ear
!n sea~n I~fe . seals are scaled for winter use in Canada on!y .

8415~21-8D0-8111 Inner glove fears 10o easily . Woollen inners, light we~ght, are on eztensive trials . AgreG lhai Ozygen Mask Robber very cold and hard tiuring winter Until the silicone material can be strengthened, there does nof
Glove inserls ~ :(lying rayon inners are net satisfar,tory and more durable replace~~enf condifions . appeariobeany solution lo lhis problem . Research is continuing .
glove, innerj wil I have fo be found.
4220-21-803-1412 Too hulky, uncomfortable around neck, rubher Chafing is being corrected Uarough a profeclive neck piece which
8415-21 ~801-9140 Hol, urcomforlable, pnor seleclian of fiis, This coverall replaced a fiae, lightr~eight cotloo garmont because Life preserver, Ynke chafes skm . ~This item must be worn on neck is now being developed.
Coverall, flying, uosighlly when sorled, pockeis loo small. ol aircrew insislenr.e on a ~nore durable maierial . Wilh Ihe IMac Wesil above collar of flying suit . Afler a iwo-hour
men's (old style Cornpletely unacceplable . inlroduciion of the new "siyl!zed" ccmbaf iype suit the covarall flighf, with continual head turning, il causes
swr~nicr flying suili f lying men's referred to was lo be declared obsoleie . In Ihe painful irrifaGon of skin .)
~nlegrafion process, RCAF supplies had to 5e shared with RCN
and Army . Only a small quanlity remains i100i after which Ihe
new sfyle will be supplied .
21GM ~155 Add pain killers~morphinel . Subject of separale Morphine was removed trom this kit several years ago because of
Firsi Aid Kif UCR action . This ifem requires review . accounfing problems under ihe Opium and Narco6c Confrol Acf,
8415~21-502-1406 Do°sn'1 mafch colout ol coveralls f dark hlue) ; This is ihe only garrrenf we have nof had UCRs on, bul ~f is and in view of ihe hmiled requiremenl for material .
Jackel, flying, men's callar irritates neck, baggy, unsighlly when agreed improvemenis are possible . This has heen taken care of in
c inferim flying jackef, spiled . fhe replacement garment ~8415 ?1841 G't66 - Mas!e~l which is lo be CAP 361, Booklel - Oul of date . CAP 3G1 ~s be~ng rewriiten as a CFP .
grey) purchased when presenl s(oc~s are ezhausled, esl~maled to be "Land and Sea
1 Sep 68 . Colour is royal bluo . Emergencies"

84! 5-21-82D 098b Generally a well-liked item . Major complainfs : New colour probably m FY G9';'(1 wll be rilleg~een or slighlly 1095-21-804-8889 Issue io all aircrew ralher than jusf keeping in A foldingwallei-type container is being prolotyped fo contain
Coveralls, flying, men's ha1 in summer, hnlfom leg pockets tao shallow. lighler maferial . UCR action suggested for re-~nlarcemerl ~f Proleclor, survival kii. mirror, projecloc, flares and malches, Samples will soon be
Inew da~k-blue) Suggeslinn for re inforcemenl where leg rubs legs . Any addilional suggesfiocs will be apprecialed . Pyrotechmc, Hand availahle for viewrng and trials . This container will be used
side of cockpil. Some difficulfy in proper leg (penlight-size llare in the survival kit and wi II be carried on ihe person .
length . Only one suil available . ejector w~fh 12 flares?
8415-21-802-6i44 EKCessive shrinkage ou lauodering . Very heavy Heat drying is responslble for shrinkage . Should be air-dried o, 5110-21-1 U2-8151 Handle ioo shorf Bas~c kil item - aze handle lengih is designed to fil into lhe
Drawers, ezUenie cold weighl . Many buy own commercially io get lighter frost-dried in wintor . Commercial versions do not rreef AKe - single bit has~c kit and emergency seat pack .
ilhermal underwear> woighl . Always difficull lo csb(am Irom supply military specitications . This is now "olficial" underwear for
wheo needed ai beginning of winter . fhe CF . Suggesl Incal supply ensure demands for ~is ifem
8415-21-809~1939 are placed al leasf siK monlhs he'ore items are ~eeded . 6135-11-803-6031 Shorl life Doth ihe Sarah balfery and Ihe interim carbon-zinc baitery for
Unriershirl, ezireme Ratfery, dry the URT 503 have a limiled shelf life of 12 mo~ths ; unifs
cold should nof aver-demand for obvious reasons . The final baltery
for 1he URT 503 is now under development and is a
8430-~1-800-2251 A disaster . To prevent circulat~on 5toppage, Only objeciion to black rubbers to-date comes from Tufor aircrew magnesium-silver chloride type with a predicted 5-year
Oveiboof, black iubber musl wear several sizes larger fherefnre bulky and low blue mukluks are on order for early delivery . Zippor shelf life .
and curnbersome . Frequeni zipper breakage . breakage is on old-style boot ; lator versions have ezcellent
zippers . Using loo large sizes of overbools aggravates the 4G I 0-G~~~-a'?-0592 Wafer laSles ba~ The desalier kil does provide potable water which may have a
problem . Re-designed insulated rubber overbool will go on Desalier k~t "flat" taste . This will have to he accepted until a beiter kii
limiled field trials during 63 69 winler monfhs . is available .

