DOTMLPF

TRAINING

System of PME
Jt Training & Exercise
Service Specific Training
Spl Trg/Ex with Others
Synergy & Synchronisation in Thinking, planning and action
Think Tanks

MATERIAL

Mil Tech & dependence

Force Multipliers
Strength of AF
Eqpt Profile – State of Art/ Current and obsolescence
 TRAINING

System of PME & Service Specific Training

1. The details of institutes that are offering PME for US AF is as follows:-

2. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part,

was intended to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise enhance the
effectiveness of military operations, and improve DOD’s management and administration.
With the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress also intended to, consistent with the
congressional declaration of policy in section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 and
among other things, reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian authority in DOD.

3. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, as amended, also:

a. established various joint officer management policies, including requiring

JPME for certain joint assignments and promotion categories

b. required officers to successfully complete an appropriate program at a JPME

school, among other things, to be designated as joint qualified—a prerequisite for
promotion to brigadier general or rear admiral lower half rank except under certain
circumstances

c. required the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to periodically review and revise the curriculum
of JPME schools to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters.
4. In addition, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005 required the Secretary of Defense to implement a comprehensive framework for
officer JPME. The PME continuum consists of five military educational levels that
correspond to the five phases of a military officer’s career:

(a) Pre-Commissioning
(b) Primary
(c) Intermediate
(d) Senior
(e) General/Flag Officer.

5. As figure 1 indicates, intermediate- and senior-level PME and JPME programs—the

focus of our review—are designed for officers at pay grades O-4 through O-6. With the
exception of the Air Force Academy, the opportunity to absorb additional professional
military education institutions at the military academies is limited by physical, financial, and
environmental constraints. All three academies are at or over capacity for classroom and
dormitory facilities. The U.S. Military and U.S. Naval academies have very little land
available to build additional facilities. The services differ in how they interpret the definition
of professional military education as defined in the Military Education Policy Document. For
example, the Army considers an officer’s basic course in a warfare specialty such as
infantry or logistics as part of professional military education, while the Air Force does not.
Therefore, because of how the services define this education, the Army has more
professional military education schools that could be consolidated than the Air Force. 32
different schools involved in conducting 60 different courses. During academic year 1992-
93, over 36,000 students were enrolled in these schools.

6. Professional military education (PME) for U.S. Air Force officers is part of a complex
system for preparing officers of all services for command and staff work in a joint context.
The system must accommodate thousands of officers every year — some in-residence at
service schoolhouses, some through fellowship opportunities at varying locations, and still
others through distance learning. There is an apparent imbalance in the assignment of Air
Force officers to specific PME programs: A greater proportion of officers who are ranked
lower by the central developmental education board are assigned to PME at Air University
than those higher on the rankings, who tend to be assigned to non–Air Force schoolhouses
or fellowship programs.

Key Findings

7. There is a systemic tendency to value options other than Air University. In-residence
seats are consistently allocated to the top officers as ranked by order of merit, but the
officers ranked most highly do not usually attend in-residence PME at Air University.
8. More officers who were ranked lower by the central developmental education board
are assigned to PME at Air University.

9. Some senior leaders cite problems with PME, but this concern is not universal. The
National Defense Strategy notes that PME has “stagnated” and does not foster the skills
and abilities needed for independent action during combat. Within the Air Force, there are
many suggestions for how the entire PME system might better prepare officers for the
future, but most senior Air Force leaders whose statements the authors reviewed did not
call for a wholesale revision.

10. Officers do not rank the quality of Air University schoolhouses highly Surveyed
officers view PME at Air Force schools less favorably than other options; few ranked Air
University options as top quality. Officers who had attended Air University programs were
more likely than others to say that the course content needs improvement.

11. There is considerable discontent with Air University's location. Survey respondents
and Air Force leadership voiced concerns about the location at Maxwell Air Force Base in
Alabama. The quality of local public schools and employment options for spouses are the
top concerns and impede the ability to recruit top-notch faculty to the area.
Military Professional Education System.

12. Career military officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of the Armed Forces
of the United States are the beneficiaries of sequential, regularly scheduled periods of
professional education. Military leaders return full-time to the "schoolhouse" every three to
five years during a twenty-plus year career. Each of these in-residence educational
experiences lasts from two months to a year or longer. When coupled with advanced civil
schooling, self-study, and on-the-job learning, these courses provide the officer or NCO
with the theoretical and practical knowledge needed for duties of increasing complexity and
scope as she or he advances in rank. For the sake of brevity, the U.S. Army's Officer
Professional Military Education (OPME) and Non-commissioned Officers Education System
(NCOES) will be used here as examples.

13. Professional military education focuses on leadership, management theory and

practices, military history and operational doctrine, national defense policy, planning and
decision-making, legal responsibilities, and professional ethics. Academic evaluations are
primarily performance-oriented, with criteria and learning conditions prescribed for each
task. Frequent informal feedback and periodic indepth performance evaluations are
provided. Emphasis is on enhancing the ability to function effectively as a leader and team
member, and in staff positions of combined arms and joint service organizations.

14. For the majority of commissioned officers, professional education begins with the
precommissioning phase, which is completed at one of the service academies (U.S. Military
Academy, Naval Academy, Air Force Academy, or Coast Guard Academy) or through a
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program at a participating college or university.
Officer Candidate Schools provide opportunities for selected enlisted members of the
various services to complete the requirements for commissioning. These educational
programs prepare young men and women to assume the responsibilities of junior officers
(second lieutenants in the Army, Air Force, and Marines and ensigns in the Navy and Coast
Guard) in active-duty (full-time), Reserve, or National Guard units.

15. For enlisted members of the Armed Services, professional education begins with
basic training, or boot camp, followed by advanced technical training in one of the many
occupational and vocational fields required by increasingly complex and technologically
advanced organizations. Members receive a Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)
designation upon successful completion of this training. The military-skill training
component of precommissioning programs has much in common with basic training.
Following an initial tour of duty, selected Army enlisted members attend the NCOES Basic
Course, which focuses on small-unit leadership.

16. The second phase of OPME focuses on the technical and tactical duties of junior
officers specific to each branch and service. Army lieutenants attend the Officers Basic
Course for their initial branch assignment, such as the Armor Officers Basic Course at Fort
Knox, Kentucky. Marine Corps officers attend their infantry-oriented basic course at
Quantico, Virginia, and then may attend a specialty course such as the Army's Artillery
School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Naval ensigns selected for Surface Warfare or Submarine
Service attend basic courses in their specialty. Officers selected for flight training attend
flight school. Some officers attend special qualification courses such as the U.S. Army
Ranger School, material maintenance programs, nuclear propulsion, or language school
prior to their first unit assignments. Officers Basic Courses provide the functional equivalent
of enlisted MOS certification and the tactical leadership training provided during the Basic
NCO Course.

17. After completing three to five years of service with troop units, Army officers attend a
two-phased Captains Career Course. Phase one is a branch-specific advanced course that
prepares attendees for command of companies, batteries, or troops (military units ranging
in size from 60 to 200 soldiers), and for technical and staff responsibilities at battalion and
brigade levels. Experiential, case-based interactive learning with extensive use of
simulation devices and practical field applications predominate the instructional
methodologies.

18. Immediately following completion of phase one, Army officers attend phase two, the
six-week Staff Process Course at the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3).
CAS3 employs small-group instruction techniques designed to improve an officer's ability to
analyze and solve problems, communicate orally and in writing, interact effectively as a key
member of a military staff, and to apply operational doctrine and procedures in the field.
Each staff group is composed of twelve students from combat, combat support, combat
service support, and specialty branches in order to encourage interdisciplinary thinking and
combined arms doctrine. Naval officers attend similar courses to prepare them for duty as
divisional officers on board ships and submarines, and for staff positions. In preparation for
assuming duties as platoon sergeants, staff specialists, and first sergeants,
noncommissioned officers attend the installation-based Advanced Noncommissioned
Officer Course (ANCOC).

19. Selected Army officers receive education in nonbranch-related functional areas–such

as Systems Automation, Army Acquisition Corps, and Foreign Area Specialties at
residential military schools–through the Advanced Civil Schooling program, which includes
the Technological Enhancement Program, or through Training With Industry. Most
midcareer officers complete advanced academic degrees through government-funded
programs on duty time or personally financed off-duty study, while many noncommissioned
officers complete associate and bachelor's degrees while off duty. Today, the American
military is unique among the armies of the world in its high percentage of officers with
master's degrees and Ph.D.s.

20. The fourth stage of OPME is the Command and General Staff College (CGSC).
Attendance at resident CGSC is selective and prepares officers for command at battalion
and brigade levels and for senior staff positions. Nonresident/distance learning CGSC
courses are also offered for active-duty, Reserve, and National Guard officers.

