Journal of Modern Italian Studies

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Italy and Africa: how to forget colonialism

Giampaolo Calchi Novati

To cite this article: Giampaolo Calchi Novati (2008) Italy and Africa: how to forget colonialism,
Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 13:1, 41-57, DOI: 10.1080/13545710701816810

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Published online: 12 May 2008.

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Journal of Modern Italian Studies 13(1) 2008: 41 – 57

Italy and Africa: how to forget colonialism

Giampaolo Calchi Novati

University of Pavia

Abstract
The debate on colonialism places great emphasis on the composite set of
transformations put in motion by colonialism fully to give birth to what became
the post-colonial state in independent Africa. Many authors suggest that Italian
colonialism in the Horn of Africa was too weak to perform this task. The present
article intends to review the influence and effects of the Italian colonial experience
for state making in the Horn of Africa. This also brings about one of the main
anomalies of the Horn of Africa, where colonialism ended without a process of true
decolonization, in the sense of a confrontation between colonized and colonizers in
the transfer of power from metropolitan rule to African representatives. The present
Italian foreign policy in Africa is similarly conditioned by its colonial history: besides
its focus on the Horn of Africa, which was the centre of Italy’s colonial expansion as
well as the only post-Second WorldWar administration (Italian Trust Administration
of Somalia – AFIS), the relations between Italy and Africa reflect the many
inconsistencies and uncertainties of the colonial experience.
Keywords
Colonialism, decolonization, Italian foreign policy, Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Somalia.

The historical links

In the thought and practice of Italian colonialism, dreams clashed with reality in
ways that often caused the authorities to lose a sense of proportion. The projects
of some politicians to propel Italy overseas failed to give rise to any parallel
commitment in Italian society. The gap between sporadic ambitions on the one
hand and real motivations and results on the other is evident throughout the
entire span of Italy’s presence in Africa from its beginnings to the present. In
particular, since Africa’s independence, Italy has proved unable to provide the
economic, political and cultural assistance that was necessary to give peripheral
states access to modernity. From its earliest contacts with Africa, Italy pursued –
and to some extent achieved – a sort of pre-eminence in the Horn. Italian
explorers were followed by missionaries, and these by ethnologists, linguists and
historians. The immense amount of knowledge about the region’s lands,

Journal of Modern Italian Studies

ISSN 1354-571X print/ISSN 1469-9583 online ª 2008 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/13545710701816810
Beyond the three circles

peoples, languages, and civilizations became part of the nation’s overall cultural
patrimony but was exploited above all to gain privileged stances in the
worldwide competition for resources and markets. As the last of the big powers
or the first of the smaller ones, Italy had a lot of difficulties in complying with the
tasks of exercising hegemony on a regional scale. Although its defeat in the
Second World War deprived Italy of its colonial possessions, it still yearned to
play a significant role in Africa.
The Horn has always played an important role in the geopolitics of the
continent. Three of the world’s great literate traditions (Judaism, Christianity
and Islam) have contended there for over a thousand years producing fierce
nationalist conflicts (Lewis 1999). The configuration of power and the
architecture of the states have been shaped together by geography and history
(Clapham 1984). The peoples of the Horn fight one another for survival and
regional hegemony first and outsiders only second. Kinship and religious
affinities transcend national borders which are contested and have generally
been badly demarcated and hence constitute a permanent threat to the political
order. Statehood in the Horn has been mostly determined by internal factors
following two very different – and to some extent incompatible – models. On
the one hand, Ethiopia imposed a policy that centralized power around the
dynasty, the national Christian Church and a feudal mode of production based
upon agriculture. On the other hand, the government of Somalia, or more
accurately the different authorities which have administered the lowlands
inhabited by Somali-speaking peoples, predominantly Muslim, was always fluid
and volatile, mirroring the anarchism and clanism that are more suitable in a
physical and social environment where nomadism and pastoralism prevail. The
government in Addis Ababa had the ‘sacred’ duty of defending the Great
Tradition of the Empire (Levine 1974). The regimes of Haile Selassie and
Mengistu Haile Mariam (after the feudal monarchy was abolished and the
Republic was proclaimed in 1974) persistently repressed the irredentist struggle
of Eritrea, dubbed as secessionism. The incorporation of un-Ethiopian peoples
through slavery and serfdom gave way – in the rhetoric of the liberation fronts
and in the literature on the Horn – to the counter-myth of ‘Abyssinian
colonialism’ (Okbazghi Yohannes 1987).
During the partition of the continent, their military force enabled some of
the political entities in the Horn to withstand European expansion successfully
while negotiating for a share of the resources. The interest of the major colonial
powers (Great Britain, France) in preserving as much as possible the autonomy
of the region helped to keep the Horn out of the scramble for Africa, at least in
part. In the event, the foremost colonial power in the Horn turned out to be
Italy, which did not possess the political and economic resources to attempt
political reconstruction. Italian territorial expansion in Eastern Africa reached
its climax with the military confrontation with Emperor Menelik and the
defeat of the troops of General Baratieri on the battlefield of Adowa in 1896
became the stain of blame that all Italian nationalists pledged to delete from the

