Write two (2) jurisprudential definitions/ explanations of the following terms, principles, or doctrines on

a yellow pad paper. Properly cite the Philippine cases penned by the Supreme Court. Without citation,
no points. Do NOT use the cases cited by the book of Alcantara (our primary book). You may use online
search engines or books at the Library for your research. DO NOT fabricate inexistent jurisprudence.

1. Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

a. There is a hierarchy of courts determinative of the venue of appeals which should
also serve as a general determinant of the proper forum for the application for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by the petitioner and
her lawyers ought to have led them to file the petition with the proper Regional Trial
Court. G.R. No. 111416
b. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of
the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. [G.R. No. 67787.
2. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
a. 1. In the case of **G.R. No. 122156 (February 3, 1997)**, the Supreme Court of the
Philippines stated that "Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated
by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract."¹.
b. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. GR 202242

3. Doctrine of Presumption of Regularity

a. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of
an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof The presumption applies when
nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard
conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the
presumption cannot arise. GR 212994
b. An [official] act… carries with it a presumption of validity. Consequently, a party
challenging it must show clear proof that would justify a claim of invalidity. GR
228489
4. Overbreadth Doctrine
a. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms." 148560
 b. The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l. exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects
of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those
rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties
GR167011
5. Parol Evidence
a. As a rule, proof of verbal agreement that tends to vary the terms of a written
agreement, is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule GR 182409
b. The Rules of Court recognizes the possibility that an agreement already entered into by
the parties may still undergo changes. The Parol Evidence Rule provides an exception to
the existence of other agreements entered into by the parties, to wit:
c.
d. 3. Parol Evidence Rule
e.
f. Section 10. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
g.
h. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he or she puts in issue in a verified pleading:
i.
j. (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
k.
l. (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
m.
n. (c) The validity of the written agreement; or
o.
p. (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest
after the execution of the written agreement.
6. Liberal and Strict Construction
 a. [I]n the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural lapses
so that a case may be resolved on its merits. Rules of procedure should promote, not
defeat, substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to
resolve substantial issues raised by the parties. GR 208224
b. referring to the rule of strict construction of penal statutes, says: "By this rule nothing
more is meant than that penal statutes shall not, by what may be thought their spirit
and equity, be extended to offenses other than those which are specifically and
clearly described and provided for GR L30664

7. Doctrine of Constitutional Presumption

a. The presumption of innocence in favor of an accused in a criminal case is a
basic constitutional guarantee GR 229204
b. The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside
legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. GR 139465
8. Legislative History of the Statute

1. G.R. No. 202242: This case involved questions about the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
under Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution2. The court’s decision in this case would have been
informed by both the text of the Constitution itself and any relevant legislative history.
2. G.R. No. 195987: This case dealt with issues related to executive control and ordinance-making power 3. In
making its decision, the court would have considered both the text of relevant laws and any associated legislative
history.

9. Ejusdem Generis
a. Also, under ejusdem generis rule, where a general word or phrase (such as
"disqualification for any cause" in this case) follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class (such as the words "dies" and "withdraws" in the
instant case) or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned GR 136351
b. The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a
general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the
same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or to be
restricted to – things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those
specifically mentioned GR 189755
c. In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk"
under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute. GR L 33693-
94
10. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
a. This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another. GR 171153
b. We apply to this case the old and familiar Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, which means that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, "where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be stretched or
extended to other matters." A.C. No. 8502
11. In pari materia
a. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the
same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular
subject matter. GR 199027
b. Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments
of the same legislature on the same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform
system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary (sic) to the earlier
enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind
the existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted its new act with reference
thereto GR 138496
12. The Rule of Recency in the Passage of a Law
a. "intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply with the new
rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the recency of the changes
introduced by the new rules." GR 116121
b. In view of the fact that at around the time these petitions were commenced, the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure had just taken effect, the Court treated
infractions of the new Rules then with relative liberality in evaluating full
compliance therewith. GR 130068
13. THe Rule on Specific and General Laws
a. Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and
certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if standing
alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or
provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the
general act or provision, especially when such general and special acts or provisions
are contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a
conflict. GR L-19628
b. More specifically, a subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and
application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment,
unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. GR L-31711
14. Verba Legis/ Plain Meaning
a. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is
only room for application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is
what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. GR 186400
b. verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution should be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed GR 202242
15. Casus Omissus
a. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est,
which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held
to have been omitted intentionally. GR 216092
b. According to the doctrine of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, a person,
object, or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. GR 228539
16. Doctrine of Stare Decisis
a. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
 Philippines which provides, thus:ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. GR
147097
b. the principle of stare decisis applies only to final decisions of this Court, because only
this Court may create judicial precedents that other courts should follow. GR 212262
17. Dictrine Res Judicata
a. There are two concepts of res judicata: 1) res judicata by bar by prior judgment; and
2) res judicata by collusiveness of judgment. Res judicata by bar by prior judgment
precludes the filing of a second case when it has the same parties, same subject,
and same cause of action, or otherwise prays for the same relief as the first case. On
the other hand, res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment precludes the questioning
of a fact or issue in a second case if the fact or issue has already been judicially
determined in the first case between the same parties. GR 233767
b. The doctrine of res judicata, in fact is founded on the public policy that it is the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and that a party should
not be vexed twice for the same cause (LINZAG vs. CA, Ibid). GR 146980
18. Exceptions in the Statute
a. Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public
welfare, or for any laudable purpose; neither may it engraft into the law qualifications
not contemplated GR 232131
b. Like all general rules, this principle admits of exceptions in the interest of
justice and fair play GR 237428
19. Use of "may" and "shall"
a. The word "may"is an auxilliary verb showing among others, opportunity or possibility.
Under ordinary circumstances, the phrase "may be" implies the possible existence of
something. In this case, the "something" is a law governing sectoral representation.
The phrase in question should, therefore, be understood to mean as prescribed by
such law that governs the matter at the time . . . The phrase does not and cannot, by
its very wording, restrict itself to the uncertainly of future legislation. (Legaspi v.
Estrella, 189 SCRA 58, 24 Aug. 1990, En Banc)
b. The ordinary acceptations of the terms "may" and "shall" may be resorted to as
guides in ascertaining the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions.
As regards adjective rules in general, the term "may" is construed as permissive and
operating to confer discretion, while the word "shall" is imperative and operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced.19 However, these are not absolute and
inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration
of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow
from construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as
mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction. GR No.
152058

20. Use of "and" and "or"

the use of "or" instead of "and" in the letter could hardly be treated as a simple typographical error,
bearing in mind the nature of the demand, the amount involved, and the fact that it was made by a
lawyer. Certainly Atty. Gonzales would have known that a world of difference exists between "and"
and "or" in the manner that the word was employed in the letter. GR 142618
A rule in statutory construction is that the word "or" is disjunctive term signifying dissociation and
independence of one thing from other things enumerated unless the context requires a different
interpretation. In criminal and penal statues, like Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646, the word "and" cannot
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be read "or," and conversely, as the rule of strict construction apply, except when the spirit and
30

reason of the law require it. GR 126394