Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Report Part Title: Venezuela

Report Title: FOOD SYSTEMS IN CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING SETTINGS

Report Subtitle: Case Studies of Venezuela and Yemen
Report Author(s): VONGAI MURUGANI, CAROLINE DELGADO, MARIE RIQUIER and
KRISTINA TSCHUNKERT
Published by: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2021)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep39754.6

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2. Venezuela
Venezuela is facing a devastating, complex humanitarian emergency. An estimated
32 per cent of the population are food insecure and in need of assistance (see
figure 2.1). 5 Of those, approximately a third—8 per cent of the population—are severely
food insecure, and two-thirds—24 per cent of the population—experience moderate
food insecurity. 6 The hunger crisis is man-made: an outcome of decades of poor policy
decisions, an over-reliance on oil revenues for government income and a more recent
reactive decarbonization process. As of 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated
the crisis further.
The hunger crisis is both worsened by and worsens violent conflict in Venezuela.
Venezuela’s homicide rate is among the highest globally, peaking at 63.3 per 100 000
in 2014 before declining to 36.7 in 2018.7 A plethora of violent armed groups, exercising
varying degrees of territorial control and including criminal groups, organized crime
syndicates, state-supported militias such as the colectivos, Colombian guerrillas and
neo-paramilitaries, drive violence in Venezuela. The border region with Colombia is
one of the most violent borderlands worldwide due to turf wars among armed actors
over lucrative trafficking routes for drugs, weapons, people and contraband, including
food. 8 How the current and future governments manage the crisis, including how they
transition the economy away from oil revenues while achieving long-term economic
stability, will have significant implications for food systems and their interconnected-
ness with violent conflict.

A man-made food crisis with deep structural roots—A historical overview

Oil-driven development and agricultural decline

The discovery of oil reserves in 1922 caused fundamental political and economic shifts
in Venezuela. While these shifts propelled development in many areas, they are also
the underlying factors explaining the food crisis ravaging the country today. The
country rapidly transitioned from an agricultural economy to one based primarily on
oil exploitation. This change set in motion key interlinked processes that significantly
affected food systems. Domestic agriculture lost its competitiveness as markets were
flooded with cheaper imports.9 Rural areas stagnated as the economic activities
developed around the oil export sector were mainly conducted in urban areas.10 The
economic pull of cities and the decline of rural regions led to rapid urbanization,
further weakening the agricultural sector.11 Although various governments attempted
to modernize the sector, domestic agriculture could not compete with cheaper food
imports. By the end of 1998, Venezuela depended on food imports for more than 70 per
cent of its food supply.12

5 World Food Programme (WFP), ‘Venezuela food security assessment: Main findings’, 2019.
6 World Food Programme (WFP) (note 5).
7 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Victims of intentional homicide, 1990–2018’, [n.d.].
8 García Pinzón, V. and Mantilla, J., ‘Contested borders: Organized crime, governance, and bordering practices in

Colombia-Venezuela borderlands’, Trends in Organized Crime, no. 24, 2021.

9 Wilpert, G., ‘Land for people not for profit in Venezuela’, 23 Aug. 2005, eds P. Rosset, R. Patel and M. Courville,

Promised Land: Competing Visions of Agrarian Reform (Food First Books: Oakland, CA, 2006), p. 249.
10 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and Development Bank of Latin America (CAF),

‘Venezuela: Nota de Análisis Sectorial: Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural’ [Venezuela: Sector Analysis Note: Agriculture
and Rural Development], [n.d.].
11 It should be noted, however, that many of those who migrated from rural areas into cities remained in poverty as

cities were unable to accommodate the rapid influx of migrants. Wilpert (note 9).
12 Schiavoni, C. and Camacaro, W., ‘The Venezuelan effort to build a new food and agriculture system’, Monthly

Review, vol. 61, no. 3 (Jul.–Aug. 2009), pp. 129–41.

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4 food systems in conflict and peacebuilding settings: case studies

Figure 2.1. Map of Venezuela showing prevalence of food insecurity, July–September 2019
Source: World Food Programme (WFP), ‘Venezuela food security assessment’, 23 Feb. 2020.