21. Selected officers attend a sister service CGSC level course (i.e., Air Command and
Staff College) or an allied national institution such as the British Staff College. Emphasis is
placed on planning and direction of joint (multiservice) and combined (multinational)
operations, in accordance with the congressionally mandated Phase I of the Joint
Professional Military Education Program (DOD Reorganization Act of 1986). Selected
officers attend the Joint Forces Staff College as Phase II of this program. A small group of
officers is chosen to participate in a second year of intensive study at the School of
Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, focusing on military history and the
art of war, computerized war games, research, and doctrinal writing.

22. Army officers selected for command at battalion and higher levels attend pre-
command courses in preparation for these demanding assignments. The
Noncommissioned Officer Education System equivalent of CGSC and pre-command
courses is the Sergeants Major Academy. This final stage of NCOES prepares highly
qualified senior NCOs for service as Command Sergeants Major and as senior staff
assistants.

23. Attendance at one of the Senior Service Colleges is the final stage of OPME.
Emphasis is on strategic planning, policy, national security decision-making, and joint and
combined military operations. Some officers pursue Senior Service College Fellowship
studies at leading universities such as Harvard and Georgetown, at the NATO Defense
College, and at interdepartmental courses such as the Advanced Operational Studies
program, the Defense Systems Management College, or the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.

(a) College of Naval Command and Staff, Newport, Rhode Island

(b) College of Naval Warfare, Newport, Rhode Island
(c) Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Air War
College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AlabamaMarine Corps Command and Staff
College, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia
(d) Marine Corp War College, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia
(e) Army’s Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
(f) Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
(g) Joint Special Operations University (JSOU)

Jt Training & Exercise

24. Joint Training Deputy Directorate Program Management Activities. Deputy

Directorate Program Management Activities (DD PMA) provides program and training policy
management for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the training
enterprise in support of joint readiness. DD PMA is comprised of two divisions. The Policy
and Programs Division (PPD) develops and maintains CJCS Joint Training Policies and
publications, administers the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), administers
security cooperation authorities relevant to exercises and training (e.g., 10 U.S.C sect 321)
and notifies the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense of significant
military exercises. The Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement and Training
Transformation (CE2T2) Division provides program management of the CE2T2 program,
and is the primary interface to combatant command, Service, and Joint Staff J-7 CE2T2
stakeholders for all program related activities. These responsibilities include governance,
program planning, budget execution, program assessment, program reporting, and process
improvement.

25. The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the Global Force Management
Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the
Unified Command Plan (UCP) are the principal sources of guidance for CCMD steady-state
campaign, contingency, and posture planning efforts, which inform subsequent
development of supporting joint training programs. The GEF promulgates strategic planning
guidance to reflect both desired regional/functional objectives as well as contingency
planning guidance. The GEF directs the development of campaign and contingency plans
for Geographic Combatant Commands and Functional Combatant Commands.

26. The GEF supports Military Departments, CSAs, and the NGB development of
campaign support plans (CSP) to organize and prioritize their actions in support of CCMDs.
The campaign plan (CP) becomes the mechanism for organizing, integrating, and
prioritizing the campaign; specifically all activities undertaken and resources applied by the
CCMD to include training and exercise events. These activities are designed to sustain
peace and security under conditions that promote U.S. national security interests or set the
conditions for military success if deterrence fails. Specifically they are designed to ensure
the survival of the nation; prevent catastrophic attack against U.S. territory; secure the
global economic system; ensure the security, confidence, and reliability of our allies and
partners; protect U.S. citizens and property abroad; and preserve and extend universal
values.

27. The GEF and JSCP, through the priorities established by the commander in the CP,
provide exercise planners with clear guidance on priorities and objectives. As a result,
exercises should reflect GEF regional or functional priorities as well as campaign and
contingency plan objectives.

Joint Training System (JTS)

28. The JTS is a four-phase iterative set of processes that aligns joint training strategy
with assigned missions to produce trained and ready individuals, staffs, and units. Although
the application of the JTS is deliberate in concept, it is flexible in execution. The JTS assists
commanders at all echelons in defining the required level of individual and collective task
performance; determining the current level(s) of performance; executing training programs
to improve performance; and assessing those levels of performance relative to mission
capability requirements. The capabilities-based JTS set of processes is focused on training
requirements identification, planning, event execution, evaluation, and assessment;
however, the JTS is also a suitable means for harmonizing joint training with joint force
development requirements. The JTS four-phased approach is appropriate for aligning and
integrating valid joint concepts and solutions, along with lessons learned and emerging
doctrine, into joint training to address joint mission readiness as well as joint force
development requirements.

Importance of the Joint Training System (JTS). The JTS is designed to ensure the U.S.
Armed Forces are trained and prepared to employ a broad portfolio of military capabilities
that offer versatility across the full spectrum of mission requirements. More specifically, it
provides a capabilities-based method for aligning joint training programs with assigned
missions (GEF, GFMIG, JSCP, and UCP) consistent with command priorities, capabilities
(both current and proposed), and available resources (CP/CSP). a. The Joint Training
Information Management System (JTIMS) is a Webbased tool suite that, in conjunction with
the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) enterprise and the Joint Lessons
Learned Information System (JLLIS), provides a set of integrated information management
capabilities. These systems are used to identify, collect, analyze, store, and disseminate
the data required to support implementation of the JTS and sustain a command joint
training program. b. The DRRS enterprise consists of Joint, Service, and OSD
readinessfocused applications which collectively support readiness reporting and
assessment requirements. References to DRRS in this guide are generic, but for the most
part will refer to DRRS-Strategic which incorporates the majority of DRRS capabilities c.
The Joint Knowledge Online supports web-based individual and staff training and provides
a repository of digital training resources, training courses and small staff exercise scenarios
for individual training plans and exercise events.

Tenets of Joint Training

29. The following six basic tenets of joint training are intended as guiding principles to be
applied by commanders and agency directors in developing their joint training plans (JTP).

(a) Joint Doctrine. Effective joint training is based on joint doctrine. Joint doctrine
establishes the fundamentals of joint operations and provides guidance on how best
to employ U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint
doctrinal publications describe standard procedures and establish uniform
operational methods based on a common terminology. This baseline assists
commanders in developing standards for joint training, exercises, and operations.

(b) Primary Trainers. Commanders and directors at all echelons are the primary
trainers and are responsible for preparing their command to accomplish assigned
missions. Commanders validate mission capability requirements and determine joint
 training requirements. Commanders implement the processes of the JTS, supported
by JTIMS, to plan, develop, execute effective joint training events, and evaluate joint
training audience performance.

(c) Mission Focus. Commanders and directors will ensure their joint training
programs are focused on supported CCMD missions and their training requirements
are derived from their assessment of current capability against the mission capability
requirements established in each organization’s joint/agency mission-essential task
list (J/AMETL). The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) provides the library of approved
joint mission tasks. CCMDs, Services, RC, NGB, CSAs, and the Joint Staff must
select the Universal Joint Tasks (UJT) that become their mission-essential tasks
(METs) from the UJTL to communicate their capability requirements. A successful
training program can be achieved when commanders and directors at every level
consciously focus their training on METs. All personnel and components shall train
on their METs to commander established conditions and standards to provide the
required capabilities that enable commanders to execute effectively their mission
responsibilities.

(d) Realistic Training. Train the way you intend to operate. Joint training must be
based on relevant conditions and realistic standards. Training shall resemble the
conditions of actual operations to the maximum extent possible and use existing
operational information networks. Commanders should also feel free to explore
recommended alternative ways to accomplish anticipated missions. An element of
realistic training, especially for the most senior leaders in the command is the
realistic portrayal of leaders and echelons above the command to improve realism
and engagement of the command’s senior leaders in joint training events.

(e) Centralize Planning and Decentralize Execution. In military operations,

centralized planning and decentralized execution provides organizational flexibility.
Decisions are made where and when necessary by subordinates, consistent with
available resources and the senior commander’s intentions, priorities, and mission
objectives. Training methods and modes must mirror operational techniques. The
intent is to apply available resources with enough flexibility to optimize training
efficiency.

(f) Link Training Assessment to Readiness Assessment. Ultimately, the

purpose of joint training is to improve capability and joint readiness to perform
operational missions. Commanders and their staffs use joint training assessment
data to support readiness assessment in DRRS. Once assessments are approved in
JTIMS, they migrate to DRRS and are made available in the DRRS mission
assessment function to synchronize and link to readiness assessments.

Joint Training System (JTS) In Perspective.

