THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 168475. July 4, 2007.]

EMILIO E. DIOKNO, VICENTE R. ALCANTARA, ANTONIO Z.

VERGARA, JR., DANTE M. TONG, JAIME C. MENDOZA, ROMEO
M. MACAPULAY, ROBERTO M. MASIGLAT, LEANDRO C.
ATIENZA, ROMULO AQUINO, JESUS SAMIA, GAUDENCIO
CAMIT, DANTE PARAO, ALBERTO MABUGAT, EDGARDO
VILLANUEVA, JR., FRANCISCO ESCOTO, EDGARDO SEVILLA,
FELICITO MACASAET, and JOSE Z. TULLO , petitioners, vs.
HON. HANS LEO J. CACDAC, in his capacity as Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, DOLE, MANILA, MED-
ARBITER TRANQUILINO C. REYES, EDGARDO DAYA, PABLO
LUCAS, LEANDRO M. TABILOG, REYNALDO ESPIRITU, JOSE
VITO, ANTONIO DE LUNA, ARMANDO YALUNG, EDWIN
LAYUG, NARDS PABILONA, REYNALDO REYES, EVANGELINE
ESCALL, ALBERTO ALCANTARA, ROGELIO CERVITILLO,
MARCELINO MORELOS, FAUSTINO ERMINO, JIMMY S. ONG,
ALFREDO ESCALL, NARDITO C. ALVAREZ, JAIME T.
VALERIANO, JOHNSON S. REYES, GAUDENCIO JIMENEZ, JR.,
GAVINO R. VIDANES, ARNALDO G. TAYAO, BONIFACIO F.
CIRUJANO, EDGARDO G. CADVONA, MAXIMO A. CAOC, JOSE
O. MACLIT, JR., LUZMINDO D. ACORDA, JR., LEMUEL R.
RAGASA, and GIL G. DE VERA, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J : p

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997

Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the nullification of the Decision 1 and
Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83061, dated 17 June
2004 and 10 June 2005, respectively, which dismissed petitioners' Petition for
Certiorari and denied their Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
The Facts
The First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a
legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco.
Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES.
On 1 April 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created the Committee on
Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of its union elections scheduled on 7 May
2003. 3 The COMELEC was composed of petitioner Dante M. Tong as its
chairman, and petitioners Jaime C. Mendoza and Romeo M. Macapulay as
members. Subsequently, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez,
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 Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano filed their respective certificates of
candidacy. On 12 April 2003, the COMELEC rejected Jimmy S. Ong's candidacy
on the ground that he was not a member of FLAMES. Meanwhile, the
certificates of candidacy of Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T.
Valeriano were similarly rejected on the basis of the exclusion of their
department from the scope of the existing collective bargaining agreement
(CBA). The employees assigned to the aforesaid department are allegedly
deemed disqualified from membership in the union for being confidential
employees. ITaCEc

On 24 April 2003, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez,

Alfredo J. Escall, Jaime T. Valeriano (Ong, et al.), and a certain Leandro M.
Tabilog filed a Petition 4 before the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE). They prayed, inter alia, for the nullification of
the order of the COMELEC which disallowed their candidacy. 5 They further
prayed that petitioners be directed to render an accounting of funds with full
and detailed disclosure of expenditures and financial transactions; and that a
representative from the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) be designated to act
as chairman of the COMELEC in lieu of petitioner Dante M. Tong. 6
On 30 April 2003, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Alex E. Maraan issued an
Order 7 directing DOLE personnel to observe the conduct of the FLAMES election
on 7 May 2003. 8

On 2 May 2003, petitioners filed a Petition 9 with the COMELEC seeking

the disqualification of private respondents Edgardo Daya, Pablo Lucas, Leandro
Tabilog, Reynaldo Espiritu, Jose Vito, Antonio de Luna, Armando Yalung, Edwin
Layug, Nards Pabilona, Reynaldo Reyes, Evangeline Escall, Alberto Alcantara,
Rogelio Cervitillo, Marcelino Morelos, and Faustino Ermino (Daya, et al.).
Petitioners alleged that Daya, et al., allowed themselves to be assisted by non-
union members, and committed acts of disloyalty which are inimical to the
interest of FLAMES. In their campaign, they allegedly colluded with the officers
of the Meralco Savings and Loan Association (MESALA) and the Meralco Mutual
Aid and Benefits Association (MEMABA) and exerted undue influence on the
members of FLAMES.