8430-21-198~1111 Leaiher soles causing many beels and a This aircrew strmmer bool is being boughf wfh composifion 7920-21-545-0219 Add more sponges Agree; sponges are essential, due to accumulalion of
Boais, flying, leaiher, hazard lo the wearer . soles; only a limited numher of boots with leather soles Sponge, cellulose moisiure on dinghy walls and floor which makes conditions
sunmer were purchased . more unoleasanl than they need he . ®

Flighr Comment, $ep Oct 1968

 Gen from Two-Ten
cont'd from poge 21 in tlte enroute stage of fli~;ht . Pending the acquisition of CF104, STRUCK HOUSE The al-
The first quarter of 196R was one of considerable bird P roof aircraft our best ho p e is in findin g out more most 200 pages of the Board of
improvement . ~~e experienced onlv 12 strikes but had about the fcathered creatures with whom vve share the In 9 uirv. is an elaborately. chronicled
ex P ected 2~ . This mav
, he attributable in P art to better h:uropean airspace, and the refinement of our response 1EARN fkOM OrFIERS' MISrAKES you'll nof live long enough 1o make Ihem all yourcellf arcount of a low-levelrecce mission
and more estensive use of information on bird mi~ration. procedures during peak nukration periods . Simultaneously, which ended in tragedy . After all the
lo counter the takeoff and landin,g bird hazard, our air- evrdence w'as rn, the Board con-
Enroute 13irdstrikes - A Real Problem ports are systematicallv beinK made most inhospitablc cluded that thc pilot had, in good
'hhe :~ir I1iv~i5ion's biggest birdstrikc headache lies for bird residents and visitors . ® weather with a serviceable aircraft,
allowed himself to be distracted
from the vital lookout, and flown his
aircraft into the ground . Fortunately
no-one else was kiUed but the photo