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records of the Motherland. Obsession with Adowa had a strong impact on the
determination of the Fascist government in the mid 1930s to initiate an out-
dated colonial adventure in Africa. Although Benito Mussolini focused his
rhetoric on the Mediterranean, the Mare Nostrum of ancient Rome, the great
target was Ethiopia. The founding of Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI) brought the
Duce great popularity and was a success that made it easier for Fascism to cope
with the consequences of the worldwide Depression.
The colonial interlude proved to be a critical juncture for the formation of all
states and nations in the Horn. Italy lacked the financial and technical resources,
as well as the time, to effect a comprehensive transformation of the economy and
society of AOI. The main communication and trade route in the region, the
Nile, lay beyond Italy’s grasp. In any case, from its headquarters in Addis Ababa,
Italy planned to achieve far more reaching goals than mere imperialism. It was
believed that the very soul of the region could be changed simply by
manipulating the hierarchical balance of the elites and major ethnic groups or
nations (Calchi Novati 2005). Italy’s colonial administration in Eastern Africa
constantly exploited issues of identity such as religion, culture and shared values.
Ogaden, a semi-desert province inhabited by Somali-speaking nomads, was
separated from Ethiopia and annexed to Somalia as part of a project of ethno-
national homogeneity. That precedent would later stimulate Pan-Somalism and
the planned reunification of an idealized Somali nation. Also in the north of
Ethiopia territory was amputated from the Empire to enlarge Eritrea with a view
to preparing the effective transformation of Italy’s colonia primogenita (first-born
colony) into a developed society in quest of nationhood (Taddia 1986). Italy
alleged to make use of scientific parameters but the re-organization was
determined in fact by racial prejudices and the political objectives of wearing
down Abyssinian resistance. Colonialism fostered ethnicity because when faced
with the assertion of foreign culture, dominance and expropriation, clan
affiliation and lineage become the most suitable way of surviving.
After the Second World War Italy lost all its possessions in Eastern Africa.
The remaining colonial infrastructure and military apparatus surrendered to
British troops and to the Emperor’s army in 1941. The AOI ceased to exist
only 5 years after it had been pompously declared by Mussolini from the
balcony of Palazzo Venezia in Rome when he conceded to Vittorio Emanuele
III the title of Emperor of Ethiopia. Although Italy left no longstanding legacy
or influence, it did leave an imprint on the Horn’s institutional, social
and economic organization. Traces of the Italian presence are still visible
particularly in terms of architecture, food, customs and even, to a certain
extent, linguistic and cultural expressions (Uoldelul Chelati and Calchi Novati
2003). The consequences of colonialism for society, its impact on the mentality
of the elites and mass imagery, did affect political life in the Horn for the rest of
the twentieth century. However, Italy proved to be a negligible player in the
fortunes of the political space that was theoretically under its influence. Lacking
a strong former colonial power as their ‘patron’ in the international arena,

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Beyond the three circles

Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea were very much in charge of their political
destinies but in conditions of intense and often violent confrontation. Ethiopia
now became the key player when it cleverly acquired support for its security
and integrity from the USA (Marcus 1983).
The terms of the 1947 Peace Treaty imposed Italy a formal renunciation of
all its colonies, i.e. Libya and its former possessions in the Horn. The Peace
Treaty acknowledged full sovereignty to Ethiopia and charged Italy with war
damages. The ending of the war seemed to leave Italy with no room for
manoeuvring. Italy prided itself on claiming that its colonial presence had been
sustained by the hard work of many Italians rather than by capital investments
and resources manumission. Even if almost all the Italian leaders who were
working to build a democratic post-Fascist state paid lip-service to anti-colonial
feelings, the government and the opposition alike were committed to rescue, if
only in the guise of a trusteeship, at least part of the former African Empire and
to safeguard the privileges and properties of the coloni (settlers), particularly in
Eritrea. Few if any at that time could have foreseen that the African continent
would be so rapidly decolonized.

Decolonization and Cold War

Under the terms of the Peace Treaty, the final destiny of the colonies was to be
settled by the four Big Powers – the United States, Britain, France and the
Soviet Union – or, if no deal was struck within a year, by the United Nations
(Rossi 1980). In the end, Italy’s residual aspirations on the one hand and the
impending East – West rivalry on the other prevailed, overriding or baffling the
rights of African peoples. The outcome of the UN debate, which in a way
disregarded the sanctity of the former colonial borders, was disappointing from
the Italian point of view. The real goals of Italian diplomacy were probably in
Europe rather than in Africa, but by playing too many cards and pursuing too
many ends Rome ended up losing almost everything. Libya obtained full
independence. Eritrea was proclaimed an autonomous unit federated to
Ethiopia and hence escaped Italy’s grasp forever. In the immediate postwar
period Eritrean religious affiliations seemed stronger than the national
discourse: hence the inclination of the plateau’s Christian elite to demand
unification with Ethiopia through the same Coptic Church. On the contrary,
the Muslim population demonstrated strong sympathy for independence. Only
derelict Somalia was assigned to Italian administration as a trusteeship territory
for a 10-year period. Irredentist initiatives in Eritrea and Somalia, which shared
a same opposition to the status quo, were evidence of the fragility of the colonial
and post-colonial order. Haile Selassie did not welcome the ‘return’ of Italy in
Africa and openly disliked the fact that Italy was responsible for the
administration of a territory on the borders of Ethiopia. To make matters
worse, the actual demarcation of the boundaries of Somalia was doomed to
make Italy collide with Ethiopia, above all because of the Ogaden. The clouds