On 6 May 2003, the COMELEC issued a Decision, 10 declaring Daya, et al.,

officially disqualified to run and/or to participate in the 7 May 2003 FLAMES
elections. The COMELEC also resolved to exclude their names from the list of
candidates in the polls or precincts, and further declared that any vote cast in
their favor shall not be counted. According to the COMELEC, Daya, et al.,
violated Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) 11 of the FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws
(CBL) by allowing non-members to aid them in their campaign. Their acts of
solicitation for support from non-union members were deemed inimical to the
interest of FLAMES. CAScIH

On 7 May 2003, the COMELEC proclaimed the following candidates,

including some of herein petitioners as winners of the elections, to wit: 12
NAME POSITION

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 Emilio E. Diokno President
Vicente P. Alcantara Executive Vice President — External
Antonio Z. Vergara, Jr. Executive Vice President — Internal
Alberto L. Mabugat Vice-President — Organizing
Roberto D. Masiglat, Jr. Vice-President — Education
Leandro C. Atienza Vice-President — Chief Steward
Felito C. Macasaet Secretary
Edgardo R. Villanueva Asst. Secretary
Romulo C. Aquino Treasurer
Jesus D. Samia Asst. Treasurer
Gaudencio C. Camit Auditor
Rodante B. [Parao] Asst. Auditor
Jose Z. Tullo Central Coordinator
Bernardo C. Sevilla North Coordinator
Francis B. Escoto South Coordinator

On 8 May 2003, private respondents Daya, et al., along with Ong, et al.,
filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR, a Petition 13 to: a) Nullify
Order of Disqualification; b) Nullify Election Proceedings and Counting of Votes;
c) Declare Failure of Election; and d) Declare Holding of New Election to be
Controlled and Supervised by the DOLE. The Petition was docketed as Case No.
NCR-OD-0304-002-LRD.
On 14 May 2003, another group led by private respondent Gaudencio
Jimenez, Jr., along with private respondents Johnson S. Reyes, Gavino R.
Vidanes, Arnaldo G. Tayao, Bonifacio F. Cirujano, Edgardo G. Cadavona, Maximo
A. Caoc, Jose O. Maclit, Jr., Luzmindo D. Acorda, Jr., Lemuel R. Ragasa and Gil G.
de Vera (Jimenez, et al.) filed a Petition with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the
DOLE-NCR against petitioners to nullify the 7 May 2003 election on the ground
that the same was not free, orderly, and peaceful. It was docketed as Case No.
NCR-OD-0305-004-LRD, which was subsequently consolidated with the Petition
of Daya, et al. and the earlier Petition of Ong, et al.

Meanwhile, the records show that a subsequent election was held on 30

June 2004, which was participated in and won by herein private respondents
Daya, et al. The validity of the 30 June 2004 elections was assailed by herein
petitioners before the DOLE 14 and taken to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 88264 on certiorari, which case does not concern us in the instant Petition.
The Court of Appeals, in the aforesaid case, rendered a Decision 15 dated 12
January 2007, upholding the validity of the 30 June 2004 elections, and the
declaration of herein private respondents Daya, et al., as the duly elected
winners therein. ECcTaH

The Decision of the Med-Arbiter

On 7 July 2003, Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes, Jr. issued a Decision 16
in favor of private respondents, Daya, et al. However, the petition of Jimenez, et
al., was dismissed because it was premature, it appearing that the COMELEC
had not yet resolved their protest prior to their resort to the Med-Arbiter.
Finally, the Petition of Ong, et al., seeking to declare themselves as bona fide
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 members of FLAMES was ordered dismissed.

