Daniel Morgan Report - Volume 3

The Report of the Daniel Morgan
Independent Panel
June 2021
Volume 3
HC 11-III
Return to an Address of the Honourable
the House of Commons
dated 15th June 2021
for
The Report of the Daniel Morgan

Independent Panel
Volume 3
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 15th June 2021
HC 11-III
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Contents
Volume 3
Chapter 9: Post-Abelard Two: Events after the acquittal of the Defendants in March 2011 855
Chapter 10: Corruption: Venality to lack of candour 1015
Chapter 11: The challenges of securing cooperation and lessons for future Panels 1117
Chapter 12: The Treatment of the Family 1141
Chapter 13: The Morgan Family’s Experience: A selection of personal perspectives
from the family of Daniel Morgan 1223
Annex A: Methodology: The Panel’s approach to preparing the Report 1233
Annex B: Timeline of key events and investigations since the murder of Daniel Morgan 1245
Annex C: Glossary of Terms 1247
Chapter 9: Post-Abelard Two:
Events after the acquittal of the
Defendants in March 2011
Contents
1 Introduction
2 The Disciplinary Review
3 The joint review by the Crown Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan Police
4 The Operation Longhorn Report: the investigation into DCS David Cook’s
unauthorised disclosure of documents
5 Operation Megan
6 The Report by the Independent Police Complaints Commission on alleged unlawful

releasing of material from police investigations to the BBC by former DCS David
Cook: The Panorama complaint 2012-2017
7 The civil action in the High Court
8 Operation Megan Two
9 The appeal against the decision of Mr Justice Mitting in the civil action
10 Operation Edison
1 Introduction
1. After the acquittal of the five suspects in the Abelard Two Investigation, Jonathan Rees,
James Cook, Garry Vian, Glenn Vian and former DS Sidney Fillery, there were a number of
developments. These included the following:
a. A review, commissioned by Commander Peter Spindler of the Metropolitan Police

Directorate of Professional Standards on 11 January 2012, to determine whether
any disciplinary offences had been committed by officers from the Abelard Two
Investigation.
b. A joint review by the Crown Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan Police of the
Abelard Two Investigation and the prosecution that followed.
855
The Report of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel
c. An investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (now the

Independent Office for Police Conduct) into the passing of information by former
DCS David Cook to journalist, Michael Sullivan. This investigation was known as
Operation Longhorn.
d. Another review commissioned on 19 November 2012 by Commander Peter

Spindler into complaints made by Jonathan Rees, and the 11 March 2011 ruling
by Mr Justice Maddison at the conclusion of the pre-trial hearing. Following this
review, a full investigation was carried out by the Special Investigations Team of the
Directorate of Professional Standards into elements of Jonathan Rees’s complaints
(see section 5.1 below) and overlapping concerns raised by the judge, codenamed
Operation Megan.
e. An investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission into an allegation

made by Jonathan Rees that confidential information, belonging to him, was
improperly disclosed to the BBC Panorama programme by former DCS David Cook
and/or officers from the Abelard Two Investigation.
f. A civil claim brought against the Metropolitan Police by Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian,
Glenn Vian and former DS Sidney Fillery, seeking damages for malicious prosecution
and misfeasance in public office. The case was presided over by Mr Justice Mitting
between 17 January and 10 February 2017. Former DS Fillery was successful in his
claim for damages.
g. An investigation into the conduct of former DCS David Cook following comments
made about him by Mr Justice Mitting, in the civil claim at the High Court in February
2017, that former DCS Cook had done an act which tended to pervert the course of
justice by breaching the sterile corridor and prompting an Assisting Offender, Gary
Eaton, to implicate Glenn Vian and Garry Vian in the murder of Daniel Morgan, and
concealing the fact that he had done so from the Crown Prosecution Service and
Prosecution Counsel. This investigation was known as Operation Megan Two.
h. An appeal by Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian and Glenn Vian to the Court of Appeal
against the findings by Mr Justice Mitting in the High Court.
i. A systematic review of the content of the electronic devices recovered, during a search
conducted by the Operation Megan Investigation, from the home of former DCS David
Cook on 04 November 2014, and the subsequent investigation by the Metropolitan
Police of possible breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998 which had not otherwise
been dealt with. This investigation was known as Operation Edison.
2. In this chapter, the Panel examines the above events in turn, assessing the effectiveness
of each review and investigation, and the conclusions that were reached. Due to the
significant failings identified during the Abelard Two Investigation (see Chapter 8, The Abelard
Two Investigation), the Panel also considers whether lessons have been learned by the
Metropolitan Police.
1.1 Chronology of key events relating to Post-Abelard Two

• 11 March 2011 The Prosecution discontinued its case against the suspects in the
Abelard Two Investigation.
856
Chapter 9: Post-Abelard Two: Events after the acquittal of the Defendants in March 2011
• 14 March 2011 The BBC Panorama programme ‘Tabloid Hacks Exposed’

was broadcast.
• 29 March 2011 The Crown Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan Police began a
review of the Abelard Two Investigation.
• 31 March 2011 A formal apology was made by the Acting Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police, Tim Godwin, to the family of Daniel Morgan.
• May-December 2011 After a general audit of email contact between journalists

and police officers by the Metropolitan Police, emails were discovered between
former DCS David Cook and journalist Michael Sullivan. Some of the emails included
unauthorised disclosure of documents to Michael Sullivan. The Serious Organised
Crime Agency made a referral to the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
• 10 January 2012 Former DCS David Cook was arrested on suspicion of committing
misconduct in public office and offences contrary to Section 55 of the Data Protection
Act 1998. Following an initial ‘no comment’ interview, he was released on bail pending
further enquiries to be carried out by the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
• 11 January 2012 Commander Peter Spindler commissioned a review of the Abelard

Two Investigation into possible disciplinary offences committed by officers involved in
the case. D/Supt Mark Mitchell carried out this review.
• 30 January 2012 Jonathan Rees made a formal complaint to the Independent Police
Complaints Commission. He made four allegations.
• 13 February 2012 D/Supt Mark Mitchell completed a report after his review.
• May 2012 The Crown Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan Police completed a
report on their review of the Abelard Two Investigation.
• November 2012 After a referral by the Independent Police Complaints Commission

regarding Jonathan Rees’s complaint, Commander Peter Spindler commissioned a
review of the complaint. D/Supt Fiona McCormack carried out this review.
• 19 April 2013 D/Supt Fiona McCormack completed a report after her review.
• 10 May 2013 The Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, announced the setting up of the
Daniel Morgan Independent Panel.
• July 2013 Former DCS David Cook retired from the Serious Organised Crime Agency.
• January 2014 Operation Megan began. This was an investigation into complaints
made by Jonathan Rees, and comments made by Mr Justice Maddison after the
acquittal of the Defendants on 11 March 2011.
• 21 January 2014 Jonathan Rees was interviewed by Operation Megan investigators.

He raised additional complaints.
• September 2014 The Independent Police Complaints Commission sent an advice file
on its investigation, Operation Longhorn, into former DCS David Cook’s unauthorised
disclosure of documents to Michael Sullivan, to the Crown Prosecution Service.
857
• 04 November 2014 After a warrant was obtained by Operation Megan, former

DCS David Cook’s home was searched. As Operation Megan had limited Terms of
Reference, a separate investigation was launched, by the Metropolitan Police, into
materials seized from former DCS Cook’s home. This investigation was known as
Operation Edison.
• 08 January 2015 Operation Megan investigators referred the allegation that

confidential information belonging to Jonathan Rees was unlawfully disclosed to
the BBC Panorama programme (as contained in Jonathan Rees’s complaint), to the
Independent Police Complaints Commission.
• 29 September 2015 The Crown Prosecution Service produced a charging advice on

Operation Longhorn and it was decided not to prosecute former DCS David Cook.
• 14 December 2016 The Independent Police Complaints Commission completed its

investigation into Jonathan Rees’s complaint that confidential information belonging to
him was unlawfully disclosed to the BBC Panorama programme. No file was referred to
the Crown Prosecution Service.
• 03 January 2017 A final report from the Independent Police Complaints Commission
with regard to the 14 December 2016 report was completed. This report clarified why
the investigation was not referred to the Crown Prosecution Service.
• 17 January 2017 Jonathan Rees, former DS Sidney Fillery, Garry Vian and Glenn
Vian brought a civil claim in the High Court against the Metropolitan Police seeking
damages for malicious prosecution and for misfeasance in public office.
• February 2017 A report on Operation Megan’s findings was completed but no file was
referred to the Crown Prosecution Service as no criminal offences were identified as
being committed.
• 17 February 2017 Mr Justice Mitting held that the Metropolitan Police was liable for
misfeasance in public office in relation to the prosecution of former DS Sidney Fillery,
but the claims of the other three Claimants failed. None of the four Claimants was
successful in their claims for malicious prosecution.
• 21 March 2017 The Metropolitan Police opened a new investigation into the conduct
of former DCS David Cook following comments made about him by Mr Justice Mitting
in February 2017. This investigation was known as Operation Megan Two.
• 06 December 2017 The Operation Megan Two Report was completed and referred to
• July 2018 A Court of Appeal judgment was delivered: Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian and
Glenn Vian were successful with their appeal against Mr Justice Mitting’s judgment of
February 2017 for misfeasance and malicious prosecution.
• November 2018 After reviewing Operation Megan Two’s file, the Crown Prosecution
Service decided not to prosecute former DCS David Cook. Jonathan Rees appealed
against this finding.
• 31 July 2019 After their successful appeal against the 2017 judgment by Mr Justice
Mitting, damages were awarded to Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian and Glenn Vian.
858
• September 2019 The Operation Edison file was referred by the Metropolitan Police to
the Crown Prosecution Service for investigatory advice.
• 01–02 April 2020 After reviewing the Operation Edison file, the Crown Prosecution
Service provided investigatory advice to the Metropolitan Police who subsequently
decided not to proceed further with the investigation into former DCS David Cook.
2 The Disciplinary Review: January-February 2012

3. On 11 January 2012, Commander Peter Spindler requested a review of the Abelard Two
Investigation. D/Supt Mark Mitchell of the Directorate of Professional Standards, who conducted
the review, stated in his report that his review was ‘in terms of possible disciplinary offences
committed by officers involved in the case’.1
4. D/Supt Mark Mitchell was directed to conduct the review using three documents:
i. the judgment of Mr Justice Maddison, dated 11 March 2011;
ii. a case summary produced by Jonathan Rees QC; and
iii. a short closing report for the Abelard Two Investigation, which had been prepared by
DS Gary Dalby.2
5. The Terms of Reference for the review were as follows:
• ‘The review will be completed based only on the documents detailed.
• The aim of the review is to identify any prima-facie evidence of criminal or misconduct
offences committed by officers.
• If such offences are identified to detail the evidence on which they are based.
• If such offences are identified detail the necessary steps/investigation that would be
required to progress the matter.
• Consider the proportionality of conducting further enquiries/instigating disciplinary

proceedings if offences are identified.
• Provide recommendations setting out the most appropriate way forward.’3
6. D/Supt Mark Mitchell took legal advice as to the situation resulting from the fact that
former DCS David Cook had been a Metropolitan Police officer and had then moved to the
Serious Organised Crime Agency.4 The report dated 13 February 2012 by D/Supt Mitchell was
completed while former DCS Cook was still employed by the Serious Organised Crime Agency,
which he left in July 2013. He was correctly advised that the Metropolitan Police could not take
disciplinary action against former DCS Cook because he had retired from the Metropolitan
Police, but that there should be consideration of communicating any findings to former DCS
Cook’s current employer, the Serious Organised Crime Agency.
1 Discipline Review by D/Supt Mark Mitchell, MPS109704001, p4, 13 February 2012.

4 Discipline Review by D/Supt Mark Mitchell, MPS109704001, pp16-17, 13 February 2012.
859
7. In his report, D/Supt Mark Mitchell concluded:
i. He had concerns about the way that Gary Eaton was managed and the breaches
of the sterile corridor.5 (The purpose of the ‘sterile corridor’ is to ensure complete
separation between the debriefing of a witness and the investigation team so as to
protect the integrity of the evidence which the witness subsequently gives).
ii. He did not believe that there was clear evidence of a criminal conspiracy to implicate
‘the brothers’ [Glenn Vian and Garry Vian] within the documents which were
available to him.6
iii. Within Mr Justice Maddison’s ruling, there was prima facie evidence of possible
criminal and misconduct offences. These related to former DCS Cook’s contact with
Gary Eaton and Mr Justice Maddison’s conclusion that ‘on the balance of probabilities’
former DCS Cook did prompt Gary Eaton.7
iv. Significant investigation would be needed to prove or disprove the initial findings of Mr
Justice Maddison to a criminal or misconduct threshold.8
8. D/Supt Mark Mitchell noted that ‘[t]he documents do raise several matters that as an
organisation should be noted in relation to the management of Resident Witnesses. These issues
have been raised previously from similar cases.’9
9. D/Supt Mark Mitchell described the actions of former DCS David Cook as being ‘poor
practice’,10 which fell short of criminal conduct.
10. D/Supt Mark Mitchell also examined the conduct of DI Douglas Clarke who, acting on
instructions from former DCS David Cook, had arranged for Gary Eaton to be spoken to about
the fact that he (Gary Eaton) had stated that his father was dead, when in fact he was still
alive. It had been alleged that this had compromised the integrity of the debrief of Gary Eaton
(see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation). DI Clarke gave evidence on this matter to Mr
Justice Maddison.
11. D/Supt Mark Mitchell concluded that DI Douglas Clarke had been ‘a poor witness who
gave inconsistent evidence’. He cited no evidence to show that DI Clarke may have committed
a criminal offence, although he said: ‘It may be that there is prima facie evidence of offences
against him regarding the tipping off […]’, but ‘it is difficult to decide if HH [Mr Justice Maddison]
believed Clarke to be responsible for the “tipping off”’.11
12. D/Supt Mark Mitchell considered the weight of the evidence available, and whether
there was a public interest in conducting further investigation. He stated that any criminal
investigation would seek to prove or disprove that ‘DCS Cook and DI Clarke were guilty of
attempting to pervert the course of justice’. His overall conclusion was that a full investigation

860
into the misconduct identified by Mr Justice Maddison would ‘take in excess of 18 months
to complete. I do not believe this to be an appropriate use of MPS [Metropolitan Police]
resources.’12
13. D/Supt Mark Mitchell had become aware of the fact that on 10 March 2011 an email had
been sent from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, Chief Crime Reporter at The
Sun newspaper. The email had included confidential information sent between the solicitor
for Daniel Morgan’s family and AC John Yates, into which former DCS Cook had been
copied. On 26 May 2011, during a meeting with Commander Simon Foy, former DCS Cook
had been given an informal verbal warning in relation to his future conduct (see paragraphs
125-127 below).
14. D/Supt Mark Mitchell concluded his report as follows:
‘No public complaint has been made to my knowledge. The comments made by the
judge highlight concerns regarding, what appear to be issues with the maintenance
of sterile corridors and fall short of criminal conduct. The issue that may need to
be considered is whether this is poor practice or misconduct. Without evidence
to the contrary I believe this to be poor practice on the part of the SIO [Senior
Investigating Officer].
‘I respectfully recommend that no further action is taken in terms of potential offences

at this time and that the MPS [Metropolitan Police] awaits the result of the independent
investigation and consultation with SOCA [the Serious Organised Crime Agency] before
embarking on any inquiry of its own. I believe that the communications between Mr
Cook and Mike Sullivan should be brought to the attention of Operation Elveden.’13
15. Given the complexity of the issues dealt with in Mr Justice Maddison’s judgment,
the three documents, mentioned at paragraph 4 above, comprised an inadequate basis
upon which to form a conclusion as to whether any further disciplinary investigation was
required, or ‘whether there was any prima facie evidence of misconduct committed by
officers’. D/Supt Mark Mitchell’s report acknowledged the gravity of the allegations made
by Mr Justice Maddison; however, because he had not seen the evidence, as he said,
D/Supt Mitchell’s conclusion was not justified.
3 The joint review by the Crown Prosecution Service and the

Metropolitan Police
16. On 11 March 2011, following the acquittal of the Defendants (Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian
and Garry Vian), DCS Hamish Campbell of the Homicide and Serious Crime Command in the
Metropolitan Police, read a prepared press statement, in which he said:

13 Discipline Review by D/Supt Mark Mitchell, MPS109704001, pp15-16, 13 February 2012. Operation Elveden was a Metropolitan Police
investigation into payments by journalists to police and other public officials.
861
‘This current investigation has identified, ever more clearly, how the initial inquiry
failed the family and the wider public. It is quite apparent that police corruption was a
debilitating factor in that investigation. This was wholly unacceptable.
‘Significant changes have occurred since that time, nevertheless there are
important issues which we need to examine now in order to understand what led to
today’s decision.’14
17. DCS Hamish Campbell’s statement also referred to the disclosure issue which had
ultimately precipitated the end of the Court proceedings: ‘Within this formidable and complex
murder enquiry it is deeply regrettable that it has not proved possible to guarantee to the court
that all relevant material has been presented to ensure a fair trial.’15
18. DCS Hamish Campbell also prepared a briefing note16 for the Metropolitan Police Authority,
following the acquittal of the Defendants, which stated that the Metropolitan Police would write
to the family of Daniel Morgan to apologise for what had happened, and that a formal apology
would be made at the full meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority on 31 March 2011.17
The Acting Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Tim Godwin, made this formal apology at
the meeting on 31 March 2011.18
19. In the briefing note, DCS Hamish Campbell also said that the Crown Prosecution Service
and the Metropolitan Police would immediately begin a review, ‘about the matters which
caused such significant challenges. These matters include the disclosure of evidence in historic
investigations taken place over time that are linked to numerous other enquiries, and the use of
witnesses under the provisions of Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.’19
20. On 31 March 2011, the Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority, Kit Malthouse, wrote to
the Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, explaining that the Acting Commissioner had apologised
and stating that the Metropolitan Police Authority ‘voted unanimously to support the Morgan
family’s request for a full inquiry into Mr Morgan’s death, the investigations that followed and the
collapse of the trial on 11 March 2011’.20
21. Kit Malthouse also advised the Home Secretary that,
‘[t]he MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] and the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] have
embarked on a review of events leading to the collapse of the case. However, there
are some aspects of this case which we believe would benefit from an independent
evaluation, in particular the impact of the disclosure rules and whether the provisions of
the Serious and Organised Crime and Policing [sic] Act 2005 around the use of known
offenders as witnesses remain viable in light of this experience.’21
22. The Home Secretary responded to the Chairman of the Metropolitan Police Authority on
19 May 2011. In her letter, the Home Secretary acknowledged that the Metropolitan Police was
undertaking a review of the collapse of the trial with the Crown Prosecution Service, and that if
this had implications for the use of Assisting Offenders under the Serious Organised Crime and
14 Metropolitan Police Authority Briefing Note, MPS109561001, p6, 29 March 2011.

18 Letter from Chair of Metropolitan Police Authority to the Home Secretary, MPS109616001, p5, 31 March 2011.
862
Policing Act 2005, this would be considered by the Government. However, the Home Secretary
also stated that despite the vote of the Metropolitan Police Authority to support the family of
Daniel Morgan in their request for a full inquiry into the murder, the Government felt that it was
unnecessary in light of the Metropolitan Police/Crown Prosecution Service review established.
23. A review had been set up and Terms of Reference for it were drawn up by the Chief Crown
Prosecutor for London, Alison Saunders, and the Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner,
Cressida Dick.22
24. The Terms of Reference were as follows:
• ‘Examine the methodology, decisions and tactics used by the prosecution team (police
and prosecutors) to deal with the witnesses who were given agreements pursuant to
the SOCPA [Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005] legislation.
• ‘Examine the methodology, decisions and tactics adopted by the prosecution team
(police and prosecutors) in order to discharge their disclosure obligations, (to include
any omissions).
• ‘Consider any other significant key areas which may emerge during the
course of review.
• ‘To make recommendations in relation to any lessons learnt or good practice which
emerge from the review.’23
25. In the introduction to the report of the review, which was led by Commander Simon Foy and
Jenny Hopkins, a Deputy Chief Crown Prosecutor in the Crown Prosecution Service London
Region, it is recorded that ‘the purpose of commissioning this Review was not to investigate
allegations of corruption, nor was it intended to serve the purpose of an investigation for police
disciplinary purposes’.24
26. There were two principal reasons why the prosecution of those charged with the
murder of Daniel Morgan did not proceed: the failure to deal properly with disclosure
and the problems arising during attempts to use Assisting Offenders under the Serious
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 as witnesses. The Terms of Reference were
sufficient to enable these issues to be dealt with.
27. The review involved the interviewing of key members of the Abelard Two team, including
Metropolitan Police officers25 and lawyers in the Crown Prosecution Service.26 The review’s
‘methodology’ was recorded as follows:
22 Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police, ‘Review into Operation Abelard II’, MPS109655001, p3, para 1.10, May 2012.
24 Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police, ‘Review into Operation Abelard II’, MPS109655001, pp2-3, para 1.7, May 2012.
863
‘A range of opinions and concerns were expressed during the Review and those
matters, together with the significant number of decisions and Judge’s Rulings made
during the course of the prosecution have been noted.’27
28. This was not a methodology but was a statement of fact as to what was noted, and it
fails to explain the manner in which the review was undertaken.
29. An email sent before the review began, dated 05 April 2011, from Commander Simon Foy to
Jenny Hopkins, suggested a more detailed methodology than that contained in the report. The
document indicated that the review would:
i. meet and interview key individuals, including police officers; Crown Prosecution
Service lawyers and caseworkers; leading, junior and disclosure Counsel;
ii. verify their position by looking at relevant documentation/decision logs/notes/Court

Orders and judgments;
iii. compare what happened in this case with the requirements of any legislation/formal
guidance/Policy that existed;
iv. reach conclusions, having taken steps 1-3 above, as to whether any deficiencies may
have contributed to the unsuccessful outcome;
v. make recommendations to ensure that similar cases where these issues occurred
would have a better chance of success;
vi. produce a report of the findings of the review; and
vii. disseminate any lessons learned.28
30. The methodology suggested by Commander Simon Foy was not adopted. Had
it been, and had it been implemented fully, it would have resulted in a more effective
Review, with the probability that more lessons would have been learned.
31. Commander Simon Foy and Jenny Hopkins interviewed four lawyers: Stuart Sampson,
Crown Prosecution Service; Nicholas Hilliard QC, Lead Counsel; Jonathan Rees QC, Junior
Counsel;29 and Heather Stangoe, Disclosure Counsel. They also interviewed seven police
officers: former AC John Yates; former DCS David Cook, Senior Investigating Officer;
T/DCI Noel Beswick, Deputy Senior Investigating Officer; DI Douglas Clarke, Liaison Officer; DS
Gary Dalby, Case Officer; DI Anthony Moore, Debrief Manager; and DI Bernard Greaney from the
Directorate of Professional Standards. Those interviewed were described as ‘key members of
the Abelard II prosecution team’.30
28 Email 05.04.2011 Simon Foy to Jenny Hopkins Crown Prosecution Service re initial stages of Metropolitan Police/Crown Prosecution Service
joint review with copies of suggested terms of reference, MPS109621001, p2, undated.
29 Jonathan Rees QC was appointed Queen’s Counsel in 2010.
30 Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police, ‘Review into Operation Abelard II’, MPS109655001, p4, paras 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, May 2012.
864
32. In the same email dated 05 April 2011, Commander Simon Foy suggested that one of the
Defence lawyers should also be consulted as part of the process, although he noted that this
would be difficult.31 Defence lawyers were not consulted.
33. There was considerable merit in Commander Simon Foy’s suggestion that one of the
Defence lawyers be interviewed. It would have enabled discussion of whether there was
anything that they could contribute, to help prevent future costly disclosure failures.
3.1 Interviews of the Prosecution team members

34. The interviews took place between June and August 2011. The papers which are available
are in note form only. There is no documentation in the material available to the Panel which
informs the comments made in the notes. The papers available to the Panel do not contain
notes for the interviews of Jonathan Rees QC, former AC John Yates or DI Douglas Clarke.
35. Former DCS David Cook told the Panel that his meeting with Commander Simon Foy and
Jenny Hopkins of the Crown Prosecution Service lasted only 20 minutes. He suggested that he
‘brought out the concerns with Barry Philips and other aspects, and that cut the conversation
short.’32 The Panel has examined the typed notes of the meeting between Commander Foy,
Jenny Hopkins and former DCS Cook. The notes record that former DCS Cook alluded to the
fact that James Ward had made an allegation of corruption against D/Supt Barry Phillips and
that later in the interview he had said that D/Supt Phillips had been ‘setting up a business with
his wife i.e. conflict of interest was setting up typing business to type up the debriefs’ and as
a consequence had not been available to run the debrief of Gary Eaton, who was unable to
contact D/Supt Phillips. He also said that DS (later DI) Anthony Moore had had to start ‘doing
Barry Phillips job which meant he was not doing the debriefs as manager.’ It is accepted that
former DCS Cook raised matters relating to D/Supt Phillips at the beginning of the interview.
However, the interview did not terminate at that point but continued with the discussion of
other issues including the debrief of Gary Eaton.33 There is no evidence of corruption from
D/Supt Phillips.
36. Many issues were raised by those who were interviewed. The experiences of Prosecution
Team members who spoke to the Review included the following:
i. That the disclosure strategy had been to ‘keep it simple. Reduce amounts’.34
The strategy was also described as being ‘[m]ake sure that when we get to court we
have everything in a schedule All marked up with what the defence are going to get’.35
ii. That the only training available for the staff involved in the debriefing process was with
a private company. It covered the circumstances in which a person offering to be an
assisting offender should be accepted as such, and what needed to be done before a
decision to commence a debrief was made. There was no written guidance to inform
the debriefing process.36
31 Email from Commander Simon Foy to Jenny Hopkins, MPS109587001, p33, 05 April 2011.
32 Panel Interview of former DCS David Cook, Transcript 1, pp22-23, 25 August 2020.
33 Former DCS David Cook interview summary notes, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, pp33-38, 11 July 2011.
34 Stuart Sampson interview summary notes, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p7, 14 June 2011.
35 Heather Stangoe interview summary notes, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p49, 26 July 2011.
36 DI Anthony Moore interview summary notes, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, pp39 and 41, 14 July 2011.
865
iii. That the Crown Prosecution Service had not anticipated the quantity of material which
had been generated by the debrief team during the debrief process;37 and that the
‘volume of material’ made it an ‘[a]lmost impossible disclosure exercise’.38
iv. That the investigation had only received summaries of the assisting offender interviews
rather than full transcripts.39
v. That there had been a failure by police to update the Crown Prosecution Service on
the status of witnesses: for example, whether a witness had a previous conviction.40
vi. That the notes prepared by the Witness Protection Unit had not been revealed
to the Abelard Two Investigation;41 nor had the notes been included in the
disclosure schedules.42
vii. That Gary Eaton had not been called to give evidence about the debrief, but he
should have been.43
viii. That there were questions about whether DCS David Cook should have continued as
Senior Investigating Officer after his retirement from the Metropolitan Police in 2007.44
ix. That part of the problem was that ‘no one wanted it’ [the investigation].45
x. That when the crates of material from the money laundering investigation into James
Ward and others had been re-examined in March 2010, a file had been found relating
to James Ward, containing information supplied, under a different pseudonym, to the
Serious Organised Crime Agency; and that, in November 2010, a further file was found
containing information supplied by James Ward under a further pseudonym.46
37. The following recommendations were made by those interviewed:
i. That witnesses must be told that they must go through a separate closed debrief
session to prove their reliability before being accepted as witnesses under the Serious
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. They must provide to the debrief team all
information, no matter how sensitive, of their knowledge of and involvement in criminal
activity. This was necessary so that the information could be checked to establish
whether they should be regarded as reliable sources despite the fact they were
dangerous and involved in criminal activity (Nicholas Hilliard QC).47
ii. That witnesses being debriefed under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act
2005 should only be interviewed if they were in custody, as the risk of unauthorised
contact was too strong (T/DCI Noel Beswick, Deputy Senior Investigating Officer).48
38 ‘Nicholas Hillyard [sic] QC’ interview summary notes, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p14, 22 June 2011.
39 T/DCI Noel Beswick interview summary notes, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p28, 07 July 2011.
41 Former DCS David Cook interview summary notes, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p34, 11 July 2011.
T/DCI Noel Beswick, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p28, 07 July 2011.
47 Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p15, 22 June 2011.
866
iii. That an investigation should receive transcripts of debrief interviews (T/DCI Noel
Beswick, Deputy Senior Investigating Officer).49
iv. That the Senior Investigating Officer needed clear accountability and should be
employed by the Metropolitan Police (former DCS David Cook).50
v. That there was a need for a proper archiving system in the Metropolitan Police to
enable recovery of all relevant material (Nicholas Hilliard QC).51
3.2 The review report: May 2012

38. The review report recorded that ‘the main reason for the withdrawal of the prosecution was
the Crown’s inability to satisfy their disclosure obligations. However, at that time there were
also issues with the reliability of key prosecution witnesses. The disclosure difficulties were the
dominant factor and were more impactive.’52
3.2.1 Failings in the disclosure process: the primary cause of the inability of the
Prosecution to proceed to trial
39. The Prosecution offered no evidence against the Defendants in March 2011, because
‘the prospects of conviction are […] significantly affected to the point that it can no longer be
said that the evidential test in the code for Crown Prosecutors is satisfied’ (see Chapter 8, The
Abelard Two Investigation).53
40. The review report stated that ‘[a]n appreciation of the scale and complexity of the disclosure
issues in this case is essential to understanding why the prosecution offered no evidence’.54
The Report noted that a vast amount of material had been gathered over 23 years (estimated
at 750,000 pages), by different agencies and retained at various locations,55 and quoted
Mr Justice Maddison, who said that ‘on any fair view it seems to me that disclosure has been
and continues to be a formidable, daunting exercise [...]. The extraordinary nature of the
case has required the prosecution to undertake an exercise in disclosure of exceptional if not
unprecedented proportions’.56
41. Heather Stangoe told the review that she had joined the Abelard Two disclosure team in
July 2006, just after Gary Eaton had contacted the investigation.57 She said that the disclosure
team were then in the process of registering all of the documents. Some historical context
of the extent and progress of the disclosure process had been provided by an Abelard Two
background case summary update document, dated December/January 2007.58 The case
summary recorded that a team of four officers had examined 1,650 documents by December/
January 2007, an estimated 4 per cent of the overall case file.59 An estimated time for
51 ‘Nicholas Hillyard [sic] QC interview summary notes’, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p14, 22 June 2011.
53 Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police, ‘Review into Operation Abelard II’, MPS109655001, p129, May 2012.
57 Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p46, 14 June-03 August 2011.
58 Background Case Summary, MPS109599001, 04 January 2007.
59 Background Case Summary, MPS109599001, p1, 04 January 2007.
867
completion of the disclosure process was given as between 9 and 12 months.60 However,
minutes of an oversight meeting held 23 January 2007 were less optimistic and recorded that
‘[a]t current rate disclosure will take one year to 18 months to complete’.61
42. In January 2007, as the disclosure preparations were ongoing, members of the family of
Daniel Morgan had a meeting with DCS David Cook and A/DCI Noel Beswick. Family members
were provided with an update on the progression of the investigation. The family noted that they
became aware of differences of opinion between DCS Cook and Stuart Sampson as to whether
the disclosure preparations should be finished before any charges were laid. The family noted
the following:
‘Expect charges in July 2007. [DCS David] Cook has a difference of opinion with
Stewart [sic] Sampson on timing of charges and whether disclosure should be finished
first. [DCS Cook’s] view is if they do all the disclosure then they will be doing it for years
and he wants to keep the current team together.’62
43. Heather Stangoe told the review that there had appeared to be pressure to charge before
DCS David Cook’s retirement from the Metropolitan Police (in December 2007), although in the
end this was not achieved.63 She was asked whether the initial disclosure exercise was finished
by the time the suspects were charged, and she responded, ‘[a]ll the material that was left was
the material to do with the SOCPA [Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005] witnesses’.64
44. The case summary stated that ‘[t]he CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] have indicated
a desire to have all of the disclosure completed prior to a decision on charging being made,
however a case conference has been arranged with a view to discussing earlier action being
taken, the reasons for which will be provided in the operational update’.65
45. The Panel has had access to the Advice of Jonathan Rees, barrister, dated 15 April 2008, as
to the consideration of the evidence given in respect of each of the Defendants (see Chapter 8,
Abelard Two, sections 7.8 and 7.9),66 and to the report which was sent on 23 April 2008 by
Stuart Sampson, to which was attached Jonathan Rees, barrister’s advice.67
46. The decision to charge had consequences in terms of the Prosecution’s responsibility to
disclose any material which might assist the Defence or undermine the Prosecution, and it is
clear from the case summary that the Prosecution was sighted of that responsibility. There is no
record, in the papers available to the Panel, of any consideration of the disclosure situation in
the context of the decision to charge which was made in April 2008. At this stage, the disclosure
exercise to review the material relating to James Ward and Gary Eaton had not been completed.
47. The consequence of the decision to charge at this time was that the defendants were
remanded in custody. This meant that custody time limits henceforth applied, and this
put further pressure on the Prosecution team. Former DS Sidney Fillery was released on
bail on 06 August 2008. He was formally acquitted of perverting the course of justice on
15 February 2010. Jonathan Rees, James Cook, Glenn Vian and Garry Vian were released
from custody on 03 March 2010, and they were ultimately acquitted on 11 March 2011.
60 Background Case Summary, MPS109599001, p1, 04 January 2007.

61 Minutes of Operation Abelard Oversight Meeting, MPS109609001, p2, 23 January 2007
62 Alastair Morgan Meeting Notes, PNL000110001, p63, 26 January 2007.
63 Heather Stangoe, 26 July 2011, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p47, 14 June-03 August 2011.
64 Heather Stangoe, 26 July 2011, Abelard Two Investigation Review Report, MPS109620001, p47, 14 June-03 August 2011.
65 Background Case Summary, MPS109599001, p1. 04 January 2007.
66 Counsel Advice by Jonathan Rees, MPS109700001, 15 April 2008.
67 Case file including Manual of Guidance forms 1,3,4,5 and 7, MPS072615001, 23 April 2008.
868
48. Although the focus of the review, as set out in its Terms of Reference, was on
disclosure and the debriefing processes under the Serious Organised Crime and Police
Act 2005, the Metropolitan Police/Crown Prosecution Service review was also required
to ‘consider any other significant key areas which may emerge during the course of
review’ and it did not take the opportunity to analyse the process by which a decision
to charge the Defendants was made at this time. The consequences of the charging
decision were enormously significant for the five Defendants and for their families, as
the Defendants were remanded in custody for varying periods. Their detention inevitably
involved very significant costs to the public, as did the successful civil action which four
of the Defendants brought against the Metropolitan Police for damages (see sections 7
and 9 below). A decision to charge in cases such as this can be very complicated, and
it is essential that the Crown Prosecution Service and Metropolitan Police can and do
justify such decisions. The review should have considered whether there was anything to
be learned from this decision.
49. Fifteen disclosure issues raised by the Defence during the pre-trial hearings were
summarised in the review report.68 They ranged across a variety of failures to disclose and
included the following:
i. Failure to disclose fully the 2006 Metropolitan Police Authority Report;
ii. Inappropriate redactions of some transcripts of debriefed Serious Organised Crime

and Police Act 2005 witnesses;
iii. Late disclosure relating to a witness;
iv. Failure to inform the Defence that the police were aware of psychiatric issues relating
to Gary Eaton between 26 July and 06 September 2006;
v. Late disclosure of general practitioners’ records relating to Gary Eaton; and
vi. Non-disclosure of a statement relating to former PC Derek Haslam and failure to

respond to a request by the Defence regarding matters within that statement.
50. All these complaints had been upheld by Mr Justice Maddison.
51. Mr Justice Maddison rejected other matters raised by the Defence, holding that:
i. particular prison records should not be disclosed;
ii. there was no lack of due diligence in the supply of details of witnesses present at the
Golden Lion public house on the night of the murder; or in the method of disclosure of
telephone records; and,
iii. there was no necessity to disclose photographs taken 20 years after the murder.
869
52. The review report noted the discovery in November 2009 of the 18 crates of evidence which
had first been delivered to the Directorate of Professional Standards’ Financial Investigations
Unit, and made available to the Abelard Two Investigation, in 2007. The review report noted that
‘a decision was made by the [Senior Investigating Officer, DCS David Cook] that the material
was not relevant’,69 and the material had been returned to the Directorate of Professional
Standards for storage (see Chapter 8, Abelard Two Investigation).
53. The review report also noted that neither the judge nor Defence Counsel were made aware
of the finding of the 18 crates before the custody time-limits hearing on 18 December 2009.70
54. In fact, the sequence of events based on the Panel’s review of the material was as follows:
i. On 20 November 2009, T/DCI Noel Beswick emailed the Directorate of Professional

Standards raising questions about the material, and he also emailed Nicholas Hilliard
QC to tell him about the crates.
ii. Later that day, Nicholas Hillard QC spoke to T/DCI Beswick and directed that the
material should be examined.
iii. By 27 November 2009, T/DCI Beswick said he had established that nothing which
might undermine the Prosecution or assist the Defence had been identified. However,
this transpired not to be the case. There were, among these papers, ‘a docket and two
information reports’ which should have been disclosed.
iv. The Defence were notified on 17 December 2009, the day before a custody time-limits
hearing, of the existence of further material which had been found in other Directorate
of Professional Standards premises. They were not informed about the 18 crates.
v. On 22 February 2010, Glenn Vian’s solicitor, while inspecting documents, found

T/DCI Noel Beswick’s email of 20 November 2009 to the Directorate of Professional
Standards and so the Defence became aware of the existence of the 18 crates.
vi. DS Gary Dalby later stated that on the morning of 26 February 2010, outside court,
he had been asked by Nicholas Hilliard QC whether he was aware of any material
from within the 18 crates that undermined the prosecution case, to which he had
replied, ‘No’.
vii. On 26 February 2010, at a hearing Mr Justice Maddison noted that ‘[i]f she had not
discovered it then, then this hearing, like the last hearing, would have gone off in
ignorance of all of this’.
viii. A week later, on 03 March 2010, as a consequence of the way in which the disclosure
of the contents of the crates had been dealt with, Mr Justice Maddison ruled that the
Defendants should be released on bail. Mr Justice Maddison noted that it indicated ‘a
lack of due diligence and expedition on the prosecution’s part’.
870
55. Had the material been examined between 16 November 2009 and 18 December
2009, it would have been established that there was relevant material to be disclosed
before the important custody time-limits hearing. There was a lack of process to identify,
consider and disclose large amounts of material in a reasonable time.
56. The review report also acknowledged that there were further problems in January 2011,
when additional papers relating to James Ward were discovered. The papers demonstrated
that he had previously, under a different name, provided information to the police. Those papers
were important (see paragraph 36 x. above). As the Report stated ‘[n]ot only did they show that
[James Ward] had been providing contradictory evidence to that contained within his formal
SOCPA [Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005] debriefing (and thus his credibility was
damaged) but until the discovery the investigation team knew nothing of the matter’.71
57. The importance of this information was that James Ward, who had maintained that he was
not a violent person, had in fact instructed a person, ‘A’, to kill a third party and, when that had
not happened, he had threatened ‘A’ that he would be killed if he continued to associate with
the third party. The Crown Prosecution Service decided that, in the light of this evidence, which
impacted on James Ward’s credibility, it could no longer rely on James Ward as a witness.
This was explained in open court on 24 January 2011.72
58. The review report stated that, in February 2011, the Defence had been provided with a
copy of an internal police report explaining the movements of the 18 crates. It stated that:
‘[…] the defence sought access to particular documents stored within the eighteen
crates and made specific reference to Box numbers. The police team were unable, in
respect of four of the boxes, to locate them.
Whilst one of the four crates contained material which bore no relevance to the trial
proceedings, the other three did. They related to the money laundering case previously
referred to. It became apparent that there had been a clear oversight in respect of
these three crates. Whilst they were already within the police Exhibit’s room, they had
not been entered in to the police records, nor ever assessed.’73
59. The review report stated that ‘[t]his was clearly an error’,74 and that ‘the Crown were no
longer able to be confident they could discharge their disclosure obligations and they would
have to offer no evidence against the defendants’.75
60. However, the submissions of Nicholas Hilliard QC to Mr Justice Maddison on

11 March 2011 made clear that there were in fact 21 crates in total of undisclosed material.
On 04 March 2011, in addition to the 18 crates discovered in November 2009, he had been told
that three more crates of unscheduled material had been discovered in the Abelard Two Exhibits
71 Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police, ‘Review into Operation Abelard II’, MPS109655001, p13, para 4.28, May 2012
72 Hearing, pp1-6, 24 January 2011.
73 Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police, ‘Review into Operation Abelard II’, MPS109655001, p13, paras 4.29-4.30, May 2012.
871
Room, where they had been stored untouched since March 2008, when four crates of material
had been sent to the Abelard Two Investigation, one of which had been declared not relevant
and returned.76
61. The review report quotes Mr Justice Maddison (from his judgment of 11 March 2011),
referring to the ‘recent enquiry in relation to the 18 crates and the recent discovery of the four
further crates’. However, the report does not explore the detail of how this very costly failure of
disclosure came about.
62. The report should not have conflated the four crates (one of which had been
returned) with the 18 crates. It should have made clear that this was a further failure to
disclose material which had been in the possession of the Abelard Two Investigation
for the previous three years, material which ‘had not been listed anywhere or reviewed
for disclosure’.77
63. In 2016, in a statement prepared in response to the civil claim by Jonathan Rees and others
against the Metropolitan Police, former T/DCI Noel Beswick said that the other three crates had
remained in the Exhibits Store until 04 March 2011, having been:
‘overlooked by the exhibits officers and not brought to my attention. The exhibits
officer’s role was to schedule all exhibits from crates received and provide DS Dalby’s
disclosure team with non-exhibit material for their review. This had not been done.
I believe a genuine mistake was made by the exhibits officers who overlooked the three
crates.’78
64. The documents in these crates had later been scheduled, and a further 31 items were
identified which had not previously been disclosed.79
65. In relation to the four additional crates, evidence now available to the Panel, which was
received from the Criminal Cases Review Commission, shows that Nicholas Hilliard QC and
Jonathan Rees QC had asked on the week commencing 28 February 2011 what had happened
to these crates. This led to the discovery that, while one had been declared irrelevant to the
murder investigation, the other three crates had been sent to the Exhibits Store without their
contents being examined, or ‘scheduled’.
66. The review report failed to highlight the fact that, despite the intense focus on
disclosure issues between 2008 and 2011, the four crates of material were not dealt with
in an appropriate manner.
76 Hearing Transcript, MPS109655001, p125, 11 March 2011.

77 Hearing Transcript, MPS109655001, p125, 11 March 2011.
78 Witness statement of former T/DCI Noel Beswick, MPS109748001, p69, para 246, 20 October 2016.
79 Witness statement of former T/DCI Noel Beswick, MPS109748001, p69, para 247, 20 October 2016.
872
3.2.2 Recommendations
67. The review report produced one overarching recommendation: ‘That steps are taken to
disseminate this Review within the Police and CPS [the Crown Prosecution Service], so that
Police and CPS can consider the following Good Practice points in future cases.’ It produced
17 Good Practice Points.80 In October 2019, the Panel enquired of the Metropolitan Police and
the Crown Prosecution Service whether the Good Practice Points identified in the review report
have been implemented and asked for evidence of their implementation where appropriate.
68. An initial reply was received from the Metropolitan Police on 07 October 2019, however it
did not contain sufficient detail. In response to a further request for specific information, a much
more detailed reply was received on 05 May 2020.
69. In response to the question about the overarching recommendation for dissemination, the
Metropolitan Police said that an officer had attended a College of Policing course at which there
was mention of the Abelard Two Investigation, and that dedicated debriefers have been given
full sight of the May 2012 review report. The Metropolitan Police also said that various training
documents and fact sheets were being prepared.81
70. The College of Policing provided to the Panel, on 15 April 2020, a report on two courses
which it now delivers: one to Assisting Offender Debriefing Officers and the other to Assisting
Offender Managers. It specifically includes material arising from the Abelard Two Investigation.82
71. From the material which it has seen, the Panel is of the view that the courses,
if delivered as indicated, should provide an appropriate basis for the development
of those involved in debriefing operations under the Serious Organised Crime and
Police Act 2005.
72. The review report is very limited in the information which it provides for those
who were required to make decisions to give effect to the Good Practice Points. It is
accepted that the authors of the review report referred to appendices containing
excerpts from court proceedings which focused on particular issues. However,
the effect of this was to require the reader to analyse the material presented in the
appendices in order to understand the full reasons why the Good Practice Points were
made. The consequence of the lack of a fully reasoned analysis of what went wrong
was that further opportunities to prevent such situations recurring was lost. This is a
further example of failure to face up to and admit major failings in Metropolitan Police
investigative processes.
80 Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police, ‘Review into Operation Abelard II’, MPS109655001, pp19-27, May 2012.
81 Metropolitan Police response to DMIP received on 07 October 2019, ‘Good Practice Recommendations’, p1, 07 October 2019.
82 Report from the College of Policing, 15 April 2020.
873
3.2.3 Good Practice Points identified in relation to disclosure

73. Eight of the 17 Good Practice Points, Points 4–11,83 dealt with disclosure issues. These can
be summarised as follows, the Metropolitan Police responses to the Panel follow each point:
i. Point 4: From the outset, consideration should be given to the types of unused
material which could reasonably be expected to be encountered in a Prosecution, and
its anticipated location. The parameters of the search for potentially relevant material
need to be clearly documented.
The Metropolitan Police stated that ‘there is a general search throughout the
MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] for material that might be disclosable in a
particular case. IMS [the Metropolitan Police Information Management System] is
one of those search methods.’84 The Panel asked for detail of how that search is
to be conducted. In May 2020, the Metropolitan Police informed the Panel that its
current Disclosure Policy provides guidance on what may amount to ‘reasonable
lines of enquiry’, with a reminder that any submission to the Crown Prosecution
Service for charging advice must contain sufficient detail without which the
submission will be rejected.85
ii. Point 5: There is a requirement for accurate record-keeping, with detailed reasoning
behind all material that is reviewed by the investigation during the enquiry and
evaluated as not relevant.
The Metropolitan Police referred to the Attorney General’s Guidelines on

Disclosure. There was originally no statement as to the process established
by the Metropolitan Police to ensure that these Guidelines are complied with.
However, after a further request by the Panel, the Metropolitan Police provided
key features of their London Disclosure Improvement Plan in its response of
05 May 2020. This indicates that a considerable amount of work has been done
and training has been provided. Further work is in progress.
iii. Point 6: Consideration must be given to the size and complexity of the disclosure task
from the outset, and the level of experience required when appointing a disclosure
officer. In cases such as this, consideration should be given to the experience
which Disclosure Counsel will need to possess, and whether, exceptionally, a
more experienced counsel is required rather than the most junior member of the
counsel team.
The Metropolitan Police response refers to the Attorney General’s Guidelines

on Disclosure and states that Disclosure Counsel had at least eight years’
experience. However, this is incorrect, as the disclosure process started in 2006
and Disclosure Counsel who was appointed at that stage, had only five years’
experience in 2006.
The Crown Prosecution Service provided a response dated 03 April 2020, which
included reference to Chapter 29 of its ‘Disclosure Manual’, which outlines
disclosure-related issues relating to large-scale cases. It emphasises the need
84 Metropolitan Police response to the Panel, pp5-6, October 2019.
85 Metropolitan Police response to the Panel, p7, May 2020.
874
for early discussion between the Crown Prosecution Service and the wider
Prosecution team to ensure that disclosure issues are actioned at an early stage.
In particular, it states the following:
‘In appropriate cases, a decision to appoint disclosure counsel may be made

at the outset of a case with a view not only to assessing unused material but
also deciding which items should constitute the evidence relied upon. Counsel
instructed may be the junior for the whole case or may be instructed solely to
deal with the question of disclosure. Irrespective of this, in complex cases, they
should be instructed for the duration of the case. Exceptionally large cases may
require a team of disclosure counsel.’86
In addition, in March 2013, the Crown Prosecution Service formalised and

mandated a regime for handling disclosure in serious and complex cases which
now requires the completion of a Prosecution Strategy Document, a Disclosure
Management Document and a Risk Register. The purpose of the Prosecution
Strategy Document is to articulate the Prosecution’s approach to the case. It
includes sections for articulating the pre-charge strategy, the charging strategy,
how evidence will be handled, the disclosure strategy, how unused material
will be managed and how Counsel will be selected. It is a living document
and is reviewed by the Unit Head to quality-assure the approach being taken
in such cases. The Disclosure Management Document allows the prosecutor
to articulate the way in which disclosure is being handled, and it includes
reasonable lines of enquiry which have been pursued and the approach being
taken to categories of unused material. It is served on the Defence and the Court
and enables disclosure issues to be identified and addressed at an early stage.
iv. Point 7: The Prosecution Team (police and prosecutors) should frequently review the
position and progress of the disclosure strategy.
The Metropolitan Police provided a response in May 2020 which indicated that
investigations now use the HOLMES 2 disclosure package. It was decided in the
Abelard Two Investigation that this package would not be used. The Metropolitan
Police advised the Panel that the Disclosure Officer, who should be appointed at
the outset of the investigation, will be an appropriately trained detective who is
an integral part of the Major Incident Team. The officer in charge of the case (the
Senior Investigating Officer) must provide support and supervision and ensure
that the Disclosure Officer has sufficient skills and authority commensurate with
the complexity of the investigation to discharge their functions effectively, using
HOLMES 2. The Disclosure Officer has the responsibility to advise the Senior
Investigating Officer about disclosure strategy issues. Reference was also made
to a requirement that the disclosure officer must certify to the prosecutor, on
each occasion when material is revealed to the prosecutor, ‘that, to the best
of his knowledge and belief, all relevant material which has been retained
and made available to him has been revealed to the prosecutor in accordance
with this code’.
86 Crown Prosecution Service response to the Panel, p2, 03 April 2020.
875
v. Point 8: Use should be made of a Disclosure Strategy document, and there should be
clarity as to which disclosure regime applies.
In May 2020, the Metropolitan Police advised the Panel of the 2013 Attorney
General’s Guidelines on Disclosure, which set out instances when a Disclosure
Management Document (otherwise known as a ‘Disclosure Strategy’) should be
used in a large and complex investigation/prosecution. A copy of the template
and guidance was also provided to the Panel.
vi. Point 9: Use should be made of the Criminal Procedure Rules to identify the issues
in the case.
The Metropolitan Police informed the Panel that this is a matter for the Crown
Prosecution Service. The Crown Prosecution Service advised in April 2020 that it
has extensive internal guidance about the Criminal Procedure Rules which have
been updated several times since May 2012. ‘Gateway’ notices are sent to all
staff whenever the Criminal Procedure Rules are updated. A new ‘Better Case
Management’ was launched in 2015 which ensures efficient compliance with the
Criminal Procedure Rules encouraging the identification of the issues in the case
at an early stage.
vii. Point 10: Disclosure schedules need to be available electronically at Court.
The Metropolitan Police advised in May 2020 that its current disclosure policy
provides that material which has to be stored in a safe because of its security
classification cannot be issued to the Court in electronic format. The procedures
to be followed in such cases are articulated in the policy. That being the case,
there still exist security classification issues that may prevent all disclosure
schedules being provided electronically to the Court.
viii. Point 11: Archiving systems should be in place to permit the identification and
retrieval of all relevant material from historical operations (for example, informant files,
microfiche, Directorate of Professional Standards files and Crown Prosecution Service
case files). Concluding point 11, the review report stated, ‘[w]hen faced with a case
of this nature it is recommended that a careful and considered judgment about the
viability of being able to retrieve all material is made before a decision to proceed to
charge is taken. This decision must be scrutinised, documented and recorded.’87
The Metropolitan Police response to the issue of archiving indicated that the
Debrief Unit uses the Information Management System to archive records.
The further response received in May 2020 provides details of the Metropolitan
Police’s Records Retention, Review and Disposal Document of 23 March 2018.
This supports the Records Management Policy and provides a framework for the
management and control of Metropolitan Police records, across all formats. It is
a general principle that no original material is to be destroyed or deleted without
appropriate review, in line with the Records Management Policy. The policy, and
other documents provided to the Panel, include information about evidence
recovery methods, dedicated digital evidence recovery officers who may be
commissioned to help extract evidence and to assist with unused material, and
Forensic Computer Analysts to assist in the process.
876
3.2.4 Failures in the handling of witnesses being debriefed under the Serious Organised
Crime and Police Act 2005
74. The review report examined the reasons that lay behind the failure to retain, under the
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, the Prosecution witnesses: James Ward, Gary
Eaton and Person J5.
3.2.4.1 James Ward

75. The review report stated that:
‘not all of the informant files relating to this witness had been correctly archived. He had
been registered with different law enforcement agencies, on several different occasions
and in different names. Whilst all possible checks were completed by the investigation
team there was no way of them knowing about an un-archived extract from an
informant file which was subsequently found under a different pseudonym.’88
76. While it is true that there was material of which the Abelard Two Investigation could not have
been aware, there were 22 crates of other material which had been brought to the attention of
the Abelard Two Investigation in 2007 and 2008, and which, if dealt with properly, could have
been disclosed. This did not happen.89
77. The inability to identify multiple pseudonyms for a source is something which should
not happen now, given the existence of a national database, if all pseudonyms are
contained in the database. However, T/DCI Noel Beswick had sought information from
this database and all the relevant information had not been found. The review report
could have usefully drawn attention to the importance of ensuring absolute compliance
with all aspects of source management to prevent a similar situation arising in the future.
3.2.4.2 Gary Eaton

78. The review report stated that Gary Eaton was ‘the prosecution’s only eye witness to
the murder’.90
79. Gary Eaton did not witness the murder, rather he claimed to have seen Daniel
Morgan’s body in the car park before the alleged murderers left the car park.
80. The Review Report set out the reasons why Mr Justice Maddison decided to exclude Gary
Eaton’s evidence. Those reasons are summarised below:
i. Breaches of the sterile corridor (i.e. the requirement for a witness to have contact
only with the debriefing officers and the witness protection officers, and not
the investigation);
89 Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police, ‘Review into Operation Abelard II’, MPS109655001, p15, para 5.3-5.7, May 2012.
877
ii. Gary Eaton’s mental health and the absence of an appropriate adult during debriefings;
iii. That Gary Eaton was probably prompted by a senior police officer to implicate Glenn
Vian and Garry Vian;
iv. That Gary Eaton had been tipped off that he had been caught lying about his father’s
death and given the chance to think of an explanation;
v. Gary Eaton’s unreliability as a witness, including his significant criminal record;
vi. That Gary Eaton’s personality disorder rendered him prone to telling lies;
vii. Gary Eaton’s differing and various accounts; and
viii. His demonstrative lies and his behaviour during the debrief process.
81. The review report said that Gary Eaton ‘frequently disregarded the rules of the de-brief
process and breached the requirement that the witness only deal with the debriefing team. He
regularly contacted the Senior Investigating Officer directly.’91
82. The above statement was correct, and it was established during the pre-trial
hearing that Gary Eaton had breached the rules of the debriefing process by contacting
DCS David Cook. The impression created by the review report was that the breaches
were Gary Eaton’s sole responsibility: this is not true. As has been demonstrated in
Chapter 8, Abelard Two Investigation, section 6.4, in fact, DCS Cook also contacted
Gary Eaton on multiple occasions, despite having agreed not to do so. DCS Cook had
the responsibility, which he acknowledged, not to breach the sterile corridor, yet he did
so repeatedly.
AC John Yates and others were aware of the extent of some, at least, of the
unauthorised contact between former DCS Cook and Gary Eaton. While giving the
reasons for the exclusion of his evidence, the Review Report did not refer specifically to
the fact that Metropolitan Police systems, and the particular context in which Gary Eaton
was debriefed, were such that DCS Cook was able to have regular and unauthorised
access to Gary Eaton. Nor did the report refer to the fact that Mr Justice Maddison
had also concluded ‘that DCS Cook probably did prompt Mr Eaton to implicate the
Vian brothers.’92
92 Document D5586, ‘Judges ruling re Eaton and other matters’, MPS107506001, p36, para 167, undated.
878
83. The Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police joint review was carried out
five years after the debrief of Gary Eaton. The review should have considered whether
current policies and procedures were adequate to ensure that such a situation could
not arise again. The way in which the matter of Gary Eaton was dealt with in the review
report effectively minimised the systematic and structural failings within the Metropolitan
Police, which contributed to the ultimate decision by Mr Justice Maddison that he would
have excluded Gary Eaton’s evidence. Although the Terms of Reference of the review did
not encompass disciplinary or conduct issues, there were serious management failures
during the Abelard Two Investigation. By failing to highlight the actions of the Senior
Investigating Officer in this case, the report authors did not seize the opportunity to deal
with those failings.
3.2.4.3 Person J5
84. The review report stated that the evidence of Person J5 could no longer be relied upon,
after it had been discovered that some of the information which she had provided to police had
been obtained from a website for missing persons. Further unrelated allegations had also been
found not to be credible.93
85. The way in which the police sought to get evidence from Person J5, and her
subsequent debriefing under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, gives
rise to many questions about whether she should have been used as a witness. Despite
her frequently restated terror about what might happen to her if she gave evidence, and
her repeated refusals to provide evidence, the police pursued her as a witness. While
it is appropriate to try and persuade witnesses to give evidence, consideration should
have been given by the Metropolitan Police and Crown Prosecution Service review
team to these matters. Furthermore, although in December 2006 she initially provided
pertinent information to the Metropolitan Police, Person J5’s evidence was ultimately
withdrawn in November 2010 after serious doubt was cast upon the veracity of some of
the information which she had provided to the police. Significant police resources were
expended over the four years in attempting to secure her evidence. This should have
resulted in an assessment as to whether there were any lessons to be learned.
3.2.5 Good Practice Points identified in relation to the witnesses

86. The review identified three issues of good practice in relation to the witnesses being
debriefed under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, which are set out in detail
below. However, it noted that procedures under the 2005 Act had evolved in the intervening
years, and accordingly, some of the issues raised were simply reflective of current practice.94
The Panel enquired of the Metropolitan Police whether these Good Practice Points have
been implemented. The Metropolitan Police, in a response received on 07 October 2019,
confirmed they had.
93 Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police, ‘Review into Operation Abelard II’, MPS109655001, p18, paras 5.21-5.22, May 2012.
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87. Good Practice Point 1
‘As a necessary pre-condition to any future SOCPA [Serious Organised Crime

and Police Act 2005] agreement, the requirement for a thorough investigation
addressing the credibility of the witness is paramount.’ [bold in original]95
88. The review report listed the type of information which would enable a decision to be made
as to whether an individual should be accepted as an assisting offender under the Act. They can
be summarised as:
i. medical records and all psychiatric records;
ii. all case papers regarding previous convictions and those for any investigation that did
not lead to a conviction; and
iii. all intelligence held by various investigative agencies regarding past and current
criminality and all material regarding any past history as an informant.
89. The review report recommended that the presumption would be that this material was
collated and considered prior to entering into the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act
2005 agreement.96
90. The Metropolitan Police indicated to the Panel that there is full compliance with
this recommendation. In addition, in May 2020, the Panel was informed that current
Metropolitan Police policy is for a medical questionnaire to be completed in relation to the
assessment of an assisting offender who is not located within the prison system. If this
leads to concerns, the assisting offender, in consultation with their legal representative,
is asked to sign a medical declaration giving authority for their medical records to be
disclosed. Following receipt of the records, an assessment is then made of any medical or
mental health risks.
‘To maintain a full and auditable record of all police contact regarding the
management of any SOCPA [Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005] witness.’
[bold in original]97
92. The review noted that it was important to maintain a record of every contact with the
assisting offender, including ‘who instigated the contact and the reason for it’.98 It stated that this
was particularly important to rebut any allegation that a witness was induced or coached.
93. This was already a requirement at the time of the Abelard Two Investigation. The
Metropolitan Police has provided assurance to the Panel that processes now exist to
ensure compliance with this requirement. The Panel has nevertheless seen no provision
to ensure that those debriefed do not have telephone access to anyone other than
those responsible for their welfare. However, in May 2020, the Panel was informed that
Metropolitan Police policy, introduced in 2019, is that telephone numbers and email
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addresses are not given directly to any such person. The majority of communications with
the legal representatives of persons being debriefed are conducted via a specific address
that they are given.
‘Adherence to the following factors should be considered as “best practice”

when dealing with SOCPA [Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005]
witnesses.’ [bold in original]99
95. These factors100 can be summarised as requiring the following:
i. Effective control and regulation of the witnesses in terms of contact, allowances

and privileges;
The Metropolitan Police did not respond to the Panel in relation to these issues
initially, but the response to a second request in May 2020 describes detailed
current processes and controls for these matters.
ii. A system to control the extent and duration of the debrief, to be set by a Gold Group
in conjunction with the Senior Investigating Officer, with clear objectives;
The Metropolitan Police state that, as not every debrief requires a Gold Group,
these matters have in the past been dealt with between the Senior Investigating
Officer, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Senior Debrief Officer/
Debrief Manager.
iii. Immediate transcription of the witness’s interviews for the purposes of challenge and
corroboration by the investigation team;
The Metropolitan Police state that this is now done as a matter of course.
iv. Ongoing editing of the debrief material for disclosure purposes;
The Metropolitan Police state that this recommendation is adhered to throughout

the debrief process.
v. That a process to allow the investigation team to provide questions to the debriefers,
without fear of breaching the sterile corridor, should be developed;
The Metropolitan Police state that specific arrangements now exist to allow
regular appropriate contact between the Debrief Manager and any investigation.
vi. That a dedicated and separate Debriefing Manager should be appointed to manage
and supervise debriefers;
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vii. That the debrief team should be represented at the Gold Group;
The Metropolitan Police state that this is now done in accordance with the
National Guidance on the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.
viii. That there should be parity of rank between the Debrief Manager and the Senior
Investigating Officer of the investigation team to aid effective communication; there
‘should be a relationship which is clearly defined, recorded and subject to inclusion
within the terms of reference of the [Gold] Group’;101
The Metropolitan Police state that a Detective Inspector as Debrief Manager

will link in with the Senior Investigating Officer, who may be a Detective
Inspector or Detective Chief Inspector, and that the Debrief Manager ‘delegates
as necessary’.
ix. That the whole Prosecution Team (police, Crown Prosecution Service and Counsel)
should take a proactive role in the development and function of such witnesses; that
as the Crown Prosecution Service enters into the agreement with the witness, it must
be kept informed of all developments;
x. That consideration should be given to the benefit of the Crown Prosecution Service
lawyer dealing directly with the solicitors for such a witness;
The Metropolitan Police state that ‘there has never been occasion when SOCPA
[Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005] lawyers have not been happy to
deal direct with the Police De-brief Unit’.
xi. That consideration should be given to the use of an appropriate adult for witnesses
who might be vulnerable as a consequence of the state of their mental health.
xii. The Metropolitan Police state that they would always err on the side of caution
and ‘follow the spirit of PACE [Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984] to ensure
that the process was protected, and the Assisting Offender given the assistance
and reassurance required’.
3.2.6 Control and direction of investigation/Prosecution

96. The review report made six recommendations about the control and direction of an
investigation: recommendations 12-17.102 The first of these related to the fact that the Abelard
Two Investigation was not managed within normal Metropolitan Police reporting structures (see
Chapter 8, Abelard Two Investigation). The review report noted that ‘[c]ircumstances and events’
had resulted in the Abelard Two Investigation being managed outside the systems already in
place for the investigation of murder within the Metropolitan Police, and that ‘[w]hilst this may
have had some merit and maintained confidentiality (considering the background of the case) it
resulted in a complex management arrangement’.103
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97. The implication that the Abelard Two Investigation was not managed according to
normal reporting structure ‘to maintain confidentiality’ is not sustainable in the light of the
available evidence. While there was an awareness of the need for security, confidentiality
was not given at any stage as a reason why the investigation was not managed
according to normal reporting structures.
98. Accordingly, Good Practice Point 12 provided that, ‘[h]istorical and complex cases such
as these should be structured within the governance arrangements and systems already
in place within the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] – primarily within the MPS Homicide
& Serious Crime command.’ [bold in original]104 The Review Report also stated that ‘[i]t is
recommended therefore that any future investigation of this type should pay particular and
detailed attention to the direction of the strategy – utilising the mechanisms already in place and
in use within the MPS and as guided by MIRSAP [Major Incident Room Standard Administrative
Procedure] and the MPS Murder Manuals’.105
99. The Metropolitan Police response to the Panel regarding this Good Practice Point
(12) was that ‘[t]his particular agreement was unique and is unlikely to be repeated’.
The way in which the Abelard Two Investigation was run resulted in massive unnecessary
costs, both human and financial. It is essential that the Metropolitan Police introduce
structures to ensure that it does not happen again.
100. The governance arrangements adopted during the Abelard Two Investigation did
not have merit and were the subject of challenge by a number of senior police officers
(see Chapter 8, Abelard Two Investigation). The review report does not refer to these
challenges, or to the fact that there is no record of any Gold Group/oversight group
meeting after July 2008, despite the fact that the defendants were not finally acquitted
until March 2011. There was an opportunity to consider whether there was any learning
to be derived from this fact, but that opportunity was not pursued.
3.2.7 Assessment in the review report of the role of DCS David Cook
101. The review report acknowledged that DCS David Cook had retired from the Metropolitan
Police during the investigation, before being immediately re-employed by the Serious Organised
Crime Agency. It stated that while he remained within law enforcement and had a detailed
knowledge of the case, a handover to a Senior Investigating Officer who was serving in the
Metropolitan Police ‘would have been more appropriate’.106 The review report said that the
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decision was made for ‘sound reasons’, particularly former DCS Cook’s detailed knowledge of
the case and the strong relationship of trust he had developed with members of the family of
Daniel Morgan.107
102. The review report provided in Good Practice Point 13 that, ‘[t]he SIO [Senior Investigating
Officer] should be employed by the police force that holds primacy for the enquiry.
They are then directly accountable to the GOLD group and associated governance
arrangements.’ [bold in original]108
103. The Metropolitan Police response to the Panel regarding this Good Practice Point
(13) simply reiterated the statement that the decision was made for ‘sound reasons’,
particularly former DCS David Cook’s detailed knowledge of the case and the strong
relationship of trust he had developed with members of the family of Daniel Morgan.109
104. In making this finding, the review report does not allude to the complications
resulting from the fact that DCS David Cook had been on full-time secondment from
the Metropolitan Police even before his appointment as Senior Investigating Officer in
March 2006 and until his retirement in December 2007. There is no consideration of
whether any learning might be available with reference to this situation. Nor is there
any consideration of the fact that the Gold Group/Oversight Group did not meet after
July 2008. This failing was particularly important since former DCS Cook was no longer
in the employment of the Metropolitan Police.
105. The review report did not identify the confusion which existed in the Metropolitan
Police as to whether former DCS David Cook had continued to be the Senior
Investigating Officer of the Abelard Two Investigation after he left the Metropolitan Police
(see Chapter 8, Abelard Two Investigation). As stated very clearly in the exchange of
emails between the Metropolitan Police and the Serious Organised Crime Agency, from
the date of his retirement, former DCS Cook did not have the powers which a Senior
Investigating Officer requires. In glossing over these facts, and the consequence of
them, the review report did not articulate any learning from this situation, other than that
the Senior Investigating Officer should be employed by the police force which holds
primacy in the investigation. This was not, and is not, necessary. What was, and is,
necessary is that the Senior Investigating Officer’s role and responsibilities are clear, that
the Senior Investigating Officer has the necessary authority, and that there is a proper
and clear command structure for any investigation.
884
106. The review report did not consider any other aspects of the role held by former
DCS David Cook, which included assumption of the role of Family Liaison Officer and his
overall command of the debrief of James Ward and in the absence of a Gold Group.
3.3 The case management process

107. The review report stated that Case Management Panels110 were held during the Abelard
Two Investigation and that their use had become well established practice. The Review Report
stated ‘[t]he panel is chaired by a senior lawyer, including the Director of Public Prosecutions
or Chief Crown Prosecutor and their function is to oversee the effective progression of the
prosecution, ensuring sound decision making and offering advice and guidance’.111
108. Accordingly, Good Practice Point 14 provided that ‘[c]ases of this significance and
complexity should be the subject of a CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] Case Management
Panel’. [bold in original]112
109. In its response to the Panel on 03 April 2020, the Crown Prosecution Service stated
that Case Management Panels ‘continued to be a common feature in serious and complex
cases’. The Crown Prosecution Service further stated that:
‘Local Case Management Panels (LCMPs) are regularly held in teams across the
CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] – usually chaired by the Deputy Chief Crown
Prosecutor. These are a useful tool for senior oversight of serious and/or complex
cases. Cases of National significance are reported to the Director of Legal
Services each month by the Chief Crown Prosecutors of each CPS Area. Cases
which require further oversight can be called for a National Case Management
Panel, chaired by the Director of Legal Services. Now, as then, the purpose is
to oversee the effective progression of the prosecution, ensure sound decision
making and offer advice and guidance.’113
110. Examination of the papers available to the Panel reveals extensive consultation
between the Crown Prosecution Service lawyer for the case, Stuart Sampson, Counsel,
DCS David Cook and others. However, the Panel has not seen evidence of such
a structured process including the Director of Public Prosecutions or Chief Crown
Prosecutor or any other senior lawyer employed by the Crown Prosecution Service
during the Abelard Two Investigation.
110 ‘The CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] […] introduced Case Management Panels during 2005 to oversee the strategies being applied
in the prosecution of these very high cost cases likely to take more than eight weeks at trial. Case Management Panels in respect of the
most serious and complex cases are chaired by the DPP [Director of Public Prosecutions], whilst others are chaired by CCPs [Chief Crown
Prosecutors] or Heads of Casework Divisions. The process enables the Director, and CCPs [Chief Crown Prosecutors], to provide personal
assurance to the Attorney, and the wider CJS [Criminal Justice System] community, that appropriate consideration has been given to all
pertinent issues surrounding the launch of any substantial prosecution case due to last eight weeks or more at trial, and that the case is kept
under regular review.’ (Crown Prosecution Service annual report and resource accounts 2005-06, p30, ordered by the House of Commons to be
printed July 2006).
113 Crown Prosecution Service response to the Panel, Good Practice Point 14, 03 April 2020.
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111. The review report stated that, ‘[f]urther to Recommendation 13,[114] we recommend that
the police and CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] consider succession planning for all members
of the prosecution team. It may be appropriate to appoint deputies for key members of the
prosecution team, who will be able to assist both in busy periods and take over in the event that
the relevant police officer or lawyer is absent or leaves the team.’115
112. Accordingly, Good Practice Point 15 provided that ‘[i]n protracted cases prosecution
team succession planning should be considered’ [bold in original].116
that such cases are relatively rare and are likely to be handled by their Central Casework
Divisions. The Crown Prosecution Service further stated that:
‘The decisions around allocation of lawyer and prosecutor to a case is one

for local managers, however where it is anticipated that a case is likely to be
particularly complex or lengthy the CCD’s [Central Casework Divisions] operate
a “buddying” system where cases are allocated to a lead lawyer and a junior
lawyer. This allows for work to be shared but also provides some resilience to
the team in the event that one of the lawyers becomes unwell or leaves the
organisation.’117
114. The Metropolitan Police response was that this was a matter for the Crown
Prosecution Service. However, Good Practice Point 15 clearly envisages that police
officers are part of the ‘prosecution team’ and requires a response from the police as
to how succession issues in investigation teams are dealt with. The Metropolitan Police
subsequently provided information about a 2017 model adopted by a named Detective
Superintendent. However, it does not address the specific question.
‘[a] strategy is required to assist effective judicial case management throughout

the duration of the case and adherence to the Criminal Procedure Rules. Case
Management hearings should utilise clear agendas, as identified in this case, as
good practice.
‘In multiple defendant prosecutions there are likely to be extensive and repetitive
oral legal arguments as between defendants. We recommend that the trial Judge is
encouraged to rely on written advocacy, supplemented only when necessary by oral
submissions. This will ensure hearings are focused, and court time is used efficiently.
The prosecution should also encourage the management of the case through
adherence to the Criminal Procedure rules.’118
116. Good Practice Point 16 therefore stated the need to ‘[e]nsure there is a strategy in place
to assist effective judicial case management’119 [bold in original].
114 Good Practice Point 13.

