Secularism & Its Discontents

Author(s): Nikki R. Keddie

Source: Daedalus, Vol. 132, No. 3, On Secularism & Religion (Summer, 2003), pp. 14-30
Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20027855
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Nikki R. Keddie

Secularism & its discontents

Xn the quarter century since the Iranian In the survey that follows, I will focus
Revolution took much of the world by on the conflict between secularist and
surprise - not least in the way its reli antisecularist trends in a variety of dif
gious leadership mobilized a genuinely ferent states, starting with the rise of
popular uprising - many commentators secularism in the West. Before I begin, it
in the West have been inclined to see the will be useful to examine more closely
Middle East and South Asia as cultural the history of some key terms.
backwaters, where religion-based poli
tics are overcoming the secular forms of Vyver the centuries, 'secular' has con
political organization appropriate to veyed a far wider variety of meanings
modern industrial societies. than current usage may suggest. A term
But this understanding of recent derived in Middle English from the Old
events is misleading. A comparative his French word seculer (itself from the Latin
torical survey of the rise and fall of sucsaecularis), the word originally referred
cessive waves of secularism in the mod to clergy who were not bound by the re
ern era reveals a more complicated and ligious rules of a monastic order. In Mid
paradoxical picture of trends in Western dle English, it could also refer to the
countries and of the impact of these realm of the 'this-worldly' as opposed to
trends on societies struggling to emulate the divine - the sacred and 'other-world
the economic success of the modern ly' realms historically monopolized in
West. Western Europe by the Roman Catholic
Church. Indeed, the evolving use of
words based on 'secular' reflects, among
Nikki R. Keddie, professor em?rita of history at
other things, a long and contentious his
the University of California at Los Angeles, has
tory ; 'secularism' and its militant Latin
been a Fellow of the American Academy since
sibling 'laicism' emerged in Western Eu
1994. She has written on Iranian history, women
ropean countries that were once, if not
in the Muslim world, religio-political trends
still, dominated by Roman Catholicism.
worldwide, and Sayyed Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani.
It was only in the nineteenth century
The author of "Modern Iran : Roots and Results that the word 'secular' came to be asso
of Revolution" (2003), she also founded and
ciated with 'secularists' who espoused a
edited the journal "Contention: Debates in Soci
doctrine of 'secularism' - that is, the be
ety, Culture and Science"from 1991 to 1996.
lief that religious institutions and values

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 Secularism
should play no role in the temporal af By the end of the nineteenth century, &its
fairs of the nation-state. These terms the political aims of secular societies had discontents
were coined in England in 1851 by a radi been largely achieved, in part because
cal atheist, George Holyoake, who was they were in tune with other social and
looking for respectable euphemisms to cultural trends. After the death of Brad
replace 'atheist,' 'infidel,' 'freethinker,' laugh and the defection of Besant, the
'unbeliever,' etc.1 Holyoake and his suc movement, never large, faded away. By
cessor Charles Bradlaugh led a national then, Darwinism and socialism had re
network of secular societies that some placed secularism as fighting creeds, and
have seen as an alternative church - cer Thomas Huxley's late-nineteenth
tainly these societies served social and century coinage, 'agnostic,' had largely
political as well as ideological functions. replaced 'secularist' as a term for reli
Appealing largely to skilled laborers gious skeptics.
from the upper working classes, the sec The older noun 'secularization' under
ular societies advocated an end of privi went a somewhat analogous evolution.
leges for the Anglican Church, and the For centuries, the term in Latin and
extension of equal rights and freedoms French referred only to a change in cleri
to all religious and antireligious persons cal status - for example, when a monk
and institutions. They convinced Parlia became a secular priest. A broader
ment to abolish disabilities for nonbe meaning was documented only after the
lieving witnesses, helped discredit Thirty Years' War and the Peace of West
(though they did not succeed in abolish phalia in 1648, when the term was used
ing) blasphemy laws, and, after Brad to describe the process whereby Bran
laugh was elected to Parliament and re denburg was granted church land within
fused to take the religious oath, made it its borders. In the decades that followed,
possible for an avowed nonbeliever to 'secularization' was often used to de
hold office.2 Apart from Bradlaugh, the scribe the confiscation or conversion of
organization's most effective speaker ecclesiastical religious institutions or
and writer was the young Annie Besant, property for civil possession and use.4
best known for her later association with By the end of the nineteenth century,
the theosophy movement, with its Hin 'secularization' was being widely used in
du and Buddhist overtones.3 conjunction with the terms 'secularists'
and 'secularism' to refer to various state
i Edward Royle gives the origin and early de
velopment of the secularist movement in Victo measures that weakened the Church and
rian Infidels : The Origins of the British Secularist religion, including the disestablishment
Movement 1791 -1866 (Manchester : Manchester
of dominant churches, the protection of
University Press, 1974)
religious and atheist minorities, and in
2 Franklin L. Baumer, Religion and the Rise of creased lay control of formerly religious
Scepticism (New York : Harcourt, Brace & spheres.5 By extension, 'secularization'
World, i960), 135. was used as well to describe a general
ized process of replacing religious with
3 Edward Royle, Radicals, Secularists and Repub
4 Karel Dobbelaere, "Secularization : A Multi
licans : Popular Freethought in Britain, 1866 -1915
(Manchester : Manchester University Press, Dimensional Concept," Current Sociology 29 (2)
(Summer 1981) : 3 - 213.
1980) ; Peter van der Veer, Imperial Encoun
ters : Religion and Modernity in India and Britain
(Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 5 Owen Chadwick, The Secularization of the
2001), chap. 3, "The Spirits of the Age: Spiritu European Mind in the Nineteenth Century (Cam
alism and Political Radicalism." bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

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NikkiR.
Keddie lay values in the character and direction In addition, all of these phenomena
on of morality, education, and culture. For vary widely in scope and intensity, and
secularism many, 'secular' and 'secularist' (and all of them can be paradoxical in their
& religion French variants on 'laic') remain associ implications. Instead of a separation of
ated with unbelief. church and state, secularism has some
times been used to justify and enforce
JC/nter the social scientists : only in the aggressive political control over religion
early twentieth century did 'seculariza and its institutions. This has been true in
tion' become a scholarly category, usual modern Turkey, Pahlavi Iran, Bourgui
ly traced to the sociologists Weber, Ton ba's Tunisia, and the Soviet Union and
nies, and Troeltsch, although similar communist Eastern Europe, whose gov
concepts can be found in earlier think ernments have mostly seen such control
ers.6 In common usage today, 'secular as a necessity for their states' rapid social
ization' refers to : and economic modernization.