The Med-Arbiter noted in his decision that during a conference which was
held on 15 May 2003, the parties agreed that the issue anent the qualifications
of private respondents Ong, et al. had been rendered moot and academic. 17
The Med-Arbiter reversed the disqualification imposed by the COMELEC
against private respondents Daya, et al. He said that the COMELEC accepted all
the allegations of petitioners against private respondents Daya, et al., sans
evidence to substantiate the same. Moreover, he found that the COMELEC erred
in relying on Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) of the CBL as basis for their
disqualification. The Med-Arbiter read the aforesaid provision to refer to the
dismissal and/or expulsion of a member from FLAMES, but not to the
disqualification of a member as a candidate in a union election. He rationalized
that the COMELEC cannot disqualify a candidate on the same grounds for
expulsion of members, which power is vested by the CBL on the Executive
Board. The Med-Arbiter also held that there was a denial of due process
because the COMELEC failed to receive private respondents Daya, et al.'s
motion for reconsideration of the order of their disqualification. The COMELEC
was also found to have refused to receive their written protest in violation of
the union's CBL. 18
Lastly, the Med-Arbiter defended his jurisdiction over the case. He
concluded that even as the election of union officers is an internal affair of the
union, his office has the right to inquire into the merits and conduct of the
election when its jurisdiction is sought. 19

The decretal portion of the Med-Arbiter's Decision states, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [P]etition to Nullify the
Order of Disqualification; Nullify Election proceedings and counting of
Votes; and Declare a Failure of Elections is hereby granted. The
disqualification of [private respondent] Ed[gardo] Daya, et al., is
hereby considered as null and void. Perforce, the election of union
officers of FLAMES on May 7, 2003 is declared a failure and a new
election is ordered conducted under the supervision of the Department
of Labor and Employment. TAaCED

The [P]etition to conduct an accounting of union funds and to

stop the release of funds to [petitioner] Diokno, et al., is ordered
dismissed for lack of merit.
And the Petition to Declare [private respondents] Jimmy Ong,
Alfredo [E]scall, Nardito Alvarez, and Jaime Valeriano as members of
FLAMES is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
The [P]etition to Nullify the election filed by [private
respondents] Gaudencio Jimenez, et al., is likewise ordered dismissed.
20

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the Director of the BLR.

The Ruling of the BLR Director

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 On 3 December 2003, the Director of the BLR issued a Resolution, 21
affirming in toto the assailed Decision of the Med-Arbiter.

Public respondent Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac ruled, inter alia, that the
COMELEC's reliance on Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) of the CBL, as a ground for
disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al., was premature. He echoed the
interpretation of the Med-Arbiter that the COMELEC erroneously resorted to the
aforecited provision which refers to the expulsion of a member from the union
on valid grounds and with due process, along with the requisite 2/3 vote of the
Executive Board. Hence, the COMELEC cut short the expulsion proceedings in
disqualifying private respondents Daya, et al. 22 The BLR Director further held
that the case involves a question of disqualification on account of the alleged
commission by private respondents Daya, et al., of illegal campaign acts, which
acts were not specifically mentioned in the guidelines for the conduct of
election as issued by the COMELEC. Likewise, on the alleged refusal of private
respondents Daya, et al., to submit to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by failing
to file a petition to nullify its order of disqualification, the BLR Director deemed
the same as an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Thus: TCAHES

By themselves, such acts could not be taken as repugnant of

COMELEC's authority. Sensing that they were prejudiced by the
disqualification order, it was only incumbent upon [private respondents
Daya, et al.] to seek remedy before a body, which they thought has a
more objective perspective over the situation. In short, they opted to
bypass the administrative remedies within the union. Such a move
could not be taken against [private respondents Daya, et al.]
considering that non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is justified
in instances where it would practically amount to a denial of justice, or
would be illusory or vain, as in the present controversy. 23

The BLR Director disposed in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Decision of Med-Arbiter Tranquilino B. Reyes, DOLE-NCR, dated 7 July
2003 is AFFIRMED in its entirety.