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that its new case management initiative, the ‘Better Case Management’ introduced in
2015, ‘supports the Court to play its pivotal role in ensuring consistent judicial case
management’. The Crown Prosecution Service further stated that:
‘The use of PTPH [Plea and Trial Preparation Hearing] forms, completed prior to
the Court hearing, allow for active judicial scrutiny of the preparation of the case.
Lead Counsel is, ultimately, responsible for assisting the Judge at any hearings
and it is common practice in complicated cases for Agenda’s [sic] or Case Notes
to be provided in advance of hearings to assist the Court.
DMDs [Disclosure Management Documents] are another mechanism by which

the Prosecution engages the Court and the Defence in its strategy in respect of
the handling [of] unused material. They are served in advance of the PTPH [Plea
and Trial Preparation Hearing] where possible.’120
118. Good Practice Point 17 was ‘Appointment of a trial judge’121 [bold in original].
‘[d]ue to the category of the charge in this case, namely murder, under the case
release provisions, consideration had to be given to the appropriateness of releasing
the proceedings from a High Court Judge to an authorised Senior Circuit or Circuit
Judge. Owing to the complexities in this case it was retained by a High Court Judge.
It will be important for the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] to inform the court of all
the complexities in a case, in order to ensure a Judge with the necessary experience
is appointed.’122
120. In its response to the Panel, the Crown Prosecution Service stated that:
‘The allocation of cases to an appropriate Judge is a matter for the Court.

However, the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] and HMCTS [Her Majesty’s
Courts and Tribunals Service] operate a “case release” system which allows the
prosecution to identify matters of significance that may warrant the case to be
released from the ordinary allocation route. This is secured by completing a case
release form and sending it to the Court.’123
887
121. Although the Crown Prosecution Service stated to the Panel in November 2020 that
the review report was a ‘review into key aspects of the investigation and prosecution of
the murder of Daniel Morgan’ and that it was ‘not intended to be a cross criminal justice
system review’, it would have been useful had those conducting the review consulted
with the judiciary generally, or with Mr Justice Maddison in particular, during the course
of their work and with the defence lawyers. They may have had useful observations to
make about the operation of the Crown Prosecution Service and the Metropolitan Police
and these could have been discussed at the time. It was not entirely surprising that
issues arose that potentially affected other parts of the Criminal Justice System. These
should have been discussed at the time by the Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan
Police review team with the relevant institutions to determine whether any amendments
to current practice were required.
122. The Crown Prosecution Service and Metropolitan Police review process afforded
an opportunity for the two organisations to consider in depth what had happened during
the Abelard Two Investigation and to identify any lessons learned, or good practice.
Even accepting the limitations of the Terms of Reference, the review report did not
clarify many of the failures in the governance and management of the Abelard Two
Investigation. Its ‘Good Practice Points’, while largely representing current guidance and
legal requirements, did not cover the totality of the issues which can be identified.
123. The review report did not identify any issues which had resulted from current
practice not being followed in this case and did not identify any lessons which might
have been learned. The failures of governance, the conduct of the Senior Investigating
Officer and the disclosure failings led, ultimately, to very protracted pre-trial hearings
which would have been avoided had the investigation been properly managed,
Prosecution Counsel been properly informed, and appropriate consequential decisions
made. Ultimately, it led to successful civil actions against the Metropolitan Police by four
of those charged. Very significant damages of £514,000124 and costs resulted from these
civil actions and added further to the overall costs of the Abelard Two Investigation.
124 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2019] EWHC 2120 (Admin), p15, paras 15 and 54-55.
888
4 The Operation Longhorn Report: the investigation into DCS

David Cook’s unauthorised disclosure of documents
124. In 2011, Commander Simon Foy and the Metropolitan Police Directorate of Information
had conducted a general audit of email contact between journalists and police officers.125
As a result, an email had been identified which had been sent from former DCS David Cook to
Michael Sullivan, Chief Crime Reporter at The Sun newspaper, on 10 March 2011.126 The email
had included confidential information sent between the solicitor for Daniel Morgan’s family and
AC John Yates. Former DCS Cook had been copied into this information. The report noted that
the email read, ‘Mike. Please treat this in confidence but it may be worthy of consideration. Why
don’t you come to [named police premises] and we will make a coffee. We will have privacy.
There is no need to sneak about. Regards DC.’
125. Both Commander Simon Foy and AC John Yates regarded this as an inappropriate
level of contact between a police officer and a journalist.127 Consequently, on 26 May 2011,
during a meeting with Commander Foy, former DCS David Cook was given an informal verbal
warning in relation to his future conduct.128 No full audit of former DCS Cook’s email account(s)
was conducted.
126. At this time, former DCS David Cook was not a police officer, and therefore was
not subject to the disciplinary arrangements applicable to serving officers. The status
of this warning is therefore unclear. In interview with members of the Panel, former
Commander Simon Foy said that at the time the warning was given, he was not aware
of any other inappropriate emails being sent by former DCS Cook. He added that if he
had been aware of other emails, ‘it should have been a criminal investigation’. Regarding
the warning, Commander Foy stated, ‘there was a consideration for a thought for
Dave’s health’.129
127. Unrelated Metropolitan Police investigations into alleged corruption were ongoing in 2011.
Michael Sullivan was one of the journalists under investigation in Operation Elveden, which
dealt with allegations that journalists had made corrupt payments to the police for information.
Material had been found in the possession of Michael Sullivan which he had received from
former DCS David Cook, including over 500 emails between former DCS Cook and Michael
Sullivan.130,131 The matter was brought to the attention of the Serious Organised Crime Agency,
as former DCS Cook’s current employer.
125 ‘Investigation into the actions of Mr David Cook unauthorised disclosure of documents to a journalist whilst he held a public office’,
IPC001370001, p8, para 22, September 2014.
IPC001370001, pp8-9, para 23, September 2014.
129 Panel interview with former Commander Simon Foy, PNL000180001, p7, 26 November 2019.
131 Metropolitan Police Operations Elvedon, and Tuleta; ‘Investigation into the actions of Mr David Cook unauthorised disclosure of documents
to a journalist whilst he held a public office’, IPC001370001, p3, para 4, September 2014.
889
128. On 07 December 2011, the Serious Organised Crime Agency referred the matter to
the Independent Police Complaints Commission, alleging that during his time in charge of
the investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan, former DCS Cook had passed sensitive
information and material (including police files, reports to the Crown Prosecution Service and
other sensitive investigative material) to Michael Sullivan. The Independent Police Complaints
Commission launched an investigation into the conduct of former DCS Cook as a result of these
allegations.132 This investigation was referred to as Operation Longhorn.
129. The Independent Police Complaints Commission established the following Terms of
Reference for the investigation:
i. ‘To investigate:
a. The quantity, content and sensitivity of classified police documentation/

information passed by David Cook (e-mail and any other means) to individuals
outside the police service during the period 2006 to 2011.
b. Whether or not David Cook was authorised by any law enforcement agency to
disclose such material to any third party outside the police service.
c. To identify whether any subject of the investigation may have committed a

criminal offence and if appropriate, make early contact with the Director of
Public Prosecutions […]. On receipt of the final report, the Commissioner shall
determine whether the report should be sent to the DPP [Director of Public
Prosecutions].
d. To identify whether any subject of the investigation, in the investigator’s opinion,

has a case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct, or no case to
answer.
ii. To consider and report on whether there is organisational learning, including:
• Whether any change in policy or practice would help to prevent a recurrence of the
event, incident or conduct investigated;
• Whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be shared.’133
130. Former DCS David Cook was arrested on 10 January 2012, on suspicion of having
committed the offence of misconduct in public office and offences contrary to section 55 of
the Data Protection Act 1998.134 Various computers, mobile phones, IT storage equipment and
documents were seized from former DCS Cook’s home, and charred remains of what appeared
to be intelligence-related documents were found in a dustbin.135 He was taken to a police station
for questioning and interviewed under caution. During the interview, which was recorded and
IPC001370001, p3, paras 1-2, September 2014.
890
videoed, he made no comment in response to the questions put to him and was released on
bail, pending further enquiries. He was formally suspended from duty by the Serious Organised
Crime Agency before he was released.136
131. The Independent Police Complaints Commission was granted full access to all the material
recovered during the search of Michael Sullivan’s home and workplace. Material from his
computers and other electronic storage devices matched that sent by former DCS David Cook
to him. The Independent Police Complaints Commission was provided by the Metropolitan
Police with 620 emails and 5,846 pages of documents which had been provided to Operation
Elveden by the Management Standards Committee at News International, which had been
established to provide oversight of all matters relating to News International. The documents
covered the period from 23 August 2006 to 07 September 2011. Michael Sullivan was also in
possession of material relating to the Daniel Morgan murder which ‘could not be sourced back
to David Cook’s trail of e-mails’.137 The Independent Police Complaints Commission stated that
‘it is not known how the journalist came to be in possession of this material’.138
132. Michael Sullivan was treated by the Independent Police Complaints Commission as a
witness. It was established that former DCS David Cook was actively seeking Michael Sullivan’s
help in writing a book about his investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan. There was a
genuine friendship between the two of them and no evidence had been found to suggest he had
used the material sent to him by former DCS Cook for any other journalistic purpose.139 Michael
Sullivan declined to assist the investigation.
133. It is understandable that Michael Sullivan was not treated as a suspect by the
Independent Police Complaints Commission, but he was a suspect in Operation
Elvedon, and he was in possession of information which belonged to the Metropolitan
Police and others, and which should not have been made available to him. This matter
should have been dealt with by the Metropolitan Police.
134. The Panel asked the Metropolitan Police about the emails and attachments sent between
former DCS David Cook and Michael Sullivan, which had been handed to them during
Operation Elveden, by News International, the owner of The Sun newspaper for which Michael
Sullivan worked. According to the Metropolitan Police response, the Panel understands that the
Metropolitan Police did not:
i. take any measures to ensure that copies of the material that were handed over to them
were retrieved and deleted from all News International systems;
ii. seek an undertaking or any assurances from News International, Michael

Sullivan and/or anyone else that no copies of this material had been taken and
preserved elsewhere;
IPC001370001, pp13-14, paras 47-48, September 2014.
891
iii. nor did they consider seeking an order under section 3 of the Torts (Interference with
Goods) Act 1977 for obtaining emails and the attached documents which may still be
held by Michael Sullivan.140
135. The Panel has found no evidence that the Metropolitan Police considered all
possible options available to them to enable the recovery of material belonging to them,
as a law enforcement agency. This was a significant failing, as much of the material,
disclosed without authorisation to Michael Sullivan, was highly sensitive. The disclosure
of at least some of this material may have involved a risk to life of those identified in
particular documents.
RECOMMENDATION
136. It is recommended that the Metropolitan Police establish a process to inform

police officers about the recovery options available to them when material is
unlawfully disclosed.
137. The Independent Police Complaints Commission stated that former DCS David Cook had
been authorised to work from home, that his address had been subject to relevant Home Office
security checks, and that his homeworking was approved by both the Metropolitan Police and
the Serious Organised Crime Agency.141
138. The Independent Police Complaints Commission articulated the content and impact of
the Metropolitan Police policies, in relation to both working away from the office and protective
marking. These policies are outlined below:142
i. Emails should only be sent from the appropriate Metropolitan Police accounts when
working away from the office.
ii. Emails should only be sent to personal accounts if the contents and attachments did
not merit a protective marking and did not contain personal information.
iii. The Protective Marking System143 provides for marking documents so as to ensure
correct handling procedures:
a. To view ‘Restricted’ or ‘Confidential’ documents it is necessary to be approved as

at least ‘Security Cleared’.
b. Material marked ‘Restricted’ must not be transmitted over the internet without the
use of approved encryption.
140 Email response from the Metropolitan Police, 07 May 2020 2:01 pm.
143 These were the Information Handling policies relevant at the time. Since 2015 the policies and the classification system has changed.
892
c. Material marked ‘Confidential’ must not be transmitted over the internet.
(Only the categories ‘Restricted’ and ‘Confidential’ are relevant to the material
disclosed by former DCS David Cook.)
iv. Any access to the internet must be through an approved firewall.
v. Any use of Metropolitan Police information must be lawful and must not breach any
relevant Metropolitan Police policy or operating procedures.
139. Police officers, civil servants and others are vetted, and their vetting status determines the
extent to which they can have access to documentation and secure premises. Records show
that DCS David Cook was vetted to a high level from 1999, 2004 and 2009.144 DCS Cook would
have had the access he required to enter secure premises and to hold, in accordance with
security requirements, sensitive documentation.
140. The Independent Police Complaints Commission did not articulate in its report the
restrictions on access to protectively marked documentation, which can only be viewed
by people who have the appropriate security clearance to enable the viewing of such
documents. There is nothing in the report to indicate that Michael Sullivan had ever been
assessed for security clearance.
141. The Independent Police Complaints Commission Report considered the Metropolitan
Police media policy of 2006. The Independent Police Complaints Commission Report noted
that ‘[i]nspectors and above were authorised to speak to the media about their own areas of
responsibility, provided an embargo would not be broken or disclosure would not compromise
an investigation, operation or the judicial process and in high profile investigations SIO’s
[sic] [Senior Investigating Officers] were expected to make the media handling policy for the
investigation clear to their team through briefings and decision log entries’.145 In addition, the
policy ‘allowed for “off the record” dealings with journalists dealing with matters not for public
disclosure with an understanding of maintaining confidentiality and specification of what could
be published’.146
142. The Independent Police Complaints Commission Report also noted the media policy’s
provision that ‘[t]he MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] will not, however, tolerate any police
officer […] who improperly discloses information (either deliberately or recklessly) to the media
(for example for personal gain or contrary to the media handling policy set out by an SIO [Senior
Investigating Officer])’.147
144 D140, MPS107542001, pp48 and 67.

893
143. The Independent Police Complaints Commission Report noted that ‘[a]s a Detective Chief
Superintendent attached to the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] Homicide Command, David
Cook would have been fully aware of the MPS media policies including that which warned,
“The unofficial disclosure of information could not only have an impact on an investigation it
could also damage the credibility of the MPS and its staff”.’148
144. The Panel obtained from the Metropolitan Police documents and policies covering the
period between 2000 and 2019. Two policies applied during the period when DCS David Cook
was working on the Abelard One/Morgan Two and Abelard Two Investigations.
145. The first document, dated 22 September 2000, was issued as a Special Notice to the
Metropolitan Police by the then Commissioner, Sir John Stevens (now Lord Stevens). It was
generally very encouraging of disclosure of information to the media, while recognising that
‘it would be inappropriate for officers and civil staff to comment, such as with issues of security,
terrorism and other critical incidents’.149 Among other things, the Commissioner said:
‘If we are to gain the goodwill, confidence [bold in original] and support of the general
public and achieve our aim of making London a safer place, we need to re-engage with
the media and seize every opportunity to be much more proactive.
‘I want to see Metropolitan Police officers and civil staff representing the Service
through the media, speaking up about their achievements, correcting inaccuracies and
just as importantly, explaining why things may not have gone as we would have liked.’150
146. The Special Notice provided that:
i. ‘Inspectors and above are authorised to speak to the media about their own areas of
responsibility.
ii. When confidence and trust is established, there may be occasions when senior
officers [bold in original] will feel able to talk to reporters on an ‘off the record’ basis
– dealing with matters not for public disclosure, explaining reasons for maintaining
confidentiality and specifying what might be published.
iii. It will be for OCU [Operational Command Unit] commanders and heads of branches
to decide at what levels within their own areas of responsibility such discretion may
be exercised.’151
147. The Special Notice made no specific reference to investigations. However, the Panel
notes that in justification of his many disclosures to journalists, former DCS David Cook
spoke repeatedly of correcting misapprehensions, protecting the reputation of the police
and acting in the public interest. This was very much the language of the Commissioner’s
document on media relations.
149 Special Notice19-00, p2, 22 September 2000.
894
148. The second document was the Media Relations Standard Operating Procedures, which
were issued in 2006 by the then Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair (now Lord Blair), and were referred
to by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (see paragraphs 141‑143 above).
In addition to the matters alluded to by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the
Standard Operating Procedures stated that ‘it is unlikely that’, in high profile investigations,
‘the senior investigating officer (SIO) would wish any officer or police staff to divulge
information without his/her express permission’. The Procedures provided no specific advice
or requirements for Senior Investigating Officers who wished to liaise with the media in relation
to their investigations. They did, however, state very clearly that it is necessary that such
‘disclosure would not compromise an investigation, operation or the judicial process’.152
149. Some of the emails had been sent by DCS David Cook from his work email account(s) to
his personal email account(s), and then forwarded to Michael Sullivan’s personal account, which
Michael Sullivan shared with his wife. On occasion, Michael Sullivan forwarded the documents
to other email accounts which he had, predominantly his account with The Sun newspaper.153
150. The Independent Police Complaints Commission Report stated that ‘[t]he emails sent by
David Cook have been graded and those which are detailed below are those which in the view
of the IPCC [Independent Police Complaints Commission] contain information which is of a
most serious nature including those which contain sensitive police information and or personal
information about others. Due to the quantity of email contact a policy decision was made to
prioritise those which contained some level of sensitive or classified information.’154
151. Although all the emails and attachments sent by former DCS David Cook to Michael
Sullivan were analysed, the report of the Independent Police Complaints Commission focused
on 46 emails which had been sent from former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan. These 46 emails
were considered to ‘represent potentially the most serious examples of unauthorised or
inappropriate disclosure’.155 Of the 46 emails, 43 had attachments.156 The majority of these
emails were sent between September 2008 and March 2011.157
152. An analysis of the attachments to the 43 emails which had been sent by former DCS David
Cook to Michael Sullivan was prepared for the Independent Police Complaints Commission by
DS Gary Dalby of the Metropolitan Police. The Operation Longhorn Report states that DS Dalby
‘had previously worked on the investigation into the murder of Daniel MORGAN and as such
had retained a considerable working knowledge of all aspects of the murder investigation’.158
DS Dalby was the case officer for the Abelard Two Investigation. A copy of a schedule of
43 attachments to the emails was provided to the Panel.
152 Media Relations Standard Operating Procedures 2006, 05 July 2006.

IPC001370001, pp15-27, paras 56-134, September 2014
156 Emails 1–43 from Appendix A of Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001322001-IPC001364001, 07 July 2008-04 May 2011.
895
153. In the schedule,159 DS Gary Dalby indicated in respect of each attachment:
i. The identification/description of the document.
ii. The Protective Marking Assessment:
All the documents which belonged to the Metropolitan Police were classified by
DS Dalby as being ‘Restricted’, with the exception of a letter of apology, dated
30 March 2011, to Alastair Morgan signed by Acting Commissioner Tim Godwin.
One of the documents was described as having originally had a ‘Highly Confidential’
marking, but as being ‘now restricted’.160 Another document was marked ‘Confidential’
but a redacted version had been disclosed to the Defence. It is not clear whether a
redacted version or the unredacted version was sent by former DCS Cook to Michael
Sullivan.161 Four documents did not belong to the Metropolitan Police.
iii. The author, disclosure and circulation details for the document:
In many cases there is no indication that the document had been properly disclosed
for the purposes of the Abelard Two Investigation, but it is noted on the schedule that
information contained in the document, or the subject matter of the document, had
been disclosed in the course of the investigation or discussed in Court at some stage.
iv. The date on which the document was created.
154. It was legitimate for the Independent Police Complaints Commission to establish
whether any of the documents disclosed by former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan
had previously been disclosed to others. This might enable some assessment of
possible harm resulting from the disclosure of the documents. However, the principal
question to be determined was whether former DCS Cook had the authority to disclose
the particular documents to Michael Sullivan.
155. The following documents/information were among the material which was provided
by former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan. Some of it was protectively marked, other
documents carried no protective marking but former DCS Cook, as an experienced investigator,
knew that this material should not have been disclosed to a journalist:
i. On 07 July 2008, copies of documents created by Defence lawyers for the purposes of
a bail application were sent by former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan. The information
within these documents included the naming of five prosecution witnesses together
with the Defence’s view of their credibility. It also included personal data about the
Defendant’s extended family, those prepared to stand surety, and details of the
Defendant’s wife’s bank balance.162 These documents were identified as having been
159 ‘Review of Exhibit KRR/50’, Emails from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, IPC001321001, undated.
160 ‘Review of Exhibit KRR/50’, Emails from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, IPC001321001, p1, item 5, undated; and, email 5
of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001326001, pp1-5, 01 February 2009.
161 ‘Review of Exhibit KRR/50’, Emails from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, IPC001321001, p2, item 7, undated; and, email 7
of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001328001, pp1-6, 16 April 2009.
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supplied by Defence lawyers to the Prosecution for a bail application three days
previously, on Friday 04 July 2008. In his email of 07 July 2008, former DCS Cook
stated, ‘Mike, you can see the way in which JC163 will go in his defence.’164 The report
by the Independent Police Complaints Commission recorded that ‘[i]t would not be
expected that such a document would be shared with a journalist. The application
contained personal information relating to individual bank accounts and similar private
information. There was also no investigative rationale or justification for disclosing
this document.’165
ii. On 19 January 2009, former DCS Cook sent Michael Sullivan three emails, containing:
an original witness statement dated 15 April 1987 from the Morgan One Investigation;
the advice file which he had submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service dated
24 March 2003; and a discipline report dated 25 September 2000 from an investigation
into corruption offences in 1999. All these documents were marked ‘Restricted’,
and the final document was stated in the accompanying schedule (see paragraphs
153‑154 above) to be ‘[n]ot relevant to the Morgan murder investigation’.166
iii. On 31 January 2009, two emails were sent by former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan.
One contained a typed note, marked ‘Abelard Two Highly Confidential.’ It was believed
to have been created in January 2009 to explain the chronology and relationships
between three connected anti-corruption investigations: Landmark, Hallmark, Nigeria
and Two Bridges. The observation on the protective marking column of the schedule
was that this had been ‘Confidential at time of creation but now restricted’.167
The second document was entitled ‘Points of Interest from Operation Gallery’ (another
Metropolitan Police anti-corruption operation), which contained details of police
intelligence about a specific individual and other sensitive information, including
detailed information about other named individuals. This document was marked
‘Confidential’ and had not been disclosed to the Defence or to the Court.168
iv. On 15 April 2009, the Central Service Record of former DS Sidney Fillery was sent to
Michael Sullivan. There is no indication that this document was ever disclosed to the
Defence lawyers. This document was classified as ‘Restricted’.169
v. On 16 May 2009, a copy of a bail application and other sensitive documents, which
had been sent to the Crown Prosecution Service and Counsel on 12 May 2009 by a
Defendant’s solicitor and forwarded to the Metropolitan Police the following day, were
provided to Michael Sullivan by former DCS David Cook. The bail application had been
heard on 15 May 2009. The accompanying email read ‘[t]his, because of its very nature
must be kept to yourself and not disseminated or referred to. But it gives some good
background.’170
163 James Cook

164 Email 1 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001322001, p2, 07 July 2008.
166 ‘Review of Exhibit KRR/50’, Emails from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, IPC001321001, p1, items 2,3 and 4, undated.
167 ‘Review of Exhibit KRR/50’, Emails from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, IPC001321001, p1, item 5, undated.
897
vi. On 28 May 2009, an email was sent from former DCS Cook’s personal email account
to both Michael Sullivan’s personal and The Sun newspaper email addresses.
There were no documents attached to this email. The email read ‘Mike I will speak
about this later’,171 and went on to include details of witnesses, some of whom had
admitted a number of criminal offences, together with details of their relatives and
home addresses.172
vii. An email dated 02 June 2009 informed Michael Sullivan that the Abelard Two
Investigation was going to arrest Kim Vian (wife of Glenn Vian) the following week for
conspiracy to murder.173
viii. On 04 June 2009, a document totally unrelated to Daniel Morgan’s murder was sent by
former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan. It included names, dates of birth and personal
telephone numbers of a number of prison officers. This was material which former
DCS Cook had obtained in disc format from his employer, the Serious Organised
Crime Agency.174 The material which made up the final document was gathered
through the Serious Organised Crime Agency’s Document Exchange facility and
comprised a synopsis of intelligence reports between August 2004 and 2006, with the
caveat ‘[t]his publication contains information which if made public may be harmful to
the enforcement objectives of the department. Readers are requested to ensure that
adequate security arrangements exist for this publication.’175
ix. On 15 July 2009, a copy of a witness statement made by Person J5 was leaked by
former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan.176 It contained particularly sensitive information.
Furthermore, the beginning of the statement indicated that this witness had taken
some persuasion to provide information and would not have wanted their details
passed to a journalist. According to the schedule, DS Gary Dalby stated that it was
subsequently provided to the Prosecution, Defence and the Court, but no date was
given as to when this happened. This document was classified as ‘Restricted’. The
witness statement was passed to Michael Sullivan on the day after it had been taken,
demonstrating the close and regular relationship between former DCS Cook and
Michael Sullivan.177
x. On 25 August 2009, former DCS Cook emailed Michael Sullivan informing him of the
forthcoming arrest of Jacqueline Cook (the wife of James Cook) in a money laundering
case. It was accompanied by the following message: ‘[…] gets arrested tomorrow for
Money Laundering but we do not anticipate much out of it’.178
173 Email 44 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001365001, 02 June 2009.
178 Email 45 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001366001, 25 August 2009.
898
xi. On 05 September 2009, a statement made three days previously, on 02 September

2009, by the wife of one of the Defendants, was leaked by former DCS Cook to
Michael Sullivan. It was disclosed to the Defence on 17 September 2009 in the unused
witness list.179 This document was classified as ‘Restricted’.180
xii. An email dated 11 September 2009 was sent to Michael Sullivan, to which was
attached a report to the Crown Prosecution Service seeking a decision as to whether
to charge Kim Vian (see paragraph 155 vii above) in connection with the murder of
Daniel Morgan. The email contained the following statement: ‘[s]he will never get
charged but you could almost turn this into part of a chapter on its own right with a bit
of wordsmithing’.181
xiii. On 17 October 2009, by email, former DCS Cook informed Michael Sullivan that
‘we have found 4 pieces of DNA on Daniel’s shoe which we have sent for urgent
profiling…’. This information should not have been disclosed. In the event no profile
was secured.182
xiv. On 27 October 2009, a report on an unrelated and unsolved murder in 1996 was
emailed by former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan. It named suspects and had been
sent to the Abelard Two Investigation by Essex Police, following the provision of
information by a witness to the Abelard Two Investigation.183 This document was
classified as ‘Restricted’ and had, until that point, only been revealed to the Crown
Prosecution Service and Prosecution Counsel. Former DCS Cook had written in his
email to Michael Sullivan, ‘[n]ot for further circulation’.
xv. On 02 November 2009, details of a visit made to a secure psychiatric hospital, to

obtain information from two named patients about violent incidents to which they
were linked, were leaked by former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan.184 The document
containing the details had been provided to the Abelard Two Investigation three
days previously, on 30 October 2009, by the officer who had visited the hospital.185
It was reported to be accompanied by an email from former DCS Cook which stated,
‘Mike, This will give you some great background of the levels of violence the Vians
are engaged in. It is absolutely not for further circulation.’186 DS Dalby recorded that
it was made available for inspection by Defence lawyers from February 2010.187
This document was marked ‘Sensitive’ and classified as ‘Confidential’.
xvi. On 22 November 2009, a very lengthy statement made by an undercover police officer,
which related to a drugs operation and which ultimately led to a conviction, was
provided by former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan.188,189 It did not relate directly to the
181 Email 18 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001339001, 13 September 2009.
182 Witness statement, MPS003719001, 21 December 2009.
189 Email 25 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001346001, pp2-21, 22 November 2009.
899
murder of Daniel Morgan but was relevant to the credibility of one of the witnesses.190
It was disclosed a month later on 21 December 2009 to Defence lawyers. This
document was classified as ‘Restricted’.191
xvii. On 26 November 2009, the Metropolitan Police Report to the Crown Prosecution
Service dated 03 October 1999 following Operation Two Bridges, which included
details of officers suspected of corruption and the investigation thereof, was sent by
former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan.192 The schedule records that ‘[a]ll information
contained in the file would have been disclosed at the trial of Rees and Others in 2000
and was discussed at length in the Abuse arguments’. This document was classified
as ‘Restricted’.193
xviii. On 30 November 2009, documentary exhibits gathered in a previous Metropolitan

Police corruption operation, including invoices from Southern Investigations and
Experian194 and a list of VAT of clients were leaked by former DCS Cook to Michael
Sullivan.195 They related to Southern Investigations enquiries and Experian checks
made in 1999, apparently on behalf of the Daily Mirror newspaper, regarding a
named Member of Parliament and his family.196 These documents were classified as
‘Restricted’.
xix. On 02 June 2010, a document was provided by former DCS Cook to Michael
Sullivan197,198 which contained information about two of the suspects and extracts from
probe material obtained during Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges, together with a list of
corrupt, named former police officers associated with the Defendants, including details
of any criminal convictions. This document was created by DS Dalby in May 2010.
The accompanying email from former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan conveyed that
‘[t]he attached file may be of some interest re background […] the project is lodged
in my mind about hoping to get something out of this otherwise I am saddled with a
mortgage that I neither want or need’.199 This document was classified as ‘Restricted’.
xx. On 23 February 2011, an email was sent by former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan
which contained a transcript from a covert listening device recorded in Glenn Vian’s
home on 19 October 2002.200 In the accompanying email, former DCS Cook wrote
‘Mike Reference our discussion yesterday. The attached is the conspiracy by Glenn and
Garry that was captured by the probe we deployed through the house we purchased.
With regards the other stuff, if I can find a way of getting it out without causing any
problems I will see what I can do.’ This document was classified as ‘Restricted’.201
190 Person F11.

192 Email 32 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001353001, 26 November 2009.
194 Experian plc is a company which carries out financial checks on individuals and companies.
196 ‘Review of Exhibit KRR/50’, Emails from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan [GXD/1/01052013], IPC001321001, p7,
item 31, undated.
197 Email 28 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001349001, pp3-8, 02 June 2010.
199 Email 28 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001349001, p2, 02 June 2010.
200 Email 37 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001358001, 23 February 2011.
201 ‘Review of Exhibit KRR/50’, Email from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, IPC001321001, p9, item 37, undated.
900
156. Thirteen emails, which had been sent by former DCS David Cook from his Serious
Organised Crime Agency email address, were examined on behalf of the Serious Organised
Crime Agency. The assessment was that eight posed a critical risk, three a high risk and two a
medium risk to the organisation.202
157. The material (see paragraph 155 above) which was leaked by former DCS David
Cook derived from a number of sources. It was fundamentally important material
which should not have been leaked and its leaking had the capacity to jeopardise
future investigative work on the issues contained in the material, to endanger named
individuals and to significantly damage public trust in the institutions concerned. It is
noted that former DCS Cook was leaking material within days of receipt by him, often
before legitimate disclosure to others in the course of his work.
158. Emails sent by former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan which were not considered
among the 46 emails analysed in depth in the Independent Police Complaints Commission
report, included:
i. An email dated 09 April 2010 to which was attached a file relating to the evidence
provided by Person J5 about the Asda supermarket robbery in March 1998. The email
stated, ‘[i]t will give you a further flavour of the stuff from [Person J5]’.203
ii. An email dated 28 June 2010 which had been sent to AC John Yates, attached to
which was a tabular analysis of the evidence given by all the major witnesses to date
and evidence derived from the Inquest against each of the four Defendants charged
with the murder of Daniel Morgan. Former DCS Cook stated, ‘I have sent this on to JY
[AC John Yates] for his information, but you may find it of value.’204,205
159. In addition to these emails, the material provided to Operation Longhorn, by

the Metropolitan Police, from News International’s Management and Standards
Committee included:
i. An email dated 30 April 2009 in which Michael Sullivan boasted to an independent

agent that he had been given ‘exclusive access to confidential police files going back
20 years’ relating to the murder of Daniel Morgan;
ii. An email dated 28 September 2010 from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan
which had attached copy invoice receipts from News International Supply Company
relating to work completed by WJ Rees for various enquiries;
iii. An email dated 14 January 2011 to Michael Sullivan containing a copy of the
Summary of Evidence against Jonathan Rees and a copy of all the evidential probe
transcript material.206
IPC001370001, p27, para 134, 07 December 2011.
203 Email from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, EDN001121001, 09 April 2010.
204 Email from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, EDN001819001, 28 June 2010.
205 Evidence summary, document attached to email dated 28 June 2010, EDN001820001, undated.
206 Report MPS10984001, p.2 31 July 2014.
901
iv. An email dated 24 May 2009 from former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan in which he
said that he had ‘boxed up all 9 of the material I have in terms of corres etc’ and that
material relates to: ‘[t]he Adams (believed to be Ray Adams) and Taffy Holmes stuff
but includes the “Hampshire Investigation”’. Former DCS Cook said that he had ‘told
Jacqui we are moving it to your brothers so that we can work on it there.’ There was
no search of Michael Sullivan’s brother’s house during either Operation Elvedon or
Operation Longhorn.
The Crown Prosecution Service was said to have been provided with all the emails
and attachments which had been disclosed to Michael Sullivan. For reasons of
economy and brevity, the report focused on the 46 emails discussed above. However,
other documents such as those referred to in paragraphs 158 and 159 were equal in
significance to many of those on which the report focused.
160. The Panel asked the Metropolitan Police a series of questions on 05 September 2019
about the steps taken in relation to the unauthorised disclosures and breaches of the Data
Protection Act 1998. In response to those questions, the Metropolitan Police:
i. indicated that no Metropolitan Police risk assessments of affected individuals

were completed;
ii. indicated that individuals who were mentioned in the documents, or whose
witness statements had been disclosed, had not been informed of the personal
data breach; and
iii. could provide no information as to whether the Information Commissioner’s Office had
been informed about the data breaches at the time.207
161. The Information Commissioner was asked whether the breaches of the Data Protection Act
1998 had been reported to the Information Commissioner as required by law. The Information
Commissioner was unable to state whether the breaches had been reported but confirmed that
no information regarding the issue was currently held.
162. The Metropolitan Police owed a duty of care to anyone who was put at risk by the
unlawful disclosure of documents by former DCS David Cook. The Metropolitan Police
should have conducted any necessary risk assessments, notified these individuals
that their personal data had been unlawfully disclosed, and informed the Information
Commissioner, as was good practice at the time and is now prescribed by law under
section 67 and section 68 of the Data Protection Act 2018. There is no evidence that
this happened.
207 Metropolitan Police response to questions from the Panel, 07 January/28 February 2020.
902
163. The Independent Police Complaints Commission noted that, in a number of the emails
sent with the above documents, former DCS David Cook stressed to Michael Sullivan the
sensitivity of the content and urged him not to pass the documents on further.208
4.1 Former DCS David Cook’s responses to questioning

164. The Independent Police Complaints Commission reported that former DCS David Cook
provided responses to a series of questionnaires through three prepared statements, after an
initial ‘no comment’ interview. He formally adopted his responses during a subsequent interview
under caution by the Independent Police Complaints Commission on 08 November 2012.209
165. In response to questions regarding sending documents from his work email address to
his personal email address, former DCS David Cook said that he was permitted to work from
home and, because he did not have a Metropolitan Police computer, he used his personal
computer which he locked away when not in use.210 Former DCS Cook said that scanning
documents and sending them via email was the most expedient way to access them while at
home and saved him from carrying them in hard copy. Former DCS Cook denied an allegation
that he sent documents in PDF format to avoid Metropolitan Police firewalls.211 He did, however,
acknowledge that, with hindsight, he should not have sent any documentation which was
marked ‘Highly Confidential’ or ‘Confidential’, nor documents which contained personal data.212
166. Former DCS David Cook also told the Independent Police Complaints Commission that he
accepted that he should not have sent confidential documents, and this would never have been
authorised. The Independent Police Complaints Commission noted that ‘[h]e did not attempt
to argue that there was any legitimate investigative purpose for disclosing the information and it
would appear to have been sent simply to assist the book project’.213
167. Analysis of the emails had shown that, as early as 2006, DCS David Cook began to
discuss with Michael Sullivan the prospect of writing a book about the investigation of the
murder of Daniel Morgan, referring to it as ‘the Book Project’.214 The Independent Police
Complaints Commission Report contains a quotation from an undated email from former
DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan discussing the proposed book, which concluded:
‘The main thing I ask is that we
1. Make an early agreement as to how we are going to do this and work towards it
2. Keep it to ourselves to prevent professional problems and infiltration as you will soon
find out
903
3. Keep it absolutely factually based
4. Do not expose secret police methodology
5. Split everything 50/50.’215
168. Former DCS David Cook told the Independent Police Complaints Commission that
he had approached one literary agent as a potential publisher, but he asserted that the
motivation behind the publication of such a book was solely ‘to reflect the progress of the MPS
[Metropolitan Police Service] had made following previous criticisms’.216 Former DCS Cook
could not recall whether he or Michael Sullivan had first made the suggestion of writing the
book. He said that they had verbally agreed that the material would not be used until after the
murder trial.217
169. The Independent Police Complaints Commission also identified two occasions, in May
2009 and August 2010, on which Michael Sullivan, in conversation with a publisher and a
literary agent, raised the issue of the book project. No interest was shown in the project on
either occasion.218
170. Former DCS David Cook said that he was under the impression that AC John Yates
was comfortable with Michael Sullivan writing the book and that he (former DCS Cook)
trusted Michael Sullivan ‘implicitly’.219 Former DCS Cook also stated that he was aware of the
Metropolitan Police previously allowing a journalist, Graeme McLagan, to access Metropolitan
Police material for the purpose of writing a book.220 Former AC Yates told the Panel in 2020 that
‘as a senior and experienced detective, David Cook would have been well aware that the briefing
of Michael Sullivan did not constitute carte blanche to share information about the investigation
which was unrelated to the newspaper article intended to trigger fresh lines of enquiry and/or
incriminating evidence.’
171. Former DCS David Cook denied ever receiving payment for information provided to
Michael Sullivan. Neither the Independent Police Complaints Commission, nor an independent
financial investigation carried out on behalf of the Independent Police Complaints Commission,
found evidence of payments from Michael Sullivan to former DCS Cook.221
IPC001370001, pp29 and 33, paras 140 and 161, September 2014.
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172. Although there is no record of any immediate financial benefit, the following email from
former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan shows that it was anticipated by both parties that
they would benefit from access to and use of the material contained in these unauthorised
disclosures to make a profit from the book which they planned to publish:
iv. An email on 29 June 2009 stated that ‘the book will allow me to put over my or the
Police side of the events [...]Yes any money accrued from the book would also be
an advantage [...] but I do not anticipate that I/we will become rich out of it unless of
course there is a movie deal of some sort.’222
v. An email on 02 June 2010, which stated: ‘I am saddled with a mortgage that I neither
want or need.’223
173. The Independent Police Complaints Commission Report said that former DCS David
Cook had told investigators that ‘a lot had been written about the Daniel Morgan murder
that was incorrect. He wanted Michael Sullivan to have the material and did not have time to
identify it himself so e-mails were the quickest way.’224 When asked whether he thought he had
authorisation to release information/documents, he said: ‘[i]t is difficult to know what I believed
at the time. I believed I had the authority to discuss with the media anything relating to the
investigation. There were no parameters set by anybody.’225
174. The statement that there were no parameters set by anyone is not true and does
not reflect the various policies and procedures which were well established with the
Metropolitan Police, and of which former DCS David Cook as a senior officer would have
been fully aware.
175. The evidence shows that the reason why former DCS David Cook was sharing
material with Michael Sullivan was that they proposed to write a book together from
which they anticipated earning royalties which they would split evenly.
176. In a further prepared statement, responding to additional questions from the Independent
Police Complaints Commission, former DCS David Cook stated that ‘my mindset was affected
greatly by the ill health I was suffering although I did not necessarily realise this at the time.
I was unwaveringly focussed on ensuring that Mike [Michael Sullivan] had all the information he
needed to be able to tell my story if I was not alive to do so.’226
226 ‘Addendum Prepared Statement of Mr David Imrie-Cook’, IPC001319001, p2, para 12, undated.
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177. Former DCS David Cook told the Independent Police Complaints Commission that he
was unaware of exactly how Michael Sullivan was storing the documents: he believed that no
other person had access to them.227 He acknowledged ‘that sending sensitive and confidential
documents to Mike would never have been authorised. I accept that providing Mike with material
later in the investigation by way of email was not the best professional decision.’228 However,
he went on to say that he did not understand the full extent of the Data Protection Act 1998
and did not at any stage consider he was contravening it until he was arrested and this was
put to him.229
178. Former DCS David Cook’s belief that no other person than Michael Sullivan could
have access to the material was misplaced. Much of the material was sent to an email
address shared by Michael Sullivan and his wife.
On many, but not all occasions, former DCS Cook stressed to Michael Sullivan the
confidentiality of the documents which he had leaked. This demonstrates that DCS Cook
appreciated the sensitivity of what he was sending.
The evidence demonstrates that this was not a matter of the failure of professional
judgement but was a wrongful and unlawful leaking of highly confidential and sensitive
information by former DCS Cook.
As stated above, former DCS Cook was a senior officer and would have known the
occasions and circumstances in which disclosure was permitted, and the limitations
on disclosure.
4.2 The findings of the Independent Police Complaints Commission

179. The Independent Police Complaints Commission concluded its report and made a number
of findings as follows:
i. Found that former DCS David Cook sent documents via secure Government email
to his own personal email account(s) before forwarding them to Michael Sullivan
and retained the documents sent from his Serious Organised Crime Agency and
Metropolitan Police email accounts within his insecure personal email accounts.230
ii. Stated that ‘[t]he SOCA [Serious Organised Crime Agency] risk assessment …
identified those e-mails sent by David Cook from his SOCA e-mail account to his
personal e-mail address(s) which [the Serious Organised Crime Agency] considered
posed a critical risk to that organisation’.231
IPC001370001, pp27 and 40, paras 134 and 201, September 2014.
906
iii. Found that the friendship between former DCS Cook and Michael Sullivan
was genuine.232
iv. Found that there was no evidence that Michael Sullivan had used information provided
by former DCS Cook for any other journalistic purposes.233
v. Concluded that former DCS Cook was reckless as to the security of the information
or the consequences, should the material have ‘landed in the possession of others’,234
which demonstrated a disregard for law enforcement and legislative policies.235
vi. Found that former DCS Cook had shown little or no consideration for those identified
in the material, disclosure of which could have a particularly grave effect on those
vulnerable individuals identified in the documentation.236 The examples given included
the witness statement of a victim who described herself as ‘frightened for her life’ and
a report detailing a visit to a high security psychiatric unit, where two patients were
interviewed.237
vii. Concluded that former DCS Cook did not have any authorisation to disclose the
material sent to Michael Sullivan. Much of the material which was leaked contained
sensitive and/or personal data. Of the 46 emails which were examined, 23 of the
attachments should not have been disclosed to anyone outside the Metropolitan
Police or the Serious Organised Crime Agency.238
viii. Rejected former DCS Cook’s admission that he failed to consider the implications of
the Data Protection Act 1998, the consequences of the disclosure of material sent to
Michael Sullivan, and the Metropolitan Police media policies, saying it was ‘remarkable
given that he held the highest security vetting status working on an investigation that
had been damaged by allegations of police wrongdoing and leaking’.239
ix. Found no evidence of any financial gain as a result of former DCS Cook sending
documentation to Michael Sullivan for the purpose of the book project, although
comments were made in the emails regarding potential earnings.240
x. Concluded that although Michael Sullivan had been initially used as part of an
investigative strategy during the Abelard Two Investigation to place articles in the
press to prompt conversations between suspects, any email communication after
this related to a plan by former DCS Cook and Michael Sullivan to write a book on the
IPC001370001, pp 38-39, para 193, September 2014.
907
police investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder. Additionally, former DCS Cook had
provided information to Michael Sullivan which could not have been considered part of
the original Metropolitan Police ‘inclusion strategy’.241
xi. Stated that former DCS Cook had not provided any credible explanation as to why
he sent material unconnected to Daniel Morgan’s murder to Michael Sullivan. One
document contained a large volume of sensitive personal data dealing with issues
of corruption within HM Prison Service, compiled from intelligence reports (see
paragraph 155 viii above).242
xii. Stated that no evidence had been found indicating that Michael Sullivan had
misused any information provided to him by former DCS Cook, or that the passing of
information to Michael Sullivan had any impact on the collapse of the Daniel Morgan
murder trial in March 2011.243
xiii. Stated that although former DCS Cook claimed that his psychological health was
suffering (which was corroborated, in part, by his medical records), an analysis of the
text of emails painted a different picture, suggesting that he was well aware of the
risk attached to what he was doing in sending such material to Michael Sullivan.244
Comments contained in emails from former DCS Cook which warned Michael
Sullivan of the sensitivity of the content included: ‘keep this absolutely to yourself’;245
‘very sensitive therefore for your information only’;246 ‘absolutely not for further
dissemination’;247 and, ‘very sensitive so please do not share’.248
xiv. Stated that ‘[t]he investigation has identified serious failings in David Cook’s handling
of law enforcement material in general. There is evidence of reckless neglect on his
part while holding a senior position in public office. The conduct of David Cook was
entirely self serving and is not what the public might reasonably expect from a person
entrusted with such information.’249
xv. Stated that ‘David Cook retired as a serving officer from the MPS [Metropolitan Police
Service] in 2007 and as a senior manager from SOCA [Serious Organised Crime
Agency] in July 2013. Had he been an employee of either organisation at this time and
subject to either Code of Conduct (SOCA or MPS) I believe from the evidence available
there would be a case to answer for gross misconduct.’250
245 Email 9 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001330001, p2, 03 July 2009.
246 Email 14 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001335001, p2, 03 August 2009.
247 Email 16 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001337001, p2, 07 September 2009; and, email 19 of 46 from
Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001340001, p2, 14 September 2009.
248 Email 20 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001341001, p2, 10 October 2009.
908
180. The Independent Police Complaints Commission’s Report was then sent to the Crown
Prosecution Service for review on 13 October 2014.
4.3 Review by the Crown Prosecution Service to determine whether the case
should proceed further
181. The Crown Prosecution Service reviewed the case under Paragraph 4.2 of the Code for
Crown Prosecutors of 2013, which stated the following:
‘In most cases prosecutors should only decide whether to prosecute after the
investigation has been completed and after all the available evidence has been
reviewed. However, there will be cases where it is clear, prior to the collection
and consideration of all likely evidence, that the public interest does not require a
prosecution. In these instances, prosecutors may decide that the case should not
proceed further.’251
182. Paragraph 4.3 of the Code states:
‘Prosecutors should take such a decision when they are satisfied that the broad extent
of the criminality has been determined and that they are able to make a fully informed
assessment of the public interest. If prosecutors do not have sufficient information to
take such a decision, the investigation should proceed and a decision taken later in
accordance with the Full Code Test set out in this section.’
183. The purpose of the review of the file was therefore to establish whether a full investigation
was required or whether it was clear that the public interest did not require a prosecution.
184. The Panel has reviewed email correspondence, from October 2014 to October 2015,
between the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the Crown Prosecution Service.
It has noted that the Crown Prosecution Service requested a full file after the Independent Police
Complaints Commission’s referral on 13 October 2014.252 The Independent Police Complaints
Commission worked on putting together a full file, as requested. However, in May 2015, after a
meeting between the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the Crown Prosecution
Service, it was decided that ‘in light of the more recent Op Elveden trials and following the
issue of further guidance to the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service], AF [Adrian Flasher] was
considering whether it was in the public interest to prosecute David Cook (Op Longhorn)’, and
that the Independent Police Complaints Commission ‘could postpone any further work they
were doing in relation to Op Longhorn’.253,254 The Crown Prosecution Service then reviewed the
file under Paragraph 4.2 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.
185. In November 2020, the Crown Prosecution Service stated that there was additional
engagement which occurred between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Independent
Police Complaints Commission after the report was received, involving additional
correspondence and conferences which took place in the intervening period, and further
251 The Code for Crown Prosecutors of 2013, https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/code_2013_accessible_

english.pdf, p6, Paragraph 4.2.
252 Independent Office for Police Conduct Disclosure on 03 April 2020, Early Case Planning Strategy form.
253 Independent Office for Police Conduct Disclosure on 03 April 2020, meeting with Crown Prosecution Service.
254 Independent Office for Police Conduct Disclosure on 03 April 2020, guidance document from Crown Prosecution Service ‘Additional
guidance on cases involving payments made to corrupt public officials by journalists’.
909
evidence which allowed the prosecutor to understand the extent of criminality alleged. Although,
the Panel had asked for all relevant correspondence, it did not receive any in respect of the
period after the report was received.
186. The Crown Prosecution Service’s decision to review the file in relation to former
DCS David Cook was not justified by the evidence which had been identified during
the Independent Police Complaints Commission investigation. The effect of the
decision was to limit further investigation. Given what had been uncovered, analysed
and concluded by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, a full investigation
should have ensued, and a full file should then have been considered by the Crown
Prosecution Service.
187. The Panel has examined the additional ‘guidance to prosecutors on prosecuting public
officials, journalists, and others for the Common Law offence of Misconduct in Public Office,
arising out of Operation Elveden, the police investigation into the payment of corrupt public
officials by journalists for information.’255,256 This additional guidance deals only with the situation
in which money is given by the recipient of the document(s) to the person disclosing the
document(s). It refers only therefore to immediate benefit and does not make any reference to
the situation in which no money passes, but the two individuals concerned are, as in the case of
former DCS David Cook and Michael Sullivan, engaged in a project which is intended to make
money in the future. The Panel does however acknowledge that such guidance cannot feasibly
cover every factual scenario.
188. The additional guidance stated:
‘Police officers are entrusted with a great deal of power and discretion, and exercise
these powers with the public at large. They regularly receive confidential information
from the public, as victims and witnesses about crimes and other traumatic events.
The public rightly believe they can rely on the integrity and incorruptibility of police
officers to protect their privacy. In addition, and unlike many of the public office holders,
the police have access to powerful databases, which store confidential information
and hold it securely for police purposes. Corrupt police officers who have access to
these databases and confidential information, and misuse the information by selling
it to journalists and others, do profound harm to the public interest in maintaining
confidence in law and order. For this reason, unless the factors in paragraph 31 of the
Guidelines apply, the public interest will usually require the prosecution of a corrupt
police officer.’257,258
255 Independent Office for Police Conduct Disclosure on 03 April 2020, guidance document from Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Additional
guidance on cases involving payments made to corrupt public officials by journalists’, p1, para 1, undated.
256 https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/media-additional-guidance-case-involving-payments-made-corrupt-public-officials.
257 Independent Office for Police Conduct Disclosure on 03 April 2020, guidance document from the Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Additional
guidance on cases involving payments made to corrupt public officials by journalists’, p2, para 9, undated.
910
RECOMMENDATION
189. It is recommended that the Crown Prosecution Service’s additional guidance

should be amended to include a requirement that the Prosecutor should consider
whether the information was disclosed with a view to one or both parties securing future
profit from the use of that material. Moreover, the additional guidance should also be
amended to note that the advantage to the parties disclosing the document(s) may not
be purely financial but, as in the case of former DCS David Cook and Michael Sullivan,
could be reputational and could have improved their employability in the future.
190. The Crown Prosecution Service asked one of its Specialist Prosecutors, Adrian Flasher, to
review the case in accordance with Paragraph 4.2. Hereafter, Adrian Flasher will be referred to
by his post as a Specialist Prosecutor.
191. The Specialist Prosecutor stated that he was ‘asked to advise whether the conduct of
DC [former DCS David Cook] amounts to the criminal offence of Misconduct in a Public Office
or an offence under the Data Protection Act 1988’.259
192. He went on to state:
‘I am reviewing this case under Paragraph 4.2 of The Code, as I am satisfied that I have
sufficient information to assess the broad extent of the criminality and that it is clear
that the public interest does not require a prosecution against DC [former DCS David
Cook] for an offence of Misconduct in Public Office or for a breach of the Data
Protection Act 1998 (Full Code Test – Paragraph 4.2.).’260
193. During the introduction to the written advice, the Specialist Prosecutor set out his
understanding of the allegations and their status:
i. He described the allegations as being, ‘in short […] that DC [former DCS David Cook]
sent to MS [Michael Sullivan] personal data about witnesses and suspects together
with sensitive police information so that a book could be written about the role of
DC [former DCS David Cook] in the MPS [Metropolitan Police] investigation into the
murder of Daniel Morgan’.261
This narrow assessment of the allegation fails to recognise that a number of

highly sensitive documents not connected to the murder of Daniel Morgan
were sent by former DCS David Cook from a variety of police investigations
and operations. These documents largely related to wider issues of alleged
corruption. It cannot be concluded that the only motive for such action was to
write a book on the Daniel Morgan murder investigations.
ii. The Specialist Prosecutor considered it to be ‘significant’ that former AC John