The oil wealth did, however, initially improve food security in Venezuela. The
government established wide-ranging social programmes to redistribute oil revenue.13
These included programmes to improve the alimentary and nutritional status of the
population and treat children suffering from severe malnutrition. Moreover, between
1945 and 1978 there was a 4 per cent annual growth in agricultural production, and
this, coupled with food imports, largely ensured the food security of the population
during this period.14
However, plummeting oil prices in the 1980s set in motion a period of instability,
recession, increasing poverty, food insecurity and social exclusion.15 As Venezuela
incurred substantial foreign debts, the government launched a fiscal austerity
package as part of a financial bailout by the International Monetary Fund. Subsidies
and support programmes were eliminated, and state price interventions weakened.16
By the end of the 1990s, around 50 per cent of the population lived in poverty, and
almost 30 per cent were extremely poor. The deteriorating conditions sparked popular
uprisings, which were violently suppressed by the military.17

13
International Crisis Group, Venezuela: Hugo Chávez’s Revolution, Latin America Report no. 19 (International
Crisis Group: Brussels, 22 Feb. 2007).
14 Hernandez, P. et al., ‘Dismantling of institutionalization and state policies as guarantors of food security in

Venezuela: Food safety implications’, Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, 18 Feb. 2021, p. 5.
15 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and Development Bank of Latin America (note 10).
16 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and Development Bank of Latin America (note 10).
17 Felicien, A., Schiavoni, C. and Romero, L., ‘The politics of food in Venezuela’, Monthly Review, vol. 70, no. 2 (June

2019), pp. 1–19.

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 venezuela 5

Figure 2.2. Annual crude oil, natural gas plant liquids and other liquids production,
Venezuela, 1973–2020
Source: United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), ‘EIA data sets’, [n.d.].

The Bolivarian Revolution and escalating crisis

Against this background Hugo Chavez came to power in 1998, pledging to reduce pov-
erty and inequality. The Chavez government spearheaded the Bolivarian Revolution,
a political process that emphasized national food sovereignty and restoring the agri-
cultural sector. The government incentivized people to return to rural areas and
engage in agriculture, through comprehensive rural reform. With food considered a
basic human right rather than a commodity for profit, the government expropriated
much private land and nationalized private industries.18 Cooperatively run farms and
food-processing factories were established to return the means of production to the
people. Social services were expanded throughout the country via Bolivarian mis-
sions. Food subsidies, price stabilization mechanisms and a government-run agri-
cultural corporation that bought produce from farmers provided farmers with access
to stable markets and assurance of adequate income.19 The reforms and programmes
were financed by the increasing oil wealth, as the price for oil reached a historic high
in 2010. By 2007 poverty had been cut by half and extreme poverty by 70 per cent. 20
These human development gains were quickly eroded as oil prices began to fall in
2013. The Venezuelan currency lost its strength, raising the cost of imported goods. 21
Falling oil prices and production levels, economic mismanagement and corruption,
and international sanctions against Venezuela caused the gross domestic product
to shrink by roughly two-thirds between 2014 and 2019 (see figure 2.2). By 2020, an
estimated 96 per cent of Venezuelan households had an income below the poverty line,
and 44 per cent of the population over 15 years of age were economically inactive. 22
Food imports declined by almost 70 per cent between 2016 and 2017, while domestic

18 Pielago, B. S., ‘Uncovering the 5 major causes of the food crisis in Venezuela’, Glocality, vol. 3, no. 1 (2020).
19 Schiavoni and Camacaro (note 12).
20 Weisbrot, M., ‘Poverty reduction in Venezuela: A reality-based view’, ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America,

vol. 8, no. 1 (2008).

21 Pielago (note 18).
22 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), ‘Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: Agricultural

livelihoods and food security in the context of Covid-19’, Monitoring report, 2019.

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6 food systems in conflict and peacebuilding settings: case studies

Figure 2.3. Total production of cereals in Venezuela, 2010–19

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), FAOSTAT, accessed 23 Nov. 2021.