Let the records of this case be returned to the DOLE-NCR for the
immediate conduct of election of officers of the First Line Association of
Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) under the supervision of
DOLE-NCR personnel. 24

Subsequently, petitioners sought a reversal of the 3 December 2003

Resolution, but the BLR Director issued a Resolution dated 10 February 2003, 25
refusing to reverse his earlier Resolution for lack of merit.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Certiorari.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found petitioners' appeal to be bereft of merit.
The appellate court held that the provision relied upon by the COMELEC
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 concerns the dismissal and/or expulsion of union members, which power is
vested in the FLAMES' Executive Board, and not the COMELEC. It affirmed the
finding of the BLR Director that the COMELEC, in disqualifying private
respondents Daya, et al., committed a procedural shortcut. It held:
Without the requisite two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board
dismissing and/or expelling private respondents for acts contemplated
thereunder, the COMELEC was clearly violating the union's constitution
and bylaws (sic) by utilizing the aforequoted provision in its said May 6,
2003 decision and, in the process, arrogating unto itself a power it did
not possess. As the document embodying the covenant between a
union and its members and the fundamental law governing the
members' rights and obligations, it goes without saying that the
constitution and bylaws (sic) should be upheld for as long as they are
not contrary to law, good morals or public policy. 26EICSDT

On the matter of the failure of private respondents Daya, et al. to come up

with 30 percent (30%) members' support in filing the Petition to Nullify the
COMELEC's Decision before the Med-Arbiter, the Court of Appeals said that the
petition did not involve the entire membership of FLAMES, so there was no
need to comply with the aforesaid requirement. Furthermore, the appellate
court applied the exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies on the ground, inter alia, that resort to such a remedy would have
been futile, illusory or vain. 27 Indeed, the Court of Appeals emphasized that
private respondents Daya, et al., were directed by the COMELEC to file their
Answer to the petition for their disqualification only on 5 May 2003. Private
respondents Daya, et al., filed their Answer on 6 May 2003. On the same day,
the COMELEC issued its Decision disqualifying them. A day after, the 7 May
2003 election was held. The Court of Appeals further stressed that private
respondents Daya, et al.'s efforts to have their disqualification reconsidered
were rebuffed by the COMELEC; hence, they were left with no choice but to
seek the intervention of the BLR, 28 which was declared to have jurisdiction over
intra-union disputes even at its own initiative under Article 226 29 of the Labor
Code.
Petitioners sought a reconsideration of the 17 June 2004 Decision of the
Court of Appeals, but the same was denied in a Resolution 30 dated 10 June
2005.

Hence, the instant Petition.

At the outset, petitioners contend that the instant Petition falls under the
exceptions to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. They
implore this Court to make factual determination anent the conduct of the 7
May 2003 elections. They also question the jurisdiction of the BLR on the case
at bar because of the failure of private respondents Daya, et al., to exhaust
administrative remedies within the union. It is the stance of petitioner that
Article 226 31 of the Labor Code which grants power to the BLR to resolve inter-
union and intra-union disputes is dead law, and has been amended by Section
14 of Republic Act No. 6715, whereby the conciliation, mediation and voluntary
arbitration functions of the BLR had been transferred to the National
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 Conciliation and Mediation Board.

Petitioners similarly assert that the 7 May 2003 election was conducted in
a clean, honest, and orderly manner, and that private respondents, some of
whom are not bona fide members of FLAMES, were validly disqualified by the
COMELEC from running in the election. They also rehashed their argument that
non-members of the union were allowed by private respondents Daya, et al., to
participate in the affair. They challenge the finding of the BLR Director that the
reliance by the COMELEC on Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) of the CBL, was
premature. Petitioners insist that the COMELEC had the sole and exclusive
power to pass upon the qualification of any candidate, and therefore, it has the
correlative power to disqualify any candidate in accordance with its guidelines.
SHIcDT