Yates (Head of the Directorate of Professional Standards) made a statement to the
Independent Police Complaints Commission in this investigation, where he observed
259 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, p4, para 12, 11 September 2015.
911
there to have been occasions when Michael Sullivan had mentioned writing a book
and that he, John Yates, may have considered the co-operation of the Metropolitan
Police in such a project after the conclusion of the case.262
a. The analysis does not recognise that, in his statement, former AC John Yates
wrote, ‘My experience of journalists […] is that they often talk about such
projects but rarely […] get around to it. I took Mike Sullivan’s mention of the
book to be in this vein. I cannot recall him mention any formal collaboration
with Dave Cook – neither did Dave Cook ever mention it to me.’ This
contradicts what former AC John Yates told the Panel in November 2020,
that the possibility of cooperating with Michael Sullivan was something he
discussed with DCS David Cook on the express understanding that ‘this
would require the endorsement of the Morgan family and could not be
undertaken until the case had concluded, including all avenues of appeal’.
b. Former AC John Yates then went on to describe how another journalist who
had written a book had the cooperation of the Metropolitan Police in allowing
him access ‘under supervision’ to a range of sensitive material. He went
on, ‘I would certainly not have authorised such access to sensitive material
by Mike Sullivan prior to the conclusion of the case. I believe Dave Cook
would have been well aware of this.’ The provision of copies of Metropolitan
Police documents to Michael Sullivan would not have been considered as
appropriate or authorised by former AC John Yates. In addition, he stated,
‘[t]he idea of the SIO [Senior Investigating Officer] collaborating (and no
doubt benefitting commercially) on writing a book would have been hugely
significant […] I would certainly have advised Dave against it. If Alistair [sic]
Morgan had found this out I believe this would have done a great amount
of damage to the relationship that we had fought so hard to build up with
his family.’263
iii. The Specialist Prosecutor stated in the introduction to his review, ‘[i]t is worthy of
note that in the relevant period of the emails (2006 to 2011) and particularly between
September 2008 and February 2011, DC [DCS David Cook] was receiving medical
treatment for anxiety and depression.’264
While this assessment of former DCS David Cook might be accurate,

and be relevant to mitigating his behaviour, the steadfast and determined
way in which former DCS Cook leaked the highly sensitive documents
demonstrates a lucid, focused mind. Despite this, he continued to work
full time, firstly for the Metropolitan Police on secondment to the Serious
Organised Crime Agency, and later for the Serious Organised Crime Agency
with an ongoing remit from the Metropolitan Police in respect of the Abelard
Two Investigation.
263 Witness statement of former AC John Yates, IPC001368001, pp7-8, 08 July 2012.
912
194. After the introduction, the Specialist Prosecutor went on to set out the following:
i. The offences under consideration;
ii. The key evidence;
iii. Outstanding investigation;
iv. Review of the evidence received to date;
v. The Director’s guidelines;
vi. The Public Interest Stage of the ‘Full Code Test’; and
vii. His conclusions.265
195. The Specialist Prosecutor examined the material sent to him. The Panel has not seen a list
of the documentation considered. He reported that, since he did not have a full file, he could not
apply the Evidential Stage of the Code. In order to do so, he reported he would have required
significant further material, without which he could not review the file to determine whether there
was sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction. He provided a non-exhaustive list
of the further material, which included:
i. Victim impact statements from the family of Daniel Morgan and individuals whose data
had been leaked.
ii. Interview transcripts or tapes for the interview on 08 November 2012 of former
DCS David Cook.
iii. Unused material schedules of other interlinked operations.
iv. Evidence about former DCS Cook’s authority and security clearance to work from
home and to use non-secure email.
v. Evidence about the extent of information given to a freelance journalist, Graeme

McLagan, and how access to material was facilitated.
vi. Forensic evidential reports on the contents of media exhibits seized from former
DCS Cook’s home.
vii. Minutes of the Gold Group meetings that would shed light on: (a) the Media Strategy;
and (b) the reasons that former DCS Cook continued to act as Senior Investigating
Officer after his retirement from the Metropolitan Police.
viii. Evidence to support the security classification placed on documents.
ix. Evidence about former DCS Cook’s health and his applications for a senior position
within the Serious Organised Crime Agency.
265 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, pp5-46, 11 September 2015.
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x. More detailed evidence about the decision to bring Michael Sullivan into the
Metropolitan Police investigation and minutes of any meeting where the extent of his
involvement was considered.266
196. In relation to 194 iii. above, there were several interlinked operations, investigations
and judicial enquiries around and involving former DCS David Cook. The Specialist
Prosecutor made reference to both the Metropolitan Police enquiry, ‘Operation Megan’
(which he knew to be considering former DCS Cook’s contact with other journalists), and
the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s Panorama investigation (which was
considering the provision of material relating to Jonathan Rees to BBC journalists by
former DCS Cook). He noted that they would both appear to him to be ‘highly relevant’
but was, nevertheless, prepared to state that he was able to determine the broad extent of
former DCS Cook’s criminality without reference to them.
197. In relation to 195 x above, the Specialist Prosecutor had apparently considered
the statement made by former AC John Yates to the Independent Police Complaints
Commission. This, however, defined the very limited authorised use of Michael Sullivan
within the Daniel Morgan investigation: ‘[t]o be clear, this was a one off authority/inclusion
of a particular individual (Mike Sullivan) for a particular purpose. It could never have
been interpreted as a more general authority for any officer to release additional material
then or in the future […]. My recollection is that Mike Sullivan was briefed about the
background of the case, including that covert methods were employed. I repeat, in my
opinion the inclusion could never have been interpreted as a more general authority for
any officer to release additional material then or in the future.’267
4.4 Consideration of the offence of misconduct in public office

198. The Specialist Prosecutor stated that former DCS David Cook had been a public officer,
acting as such at the time he sent the emails in question to Michael Sullivan.268 In order to prove
the offence of misconduct in public office, it had to be shown that he had wilfully neglected to
perform his duty or misconducted himself to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the
public’s trust in him, without reasonable excuse or justification.269
199. Given the admission of former DCS David Cook, that he had sent the emails and
attachments to Michael Sullivan, that he had known he should not have done so, and his
admission that the purpose of the emails was in relation to the future publication of a book (the
‘Book Project’), the Specialist Prosecutor found that in respect of some of the emails sent by
former DCS Cook, he had wilfully misconducted himself.270
200. As former DCS David Cook’s reason for the ‘Book Project’ was to set ‘the record straight’
and ‘show the integrity of his investigation’,271 it was the view of the Specialist Prosecutor that
this could be capable of being construed as amounting to a reasonable excuse or justification
for former DCS Cook sending the emails and attachments to Michael Sullivan.272
266 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, pp27-28, para 124, 11 September 2015.
267 Witness Statement of former AC John Yates, IPC001368001, pp6-7, 08 July 2012
269 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, p29, para 129, 11 September 2015; Attorney General’s Reference
(No.3 of 2003) Court of Appeal Criminal Division, 07 April 2004.
271 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, pp31 and 33, paras 137 and 146, 11 September 2015.
914
201. The Specialist Prosecutor’s conclusion was based on a number of factors:
i. He had seen no evidence that former DCS David Cook received any financial gain,273
or that the sending of emails had any responsibility for the failure to prosecute or had
caused damage to the murder investigation.274
There was clear evidence of an intention that former DCS David Cook would
financially benefit. This was set out in the Operation Longhorn report. Furthermore,
it was impossible to assess the future damage that the disclosure of the highly
sensitive material might do, especially that assessed by the Serious Organised
Crime Agency as posing a ‘critical risk’ (see paragraph 157 above).
ii. The ‘sole purpose’ of a number of the emails sent by former DCS Cook to Michael
Sullivan was to further the ‘Book Project’,275 the aim of which was to ‘put the record
straight’276 in relation to the previous investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan,
and to put forward the Metropolitan Police’s and former DCS Cook’s approach to the
investigation in a positive light.277
There were emails sent that were not connected to the investigation of Daniel
Morgan’s murder. There is an inference to be drawn, therefore, that the Daniel
Morgan case was not the sole purpose of the agreement between former DCS
Cook and Michael Sullivan.
iii. The sending of information by former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan did not amount
to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder to the very high threshold required
for a prosecution. The Specialist Prosecutor recommended that the matter would
more properly have been dealt with internally by the Metropolitan Police rather than
by prosecution.278
278 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, p32, para 144, 11 September 2015.
915
202. The Specialist Prosecutor did not explain how he came to the conclusion that the
threshold for prosecution was not met. None of the documents examined during the
investigation should have been provided by former DCS David Cook. Some of them,
such as an Essex Police report on a murder,279 were not disclosed to Defence lawyers
acting in the case in question and did not relate to the murder of Daniel Morgan. The
Panel does not consider it appropriate to conclude that such actions by an individual
police officer could be justified as seeking to ‘prove the integrity of his investigation’, nor
could they amount to actions which should be reasonably excused and therefore not
prosecuted. Were this the case, then any dissatisfied police detective would have a route
through which to seek to justify his or her actions, a route which would almost inevitably
involve breach of the law and of police policy, and which might ultimately compromise
the integrity of future prosecutions.
4.5 Offences under the Data Protection Act 1998

203. The Specialist Prosecutor concluded that the emails sent by former DCS David Cook to
Michael Sullivan ‘disclosed personal data or the information contained in personal data’.280
204. The Specialist Prosecutor then considered whether former DCS David Cook could rely on
any of the following statutory defences:
i. ‘[T]hat he acted in the reasonable belief that he had in law the right to obtain or
disclose the data or information’.281
The Specialist Prosecutor did not believe, based on the evidence, that former
DCS Cook had such a right in law.282
ii. ‘[T]hat he acted in the reasonable belief that he would have had the consent of the data
controller if the data controller had known of the obtaining, disclosing or procuring and
the circumstances of it’.283
The Specialist Prosecutor noted, based on former DCS Cook’s knowledge of the book
‘Bent Coppers’ and the extent of information previously provided by the Metropolitan
Police to the journalist Graeme McLagan, that it was arguable that former DCS
Cook had acted in the reasonable belief that he would have had consent for the
‘Book Project’.284
279 Email 22 of 46 from Appendix A of the Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001343001, 27 October 2009.
280 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, p33, para 148, 11 September 2015. Contrary to Section 55(1)(a) of
the Data Protection Act 1998.
281 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(2)(b).
282 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, p33, para 148i, 11 September 2015.
283 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(2)(c).
284 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, p33, para 148ii, 11 September 2015.
916
This ignores the fact that former DCS Cook had admitted he had no such
permission from the Metropolitan Police and that any such permission could only
have been obtained some considerable time after the leaking of the material, i.e. at
the conclusion of the case. The data belonged to the Metropolitan Police.
iii. That ‘in the particular circumstances the obtaining, disclosing or procuring was
justified as being in the public interest’.285,286
The Specialist Prosecutor stated that there was a public interest287 in the publishing of
the book, subject to an investigation into the extent of what information had been in
the public domain:288
i. Former DCS Cook wanted to use his book to highlight the integrity of the
investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan, as well as the integrity of the
Metropolitan Police from the time of his involvement.289
ii. The public had an interest in the case because of corruption during earlier
investigations and the fact that the case remained an unsolved crime.290
The Specialist Prosecutor stated that former DCS Cook’s proposed book had the
potential to expose corruption and potential miscarriages of justice.291
iii. His proposed book had been capable of raising or contributing to an important
matter of public debate, which although no exhaustive definition had existed,
included public debate about serious impropriety, significant unethical conduct
and significant incompetence, which affected the public.292
205. The Specialist Prosecutor concluded that he was satisfied that he had sufficient
information to assess the broad extent of the criminality of former DCS David Cook,
concluding that it was unlikely that there would be sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect
of conviction in relation to an offence of misconduct in public office and, in addition, there
were potential statutory defences available to former DCS Cook for an offence under the Data
Protection Act 1998.293
285 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, p33, para 148iii, 11 September 2015.
286 Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(2)(d).
287 When considering cases affecting the media in which freedom of expression and the right to receive and impart information are in
issue, prosecutors should specifically go on to consider: Whether the public interest served by the conduct in question outweighs the overall
criminality? Media: Guidance for prosecutors on assessing the public interest in cases affecting the media,
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/media-guidance-prosecutors-assessing-public-interest-cases-affecting-media para 28.
288 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, p33, para 148iii, 11 September 2015.
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206. The Specialist Prosecutor does not appear to have considered that, by the time he
was making this decision, the murder trial had collapsed due, in part, to major failings on
the part of former DCS David Cook. These had been classified by the defence as corrupt
activities and the Judge had concluded that former DCS Cook had prompted and
“tipped off” witnesses. In these circumstances, it was inappropriate for the Specialist
Prosecutor to decide that there was any public interest in former DCS Cook leaking
confidential information to publish a book which would be self-serving both in terms
of seeking to clear his name and benefitting financially. In November 2020, the Crown
Prosecution Service stated to the Panel that in their view, ‘the decision reached was a
reasonable one and is justifiable based upon the evidence which was available, applying
the law, guidance and Code as it was’. The Crown Prosecution Service also reiterated
that the threshold for an offence of misconduct is high, and that such misconduct must
be dishonest, oppressive or corrupt to come within the criminal threshold. The Panel
believes that the elements of dishonesty and corruption are present.
4.6 The Director of Public Prosecutions’ Guidelines on Assessing the Public

Interest in cases involving the Media
207. The Specialist Prosecutor went on to consider the Director of Public Prosecutions’
Guidelines on Assessing the Public Interest in cases involving the Media, which stated
the following:
‘When considering cases affecting the media in which freedom of expression and the
right to receive and impart information are in issue, prosecutors should specifically
go on to consider: Whether the public interest served by the conduct in question
outweighs the overall criminality.’294
208. In line with the guidance, the Specialist Prosecutor engaged in a three-stage process:
i. Assessing the public interest served by the conduct in question:
The Specialist Prosecutor assessed the public interest served by the conduct as being
medium to high.295 His reasoning for this was that there had been ‘a number of public
enquiries and a television documentary about the investigation’,296 and that former
DCS David Cook’s planned book was capable of ‘exposing corruption and potentially
miscarriages of justice’.297
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In fact, former DCS David Cook had said that the book was to be written to ‘put
over my or the Police side of the events putting a balance on whatever is said’.298,299
By the time the Specialist Prosecutor’s assessment was being made, former
DCS Cook’s integrity had been seriously criticised during the collapse of the
Abelard Two Prosecution case. He was the subject of two other investigations for
potentially criminal behaviour alleging similar leaks not connected to the writing of
this book. It is impossible to understand how the Specialist Prosecutor could reach
the view that he did.
ii. Assessing the overall criminality:
The Specialist Prosecutor assessed the overall criminality as being medium to high.300
His reasoning for this was that former DCS David Cook was a high-ranking police
officer in a position of trust (leading a difficult and sensitive investigation which
was already tainted by corruption), whose offending behaviour amounted to ‘not
respecting the security classifications of documents and their handling, and improper
use of personal data’. He went on to say that ‘the only person who would have known
about the emails or their contents was MS [Michael Sullivan]’ and, as for the victims,
the effect upon them of former DCS Cook’s leaks were difficult to assess, but he
concluded that a ‘great deal of information about witnesses and defendants inevitably
found its way into the public arena’. He noted that former AC John Yates would have
preferred the matter to have been finalised without ‘the need for a prosecution’.301
The Specialist Prosecutor ignored the fact that the emails were sent to the joint
account of Michael Sullivan and his wife, and then further distributed to Michael
Sullivan’s The Sun newspaper email account, without the Metropolitan Police
having any continuing control of the material. The potential distress and danger for
those whose personal details were disclosed must have been significant and was
impossible to assess. Moreover, most of the information sent to Michael Sullivan
had not been in the public domain at the time at which it was sent, and some of
it never entered the public domain. The Guidelines confirm that the impact on the
victims of the conduct in question ‘is of considerable importance […] therefore,
prosecutors should ensure that, where possible, information is obtained about the
particular impact of the conduct in question on the victims’.
298 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, p35, para 156, 11 September 2015
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Although former AC John Yates has consistently said that he had not, and would
not have authorised disclosure, he had said that he hoped that the matter could be
dealt with without prosecution.302 He was the person to whom DCS Cook reported
throughout the Abelard Two Investigation. Former AC Yates told the Panel that
‘when [he] expressed a hope that DCS David Cook’s unauthorised disclosures to
Michael Sullivan might ultimately be dealt with as organisational learning, [former
AC Yates] was motivated at that time solely by a genuine concern about David
Cook’s mental health and wellbeing.’
iii. Weighing the two considerations of overall criminality and the public interest served by
the conduct in question:
The Specialist Prosecutor repeated that he did not have a ‘full evidential file’ but that,
in his opinion, the public interest outweighed the criminality involved.303
4.7 The ‘Public Interest Stage’ of the ‘Full Code Test’

209. The Specialist Prosecutor then assessed the conduct of former DCS David Cook against
the five relevant questions set out within the ‘Public Interest Stage’ of the Code for Crown
Prosecutors’ ‘Full Code Test’:304
i. How serious is the offence committed?
ii. What is the level of culpability of the suspect?
iii. What are the circumstances of, and the harm caused to, the victim?
iv. What is the impact on the community?
v. Is prosecution a proportionate response?305
4.7.1 How serious were the offences committed?

210. In considering how serious the offences of misconduct in public office and breach of the
Data Protection Act 1998 were, the Specialist Prosecutor considered a number of matters,
including the following:
i. Misconduct in public office is a serious offence. Similar cases306 against public officials
had often resulted in custodial penalties. Breach of the Data Protection Act 1998
carries a fine only, even on indictment.307
306 brought under Operation Elveden.
920
In considering the possibility of the offence of misconduct in public office, the

only test of corruption apparently used by the Specialist Prosecutor was whether
money had passed between former DCS David Cook and Michael Sullivan. As
former AC John Yates observed in his statement to the investigation, it was to be
anticipated that former DCS Cook might have benefitted considerably had the
book been published. There is no evidence that former DCS Cook and Michael
Sullivan had abandoned the idea of writing the book before the unauthorised
disclosure of the material was discovered. Indeed, according to the Operation
Longhorn Report, at least three literary agents had been approached by one or
the other of them. The evidence is very clear that former DCS Cook and Michael
Sullivan reasonably expected to profit in the future from the book which they
intended to write.
ii. The motivation had been to facilitate the writing of a book, something which had
been authorised in respect of another matter on a previous occasion. The Specialist
Prosecutor noted that there were clear requests by former DCS Cook to Michael
Sullivan to ensure the emails and their content remained confidential.308
The Specialist Prosecutor’s comments that the publication of a book had

previously been authorised by the Metropolitan Police and that former DCS Cook
had asked Michael Sullivan to keep the material (which consisted not only of
emails) confidential, were not relevant to motivation. DCS Cook had not sought
any consent to write a book, nor had he sought consent for the disclosure which
he had ultimately made.
iii. The information disclosed had not affected the prosecution of any Defendant, nor had
it led to any published newspaper story.309
The Specialist Prosecutor did not refer to the fact that disclosure of this
information by former DCS Cook could adversely affect the safety of individuals
whose details were leaked; breached the privacy of individuals whose data was
leaked; and had the potential to lead to abuse of process arguments in any future
trial of an individual for the murder of Daniel Morgan should an attempt be made
to rely on any of the information leaked. These were all matters which should have
been taken into consideration.
iv. There was mitigation to be found in the fact that Michael Sullivan had previously been
given significant authorised access to sensitive case material.310
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There is no evidence that Michael Sullivan had been given ‘significant authorised
access’ previously to sensitive material. He had been briefed only to assist in the
placing of an article in the media in relation to the Daniel Morgan case.
v. In any event former DCS David Cook was authorised, as the Senior Investigating
Officer, to share information largely at his discretion.311
The Panel notes that former AC John Yates, in his statement, had said:
‘My recollection is that Mike Sullivan was briefed about the background of the
case, including that covert methods were employed. I repeat, in my opinion, the
inclusion could never have been interpreted as a more general authority for any
officer to release additional material then or in the future.
‘I cannot recall other instances where either Mike Sullivan or other journalists
were used in this way (post 2006) in this case – other than press releases for
significant events.’312
Former AC John Yates had also said:
‘The MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] media policy at the time allowed for
“off the record” discussions between journalists and officers of Inspector and
above. I acknowledge Mike Sullivan was included in the early stages and I
would not have been surprised if Dave Cook had discussed the case with Mike
[Sullivan] over the years. However, I repeat that the sending of sensitive and
confidential documents would never have been authorised.’313
There is no evidence that former DCS David Cook ‘was authorised, as the Senior
Investigating Officer, to share information largely at his discretion’. The Independent
Police Complaints Commission Report set out clearly some of the restrictions on
disclosure of material. This finding by the Specialist Prosecutor is not consistent
with the contents of the report submitted by the Independent Police Complaints
Commission or with evidence given in the statement of former AC John Yates
‘that the sending of sensitive and confidential documents would never have been
authorised’.
vi. A previous email between former DCS David Cook and Michael Sullivan had been
brought to the attention of the Metropolitan Police via an internal audit. This had been
dealt with by way of an internal informal warning, and no further investigation had
been considered necessary.314
313 Witness statement of former AC John Yates, IPC001368001, p9, 08 July 2012.
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In describing the seriousness of the offence, the Specialist Prosecutor aligned the
current situation to that dealt with by Commander Simon Foy in which the sending
of one email containing an unauthorised attachment had been dealt with by way of
an informal warning. The situation under consideration at this stage was manifestly
more serious and concerned awareness of around 500 disclosures. Nevertheless,
the Specialist Prosecutor assumed that the way in which the Metropolitan Police
dealt with one wrongful disclosure should indicate the way in which all other
unauthorised disclosures should be handled. This rationale was not justified by the
circumstances.
vii. The Specialist Prosecutor considered that the ‘health position’ of former DCS David
Cook, particularly between September 2008 and February 2011,315 did not provide any
defence to his actions, although it was seen to go some way in explaining his mindset
and mitigated the seriousness of the offence.316
The Specialist Prosecutor was correct that poor mental health may mitigate the
seriousness of an offence. In considering mitigating factors against the seriousness
of the offence, the Specialist Prosecutor erroneously relied on, among others, the
fact that former DCS David Cook had not received or sought payment.
4.7.2 What is the level of culpability of the suspect?

211. The Specialist Prosecutor determined that because former DCS David Cook had held high
rank within the police service, in a position of trust, and had been responsible for a difficult and
sensitive investigation which had already been tainted by corruption, this indicated a high level
of culpability.317
212. Despite the fact that former DCS David Cook had clearly shown, in a number of emails,
his understanding of the significance of what he had been sending to Michael Sullivan,318
there were, the Specialist Prosecutor found, matters of significant mitigation.319 The Specialist
Prosecutor referred to the fact that he had been able to cross-reference the timings of emails
with evidence of former DCS David Cook’s medical position at the time. He also acknowledged
former DCS Cook’s admission that his judgement had been affected by his state of health.
213. In November 2020, the Specialist Prosecutor explained to the Panel that although he had
not had sight of a medical report, he was in possession of a full bundle of medical records in
relation to former DCS David Cook which he had assessed.
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214. It was open to the Specialist Prosecutor to consider whether former DCS David
Cook was, at the time of consideration of charging or at the time of the offence, affected
by any ‘significant’ mental ill health or disability. In some circumstances this may
mean that it is less likely that a prosecution is required. However, the Code for Crown
Prosecutors makes clear that the prosecutor will also need to consider how serious the
offence was. It is the Panel’s view that the state of former DCS Cook’s mental health
might have mitigated the seriousness of the sentence or penalty applied to this offence,
but that the Specialist Prosecutor should not have assessed former DCS Cook’s mental
health as demonstrating significant mental illness in the absence of a medical report.
215. Consideration was given to the evidence of former AC John Yates that the case had
taken a dramatic toll on the health of former DCS David Cook, and to whether pressures had
contributed to lapses in his professional judgement.320
216. The Specialist Prosecutor did not explain why, despite the evidence which he had before
him, he described former DCS David Cook as ‘a man of good character’. Although this may,
previously, have been true, there was no justification for basing any decision on such an
observation.321 As a result of this, in addition to the other factors considered and the very remote
prospect of any further similar behaviour since former DCS Cook had retired, the Specialist
Prosecutor concluded that the culpability of former DCS Cook was at ‘a medium level’.322
217. There is no evidence that the health of former DCS David Cook was raised as
having affected his performance at any review of his work between 2006 and 2011. It
is accepted that former DCS Cook experienced health difficulties during this period.
However, the Panel is aware of only one relatively prolonged period of sickness during
the Abelard Two Investigation. In these circumstances, a disproportionate weight
seems to have been given by the Specialist Prosecutor to the issue of former DCS
Cook’s mental health, and the effect of that weighting was to diminish his culpability
disproportionately.
4.7.3 What are the circumstances of, and the harm caused to, the victim?
218. The Specialist Prosecutor identified three potential primary ‘victims’ as a consequence of
the conduct of former DCS David Cook. These potential primary ‘victims’ were:
i. The Metropolitan Police:
The Specialist Prosecutor said that he was aware that there had been ‘a number
of articles, Court cases and indeed an ongoing Public Enquiry [sic]’,323 assessing
the failures of various Metropolitan Police investigations and alleged corruption.324
924
As such, the Specialist Prosecutor determined that the allegation against former DCS
Cook would not have significantly increased the reputational damage already suffered
by the Metropolitan Police.
The Panel struggles to understand how these allegations, relating as they do to the
activities of an officer who was initially a serving Metropolitan Police officer, and
who was subsequently retained by the Metropolitan Police to work on the Abelard
Two Investigation, could not have significantly increased the reputational damage
of the organisation.
ii. Individuals whose personal data was leaked by former DCS David Cook:
The Specialist Prosecutor said that it was difficult to assess the harm caused to
individuals ‘who were suspects, defendants and witnesses both for the defence and
for the Crown’, whose personal data was disclosed by former DCS Cook, ‘beyond MS
[Michael Sullivan] seeing the information’. Although sending data via an insecure email
had the potential to cause harm, this did not ever materialise.325 In the view of the
Specialist Prosecutor, former DCS Cook was ‘at the very least reckless when sending
out the personal data’.326
The Special Prosecutor did not, as he admitted, have the evidence to support a
finding that no harm had ‘materialised’ as a consequence of the use of insecure
email. Without an investigation, it is not possible to identify the harm which may
have resulted from DCS David Cook’s unauthorised disclosure of the material.
The Metropolitan Police has since informed the Panel that no risk assessments
were conducted in relation to the individuals potentially affected by the data leaks,
and nobody was informed of any leak of material pertaining to them. Former
DCS Cook had also disclosed very sensitive material belonging to the Serious
Organised Crime Agency, in which he was employed at a high level at the time of
the disclosures. The Special Prosecutor should have considered this issue and
questioned whether the Serious Organised Crime Agency also a victim.
925
The Special Prosecutor had the benefit of the Independent Police Complaints
Commission Report in Operation Longhorn, which contained, among other
conclusions, the fact that former DCS David Cook had leaked to Michael Sullivan
the statement of a vulnerable witness who was ‘frightened for her life’.327 This
was done within a day of it having been signed by the witness. The analysis of
the Specialist Prosecutor apparently also ignored the assessment of the Serious
Organised Crime Agency that, of the 13 emails belonging to the Agency, eight
posed a critical risk to the Agency, three a high risk, and two were assessed as
being a medium risk to the organisation (see paragraph 156 above).
iii. The members of Daniel Morgan’s family:328
The Specialist Prosecutor’s findings included the fact that ‘no story was ever printed
or book published following the emails and that nothing sent by DC [former DCS
David Cook] appears to be or intended to be deliberately against the interests of the
Morgan family’. He found that the position of former DCS Cook had been crucial,
because of the ‘highly damaged’ relationship between the Metropolitan Police and the
family.329 The Specialist Prosecutor added that ‘the whole investigation remains in the
public domain in any event and as I have said there is an ongoing Public Enquiry [sic]’.
In addition, the Specialist Prosecutor acknowledged that Daniel Morgan’s brother,
Alastair Morgan, had at the time been writing his own book.330
This analysis ignored the conclusions of former AC John Yates, in his statement
to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, that ‘[t]he idea of the SIO
[Senior Investigating Officer] collaborating (and no doubt benefitting commercially)
on writing a book would have been hugely significant [….] I would certainly have
advised Dave [former DCS David Cook] against it. If Alistair [sic] Morgan had found
out I believe this would have done a great amount of damage to the relationship
that we had fought so hard to build up with his family.’331
It was completely irrelevant that Alastair Morgan was writing his own book. He was
not the Senior Investigating Officer, as former DCS Cook was, and he did not use
confidential material in his book, whereas former DCS Cook had, and former DCS
Cook was also sending such material to Michael Sullivan for the purposes of the
‘Book Project’.
The Specialist Prosecutor concluded ‘on balance that the harm to any victim is low’.332
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4.7.4 What is the impact on the community?

219. The Specialist Prosecutor stated there was ‘an impact on the community if an officer, and
particularly one of the seniority of DC [former DCS David Cook], either acts corruptly or reduces
their performance because they are improperly distracted by other tasks’.333
220. The Specialist Prosecutor found no evidence to suggest that former DCS David Cook was
corrupt, nor that the nature of his relationship with Michael Sullivan was corrupt. As such he
found ‘the impact on the community to be low’.334
221. The narrow definition of corruption adopted by the Specialist Prosecutor enabled
him to reach this conclusion. A wider definition of corruption, which included the use
of this material to generate future profit, should have resulted in a different conclusion.
In fact, DCS David Cook had been intending to write a book and had during this
investigation already drafted a significant number of chapters.
4.7.5 Is prosecution a proportionate response?

222. In considering whether the prosecution of former DCS David Cook was a proportionate
response to his conduct, the Specialist Prosecutor found the following:
i. There had been no evidence to suggest that the emails or attachments sent by former
DCS Cook were the reason for the failure of any prosecution or that the emails had
damaged the murder investigation.335
There was no consideration of the damage which might have been done to
investigations other than the murder of Daniel Morgan, by the unauthorised leaking
of confidential information relating to those investigations.
ii. He had seen no evidence of former DCS Cook receiving or requesting payment from
Michael Sullivan.336
The Specialist Prosecutor had, however, seen evidence that former DCS Cook and
Michael Sullivan reasonably anticipated making a profit from their joint activities.
This should have been of concern to the Specialist Prosecutor.
927
iii. The fact that one email had been dealt with previously through an informal warning
was important in deciding on the proportionality of a prosecution.337
The Panel does not accept this conclusion (see paragraphs 124-126 and
210 vi above).
iv. The email communication under consideration was ‘somewhat historic in nature’.338
The matter had been referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission
in 2012 and some of the emails under consideration dated from 2011. This cannot
be regarded as ‘historic’ communication. Nor was there consideration of the effect
on future investigations of leaking so much police information.
v. There would be considerable cost implications should the Independent Police

Complaints Commission be required to complete a full file for submission to the Crown
Prosecution Service.339 The Specialist Prosecutor coupled this with a reference to
‘evidential challenges’.
Prosecutions are expensive and many face evidential challenges. These issues
were not particularly different from any other case. The Specialist Prosecutor,
having reviewed the over 500 emails, considered the 46 emails indicated by the
Independent Police Complaints Commission as the ‘most appropriate on which
to focus when considering the criminality of the case’. The Specialist Prosecutor
did not elaborate on what the evidential challenges might be. However, the fact
remains that a significant volume of very specific case related material belonging to
several law enforcement agencies had been disclosed unlawfully. The effect of not
acknowledging the extent of the problem and dealing with it may well be to give
comfort to others who are contemplating similar action.
928
vi. The Specialist Prosecutor could not make any comment on the impact a prosecution
might have had on former DCS Cook’s mental health; however, it was relevant
in considering the proportionality of a prosecution. His mental health would also
be relevant to any sentence likely to be imposed in the event of a successful
prosecution.340
The Panel accepts that the mental state of a suspect at the time of the charging
decision being made is potentially relevant to the issue of the proportionality of a
prosecution. However, here the Specialist Prosecutor had not been provided with
any medical report confirming the extent to which a prosecution would impact
upon former DCS Cook’s mental health.
223. The Specialist Prosecutor did not consider a prosecution to be a proportionate response.341
224. The Panel disagrees with the reasoning on which the Specialist Prosecutor based
his conclusions.
4.8 Conclusion by the Specialist Prosecutor

225. The Specialist Prosecutor concluded that he was satisfied that, under paragraph 4.2 of the
Code for Crown Prosecutors (January 2013), even in the absence of all available evidence, the
public interest did not reach the threshold for a prosecution for offences of misconduct in public
office or breach of the Data Protection Act 1998.342 In reaching this conclusion, he referred to
the range of matters discussed above.
226. The Specialist Prosecutor added the following:
‘At the time I was asked by the IPCC [Independent Police Complaints Commission]
to provide a charging advice in this case, I was also made aware of a separate MPS
[Metropolitan Police Service] Investigation (Operation Megan) into a complaint by
Jonathan Rees that his personal data had been provided to the Panorama television
programme and to the media by DC [former DCS David Cook]. I am told that the MPS
Operation Megan team propose to deal with any misuse by DC [former DCS David
Cook] of the personal data of Jonathan Rees as an internal matter rather than one for
prosecution and I consider that to be relevant and indicative of how matters of that
nature may have been dealt with at that time.’343
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227. The function of the Specialist Prosecutor was to consider the evidence available
to him and to assess whether a prosecution should occur. There is nothing in the Code
for Crown Prosecutors which indicates that it was appropriate to consider how the
Metropolitan Police proposed to deal with another separate offence.
The Specialist Prosecutor stated, ‘I also assess that there is a public interest in the
publication of a book detailing the good investigative work of DC [former DCS David
Cook] and the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] and the “setting of the record”
straight’.344 The Specialist Prosecutor had not examined the content of the investigations
conducted by former DCS Cook or of the Metropolitan Police so as to be able to identify
the ‘good investigative work’ which he said had been done by former DCS Cook.
Moreover, the evidence available showed that the case had collapsed because of the
failings of the investigation as acknowledged by former AC John Yates and quoted
above by the Specialist Prosecutor.
The Specialist Prosecutor acknowledged that former DCS Cook had acted unlawfully in
releasing the material. That material had included information about witnesses, suspects,
evidence obtained from a listening device, as well as internal police reports on various
investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder, and investigations not connected to his
murder. The Specialist Prosecutor’s reasoning was set out at length in his report.
That reasoning does not, in the Panel’s view, justify his decision. The hope expressed by
former AC Yates that the matter could be dealt with ‘under the umbrella of organisational
learning’ is not justification for the decision. The Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan
Police Review to which former AC Yates referred did not preclude the possibility of
prosecution. What was required in the circumstances before the Specialist Prosecutor
was further investigation to enable full analysis of whether a prosecution should occur.
4.9 Review of the decision by the Specialist Prosecutor

228. The decision by the Specialist Prosecutor was endorsed by the Head of the Organised
Crime Division at the Crown Prosecution Service, Gregor McGill.345
229. In a document entitled ‘Endorsement by Head of Division’, Gregor McGill took a different
approach from that taken by the Specialist Prosecutor to the question of whether or not former
DCS David Cook should be prosecuted. Rather than assessing the matter under paragraph
4.2 of the Code (which does not engage the question of whether or not the ‘Evidential
Test’ had been passed), Gregor McGill’s report encompassed answering that very question
almost entirely.
230. Gregor McGill recorded that, ‘[t]he allegation against Dave Cook is that he sent to Mike
Sullivan MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] data about witnesses and suspects together with
evidence obtained from a probe’.346
345 ‘Endorsement by Head of Division’, IPC001410001, pp47-58, 29 September 2015.
346 ‘Endorsement by Head of Division’, IPC001410001, p48, para 9, 29 September 2015.
930
231. This repeated the overly narrow and incomplete picture that had been painted by the
Specialist Prosecutor.
232. He continued, ‘[t]he purpose of his doing this is so that he and Mike Sullivan could
collaborate on the writing of a book about the murder [….] It is clear that SIO’s [sic] [Senior
Investigating Officers] were encouraged to co-operate with the media in large, high profile
investigations and MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] policy on how this was done was open to
some interpretation by senior officers.’347
233. There is nothing to affirm the suggestion that the leaking of highly sensitive personal
data during the course of a criminal investigation was merely the result of the Senior
Investigating Officer’s interpretation of the Metropolitan Police media policy.
234. Gregor McGill acted on the basis that medical evidence showed that former DCS David
Cook was suffering from ‘depression and anxiety and […] suicidal thoughts’ and that former
DCS Cook himself had confirmed his ‘fragile mental state’ and a desire to put the Metropolitan
Police’s side of the story.348 There is no evidence that he had been provided with the original
medical reports.
235. Gregor McGill went on to consider that Michael Sullivan was ‘fully briefed about the
murder investigation’ by the Metropolitan Police mid-2006.349 He expressed ‘surprise’ at the
scope of this briefing (despite the fact that neither he nor the Specialist Prosecutor had seen any
minutes of the meeting) and observed that the Metropolitan Police ‘had made a decision to fully
indoctrinate […] Mike Sullivan into the investigation’,350 and that it could be argued that ‘Mike
Sullivan had a legitimate expectation that he would be kept regularly updated as the investigation
developed.’ He continued, ‘I can certainly see, objectively and despite the observation to the
contrary by John Yates, how Dave Cook could have formed this impression.’351 This aspect of
the position of Michael Sullivan did, in Gregor McGill’s view, reduce the culpability of former
DCS Cook’s conduct ‘by a considerable degree’.352
236. There is no justification for the inference by Gregor McGill that Michael Sullivan had
‘a legitimate expectation that he would be kept regularly updated as the investigation
developed’. The briefing provided in 2006 was for a specific purpose. Gregor McGill
did not explore how Michael Sullivan might have been lawfully updated, nor did he
distinguish between lawful updating and unauthorised leaking, despite the lengthy
statement by former AC John Yates on this matter.
The use of Michael Sullivan on one aspect of the investigation, which was short-lived
and concluded before the leaks began, did not in any way make former DCS David
Cook’s actions less culpable.
347 ‘Endorsement by Head of Division’, IPC001410001, p48, paras 9-10, 29 September 2015.
348 ‘Endorsement by Head of Division’, IPC001410001, p48, paras 11-12, 29 September 2015.
350 ‘Endorsement by Head of Division’, IPC001410001, pp50-51, 29 September 2015.
351 Crown Prosecution Service, Operation Longhorn Report, IPC001410001, p51, 29 September 2015.
352 ‘Endorsement by Head of Division’, IPC001410001, p52, 29 September 2015.
931
237. In reaching his decision, Gregor McGill stated that, ‘[t]here appears to be some 550 e mails
[sic] – but some 46 have been identified as being e mails [sic] where either the documents
or the information in the e mail [sic] itself should not have been shared by Dave Cook with a
journalist’.353
238. Gregor McGill, in making this statement, did not take note of the Independent Police
Complaints Commission investigator’s original statement:
‘This report has focussed [sic] upon a total of 46 e-mails sent by David Cook
to Mike Sullivan over the period 2006 to 2011. They have been chosen as they
represent potentially the most serious examples of unauthorised or inappropriate
disclosure by David Cook to Mike Sullivan.’354
The report also stated that ‘[a] number of other documents sent by David Cook
included information concerning a variety of police investigations and operations
unconnected to the murder of Daniel Morgan’.355
239. Gregor McGill referred to the informal warning given to former DCS David Cook by
Commander Simon Foy for the sending of a single email to Michael Sullivan after the conclusion
of the trial as a ‘very minor form of sanction’. He went on to add, ‘if Commander Foy had known
of these other breaches, would it really have made any difference? It is arguable that it would not
have done so.’356
240. Gregor McGill appears to have made his decision on the basis of a false
assumption about the nature and extent of the unauthorised disclosures by DCS David
Cook, some of which did not even relate to the investigation of the murder of Daniel
Morgan. The Panel does not agree that it was ‘arguable’ that Commander Simon Foy
would have taken such a lenient view of former DCS Cook’s actions had he known
there to have been over 500 such emails sent to Michael Sullivan, most sent before
the conclusion of the trial, and at least 46 of which had been declared by the Case
Officer from the Abelard Two Investigation to have contained sensitive material. When
interviewed by the Panel, former Commander Foy indicated that this would not have
been the case (see paragraph 126 above).
241. Gregor McGill then went on to consider the Director’s Guidelines (as referred to in the
Specialist Prosecutor’s advice). He assessed the public interest in the disclosure made by
former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan to be ‘high’ and the overall criminality of former
DCS Cook’s behaviour as being ‘medium’. In coming to this decision, Gregor McGill noted that
‘there was no real element of corruption [...] there were no threats and the disclosures did not
affect the result of any police investigation. Dave Cook’s motivation appears to have been to put

932
the record straight so as to explain the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] investigation and try
to mitigate some of the criticism made of the MPS ’, so that, on balance, a prosecution was less
likely to be required in the public interest.357
242. Gregor McGill concluded that:
‘Dave Cook does have a potential public interest defence in making these alleged
disclosures, and that this makes a prosecution for Misconduct in Public Office less
likely in the public interest, the same public interest factors must apply for an offence
under section 55 (1) DPA 1998.’358
243. Relying on the advice provided by the Specialist Prosecutor, he said: ‘I am satisfied
[…] that there is not at this stage, and is unlikely to be in the future, a realistic prospect of a
conviction for an offence disclosed by this offending.’359
244. Gregor McGill then finally dealt with the question of whether, under paragraph 4.2 of the
Code, a prosecution should follow. He said:
‘I am satisfied that the broad extent of the criminality has been determined and that
I can make a fully informed assessment of the public interest. I am satisfied that the
public interest does not require a prosecution in this case and that this case should not
245. The way in which the following matters were handled by the Specialist Prosecutor
and the Head of the Organised Crime Division, Gregor McGill, dictated their advice:
i. The reason for former DCS David Cook’s leaking of information being limited to
the writing of a book on the Daniel Morgan investigation.
ii. The narrow interpretation of the purpose of the leaks and the definition
of corruption.
iii. The misinterpretation by them of AC John Yates’s view that he would have
condoned the provision of sensitive material to Michael Sullivan for the
purposes of writing this book. AC Yates specifically stated that the disclosure
was not, and would not have been, authorised.
iv. The poor mental health of former DCS Cook equating to a lack of intent and
determination.
v. The failure to equate future remuneration from the publishing of a book as

constituting financial motive or gain.
vi. The use of Michael Sullivan’s journalistic skill on one occasion in a discrete and
limited way as leading to a legitimate expectation that he would be provided
with highly sensitive restricted information.

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vii. The failure to call for the Operation Megan and Panorama papers to determine
the broad extent of former DCS Cook’s criminality.
viii. The assumption that Commander Simon Foy would have issued an informal
warning had he known there to have been over 500 questionable emails, 46
of which contained sensitive attachments and 13 of which were considered
by the Serious Organised Crime Agency to have carried a ‘critical risk’ to that
organisation.
ix. The assessment of the effect on the victims as being ‘low’ when in fact no risk
assessments or exploration of this impact had been undertaken.
The conclusions of the Specialist Prosecutor and the Head of the Organised Crime
Division were dictated by this approach and analysis of the available information.
These conclusions have, in turn, affected subsequent consideration of the behaviour of
former DCS Cook.
246. In November 2020, the Specialist Prosecutor stated to the Panel that his advice was
reviewed at the time by his manager, the deputy Head of the Division, albeit informally, and by
the Head of Division personally. The Specialist Prosecutor also noted that both of these lawyers
agreed with his conclusions, and the Independent Police Complaints Commission decision
not to appeal his advice, nor to carry on its investigation also indicated its acceptance. While a
review of his advice may have provided some reassurance, the Panel’s view is that the advice
itself was not based upon a sound factual basis.
247. The Panel interviewed former DCS David Cook after the conclusion of all the investigations
into his conduct. He generally declined to discuss these matters, saying that he could not now
account for his thought process in disclosing material to Michael Sullivan, but he did make
some comments. He told the Panel that during the Abelard Two Investigation, Michael Sullivan
was ‘out drinking with John Yates’, and that AC John Yates had been telling Michael Sullivan
things about the investigation.361 Former DCS Cook said that Michael Sullivan ‘was getting a far
more detailed briefing initially from John Yates than he was from myself’.362 When asked whether
he had mentioned this to anyone previously he said that he had not done so because, ‘I’ve
never had cause to’.363
248. AC John Yates discussed his relationship with Michael Sullivan and briefings given to
journalists during the Abelard Two Investigation in a statement to the Independent Police
Complaints Commission in 2012. He stated that he had known Michael Sullivan for several
years and their relationship was a professional one, but they also met socially ‘although within a
work-based context’. 364 AC Yates also stated that he was present when briefings were provided
to journalists ‘off the record’.365 As stated above (at paragraph 193 ii), AC Yates also said,
‘I would certainly not have authorised such access to sensitive material by Mike Sullivan prior to
the conclusion of the case. I believe Dave Cook would have been well aware of this.’366
361 Panel interview with former DCS David Cook, Transcript 3, pp9-10 and 15, 25 August 2020.
362 Panel interview with former DCS David Cook, Transcript 3, p10, 25 August 2020.
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249. Former AC John Yates told the Panel that ‘[he] had frequent interactions with the press,
including Michael Sullivan. These were professional engagements as part of [his] role as the
most senior detective in London. [He] was open and transparent about these interactions in [his]
evidence to the Leveson Inquiry and [he] reiterate[s] that no finding of wrongdoing was made by
Leveson LJ.’ Former AC Yates has categorically denied that he provided Michael Sullivan with
any confidential information other than a formal briefing at an early stage in the Abelard Two
Investigation.
250. Former DCS David Cook had, in 2012, previously raised his suspicions in a
statement to the Independent Police Complaints Commission that AC John Yates was
passing information to Michael Sullivan. By 2020 he seemed convinced that it must
have been AC Yates. However, the Panel has not seen any information to support this
suggestion. There is no evidence that the matter was raised by the Independent Police
Complaints Commission with the Metropolitan Police.
251. Former DCS David Cook also told the Panel that one other person within the Abelard Two
Investigation team may have disclosed information to Michael Sullivan.367 When asked whether
he had taken any action as Senior Investigating Officer to stop this other person disclosing
material to Michael Sullivan, he said that:
‘[t]his was 2010 I think, when it came. I was no longer in the Metropolitan Police, we
were already in the process….
These are personal relationships that Mike has with other people. Do I know what this
other person was saying to Mike? I know that one area that the person was discussing
with Mike, she was discussing with Mike their view on the success of the case and how
it’s going. They were very negative, I was very positive. But in terms of the detail of
what was being discussed, I don’t know.’ 368
252. When asked about his stated belief that he had authority to talk to the media, and whether
he distinguished between briefing and giving Michael Sullivan confidential reports, former DCS
David Cook responded, ‘I did have, you could say I did have the authority as the SIO to sit down
and brief Mike on absolutely anything. And that’s contained within the Met Police policy at that
time.’369 He also said ‘[c]an I also make it clear that other journalists who were interested in the
investigation, if they came in and they asked us questions then we sat down and we gave them
a comprehensive briefing.’370 When asked if he kept a log of who came and what they were told,
he responded that ‘[t]here should be some sort of log.’ He also said: ‘It wasn’t just me that did
this, sometimes Noel was present etc.’371
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253. It is the case that DCS David Cook had authority to conduct media briefings
within normal constraints, and that AC John Yates and others attended such briefings.
However, the proposition that DCS Cook had authority to brief and to provide
documents to the extent that he disclosed material to Michael Sullivan and others
is completely rejected. No log of meetings with journalists has been provided to the
Panel. Had such regular and comprehensive briefings occurred, they should have been
recorded in a log and there should have been a strategy throughout for what could
and could not be disclosed. The Panel rejects former DCS Cook’s account that he was
entitled to disclose material as he suggested he was.
5 Operation Megan
5.1 Complaint by Jonathan Rees
254. On 30 January 2012, Jonathan Rees made a complaint to the Independent Police
Complaints Commission against the Metropolitan Police. The Metropolitan Police were
informed of the complaint, which contained four allegations. In subsequent meetings
and correspondence, Jonathan Rees amended these allegations. The four allegations
were as follows:
i. ‘Confidential information belonging to Mr Rees had been improperly disclosed to the

BBC Panorama programme on 14th March 2011.
ii. DCS Cook prompted and coached prosecution witness Gary Eaton to change his
evidence. DCS Cook then gave live evidence at the Voir Dire[372] and lied about his
contact with him.
iii. Mr Rees was defamed in a Sun Newspaper article[373] published on 27th October 2006.
This complaint was later withdrawn.
iv. Mr Alistair [sic] Morgan the brother of Daniel Morgan attended the IPCC to “question”
them about the arrest of DCS Cook by the IPCC in January 2012.’ 374
255. The first allegation375 referred to video taken from Jonathan Rees’s computer hard drive;
transcripts of covert police recordings; and invoices that had Jonathan Rees’s personal details
on them, which had been seized by the Abelard Two Investigation during a search of Jonathan
Rees’s home on 07 February 2007.376,377 Some of this material had been shown during the BBC
Panorama programme on 14 March 2011.378 Jonathan Rees named two journalists, Graeme
McLagan, who appeared in the Panorama programme, and Michael Sullivan, as contacts of
former DCS David Cook.379,380
372 The pre-trial hearing.

373 ‘Found! The 1957 Austin Healey that could solve 20-year murder riddle’, Michael Sullivan, MPS102671001, 27 October 2006.
374 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p9, para 5.1, undated.
375 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William J. Rees’, IPC001411001, p4, paras 1-3, 14 December 2016.
376 Witness statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS109704001, pp47-48, para 28, 13 June 2014.
377 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William J. Rees’, IPC001411001, p8, para 41, 14 December 2016.
378 Witness statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS109704001, p41, para 4c, 13 June 2014.
380 Witness statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS109704001, pp63-64, para 71, 13 June 2014.
936
256. Following D/Supt Mark Mitchell’s review in February 2012 (see section 2 above), there
was discussion between the Independent Police Complaints Commission and the Metropolitan
Police about who should investigate Jonathan Rees’s complaint. On 03 July 2012, the
Independent Police Complaints Commission Investigator contacted Commander Peter Spindler
at the Metropolitan Police requesting that the first two allegations should be dealt with by the
Metropolitan Police. Jonathan Rees withdrew his third allegation, and the fourth was dealt with
by the Independent Police Complaints Commission.381
5.1.1 Review into the complaint by Jonathan Rees and findings of Mr Justice Maddison,
in R v Rees & Others, 19 April 2013382
257. Commander Allan Gibson of the Directorate of Professional Standards asked DCI Fiona
McCormack and DI Donna Smith to carry out the review of the complaint by Jonathan Rees and
of the findings of ‘The Maddison Ruling’.
258. The Terms of Reference for DCI Fiona McCormack’s review were as follows:
i. To contact Jonathan Rees’s solicitor and establish the extent of the allegations and
supporting evidence.
ii. To review the judgment of Mr Justice Maddison ‘around improper handling and
prompting’ of Gary Eaton by DCS David Cook.
iii. To review the evidence given in Court by former DCS Cook.
iv. To review the evidence of others given in Court that related to the police handling
of Gary Eaton.
v. To prepare a report detailing a timeline of events, investigative opportunities and

potential criminal/misconduct offences that may have been committed.
vi. To seek early Crown Prosecution Service advice.383
259. On 14 February 2013, Jonathan Rees was interviewed, and he disclosed further
complaints. This interview was transcribed by police into a draft statement for Jonathan Rees,
which was supplied to him for signature. However, at that stage he did not sign it, as he wished
to make further amendments.384
260. On 05 March 2013, DCI Fiona McCormack and DI Donna Smith met Alison Saunders, the
Chief Crown Prosecutor for the London region of the Crown Prosecution Service, to discuss
the emerging findings of the review. Alison Saunders stated that she believed a full investigation
should take place into Jonathan Rees’s complaint and the issues addressed by Mr Justice
Maddison, pointing out that, without this, the family of Daniel Morgan would always have
unanswered questions. It was recorded that she further recommended ‘the investigation should
not be conducted by the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] as the public and the family had lost
confidence in the MPS as a result of numerous failed investigations’.385
381 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p9, paras 5.1-5.2, undated.

382 ‘Review into the public complaint of Jonathan Rees and the findings of “The Maddison Ruling”’, MPS109704001, p19, 19 April 2013.
385 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p10, paras 5.7–5.8, undated.
937
261. On 19 April 2013, DCI Fiona McCormack reported the results of her review. She detailed
potential investigative opportunities, focusing on the following:
i. The unauthorised contact between former DCS David Cook and Gary Eaton.
ii. The possibility that Gary Eaton had been prompted by former DCS Cook when
providing his evidence.
iii. Whether Gary Eaton had been ‘tipped off’ regarding his claim that his father was dead.
iv. Jonathan Rees’s allegations regarding the lack of investigations by officers during the
Abelard Two Investigation.
v. Confidential information belonging to Jonathan Rees being disclosed to the Panorama

programme386 (this matter was transferred back to the Independent Police Complaints
Commission in 2015 and dealt with there).
262. DCI Fiona McCormack stated in her report:
‘There are vast political and moral reasons for ensuring that a thorough, impartial
investigation takes place into Abelard II. If this is not done, it could be perceived that
the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] are failing to act on comments made by the
Crown Court Judge, a public complaint made by a defendant and civil complaints
made by the family and other defendants.’387
263. DCI Fiona McCormack concluded her report with a recommendation that an independent
investigation be carried out by the Independent Police Complaints Commission.388
264. During the months which followed, there was discussion as to who should conduct
the investigation. On 14 June 2013, the Independent Police Complaints Commission Deputy
Chair, Deborah Glass, wrote to Commander Allan Gibson declining to investigate and saying
that ‘[w]hile the IPCC [Independent Police Complaints Commission] does investigate a small
number of corruption cases you are aware that we are not currently resourced to carry out
many or large corruption enquiries […]’.389 She suggested that either Sir Stanley Burnton, then
newly appointed Chair of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, or the Serious Organised
Crime Agency (as former DCS David Cook’s employer) might investigate former DCS Cook.390
On 16 August 2013, the Metropolitan Police invited Sir Stanley Burnton to conduct the
investigation.391 On 17 September 2013, Sir Stanley Burnton declined to take the complaints
investigation, stating that the Panel’s remit ‘does not include investigating complaints of
misconduct against any particular officer’. He went on to say that the Panel would ‘not be
conducting an investigation in the sense that might be expected to be conducted by the MPS
[Metropolitan Police Service] in respect of a recordable conduct matter under the Police Reform
Act 2002’.392,393

389 Letter from Deborah Glass to Commander Allan Gibson, MPS109847001, pp1-2, 14 June 2013.
391 Decision 38, SIO Decision Log, MPS109902001, p45, 16 August 2013.
392 Letter from Sir Stanley Burnton to Commander Allan Gibson, 17 September 2013.
393 Decision 41, SIO Decision Log, MPS109902001, p48, 23 September 2013.
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265. On 25 October 2013, DCI Fiona McCormack recorded that Commander Allan Gibson
had decided that the Directorate of Professional Standards should take the investigation and
that it would be led by DCI McCormack as the Senior Investigating Officer.394 On 01 December
2013, the Metropolitan Police requested that the British Transport Police should be appointed
to provide independent oversight of the enquiry, to ensure that a thorough and professional
investigation was conducted with integrity.395 On 18 December 2013, DCS Martin Fry of
the British Transport Police was appointed as the Senior Investigating Officer, to provide
independent oversight.396 The investigation commenced in January 2014. 397
5.2 The Operation Megan Investigation

266. In November 2013, Jonathan Rees explained that he wanted to amend his draft statement
of 14 February 2013.398 On 21 January 2014, Jonathan Rees was interviewed. The Terms of
Reference for the Operation Megan Investigation, derived from his complaints which were made
formally in a statement dated 13 June 2014,399 were as follows:
A. To fully investigate the complaints made by Jonathan Rees:
i. Police officers dealing with the witness, Gary Eaton, breached the sterile corridor
between the Abelard Two Investigation and the witness debriefing team.
ii. Gary Eaton was prompted and/or coached by the Operation Abelard Two
Investigation team, particularly DCS David Cook.
iii. Gary Eaton was tipped off by the Operation Abelard Two Investigation team that
Defence lawyers had discovered that he had lied about his father being dead.
iv. Former DCS Cook lied in court during a bail application regarding the history of
James Ward and did not disclose relevant information about his background.
v. Former DCS David Cook lied during a bail application when providing evidence
that Glenn Vian threatened a named individual400 with an axe.
vi. DCS David Cook, AC John Yates and other members of the Operation Abelard
Two Investigation team allowed Gary Eaton to confess to serious crimes despite
being mentally ill. Gary Eaton should have had an appropriate adult, and the
Operation Abelard Two Investigation team did not conduct any enquiries to
corroborate Gary Eaton’s confessions.
vii. The Operation Abelard Two Investigation team pressurised Person J5 into giving
a statement despite her being mentally ill.
viii. The Operation Abelard Two Investigation team failed to challenge Gary Eaton
and Person J5 on their allegations despite believing that the information they
provided could not be correct.
394 Decision 42, SIO Decision Log, MPS109902001, p49, 14 October 2013.
395 Decision 54, SIO Decision Log, MPS109903001, p9, 01 December 2013.
397 Decision 49 and Decision 50, SIO Decision Log, MPS109903001, pp3-5, 26 November 2013.
398 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, page 11, para 5.19, undated.
399 Witness statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS109704001, pp40-64, 13 June 2014.
400 Person W14.
939
ix. The Operation Abelard Two Investigation team were aware of, but failed to
disclose, 18 crates of relevant material.
x. Information was improperly disclosed to Panorama by Metropolitan Police

officers, and subsequently by others following the seizure of Jonathan Rees’s
computers and documents during a search in 2007.
xi. The Operation Abelard Two Investigation team attempted to pressurise Jonathan
Rees’s partner, Margaret Harrison, into providing a statement against him.401
B. To consider whether any person had committed any criminal offences and/or had a
case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct.402
C. To identify any organisational learning and make recommendations as

deemed necessary.403
267. DCI Fiona McCormack’s initial focus was to investigate allegation (x) above, that
information was improperly disclosed to Panorama by Metropolitan Police officers, and
subsequently by others, following the seizure of computers and documents during a search at
Jonathan Rees’s home address in 2007.404 Photographs and invoices, which were contained
within a laptop seized from Jonathan Rees by police during the Abelard Two Investigation,
had been shown on the Panorama programme entitled ‘Tabloid Hacks Exposed’ (broadcast on
14 March 2011).405
268. This was the first occasion upon which this aspect of Jonathan Rees’s complaint had
actually been examined. For the previous two-and-a-half years the Metropolitan Police and the
Independent Police Complaints Commission had been clarifying the allegations contained in
the complaint and discussing who should investigate the allegations. The Independent Police
Complaints Commission did not have to investigate such a complaint and had the right to refer
it back to the Metropolitan Police which it sought to do. The Metropolitan Police preferred the
Independent Police Complaints Commission to carry out the investigation.
269. Following extensive investigation, Operation Megan established that a working copy
of a disc produced from Jonathan Rees’s computer for the Abelard Two Investigation, which
contained the material which was shown on the Panorama programme, was missing and could
not be located. It was also established that the invoices which were shown on the programme
had been sent by email from former DCS David Cook to the journalist Michael Sullivan.406
270. Simultaneously, the Independent Police Complaints Commission investigation, Operation

Longhorn (see section 4 above) was investigating leaks of police material from former DCS
David Cook to Michael Sullivan.407
271. Although the Operation Megan Investigation made some progress in relation to the
investigation of the unauthorised disclosure of material to the Panorama programme, there was
a very real problem created by the dual roles of the Metropolitan Police and the Independent
Police Complaints Commission, and the lack of resources to investigate at the Independent
401 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p2, para 2, undated.

406 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p14, paras 7.9 and 7.10, undated.
940
Police Complaints Commission. This led to a meeting on 08 January 2015, between the
Independent Police Complaints Commission, Senior Investigator Chris Mahaffey and the
Metropolitan Police Senior Investigating Officer, DCI Fiona McCormack. At this meeting, it was
agreed that the investigation into the Panorama leakage would be conducted wholly by the
Independent Police Complaints Commission.408
272. The Independent Police Complaints Commission Report on the Panorama allegation is
analysed at section 6 below.
273. As a result of the meeting on 08 January 2015, one of Jonathan Rees’s complaints
to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, which was that ‘DCS Cook prompted
and coached prosecution witness Gary Eaton to change his evidence. DCS Cook then gave
live evidence at the Voir Dire409 and lied about his contact with him,’410 was returned to the
Metropolitan Police for investigation, by the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
274. Operation Megan investigators accessed various data and information sources, including
the following:
i. The seven HOLMES accounts used to investigate the murder of Daniel Morgan.411
ii. Exhibits seized following the arrest of Jonathan Rees in 2007.412
iii. Documentation and exhibits seized after the arrest of former DCS David Cook by the
Independent Police Complaints Commission in 2012.413
iv. Exhibits seized by police following the execution of a search warrant at former DCS
Cook’s home address in 2014.414
v. All material held by the Criminal Cases Review Commission in relation to the proposed
prosecution of Jonathan Rees and others, which was withdrawn on 11 March 2011.415
5.2.1 The initial review of exhibits seized from former DCS David Cook’s home address in
November 2014
275. In the course of communication by former DCS David Cook with the Metropolitan Police
on a personal matter in 2014, he supplied the Metropolitan Police with a copy of a Metropolitan
Police document which he should not have had, since he was retired. This led the Metropolitan
Police to question whether he might also be holding other Metropolitan Police material.416
Operation Megan investigators obtained and executed a search warrant at former DCS Cook’s
home address in November 2014.417,418 During this search, numerous exhibits were seized,

416 Decision 89, SIO Decision Log, MPS109903001, pp45-46, 23 July 2014.
418 Witness statement, MPS1097130001, p221, 04 November 2014; Witness statement, MPS1097130001, pp242-244, 05 November 2014.
941
including a large number of electronic storage devices such as laptops, memory sticks and
mobile telephones. These electronic devices were subjected to forensic examination and the
contents were analysed by Operation Megan investigators.419
276. Two exhibits were assessed to be of particular note: a hard drive concealed in a recess in
former DCS David Cook’s guest bathroom, and a MacBook Pro laptop.420,421 Investigators also
gained access to former DCS Cook’s Metropolitan Police, the Serious Organised Crime Agency
and Yahoo email accounts, which contained in excess of 20,000 emails.422
277. Interrogation of the electronic devices and email accounts owned by former DCS
David Cook showed that he had retained copies of material and correspondence relating to
many of the investigations he had managed during his time as a Senior Investigating Officer.
This material was varied, and included intelligence logs, case file papers, research and
analysis documents, and email correspondence. The recovered documentation ranged in
its classification, from open source material which is freely available to the public, to highly
sensitive, secret documents.423
278. Operation Megan was also provided by the Independent Police Complaints Commission
with 620 emails and 5,846 pages of documents covering the period between 23 August 2006
and 07 September 2011, which had been provided to Operation Elveden by the Management
Standards Committee at News International. The documents covered the period from 23 August
2006 to 07 September 2011. These documents were analysed, and a report was submitted by a
Detective Constable on 31 July 2014.424 The report concluded that:
‘what is evident from reviewing these 5,846 pages of documents is that David COOK
was intent on advancing his career as a future author of books and as a result provided
Mike SULLIVAN with unrestricted access to material belonging to the Metropolitan
Police Service and Operation Abelard Two. Although it is apparent from the content
of some of these emails and from his prepared statements to the IPCC [Independent
Police Complaints Commission] that he was experiencing both health and personal
problems, he was undeterred in his mission to publish this book.’425
279. This conclusion is clearly justified by the content of the emails.
280. Operation Megan had specific, limited Terms of Reference. These did not include
an investigation into material found concealed at former DCS David Cook’s home in
November 2014. Following a meeting with AC Martin Hewitt (who was newly appointed
to deal with these matters following the departure of AC Cressida Dick426 from the
Metropolitan Police), this material was transferred to a new investigation called Operation
Edison (see section 10 below).427
419 Decision 99, SIO Decision Log, MPS109904001, p5, 20 November 2014.
420 Briefing note re Operation Megan Report, Metropolitan Police Service Directorate of Professionalism, MPS109907001, p1, 26 January 2015.
421 Witness Statement, MPS1097130001, p221, 04 November 2014, Witness Statement, MPS1097130001, p243, 05 November 2014.
424 D276 Op Megan, p19, 31 July 2014.
425 D276 Op Megan, pp17-18, 31 July 2014.
426 Subsequently returned to the Metropolitan Police as Commissioner in April 2017.
427 Decisions 99 and 100, SIO Decision Log, MPS109904001, pp5-6, 20 November 2014 and 20 January 2015.
942
5.2.2 Allegations concerning the debrief and handling of Gary Eaton and the allegation
that Gary Eaton was prompted and coached by former DCS David Cook and other
members of the Abelard Two Investigation
281. Operation Megan investigators examined the information concerning allegations of
a breach in the sterile corridor between Gary Eaton and the Abelard Two Investigation and
whether he had been prompted or coached by former DCS Cook and other members of the
Abelard Two Investigation.428 Gary Eaton had not given evidence at the pre-trial hearing in
relation to these matters. The matters were dealt with together because the occasions on which
the sterile corridor was said to be breached were the occasions on which it was alleged that
Gary Eaton had been prompted or coached.
282. Gary Eaton was interviewed by Operation Megan investigators on 08 and 09 July
2014.429,430,431,432,433 An interview strategy prepared by a Detective Inspector provided that Gary
Eaton was to be treated as a vulnerable witness.
283. In summary, it was reported that Gary Eaton had said that:
i. He knew about the sterile corridor and how it should work. It had been explained to
him in the debrief and by his witness protection team.434
ii. That the sterile corridor had only been breached on one occasion, and this happened
when he was being asked about Glenn Vian and Garry Vian and he could not
remember their names. During a break he had gone with DS (later DI) Anthony Moore
for a walk. Gary Eaton said that DS Moore said to him ‘if you are having difficulty
remembering their names I can give them to you’. He said that he ‘went mad’ and
returned to the debrief telling his solicitor what had happened and recording the
breach on tape at the start of the next session. He said that he did not trust DS Moore
due to the fact that DS Moore had tried to feed him information.435
iii. Former DCS David Cook was ‘an honest, totally upfront “Old Style Copper”’.
All contacts with former DCS Cook were in relation to welfare issues and issues
surrounding the protection of his family. Contact which had taken place with former
DCS Cook had not related to the ongoing investigation and were not inappropriate.
He also said that the majority of the calls were made to him by former DCS Cook.436
iv. He was never given instructions on what to say by anyone.437
v. He had not signed the handwritten statement of 05 September 2006 in which he had
stated that he wanted to disclose that ‘the brothers are involved’ (see Chapter 8,
Abelard Two Investigation).438
428 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p2, paras 2.1.1-2.1.2, undated.