food prices soared as inflation reached an annual average of over 2700 per cent in May
2021. 23 With the average public-sector salary covering less than 1 per cent of the basic
food basket, people became increasingly dependent on the state food distribution
programme, run by committees of local supply and production (CLAP). 24
There have been attempts to address the fall in agricultural production. The current
government, under President Nicolás Maduro since 2013, has sought to reinforce
urban agriculture—a policy originally introduced by Chavez in 2002—as a strategy to
increase food supply, combat poverty, recover urban spaces and reduce environmental
effects caused by agrochemicals. Urban agriculture has had some positive outcomes
and continues to gain momentum against the impact of spiralling inflation and food
shortages in shops. However, critics have pointed to the limitations of micro-solutions
for solving national structural problems in production. 25 The health service and basic
infrastructure are in a state of near collapse, which compounds the food crisis. 26
Political opposition to the government and mass protest over the dire humanitarian
situation have been met with increasing government repression. Political persecution
is on the rise, manifested through social control, the repression of protest and selective
extrajudicial executions. 27 As the crisis in Venezuela deepens, the military has been
given control over key state institutions. As of 2019, nine out of the 32 government
ministries were controlled by the military, including the Ministry of Agriculture. 28
The crisis has led to mass migration, with more than 5.6 million Venezuelans fleeing
the country since 2015. 29
23 FocusEconomics, ‘Inflation in Venezuela’, [n.d.]; and Doocy, S. et al., ‘The food security and nutrition crisis in
Venezuela’, Social Science & Medicine, vol. 226 (2019).
24 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), ‘Preliminary findings of the visit to

the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures
on the enjoyment of human rights’, 12 Feb. 2021.
25 Dobson, P., ‘Venezuela to expand small-scale urban agriculture’, Venezuelanalysis.com, 19 Mar. 2018.
26 International Crisis Group, Imagining a Resolution of Venezuela’s Crisis, Latin America Report no. 79

(International Crisis Group: Brussels, 11 Mar. 2020).

27 Galavís, N. G., ‘Rule of law crisis, militarization of citizen security, and effects on human rights in Venezuela’,

European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies/Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe,
no. 109 (2020), pp. 67–86.
28 Tian, N. and Lopes da Silva, D., ‘The crucial role of the military in the Venezuelan crisis’, SIPRI Topical

Backgrounder, 2 Apr. 2019.

29 R4V, Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, ‘Venezuelan refugees and migrants in

the region’, Mar. 2021.

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 venezuela 7

Box 2.1. Decarbonization and the Venezuelan Government’s response

The collapse of the oil sector in Venezuela—falling from US$50 billion in export value in 2014 to $12 billion
in 2019—has forced a process of transition. This has been labelled a process of reactive decarbonization. a
Decarbonization refers to the process of reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the atmosphere that have
resulted from human activity to mitigate the effects of climate change.
Decarbonization can be planned or reactive. Reactive decarbonization involves little planning so nega-
tive outcomes are neither prevented nor minimized. b Venezuela’s climate change response focuses on adap-
tation rather than mitigation because it only produces 0.5 per cent of the world’s carbon emissions. While
many other countries have opted to decarbonize their energy sectors, 70 per cent of Venezuela’s electricity
is already generated using hydroelectric energy.c Nevertheless, while the country is not pursuing planned
decarbonization, many of the countries that bought oil from Venezuela prior to the sector’s collapse are. d
This will likely lower demand for petroleum and gas in the coming decades.e
The rapid, deep and enduring shifts in the oil sector have already profoundly altered the economy,
livelihoods, the relationship between the state and its citizens, and Venezuela’s geopolitical standing. In
response to the collapse of oil prices and decarbonization imperatives, the government is advancing an
array of new extractive projects destructive to sensitive ecosystems.f These include opening over 10 per
cent of national territory for mining.
a Kingsbury, D. V., ‘Combined and uneven energy transitions: Reactive decarbonization in Cuba and
Venezuela’, Journal of Political Ecology, vol. 27, no. 1 (2020); and Observatory of Economic Complexity,
‘Venezuela’, [n.d.].
b Kingsbury (note a).
c Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ‘Contribuciones Previstas Nacionalmente Determinadas de la
República Bolivariana de Venezuela para la lucha contra el cambio climático y sus efectos’ [First Nationally
Determined Contribution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the fight against climate change and
its effects], July 2015.
d República Bolivariana de Venezuela (note c); Government of India, ‘India’s Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution: Working towards climate justice’, 2016; and People’s Republic of China,
‘Enhanced actions on climate change: China’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions’, 2015.
e International Energy Agency, ‘Net zero by 2050: A roadmap for the global energy sector’, revised
version July 2021.
f Kingsbury (note a); and Rosales, A., ‘Venezuela’s deepening logic of extraction’, NACLA Report on the
Americas, vol. 49, no. 2 (2017).