an increase in the number of people

J?or much of the nineteenth and twenti
with secular beliefs and practices ;
eth centuries, most scholars and writers,
a lessening of religious control or influ Western and Eastern alike, saw the
ence over major spheres of life ; and
growth of secularism as a one-way street
a growth in state separation from reli toward modernization - a wholly posi
gion and in secular regulation of for tive process according to Comte and
merly religious institutions and cus many subsequent theorists, or a dialecti
toms.
cal process synthesizing positive and
These phenomena are to a degree logi negative moments, as hypothesized by
cally independent, and also often inde Hegel and Marx. In the social science lit
pendent in practice. Trying to measure erature, the growth of secularism is of
the extent of secular beliefs and prac ten interpreted as a natural concomitant
tices through church membership may of the spread of science, education, and
not yield accurate results ; in Europe to technology - all of which seem to under
day figures for religious belief as mea mine the need for religious explanations
sured by opinion polls are considerably of the world and, ultimately, for power
higher than those for church attendance ful organized religions in modern socie
and membership. Nor does the extent of ty. Theorists with a progressive view,
belief or unbelief necessarily correlate whether straight-line or dialectical, have
positively with the extent of state sepa also tended to imagine that people will
ration from, or control over, religion.7 enjoy ever greater levels of material well
being, thus diminishing the collective
6 Dobbelaere, "Secularization," 9. need for religious consolation. (It is
worth bearing in mind, however, a cer
7 For discussions of problems regarding secu
tain imbalance in scholarly accounts :
larization see Steve Bruce, ed., Religion and Mod
most scholars who write about secular
ernization : Sociologists and Historians Debate the
Secularization Thesis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ization consider it a rational, even natu
1992). In that volume, Hugh McLeod, "Secular ral, point of view, while most scholars
Cities : Berlin, London, and New York in the who write about fundamentalism are
Later Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centur
ies," 58 - 89, notes the ambiguity of the word cities in terms of religious belief, but the least
'secularization' and shows that in this period secular by the criterion of church-state rela
Berlin was by far the most secular of the three tions.

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 lization in most of the world - and cer Secularism
skeptical about the value of religious &its
politics.8) Most of the evidence from the tainly in Western Europe. There the discontents
West has tended to bolster this view of authority of the Roman Catholic Church
progressive secularization, and, despite was unrivaled : it may well have been the
the West's crisis of confidence in prog most powerful religious institution the
ress, most modern governments have world has ever seen. From the late elev
continued to exercise ever greater levels enth century until about 1300, canon law
of control over formerly religious had priority over secular law, and kings
spheres. had to perform significant penance if
At the same time, it has become in they violated Church edicts.10 Further
creasingly clear in country after country more, the Church played a leading role
that the political struggles between reli in organizing Crusades not only in the
gious and secular forces are far from Holy Land, but also against heretics and
over - whether in Iran, India, or even the non-Catholics in Europe. Later it also
United States. Even though worldwide a played a leading role in dividing the New
great many people think religion should World into Spanish and Portuguese do
not affect legislation and policy-making, mains.
those who disagree are a growing force. The rise of Protestantism initially in
In the survey that follows, I shall focus creased religiosity in Western Europe by
on parts of the world where institutions provoking intense personal concern
of major world religions held power that about religious doctrines and loyalties,
created significant obstacles to secular among both Protestants and the re
ization. I will therefore concentrate on formed and aroused Catholics of the
areas that had either monotheistic scrip Counter Reformation. Ultimately, how
tural religions with exclusive claims ever, the proliferation of sects and the
- namely Judaism, Christianity, and Is exhaustion of the combatants in long,
lam ; or a number of conflicting religions bloody, and inconclusive religious wars
with strong incompatible claims, as in led to increasing religious toleration.
South Asia. These are the areas where Governments gradually granted equal
important struggles over secularization civil status to those holding a variety of
have occurred. They are also, not coinci religious and irreligious beliefs - a key
dentally, the areas that have seen the re condition for creating secular states. But
cent rise in ' fundamentalist' move rulers in Western Europe now had to
ments, which I have termed 'The New contend with a great variety of religions.
Religious Politics.'9 The political implications of these
changes evolved over several centuries,
JDefore the sixteenth century, religion in a series of sometimes violent struggles
was a major organizing principle of civi that pitted rulers against established reli
8 For further discussion of these and other gious groups. In England, Henry VIII
(r. 1509 -1547) broke with Rome, confis
points on secularism see Nikki R. Keddie, "Sec
ularism and the State : Toward Clarity and cated church lands, and closed monas
Global Comparison," New Left Review 226 (No teries. In Italy three centuries later, the
vember/December 1997) : 21 - 40. nationalists under King Victor Emman
9 See Nikki R. Keddie, "The New Religious
to Thomas Renna, Church and State in Medieval
Politics : Where, When and Why do 'Funda
mentalisms' Appear?" Comparative Studies in Europe 1050 -1314 (Dubuque, Iowa : Kendall/
Hunt, 1974).
Society and History (October 1998).