429 Gary Eaton Interview, Disk 1, MPS109853001, 08 July 2014.
434 Overview of Gary Eaton’s interviews of 8th and 9th July 2014, MPS109821001, p2, undated.
436 Overview of Gary Eaton’s interviews of 8th and 9th July 2014, MPS109821001, pp2-3, undated.
943
284. Operation Megan investigators were aware that a further allegation had been made by
Gary Eaton that:
i. during his debrief an officer had dropped him a name;
ii. when he was attending an identity parade he had ‘been shown a face’ by
DS Anthony Moore; and
iii. had also said that ‘Cook [(DCS David Cook)] should not have been on the case’.
This was alleged to have happened on 12 May 2010 when Gary Eaton had
commented on the two alleged breaches of the sterile corridor to two police officers.439
285. These matters referred to in the previous paragraph had been brought to the attention of
a Detective Inspector in the Witness Protection Unit. The Detective Inspector had recorded on
20 May 2010 that he had visited Gary Eaton at his home on 19 May 2010, and had asked him
about these allegations:
i. Gary Eaton had explained that during a break in his debrief one day, DS Anthony
Moore had suggested that he might jog his memory in respect of the name of a person
whom he had been discussing. He immediately rejected the suggestion and the matter
had been dropped. Gary Eaton had also said that he later complained about this
incident to D/Supt Barry Phillips and that, as a result, a very short time later DS Moore
had been removed from the enquiry.
Gary Eaton had confirmed to the Detective Inspector ‘that he had already formally
complained about this incident and it had been dealt with’.440
ii. when asked what he meant by saying that after he had participated in an ID procedure
he had been ‘shown a face’, Gary Eaton had said that after the ID procedure DS Moore
had asked Gary Eaton whether he had picked out a particular suspect, and he had
replied that he had not. He said that at a later debrief DS Moore had ‘tried to “force”
the matter’ but that he stated that he had refused to be drawn on the matter.441
iii. when asked what he meant when he commented that ‘Cook should not have been on
the case’ he explained that David Cook used to ring him up and say things but that
none of what he said was inappropriate.
286. The Detective Inspector from the Witness Protection Unit determined that the first
allegation had been reported and dealt with and, in respect of the second and third allegations,
nothing improper had occurred.442 He also said that that being the case, and because Gary
Eaton was no longer a prosecution witness, he had decided to take no further action.
287. The interview by the Detective Inspector from the Witness Protection Unit on 19 May
2010 was simply recorded as a Case Note in the Witness Protection files. There is no
evidence that it was brought to the attention of Prosecuting Counsel or to his senior officers.
However, it is recorded that on 05 October 2010 the Case Note was sent to the Directorate of
Professional Standards.
439 Witness Protection Unit Case Note, MPS001357001, p1, 20 May 2010.
442 Witness Protection Unit Case Note, EDN001096001, p2, 20 May 2010.
944
288. An investigation was then carried out by a Detective Sergeant in the Directorate of
Professional Standards who reported on 13 October 2010. He stated that he had reviewed
these matters and:
i. On 08 October 2010, Gary Eaton’s solicitor had been contacted but had responded
that Gary Eaton had not made a complaint and does not intend to do so. Gary Eaton’s
solicitor was unable to give a statement without the consent of her client and that
consent had not been forthcoming.443 However, the Detective Sergeant recorded that
the solicitor had been present throughout all the interviews and had accompanied
Gary Eaton on all breaks and had not made any complaint.444
ii. Gary Eaton had disputed that he made these complaints and did not wish
to complain.445
iii. He could find no record of how the first allegation about the giving of a name had been
dealt with, and no record of the allegation on the police discipline computer system.446
However, neither Gary Eaton nor his solicitor, ‘alleged any inappropriate actions [by] DI
Tony Moore regarding this allegation’.447
iv. There was no impropriety in the second allegation because Gary Eaton had not been
shown a photograph before the ID procedure.448
v. The third allegation was an expression of Gary Eaton’s opinion that David Cook should
not have been on the investigation.449
vi. ‘No evidence has been found to corroborate any inappropriate actions by either
DI Tony Moore or Dave Cook. Unless new information comes to light, it is not
proportionate or appropriate to investigate this matter any further.’450
289. Operation Megan became aware of this matter, and officers who were deemed to be
significant to the allegations were interviewed in 2014. It was reported that:
i. Former D/Supt Barry Phillips provided no new disclosures to the investigation

but referred the Operation Megan investigators to his decision logs which were
contemporaneous records.451 There was nothing in the logs.
ii. DI (formerly DS) Anthony Moore provided no further evidence.452 As the Debrief
Manager, he produced the report about alleged interference in the debrief of Gary
Eaton by members of the Abelard Two Investigation which was referred to by defence
lawyers and others as ‘Mooregate’,453 and reiterated that the matters alleged by Gary
Eaton had not occurred
443 Operation Scaup Report, MPS109851001, p8, paras 12-14, 13 October 2010.
444 Operation Scaup Report, MPS109851001, p8, para 7, 13 October 2010.
451 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p41, para 8.5.3.14, undated.
452 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p41, para 8.5.3.13 and 8.5.3.15, undated.
453 Report by DI Anthony Moore, MPS006784001, undated.
945
iii. One of the debriefers, a former police officer, also felt that Gary Eaton had been
coached or led by the Abelard Two Investigation. He also said that ‘during one of the
debriefs Mr Eaton mentioned that he and DCS Cook would speak on “Skype” to avoid
any trace’. This was not recorded in any of the transcripts. The debriefer also referred
to DNA evidence in relation to Gary Eaton being ‘buried’ or ‘covered up.’ A review of
the forensic evidence in relation to Gary Eaton was conducted by Operation Megan
and it was reported that nothing improper was discovered.454
iv. The Operation Megan Report stated that one of the other debriefers added nothing to
the documentation which he had already provided.455
290. The Panel checked whether DS Anthony Moore had been removed from Gary Eaton’s
debrief team, as alleged by Gary Eaton. It has been established that DS Moore remained
manager of the debrief team until the end of the debrief.
291. The Operation Megan Report states that former DCS David Cook had been arrested by
the Independent Police Complaints Commission on 10 January 2012, and that following his
arrest he had been interviewed regarding the offences for which he was arrested and matters
relating to Gary Eaton. That interview had been carried out under caution, in accordance with
the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. However, there had been no
further formal interviews by the Independent Police Complaints Commission. Matters had been
dealt with through written questions sent by the Independent Police Complaints Commission to
former DCS Cook’s solicitor. These were not under caution. In these answers he had maintained
that there had been no wrongdoing in the manner Gary Eaton had been treated.456
292. Although DCS David Cook’s written responses to questions were not made under caution,
it is reported in Operation Longhorn that former DCS Cook had adopted the three documents
which he had provided during an interview under caution by the Independent Police Complaints
Commission on 08 November 2012.
293. The fact that DCS David Cook had denied under caution any wrongdoing in
relation to how Gary Eaton had been handled did not preclude the Metropolitan Police
from questioning him about matters arising from the investigation of Jonathan Rees’s
complaints. Former DCS Cook was not interviewed by officers from Operation Megan.
DCI Fiona McCormack made a reasoned decision in October 2016 that she would not
interview former DCS Cook because ‘there was insufficient evidence to interview him’.457
294. The Operation Megan Investigation into these two allegations – that there had been a
breach of the sterile corridor and that Gary Eaton had been coached in giving his evidence –
concluded the following:
i. There was no evidence to suggest that Gary Eaton was prompted to provide
information by the Abelard Two Investigation.458
ii. Former DCS David Cook should not have maintained the levels of contact which he
had with Gary Eaton without keeping formal records of the contacts.459
454 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p41, paras 8.5.3.16–8.5.3.18, undated.

457 Decision 103, Policy Book 3, Operation Megan, MPS109904001, October 2016.
946
iii. However, while ‘[o]n the balance of probabilities DCS Cook’s actions did amount to
a breach of the standards of professional behaviour’,460 this breach was assessed as
being ‘misconduct only’.461
iv. Former DCS Cook could no longer be subjected to misconduct proceedings following
his retirement.462
v. There was no evidence to suggest that any member of the Abelard Two Investigation
team breached the standards of professional behaviour.463
vi. There was ‘insufficient evidence to suggest that the criminal threshold has
been reached’.464
295. There is a very clear timeline which shows extensive unauthorised contact between
DCS David Cook and Gary Eaton, and the development of Gary Eaton’s evidence to
the Abelard Two Investigation (see Chapter 8, Abelard Two Investigation, section 6.4).
However, apart from this circumstantial evidence there is nothing which is capable of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Gary Eaton was prompted to provide evidence to
the Abelard Two Investigation and Gary Eaton has denied that he was coached in what to
say. The Panel has noted that allegations that DS Anthony Moore had attempted to coach
him were made and subsequently withdrawn by Gary Eaton. Had Gary Eaton admitted that
he had been coached and that he had given fabricated evidence in accordance with such
coaching, he would have been admitting criminal behaviour not only by him, but also by
the person who had coached him.
296. There was no attempt to gain further information about these issues. Person G23
could have been interviewed, as could the Witness Protection Unit officers and the
Criminal Justice Protection Unit officers, in addition to those who were questioned.
Furthermore, former DCS David Cook should have been interviewed so that investigators
could put to him the allegations which had been made, and so that he could give his
account of what happened.
5.2.3 The allegation that Gary Eaton was tipped off by the Abelard Two Investigation team
that Defence lawyers had discovered that he had lied about his father being dead
297. Operation Megan investigators reviewed the evidence available in relation to the allegation
that Gary Eaton had been ‘tipped off’ that Defence lawyers had discovered that he had lied
about his father being dead as alleged by Jonathan Rees.465,466
298. The details of what happened in relation to whether Gary Eaton had lied about his father’s
death, and whether he had been ‘tipped off’ that he had lied are to be found in Chapter 8,
Abelard Two Investigation, section 6.4.6.

465 Witness statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS1097130001, p151, para 43, 13 June 2014.
947
299. Operation Megan recorded the chronology of events and concluded that Gary
Eaton had been:
‘given the opportunity to retain credibility by explaining an obvious discrepancy in his

account. This does not amount to either a criminal offence or misconduct on behalf of
any officer.
‘There is evidence that the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] had been consulted
regarding the further interviews and de-briefs of Mr Eaton surrounding his father. No
evidence has been found either by Mr Justice Maddison or Operation Megan to show
any actions amounting to criminal conduct or that would be subject to disciplinary
proceedings.
‘AC [John] Yates was informed of the concerns DS [Anthony] Moore had regarding the
handling of ‘the father’ issue and he [(AC John Yates)] subsequently tasked Commander
Stuart Osbourne [sic] to investigate the way the matter had been dealt with.
Commander Osborne’s findings concluded that the decisions made were appropriate
and that there were no misconduct issues arising from the actions taken.’467
300. Mr Justice Maddison did not comment on whether there was any action amounting
to criminal conduct or that would be subject to disciplinary proceedings. It was therefore
inaccurate for the Operation Megan Report to state that ‘no evidence has been found’ by Mr
Justice Maddison ‘to show any actions amounting to criminal conduct or that would be subject
to disciplinary proceedings’. In fact Mr Justice Maddison did consider whether Gary Eaton was
‘tipped off’ that he had been found to have lied about his father’s death,468 and concluded that
‘[t]he purpose of the approach to Mr Eaton in my view was in part at least to tip him off that he
had been caught out lying about his father’.469
301. The Operation Megan Report concluded that there was ‘no evidence to suggest that there
was any breach in the standards of professional behaviour by any members of the investigation
team, witness protection teams or debrief teams’ in this regard.470
302. This conclusion is not justified. There was evidence to suggest that there had
been some breaches in the standards of professional behaviour, not least in the various
comments made by Mr Justice Maddison. Those comments included the following:
i. His evaluation of the disclosure problems arising in the context of the 18 crates
was that ‘a clearer example of a lack of due diligence and expedition is difficult
to imagine’.471
ii. In relation to Gary Eaton eventually naming the brothers (Glenn Vian and
Garry Vian), he said that he was ‘satisfied there was improper prompting of
some kind’. 472
467 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p47, paras 8.6.3.2–8.6.3.4, undated.

468 Document D5586, ‘Judges ruling re Eaton and other matters’, MPS107506001, pp58-62, paras 267-279, undated.
469 Document D5586, ‘Judges ruling re Eaton and other matters’, MPS107506001, p60, para 274.5, undated.
471 Maddison J judgment, CLA000144001, p22, 03 March 2010.
472 Ruling of Maddison J, MPS107506001, p36, para. 167, undated.
948
iii. In discussing DCS David Cook’s breaches of the sterile corridor during the
briefing of Gary Eaton, Mr Justice Maddison said: ‘It is clear in my view that
DCS Cook seriously understated the frequency of his previous contact with Mr
Eaton when he completed these schedules, and he probably did so knowingly.
I could readily understand some omissions due to human error and/or lack of
time. However, the stark fact is that the schedule in its final form referred to
only one-sixth of the days on which contacts were actually made.’ 473 He later
said, ‘DCS Cook was aware of the sterile corridor system and of its purpose but
contacted Mr Eaton repeatedly in breach of the system. He continued to do so
even after receiving directions and giving undertakings not to do so.’ 474
5.2.4 The allegation that former DCS David Cook lied in court during a bail application
regarding the history of James Ward and did not disclose relevant information about
his background
303. Jonathan Rees had alleged in his written statement of complaint that ‘[t]here were several
bail applications. As usual, the bail applications were farcical in that the information that [former
DCS David] COOK was putting up to stop us getting bail was absolutely totally misleading and
lies.’ He also said, ‘[h]owever, I confirm that my belief that false or misleading information was
provided at any of the bail applications relating to the case does not form part of my complaint
and I have requested that this is not investigated as part of it’.475 Finally, Jonathan Rees had said
that DCS Cook ‘said that Glen [sic] shouldn’t be released as he would interfere with witnesses
and this was one of the main reasons for objecting the bail’.476
304. This was reported by DCI Fiona McCormack as being a complaint that DCS David Cook
had ‘lied in court during a bail application regarding the history of Mr Ward and did not disclose
relevant information about his background’ and that ‘DCS Cook lied during a bail application
when providing evidence that Mr Glenn Vian threatened [Person W14] with an axe’.477 He said
that former DCS Cook had given misleading information to the court during a bail application, as
a consequence of which he had been kept on remand in prison.
305. Operation Megan investigators established that former DCS David Cook had not given
evidence on oath at any of the bail hearings or the hearings of applications by the Prosecution
to extend the custody time limits.478
306. Jonathan Rees had stated that when his lawyers had asked whether James Ward had
ever been an informant, the prosecution replied in writing that James Ward had never been an
informant. He stated that it had later been discovered that James Ward had been an informant
and had used at least two pseudonyms (see Chapter 8, Abelard Two Investigation). He also
stated that James Ward had provided information to police about where drugs had been hidden
in a cemetery in Norwood, which had resulted in him receiving a reduced sentence.479
473 Ruling of Maddison J, MPS107506001, p32, para. 156, undated.

474 Ruling of Maddison J, MPS107506001, p34, para. 166(b), undated.
476 Witness statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS1097130001, p152, paras 46, 13 June 2014.
478 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p 51, para 9.5.2, undated.
949
307. This matter was not addressed in the Operation Megan Report other than in the
conclusion of the section on this aspect of his complaint it was said that ‘[t]he evidence that
the prosecution relied on to oppose Mr Glenn Vian’s bail application was endorsed by the
CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] and ratified by Mr Hilliard QC prior to being presented
in court by prosecution counsel. […] no misleading information was presented during any
bail applications.’480
308. Since it was correct that there was no evidence that former DCS David Cook
had given evidence during any bail application or custody time limit hearing, it was
correct to say that former DCS Cook had not lied in court when giving evidence during
such hearings.
There is no evidence that former DCS Cook had known that James Ward had been
an informant before he first met James Ward in 2005. The information which he
had previously supplied had been given using pseudonyms. Requests for any other
pseudonyms used for James Ward, made by T/DCI Noel Beswick during Abelard Two,
had received a negative reply. The evidence available shows that T/DCI Beswick had
first become aware in March 2010 (see Chapter 8, Abelard Two Investigation) that James
Ward had previously provided evidence to the police under pseudonyms.
Notwithstanding this, former DCS Cook had known that James Ward had stated in 2006
that he had provided information to police in 1987 which had resulted in his sentence
of seven years being reduced to two years. Jonathan Rees was correct in saying that
James Ward had previously provided information to the police.
309. Jonathan Rees also alleged that former DCS David Cook had lied during a bail application
when providing evidence from James Ward that Glenn Vian had threatened Person W14 with
an axe. Jonathan Rees stated that Person W14 had been identified and visited by a private
investigator (a former police detective) who was working for Jonathan Rees’s solicitors. Person
W14 had told the private investigator that he had previously told the Abelard Two Investigation
that he had not been threatened by Glenn Vian with an axe.481
310. In response to this allegation by Jonathan Rees, the Operation Megan Report stated that
‘the investigation team were in possession of information from independent witnesses and
covert recording product, all of which implicated Mr Glenn Vian in threatening a male relative
with an axe. This information provided sufficient grounds in making an application to oppose Mr
Glenn Vian’s bail applications.’482 In addition to this, the Abelard Two Investigation had relied on
other evidence from James Ward.483
311. The Operation Megan Investigation had a covert recording indicating that a male relative of
Glenn Vian had known something about a third party being chased around a field with an axe.
The recording did not indicate that a male relative of Glenn Vian had been threatened with an

482 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p51-52, paras 9.5.5–9.5.8, undated.
483 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, pp51-52, paras 9.5.3–9.5.7, undated.
950
axe or chased around a field with an axe. In addition, the recording did not indicate that Glenn
Vian had chased anyone around a field with an axe. The recording simply said that an unnamed
individual ‘had been chased around the field with an axe’.
312. The material available to the Panel shows that James Ward had made a statement on
09 November 2006 in which he said that a man who, he thought, was Person W14, ‘had been
mouthing off that Glen [sic] and Gary [sic] were responsible for the Daniel Morgan murder. Glen
[sic] and Gary [sic] decided to give him a visit to warn him off.’ James Ward had not stated that
Person W14 had been chased across a field. Rather he had said that ‘[t]here was a wire fence
between them. Glen [sic] started to give [Person W14] a warning about keeping his mouth shut.
[Person W14] started to run off across the field. They couldn’t chase him because of the fence.
Glen [sic] started shouting at [Person W14]. The next thing Glen [sic] produced an axe from his
coat. Gary [sic] said Glen [sic] was shouting to [Person W14]to keep his mouth shut or he’d get
some of this.’484
313. Abelard Two investigators had visited Person W14 on 12 October 2006 and he had told
them that a family member owned a field with horses and could be the person they needed
to speak to.485 The family member had been visited and had said that Kim Vian, Glenn Vian’s
wife, was his niece. He also said that he had not been threatened with an axe by Glenn Vian.486
A third person, John Peacock, who had been a process server with Southern Investigations at
the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder, was also visited by T/DCI Noel Beswick and DS Gary Dalby
on 12 February 2009. He said that he had visited a farm owned by a male relative of Garry Vian
and Glenn Vian who had owned horses. He did not give any information about anyone being
threatened with an axe by Glenn Vian.487 In total, three people were visited by the Abelard Two
Investigation. None of them had said he was threatened by Glenn Vian with an axe. There is no
record that any of them were asked whether they knew anyone who had been so threatened.
314. In relation to the information provided by John Peacock on 12 February 2009, DS Gary
Dalby reported that, ‘[t]his information corroborates WARD’s account of the VIAN’s
attending a farm with horses owned by a relative to threaten the relative with an axe for
talking about the MORGAN murder’ [bold in original].488
315. The information provided by John Peacock did not corroborate James Ward’s
account as set out by DS Gary Dalby. What the document actually reports was that John
Peacock had attended a farm in a known location that ‘was owned by an older male
relative of the VIAN’s and had 5 or 6 horses there’ [bold in original].489 The information
supplied by DS Dalby, as recorded in this document, to the Abelard Two Investigation is
therefore incorrect.
484 Witness Statement of James Ward, MPS090079001, p28, 09 November 2006.

485 Message from DS Gary Dalby regarding visiting Person W14 to ascertain if he was threatened by Glenn Vian and Person W14’s family
information, MPS064237001, p1, 16 November 2006.
486 Action A589, ‘Take interview and Take statement of […] re incident with Vian’, MPS064499001, 17 November 2006.
487 Message M1343, ‘Message to […] from DS Dalby regarding meeting with John Peacock on 12/02/09’, MPS068679001, p2,
12 February 2009.
12 February 2009.
12 February 2009.
951
5.2.5 The allegation that former DCS David Cook, AC John Yates and other members
of the Abelard Two Investigation team allowed Gary Eaton to confess to serious
crimes despite being mentally ill and did not conduct any enquiries to corroborate
the confessions
316. Operation Megan investigators reviewed interview transcripts and police actions in relation
to the debrief and handling of Gary Eaton during the Abelard Two Investigation, and also
examined his medical history. They found the following:
i. When examined by the Force Medical Officer on 06 September 2006, Gary Eaton
had said that he had never suffered from any mental illness and had never seen a
psychiatrist;490 and
ii. Although the Force Medical Officer had recommended that an appropriate adult491 be
present during any subsequent interviews, he had concluded that Gary Eaton’s mental
health issues did not affect his communication and understanding abilities, and that he
was competent to provide evidence without the need of an appropriate adult.492
The Panel has reviewed the Force Medical Officer’s statements in respect
of Gary Eaton’s debrief.493,494,495,496,497,498 Whilst the Force Medical Officer had
recommended that Gary Eaton be accompanied by an appropriate adult after his
first assessment, he made no mention as to whether an appropriate adult was
required after subsequent examinations of Gary Eaton. The Operation Megan
Report was therefore incorrect in stating that the Force Medical Officer had
concluded that Gary Eaton was competent to provide evidence without the need
of an appropriate adult.
iii. On 08 September 2006, the debrief Senior Investigating Officer had recorded that
the Criminal Justice Protection Unit Officers had documented that Gary Eaton
would not contribute to the debrief process in the presence of an appropriate adult,
and that his solicitor had agreed to the debrief taking place in the absence of an
appropriate adult.499

491 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) Codes of Practice provide for an appropriate adult to be called to the police station
whenever a juvenile or mentally vulnerable person has been detained in police custody. Appropriate adults have an important role to play in the
custody environment by ensuring that the detained person whom they are assisting understands what is happening to them and why. (Home
Office Guidance for Appropriate Adults 2003.)
493 Witness statement of doctor attending, MPS079071001, 03 August 2008.
496 Witness statement of doctor attending, MPS003391001, 15 November 2008.
497 Witness statement of doctor attending, MPS003392001, 15 November 2008.
498 Witness statement of doctor attending, MPS003439001, 04 April 2009.
952
iv. The debrief manager, DS Anthony Moore, had explained that the decision to continue
with the debrief without an appropriate adult was also based on minimising the
security risk to Gary Eaton were anyone else to be involved in the process, but that no
interviews would be held in the absence of Gary Eaton’s solicitor. Gary Eaton and his
solicitor had agreed to this.500
v. Because Gary Eaton had been a voluntary witness in a debrief process, he had not
been in police detention at any time, and therefore he was not required to have an
appropriate adult present.501
317. At the request of Operation Megan, a registered intermediary502 assessed Gary Eaton and
had confirmed that Gary Eaton had the ability to communicate and give evidence if necessary,
and that the use of a registered intermediary would not have improved the quality of any
evidence which Gary Eaton might provide.503
318. DCI Fiona McCormack concluded that she was ‘satisfied that the investigation team
considered Mr Eaton’s mental health issues and that steps and that the appropriate action
was taken as soon as an appropriate adult was recommended for Mr Eaton’.504 She ‘found no
evidence of any individual wrongdoing’505 and ‘no evidence to suggest that there was any breach
of the standards of professional behaviour by any individual in relation to this aspect of the
investigation’.506 However, it was noted that ‘more expediency’ between the recommendation
for an appropriate adult and the obtaining of a full medical history of the witness would be
considered best practice, and that the Metropolitan Police policy regarding this had been re-
written as a result of the Crown Prosecution Service/Metropolitan Police joint review following
the withdrawal of all remaining evidence against the defendants on 11 March 2011.507
319. When assessing the allegation that Gary Eaton’s confessions to the debrief team regarding
his own criminality were not sufficiently investigated, Operation Megan found that each
criminal offence was subject to an individual investigation, and analysis showed that ‘there was
sufficient evidence that he had committed 53 substantive offences between 1986 and 2006’.508
Among these offences were two assertions which contained an admission of involvement in a
conspiracy to commit murder in 2006.509 This matter was separately investigated, schedules
of the offences identified, and the assertions made by Gary Eaton had been disclosed to both
prosecution and defence counsel for each defendant.510 Operation Megan found that there
was ‘no evidence’ of any ‘breach in the standards of professional behaviour’ to substantiate
this allegation.511

502 A registered intermediary is a ‘self-employed communication specialist who helps vulnerable witnesses and complainants to give evidence
to the police and to the court in criminal trials’. They are recruited and selected by the Ministry of Justice;
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ministry-of-justice-witness-intermediary-scheme.
507 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p30, para 8.3.4.9, undated
953
320. The Panel is satisfied that this allegation was properly examined. The Panel is of
the view, however, that Gary Eaton’s violent and erratic behaviour and his references
to having been depressed should have resulted in a psychiatric examination of him
before he was allowed to enter into an agreement under the Serious Organised Crime
and Police Act 2005. This matter was dealt with in the Crown Prosecution Service/
Metropolitan Police joint review and a recommendation for new practice was made. In
the circumstances of the review of Gary Eaton and the way in which matters developed,
the fact that he was provided with medical attention and counselling, and the absence
of guidance on the matter, the Panel does not consider the omission of such an
examination to have been a matter of misconduct on the part of any officer.
5.2.6 Allegations concerning Person J5

321. Jonathan Rees initially made the following allegations concerning Person J5:
i. that Person J5 had been pressurised by DC Caroline Linfoot and DC Danny Dwyer into
providing a witness statement and entering into the debrief process;
ii. that the Abelard II investigation team had failed to challenge her account despite
knowing it to be untrue;
iii. that Person J5 was mentally ill and therefore not a competent witness; and
iv. that DCI Noel Beswick had provided Person J5 with a laptop and that she
subsequently used that laptop to research information she was providing
during debriefs.512
322. However, on 14 February 2013, Jonathan Rees was interviewed again. During this
interview he retracted his allegations concerning Person J5 although he stated he stood by
the allegations. Nevertheless, DCI Fiona McCormack decided to continue to investigate the
matters raised.513
323. After reviewing the evidence available, DCI Fiona McCormack concluded within the
Operation Megan Report that allegations i, ii and iii (see paragraph 321 above) could not be
substantiated.514,515,516 In relation to allegation iv (see paragraph 321 above), it was concluded
that the laptop was provided to Person J5’s fiancé by the Witness Protection Unit to facilitate
an educational course he was undertaking, and that the investigation team were unaware of this
decision.517 The Operation Megan Investigation also concluded that, upon learning that Person
J5 was using the laptop to conduct research, Abelard Two investigators took ‘immediate and
appropriate action’ which led to her being discontinued as a prosecution witness.518
512 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p53, para 10.1.1, undated.

954
324. Concerning all four allegations regarding Person J5, Operation Megan concluded
that there was no evidence of any breach of standard of professional behaviour or criminal
conduct.519,520,521,522
5.2.7 The allegation that the Abelard Two Investigation team knew about, but failed to
disclose, 18 crates of material
325. Operation Megan investigators undertook a comprehensive review of the timeline and
content of disclosure during the Abelard Two Investigation.523 They concluded that there had
been ‘no deliberate attempt by members of the investigation or disclosure teams to conceal or
withhold relevant information’,524 but there had been ‘organisational failings in the management
and storage of material’.525 The Operation Megan Report further concluded that the failings in
the management of material were ‘due to the size and complexity of Operation Abelard II’,526 and
referred to the fact that, due to ‘failures identified in Operation Abelard II and other large scale
investigations, the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] addressed and instigated organisational
learning practices through Operation Filesafe’.527
326. Operation Filesafe was a review of document handling and record management and
examination of all physical records held by the Metropolitan Police. It was completed in 2018.
5.2.8 Allegations regarding police treatment of Margaret Harrison

327. Jonathan Rees initially made a complaint that DC Caroline Linfoot had been ‘aggressive
and malicious’ in her dealings with his partner, Margaret Harrison.528 However, within his
statement of 13 June 2014, he stated he did not wish the matter to be investigated and had
disclosed this for information only.529 However, DCI Fiona McCormack decided to investigate
this matter for the purposes of ‘completeness’.530 It was reported that ‘Mrs Harrison was an
important witness during the initial investigation, she had seen Daniel Morgan on the day that
he was murdered and was also in a relationship with him at the same time. As such six witness
statements were taken from her.’531
328. After reviewing the evidence available, it was concluded that there was ‘no corroborating
material to support that DC Linfoot was aggressive or malicious in her dealings with
Mrs Harrison’.532

523 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, pp62-67, paras 11.3–11.3.67, undated.
527 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p70, para 11.5.5, undated; ‘The purpose of Op FileSafe is to review MPS [Metropolitan Police
Service] document handling and record management and complete a thorough assessment of all physical records held across the MPS
[Metropolitan Police Service] estate’ (Witness statement of D/Supt Neil Hutchinson to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, para 7,
https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Hutchison-WS-R9-8-and-R9-12.pdf.
529 Witness Statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS1097130001, p150, para 38, 13 June 2014.
955
5.3 Conclusions of the Operation Megan Investigation

329. Since no criminal offences had been identified by the Operation Megan Investigation, the
matter was not referred to the Crown Prosecution Service. DCI Fiona McCormack determined
that there was insufficient evidence to interview former DCS David Cook and reported to DAC
Fiona Taylor.
330. The Panel acknowledges the conclusions reached by the Operation Megan
Investigation and is satisfied, based on evidence examined by the Operation Megan
Investigation team, that there was no evidence of any criminal offence in relation to the
matters considered in Operation Megan.
6 The 2017 Report by the Independent Police Complaints

Commission on alleged unlawful releasing of material from
police investigations to the BBC by former DCS David Cook:
The Panorama complaint 2012-2017
331. When Jonathan Rees’s complaint about the BBC Panorama Programme had been
received in 2012, former DCS David Cook was a senior manager at the Serious Organised
Crime Agency. The Independent Police Complaints Commission noted in its report that former
DCS Cook retired in July 2013, taking advantage of a managerial early retirement scheme before
the Serious Organised Crime Agency was abolished by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, and
its functions were transferred to the National Crime Agency in October 2013. The transitional
arrangements concerning complaints against former Serious Organised Crime Agency
staff allowed the investigation to continue notwithstanding his retirement, but the National
Crime Agency would not be required to determine whether disciplinary proceedings should
be brought.533
332. The complaint was initially referred back to the Metropolitan Police for investigation
but returned to the Independent Police Complaints Commission in 2015 (see paragraphs
266-272 above).534
333. The Terms of Reference for the Independent Police Complaints Commission
investigation were:535
1. ‘To investigate
a) Whether or not the documents screened during the Panorama programme were
provided unlawfully
b) Whether there is any evidence Mr Cook was responsible for this
c) Whether Mr Cook was party to any person, under his supervision, being
responsible for this
534 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William J. Rees’, IPC001411001, p4, paras 7-8, 14 December 2016.
535 These were approved by the IPCC’s Commissioner on 28 July 2015.
956
2. ‘To identify whether any subject of the investigation may have committed a
criminal offence and, if appropriate, make early contact with the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP). On receipt of the final report, the Commission shall determine
whether the report should be sent to the DPP.
3. ‘To identify whether any subject of the investigation, in the investigator’s opinion,
has a case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct or no case to answer. In
Mr Cook’s case whether he would, in the investigators opinion, have had a case to
answer had he not retired.
4. ‘To consider and report on whether there is organisational learning, including:
• whether any change in policy or practice would help to prevent a recurrence of

the event, incident or conduct investigated;
• whether the incident highlights any good practice that should be shared.’536
334. Both the Metropolitan Police and the Independent Police Complaints Commission
had asked the BBC for material. The BBC declined to assist in the absence of a court order
compelling it to do so, to protect confidential journalistic source(s).537 The Metropolitan Police
sought a Production Order to compel the BBC to produce or allow access to the material
sought by the Metropolitan Police.538 The BBC challenged the application but subsequently
disclosed some materials, albeit re-typed, and did not assist with enquiries to identify the
source(s) of the confidential journalistic material which it had received.539 The Independent
Police Complaints Commission did not seek a Production Order after taking all relevant matters
into account.540
335. The Independent Police Complaints Commission identified the documents and video
footage of the boat trip by Jonathan Rees shown on Panorama as being material which had
been on a copy of Jonathan Rees’s hard drive, seized from him in February 2007 by the
Abelard Two Investigation team.541 After analysing the materials seized from former DCS David
Cook’s address in January 2012, the Independent Police Complaints Commission noted that
former DCS David Cook provided some materials, if not all, from Jonathan Rees’s hard drive
to Panorama.542
336. The material available to the Independent Police Complaints Commission for the purposes
of their investigation included material from Operation Longhorn (see section 4 above), the
material seized when former DCS David Cook was arrested and his home was searched in
2012, and emails and documents disclosed by News International, some of which had been
redacted by News International lawyers, for reasons of legal professional privilege and to protect
journalistic sources. Those emails did not contain all the material which would have been
available, as it had not been possible to recover some deleted items.543
536 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J.Rees’, IPC001411001, p9, para 51, 14 December 2016.
537 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J.Rees’, IPC001411001, p14, paras 96 and 99, 14 December 2016.
538 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, sch 1, paras 1-4.
539 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J.Rees’, IPC001411001, p14, paras 96-97, 14 December 2016.
542 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J.Rees’, IPC001411001, p26, paras 203 – 213, 14 December 2016.
957
337. The Independent Police Complaints Commission identified a series of emails sent by
former DCS David Cook between September 2010 and August 2011 to a variety of journalists
including Glen Campbell, a journalist who worked on the Panorama programme in question,
Michael Sullivan of News International, and Kirsteen Knight of the BBC.544 There is no indication,
in the Independent Police Complaints Commission report, of whether there was an awareness
that, besides working for the BBC, Kirsteen Knight was also the partner of Daniel Morgan’s
brother, Alastair Morgan, and took notes at all the meetings held between the Metropolitan
Police and Alastair Morgan.
338. The Independent Police Complaints Commission Report notes that ‘[i]t was apparent, from
the tone of the communications, that they were interspersed with face-to-face meetings and
telephone calls, the details of which were not obvious.’545
339. The emails which were examined demonstrated that former DCS David Cook had given
documents and information to Michael Sullivan.546 According to the Independent Police
Complaints Commission Report, those between former DCS Cook and Glen Campbell showed
the following sequence of events:
i. On 04 October 2010, Glen Campbell emailed former DCS Cook suggesting it would be
‘good to see you and catch up since we last met […]’.547
ii. Later that evening, former DCS Cook emailed to himself ‘a schedule of invoices –
afour page document apparently related to work carried out for newspapers in 1998
and 1999 which included work carried out by Jonathan Rees’, and ‘several News
International Self Billing Invoices in the name of W.J Rees (William Jonathan Rees) from
2005 and 2006, including the invoices which were – with slight alterations – screened
on the Panorama programme’.548 He then emailed Glen Campbell offering to meet the
Panorama producer and seeking an assurance ‘about the discretion aspect’.549
iii. On 06 October 2010 Glen Campbell had emailed former DCS Cook arranging to
meet, and former DCS Cook responded saying, ‘I have a 4 page document from 1999
from Southern Investigations. It details some of the work they were doing then for
newspapers […] They were being paid a lot of money by 1999 standards for some
of the stuff they were doing. If I give you the document, you cannot broadcast its
existence but it will give you some good background.’550
iv. On 09 October 2010, Glen Campbell emailed former DCS Cook: ‘Let me know when
I can collect the 1999 Southern document […].’ Former DCS Cook replied saying
that he had them electronically and could send them anytime, but he wanted ‘some
assurances about how they will be used. I cannot afford for them to be blazoned
across a tv screen.’551
544 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J.Rees’, IPC001411001, pp16-22, paras 120-161, 14 December 2016.
548 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J.Rees’, IPC001411001, pp17-18, para 130, 14 December 2016.
958
v. Some months later there followed a series of Skype messages between former DCS
Cook and Glen Campbell, the most significant of which was a message from former
DCS Cook to Glen Campbell on 26 February 2011 which said: ‘Not sure there is much
on it but what would a copy of a certain PI’s552 hard drive [sic] worth.’553
340. In addition to this, emails between Kirsteen Knight of the BBC and former DCS David
Cook showed the following:
i. that on an unknown date, Kirsteen Knight had written to former DCS Cook as follows:
‘Powerful people in the BBC are looking at whether they should go for maximum
impact on the Rees story. This means saving all the stories about Southern
Investigations that various parts of the BBC are digging into and putting the [sic]
all out on the same day. To do that they need very strong new material …So if
there is anything you want said or have any suggestions let me know….’554
ii. On 08 August 2011 former DCS Cook emailed Kirsteen Knight saying,
‘…What sort of material is it that they need, I might be able to point you in the
right direction’. Not surprisingly I ma [sic] having a lot of aggravation from my
current employer over the phone hacking stuff and the fall out from the Abelard
Trial but I will do what I can to help…’555
iii. On 09 August 2011, Kirsteen Knight is recorded as having sent a lengthy email in
which she said:
‘What all the BBC teams are desperate for, are the transcripts of the third enquiry
that prove Rees was undertaking illegal activities for newspapers. Panorama and
Graeme McLagen [sic] have them but they won’t share them with anyone else...’
‘…In fact are there any invoices at all that we could have sight of?’ […] ‘I won’t
be surprised or offended if you can’t help with any of the above.’556
iv. On 12 August 2011, former DCS Cook replied saying that, ‘anything I can give is
only from memory’… ‘I am surprised Graeme McClaggan [sic] cannot assist. I do not
know what Graeme has because he was given access before I became involved in
the investigation but it must be substantial because of his book and the articles he
has written.’ Former DCS Cook concluded the mail by saying ‘[i]f it is off the record
and does not come back to me, I am happy to sit down and chat through things with
someone… that is about as much as I can do’.557
341. Former DCS David Cook was interviewed under caution about these matters on
16 June 2016. He declined to answer any questions and did not provide a written response.558
552 The letters PI were interpreted by the Independent Police Complaints Commission as being an abbreviation for Private Investigator.
557 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J.Rees’, IPC001411001, pp21-22, paras 160-161, 14 December 2016.
558 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J.Rees’, IPC001411001, pp11-12, para 71, 14 December 2016.
959
6.1 The findings of the investigation

342. The Independent Police Complaints Commission concluded that:
i. the invoices, transcripts and video footage seized from Jonathan Rees’s house were
provided to the Panorama programme;559
ii. ‘[t]here was no evidence to suggest any member of the investigation team, other than
Mr Cook, disclosed material to Panorama’,560 and that ‘taking into account CPS [Crown
Prosecution Service] guidance it was not considered that there were any grounds
to suspect any person who may have received the information from Mr Cook of
committing an offence’;561
iii. ‘[t]here is evidence that the transcripts may have already been disclosed to Mr
McLagan with authority from the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service]. However, there is
no evidence of the MPS authorising the disclosure of the invoices or the video images
of the boating trip to any person outside the MPS’;562
iv. ‘[t]here is insufficient evidence for any reasonable tribunal to find that Mr Cook
provided the transcripts to Panorama, whether by himself, through Mr Sullivan or by
any other means’;563
v. the two invoices shown on the Panorama programme were identified as having been
seized from Jonathan Rees’s house in 2007, DCS David Cook had had access to
these,564 and it was concluded that ‘a disciplinary tribunal could conclude that Mr
Cook was responsible for disclosing the invoices to Panorama, whether by himself or
through Mr Sullivan’;565
vi. ‘there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable tribunal to conclude that Mr Cook
provided Glenn [sic] Campbell with a copy of material from Mr Rees’s hard drive’ which
contained the video of the boating trip shown on the Panorama programme;566
vii. emails and Skype messages showed ‘a willingness, on Mr Cook’s part, to provide
documents’,567 and that it is known that former DCS David Cook provided documents
to Michael Sullivan, and it can be inferred that he also provided documents to Glen
Campbell;568 and
viii. ‘[i]n considering whether there is a case to answer, whether Mr Cook knew or intended
that the material should be broadcast is, in my opinion, irrelevant. The seriousness of
any disclosure of information, particularly personal data without authority, is in the loss
of control of that information and how it may be used.’569
960
343. The report produced by a member of staff at the Independent Police Complaints
Commission was addressed to the Deputy Chair who then made a decision as to the future
handling of the matter. It stated that there was evidence showing unauthorised disclosure of
personal data to Panorama, which is an offence under section 55 of the Data Protection Act
1998, and of misconduct in public office. Thereafter a decision was required of the Deputy Chair
as to whether a criminal offence may have been committed and whether any file should be
submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service.
344. In relation to the offence of misconduct in public office, the report stated that ‘the Deputy
Chair will no doubt wish to take into account the recent guidance from the CPS [Crown
Prosecution Service] […]. There is no evidence of any payment for making the disclosure.
Panorama is a respected current affairs programme and the issues surrounding Mr Rees’s work
for News International engage issues in which there is a public interest.’570
345. The report concluded that ‘[i]n deciding whether it is appropriate to refer this report to
the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] the Deputy Chair will no doubt wish to take into account
the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] reasons given in respect of the previous investigation
for considering that it was not in the public interest to charge Mr Cook for his disclosures to
Mr Sullivan.’571
346. The Independent Police Complaints Commission’s Report concluded that ‘there was
sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable tribunal could conclude that the officer [former DCS
David Cook] had a case to answer for gross misconduct’.572 No separate organisational learning
issues were identified.
347. On 03 January 2017, the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission
made her determination, pursuant to Schedule 3 of the Police Reform Act 2002.573
348. Her determination adopted the investigator’s finding that former DCS David Cook had
provided material to Panorama. However, in relation to offences under the Data Protection Act
1998, she determined that:
‘[t]here was, and remains, considerable public concern about the use of phone hacking
by journalists in pursuit of a story, and in my view there is insufficient evidence to
negate a defence that the disclosure by Mr Cook was justified as being in the public
interest’; and that ‘[e]ven if there was an indication then, taking into account the
availability of this defence, in my opinion, there is no realistic prospect of the CPS
[Crown Prosecution Service] bringing charges’.574
349. In relation to the offence of misconduct in public office, the Deputy Chair found
the following:
i. DCS David Cook, as a serving police officer at the time of the disclosure, was in
public office.
ii. DCS Cook wilfully misconducted himself.
572 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J.Rees’, IPC001411001, p29, 14 December 2016.
573 Police Reform Act 2002, sch 3, paras 23(2)(b) and (c).
574 Commission delegate decision regarding early referral to the Director of Public Prosecutions, p8, 03 January 2017.
961
iii. With reference to the additional guidance issued to the Crown Prosecution Service
on cases involving disclosure of information to journalists (see paragraphs 187-189
above),575,576 the disclosure by DCS Cook arguably had a significant effect on one
individual, Jonathan Rees, however the material formed only part of the information
presented by the programme and this impact had to be weighed against the broader
public interest in airing issues of public concern. There was no indication that the
information was provided for payment, nor was there any suggestion of a corrupt
relationship between DCS Cook and the Panorama journalists.
350. She stated:
‘In my view as set out above when considering a potential [Data Protection Act]
offence, there is a potential public interest argument in favour of the disclosure, which
in my view is capable of amounting to a reasonable excuse or justification.
‘There is no evidence that the material was provided in return for payment or that
the disclosed material, of itself, damaged the public interest. Taking into account the
[Crown Prosecution Service] guidance above, I have determined there is no indication
that the offence of Misconduct in Public Office may have been committed. Even if
there were an indication, there is, in my opinion, no realistic prospect that the [Crown
Prosecution Service] would charge the offence.’ 577
351. On the basis of the evidence and with the assistance of legal advice, the Deputy Chair of
the Independent Police Complaints Commission decided that the report of the Independent
Police Complaints Commission investigator ‘does not indicate that criminal offences may have
been committed […]’ and that ‘even if it did, that there is no realistic prospect of the full code
evidential and public interest charging tests being met and so it would be inappropriate for the
matters in the report to be considered by the [Director of Public Prosecutions]’, and ‘I have
accordingly decided not to refer this investigation to the [Director of Public Prosecutions].’578
The conclusion that ‘there is no realistic prospect of the full code evidential and public interest
charging tests being met’ is not sustainable in the absence of full consideration of the issues,
and of a recognition that former DCS Cook’s right to present a public interest defence did not
negate the fact that there may have been a public interest in prosecuting former DCS Cook.
352. The determination by the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission
that no criminal offences had been identified relied on the fact that, despite the finding that there
was evidence showing unauthorised disclosure of personal data to Panorama, conduct which
is capable of constituting an offence under section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998, and of
misconduct in a public office, there were defences available to former DCS Cook.
353. No consideration was given in this report by the Independent Police Complaints
Commission to the cumulative damage potentially caused by unauthorised disclosure, either
to the prosecution which would in all probability have occurred but for the acquittal of the
Defendants before the trial was heard, to future prosecutions of various cases, or to the
investigative methodologies of the police service.
575 Independent Office for Police Conduct Disclosure on 03 April 2020, AF relevant Doc 36 Guidance doc from Crown Prosecution Service
20 April, ‘Additional guidance on cases involving payments made to corrupt public officials by journalists’, p1, para 1, undated.
577 Commission delegate decision regarding early referral to the Director of Public Prosecutions, pp8-9, 03 January 2017.
962
354. The Independent Office for Police Conduct (the successor organisation to the
Independent Police Complaints Commission) explained that the possible damage caused by
the unauthorised disclosures was considered in the Operation Longhorn report (unauthorised
disclosure to Michael Sullivan), and that the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints
Commission took into account the Crown Prosecution Service decision which had been made
on 11 September 2015 on the Operation Longhorn referral, in which the volume of material
disclosed, its sensitivity and the motive for disclosure provided a greater public interest for a
prosecution.
355. The decision made by the Specialist Prosecutor in Operation Longhorn (which was
endorsed by the Head of the Organised Crime Division at the Crown Prosecution Service,
Gregor McGill579) had been that he was satisfied, even in the absence of all available evidence,
that the public interest did not reach the threshold for a prosecution for offences of misconduct
in public office or breach of the Data Protection Act 1998.580 In reaching this conclusion, the
Specialist Prosecutor noted that:
‘At the time I was asked by the [Independent Police Complaints Commission]
to provide a charging advice in this case, I was also made aware of a separate
[Metropolitan Police Service] Investigation (Operation Megan) into a complaint by
Jonathan Rees that his personal data had been provided to the Panorama television
programme and to the media by DC [former DCS David Cook]. I am told that the
Operation Megan team propose to deal with any misuse by DC [former DCS David
Cook] of the personal data of Jonathan Rees as an internal matter rather than one for
prosecution and I consider that to be relevant and indicative of how matters of that
nature may have been dealt with at that time.’581
356. It is clear that the Specialist Prosecutor in Operation Longhorn, in reaching his
decision on 11 September 2015, was relying on the fact that he had been advised that
Jonathan Rees’s complaint about unauthorised disclosures to Panorama was not going
to be treated as a matter for prosecution. In the event, the Panorama disclosures were
investigated by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, not the Metropolitan
Police (see paragraph 332 above). That complaint was not finalised until January 2016,
some four months after the Specialist Prosecutor reached his conclusions with regard to
Operation Longhorn. On 03 January 2017, the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police
Complaints Commission then relied on the Specialist Prosecutor’s decision that the
threshold for prosecution was not met when making her decision.
357. The statutory arrangements under which the Independent Police Complaints Commission
was operating582 did not enable it to make representations to the National Crime Agency
(formerly the Serious Organised Crime Agency) or the Metropolitan Police about possible
organisational learning which might derive from the investigation which had been conducted.
There was therefore no opportunity for the Independent Police Complaints Commission to alert
579 Endorsement by Head of Division, IPC001410001, pp47-58, 29 September 2015.

580 Crown Prosecution Service Organised Crime Division (Hacking Unit) I.P.C.C. Investigation Operation Longhorn – David Cook,
IPC001410001, para 190, p46, 11 September 2015.
581 Crown Prosecution Service Organised Crime Division (Hacking Unit) I.P.C.C. Investigation Operation Longhorn – David Cook,
IPC001410001, para 182, p45, 11 September 2015.
582 Police Reform Act 2002 section 26.
963
these agencies to the damage potentially caused by the unauthorised disclosure, nor to the
opportunity for organisational learning about the Metropolitan Police’s process for and controls
over the disclosure of information to journalists.
RECOMMENDATION
358. Guidance should be issued by the Metropolitan Police to enable officers to

determine whether it is appropriate, necessary and lawful to disclose investigative
material to journalists. That guidance should include a requirement to record by whom,
to whom and when any such evidence was disclosed, who authorised the disclosure,
the reasons for the disclosure of the material, and the express conditions upon which the
information is disclosed.
7 The civil action in the High Court

359. Following their acquittal, Jonathan Rees, former DS Sidney Fillery, Garry Vian and Glenn
Vian (henceforth referred to as ‘the Claimants’) brought a civil action in the High Court against
the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis seeking damages for malicious prosecution and
for misfeasance in public office. James Cook, the fifth Defendant acquitted, was not a party to
this action.
360. The Claimants argued that the Commissioner was vicariously liable for the actions
of former DCS David Cook. At the heart of the Claimants’ case was the argument that by
breaching the sterile corridor and corrupting Gary Eaton’s evidence, former DCS Cook had
committed a criminal act, and that had it not been for former DCS Cook’s criminal conduct, the
Claimants would not have been prosecuted for the murder of Daniel Morgan, or in the case of
former DS Sidney Fillery, for perverting the course of justice.
361. Former DCS David Cook was asked to provide evidence in this case but did not do so.
Former DCS Cook told the Panel in interview that when he was asked to provide a witness
statement he was already under investigation by the Metropolitan Police (Operation Megan,
which ran from 2012-2018, and Operation Edison which ran from 2015-2020) and by the
Independent Police Complaints Commission about allegations made about him by Jonathan
Rees in 2012 (that investigation concluded in 2017).583 Those investigations, which were ongoing
at the time, could have led to criminal proceedings against former DCS Cook had the evidence
justified such proceedings. In addition to this, former DCS Cook had recorded, in a note to his
solicitor, other reasons including the following:
i. The Metropolitan Police had offered him ‘no real support’ for the difficulties he
experienced after the surveillance on him;
ii. He and his family had suffered substantial damage to their health and general welfare.
By giving evidence he would expose himself and his family to further risk;
iii. Over the years, Jonathan Rees had made threats to him and there had been further
concerns about his safety and that of his family;
583 Panel interview with former DCS David Cook, Transcript 6, pp3-5, 26 August 2020.
964
iv. To give evidence would be further detrimental to his safety and he could not and
would not rely on the Metropolitan Police to support him; and
v. The Metropolitan Police had known about the civil action for almost four years but had
left it until three months before the trial date to contact him.584
362. The material available to the Panel indicates that because it had been said that former
DCS David Cook was not fit to give evidence, a very lengthy statement was prepared by former
T/DCI Noel Beswick, the Deputy Senior Investigating Officer of the Abelard Two Investigation.585
363. The Metropolitan Police should have contacted former DCS David Cook earlier
to obtain his views on the civil proceedings by Jonathan Rees and others against the
Metropolitan Police. He had been the Senior Investigating Officer. However, in light of
the information provided by former DCS Cook’s solicitor on 07 October 2016 that he
was not fit to give evidence, it was reasonable to seek a statement from former T/DCI
Noel Beswick.
364. Former DCS David Cook subsequently alleged that the Metropolitan Police should have
informed the court that he was under criminal investigation by the Metropolitan Police in relation
to his conduct of the Abelard Two Investigation, when explaining that he was unable to give
evidence.586 He also explained to the Panel that his position of being under criminal investigation
compromised his ability to give evidence on behalf of the same organisation in relation to the
same issues, matters which he raised with the Metropolitan Police at the time. He told the Panel
that when he was informed that he was no longer under investigation, he refused to provide
a witness statement because he was denied access to the relevant documentation which he
required to perform this task by the Metropolitan Police.
365. Former DCS David Cook’s solicitor had told the Metropolitan Police that former
DCS Cook was not fit to give evidence because of ill health. Former DCS Cook was
being investigated by the Metropolitan Police in relation to unlawful retention and
disclosure of material belonging to the Metropolitan Police and other authorities. These
matters were not the subject of the civil action and in those circumstances, it was not
improper for the Metropolitan Police to explain former DCS Cook’s inability to attend and
give evidence on the grounds provided to them by former DCS Cook’s solicitor.
584 Briefing note from former DCS David Cook to his solicitor provided to the panel by former DCS Cook 19 March 2017.
585 Statement of former T/DCI Noel Beswick, MPS109748001, 20 October 2016.
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7.1 The findings of Mr Justice Mitting

366. The trial, which was presided over by Mr Justice Mitting, lasted from 17 January 2017 to
10 February 2017587 and involved detailed examination of a large volume of material, spanning
the nearly 30-year period since Daniel Morgan’s murder.
367. Mr Justice Mitting heard submissions from the Claimants and the Defendant as to
whether former DCS David Cook had maliciously prosecuted the Claimants and/or committed
misfeasance in public office.
7.1.1 Malicious prosecution

368. The Claimants claimed that former DCS David Cook had maliciously prosecuted them.
In a strictly factual sense, former DCS Cook was not the prosecutor. The Crown Prosecution
Service was the prosecutor. However, the Claimants argued that because former DCS Cook
had contaminated the evidence of Gary Eaton and had deliberately concealed this from the
Crown Prosecution Service and Treasury Counsel, the Crown Prosecution Service and Treasury
Counsel were unable to exercise independent judgment when deciding whether to charge
and prosecute the Claimants. The Claimants claimed that this made former DCS Cook the de
facto Prosecutor.588
369. For each of the Claimants to establish malicious prosecution they had to prove the
following five elements:
i. He was prosecuted by the defendant.
ii. The prosecution was determined in his favour.
iii. The prosecution was without reasonable and probable cause.
iv. It was malicious.
v. The claimant suffered actionable damage.589
370. Mr Justice Mitting held that former DCS David Cook was not to be treated as the
Prosecutor (point i) and the Claimants’ claims for malicious prosecution therefore failed.590
7.1.2 Misfeasance in public office

371. The Claimants also argued that former DCS David Cook’s actions constituted misfeasance
in public office. Mr Justice Mitting referred to the elements of the tort of misfeasance in
public office:591
i. The Defendant must be a public officer.
ii. The exercise of power must be as a public officer.
587 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] EWCH 273 (QB), MPS109702001, p 1, 17 February 2017.
588 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] EWHC 273 (QB), MPS109702001, pp38-39, paras 146-147.
589 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] EWHC 273 (QB), MPS109702001, p32, para 136, 17 February 2017.
966
iii. Misfeasance in public office may be either ‘targeted malice by a public officer, i.e.
conduct specifically intended to injure a person or persons. This type of case involves
bad faith in the sense of the exercise of public power for an improper or ulterior
motive,’ or may occur ‘where a public officer acts knowing that he has no power to
do the act complained of and that the act will probably injure the plaintiff. It involves
bad faith in as much as the public officer does not have an honest belief that his act
is lawful.’592
iv. The act or omission of the public officer must cause loss to the claimant.
372. Mr Justice Mitting found that by breaching the sterile corridor, designed to protect Gary
Eaton’s evidence, former DCS David Cook had done an act tending and intended to pervert
the course of justice, which is a criminal offence, and that in doing so he had ‘contaminated the
source of justice’.593 As Mr Justice Mitting explained:
‘On the facts of this case, I am satisfied that what Maddison J found that Cook did
amount [sic] to the crime of doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course
of justice. The principal purpose of the sterile corridor system, even though it was
non‑statutory was as stated: to ensure the integrity of evidence to be given by an
assisting offender. By prompting a potentially unreliable witness to implicate Glenn and
Garry Vian in the Morgan murder and then to conceal the fact that he had done so from
the CPS and prosecuting counsel, Cook did an act which tended to pervert the course
of justice.’594
373. Mr Justice Mitting was satisfied that misfeasance in public office had been committed
by former DCS David Cook595 and that he realised that his conduct would probably injure
the Claimants.596
374. It was then necessary for Mr Justice Mitting to determine whether or not former DCS
David Cook caused loss to the Claimants. Mr Justice Mitting asked himself ‘whether or not the
relevant claimant would have been charged, detained and sought to be brought to trial as a
result of Cook’s conduct in relation to Eaton.’597
375. Mr Justice Mitting held that the criminal conduct of former DCS David Cook had not
caused Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian or Glenn Vian loss, because they would have been
prosecuted in any event. As Mr Justice Mitting explained, ‘I am satisfied on the balance of
probabilities that prosecuting counsel and the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] would have
decided to prosecute Rees and Glenn and Garry Vian on the basis of the evidence available
when they were charged other than that of Eaton.’598 Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian and Glenn
Vian’s claims therefore failed.599
967
7.1.3 Former DS Sidney Fillery

376. Former DS Sidney Fillery was the only Claimant who was (partially) successful in his claim
at first instance. He was awarded damages for misfeasance in public office but not for malicious
prosecution. Former DS Fillery had not been charged with the murder of Daniel Morgan, but with
perverting the course of justice after allegedly threatening Gary Eaton in a public house in 1987.
Mr Justice Mitting found that former DS Fillery’s case was different from the other Claimants
because the only evidence supporting the charge against him was the evidence of Gary Eaton,
and that ‘but for Cook’s conduct in relation to Eaton, Eaton’s evidence would never have seen
the light of day’.600 As Mr Justice Mitting explained:
‘Different considerations apply in the case of Fillery. In his case, the only evidence on
which the prosecution proposed to rely was that of Eaton [...] Maddison J only stayed
the case against Fillery because he considered that he should consider a stay first.
He considered that, to try Fillery on a single count which depended upon the evidence
of a doubtful witness about what was said 22 or 23 years ago was not fair. [...] Although
there is nothing to prove that Cook prompted Eaton to accuse Fillery of making the
threat against him on which the prosecution depended, the simple fact is that, but for
Cook’s conduct in relation to Eaton, Eaton’s evidence would never have seen the light
of day and Fillery would not have been prosecuted. It follows that his claim for damages
for misfeasance in public office succeeds in full.’601
8 Operation Megan Two

377. Following the comments made by Mr Justice Mitting in February 2017, that former
DCS David Cook had done an act tending and intended to pervert the course of justice by
breaching the sterile corridor and prompting Gary Eaton to implicate Glenn Vian and Garry
Vian in the murder of Daniel Morgan, and concealing the fact that he had done so from the
Crown Prosecution Service and Prosecution Counsel, the Metropolitan Police opened a new
investigation into the conduct of former DCS Cook on 21 March 2017.602
378. The Metropolitan Police enquired of the Independent Police Complaints Commission
whether they wanted to conduct this investigation.603 The Independent Police Complaints
Commission declined to do so.
379. The Metropolitan Police appointed D/Supt Fiona McCormack, who had conducted the
Operation Megan Investigation, as Senior Investigating Officer.604 The investigation, which
was called Operation Megan Two, began on 11 April 2017.605 The Megan Two Investigation’s
task was to establish whether there was evidence to show that former DCS David Cook had
committed perjury, perverted the course of justice and committed misconduct in public office.
380. A report was sent to the Crown Prosecution Service for decision on 06 December 2017.
The Metropolitan Police and the Crown Prosecution Service decided that no access to the
papers from this investigation would be given to the Panel until the Crown Prosecution Service
had made a decision.606 This report was made available to the Panel on 02 July 2019.
602 SIO Decision Log, MPS109905001, pp1-7, 21 March 2017.
603 Decision 1, SIO Decision Log, MPS109905001, p5, 21 March 2017.
604 SIO Decision Log, MPS109905001, pp3 and 6, 21 March 2017.
605 SIO Decision Log, MPS109905001, pp3 and 8, 23 March 2017.
606 Decision 19, SIO Decision Log, MPS109905001, p24, 01 November 2017.
968
381. Operation Megan Two investigators examined the material available from previous
investigations, including telephone records, and sought further evidence. In all, 22 key witnesses
were identified. Four of those witnesses declined to cooperate with the investigation.607
The pre‑trial hearings in relation to Gary Eaton ran between 19 October 2009 and 18 December
2009 and the transcripts of those proceedings were examined. Gary Eaton had been
interviewed by Operation Megan investigators on 08 and 09 July 2014. He had said that he
had never been prompted in any way by DCS David Cook or any member of the Abelard Two
Investigation. He declined to be interviewed further.608
8.1 DCS David Cook’s interactions with Gary Eaton and the development of
Gary Eaton’s evidence
382. The report stated that significant events in the debriefing of Gary Eaton, during which vital
evidence was disclosed, were as follows:
i. 09 August 2006: Gary Eaton made no mention of being at the murder scene although
he did not explicitly state that he was not at the scene.
ii. 10 August 2006: Gary Eaton stated that a few weeks after the murder he had asked
James Cook if he had been involved and had later found out that James Cook had
provided a getaway vehicle and driven the murderer away.
iii. 01 September 2006: Gary Eaton stated that he was at the murder scene and
witnessed James Cook driving away and that was how he knew that James Cook
was the driver.
iv. 05 September 2006: Gary Eaton stated that ‘the brothers’ were involved.
v. 12 September 2006: Gary Eaton said that he was called into the toilet at the Golden
Lion public house by ‘Brother 1’ and went into the car park and saw ‘Brother 2’ and
James Cook in the car.
vi. 14 September 2006: Gary Eaton was asked by his solicitor if he could remember
anything about the brothers. Gary Eaton could not.
vii. 19 October 2006: Gary Eaton first referred to the brothers as Glenn and Scott.609
383. The report correctly noted that ‘[t]he disclosure of these events coincides with the highest
volume of sterile corridor breaches and contact events between Eaton and DCS Cook. It also
coincides with the period in which Eaton’s management was most challenging and his mental
and physical health deteriorate [sic] leading to the involvement of medical practitioners.’610
384. Mr Justice Mitting had stated that former DCS David Cook was aware of the sterile
corridor system and its purpose, but contacted Gary Eaton repeatedly, in telephone calls, some
of which were of substantial length, and continued to do so even after receiving directions and
giving undertakings not to do so. He did not make any note of what he said or texted. The
timing of the telephone calls was significant, in particular those of 28 and 29 August 2006,
three and four days before Gary Eaton said, on 01 September 2006, for the first time that he
had been at the pub on the occasion of the murder. When Gary Eaton produced the prepared
607 Operation Megan II Report, MPS109753001, p13, 05 December 2017.