30. Throughout history, military training has evolved with the nature of the strategic
environment. The case can be made that U.S. and allied forces fought jointly during WWII
and previous conflicts. However, they did so out of necessity but not necessarily design, in
order to bring the greatest amount of force to the enemy in the most efficient manner
possible. Training to fight jointly did not come to full fruition in the U.S. military until the
1990s. Following the Operation Desert Storm after action review, the Chairman and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff determined the need to institutionalize a “mission-to-task”
(requirementsbased) training system aimed at improving joint readiness. CJCS policy and
guidance directed the evolution of joint training from events-based training to requirements-
based training that is embodied in the four-phase JTS. The JTS was initiated by the
Chairman in FY 1994, fully implemented in the CCMDs in 1998, and directed for DoD-wide
implementation in 2004. The JTS is now a capabilities-based system, having evolved in
consonance with other key DoD systems as national security and national military
strategies took on a capabilities-based construct.

Commander’s/Director’s Responsibilities

31. As a commander or agency director, what are your responsibilities with regard to
joint or agency training and where can command or agency emphasis be placed with best
results? The following guidelines identify those areas where commanders and directors
have specific responsibilities. These responsibilities will be stressed throughout this guide
to show where the commander or director has specific input as well as overall
responsibility. Additional details and guidance are found in references a, b and c.

(a) Designate a staff office of primary responsibility for joint training and ensure
the JTS is employed to manage training within the command.

(b) Provide authoritative direction on all aspects of joint training to subordinate

commands and forces to include requirements for J/AMETL and JTP development.

(c) Annually review the J/AMETL and update in DRRS.

(d) Review and assess the adequacy of task linkages between command
J/AMETL and those of assigned and supporting forces.

(e) Provide commander’s and/or director’s training guidance to initiate JTP

development and refine, as necessary, throughout the development process.

(f) Approve and publish JTP annually.

(g) Consider resources available to meet joint/agency training requirements with

focus on lower cost training modes and use of distributed joint training enablers to
achieve multiple cross-CCMD joint training objectives. Initiate prioritization of
resource needs.
 (h) Evaluate the performance of the training audience in achieving task standards
in every training event. Additionally, evaluate the effectiveness of training events in
achieving training objectives.

(i) Identify, validate, and track observations that apply across the Joint Force for
resolution within the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP).

(j) Assess the command’s ability to meet J/AMETL standards. Monthly, assess
the command’s proficiency using the results of training events in JTIMS, real-world
operations, experimental events, lessons learned in JLLIS, and security cooperation
activities, and report MET readiness in DRRS.

(k) Identify and report in DRRS, JLLIS, and JTIMS any program or resource
shortfalls and the impact these shortfalls have on the command’s and/or agency’s
ability to accomplish its joint/agency training requirements.

32. The JTS goals are to improve the joint readiness of joint forces; to improve the
interoperability of units; and to achieve an integrated training effort that facilitates unified
action.

(a) Improve Joint Readiness

(b) Improve Interoperability
(c) Unified Action

33. JCS exercises contribute significantly to the training and readiness of U.S. military
forces. They are a principal means of providing both interservice training and combined
training with allied forces. They also provide excellent opportunities to test the plans and
doctrine U.S. Forces will employ in the event of war. The exercises' contributions to our
forces' readiness are demonstrated by the following statement, given by former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown, before the Senate Committee on
Armed Services in 1977 hearings: "Joint training exercises are essential to the preparation
of U.S. Defense. * * * Unless operating forces are trained and evaluated jointly, total force
readiness cannot be achieved.

34. JCS has authorized the commanders of unified and specified commands to
schedule, plan, and conduct joint/ combined exercises. The unified and specified
commanders may hold exercises employing their own forces within their own respective
geographic areas of responsibility without referral to JCS. Their authority for JCS exercises
is similar, except that the commanders must coordinate exercise scheduling with JCS. The
JCS Exercise Program is, with a few exceptions, a collation of the JCS directed and
coordinated exercises included in the sponsoring unified and specified commands'
individual exercise programs. JCS is responsible for
 (a) providing the unified and specified commands procedural guidance for
developing and executing joint/combined exercises

(b) coordinating the scheduling of JCS directed and coordinated exercises within
established funding limitations

(c) approving the annual JCS Exercise Program for execution. In developing their
respective annual exercise programs, the unified and specified commands should
assess their needs for joint/combined exercises and structure their programs to
reflect the number and size of needed exercises. To do this, these commands must
examine their forces' readiness conditions, training requirements, and the plans and
doctrine that require testing and tailor their programs to these needs. Once exercise
needs are identified, all available alternatives for satisfying the needs --such as field
training exercise, command post exercise, or coordinated unilateral service
exercises L/ --should be examined. Finally the exercises deemed necessary should
be fully justified on the basis of the above studies.

35. JCS exercise program development guidance to the unified and specified commands
should incorporate the above conditions. Further, since JCS acts as the Secretary of
Defense's military staff for operational direction of unified and specified commands' forces
and is responsible for approving the annual JCS Exercise Program, To enable designers to
plan the exercises to satisfy identified requirements and provide benchmarks for effective
exercise evaluation, exercise objectives should be as specific, limited, and clearly defined
as possible. JCS exercises provide excellent opportunities for identifying and correcting
weaknesses and deficiencies in joint forces' readiness, plans, and doctrine. To take
maximum advantage of these opportunities, the exercises should be carefully and
methodically evaluated. Resulting lessons learned should be adequately addressed and
improvements incorporated into ongoing operations and subsequent exercises to preclude,
to the degree possible, their recurrence.

Spl Training and Exercise with Others.

Ser Year Exercise

No
1 2012 Cold Response. 16,000 troops. Norwegian-led in Norway in March.
2 2014 Atlantic Resolve. Four companies of U.S. forces (about 150 troops
each) rotate continuously throughout the year, deployed in Estonia,
Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. Also U.S. Air Force Joint Terminal Attack
Controller from the 2nd Air Support Operations Squadron out of Vilseck,
Germany.
3 2015 Dragoon Ride. Small operation connected with Atlantic Resolve.
4 Spring Storm (Siil, Hedgehog). 13,000 troops including 7,000
reservists. Article 5-type scenario in Estonia in May.[8]
5 2016 Air Component
 United States
Boeing B-52H Stratofortresses of the 2d Bomb Wing[9]
Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers[9]
General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons[9]Lockheed C-130
Herculeses[9]
Anaconda 2016. Polish-led exercises involving 31,000 military
personnel from 24 NATO and non-NATO countries, including 14,000
from the U.S., 12,000 from Poland and 800 from the UK.[10] Elements of
the NATO Response Force participated in the exercises.[11] Took place
from 7 June to 17 June.[11]
Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons and U.K aviation Task
Force operate in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.
6 2017 Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, U.S. 10th Combat
Aviation Brigade, a U.S. Army Aviation Brigade of 400 soldiers and, also
from the U.S., 3500 army troops, 87 tanks and 144 Bradley Fighting
Vehicles operated in Bulgaria, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.
Rapid Trident. 2500 personnel, including Canadian. Location: Ukraine.
7 2018 Exercise Trident Juncture 2018. 50,000 troops. Held
in Trøndelag, Oppland and Hedmark, Norway mainly in October–
November. Stated purpose was to train the NATO Response Force.
Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, a U.S. Army Aviation
Brigade and a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team operated in Eastern
Europe.
8 2019 Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, a U.S. Army Aviation
Brigade and a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team operated in Eastern
Europe.
9 2020 DEFENDER-Europe 20. U.S.-led multinational exercise including NATO
participation. Included 20,000 soldiers deployed directly from the U.S. to
Europe.[13]
Dynamic Mongoose 20. NATO-led. 29 June to 10 July 2020 in the High
North. Ships, submarines, aircraft and personnel from six Allied nations
(France, Germany, Norway, UK, Canada and U.S.) exercised off the
coast of Iceland for anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare
training. According to scientists, sonar anti-submarine trainings during
Dynamic Mongoose 20 resulted in disastrous consequences for the
population of whales in the North Atlantic. British zoologists have
recorded the death of at least 29 marine mammals over several weeks
across Europe that caused irreparable damage to the fragile marine
ecosystem.[14]
Cold Response. Suspended due to the pandemic.
Bomber Task Force. Strategic bomber mission held since 2018 for U.S.
integration with NATO allies.[15]
 Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, a U.S. Army Aviation
Brigade and a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team operated in Eastern
Europe.
Six U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bomber aircraft from the 5th
Bomb Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, arrived at RAF
Fairford, England on 22 August 2020 for a planned training mission
where the aircraft conducted theater and flight training across Europe
and Africa.[16]
On 4 September, the American B-52s entered the airspace of Ukraine
for the first time in history, where they made a long flight along the
borders of the Crimean peninsula.[17]
On 25 September, two U.S. bombers staged a mock attack run
on Kaliningrad, a Russian semi-exclave on the Baltic between Poland
and Lithuania, where Russia moved nuclear-capable missiles in 2018.
[18]
The flight path allowed the bombers effectively to fly a circle
around Kaliningrad. The simulated raid on the region was a test case of
neutralizing Russian missile systems.[19]
Altogether, in August-September 2020, two U.S. Air Force B-52
Stratofortress bomber aircraft, integrated with Norwegian F-35 and F-16
fighter aircraft as well as Norwegian frigates, flew over international
waters in the vicinity of the Norwegian Sea.[20]
10 2021 In 2021, NATO expected to conduct 95 NATO exercises and NATO
countries were expected to conduct 220 other national and multinational
exercises.[12] The NATO exercises were to include 24 land-focused
exercises, 24 air exercises, 9 maritime exercises and 20 multi-domain
exercises.