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Nikki R.
Keddie uel II (r. 1861 -1878) stripped the Church loyalties potentially conflicted with the
on of its control over the papal states and priorities of emergent nation-states ;
secularism Rome, resulting in a break in relations even before the rise of modern national
& religion between the Vatican and the Italian gov ism, European regimes tried to weaken
ernment that lasted into the twentieth religious institutions that interfered
century. In France, the struggle between with their secular power.
the government and the Church, begun Nationalism created an ideological ba
in 1789 during the French Revolution, sis for nonreligious loyalties and also
culminated between 1901 and 1905 in the made it easier to extend equal rights to
confiscation of religious property and in citizens professing different religious
a strict separation of church and state. In beliefs, and possible to encourage na
Spain, Portugal, and many nations in tional networks of production and con
Latin America, analogous struggles fol sumption.13 Although in some modern
lowed a broadly similar course.11 European countries - for example, Po
Regarding these trends, Western land and Ireland - nationalism has uti
thinkers drew a variety of conclusions. lized religious sentiments, in most it has
Some thinkers, such as John Locke and been a force for secularization, putting
John Stuart Mill, advocated religious tol national loyalty above religion and ren
erance, while others, particularly in dering the nation-state stronger than
France during the Enlightenment, any church, even in the presence of state
harshly criticized organized religion. But religions, as in England.
even some of the harshest critics (Vol The period from i860 to 1914 was
taire, for one) believed that religion probably the heyday in Europe of expan
might be good for the lower classes, sive secularization, just as it was the hey
keeping them honest, diligent, and day of optimistic theories of evolution
peaceful - a proposition that came to ary human progress, from Karl Marx to
seem especially credible after the anti Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. As
clerical violence unleashed during the Eric Hobsbawm describes the period:
French Revolution.12
The French Revolution also made it Traditional religion was receding with
unprecedented rapidity, both as an intel
clear that nationalism - a growing senti
lectual force and among the masses. This
ment of shared moral, political, and was to some extent an almost automatic
social attachments expressed through
the institutions of the nation-state - consequence of urbanization.... In the
Roman Catholic countries, which com
might well rival, or even replace, reli
prised 45 percent of the European popula
giosity in the minds of newly self
tion, faith retreated particularly fast...
conscious citizens. Traditional religious
before the joint offensive of... middle
il Four Catholic national groups scarcely class rationalism and the socialism of
touched on in this essay - Poland, Brazil, Spain,
and the United States - are discussed in Jos? 13 For recent interpretations of nationalism, its
Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World causes and meanings, see Benedict R. Ander
(Chicago, 111. : University of Chicago Press, son, Imagined Communities : Reflections on the
1994). On France and Italy, see Maurice Larkin, Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London : Ver
Church and State after the Dreyfus Affair : The so, 1983) ; Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Na
Separation Issue in France (London : Macmillan, tionalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994);
1974). E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since
1780 : Programme, Myth, Reality (New York:
12 See, e.g., Chadwick, The Secularization, 104 Cambridge University Press, 1992).
105.

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 school teachers, but especially of the com sons of state. While democratic and so Secularism
&its
bination of emancipatory ideals and polit cialist secularists spoke for parts of the discontents
ical calculation which made the fight urban intelligentsia, the rural majority
against the Church the key issue in poli of Russia's people remained devoutly
tics.^ Christian.
After the October 1917 revolution, the
These changes were accompanied by a Bolsheviks - committed to Marx's athe
surge in secular control over education ist worldview - disestablished the Or
and a rise in Marxist socialism, especial
thodox Church and expropriated its
ly among workers. "In many ways Marx
assets. Violent nationwide campaigns
ism [in Karl Kautsky's version]... was
against the Church, religious belief, and
the last triumph of nineteenth-century
the clergy ensued. These policies
positivist scientific confidence. It was
materialist, determinist, inevitabilist, changed during World War II, and in
1943 the regime accepted an accommo
evolutionist, and firmly identified the dation with the Church that restored the
laws of history' with the laws of sci
ence.'"15 patriarchate. The end of communism in
the Soviet Union enabled the Church to
recover considerable property and influ
In Eastern European countries, where
ence, but levels of religious belief and
orthodox Christianity prevailed, secular church attendance remained low,17 indi
ism was also a rising trend between the
cating that even top-down secularization
seventeenth and early twentieth century.
can succeed in undermining religious
Peter the Great (r. 1682 -1725) abolished
belief in some circumstances. (Similarly
the Russian patriarchate, created church
low levels of church and mosque atten
government by synod, and installed a
dance have been reported in post
government representative as chief pro
Communist orthodox Bulgaria and Ser
curator of the synod. Catherine the
bia, as well as in many other areas of
Great (r. 1762 -1796) confiscated much
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
church land, and a succession of nine
Union.)
teenth-century tsars took further meas
ures to control the Orthodox Church.16 European Jewry was also affected by a
broad secular trend, especially in West
In these years, secularization was prima
ern Europe. In countries like Germany
rily a top-down affair carried out for rea
and France, middle-class Jews welcomed
the separation of church and state and
14 E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875 -1914
(New York : Vintage Books, 1989), 265 - 266. the spread of civil equality. Theodor
Herzl and most of the other late
15 Ibid., 267. nineteenth-century founders of political
Zionism were secularists - but many of
16 See Gregory L. Freeze, "Eastern Orthodoxy,"
their followers in Eastern Europe were
Encyclopedia of European Social History, vol. 5
(New York : Scribner, 2001), 313 - 326 ; Robert not. Among European Jews, secularism
L. Nichols, "The Church in Imperial Russia," and nationalism were not entirely con
The Donald W. Treadgold Papers In Russian, East gruent forces : many Zionists, especially
European and Central Asian Studies, 102 (Seattle : on the popular level, were not secular
The Henry M. Jackson School of International ists, and many secularists were not Zion
Studies, University of Washington, 1995); Geof ists.
frey Hosking, Russia : People and Empire 1552 -
1917 (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University
Press, 1997). 17 Freeze, "Eastern Orthodoxy."

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NikkiR. Meanwhile, in the United States
Keddie economy has exacerbated many of these
on throughout the nineteenth century, problems and tensions and has lowered
secularism though secular principles organized po living standards for many. Working
& religion litical life, a variety of religions flour class solidarity, trade unionism, and
ished, partly because the equal treat indeed the industrial working class itself
ment of different Christian churches in have all proved weaker than socialists
America left people free to join or found expected.
a religion of their choice. But when reli The new secular social systems have
giously minded intellectuals in America also had mixed success, ameliorating
moved toward more rationalist and so some major problems but often creating
cially reformist interpretations of reli new ones. The decline in racial barriers
gion in the latter part of the nineteenth worldwide was a major advance, but was
century, it provoked a backlash from lit nowhere accompanied by adequate edu
eralist Protestant conservatives, who cational, health, and other measures to
fought the gradual secularization of be provide equality of opportunity among
havior, belief, and public schooling. racial groups. Ethnic tensions have
Even in European countries at the ze sometimes worsened. Many parts of
nith of expansive secularization, reli Europe have seen growing hostility to
gious groups did not accept the situation immigrants, especially to Muslims.
without a struggle. In Germany, divided Women have won greater equality, but
between Protestants and Catholics, a very few countries have adequate child
Catholic party formed and gained con care and other services for working
siderable strength. And in the past half mothers. Some women, given current
century, a number of Western nations difficulties, long for a return to the days
have experienced a renewal of political of the idealized two-parent, male
claims on behalf of religious values and breadwinner family, often associated
institutions. with religious morality.
Doubts about the wisdom of unmiti In short, secularism is nowhere in the
gated secularism have been provoked by West a simple fait accompli. The spread of
a variety of developments. One was the secular beliefs and practices in Europe
devastation caused by the two world and the United States has involved slow
wars and subsequent regional blood change and continuing, sometimes
baths. The civilized peoples' capacity to sharp, debate. As a result, it would be
commit acts of mass destruction, far foolish to expect that secularist reforms
worse than anything experienced in the would somehow be accomplished more
nineteenth century, bred pessimism easily in the Middle East and South Asia.
about progress. Another factor was the I would argue that the slow ripening of
mixed performance of economic sys secular tendencies is more important
tems, whether capitalist or socialist, that than doctrinal differences in explaining
were supposed to ensure the wealth of the current strength of secularism in the
nations. Although most people living in West. As even a short survey indicates,
the West enjoyed a steady rise in their the West was at first no more open to
standard of living, the new economic secularization than are parts of the Mid
order created new uncertainties : cycles dle East and South Asia today. As I have
of boom and bust, increasing income argued elsewhere, the common idea that
gaps, high levels of unemployment. Re religion and politics have always been
cent rapid globalization of the world more inextricably intertwined in Islam