969
statement mentioning ‘the brothers’ on 05 September 2006, soon after receiving an unrecorded
text message from DCS Cook, saying that he needed further reassurance as to the safety of
his family before going into further detail, he received that reassurance from DCS Cook, in
clear breach of the sterile corridor system. The evolution of his account about the brothers in
debriefing interviews on 12 and 13 September 2006, was interposed by a telephone call from
DCS Cook to Gary Eaton. There were a large number of unrecorded calls by DCS Cook to Gary
Eaton before the latter arrived at his final version of events on 19 October 2006.611
385. The Megan Two Report summarised dates of telephone contact between Gary Eaton and
DCS David Cook between 23 August 2006 and 12 September 2006,612 although it was stated
that there was a gap in the billing from Gary Eaton from 23 August 2006 to 19 September 2006,
which was a crucial period.613 It noted that data were available at a cost of £5,000 in 2006, but
‘[a]t the time this amount was not considered proportionate so the data was not obtained. The
officers would not have been aware of the significance of this gap until it became an issue during
the Voir Dire614 in 2009. Efforts were then made to retrieve the data but were unsuccessful due
to the passage of time.’615 The Megan Two Report contained details of the Criminal Justice
Protection Unit logs articulating the difficulties which they had experienced in managing Gary
Eaton as a witness (see Chapter 8, Abelard Two Investigation, section 6.4).616
386. The report referred in detail to events which occurred on 05 September 2006. The
sequence of events was recorded by DS Anthony Moore, who was the debriefing officer, in a
typed Schedule of Contact as follows:
‘Debrief takes place then GS [Gary Eaton] taken to covert location for welfare visit by
DCS COOK. Also present DS MOORE and Keima PAYTON (SOL).’
These words were followed immediately by the following words:
‘0945 Gary [Eaton] arrives – consultation
With sols 10.15 Sols out DS Moore out fro [sic] Tea/Coffee 10.55 DS Moore returns,
coffee Provided & cigarettes. Gary has broken down & Remains alone in bedroom –
given time to think & Compose himself 1150 Sols in consultation
12.20 Sols out with note – signed & exhibited Gary does not want to Go further today.
1830 meeting held at covert Location at request of DCS Cook
Via DSU Phillips Keima Payton Also present. Purpose is to reassure Gary that
everything is being done to Provide security for him and his Family […]’617
387. This note of events gave rise to an understanding that Gary Eaton had been taken to a
secure location by DCS David Cook before 9.45 am on 05 September 2006. The first words,
‘Debrief takes place then GS [Gary Eaton] taken to covert location for welfare visit by DCS
COOK’, were misunderstood. As examined in Chapter 8, the Abelard Two Investigation, this was
a critical misunderstanding.
611 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] EWHC 273 (QB), MPS109702001, pp24-25, para 100, 17 February 2017.
616 Operation Megan II Report, MPS109753001, pp9-10, 05 December 2017.
617 ‘Schedule of Contact with Gary [Eaton] – Operation Abelard II’, MPS006763001, p9, undated.
970
388. Former DCS David Cook had been examined, on 08 December 2009, by Richard
Christie QC for the Defence, and asked whether he was present when Gary Eaton was
debriefed on 05 September 2006, or before the debrief. Former DCS Cook had replied ‘No’
to both questions. When asked whether, ‘You only saw him later that day?’ former DCS Cook
said ‘Yes.’618
389. Former DCS David Cook had, however, texted Gary Eaton at 11.25 on 05 September
2006, before Gary Eaton had signed a statement that ‘The time is 11.57 [...] I wish to disclose
that the “brothers” are involved.’619 Former DCS Cook said in evidence to the hearing that he did
not know why he had texted Gary Eaton at that time. Gary Eaton had declined to provide any
further information during his interview.
390. However, DS Anthony Moore’s entry on the Schedule of Contact was construed by Mr
Justice Maddison to mean that Gary Eaton had been taken by DCS David Cook for a welfare
visit prior to the debrief. Mr Justice Maddison reported that, ‘Mr Eaton was taken to a covert
location by DCS Cook for what was described as a “welfare visit” […] Mr Eaton then had a
consultation with his solicitor.’ ‘At 10.15 he was left alone in a bedroom […].’620
391. On examination of the contemporaneous documentation the Panel has established

the following:
i. 09.40 am – Gary Eaton arrived for his debrief. He had a consultation with his solicitor.
ii. 10.15 am – The consultation with the solicitor finished. DS Anthony Moore went out for
‘tea/coffee’.
iii. 10.50 am – DS Moore returned and provided coffee and cigarettes. He recorded ‘Gary
has broken down and remains in bedroom given time to think and compose himself.’
iv. 11.50 am – Gary Eaton’s solicitor had a further consultation with him.
v. 12.20 pm – The solicitor emerged with a handwritten statement signed by Gary Eaton
saying that the brothers were involved signed. Gary Eaton declined to be debriefed
further that day.
vi. 6.30 pm – Gary Eaton, in the presence of his solicitor and DS Moore,
met DCS Cook.621
392. The Megan Two Report concluded that Mr Justice Mitting’s finding, in his judgment on
the civil action brought by Jonathan Rees and others, that ‘before 1015 am Cook took Eaton
to a covert location for a welfare visit’, was incorrect. This understanding by Mr Justice Mitting
derived from the statement of Mr Justice Maddison. The only meeting between DCS David
Cook and Gary Eaton, accompanied by DS Anthony Moore and Gary Eaton’s solicitor, Keima
Payton, occurred at 6.30 pm.
618 Transcript of hearing, p55, 08 December 2009.

619 ‘Prepared Statement of Gary [Eaton]’, MPS006779001, p1, 05 September 2006.
620 Ruling of Mr Justice Maddison, MPS109597001, p55, para 78, undated.
621 Operation Megan II Report, MPS109753001, pp5-6, 05 December 2017.
971
393. Having reached the conclusion which he did, Mr Justice Mitting stated that ‘prompting
a potentially unreliable witness to implicate Glenn and Garry Vian in the Morgan murder and
then to conceal the fact that he had done so from the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] and
prosecuting counsel, Cook did an act which tended to pervert the course of justice’.622
394. In reaching this conclusion, Mr Justice Mitting said:
‘I reach that conclusion even though I am not persuaded that Cook intended that Eaton
should give false evidence. Although no-one, other than Cook and Eaton can know
for certain what he said to him, I believe it to be inconceivable that Cook gave Eaton
a detailed account of what he believed had happened, knowing that Eaton had not
witnessed it. My strong suspicion – it can be no more than that – is that he encouraged
Eaton to say that he was present at the Golden Lion [public house] on 10 March 1987
and did witness the aftermath of the murder because he believed that Eaton had been
there, but was reluctant to say so, because of fears for his and his family’s safety and
that inaccuracies in his account would be exposed. I strongly suspect that in the two
lengthy calls on 28 and 29 August 2016 […] he encouraged Eaton to say that the
next debriefing session on 1 September 2006, as he had not done before, that he
was present at the scene. I strongly suspect that this was because Eaton had said
something to Cook which prompted him to believe that Eaton may have been there.
Once he began to tell his story, like Maddison J, I accept that Cook prompted him to
name “the brothers” as Scott and Garry. The danger in this was that it encouraged
an unstable individual with severe personality and psychiatric problems to say what
he thought Cook wanted him to say, whether or not it was true. I am satisfied that
something like that is what happened. I do not believe that Eaton was present in the
Golden Lion [public house] on 10 March 1987 and so did not see what he claimed to
have seen. If he had been allowed to give evidence of that before a jury, the course
of justice would unquestionably have been perverted, whatever the outcome of
the trial.’623
395. The Megan Two Report stated that there being no new witness evidence since Person
G23, Gary Eaton’s former solicitor, Keima Payton, and former DCS David Cook’s former wife,
Jacqui Hames, all declined to provide evidence to the Megan Two Investigation, there was no
new evidence ‘to alter the original findings published’ in the Operation Megan Report.624 Those
findings had been that ‘DCS Cook should not have maintained the levels of contact that he did
with Mr Eaton without keeping formal records of contact’ and that his ‘actions did amount to
a breach of the standards of professional behaviour and there is a case to answer in respect
to duties and responsibilities.’625 As former DCS Cook had retired, no disciplinary proceedings
were possible.
8.2 The issue of whether Gary Eaton had been tipped off that his
father was dead
396. The Megan Two Investigation reviewed the notebooks and other notes made by
Directorate of Professional Standards Witness Protection Unit officers and other officers and
confirmed its earlier conclusion that there had been a miscommunication of information which
resulted in a misguided assertion by DS Anthony Moore.
623 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2017] EWHC 273 (QB), MPS109702001, pp50-51, para 188, 17 February 2017.
972
397. Former DCS David Cook was interviewed by the Megan Two Investigation on 11 July 2017
between 1.23 pm and 2.03 pm.626 He produced a 50-page prepared statement627 and answered
some of the questions which were put to him.
398. In his prepared statement, former DCS David Cook’s responses to questions included:
i. Denial of any criminal acts628 but admitted that he had made mistakes and he
apologised for those mistakes.629
ii. That he ‘never knowingly or intentionally did anything to break the law or to frustrate
the interests of justice or to cover up anything [he] had done’.630
iii. That he had never concealed his contacts with Gary Eaton and was fully aware that
those contacts would be recorded by phone companies.631
iv. That he never intentionally prompted Gary Eaton.632
v. That the sterile corridor had no statutory basis nor was there any Association of
Chief Police Officers guidance, and at no point was he given training about Serious
Organised Crime and Police Act debriefs other than a draft copy of the guidelines
which did not cover situation that arose with Gary Eaton.633
vi. That he did not tip off Gary Eaton about his father being dead and said that it was he
who insisted that Gary Eaton had to be challenged as the revelation of the fact that
he had described his father as being dead had an adverse effect on his credibility
as a witness.634
vii. That he had not wanted further contact with Gary Eaton after his initial contact, but
that no unit would take responsibility for him immediately (former DCS Cook described
this as a ‘well-known corporate weakness within the MPS [Metropolitan Police
Service]: no-one will grip difficult decisions and things drift and drift’635 and confirmed
that during the initial period his ‘role was simply to assist the operational team,
supervise and look after his [Gary Eaton’s] welfare’.636
viii. That he had handed Gary Eaton over to the Criminal Justice Protection Unit on
11 August 2006 and believed that there would be no further contact, however Gary
Eaton continued to call on welfare grounds complaining of accommodation, his
relationship with Person G23637 and later, after taking a dislike to DS Anthony Moore he
complained about him (DS Anthony Moore).638
626 Record of interview with former DCS David Cook, MPS109901001, p1, 11 July 2017.
627 Redacted copy of prepared statement of former DCS David Cook, MPS109752001, 11 July 2017.
628 Redacted copy of prepared statement of former DCS David Cook, MPS109752001, p4, para 6, 11 July 2017.
634 Redacted copy of prepared statement of former DCS David Cook, MPS109752001, pp6-7, para 17, 11 July 2017.
637 Redacted copy of prepared statement of former DCS David Cook, MPS109752001, p25, paras 118-119, 11 July 2017.
973
399. The Megan Two Investigation concluded that, although former DCS David Cook
underestimated the volume of contact which he had had with Gary Eaton, there was no
evidence to disprove former DCS Cook’s account in any other area, nor was there any additional
evidence to suggest that DCS Cook made attempts to prompt Gary Eaton or provide him with
information relating to the inquiry.639
400. The Megan Two Report concluded with an examination of the evidential weaknesses of
the case against former DCS David Cook among which were the following facts:
i. Both Mr Justice Maddison and Mr Justice Mitting regarded Gary Eaton as

wholly unreliable.640
ii. Two key witnesses, Person G23 and his solicitor at the time of the debrief, had refused
to be interviewed.641
iii. Mr Justice Mitting had not heard evidence from former DCS Cook and had not
had access to the Operation Megan Investigation papers, including the interview
of Gary Eaton on 08 and 09 July 2014. Mr Justice Mitting’s conclusion about the
events of 05 September 2006 relating to Gary Eaton, were based on the inaccurate
assumption that former DCS Cook had been present both in the morning and in the
evening of 05 September 2006. It had been shown that, in fact, DCS Cook had only
met Gary Eaton once that day at 6.30 pm. Gary Eaton had said that he had ignored
the text which he had received from DCS Cook at 11.25 am on 05 September. The
prepared statement in which he had implicated ‘the brothers’ in the murder had been
produced during a debrief. Gary Eaton’s health had been ‘drastically deteriorating’
at this time, his concerns about the safety of his family had reached a critical level
and he was unwilling to continue. He was the ‘only reliable witness and as such DCS
Cook felt he was entitled to hold the meeting and do everything possible to keep Gary
Eaton on board’.642
iv. There was no evidence to disprove the assertion, by both former DCS Cook and Gary
Eaton, that contact between them had been welfare related.643
v. Breaching a sterile corridor is not a criminal offence. It is a breach of the Code of

Conduct for police officers.644
vi. The report produced by the Covert Operations Security Unit in April 2007 on the
debriefs of James Ward and Gary Eaton had emphasised that the shortcomings
identified through the debriefing process were substantially, if not wholly, down to
the fact that there was no clear corporate guidance and limited resources to secure
evidence from such witnesses and that ‘given the circumstances DCS Cook should
be “applauded”.’645

640 Operation Megan II Report, MPS109753001, p16, para 1, 05 December 2017.
974
vii. DCS Cook had been aware that his initial conversation with Gary Eaton was being
recorded, therefore it was highly unlikely that as an experienced Senior Investigating
Officer, he would have prompted Gary Eaton.646
viii. Gary Eaton was a very problematic witness and the witness protection contact logs
supported DCS Cook’s account.647
ix. The accounts from the three strongest prosecution witnesses, DI Anthony Moore and
the two debriefers, were unsubstantiated, and no evidence could be found to support
the allegations made.648
401. The Megan Two Investigation sought advice on charges against former DCS David
Cook as follows:
i. Perjury:
No evidence had been identified to suggest that former DCS Cook had wilfully lied or
withheld information despite being cross-examined for nine days during the pre-trial
hearing. Mr Justice Maddison had concluded that he was satisfied that former DCS
Cook had adequately accounted for his actions.
ii. Perverting the course of justice:
There was no new evidence to suggest that former DCS Cook had intentionally
contacted Gary Eaton with the purpose of providing him with information or that he did
an act intending to pervert the course of justice.
However, the Operation Megan Two report said ‘it must be considered that DCS
Cooks actions alone constitute an offence. DCS Cook was an experienced SIO [Senior
Investigating Officer] who would have been well aware of the sterile corridor and the
protocols and risks associated with operating outside these guidelines […] as the
debriefing of Eaton continued it would have become more apparent that he was an
unstable witness and that his assertions being made were becoming problematic as his
account developed. […] it could be considered that DCS Cooks actions in maintaining
Eaton as a witness and persisting with him up to trial is in itself an attempt to pervert
the course of justice as he should have withdrawn him as a witness or at the least cast
doubt on his reliability […] as Eaton undermined the prosecution case based on his
unreliability.’649
iii. Misconduct in public office:
The Megan Two Investigation identified no new evidence which would alter the
findings of the Operation Megan Investigation. There was no evidence ‘to suggest that
DCS Cook provided Eaton with information relating to the Daniel Morgan murder or
manipulated events in order to assist Eaton in doing so’.650
646 Operation Megan II Report, MPS109753001, pp16-17, para 7, 05 December 2017.

975
402. Following the submission of this report in December 2017, a decision was made by the
Crown Prosecution Service in November 2018 not to prosecute former DCS David Cook.
Jonathan Rees, former DS Sidney Fillery and Glenn Vian appealed against this finding. The
decision was upheld by a different branch of the Crown Prosecution Service on 17 May 2019.
The Panel was notified confidentially on 19 June 2019. On both occasions, Jonathan Rees was
provided with a written explanation for these decisions by the relevant Prosecutor. The reviewing
lawyer in the Crown Prosecution Service concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that former DCS Cook’s actions tended and were intended to pervert the course of justice.651 He
also said that he did not consider that former DCS Cook’s actions in repeatedly breaching the
sterile corridor, contrary to instructions and his own agreement not to do so, was misconduct
calculated to injure the public interest so as to call for condemnation and punishment.652
9 The appeal against the decision of Mr Justice Mitting in the

civil action, 2018
403. Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian and Garry Vian, whose claims against the Metropolitan Police
Commissioner had failed in the High Court, sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.653
Leave had been denied by Mr Justice Mitting, but was granted by the Court of Appeal on
01 June 2017. Lord Justice McCombe, Lady Justice King and Lord Justice Coulson heard the
appeal on 24 and 25 April 2018. The appeal was on points of law. There was no challenge to
any of Mr Justice Mitting’s factual findings. Judgment was delivered on 05 July 2018.
404. Lord Justice McCombe stated at the beginning of his judgment:
‘I would emphasise at the outset that this judgment is founded entirely upon the
primary facts found by the judge. It will be seen, however, that in certain areas I find
myself in disagreement either with the judge’s legal conclusions or the secondary
conclusions which he draws from the primary facts which he found.’654
405. Lord Justice McCombe explained:
‘The salient feature of the present proceedings, however, and the salient reason why
Maddison J decided to exclude Eaton’s evidence from the appellants’ prospective
trial, was that the Senior Investigating Officer (“SIO”), Detective Chief Superintendent
David Cook (“DCS Cook”) was found to have compromised the de-briefing of Eaton
by making and receiving an extensive number of unauthorised direct contacts with
Eaton in the period leading up to Eaton’s making of his statements, in contravention
of express procedures for keeping a “sterile corridor” between the debriefing officers
and the investigation team. In the course of the debriefing process, Eaton moved
from being unwilling to name directly any of the participants in the murder to naming
the three appellants and giving his graphic (as it turned out obviously inaccurate)
description of the murder scene.’655
651 Victim’s Right to Review Letter from the Crown Prosecution Service to Jonathan Rees, Sidney Fillery and Glenn Vian, p26, para 98,
17 May 2019 [Crown Prosecution Service disclosure to DMIP via email on 12 November 2019]
652 Victim’s Right to Review Letter from the Crown Prosecution Service to Jonathan Rees, Sidney Fillery and Glenn Vian, p26, para 103,
17 May 2019 [Crown Prosecution Service disclosure to DMIP via email on 12 November 2019]
653 Court of Appeal letter granting permission for appeal, CIV000003001, p1, 01 June 2017.
654 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2018] EWCA Civ 1587, pp2-3, para 2.
655 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2018] EWCA Civ 1587, p4, para 8.
976
9.1 Malicious prosecution

406. The Court of Appeal overturned Mr Justice Mitting’s finding that former DCS David
Cook was not the Prosecutor. Their Lordships found that ‘[t]he decision to prosecute was
“overborne and perverted”’ by former DCS David Cook’s misfeasance.656 As Lord Justice
McCombe explained:
‘It seems to me that the judge’s conclusions […] fail to take fully into account the
position of DCS Cook, as the most senior police officer in the case, presenting a case
to the CPS for a prosecution decision. By virtue of the judge’s other express findings,
DCS Cook was intending to pervert the course of justice in suborning Eaton and
then knowingly presented the fruits of that criminal offence to influence the charging
decision. DCS Cook presented Eaton as an eyewitness to the murder scene.’657
407. Lord Justice McCombe went further, stating that the ‘malign influence’658 of former DCS
David Cook tainted the whole investigation:
‘In assessing whether the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] and Treasury Counsel
were able to exercise a truly independent judgment, it is necessary to stand back
from the printed word and, postulating the reverse of the facts as they were, to ask
what effect it would have had on their judgment if they had been told that the SIO
[Senior Investigating Officer] had deliberately presented to them a case in which the
evidence of the only supposed eyewitness had been improperly procured by that
officer by acts intended by him to pervert the course of justice. The case otherwise was
supported only by evidence, not to mince words, of extremely “dodgy” witnesses and
some circumstantial material. In my judgment, on this hypothesis, it is inconceivable
that, in such circumstances, the CPS would have advised that murder charges be
brought, without DCS Cook having been removed from the process entirely and a
fresh review of the material having been prepared from which his malign influence had
been removed.’659
408. Having established that former DCS David Cook was the Prosecutor, the Court of Appeal
considered whether former DCS Cook had acted with malice. In the High Court, Mr Justice
Mitting had declined to find that former DCS David Cook was malicious because, ‘even if
Cook’s methods are open to criticism, his motive was not: it was to bring those he believed to be
complicit in the Morgan murder and in covering it up to justice’.660 Before the Court of Appeal,
Nicholas Bowen QC, Counsel for Jonathan Rees and Glenn Vian, argued that this amounted to
‘a judicial sanction of corruption’.
409. The Court of Appeal held that there was neither subjective nor objective reasonable
and probable cause to lay murder charges against the Claimants. As Lord Justice
McCombe explained:
‘In my judgment, it is entirely clear that the case presented by DCS Cook to the CPS
[Crown Prosecution Service] was not a “proper” one, nor was it “fit to be tried”. It
included (and relied strongly upon) evidence, on the judge’s finding, procured by DCS
Cook’s own acts which were intended by him to pervert the course of justice. There is
977
no evidence that he gave any thought to the question whether there was a fit or proper
case to be laid before the court absent that tainted evidence. In such circumstances,
I cannot see that DCS Cook could be found to have honestly believed that there was a
“proper” case to lay before a court.’661
410. The Court of Appeal profoundly disagreed with Mr Justice Mitting’s reasoning and held
that former DCS David Cook was ‘malicious’ in what he did.662 It was the only point on which all
three judges felt it necessary to give judgment individually. Lord Justice McCombe stated:
‘Can it be the law, as assumed by the judge, that because a prosecutor believes a
person is guilty of an offence, he prosecutes that person without malice (in the sense
of dishonesty), even if the case which he presents to prove guilt is heavily reliant on the
evidence of a witness which he has procured by subornation amounting to a criminal
intention to pervert justice? In my judgment, that is not the law. Before probing the
matter more, I would hold that bringing a prosecution in that manner is not “bringing a
criminal to justice” at all.’663
411. Lady Justice King used a Robin Hood analogy to explain why former DCS David Cook’s
motives were irrelevant:
‘To say that DCS Cook, a prosecutor guilty of perverting the course of justice by
creating false evidence against the appellants, was, on account of his belief in their
guilt, not acting maliciously, is rather like saying that Robin Hood was not guilty of theft.
One understands the motivation in each case, but any seeming endorsement of such
dishonest behaviour, particularly within the police force, leads as McCombe LJ puts it,
to a (serious and unacceptable) “negation of the rule of law”.’664
412. Finally, on the same point Lord Justice Coulson observed:
‘It would be contrary to basic principle to find, as the judge did, that a senior policeman
can pervert the course of justice to create false evidence against the appellants, but
not be guilty of malice simply because he personally believed them to be guilty of
Daniel Morgan’s murder. That would amount to an endorsement of DCS Cook’s criminal
conduct and his view that the ends justified the means, which I emphatically reject.’665
9.2 Misfeasance in public office

413. Mr Justice Mitting had found for Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian and Garry Vian on all of the
elements of misfeasance in public office, save for causing their loss. As mentioned above,
Mr Justice Mitting came to this conclusion because it was his view that ‘prosecuting counsel
and the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] would have decided to prosecute Rees and Glenn
and Garry Vian on the basis of the evidence available when they were charged other than
that of Eaton’.666
978
414. The Court of Appeal again disagreed with Mr Justice Mitting and found that former DCS
David Cook’s actions did cause Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian and Garry Vian loss. Lord Justice
McCombe explained:
‘I find that it is inconceivable that any properly informed prosecutor, or counsel advising
him or her, would have countenanced the preferring of charges on the relevant date
based, as these were, on the report of an SIO [Senior Investigating Officer] who had
procured a significant plank of the proposed Crown case by committing the crime
which the judge held that DCS Cook had committed. Such a prosecutor would, I am
convinced, have wanted DCS Cook, and any influence deriving from him, to be cleared
from the scene and a fresh untainted assessment made of the remaining evidence
before considering again whether a prosecution should be brought.’667
415. The Court of Appeal also noted that once Gary Eaton’s evidence was removed from the
equation, ‘the prosecutor would have noted that much of the remaining evidence had previously
been rejected as giving sufficient ground for a prosecution and that some of the other evidence
later obtained had come from witnesses of highly doubtful credibility.’668
416. The Court of Appeal therefore unanimously allowed the Claimant’s appeals for both
malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office.669
417. A hearing to assess the damages to be paid was held on 15 and 16 May 2019, presided
over by Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb. Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian and Glenn Vian were awarded
damages for their loss on 31 July 2019. Jonathan Rees and Glenn Vian received £155,000670
each and Garry Vian, who had been held in prison for a shorter period, received £104,000.671
These awards included a payment of £18,000 each in exemplary damages, which was awarded
to ‘highlight and condemn the egregious and shameful behaviour of a senior and experienced
officer DCS Cook’.672
10 Operation Edison 2015-2020

418. In July 2014, the Metropolitan Police became aware that former DCS David Cook had in
his possession material belonging to the Metropolitan Police which he should not have had.673
419. There were, at this time, three ongoing investigations into former DCS David Cook:
i. Operation Longhorn, the investigation by the Independent Police Complaints

Commission into the supply of confidential and secret material to the journalist
Michael Sullivan (see section 4 above).674 As part of this investigation, material had
previously been seized during a search of former DCS Cook’s home address in
January 2012 (see paragraph 130 above).675
669 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2018] EWCA Civ 1587, pp30-31, paras 104, 105 and 109.
670 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2019] EWHC 2120 (Admin), p12, para 54.
673 Edison Report, EDN002248001, p2, paras 3-4, June 2019.
979
ii. The BBC Panorama Investigation, which was then being conducted by the
Metropolitan Police, but which was transferred to the Independent Police Complaints
Commission on 08 January 2015.676 This was an investigation into allegations that
former DCS Cook had disclosed material, held by the Abelard Two Investigation into
the murder of Daniel Morgan, to the BBC677 (see section 6 above).
iii. Operation Megan, the Metropolitan Police Investigation into some of the allegations
made by Jonathan Rees, and criticisms of former DCS Cook made by Mr Justice
Maddison at the pre-trial hearings in the case of R v Jonathan Rees and others, which
culminated in the acquittal of the five Defendants by March 2011678. The Independent
Police Complaints Commission had provided Operation Megan with 620 emails
and 5,846 pages of documents covering the period between 23 August 2006 and
07 September 2011.679 These documents were analysed, and a report was submitted
on 31 July 2014.680
420. Three months later, on 04 November 2014, the Metropolitan Police obtained a search
warrant and Operation Megan investigators searched former DCS David Cook’s home
address.681 During this search, 43 exhibits were seized, including a large number of electronic
storage devices including laptops, memory sticks and mobile telephones.682 Some of this
material belonged to members of former DCS Cook’s family. The material within these
seized exhibits has been described as being ‘extensive’.683 The Crown Prosecution Service
Investigative Advice (see section 10.5 below) describes it as follows: ‘It is estimated that if
printed on to A4 paper, the contents would be the height of 2 Eiffel towers.’684
421. The Panel was aware of the search of former DCS David Cook’s home and of the fact
that a criminal investigation had commenced. However, it was not until November 2016 that it
became aware that material seized during the search included some relating to the murder of
Daniel Morgan.685
422. In August 2017, the Metropolitan Police advised the Panel that the electronic devices
had been subjected to forensic examination. Many were assessed as containing personal
documentation and data relating to former DCS David Cook and members of his family.
However, several were found to contain what was described as ‘enormous’ and ‘massive’686
amounts of law enforcement-related information. Two exhibits were assessed to be of particular
note: a hard drive concealed in a recess in former DCS Cook’s guest bathroom, and a MacBook
Pro laptop.687 Investigators also gained access to former DCS Cook’s Metropolitan Police,
Serious Organised Crime Agency and Yahoo email accounts, which contained in excess of
20,000 emails.688

679 Report of a Detective Constable on Operation Megan, MPS109840001, p1, 31 July 2014.
680 Report of a Detective Constable on Operation Megan, MPS109840001, p19, 31 July 2014.
681 Edison Report, EDN002248001, p1, para 1, June 2019.
682 Witness Statement of a Detective Sergeant, MPS1097130001, pp242-243, 05 November 2014.
683 Investigative advice of Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, para 1.7, p2, 04 February 2020.
684 Investigative advice of Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, para 1.7, p2, 04 February 2020.
685 Email from DS Gary Dalby to the Panel, 09 November 2016.
686 Operation Edison material held by the Metropolitan Police Directorate of Professional Standards, PNL000267001, p1, para 1,
10 September 2017.
687 Briefing note on Operation Megan Report, Metropolitan Police Service Directorate of Professionalism, MPS109907001, p1,
26 January 2015.
688 Briefing note on Operation Megan Report, Metropolitan Police Service Directorate of Professionalism, MPS109907001, p1,
26 January 2015.
980
423. Interrogation of the electronic devices and email accounts owned by former DCS
David Cook showed that he had retained copies of material and correspondence relating to
many of the investigations he had managed during his time as a Senior Investigating Officer.
This material was varied, and included reports, intelligence logs, case papers, research and
analysis documents, and email correspondence. The recovered documentation varied in
its classification, from open source material which is freely available to the public, to highly
sensitive ‘Secret’ documents.689
424. The material seized indicated that former DCS David Cook used several email addresses,
and different telephone numbers on occasion.
425. The Metropolitan Police established which databases, of the material seized, could be
accessed, as some could not be viewed, and started to identify material which might be classed
as legally privileged.
426. The investigation in relation to this matter was transferred to a new investigation called
Operation Edison by AC Martin Hewitt in January 2015.690
427. In January 2015, after some material subject to legal professional privilege, (such as
correspondence between former DCS Cook and his legal advisors), had already been identified,
independent legal counsel were appointed to examine the material and remove anything which
was subject to legal professional privilege.691 This process took 13 months.692 There followed a
period of over two years during which there was some examination of the material recovered,
followed by a review of the strategy for the examination of the electronic exhibits which had
been recovered. In May 2017, examination of the exhibits resumed.693 The Terms of Reference of
the Examination Officer were as follows:
‘Phase 1 Triage
1. Index Mr Cook’s exhibits and establish which items do and do not contain law
enforcement material.
a. Compile report for authority to return non-evidential items
b. Return exhibits that do not require examination.
Phase 2 Overview
2. Provide a brief overview of the contents of each exhibit, e.g.
a. Size of exhibit
b. Breakdown of the contents, i.e.
i. 500 word docs
ii. 200 images
689 Briefing note on Operation Megan Report, Metropolitan Police Service Directorate of Professionalism, MPS109907001, p1, 26 January 2015
690 Decisions 99 and 100 SIO Decision Log, MPS109904001, pp5-6, 20 January 2015.
692 Investigative advice of Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, p2, para 1.9, 04 February 2020.
981
iii. 1,000 emails.
Phase 3 – Daniel Morgan Murder material to be collated
3. Identify which exhibits contain folders and material relevant to DMIP.
a. Isolate those elements
b. Index where possible
c. Compile an update report with attached index
d. Following 2 IPCC investigations DPS Gold Group have directed that these
items are not for further investigation
e. Provide DMIP with copy of index
Phase 4 – Investigate the contents of remaining law enforcement material
4. Examine the contents of the exhibits owned by Mr Cook to establish if criminal

offences have been committed by his possession or unlawful dissemination of
this data.
a. Identify topic or investigation headings
b. Catalogue the material contained within the exhibits
c. Examine emails and other communication to establish what, if anything, has

been passed to persons not authorised to possess
d. Compile report for consideration of criminal charges.’694
428. A copy of the Examining Officer’s Terms of Reference was not received by
the Panel until July 2019. The effect of the Terms of Reference was to exclude any
consideration of from where former DCS David Cook acquired the materials. Moreover,
they precluded the inclusion, in the index for the Panel, of materials relating to the
two investigations which had been conducted by the Independent Police Complaints
Commission. Items excluded as a consequence of this direction may or may not have
been considered by the Independent Police Complaints Commission. They should have
been included in the index prepared for the Panel.
429. In September 2017, the Panel was advised that the examination of the exhibits was still
ongoing and that the Metropolitan Police had one member of staff working two 12-hour shifts a
week examining them.695
430. The Panel was granted initial access to some of the schedules of material which had
been prepared by the Metropolitan Police on 30 January 2018, and the review of the schedules
began. The process through which the Panel’s researchers were able to examine the content
694 Examination Officer Terms of Reference, May 2017.

695 Operation Edison material held by the Metropolitan Police DPS, PNL000267001, p3, para 9, 10 September 2017.
982
of some of the exhibits was difficult, slow and cumbersome. It was important to the Panel
to establish whether there was any material relevant to the murder of Daniel Morgan which
had not previously been made available to the Panel. When the Panel was given access to
the schedules of exhibits created by the Metropolitan Police, two Panel researchers spent up
to three days a week at Metropolitan Police premises working collectively or individually as
necessary. The progress was significantly slower than the Panel wanted as the terminal was
shared and used by the Examination Officer two days a week and used by Panel researchers for
the remaining three days. Only this terminal had the required specific software for searching the
relevant databases.
431. During the period from November 2014 to January 2018, the Panel was unable
to access material relevant to its work. The Panel is aware of the resource constraints
within which the Metropolitan Police operates, nevertheless a delay of over three years
in providing access even to the schedules to this material was totally unsatisfactory
for the Panel.
432. The material which former DCS David Cook had been able to abstract from
confidential and secret policing files was very significant, and there is no evidence of
any consideration of how to improve processes designed to ensure the security of such
material in the organisations from which former DCS Cook had taken the material.
433. The Panel had to use the Metropolitan Police assessment of the material as a
starting point and focussed on nine exhibits identified as holding police-related material.696
On 16 February 2018, the mass storage device on which the Edison data was held suffered
a hardware failure, causing a cessation of all work. The review was expected to restart on
05 March 2018, but the Metropolitan Police raised concerns that there might be further material
subject to Legal Professional Privilege within the exhibits. No further work was able to be done
on the Edison material by the Panel’s researchers until 27 March 2018.
434. A Panel researcher looking through material found that 81 emails had been marked not for
disclosure to the Panel. On enquiry, the Panel was told the material had been mislabelled and
was covered by Legal Professional Privilege.
435. The Panel has only had access to limited material from the whole data set, and it is aware
that there is much more material available to the Metropolitan Police than it has seen. When
Edison documents were identified as relevant by the Panel’s researchers, they were notified to
DS Gary Dalby who reviewed each document to determine whether it was material subject to
Legal Professional Privilege, in which case it was withheld from the Panel, and whether it was
‘confidential’. Where material was considered ‘confidential’, it was subject to limited viewing
only at police premises. Other material was made available in tranches for uploading onto the
Panel’s database. The last tranche was received in February 2019.697
696 Witness Statement of a Detective Sergeant, MPS1097130001, pp242-243, 05 November 2014 [ASM/1, ASM/2, ASM/4, ASM/12, ASM/20,
ASM/24, ASM/29, ASM/40 and ASM/42].
697 Review of Operation Edison disclosure to DMIP – Tranche 7, EDN002074001, pp1-2, 30 January 2019.
983
436. Eight electronic devices were assessed by the Operation Edison investigation as
containing law enforcement-related material, which originated from both the Metropolitan Police
and the Serious Organised Crime Agency.
437. Several of the electronic devices were found to contain files directly relevant to the
investigations into the murder of Daniel Morgan. The Metropolitan Police report on the
investigation states that, ‘[t]here are many thousands of documents and it is likely that most of
the documentation relating to several investigations is present. Some email communications
relevant to the various enquiries have also been retained.’698
438. Documents relating to the investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan which were
disclosed unlawfully by former DCS David Cook to various people have been identified by the
Panel as including:
i. Many witness statements dating from 1987;699
ii. Details of witnesses and suspects;700
iii. Debrief reports containing intelligence naming individuals;701,702
iv. Intelligence reports;703
v. An interim report on Operation Two Bridges;704
vi. A spreadsheet summarising 200 audio probe recordings from Operation

Two Bridges;705
vii. Gold Group meeting minutes marked ‘Confidential’;706
viii. Surveillance logs;707
ix. Extensive quantities of material from the Abelard Two Investigation;708
x. Material relating to other police operations which derived from the investigation of
Daniel Morgan’s murder;709
xi. More than 50 draft chapters of the book that former DCS was writing about the
investigation,710 some of which contained police material which should not have
been divulged;711

699 Operation Edison Appendix B review of emails and attachments, EDN002279001, p.4, 04 April 2010.
700 Operation Edison Appendix B review of emails and attachments, EDN002279001, p.1, 13 October 2009.
702 Operation Edison Appendix B review of emails and attachments, EDN002279001, p.6, 04 August 2010.
708 Operation Edison Appendix B review of emails and attachments, EDN002279001, various dates.
710 Operation Edison material held by the Metropolitan Police DPS, PNL000267001, p2, para 5iv, 10 September 2017.
711 Email from former DCS David Cook to Mike Sullivan, EDN002064001, 05 November 2006.
984
xii. Emails exchanges with members of the family of Daniel Morgan and others, including
journalists, concerning matters relating to the investigation.712 One hard drive alone
was found to contain 15,797 emails;713 and
xiii. A strictly confidential letter to the editor of The Guardian newspaper in relation to the
activities of two journalists.714
439. The material disclosed to the Panel confirms that former DCS David Cook was in email
contact with a number of journalists including Glen Campbell,715 Peter Jukes716 (an independent
investigative journalist and an associate of Daniel Morgan’s brother, Alastair Morgan, with whom
he has produced both a very detailed multi-part podcast and a book on the murder of Daniel
Morgan), Laurie Flynn,717 Michael Sullivan,718 and Bob Graham.719 He was also in contact with
former AC Robert Quick,720 Alastair Morgan721 and Alastair Morgan’s solicitor.722
440. The material also indicates that, in addition to his plan to write a book on the murder of
Daniel Morgan and police corruption, former DCS David Cook was very much interested in the
issue of corruption involving police officers, private investigators and journalists, particularly
after he had been subjected to surveillance over three days by News of the World journalists in
2002. During this time, his post had also been interfered with,723 private information belonging
to DCS Cook and his then wife, Jacqui Hames, had been unlawfully obtained from the
Metropolitan Police by a private investigator working for the News of the World,724 an attempt
had been made to acquire other material about DCS Cook from Surrey Police,725 and he had
suffered attempts to discredit him (see Chapter 6, Abelard One/Morgan Two). The material
available to the Panel indicates that these attempts to discredit former DCS Cook were probably
made by former DS Sidney Fillery, who was running Law & Commercial in 2002 at a time when
Jonathan Rees was serving a sentence of imprisonment,726 and Alex Marunchak of the News
of the World.
441. Between July 2011 and November 2012, the Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice
and ethics of the press was conducted. There were also investigations arising from allegations
of phone and computer hacking, and various high-profile prosecutions ensued, including those
of Rebekah Brooks (to whom former DCS Cook had spoken about the surveillance on him by
the News of the World in December 2002, (see Chapter 6, Abelard One/Morgan Two) and Andy
Coulson of News International, on charges of conspiracy to hack voicemails, conspiracy to pay
public officials and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.727 In all, eight journalists and one
private investigator were convicted of criminal offences including:

713 Operation Edison material held by the Metropolitan Police DPS, PNL000267001, p2, para 5ii, 10 September 2017.
714 Edison Report, EDN002248001, pp6-7, paras 35-38, June 2019.
717 Email from former DCS David Cook to Laurie Flynn, EDN001741001, p1, 15 June 2014.
722 Email from former DCS David Cook to Raju Bhatt, EDN001688001, pp1-2, 07 August 2014.
723 Operation Tuleta Report by DS Gary Dalby, MPS102164001, p4, 02 December 2011.
724 Operation Tuleta Report by DS Gary Dalby, MPS102164001, p3, 02 December 2011.
725 Email from Surrey Police payroll officer, MPS102164001, p52, 08 July 2002.
726 Police National Computer printout in respect of Jonathan Rees, MPS004001001, p3, 14 July 2009.
727 Investigative advice of Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, p3 para 1.14, 04 February 2020.
985
i. Andy Coulson, former News of the World editor;
ii. Ian Edmondson, former News of the World news editor;
iii. Jules Stenson, former News of the World features editor;
iv. Greg Miskew, former News of the World news editor;
v. Neville Thurlbeck, former News of the World news editor and chief reporter;
vi. James Weatherup, former news editor at the News of the World;
vii. Dan Evans, a journalist at the News of the World and at the Sunday Mirror;
viii. Graham Johnson, former Sunday Mirror journalist; and
ix. Glenn Mulcaire, private investigator used by the News of the World.
Rebekah Brooks was acquitted.728
442. Former DCS David Cook was interested in contributing to various television programmes
on these issues. The evidence shows that he had been collecting police and other criminal
investigation material over many years to facilitate both the book which he intended to write and
other associated activities.
443. DCI Tony O’Sullivan was appointed as the Senior Investigating Officer of Operation
Edison on 03 January 2017, after having served as Investigating Officer on the Operation since
23 January 2015.
444. The Report on Operation Edison does not set out its Terms of Reference. The objectives of
the investigation were explained to the Panel as being:
i. To identify what material former DCS Cook had possession of, and why he had it;
ii. To identify how he obtained possession of it and from whom;
iii. To ascertain if he obtained any data from serving police officers or police staff after he
had left the Metropolitan Police and/or Serious Organised Crime Agency; and
iv. To identify any disciplinary or criminal offences committed by former DCS Cook
and others.729
445. However, on 10 March 2021, the Panel was provided, a year after requesting it, with the
Decision Log for Operation Edison which included an email dated 03 November 2017. It records
that the terms of reference agreed on 15 June 2015 were:
i. ‘To lawfully collate all relevant Operation Megan electronic exhibits and prepare for
examination.
ii. To examine the electronic exhibits in a systematic manner to identify current or historic
evidence of criminal or disciplinary conduct. This will take place at a secure site once
any LPP material has been removed in accordance with legal advice.
729 Operation Edison material held by the Metropolitan Police DPS, PNL000267001, p2, para 6, 10 September 2017.
986
iii. Should examination of the material seized suggest current corruption or other criminal
offences involving DC or any law enforcement personnel connected to him, to identify
and assess opportunities for a covert investigation led by the Projects Team.
iv. Should examination of the material seized suggest historic corruption or other criminal
offences involving DC or any law enforcement personnel connected to him, to identify
the most appropriate authority or team to investigate.
v. Liaise with other law enforcement agencies as appropriate.
vi. To identify if sensitive intelligence has been exposed and establish if there is a risk to
public safety or the safety of police personnel or other reputational risk to the MPS or
other law enforcement partners.
vii. To comply with CPIA legislation and access requests from other investigative units to
view or use evidence held by Operation Megan / Edison in a controlled, transparent
and documented manner.’730
446. DCI Tony O’Sullivan reported to the Crown Prosecution Service only on disclosures
made by former DCS David Cook during the period from 10 January 2012 to 04 November
2014, this being the period agreed on 20 January 2017 by the Operation Edison Gold Group
led by AC Fiona Taylor.731 Operation Edison identified 56 emails described as being relevant.
The Metropolitan Police state that every email generated between former DCS Cook and
others including journalists Glen Campbell, Peter Jukes, Michael Sullivan, and Bob Graham,
former AC Robert Quick, Alastair Morgan, and Alastair Morgan’s solicitor were extracted and
provided to the Crown Prosecution Service for review, many pre-dating the 10 January 2012 to
04 November 2014 period.732 The Crown Prosecution Service was also provided with the 620
emails and 5,846 pages of attachments733 referred to above (see paragraph 278).734 However, in
January 2021, DCI Tony O’Sullivan informed the Panel that, due to an oversight brought to his
attention by the Panel, it became apparent that the Metropolitan Police had not provided the
Crown Prosecution Service with all of DCS David Cook’s email communications with Alastair
Morgan and his solicitor, Raju Bhatt. Once this error was realised, the Crown Prosecution
Service were provided with this documentation and a further copy of the Edison advice
was prepared.
447. DCI Tony O’Sullivan explained to the Panel that the 56 emails were selected as emails
containing evidence of material shared without lawful authority and/or conversations relating to
the sharing of material, sent to identified recipients. The explanation from DCI Tony O’Sullivan
as to why these particular emails were selected, does not explain why nothing was done to
investigate apparent dissemination of other material to third parties such as the investigation file
in the case of the murder in 1974 of the nanny who was employed to look after Lord and Lady
Lucan’s children. Parts of this file were in an email sent by former DCS Cook to a third party in
October 2013.735
730 Edison Decision Log EDN002293001 pp1-3, 03 November 2017

731 Letter from DCI Tony O’Sullivan to Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, p2, 04 August 2020.
732 Letter from DCI Tony O’Sullivan to Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, p3, 04 August 2020.
735 Investigative advice of Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory, Appendix F EDN002283001, pp16-17.
987
448. A report to the Crown Prosecution Service was prepared by DCI Tony O’Sullivan. It referred
only to the possibility of offences having been committed under the Data Protection Act 1998
and identified only one suspect: former DCS David Cook. In preparing his report, DCI O’Sullivan
considered the outcome of two of the other three investigations into former DCS Cook. The
third investigation, Operation Megan, was not relevant to the matters under consideration by
DCI O’Sullivan:
i. The Independent Police Complaints Commission’s Operation Longhorn Investigation

into former DCS Cook’s unauthorised disclosure of information to Michael Sullivan
which had concluded in September 2015, and in which the Specialist Prosecutor had
concluded that he was satisfied that he had sufficient information to assess the broad
extent of the criminality of former DCS Cook; that it was unlikely that there would be
sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction in relation to an offence of
misconduct in public office, and in addition there were potential statutory defences
available to former DCS Cook for an offence under the Data Protection Act 1998.736
ii. The Independent Police Complaints Commission’s investigation of Jonathan Rees’s

complaint that former DCS Cook had provided transcripts, invoices and a video
belonging to him to BBC’s Panorama programme. It had been determined in 2017
that no criminal offences had been identified,737 which was not consistent with the
finding of the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s investigator that there
was evidence showing unauthorised disclosure of personal data to Panorama, which
is an offence under section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998, and of misconduct
in a public office. The matter had not been referred to the Director of Public
Prosecutions.738
449. Significant criticism is made in this Report of the decisions in both Operation
Longhorn and the BBC Panorama complaint (see sections 4 and 6 above).
450. The Panel received the Operation Edison Report to the Crown Prosecution Service
in July 2019, a month after it had been submitted. The Panel was not given access to
the investigation papers or any Gold Group papers from Operation Edison until March
2021 when it received only the Decision Log, a year after it had first been requested and
after a number of reminders had been sent. Much of the material examined in Operation
Edison related to the murder of Daniel Morgan. The Metropolitan Police did not willingly
or voluntarily provide the documentation as it should have done under the Panel’s Terms
of Reference.
988
451. There is no evidence in the material available to the Panel of any attempt to identify
how former DCS David Cook had acquired the material found in his home in 2014, nor
of any attempt to ascertain if he had obtained any data from serving police officers or
police staff after he had left the Metropolitan Police in 2007, and the Serious Organised
Crime Agency in 2013. No witnesses were cited as providing evidence in the Report to
452. Former DCS David Cook was not interviewed. He had previously been questioned on
10 January 2012, under caution, during Operation Longhorn, regarding the offences for which
he had been arrested and matters relating to Gary Eaton. It was a ‘no comment’ interview.739
He had subsequently provided responses to a series of questionnaires from the Independent
Police Complaints Commission through three prepared statements and had adopted the three
statements which he had provided, during an interview under caution with the Independent
Police Complaints Commission on 08 November 2012.740
453. Former DCS David Cook had been interviewed under caution on 16 June 2016 in relation
to the unauthorised disclosures to Panorama. He declined to answer any questions and did not
provide a written response.741 He was not interviewed by the Operation Megan Investigation.
He had been interviewed by the Megan Two Investigation742 on 11 July 2017 for 42 minutes
and 12 seconds.743 He produced a 50-page prepared statement744 and answered some of the
questions which were put to him.
454. Senior Specialist Prosecutor, Michael Gregory, recorded that the Operation Edison
Investigation was of the opinion that former DCS David Cook had been asked the
relevant questions by the Independent Police Complaints Commission investigators
conducting the Operation Longhorn Investigation.745 However, DCI Tony O’Sullivan as
Senior Investigating Officer of Operation Edison, was required to identify how former
DCS Cook obtained possession of material which was significantly greater in volume
than the 54 emails and attachments considered during Operation Longhorn, and which
contained documents which had not been considered in Operation Longhorn. Former
DCS Cook had continued to access and to disclose documents after his arrest in 2012.
In addition to this, it was six years since the interview of former DCS Cook in Operation
Longhorn and Operation Edison was considering the unauthorised disclosure of
documents which had not been available to the Operation Longhorn Investigation.
739 Investigation into the actions of Mr David Cook unauthorised disclosure of documents to a journalist whilst he held a public office,
IPC001370001, paras 7 and 10, p5 and p6, September 2014.
IPC001370001, para 11, p6, September 2014.
741 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William J. Rees’, IPC001411001, pp11-12, para 71, 14 December 2016.
742 This investigation resulted from comments made about former DCS Cook by Mr Justice Mitting, in a civil claim against the Metropolitan
Police by Jonathan Rees, former Ds Sidney Fillery, Glenn Vian and Garry Vian at the High Court in February 2017, that former DCS Cook had
done an act tending and intended to pervert the course of justice by breaching the sterile corridor and prompting an Assisted Offender, Gary
Eaton, to implicate Glenn Vian and Garry Vian in the murder of Daniel Morgan, and concealing the fact that he had done so from the Crown
Prosecution Service and Prosecution Counsel.
743 Record of Interview with David Cook, MPS109901001, 11 July 2017.
744 Redacted Copy of Prepared Statement of David Cook, MPS109752001, 11 July 2017.
989
455. As stated above, the Panel received the Operation Edison Decision on 10 March 2021.
It was established that a decision to interview former DCS David Cook had been made on
01 March 2019 by DCI Tony O’Sullivan. Three weeks later, a further decision was made to
approach a specialist interviewer to assist with the interview. 746 However, on 11 June 2019, it
was recorded, after a meeting with the interviewer and consultation with Independent Office
for Police Conduct, that an interview would be unlikely to result in any evidence, and therefore
former DCS Cook would not be interviewed. 747
456. Former DCS Cook should have been interviewed, and he should have been asked
about the issues identified during Operation Edison. His unauthorised disclosure of
very sensitive material to a range of people over the period from 2006 had, and has, the
potential to undermine any future prosecution of those who murdered Daniel Morgan, and
to cause significant risk to many of those identified in the material disclosed.
457. Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory was tasked by the Crown Prosecution
Service to advise on the Operation Edison Investigation file at the beginning of August 2019,
and he met DCI Tony O’Sullivan on 02 September 2019.748 Michael Gregory states, that on
16 September 2019, he received the report from DCI O’Sullivan.749 Michael Gregory described
DCI O’Sullivan’s request for advice as follows:
‘in light of the [Crown Prosecution Service] decision in Operation Longhorn and the
[Independent Police Complaints Commission] (as then) decision in the Panorama
Investigation, on the material gathered, is the decision for the Investigation likely to be
the same as in Operation Longhorn – that it is not in the public interest to prosecute
David Cook for any criminal offence in relation to the disclosure of material.’750
458. The Operation Edison report stated that DCS David Cook had been seconded to the
Serious Organised Crime Agency in 2006, that he later became a permanent employee of the
Serious Organised Crime Agency in a senior management role and continued to act as Senior
Investigating Officer for the Abelard Two Investigation.751
459. This information is both incomplete and incorrect. DCS David Cook had been on
secondment from April 2003 to HM Customs and Excise and from April 2006 to the
Serious Organised Crime Agency. When he left the Metropolitan Police on 07 December
2007, he did not continue to be Senior Investigating Officer, although he described
himself as such and was accepted as such by many Metropolitan Police colleagues,
including the most senior officers. The arrangement between the Serious Organised
Crime Agency and the Metropolitan Police was that former DCS Cook would act as a
‘consultant’ to the investigation but that his powers would be limited (see Chapter 8, The
Abelard Two Investigation).
746 Tier 5 interviewer

747 Edison Decision Log EDN002293001
990
460. The report stated that the data recovered included:
‘material present that originates from major crime investigations conducted in the
mid-1990s during his work with Surrey Police, including many murder enquiries
and high profile [sic] investigations, through to his leadership of Operation Morgan
II (Daniel Morgan murder enquiry) from 2001-2002, his work with SCD1 Homicide
(2003‑2005) and the further investigation of Operation Abelard 2 from 2006 until2011
and beyond.’752
461. In fact, DCS David Cook worked on ‘Operation Morgan’ (Abelard One/Morgan Two)
from 2002-2003 and was on secondment from April 2003 to HM Customs and Excise as
a Senior Liaison Officer and was not working in ‘SCD1 Homicide’.
462. The report commented on the fact that former DCS David Cook is ‘particularly organised
and very proficient in the use of computers as a means to store material and communicate.’753
463. The report recorded disclosure of material to a range of associates of former DCS David
Cook. It identifies three journalists with whom, it states, former DCS Cook had ‘a particularly
close association’ Glen Campbell, Peter Jukes and Michael Sullivan.754 It notes ‘to a lesser
degree’ that communications were also present with another journalist, Bob Graham.755
464. The Operation Edison report set out former DCS David Cook’s disclosure of
material to a range of third parties, noting to a ‘lesser degree’ with a journalist, Bob
Graham. However, although communication with Bob Graham was much less frequent
than communication with others, it is notable that at least one document comprising 259
pages and prepared for Defence counsel in the Abelard Two prosecution, in relation to
a witness, which was marked as ‘sensitive’ and contained personal data and significant
information about named individuals was sent to him in 2010.
465. In addition to this, the report notes that former DCS David Cook was in contact with
former AC Robert Quick,756 who had commanded the Metropolitan Police anti-corruption unit,
and who subsequently became Chief Constable of Surrey Police and later returned to the
Metropolitan Police and became an Assistant Commissioner.757 Former AC Quick had retired
from the Metropolitan Police, after being photographed with a document which was marked
‘Secret’ when he was going into an official meeting at 10 Downing Street.
466. Former AC Robert Quick has stated that he was not supported by the Metropolitan Police
during this very difficult period in his professional life. The Edison report records that he and
former DCS David Cook, discussed ‘their common grievances’ about lack of support for them
752 Edison Report, EDN002248001, para 16, p3, June 2019.

754 Edison Report, EDN002248001, p4, para 22, 3 June 2019.
755 Edison Report, EDN002248001, p4, para 22, 3 June 2019.
991
from the senior staff of the Metropolitan Police.758 It states, ‘[t]here are indications that restricted/
confidential documentation may have been passed to Mr Quick by email as a means of update
him on facts relating to Mr Cook’s position. Some material related to Mr Quick.’759 The report
also stated that one of the documents sent to former AC Quick ‘related to intelligence
about Mr Quick.’760
467. It is also reported that former DCS David Cook ‘had developed a close link with Alistair
[sic] MORGAN’ and ‘there is extensive communication between them on various subjects.’761
The report deals with communication to other private individuals with whom he had no intention
to profit in any way or at any time.
468. The report deals in detail with only some of the information which was disclosed to two
journalists: Peter Jukes762 and Glen Campbell.763
469. Early disclosures were made when former DCS Cook was still employed by the Serious
Organised Crime Agency. He retired in July 2013.764
470. Former DCS David Cook retained sensitive information on his personal computer, conduct
which itself could amount to the offence of misconduct in a public office. The offence would
have been committed at the time that the material was stored on his computer. Depending
on the information disclosed, he could also have committed an offence under section 8 of the
Official Secrets Act 1989.765 He could also, whether holding public office or not, be guilty of an
offence contrary to section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998.766,767 None of these offences
were considered by DCI Tony O’Sullivan in writing his report to the Crown Prosecution Service.
In January 2021, DCI O’Sullivan said that his report ‘was intended to provide an overview of
the new evidence which had been obtained in order to initiate dialogue with the CPS [Crown
Prosecution Service] at an early stage and to obtain advice on potential criminal charges in order
to focus the enquiry and establish the viability of bringing a prosecution prior to interviewing
David Cook and investing considerable resources in preparing a full prosecution file.’
10.1 Peter Jukes

471. The report records that the earliest emails between former DCS David Cook and Peter
Jukes were from December 2012 and involved discussions about public officials providing
information in exchange for payments or otherwise.768 It was reported that former DCS Cook
disclosed information to Peter Jukes including:
i. Police material relating to an agreement reached between the Metropolitan Police and
the Media Standards Committee of News International during the trial of journalists for
phone hacking. The agreement involved the supply of journalistic material from News
International to the Metropolitan Police. The Report indicates that although former
DCS Cook did not have access to the documentation relating to the agreement on

759 Edison Report, EDN002248001, para24, p5, June 2019.
762 Edison Report, EDN002248001, paras 26-45, pp5-9, June 2019.
765 Safeguarding Information – retaining a document contrary to his official duty.
766 unlawful obtaining of personal data.
767 This was subsequently replaced with section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018.
992
08 August 2013, he was aiming to get this.769 By 05 October 2013, former DCS Cook
had obtained possession of the documentation ‘totally on the QT via a very circuitous
route and I would not want the person who has control of it to know I have it.’770
An email from former DCS Cook to Peter Jukes read ‘I am happy to let you read it but
you must never quote from it or say you have seen it’.771 Many of the documents were
protectively marked as ‘confidential’, including numerous Gold Group minutes, advice
from Legal Counsel and Metropolitan Police Directorate of Legal Services attendance
notes, much of which would have been the subject of legal professional privilege.772
The Metropolitan Police concluded that there were no indications that the documents
were obtained from a police source.773
However, it is noted that Michael Gregory, the Senior Specialist Prosecutor,

concluded that these documents were part of material disclosed to the Defence
in the trial of Rebekah Brooks. He concluded, in agreement with the Edison
Investigation, that therefore there were no indications that this information was
obtained by former DCS David Cook from a police source.774 The Panel notes that
many of the documents sent by former DCS Cook comprised material sent by the
police to the Defence in other trials.
ii. A copy of a letter sent by Commander Andrew Hayman to the Editor of The Guardian
newspaper relating to the activities of two journalists who might unintentionally have
jeopardised the prosecution of Jonathan Rees and others for perverting the course of
justice.775 Ultimately, on 14 December 2000, Jonathan Rees, DC Austin Warnes and
Simon James were convicted and Jonathan Rees and Simon James were sentenced
to six years’ imprisonment (seven years following appeal by the Attorney General);
DC Austin Warnes was sentenced to four years (five years following appeal by the
Attorney General)776 (see Chapter 4, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges).
iii. A spreadsheet summarising 200 audio probe recordings from Operation Two
Bridges;777 which was attached to an email which stated ‘[p]lease treat this with
discretion. The exact detail should not be copied but it will give some useful
background […] [p]lease do not get Brown Moses to admit to having the documents
[sic].’778 Brown Moses was another journalist.
769 Edison Report, EDN002248001, paras 29-30, p6, June 2019.