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 Italy and Africa

over relations between Italy and Ethiopia, which was one of the would-be
protagonists of the post-colonial Africa with a decisive role in the Horn and
outside it, confirmed Rome’s incapacity to reconcile different and possibly
contradictory stakes. Did Italy mean to restore a covert form of colonialism in
the Horn or did it intend to make a fresh outset by advocating the rights of the
independent African states and by dealing with the politicians in Addis Ababa
on the basis of genuine equality? While denouncing Ethiopia’s interference in
Eritrea did Italy seek to protect the integrity and national identity of its beloved
former colony, or was it just selfishly worried that the absorption of Eritrea into
the Empire would jeopardize the assets of the coloni and Italian business?
The Italian Trust Administration of Somalia (AFIS) exported Italy’s new
democratic profile to Africa. Italian authorities put aside the past idiosyncrasies
and took resolute steps to bargain with the most dedicated and militant
nationalist movement, the Somali Youth League (SYL), with its blend of
traditionalism, ethnicity and modernization. Converging interests made it
relatively easy to work hand in hand. Italy was confident that the SYL
government would be bound to turn to Italy for financial assistance because of
Somalia’s craving for goods, cash and know-how. Italy’s sway in Somalia was
contained by the residual British influence in the former British Somaliland,
until that was merged with the former Italian possession to form the Republic
of Somalia that became independent in 1960 (with Mogadishu as capital city).
Somalia was the main beneficiary of Italian aid throughout the 1960s and
1970s. At the very moment of Somalia’s independence, Somali nationalism
claimed that national self-determination required that the French colony of
Djibouti, reckoned as a Somali territory, the Ogaden and the Northern
Frontier District of Kenya be co-opted into the new state, However, this
Greater Somalia project, alias the unification of all Somali lands initially
sponsored by Britain, was rejected practically by everyone, especially in Africa.
Italy and all other major powers had taken position against the reshuffling of
colonial and post-colonial boundaries and endorsed the OAU conservative
deliberations. Pan-Somalism represented a manifest threat to the integrity of
other established African states. Ethiopia, in particular, agreed with Kenya in
rejecting the Somali grievances. Despite the traditional pro-Somali leanings of
Italian diplomacy, Rome could not agree to the package deal put forward by
the government in Mogadishu for arming and training their troops. The
response of the Somali government was to address the Soviet Union and line
up with the anti-West camp. Unlike most of the so called ‘grey areas’ on the
edges of the world system – compelled to abide by the will of the superpowers
and the overall stakes of the Great Policy – the states and the political
movements in the Horn succeeded in keeping the initiative in their own hands.
They constantly relied on the protection and assistance of the big powers, but
mainly with the aim of fulfilling their own objectives. The USA and USSR
were expected to stand for and, if necessary, to defend their demands in
exchange for valuable strategic assets made available by Ethiopia and Somalia

45
Beyond the three circles

(or Eritrea). Whereas in its African policies the USA refrained as much as
possible from interfering within the previous colonial possessions of its most
important European allies, the Horn was a major exception. Back in 1945
Ethiopia had been chosen by the USA as its main partner in the Red Sea –
Indian Ocean region, which links Africa and the Middle East. The Ethiopian –
American partnership became a secret military pact signed in 1953 and
benefited both parties. Ethiopia badly needed a valid ally in the new page of its
history after the Italian occupation and it was essential for a superpower
without a colonial background in Africa like the USA to get hold of a
viable and acceptable entry to Sub-Saharan Africa. A military coup d’état
in September 1969 removed the SYL leaders whom Italy had supported in
shaping the Somali state. Some of the army officers that seized power in
Mogadishu had been trained in the Soviet Union and were therefore
supposedly eager to side with Moscow rather than the West.
However, the new president, General Mohamed Siyad Barre, had spent
several years in an Italian military academy, and the government appointed by the
Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) included some civil ministers with
Italian university background many of whom had close links with the Italian
Communist Party (PCI – Partito Communista Italiano) and the Italian left-wing
trade-unions. One can assume that the ideals which prevailed in the Somali
Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), later founded by the SRC, actually
originated within the former colonial metropolis, albeit via unorthodox
channels. Faced with a regime that had adopted the ideology and methodology
of ‘scientific socialism’ and had turned to the Soviet Union for hard military
equipment, the Italian government did its best to prevent Somalia from relying
completely on the Eastern bloc. Rome once again supplied Somalia with
weapons as soon as the disgraceful war undertaken by Siyad Barre against
Ethiopia in 1977 – 78, with the official objective of ‘liberating’ the Ogaden,
ended. Among all African nations, Somalia was the leading buyer of Italian arms
in the 1980s (together with Nigeria), and ranked sixth in this respect in the Third
World as a whole. A prolonged provision of financial and technical aid was aimed
at promoting economic linkages and strengthening political partnership without
paying too much attention to the nature of the regime.1
The process of political radicalization in Ethiopia, which in 1974 led to the
ousting of Haile Selassie’s autocracy, represented another challenge for Italy’s
policies in the Horn. In principle the revolution, steered by the military
committee known as Derg, was damaging for Italy’s remaining interests in
Ethiopia and, above all, in Eritrea, then an integral part of the former Empire.
The decision to close the Italian consulate in Asmara and the nationalization of
Italian factories, lands, private houses and other assets marked the end of an era.
However, Italy was ready to adapt its approach and pushed ahead with a
strategy of being ‘present’ and ready to deal with anybody regardless of their
ideology or alignment. As a minor partner in the Western bloc with a good
knowledge of the region’s problems, Italy anticipated that its own scope for