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 Secularism
than in Christianity is untrue. Typically, Atat?rk's Turkey, in part because Turk &its
governments in the Muslim world fol ish secularists had reasons to fear the discontents
lowed Islamic rules only to the extent socioeconomic, political, and cultural
they thought it was in their interest to power of their own religious elite.
do so. Western European regimes were in
consistent in their application of secu
Secularism as an animating set of polit larizing principles - especially in their
ical beliefs came late to the Muslim colonies. While the French and some
world, as a by-product of the growing other colonial powers were suppressing
influence of Western political ideas. religious schooling at home, they en
While Christian Europe underwent its couraged it in their colonies as part of a
epochal series of struggles between wider cultural project. The French col
church and state, most Muslim coun onies, where conservative diplomats and
tries remained moderately religious in military officers dominated, were ex
orientation. Throughout the early mod empted from anticlerical laws, as the
ern period, the majority of Middle East Catholic orders continued to receive
ern rulers adhered to Islam, and Muslim French government subsidies and sup
religious leaders continue to play an ac port for colonial educational institutions
tive role in civil society, though without by arguing that local nationalists would
making claims to temporal authority of otherwise take over.19 Colonial policy
the sort advanced by the Roman Cath sometimes favored certain religious
olic Church before the Reformation. groups, thus increasing sectarian strife -
Because secularization has progressed but it also introduced some leaders in
unevenly around the world, secularists colonized areas to Western thinking
in the Middle East now face some of the about secularization and modernization.
difficulties previously encountered in After studying at Western-model schools
Western Europe. For example, just last or returning to the Middle East and
century, secularists in France and Italy South Asia from schools in the West,
were hesitant to grant women suffrage, several of them opted for secular nation
for fear that the majority of them would alism, which after World War II became
vote with the Catholic Church; some a dominant mode of decolonization not
secularists in Arab countries today fear only in India, Turkey, and Tunisia, but
the majority of a free electorate will elect also in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Iraq.
religious parties. Similarly, in 1902 the While some have compared the
leaders of the French Radical Party is politico-religious ferment in the Muslim
sued an election program that proposed world today with the rise of Protestant
that "By suppressing religious orders, by ism, a closer, though still inexact, paral
secularizing ecclesiastical property in lel is the history of religious-secular
mortmain, and by abolishing payment of struggles in Catholic countries. In both
public money to the clergy, we mean to possible parallels, religion claimed pow
put into practice this decisive liberal for er in politics, law, personal behavior, and
mula - free churches in a free and sover the regulation of gender and family
eign state" ;l8 a few decades later, a
19 See Elizabeth Thompson, "Neither Conspir
somewhat similar policy was pursued in
acy nor Hypocrisy : The Jesuits and the French
Mandate in Syria and Lebanon," <http ://www.
i8 ?mile Faguet, Le Lib?ralisme (Paris : Soci?t? columbia.edu/sec/dle/ciao/conf/meioi/theoi.
Fran?aise d'Imprimerie, 1903), 121. htmlx

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NikkiR. roles. But whereas some version of secu
Keddie gious institutions. For example, Muslim
on larism has emerged victorious in almost scholars, or ulama, were hierarchically
secularism every Catholic country, the past few de organized and sanctioned by the state,
& religion cades have seen a dramatic growth in the and Ottoman sultans often issued de
influence of so-called Islamists - Mus crees with the force of law. The powers
lims who want to consolidate religion of the central government grew after
and politics in novel combinations that 1826, enabling it to initiate a number of
they present as traditional.20 secularizing measures in the nineteenth
Contrary to Christian practice, in Is century, often under Western pressure.
lam there has never been a central body These measures included significant
to decide religious dogma; even the cen government control over vakf (mort
tral institution of Islamic law has never main) property and the declaration of
been universally applied. Here my dis equal rights for Muslims and non
cussion will center on the Middle East Muslims. Meanwhile, nationalism grew
and Pakistan, which include the strictest in the army and among the educated
regions of Islam ; and it should be noted middle classes.
that in Southeast Asia and in Africa The biggest impetus to secular nation
south of the Sahara, where Islam spread alism came after World War I, with the
late and peacefully, Islamic law and prac accession to power of Mustafa Kemal
tice has usually been less strict. Atat?rk. A war hero, he had led the
Turkish troops that repelled the Euro
JLerms like 'secular' were never widely pean invaders, forcing the Allied powers
used in Muslim countries until the twen to recognize Turkish control of enough
tieth century. Then, until roughly 1967, territory to constitute a viable nation
secularists, nationalists, and socialists state. Since the sultan-caliph had acqui
played a growing political role in the esced in the possibility of an Allied dis
Muslim world, coming to power in sev memberment of Turkey, there was little
eral countries and carrying out seculariz internal resistance to Atat?rk's abolition
ing programs as a concomitant to mod of the sultanate and then of the cali
ernization. phate, though the abolition of the latter
The Ottoman Empire and Turkey, its aroused resistance in other parts of the
most central successor state, played a Muslim world.
pioneering role in this regard. Under the The need for strong government ac
Ottoman Empire, the state exercised an tion to establish a secular state was due
unusual amount of control over its reli both to the residual strength of existing
Islamic institutions and the felt need to
20 These problems were early suggested by catch up with a West that had a long
Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. head start in centralization and modern
Carol Volk (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Uni
ization. Atat?rk's secularizing measures
versity Press, 1994), and are stressed in Gilles
Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cam included the romanization of the script
bridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2002). and outlawing the use of Arabic - and
The trend to moderation of Iran's policies since the abolition of religious education and
the 1978 -1979 revolution and the early loss of of Shariah. Modeling Turkish law on
Muslim faith in Iran as a model for revolution
elsewhere are relevant, and are discussed in the Swiss Civil Code, Atat?rk granted
Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran : Roots and Results women almost equal rights and discour
of Revolution (New Haven, Conn. : Yale Univer aged veiling. His were the strongest mea
sity Press, 2003). sures against religious institutions any