36. Other exercises were to be conducted to train specific functions such as cyber
defence, crisis response decision-making, Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear
defense, logistics, communications and medical activities. The exercises included the
following:

(a) Soldiers from the Rapid Response Forces Division in the NATO exercise
GREEN GRIFFIN 21 on Oct. 4, 2021 at Lehnin, Germany. GREEN GRIFFIN is an
annual NATO training exercise of NATO allies and partner forces. The exercise
involved elements from the U.S. Army’s 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, the
Bundeswehr's Rapid Response Forces Division, the Netherlands Air Force, and the
Romanian Army’s Mechanized Brigade.

(b) Griffin Force I 2021. Training of land component of NATO Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force in enablement and rapid military mobility, 18 - 20
January in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.[12]
(c) Defender-Europe 21. 30,000 troops.[21] Mid-March through June. Included
"nearly simultaneous operations across more than 30 training areas"
in Albania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Kosovo and other countries.

(d) Locked Shields 21. "One of the world's largest and most complex live cyber
defence exercises, hosted annually by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre
of Excellence... The exercise simulates responding to a massive cyber incident, and
includes strategic decision-making, legal and communication aspects. Held 1 - 30
April in Estonia.

(e) CAPABLE DEPLOYER 2021 – NATO Allied Force Interoperability Exercise.

Romania, 2 May to 23 May. Planned and coordinated by the Multinational Logistics
Center.

(f) Wind Spring 21. Romania, 2 May to 27 May. Joint and multinational NATO
military operations.

(g) Ramstein Ambition 21 – The NATO Electronic Warfare Force Integration

Programme with regional elements of NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence
System conducted through the Combined Air Operation Centre (CAOC), which took
place between 3 May and 14 May.

(h) Spring Storm. 14,000 troops, 11 May to 31 May in Estonia. "A large live
exercise of the Estonian Defence Forces with participation from NATO's Enhanced
Forward Presence battlegroups and other Allied forces."

(i) Breeze 21. Live exercise led by Bulgarian Navy from 11-19 July. Size: around
2500 people.

(j) Iron Wolf II 21. 4000 troops. Live exercise, 1-26 November in Lithuania to
train NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence.

(k) Atlantic Resolve. Several U.S. fighter squadrons, a U.S. Army Aviation
Brigade and a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team operated in Eastern Europe.

(l) Cold Response. Cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

(m) Neptune Strike 22 started in late January with aircraft carrier USS Harry S.
Truman and its battle group coming under NATO command for patrolling exercises in
the Mediterranean Sea.

(n) Cold Response 2022. 30,000 participants from 27 countries. Norwegian-led in

Norway starting 14 March expected to end in April.
Synergy & Synchronisation In Thinking, Planning and Action

37. Cross-Domain Synergy via the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP)
Planning blends the collective knowledge of the many diverse communities within the joint
staff into a single, coherent plan which accomplishes the JFCs’ missions. It transforms
national strategic objectives into activities by development of operational products that
include planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment,
and demobilization of joint forces. This flexible and adaptable process is applicable to
planners across all domains and mirrors Service planning processes.

38. Planning involves a combination of conceptual planning and detailed processes.

Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 recognizes this dynamic by describing the benefits of operational
art and design in chapter III before describing the JOPP in chapter IV. Conceptual planning
enables cross-domain and cross-functional collaboration which fosters innovative, cross-
domain solutions. Operational art and the application of operational design provide the
conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations.30 Detailed methods are used to
help provide form and function to the planning process. This section will look at how
conceptual planning can feed detailed planning through discussion, debate, and
brainstorming. These methods in combination assist the joint planner understand the
problem and to develop creative solutions.

39. JOPP is an orderly, analytical, structured process, which consists of a set of logical
steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the
best COA; and produce a plan or order.31 JOPP provides a proven process to organize the
work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop
plans that will appropriately address the problem. It focuses on defining the military mission
and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission.

40. Conceptual Planning. Conceptual planning, or “brainstorming,” occurs early, often,

and regularly throughout the planning process to generate as many different options for
solving the military problem as possible within the allocated time. Brainstorming sessions
should inspire creative thinking, encourage open discussion from all participants, and drive
consideration of many, wide-ranging options. They should assemble experts with differing
perspectives to account for all available capabilities and elicit novel approaches to solving
the problem prior to detailed planning. While less time and fewer planners may be available
for Crisis Action Planning (CAP), planners should 30 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2011), IV-1. 31 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, IV-
1. Joint Operational Planning integrates military actions with those of the other instruments
of national power in time, space, and purpose to achieve the specified objectives. Cross-
Domain Synergy via the JOPP 23 still attempt to allocate time for unstructured,
unconstrained thinking. Cyberspace, space, and SOF planners are particularly important
participants due to their expertise in employing these specialized capabilities. LNOs from
the U.S. interagency and foreign nations can add unique experiences. The range of
perspectives gained by including many different subject matter experts in the planning
process facilitates the development of cross-domain solutions. These conceptual sessions
will provide dividends to planners through exchanging knowledge, collaborating on like
ideas, and debating differences that can lead to innovative thought and solutions. The
results will assist planners during JOPP or CAP to create the best possible plan in support
of the JFC.

41. Detailed Planning. Joint operation planning occurs within the Adaptive Planning and
Execution (APEX) system, which is the department-level system of joint policies,
processes, procedures, and reporting structures. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Guide (CJCSG) 3130 Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework
defines APEX as “the Joint Capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically,
as circumstances require.” APEX is supported by communications and information
technology that is used by the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) worldwide
to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment,
redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Figure III-2
shows the JPEC members. All domain planners are members of the JPEC. Chapter 3 24
The JFC gains an understanding of the operational environment, defines the problem, and
develops an operational approach for the campaign or operation. JFCs communicate their
operational approach to their staff, subordinates, supporting commands, agencies, and
multinational/nongovernmental entities in their initial planning guidance. The JFC’s timely
communication with subordinates ensures their approach can be translated into executable
plans. This iterative process between the JFC’s maturing operational approach and the
development of the mission and concept of operations (CONOPS) through JOPP facilitates
the continuing development of possible COAs and their refinement into eventual CONOPS
and executable plans.

42. JOPP. Planners use JOPP to translate the creative thinking developed through
conceptual planning into a plan or order. It is a seven-step process that culminates with a
published operations order (OPORD) in CAP and results in an operations plan (OPLAN),
concept plan (CONPLAN), Base Plan, or commander estimate during contingency
planning.33 The JOPP starts with Mission Analysis (MA) followed by Course of Action
(COA) Development, COA Analysis, COA Comparison, and COA Selection and ends with
OPLAN production and rehearsals. Lead planners direct these efforts, and all supporting
planners analyze, simulate, exercise, and critique to produce the best plan. The resulting
plan should support the foreign and/or domestic theater campaign plan and global
synchronizing plans. The JOPP steps are provided at Figure III-3
43. Planning Initiation. “Joint operation planning begins when an appropriate authority
recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or
actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authority-the President, SecDef, or CJCS-initiates
planning by deciding to develop military options. The Guidance for Employment of Force
(GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Unified Command Plan (UCP), and related
strategic documents provide initial guidance for deliberate planning.”35 Planners from all
domains must understand the guidance in these documents.

44. JFCs and lead planners must integrate all domain planners (air, land, maritime,
space, and cyberspace) as soon as possible. It is particularly important to include space
and cyberspace planners due to the unique authority levels, requirements, processes, and
time-sensitivities associated with employment of their domain capabilities. Some space and
cyberspace employment options could require an inordinate amount of time to gain
approval for execution. JFCs and lead planners must understand the capabilities and
limitations early in the planning process.