For their part, private respondents Daya, et al., maintain that the Petition
they filed before the DOLE-NCR Med-Arbiter questioning the disqualification
order of the COMELEC and seeking the nullification of the 7 May 2003 election
involves an intra-union dispute which is within the jurisdiction of the BLR. They
further claim that the COMELEC, in disqualifying them, mistakenly relied on a
provision in the FLAMES' CBL that addresses the expulsion of members from
the union, and no expulsion proceedings were held against them. Finally, they
underscore the finding of the appellate court that there was
disenfranchisement among the general membership of FLAMES due to their
wrongful disqualification which restricted the members' choices of candidates.
They reiterate the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that had the COMELEC
tabulated the votes cast in their favor, there would have been, at least, a basis
for the declaration that they lost in the elections.
Issues
Petitioners attribute to the Court of Appeals several errors to substantiate
their Petition. 32 They all boil down, though, to the question of whether the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the
jurisdiction of the BLR to take cognizance of the case and then upheld the ruling
of the BLR Director and Med-Arbiter, nullifying the COMELEC's order of
disqualification of private respondents Daya et al., and annulling the 7 May
2003 FLAMES elections.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.
We affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals upholding the jurisdiction of
the BLR. Article 226 of the Labor Code is hereunder reproduced, to wit:
ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. — The Bureau of
Labor Relations and the Labor Relations Divisions in the regional offices
of the Department of Labor shall have original and exclusive authority
to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties,
on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances
or problems arising from or affecting labor-management relations in all
workplaces whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those
arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective
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 bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance
procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.DAEIHT

The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor
cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties.

The amendment to Article 226, as couched in Republic Act No. 6715, 33

which is relied upon by petitioners in arguing that the BLR had been divested of
its jurisdiction, simply reads, thus:
Sec. 14. The second paragraph of Article 226 of the same
Code is likewise hereby amended to read as follows:
"The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) calendar days to act on labor
cases before it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties."

This Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 34 interpreting Article 226 of the

Labor Code, was explicit in declaring that the BLR has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. We said that since Article
226 of the Labor Code has declared that the BLR shall have original and
exclusive authority to act on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, there
should be no more doubt as to its jurisdiction. As defined, an intra-union
conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-
union controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among
unions. 35 More specifically, an intra-union dispute is defined under Section (z),
Rule I of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, viz:
(z) "Intra-Union Dispute" refers to any conflict between and
among union members, and includes all disputes or grievances arising
from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the
constitution and by-laws of a union, including cases arising from
chartering or affiliation of labor organizations or from any violation of
the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the
Code.

The controversy in the case at bar is an intra-union dispute. There is no

question that this is one which involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a
labor union. At issue is the propriety of the disqualification of private
respondents Daya, et al., by the FLAMES COMELEC in the 7 May 2003 elections.
It must also be stressed that even as the dispute involves allegations that
private respondents Daya, et al., sought the help of non-members of the union
in their election campaign to the detriment of FLAMES, the same does not
detract from the real character of the controversy. It remains as one which
involves the grievance over the constitution and by-laws of a union, and it is a
controversy involving members of the union. Moreover, the non-members of
the union who were alleged to have aided private respondents Daya, et al., are
not parties in the case. We are, therefore, unable to understand petitioners'
persistence in placing the controversy outside of the jurisdiction of the BLR. The
law is very clear. It requires no further interpretation. The Petition which was
initiated by private respondents Daya, et al., before the BLR was properly within
its cognizance, it being an intra-union dispute. Indubitably, when private
respondents Daya, et al., brought the case to the BLR, it was an invocation of
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 the power and authority of the BLR to act on an intra-union conflict.
After having settled the jurisdiction of the BLR, we proceed to determine if
petitioners correctly raised the argument that private respondents Daya, et al.,
prematurely sought the BLR's jurisdiction on the ground that they failed to
exhaust administrative remedies within the union. On this matter, we affirm the
findings of the Court of Appeals which upheld the application by the BLR
Director of the exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
2005jur

In this regard, this Court is emphatic that "before a party is allowed to

seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction when such remedy should be exhausted first
before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
court's judicial intervention is fatal to one's cause of action." 36