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where outside the Communist world, as much religious backlash in Turkey today Secularism
&its
he and many Turkish nationalists adopt as in several Arab countries in the Mid discontents
ed the French model of militant laicism. dle East, and Turkey is unique in its re
It is not surprising that after World nunciation of Islamic justifications for
War II there was a backlash against some laws and institutions. (Laws on women's
of Atat?rk's most aggressively seculariz status have been similarly reformed in
ing measures. Even secular politicians Tunisia, but there the reform was carried
wanting better relations with the oil-rich out under Islamic justification.)
Arab world made gestures toward Islam.
A dramatic sign of antisecularist reac In Iran, the ulama had far more inde
tion was Turkey's giving an electoral pendent power than anywhere else in
plurality to an Islamist party and the ap the Muslim world, due to developments
pointment of a prime minister from that in Iranian Shiism after it became the
party in 1996.21 This in turn produced a state religion in 1501. Only in the late
secularist reaction, especially within the nineteenth century did nationalism be
military, and the Islamist prime minister gin to grow in the country: in dramatic
resigned in the summer of 1997. Mainly contrast to Muslim leaders, early Iranian
because of a deep economic crisis, a new nationalists blamed the country's de
Islamist-based but more moderate and cline on the seventh-century Arab Islam
formally secular AK Party won a plurali ic conquest, and vaunted its ancient
ty in the November 2002 elections and 'Aryan' (linguistically Indo-European)
has since led the government. Periodic heritage. Disgruntled ulama allied with
struggles continue over issues like the merchants and nationalist reformers in a
prohibition of Islamic head covering for partially successful antigovernmental
women in state localities such as Parlia
revolt in 1890 -1891. Beginning in late
ment and universities. This prohibition 1905, a revolution produced a constitu
may eventually be rescinded, but the tional parliamentary regime that contin
basic secular nature of Turkey's govern ued in power until Russia and Britain
ment is unlikely to change. This is partly intervened in 1911.2Z
because Turkey has hopes of joining the Reza Shah, who governed Iran from
European community, and partly be 1921 until 1941, imitated Atat?rk, though
cause the active majority of Turks are in his less modern nation he could not
still secular, though often willing to al go as far. He centralized his country -
low freedom of dress, and the ruling par chiefly by forcibly settling nomads, im
ty is not threatening basic secularism. proving education, transport, and com
As in Russia, much of the population 22 In the extensive literature on this, see espe
was successfully secularized by govern cially Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in
mental fiat and policies. There is not as Iran : The Iranian Tobacco Protest of 1891 -1892
(London : Frank Cass, 1966) ; Janet Afary, The
Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906 -1911 :
21 On Turkey see Niyazi Berkes, The Develop
ment of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal : McGill Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the
University Press, 1964) ; Binaz Toprak, Islam and Origins of Feminism (New York: Columbia Uni
versity Press, 1996) ; Mangol Bay?t, Iran s First
Political Development in Turkey (Leiden : E. J.
Revolution : Shiism and the Constitutional Revolu
Brill, 1981) ; David Kushner, "Turkish Secular
tion of 1905 -1909 (New York : Oxford Univer
ists and Islam," The Jerusalem Quarterly 38
(1986) : 89 -106 ; Roy Mottahedeh, "The Islamic sity Press, 1991) ; Vanessa Martin, Islam and
Movement : The Case for Democratic Inclu Modernism : The Iranian Revolution of 1906 (Lon
sion," Contention 4 (3) (Spring 1995) : 107 -127. don : Tauris, 1989) ; and several articles by Ann
K. S. Lambton.

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NikkiR.
Keddie munications, and promoting the secular Muslim countries occupied by foreign
on nationalist view of Iran hitherto favored settlers, there was a strong counter
secularism by intellectuals. Simultaneously, he assertion of national and religious iden
& religion forced his citizens to adopt Western tities, prompted in large part by efforts
dress, promoted a secular public school to assert local, non-Western cultural val
system, and so forth. Modernizing secu ues in regions ruled by the West.
larization continued under his son, Mu Secular nationalists generally led the
hammad Reza Shah (r. 1941 -1979), and anticolonial liberation movements after
was widely associated with subservience World War II. In Egypt, Gamal Abdul
to the United States and its interests, es Nasser participated in a 1952 revolution
pecially after American leadership and and survived an assassination attempt
British involvement in the 1953 coup that by the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954,
overthrew the popular (and secular) which he used to legitimate a crackdown
Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. on religious institutions ; two years later,
Modernization, which took place there Nasser declared Egypt a socialist state.
almost entirely between 1925 and 1975, Popular support for his brand of secular
was much more sudden in Iran than it ism began to fade with the defeat of
had been in Turkey. Meanwhile, the sup Egypt by Israel in the Six-Day War in
pression of secular opposition opened 1967, and his successors, as autocratic as
the way for the rapid rise and 1979 victo he, provoked even deeper distrust by in
ry of a multifaceted revolutionary move stituting 'free market' policies that, crit
ment led by a religious opposition that ics charged, primarily served Western
appealed to widespread anti-Western interests. Current Egyptian Prime Min
and anti-tyrannical feelings.23 ister Hosni Mubarak has not limited his
Other Muslim countries had only crackdown to militant Islamists ; he has
partly similar trajectories, which I will arrested and brought to trial a number of
describe in brief. By a historical contin dissidents, including civil rights leaders
gency, in the Middle East only Arab like Saad Eddin Ibrahim.
countries experienced Western colonial In Tunisia after its 1956 independence,
rule. Almost all of them outside the Ara Habib Bourguiba instated strongly secu
bian Peninsula were for a time either lar measures that reinterpreted Islam,
colonies, protectorates, or mandates of weakened religious institutions, and in
Britain or France. Western control of troduced virtually equal rights for wom
Palestine in the crucial years after 1918 en. His successor, Ben Ali, however, has
culminated in the creation of Israel, autocratically suppressed both Islamists
which greatly strengthened anti of all varieties and civil rights lawyers
Western currents in the Arab Middle and advocates.
East. In Palestine and Algeria, the only In Algeria, governmental suppression
of the 1992 elections that Islamists were
23 Among the many works on Iran, see Ervand
Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions poised to win led to a bloody civil war,
(Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, but also to a significant decline in mili
1982) ; H. E. Chehabi, Iranian Politics and Reli tant Islamism.24 Jordan and Morocco's
gious Modernism (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell Univer recent histories are more moderate ; Sau
sity Press, 1990) ; Nikki R. Keddie, Iran and the di Arabia is ruled under a strict Islamic
Muslim World : Resistance and Revolution (Lon
don : Macmillan, 1995) ; Sami Zubaida, Islam, 24 See Islamism and Secularism in North Africa,
The People and the State (London : Routledge, ed. John Ruedy (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1989). 1994).

