G.R. No. 188492. August 28, 2018.

GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS, GNC FACULTY AND LABOR UNION and
GNC NONTEACHING MAINTENANCE LABOR UNION,
respondents.

Voluntary Arbitrators; Judicial Review; Certiorari; The

decisions and awards of Voluntary Arbitrators (VAs), albeit
immediately final and executory, remained subject to judicial
review in appropriate cases through petitions for certiorari.—
Accordingly, the decisions and awards of Voluntary Arbitrators,
albeit immediately final and executory, remained subject to
judicial review in appropriate cases through petitions for
certiorari. Such was the state of things until the promulgation in
1995 of the ruling in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of
Luzon Development Bank Employees, 249 SCRA 162 (1995).
Therein, the Court noted the silence of R.A. No. 6715 on the
availability of appeal from the decisions or awards of the
Voluntary Arbitrators. In declaring the Voluntary Arbitrators or
Panels of Voluntary Arbitrators as quasi-judicial
instrumentalities, Luzon Development Bank v. Association of
Luzon Development Bank Employees pronounced the decisions or
awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators to be appealable to the CA.
Same; Same; Petition for Review; The ten (10)-day period
stated in Article 276 should be understood as the period within
which the party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary
Arbitrators (VAs) or Panel of Arbitrators may file a motion for
reconsideration. Only after the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA) by filing the petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court within fifteen (15) days from notice pursuant to
Section 4 of Rule 43.—The 10-day period stated in Article 276
should be understood as the period within which the party
adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or
Panel of Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only
after the resolution of the motion for reconsideration may the
aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the petition

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* EN BANC.

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for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15 days

from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43. The Court notes that
despite the clarification made in Teng v. Pagahac, the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) have not revised or
amended the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of
Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings insofar as its Section 7 of Rule
VII is concerned. This inaction has obviously sown confusion,
particularly in regard to the filing of the motion for
reconsideration as a condition precedent to the filing of the
petition for review in the CA. Consequently, we need to direct the
DOLE and the NCMB to cause the revision or amendment of
Section 7 of Rule VII of the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the
Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings in order to allow
the filing of motions for reconsideration in line with Article 276 of
the Labor Code.
Motion to Dismiss; Certiorari; The denial of a motion to
dismiss cannot be assailed by petition for certiorari.—Generally,
the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be assailed by petition for
certiorari. As we indicated in Biñan Rural Bank v. Carlos, 757
SCRA 459 (2015): The denial of a motion to dismiss generally
cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, as this
remedy is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be
the subject of an appeal which is available only after a judgment
or order on the merits has been rendered. Only when the denial of
the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion can
the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be justified.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Sabino Jose M. Padilla for petitioner.
Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz for private respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

This case focuses on the correct period for appealing the

decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

Arbitrators. The issue arises because the decision or award

of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators is
appealable to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which provides
a period of 15 days from notice of the decision or award
within which to file the petition for review. On the other
hand, Article 262-A (now Article 276)1 of the Labor Code
sets 10 days as the period within which the appeal is to be
made.

The Case

Petitioner Guagua National Colleges (GNC) hereby

assails by petition for certiorari the resolution promulgated
on December 15, 2008,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
denied its Motion to Dismiss filed vis-à-vis the respondents’
petition for certiorari in the following manner:

This Court resolves:

1. x x x
2. To Deny:
 a) respondent’s Motion to Dismiss dated 22 July
2008. While it is true that Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-
PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. held in part:

“x x x [U]nder Section 6, Rule VII of the same

guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the
Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course,
would become final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of copies of the
decision by the parties

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1 See DOLE Department Advisory No. 01, Series of 2015.

2 Rollo, pp. 32-35; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Ricardo R. Rosario, concurring.

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x x x unless, in the meantime, a motion for

reconsideration or a petition for review to the Court
of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is
filed within the same 10-day period. x x x”;

We, more importantly recognize the pronouncement of the

Supreme Court in Manila Midtown v. Borromeo which
reads in part:

“Upon receipt of a copy of the Voluntary

Arbitrator’s Decision, petitioner should have filed with
the Court of Appeals, within the 15-day reglementary
period, a petition for review x x x”

Coca-Cola Bottlers is not in direct conflict with Manila

Midtown as there is no categorical ruling in the former that
the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
 assailing the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator should be
filed within ten (10) days from receipt thereof and not the
customary reglementary period of fifteen (15) days.
Likewise, Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU, reiterating the
landmark Case of Luzon Development Bank v.
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees,
declared that the proper remedy from the award of a
voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to the CA,
following Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which
in turn provides for a reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days within which to appeal.
Keeping in mind Article 4 of the Labor Code which
mandates that all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing
rules and regulations, should be resolved in favor of labor
and considering that technicalities are not supposed to
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the
rights and obliga-

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

tions of labor and capital, We rule that the Petition for

Review was seasonably filed. More so that We have already
granted petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Extension.