Verily, there are exceptions to the applicability of the doctrine. 37 Among

the established exceptions are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal; 2)
when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when
the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7)
when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; 8) when strong
public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the proceeding is private
land; 10) in quo warranto proceedings; 38 and 11) where the facts show that
there was a violation of due process. 39 As aptly determined by the BLR
Director, private respondents Daya, et al., were prejudiced by the
disqualification order of the COMELEC. They endeavored to seek
reconsideration, but the COMELEC failed to act thereon. 40 The COMELEC was
also found to have refused to receive their written protest. 41 The foregoing
facts sustain the finding that private respondents Daya, et al., were deprived of
due process. Hence, it becomes incumbent upon private respondents Daya, et
al., to seek the aid of the BLR. To insist on the contrary is to render their
exhaustion of remedies within the union as illusory and vain. 42 These
antecedent circumstances convince this Court that there was proper
application by the Med-Arbiter of the exception to the rule of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, as affirmed by the BLR Director, and upheld by the
Court of Appeals.
We cannot accept, and the Court of Appeals rightfully rejected, the
contention of petitioners that the private respondents Daya, et al.'s complaint
filed before the Med-Arbiter failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement
because it was not supported by at least thirty percent (30%) of the members
of the union. Section 1 of Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of Book V
mandates the thirty percent (30%) requirement only in cases where the issue
involves the entire membership of the union, which is clearly not the case
before us. The issue is obviously limited to the disqualification from
participation in the elections by particular union members.
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 Having resolved the jurisdictional cobwebs in the instant case, it is now
apt for this Court to address the issue anent the disqualification of private
respondents and the conduct of the 7 May 2003 elections.

On this matter, petitioners want this Court to consider the instant case as
an exception to the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; hence,
importuning that we make findings of fact anew. It bears stressing that in a
petition for review on certiorari, the scope of this Court's judicial review of
decisions of the Court of Appeals is generally confined only to errors of law, 43
and questions of fact are not entertained. We elucidated on our fidelity to this
rule, and we said:
Thus, only questions of law may be brought by the parties and
passed upon by this Court in the exercise of its power to review. Also,
judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has
based its determination. 44SCEDaT

It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done

through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only
questions of law. 45 The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. 46 This is already
outside the province of the instant Petition for Certiorari. While there may be
exceptions to this rule, petitioners miserably failed to show why the exceptions
should be applied here. With greater force must this rule be applied in the
instant case where the factual findings of the Med-Arbiter were affirmed by the
BLR Director, and then, finally, by the Court of Appeals. The findings below had
sufficient bases both in fact and in law. The uniform conclusion was that private
respondents Daya, et al., were wrongfully disqualified by the COMELEC;
consequently, the FLAMES election should be annulled.

On the issue of disqualification, there was a blatant misapplication by the

COMELEC of the FLAMES' CBL. As has been established ad nauseam, the
provision 47 relied upon by the COMELEC in disqualifying private respondents
Daya, et al., applies to a case of expulsion of members from the union.
In full, Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) of the FLAMES' CBL, provides, to wit:
Section 4 (a). Any member may be DISMISSED and/or
EXPELLED from the UNION, after due process and investigation, by a
two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board, for any of the following
causes:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Acting in a manner harmful to the interest and welfare of
the UNION and/or its MEMBERS. 48

We highlight five points, thus:

First, Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) of the FLAMES' CBL, embraces
exclusively the case of dismissal and/or expulsion of members from the union.
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 Even a cursory reading of the provision does not tell us that the same is to be
automatically or directly applied in the disqualification of a candidate from
union elections, which is the matter at bar. It cannot be denied that the
COMELEC erroneously relied on Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) because the same
does not contemplate the situation of private respondents Daya, et al. The
latter are not sought to be expelled or dismissed by the Executive Board. They
were brought before the COMELEC to be disqualified as candidates in the 7 May
2003 elections. aSECAD

Second, the aforecited provision evidently enunciates with clarity the

procedural course that should be taken to dismiss and expel a member from
FLAMES. The CBL is succinct in stating that the dismissal and expulsion of a
member from the union should be after due process and investigation, the
same to be exercised by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive Board for any of
the causes 49 mentioned therein. The unmistakable directive is that in cases of
expulsion and dismissal, due process must be observed as laid down in the CBL.

Third, nevertheless, even if we maintain a lenient stance and consider the

applicability of Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) in the disqualification of private
respondents Daya, et al., from the elections of 7 May 2003, still, the
disqualification made by the COMELEC pursuant to the subject provision was a
rank disregard of the clear due process requirement embodied therein.
Nowhere do we find that private respondents Daya, et al. were investigated by
the Executive Board. Neither do we see the observance of the voting
requirement as regards private respondents Daya, et al. In all respects, they
were denied due process.