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 Secularism
creed that dates back to the eighteenth political primacy of clerical and lay Mus &its
century; Syria and pre-war Iraq have si lim leaders. The idea and practice of discontents
multaneously suppressed Islamic and codifying Islamic law and making it the
non-Islamic opposition. Militant Islam law of the state is also distinctly modern.
is still a strong force in much of the Mus Still, most people attracted to Islamist
lim world, but I would agree with those ideologies do not envision a violent
who point to its weakening in recent overthrow of their governments ; they
years in key centers including Iran, rather wish to establish political parties
Egypt, and Algeria. Despite the bin and participate in free elections. Several
Laden phenomenon, it seems unlikely Islamists today champion values long as
that militant Islamists will take over sociated with secularism in the West, in
more Arab governments in the near fu cluding democracy and respect for mod
ture.25 On the other hand, recent U.S. ern science, technology, and education.
policies toward the Arab-Israeli dispute, Anti-Western terrorism, while of natural
Pakistan, and most recently, Iraq, have international concern, involves a very
led to a growth in both Islamist and non small minority of Muslims, and has thus
Islamist hostility to the U.S. government far spread far less than many feared after
in the Arab world, Turkey, Pakistan, and 2001.

Southeast Asia that could be expressed Paradoxically enough, the Islamic

in further violence against American and country where forms of secularism are
Western targets. most popular today is probably Iran. Re
The fatal association of secularism formists have won repeated electoral vic
with autocratic rule and Western influ tories in the country since 1997, demon
ence helps account for the general trend strations against the hard-liners who
against secularism in the Muslim control the government are increasingly
world;26 when people want to be free frequent, and there is a healthy ferment
of Western control, they don't generally in the arts. Just as the Iranian revolution
envision the path to their salvation in was briefly seen as a model in much of
the secularist ideas sovereign in the the Muslim world, so Iranian reformism
West. The creation in recent decades of and activist opposition to clerical autoc
modernized and highly political versions racy are now models for many outside
of Islam encourages mobilization of the Iran.27 Furthermore, in Iran as else
still-religious masses and provides the where, a number of writers, mostly
elements of an ideology that seems fa women, have undertaken the difficult
miliar, powerful - and untainted by issue of interpreting early Islamic tradi
Western influence. tions as implying equality for women,
In recent years, Islamist Muslims have and there have been a few legal and
introduced antisecular elements rare in many social changes in the direction of
past Islamic history, like the total inter greater gender equality, though laws are
twining of religion and politics and the far more unequal than they were under

25 Kepel, Jihad ; Olivier Roy is also writing a

book on these questions. 27 See Asef Bayat and Bahman Baktiari, "Revo
lutionary Iran and Egypt : Exporting Inspira
26 These points are emphasized in several tions and Anxieties," in Iran and the Surrounding
chapters of Islam and Secularism in the Middle World, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Rudi Matthee
East, ed. Azzam Tamimi and John L. Esposito (Seattle : University of Washington Press,
(London: Hurst and Co., 2000). 2002).

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Nikki R. secularist intellectuals continue to be
Keddie the Shah.28 Women now comprise 63
on percent of university entrants, as health, stronger in these countries than in much
secularism of the Islamic Middle East. As a result,
education, and family programs have
& religion
brought birthrates down from seven per there is no consensus that being a Jewish
woman to two. or Muslim state requires any further
Some intellectuals in Iran and else strengthening of religious laws.
where in the Muslim world think that Pakistan differs greatly from Israel,
advances associated with secularism in however; it trails Israel in moderniza
the West can be achieved via reinterpre tion and education programs, and must
tations of Islam without renouncing the also contend with widespread poverty
ties between state and religion. The eco and persistent tribal and regional power
nomic failures and cultural repression centers. Having enacted, under General
experienced under Islamic rule have dis Zia ul-Haq in the 1970s, Islamic' laws
illusioned most Iranians, whose anticler that discriminate against women and re
icalism is exemplified by the pervasive ligious minorities, it is also substantially
different from Israel on the social front.
refusal of the country's taxi drivers to
Current Pakistani President Pervez Mu
pick up clerics. Many Iranians are speak
ing not only against clerical rule, but sharraf has secular aims, but by his acts
also explicitly in favor of the separation he has alienated many Islamists and
democratic secularists alike, and he is
of religion and the state. The failures of
the Islamic Republic have also damp having trouble in his efforts to introduce
ened enthusiasm for Islamic revolution secular education into the far-flung ma
and rule elsewhere. drasas. Ultimately, Israel's government
and society, despite all the privileges
JLhe dynamics of secularization in granted to Jews and the religious parties,
are more secular than Pakistan's.
South Asia and Israel, where religion
The case of India, where Hinduism is
and nationalism have been closely inter
twined for decades, have been somewhat practiced among several other major re
different from those in the West and the ligions, is more complex. Hinduism, it
Middle East. In Pakistan and Israel, reli has been argued, did not originate as a
gious identity spurred movements to single religion, but rather was 'reformed'
create a nation, movements chiefly into a unity of doctrine and practice af
based on religious nationalism. And in ter the coming of the British and the de
both countries religion-based parties velopment of clearer Christian and Mus
have grown since the states' formation, lim identities within the country.30 Re
and constitute a significant element in form movements that incorporated
political life. Western influences first emerged in In
The early leaders of Israel's Zionist dia during the early nineteenth century
movement were, however, secularists, as and developed earliest among Hindus,
were a number of Pakistan's founders, who occupied more middle-class posi
tions than Muslims.
including Muhammad Ali Jinnah.29 And
28 See Nikki R. Keddie, "Women in Iran since
1979," Social Research 67 (2) (Summer 2000): 30 See chapters by David Shulman, Heinrich
405 - 438, and the sources it cites. von Stietencron, and Robert E. Frykenberg in
G?nther D. Sontheimer and Hermann Kulke,
29 See Stanley A. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan eds., Hinduism Reconsidered (New Delhi: Mano
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). har, 1989).