45. Mission Analysis. Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and
purpose of the operation and allows the JFC to issue guidance. The first step is defining the
problem. It is the most difficult and the most important step. It involves diagnosing the
situation to focus on the real problem and not on its symptoms. Domain planners will
accomplish all the steps outlined in Figure III-4 for their domain. Planners should
understand that the steps do not necessarily happen sequentially. Although some activities
occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing of
information by the JFC and staff, particularly in a CAP situation. During mission analysis, it
is essential that the tasks (specified and implied) and their purposes are clearly stated to
ensure planning encompasses all requirements; limitations (restraints-cannot do, or
constraints-must do) on actions that the JFC or subordinate forces may take are
understood; and the correlation between the JFC’s mission and intent and those of higher
and other commanders is understood. It is at the end of the mission analysis process that
all domain planners produce their staff estimates.
46. If planners fail to account for each of the domains - air, land, maritime, space, and
cyberspace - staff estimates will be incomplete and the resulting COAs, OPORDs, and
plans will be sub-optimal. Once mission analysis is complete; the JFC receives a mission
analysis brief. An example of how the brief might be structured is provided at Figure III-6.
Figure III-6: Example Mission Analysis Briefing.

47. Course of Action Development (COA Dev) . “A COA is a potential way (solution,
method) to accomplish the assigned mission. The staff develops COAs to provide unique
choices to the commander, all oriented on accomplishing the military end state. A good
COA accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance, provides flexibility to
meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations.
It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative.”39 Figure III-7 provides key
inputs and outputs for COA Dev. The products of mission analysis drive COA development.
Since the operational approach contains the JFC’s broad vision to solving the problem, the
role of COA development is to expand this concept with the additional details. These details
must describe who will take the action, what type of military action will occur, when the
action will begin, where the action will occur, why the action is required (purpose), how the
action will occur (method of employment of forces), and upon whom will the action be
directed. COAs must be substantially distinguishable from each other. The JFC’s
involvement in the early operational design process can help ensure that only viable options
are considered. If time and personnel resources permit, different COAs could be developed
by different teams to ensure they are unique. During this step, planners screen the viable
options proposed during conceptual planning and further develop the COAs considered
acceptable, feasible, suitable, and distinct. Figure III-7 Course of Action Development
Inputs and Output. Bringing the capabilities of different domains together mandates that
planners from all domains participate and characterize the potential contributions and
limitations of their area of expertise. Cross-Domain Synergy via the JOPP 29 Figure III-8:
Course of Action Development40

48. Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming. COA analysis is the process of
closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that will allow the JFC and staff to
tentatively identify COAs that are valid, and then compare these COAs. The JFC and staff
analyze each tentative COA separately according to the JFC’s guidance. While time-
consuming, COA analysis should answer two primary questions: Is the COA feasible, and is
it acceptable? Key inputs and outputs of COA analysis are provided in Figure III-
8Wargaming is the primary means to conduct this analysis. Wargaming is a disciplined
process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation. The
process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy assets and
probable COAs; and characteristics of the physical environment. When time permits,
planners should wargame each critical event within a proposed COA using the action,
reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction.
Wargaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be allocated more time
than any other step. At a minimum, each retained COA should be wargamed against both
the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs. When considering these enemy COAs,
the analysis must consider all domains to ensure JFCs have a complete understanding of
the COA they approve for execution.

49. Course of Action Comparison. COA comparison is a subjective process in which

planners study each COA independently and evaluate/compare it against a set of criteria
established by the staff and JFC. The goal is to identify and recommend the COA that has
the highest probability of success against the enemy COA that is of the most concern to the
JFC. Figure III-9 depicts inputs and outputs for COA comparison. Figure III-10: Course of
Action Comparison42 42 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation
Planning, IV-37. To accurately consider all aspects of the mission, each domain must be
adequately represented for friendly forces, adversary forces, and wargame control groups.
Cross-Domain Synergy via the JOPP 31 JFCs modify the criteria list as required. Normally,
staff officers use a matrix, such as the example in Figure III-10 to compare COAs with
respect to their functional areas. Figure III-11: Staff Estimator Matrix (Intelligence Estimate)
50. COA Approval. In this step, the staff briefs the COA analysis and comparison
results, then recommends a COA to the JFC. The COA brief include the following: a.
Prepare and present the COA decision briefing. b. Commander selects/modifies the COA.
c. Refine Selected COA. d. Prepare the Commander’s Estimate.
51. Plan/Order Development. From the JFC’s COA selection, the staff must now
produce an OPLAN or OPORD. Deliberate planning will produce an OPLAN, while CAP
typically will result in an OPORD. The JFC and staff, in collaboration with mission partners
and planners from across all domains, accomplish plan/order development. The JOPP
transforms the selected COA into a Concept of the Operations (CONOPS) that
accomplishes the JFC’s mission. It describes how the actions of the joint force components
and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish
the mission, including branches and sequels. The CJCSM 3130.03 series that provide
detailed guidance on CONOPS content and format.

Think Tanks

52. You can think of a think tank as a research university blessed with a complete
absence of students and where, as a consequence, none of its professors has to teach---all
they have to do is research, research, research. At last count, the United States had 1,984
think tanks---nearly a third of the world's total. Few of the think tanks are as follows:-

(a) American Foreign Policy Council Issues covered include: Aid to the Former
USSR; Missile Threats & Defenses; Espionage, the KGB & the Russian Security
Services; Reform in Russia; U.S.-China Relations, and Chemical Weapons.

(b) Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies Funded by the U.S. Department of
Defense.

(c) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Non-Proliferation Project "An

internationally recognized source of information and analysis on weapons of mass
destruction" (from the website).

(d) Cato Institute - Defense Studies Maintains an extensive publications program

on topics such as military spending, NATO, and international security.

(e) The Center for Defense Information A private, nongovernmental, and

"independent monitor" of the military. Maintains the Arms Trade Database.

(f) Center for International Policy "Promoting a U.S. foreign policy based on
peace, international cooperation, demilitarization and respect for basic human
rights."(from the site) Topics include Cuba, Arms Trade, and Demilitarization.

(g) Center for Nonproliferation Studies "The world's largest non-governmental

organization devoted to combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction."(from
the site) Resources by subject and by region.

(h) Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Topics ranging from
Defense and Preventive Diplomacy to Infectious Disease.
(i) Center for the Study of Technology and Society A major focus of the Center is
National Security.
(j) Commonwealth Institute A local (Cambridge) public policy research
organization with current projecs in defense and military affairs.

(k) Council on Foreign Relations - National Security Publishes Foreign Affairs, a

leading journal on global issues.

(l) Federation of American Scientists (FAS). The FAS is a widely respected

organization of scientists concerned with arms control issues. see also Arms Control
Agreements

(m) Foreign Policy in Focus "A "think tank without walls" that functions as an
international network of more than 650 policy analysts and advocates."(from the site)

(n) Global Focus - Flashpoints Provides country reports on current conflicts,

ethnic violence, terrorism, nationalism, human rights, and foreign policy issues.

(o) Henry L. Stimson Center An independent, nonprofit, public policy institute

committed to finding and promoting innovative solutions to the security challenges
confronting the United States and other nations in the twenty-first century.

(p) Heritage Foundation Openly conservative in its views, the objective of

Heritage is to present to policy-makers and opinion leaders, and especially members
of Congress and their staff, factual and timely information on major issues of the day.
'Key issues' include matters of both domestic and foreign policy.

(q) Hoover Institution (Stanford University) Publishes research on political issues,

foreign relations and diplomacy, economic issues, and security and
defense. Publishes Essays in Public Policy

(r) Institute for Global Communication (IGC)

(s) Manages a number of 'Nets', including PeaceNet. Choose 'search documents'
to find full-text material.

(t) International Institute for Strategic Studies The IISS publishes Strategic
Surveys focusing on trouble spots around the world. It also issues a World Directory
of Strategic Studies Centres.

(u) International Relations and Security Network (ISN) ISN hosts (with SIPRI)
Facts on International Relations and Security Trends (FIRST), a free-of-charge
database on weapons, political systems, armed forces and peace-keeping activities.
 (v) National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START)
(w) The National Security Archive "The National Security Archive is an
independent non-governmental research institute and library located at The George
Washington University in Washington, D.C. The Archive collects and publishes
declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)."
(from the site)

(x) Rand The publications of the Rand Corporation frequently focus on national
security issues of all sorts. This Web site provides a searchable index of documents
produced by Rand. Includes, citations, abstracts and Rand accession numbers.
Boston University currently owns aproximately 1500 of these publications.
(y) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) SIPRI was
established as an international independent research institute "to conduct scientific
research on questions of conflict and co-operation of importance for international
peace and security, with the aim of contributing to an understanding of the conditions
for peaceful solutions of international conflicts and for a stable peace."