3. x x x
SO ORDERED.

Antecedents

Under Section 5(2)3 of Republic Act No. 6728 (

Government Assistance To Students and Teachers in
Private Education Act), 70% of the increase in tuition fees
shall go to the pay-

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 3 Section 5. Tuition Fee Supplement for Students in Private High
School.—(1) x x x
(a) x x x
(b) x x x
(2) Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall be
granted and tuition fees under subparagraph (c) may be increased, on the
condition that seventy percent (70%) of the amount subsidized allotted for
tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of
salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and
nonteaching personnel except administrators who are principal
stockholders of the school, and may be used to cover increases as provided
for in the collective bargaining agreements existing or in force at the time
when this Act is approved and made effective: Provided, That government
subsidies are not used directly for salaries of teachers of non-secular
subjects. At least twenty percent (20%) shall go to the improvement or
modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia
and similar facilities and to the payment of other costs of operation. For
this purpose, school shall maintain a separate record of accounts for all
assistance received from the government, any tuition fee increase, and the
detailed disposition and use thereof, which record shall be made available
for periodic inspection as may be determined by the State Assistance
Council, during business hours, by the faculty, the nonteaching personnel,
students of the school concerned, the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports and other concerned government agencies.

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

ment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of

the teaching and nonteaching personnel. Pursuant to this
provision, the petitioner imposed a 7% increase of its
tuition fees for school year 2006-2007.4
Shortly thereafter, and in order to save the depleting
funds of the petitioner’s Retirement Plan, its Board of
Trustees approved the funding of the retirement program
out of the 70% net incremental proceeds arising from the
tuition fee increases.5 Respondents GNC-Faculty Labor
Union and GNC Nonteaching Maintenance Labor Union
challenged the petitioner’s unilateral decision by claiming
that the increase violated Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728.
The parties referred the matter to voluntary arbitration
after failing to settle the controversy by themselves.6

Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator

After hearing the parties, Voluntary Arbitrator Froilan

M. Bacungan rendered his decision dated June 16, 2008 in
favor of GNC,7 holding that retirement benefits fell within
the category of “other benefits” that could be charged
against the 70% net incremental proceeds pursuant to
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728.
After receiving a copy of the decision on June 16, 2008,
the respondents filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension praying that the CA grant them an extension of
15 days from July 1, 2008, or until July 16, 2008, within
which to file their petition for review.8

_______________

4 Rollo, p. 43.
5 Id., at pp. 43-44.
6 Id., at p. 57.
7 Id., at pp. 42-52.
8 Id., at p. 6.

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Ruling of the CA

On July 2, 2008, the CA issued a resolution granting the

Urgent Motion for Extension.9 The respondents filed the
petition for review10 on July 16, 2008.11
Subsequently, the petitioner filed its Motion to Dismiss,
12
asserting that the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator
had already become final and executory pursuant to Article
276 of the Labor Code and in accordance with the ruling in
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-
PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.13
The CA acted on the Motion to Dismiss on December 15,
2008 through the now assailed resolution denying the
Motion to Dismiss.14
The petitioner sought reconsideration,15 but the CA
denied the motion for reconsideration on January 30, 2009.
16
Hence, the petitioner instituted its petition for
certiorari.

Issue

The petitioner submits the lone issue that —

THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT,

IS ACTING WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN C.A.-G.R. S.P. NO. 104109
CONSIDERING THAT THE DECISION OF THE
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR IN AC-025-RB3-04-01-03-
2007, FOLLOWING RULE [276] OF THE LABOR CODE
AND

_______________

9 Id., at p. 55.
10 Id., at pp. 56-78.
11 Id., at p. 7.
12 Id., at pp. 79-81.
13 G.R. No. 155651, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 507.
14 Rollo, pp. 32-35.
15 Id., at pp. 95-104.
16 Id., at pp. 38-39.