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 Founded in 1885, the Indian National Secularism
In elections for provincial legislatures &its
Congress was predominantly liberal in 1937, the Muslim League did not get discontents
secular, and officially neutral regarding the majority of Muslim votes, but subse
religion. Such religious neutrality quently many Muslims found the per
seemed necessary if the party was to formance of the Congress-dominated
enlist both Muslims and Hindus in the legislatures pro-Hindu and discrimina
struggle for national independence. On tory. In the 1940s, after the Muslim
the other hand, some leaders' emphasis League's determination to make Pak
on Hindu issues (for example, the move istan a Muslim state further aroused
ment against cow slaughter) as advocat communal-religious feelings, most Mus
ed in the early twentieth century by B. G. lims actively supported the creation of a
Tilak attracted mostly Hindu support separate Muslim state. While partition
and alienated some non-Hindus. might have been avoided - especially if
In the first years of the twentieth cen Nehru had accepted proposals for sub
tury, divisive communal issues came to stantial autonomy for Muslim regions -
the fore with the abortive partition of it instead took effect with brutal sudden
Bengal, favored by Muslims but broadly ness after the hasty departure of the
opposed by Hindus. The dispute over British in 1947. Large-scale massacres
Bengal led to the formation of the Mus occurred on both sides.31 And in the
lim League and to the granting of sepa decades that followed the partition,
rate electorates, at first for local bodies, three major Indian leaders were assassi
based on religion. Congress and the nated for religio-political reasons : Ma
Muslim League cooperated in the Khi hatma Gandhi in 1948 by a Hindu na
lafat movement of support for the Otto tionalist; Nehru's daughter, Prime Min
man caliphate during and after World ister Indira Gandhi, in 1984 by a Sikh
War I, but this became a nonissue with militant; and her son, Prime Minister
Atat?rk's abolition of the caliphate, and Rajiv Gandhi, in 1991 by a Hindu adher
the cooperation broke down. ent of the Tamil Tigers.
The Congress Party attracted a num In India after the partition, maintain
ber of Muslim politicians, most promi ing state secularism and religious neu
nently A. K. Azad, at a time when the trality proved difficult, and the Indian
Muslim League was far from securing constitution did not establish a uniform
the majority of Muslim voters. Congress civil code. In 1985, a crisis ensued when a
secularism had unacknowledged contra branch of the Indian supreme court
dictions, however, and the successes of ruled that an elderly Muslim woman,
the party's outstanding leader Mohan Shah Bano, was entitled to maintenance
das Gandhi were partly due to the mass by her ex-husband under a section of the
appeal of his spiritual themes such as Indian Criminal Code, and went beyond
nonviolence and asceticism, which were this in advocating a uniform civil code.
closer to certain Hindu and Jain tradi This led to significant Hindu-Muslim
tions than to Islam. On the other hand, conflict, though some Muslim women
the religious Gandhi and his agnostic fel and liberals agreed with the judgment.
low Congress leader Jawaharlal Nehru Rajiv Gandhi's Congress (I) government
were in agreement that the national backtracked, however, successfully
movement and ultimate national gov
ernment of a united India should be sec 31 See Gyanenda Pandey, Remembering Parti
tion : Violence, Nationalism and History in India
ular in its policies and treat all religions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
equally.
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NikkiR. reaction to Hindu and Muslim versions
Keddie pushing a 1986 law exempting Muslim
on women from the law of maintenance. A of religious nationalism, Sikh and Bud
secularism Hindu nationalist backlash was a factor dhist nationalist movements have
& religion in the ultimately successful campaign to emerged in South Asia. In India, Sikhs
demolish the Babri Mosque in Ayod and Muslims have clashed with Hindus ;
hya.32 Other governmental acts that in Sri Lanka, Buddhists are battling Hin
encouraged communal reactions includ dus. All of these religious nationalist
ed affirmative action policies for Mus movements have contributed to a weak
lims and for disfavored castes and tribes ening of secularism in the region.34
at a time when educated Hindus were The Indian situation differs from that
experiencing high unemployment. of the Muslim world in that it involves
In recent years, Hindu nationalism has reactions against a longstanding secular
grown in power; its party, the BJP, cur government with democratic elections.
rently leads the government. A number At the same time, Western political
of intellectuals, including Ashis Nandy, hegemony is less of an issue in India.
T. N. Madan, and Partha Chatterjee, India and the Muslim world are similar
have questioned either secularism itself in that secularism developed there much
or the particular secularist policies of more rapidly than in the West - imposed
past governments. Some Indian intellec top-down on populations that have not
tuals defend secularism, but criticize its yet embraced a secular outlook.
application, arguing, for example, that
Nehru and his followers adopted a top /Vnother area where secularism has
down policy, doing little to negotiate been on the defensive, and religio
with religious people before handling politics on the rise, is a very different
problems with insensitivity. Others criti country, neither third world nor newly
cize the government's conformity to established: the United States.
public opinion. As a result of these on The United States has little in com
going controversies, contemporary India mon with the countries surveyed so far,
has produced perhaps the world's largest and very possibly most of the reasons for
contemporary body of publications the attacks on secularism in the United
debating the merits of secularism.33 States are different from those else
The conflict between secularism and where, even though its antisecular forces
religious nationalism has been a recur became strong almost simultaneously.
rent theme of recent South Asian history There do, however, seem to be some
not only in India but also in Sri Lanka. In similarities.
34 On religious nationalisms in India see Peter
32 See especially the chapters on South Asia in van der Veer, Religious Nationalism : Hindus and
Fundamentalism and Gender, ed. John Stratton Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of Cali
Hawley and Wade Proudfoot (New York : Ox fornia Press, 1994) ; Mark Juergensmeyer, The
ford University Press, 1994). New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts
the Secular State (Berkeley : University of Cali
33 A good sampling of published work on the fornia Press, 1993) ; and the relevant chapters by
question is Secularism and its Critics, ed. Rajeev Daniel Gold, Robert Eric Frykenberg, Harjat
Bhargava (Delhi : Oxford University Press, Oberoi, Ainslee T. Embree, and Peter van der
1998), with an outstanding chapter by Akeel Veer in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby,
Bilgrami. The issue is intelligently covered in eds., Fundamentalisms Observed, Fundamental
T. N. Madan, Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Sec isms and the State, and Accounting for Fundamen
ularism and Fundamentalism in India (Delhi: Ox talisms (Chicago, 111. : University of Chicago
ford University Press, 1997) Press, 1991 -1994).

