The Concept of Prama and Pramana in Jain Philosophy

Dr. Rishika Verma

Assistant Professor
Philosophy Department
Hemvati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal University,
Srinagar Garhwal Uttarakhand, A Central Univeristy
Email id : rishika.verma75@gmail.com
Mobile no. 9335663975
In Indian philosophy, two words are used to stand for knowledge:
„Jnana‟ and „Prama‟. „Jnana‟ means all kinds of knowledge, true or
false. But the word „Prama‟ is used only in the sense of true knowledge
or „Yathartha Jnana‟. True knowledge or yathartha Jnana is distinct
from false knowledge. In other words, the word „Jnana‟ is used for
knowledge from the psychological standpoint; knowledge or Jnana is
taken to mean any cognition of an object, while the word „Prama‟ is
used in the logical sense. Prama means right or true knowledge of an
object. Thus in the logical sense a knowledge is that which is true and a
knowledge is true when it represents its object with that nature and
character which belong to it.
All philosophers accept Prama in the sense of valid knowledge
but they hold different views as regards the meaning of validity or truth
of knowledge. For example the Naiyayikas regard true knowledge or
Prama as true presentational knowledge. The Buddhists hold that the

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truth of (Yatharthanubhava) knowledge consists in its practical value.
According to the Advaita Vedantists, the truth of knowledge consists in
its non-contradictedness. The Mimamsakas hold that the truth of
knowledge consists, in novelty, and uncontradictedness; that is, prama is
defined as uncontradicted knowledge whose object was not known
before (anadhigat).
The jainas define knowledge as „Svaparavyavasayi-jnanam‟
which means that the nature of knowledge is to be self-revealing as well
as object-revealing. This very nature may be compared with a lamp. A
lamp, like knowledge, reveals its object by virtue of revealing itself.
According to the Jainas, the relation between the self and its knowledge
is „bhedabheda‟. In this sense they do not accept either complete
difference or complete non-difference between knowledge and the self
from their doctrine of Anekantvada. So the Jainas‟ view in this regard
is quietly different from the both, the view of Nyaya and the view of
Advainta also.

Thus knowledge or jnana is taken to mean any cognition of an

object, while the word „prama‟ is used in the logical sense. That is to
say, it is true-cognition. According to the Jainas, right or definite
cognition about an object which is other than doubt, error, etc., is
prama.1 In other words, definiteness is essential mark of the validity of
knowledge.2 The characteristic definiteness here, however, does not
differ essentially form the view of the Naiyayikas, because definiteness

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is further stated by Jaina logicians themselves to be the determination of
an object in the form in which it really exists. In the Jaina philosophy the
first great logician, Siddhasena Divakara and Acharya
Samantabhadra define valid cognition (Prama) as having its nature to
reveal itself as well as its object.3

Jainas classify knowledge into immediate (aparoksa) and mediate

(paroksa). But they point out that what is ordinarily regarded as
immediate knowledge is only relatively immediate. Perception of
external or internal objects through the senses (indriya) or mind
(manas) is immediate as compared with inference. Still such knowledge
cannot be said to be absolutely immediate, because even here the soul
knows through the medium of something else, the senses or manas. In
addition to such ordinary or empirical (vyayaharika) immediate
knowledge, there is also a really or absolutely (Paramarthika)
immediate knowledge, which a soul attains, by removing its karma
obstacles. In such knowledge the soul‟s consciousness becomes
immediately related to objects, without the medium of senses, etc.,
simply by the removal of the karmas that prevented it from reaching
those objects. Three different kinds of such really immediate knowledge
are distinguished.4 When a person has partially destroyed and allayed the
influences of karmas, he acquires the power of knowing objects which
have forms, but are too distant or minute or obscure to be observed by
the senses or manas, such immediate knowledge by the unaided soul is,

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however, limited as its objects are limited and therefore, it is called
avadhijnana (limited knowledge). Again, when a person has overcome
hatred, jealousy, etc. (which create obstacles that stand in the way of
knowing other minds), he can have direct access to the present and lack
of knowledge are completely removed from the soul there arises in it
absolute knowledge or omniscience. This is called kevala jnana. Only
the liberated souls have such knowledge.5 Thus Immediate knowledge is
further divided into Avadhi, Manahparyaya and Kevala; and mediate
knowledge into Mati and Shruta. Perceptual knowledge which is
ordinarily called immediate is admitted to be relatively so by Jainism
and therefore included in mediate and not immediate knowledge. It is
included under Mati. Pure perception in the sense of mere sensation
cannot rank the title of knowledge. It must be given meaning and
arranged into order by conception or thought. Perceptual knowledge
therefore is regarded as mediate since it presupposes the activity of
thought. Mati includes both perceptual and inferential knowledge.
Shruta means knowledge derived from authority. Thus Mati and
Shruta which are the two kinds of mediate knowledge have as their
instruments perception, inference and authority, the three Pramanas
admitted by Jainism. Avadhi-jnana, Manah-paryaya-jnana and
Kevala-jnana, are three kinds of immediate knowledge which may be
called extra-ordinary and extra-sensory perceptions. Avadhi is
clairvoyance; Manahparyaya is telepathy; and Kevala is omniscience.