the
shows how narrow was the margin .
times. The auxiliarv trim w~orked okav but the stick '1'he Board recommended -
switch had to bc hcld hard-on before cont-a ct c ou 1 d b~c
Power
among other things - that we ` . . .
madc . 'hhe stick ,rip was chanxed anti again cvcrv~thing re-em Phasize the dan g ers of low-
checked functionallv~ serviceable . level flying, particularly the effect
of Although the aircraft subsequcntly flctiv serviceable
the lab test on the eircuit breaker and stick grip showed
of drstractron erther rn the cockprt or
looking behind" . lIcnce, this itcrn .
Positive that while this could have caused the incident it didn't
satisfaetorily explain the intennittent operation . Basc
'I'hc rules have been written,
the lrmrts establrshed - all that
Persistence avionics specialists tlccidcd to carrv out another com-
plete check of t}te stab trrm crrcurt . It checked out ~h .
rcmains is compliance .
titill not satisfied, the team dccided to replace the stab
`l'he pilot, an dchricfinK, had an interestinX experi- trim actuator and tcst it ; thc clutch was found ,lipping
cncc tc~ rclatc . Aftcr takeoff ~ear and fla P s u P ~ he had at a i-lb load vs a ?0-lb re q rurement . A irlo a d~ o~r the TRACKER, 16INGTIP Il1TS PULE centrated on the civilian marshallcr
selected nose-up trim which continued to go nose-up stabilizer are hcavy enough to slip that clutch whereas The captain considered that " . . . a off to the ri ;;ht ; bchind him, a parkcd
despite forward stick trirn . Alternate trim did not takc a ,t;roundrheck would not reveal this fault . This slippa~;e
quick stopover to disernbark a pa :~- aircraft also distracted tlreirlookout .
immediate effect, however t}ce aircraft was flown in thc u~ould account for the apparcnt trim chan5c thc pilot
senger, then to flv on, tivas not ,As the prlot wa5 ahout to turn hard
vicinity to hurn off fuel durin~; which the elevator lrim expc~ricnced .
deviatin~,~ from the initial fliKht plan ri~,~ht in responsc to the marshaller's
workcd only intermittentlv on stick and alternate trim ~1s a rcsult of thcir commendable diligence in not
unacce~tahl
I }~" . Tlris interim sto~I at srs;nal, the arrcraft camc to a ~oltrnK
positions . (_ln final, tlre pilot atternpted to isolate the accepting an initial superficial diagnosis, a serious
a civil airport - embarrassin,gl~~ near stop . 'I'he port wrnxtrp had struck a
trim by pullin,t; the circuit brcakcr but it wouldn't buciKc . flight hazardwas spotted before it caused further hazard .
thc destination - was to enable a pole located in an area norrnally
First , the circuit breaker w~as re P laced and lhe
passenger to quickly obtain his car used only for parking aircraft re-
stahilizer trim was functionally ground checkccl twc:lve C~ood work!
and pick up the crew~ at the nearbv fuellcrs . thc airportw~asohviouslyill-eyuipped
mil itary~ base . ~on-standard flights call for to handle tihort sto P-over militar Y
'I'axying in, the two pilots con- increased vi7ilance~
k , in this case > air traffic .

bailout bottle - still no blinker . Hy this time, the onset 'I'3 .3, ~6RONG 1lANDLF Althouk~hnot mnment the wheels-up selection was
of hypoxia was well established and the pilot in the rear a, commonplace thcsc davs this made, bouncing or an uncven runway
CLOSE OPERATIONAL seaf took control and kept up a nrnning commentary about hazard is still with us . On Ic~om P le- surface could havc I~ermitted ~uffic-
CALL HAZ_ARp
possible remedies . The decision to descend was tion of an instrument ride the check ient oleo extension tr, override the
0 imminent, when I finally noticed that the hose had
become disconnected at the mask inlet . I immediatel Y
pilot in thc Iront seat landec} the ground safetv switch .
aircralt, ancl after touchdovvn -- T he pc-~st-landin ~ c~heck calls
SAFETY
stuck the hose in my mouth and the hypoxia disappeared . raiscd thc flaps . "'I'he aircraft for flaps-UP onlv "when a landinK
SUGGESTIQN
I refitted the lube and we continued to our destination . settlec3 to tl7c runwav verv smoothlv has hccn com 1~l eted . . . " R ai sin g
IVe found that the clamp holding the tube to the mask was ard r st~atr cd to vcer left" ,/ and came flaps durin,r; the landine rc~ll when
missing . With the tube repairc:d and the bailout bottle to a stup half off the rrmwav after you're
. lookin ';~ out fof othc:r', more
replaced, the return trip was uneventful . t u rnin ~,~ 11 (! de t,~rees . As soon/a5 the important thin~ ;s is asking fnr harards ; they're excellent Kuides to