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THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN COCA-COLA

BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., SALES FORCE UNION-
PTGWO BALAIS v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES,
 INC. X X X X, HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY, HENCE UNCHALLENGEABLE SINCE THE
“URGENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION” DATED 30 JUNE 2008
AND 16 JULY 2008 RESPECTIVELY, OR TEN (10) DAYS
AFTER THE UNIONS AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD
WERE PERSONALLY SERVED
THE VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR’S DECISION ON 16 JUNE 2008. 17

The petitioner argues that the CA went beyond its

jurisdiction when it denied the Motion to Dismiss despite
the finality of the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator
pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code; that following
the pronouncement in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,
Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc.18 the CA was no longer authorized to
exercise its appellate jurisdiction;19 that the CA’s reliance
on the rulings in Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo20 and
Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Leyeco IV Employees
Union-ALU21 was misplaced because said rulings did not
define the reglementary period to appeal the decision or
award of the Voluntary Arbitrator;22 and that the CA
misapplied the rule on equity in the absence of strong or
compelling reasons to suspend the rules of procedure.23
The petitioner emphasizes the need to harmonize Rule
43 of the Rules of Court with Article 276 of the Labor
Code in

_______________

17 Id., at pp. 8-9.

18 Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-
Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., supra note 13.
19 Rollo, p. 9.
20 G.R. No. 138305, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 653.
21 G.R. No. 157775, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 154.
22 Rollo, pp. 14-17.
23 Id., at pp. 20-21.

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

view of their conflicting provisions on the period for the

appeal from the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator. It
maintains that unless Congress amends Article 276 of the
Labor Code, the reglementary period within which to
appeal the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator is
10 days following the ruling in Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v.
Coca­-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., instead of 15 days
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In contrast, the respondents insist that they have a
meritorious case because the controversy involves the
interpretation of Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 6728 on the
disposition of the tuition fee increase;24 that the CA did not
abuse its discretion given the rule on the liberal application
of rules of procedure to achieve substantial justice, and the
policy on the liberal construction of laws in favor of labor;25
that a long line of jurisprudence26 set the remedy of appeal
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as applicable in
challenging the decisions or awards of the Voluntary
Arbitrator.
Did the CA gravely abuse its discretion in denying the
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss despite the finality of the
decision

_______________

24 Id., at p. 125.
25 Id., at p. 137.
26 Notably: Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero, No. L- 43890, July
16, 1984, 130 SCRA 392; Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and
Workers Union v. Bacungan, No. L-48437, September 30, 1986, 144 SCRA
510; Continental Marble Corp. v. NLRC, No. L-43825, May 9, 1988, 161
SCRA 151; Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees, G.R. No. 120319, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 162;
National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134468, August
29, 2002, 388 SCRA 85; Mora v. Avesco Marketing Corporation, G.R. No.
177414, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 226; Samahan ng mga
Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v. Bacungan, G.R. No. 149050,
March 25, 2009, 582 SCRA 369; and Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo,
supra note 20.
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of the Voluntary Arbitrator pursuant to Article 276 of the

Labor Code?

Ruling of the Court

We dismiss the petition for certiorari.

The petition for review shall be filed within 15 days

pursuant to Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court;
the 10-day period under Article 276 of the Labor Code
refers to the filing of a motion for reconsideration
vis-à-vis the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision or award

In resolving whether or not the CA committed grave

abuse of discretion, the Court has first to determine which
between the two periods found in Article 276 of the Labor
Code and Section 4 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governs
the appeal from the decision or award by the Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Arbitrators.
The petitioner posits that the appeal from the decision
or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator should be filed within
10 days in view of Article 276 of the Labor Code which
reads in full:

Article 276. Procedures.—The Voluntary Arbitrator or

panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have the power to hold
hearings, receive evidences and take whatever action is
necessary to resolve the issue or issues subject of the
dispute, including efforts to effect a voluntary settlement
between parties.
All parties to the dispute shall be entitled to attend the
arbitration proceedings. The attendance of any third party
or the exclusion of any witness from the proceedings shall
 be determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators. Hearings may be adjourned for
cause or upon agreement by the parties.