Pathways between food insecurity and violence in Venezuela

Using the framework developed in the first paper—which shows that conflict has a
two-way relationship with food insecurity—this section looks in more detail at the way
in which violent conflict, in combination with other factors, has disrupted Venezuela’s
food system. The focus is on the production, distribution and marketing elements of
the country’s food system. In the case of Venezuela, various factors, including falling
oil prices, government policies and violent conflict, led to declining food production.
This had a knock-on effect on distribution and marketing, leading to higher food
insecurity. These disruptions to the food system and the resulting food insecurity
have led to social unrest, social control and repression, which are among the drivers
of violence in Venezuela.

Production, distribution and marketing

Food production in Venezuela fell by 60 per cent between 2014 and 2018 (see
figure 2.3). 30 Factors contributing to this decline include falling oil prices, government
policies and escalating levels of violence in rural areas. These developments are
intrinsically linked to Venezuela’s violent conflict.
The fall in oil prices and the resultant reactive decarbonization (see box 2.1)
have had a profound effect on agricultural production. The import of crop seeds
and agricultural supplies has declined, and fuel shortages have negatively affected
cultivation and distribution. Government policies—including large property seizures
of arable and cattle farms, and industrial facilities—radically reduced agricultural

30 Bengoa Foundation, Venezuelan Health Observatory (OVS) and the Agri-Food Network of Venezuela, ‘Complex

humanitarian emergency in Venezuela: Right to food’, National Report, Dec. 2018.

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8 food systems in conflict and peacebuilding settings: case studies

competitiveness, efficiency and quality, and led to a lack of confidence among private
investors. 31 The nationalization of the agricultural supplies company, Agroislena
(later renamed Agropatria), in 2010, which was accused of price speculation, brought
down prices for items such as fertilizers, agrochemicals and seeds, but also created
shortages, disrupted logistics and opened up opportunities for corruption. 32
Furthermore, the fall in oil prices has meant armed groups have adopted new tactics
to make up for a decline in income from oil. From common crime groups, colectivos and
the security forces to Colombian guerrilla groups, the armed groups are increasingly
targeting producers and distributors, as they adapt to declining oil revenues. 33
The resulting escalating levels of violence in rural areas since 2013 have caused
agricultural production to fall between 10 and 20 per cent. 34 For example, in producing
regions, such as Monagas, criminal groups that previously extorted oil companies and
contractors are now targeting agricultural workers. 35 In Portuguesa—the breadbasket
of Venezuela—armed groups have engaged in extortion of agribusiness. In coastal
areas, fishermen are robbed of their products and equipment at sea and on land by
armed groups, frequently operating in collusion with the coastguard and police. 36 As
a consequence, fishing has declined by 70 per cent. In other regions, such as Guárico,
armed groups seek to control key transport routes from production sites to markets. 37
Armed groups, including the state security forces, operate checkpoints, charging fees
or confiscating all or part of the cargo. In areas such as Mérida, violence has caused
the distribution and marketing of agricultural produce to drop by up to 60 per cent.
There are also reports of violent colectivos running urban farms. 38 Consequently,
producers spend 10 to 25 per cent of production costs on security. 39 Reduced volumes
and rising costs of agricultural production and distribution mean consumers end up
paying distorted prices for the final product, which partially drives up inflation levels
in the country. 40
The knock-on impact of the deteriorating security landscape in rural production
areas on consumers has been a sharp increase in food insecurity. Declining domestic
production combined with a fall in food imports has severely affected the distribution
of food and its availability on the market. The food that is available has become
unaffordable for many Venezuelans. Furthermore, corruption, lack of fuel and a
crumbling infrastructure have reduced food quality and safety. In turn, rising food
insecurity has made most households dependent on the government CLAP food
subsidy distribution programme. 41

31 Purcell, T. F., ‘The political economy of rentier capitalism and the limits to agrarian transformation in Venezuela’,

Journal of Agrarian Change, vol. 17, no. 2 (2016).