46
 Italy and Africa

action might become wider and that its chances to mediate could be propelled
by the worsening of relations between Washington and Derg. A vast
programme of humanitarian aid and development cooperation was delivered
by Italy as proof of goodwill and a contribution to the progress of Ethiopia.
Nominally, Italy was committed to a policy of strict equidistance – between
Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as between Ethiopia and Eritrea – without
embracing either cause. Such multifaceted co-operation was meant to alleviate
the intransigence of rival regimes and guerrilla movements and to advocate
economic development rather than the arms race. However, the government
in Rome was racked by feuds – the two major partners in the cabinet coalition,
the Christian Democrats (DC – Democrazia Cristiana) and the Italian Socialist
Party (PSI – Partito Socialista Italiano), sponsored Ethiopia and Somalia,
respectively – and Italy’s warnings were far less effective. Italy was so tightly
entangled in the crossed conflicts in the Horn that the takeover in Ethiopia, the
Somali – Ethiopian rivalry and the war of ‘liberation’ in Eritrea embarrassed not
only the government but also the main opposition party: the Italian
Communist Party (PCI) had championed the new Ethiopian regime on the
basis of ideological affinities and celebrated the ‘revolution’ carried out by the
Derg as one of the most hopeful examples of implementation of socialism in
Africa. However, some leaders did not share the official line of the party,
despite its tradition of strict discipline on all international issues.
These uncertainties penalized Italy during the 1977 – 78 crisis, when Somalia
attacked Ethiopia in an undeclared war. Moscow did not endorse the Somali
invasion of Ethiopia and withdrew its troops and military advisers from Somalia
and backed Ethiopia with the support of Cuban soldiers. In retaliation, Siyad
Barre made a U-turn, severed relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba and
called for Western support. This was another example of the ability of a Horn
state to further its own interests irrespective of the policies of the superpowers.
The US did not give full military support because President Carter disapproved
of Somali aggression. Nonetheless, it provided indirect aid to Somalia through a
precarious coalition of some Muslim countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt)
whose concern about the progress of revolutions and Soviet meddling in a
region close to the Middle East and the oilfields was growing. The 1977 – 78
war between Somalia and Ethiopia was a breakthrough for the entire Horn of
Africa because Islam now appeared on the stage as an active agent in regional and
trans-regional politics. It is noteworthy that Islam was evoked by the pro-
Western, US-inspired, ‘moderate’ side of the two opposing camps, in order to
counteract forces that were supposed to perform a social and political revolution
supported by the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc.
In Italy the invasion of Ethiopia was judged by the standards of the Cold
War rather than by the claims of the local contenders. The controversy
concerning the status of Eritrea gave rise to even more marked and resounding
rifts than the Ogaden question, which had various repercussions for the
coalition in power and all the Italian political parties. Whereas Pan-Somalism

47
Beyond the three circles

could be rejected as a threat to the integrity of an established state, the war in

Eritrea was widely reckoned to be a legitimate struggle aimed at the elimination
of an anomalous form of internal colonialism. Which principle ought to be put
forward if the two were not compatible: the self-determination of peoples or
the inviolability of borders? In brief, Italy pretended to be neutral: friend to all,
enemy to none. Apparently nobody was aware of the contradiction raised by
formally sponsoring the unity of Ethiopia and simultaneously flirting with
separatism and hosting semi-official rallies of Eritrean students living in Europe.
The same happened with the armed opposition to the Derg. Italy agreed to talk
to rebels, perhaps with the aim of seeking an alternative solution. Apart from
the obvious concerns about a political legacy, this comprehensive and
ubiquitous stance, which was well larded with the questionable generosity of
official development aid, was designed to assure a privileged outlet in markets
that remained relatively important for Italian exports.

The post-bipolar order

Italy’s potential or imaginary benefits in the Horn evaporated when, in 1991,
the established regimes were disrupted and overthrown, first in Somalia and
then in Ethiopia (Calchi Novati 2004). The entire political situation in the
Horn abruptly changed as a result of the political earthquake that had three
main consequences: (i) the breakdown and dismemberment of Somalia; (ii) the
full independence of Eritrea under the leadership of the Eritrean People’s
Liberation Front (EPLF); (iii) the introduction of a form of federalism and
decentralization on a regional and ethnic basis in Ethiopia. Since Eritrea finally
acquired its independence, Italian colonial policy had proved to be stronger
than Ethiopia’s Great Tradition. Colonialism as a ‘state-maker’ had triumphed
in Somalia as well. However, Italian policy had always considered ‘statehood’
to be of fundamental importance and the state was the first victim of this crisis.
In Somalia the state had committed ‘suicide’. In Ethiopia, the government had
acknowledged ethnicity, sub-nations and the right of self-determination within
the established state. Ironically, the two political movements/parties that Italy’
had neglected the most, the EPLF in Eritrea and the TPLF (Tigray People’s
Liberation Front) in Ethiopia, emerged as the main winners.
Somalia was ravaged by civil war and caught in a spiral of despair and
famine, and Italy offered its good offices. The aim was to promote an orderly
transfer of power to a large coalition of forces in which Siyad Barre would play
a role as a primus inter pares in order to avoid – or so it was argued – a dangerous
political vacuum. The president’s enemies absolutely refused to be part of such
a deal, arguing that he must be held personally responsible for gross human
rights violations, malpractice and political chaos. The flight of Siyad Barre from
Mogadishu in January 1991 was the final act of a regime that Italy had
considered to be the key to stability and which it had tried tirelessly to prop up
for over 20 years.2 As anarchy spread in all the country shattering the fragile