(z) Terrorism Research Center ”an independent institute dedicated to the

research of terrorism, information warfare and security, critical infrastructure
protection, homeland security, and other issues of low-intensity political violence and
gray-area phenomena’. (from the site)

(aa) World Policy Institute Examines critical world problems in the United States
and abroad. Organzed by 'research project', such as 'Arms Trade'. The 'North
America Project' explores issues of democracy, human rights, and environmental
quality in the context of North American economic integration.

(bb) U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute The Strategic Studies
Institute (SSI) is the primary research faculty of the U.S. Army War College. The
Strategic Studies Institute identifies international security issues likely to affect the
United States, its friends, and potential adversaries; analyzes national security
issues and, through the timely publication of studies and conduct of conferences,
informs Army leaders of policy options; and provides the U.S. Army with a source of
ideas, criticism, innovative approaches, and independent analyses. Of particular
value is this site's 'Hotlinks to Military and Strategy Related Sites'.

MATERIAL

Mil Tech & dependence

53. Because the U.S. has a technological culture, the U.S. military has become
technology dependent. This dependence has made the military more vulnerable and has
plunged the DoD into a perpetual cycle of purchasing technology to fill shortfalls resulting
from reductions in manpower, technology evolutions, and to maintain the leading edge.
Because technology is increasing in per-unit cost, the DoD purchases fewer items which
increases the impact of minimal losses in combat. It is feasible that while technology can
make warfighting more efficient, the military can become so technology dependent that the
organization no longer recognizes that technology has made it more vulnerable
strategically, operationally, and tactically. The United States military is going through a
cyclic downsizing of force strength when all the people are gone, where does the military
turn to backfill human capacity This thesis will address three fallacies associated with
overdependence on technology in the U.S. military first, that technology reduces manpower
requirements, second that it is less expensive to use technology in lieu of humans in
warfighting. and finally, that incorporating technology in operations ensures a decisive
victory in today and future conflicts. Reversing technology dependence requires better
integration, complementary technologies among the services, decreasing the innovation to
fielding timeline, and practice in degraded technology environments.

54. The United States has been developing a culture of technology for centuries.
Technology can make processes more efficient and less costly. In the 18th Century, Eli
Whitney patented the cotton gin, making cotton harvesting more efficient and profitable, and
revolutionized manufacturing with the development of interchangeable parts.5 In the 19th
Century, Henry Ford created the assembly line to streamline vehicle production.6
Contemplate whether or not the current households of America would be willing to revert
back to fireplaces as the sole. Technology is inseparably woven into American culture. A
technological culture adapts and incorporates technology in such a way that retrograding is
very difficult. The U.S. military is a melting pot of cultures including the technological
cultures introduced by each individual military member. This is a strength but can also be a
weakness. Because the majority of members of the U.S. military are raised in the
technological culture of the U.S., they bring varying levels of technology dependence to the
military. Military Strategy in Technological Culture Strategic culture is not as easy to define;
applying strategy to technology is even more daunting. According to Johnston, a strategic
culture consists of “predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or
formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical,
political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.”

55. Strategic culture is also defined as, “an amalgam of a country’s set of shared beliefs,
assumptions, and narratives that shape its strategic decision-making process.” The United
States does not have a stated strategy or direction for technological development despite
the National Security Strategy (NSS) stating, “We continue to set the pace for science,
technology, and innovation in the global economy.” In the National Military Strategy (NMS)
2015, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) states, “The United States is the
world’s strongest nation, enjoying unique advantages in technology, energy, alliances,
partnerships, and demographics. However, these advantages are being challenged…
emerging technologies are impacting the calculus of deterrence and conflict management
by increasing uncertainty and compressing decision space.” However, the NSS offers no
solution to this stated problem. Evidence of a technological culture in the United States is
reflected in the governing strategic documents of today. Numerous strategy documents also
cite “technological advantage” as an objective. Although not explicitly stated, accepting that
technology is an answer, and in some cases the answer, technological culture is driving
technology dependence in the military. Many would question whether the United States will
enter into any conflict without the use of drones, 5th generation fighters, stealth bombers, or
computers. U.S. technological advantage is astounding. However, that advantage is
tenuous as extremists and non-state actors challenge U.S. resolve to fight as the cost-
benefit analysis tips the scales where the cost of employing technology may outweigh the
results. Technology is expensive and when adversaries do not have the capital to spend,
they turn to inexpensive and innovative ways to gain the asymmetric advantage. For
example, terrorists could use a $3 sticker to defeat million dollar precision targeting efforts.

56. Vulnerability Assessment in Technological Culture Some would argue that

technology increases efficiency, increases effectiveness, and decreases vulnerabilities. The
introduction of technology into a complex system can create more problems than it solves.
Vulnerability is defined in three environments: intrinsic, internal, 16 and external
vulnerabilities. The definition of risk in Joint Pub 5.0 and the arguments presented by Bijker
on vulnerabilities in technological cultures reinforce the notion that the U.S. has a
technological culture and thereby is vulnerable to technology dependence. Dr. Jack
Douglas’ research illustrates that the proliferation of technology has generated a reliance
that threatens the American way of life. Douglas argues that the widespread use of
technology has an effect on American values, politics, and society as a whole. Consider the
use of remotely piloted aircraft to attack targets in locations thousands of miles from where
the operators sit. The initial use of unmanned aircraft spawned heated debates over the
ethics of their use in war; however, today drones are no longer for military use only.
Recently enthusiasts flying drones all over the U.S. has forced the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to institute policies concerning drone operations in proximity to busy
airspaces. Drone technology has become smaller and less expensive and drone uses have
expanded to include farmers surveying their fields and sports enthusiasts recording their
own athletic adventures. Using unmanned machines in war causes an ethical dilemma in
warfighting that is still under scrutiny. Some have associated the surgical strike capability of
drones to assassination. Over the past 15 years of drone warfare, ethical challenges have
begun to slowly redefine traditional American values concerning the employment of robots
in war. Keeping an American Airman from harm’s way in Nevada while killing an adversary
combatant on the other side of the planet is now seen as acceptable. Despite Douglas’
1971 statement, “there is still time to prevent the rise of this technical tyranny,” it could be
argued that the U.S. has become even more technology reliant than even Douglas foresaw.
While using drones may appear to reduce vulnerability to U.S. service members, it actually
increases the vulnerability of the warfighting system. If a drone loses its satellite link,
communication with its handler, or has a mechanical malfunction, the loss of the asset can
have tactical, operational, and strategic ramifications. The loss of the RQ-170 drone in Iran
in December 2011 will likely have significant military, scientific, and political impact for years
to come. Additionally, vulnerabilities are introduced into the complex system as well. For
example, reducing satellite bandwidth to manned assets in order to facilitate the up-link and
down-link frequencies of unmanned systems makes the manned assets more vulnerable to
communication exploitation. Aircraft are given limited radio spectrum usage, usually
resorting to using ultra-high-frequency (UHF) radios instead of secure beyond line-of-sight
(BLOS) satellite radios. Slower moving, less maneuverable, and hard to see drones into the
airspace also increases the collision risk to manned aircraft flying in proximity to unmanned
aircraft. There are significant technical requirements to fly, exploit, and disseminate the data
coming from the drone’s sensors and these channels are now vulnerable to enemy
exploitation, influence, and attack. So while the lives of one or two servicemen in Nevada
are no longer at risk in the warfighting environment, the lives of others, the exploitation of
information, and the vulnerability of the complex warfighting system has logically increased.