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Avadhi is direct knowledge of things even at a distance of space or time.
It is called Avadhi or „limited‟ because it functions within a particular
area and up to a particular time. It cannot go beyond spatial and
temporal limits. Manah-paryaya is direct knowledge of the thoughts of
others. This too is limited by spatial and temporal conditions. In both
Avadhi and Manahparyaya, the soul has direct knowledge unaided by
the senses or the mind. Hence they are called immediate, though limited.
Kewala-jnana is unlimited and absolute knowledge. It can be acquired
only by the liberated souls. It is not limited by space, time or object.
Besides these five kinds of right knowledge we have three kinds of
wrong knowledge – Samshya or doubt, Viparyaya or mistake and
Anadhyavasaya or wrong knowledge through indifference.6 There are
differences of opinion among Jaina writers regarding the exact meanings
of the terms „Mati and Shruta‟. But ordinarily mati is takes to mean any
kind of knowledge which we can obtain through the senses or through
manas.7 Thus understood, mati includes ordinary immediate knowledge
(or internal and external perception), memory recognition and inference.
Shruta is knowledge obtained from authority.

Thus according to the Jainas, judgmental knowledge which is other

than doubt, error, etc. is true knowledge or prama. In other words, right
judgment about an object is prama.8 The special source of prama or
valid knowledge is called Pramana. Pramana is defined as the karan or
the extraordinary cause of a prama or right knowledge.

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Praman and Naya :

According to Jainas knowledge may again be divided into two kinds –

pramana or knowledge of a thing as it is, and Naya or knowledge of a
thing in its relation.

Generally speaking, we may say that pramana is the means of

right knowledge. It is that which gives us right knowledge of an object.
Though all accept pramana as the karan or the extraordinary means of
prama yet there are differences of opinion about the characteristics of
karana or pramana. Thus the philosophers have different views
regarding the nature of pramana.

The older Naiyayikas define pramana as the cause of an

apprehension of an object. (Upalabdhihetupramanam).9 The Baudhas
define pramana as uncontradicted experience (pramanam
avisamvadijnanam)10. According to the Bhattas, pramana is that which
gives us new knowledge that is a true knowledge of objects of which we
have no knowledge in the past (anadhigatatathabhtartha niscayakam
pramanam)11. According to the Samkhya mental modification is
pramana, the self knows an object through a mental modification
(Buddhi vrtti).

Generally the Jainas define pramana as knowledge which reveals

itself and its object, and which must be determinate (swa-para vyavasayi
jnanam pramanam)12. It is the definition of pramana commonly given by

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the Jaina logicians. But the different logicians of different times have
also defined pramana in their own ways. Though the definitions are
different, yet the meanings of them are not very different. The first great
logician sidhasena defines „Pramana‟ as “Pramana is knowledge which
is self-revealing and object-revealing and which is free from
contradictions.”13 Akalanka, the systematizer of Jaina logic, defines
pramana using the objective anadhigata (unknown) for the object of
pramana. That is, “pramana is knowledge which is uncontradicted and
which manifests the unknown object.14” Manikyanandi, a follower of
Akalanka, defines pramana by using the word apurva in the same sense
as Akalanka. But he has used also the other adjective „sva‟ which came
from Siddhasena. Thus Manikyanadi defines “Pramana” as the
knowledge which reveals itself and the unknown object and which is
determinate.”15

Vidyanandi and Vadideva suri define pramana in another way.