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 Italy and Africa

combination among the military factions that had seized power in Mogadishu
and in the other Somali regions, little room was left for Italy’s mediation. Italy
could look forward to benefits in return for the hospitality offered to one of the
masters of the new Somalia, the United Somali Congress (USC), which had
been founded in Rome in 1989, but its relations with the post-Siyad leadership
remained unsteady. Moreover, Italy had always experienced difficulty in
dealing with the northern, ‘anglophone’ Somalis, whose political objectives had
been encouraged by London. As it was not in Italy’s power to dissuade the
Somali National Movement (SNM) from proclaiming (May 1991) the separate
independence of the former British Somaliland, in Rome the move was
resented and seen as a major political setback.
Because of its traditions as an independent state, Ethiopia was supposed to be
very different from Somalia. In fact Addis Ababa fell in May 1991 in somewhat
similar circumstances but with less bloodshed and without the total collapse of
central authority. To Italy’s dismay and despite all its efforts over the previous
20 years, the USA played the leading role in the last days of the fighting that
determined the end of Mengistu’s regime and the flight abroad of the ‘Red
Negus’. The conference in London that followed the dissolution of the Derg
government, was supervised by Herman Cohen, US Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs and it was Cohen who gave the green light to the Ethiopian
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the nation-wide restyling
of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), to enter Addis Ababa and
occupy the Palace as soon as it became clear that the Derg was no longer at the
helm. An outstanding Italian diplomat, who had spent some years as
ambassador in Ethiopia, had chaired talks between the Derg and the Tigray
People’s Liberation Front in the hope of establishing some degree of autonomy
for Tigray. However, the TPLF’s target was now to transform its autonomist
struggle into a drive for the power at the highest levels. The outcome of the
long civil war showed Italy’s conviction that it was an indispensable go-
between to be groundless. Indeed, the outcome was a diplomatic disaster
for Italy. Last but not least, the interim president and some ministers of the
ousted regime sought political asylum in the elegant premises of Villa Italia (i.e.
the Italian embassy in Addis Ababa), causing further embarrassment and
resentment.
Italy had not been among the warmest fans of Eritrea’s independence despite
the affection towards its colonia primogenita. In fact Italy, at least until the 1980s,
had sided with Ethiopia. Nevertheless, in Italy’s intricate political system that
was heavily inflected by the East – West conflicts, there were always some
political groups ready to ensure an Italian presence in any political issue, one
side or another. A particularly remarkable example came when the Socialists
(PSI) of Bettino Craxi – which distrusted the Soviet Union and its allies –
became fervent supporters of Eritrean nationalism because Ethiopia was part of
the Eastern bloc and helped first the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) and then
the EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front). When the then provisional

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Beyond the three circles

President of Eritrea, Isaias Afewerki, visited Rome in 1992 he was treated as a

full-fledged head of state by the Italian authorities, major corporations and the
press. When the Eritreans celebrated on Independence Day (24 May 1993), the
Italian Foreign Minister, Beniamino Andreatta, attended the ceremony as an
honoured guest. After all, Eritrea was an ‘invention’ of Italian colonialism.
Within the binding terms of the bipolar system, Italy believed that its
influence was likely to be particularly palatable to nationalist and radical forces
in Africa and the Middle East. The developing countries had little or nothing to
fear from the initiatives of a middle-sized power like Italy. Italy was a former
colonial power with no more colonies. It was not a big power like the USA or
the Soviet Union. International weakness could in fact be a modest but
significant asset. For the special kind of foreign policy that Italy practiced in the
Third World by exploiting the interstices of the East – West confrontation, it
could be argued that the demise of Western influence in a Third World
country was likely to foster Italy’s political self-promotion as a last resort for the
West. Therefore, when the Horn regimes moved into the Socialist field and the
Soviet bloc3 this had little effect on Italy’s policies in the region.
Africa as a whole was experiencing deep changes that were challenging
the uncontested legitimacy of nation-states and the political implications of
interdependence. The traumas of transition from military, authoritarian and
largely unpopular regimes to more accommodating liberal-democratic systems
proved to be particularly complicated in Ethiopia and Somalia. In this situation
Italian patronage at the international level was not an adequate shield. The new
state of Eritrea did not receive from Italy the support that perhaps it might
reasonably have expected in the light of the ‘historical relations’ (the term
Italian sources use to avoid speaking of colonialism) between the two countries.
Nevertheless, the governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia continued to
seek Italian co-operation in their search for economic and political inclusion
into the global market. This was due to a long-standing acquaintance, though
the stabilization and sustainable development of their countries depended
ultimately on dynamics and resources that are well beyond Italy’s reach and
needed to be addressed on a European basis at least.
In the last 10 – 15 years, Somalia has proved to be very sensitive to the
contagious instability that has characterized the international system. Within
the Horn, it has been the only African theatre of international military
intervention and frequently the country has been on the verge of major
conflict. Indeed, it shares certain features of the crises in the Middle East,
Balkans and Central Asia. The Horn of Africa is seen by the superpowers, and
especially by the USA, as a sort of appendix of the Middle East, and the
region – Somalia in particular – is constantly associated with the commitment
to creating a ‘new’ Great Middle East. Israel had played a primary role in the
Horn and in Sudan where it has backed all the possible anti-Arab and anti-
Muslim forces. At a US Senate hearing in 1990 General Norman Schwartzkopf
reaffirmed the strategic importance for the Western defence planners of the area