771 Edison Report Appendix D1, Email from former DCS David Cook to Peter Jukes, EDN002249001, p30, 05 October 2013.
776 ‘Operation ‘Two Bridges Closing Report’, MPS099294001, pp37-38 and p46, 20 July 2001. –
993
iv. A series of police documents relating to the surveillance of DCS David Cook by the
News of the World in 2002. They included information on the vehicles used during the
surveillance, and on the occupants of the vehicles.779 A separate email from former
DCS Cook to Peter Jukes said, ‘[p]lease confirm receipt of last and agreement on
confidentiality’.780
v. Other material not relevant to the investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan relating
to the activities of Mazher Mahmood, an investigative journalist who had on occasion
disguised himself as the ‘Fake Sheikh’.781
10.2 Glen Campbell

472. Former DCS David Cook had known the journalist Glen Campbell, since the mid-1990s.
In 2010, Glen Campbell began researching the murder of Daniel Morgan and the activities of
Jonathan Rees.782 Former DCS Cook had communication with Glen Campbell on these matters
both before and after the acquittal, in 2011, of the Defendants in the prosecution of Jonathan
Rees and Others for the murder of Daniel Morgan.783 Glen Campbell was working for the BBC
at this time and former DCS Cook was hoping that he could advise on a programme about
phone-hacking as well as the Panorama programme which was shown on 14 March 2011. The
report states that there is evidence of general communication and information disclosed to Glen
Campbell in the form of attachments to emails which included:
i. material, the disclosure of which was investigated by the Independent Police

Complaints Commission (the Panorama Investigation).
ii. information which derived in part from the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation,
about the business relationship between Jonathan Rees, former DS Sidney Fillery
and Alex Marunchak of the News of the World.784 Rebekah Brooks, the former editor
of the News of the World and later Chief Executive Officer of News International, had
been acquitted of various offences in June 2014 and Glen Campbell was hoping to
be involved in the making of a film by the BBC, and also to be a consultant in another
production based on the book ‘Dial M for Murdoch’. The information suggests former
DCS Cook hoped also to contribute to both productions. Discussions occurred about
the purchase of computers to facilitate the work for the BBC785 and, on 24 July 2014,
former DCS Cook wrote to Glen Campbell in relation to material which he had supplied
and a discussion which he had had with Glen Campbell. He said:
‘Thanks for the discussion.
Without being too obvious on the subject.
I would be content if your colleague ‘S’ chose to work from whatever location
suitable but the contents must not be downloaded onto any machine for security
purposes
The content must be used purely for the purpose in which it has been discussed

784 Edison Report, EDN002248001, p10, June 2019.
994
It must not be shared or used as purchase for other information.
As discussed, this was not my intention initially with regards this but things have
changed and a greater public interest issue has I must recognise forced me to
re-consider.
I am concerned however that it is not used for the sake of using it and that a
specific public interest issue must be both e [sic] driver and the aim, but we have
discussed that at length.’786
He also provided a different email address from that previously used for contact, and
also suggested that the ‘organisation’ might wish to fund a Pay as you Go mobile
which he could use, stating ‘I simply do not wish to share my personal number which
as discussed could lead to problems.’ Glen Campbell replied stating, ‘[g]etting your
mobile now..Hope! Send to your house.’787
Ultimately the BBC decided that Glen Campbell could not contribute to the ‘Dial M
for Murdoch’ film project whilst working for them. Former DCS Cook provided to Glen
Campbell the material in relation to Mazher Mahmood which he had also provided to
Peter Jukes. Some of that information derived from material acquired during Operation
Two Bridges and subsequently. At this time, the BBC were making the Panorama
programme ‘The Fake Sheikh’ based on the activities of Mazher Mahmood.788
The evidence shows that police material, including an intelligence document sent by
former DCS Cook to Glen Campbell was used in this programme which was broadcast
on 12 November 2014.789
iii. On 16 October 2014, former DCS Cook sent Glen Campbell two emails one of which
was entitled “Gulp” and was a debrief report from the Abelard Two Investigation
containing intelligence details of individuals, and the second, entitled “Double Gulp”
contained an intelligence report relating to Jonathan Rees.790
473. The Report concludes ‘[u]nder Operation Megan financial enquiries established that there
was no evidence of financial gain in relation to the disclosure of material to any party.’791
474. The Report is a most unusual prosecution file. There is:
i. no attempt to present or assess any evidence in respect of any offence;
ii. no consideration of any specific offence other than reference on the cover page to the
Data Protection Act 1998;
iii. no information to indicate that any attempt was made to interview the suspect, DCS
David Cook, but rather a statement that, in the opinion of the reporting officer, this was
not necessary;
iv. no attempt to identify or interview any of those to whom former DCS Cook
supplied material;

789 Edison Report, EDN002248001, para 70, pp13-14, June 2019.
995
v. no report of any investigation of Metropolitan Police computer systems to track the

passage of emails;
vi. no reference to the fact that other police officers (DS Gary Dalby and A/DCI Noel
Beswick) were sending confidential material to DCS Cook on his personal email
account, rather than his Serious Organised Crime Agency account or any other official
email account, despite the fact that former DCS Cook had a Metropolitan Police email
account as late as December 2010, and a Serious Organised Crime Agency email
account until 2013;
vii. no identification of any witnesses, although DCI Tony O’Sullivan said in January 2021
that those to whom documentation was disclosed were potential witnesses;
viii. no complete attempt to classify in the Operation Edison Report the information which
former DCS Cook distributed, other than the fact that some documents are described
in one of the appendices as ‘not restricted’;
ix. no examination of the circumstances in which former DCS Cook had wrongly
disclosed to Alastair Morgan, for example, an email chain in September 2013 in which
the informant status of several individuals is discussed, and, in another email to
Alastair Morgan, had discussed the informant status of an individual not connected to
the Daniel Morgan case;792
x. no examination of the fact that former DCS Cook was in contact with the solicitor
for Alastair Morgan and, for example, that he (DCS Cook) sent to the solicitor an
intelligence document dated 03 March 1999 which reveals the informant status of an
individual. In another email to the solicitor dated 24 March 2014, a document entitled
‘Briefing Note Sawyer’ was attached.793 This was a police document briefing a senior
officer in the Metropolitan Police. At this stage, former DCS Cook was no longer
employed by a public authority, but he was in possession of material belonging to the
Metropolitan Police which should not have been disclosed;
xi. it does not deal with all of the communication former DCS Cook had with the journalist
Michael Sullivan, which was not dealt with by the Independent Police Complaints
Commission during Operation Longhorn. Material identified in the Edison report
included a document written by Alastair Morgan in respect of which, on 04 January
2010, former DCS Cook wrote ‘[t]his was a report that Alastair wrote and I came
across. It is quite emotive. Naturally he would not be happy if he knew I had it or was
sharing it with you’.794
xii. it does not deal with the email on 09 April 2010 to Michael Sullivan in which former
DCS Cook emailed from his personal email address, a copy of an ‘MG3 Report to
Crown Prosecutor’ requesting a charging decision on an unrelated case in which
Person J5, one of the witnesses from the Abelard Two Investigation, was also a
witness. Former DCS Cook stated ‘This is the file re the ASDA robbery, it will give you
a further flavour of the stuff from [Person J5]. This is us requesting a decision form [sic]
792 Retention and Redaction Op Edison disclosure to DMIP, EDN001055001, p2, 24 May 2018.
793 Retention and Redaction Op Edison disclosure to DMIP, EDN001055001, p1, 24 May 2018.
794 Email from former DCS David Cook to Mike Sullivan, EDN001821001, 4 January 2010.
996
the CPS so we will have to wait and see.’795 The police did not send this report to the
Crown Prosecution Service until 20 April 2010, 11 days after former DCS Cook sent it
to Michael Sullivan.
475. In January 2021, DCI Tony O’Sullivan advised the Panel that ‘[…] disclosure was
overlooked by Operation Edison during the examination of the material recovered from David
Cook’s devices. It is for this reason that there is no mention made of disclosure in the Operation
Edison Report to the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] and accompanying appendices’. The
Metropolitan Police also wrote to the Panel in January 2021 to say that the disclosure of the
documents was overlooked. However, in the same letter, the Metropolitan Police also said that
the Operation Edison report was concerned with evidence of former DCS Cook’s unauthorised
disclosure of confidential material.
476. The report does not deal with material not directly relating to the investigation of Daniel
Morgan’s murder, but relevant to the Panel’s enquiries, which was found among the materials at
former DCS David Cook’s home during the searches in 2014, such as:
i. The report into the death of DC Alan Holmes and documents relating to that report;796
ii. 95 intelligence report documents from Operations Nigeria and Two Bridges;797
iii. A prison intelligence file;798
iv. A document discussing the covert methodology of deployment of probes during the
investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder;799
v. A report, classified ‘Secret’;800 and
vi. Advice from Jonathan Rees QC which was highly confidential and related to an
intelligence source.801
477. In January 2021, DCI Tony O’Sullivan informed the Panel that these documents were not
referred to within the report as the report was directed at DCS David Cook’s dissemination,
not possession, of law enforcement material. There was no evidence to indicate that these
documents were disseminated by DCS Cook, and no evidence to suggest that these documents
had been improperly provided to DSC Cook in the first instance. However, this is not consistent
with DCI O’Sullivan’s earlier assertion that the Examination Officers Terms of Reference stated
at Phase 4: ‘Examine the contents of the exhibits owned by Mr Cook to establish if criminal
offences have been committed by his possession or unlawful dissemination of this data.’
795 Email from former DCS David Cook to Mike Sullivan, EDN001121001, 9 April 2010.
796 Report re review of Op Edison, EDN000778001, p1, 23 February 2018.
997
10.3 Operation Tiberius

478. In its review of the material seized from former DCS David Cook’s home on 04 November
2014, the Panel identified an email which former DCS Cook had sent to his personal email
address from his Metropolitan Police account on 08 December 2010, to both his Serious
Organised Crime Agency email address and a personal email address. Attached to this email
was the Operation Tiberius report which was marked ‘Secret’.
479. The Operation Tiberius document was a highly confidential report on the Metropolitan
Police review into the role of corrupt serving police officers linked to Organised Crime Groups in
the East and North East of London. This report contains extensive highly sensitive information,
including the names of serving police officers who were assessed by the Metropolitan Police as
being corrupt, the organised criminals to whom they were linked, and details of their suspected
ongoing criminality. It is known that former DCS David Cook had mentioned his knowledge of
the Operation Tiberius report to former Commander Robert Quick in October 2013802 and sent
one page of the Tiberius Report to Michael O’Sullivan on 14 January 2014.
480. This report was the subject of an ‘expose’ by Tom Harper at The Independent newspaper
in January 2014, and of an episode of Panorama in 2016.
481. It is quite extraordinary that the Operation Edison investigation apparently did not
seek to find out how former DCS Cook had accessed the Operation Tiberius report
and who had leaked the document. The Panel was informed by DCI Tony O’Sullivan
that ‘[s]ignificant time and resources were expended by Operation Edison to investigate
David Cook’s handling of the Operation Tiberius report.’ However, this did not include
interviewing former DCS Cook about the matter. DCI O’Sullivan told the Panel in January
2021 that the matter had been investigated by Metropolitan Police Operation Yestin.
482. The Panel asked former DCS David Cook how he came to have possession of the
Operation Tiberius report. He responded, ‘[t]his big ‘Top Secret’ document was found in one of
the crates that was delivered to us at [named police premises] along with a whole pile of other
stuff.’803 Former DCS Cook said that he read the document and then returned it to someone
within the Abelard Two Investigation, who ‘made copies’ of it and gave him one of the copies.804
He then left it ‘within the inquiry.’805 Former DCS Cook declined to name the person within his
investigation to whom he had returned the Operation Tiberius report.
483. Former DCS David Cook was asked why he had simply returned the Operation Tiberius
report to his staff and for what purpose he himself had retained a copy. It was put to him that
he was a former very senior officer in the Metropolitan Police, he had worked for the Serious
Organised Crime Agency, he had been involved in a great deal of sensitive work throughout
his career, he had been given a report marked ‘Secret’, knowing the rules in relation to the
handling of sensitive material, and aware that it was circulating among people within his team
who had no legitimate right of access to it. In these circumstances, he should have taken steps
to ensure that it was immediately protected. He responded saying that the investigation had
802 Operation Edison – Examination of Electronic Exhibits Seized from former DCS David Cook (Material relating to former Commander Robert
Quick), EDN002252001, p5.
803 Panel interview with former DCS David Cook, PNL000191001, p18, 26 August 2020.
998
been very busy and that, ‘it wasn’t relevant to the Morgan thing. But it was relevant to my whole,
you could say interest in the whole corruption aspect, and stuff like that.’806 Despite further
questioning on this, former DCS Cook declined to provide any further information.
484. The Metropolitan Police has not disclosed to the Panel the nature of much of the
material recovered in 2014, because, it says, this material does not relate to the murder
of Daniel Morgan.
485. At the time when he came into possession of the Operation Tiberius report
former DCS David Cook was still the ‘Consultant Senior Investigating Officer’ for the
Abelard Two Investigation. He was reporting to AC John Yates. He was also employed
as a public servant by the Serious Organised Crime Agency. The fact that he did
not take action in 2010 to protect this secret report and its contents from further
unauthorised dissemination and to return it to safe custody was a very serious failing by
former DCS Cook.
486. The Operation Tiberius document remains available on the internet. The Panel has
drawn this to the attention of the Metropolitan Police but has received no response to
indicate that any action has been taken as a consequence. The Panel asked whether
those whose personal data had been revealed in the Operation Tiberius report which
appeared on the internet had been advised of this fact and whether the leaks had
been reported to the Office of the Information Commissioner. No such action had been
taken by the Metropolitan Police. Following notification that the Panel was proposing
to be critical of this in its Report in January 2021, the Metropolitan Police stated to the
Panel that in 2015 enquiries were made to explore possible avenues for removing the
Operation Tiberius report from the internet, including seeking advice from the Directorate
of Legal Services and the Directorate of Media Communications. At the conclusion
of these enquiries, it was established that it would not be possible to secure removal
of all copies of the report from the internet, due to the report having been posted on
a number of different websites, social media platforms and non-UK based servers. In
addition to this, the Metropolitan Police stated that the actions of a member of the public
in printing, posting and emailing copies of the report made obtaining control of the
report impossible.
999
10.4 Observations
487. The evidence contained within the Operation Edison database clearly shows
that former DCS David Cook systematically used personal email addresses not only
to conduct sensitive Metropolitan Police business, but also to supply sensitive police
information to his friends and contacts who, as members of the public, were not entitled
to receive this information.
488. The material available shows that, while former DCS David Cook saw himself as
working to prevent corruption in policing and the media, he also hoped to make money
publishing a book and being involved in film making and was quite prepared to hand
material to unauthorised third parties to further this aim. He articulated his need to make
money at various intervals, such as asking Glen Campbell to speak to an individual
involved in making a film about News International saying, ‘to be honest the money
would be helpful just now if it can be rescued.’807 Former DCS Cook repeatedly urged
those to whom he supplied material, to protect the material and his identity as the
source of the material.
489. It is obvious from the material available that, in some cases, documents belonging
to the Metropolitan Police were attached to emails and sent to third parties, including
the journalists referred to above. On other occasions the emails disclose that former
DCS David Cook arranged to meet someone such as Peter Jukes to provide them with
documentation. In those cases, it is not known what the documentation was. However,
the Panel has noted that former DCS Cook had no qualms about sending confidential
material by email from his private email addresses.
490. Whilst the withdrawal of the charges against the Defendants on 11 March 2011 was
caused in part by ‘identified disclosure problems which had been of concern throughout
the judicial process’,808 the evidence shows that former DCS David Cook was passing
information to journalists and other associates both during and after the trial. The scale
of the information leaks by former DCS Cook had the potential to disrupt any judicial
process in any future trial relating to Daniel Morgan’s murder.

1000
10.5 The Investigation Advice from the Senior Specialist Prosecutor

491. The Metropolitan Police report was referred to a Senior Specialist Prosecutor at the Crown
Prosecution Service at the beginning of September 2019. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor,
Michael Gregory, first considered 18 emails sent by former DCS David Cook between
13 October 2009 and 21 June 2013 which had restricted police material attached: 12 to Michael
Sullivan; two to Jacqui Hames; one to Bob Graham; one to Peter Jukes; one to Glen Campbell
and one to former AC Robert Quick. He stated that it was necessary to consider the offence
of misconduct in public office for sending these emails and attachments and disclosure of
personal data contrary to section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998.809
492. In reaching his conclusion he took into account:
i. the emails and materials to and from former DCS David Cook, (56 of which had been
identified by DCI Tony O’Sullivan as the ‘relevant emails’);
ii. the schedule prepared by DS Gary Dalby for the purposes of Operation Longhorn
which indicated whether or not the material considered in that investigation was in the
public domain;
iii. witness statements from Jacqui Hames, Michael Sullivan, former AC Robert Quick and
former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, to the Leveson Inquiry; and
iv. materials from the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s Operation Longhorn
and the Crown Prosecution Service review of their investigation report and from the
Panorama investigation.810
493. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor said, having reviewed all the material which was not
contained in the 56 emails referred to in the Operation Edison report, but which he had been
sent by DCI Tony O’Sullivan, that he was satisfied that ‘they, of themselves, do not show
criminality over and above that disclosed in the 56 emails’.811
494. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor referred to emails which had been sent to various people
by former DCS David Cook including two emails from former DCS Cook to Alastair Morgan.
One sent on 15 October 2013 contained no message but included a number of attachments
including a witness statement from the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation in which the
witness gave evidence about the relationship between Southern Investigations and the News
of the World and its editor Alex Marunchak, and a ‘Day Book’ containing payments from Alex
Marunchak to Southern Investigations. DCS Cook also sent various police documents relating
to the surveillance of himself in 2002.812 In a second email, dated 14 November 2013, he sent
Alastair Morgan a copy of an intelligence report which he had submitted in 2006. On 28 March
2014 former DCS Cook sent Alastair Morgan’s solicitor copies of the two documents relating to
surveillance on himself which he had sent to Alastair Morgan on 15 October 2013.813
495. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor referred to the fact that no full file had been received and
listed the following categories of material which would be required to create a full file:
i. ‘An account under caution from David Cook.
809 Investigative Advice 2 from the Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, p4, para 2.1-2.2, 04 February 2020
810 Investigative Advice 2 from the Senior Specialist Prosecutor, Michael Gregory, p9 paras 4.1-4.2, 04 February 2020.
811 Investigative Advice 2 from the Senior Specialist Prosecutor, Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, p10, para 4.7, 04 February 2020.
812 Investigative Advice 2 from the Senior Specialist Prosecutor, Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, pp54-55, para 5.106, 04 February 2020.
1001
ii. An update on David Cook’s medical and psychiatric wellbeing. As part of Operation
Longhorn, in 2012 David Cook provided medical records outlining his physical state
and mental health.
iii. Victim Impact Statements from any individual whose personal data or information was
given to by David Cook.
iv. Unused material schedules. In a case with so many interlinked Operations and
Investigations, the MG6 series [of forms] would be an essential ingredient of the full file.
In particular, this would require engagement with the IOPC for all material in relation to
Operation Longhorn and Panorama investigations and of the digital material found as
part of Operation Edison.
v. Evidence about the extent of David Cook’s authority and security clearance to work
from home and use non secure email whilst employed by SOCA.
vi. Evidence about the extent of information given to Graeme McLagan for his book ‘Bent
Coppers’ and how that access was facilitated.
vii. Evidence about the extent of material disclosed to Jacqui Hames by the Leveson
Inquiry in order for her to make her statement.
viii. Evidence of whether the material disclosed to Alistair Morgan/his solicitor had been
disclosed to him officially as part of an investigative update by Operation Abelard II.
ix. Evidential forensic reports on the contents of media exhibits seized from David Cook
as part of Operation Edison.
x. Evidence to support the security classifications placed on documents and evidence to

support the timing and extent of their disclosure.
xi. T/DI Dalby, the Disclosure Officer for Abelard II has assisted greatly in identifying
whether documents/information disclosed by David Cook in Operation Edison were
discussed in Court during Operation Abelard II hearings and/or are in the public
domain (using the Information Commissioners definition of ‘public domain’ as a
guiding principle). On my reading of the Leveson Inquiry a review of whether any of
the disclosed information was provided by senior MPS officers to the Inquiry needs to
be conducted.
xii. Clarification as to whether the content of witness statements disclosed by David Cook
(e.g. […]), who may have given evidence during Daniel Morgan’s inquest was covered
in the media and the accessibility of such.
xiii. T/DI Dalby indicates that there are various bloggers who have obtained copies of MPS
documents and published them online. A search would need to be conducted.
xiv. Statement from a suitable person to outline MPS role as “data controller”, setting out
the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data is (as in 2010-2014)
processed by MPS.’814
1002
496. He said that it was probable that some of this material did not exist and reliance would
have to be placed on best memory witness statements. The remaining work would be
considerable and would require significant resources in terms of personnel and time.815
497. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor was satisfied that the emails disclosed personal data or
the information contained personal data. He described the defence under section 55(2) of the
Data Protection Act 1998 which provides that the prohibition in disclosing personal data does
not apply if: ‘in the particular circumstances the obtaining, disclosing or procuring was justified
as being in the public interest.’816
498. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor referred to the decision of the Prosecutor in the
Operation Longhorn Investigation who concluded that former DCS David Cook’s proposed
book was capable of raising or contributing to an important matter of public debate and that the
public interest served was medium to high.817
499. In reflecting on former DCS David Cook’s motivation, the Senior Specialist Prosecutor
referred to the material which former DCS Cook had in his possession, saying that, ‘[h]e had a
huge volume of material covering many investigations not related to the death of Daniel Morgan.
The overwhelming focus of his disclosures was on the discreet issue of the press relationship
with private investigators and their role in using unlawful methods to obtain citizens [sic] private
information/ their role in creating stories. It is an indication of this focus in my view that David
Cook disclosed the same documents to an [sic] number of his contacts.’818
500. He continued, ‘[a]s a broad overview, the disclosure of information covering these headings
in 2012-2014, when there was a real national focus on the conduct of journalists and those who
worked for them, was capable of raising or contributing to an important matter of public debate
about serious impropriety, significant unethical conduct and significant incompetence. Given
that the issues were still current in the public domain, the likely public interest served by this
information in my view was medium to high.’819
501. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor quoted the Director of Public Prosecutions’ Guidelines
on Assessing the Public Interest in cases involving the Media which state, ‘[w]hen considering
cases affecting the media in which freedom of expression and the right to receive and impart
information are in issue, prosecutors should specifically go on to consider: Whether the public
interest served by the conduct in question outweighs the overall criminality?’ 820
502. He said that,
‘[i]n considering the public interest factors outweighs the overall criminality prosecutors
should follow the approach set out below. It is a three stage process: (1) assessing the
public interest served by the conduct in question; (2) assessing the overall criminality;
and (3) weighing these two considerations.
‘Whilst of course the public interest factors in prosecuting David Cook for disclosure in
relation to each journalist would have to be considered individual (sic), it is possible to
815 Investigative Advice 2 from the Senior Specialist Prosecutor, Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, p58, paras 6.3-6.5, 04 February 2020.
1003
make some general observations that are relevant to all. In assessing overall criminality,
the following factors (not exclusively) should be considered:
• ‘Whether the conduct was part of a repeated or routine pattern of behaviour

or likely to continue. David Cook stated in 2012, in his prepared statements as part
of Operation Longhorn, that he had not given DPA 1998 considerations any thought.
Following his Operation Longhorn arrest in 2012, he can have been left in no doubt
of those provisions. Despite being under investigation for Operation Longhorn, he
continued to disclose material to journalists.
• Whether there was any element of corruption in the conduct in question. In my

view it cannot be established that David Cook’s disclosures were motivated in whole/
part by financial reward. There is no evidence that he gained financially.
• Whether the conduct in question included the use of threats, harassment or

intimidation. This element is not present in any of the disclosure.
• The impact on any course of justice, for example whether a criminal investigation
or proceedings may have been put in jeopardy. There is no evidence that any
criminal investigations were or may have been put in jeopardy.
• The motivation of the suspect insofar as it can be ascertained (examples might

range from malice or financial gain at one extreme to a belief that the conduct
would be in the public interest at the other, taking into account the information
available to the suspect at the time). On the information available, David Cook was
of extreme belief that his disclosures were in the public interest. The email exchanges
reveal that was also the view of the journalists Peter Jukes and Glen Campbell for the
disclosure to them.
• Whether the public interest in question could equally well have been served by
some lawful means having regard to all the circumstances in the particular case.
Of course this would only apply if the disclosure was not considered to be in the public
interest.’ (Bold in original)821
821 Investigative Advice 2 from the Senior Specialist Prosecutor, Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, pp62-63, paras 6.22-6.23,
04 February 2020.
1004
503. In drawing these conclusions, the Senior Specialist Prosecutor did not take
account of the fact that it is clear from the emails that former DCS David Cook very
much hoped to make money from his book and any consequential media or other
opportunities. He gives no explanation for his statement that, ‘[t]here is no evidence
that any criminal investigations were or may have been put in jeopardy.’822 Many of
the documents disclosed by former DCS Cook related to unsolved crimes, including
the murder of Daniel Morgan. Placing these documents into the public domain risked
compromising any future trial of these cases. The Panel does not accept the statement
that the test of ‘[w]hether the public interest in question could equally well have been
served by some lawful means having regard to all the circumstances in the particular
case’ would ‘only apply if the disclosure was not considered to be in the public
interest.’823 The Guidelines to which the Senior Specialist Prosecutor referred specifically
state that the Prosecutor must weigh the public interest as assessed against the
criminality as assessed.
504. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor then considered the public interest stage of the Full
Code Test in the Code for Crown Prosecutors (2018 version). He set out the following general
considerations:
a. How serious is the offence committed;
b. An assessment of former DCS David Cook’s age and maturity at the time of
the offence;
c. The impact on the community;
d. Whether prosecution was a proportionate response.824
505. In considering whether prosecution was a proportionate response, he stated, ‘[r]elevant

factors in considering whether a prosecution is a proportionate response, particularly in relation
to an offence under s. 55 DPA 1998, the penalty for which is a fine, are (not exclusively):
i. Operation Edison started in November 2014. The email communication which is the
subject of this advice is now somewhat historic in nature. The oldest is over 11 years
old and the newest is approaching 5 ½ years ago.
ii. I have set out above the considerable amount of further work required to provide a full
file. This clearly has a considerable cost and resource implications should the police
complete the necessary work to complete a Full File. This is particularly relevant given
what I have said above about the evidential challenges in relation to the evidential
stage of the Full Code Test.
iii. Although I have no evidence about the impact that any prosecution might have
on David Cook’s mental health it is nonetheless a matter to be considered when
determining the proportionality of a prosecution.
1005
iv. The mental health of David Cook would be relevant to any sentence likely to be
imposed. This has a cost and resource implication.’825
506. He then said, ‘[t]aking into account the public interest factors a – d above, a prosecution is
very unlikely to be a proportionate or appropriate response in the public interest’.826
507. In considering the public interest stage, and reaching this conclusion, the Senior
Specialist Prosecutor should have given much greater weight to possible damage to
a victim. There were many victims whose personal data had been disclosed in breach
of the Data Protection Act 1998 by former DCS David Cook, even during the period
from 10 January 2012 to 04 November 2014. Some of the information disclosed was
extremely sensitive, and in the case of information relating to the identity of a possible
informant, it was information which might lead to a risk of injury or a risk to the life of
an individual.
508. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor considered the information disclosed by former DCS
David Cook to Michael Sullivan of The Sun newspaper. He said ‘[t]aking into account:
i. A decision has previously been made by the CPS (Operation Longhorn) under 4.2
of the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Having been asked by the IPCC for a charging
decision and prior to reviewing all the evidence (a full file), the reviewing lawyer
concluded that the public interest did not require a prosecution of David Cook for the
offences of misconduct in a public office and/or s. 55 DPA 1998.
ii. The time period of emails considered as part of Operation Edison falls within the same
period as considered by Operation Longhorn.
iii. The material disclosed by David Cook to Mike Sullivan in Operation Edison, was like
Operation Longhorn motivated David Cook and Mike Sullivan to publish a book [sic]
on the Daniel Morgan police enquiry. Any such book would have sought MPS approval
before publishing.
iv. Email from IOPC LI on Operation Longhorn to Operation Edison on 10.06.19 which
states, ‘… in my opinion, what they have found that falls within our parameters would
not have altered anything …’
A charging decision in relation to the material disclosed to Mike Sullivan would reach the
same conclusion as those reached in Operation Longhorn.’827
1006
509. The Panel has expressed its opinion on the flaws in the decision-making of the
Prosecutor in Operation Longhorn (see sections 4.3-4.9 above). The time periods
covered by Operation Longhorn and Operation Edison were not the same. In addition
to this, the Metropolitan Police had become aware in 2014 that former DCS David Cook
had possession of the full Operation Tiberius report – a secret Metropolitan Police report,
not just the single page which former DCS Cook had sent to Michael Sullivan. The Panel
has not seen the complete database of material seized by the Metropolitan Police and
does not know whether it was disseminated by former DCS Cook. However, this was a
matter which should have resulted in an investigation. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor
was also aware that former DCS Cook had sent Michael Sullivan a report into the debrief
of Person F11, which was not in the public domain and which was not considered in
Operation Longhorn.828
510. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor considered the evidence in respect of former DCS David
Cook’s disclosures to his former wife, Jacqui Hames. He stated that at the time of the disclosure
former DCS Cook was in public office because he was employed by the Serious Organised
Crime Agency. He said:
‘Having considered the matter carefully, I see little prospect of there being sufficient
evidence to establish that this conduct was to such a degree as to amount to an abuse
of the public’s trust in David Cook:
• The 14 documents disclosed had a common theme. They related to the surveillance/
potential criminal activity against them (David Cook and Jacqui Hames) in 2002 and the
NoTW [News of the World] working with Southern Investigations.
• The purpose was to enable Jacqui Hames to be in a position to request and ensure
she had that information (albeit I am sure it would have been redacted) from MPS in
her action against NI.
• A degree of redaction had been conducted by David Cook of personal information –

i.e. redacting the statement of […] to remove [their]name.
I therefore see little prospect of being able to satisfy the evidential stage of the
Code of Crown prosecutors against David Cook for the offence of misconduct in a
public office.’829
511. It would have been possible for Jacqui Hames to have sought disclosure of this
material from the Metropolitan Police. It was not necessary for former DCS David Cook
to have provided the documentation to her.
1007
512. In relation to the offence of breach of section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998, the
Senior Specialist Prosecutor said that the documents supplied did contain personal data.
He then said:
‘It can be readily foreseen that David Cook is likely to argue that the disclosure of this
information, in the particular circumstances was in the public interest (s.55 (2) (d) DPA
1998. I see considerable force in the provision of these documents to secure disclosure
in civil proceedings as being in the public interest. On the face of it, difficult to argue
that as they appear to show his very conduct that NI [News International] later accepted
civil liability for, that it was not in the public interest to disclose the material.’830
513. It is not clear what the Senior Specialist Prosecutor is saying in this statement.
514. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor considered former DCS David Cook’s disclosure to Bob
Graham and concluded that ‘a charging decision in relation to the material disclosed to Bob
Graham would reach the same conclusion as those reached in Operation Longhorn/Panorama
review.’831 However, the document disclosed to Bob Graham was a 259 page briefing prepared
for Defence counsel in the Abelard Two prosecution in relation to Person J5, which detailed her
confessions to criminality and her accounts of the criminality of others. It had a security marking
of ‘Sensitive’.832 This document contained a huge amount of material about a large number of
people. The Panel acknowledges that the dissemination of this report to Mike Sullivan had been
considered in Operation Longhorn. This was another dissemination to another individual and, as
such, warranted separate consideration within Operation Edison.
515. The Specialist Prosecutor considered the situation with regard to Peter Jukes and the
disclosures to him. He concluded that prior to 26 March 2013 former DCS David Cook and
Peter Jukes had not met. The relevance of this is not obvious. He concluded that:
‘In 2012-2014, when there was a real national focus on the conduct of journalists and
those who worked for them, this information was capable of raising or contributing to
an important matter of public debate about serious impropriety, significant unethical
conduct and significant incompetence. Given that the issues were still current in the
public domain, the likely public interest served by this information in my view was
medium to high. Therefore [sic] see little prospect of being able to satisfy the evidential
stage of the Code of Crown prosecutors against David Cook for the offence breaching
s55 DPA 1998.
‘Even if, on an analysis of a full file of evidence I was satisfied that there was sufficient
evidence, it is very unlikely that it would be in the public interest to prosecute.’833
1008
516. Although it is known that former DCS David Cook had previously sent other police
documents prepared for Defence lawyers to third parties, it was the opinion of the
Specialist Prosecutor and Crown Prosecution Service that the material came to former
DCS Cook from a Defence source during litigation.
517. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor then considered the disclosures by former DCS David
Cook to Glen Campbell. He came to the same conclusion in respect of Glen Campbell as
Peter Jukes.834
518. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor did not provide any positive investigative advice in
relation to any of the people to whom former DCS David Cook had disclosed material. He
concluded that, even where there were indications that a criminal offence had been committed,
it would not be in the public interest to prosecute former DCS Cook.
519. Having received this advice from the Crown Prosecution Service, the Metropolitan
Police decided in April 2020 that there would be no further investigation of the abstraction of
police and Serious Organised Crime Agency material by former DCS David Cook, or of the
unauthorised dissemination of some of that material, including large volumes of material forming
part of the investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder.
10.6 Conclusions
520. The Panel received the Report from the Crown Prosecution Service on 04 June 2020.
It was marked ‘Secret’ and the Panel Chair and Counsel to the Panel had to travel to London
during the COVID-19 Lockdown835 to inspect the documentation. The Panel Chair and Counsel
asked for the security classification, which they regarded as unjustified, to be reduced so that
the material could be made immediately available to all the Panel and its staff. This was done.
521. A decision had been made in January 2017 to limit the time span for the Operation
Edison investigation to cover the period from 10 January 2012 to 04 November 2014.836
The deliberations and the decisions of the Gold Group which was formed for Operation Edison
should have informed DCI Tony O’Sullivan’s investigation. The members of the Gold Group
should have been aware of the extent of the abstraction and dissemination of confidential
police material by former DCS David Cook if they were to fulfil their role properly. It is not known
whether they were fully informed.
522. In July 2020, the Panel wrote to the Metropolitan Police asking how the time span of the
investigation was determined and how the emails which were considered in the Report were
selected for examination. It was pointed out to the Metropolitan Police that there had been
unlawful disclosure of material relating to activity during the period from the mid-1990s, when
former DCS David Cook worked in Surrey Police, until his retirement from the Serious Organised
Crime Agency in June 2013.837
835 This was a period during which travel and meetings were greatly restricted to limit the spread of the Coronavirus and vast numbers of
people, including the Panel, and its staff worked from home.
836 Letter from DCI Tony O’Sullivan to the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel, p2, 04 August 2020.
837 Letter from the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel to the Metropolitan Police, 16 July 2020.
1009
523. On 04 August 2020, DCI Tony O’Sullivan responded on behalf of the Metropolitan Police
saying that the decision to limit the time span of the investigation was made because Operation
Longhorn had dealt with the period before 10 January 2012.838 In response to the question
about how the emails considered in the Report were chosen, he said that ‘the investigation
identified material shared by Cook prior to this point, which may have amounted to an offence of
misconduct in a public office, for completeness those emails were provided to the CPS and are
dealt with in the CPS Advice file.’839
524. Despite the acknowledgment by DCI Tony O’Sullivan that former DCS David Cook’s
conduct may have amounted to misconduct in public office, there is no statement to this
effect in his report to the Crown Prosecution Service. The words ‘misconduct in public
office’ do not appear anywhere in the Operation Edison report. As a consequence,
these matters were not drawn to the attention of the Crown Prosecution Service. The
only potential criminal offence alluded to in the report is contained in a reference to the
‘Data Protection Act’.840 The Panel cannot accept that an officer of DCI O’Sullivan’s rank
and experience would have been unaware of the evidence indicating misconduct in
public office by former DCS Cook. DCI O’Sullivan’s response to the Panel’s request for
information indicated that he did recognise the existence of such evidence, yet he did
not refer to it in his report to the Crown Prosecution Service.
525. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor did identify some elements which might constitute the
offence of misconduct in public office as described above but did not recommend any further
action for the reasons described above.
526. The Senior Investigating Officer, DCI Tony O’Sullivan prepared a very brief, incomplete
report on the facts surrounding the materials seized by the Metropolitan Police in 2014. It was
subsequently described as an interim report, although when the Panel had enquired about the
status of the Operation Edison report, it had been told by the Metropolitan Police that it was a
full report.
527. From the material available, it is clear that the Metropolitan Police did not ensure
that a full investigation was conducted of the possible offences which may have
been committed by former DCS David Cook in the abstraction and unauthorised
dissemination of materials, despite the fact that former DCS Cook was under
investigation by the Metropolitan Police from 04 November 2014 until the decision was
made by the Metropolitan Police to terminate the investigation in April 2020.
840 Edison Report, EDN002248001, p1, June 2019.
1010
528. It is clear from the investigative advice of the Senior Specialist Prosecutor, Michael
Gregory that the report submitted to him was an interim report. No full investigation was
required by Michael Gregory. However, only a limited amount of the material which had
been abstracted, and in some cases disseminated, by former DCS David Cook was
drawn to Michael Gregory’s attention. His conclusion was not based, therefore, on an
understanding of all the material which had been disclosed without authorisation by
former DCS Cook.
529. During Operation Longhorn, only 46 emails, of over 500 emails and attachments, which
had been recovered during the search of former DCS David Cook’s home in January 2012,
were considered as ‘relevant.’ They were chosen, it was stated, ‘as they represent potentially
the most serious examples of unauthorised or inappropriate disclosure by David Cook to Mike
Sullivan.’841 The Panel has indicated above the fact that there were other emails which involved
very serious examples of unauthorised disclosure of material, some of it classed as ’Secret’.
The Head of the Organised Crime Division at the Crown Prosecution Service, Gregor McGill,
stated in reaching his conclusions that, ‘[t]here appears to be some 550 e mails [sic] – but some
46 have been identified as being e mails [sic] where either the documents or the information
in the e mail [sic] itself should not have been shared by Dave Cook with a journalist’.842 His
understanding, therefore, was that only 46 of the emails were relevant to his decision and he
made his decision on the basis only of these 46 emails.
530. During Operation Edison, only 56 emails of the total materials recovered by the
Metropolitan Police during their search of former DCS David Cook’s house in November 2014,
which took three years to analyse prior to investigation, were considered relevant and presented
to the Crown Prosecution Service for consideration. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor, Michael
Gregory stated that he had reviewed the emails sent to the various individuals described in the
Operation Edison report and ‘I am satisfied that they, of themselves, do not show criminality over
and above that disclosed in the 56 emails […]’.843 This is incorrect, as there is evidence in the
other emails of other unidentified confidential material having been disclosed.
531. The Terms of Reference established for Operation Edison required that the
investigation seek to establish whether any offences had been committed by any other
officers. The Senior Specialist Prosecutor should have advised the Metropolitan Police
that further investigation was required to ascertain how former DCS David Cook had
obtained the material which he wrongfully held, and whether he had obtained any data
from serving police officers or police staff between 2006 and 2014.
532. The Crown Prosecution Service advices, in both Operation Longhorn and Operation
Edison, refer to the fact that Commander Simon Foy issued an informal warning in 2011 when
he became aware that former DCS Cook had disclosed one email to Michael Sullivan.
842 Endorsement by Head of Division, IPC001410001, p52, 29 September 2015.
1011
533. The conclusions of the Senior Specialist Prosecutor in Operation Edison, to the
extent that they related to the disclosure to Michael Sullivan, derived from the findings
in Operation Longhorn. These findings, in turn, derived from the informal warning issued
to former DCS David Cook on 26 May 2011.844 That email had included confidential
information sent between the solicitor for Daniel Morgan’s family and AC John Yates
(see paragraph 124-126 above).845 This way of handling the unauthorised disclosure of
one email by former DCS Cook was interpreted by the Independent Police Complaints
Commission and the Crown Prosecution Service as relevant and was influential in the
decision which was made in Operation Longhorn. That decision was that, although
criminal conduct had been identified, it would not be in the public interest to prosecute.
The decision in Operation Longhorn has been severely criticised by the Panel. The
decision in Operation Edison was reliant on the decision in Operation Longhorn, given
that both Operations considered material disclosed by former DCS Cook to Michael
Sullivan during the same period and for the same purpose – the publishing of a book.
However, the unauthorised disclosure evident in the material seized by the Metropolitan
Police from former DCS Cook’s home in November 2014 was made to multiple
journalists and others. Given the volume and nature of the information disclosed by
former DCS Cook, and recovered in Operation Edison, the public interest required a
proper investigation into all aspects of the unauthorised disclosures, and a decision
based on such a proper investigation. This did not happen.
534. The way in which the ‘relevant’ material was selected during both the Operation
Longhorn and Operation Edison Investigations, meant that the unauthorised disclosure
of some highly sensitive and secret material which was not specifically related to the
investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan was excluded from or not considered
properly during both investigations.
535. Former DCS David Cook was under investigation from January 2012 to April 2020. It is
understood that he had concerns about his health and security from 2002. He was afforded
some assistance, and there is evidence that senior officers in the Metropolitan Police were
concerned about him in later years, when he was under investigation, and took steps to ensure
that he had the assistance of his staff association and of its Occupational Health Department,
as did the Serious Organised Crime Agency. Notwithstanding that, it is noted that former DCS
Cook, in answering questions about his mental health when he was being vetted in 2009 stated
that he had no health problems.
536. The Panel has stated previously its view that former DCS David Cook should not have
been allowed to remain involved in the Abelard Two Investigation for a number of reasons,
including some of the ways in which he had conducted himself as Senior Investigating Officer.
However, while the state of his health was discussed in both Operation Longhorn and Operation
1012
Edison, there is no evidence that it was taken into consideration in an appropriate manner in the
absence of any medical report or records. Finally, the evidence indicates that, despite his health
problems, former DCS Cook was resolute, persistent and determined in acquiring information
which he thought might be useful to him both in writing the book which he intended to write
with Michael Sullivan about the murder of Daniel Morgan and in revealing what he perceived
as corruption between the police, organised crime and private investigators and the media.
He produced some 57 chapters of his proposed book during the period before 2014, some of
which contained material which should never have been disclosed to those outside the relevant
police inquiries. He shared these chapters with Michael Sullivan.
537. During the period from 2012 to 2020, the circumstances surrounding the
abstraction and dissemination of material by former DCS David Cook was not fully
investigated. Had proper investigation occurred and had the Prosecutors employed
by the Crown Prosecution Service discharged their duties fully, it is possible that there
would have been compelling arguments as to why it would not have been in the public
interest to prosecute former DCS Cook. However, it is also the case that bringing
proceedings against former DCS Cook would have resulted in an obligation on the
Metropolitan Police to engage in what might have been among the most extensive
disclosure processes of any criminal prosecution in this country, given the extent
of the materials which he had abstracted and disseminated without authorisation.
The revelation of the extent to which it was possible for one officer to misconduct
himself would have been revealed. This would have caused embarrassment to the
538. Former DCS David Cook has been shown to have acted wrongly over many years.
He did so, he said, because he wanted to bring the murderers of Daniel Morgan to
justice and if he could not do that, he wanted to write a book, to reveal the evidence of
corruption within alliances between elements of policing, private investigation and the
media and to make money. However, former DCS Cook should have been very clear that
his duty was to act within the law and to follow proper procedures.
539. The Panel does not accept that this was a mere accident or omission. As a
consequence of the legal constraints under which the Panel rightly operated, it has not
been possible to disclose the extent of the content of some of the material which it has
seen. However, the Panel is of the view that the Metropolitan Police were aware of parts,
at least, of this situation when the Panel was appointed by the Home Secretary in 2013,
and that as more understanding emerged, the imperative was in part to protect the
reputation of the police, rather than to expend resources dealing with the totality of the
issues emerging.
1013
540. Any serving officer, with access to sensitive information, has the opportunity to
remove it and use it for unlawful purposes. The failure of the Metropolitan Police to
prevent DCS David Cook from removing materials over such an protracted time period
causes concern as to the extent to which such behaviour may be continuing within the
police service unchecked.
1014
Chapter 10: Corruption: Venality
to lack of candour
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Terms of Reference and definition of corruption
3 Context
4 Analysis of the role of corruption
5 Admissions of corruption in the Metropolitan Police and lack of candour
6 Tackling corruption in the Metropolitan Police: legislation, policy and practice during
the period of investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder
7 Corruption in the linkages between police officers, private investigators and the media
8 Confronting corruption and incompetence
9 Conclusion
1 Introduction
1. It is now more than three decades since Daniel Morgan was murdered with axe blows
to the head in a dark car park behind a public house in Sydenham, South East London, on
10 March 1987. His body was discovered by a member of the public within a short time of his
killing. The police were called immediately, and an investigation began that would prove to be
the first of several murder investigations and other police operations arising from, or linked to
the murder, or those associated with it, none of which has succeeded in bringing to justice the
person or persons responsible for Daniel Morgan’s murder.
2. Allegations of police corruption arose soon after the murder, and the case became notorious
because of this. In 2013, the Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, appointed the Independent
Panel to conduct ‘a full and effective review of corruption as it affected the handling of this case
and of the treatment of the family by the police and other parts of the criminal justice system’.1
1 Terms of Reference, para 2. The full text of the Panel’s Terms of Reference can be found in Annex A.
1015
3. The role of corruption was a key focus of the Panel’s Terms of Reference. This is because
the suggestion that police corruption played a role in Daniel Morgan’s murder has, from the
outset, been a recurring theme around successive investigations. It has been suggested either
that the police were involved in the killing, or that police officers were somehow able to frustrate
successive police investigations thereby preventing those responsible for Daniel Morgan’s
murder from being brought to justice.
4. This chapter discusses some general and thematic concepts of corruption and explores the
indications and evidence in the data available to the Panel as to the role of police corruption in
relation to the murder of Daniel Morgan and its investigation.
5. When successive investigations failed to identify the perpetrator(s) of the murder or expose
the role of police corruption in the murder or the murder investigations, the family of Daniel
Morgan, frustrated by the lack of progress, mounted a formidable campaign without which the
Panel would almost certainly not have been appointed.
6. This is the background to the Panel’s analysis of the different manifestations of police
corruption which have been alleged during the course of the investigations into Daniel Morgan’s
murder, from 1987 to the present day.
7. In this chapter, the Panel will extend the discussion of the evidence arising from the
investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder beyond what is generally understood by police
corruption as a form of venality: that is, dishonest behaviour for personal, usually pecuniary,
advantage (everything from police officers ‘moonlighting’ to the selling of confidential
information). The Panel has identified defensive behaviour on behalf of the Metropolitan Police,
in the form of statements by the Metropolitan Police made to Daniel Morgan’s family or to
the media. These statements gave unwarranted assurances regarding the rigour of police
investigations and reflected a lack of candour, through a lack of transparency as well as
prevarication and obfuscation regarding investigative shortcomings, of which senior officers
were aware. The effect of the statements was corrosive for the trust of members of Daniel
Morgan’s family and ultimately that of the public.
8. Public trust in the integrity of the police is essential for effective policing, as is organisational
learning from identified failings and wrongdoing. It is for this reason that the Panel discusses
both venal behaviour by individuals and lack of candour on the part of the Metropolitan Police,
which can be seen as falling within a range of behaviour that amounts to corruption of differing
degrees of seriousness and harm.
9. As more than three decades have passed without resolution of the case, so, gradually, the
Metropolitan Police has moved from stating that the investigation had been thorough and
had met the standards of the time, to acknowledging that police corruption and professional
shortcomings had been a factor in the original investigation. However, they have done so
without stating clearly what that corruption comprised. Nobody has ever been convicted of a
criminal offence arising from corrupt activity relating to the Morgan One Investigation, the first
investigation into the murder.
1016
Chapter 10: Corruption: Venality to lack of candour
10. In 2011, the Metropolitan Police stated that ‘[t]he MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] has
accepted that police corruption in the original investigation was a significant factor [emphasis
added] in this failure’.2 When asked for specific details of what that corruption was which
prevented those responsible from being brought to justice, how and when this corruption had
been investigated and what they were doing to prevent such corruption occurring again, no
clear answer emerged. In December 2020, in response to these questions the Metropolitan
Police referred to various anti-corruption initiatives, such as:
• an Information Code of Conduct detailing the personal responsibility and duty of

confidentiality owed by all officers and staff members;
• a declarable association policy which requires all police officers and staff to disclose
any family connections, friendships or other associations with criminals or those who
pose a risk of corruption; and
• an Integrity Assurance Unit which provides guidance on declared associations in

accordance with force policy and is capable of running integrity checks on officers,
staff and potential recruits.
11. However, in the absence of a Metropolitan Police definition of what was meant by the
statements made about the Morgan One Investigation, it cannot be said that these specific
initiatives would have prevented the undefined corruption which was said to be such ‘a
significant factor’.
12. To address this lack of clarity, the Panel has sought to establish what the Metropolitan
Police has meant when it has referred to corruption during the 34 years since the murder of
Daniel Morgan.
2 Terms of Reference and definition of corruption

2.1 The Panel’s Terms of Reference
13. The Terms of Reference, as drawn up by the Home Office, the Metropolitan Police and
members of Daniel Morgan’s family, set out the complex questions to be addressed by the
Panel, namely:
‘The purpose and remit of the Independent Panel is to shine a light on the
circumstances of Daniel Morgan’s murder, its background and the handling of the case
over the whole period since March 1987. In doing so, the Panel will seek to address the
questions arising, including those relating to:
• police involvement in the murder;
• the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the murder
from being brought to justice and the failure to confront that corruption; and
• the incidence of connections between private investigators, police officers and

journalists at the News of the World and other parts of the media and alleged
corruption involved in the linkages between them.’3
2 Letter from Acting Commissioner Tim Godwin to Alastair Morgan, MPS094332001, p16, 30 March 2011.
3 Terms of Reference, para 3.
1017
14. Any involvement by police officers in the murder, whether in planning, organising or carrying
out the murder, would constitute both criminal behaviour and police corruption. Moreover,
were the planning of the murder to include arrangements beforehand to ensure the failure to
identify those responsible and bring them to justice, this would also constitute involvement
in the murder.
15. The Terms of Reference give a vague formulation of the second issue: the role played by
police corruption in protecting those responsible. There are two possible interpretations of this.
It could mean that,
i. one or more police officers became aware after the murder of who was responsible
and protected them; or
ii. one or more police officers who were not aware of who was responsible for the murder
committed corrupt acts for their own reasons, and in so doing compromised the
investigation with the result that there was no evidence capable of proving who was
responsible for the murder and of bringing them to justice.
16. Under either of these interpretations, this would constitute the offence of doing an
act tending to and intended to pervert the course of justice and would be an example
of police corruption. Under either interpretation, the failure to confront any identified
corruption needs to be addressed by the Metropolitan Police.4
17. The Terms of Reference have been interpreted as requiring the Panel to examine:
i. whether or not there was any police involvement in the murder itself;
ii. whether there was any police corruption affecting the investigation of the murder and
making it impossible to bring whoever was responsible to justice; and
iii. in the context of the murder and its investigation, what was the incidence of
connections among private investigators, police officers and the media, and whether
or not there was, as alleged, corruption in the linkages.
18. The Panel has carried out its enquiries without making any assumptions, seeking to
understand exactly what is meant by the Metropolitan Police’s acknowledgment of its ‘failure to
confront the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the murder from
being brought to justice’ referred to in Article 1 of the Panel’s Terms of Reference. It has done
this by examining all the documentation now available and the information it has gathered, and
by asking the Metropolitan Police precisely what they meant.
2.2 The Panel’s definition of corruption

19. The Panel’s Terms of Reference do not include a definition of corruption. The Panel has
therefore developed its own definition, drawing upon the definitions of corruption and corrupt
behaviour used by relevant bodies. Such bodies include the Independent Police Complaints
Commission and its successor organisation, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, the
National Police Chiefs Council, the College of Policing and the Metropolitan Police.
4 After the Panel’s Terms of Reference were agreed, in 2015, a new criminal offence, ‘corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers and
privileges’, was introduced under section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.
1018
20. To inform its analysis, the Panel has drawn upon the report of the mid-Staffordshire NHS
Foundation Trust Public Inquiry,5 the report by Mark Ellison QC on his review concerning
the Stephen Lawrence investigation,6 the report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel
and the subsequent report by the Right Reverend James Jones KCB,7 the report of the
Gosport Independent Panel,8,9 and the work of the public inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire.10
These inquiries and reports provide important insights into serious failures of a variety of
public services, including but not limited to the police, and address the complex issues of
accountability and corruption.
21. The generic definition of corruption is ‘dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power,
typically involving bribery’.11 This definition suggests that for dishonest conduct to amount
to corruption the person acting corruptly must be someone in power or exercising powers.
This definition would apply to police forces, prison, probation and healthcare services, or
other organisations serving the public. In these settings, ‘corruption’ may denote the misuse
of authority in terms of deviance from the law, professional norms, ethical standards or public
expectations.12
22. In common parlance ‘corruption’ is also used to refer to the venal behaviour of persons who
do not hold positions of power, but who do have something to sell, or who act as corrupters in
that they bribe persons exercising powers to commit corrupt acts: it follows that people within
and outside the police may be involved in ‘corrupt behaviour’.
23. The Panel’s Terms of Reference require it to consider, primarily, wider questions relating to
corruption. It is asked to address:
i. ‘police involvement in the murder’.13 By any reasonable person’s definition, if police

officers commit or assist in planning a murder, it is not only the most serious crime of
taking a person’s life, but it is also the gravest breach of the duties of a police officer.
ii. ‘the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the
murder from being brought to justice and the failure to confront that corruption’.14
The ‘corruption’ is not explained further, but the Terms of Reference refer to the fact
that ‘in March 2011 the Metropolitan Police acknowledged “the repeated failure of the
MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] to confront the role played by police corruption in
protecting those responsible for the murder from being brought to justice”’.15
5 Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, Sir Robert Francis QC (The Francis Report), 2013.
6 The Stephen Lawrence Independent Review, 06 March 2014.
7 The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel, September 2012; the report by the Right Reverend James Jones KBE, ‘The Patronising
Disposition of Unaccountable Power’, November 2017.
8 The Panel was set up to address concerns about the care of patients in Gosport War Memorial Hospital and the subsequent investigations
into their deaths.
9 The Report of the Gosport Independent Panel, 2018.
10 Phase 1 Report, The Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 30 October 2019.
11 Oxford English Dictionary.
12 Downes, D. and Rock. P. 2007, Understanding Deviance, 5th edn. Oxford University Press.
1019
iii. ‘the incidence of connections between private investigators, police officers and […]
the media and alleged corruption involved in the linkages between them’.16 To do this,
the Panel has adopted an expansive approach to ‘corruption’, including the conduct
of the police and the behaviour of other individuals linked to the police or involved in
corrupt activity with them.
24. The Independent Police Complaints Commission report on corruption in the police service
in England and Wales in 2012 identified ‘the need for a clear definition, understood by both the
public and police’.17
25. The Panel has adopted a broad definition of corruption for the purposes of its work.
The definition below is based on the key elements of dishonesty and benefit, and allows for the
involvement of a variety of actors and a variety of forms of benefit:
The improper behaviour by action or omission:
i. by a person or persons in a position of power or exercising powers, such as

police officers;
ii. acting individually or collectively;
iii. with or without the involvement of other actors who are not in a position of
power or exercising powers;
for direct or indirect benefit :
iv. of the individual(s) involved; or
v. for a cause or organisation valued by them; or
vi. for the benefit or detriment of others;
such that a reasonable person would not expect the powers to be exercised for
the purpose of achieving that benefit or detriment.
The Panel has used this definition to consider the conduct of the police officers involved in the
investigations of the murder of Daniel Morgan.
26. The Panel includes in its wider definition of corruption some instances of failures on
the part of senior officers/managers, acting as representatives of their organisations.
The documentation reveals the following wide range of actions and omissions by senior
postholders on behalf of their organisations; many of these actions and omissions have
been identified in the reports of other independent panels and inquiries:
i. failing to identify corruption;
ii. failing to confront corruption;
iii. failing to manage investigations and ensure proper oversight;
iv. failing to take a fresh look at past mistakes and failures;

17 Corruption in the Police Service in England and Wales, Dame Anne Owers, p4, May 2012.
1020
v. failing to learn from past mistakes and failures;
vi. failing to admit past mistakes and failures promptly and specifically;
vii. giving unjustified assurances;
viii. failing to make a voluntarily commitment to candour; and
ix. failing to be open and transparent.
27. These failings do not all automatically fall within the definition of corruption.
Some may result from professional incompetence or poor management. However, when
the failures cannot reasonably be explained as genuine error and indicate dishonesty for
the benefit of the organisation, in the Panel’s view they amount to institutional corruption.
A lack of candour on the part of the Metropolitan Police in respect of its failings is shown
by a lack of transparency, as well as prevarication and obfuscation.
3 Context
28. Before dealing in more detail with the role played by police corruption, it is important
to summarise the key features of the general context in which the murder of Daniel
Morgan occurred.
3.1 Private investigators and the police

29. Daniel Morgan was a private investigator running a firm called Southern Investigations.
Both he and his partner, Jonathan Rees, had close working relationships with the police and
both, particularly Jonathan Rees, spent a great deal of their time in the company of the police.
Their police contacts would have been professionally useful to them given that they were
engaged in privately contracted activities akin to policing. The firm accepted commissions of
a security-related nature from a variety of clients. They safeguarded and recovered property,
carried out surveillance, enforced County Court judgments and collected debts. Such work
would have brought them into contact with both clients and subjects potentially known to the
police, and about whom police intelligence and cooperation would have been valuable.
30. In the 1980s, as is the case today, there were a number of former police officers who
worked as private investigators. Neither Daniel Morgan nor Jonathan Rees had been police
officers. Former DS Sidney Fillery became Jonathan Rees’s business partner in June 1989.18
31. Concerns about the integrity of some persons working in the important and burgeoning
private security industry led the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons to
recommend in 1995 that a licensing system be introduced to ensure that personnel were fit
and proper.19
32. The Private Security Industry Act 2001 provided for the creation of the Security Industry
Authority to carry out various functions in relation to licensing and approvals for those working in
the private security industry. The purpose of the Act was to regulate the private security industry
18 Report on the trading activities of Southern Investigations, MPS061738001, p2, undated.