57. Technological Culture Model Overview Models are helpful in taking complex
concepts and simplifying them to facilitate understanding. Models can also help illustrate a
difficult conceptual problem. Visualize the perpetual nature of current military technological
culture. Every model must have a starting place; for the Technological Culture Model the
starting place is in requirements identification. Requirements generation can drive
innovation. The model then walks the reader through technology development, technology
procurement, and finally fielding new technologies. When the military fields new technology,
it oftentimes does not integrate seamlessly into the system without requiring adjustments.
The introduction of new technology often generates new requirements, especially if the
technology is not fully integrated or interoperable within the system. Because of
interoperability difficulties, it is not uncommon for systems to adjust while incorporating
newer technology in order to gain a technological advantage or to meet some tactical or
operational end. The four main sections of the Perpetual Technology Model are first, an
observed need, requirement, or presumptive anomaly that begins the cycle. Second,
innovation leading to technology research and development through the United States
military laboratories or through the military or private industrial complex leads to technology
development. Third, once the technology is designed and developed, it must be budgeted,
purchased, leased, or contracted. Fourth, after the technology is acquired, it must be tested
and evaluated to determine how, when, and where it will be fielded. Once fielded, leaders,
planners and tacticians determine the optimum operational integration strategy and weave
the new technology amongst multiple other technologies attempting to achieve
interoperability. When the military fields new technology, it disrupts the complex operational
environment and oftentimes generates new requirements to allow the incorporation of the
newly fielded technology into the operational schema. Many of the technological disruptions
in the operational or tactical environment are the result of vulnerability mitigation efforts
inherent to the integration of new technology and the stress induced on the complex system
of the battlefield. Mitigating the induced vulnerabilities generates further adjustments or new
requirements and the perpetual cycle re-starts. Sometimes a “presumptive anomaly” drives
a new requirement. Other times, disruptive technology will interrupt the cycle driving hasty
requirements and rapid innovation. Ultimately, the Technological Culture Model provides a
framework for visualizing how the DoD functions in a perpetual technology cycle based on
the U.S. technological culture. The model does not illustrate the fact that there are intrinsic,
internal, and external vulnerabilities within every new technology and once introduced into a
system compounding vulnerabilities can emerge. While technology may temporarily fill gaps
in capability, relying too heavily on technology will increase the overall vulnerability of the
system. In an environment of diminishing fiscal resources, it is imperative that the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) recognize that
the United States military is caught in a perpetual technology cycle creating greater
vulnerabilities at the strategic level, while solving technology challenges at the tactical level.
The dependency on technology that is being generated in today’s military carries strategic
risk. In the 21st century warfighting environment, satellite communication (SATCOM) radios
or internet telephones shrink the connection between the tactical level of war and the
strategic level. Because the operational gap that used to separate the two environments
has shrunk, tactical actions can have strategic impact. For example, the loss of one F-22
fighter aircraft will diminish the total fleet by .55% whereas the loss of a single F-16 aircraft
only diminishes the fleet by .001%. Some would argue that this difference in force strength
is because one F-22 has the technical capacity and total cost of up to eight F-16s. If that
were true, reversing that logic would mean that losing one F-22 will have 8-times the impact
of losing one F-16. Because the DoD has to work within the constraints of the budget, and
because technology is very expensive, keeping the fleet on the leading edge creates
greater vulnerability to the system as a whole because the smaller fleet cannot absorb the
potential loss of aircraft nor the loss of capabilities that one aircraft brings to the fight.

58. Force Multipliers. Some common force multipliers are:

(a) Morale
(b) Mobility
(c) Fearsome reputation
(d) Technology
(e) Geographical features
(f) Weather
(g) Recruitment through diplomacy
(h) Training and experience
(i) Military strategy, such as the Fabian strategy
(j) Military tactics, such as force concentration
(k) Intelligence
(l) Deception

59. Some factors may influence one another, e.g. enhanced technology improving
morale or geographical features allowing deception.

60. Aircraft carriers. Aircraft carriers, such as the USS Gerald R. Ford, can carry more
than 75 aircraft with fuel and ammunition for all tasks that an aircraft carrier should need
like air to air, air to naval and air to ground missions. When deployed, aircraft carriers are a
massive force multiplier that can turn any engagement in favour of those that have the
aircraft carrier. Carriers can hold different type of aircraft to different usage meaning the
force multiplier can vary depending on the specific task at hand.
61. Tankers. Airborne tanker aircraft, such as the Boeing KC-135 are a very significant
force multiplier. They can carry fuel so bomber and fighter aircraft can take off loaded with
extra weapons instead of full fuel tanks. The tankers also increase the range and time
loitering within or near the target areas by off-loading fuel when it is needed. Tankers can
also be used to rapidly deploy fighters, bombers, SIGNET, Airborne Command Post, and
cargo aircraft from the United States to the areas where they are needed. The force
multiplier of a KC-135R can be anywhere from 1.5 to as much as 6 when used near the
target area.

62. Bombers. At one extreme, a stealth aircraft like the Northrop Grumman B-2
Spirit strategic bomber can attack a target without needing the large numbers of
escort fighter aircraft, electronic-warfare aircraft, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, and
other supporting aircraft that would be needed were conventional bombers used against the
same target.

63. Precision-guided munitions (PGM) give an immense multiplication. The Thanh

Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam had been only mildly damaged by approximately 800 sorties
by aircraft armed with conventional Unguided bombs, but had one of its spans destroyed by
a 12-plane mission, of which 8 carried laser-guided bombs. Two small subsequent
missions, again with laser-guided bombs, completed the destruction of this target. Precision
guided munitions are one example of what has been called the Revolution in Military
Affairs. In World War II, British night bombers could hit, at best, an area of a city.

64. Modern PGMs commonly put a bomb within 3–10 meters of its target (see Circular
error probable), and most carry an explosive charge significant enough that this uncertainty
is effectively voided. See the use of heavy bombers in direct support of friendly troops in
Afghanistan, using the technique of Ground-Aided Precision Strike.

65. Fighter Combat. Fighter aircraft coordinated by an AWACS control aircraft, so that
they can approach targets without being revealed by their own radar, and who are assigned
to take specific targets so that duplication is avoided, are far more effective than an
equivalent number of fighters dependent on their own resources for target acquisition.

66. In exercises between the Indian and US air forces, the Indian pilots had an
opportunity to operate with AWACS control, and found it extremely effective.[8] India has
ordered AWACS aircraft, using Israeli Phalcon electronics on a Russian airframe, and this
exercise is part of their preparation. Officer and pilot comments included "definitely was a
force multiplier. Giving you an eye deep beyond you". "We could pick up incoming targets
whether aircraft or missiles almost 400 kilometers away. It gives a grand battle coordination
in the air".
67. Creating Local Forces. The use of small numbers of specialists to create larger
effective forces is another form of multiplication. The basic A Team of US Army Special
Forces is a 12-man unit that can train and lead a company-sized unit (100–200 men) of
local guerrillas.

68. Deception. Deception can produce the potential effect of a much larger force. The
fictitious First United States Army Group (FUSAG) was portrayed to the World War II
Germans as the main force for the invasion of Europe. Operation Bodyguard[9] successfully
gave the impression that FUSAG was to land at the Pas de Calais, convincing the Germans
that the real attack at Normandy was a feint. As a result of the successful deception, the
Normandy force penetrated deeply, in part, because the Germans held back strategic
reserves that they thought would be needed at the Pas de Calais, against what was a
nonexistent force. FUSAG's existence was suggested by the use of decoy vehicles that the
Allies allowed to be photographed, fictitious radio traffic generated by a small number of
specialists, and the Double Cross System.[10] Double Cross referred to turning all surviving
German spies in the UK into double agents, who sent back convincing reports that were
consistent with the deception programs being conducted by the London Controlling Section.

Strength of AF

69. Overview

70. Manpower
71. Airpower

72. Land Forces

73. Naval Forces

74. Manpower - Values partly derived from the CIA World Factbook. Some values may
be estimated.

75. Airpower - Values derived from multiple sources. Total Aircraft Strength value
includes both fixed-wing and rotorcraft platforms from all branches of service (at this time
UAVs are not included in the total). 'Attack' value constitutes purpose-built attack types.
'Transports' value includes only fixed-wing aircraft while all rotorcraft are represented under
the 'Helicopters' value. 'Special-Mission' value no longer includes aerial tankers which are
now covered in their own listing. For an in-depth look into the current air powers of the
world, consider "the World Directory of Modern Military Aircraft" [www.WDMMA.org -
external link].

76. Land Forces - Values derived from multiple sources. 'Tanks' value includes Main
Battle Tanks (MBTs), light tanks, and tank destroyers (no distinction being made between
track-over-wheel and all-wheeled types). 'Armored Vehicles' value includes APCs, IFVs,
MRAPs, and Armored Cars. 'Rocket Projectors' include only self-propelled forms.

77. Naval Forces - Values derived from multiple sources. 'Total Assets' value includes
all possible/available vessels including auxiliaries, which are not showcased individually.
'Aircraft Carriers' value includes only traditional carriers (both conventionally- and nuclear-
powered while Helicopter Carriers are now considered under their own listing. 'Submarines'
value includes both diesel-electric and nuclear-powered types. Landlocked nationd are not
penalized for the lack of a standing navy. For an in-depth look into the current naval powers
of the world, consider "the World Directory of Modern Military Warships"
[www.WDMMW.org - external link].