They do not use words like „Anadhigat‟, „avisamvadi‟, „apurva‟ etc.
they simply define it as „svarth vyavasayatmakam jnanam
pramanam‟ or as „sva-par vyavasayi jnanam pramanam.16‟
According to Vidyanandi, “Pramana” is the knowledge which reveals
itself and the object and it must be determinate (vyavasayatmakam or
vyavasayi). Since the object of pramana may be known or unknown, the
words “anadhigat” and “apurva” as used by Akalanka and
Manikyanandi are useless. Hem Chandra defines pramana as

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“Samyagarth Nirnaya pramanam”.17 It means that pramana is the
knowledge which possesses the property of truly determining the nature
of object. The definition may also be stated in the form of an inference
of the following form. “This knowledge truly determines the nature of
its object, because it is a “pramana.”

“Artha” is that which is an object of right knowledge. „Nirnaya‟

means judgmental knowledge which is other than doubt, error etc.
though; they are knowledge yet are not pramana. The word „samyak‟ is
the adjective of the word nirnaya. „Samyak‟ nirnaya means right
judgment. To acquire true knowledge right judgment is necessary. The
object itself is not right or wrong. Thus „samyak‟ means to be true of the
object, or not to be contradictory of the object. Therefore, the definition
excludes error.

The older Jaina philosophers, as we have described above, define

pramana by saying that knowledge is pramana, which reveals itself and
its object. Hem Chandra accepts that knowledge is self-revealing. But he
does not take it to be a definition of pramana. Because this property of
being self-revealing belongs to all knowledge including the false ones.
Therefore, he says that we cannot define a pramana with the help of this
property.

Again, pramana is knowledge because it enables us to accept the

acceptable (Upadeya) things and to reject the things which are not

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acceptable (heya).18 It has the power to lead to an acceptance or rejection
of things, and so it must be of the nature of knowledge. There are two
kinds of objects. They are either heya– an object of hatred, or upadeya,
an object of desire. We get the sense of what object we should accept or
what object we should reject due to knowledge. Knowledge alone
possesses this capacity. Thus knowledge is pramana. There is a third
kind of object which is neither desirable nor undesirable but which is the
object of indifference. One does not possess any kind of feeling towards
such object. For example, walking on grass one is indifferent to the grass
under one‟s feet. Even such „upeksaniya‟ objects are manifested by
pramana.

Pramana is knowledge, because it enables us to accept or reject an

object. The manifestation of an object is due to the capacity of
knowledge. In manifestation of knowledge neither the object comes to
the agent nor does the agent come to the object. It is the knowledge itself
which manifests the object.19 Therefore, pramana is knowledge; which is
the extraordinary cause of the manifestation of an object. But when one
actually gets his desired object, it is not due to the pramana which
manifests the object. In other words, at first knowledge manifests object
and the activity of getting the object depends on the knowledge. If there
were no knowledge, there would be no activity directed towards the
object. This may be seen in every day experience. The prapakattva of a
pramana does not depend upon activity. When we see the sun or the

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moon, such knowledge may not give rise to any activity and yet the
knowledge does manifest its object.

Since the pramana is to be a knowledge which has the capacity for

accepting or rejecting an object, nothing that is not knowledge, for
example, the sense-object contact cannot be called pramana. Akalanka
defines pramana as knowledge which is uncontradicted and which
manifests the unknown object.20 But Naya is the knowledge of a thing in
a particular context or relationship of the knower.21 In other words, Naya
is that particular standpoint from which we deliver our judgment about a
particular thing. As we are not omniscient, so it is not possible for
ordinary people to know all the qualities of a thing. For what they know
it relative and limited. For this reason our intention to explain the
meaning of Naya in order to achieve the nature of valid knowledge.

Nayas also differ with difference of standpoints accepted by a

particular school. Thus every Naya gives us relative knowledge and that
can be hypothetically entertained. Since when it reveals the true nature
of the object as it exists, it is true. On the contrary, when this is
obstructed, it is not true. According to the Jainas, everything possesses
an infinite number of qualities (dharma). When we affirm a thing by
one of these manifold qualities, we apprehend Naya. But when we know
a thing in different ways by different qualities, the knowledge comes
through pramana. Thus both pramana and Naya are essential for valid
knowledge of a thing.
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 Hence, there is no judgment which is completely true or
completely false. This is known as the basic doctrine of the Jainas called
„Syadvada‟ which means the doctrine of „may be‟. It signifies about
absolute affirmation and absolute negation is impossible as all
judgments are a partial application to reality. They are incapable of
giving us a complete truth which can be grasped.

Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make a

statement about a thing.22 All truth is relative to our standpoints. Partial
knowledge of one of the innumerable aspects of a thing called „naya‟.23
Judgment based on this partial knowledge is also included in „naya‟.