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

Unless the parties agree otherwise, it shall be mandatory

for the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators to render an award or decision within twenty
(20) calendar days from the date of submission of the
dispute to voluntary arbitration.
The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall contain the
facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties.
Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary
Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor
Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of
the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, for any reason, may issue a
writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the
Commission or regular courts or any public official whom
the parties may designate in the submission agreement to
execute the final decision, order or award. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Article 276 is an amendment introduced by R.A. No.

6715.27 Prior to the effectivity of the amendment on March
21, 1989,28 Article 262 (the predecessor provision) stated
that voluntary arbitration decisions or awards would be
final, unappealable and executory. Despite such
immediately executory nature of

_______________
 27 Entitled An Act to Extend Protection to Labor, Strengthen the

Constitutional Rights of Workers to Self-Organization, Collective

Bargaining and Peaceful Concerted Activities, Foster Industrial Peace
and Harmony, Promote the Preferential Use of Voluntary Modes of

Settling Labor Disputes, and Reorganize the National Labor Relations

Commission, Amending for these Purposes Certain Provisions of

Presidential Decree No. 442, as Amended, otherwise known as the Labor

Code of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for Other
Purposes.
28 See Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

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the decisions and awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators,

however, the Court pronounced in Oceanic Bic Division
(FFW) v. Romero29 that the decisions or awards of the
Voluntary Arbitrators involving interpretations of law were
within the scope of the Court’s power of review. The Court
explained:

x x x x We agree with the petitioner that the decisions of

voluntary arbitrators must be given the highest respect and
as a general rule must be accorded a certain measure of
finality. This is especially true where the arbitrator chosen
by the parties [enjoys] the first rate credentials of Professor
Flerida Ruth Pineda Romero, Director of the U.P. Law
Center and an academician of unquestioned expertise in the
field of Labor Law. It is not correct, however, that this
respect precludes the exercise of judicial review over their
decisions. Article 262 of the Labor Code making voluntary
arbitration awards final, inappealable, and executory except
where the money claims exceed P100,000.00 or 40% of paid
up capital of the employer or where there is abuse of
discretion or gross incompetence refers to appeals to the
National Labor Relations Commission and not to judicial
review.
Inspite of statutory provisions making “final” the
decisions of certain administrative agencies, we have taken
 cognizance of petitions questioning these decisions where
want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of
due process, denial of substantial justice, or erroneous
interpretation of the law were brought to our attention.
There is no provision for appeal in the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan but this has not precluded us from
examining decisions of this special court brought to us in
proper petitions. Thus, we have ruled:

“Yanglay raised a jurisdictional question which

was not brought up by respondent public officials. He
contends that this Court has no jurisdiction to review
the decisions of the NLRC and the Secretary of Labor
‘under

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29 Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero, supra note 26.

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

the principle of separation of powers’ and that judicial

review is not provided for in Presidential Decree No. 21.
“That contention is a flagrant error, it is generally
understood that as to administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is
an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the
acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
statute’ (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56).
“The purpose of judicial review is to keep the
administrative agency within its jurisdiction and
protect substantial rights of parties affected by its
decisions’ (73 C.J.S. 507, Sec. 165). It is part of the
system of checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and
unjust adjudications.
 “Judicial review is proper in case of lack of
jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law,
fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v. Vicente, 62 O.G.
9424; Macatangay v. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua v. Singson
Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440).
“The courts may declare an action or resolution of
an administrative authority to be illegal (1) because it
violates or fails to comply with some mandatory
provision of the law or (2) because it is corrupt,
arbitrary or capricious’ (Borromeo v. City of Manila
and Rodriguez Lanuza, 62 Phil. 512, 516; Villegas v.
Auditor General, No. L-21352, November 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 877, 891). [San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary
of Labor, 64 SCRA 56]

xxx xxx xxx

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“It is now settled rule that under the present Labor

Code, (Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended
[1974] if lack of power or arbitrary or improvident
exercise of authority be shown, thus giving rise to a
jurisdictional question, this Court may, in appropriate
certiorari proceedings, pass upon the validity of the
decisions reached by officials or administrative
agencies in labor controversies. So it was assumed in
Maglasang v. Ople, (No. L-38813, April 29, 1975, 63
SCRA 508). It was explicitly announced in San Miguel
Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, (No. L-39195, May
16, 1975, 64 SCRA 56) the opinion being penned by
Justice Aquino. Accordingly, cases of that character
continue to find a place in our docket. (Cf. United
Employees Union of Gelmart Industries v. Noriel, No.
L-40810, Oct. 3, 1975, 67 SCRA 267) The present suit
is of that category. [Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa
sa La Suerte-Foitaf v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414]
 A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts
in a quasi-judicial capacity. There is no reason why her
decisions involving interpretation of law should be beyond
this Court’s review. Administrative officials are presumed
to act in accordance with law and yet we do not hesitate to
pass upon their work where a question of law is involved or
where a showing of abuse of authority or discretion in their
official acts is properly raised in petitions for certiorari.30