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 Italy and Africa

that contains the Suez Canal, the Red Sea in the north and the Bab-el-Mandeb
in the south.
The objectives of the ill-conceived ‘Restore Hope Operation’ in Somalia,
launched by the USA in December 1992, were confused. The United Nations
joined the operation and later on took the lead. Italy sent its troops while
reserving operational autonomy. After sharp quarrels with both the US
government and the UN commands about how to perform the peace-keeping
activities, Italy withdrew its contingent from Mogadishu and relocated it
northwards in a strategically less crucial area. The main bone of contention was
the way to deal with General Aidid, the rival of the self-appointed President Ali
Mahdi. The October 1993 battle in which 18 American rangers and hundreds,
perhaps thousands, Somalis died in a failed raid to capture or kill the ambitious
‘warlord’, made an enormous impression on US public opinion and convinced
the USA to close down ‘Restore Hope’. Italy meanwhile was trying to appease
Aidid by means of a political compromise. Ironically, when Aidid was later
‘rehabilitated’ he travelled amicably with the USA special envoy on a US
aircraft to Addis Ababa where he held talks with the Somali counterparts, while
Italy was side-lined once again. The international force, including the Italian
soldiers, withdrew by March 1995 apparently without results. The peak of the
famine had been overcome, but Somalia was still in chaos.
Since 9/11 President Bush has closely scrutinized Somalia for possible
complicity with al-Qaeda and the terrorist network of fundamentalist Islam.
Al-Ittihad, a religious group widely involved in charity activities all over the
country, was suspected to be a terrorist organization. The principal accusation
against al-Ittihad was its alleged part in the preparation of the bombings of the
US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in summer 1998. On the eve of the attack
against the regime in Kabul, the US press recommended that the administration
bear in mind the ‘Somali lesson’ (Hirsch and Oakley 1995; Clarke and Herbst
1997). After the end of the war in Afghanistan rumours circulated about the
possibility of a new round of fighting in Somalia, which was identified as a
possible refuge for the surviving Taliban and al-Qaeda forces fleeing
Afghanistan. The political, religious and ecological background of Somalia
was very similar to Afghanistan (Calchi Novati 2002). Italy, despite its
uncritical support for the global war launched by President Bush, seemed
reluctant to strike at its former and already devastated possession.
Hitherto Italy has strongly supported all attempts to establish a government
of national unity in Somalia, on a bilateral basis and within the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional body that
includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti. A special envoy, the
former Socialist MP Mario Raffaelli, was appointed by the government, with
bi-partisan support. Of course, after 9/11, enforcing the law and controlling
the territory have become more important goals than providing flexible and
free access to investments and goods, as the rhetoric of globalization expected
from the periphery countries. In the new context of the ‘war on terror’, Italy is

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doomed to be less relevant in the politics of the Horn and even its past links
with the region look less significant. A major conflict in the Horn would still be
a challenge for Italy. The Centre-Right government led by Silvio Berlusconi,
the spokesman of the cultural and political discourses of the Italian Right,
played on the nostalgia for colonies that endures in important sectors of the
Italian public opinion. Somalia and Eritrea both stood to gain from this political
reorientation in Italy, whereas Ethiopia had traditionally been the favoured
child of the Italian Left as a result of its historical opposition to fascism and
imperialism. However, even with Berlusconi’s government in power Ethiopia
started to raise more and more attention in Rome. The ‘war on terror’ on a
world scale offered Ethiopia the long awaited opportunity to intensify its
pressure on the borders of Somalia on the pretext of containing the Islamic
‘threat’ and to create a bastion of anti-Arabism. The conquest of Mogadishu by
the militias of the Islamic Courts in June 2006 produced a perfect casus belli for a
retaliation and in December Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia and brought to
power in Mogadishu the government sponsored by Meles Zenawi. Watchful of
its security, Ethiopia declared its full commitment to the global war declared by
Bush, another good example of the ways in which local actors in the region are
able to exploit or redefine international strategies in a local context. The US
fully supported the Ethiopian initiative and US planes bombed villages in
Somalia to destroy the remains of the defeated Islamic militias. When the
leaders of the Italian government protested at this unilateral intervention,
the Centre-Left coalition in power was accused of ‘anti-Americanism’ by the
opposition.
The prospect of a military occupation, albeit an indirect one, of Somalia by
the Ethiopian army is a cause for anxiety and turmoil. Ethiopia and Somalia are
historical ‘enemies’ and Ethiopia has to choose between security and
expansionism. As the experience of the Sudan confirms, hard resistance from
most of the Muslim states to any ‘international’ interference can be taken for
granted. Ethiopia has traditionally always been in the anti-Arab camp. Egypt, a
leading member of the Arab world, is the other regional power that looks on
Somalia as its backyard. Egypt – like Ethiopia – also holds an important stake in
US policies as well as being a potential partner of Italy in the region. Although
Italy was moderately alarmed by the victory of the militias that represented
radical Islam in Somalia, envoy Raffaelli’s efforts as a ‘facilitator’ have been
directed at achieving some form of national reconciliation and resisting the idea
of entrusting Ethiopia with the dubious role of being the last resort against
fundamentalism.
The immediate cause of the war that erupted in May 1998 between Eritrea
and Ethiopia was a boundary dispute.4 The well-known ambivalence has
thwarted the efforts of Italian governments to offer effective mediation. Once
more, Italy failed to choose decisively between the two rivals and instead tried to
remain equidistant. Touring Ethiopia and Eritrea during the war, the impression
was that the two Italian ambassadors in Addis Ababa and Asmara tried to