Fourth, the Court of Appeals, the BLR Director, and the Med-Arbiter
uniformly found that due process was wanting in the disqualification order of
the COMELEC. We are in accord with their conclusion. If, indeed, there was a
violation by private respondents Daya, et al., of the FLAMES' CBL that could be
a ground for their expulsion and/or dismissal from the union, which in turn
could possibly be made a ground for their disqualification from the elections,
the procedural requirements for their expulsion should have been observed. In
any event, therefore, whether the case involves dismissal and/or expulsion from
the union or disqualification from the elections, the proper procedure must be
observed. The disqualification ruled by the COMELEC against private
respondents Daya, et al., must not be allowed to abridge a clear procedural
policy established in the FLAMES' CBL. If we uphold the COMELEC, we are
countenancing a clear case of denial of due process which is anathema to the
Constitution of the Philippines which safeguards the right to due process.
Fifth, from another angle, the erroneous disqualification of private
respondents Daya, et al., constituted a case of disenfranchisement on the part
of the member-voters of FLAMES. By wrongfully excluding them from the 7 May
2003 elections, the options afforded to the union members were clipped.
Hence, the mandate of the union cannot be said to have been rightfully
determined. The factual irregularities in the FLAMES elections clearly provide
proper bases for the annulment of the union elections of 7 May 2003. ASCTac

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 On a final note, as it appears that the question of the qualifications of
private respondents Ong, et al. had been rendered moot and academic, 50 we
do not find any reason for this Court to rule on the matter. As borne out by the
records, the question had been laid to rest even when the case was still before
the Med-Arbiter. 51

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated 17 June 2004, and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No.
83061 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Nachura, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador with Associate

Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., and Aurora Santiago-Lagman, concurring.
Rollo , pp. 62-72.
2. Id. at 74-75.
3. According to Section 5, Article V of the FLAMES Constitution and By-Laws, the
OFFICERS of the UNION shall hold office for a period of three (3) years from
the date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elected
and qualified; provided that they remain members of the UNION in good
standing. Id. at 83.

4. Id. at 88-103.
5. Id. at p. 100.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 105.
8. DOLE personnel were assigned to the following precincts, to wit:

a) Head Office — Ortigas

b) Manila Sector

c) Pasig Sector

d) Balintawak Sector
e) Valenzuela Sector

f) Alabang Sector
g) Plaridel Sector

h) Rizal Sector

i) Sta. Rosa Sector

j) Dasmariñas Sector

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 k) San Pablo Sector. Id.
9. Id. at 106-113.
10. Id. at 121-128.
11. Section 4.

(a) Any member may be DISMISSED and/or EXPELLED from the UNION, after
due process and investigation, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the Executive
Board for any of the following causes:
xxx xxx xxx

6. Acting in a manner harmful to the interest and welfare of the UNION and/or
its MEMBERS.
12. Rollo , p. 129.
13. Id. at 130.
14. From the Decision dated 12 January 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88264, it can be gleaned that on 4 October 2004, Med-Arbiter
Tranquilino C. Reyes proclaimed private respondents Daya, et al. as the duly
elected winners. On appeal, BLR Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac affirmed the
Med-Arbiter and upheld the validity of the 30 June 2004 election, as well as
the propriety of the proclamation of private respondents Daya, et al., as
officers-elect of FLAMES. Id. at 420.HDATCc

15. Penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin with Associate Justices

Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; id. at 417-435.

16. Id. at 170-183.

17. Id. at 176, 179. Notwithstanding his statement in the Decision dated 7 July
2003, that the parties had agreed in a conference on 15 May 2003 that the
qualifications of private respondents Ong, et al. became moot and academic,
the Med-Arbiter proceeded to rule that Jimmy S. Ong is not a member of
FLAMES as he was assigned to the Accounting Department which had been
excluded from the bargaining unit per Addendum to the 1998 CBA. The Med-
Arbiter said that Ong's transfer to a department not excluded from the
bargaining unit per the 2002 CBA as well as the deduction from his salary of
union dues did not automatically make him a member of FLAMES. It was not
shown that he filed an application for membership nor was the same
approved by the union president. Moreover, the Med-Arbiter stressed that
private respondents Alfredo J. Escall, Nardito C. Alvarez, and Jaime T.
Valeriano are disqualified from FLAMES membership because they belong to
departments excluded from the bargaining unit pursuant to 2002 CBA. The
group of Ong, et al. were found to have no corresponding right to inquire into
the funds of the union.