Accordingly, the decisions and awards of Voluntary

Arbitrators, albeit immediately final and executory,
remained subject to judicial review in appropriate cases
through petitions for certiorari.31

_______________

30 Id., at pp. 399-401.

31 Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 90426, December
15, 1989, 180 SCRA 177, 182.

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376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

Such was the state of things until the promulgation in

1995 of the ruling in Luzon Development Bank v.
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees.32
Therein, the Court noted the silence of R.A. No. 6715 on
the availability of appeal from the decisions or awards of
the Voluntary Arbitrators. In declaring the Voluntary
Arbitrators or Panels of Voluntary Arbitrators as quasi-
judicial instrumentalities, Luzon Development Bank v.
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees
pronounced the decisions or awards of the Voluntary
Arbitrators to be appealable to the CA, viz.:

It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by

law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators
 is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. The
state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration
provides that “(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary
Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or
decision by the parties,” while the “(d)ecision, awards, or
orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards, or orders.” Hence, while there is an express mode of
appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No.
6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of
a voluntary arbitrator.
Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a
voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the
Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect
equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the
Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is illogical
and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

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32 Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank

Employees, supra note 26.

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In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., on the

settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of
[quasi-judicial] agencies must become final at some definite
time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary
arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their
decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court.
In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., this
Court ruled that “a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of
her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.” Under these
 rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether
acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a
quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from,
the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the
latter.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:

“x x x x x x x x x (3) Exclusive appellate

jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Employees’ Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph
and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

xxx xxx x x x”

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the

panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be
considered as a [quasi-judicial] agency, board or
commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

within the concept of a “quasi-judicial instrumentality.” It

may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation
presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary
arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent
arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, that the
broader term “instrumentalities” was purposely included in
the above quoted provision.
An “instrumentality” is anything used as a means or
agency. Thus, the terms governmental “agency” or
“instrumentality” are synonymous in the sense that either
of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which
a certain government act or function is performed. The word
“instrumentality,” with respect to a state, contemplates an
authority to which the state delegates governmental power
for the performance of a state function. An individual
person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial
instrumentality in the settling of an estate, in the same
manner that a subagent appointed by a bankruptcy court is
an instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in bankruptcy
of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state
function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to
him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he
falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term
“instrumentality” in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The
fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the
Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said
Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as
contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the
Employees’ Compensation Commission is also provided for
in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the
forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its
decisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing
rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act
No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.
A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be ap-

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

pealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure

outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just
 like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions enumerated therein.
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the
original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform
procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all
quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the
coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or
another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative
intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable
directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases
within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary
arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or
the labor arbiter.33

In other words, the remedy of appeal by petition for

review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court became
available to the parties aggrieved by the decisions or
awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panels of
Arbitrators.
In the 2004 ruling in Sevilla Trading Company v.
Semana,34 the Court ruled that the decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator became final and executory after the
expiration of the 15-day reglementary period within which
to file the petition for review under Rule 43. Manila
Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo35 also ruled so. The 15-day
period was likewise adverted to in the ruling in Nippon
Paint Employees Union-Olalia v. Court of Appeals,36
promulgated in November 2004.
In 2005, the Court promulgated the decision in Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-
Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,37 wherein it
made

_______________

33 Id., at pp. 167-171.

34 G.R. No. 152456, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 239.
35 Manila Midtown Hotel v. Borromeo, supra note 20.
36 G.R. No. 159010, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 286.
37 Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-
Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., supra note 13.
 380