32 Purcell (note 31).
33 InSight Crime, ‘Pirates of the lake: Gangs prey on Venezuelan fishermen’, Brief, 10 Nov. 2020.
34 Briceño-León, R., ‘Impacto de la inseguridad y violencia en el sector agroalimentario en Venezuela’ [Impact

of insecurity and violence on the agri-food sector in Venezuela], Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales, 1 Reporte de
investigacion LACSO, 1 Mar. 2020.
35 Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, ‘Informe annual de violencia 2020: Entre las pandemias de la violencia y

del Covid-19’ [Annual report on violence 2020: Between the pandemics of violence and Covid-19], 29 Dec. 2020.
36 Briceño-León (note 34); and InSight Crime (note 33).
37
Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia (note 35).
38 InSight Crime, ‘The devolution of state power: The “colectivos”’, Venezuela: A Mafia State? (InSight Crime, 2018).
39 Briceño-León (note 34).
40 Briceño-León (note 34).
41 Penfold, M. A., ‘How to reconstruct Venezuela: Political conflict, weak state capacities, and social violence’, Latin

American Program, Wilson Centre, Working paper, Mar. 2021.

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 venezuela 9

Food crisis feeding into violence

Food as social control

Food insecurity emerging from disruptions to the production, distribution and
marketing elements of the food system in Venezuela feeds back into the mechanisms
that could drive conflict, demonstrating one of the pathways between food insecur-
ity and violent conflict. One way this occurs is when food is used as a tool for social
control. In Venezuela, this is taking place in an increasingly authoritarian and vio-
lent context. Food insecurity has made more people dependent on CLAP distribution.
The distribution of CLAP boxes is coordinated by communal boards and community
organizations controlled by the government. 42 But armed groups, including the armed
forces, government aligned militias and colectivos, as well as criminal gangs and
Colombian guerrilla groups, often carry out the distribution. 43 The government has
granted the CLAP vaguely defined powers of vigilance and organization to guarantee
security and sovereignty, and there is mounting evidence that CLAP boxes are used to
secure votes for the government. 44 Alongside establishing CLAP, the government also
issued the homeland card (carnet de la patria), a national identification card purport-
edly intended to streamline aid distribution. This card holds information on indi-
viduals’ use of public services and political affiliation. 45 The state allegedly uses the
cards to distribute assistance based on loyalty to the ruling party and to track party
affiliation during elections. 46 While individuals are not officially required to have a
homeland card to receive CLAP boxes, it has become the de facto requirement in many
places. Furthermore, when registering for CLAP, individuals need to state whether
they belong to the ruling party. 47 Research suggests that CLAP boxes are distributed
mainly to government supporters. A survey in 2017 targeting 4.4 million citizens found
that over 80 per cent of government voters say that the boxes are their primary source
of food, compared to only 14 per cent of independents. Linked to this, 73 per cent of
government voters state that they have access to three meals a day, compared to only
54 per cent of independents. 48 Findings like these have led some analysts to argue that
the way CLAP and the identity cards are used amounts to weaponizing hunger and
using food as a political tool to manipulate and control the Venezuelan population. 49

Thriving black markets and soaring incomes for armed groups

Another way in which rising food insecurity triggers risks of violent conflict is
through the black market. The dwindling food supply and deepening economic crisis
in Venezuela have generated a profitable black market for food, fuel and other agri-
cultural inputs. CLAP boxes and food purchased or looted at the state-subsidized food
markets are resold on the black market, usually controlled by the colectivos and other

42 Hernandez et al. (note 14); Pielago (note 18); and Herrera-Cuenca, M., Landaeta Jimenez, M. and Sifontes, Y.,

‘Challenges in food security, nutritional, and social public policies for Venezuela: Rethinking the future’, Frontiers in
Sustainable Food Systems, no. 5, 28 Apr. 2021, p. 127.
43 Dayton, R., ‘Maduro’s revolutionary guards: The rise of paramilitarism in Venezuela’, CTC Sentinel, vol. 12, no. 7

(Aug. 2019); InSight Crime, ‘Colombia’s ELN reportedly distributing Venezuela government food on the border’, 9 Feb.
2018; and Transparency Venezuela, ‘Organised crime and corruption in Venezuela: A problem of state’, June 2020.
44 Pielago (note 18); and Human Rights Watch, ‘Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis: Severe medical and food shortages,

inadequate and repressive government response’, 2016.

45 Penfold (note 41).
46 United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘Detailed findings of the independent international fact-fining mission

on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’, A/HRC/45/CRP.11, 15 Sep. 2020.

47 Human Rights Watch (note 44).
48 Rendon, M., ‘The Maduro diet: Food v. freedom in Venezuela’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 9 July

2018.
49 Pielago (note 18); and Rendon (note 48).