Is "Slight Hypoxia'~ possible? nose started to sink the 1~ilot real- trouhlc . The ;~Uls, for thc: most avoidin g the rtristakes of others who
Thc° qucstinnahle .c~i .rdc~rn o,l' the cd ;~tain c~c~ntin- izcd hc had mi~takenlv selectcd part, are written responses to known have gone before .
uinq the ~litlht ("Thc~ de~:i .iinn iu ;ic~i~enri :cu,i whcels u~F " . . .hut the under-
L vaas captain of a T33 on a cross-country with a immin~°nt . . . "j :ras lat~~r explained b~~ tht~ pilot carria g~e han~lc w'c>uld nc~c ;~u back
qualified pilot irt the rear seat . After one hour at 37U00 a~ soniethin y h~~ t c~rtainl~~ rt~ould irot hac~c~ donc down" .
(cabin pressure 23000) I recognized the first symptoms of lra~ ht~ heen .rlilc~, in cc~hicJt case hr ~aould have The technical investi~~ation un- Foot-dragging drivers . . .
hypoxia : blurred vision, cold, tingling, etc, and descc°nclcd immediatelv . fn his hypox~ic conjusion covered no unserviceabilitv of thc
immediately checked the 02 blinker . lt was not operating . h~ ~~ullt~cl' thc hailnut hottic~ ancl thcn checkc~ thr
r underrarria p e svstem includin r the
F, . 1
. . . although omple worning is given on overdue
The next step wds to check the connection at the lap hlinker . Soundi like pretty good suhstantiaticm electrical i,Tround safetv. devire equipment, some aircrew were still delaying
belt ; it was OK and still connected . Then I selected ,lor a quick - but thorough - ~r~isual cht'ck o~ yuur which prevents rclrac'tion whcn th~ inspection of their oxygen masks ond para-
l0U°''~ - sti11 no blinker . Then I pulled the emergency ma ck 6c iore guing Ilti~iny . olcos are compresscd . .at the precise chutes . . .
- fllght Safety Commlttee