19 Home Affairs Select Committee, First Report, The Private Security Industry, HC 17-1 (1994-5) London: HMSO.
1021
effectively, prevent crime, raise standards and recognise quality service. The Act created the
criminal offence of using unlicensed security operatives in the regulated industry sector and
provided for the entry of premises for inspection by the Security Industry Authority.
33. Schedule 2 to the 2001 Act lists those activities liable to control under the Act. ‘Private
Investigations’, alongside ‘manned guarding’ and ‘vehicle immobilisation’, is one of the listed
activities. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 defines what sort of investigation is included and what is
excluded. This paragraph was brought into force on 01 February 2004.20 In practice, only so-
called ‘door operatives’ and ‘vehicle immobilisation contractors (and employees)’ are currently
required to obtain an operating licence. The Security Industry Authority does not as yet require
private investigators to obtain a licence to operate.
34. This lacuna in the regulatory framework for what is an important branch of the private
security industry continues to exist despite reports from the Serious Organised Crime Agency,21
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary22 and, for the second time, a House of Commons
Select Committee expressing continued concerns about the integrity of some private
investigators and the need for active regulation.23
35. In 2013, the Government responded to the recommendations of the Home Affairs Select
Committee as follows:
‘The Government can confirm its intention to regulate the activities of private
investigators by requiring them to be licensed by the Security Industry Authority. It will
then become a criminal offence to undertake private investigations without a licence,
which could then only be issued following satisfactory criminality and identity checks,
and competency-based training. Furthermore it will become a criminal offence to
breach the conditions of a licence for private investigation as per section 9(4) of the
Private Security Industry Act 2001 (PSIA).
‘It is the Government’s intention that the regulation of the private investigations sector
will be rolled out from the autumn of 2014.’24
36. In 2016, the Home Office asked a senior official to undertake a review of the Security
Industry Authority and its role. Following consultation, the review report was published in 2018,
and it found that there was a case for regulation of private investigators. It recommended that
private investigators should be treated as businesses and subject to the revised Approved
Contractor Scheme system of standards overseen by the Authority. The review said that the
statutory body, the Security Industry Authority, would need to work with the private investigation
industry to develop a suitable set of standards and an implementation timetable. It said the
Private Security Industry Act 2001 may need to be reviewed and legislation introduced to
ensure that regulation of the private investigation industry was implemented.25 The Home Office
Minister, Nick Hurd MP, later wrote to advise the Security Industry Authority in February 2019
20 The Private Security Industry Act 2001 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2003.
21 Serious Organised Crime Agency, ‘Private Investigators: The Rogue Element of the Private Investigation Industry and others: Unlawfully
Trading in Personnel Data, January 2008.
22 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, ‘Without Fear or Favour: A Review of Police Relationships’, December 2011
23 Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC), Fourth Report, HC 100, Private Investigators, 06 July 2012.
24 The Government response to the Fourth Report of the Home Affairs Committee Session 2012-13 HC 100, Private Investigators, Opening
Statement, July 2013.
25 Home Office, ‘Security Industry Authority Review 2016/17’, 07 June 2018.
1022
about the review’s recommendations and indicated that there was no substantive case for
extending the current regime, and therefore no need for significant legislative change such as
business licensing.26
RECOMMENDATION
37. The Government should act on its stated intention in 2013 to require licensing
measures, introduce legislation to ensure the creation and use of standards, and
implement the recommendation in the 2016 review concerning the regulation of private
investigators.
38. The Government response to the 2012 Home Affairs Select Committee report also
recommended that the Home Secretary exercise her power to strengthen the penalties available
for offences relating to the unlawful obtaining, disclosure and selling of personal data. This has
not been done. Section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998 has now been repealed and replaced
with section 170 of the Data Protection Act 2018. The new provisions are broadly the same as
those replaced, although the 2018 Act creates an additional offence of retaining data (which
may have been lawfully obtained) without the consent of the data controller.
39. In conducting its enquiries, the Panel has encountered significant volumes of evidence
indicating that Southern Investigations (later, Law & Commercial) was heavily involved in such
activities from 1989.
40. This, the Panel considers, was an important opportunity missed to introduce
legislation to provide for custodial sentences. Offences of this nature are still only
punishable by financial penalties.
RECOMMENDATION
41. Given the potential seriousness of such offences, it is recommended that the
Government take an early opportunity to amend the Data Protection Act 2018 to provide
for sentences of imprisonment for offenders.
3.2 Organised crime and police connections

42. It is not part of the Panel’s remit to examine corruption within the Metropolitan Police
generally during the period in question but rather to focus on addressing specific issues
related to it and to Daniel Morgan’s murder. However, in interviews carried out with former
police officers and others throughout the course of the Panel’s work, the subject was inevitably
discussed. A number of former officers related their experiences of corruption, especially within
26 Security Industry Authority (2019-2020), ‘Raising Standards, Protecting the Public, SIA Corporate Plan’, p9; at www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/
Documents/corporate-plans/sia-corporate-plan-2019-20.pdf,
1023
the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in the 1980s and 1990s, and it may be useful to
set out some of what they said, including examples of specific instances of corrupt activity, to
provide context and background.
43. The Senior Investigating Officer of the last investigation into the murder (the Abelard
Two Investigation), DCS David Cook, joined the Metropolitan Police in 1979 and served in
the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) throughout the 1980s and 1990s until he left to
join Surrey Police in September 1996. Former DCS Cook told the Panel that, in his view, the
Metropolitan Police was ‘institutionally corrupt’. He stated that corruption was often ‘brushed
under the carpet’ and was confronted only as long as doing so would not impact negatively on
the officer who had to make the decisions about dealing with it.27
44. Former DCS David Cook related two examples of when he was personally affected by
corrupt officers:
i. When serving as a Detective Constable in the Central Drugs Squad, he recruited an

informant who passed information about the smuggling of heroin. During the first
operation undertaken as a result of what the informant had said, six kilograms of
heroin was seized. Consequent to the seizure and in anticipation of future operations,
an experienced Detective Sergeant was appointed to help manage the informant.
Sometime later, then DC (later DCS) Cook, went on leave and in his absence another
operation involving the informant was established. This necessitated the installation of
a listening device in a flat rented especially for the purpose of the operation. A reward
was due to be paid to the informant. On his return from leave, DC Cook was told by
the informant that the Detective Sergeant had approached him to tell him that from
now on, he (the Detective Sergeant) would be the sole handler and that he wanted a
share of the reward. DC Cook reported the informant’s allegation to senior officers, as
a consequence of which the Detective Sergeant was simply transferred. Former DCS
Cook told the Panel that he was then ‘blackballed’ by colleagues for reporting the
matter. Some while later, the Detective Sergeant was promoted to Detective Inspector
but then dismissed from the Metropolitan Police, following unrelated allegations of
corrupt behaviour.28
ii. Former DCS Cook told the Panel that, subsequently, while serving at Heathrow
Airport, his team recovered a large number of stolen laptops, for which a reward had
been offered. Such rewards are not payable to the police but can be paid to police
informants. A Detective Inspector approached him and suggested that he ‘invent’ an
informant, claim the reward on the ‘informant’s’ behalf and then share the proceeds
with the Detective Inspector. Former DCS Cook said that the Detective Inspector
told him that if he reported the approach to senior officers, he could ‘kiss his CID
career goodbye’.29
45. The failure to deal properly with officers against whom allegations were made was also
related by another retired police officer, who was formerly a Detective Chief Inspector. The
retired officer told the Panel that when he was a Detective Constable in South East London in
the 1980s, he recruited, as an informant, a man aged in his early 20s, who was the son of a
member of a local organised crime family. Sometime later, the officer’s divisional Detective Chief
Inspector was playing golf with the informant’s father and told the man that his son was passing
27 Panel interview with former DCS David Cook, pp1-2, 04 June 2015.
28 Panel interview with former DCS David Cook, p1, 04 June 2015.
29 Panel interview with former DCS David Cook, pp1-2, 04 June 2015.
1024
information to the police. As a result of this, the informant was beaten by his father and ceased
to be an informant. When he found out what had happened, the officer went to see his Detective
Chief Superintendent and asked for a transfer. The Detective Chief Superintendent said that the
Detective Chief Inspector was ‘a daft so and so’ and arranged for the officer’s transfer. No action
was taken against the Detective Chief Inspector.30
46. A former Detective Sergeant told the Panel that, during the time he was a member of an
Area Major Incident Pool in North London, he recruited informants who provided information
concerning drug trafficking linked to a car-ringing gang. He said that he submitted intelligence
logs which were then forwarded to the South East Regional Crime Squad, which had an
interest in the case. He also periodically submitted ‘reward reports’, requesting payment for
his informant. It became clear that these reports were going missing, and he believed that they
were being intercepted by a Detective Inspector on the Regional Crime Squad, who was then
substituting his own informant for the rewards. The former Detective Sergeant complained
about this to his Detective Chief Superintendent, who responded that this was a very serious
allegation about which the Detective Sergeant should think long and hard. However, he agreed
to set up a meeting with the Regional Crime Squad Detective Inspector’s senior officer.31
47. When the meeting took place, the Detective Sergeant found that he had been ‘ambushed’.
When he arrived at his Detective Chief Superintendent’s office, he saw that not only was his
senior officer and the Regional Crime Squad Detective Inspector’s senior officer present, but
the Detective Inspector himself was also there. He said that this led to ‘a lot of table banging’,
during which he accused the Detective Inspector of being corrupt. A few days later, he received
a telephone call from another Detective Inspector on the Regional Crime Squad, who told him
he was passing on a message from the Detective Inspector to the effect that ‘if I wasn’t careful, I
would have a kilo of cocaine planted in the boot of my car’.32
48. Subsequently, the Detective Sergeant discovered that he was under surveillance by
Customs Officers. He was then told that he was under investigation on suspicion of drug
importation and money laundering. Fortunately, he was able to demonstrate his innocence and
measures were put in place to protect him. It appears that no action was taken against the
officer from the Regional Crime Squad.33
49. Another former Detective Constable (who had himself been convicted of a serious crime,
for which he received a prison sentence) told the Panel of a practice in the Flying Squad: ‘If you
got posted to their squad the first morning you would find a brown envelope on your desk with
money in it. If you didn’t accept it then the result was that by lunchtime you were posted back to
your old position.’34,35
50. A former Detective Chief Inspector in the Metropolitan Police Fraud Squad told a member
of the Panel that in the 1980s it was the practice in at least one police division in South London
for 10 per cent of detectives’ overtime and expenses payments to be paid each month to
the divisional Detective Superintendent. A refusal to pay would result in future overtime and
expenses claims not being authorised.36
30 Panel interview with the former Detective Chief Inspector, pp1-2, 11 February 2020.
31 Panel interview with a former Detective Sergeant who was a member of an Area Major Incident Pool in north London, p2, 22 October 2019.
32 Panel interview with a former Detective Sergeant who was a member of an Area Major Incident Pool in north London, p2, 22 October 2019.
33 Panel interview with a former Detective Sergeant who was a member of an Area Major Incident Pool in north London, pp2-3,
22 October 2019.
34 Panel interview with a former Detective Constable who related information about an alleged Flying Squad practice, 12 June 2018.
35 Email from the Detective Constable to the Panel, 31 May 2018.
36 Conversation with a former Detective Chief Inspector in the Metropolitan Police Fraud Squad, 2014.
1025
51. The Panel also read several unsigned and undated draft statements of former DC Duncan
Hanrahan, who had played a role in the Morgan One Investigation (see Chapter 1, The Morgan
One Investigation). These were part of a series of statements prepared from his intensive
debriefing, following his conviction for a number of offences, including attempting to bribe a
Detective Chief Inspector in the Metropolitan Police Directorate of Professional Standards.37
Judging by the context, the statements were taken towards the end of 1999/early 2000.38
52. In one of the statements, former DC Duncan Hanrahan recounted that, while serving on the
Divisional Crime Squad at Rochester Row Police Station, he learned of the system known as
‘Giving a Life’. This was a practice whereby criminals involved in street crime (burglary, robbery,
theft and pickpocketing) would pay local police officers in order to operate in a particular area
without fear of arrest. Former DC Hanrahan related an incident where he and a colleague
arrested a man who became very violent and attempted to escape. The man later explained
his actions by saying that, the day before, he had paid a British Transport Police Officer to be
allowed to operate freely in the area.39
53. The above accounts cover a range of circumstances involving officers of both high
and low rank. The Panel has taken no steps to verify them but has no reason to doubt
their veracity. If true, they are a vivid illustration of the culture and atmosphere embedded
in parts of the police service at the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder and in its aftermath.
54. It is accepted that new law and policy has been introduced over the years in an
attempt to prevent such corrupt activities. Nevertheless, this evidence is cited to enhance
public understanding of the ways in which corruption has occurred in the past and may
indeed continue to occur unless there is rigorous control of the ways in which policing
is delivered.
3.3 Media interest in the murder and police corruption

55. The nature of Daniel Morgan’s murder was unusual – in a dark car park behind a South
East London public house, with an axe apparently prepared for the purpose (the handle wound
with tape, providing a good grip and possibly reducing the likelihood of leaving fingerprints)
and wielded with such force that it was embedded in Daniel Morgan’s head. Axe murders,
premeditated or otherwise, are unusual.40 A large sum of money in Daniel Morgan’s jacket
pocket was not taken, indicating that the motive was not robbery.
56. These circumstances alone were sufficient to attract considerable media attention.
The police appealed for information through the BBC’s Crimewatch programme. The depiction
by the BBC of Daniel Morgan and some aspects of his private detective work served to
emphasise the close relations between the police and some of the work of his firm.
57. The hypothesis that the police might somehow have been involved in the murder, or
in undermining the first investigation, was boosted when, at the Inquest into the death of
Daniel Morgan in 1988, Kevin Lennon, a former bookkeeper at Southern Investigations, gave
37 The Guardian, ‘Jail for Met Officer in Web of Corruption’, Duncan Campbell, 20 March 1999; https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/mar/20/
duncancampbell.
38 Unsigned and undated draft statements of former DC Duncan Hanrahan, accessed by the Panel on 05 July 2018.
39 Unsigned and undated, 89 page-long, draft statement of former DC Duncan Hanrahan, accessed by the Panel on 05 July 2018.
40 National Injuries Database Full Search Report, National Crime Agency, 13 September 2019.
1026
evidence reflecting what he had earlier stated to the police in September 1987 as a reluctant
witness: namely, that Jonathan Rees had told Kevin Lennon of his wish to have Daniel Morgan
murdered and that his ‘mates at Catford nick’41 would arrange it42,43,44 (see section 4.1.2 and also
Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
58. Whatever the evidential strength or weakness of the different hypotheses suggesting
corrupt police involvement in Daniel Morgan’s murder and/or its investigation, they fell on
fertile ground in the public domain, generating and attracting a great deal of publicity in the
print media. They did so to some extent because there had been, in 1978, well-publicised
evidence of police corruption in the Metropolitan Police, particularly within its detective units.
Sir Robert Mark, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police from 1972 to 1977, wrote in 1978
that the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in the capital was ‘the most routinely corrupt
organisation in London’.45
59. Sir Robert Mark famously battled, with limited success, to bring the detective branch of the
Metropolitan Police under control. A series of scandals and prosecutions demonstrated that
some members of the specialised Criminal Investigation Department (CID) detective squads
colluded with organised crime and jointly engaged in the very crimes they were created to
combat.46,47 In the late 1970s, a significant number of detectives were convicted of serious
criminal offences and sentenced to imprisonment. Hundreds of Metropolitan Police officers
were dismissed or required to resign.48
60. Operation Countryman, an anti-corruption investigation ordered by the then Home

Secretary, was conducted between 1978 and 1982 and focused particularly on the Metropolitan
Police Flying Squad. Although eight police officers were prosecuted, none were convicted.
Its investigations appear not to have been well received by Acting Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police, Patrick Kavanagh, who assessed the operation in 1982, referring to its
lead officer as indulging in ‘imagined conspiracies of obstruction’, despite clear evidence that
suspected officers were warned of being under investigation before they were interviewed.
Acting Commissioner Kavanagh was dismissive of any idea of institutional corruption and
considered that the whole climate had changed: ‘In my view there is no cause for alarm about
the probity of the Metropolitan Police and there is not a substantial measure of corruption.’49
61. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 introduced procedures which closely regulated
the arrest, detention and interview of suspects and were designed in part to deal with corrupt
police activities including obstruction, the fabrication of evidence and ill-treatment of suspects.
3.4 Police use of informants

62. The Panel has seen evidence that several people with whom Daniel Morgan associated
or worked, and who featured in the initial investigation into his murder either as witnesses
or as persons of interest or suspects, were at the time, or had previously been, police
informants. Some of these informants were, or had previously been, handled by members of
41 Witness Kevin Lennon, examined by the Coroner, Inquest Day One, INT000001001, p38, 11 April 1988.
42 Witness Kevin Lennon, examined by the Coroner, Inquest Day One, INT000001001, pp15-42, 11 April 1988.
43 Witness statement of Kevin Lennon, MPS038476001, 02 September 1987.
44 Witness statement of Kevin Lennon, MPS032255001, 15 September 1987.
45 Mark. Sir R. (1978) In the Office of Constable: An Autobiography, London: Collins, p130.
46 Hobbs D. (1988) Doing the Business: Entrepreneurship, the Working Class and Detectives in the East End of London, Oxford: OUP
47 Mark. Sir R. (1978) In the Office of Constable, London: Collins, p248.
48 Hobbs D. (1988) Doing the Business: Entrepreneurship, the Working Class and Detectives in the East End of London, Oxford: OUP.
49 Acting Commissioner P. Kavanagh, ‘The Integrity of the Metropolitan Police’, pp10, 12, 13 and 18, 19 August 1982.
1027
the investigation team, without the senior officer being aware of the status of the informants
and of these relationships. It appears that analogous situations occurred in some of the later
investigations into the murder of Daniel Morgan.
63. Informants are usually persons who have been, or are themselves, involved in criminal
activity, or who are closely linked to such people. They know about the activities of other
criminals and for various reasons (financial reward, leniency from the police in charging or from
the courts in sentencing, revenge, the wish to make a clean start, etc.) are willing to divulge
information about the crimes with which they, and the criminals with whom they associate,
are familiar.
64. Recorded crime is largely known to the police because members of the public choose to tell
the police about it, and many crimes are solved because members of the public tell the police
who the perpetrator is. But there are categories of crime, such as serious organised crime, drug
dealing, crime in areas where there is intimidation and a culture of not talking to the police, that
are significantly under-reported and the perpetrators difficult to gather evidence against. It is in
these categories that informants are of particular value and even vital for effective policing.
65. Cultivating informants has therefore always been part of the stock in trade of police
detectives. However, it is an operational practice which, because it is of necessity governed by
principles of secrecy, and implicitly involves trading with criminals or those close to criminals, is
recognised to involve high risk of both injustice and police corruption.50 There can be a fine line
between the police knowing about crime and colluding with or engaging in crime.51 For these
reasons, there are now strict rules concerning how informants are dealt with and handled.
66. At the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder, the rules were not codified but were contained in
a mixture of case law and Home Office circulars,52,53 supplemented by individual forces’ own
rules. The use of informants by the Metropolitan Police was governed by ‘General Orders and
Regulations’,54 complemented by the ‘Informant Handling and Development Guidelines’.55 The
procedures set out in the latter document were initially introduced as a three-month ‘experiment’
in November 198456 but subsequently adopted with amendments and were the precursor of
the current national and statutory-based procedures, as set down in Part II of the Regulation
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Code of Practice issued pursuant to Section 71 of
that Act. The Code of Practice provides guidance on the use of ‘Covert Human Intelligence
Sources’,57 which is the term now used to describe informants, although this Report will
continue to refer to them as ‘informants’.
50 Maguire M. (2003) ‘Criminal investigation and crime control’ in Newburn T. (ed) Handbook of Policing, Willan Publishing: Cullompton.
51 Maguire M. and John T, (1995), Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: Integrated Approaches, Crime Prevention and Detection Series,
Paper 64, London: Home Office.
52 E.g. R -v- McEvilly & Lee (1974 Cr. App. R 150).
53 Home Office Circular No. 97/1969, ‘Informants who take part in crime’.
54 Metropolitan Police General Orders and Regulations, Section 20, MPS107540001, pp104-108, paras 61-69, 1982.
55 Informant Handling and Development Guidelines, 2nd Edition, MPS107530001, pp31-38, October 1985.
56 Informant Handling and Development Guidelines, MPS107530001 p8, para 14, November 1984. The latest version supplied to the Panel
is the 1985 ‘2nd Edition’. However, the relevant section of ‘General Orders and Regulations’ supplied, which refers to but does not quote the
Guidelines, contains amendments to December 1988 and refers to the ‘3rd Edition’. It is not known whether any material changes had been
made to the procedures set out in the 2nd Edition, nor the date on which the 3rd Edition was issued.
57 Covert Human Intelligence Sources, Revised Code of Practice, August 2018.
1028
67. In 1985, the Metropolitan Police relied on a broad definition of an informant that took
into account factors such as the person’s offending history, access and ability to provide
information.58 The guidelines, General Orders, Home Office Circulars and case law also referred
to two types of informant, ‘participating’ and ‘resident’, as follows:
i. A ‘participating informant’ was an informant who participated in criminal activity but

to a lesser degree than those on whom he/she informed. Such participation would be
with the authorisation and under the supervision of the police, in consultation with the
Crown Prosecution Service. There is now no distinction between a simple informant
and a participating informant – under the provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory
Powers Act 2000, they are both simply ‘Covert Human Intelligence Sources’.
ii. A ‘resident informant’ was an informant, usually in custody awaiting trial or someone
already sentenced, who provided information about serious crime in return for a
reduced sentence. Colloquially they were sometimes referred to as ‘supergrasses’.
They are now termed ‘assisting offenders’ and their use is governed by statutory
provisions contained in Part II of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005.
68. Participating and resident informants feature at one or more stages of the various
investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder, and the Panel has identified concerns with the
use of informants in all these categories. Because of the paramount need to maintain the
anonymity of informants, in order to protect them from reprisals, it is not possible in this
Report to set out in detail all of the Panel’s concerns. To the extent it is proper to do so,
some are outlined in this chapter and in other parts of this Report.
69. The guidelines introduced by the Metropolitan Police were intended to reform and
strengthen the hitherto loose and inconsistently enforced rules contained in Home Office
circulars and case law. It is clear that the guidelines were designed to, and did, undermine the
cultural and operational autonomy that detectives had previously enjoyed.
70. The common practice was for detectives to regard informants as their ‘personal property’
and jealously to guard their identities. The guidelines emphasised the principle that the
‘informant is a servant of the Force not the “property” of an individual officer’.59
71. The guidelines also addressed other defects in the system, for example by the introduction
of the role of ‘controller’, carried out by a senior officer, and by the adoption of a formal
system of evaluation of both the reliability of the informant and the accuracy of the information
provided.60,61 There had previously been little strategic control of informants’ activities, and
records were largely held only locally. Management of the system lacked effective central control
and co-ordination, with little ‘quality control’. One of the (several) adverse consequences of
this situation was that someone could act as informant for more than one police officer – or
indeed, more than one law enforcement agency – using more than one pseudonym, without
anyone knowing, something which was demonstrated during investigation of the murder of
Daniel Morgan (see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation). One witness, who had previously
provided information under two pseudonyms, had to be excluded by the Prosecution because
intelligence previously received from that informant was in direct contradiction to some of the
information which he had provided to the Abelard Two Investigation.
58 Informant Handling and Development Guidelines, 2nd Edition, MPS107530001, p35, para 7, October 1985.
59 Informant Handling and Development Guidelines, 2nd Edition, MPS107530001, p34, para 6a, October 1985.
61 Informant Handling and Development Guidelines, 2nd Edition, Appendix F, MPS107530001, pp49- 50, October 1985.
1029
72. There was a recognition in the guidelines that not every officer would adapt to
the new policy:
‘The new tenets involved are fundamental to the success of the scheme, the protection
of those involved and the reputation of the Force. It is realised that sceptical officers
cannot be coerced to accept the scheme. It is therefore recommended that ONLY
those who can readily see its merits be involved. Any officer who finds the principles
difficult to accept or understand must be excluded totally and informed that any
sources of information he has must either be introduced to a co-operative officer or
discontinued altogether.’ [emphasis in original]62
73. While the Panel is not able to say with certainty that there was a negative impact on the
Morgan One Investigation, the fact that the Senior Investigating Officer did not know who was
an informant and who was a handler, and what their histories were, had a potentially adverse
effect on decisions relating to suspects and how much credence to give to the evidence of
witnesses. There is some concern as to whether the informant status of at least one person
improperly influenced the police so that enquiries relating to them were not handled effectively.
74. Some examples of the potential for corruption and criminality in the former, less closely
managed system prior to the introduction of guidelines, especially in relation to the payment of
rewards to informants, are given elsewhere in this chapter (see paragraphs 43-52 above).
75. Even after the adoption of guidelines, practice was not wholly compliant with the theoretical
governance provided for by the new rules. As one senior officer, DAC Roy Clark, who had
responsibility for anti-corruption activities within the Metropolitan Police, wrote long after
Daniel Morgan’s murder, there was reportedly little effective management of informant handlers
combined with considerable pressure that they get results.63
76. There are also some issues concerning the security of informants and of the information
they provide. In 2009, a person with whom the Panel has met, wrote to the Metropolitan Police,
informing them that he had been handed transcripts of covert recordings made by police at
the home of a witness in the Abelard Two Investigation. It was alleged that at the same time
he was handed the names of six informants or witnesses in the case. A copy of the letter was
given to the Panel. Both the transcripts and the names were passed to the Metropolitan Police
by the person, but these have not been seen by the Panel. The Panel has not sought to verify
the accuracy of the allegations, but it is not clear what action, if any, the Metropolitan Police
took to do so.
77. During the course of a later investigation into complaints made by an informant who had
provided information to the Abelard Two Investigation, the Metropolitan Police admitted to
the Independent Police Complaints Commission that it had ‘lost’ the original of an important
sensitive document, signed by the informant and his handler and the handler’s senior officer.
A copy of the document had not been retained. This was a serious matter, as there was a
dispute as to what actions the informant had been authorised to carry out.
63 Clark R. (2000) ‘Informers and Corruption’ in Billingsby R., Nemitz T. and Bean P. (eds), Informers, Policing, Police and Practice, Cullompton:
Willan, pp38-49.
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78. While the present rules concerning the management of informants are a vast
improvement on the earlier arrangements, there remains the potential and opportunity for
abuse. Compliance is regulated by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. Any police
force or law enforcement agency that takes its responsibilities to prevent and detect
corrupt activity seriously will keep their operation under constant review and put in place
measures to monitor compliance.
RECOMMENDATION
79. The Panel is concerned that the policies and procedures relating to the use of
informants by law enforcement agencies still allow scope for corrupt practices, and it
recommends that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner takes this into consideration
during inspections.
4 Analysis of the role of corruption

80. This section of the chapter provides examples of corruption related to the murder of Daniel
Morgan and its investigation over time. Some of the examples demonstrate multiple types of
unacceptable behaviour that might be said to amount to corruption.
4.1 Part 1: Police involvement in the murder

81. Police involvement in murder, conspiracy to murder, planning or organising a murder or
aiding and abetting a murder constitute serious crime and represent extreme breaches of the
duty owed by every police officer. Likewise, police involvement in ensuring that an investigation
of a murder would not succeed in bringing any person responsible for the murder to justice also
constitutes a criminal offence, a most serious breach of the duty owed by police officers and is
a form of police corruption. It is possible for a police officer to be involved in both the planning
and/or execution of a murder, and in undermining subsequent investigation.
4.1.1 The April 1987 arrests

82. Three serving police officers, DS Sidney Fillery,64 DC Alan Purvis65 and DC Peter Foley,66
were arrested in connection with the murder of Daniel Morgan. All were questioned and
subsequently released without charge.67,68,69
64 Custody record for DS Sidney Fillery, MPS014836001, p9, 03 April 1987.

65 Custody record of DC Alan Purvis, MPS014834001, p2, 03 April 1987.
66 Custody record of DC Peter Foley, MPS014835001, p1, 03 April 1987.
67 Custody record for DS Sidney Fillery, MPS014836001, p5, 03 April 1987.
68 Custody record for DC Alan Purvis, MPS015895001, p3, 03 April 1987.
69 Custody record of DC Peter Foley, MPS014835001, p6, 03 April 1987.
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83. The three police officers were implicated through their involvement in providing security for
Southern Investigations at Belmont Car Auctions and the related civil court action, the origin of
which was the alleged robbery from Jonathan Rees of £18,280.62 in takings from Belmont Car
Auctions. In his report dated 22 January 1988, D/Supt Douglas Campbell based his decision
to arrest the suspects on a number of suspected motives, including the possibility that Daniel
Morgan had threatened to expose the police officers’ involvement with Belmont Car Auctions70
(see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
84. A major focus of the Morgan One and Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority investigations
was on police officers ‘moonlighting’ at the Belmont Car Auctions and the suspected corrupt
actions of DS Sidney Fillery while working on the Morgan One Investigation during its first days.
However, what was not seriously considered was the possibility that both represented the ‘tip of
an iceberg’ of extensive local police corruption which, as a result of developments connected to
the Belmont Car Auctions saga, now threatened the integrity of Daniel Morgan’s business and
livelihood and thus was a matter about which Daniel Morgan felt he had to do something. There
was evidence that he had been going to report police corruption (see section 4.1.3 below).
85. The corollary of this possibility is that local officers involved in lucrative corrupt practices –
‘moonlighting’, selling confidential information, assisting criminals with inside police information
(practices that will be illustrated below) – saw both their police careers and pensions under
threat, and future, potentially lucrative, options, put at risk by Daniel Morgan’s plan to reveal
what he knew. The evidence supporting this theory as to why Daniel Morgan was murdered
was never seriously investigated, despite the fact that in the years following Daniel Morgan’s
murder, several of the police officers connected to Daniel Morgan’s circles and business were
investigated for and convicted of serious crime.
86. D/Supt Douglas Campbell saw the police officers’ ‘moonlighting’ as a serious matter
which could have led to dismissal and substantial loss of pay and pension (see Chapter 1,
The Morgan One Investigation). The Panel agrees that the ‘moonlighting’ was a serious matter:
it constituted police corruption. The Panel does not agree that it was likely to lead to dismissal.
D/Supt Campbell reported his suspicions to the Professional Standards Unit in April 1987, and
an Investigating Officer, DCI Roy Sutherland, was appointed. He was replaced in September
1987 by DCI Ernest Anderson, who was replaced by D/Supt Alec Button on 27 June 1988.71
The report of the disciplinary investigation was completed on 07 October 1988.72
87. DS Sidney Fillery had been on sick leave since 08 September 1987 and had received a
medical discharge on 20 March 1988.73 At this distance in time, it is impossible to determine
why, when his unacceptable behaviour was known about in March 1987, the disciplinary
investigation of DS Fillery by the Metropolitan Police was not completed before he retired on
medical grounds in March 1988. Allowing officers under disciplinary process to retire before the
conclusion of such process was not uncommon in police forces generally at that time.
88. The two junior officers, DC Alan Purvis and DC Peter Foley, received ‘strong words of
advice’ from their senior officer,74 in contrast to the more serious sanctions envisaged by D/
Supt Douglas Campbell.
70 Report by D/Supt Douglas Campbell, MPS016002001, pp25 and 47, 22 January 1988.
71 Report by D/Supt Alec Button, MPS015801001, 07 October 1988.
72 Report by D/Supt Alec Button, MPS015801001, 07 October 1988.
73 Sickness records of former DS Sidney Fillery, MPS005107001, p5, 10 November 1988.
74 Report by D/Supt Alec Button, MPS015801001, p42, 07 October 1988.
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89. At the Inquest held in April 1988, the Coroner ‘exonerated’ DC Peter Foley and DC Alan
Purvis, on the basis that there was nothing to connect them to the murder.75 The Coroner did
not exonerate former DS Sidney Fillery. However, it was not within the power of the Coroner to
exonerate anyone, and he should not have made these comments.
90. In 1990, DC Alan Purvis and DC Peter Foley launched a civil action against the Metropolitan
Police in respect of their treatment as suspects for Daniel Morgan’s murder. During the
proceedings, a statement was read out in court which explained that the Metropolitan Police
recognised that their arrests should not have taken place.76 They were awarded damages of
£25,000 each.77
4.1.2 Allegations by Kevin Lennon

91. Kevin Lennon, former bookkeeper at Southern Investigations, was a reluctant witness
in 1987, when, having been secretly recorded by former DCI Laurence Bucknole,78 he was
interviewed about the murder of Daniel Morgan. He only provided his evidence when faced with
the recording of his account.
92. Kevin Lennon made statements to the Morgan One Investigation alleging that Jonathan
Rees had repeatedly asked him to arrange Daniel Morgan’s murder79 and that in August or
September 1986 Jonathan Rees had said: ‘I’ve the perfect solution for Daniel’s murder; my
mates at Catford Nick are going to arrange it.’80 According to Kevin Lennon, Jonathan Rees
said that, because the murder would take place in the Catford Crime Squad catchment area,
those same officers would be involved in the subsequent murder investigation and thus be in
a position to suppress information linking the murder with Jonathan Rees or themselves (see
Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
93. The Morgan One Investigation considered Kevin Lennon’s credibility as a witness, in light
of minor discrepancies in his statements and his forthcoming prosecution on unrelated fraud
charges, which raised the question as to whether he was offering information to the police to
gain a reduced sentence. Kevin Lennon’s evidence was not fully investigated.81
94. Kevin Lennon confirmed his evidence in testimony at the Inquest in April 1988 (see
Chapter 2, The Inquest).
95. In 1989 in his final report on the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation,
DCS Alan Wheeler wrote: ‘[w]hilst I consider LENNON has discredited his own testimony
his evidence cannot be ignored but my investigation has failed to corroborate his account’82
(see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation). In 1996, DCS
Wheeler made a statement in connection with the civil action brought against Hampshire
Constabulary by Jonathan Rees and others. DCS Wheeler said that after considering all the
contextual information about Kevin Lennon’s offences and motives, ‘I could not find anything
wrong with LENNON’s evidence. It stood up as the truth.’83
75 Coroner’s summing up, Inquest Day Eight, INT000008001, p130, 25 April 1988.
76 Statement in open court, DC Purvis and DC Foley civil action, MPS105400001, p7, 17 May 1990.
77 Letter to Russell Jones & Walker, MPS035776001, p1, 29 April 1994.
78 Report by D/Supt Douglas Campbell, MPS022269001, p31, 22 January 1988.
79 Witness statement of Kevin Lennon, MPS010528001, pp14-18 15 September 1987.
80 Witness statement of Kevin Lennon, MPS010528001, p22, 15 September 1987.
81 Kevin Lennon died on 07 February 2018.
82 Final Report of DCS Alan Wheeler to the Police Complaints Authority, p82, MPS060685001, 04 September 1989.
83 Witness statement of former DCS Alan Wheeler, HAM000315001, p7, 24 July 1996.
1033
96. In February 2010, former DCS Alan Wheeler and former DCI Paul Blaker (from the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation) told officers from the Abelard Two
Investigation that, in their view, Kevin Lennon was telling the truth about Jonathan Rees and
his (Jonathan Rees’s) requests to find someone to murder Daniel Morgan. They said that ‘their
concerns for his credibility centred around the fact that he was charged with Fraud’.84
97. The Abelard Two Investigation considered Kevin Lennon’s evidence, investigated it further,
interviewed him and cited his evidence in the report to the Crown Prosecution Service. Kevin
Lennon agreed to give evidence, although he did not wish to do so in open court. He was one
of the nine witnesses whom the Prosecution intended to use in the trial. The Prosecution’s case
collapsed when three of the witnesses (not including Kevin Lennon) were either withdrawn by
the Prosecution or their evidence was ruled as inadmissible by Mr Justice Maddison. Kevin
Lennon’s evidence, on its own, would not have been a sufficient basis for a prosecution.
4.1.3 Allegations that Daniel Morgan planned to reveal police corruption

98. It was alleged that Daniel Morgan had planned to reveal police corruption possibly by
telling another police force about it and that he was murdered to prevent him disclosing police
corruption. Individuals linked with organised crime and allegedly to corrupt police officers were
associated with a Range Rover recovered from Malta by Daniel Morgan in February 1987.
An officer from West Yorkshire Police told the Morgan One Investigation the day after the murder
that he had been in contact with Daniel Morgan and wished to take a statement from him. West
Yorkshire Police were investigating individuals suspected of committing major fraud and one of
those individuals had removed the Range Rover which had been recovered by Daniel Morgan.85
That individual was on bail in London at that time (he had answered his bail in London at 5.30
pm on the day of Daniel Morgan’s murder). There was some investigation of the allegation by
the Morgan One Investigation and by the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation,
but there remained outstanding lines of enquiry at the end of both investigations.
99. Another alleged scenario was that Daniel Morgan was planning to expose police
corruption through the media. In May 1987, the Morgan One Investigation was informed that
Daniel Morgan had information about illegal police activities that he had been attempting to sell
to newspapers.86 In the course of investigating this line of enquiry, statements were obtained
from Bryan Madagan, a business associate of Daniel Morgan, who said, on 22 May 1987, that
Daniel Morgan had told him that a Sunday newspaper had offered him ‘a sum in the region of
£250,000 for an expose on his business – client relationship with regard […] to how he obtained
his information’.87 In a subsequent message to DC Kinley Davies on 09 June 1987, Bryan
Madagan said that Daniel Morgan had sold stories to various papers.88
100. Sylvia Jones, a Daily Mirror reporter, stated at the time of the murder that Daniel Morgan
‘used to deal with the press a lot’89 and had in the past attempted, apparently without success
in her case, to sell stories to journalists.90 Another Daily Mirror reporter, Anton Antonowicz, said
that Daniel Morgan was ‘always on the make for money for storys [sic]’.91
84 Message M1661, MPS001498001, p2, 04 February 2010.

85 Message M71, MPS012131001, 11 March 1987.
86 Witness statement of Anthony Pearce, MPS010463001, 21 May 1987.
87 Witness statement of Bryan Madagan, MPS010404001, 22 May 1987.
88 Message M295, MPS012355001, 09 June 1987.
89 Message M53 Morgan One Investigation, MPS012112001, 12 March 1987.
90 Message M53 Morgan One Investigation, MPS012112001, 12 March 1987.
91 Action A1529, MPS014644001, p2, 04 February 1988.
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101. In August 1987, DC Kinley Davies reported to the Morgan One Investigation that
information had been received some months previously from Peter Wilkins (a retired Detective
Constable who worked with Southern Investigations) that Daniel Morgan had been preparing an
exposé of police corruption for which he had been offered £250,000 and had been in contact
with an ‘investigative journalist from a Fleet St “Sunday”’.92 In a statement given to the Morgan
One Investigation subsequently, former DC Peter Wilkins denied knowledge of the matter.93
102. The efforts by the Morgan One Investigation to explore this possibility were inadequate,
relying mainly on questions asked by the Metropolitan Police senior information officer of his
media contacts, who did not work for the Sunday newspapers (see Chapter 1, The Morgan
One Investigation). The investigation team did not pursue this line of enquiry about the Sunday
newspapers fully and did not focus on the type of newspapers alleged to have been involved.
The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation also examined this matter, but
nothing was found.
103. In April 1988, D/Supt Douglas Campbell testified at the Inquest that he had examined the
possibility that Daniel Morgan had intended to sell a story of police corruption and said: ‘I could
find no evidence at all.’94
104. Had Daniel Morgan been in contact with the media about police corruption, it is
likely that any newspaper or journalist he had contacted would have reported this after
his murder. This did not happen. It is unlikely that Daniel Morgan had given details about
police corruption to any member of the media before his murder. However, it is possible
that Daniel Morgan had talked about such a plan with people whom he knew.
105. Another possible scenario suggested in the media was that Daniel Morgan’s murder was
linked to the death of DC Alan Holmes, known by his nickname ‘Taffy’. He was a serving police
officer until his death by suicide on 28 July 1987. Separate allegations were made, by Jonathan
Rees and by former PC Derek Haslam, who was close to Jonathan Rees and had, at one stage,
acted as his driver after a Christmas party when Jonathan Rees could not drive himself,95
that Daniel Morgan and DC Holmes were associates, and that they wanted to sell information
regarding police corruption (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
106. D/Supt Douglas Campbell and DCS David Banks, who was making enquiries into
allegations against Commander Ray Adams and the role of DC Alan Holmes in alerting
Commander Adams to the police investigation of him, both confirmed that no link between
Daniel Morgan’s murder and DC Holmes’ suicide had been found (see Chapter 1, The Morgan
One Investigation).
107. The Panel has looked extensively at the suggestion that Daniel Morgan was working with
DC Alan Holmes to expose police corruption. The Panel has found evidence that the story of a
link between Daniel Morgan and DC Holmes was told by Jonathan Rees to several individuals.
The Panel has not been able to identify any persons other than Jonathan Rees, former PC Derek
Haslam and David Bray, who have said they had direct knowledge that Daniel Morgan and
DC Holmes knew each other.
92 Message M423, MPS012483001, 06 August 1987.

93 Witness statement of former DC Peter Wilkins, MPS034134001, p1,14 December 1987.
94 Witness D/Supt Douglas Campbell, cross-examined by June Tweedie, Inquest Day Five, Inquest day five, INT000005001, p63, 15 April 1988.
95 Witness Statement of PC Derek Haslam, MPS010635001, pp7-8, 16 November 1987.
1035
108. In June 2016, the Panel interviewed former PC Derek Haslam. He said that DC Alan
Holmes had told him that he had a story involving police corruption that Daniel Morgan was
negotiating to sell to the press for £250,000 on their behalf.96 There is no evidence in the papers
available to the Panel that former PC Haslam had told any of the previous investigations that DC
Holmes had told him this; rather former PC Haslam had repeatedly said that he had been told
this by Jonathan Rees.
109. In 2017, David Bray, who had worked with Daniel Morgan, contacted the Panel expressing
a wish to speak about his knowledge of the case. Among the matters discussed during the
course of two interviews and a lengthy telephone conversation, was the question of the
relationship between Daniel Morgan and DC Alan Holmes. David Bray asserted that in early
1987 he had been present at two meetings between Daniel Morgan and the police officer97
(see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation). David Bray did not mention this in any of the
13 statements he had made over the years to police officers investigating the murder.
110. The Morgan One Investigation did follow up many lines of enquiry related to
the issue of possible police involvement in the murder, but it did not rigorously or
systematically pursue all the complexities of a murder case that included allegations of
police corruption.
D/Supt Douglas Campbell’s worries about police corruption caused him to

ask the Professional Standards Unit to take over the murder investigation.
His request was denied.
The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation did not follow up all the lines of
enquiry related to police corruption rigorously and systematically, even though this was
the focus of its Terms of Reference, and some significant work by the Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority Investigation team on this aspect was not included in DCS Alan
Wheeler’s final report to the Police Complaints Authority.
Subsequent investigations uncovered information indicating corruption at the time of

the murder, but due at least in part to the passage of time, investigating these lines of
enquiry proved unfruitful.
The Panel has not seen evidence that Daniel Morgan was killed to prevent him exposing
corruption. Having considered the available documentary evidence, the Panel cannot
conclude there was police involvement in the murder.
4.2 Part 2: The role of corruption in the murder investigations

111. The Panel’s Terms of Reference leave open the question as to whether corruption affecting
the investigation had the unintended consequence of preventing convictions of any persons
for the murder, or whether it was inspired by a general aim to prevent any convictions for the
murder or by a specific aim to protect a particular individual or group known to be responsible
for the murder. This reflects an ambiguity also present in the acknowledgements and admissions
made over the years by the Metropolitan Police.
96 Panel interview with former PC Derek Haslam, pp51-52, 01 June 2016.

97 Panel interview with David Bray, p1, 28 November 2017.
1036
4.2.1 DS Sidney Fillery’s role and relationship with Jonathan Rees

112. The Metropolitan Police admissions about the role of police corruption in relation to the
investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan centre on DS Sidney Fillery, but there has been no
clear explanation as to precisely how corruption on his part prevented the police from solving
the murder and bringing the culprits to justice.
113. The relationship between Daniel Morgan, Jonathan Rees and police officers including
DS Sidney Fillery was strong and mutually beneficial. Jonathan Rees and Daniel Morgan both
socialised very regularly in various public houses with police officers and attended at least one
police Christmas party, and they worked closely with police officers.
114. Jonathan Rees’s relationship with DS Sidney Fillery was particularly close:
i. At various times, Jonathan Rees passed information he thought might be helpful to the
police, to DS Sidney Fillery and DCI Laurence Bucknole.
ii. On behalf of the solicitor Michael Goodridge, Jonathan Rees at times represented
clients who had been arrested.98 This involved further visits to the police station.
iii. In the three days after the murder, DS Fillery was repeatedly in Southern Investigations
with Jonathan Rees. His diary shows that he was there twice on 11 March 1987, once
at 11.00 am, and later at 4.30 pm ‘to Thornton High St re information’.99 He was there
again on 12 March 1987 having been to the Golden Lion public house at 1.30 pm for
‘drinks for others’ and, ‘seeking info then Thornton High St’ at 5.00 pm, he had a meal
at a café, and then went to Southern Investigations.100 On 13 March 1987, he went
to Southern Investigations at 11.00 am, possibly to collect information which was
allegedly subsequently placed in the boot of his car, and then to court.101
iv. Some police officers stated that they had thought Jonathan Rees was a police officer,
such was the frequency of his presence in the police station.102
v. DS Fillery took Jonathan Rees with him on police business, such as the visit to a
witness who wished to provide information to the murder investigation.103
vi. When Jonathan Rees was arrested for murder in 1987, a police file and a police
property bag, relating to one of DS Fillery’s cases, was found in the boot of Jonathan
Rees’s car (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation). Jonathan Rees said that
the items had been left there by DS Fillery when they had been at court together.104
115. At the request of D/Supt Douglas Campbell, a document was prepared for the Morgan
One Investigation by DS Sidney Fillery, which illustrated his close relationship with Jonathan
Rees. It contained the following information:
‘(1) I first met REES whilst attached to the R.C.S. (C.O. Squad) in 1982 or 1983. I met
him at “PR”, with our D.I. at the request of D.C.I. Bucknall.
98 Witness statement of Michael Goodridge, MPS010250001, pp1-2, 14 March 1987.

99 Copy of duty sheets of DS Sidney Fillery 090387–150387, MPS025677001, p2, undated.
102 Witness statement of PC Derek Haslam, MPS010631001, p2, 10 April 1987.
103 Witness statement of a business associate, MPS000394001, pp2-3, 01 May 1987.
104 Witness Statement of D/Supt Douglas Campbell, MPS010913001, p2, 06 April 1987.
1037
‘(2) We became involved in a long and fairly complicated enquiry with REES, involving
a massive, organised, theft by employees. We met REES regularly and at some stage
met MORGAN.
‘(3) I became aware that REES has several friends within the Force, especially on “Z”
District. From conversation I think some can be described as close friends. (In case of
difficulty a talk to Laurie Bucknall ex-D.C.I. [sic]).
‘(4) I have kept in regular contact with REES (he always uses the name John or
Jonathan, never William) since.
Mostly because I was eventually transferred from the R.C.S. to South London and thus
stayed in his “catchment” area.
‘(5) I see him on average once a week although it often goes longer than that before
we “coincide”.
‘(6) Invariably we meet in a pub on Catford Division’s ground. We have been in most of
the pubs together. Often we were with other officers.
‘(7) From conversations with him it is obvious he knows many officers in and around
the M.P.D. especially “Z” District.
‘(8) Although I strongly suspect that he has a facility to obtain N.I.B. checks etc. he [sic]
has never approached me (REES or MORGAN) to that effect.
‘(9) I was often treated as a sort of “technical adviser” by REES, i.e. when he had a
crime he was investigating he would discuss his ideas with me and I would advise him
on the possible repercussions or evidential practicality of such action.
‘(10) REES has been involved several times with other officers by catching criminals
“off duty” and giving evidence. To his credit he has been commended a couple of times
for these actions.’105
116. There is no further information about this document, but it clearly articulated Jonathan
Rees’s very close relationship with police officers.
117. Former D/Supt Douglas Campbell told the Panel in July 2016 about the reasons why he
sought to arrange surveillance on Jonathan Rees by an outside police force, saying that:
‘[m]y reasoning behind the request for an outside Force to carry out surveillance on
Rees was that I strongly suspected that the investigation was being hampered by his
Police “friends” of which he appeared to have many and which I am sure increased
once I had caused the three officers to be arrested. I wanted to find out who he was
associating with including police officers, criminals and other individuals.
‘It was my judgement that it would need an outside Force for the surveillance to
be successful.’106
105 ‘NOTES OF SID FILLERY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH REES’, MPS011583001, pp2-3, undated.
106 Email from former D/Supt Douglas Campbell to Panel member, Michael Kellett, 13 July 2016.
1038
118. Former D/Supt Douglas Campbell also responded to questions about his request for an
outside police force to take over the investigation, saying that:
‘[m]y contacts with Commander Fry were normally carried out through Detective Chief
Superintendent Shrubsole, my immediate senior officer. I would have discussed my
request with Mr Shrubsole and asked him to seek Mr Fry’s approval. I do not recall any
discussion direct with Mr Fry and I certainly was not told why he refused the request.
I do consider that it may have been because he refused my initial request for an outside
Force to take over the murder investigation when it was suspected that Police Officers
were involved, as discussed at my meeting with him and Commander Merton just prior
to the officers being arrested.
‘If in both instances he had agreed he would have had to seek approval with senior
management at Scotland Yard. You will have noted that the decision to call in
Hampshire Police was taken by Assistant Commissioner John Smith who I am sure
would have sought the approval of the Commissioner Sir Peter Imbert.
‘Obviously to this day it bugs me as to why this action was never taken.’107
4.2.1.1 Metropolitan Police ‘précis’ of DS Sidney Fillery’s suspected corrupt practice

119. In answer to the Panel’s queries as to what was meant by the Metropolitan Police’s
references to police corruption as ‘a debilitating factor’108 in the original murder investigation,
the Metropolitan Police provided the Panel with a précis about ‘Fillery’s suspected corrupt
practice’,109,110 containing the following ten points:111
(1) ‘Came off the Clapton murder that day and must have told REES at the meeting on
9th March 1987[.]
(2) ‘3 meetings with REES in run up to 10th March 1987[.]
(3) ‘Meeting with REES, [DC Michael] Crofts, [PC Derek] Haslam, [Paul] Goodridge at
Prince of Wales PH, Thornton Heath on 13th March 1987.
(4) ‘Presence/working at Belmont car auctions.
(5) ‘[Peter] Newby gave Belmont car auctions FILLERY file which subsequently
appeared very slim/missing.
(6) ‘[Kevin] LENNON told REES officers from Catford Crime Squad would organise
MORGAN’s death.
(7) ‘Fillery took Morgan’s place as predicted by LENNON[.]
(8) ‘Evidence of officer [Police Officer N21] corrupt practices in Fillery’s crime squad.
(9) Statement of REES, taken by FILLERY is generally of a poor quality but also lacks
any detail in relation to the two known motives. Belmont Car auctions and Margaret
107 Email from former D/Supt Douglas Campbell to Panel member, Michael Kellett, 13 July 2016.
108 Metropolitan Police Authority briefing note, MPS109561001, p6, 29 March 2011.
109 Letter from DLS to the Panel’s solicitors, Fieldfisher, 21 March 2018.
110 Précis of Evidence of Conspiracy against Sidney Fillery, MPS109910001, undated. Sent to the Panel 21 March 2018
111 The précis comprised bullet points, but the Panel has numbered them for ease of reference.
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Harrison. FILLERY was careful to avoid mentioning HARRISON but did mention two
other women with whom MORGAN had affairs. He also allowed Rees to detail an event
which he knew to be a lie as he was there at the time.
(10) ‘[Person X8] states Fillery had a network of corrupt police contacts within the
criminal underworld.’
120. The Panel has been told by the Metropolitan Police that the précis was drafted by DS Gary
Dalby on 23 January 2013 as a briefing for Home Office officials on 30 January 2013, in the
context of discussions about setting up the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel. DS Dalby told
the Panel that he had originally created it as a ‘personal aide mémoire’.112 The briefing had been
subsequently amended on a number of occasions. Former DS Dalby told the Panel in November
2020 that ‘the précis was never intended to be shown to anyone’.
121. The Panel asked DS Gary Dalby to clarify the reference to three meetings referred to in
point 2 above. He responded: ‘I suspect the meetings I was referring to were at the Royal Courts
of Justice on 5th March 1987, then later that day at either the Dolphin or Golden Lion. The third
would be 09/03/1987 at the Golden Lion.’113
122. The précis is imprecise and on occasion incorrect. For example, Metropolitan Police
documents clearly show that Kevin Lennon did not tell Jonathan Rees that officers from the
Catford Crime Squad would organise the murder (see the précis, point 6). The documents show
the opposite: Kevin Lennon alleged that Jonathan Rees had told him that officers from the
Catford Crime Squad would organise the murder.
123. While it is accepted that ‘the précis was never intended to be shown to anyone’,
this was the only response made to the Panel by the Metropolitan Police in answer to its
query about what was meant by the Metropolitan Police’s references to police corruption
as ‘a debilitating factor’ in the original murder investigation.
124. In addition to the matters listed in the Metropolitan Police précis, the Panel has identified
other alleged behaviour by DS Sidney Fillery that could amount to corruption. For example,
in 1988 PC Timothy Grattan-Kane provided information to the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation about former DS Fillery’s alleged dishonest use of members of
his squad to run police checks, each fictitiously recorded as ‘drugs enquiry’,114 and other
dishonest activities for personal benefit, such as keeping British Gas stamps which had been
seized during police searches (see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation). PC Grattan-Kane further reported that police officers executed County Court
civil warrants during police time, on behalf of Southern Investigations, for which services they
were paid.115 In November 2020, former DS Fillery advised the Panel that he did not know PC
Gratton-Kane and denies ever being questioned about these matters.
112 Email from DS Gary Dalby to the Panel, 03 June 2020.

113 Email from DS Gary Dalby to the Panel, 03 June 2020.
114 Report of a Detective Sergeant, MPS022376001, 12 September 1988.
115 Report of the Detective Sergeant, MPS022376001, p2, 12 September 1988.
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125. These allegations, which had been reported by PC Timothy Grattan-Kane, about DS
Sidney Fillery were considered by DS Dennis Stephens, who recommended eight investigative
actions, two of which were dealt with:116
i. To interview PC Laurence Hart and another officer, who had passed the information
to PC Timothy Grattan-Kane. Both officers were interviewed and provided written
statements. However, these written statements did not deal with the matters referred
to by PC Grattan-Kane, and there is no evidence that they were asked about the
allegations.117,118
ii. To interview PC Gratton-Kane’s Detective Sergeant, to whom he had referred during

the conversation. The Detective Sergeant was never interviewed and the action to
see him was later marked as ‘NFA’ (No Further Action) on the directions of DCS Alan
Wheeler, although no reason was recorded for this.119
126. No further enquiries were made, and the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation did not refer the allegations to the Metropolitan Police.
127. Although these allegations did not fall within the remit of the Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority Investigation, they were allegations of corrupt activity which should
have been reported to the Metropolitan Police.
128. Another example concerns Jonathan Rees and DS Sidney Fillery going together to
meet a witness, and DS Fillery subsequently withholding information from the Morgan One
Investigation. Jonathan Rees had received a telephone call from a business associate from
whom Daniel Morgan and Jonathan Rees had previously rented office space, who had said that
Daniel Morgan had been having an affair with a married woman. On 12 March 1987, DS Fillery
went with Jonathan Rees to see the business associate who provided further information.120
DS Fillery passed some, but not all, of the information to the Morgan One Investigation. He did
not provide the identity of the person supplying the information.121
129. DS Sidney Fillery should have reported receipt of the information from Jonathan
Rees, should have conducted his subsequent enquiries with another police officer, not
with Jonathan Rees, and should have provided the business associate’s details so that
further enquiries could be made. This conduct on the part of DS Fillery was improper.
130. There is no evidence that any further action was taken on this matter. Neither
Jonathan Rees nor DS Sidney Fillery were questioned about it. This was a serious
omission for which no adequate explanation was given. This matter should have been
referred for immediate investigation, as it indicated misconduct by DS Fillery.
116 Report by DS Dennis Stephens, MPS023075001, 12 September 1988.

117 Witness statement of a Police Constable, MPS018202001, 17 October 1988.
118 Witness statement of PC Laurence Hart, MPS018109001, 19 April 1989.
119 Action A487, MPS031884001, 12 December 1988.
120 Witness statement of the business associate, MPS000394001, pp2-3, 01 May 1987.
121 Message M26, MPS012085001, 12 March 1987.
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131. The Panel provides an analysis below of two examples, drawn from the Metropolitan
Police précis discussed above, illustrating how the original investigation appears to have been
compromised by DS Sidney Fillery’s conduct.
4.2.1.2 Jonathan Rees’s first statement

132. When asked to take Jonathan Rees’s statement, DS Sidney Fillery did not declare how
close a friend and work associate of Jonathan Rees he was, that he acted as a ‘technical
advisor’122 to Jonathan Rees, nor that he had gone to the Dolphin public house, where Jonathan
Rees and Daniel Morgan were drinking on the night before the murder, at about 9.00 pm and
invited them to join him and his colleagues at the Golden Lion public house. DS Fillery should
have declared this at once and asked to be removed from the investigation, and he should have
had no further dealings with the investigation (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
133. DS Sidney Fillery recorded in the statement Jonathan Rees made to him on 11 March 1987
that Jonathan Rees and Daniel Morgan had been in the Golden Lion public house on 09 March
1987 from about 7.30 pm.123 He knew that this was untrue.
134. In his statement, Jonathan Rees made no mention of DS Sidney Fillery being one of the
police officers with whom he and Daniel Morgan had been drinking with during the evening
before the murder, in the Golden Lion public house. This was a place they did not usually
frequent, at which Daniel Morgan was not known, and which was where Daniel Morgan’s body
was found in the car park the following night (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
135. There was also no reference in Jonathan Rees’s statement to the on-going civil action by
Belmont Car Auctions against Southern Investigations, to recover £18,280 belonging to Belmont
Car Auctions which had allegedly been stolen from Jonathan Rees in 1986. DS Sidney Fillery
and at least two other police officers had attended Belmont Car Auctions with Jonathan Rees,
allegedly as security officers (this later gave rise to disciplinary investigation of all three serving
police officers for ‘moonlighting’).
136. The civil action had placed a financial burden on Jonathan Rees and Daniel Morgan and,
according to Jonathan Rees, they were at the Golden Lion public house on the night of the
murder to discuss how to raise a loan of £10,000. The money was required to be deposited at
court to enable Southern Investigations to continue to fight the civil action. DS Sidney Fillery
knew of this because he had discussed it with Jonathan Rees and Daniel Morgan on 05 or
06 March 1987.
137. Jonathan Rees referred to a number of women with whom he alleged that Daniel Morgan
had had affairs. He did not mention Margaret Harrison.
138. DS Sidney Fillery was an experienced, trained detective. It is implausible that the
omissions described above were the result of factors other than a deliberate decision to
withhold information from the investigation.
122 ‘NOTES OF SID FILLERY’S RELATIONSHIP WITH REES’, MPS011583001, p3, undated.
123 Witness statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS021752001, p5, 11 March 1987.
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139. Once the Senior Investigating Officer, D/Supt Douglas Campbell, became aware of the
true extent of the relationship between Jonathan Rees and DS Sidney Fillery, that relationship
became an increasingly important line of enquiry in the first murder investigation (see Chapter 1,
the Morgan One Investigation).
140. In 2008, during the Abelard Two Investigation, Jonathan Rees, barrister, noted in his advice
in relation to charging former DS Sidney Fillery that ‘there are pieces of evidence which raise
suspicions that he set out to frustrate the investigation into the murder’.124 He considered in
particular whether the witness statement taken by former DS Sidney Fillery from Jonathan Rees
on 11 March 1987 was adequate, and also whether former DS Sidney Fillery should be charged
with misfeasance in public office because he had not notified his superiors of his relationship
with Jonathan Rees for 48 hours, he had not provided them with an honest account of his
relationship with Daniel Morgan, Jonathan Rees and Southern Investigations, and he had not,
while still a police officer, told investigating officers of his suspicions about who had murdered
Daniel Morgan.125
141. Counsel concluded that there was insufficient evidence to charge former DS Sidney Fillery
(see Chapter 8, the Abelard Two Investigation).
4.2.2 The Southern Investigations Belmont Car Auctions file

142. The Metropolitan Police précis referred to the ‘slim/missing’126 Southern Investigations file
on the Belmont Car Auctions.
143. Peter Newby, the Southern Investigations Office Manager, told the Morgan One
Investigation that he had been asked for the Southern Investigations file on the Belmont Car
Auctions case by DS Sidney Fillery and had given it to him on 11 March 1987 when DS Fillery
attended the office to search Daniel Morgan’s desk.127 The material seized from Southern
Investigations that morning was placed in a black plastic bag, taken to Catford Police Station
and left in an unlocked office.128 The contents of that plastic bag were later recorded in Jonathan
Rees’s statement which was taken by DS Fillery.129 There is no reference to the file in the
statement or in the Morgan One Investigation Exhibits Book. The file could not be found and,
ultimately, Jonathan Rees denied that there had ever been such a file. DS Fillery consistently
denied having received the file. The Morgan One Investigation did not believe him or Jonathan
Rees (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
144. The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation was later told that DS Sidney
Fillery had conducted a second search at Southern Investigations (the existence of which was
previously unknown) and had taken files recovered from Daniel Morgan’s desk away in his
vehicle (see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation). This matter
was not mentioned in DCS Alan Wheeler’s report to the Police Complaints Authority. This was a
significant failing particularly given the Terms of Reference of the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation and the importance of the allegation that DS Fillery was responsible for
the disappearance of the Belmont Car Auctions file.
124 Counsel’s Advice by Jonathan Rees, MPS109700001, p99, 15 April 2008.

125 The Panel has seen nothing to inform this final ground for bringing a charge for misfeasance in public office.
126 Precis of Evidence of Conspiracy against Sidney Fillery, MPS109910001, undated. Sent to the Panel 21 March 2018.
127 Witness statement of Peter Newby, MPS010345001, pp4-5, 30 March 1987.
128 Witness statement of PC Stephen Thorogood, MPS015791001, p2-3, 19 May 1987
129 Witness statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS021752001, pp10-11, 11 March 1987.
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145. In 2002, Peter Newby told the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation that about a year
after he had handed the Belmont Car Auctions file to DS Sidney Fillery ‘on the morning of the
murder’, he had been shown the file.130 He had been ‘astonished to see that the majority of the
file was missing’ and told the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation that he believed he had
told DS Christopher Horne, a Morgan One Investigation team member, that he would not make
a statement without access to the full file.131 When asked about this in May 2003, former DS
Horne said that his memory was poor and he could not recall specific details. No statement was
taken from him.132
146. Peter Newby’s statement in 2002 appears to be the basis for the description of the
Belmont Car Auctions file as ‘slim/missing’ in the Metropolitan Police précis.
147. The Panel is satisfied that there was in existence a file relating to Belmont Car
Auctions. Peter Newby had identified the file number and had said that Jonathan Rees
had given it to DS Sidney Fillery. That file could not be found when the police sought it
on 30 March 1987.
148. DS Sidney Fillery was involved in the original investigation for only the first few critical
days. By 15 March 1987, D/Supt Douglas Campbell believed that DS Fillery was keeping
Jonathan Rees informed about the investigation and that was why he was removed.
On 16 March 1987, he and all other officers who formed part of Catford Crime Squad were
returned to other normal duties.133
149. The documentation shows that DS Sidney Fillery was suspected of corruption by senior
officers in the Morgan One Investigation. Initially there were suspicions about DS Fillery and his
role in compromising the original investigation, both while he was briefly on the team during the
first critical days and also after he left the investigation with the other Catford-based officers on
16 March 1987.
150. One of the questions arising from the lack of prompt action to deal with DS Sidney Fillery’s
corrupt behaviour is whether there was any connection between that failure and DS Fillery’s
position as a member of a Masonic Lodge, which may have conferred a status beyond his
position as a Detective Sergeant.
151. Concerns about Freemasonry, and the potential for conflicts of loyalty among Freemasons
who were also police officers, recur in the documentation, from 1987 onwards (as discussed in
the section 8.1.1 below on Freemasonry).
152. There has never been a clear explanation as to why the Metropolitan Police did not
confront and sanction the unacceptable behaviour of DS Sidney Fillery when it occurred.
The disciplinary investigation in relation to the three officers working at Belmont Car
Auctions took 18 months to complete, concluding in October 1988 after DS Fillery
had retired.
130 Witness statement of Peter Newby, MPS007896001, p1, 25 November 2002.

131 Witness statement of Peter Newby, MPS007896001, p1, 25 November 2002.
132 Action A390, ‘TST HORNE N469 re knowledge of the murder of MORGAN N1’, MPS059829001, returned 15 May 2003.
133 Morgan One police file, MPS004821001, p4, 11 March 1987 to 07 February 1989.
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153. When DS Sidney Fillery retired from the police on medical grounds in 1988, he continued
to be the subject of suspicion in terms of his alleged corrupting influence on police officers
linked to Southern Investigations (later Law & Commercial). Former DS Fillery became a partner
in Southern Investigations in June 1989. The business was later considered by the Metropolitan
Police to be a hub of corruption (see Chapter 4, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges and section 7 in
this chapter).
154. Former DS Sidney Fillery was suspected in 2002 of orchestrating surveillance of the
Morgan Two Senior Investigating Officer, DCS David Cook, by the News of the World and of
complicity in other attempts to undermine DCS Cook in order to compromise the Abelard One/
Morgan Two Investigation (see Chapter 6, The Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation; and
Section 7.3 below).
155. Other examples of corruption apparently not related to the actions or omissions of
DS Sidney Fillery, but which occurred during the murder investigations in the 1980s, are
illustrated below.
4.2.3 The leak about the impending arrests in April 1987

156. The Morgan One Investigation planned to arrest six suspects on 03 April 1987 in
connection with the murder of Daniel Morgan. On 02 April 1987, a man named Len Beauchamp
allegedly telephoned another man, Person U25, and told him that six people had been arrested
for the murder of Daniel Morgan, among them three police officers. Person U25 approached a
freelance journalist in Cambridge, who provided the story to the Daily Mirror news desk134 (see
details in Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
157. Sylvia Jones, a Daily Mirror journalist, was contacted by the newspaper that day. She
attempted to verify the information by contacting D/Supt Douglas Campbell, who was not
available. She said that she could not confirm the information from any other source.135 She also
later stated that she had contacted Southern Investigations and ‘may well have warned REES of
the impending operation’.136
158. No reports regarding the arrests which were made on 03 April 1987 appeared in the
media until the following day; the media respected the confidentiality of the information.
159. Subsequently it became known that a private investigator who had been a police
officer (former DS John Ross) had been brought into the Morgan One Investigation room on
02 April 1987 by DC Donald Leslie, a member of the investigation.137 DC Leslie was removed
from the investigation by D/Supt Douglas Campbell on 16 April 1987. D/Supt Campbell
recorded a decision to ‘[r]eturn D.C. Leslie to normal duties’ because he had ‘contacts with ex
Police Officers who may be connected with Southern Investigations’.138
160. The Metropolitan Police conducted an enquiry into the leak. Attempts to trace
Len Beauchamp proved inconclusive (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation did not pursue actions recommended
by DI Rex Carpenter. The Deputy Senior Investigating Officer of the Hampshire/Police
134 Witness statement of Person U25, MPS010825001, pp6-10, 04 November 1987.

135 Witness statement of Sylvia Jones, MPS010814001, pp1-2, 02 November 1987.
136 Message M545, MPS012605001, 02 November 1987.
137 Report R2 of DI Rex Carpenter, MPS027949001, 13 June 1989.
138 Policy Decision 8, MPS017104001, 16 April 1987.
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Complaints Authority Investigation, DCI Paul Blaker, only instructed one of those actions to be
carried out, and this was not done (see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation).
161. The failure to respond to DI Rex Carpenter’s recommendations, which went to

the core of DCS Alan Wheeler’s mandate from the Metropolitan Police and the Police
Complaints Authority, was a serious failing by the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation (see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation).
162. It is probable that some, if not all, of those arrested had warning of the arrests,
which would have enabled them to take any action they thought necessary prior to
the arrests and afforded them the opportunity to ensure that no incriminating material,
should such have existed, was to be found in property owned by them.
This was a major compromise of the Morgan One Investigation. The source of the leak
has not been identified with any certainty, nor is it known whether the story was leaked
for financial gain, to protect someone, or for some other reason. The person or persons
who leaked the information originally would have known they should not have disclosed
the information. Therefore, this was a deliberate and corrupt act.
4.2.4 Further allegations of police involvement in the murder

163. Paul Goodridge, an associate of Jonathan Rees and Daniel Morgan, was arrested by
the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation in February 1989 and charged with
the murder of Daniel Morgan (see Chapter 2, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation).139 After his arrest, while in custody, he made off-the-record allegations about
Metropolitan Police involvement in the murder to DCS Alan Wheeler. DCS Wheeler made notes
of these, indicating that Paul Goodridge was afraid for himself and his family and had said
the following:
‘There is a big firm involved in this […] that is all powerful. I can’t tell anyone [….]
Your lot are ok. I think I might be able to tell you.
‘[…] The Met Police are a big and powerful firm. There are about seven involved
in this.’140
164. DCS Alan Wheeler’s notes indicate that he understood Paul Goodridge to be alleging
police involvement in the murder of Daniel Morgan.141 If the allegations had been true, this would
have constituted criminal acts by police officers, amounting to serious police corruption.
139 Custody record of Paul Goodridge, HAM000672001, 02 February 1989.