380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

reference for the first time to the 10-day period for the
filing of the petition for review vis-à-vis decisions or awards
of the Voluntary Arbitrator provided in Article 262-A (now
Article 276).38 Within the same year, Philex Gold
Philippines, Inc. v. Philex Bulawan Supervisors Union
39
applied the period of 10 days in declaring the appeal to
have been timely filed.
Thereafter, the Court has variantly applied either the
15-day or the 10-day period as the time within which to
appeal the decisions or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators
or Panels of Arbitrators. Thus, in the 2007 ruling in Leyte
IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Leyeco IV Employees Union-
ALU,40 the Court recognized the 15-day reglementary
period under Rule 43. This was reiterated in AMA
Computer College-Santiago City, Inc. v. Nacino (2008),41
Mora v. Avesco Marketing Corporation (2008),42 Samahan
ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v.
Bacungan (2009),43 Saint Luis University, Inc. v.
Cobarrubias (2010),44 Samahan ng mga Mangga-

_______________

38 The Court declared: “[T]he Decision of the Panel was in the form of
a dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. Naturally, this dismissal was
contained in the main decision and not in the dissenting opinion. Thus,
under Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article
262-A of the Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would
become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
copies of the decision by the parties even without receipt of the dissenting
opinion unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration or a petition
for review to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is
filed within the same 10-day period.” (Id., at pp. 515-516)
39 G.R. No. 149758, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 111.
40 Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Leyeco IV Employees Union-
ALU, supra note 21.
41 G.R. No. 162739, February 12, 2008, 544 SCRA 502.
42 Mora v. Avesco Marketing Corporation, supra note 26.
 43 Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL v.
Bacungan, supra note 26.
44 G.R. No. 187104, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 649.

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

gawa sa Hyatt (SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN) v.

45
Magsalin (2011) and Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.-Cebu Plant (2013).46
But in Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v.
Court of Appeals (2014),47 Baronda v. Court of
Appeals (2015),48 and NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. v.
Dabu (2017),49 the Court, citing Article 276 of the Labor
Code, applied the 10-day period. Notably, the Court opined
in Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of
Appeals that despite the period provided in Rule 43, the 10-
day period should apply in determining the timeliness of
appealing the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator
or Panel of Arbitrators, to wit:

Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal,

we rule that the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision must be
appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar
days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor
Code.
Appeal is a “statutory privilege,” which may be exercised
“only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of the law.” “Perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional so that failure to do so rendered the decision
final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to
entertain the appeal.”
We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the
appeal of decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute
provides that the Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision “shall be final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy
 of the award or decision by the parties.” Being provided in the
statute, this

_______________

45 G.R. No. 164939, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 445.

46 G.R. No. 198783, April 15, 2013, 696 SCRA 357.
47 G.R. No. 168612, December 10, 2014, 744 SCRA 361.
48 G.R. No. 161006, October 14, 2015, 772 SCRA 276.
49 G.R. No. 225142, September 13, 2017, 839 SCRA 601.

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382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

10-day period must be complied with; otherwise, no appellate court

will have jurisdiction over the appeal. This absurd situation occurs
when the decision is appealed on the 11th to 15th day from receipt
as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under the law, has
already become final and executory.
Furthermore, under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the
Constitution, this court “shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights” in promulgating rules of
procedure in courts. The 10-day period to appeal under the
Labor Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be
diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of
Court.
In Shioji v. Harvey, this Court held that the “rules of
court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and
effect of law, if not in conflict with positive law.” Rules of
Court are “subordinate to the statute.” In case of conflict
between the law and the Rules of Court, “the statute will
prevail.”
The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator’s
award or decision shall be appealed before the Court of
Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the award or
decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion
for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the
motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a
 motion for reconsideration is filed “within the period for
taking an appeal.”50

The ratiocination in Philippine Electric Corporation

(PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals backstopped the ruling in
NYK-FIL Ship Management, Inc. v. Dabu.
Given the variable rulings of the Court, what should
now be the period to be followed in appealing the decisions
or awards of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of
Arbitrators?

_______________

50 Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals,

supra note 47 at pp. 387-389.