24 Flight Comment, Sep Oct 1968

 af the 6oom . permits practice autorotative land- cated bv the removal oI thc aircraft '`1'here is no doubt that the aero-
'Che circumstances leadine up ings only on airfields or properly before ~the Board arrived on the medical factors were enough to make
to this alrnust inrvitable occurre n cc: authorized areas . (The investi- scene .) the accident a probability from the
~unstitutr a fair list of don'ts : g ation of the accident was com P li- Another observation was made : minute the maneuver was begun . . . "
" t}rc: wrong-tvpe rir; for hc_iisting
thc P ro P was uscd
. the crane operator had been on
CF10~, haGltir; FAILURE In an areas to watch .
dutv nver 11 hours
earlier articae "V'i~ht Rescue" we 41'atchin~ for deficienciesbrings
the ~rrtv were attxinus to com-
related the interestin g circum- to mind - SOAP (S P ectrometric Oil
plctr thc job
. thc cranc was moved in a stances surrounding a pilot's suc- Analysis Prot;ram). In the Air llivis-
cessful ejection into the bush near ion the SOAP has been a s P ectacular
crowded crampcd area
. the several trades represented Cold I .ake and his timelv rescue . success and for obvious reasons
ARGI'S, B00'vi STRIKES B00?~i Thc engine crane and its operator were
Now that the lengthy detailed (not thc lcast of which was this
crane used to install the engine was pressed into service . Before liftinK in the crrw were nut cu-ordrn-
analysis of the engine failure cause az~oidable occurrence), a SOAP
still in position w~hen the prop was the prop, the experienced operator ated ur controlled by a super-
has been completed, it seems most project is now underway for Cold
ready to hang, so rathcr than get swun,~ the crane under the 11A1) vrsor .
probable that a transfer gearbc~x Lake .
the prop crane (the crew~ were an- boorn of an adjac'ent Ar~us ; the Itiith conditiuns like that, seems
breakdown caused a total disruptiun SOAP is nc~t as widely accepted
xious to complete the job), the impact necess~tated the replacernent like you just can't mi~s .
of all aircraft systems dependent on as we would like ; jeopardizing a
the gearbox . This is a known prob- pilot's life and losing a million-and-
lem with the Ji9 and pending a one-half dollar aircraft is a prctty
fl?l, BLAUf~: TR :1('K1NG puring substantial increase in the y uality. high price to offset the economies
Pow~er trackinK (ti EE > >ath aliKnmentl
. t Unusual wear patrern on gear trans- and reliability of this component achieved bv not havin K SOAP more
of thc forward rotor, a rotor bladc fer box comFonent. it will continue to be one of the widel y a pp lied .
snagged the webbing on the trackinK
pole, crackin~ the upper and lower
skin . As the blades are matched
sets, the dama,~e necessitated re-
P 1 acin 7 all threc: forward rotor bladcs .
Birdstrikes: a new problem?
'Tlie tra~kinTk "fla >" (a ribbon
After flying through a tlock of birds a Mosquito board spinner was bashed in, the starboard wing
of cluth stretched on a pole) had
returned with its bullet-proof windscreen rendered bomb fairing half carried away and the radiator
heen ri~;,~;ed w'ith 3-inch cotton web- An electrunic trackcr availablc was contin~,ially unserviceable - a
opaque by crocks and a 2-inch hole through it . duct badly damaged . That was about 25 years
bing rn lreu of the authorrzed - but to (11113 unit5 wa~ rccommenJcd ; common problem wrth this device .
The nose below the Browning guns and the star- ogo!
onavailable - balloon cloth . Thrs however, similar blade trackinK A strobe light and reflective
wehhin~; had been used bv other 1121 damage recentlv occ:urred on a material on the bladc ti P s - alreadv.
un its . ( Later , the bal .loon cloth CH 11 ~ usin~ the unautho_rized w'eb- in use in the Canadian Forces - is a
provcd too 1 i ~ht ; it tore: when stretch- bing on a trackin~,7 palc . 'l~hc cl- possible solution to this hazard . In
cd on the trackin~; pole .) cclronic trackcr wa5 not in usc ; it the meantime - no webbing! Comments
CH11?, PhACTICE CRASII The blinded hirn . lle a,gai~r hit on the rear Considerable fati~ue and nn
to the editor
acrident followedsix strcnuous days of thc skids, bounced and z urrectcd food for 11 hours would tend to lower
of dawn-tu-dusk Elyin~; to meet the with aft cvclic
, fur an a PP arent pilot efficiency - particularly for a The article "tica and 5urvival" situations in most cases prcrludcs 1he need fc~r c:ompleting these
commitments of a field exercise, liv- dro lP
~ in ~ uf thc nose . The aircraft maneuver reyuirin~; hi~;h skill and in the 't1ari'Apr issue bears credence mac wcst deplovmcnt . actions was vividly demonstrated
ing in tents, irreKular meals, sleep again hit the ground - this time verv ~ud
J K emcnt . The helico E~ter wa5 bein r to the fact that our CF104 water ( apt hrng stateJ that once rn when Capt Kin~ struggled out of his
disturbcd bv alerts, and earlv brief- tail-luw . The helico Pter commenced fluwn in a dan>erous k C o( G condi- surviva) cyuipment is lacking in tlre water he was pulled along on parachute harness, without an in-
ings . an uncontrollable yaw to thc righl tian, a faet known to thc pilot al- some automatic features . lluwever, his back bv thc pararhute and that flatcd mae west, onlv to find himsclf
The pilot, prror lo positionin,r ; and finally ret~~rned tu earth with though thc effecl was not fully the article, because of its clear whcn hc rcleascd himsclf from thc: titill connected to .the harncss bv
his helicopter for thc ni~;ht, follc~wed left drift, havin,k sw~m,t; thrinr~,rh 1'0 app r ec~'ia tcd . T his turned out to be outline of Capt hin,r,~'s difficulties chute he bc:k~an to ~ink at once . ' ' clip and bcin~
the riKht-siac ' ~ ~u
~ ll ed
the detachmcnt rommancler's lead in degrecs . a poor plare: and a poor time for on watcr cntrv, bears testimonv to Unfortunately, he had not received under by the weiKht uf Iri~ eyuip-
decidin~; to practice "a couple" of Unknown to the pilot, the eail tihuotin,~; autorotations - CH'P 100 ' ~ on water ,lifc-
thcy nccd for trainin~,
~ previous trainin,r; on parachute draR- ment . A s a rcsult , the force exerted
autorotations . 1\ot satisfied with a rotor had struck the ground on thc su PP ort e y ui P ment earlv. in the ging for if he had assumed thc drag bruke the Jin~;hy lanyard causing
heel-first touchdown, the pilot initial contact and broken uff murh R, '` i CF10~ training proR~ram . position he would have attained him to losc: his life raft .
attempted a second autorotation, of the blades . Applyin,~ aft cyclir Ca P t Kin-~ mav havc had much enough flotation to allow himself to Thert: is no doubt that the
w ..
changing his final hcaiiink approxi- after this im~act to iounteract the less tro u 61e de: p~loa~in
, g his mae arcomplish thc actians he wa~ uri- ro er de lovment of our ('F104
pf
matcly. 1 S de rees to cumpensate the nose-down pitchink~ c~nly aggra- west if prror to flyrng h c checked able to complctc during the short water survival eycupment is com-
for an apparent drift noticcd on his vated matters . that the (0? to g.g le fla P was un- parachute descent, ie, inflatc mac plex . However, sea survival traininki
first approach . This heading chan,t;e The tail rotor drivcshaft was fastened and that the togglc was not west, deploy survival scat pack, can dis ':~el most of the a PP rehension
meant that as he looked u P to level sheared and considerable damage hidden by the parachute ri~ht lek- release right-side clip and turn thc and confusion toward5 the use of this
the helicopter for completion of thc sustainc:d bv the tail boom bodv , stra p . Otherwise ~ the difficultv. in parachute quick release box to the typc of lifc suppurt eyuipment . Nith-
flare, the scttin~ sun momentarily and skid landin ~,~ kTear . locatinK the togglc~ undet emerkency full clockwise or opcn pusiiiun . out thrs experience the pilot's unlv