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10 food systems in conflict and peacebuilding settings: case studies

armed groups exercising de facto control over many neighbourhoods. 50 The govern-
ment plays a significant role in facilitating black markets. President Maduro has begun
using the country’s food supply as a source of patronage to replace falling oil rev-
enues. 51 The government has granted the military control over the country’s ports and
the distribution of imported food, partly to ensure its support as Maduro’s popularity
falls. 52 This control gives military officers access to food and significant power and
enrichment opportunities. Furthermore, by exploiting a complex currency system,
military officials have been able to import food at an advantageous exchange rate
and then sell it on the black market for hundreds of times the government-set price. 53
Changes to the official exchange rate and the partial dollarization of the economy
have eroded this enrichment scheme. 54 Nevertheless, opportunities like these should
not be underestimated in a country where the highest-paid member of the military
earns less than US$50 per month. 55 By some estimates, trafficking in food is now more
profitable and less risky than drug trafficking. 56
While the availability of food on black markets provides a safety vault for
Venezuelans who can afford it, profits from the black market strengthen the power
of the armed groups who control them and drive violence in Venezuela. The border
region with Colombia is particularly affected; it has become one of Latin America’s
most important and violent organized crime hubs. 57 Until recently, subsidized food
items were smuggled from Venezuela to Colombia, where they are sold at much
higher prices. With rising food insecurity in Venezuela, the groups adapted and began
trafficking Colombian food items into Venezuela to be sold on the emerging lucrative
black market for food. 58 This coincided with the closure of the border by Maduro
following a dispute between the Colombian and Venezuelan governments. The border
closure further boosted trafficking, paving the way for organized criminal groups
and corrupt elements of the Venezuelan National Guard to strengthen their control
of the unofficial crossings used by smugglers, and charge for allowing goods to cross.
These routes are also used by Venezuelan migrants fleeing the crisis, who are charged
trafficking or protection fees. 59 Consequently, the groups in control of the trafficking
routes have seen their revenues soar because of the crisis in Venezuela. 60
The Venezuelan crisis and the illegal economies combine to generate a pool of
recruits for armed groups in Colombia and Venezuela. In Colombia, armed groups
recruit Venezuelan migrants to strengthen their ranks. 61 While some recruitment is
violent and forced, the groups also offer substantial incentives to migrants facing dire
humanitarian conditions in Colombia and Venezuela. 62 Notably, while groups used to

50 Transparency Venezuela, ‘Dijeron que los colectivos entregarán las CLAP y le caerán a tiros al que hable mal del

gobierno’ [They said that the groups will hand over CLAP and they will shoot anyone who speaks ill of the government],
27 Feb. 2019; and InSight Crime, ‘Shifting criminal dynamics signal violent future for Colombia–Venezuela border’,
29 Jan. 2018.
51 Tian and Lopes da Silva (note 28).
52 Dreier, H. and Goodman, J., ‘Venezuela military trafficking food as country goes hungry’, Associated Press,

28 Dec. 2016.
53 Tian and Lopes da Silva (note 28).
54 Klapper, R., ‘Venezuela changes currency as inflation skyrockets, price of dollar rises on black market’, Newsweek,

1 Oct. 2021.
55 InSight Crime (note 50).
56 InSight Crime (note 38).
57
InSight Crime (note 50).
58 Ulmer, A. and Polanco, A., ‘In switch, hungry Venezuelans now smuggle Colombian food home’, Reuters, 8 June

2016.
59 Delgado, C., The World Food Programme’s Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace in Colombia (SIPRI:

Stockholm, 2020).
60 InSight Crime, ‘Crime groups win in Colombia–Venezuela border closure’, 16 June 2016.
61 Delgado (note 59).
62 Delgado (note 59).

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 venezuela 11

offer luxury items as a means to recruit, they now offer food supplies. 63 The precar-
ious situation of the migrants in Colombia, their fear of deportation and their survival
needs, coupled with the threats many face back in Venezuela, make it easier for armed
groups to recruit Venezuelan migrants than Colombians, which the non-state armed
groups have been quick to exploit. 64