There are seven „nayas‟ of which the first four are called „Artha-
naya‟ because they relate to objects or meanings and the last three are
called „Shabda-naya‟ because they relate to words. When taken as
absolute, a „naya‟ becomes a fallacy- „nayabhasa‟.

The first is the „Naigama-naya‟. From this standpoint we look at

a thing as having both universal and particular qualities and we do not
distinguish between them. It becomes fallacious when both universals
and particulars are regarded as separately real and absolute, as is done by
Nyaya-Vaishesika. The second is the „Sangraha-naya‟. Here we
emphasize the universal qualities and ignore the particulars where they
are manifested. It becomes fallacious when universals alone are treated
as absolutely real and particulars are rejected as unreal, as is done by

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Samkhya and Advaita Vedanta. The third is the „Vyavahara-naya‟
which is the conventional point of view based on empirical knowledge.
Here things are taken as concrete particulars and their specific features
are emphasized. It becomes fallacious when particulars alone are viewed
as real and universals are rejected as unreal, as is done by Materialism
and Buddhist realistic pluralism. The fourth is called „Rjusutra-
naya‟. Here the real is identified with the momentary. The particulars
are reduced to a series of moments and any given moment is regarded as
real. When this partial truth is mistaken to be the whole truth, it becomes
fallacious, as in some schools of Buddhism. Among the nayas which
refer to words, the first called „Shabda-naya‟. It means that a word is
necessarily related to the meaning which it signifies. Every word refers
either to a thing or quality or relation or action. The second is
„Samabhiruda-naya‟ which distinguishes terms according to their
roots. For example, the word „pankaja‟ literally means „born of mud‟
and signifies any creature or plant born of mud, but its meaning has been
conventionally restricted to „lotus‟ only. Similarly the word „gauh‟
means „anything which moves‟, but has conventionally become
restricted to signify only a „cow‟. The third is called „Evambhuta-naya‟
which is a specialized form of the second. According to it, a name
should be applied to an object only when its meaning is fulfilled. For
example, a cow should be called „gauh‟ only when it moves and not
when it is lying down.

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 Each naya or point of view represents only one of the innumerable
aspects possessed by a thing from which we may attempt to know or
describe it. When any such partial viewpoint is mistaken for the whole
truth, we have a „nayabhas‟ or a fallacy. The „nayas‟ are also
distinguished as „Dravyarthika‟ or from the point of view of substance
which takes into account the permanent nature and unity of things, and
as „Paryayathika‟ or from the point of view of modes which takes into
account the passing modification and the diversity of things. When a
thing is takes be either as permanent only or as momentary only, either
as one only or as many only, fallacies arise.24

Reference

1
Pramanamimamsa of Hemachandra, translated into English by G. Jha, culcutta,
1946, p. 03.
2
Pramananayatattaloka, 1/2, Bombay , 1967
3
Pramanam Svaparabhasi jnanam badhavivarjitam and Svaparavabhasakam yatha
pramanam bhuvi buddhilaksanam, P. 63
4
S.C. Chatterjee and D.M. Datta, An introduction to Indian philosophy, P.71-72
5
Tattvadhiga ma-sutra, chap, 1, sutras 9, 12, 21-29
6
C.D. Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, P. 48-49
7
Tattvadhiga ma-sutra, 1.14.
8
Praman Mimamsa. p. 3
9
Nyayasutra, Bhasya, p. 226
10
Pramana Vartika, 1/3
11
Samayasara Dohan, p, 123
12
Pramananyaya tattavalok, 1/2
13
Pramanam sva-parabhasi badhavivarjitam, Nyayavatara, 1/2
14
Pramanam avisamvadijnanam anadhigatarthadhigama laksanatvat, Astasahastri
p. 175
15
Svapurvarthavyavasayatmakam jnanam pramanam, Pariksamukham, p.1
16
Pramananyatattvalokalankara, P. 45
13
17
Pramanamimamsa, 1/1/2
18
Abhimatanabhimata vastu avikara tiraskara ksamama hi pramanam
atojnanamevedam. Pramannyaya Tattvaloka , 1/3
19
Pramannyaya Tattvaloka 1/3
20
Pramanam avisamvadi jnanam anadhigatarthadhigamalaksanatvat. Astasahstri,
P. 175
21
Niyate gamyate arthaikadeso neneti nayah. Syadvadaratnakara, p. 8
22
Ekdeshavishisto‟rtho nayasya visayo matah, Nayavatara, 29.
23
Niyate gamyate arthaikadesho neneti nayah, Syadvadaratnakara, P. 8.
24
C.D. Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, P. 50.

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