78. Natural Resources - Values derived from the CIA World Factbook or estimated in
some cases. Values presented as BBL (Barrel unit). Analysis concluded with these
assessments:

79. Army as “Marginal.” The Army’s score remains “marginal” in the 2022 Index. The
Army has sustained its commitment to modernizing its forces for great-power competition,
but its modernization programs are still in their development phase, and it will be a few
years before they are ready for acquisition and fielding. In other words, the Army is aging
faster than it is modernizing. It remains “weak” in capacity with only 62 percent of the force
it should have. However, 58 percent (18) of its 31 Regular Army BCTs are at the highest
state of readiness, thus earning a score of “very strong” and conveying the sense that the
service knows what it needs to do to prepare for the next major conflict. That said, its
capability score remains “marginal” given the age of its equipment and the size and maturity
of its modernization programs.

80. Navy as “Marginal,” Trending Toward “Weak.” The Navy’s current battle force
fleet of 296 ships and intensified operational tempo combine to reveal a service that is
much too small relative to its tasks, resulting in a capacity score of “weak,” which is
unchanged from the 2021 Index. It desperately needs a larger fleet of 400 ships, but current
and forecasted levels of funding will prevent this from occurring for the foreseeable future.
This has the unhappy effect of causing the service to age more rapidly than it can replace
older ships, thus making it easier for major competitors to achieve technological parity. It
also has made it difficult for the Navy to conduct the training essential to achieving high
levels of readiness. Consequently, the Navy is rated “marginal” on a downward slope to
“weak” in readiness.

81. Air Force as “Weak.” This is a downgrade from an assessment of “marginal” in

the 2021 Index. Though the Air Force possesses 86 percent of the combat aircraft that
this Index recommends, public reporting of the mission readiness and physical location of
these planes would make it difficult for the Air Force to respond rapidly to a crisis.
Additionally, the need to source these aircraft from all locations for a single major fight
would likely preclude a response to any other major combat action. Modernization
programs are generally healthy, but the advanced age of key aircraft in the Air Force’s
inventory is driving the service to retire planes faster than they can be replaced, leading to a
capability score of “marginal.” The service also lost ground in readiness compared with the
preceding year. A score of “weak” in this area is the result of a shortage of pilots and flying
time that implies a lack of effort or focused intent given the general reduction in operational
deployments as U.S. actions overseas have ebbed.

82. Marine Corps as “Strong.” The score for the Marine Corps was raised to “strong”
from “marginal” for two reasons: (1) because the 2021 Index changed the threshold for
capacity, lowering it from 36 infantry battalions to 30 battalions in acknowledgment of the
Corps’ argument that it is a one-war force that also stands ready for a broad range of
smaller crisis-response tasks, and (2) because of the Corps’ extraordinary efforts to
modernize (which improves capability) and enhance its readiness during the assessed
year. However, in the absence of additional funding in FY 2022, the Corps intends to
reduce the number of its battalions even further from 24 to 21, and this reduction, if
implemented, would harm the Corps’ overall ability to perform the role it has set for itself:
enabling the projection of naval power into heavily contested combat environments. The
service has moved ahead aggressively with a redesign of its operating forces and the
acquisition of new warfighting tools, but it remains hampered by old equipment and
problematic funding.

83. Space Force as “Weak.” The Space Force was formally established on December
20, 2019, as a result of an earlier proposal by President Trump and legislation passed by
Congress. The 2021 Index provided an overview of the new service, explaining its mission,
capabilities, and challenges, but did not offer an assessment. With an additional year to
gain more insight, the 2022 Index scores the USSF as “weak” in all measured areas. The
service has done quite well in transitioning missions from the other services without
interruption in support, but it does not have enough assets to track and manage the
explosive growth in commercial and competitor-country systems being placed into orbit.
The majority of its platforms have exceeded their planned life span, and modernization
efforts to replace them are slow and incremental. The force also lacks defensive and
offensive counter-space capabilities.

84. Nuclear Capability as “Strong” but Trending Toward “Marginal” or even

“Weak.” This is the opposite of the conclusion reached in the 2021 Index, which reported a
trend from “marginal” to “strong.” The grade of “strong” recognizes the Trump
Administration’s commitment to reversing the decline in the U.S. nuclear enterprise and the
Biden Administration’s decision to sustain the commitment to modernization of the entire
nuclear enterprise—warheads, platforms, command and control, personnel, and
infrastructure—and allocate needed resources accordingly. Without this commitment, this
overall score will degrade rapidly to “weak.” Progress in modernization efforts, combined
with assurances from senior leaders that the forces remain reliable, warrants a more
optimistic assessment than we have been able to provide in previous editions. That being
said, this score of “strong” with a conditional trend toward “marginal” or “weak” reflects a
greater risk of a degradation in nuclear deterrence than has been seen in the recent past.
Current forces are assessed as reliable today, but nearly all components of the nuclear
enterprise are at a tipping point with respect to replacement or modernization and have no
margin left for delays in schedule. Failure of on-time appropriations and lack of
Administration support for nuclear modernization could lead to a rapid decline in this
portfolio to “weak” in future editions.
85. In the aggregate, the United States’ military posture continues to be rated
“marginal” and features both positive and negative trends: progress in bringing some
new equipment into the force, filling gaps in manpower, and rebuilding stocks of munitions
and repair parts alongside worrisome trends in force readiness, declining strength in key
areas like trained pilots, and continued uncertainty across the defense budget that is now
having a negative effect both on major acquisition programs and on installation-level repair
capabilities. The 2022 Index concludes that the current U.S. military force is likely
capable of meeting the demands of a single major regional conflict while also
attending to various presence and engagement activities but that it would be very hard-
pressed to do more and certainly would be ill-equipped to handle two nearly simultaneous
MRCs—a situation that is made more difficult by the generally weak condition of key
military allies. The presidential decision to withdraw forces from Afghanistan might provide
some breathing room for force recovery but only if other operational demands do not retask
the military services. In general, the military services continue to prioritize readiness and
have seen some improvement over the past few years, but modernization programs,
especially in shipbuilding, continue to suffer as resources are committed to preparing for the
future and recovering from 20 years of operations. In the case of the Air Force, some of its
limited acquisition funds are being spent on aircraft of questionable utility in high-threat
scenarios while R&D receives a larger share of funding than efforts meant to replace quite
aged aircraft are receiving. As observed in the 2021 Index, the services have also
normalized reductions in the size and number of military units, and the forces remain well
below the level needed to meet the two-MRC benchmark. The Marine Corps’ plan to reduce
its size even further so that it can redirect savings in manpower toward the capability
modernization that it views as essential for success in future combat provides a stark
example of the consequences of the government’s underinvestment in defense. Congress
and the Administration took positive steps to stabilize funding in the latter years of the
Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). This mitigated the worst effects of BCA-restricted
funding, but sustained investment in rebuilding the force to ensure that America’s armed
services are properly sized, equipped, trained, and ready to meet the missions they are
called upon to fulfill will be critical.
86. As currently postured, the U.S. military continues to be only marginally able to
meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests.

Eqpt Profile – State of Art/ Current and obsolescence

87. The FEDERAL SUPPLY CLASSIFICATION (FSC) and its Indexes have been
developed and adopted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for use in classifying
items of supply identified under the Federal Cataloging Program.

88. The FSC is a commodity classification designed to serve the functions of supply and
is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to permit the classification of all items of personal
property. In order to accomplish this, groups and classes have been established for the
universe of commodities, with emphasis on the items known to be in the supply systems of
the Federal Government.

89. The structure of the FSC, as presently established, consists of 78 groups, which are
subdivided into 645 classes. The Federal Supply Group (FSG) identifies, by title, the
commodity area covered by classes within the group. Each class covers a relatively
homogeneous area of commodities, in respect to their physical or performance
characteristics, or in the respect that the items included therein are such as are usually
requisitioned or issued together, or constitute a related grouping for supply management
purposes.

90. Groups 21, 27, 33, 50, 57, 64, 82, 86, 90, 92, 97, and 98 are currently unassigned.

91. The FSC utilizes a four-digit coding structure. The first two digits of the code number
identify the group, and the last two digits of the code number identify the classes within
each group. Code numbers are so assigned as to make it possible to expand the number of
groups and classes as that becomes necessary.

92. In most instances gaps have been left within each group, between the numbers
assigned to adjacent classes, to permit the insertion of new classes in logical sequence,
when necessary, because of technological advances or to accomplish other desirable
additions and changes. The primary application of the FSC code number is in the National
Stock Number (NSN). The NSN for an item of supply consists of the applicable four-digit
FSC code number plus the nine-digit National Item Identification Number (NIIN).

93. he Federal Supply Classification Cataloging Handbook, H2, presents the

classification structure of the FSC, showing all groups and classes listed in the arrangement
of the four-digit FSC codenumbering system. Where appropriate, the main inclusions and
exclusions, which delimit the coverage of a particular class, are shown immediately
following the title for the class.