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persuade their respective interlocutors that Italy was more or less on their side.
That apparent hypocrisy perhaps reflected a deficit of instructions from Rome.
Probably the two envoys both felt a sense of frustration that accounted for a
certain degree of liberty in their initiatives. In Ethiopia, public opinion,
inflamed by popular press, believed that Italy was behind the Eritrean President
Isaias Afewerki, who was often depicted in cartoons as an ascari with a fez (the
fascist cap). The juxtaposition between the Ethiopians’ heroic resistance to
Italian colonialism and the complicity of the Eritreans who enrolled as colonial
troops (ascari) and took part in Italy’s colonial wars has become a standard theme
in local political discourse. Indignation was general when the Eritrean air force
bombed Makalle killing some dozens of civilians with a plane that had been sold
to Eritrea by Italy.5 In Eritrea, however, many local politicians, the press and
part of the academic world thought that Italy was favourable to Ethiopia which
had traditionally been an ‘icon’ of the left-wing parties then in power. Other
Eritrean intellectuals instead greatly appreciated the decision taken by the Italian
embassy to instruct Italian teachers, diplomats and broadly speaking the Italian
community living in Eritrea not to leave the country unless their personal
security became unmanageable, thus delivering an important political message
to the Eritrean Government and to the people at large at a moment when the
future appeared really gloomy (Uoldelul Chelati and Calchi Novati 2003).
Italy has also been extremely active in the immediate aftermath of the conflict
when there was a serious diplomatic imbalance. For the entire duration of the
war, Rino Serri, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Italian Centre-
Left Government (1996 – 2001) and the special representative of the European
Community, succeeded in maintaining contacts between the two parties thanks
to intense shuttle diplomacy. The expulsion from Asmara of the Italian
ambassador Bandini as persona non grata in October 2001 – a few months after the
replacement of the Centre-Left coalition by a new Berlusconi Government – was
a false step. It could be argued that the Italian ambassador was perceived by the
Eritrean Government as a man chosen by the Centre-Left and some of Isaias
Afewerki’s entourage wanted to have another interlocutor. Or else, the measure
against the Italian ambassador was a form of posthumous revenge and a protest
against Italian and European diplomacy for celebrating too soon the funeral of the
Eritrean regime after the Ethiopian breakthrough of May 2000 and exploring
possible alternatives to Isaias. As a matter of fact, Bandini had protested at the
arrest of some dissenters and at measures against the freedom of the press on
behalf of the European Community and not specifically as Italian ambassador.
Both Eritrea and Ethiopia were very close to the USA, and the war was
perhaps meant to test their own credibility as the foremost ally in the Horn.
Ethiopia is of course incomparably stronger in terms of size, population and the
capacity of its army, but Eritrea had constructed a solid aura of military
invincibility. Nonetheless, for strategic, economical and also diplomatic
reasons, Ethiopia ultimately remains the most obvious choice in the Horn
for the US. Although Eritrea’s government feels slighted by this it also

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Beyond the three circles

recognizes that the US is the only force that can guarantee accomplishment of
the Algiers Treaty that ended the war with Ethiopia and block any future
Ethiopian’s temptations to modify its present status of landlocked country by
forcibly annexing the port of Assab. The delimitation and demarcation of the
boundary between Eritrea and Ethiopia, according to the decision of the
international committee appointed by the UN, turned out to be quite
favourable to the claims of Eritrea in the fundamental area of Badme, although
Ethiopia has used various pretexts to avoid the implementation of the verdict.
Italian diplomacy regards the Horn as a natural area of its own influence,
comparable, beyond the difference of means, to France’s pré carré in West
Africa. Italy remains a privileged interlocutor in the Horn, but the renewed US
hegemonic presence downplays Italy’s role mainly to economic issues. Italian
enterprises are interested in developing a solid partnership with local actors and
have the capacity to avoid the hazards of corruption, reckless businessmen and
pollution that in the recent past have dogged many initiatives in this region.6