26 , . Flight Comment, Sep Oct 1968 27

 c
resort is to study a sequcnce of wire to pull loose, and had over thc corrcct . A rccent modification was ck ~l'~'
~f. ~
actions that must be taken on an vears become '"modificd" to the incorporated to ~reatly reduce falsc
illustratcd ron(i uration. f su e~t
over-water bailout and commit it to
mcrnorv - leaving enouKh flexibility that an approved type of terminal
mode IIl emerKency reports caused
by overlapping tiIF replies, spurious
BIRD WATCHERS' CORNER
to cover as many situations as end hc uscd for all cxtension li~ht repiie5, and exc:essive noi~e .
posstblc . cords w'ith a small dah of ''LOC- The only emerKencv condrtcon
( apt G .E .S . ~9rllcr
'hITE" or equivalent on the threads that the SAGE cquipmcnt is capable
AI~L~ Survival School
of the terminal screws . "1 .OC- of processin~ is the Ran~e Coinci-
Dccimomannu, ~ardinia
~11TF:" is used extensivelv on air- dent type or I F F Control Box-
craft and is available from anv Emer,~enc,,`. .
?Vo malter how simple or corn-
automotive su PP lv. house. Rho hasn't ~11ti'0 T, hiclnti'k
plex our equipment is, i! aircrecc <<~ho
at some time durint; a tour of a
use this equipment are nol traired ~? Radar ~ q~
n CFB Cc~ld Lakc
han~;ar durin,t; their years of ser~~ice,
in its usc°, ic will he of douht)tcl accidcntallv tripped over an exten-
~c~alue u.hc~n t.he "crunch" comes. Thr statement containc~~i in the
sion rord and i~ut a mechanical load
7here's some progress under- 1~ay-Jun issuc r~n IFF ;"S1F S:aGE
on the terminals of the extension raciars on Emergency recciyr.iliort is
;1' a1' :
cord?
. ~Z CH'101 and CF'10~ mvdi fi- indeed not Jully correct . ;aDC S.aGF;
~~ours, for fcNCr air~ralt fircs .
catior ;~.~hieh relea S e S thc Sl ~ P raaars at one time iould autnmati-
clip or airlock connectivn to ('apt );) .l . Shade cally detect a mnde _~ code ii (00]
the dinghy lanyard zahen the ~1 ;"+TC011, hockcliffe response as an emergenca~, lrut
, technieal diJficultie .c ,.~re en-
D-riny on thc surzar~~al att is
pulled, rcas slatc~d to go out )'our cvmmcnts aremost helpful . countered and in I1av Iub7 thc'
Irvm ,~9%ITCOa1 in the fir}~t :c~eek Iln-a~ many of our lurrtps are danger- e~ui~ment
r uas nodific~cl.. S :~IGf'; ;~1DC
o,t July, This rc:mo .~es one activn nuslv ~~c~ircd? ra~dari. u~'ll t n o ; ~ o nly rc°cor~nt~a,e an
(rom, the post-e~ectton sequence . Lnolinc morc~ dce ly il int.v this IF'F','SIF radar emergency signal
' ,. . probfem u~e unco-.~ered un area thal. Irom manual sclection o/ h.' ;I1f:'R-
This moatftcativn ctGso me~an .i
that ~c~hen the aircreu fly :.ithout is cause for rral concern . 61'e ask : CE.~'C}', nr automaticalfy rrt bailout,
, , are :~apour-prooJ lantps used ~~chcn depending on tht' aircraf t. llnly vn
u mae zeest, they mu ~~ huorr up
the dinyhy lanyard to their para- expfosion-proof lamp .carernandatnry? the D07' sur~~cillance rudars ~tuill
Ij yes, does a rrtan really k'nou~ thc' selection o( mode .l cvde i7 (L1D1
chute strap . f,f lhey ricrn't, u~hen
di~(crence? 11e surpect not . I:t~en aut~matica.lly indicate emergencti~ .
thc'y pull thc 3urvi~-al ait D-rinq
the 1~resent dav, ~atalorues
1 don't ln lhe manunl sc~ctor (outsidr~
a)'ter ejection, lhev will lo~c~ a1~
help much, and to jill thi .c gap :c+r'rc the SACE ~'vstem) the aGarm is
their survival yeur. ,