18. The Med-Arbiter in his Decision, cited Article IX, Section 1 of the FLAMES
CBL, which provides, thus:
Section 1.

xxx xxx xxx

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 (c) In the event of any election protest or questions, the COMELEC shall rule
[on] such protest or questions regarding the conduct of the election provided
that the protest or questions must be submitted in writing within twenty-four
(24) hours from the time that the last ballot has been officially opened. The
COMELEC has three (3) days to decide the protest or question.

19. Id. at 181.

20. Id. at 183.
21. Penned by Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac; id. at 209-216.

22. Id. at 214.

23. Id. at 216.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 217-220.
26. Id. at 69.
27. The Court of Appeals expounded in this wise, thus:
Although the rule had, likewise, been long-settled that redress must first be
sought within the union itself, in accordance with its constitution and bylaws
(sic), before a case should be elevated to the jurisdiction of labor agencies,
said requirement had been traditionally held inapplicable under the following
circumstances, to wit: (a) when resort to the remedy would be futile, illusory
or vain; (b) when the remedy applied for was not acted upon for an
unreasonable length of time; (c) when the relief sought was simply for
damages; (d) when the act complained of is contrary to the constitution and
bylaws (sic); (e) when the issue is purely a question of law; and (f) when due
process was not observed. Id. at 71. SEcITC

28. Id. at 70.

29. ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. — The Bureau of Labor Relations
and the Labor Relations Division in the regional offices of the Department of
Labor shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative
or upon request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting
labor-management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or
nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject
of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.

The Bureau shall have fifteen (15) working days to act on labor cases before
it, subject to extension by agreement of the parties.
30. Id. at 74.
31. Supra note 29.
32. Id. at 367.
33. Entitled AN ACT TO EXTEND PROTECTION TO LABOR, STRENGTHEN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WORKERS TO SELF-ORGANIZATION,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PEACEFUL CONCERTED ACTIVITIES, FOSTER
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 INDUSTRIAL PEACE AND HARMONY, PROMOTE THE PREFERENTIAL USE OF
VOLUNTARY MODES OF SETTLING LABOR DISPUTES, AND REORGANIZE THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AMENDING FOR THESE
PURPOSES CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS
AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. aSIDCT

34. G.R. 123375, 28 February 2005, 452 SCRA 406, 420.

35. Id.
36. Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Metro Drug Corporation Employees
Association-Federation of Free Workers, G.R. No. 142666, 26 September
2005, 471 SCRA 45, 58, citing Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
143398, 25 October 2000, 344 SCRA 372.

37. Morcal v. Laviña , G.R. No. 166753, 29 November 2005, 476 SCRA 508, 512-
513.
38. Id.
39. Verceles v. Bureau of Labor Relations-Department of Labor and
Employment-National Capital Region, G.R. No. 153322, 15 February 2005,
451 SCRA 338, 349.

40. Id. at 175.

41. Id.
42. Rollo , p. 216.
43. Gerlach v. Reuters Limited, Phils., G.R. No. 148542, 17 January 2005, 448
SCRA 535, 544-545.
44. Id.
45. Umpoc v. Mercado , G.R. No. 158166, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 220, 235.
46. Id.
47. Article IV, Section 4 (a) (6) of the FLAMES' CBL.

48. Rollo , p. 82 and its dorsal page.

49. (1) Non-payment of dues and other monetary obligations for a reasonable
period of time, subject to the provisions of Article X;

(2) Joining or forming another UNION;

(3) Violation of any provision of the Constitution, By-laws, rules and

regulations of the UNION;

(4) Willfull (sic) violation of any provision of the Collective Bargaining

Agreement (CBA);
(5) Urging or advocating that a member start an action in any court of justice
against the UNION or any of its officers, without first exhausting all internal
remedies open to him or available in accordance with the constitution and
by-laws of the UNION; ICAcTa

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 (6) Acting in a manner harmful to the interest and welfare of the UNION
and/or its MEMBERS; id.
50. Supra note 17.
51. Id.

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