Conclusion
Despite the myths about the benign nature of Italian colonialism and italiani
buona gente, Italy’s colonial past in Africa, and particularly in the Horn,
continues to be associated with Fascism, the dark side of Italian history. At the
same time, Italian colonialism was superficial and inadequate to achieve the
proclaimed mission of European expansion overseas. Italy has proved unable to
establish those networks of partnership and complicity, in other words neo-
colonialism, that have been the legacy of European imperialism elsewhere and
which have frequently proved to be much stronger and more resilient than
direct colonial administration. Indeed, the weakness of Italian colonialism has
often been cited as a tentative reason for the belated awakening of an Eritrean
national consciousness as well aspirations to independence as a nation-state. It
can also explain why the Horn has been an area marked by chronic instability
and belligerence. Italian colonialism was wiped out by international diplomacy
rather than through a decolonization process that usually involves a face to face
between colonized and colonizers until a forced or an agreed transfer of power
from metropolitan rule to African representatives.
After the independence of its former colonies, in the political climate of the
East – West confrontation, Italy tried to make up for its weakness as a ‘half
power’ by following multiple initiatives and courting various partners at the
same time. This strategy led to contradictions, i.e. Somalia vs Ethiopia, as well
as self-determination vs integrity of states and sympathy with liberation fronts vs
cooperation with legal or de facto governments – that Italy in the end proved
unable to master. In many cases it is virtually impossible to ascertain whether
Italian policies in Africa deal with states, nations, territories, peoples, political
forces, classes, or with individual leaders. Did Italy want to respect local
grievances, to improve political stability, or to pursue its own interests and

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stakes? Either it chose the expedient of putting off making definitive choices or
trying to arrange some precarious synthesis of the options by urging the
necessity of ‘conciliation’ even in the face of irreconcilable differences, or, and
in contrast to the highly predictable attitudes of the other powers, the
international image of Italy depends on rare ‘striking’ coups.7
During the Cold War, Italy was an exposed outpost of the Western bloc.
Given the sharp polarization of its domestic politics which reflected these
international alignments, it was simply not feasible to devise a bi-partisan policy
for the Horn that could be endorsed by both the government and the
opposition. The result was rather a ‘partisan bi-policy’, whereby the parties of
the majority coalition – and sometimes organized factions within a single
party – differed amongst themselves sharply in their analysis of and approach to
most crucial issues. This political situation made it difficult to develop
consistent and affirmative policies that respected the ‘rights’ of African nations
or even the regional balance of power. Italian rulers therefore concentrated
their efforts, and the funds made available by the allocations for overseas
development aid, on specific partners, thus expecting profits in terms of
political obedience, cronyism, lawful or illicit economic returns. The Horn has
been a priority for Italian development cooperation and was consistently the
leading recipient down to 1991 (Calchi Novati 1994).
Following the collapse of the military regimes in Somalia and Ethiopia,
which had previously been indulgently backed as de facto allies for many years by
the Italian authorities as well as by a number of private and state enterprises, Italy
failed to find timely responses to the emergency in the Horn and in Africa. Italy’s
efforts were insufficient to provide effective support for the reorganization of
the region’s political institutions and economies in the era of globalization.
Abandoning as unrealistic the projects of autonomy and self-reliance dear to
many of the founding fathers, African states dismantled national assets in all
sectors, agreed to replace collectivism with privatization and market-oriented
reforms, and are going to be incorporated into the world economy without
further reservations. This process has yet to be accomplished, but Italy had
shown little capacity for proactive and positive intervention and has already
been bypassed and sidelined by the much more assertive and effective initiatives
taken in Western and Central Africa by the French government and, as far as the
Horn is concerned, by the United States under the banner of governance and
human rights. In the new international perspective, where past colonialism has
been re-evaluated to justify and enforce military intervention (e.g. Britain in
Sierra Leone, France in Ivory Coast), the relative ‘innocence’ claimed for Italy’s
colonial records can no longer benefit its policies in Africa.

Notes
1 The management of the Somali National University, where most courses were held
in Italian, provided opportunities by creating an acculturated intelligentsia and a
West-oriented bureaucracy capable of using Italian as a working language.

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2 The university, the jewel of Italian technical assistance, was destroyed and vandalized.
Aghast and bitter, the many Italian expatriates in Somalia had to watch the battle for
the control of the capital city as passive bystanders.
3 It was the case with the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation signed by Somalia in
1974 with the Soviet Union and terminated in 1977, or with the strong link
established in 1977 – 78 between the Ethiopian military junta and the USSR.
4 On the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, see Battera (2001), Le Houérou (2000),
Ruth Iyob (2000), Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll (2001) and Uoldelul Chelati (1999).
5 To be fair, the military deal between Italy and Eritrea took place when the
relationships between Eritrea and Ethiopia were smooth and absolutely good.
6 Elsewhere in Africa, Italy has played a significant role only in Mozambique, thanks in
large part to maintaining solidarity through left-wing parties and private associations
like IPALMO (Instituto per la relazioni fra l’ Italia e i paesi dell’Africa, America latina
e Medio Oriente; Institute for the relations between Italy and Africa, Latin America
and Middle East Countries) with the liberation struggle of FRELIMO (Frente de
libertaçào de Moçambique; Mozambique Liberation Front). In the peace talks
between FRELIMO and RENAMO (Resistencia nacional moçambicana; Mozam-
bican National Resistance), the Comunità di Sant’Egidio, a non-governmental
Catholic organization based in Rome, was very active. In a broader political
perspective, however, once the Cold War came to an end and international politics
ceased to be divided into two rival ideological blocks, the room for Italy to play its
traditional role of commuting between the different parties as a West not perceived
and resented as a true West has been heavily reduced.
7 I want to thank Joseph LaPalombara for this remark.

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