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

In the 2010 ruling in Teng v. Pagahac,51 the Court

clarified that the 10-day period set in Article 276 of the
Labor Code gave the aggrieved parties the opportunity to
file their motion for reconsideration, which was more in
keeping with the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, holding thusly:

In the exercise of its power to promulgate implementing

rules and regulations, an implementing agency, such as the
Department of Labor, is restricted from going beyond the
terms of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither
modify nor improve the law. The agency formulating the
rules and guidelines cannot exceed the statutory authority
granted to it by the legislature.
By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of
Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is
to provide an opportunity for the party adversely
affected by the VA’s decision to seek recourse via a
motion for reconsideration or a petition for review
 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA.
Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more
appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. For this
reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to
the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires
exhaustion of available remedies as a condition
precedent to a petition under that Rule.
The requirement that administrative remedies be
exhausted is based on the doctrine that in providing for a
remedy before an administrative agency, every opportunity
must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to
exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given
remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting to, the
courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearly required
exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs, guided by
congressional intent.
By disallowing reconsideration of the VA’s
decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Sec-

_______________

51 G.R. No. 169704, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 173.

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384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

tion 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly

against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the
Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct
himself and compel the courts of justice to prematurely
intervene with the action of an administrative agency
entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming
under its special knowledge, training and specific field of
expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for
specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge,
experience and capability to hear and determine promptly
disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts,
subject to judicial review, is indispensable. In Industrial
 Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that relief must first
be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will
be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the
proper jurisdiction of a court.52 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, the 10-day period stated in Article 276 should be

understood as the period within which the party adversely
affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel
of Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only
after the resolution of the motion for reconsideration may
the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing the petition
for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within 15
days from notice pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43.
The Court notes that despite the clarification made in
Teng v. Pagahac, the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) and the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) have not revised or amended the
Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary
Arbitration Proceedings insofar as its Section 7 of Rule VII
53
is concerned. This inaction has obviously sown confusion,
particularly in regard

_______________

52 Id., at pp. 184-185.

53 Section 7. Motions for Reconsideration.—The decision of the
voluntary arbitrator is not subject of a motion for reconsideration.

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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

to the filing of the motion for reconsideration as a condition

precedent to the filing of the petition for review in the CA.
Consequently, we need to direct the DOLE and the NCMB to
cause the revision or amendment of Section 7 of Rule VII of the
Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary
Arbitration Proceedings in order to allow the filing of motions for
reconsideration in line with Article 276 of the Labor Code.
 II

Certiorari does not lie in assailing

the CA’s denial of a motion to dismiss

Generally, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be

assailed by petition for certiorari. As we indicated in Biñan
Rural Bank v. Carlos:54

The denial of a motion to dismiss generally cannot be

questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, as this
remedy is designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to
dismiss be the subject of an appeal which is available only
after a judgment or order on the merits has been rendered.
Only when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion can the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari be justified.

Although it admits being aware of this rule, the

petitioner insists on the propriety of its petition for
certiorari based on its belief that the CA had gravely
abused its discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the
respondents’ petition. It argues that the decision rendered
by Voluntary Arbitrator Bacungan had already become
final pursuant to Article 276 of the Labor Code, and,
accordingly, the CA could no longer exercise its appellate
jurisdiction.

_______________

54 G.R. No. 193919, June 15, 2015, 757 SCRA 459, 463.

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386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

The petitioner is mistaken.

 Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when
such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner
as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.55
Here, the CA did not act arbitrarily in denying the
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. It correctly noted that Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-
Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. did not make
a definitive ruling on the correct reglementary period for
the filing of the petition for review. Given the varying
applications of the periods defined in Article 276 and
Section 4 of Rule 43, the CA could not be objectively held to
be guilty of grave abuse of discretion in applying the
equitable rule on construction in favor of labor. To be
underscored is that the underlying aim for the requirement
of strict adherence to procedural rules, particularly on
appeals, should always be the prevention of needless delays
that could enable the unscrupulous employers to wear out
the efforts and meager resources of their workers to the
point that the latter would be constrained to settle for less
than what were due to them.56
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DISMISSES the
unmeritorious petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on December 15, 2008 by the Court of
Appeals; and DIRECTS the Department of Labor and
Employment and the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board to revise or

_______________

55 Id.; Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161596, February 20,

2013, 691 SCRA 269, 289.
56 Opinaldo v. Ravina, G.R. No. 196573, October 16, 2013, 707 SCRA
545, 557.

387
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Guagua National Colleges vs. Court of Appeals

amend the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of

Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings to amend the Revised
Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary
Arbitration Proceedings to reflect the foregoing ruling
herein.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro (CJ.), Carpio, Peralta, Del

Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa,
Tijam, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.

The Voluntary Arbitrator’s (VA’s) decision may still be

reconsidered on the basis of a motion for reconsideration
seasonably filed within 10 days from receipt thereof;
Seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such
decision. (Teng vs. Pahagac, 635 SCRA 173 [2010])

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