Increasing protest and social unrest

Another mechanism through which food insecurity can feed the drivers of conflict
is through protest and social unrest. Protests against the government increased in
number and intensity between 2014 and 2019 as the political, social and economic
crisis in Venezuela deepened. 65 Most of these protests were motivated by demands for
economic and social rights, including access to food, basic services and social security,
as well as by presumed electoral fraud. 66 The government responded with increas-
ingly violent measures to contain protests, including the arbitrary detention, beating
and killing of unarmed protesters. 67 Protests decreased with the onset of the Covid-19
pandemic, however, the state of emergency imposed by the government in response to
the pandemic has been seen as a further pretext to repress dissent. Dozens of polit-
ical opponents, civilians critical of the government’s handling of the pandemic and
lawyers who provide legal support to demonstrators protesting the lack of basic ser-
vices have been arbitrarily detained and prosecuted. 68 Protesters risk direct violence
and losing state-provided access to food, medicine, water and domestic gas. 69

Food protests internationalized

Finally, protest and social unrest have become internationalized, as hunger has
become a tool in wider contestations in the geopolitical arena. Food-related protests
have become intertwined with international food aid, which is increasingly serving
geopolitical objectives. The starkest example is the stand-off in 2019 between the
Maduro-aligned security forces and pro-opposition supporters aligned with oppos-
ition leader and National Assembly leader, Juan Guaidó. The National Assembly sought
to block Maduro from assuming the presidency after the presidential elections in
2018, which the opposition argued were fraudulent. Guaidó declared himself interim
president and a string of government and military defections followed. In support of
Guaidó, the United States government sent food and medical aid worth $60 million
to the Colombian border to be distributed in Venezuela. Maduro’s security forces
blocked the aid from entering and violent clashes followed, claiming three lives and
leaving several hundreds wounded.70
Maduro rejected the aid on the basis that it was merely a pretext for regime change
by the USA and other countries that support Guaidó. Maduro’s fear of aid being used to
topple his regime was not unfounded. An audit of the US-backed aid effort concluded
that it was not planned in alignment with humanitarian principles and that it sought

63 Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, ‘Informe OVV de Violencia’, Annual report 2017, 5 Jan. 2018.
64 Murphy, H. and Acosta, L. J., ‘Exclusive: Colombian armed groups recruiting desperate Venezuelans, army says’,

Reuters, 20 June 2019.

65 United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘Human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’, Annual report

of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and
the Secretary-General, A/HRC/41/18, 5 July 2019.
66 Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad Social, ‘Conflictividad social en Venezuela en 2020’ [Social conflict

in Venezuela in 2020], 25 Jan. 2021; and United Nations Human Rights Council (note 46).
67 United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘Venezuela: UN report urges accountability for crimes against humanity’,

16 Sep. 2020.
68 Human Rights Watch, ‘Venezuela: Events of 2020’, [n.d.].
69 Dupraz-Dobias, P., ‘Q&A: Venezuela’s growing aid needs and continuing political restrictions’, New

Humanitarian, 4 Mar. 2020.

70 Yi, Y, ‘Tackling the hunger problem in Venezuela’, Borgen Magazine, 19 June 2020.

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12 food systems in conflict and peacebuilding settings: case studies

to reinforce the interim government’s credibility.71 US officials and opposition leaders

have explicitly stated that one of the goals of the aid delivery was to weaken Maduro
by forcing the Venezuelan military to choose between blocking the aid caravan or
disobeying the president.72 The audit also found that the US Government reduced
funding to United Nations agencies because the government believed that the agencies
were sympathetic to Maduro’s government.
Although the Maduro government has since softened its stance on foreign aid,
the issue is strategically important for the government and the opposition. Maduro
has labelled US sanctions against Venezuela an ‘economic war’, and the government
only accepts humanitarian aid and allows UN agencies to operate inside the country
as a means to confront this war. The government, however, maintains tight control
over distribution as it fears that allowing large-scale assistance would weaken its
political control. At the same time, being seen to block aid is detrimental to its image.73
While aid, in particular from the USA, has been used to bolster the opposition, aid
restrictions also serve the opposition; part of it believes that reducing the suffering
would ease the pressure on the government.74 Consequently, humanitarian access is
highly constrained, and the government is increasingly harassing aid organizations.75