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 Secularism
Notably, the rise of the New Religious decline in community action and spirit, &its
Politics since 1970 is in part a reaction to
partly due to atomizing forces like televi discontents
strong and sometimes resented secular sion. Some people find in revived reli
measures, accompanied by a rise in gov gious ties and morality a partial or com
ernment centralization and increasing plete solution for such problems.
encroachment in many spheres of life. In In the past, when religion and govern
the United States there have been a num ment were usually intertwined, it was
ber of secularizing governmental meas easy for dissidents to see the weakening
ures, but antisecular opposition has fo of religious powers and the creation of
cused in particular on two Supreme secular states as major steps to solving
Court decisions : the outlawing of school social problems. Similarly, today, when
prayer in 1962 and the legalization of secularism and government are usually
abortion in 1973. The fundamentalists' intertwined, it is easy for dissidents to
earlier focus on creationism versus evo react against secular states and call for
lution, a matter for local governments an obvious alternative - renewed politi
and school boards, has expanded to cal power for religion. The same 'enemy
encompass opposition to schools' teach of my enemy is my friend' logic applies
ing about homosexuality - and, indeed, to ideology. In the past, when secular
about sex at all.35 ideologies like nationalism, socialism,
Throughout the world, the strengthen and free market capitalism had not been
ing of antisecular political parties and widely tried, they could more easily be
movements has been accompanied by presented as keys to creating a better
some weakening of secular parties and world. In recent decades this situation
movements, a weakening due not only to has been reversed, and religious groups
political failures but also to popular dis no longer tied to government have been
illusionment with the old secular ideolo able to advance religious solutions to
gies and panaceas. The end of Commu intractable secular problems.
nism unleashed in some populations a A related dynamic is at work in some
renewal of religious traditions not whol intellectual circles, in which disillusion
ly lost in Eastern Europe and Central with various older secular ideals has
Asia. Among worldwide behavioral opened the door for some to reinstate
trends are the rise of freer sexual habits, religion or create new religious ideolo
resulting in more babies born out of gies. This goes along with the upswing in
wedlock and a rise in sexually transmit identity politics in recent decades, where
ted diseases and crime rates, and a felt religion, along with ethnicity, gender,
and sexual preference, has become a ba
35 Different approaches to religion and politics sis of political solidarity, in part replac
in contemporary America are found in Sara
ing older identities based on class or pa
Diamond, Roads to Dominion : Right-Wing Move
ments and Political Power in the United States triotism, or on universalist worldviews
(New York : The Guilford Press, 1995) ; Garry like socialism and liberalism.
Wills, Under God: Religion and American Politics In some ways, however, the rise in reli
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Ralph giosity and decline in secularism are per
Reed, Active Faith : How Christians are Changing
the Soul of American Politics (New York : The
haps less pervasive than they seem. For
Free Press, 1996). A thorough survey is Barry A. one thing, all sorts of traditions es
Kosmin and Seymour P. Lachman, One Nation chewed by the Westernized educated
Under God: Religion in Contemporary American classes have come to be seen, often erro
Society (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993). neously, as belonging to religious tradi

D dalus Summer 2003 29

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NikkiR. tion. In the Islamic world as in the Unit In conclusion, I think it is worth
Keddie
on ed States, the religious Right has em stressing two major points that emerge
secularism braced a romantic view of traditional from this brief comparative historical
& religion social relations, projecting a picture of survey of secularism around the world :
harmony that never, or rarely, existed.36 First, secularization around the world
At the same time, when religious parties has been a far longer, more difficult, and
have come to power, as in Iran, they have more partial process than is usually
tended to retain, or eventually to rein assumed. It requires a profound change
state, important components of modern in human outlook: in both the West and
secularism. Not only, for example, did the East, the difficulties of establishing
Iran's Islamic Republic adopt a largely stable secular regimes have often been
secular constitution using Western mod underestimated.
els, but its economy, foreign policy, and Second, the Western path to secular
educational system are also run on ism, and indeed the Western definitions
mainly secular lines, despite a religious of secularism, may not be fully applica
overlay that, as with the U.S. religious ble in all parts of the world, because of
Right, concerns mainly questions of religious differences and the complex
gender and sexuality. impact of Western colonialism. It is
The backlash to secularism is likely to therefore predictable that non-Western
produce its own backlash, which is hap states that try to establish secularism
pening already in Iran, particularly quickly by government fiat, without
among young people and women, who marshaling popular support, will experi
have been able to force some changes in ence serious difficulties - and run the
policy. In the United States too, for all risk of provoking a religious backlash.
the superior grassroots political organi Modern religious rule has not, however,
zation of the religious Right, fundamen solved the problems that brought it to
talism has so far been unable to win ma power. It has increased inequalities
jority support, either in elections or in between genders and among religious
polling on major moral and social issues, communities and has brought about its
even though it has importantly influ own backlash and countermobilizations.
enced Republican policies.

laking the world as a whole, we see

that secularism today is not in over
whelming retreat, although antisecular
ideologies now have more strength than
they did some decades ago. Still, the
struggle between secular and religious
worldviews is far from over.

36 See Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never

Were (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

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