prc'sently crankiny up an articlc uith trinyered dirrctfy at thc radar sitc

7'esting o,f three vr four ty~,~~°_r r~~,f
phc~t~graphs nutlininq the sevcrt rathcr than huc~in 9 tv 6e r~a .csed
autotnatic actuutors ,for jet air-
typcs o,+' lantps readily az~ailable' to ,tr~~m the S :1Gh' Dircction Centre .
creu mae u~e~l~ is underua~ ;
thc' Cunadian F'orces . ln thc~ mean- h`urther, IheS;1CC'system is designed
this itcm is qettiny top priority .
timc', lamp ust'rs shoulcl knn,e thc to git;~e prirrity to a modt~ ll squa~uk
di ;(c~rencr betccrcn thc, t~c~o ~peri~~~ . otier a mode 111 trhc~rt t~oth are trans-
mitting simultaneously f rom an air-
c cra~t; hozc~e~cier, tht modc ll should Irr
"A ]loar and a hclloK' h'lash"
.ieleclcd OL`T tu ensurt' uppcuruncc
ticas read w~ith much intcrcst . It rould In "On the Uials", ,'v1av-Jun oJ the mode I11 squacaf: at a S ;~ICE
easilv ha~~e been entitled "'1 ell (1-1e
is~ue ehc Statemcnt "Thel Air r:entrc' . Stmtlarly, ahc'ne,rer tt hr~-
the (lld, Old Storti " . h ires rauscd
Uc~fence radars will detect anv c:omes ncces ~ary to initiuf.e an
by so-called safetv lamps have been ., ,
cmcr K cncv, ur mode ii i selections I;merc~cncy~, ur .ii i ±ctucr:rh, ti ;c~itc,~1
anil are far too common .
as an cmcr enc~~" is not fullv
. 01 ' rrt ci d e II .

HOUSE GROUSE
flhc photo~raph su~~ ;ests that
the ,crew mav ha~~e become loo : ;e
br~cause of .fories lcavin~k bern
a (p
~ lied to the lcad-in cord . ( :Inr
«onders if provi5ion ~aas maue in This species has, by a curious inversion of the natural order,
thc partrrular type nf rnspec:non aroused much scientific interest amonq bird watchers . A reversal
of roles in the Grouse is revealed in the female's extraordinary
li);ht for clampin,t; uf the cord ar
brilliance of plumaqe, distinct sonq (the male, character>stically,
alccrnativclv whcther room «'as has none), aqressive qestures-and so on . Bested in the nest by
availablc for thc usc of an under- his mate, the male is reduced to perpetual frustration and fury- -
writers' kn~~t to pre~~ent a for~c a state of mind highly prone to error. As lonq unpunctuated
bein,~ applied to the terminals . paraqraphs fill the air, the male has aqain bequn his day the
It is likclv that the inspection unsafe way. The House Grouse`s lament continues, but strikes
Unless you cage the J8, the indicpbr moy ered inverted unhearinq ears :
lamp ~a5 orik~inally assembled with
"'e`'elet"
. tyoe
.r of terminalsfor e-ui`~-
q giving you reve~se pitch and ro11 indications. We suspect
alentl makin it im pcissible for the t1~y re not always coged be~Ore fli~bt . . , YOUJUSTSITTHEREEVERYDAY
ANDNEVERLISTENTOWHATISAY
28
This see-through lighter
carries
raw fuel m
it is
dangerous
in aircraft .
Out-of-
control
torching
has caused
several
in-flight
fires.