Food systems and the prospects for peaceful relations in Venezuela

The crisis in Venezuela shows no signs of easing.76 Food insecurity is likely to keep
rising, as is the number of migrants leaving Venezuela. However, there are ways
in which food systems in Venezuela can generate conditions conducive to peaceful
relations. In-depth research by SIPRI shows that it is possible to contribute to
improving the prospects for peace through food security interventions even in the
most unfavourable circumstances.77 This is possible by leveraging efforts to build
resilience, sustainable livelihoods and social cohesion.
One positive step is that the Venezuelan government now acknowledges the
humanitarian crisis and is allowing humanitarian agencies to respond, albeit with
restrictions. In 2021 the World Food Programme (WFP) was granted access to the
country. The WFP’s presence allows not only food insecurity to be addressed but also
brings with it significant logistical capacity, something that has so far been lacking in
the humanitarian response. In neighbouring Colombia, tentative findings show that
WFP programming could have a stabilizing impact on the refugee crisis and the risk of
non-state armed groups targeting Venezuelan migrants.78 Therefore the WFP’s pres-
ence in the country is a step towards improving food security while potentially also
contributing towards the prospects for peaceful relations. Nevertheless, the impact
will largely depend upon whether the WFP and other humanitarian organizations are
allowed full and unhindered access throughout the country.

71 Office of Inspector General, US Agency for International Development (USAID), ‘Enhanced processes and

implementer requirements are needed to address challenges and fraud risks in USAID’s Venezuela response’, Audit
Report 9-000-21-005-P, 16 Apr. 2021.
72 Parkin Daniels, J., ‘Hungry Venezuelans urge help but standoff looms over “politicised” aid’, The Guardian,

13 Feb. 2019.
73 International Crisis Group, Venezuela: What Lies Ahead after Election Clinches Maduro’s Clean Sweep, Latin

America & Caribbean Report no. 85 (International Crisis Group: Brussels, 21 Dec. 2020); and Krygier, R. and
O’Grady, S., ‘In Venezuela, humanitarian aid has become a political weapon’, Washington Post, 14 Feb. 2019.
74 International Crisis Group (note 73).
75 ACAPS, ‘Venezuela: Complex crisis’, [n.d.].
76 Angelo, P., ‘Top conflicts to watch in 2021: Economic, political and humanitarian catastrophe in Venezuela’,

Council on Foreign Relations, 22 Jan. 2021.

77 Delgado, C. et al., The World Food Programme’s Contribution to Improving the Prospects for Peace (SIPRI:

Stockholm, 2019).
78 Delgado (note 59).

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 venezuela 13

Tackling the crisis means alleviating food insecurity in Venezuela and tackling
violence and the wider economic and political crisis. This, in turn, depends on how
the government continues to adapt to the fall in oil production and demand, given
that Venezuela’s oil wealth has dominated the economy and shaped the relationship
between the state and its citizens. As shown, armed groups have been quick to adapt
to and exploit changing dynamics. Therefore, any lasting solution to the crisis will
require the government to curb the growing power of armed groups and their terri-
torial and social control over a large part of the country’s most vulnerable populations.
There are few indications that the Maduro government is willing to do so. How the
current and future governments reconstruct the country and diversify its economy will
determine how the food system in Venezuela evolves and, with it, how the pathways
between hunger and conflict, and food security and peace, evolve. Actors engaged in
responding to the crisis must identify these pathways and integrate a food security
lens in peacebuilding efforts and a peacebuilding lens in food security.
The Venezuelan case study traces the pathways between hunger and conflict by
identifying that the structural roots of the current food crisis are in the parallel oil-
driven development and agricultural decline starting in the first half of the 20th cen-
tury. The hunger crisis is a result of poor policy, over-reliance on oil revenues and
reactive decarbonization, and has been worsened by and worsens violent conflict in
Venezuela. The case study draws out the impact of violent conflict on the production,
distribution and marketing elements of food systems, identified in the first paper as
being the parts of the food system most affected by violent conflict. The study then
looks at how food insecurity can lead to social unrest and the weaponization of food,
which in turn increases the risk of violence. Finally, it considers the challenges to con-
fronting the food crisis as oil production in Venezuela falls and the world increasingly
decarbonizes.
The Venezuelan case study shares many overarching similarities with the Yemen
case study below. There are similarities in the ways through which violent conflict
erodes food security, and how deteriorating food insecurity exacerbates violence. Four
compounding factors that demonstrate the pathways emerge from the Venezuelan
case study and can also be seen in the Yemen one: (a) a shift from agriculture to oil;
(b) detrimental government policies; (c) migration and displacement; and (d) the
politicization and weaponization of food. But there are also significant differences,
highlighting the importance of contextual considerations for breaking the pathways
between hunger and conflict and leveraging the potential of food systems to generate
the conditions conducive to peace.

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