140 Witness statement of former DCS Alan Wheeler, HAM000340001, p70, 24 July 1996.
141 Transcript of pocket notebook entry made by DCS Alan Wheeler, MPS033399001, p3, 02 February 1989.
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165. DCS Alan Wheeler relayed Paul Goodridge’s allegations to Roland Moyle, Deputy Chair of
the Police Complaints Authority, to Assistant Chief Constable John Wright and DCI Paul Blaker
of Hampshire Constabulary, and to the Metropolitan Police Detective Superintendent acting as
liaison officer. A file minute by Roland Moyle recorded that ‘[i]n view of what Goodridge says
Wheeler now appears worried about the possible involvement of Met officers’.142
166. Paul Goodridge was remanded in custody and the following week, when he was visited
by a friend, he repeated the allegation he had made to DCS Alan Wheeler. The friend, with Paul
Goodridge’s knowledge and consent, informed a Detective Constable in the Metropolitan Police
whom the friend knew and trusted. On 10 February 1989, on the advice of his superior officer,
the Detective Constable spoke on the telephone with DCS Wheeler, confirming what Paul
Goodridge had told DCS Wheeler. DCI Paul Blaker took notes of the call (see Chapter 3, The
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation).143,144
167. Paul Goodridge was visited in prison by police officers, ostensibly to gain his consent for
access to his medical records. On 13 February 1989, DCS Alan Wheeler received a call from the
Crown Prosecution Service who had been telephoned by Paul Goodridge’s solicitor about the
visit. DCS Wheeler advised that his officers had not been to the prison.145 When seen by DCS
Wheeler on his way to his next appearance at court some days later, Paul Goodridge was non-
committal and would not talk to DCS Wheeler. DCS Wheeler took no action on the telephone
calls (see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation).
168. The Panel’s view is that this visit was probably carried out by Metropolitan Police officers
(see paragraph 291 below).
169. Neither Paul Goodridge’s allegations, nor the two visits made to Paul Goodridge when he
was remanded in custody, were referred to in either DCS Alan Wheeler’s report to the Police
Complaints Authority, or his report to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The information
was not entered onto the investigation’s HOLMES database, nor recorded in the policy book
or in any document other than in DCS Wheeler’s pocket notebook. Only when he made a
witness statement in 1996 in connection with the civil action being taken against Hampshire
Constabulary by Paul Goodridge did DCS Wheeler refer to the allegations (but not to the prison
visits).146 The Panel has not seen any evidence that these allegations were pursued.
170. DCS Alan Wheeler told the Police Complaints Authority that there was ‘no evidence of
police involvement’ in the murder of Daniel Morgan. That conclusion was not true. There was
no reference in his report to Paul Goodridge’s allegations, or to the evidence provided by Kevin
Lennon (see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation). The report
should have referred to the information about alleged police involvement in the murder and
should have justified the decision not to pursue this line of enquiry.
171. DCS Alan Wheeler, his Chief Constable John Hoddinott and Roland Moyle, Deputy Chair
of the Police Complaints Authority, and senior Metropolitan Police officers, were all aware of
the allegations involving police corruption and of the lack of follow-up action. These allegations
raised serious issues directly related to the Terms of the Reference of the Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority Investigation (see Chapter 3).
142 Extract from Police Complaints Authority minute sheet, by Roland Moyle, MPS034440001, p3, 03 February 1989.
143 Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority M657, MPS030975001, 10 February 1989.
144 Panel interview of a former DCI, PNL000182001, 11 February 2020.
145 Message M658, MPS030974001, 13 February 1989.
146 Witness Statement by former DCS Alan Wheeler, HAM000340001, p70, 24 July 1996.
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172. The Police Complaints Authority should not have accepted DCS Alan Wheeler’s final report
knowing these matters had not been properly investigated. The interim public statement by the
Police Complaints Authority that ‘[a]ll matters raised have been investigated thoroughly to the
satisfaction of the Police Complaints Authority’147 was incorrect and misleading, in so far as it
declared the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation to have been thorough.
173. Paul Goodridge’s allegations were known to Hampshire Constabulary, the

Metropolitan Police and the Police Complaints Authority. None of the three organisations
raised the issue of the report’s omission of this matter. They agreed, whether tacitly or
expressly, to hide from the family of Daniel Morgan and from the public in general, the
fact that the original Metropolitan Police investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan
had been ineffective and, in many respects, incompetent.
There is no explanation as to why Paul Goodridge’s allegations and the alleged prison
visit by unidentified police officers were not the subject of investigation. DCS Alan
Wheeler took no action in relation to the calls he received about the visit by police
officers to Paul Goodridge in prison. Nor did he inform anyone of the calls. Given his
Terms of Reference, that DCS Wheeler did not take this opportunity to establish the
identity of police officers who may have been involved in an attempt to prevent someone
claiming knowledge of police involvement from talking to him is astonishing.
4.2.5 The handling of witnesses in the Abelard Two Investigation

174. The preceding examples fall under what was originally envisaged when the Panel’s Terms
of Reference were agreed. The following examples reflect further concern about corruption
related to the way the most recent police investigation was conducted.
175. There is evidence that DCS David Cook, the Senior Investigating Officer of the Abelard
Two Investigation, repeatedly breached the ‘sterile corridor’ that should have existed between
the investigation and an Assisting Offender, Gary Eaton, who was being debriefed. Some of
these breaches were made known to AC John Yates and others at the time. DCS Cook said
that many of the contacts were initiated by Gary Eaton for reasons relating to his welfare, and
repeatedly gave assurances that he would have no further contact with Gary Eaton. Despite
this, DCS Cook continued to have unauthorised contact. Gary Eaton also repeatedly breached
the rules applicable to his status as a witness being debriefed by contacting DCS Cook (for
further details, see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation).
176. The Crown Prosecution Service gave clear advice about the dangers of contamination of
the debriefing process through contacts between DCS Cook and Gary Eaton.
177. The debrief should have been discontinued by AC John Yates, but this did not happen.
178. DCS David Cook’s contacts with Gary Eaton were incompatible with his ongoing role in the
Abelard Two Investigation. The juxtaposition of the timing of calls and the presentation by the
witness of new evidence about Daniel Morgan’s murder, gave rise to suspicions that the witness
had been ‘coached’ (see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation). Mr Justice Maddison said
147 Home Office timeline, Record of interim statement issued 12 February 1990, HOM000376001, p9, 29 October 2004.
1048
that he was ‘satisfied there was improper prompting of some kind’.148 The very expensive and
lengthy debrief process was regarded as having been compromised, rendering Gary Eaton’s
evidence inadmissible.
179. DCS David Cook had been managed by AC John Yates, who had not provided for normal
line management and oversight of the investigation, despite early concerns raised by two senior
officers, Commander David Johnston and DAC Janet Williams (see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two
Investigation). While DCS Cook’s actions were the immediate cause of the exclusion of Gary
Eaton’s evidence, responsibility also lay with AC Yates for his failure to oversee the management
of the investigation properly.
180. Ultimately the Prosecution withdrew all evidence against the Defendants, and they were
acquitted by Mr Justice Maddison.
181. In the subsequent civil case,149 a High Court Judge, Mr Justice Mitting, found on the
balance of probabilities that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner was liable for misfeasance
in public office in relation to the prosecution of former DS Sidney Fillery, but that the claims of
the other three claimants failed. None of the four claimants was successful in their claims for
malicious prosecution (see Chapter 9, Post-Abelard Two). The three claimants whose claims had
failed at first instance, Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian and Glenn Vian, then successfully appealed to
the Court of Appeal, which unanimously overturned the judgment of Mr Justice Mitting.150
182. During the hearing of the appeals by Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian and Glenn Vian, Lord
Justice McCombe explained:
‘The salient reason […] was that the Senior Investigating Officer (“SIO”), Detective
Chief Superintendent David Cook (“DCS Cook”) was found to have compromised the
de-briefing of Eaton by making and receiving an extensive number of unauthorised
direct contacts with Eaton in the period leading up to Eaton’s making of his statements,
in contravention of express procedures for keeping a “sterile corridor” between the
debriefing officers and the investigation team.’151
183. In her order and final judgment concerning the level of compensation to be awarded to the
claimants, on 31 July 2019, Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb stated, ‘there is no place for any form of
“noble-cause” justification for corrupt practices in those trusted to uphold the law’.152
184. Damages of £514,000 and costs resulted from these civil actions.153
185. Despite the passage of time since the collapse of the Abelard Two Prosecution in
2011, the investigation of former DCS David Cook’s conduct with regard to the witness Gary
Eaton continued until May 2019. The process involved the Independent Police Complaints
Commission (now Independent Office for Police Conduct), the Metropolitan Police and the
Crown Prosecution Service.
148 Ruling of Mr Justice Maddison, MPS107506001, p36, para 167, undated.

149 This was the civil claim brought by Jonathan Rees, former DS Sidney Fillery, Garry Vian and Glenn Vian in the High Court against the
Metropolitan Police, seeking damages for malicious prosecution and for misfeasance in public office.
150 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2018] EWCA Civ 1587.
152 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2019] EWHC 2120 (Admin), para 53.
153 Rees & Ors v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2019] EWHC 2120 (Admin), paras 15 and 54-55.
1049
186. Operation Megan was an investigation conducted by the Metropolitan Police from 2017
to 2018 into allegations arising from comments made by Mr Justice Maddison during the
pre-trial hearings in the Abelard Two Investigation and complaints made by Jonathan Rees.
The complaints included alleged misconduct in relation to the Assisting Offender, Gary Eaton, as
well as deliberate failure to disclose material to Defence lawyers. (see Chapter 9, Post-Abelard
Two). Mr Justice Maddison had found that there was prima facie evidence of possible criminal
and misconduct offences. These related to former DCS Cook’s contact with Gary Eaton and
Mr Justice Maddison’s conclusion that ‘on the balance of probabilities’ former DCS Cook did
prompt Gary Eaton.
187. Operation Megan Two was an investigation conducted by the Metropolitan Police from
2017 to 2019. It examined comments made by Mr Justice Mitting in the civil claim at the High
Court in February 2017. Relying upon the judgment of Mr Justice Maddison, Mr Justice Mitting
commented that former DCS Cook had done an act which tended to pervert the course of
justice by breaching the sterile corridor and prompting Gary Eaton to implicate Glenn Vian and
Garry Vian in the murder of Daniel Morgan, and concealing the fact that he had done so from
the Crown Prosecution Service and Prosecution Counsel (see Chapter 9, Post-Abelard Two).
188. Ultimately, in November 2018 it was decided that no action should be taken against
former DCS David Cook. Jonathan Rees appealed against this decision, which was upheld by a
different branch of the Crown Prosecution Service in May 2019.
189. The above examples demonstrate that police corruption did occur during
the investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan and was not confined to the first
investigation. Some of the examples of corrupt behaviour clearly had the potential
to affect the investigation adversely, and to contribute to preventing the person(s)
responsible from being brought to justice. The leak about the impending April 1987
arrests is a case in point. The breaching of the sterile corridor between the Abelard Two
Investigation and an Assisting Offender, Gary Eaton, cannot be justified on the basis that
the intention was to maintain the willingness of the witness to give evidence and to bring
to justice those thought to be responsible for the murder of Daniel Morgan.
5 Admissions of corruption in the Metropolitan Police and

lack of candour
5.1 Acknowledging the role of corruption generally
190. Since the 1990s, the Metropolitan Police have acknowledged corruption in general
terms as an issue and have done so publicly. In 1997 Sir Paul Condon, then Commissioner
of the Metropolitan Police, gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee of the House of
Commons, describing
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‘a minority of officers who are corrupt, dishonest, unethical. […] They commit crimes,
they neutralise evidence in important cases and they betray police operations and
techniques to criminals. These bad officers sap the morale of their honest colleagues
and they do immense damage to public confidence […] they are very difficult to target
and prosecute.’154
191. When asked if he could quantify the extent of the corruption problem, Sir Paul Condon
responded with figures which attracted much publicity:
‘I would hope and believe it is contained somewhere between 0.5 per cent and one
per cent. There is a spurious precision to that but I would say somewhere between
100 officers and 250 officers.’155
5.2 Acknowledging the role of corruption in relation to Daniel

Morgan’s murder
5.2.1 Internal acknowledgement
192. In relation to the murder of Daniel Morgan, there are, in the documentation, various
indications that Metropolitan Police officers voiced their concerns internally about corruption
from early in the first investigation. In April 1988, during the Inquest into the death of Daniel
Morgan, allegations of police corruption were heard and became the subject of considerable
media attention. The Coroner stated in his concluding remarks that there had been ‘no evidence
whatsoever to point to any police involvement in this killing’.156 This description of the evidence
heard at the Inquest was not accurate and overstated the evidential position. The Coroner had
heard Kevin Lennon confirm in his testimony at the Inquest what he had said in his statements
to the police: he alleged that Jonathan Rees had told him that his ‘mates at Catford’ would
help him to kill Daniel Morgan. The Coroner’s incorrect remarks were subsequently repeated
on 10 June 2004, by the Home Office Minister, Hazel Blears MP, when she set out her reasons
for refusing the request for a public inquiry, saying ‘[w]e cannot ignore the Coroner’s remarks
when delivering his verdict of unlawful killing during the inquest, that there was “no evidence
whatsoever in this inquest to point to any police involvement in this killing” ’.
193. The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation was set up to ‘investigate

allegations that police were involved in the murder of Daniel Morgan and any matters arising
therefrom’.157 The Deputy Chair of the Police Complaints Authority, Roland Moyle, recorded
DCS Alan Wheeler as saying that ‘he feels he will have to look at the whole murder enquiry
including FILLERY’s involvement, which appears to include picking up documentation from
the PI’s [private investigators’] office, which subsequently disappeared’ (see Chapter 3, The
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation)158 This was one of many concerns raised
during the second investigation about the behaviour of officers involved in the first murder
investigation.
194. However, these concerns were not properly reflected in DCS Alan Wheeler’s final report to
the Police Complaints Authority.
154 Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC), HC 258-I, First Report – Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedure, para 1, 15 January 1998;
available online at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhaff/258-i/ha0103.htm.
155 Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC), HC 258-I, First Report – Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedure, para 13, 15 January 1998;
available online at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmhaff/258-i/ha0103.htm.
156 Coroner’s summing up, Inquest Day Eight, INT000008001, p134, 25 April 1988.
157 Memorandum from Cdr Kenneth Merton to DCS Alan Wheeler, MPS020664001, 24 June 1988.
158 Home Office timeline, Minute of meeting of 15 July 1988, HOM000376001, p4, 29 October 2004.
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195. The view that both the Morgan One and Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
investigations had been effective was wrongly endorsed by the Police Complaints Authority in
March 1990 when Gerry Gillman, a senior member of the Police Complaints Authority, wrote to
Alastair Morgan, stating:
‘[…] I would like to stress that the two enquiries carried out by the Metropolitan Police
and the Hampshire Constabulary have been most thorough and have produced no
evidence of police involvement in your brother’s murder.’159
196. The Coroner’s remarks, the findings of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation as presented in the final report of DCS Alan Wheeler, and the Police
Complaints Authority’s acceptance of its conclusions, formed an unsound basis for the
subsequent repeated assertions that there was no police corruption associated with the
murder or its investigation.
197. A Metropolitan Police summary of the case history dated March 2011 referred to ‘the
flawed initial investigation caused by corrupt Police Officers’160 and stated:
‘[m]ost notable was the use of Detective Sergeant, Sidney Fillery, who had a close
personal and professional relationship with Jonathan Rees. His involvement in the
investigation led to the compromise of various critical evidential lines of enquiry.’161
198. The Panel asked the Metropolitan Police to explain which ‘corrupt Police Officers’ were
being referred to and which ‘critical evidential lines of enquiry’ were meant.162 In response, the
Metropolitan Police referred to the role of DS Sidney Fillery and provided a summary of issues
relating to him (see paragraph 119 above), and further stated,
‘[a]s to an explanations [sic] you seek. As mentioned in previous correspondence,

this is a matter for the Panel to take up with the author including enquiring what
underlying material or information that officer had in their possession when making
those assertions. I nor my client’s current officers can step in the shoes of the authors
of those passages. It is unhelpful to speculate.’163
199. This reply typifies the Metropolitan Police response to the Panel’s queries about what
is meant by the words which have been used and which are very significant to the family
of Daniel Morgan and to the wider public, who have an ongoing interest in the question of
whether Daniel Morgan’s murderer(s) escaped justice because of police corruption.
159 Letter from Gerry Gillman to Alastair Morgan, PNL000099001, p285, 27 March 1990.
160 Metropolitan Police proposal to the Metropolitan Police Authority, to consider an ex-gratia payment to Daniel Morgan’s family,
MPS109485001, p52, March 2011.
MPS109485001, p50, March 2011.
162 Letter to Metropolitan Police from the Panel’s solicitors, Fieldfisher, p2, 07 August 2019.
163 Email from Metropolitan Police to the Panel’s solicitors, Fieldfisher, 18 September 2019.
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5.2.2 External admission

200. In July 2004, over 17 years after the murder of Daniel Morgan, Caroline Flint MP, a Home
Office Minister, stated in Parliament that:
‘I am informed that the Metropolitan Police accept that the original investigation falls
below current investigative standards, but that it was consistent with the standards of
the day.’164
201. This was the Metropolitan Police’s first public acknowledgement of problems in the
investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder.
202. On the issue of alleged police corruption, Caroline Flint MP quoted the Coroner’s remarks
and Roland Moyle’s statement when he expressed satisfaction with the final report of the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation.
203. The Panel asked to see any briefing material provided to inform the preparation of the
Ministerial statement. The Home Office was able to provide copies of correspondence between
the Home Office and Members of Parliament, the solicitor representing members of Daniel
Morgan’s family, the Metropolitan Police and others, as well as briefing notes prepared for
Ministers based on the correspondence.165
204. The briefing materials reflected a partial picture of what had occurred since the murder
of Daniel Morgan, largely based on the information provided by the Metropolitan Police to the
Home Office. Again, there was emphasis on the Coroner’s summing up at the Inquest and his
conclusion that there had been ‘no evidence whatsoever in this inquest to point to any police
involvement in this killing’.166 The material again referred to the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation and the fact that the Police Complaints Authority had confirmed to the
Home Office that it was satisfied with the conduct of the investigation and with its findings.
205. The briefing materials also refer, among other things, to a Metropolitan Police document
in which DCS David Cook, the Senior Investigating Officer of the overt side of the Abelard One/
Morgan Two Investigation, was reported to have said that the investigation had looked for
evidence, intelligence or other information that would suggest corruption, but had found none.167
206. In response to requests from members of Daniel Morgan’s family for a public inquiry, the
Home Office prepared a submission to the Minister, which included a draft letter that repeated
the Coroner’s remarks and the Police Complaints Authority’s acceptance of the final report on
the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation.168
164 Hansard HC Deb, Vol 423, Col 236WH, 06 July 2004; https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2004-07-06/debates.
165 Home Office briefing materials, HOM000022001, pp1-12, 2004.
166 ‘Draft Response to letter from Chris Smith MP, Roger Williams MP and Lord Livesey of Talgarth’, HOM000022001, p11, undated.
167 ‘Chronology of events’, HOM000019001, p7, 19 April 2004.
168 ‘Draft Response to letter from Chris Smith MP, Roger Williams MP and Lord Livesey of Talgarth’, HOM000019001, pp8-10, undated.
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207. The Home Office Minister, Hazel Blears MP, sent a letter dated 08 December 2004 to the
solicitor representing members of Daniel Morgan’s family.169 In her letter, the Minister stated
that the Metropolitan Police ‘have acknowledged to me that there were failings in that first
investigation and that it was undermined because of the involvement of certain individuals within
the investigation team’.170 The letter did not specify how certain individuals had undermined the
investigation. This reflects the lack of detail in the briefing material prepared for the Minister,
which in turn reflects the lack of detail provided by the Metropolitan Police.
208. The Minister did not use the term ‘corruption’ in her letter. She quoted the Metropolitan
Police’s acknowledgement, which is vague and might be interpreted in different ways.
The ‘failings in that first investigation’ and the undermining of the investigation by individuals
within the investigation team might be taken as a reference to mistakes and incompetence or as
an oblique reference to corruption.171
209. The Metropolitan Police should have been more candid and specific in their briefing
to the Home Office Minister, Hazel Blears MP. Her letter was based on the information
provided to her.
210. The Metropolitan Police’s admission of failings was repeated in October 2005 by
Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, in oral evidence given to the Metropolitan Police Authority, when he
stated that the Morgan One Investigation had been ‘compromised’.172 This statement was not in
the public domain, as meetings of the Metropolitan Police Authority were not public.
211. Neither the letter from the Home Office, nor Commissioner Sir Ian Blair’s comments,
specified the way in which it was believed that the investigation had been ‘undermined’ or
‘compromised’. The Panel asked former Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, now Lord Blair, what he had
meant. He explained that it was a reference to the alleged actions of former DS Sidney Fillery.173
He could provide no further clarification.
212. In 2006, a report commissioned by the Metropolitan Police Authority into the murder of
Daniel Morgan was presented in confidence by DAC John Yates (see Chapter 7, The 2006
Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority). Even though the Terms of Reference included the
requirement to indicate whether there was police corruption/collusion or involvement in either
the murder itself or in the subsequent failure of investigations, the initial draft report failed to
confront the issue of corruption adequately, and went so far as to state the following:
‘It was beyond any reasonable comprehension, then, as it would be now, despite
having measures in place, to think that a Police Officer could have been involved and
working against the direction of the enquiry and the interests of the family by destroying
evidence or giving the suspects an advantage through informing them of intended
police action.’174
169 Letter to Bhatt Murphy from Hazel Blears MP, HOM000380001, 08 December 2004.
170 Letter to Bhatt Murphy from Hazel Blears MP, HOM000380001, p3, 08 December 2004.
171 Letter to Bhatt Murphy from Hazel Blears MP, HOM000380001, p3 08 December 2004.
172 Alastair Morgan Folder 12, ‘PROPOSAL BEFORE FULL METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY SITTING’, PNL000110001, p27, 27 October 2005.
173 Panel meeting with Lord Ian Blair, p2, 20 July 2015.
174 The 2006 Report from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service to the Metropolitan Police Authority, MPS105740001, pp32-33,
para 192, 31 January 2006.
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213. The wording in the 2006 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority reflects
a totally inappropriate mindset. It ignores the endemic risk and existence of police
corruption. All strategies to prevent police corruption must always involve a recognition
of the fact that police officers may commit corrupt acts. It should not be ‘beyond
any reasonable comprehension’ that an officer might work to undermine an enquiry.
Awareness of the risk of corrupt behaviour is a prerequisite for confronting and
combatting corruption.
214. Len Duvall, Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority at the time of the report, stated in
interview with the Panel that he wanted the Metropolitan Police to accept that something was
wrong with their processes. In his rejection of the first draft of the report from the Metropolitan
Police, Len Duvall stated that the report had the tone of ‘everything was alright’,175 which was
both wrong and unacceptable.
215. The report was revised. The final version included an admission about corruption generally
in the Metropolitan Police:
‘There can be little doubt that this was a time when corruption in certain parts of the
MPS [Metropolitan Police Service], particularly the specialist squads, was endemic.
It was only in the mid to late 90s that the true extent of the nature of the corrupt activity
came to light and positive action taken to address the issues, both directly and allied
with a proper preventive strategy. It is fair to say that the MPS had taken its collective
eye off the ball in the 1980s and the result was squads within squads and an appalling
level of dishonest activity. This is not something that the MPS can be proud of.’176
216. Even this limited acknowledgement of corruption was included only at the instigation
of Len Duvall. This report was shared with members of Daniel Morgan’s family but was not
published, as the Metropolitan Police Authority did not normally publish such reports.
217. Len Duvall carried out his role as Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority
effectively. He held the Metropolitan Police to account and robustly challenged the first
version of the report presented to him.
218. On 10 April 2006, David Riddle, the Deputy Chief Executive and Solicitor to the
Metropolitan Police Authority, on behalf of Len Duvall, sent a copy of the 2006 Report to
solicitors representing members of Daniel Morgan’s family. In the accompanying letter, he wrote:
‘DAC John Yates has confirmed that in his professional view this case, particularly in
the early stages, suffered significantly from the taint of corruption. In particular, the
actions and conduct of ex-Detective Sergeant Fillery (and his potential associates)
fell well below that which is expected. DAC Yates personally considers that Fillery was
both corrupt and a corrupter of colleagues and others. What he cannot say, to the
175 Panel interview with Len Duvall, pp.2-3, para 13, 20 July 2017.
176 The 2006 Report from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service to the Metropolitan Police Authority, para 109, MPS109479001,
p178, para 109, 07 April 2006.
1055
degree of certainty required, is that he was corrupt around this particular case. This was
a deplorable episode in the history of the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] and it is
deeply regrettable that the family have not seen anyone brought to justice as yet; a
situation made worse through the probable fact that some of those entrusted to uphold
the law may have deliberately undermined the initial investigation.’177
219. There is no explanation in the letter as to the identities of the ‘potential associates’ of
DS Sidney Fillery, and it does not specify whether they included civilian associates or police
officers (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
220. The 2006 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority contained the following paragraph:
‘Viewing it from what we know, Detective Superintendent [Douglas] Campbell was

not far from the truth. Sadly to prove their suspicions they needed evidence but the
initial weakness in the investigation had probably led to that being destroyed and no
longer available.
‘That weakness was the presence of Detective Sergeant Fillery on the murder
investigation and his corrupt relationship with the prime suspect Jonathan Rees.’178
221. A briefing was prepared in 2011 by DCS Hamish Campbell, Metropolitan Police Homicide
Command, for Metropolitan Police Authority members about the collapse of the trial of those
accused of Daniel Morgan’s murder.179 It contained references to the conduct of police officers,
including ‘suspicions that Fillery’s participation in the first investigation contributed to the
compromise of securing critical evidence’180 and, in the Abelard Two Investigation, information
from witnesses suggesting ‘that the actual motive behind Morgan’s murder was to prevent
him disclosing the criminality of certain persons – and their link to corrupt police officers’.181
An earlier version of the briefing note dated 18 March 2011 explained that the Abelard Two
Investigation had gathered information that Daniel Morgan was murdered ‘to prevent him
disclosing the criminality of Rees, the Vian’s [sic] and their links to corrupt police officers, such
as Fillery’.182
222. In 2011, after the Prosecution withdrew its case against Jonathan Rees, James Cook,
Glenn Vian, Garry Vian and former DS Sidney Fillery, Acting Commissioner Tim Godwin wrote a
letter to Alastair Morgan, saying:
‘I am deeply sorry that the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] has failed to bring to
justice those responsible for the murder of Daniel. The MPS has accepted that police
corruption in the original investigation was a significant factor in this failure. As you
know, corruption in its various forms formed a major line of enquiry in the most recent
investigation.
‘I recognise how important this is to both you and your family and that the part played
by corruption in the original investigation is acknowledged publicly. You are entitled to
an apology not only for this failure but also for the repeated failure of the MPS, over
177 Alastair Morgan Folder 11, Letter from David Riddle to Raju Bhatt, PNL000109001, pp1-2, 10 April 2006.
178 The 2006 Report from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service to the Metropolitan Police Authority, MPS109479001,
pp190-191, paras 186-187, 05 April 2006.
179 Metropolitan Police Authority briefing note, MPS107588001, pp3-7, 29 March 2011.
1056
many years following Daniel’s murder, to accept that corruption had played such a part
in failing to bring those responsible to justice.
‘[…] we recognise the consequences of the repeated failure of the MPS over the years
to confront the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for the
murder from being brought to justice.’183
223. Throughout this process of internal acknowledgement and confidential disclosure to

members of the family of Daniel Morgan, the family have been placed in the extraordinary
position of receiving a lot of information in confidence, including information about
suspected police corruption, without being able to cite it, and without the satisfaction of
seeing corrupt officers called to account (see Chapter 12, The Treatment of the Family).
What the family was told about the nature of this corruption was tantalisingly imprecise:
it comprised little more than innuendo, and yet was repeated on a number of occasions.
The Metropolitan Police have provided little detail of the alleged corruption other than the
repeated reference to DS Sidney Fillery. There is some evidence in the material available
to the Panel to support the allegation that the first investigation of Daniel Morgan’s
murder was compromised by corruption. There were also other very serious problems
with that investigation (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
224. In December 2020, the Metropolitan Police acknowledged to the Panel that the
scope of corruption surrounding the investigations into the murder of Daniel Morgan
went beyond the role of DS Sidney Fillery. The Metropolitan Police claimed they had
investigated the possibility that the motive for the murder was to prevent Daniel Morgan
exposing general and serious police corruption. The Metropolitan Police stated that this
line of enquiry was actively pursued in the Morgan One, Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority and Abelard Two investigations, but that the Metropolitan Police were unable to
find any significant corroboration to support it. The Panel does not accept that this line of
enquiry was pursued actively or fully in these investigations.
5.2.3 Public admission

225. The first public admission of police corruption came in the press statement by
DCS Hamish Campbell on 11 March 2011, when the criminal proceedings against those
charged ended. He said:
‘This current investigation has identified, ever more clearly, how the initial inquiry
failed the family and the wider public. It is quite apparent that police corruption was a
debilitating factor in that investigation. This was wholly unacceptable.’184
226. A further public statement was made by AC Martin Hewitt on 10 March 2017, the thirtieth
anniversary of the murder of Daniel Morgan. It stated:
‘The Met’s re-investigation into Daniel Morgan’s murder identified, ever more clearly,
how the initial inquiry failed the family and wider public. We publicly stated that it is
quite apparent that police corruption was a factor in that first investigation. This is
wholly unacceptable.’185
183 Letter from Acting Commissioner Tim Godwin to Alastair Morgan, MPS109485001, pp5-6, 30 March 2011.
185 Vikram Dodd, 11 March 2017, ‘Daniel Morgan: how a 30-year-old murder still haunts Britain’s powerful’, The Guardian; at
www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/mar/10/daniel-morgan-how-private-eyes-haunts-britains-powerful-30-years-on.
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5.3 Lack of candour and obfuscation

227. The Panel requested from the Metropolitan Police the briefings for all the statements
acknowledging the role of police corruption in the investigation of the murder, including the
public statements made most recently. The Metropolitan Police provided some, but not all, of
the briefing material. They wrote to the Panel in June 2019 indicating that they had ‘not been
able to find any new material to assist’.186
228. In the absence of all the requested briefings, the Panel asked the Metropolitan Police
to clarify what lay behind the admissions of corruption. The Metropolitan Police Directorate
of Legal Services replied that, in instances where individual police officers had accepted or
conceded corruption in the case, ‘any clarity required would have to be provided by those
officers themselves’.187 In June 2019, AC Nick Ephgrave informed the Panel Chair that his team
had made enquiries in respect of the intended meaning or intent of Acting Commissioner Tim
Godwin’s statement of March 2011, but had not been able to find any new material to assist.
He suggested that the Metropolitan Police’s concerns were likely to be in relation to the conduct
of DS Sidney Fillery and the subsequent failure of the Metropolitan Police to obtain sufficient
evidence to charge and convict him of any offences connected to the alleged corruption.
AC Ephgrave indicated, as had the Metropolitan Police’s solicitor previously, that it may be
necessary for the individual authors to provide further elucidation.188
229. Public statements such as those made by senior Metropolitan Police officers are
made on behalf of the Metropolitan Police. The Metropolitan Police as an organisation
must be able to provide and explain the reasons for statements made on its behalf,
especially where it is making admissions of corruption. It is not acceptable to abrogate
the responsibility by referring the Panel to the individuals who made the statements.
230. What is notable about the various corruption admissions emanating from senior
Metropolitan Police officers in the case of Daniel Morgan is that:
i. only two of them were public statements;
ii. at no point has it been indicated that the suspected corruption related to the
murder itself; rather the implication has been that the suspected corruption
prevented the successful prosecution of those responsible for the murder;
iii. virtually no detail has been given as to the nature of the suspected corrupt
behaviour or how it served to undermine the murder investigation;
iv. the suspicion of corruption has solely been connected to the ‘initial’ murder
investigation (that is Morgan One); and
v. the focus of the imputed police corruption has been almost entirely on one
individual officer.
186 Letter from AC Nick Ephgrave to Baroness Nuala O’Loan, p2, 26 June 2019.
187 Letter from Metropolitan Police to the Panel’s solicitors, Fieldfisher, p2, 21 March 2018.
188 Letter from AC Nick Ephgrave to Baroness O’Loan, p2, 26 June 2019.
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231. In internal documents there are multiple references to DS Sidney Fillery’s possible
role in corruption, and police suspicions about him date back to a matter of days after
the commencement of the initial murder investigation (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One
Investigation). The Panel has concluded that the Metropolitan Police were justified in some of
their suspicions about DS Fillery, for example, in relation to the first statement he took from
Jonathan Rees.
232. In 2011, the Metropolitan Police had written of ‘the flawed initial investigation caused by
corrupt Police Officers’189 when proposing to the Metropolitan Police Authority that an ex gratia
payment be made to the family of Daniel Morgan. The ‘corrupt Police Officers’ were not named.
233. The Metropolitan Police have not been able to explain what it meant by its various
statements about individual police corruption adversely affecting the investigation of
Daniel Morgan’s murder. This is an extraordinary situation, given that the concerns about
police corruption have been the strongest concern (other than the identification of the
murderer(s) of Daniel Morgan) of the members of his family and others, and have created
enormous public interest in this case.
234. The examples of corruption provided to the Panel by the Metropolitan Police (see
paragraph 119 on the précis above) reflect what has been termed a ‘rotten apple’ model of
police corruption, that is, a single officer acting corruptly.190 The repeated internal references
by the Metropolitan Police to the actions or inactions of officers, and notably former DS Sidney
Fillery, whether well-founded or not, have tended to divert attention from the wider problems of
management and governance identified in the investigation chapters in this Report.
235. The Panel has identified three types of failings. The first is the tolerance of policing that
was poor or below accepted standards, as is described in the investigation chapters: for
example, the failure to preserve the crime scene, the failure to hold evidence and exhibits in a
secure and proper manner, the lack of appropriate management and the lack of compliance
with established procedures. This has been accompanied by a failure of senior police officers
to acknowledge evidence of police incompetence when it is put before them, and a general
tendency for the police service to ‘close ranks’ and become defensive when challenged.
236. The second type of failing was an historical phenomenon and involved the tolerance and
even encouragement of a culture based on regular drinking sessions (usually accessed by car),
and an expectation of socialising in local pubs. Regular drinking sessions and drink driving are
not features of police culture today. However, there were, and continue to be, issues attaching
to the involvement of police officers in ‘secret’ societies, such as the Freemasons, and police
officers mixing with local figures operating on the fringes of legality, including with some private
investigators working in the area of local security and used car dealing, debt collection and
property recovery.
237. Where failings of type one and two are already present, the scope for corruption is
greatly increased.
MPS109485001, p52, March 2011.
190 Newburn T. (2015) Literature Review – Police Integrity and corruption, London: HMI Constabulary.
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238. The third type of failing is incontrovertibly corrupt behaviour, including the selling of stories
to press contacts, the sale for private gain of police services (such as tracing car registration
plate numbers through the Police National Computer) and the planting of false evidence, as
in the Simon James conspiracy to pervert the course of justice case, when Jonathan Rees
arranged through corrupt linkages with one or more police officers for the police to discover
drugs planted in the car of his client’s estranged wife, leading to her arrest on drugs charges
(see Chapter 4, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges).
239. As regards the original murder investigation (the Morgan One Investigation), it is not clear
in every instance which failings were attributable to corruption and which to incompetence, poor
management, failures to comply with national policy and police practice falling far below the
expected standards at the time. There are examples of all of these in the first two investigations.
The Metropolitan Police’s lack of candour both about corruption and about other failings
obscures the truth still further. Their repeated assertion that the original murder investigation
reflected the standards of the time is just one example.
240. The Morgan One Investigation failed to comply with national policy191 when it merged
several distinct roles in the administration of the investigation and assigned them to one
and the same officer. In the Abelard Two Investigation, roles that were supposed to be
carried out by different officers were likewise assigned to a single officer. The national
policy on the staffing of distinct roles in the Major Incident Room was designed to
safeguard the integrity of investigations into serious crimes.
241. The Metropolitan Police did not acknowledge this failing in the first murder
investigation at the time. Nor have they acknowledged this failing in the last murder
investigation. The repetition in the Abelard Two Investigation of a failure analogous
to that seen in the Morgan One Investigation indicates a lesson not learned in the
intervening 19 years.
242. When failings in police investigations are combined with unjustified reassurances
rather than candour on the part of the Metropolitan Police, this may constitute
institutional corruption. The Metropolitan Police’s culture of obfuscation and a lack of
candour is unhealthy in any public service. Concealing or denying failings, for the sake
of the organisation’s public image, is dishonesty on the part of the organisation for
reputational benefit. In the Panel’s view, this constitutes a form of institutional corruption.
243. The Metropolitan Police’s lack of candour manifested itself in the hurdles placed in the
path of the Panel, such as AC Cressida Dick’s initial refusal to recognise the necessity for
the Panel to have access to HOLMES (the data system which provides safeguards for the
integrity of investigations and also enables independent scrutiny to identify failures), as well
as limiting access to the most sensitive information (which was not provided at the Panel’s
secure premises and was only accessible at a location involving considerable travel time and
precluding daily reference and crosschecking; see Chapter 11, for details). It can also be seen in
the Metropolitan Police responses to the Panel’s ‘fairness process’ in December 2020.192
191 The Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP).

192 The Panel sent ‘fairness’ letters to all those individuals and organisations it was considering criticising, in order to allow them the
opportunity to respond and to make representations as to why they ought not to be criticised. The Panel considered all the responses it received
and, where appropriate, either amended or withdrew its draft remarks.
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244. For example, the Panel indicated in its fairness letter that it intended to criticise
the Metropolitan Police for not complying with the Major Incident Room Standardised
Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP) when the Morgan One Investigation’s Major Incident Room
merged several management roles and assigned them to an individual officer. This removed a
layer of scrutiny and quality assurance from the investigation. If the MIRSAP procedures had
been adopted, with different officers performing different roles, this would have provided an
important safeguard for the integrity of the investigation.
245. The Metropolitan Police responded that it did not fully adopt MIRSAP until 2015, but it did
endeavour to apply the principles of MIRSAP. In 1987, the investigation team utilised the Major
Incident Computer Application (MICA), a computer system MIRSAP did not supply guidance
for. This system was trialled, but HOLMES became the tool ultimately adopted by police forces
throughout the UK. Between 2004 and 2015, the Metropolitan Police used as its reference the
London Homicide Manual. This document permitted some variance from MIRSAP due to the
volume of murder investigations undertaken in London.
246. The Metropolitan Police had not provided the Panel with a copy of the London Homicide
Manual, and the Panel had not been aware of its existence until receipt of the Metropolitan
Police response to their fairness letter in December 2020.
247. Lack of candour about past failures is not conducive to better policing, especially
when those failures include corruption. There is a risk that, if a police force does not
acknowledge corruption and combat it promptly and robustly, some officers may believe
they can behave corruptly without consequences. With regard to the murder of Daniel
Morgan and its investigation, placing the reputation of the organisation above the
need for accountability and transparency did not prevent further corrupt behaviour, for
example in and after the Abelard Two Investigation.
248. In 2006, the United Kingdom ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption,
which recognises that ‘the prevention and eradication of corruption is a responsibility of
all States’.193 Under the provisions of the Convention, the state is obliged to ‘develop and
implement or maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the
participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public
affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability’.194
193 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004, United Nations Convention against Corruption, p6, New York, available at
https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf.
194 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004, United Nations Convention against Corruption, p9, New York, available at
https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf.
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6 Tackling corruption in the Metropolitan Police: legislation,

policy and practice during the period of investigations into
Daniel Morgan’s murder
6.1 The law relating to police corruption
249. Before 2015 there was no statutory offence of police corruption. Officers suspected of
corrupt activity were sometimes prosecuted for the common law offences of misconduct in
public office, misfeasance in public office, attempting to pervert the course of justice, perjury
and conspiracy to commit criminal acts, depending on the circumstances of the unlawful
behaviour. This was the position in 1987 when Daniel Morgan was murdered, and investigation
of the murder began. The position has changed over the course of the 34 years since then.
The Panel has looked at the changing position and the indications of corruption occurring
during this long period.
250. A new criminal offence, ‘corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers and
privileges’,195 was introduced under section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.
Announcing plans for the new legislation, the Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, gave the
following explanation:
‘The current law on police corruption relies on the outdated common-law offence of
misconduct in public office. It is untenable that we should be relying on such a legal
basis to deal with serious issues of corruption in modern policing.’196
251. With the implementation on 13 April 2015 of this new statutory offence, a police officer
commits an offence if he or she:
‘(a) exercises the powers and privileges of a constable improperly, and
(b) knows or ought to know that the exercise is improper.’197
252. At section 26(4), the legislation explains that ‘a police constable exercises the powers and
privileges of a constable improperly if -
(a) he or she exercises a power or privilege of a constable for the purposes of

achieving -
(i) a benefit for himself or herself, or
(ii) a benefit or a detriment for another person, and
(b) a reasonable person would not expect the power or privilege to be exercised for the
purpose of achieving that benefit or detriment.’198
253. The College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs Council now follow similar
definitions of corruption based on the section 26 offence.199
195 Introduced under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 201, s26.
196 Hansard HC Deb, Vol 576, Col 1065, 06 March 2014; https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2004-07-06/debates.
197 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s 26(1).
198 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s26(4).
199 Briefing to the Panel by the College of Policing, 29 April 2020.
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6.2 The definition of corruption used by the Metropolitan Police

254. The Metropolitan Police did not regard as serious or view as corruption an early example
of alleged ‘moonlighting’. This is explored in Example A below.
Example A
255. Three serving police officers, DS Sidney Fillery, DC Alan Purvis and DC Peter
Foley, were subject to disciplinary investigation for assisting Southern Investigations in
providing security at the Belmont Car Auctions. All three officers admitted being present
at the auctions but denied being paid; none had informed the Metropolitan Police about
attending the auctions.
Evidence emerged that one of the Detective Constables received a benefit in kind: when
he had traded in his old car for one of the cars on auction, the car value was inflated to
ensure that the officer had the deposit to purchase the car through a finance company.
DS Sidney Fillery took medical retirement before his disciplinary case was completed.
The report on the disciplinary case recommended that the two junior officers ‘should
receive strong words of advice from their Chief Superintendent as to their conduct
throughout this matter and their future behaviour’200 (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One
Investigation).
256. The Panel believes that DS Sidney Fillery, DC Alan Purvis and DC Peter Foley were
obtaining work, in addition to their police work, by virtue of their position and skills as police
officers and thereby gaining benefit.
257. As the most senior of the three police officers, DS Sidney Fillery’s involvement in this
matter implied a more serious failure. It is probable that, had the disciplinary process found
against DS Fillery, the sanctions would have been more severe than was the case in respect
of the two junior officers, DC Peter Foley and DC Alan Purvis. It was not uncommon at the
time for police officers under disciplinary scrutiny to retire before the process was concluded.
Following sustained criticism of the long-standing pattern of police officers facing the prospect
of disciplinary action being allowed to take early retirement, the regulations regarding this option
were changed in 2015.201,202
258. In October 1997, DAC Roy Clark provided a witness statement, relating to the alleged
‘moonlighting’, in which he said that Southern Investigations ‘had been profiting from the
services of a small number of police officers contrary to their duty’. He stated that ‘[w]hilst these
matters amounted to discipline offences under the Police Discipline Regulations they do not
amount to corruption’.203
200 Report by D/Supt Alec Button; Complaint against Police, MPS015801001, p42, 07 October 1988.
201 Independent Police Complaints Commission, (2013) Eleventh Report of Session 2012-2013, London: The Stationery Office Limited, p28,
para 84, see https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmhaff/494/494.pdf.
202 The Police Pension Regulations 2015 came into force on 01 April 2015.
203 Witness statement of DAC Roy Clark, MPS054304001 p3, 30 October 1997.
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259. DAC Roy Clark acknowledged that the officers’ conduct amounted to disciplinary
offences but did not view it as corrupt. While the Panel agrees that the conduct could
be treated as disciplinary offences, it disagrees with DAC Clark’s view that it did not
constitute corruption.
260. In June 2019, the Metropolitan Police gave further responses to the Panel, indicating that
its Directorate of Professional Standards anti-corruption unit has also utilised the following
description of ‘corruption’ for training and reference purposes:
‘This involves a direct abuse of position in a relationship of implicit or explicit exchange

with others, inside or outside the police organisation. It follows the common idea of
corrupt police staff doing or not doing, something for an external or internal “corrupter”
for some kind of gain (though not necessarily financial). It will also be taken to mean the
breaking of rules and laws by police staff in order to achieve results.’204
261. It is not clear whether this definition was used historically in training. The Panel’s remit to
examine the connections and corrupt linkages between police officers, private investigators and
the media resonates with the reference to a ‘relationship of implicit or explicit exchange with
others, inside or outside the police organisation’. This is illustrated by the following example.
262. The historic intelligence which gave rise to Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges described
former DS Sidney Fillery and Jonathan Rees as ‘deeply involved in corruption, using a
network of serving and retired police officers to access sensitive intelligence for the purpose
of progressing crime, frustrating the course of justice, and selling sensitive information to
the press’.205 Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges was undertaken ‘to investigate “corrupters of
police” ’.206 The intelligence it gathered indicated that Southern Investigations (which, by May
1999 was trading as Law & Commercial) was acting as a hub for serious and ongoing corruption
(see Chapter 4, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges).
263. It is critical to the Panel’s analysis of the role of corruption in the investigations over
time to understand how the Metropolitan Police has defined corruption, and on what basis it
endeavours to prevent, identify, investigate and combat it. In 1987, when Daniel Morgan was
murdered, all allegations of police misconduct and all complaints were investigated by the
police, on occasion supervised by the Police Complaints Authority. When the Panel began to
receive documents early in 2015, it asked the Metropolitan Police for its definition of corruption.
264. In May 2015, the Metropolitan Police explained that its Directorate of Professional
Standards had adopted as its working definition, the definition used by the Independent Police
Complaints Commission.207 The Independent Police Complaints Commission’s definition was of
serious corruption (which it might investigate) and included:
i. ‘any attempt to pervert the course of justice or other conduct likely seriously to harm
the administration of justice, in particular the criminal justice system;
205 Application for renewal of surveillance, MPS099739001, p69, 8 December 1998.
206 2000 Murder Review Report, MPS020525001, p77, para 9.4, 06 October 2000.
207 Independent Police Complaints Commission, Statutory Guidance, 2015.
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ii. payments or other benefits or favours received in connection with the performance of
duties amounting to an offence for which the individual concerned, if convicted, would
be likely to receive a sentence of more than six months;
iii. abuse of authority;
iv. corrupt controller, handler or covert human intelligence source (CHIS) relationships;
v. provision of confidential information in return for payment or other benefits or favours

where the conduct goes beyond a possible prosecution for an offence under S55 of
the Data Protection Act 1998;
vi. extraction and supply of seized controlled drugs, firearms or other material; or
vii. attempts or conspiracies to do any of the above.’208
265. The Metropolitan Police version of the above text, ‘Incidents and offences that meet
the definition of serious corruption set down by the IPCC [Independent Police Complaints
Commission]’, included the addition of the following offences:
i. ‘Information leakage to criminals’;
ii. ‘Information leakage to the media’;
iii. ‘Misuse of authority for sexual advantage (excluding those from searches)’;
iv. ‘Theft’;
v. ‘Fraud (significant financial gain £1000+); and’
vi. ‘Involvement in production, supply or distribution of controlled drugs.’209
266. The definition of serious corruption was used by the Independent Police Complaints
Commission in determining which instances of corrupt conduct by police officers were
sufficiently serious to merit being investigated by the Commission, rather than through
the internal police disciplinary process. As it was a definition of ‘serious corruption’, it did
not purport to cover all corrupt conduct.
267. The adoption of the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s definition of serious
corruption as the basis for the Metropolitan Police’s working definition of corruption, with a
brief list of other criminal offences added by the Metropolitan Police, begged the question as
to how the Metropolitan Police regard other examples of corrupt conduct that do not meet the
threshold of serious corruption, such as fraud where the financial gain is less than £1,000. The
Panel asked the Metropolitan Police about this. They replied that ‘it is difficult to conceive of
corruption that is not serious’.210 This response does not go to the matter at issue. The Panel
agrees that corruption is always ‘serious’, but there are different levels of seriousness. The
Independent Police Complaints Commission definition, and by extension the Metropolitan
Police’s working definition of corruption, only concerned offences serious enough to be
investigated by the Independent Police Complaints Commission.
208 Independent Police Complaints Commission, Statutory Guidance, 2015, p45, para 8.13.
209 Response by D/Supt Neil Hutchinson, ‘AC Professionalism Public Inquiry Team Briefing Note: Summary of questions and responses to the
Daniel Morgan Independent Panel on 12 May 2015’, p3, 30 June 2015.
210 Letter from the Metropolitan Police to the Panel’s solicitors, Fieldfisher, p2,21 March 2018.
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268. The Metropolitan Police responses on the definition of corruption have not referred to
the Code of Ethics issued by the College of Policing in July 2014.211 The Code has a statutory
basis212 and as such applies to all police forces in England and Wales.213 It sets out principles
and standards of professional behaviour for the policing profession in England and Wales;
among the principles are honesty, integrity, accountability and openness, all of which are
relevant to an analysis of corruption.
269. The Metropolitan Police response to the Panel in June 2019 also stated that, in practice,
the Directorate of Professional Standards investigates an officer or member of police staff for a
specific criminal offence such as bribery, perverting the course of justice or misconduct in public
office, rather than for ‘corruption’, since ‘corruption’ is not a criminal offence.214 This ignores
the fact that section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 had already been brought
into force in April 2015, introducing the offence of ‘corrupt or other improper exercise of police
powers and privileges’.215 This important change in the legislation relating to corruption was not
mentioned by the Metropolitan Police in its initial response to the Panel, nor in their subsequent
responses to repeated requests on this subject. However, the Panel accepts that all the possible
offences in the Daniel Morgan murder investigation were committed before 2015.
270. In April 2017, a supplementary Operational Advice Note by the Independent Police
Complaints Commission was issued, including material about the change in legislation.216
In February 2020, the Independent Office for Police Conduct issued revised statutory guidance
on the police complaints system, including a revised definition of ‘serious corruption’.217
271. The guidance issued by the Independent Office for Police Conduct in February 2020
includes, after the definition of ‘serious corruption’, a definition of ‘abuse of position’ as:
‘any attempt by a person serving with the police, whether on or off-duty, to

inappropriately or illegitimately take advantage of:
i. their position as a person serving with the police
ii. the authority their position as a person serving with the police affords them, or
iii. any powers conferred on them by virtue of their position as a person serving with
the police.’218
272. In 2019, the Metropolitan Police explained to the Panel that, for the purposes of the
Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) and Metropolitan Police Service joint anti-fraud,
bribery and corruption strategy, corruption is defined as:
‘the offering, promising, giving, requesting, receiving or agreeing to accept an

inducement or reward (i.e. a bribe), which may influence a person to act against
211 College of Policing, Code of Ethics, July 2014. This was the first Code issued by the College of Policing, which was established in 2012.
212 As a code of practice issued under section 39A of the Police Act 1996 (as amended by s124 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and
Policing Act 2014). College of Policing, Code of Ethics, p1, para 1.2.1, July 2014.
213 College of Policing, Code of Ethics, p1, para 1.2.2, July 2014.
215 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s26.
216 Independent Police Complaints Commission, Operational advice note, April 2017.
217 Independent Office for Police Conduct, Statutory Guidance on the police complaints system, February 2020, p57, para 9.15.
218 Independent Office for Police Conduct, Statutory Guidance on the police complaints system. February 2020, p57, para 9.17.
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the interests of MOPAC/MPS [Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime/Metropolitan

Police Service].’219
273. The key issue is not that the person is acting against the interests of the Mayor’s
Office for Policing and Crime and/or the Metropolitan Police, but more importantly
that they would be acting contrary to the public interest and to the professional
integrity required of every police officer. The public interest and professional integrity
of the police should be at the heart of any anti-corruption strategy adopted by the
police and explicitly referenced as such. This definition of corruption is not sufficiently
comprehensive.
274. The changes made in 2020 to the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s 2015
definition by the Independent Office for Police Conduct are of relevance to the Panel’s work
and include:
i. reference to the new offence of ‘corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers
and privileges’ introduced by section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015;
ii. the addition to the text of the ‘abuse of position for a sexual purpose or for the purpose
of pursuing an improper emotional relationship’, reflecting the work carried out by the
Independent Police Complaints Commission and the Independent Office for Police
Complaints on complaints about this kind of police conduct;
iii. a new formulation about the ‘provision of confidential information in return for payment
or other benefits or favours’ with a reference to the legislation on data protection
enacted since the previous definition of serious corruption by the Independent Police
Complaints Commission;220
iv. the amendment of ‘abuse of authority’ to ‘any other abuse of position’; and
v. the extension of the provision of ‘attempts or conspiracies to do any of the above’ so

that the definition now applies to ‘attempts, conspiracies, incitements, assistance or
encouragement to do any of the above’.221
275. These changes broaden the behaviours encompassed in the definition used in the 2015
guidance issued by the Independent Police Complaints Commission. However, the 2020
guidance by the Independent Office for Police Conduct does not explicitly list ‘Information
leakage to criminals’ and ‘Information leakage to the media’. These examples of criminal acts
were added by the Metropolitan Police to the definition of ‘serious corruption’ which fell within
the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s guidance issued in 2015 for the purposes of
the Metropolitan Police’s working definition of serious corruption.
220 Data Protection Act 2018, s170.
221 Independent Office for Police Conduct, ‘Statutory guidance on the police complaints system’, p55, February 2020, see
https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/statutoryguidance/2020_statutory_guidance_english.pdf.
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276. In May 2020, in response to the Panel’s question, the Metropolitan Police confirmed that
it was now using the statutory guidance issued by the Independent Office for Police Conduct
in conjunction with guidance prepared by its Directorate of Professional Standards and
issued in 2020.
277. There is risk attached to the Metropolitan Police using a restrictive definition of
corruption that concerns only ‘serious corruption’. Less serious corrupt behaviour may
not be considered ‘corruption’ and might be dealt with lightly or overlooked, with the risk
of promoting a culture of tolerance of low-level corruption and an expectation of impunity
that could encourage some individual police officers to go further and become involved in
serious corruption.
278. Example B below illustrates one of the offences added by the Metropolitan Police to the
Independent Police Complaints Commission’s definition of serious corruption: information
leakage to the media.
Example B
279. By the early 1990s, News International had become a major client of Southern
Investigations. The documentation indicates that income came from ‘investigating
stories and supplying stories’. The intelligence examined by the Panel concerning former
police officers associated with former DS Sidney Fillery, Jonathan Rees and Southern
Investigations (later Law & Commercial) includes evidence of behaviour resulting in
criminal convictions, dismissals and resignations. One police officer was dismissed from
the Metropolitan Police for failure to meet standards of honesty and integrity, having
been charged with selling copies of The Police Gazette (a confidential police document
circulated nationally that contained details of wanted criminals and serious crimes) to
Jonathan Rees and with disclosing to the press via Jonathan Rees the time and place of
an identification parade involving a major crime figure.
280. The final sentence of the anti-corruption unit’s definition broadens it to include police
personnel acting corruptly out of a desire to get results. This is illustrated by Example C below.
Example C
281. During the Abelard Two Investigation, DCS David Cook had repeated contact with
Gary Eaton, despite his awareness and warnings from DAC John Yates that this was in
breach of the requirement that there can be no direct contact between the investigation
and the witness who is being debriefed. Mr Justice Maddison decided to exclude the
evidence of this witness, because there had been repeated breaches, because he was
satisfied that there was improper prompting of the witness and because of the mental
health of the witness.
282. Both offences (leakage of police information to criminals and leakage of police information
to the media) added to the definition of ‘serious corruption’ by the Metropolitan Police in its
2015 guidance are no longer explicitly highlighted in the 2020 Metropolitan Police guidance.
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However, it is very likely that such acts would now fall within the scope of the police corruption
offence introduced by section 26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. Both acts are of
relevance in the context of the investigations into the murder of Daniel Morgan.
283. Examples D and E below illustrate the leakage of police information to people suspected
of criminal offences.
Example D
284. On 02 April 1987, the day before the planned arrests of three police officers
and of three other individuals for the murder of Daniel Morgan, there was a leak of
this information via a tip to the news desk of the Daily Mirror. One of the newspaper’s
journalists had attempted to verify the information by contacting D/Supt Douglas
Campbell. Unable to reach him, she had contacted Southern Investigations and ‘may
well have warned REES of the operation’.
Example E
285. During Operation Abelard Two, the Senior Investigating Officer, former DCS David
Cook, leaked information about two separate impending arrests to Michael Sullivan,
a writer and journalist. Former DCS Cook also disclosed a large amount of police
information, including sensitive and personal data, to journalists and others outside the
police. He has stated that his behaviour was motivated by a keen desire to reveal what
he believed to be the truth about the murder of Daniel Morgan and its investigation.
The sharing of information was also motivated, at least in part, by the expectation of
profits from publishing the book he was writing with Michael Sullivan about police
investigations, including the investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan. Michael
Sullivan appears to have kept confidential the materials provided to him by his co-
author. Other information leaked by former DCS Cook was used in the BBC Panorama
programme (see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation).
286. In December 2020, the Metropolitan Police advised the Panel that it uses different
definitions of corruption depending on the circumstances. However, they have failed to
explain what the different definitions are or what the different circumstances might be.
6.3 Tackling corruption in practice

287. The following examples, taken from the earliest and the most recent investigations of the
murder of Daniel Morgan, serve to illustrate what the Panel means by institutional corruption.
288. The documentation shows that the Morgan One Investigation had already been
compromised by serious mistakes and incompetence. Example F below illustrates both this and
the failure by senior management to confront corruption promptly.
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Example F
289. Senior managers were alerted to concerns about corruption in the Morgan
One Investigation by D/Supt Douglas Campbell’s requests to his superiors for the
investigation to be transferred to another unit and later for a review of the investigation.
Senior officers refused the first request and appointed DCS Douglas Shrubsole,
D/Supt Campbell’s line manager, to conduct what turned out to be a brief review
resulting in a positive assessment of the investigation that was not warranted by the
available information or by the limitations of the review (see Chapter 1, The Morgan
One Investigation).The documentation shows that the investigation had already been
compromised, including through loss of evidence and forensic failures, causing
irretrievable damage to the prospect of successfully bringing those responsible for the
murder to justice. Senior management was responsible for lack of effective oversight of
the first investigation and failure to act promptly to confront corruption.
290. Example G below shows a senior police officer seeking to cover up any possibility of
police involvement in the murder of Daniel Morgan.
Example G
291. On 02 February 1989, DCS Alan Wheeler had spoken privately with Paul
Goodridge, who was in custody and was charged with the murder of Daniel Morgan.
He was fearful of reprisals for giving information to the police. Paul Goodridge alluded
to the involvement of Metropolitan Police officers in the murder. DCS Wheeler spoke
of his concerns about these allegations with his own senior management in Hampshire
Constabulary, with Roland Moyle, Deputy Chair of the Police Complaints Authority, and
with senior management in the Metropolitan Police. Following further developments,
Paul Goodridge, who was then remanded in custody, was visited by police officers
ostensibly to gain his consent for access to his medical records. Further to a phone call
from the Crown Prosecution Service telling DCS Wheeler of the police officers’ visit to
see Paul Goodridge, DCS Wheeler advised that his officers had not been to the prison.
Paul Goodridge subsequently refused to engage further with DCS Wheeler.
The Panel concludes that the unknown visitors to Paul Goodridge were in all probability
Metropolitan Police officers. DCS Wheeler did not inform anyone of the calls or refer
to them in his reports to the Crown Prosecution Service or to the Police Complaints
Authority. He did not mention them in the statement he made in connection with the later
civil proceedings. Given his Terms of Reference, it is astonishing that he did not take this
opportunity to establish the identity of police officers who may have been involved in
an attempt to prevent someone who said he had knowledge of police involvement from
talking to him. This points strongly to an intention on the part of DCS Wheeler to cover
up the possibility of police involvement in the murder of Daniel Morgan (see Chapter 3,
The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation).
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292. Example H below illustrates institutional corruption involving multiple organisations.
Example H
293. DCS Alan Wheeler failed to fulfil the Terms of Reference of the Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority Investigation ‘to investigate allegations that police were involved in
the murder of Daniel Morgan and any matters arising therefrom’, despite reports from his
officers indicating multiple problems with the first investigation, including indications of
corruption during the Morgan One Investigation, and despite allegations received at the
end of his investigation about police involvement in the murder, which were not followed
up properly (see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation).
The Morgan One Investigation was compromised by serious failures, incompetence and
the role of DS Sidney Fillery in the investigation. DCS Alan Wheeler’s final report on the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation omitted a number of important
issues which should have been included. The Police Complaints Authority accepted the
report, despite being aware of the omissions, stating that ‘[a]ll matters raised have been
investigated thoroughly’. A letter from the Police Complaints Authority to Alastair Morgan
stated that the Morgan One and Hampshire Constabulary investigations had ‘produced
no evidence of police involvement in your brother’s murder’. This was taken as a finding
that there was no police corruption involved in the murder. That inaccurate message was
repeated for many years.
Three organisations – Hampshire Constabulary, the Metropolitan Police and the Police
Complaints Authority – accepted the omissions and inaccuracies in DCS Wheeler’s
final report, despite their awareness to the contrary. The three organisations failed to
ensure that the allegations of corruption received at the end of the Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority Investigation were followed up properly, even though DCS Wheeler
had brought this matter to their attention. Their acceptance of his final report and their
failure to act cannot reasonably be explained as coincidence or as genuine error.
DCS Wheeler’s final report and Roland Moyle’s conclusions about the thoroughness of
the first two investigations were used for many years to protect the reputation of the
Metropolitan Police, as well as the reputation of the Hampshire Constabulary and of the
Police Complaints Authority.
These cumulative failures amount to institutional corruption on the part of all three
organisations.
294. The inaccurate positive assessment of the Morgan One and Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority investigations also formed the basis for unjustified assurances which were repeated
over the years by the Metropolitan Police. Examples of this are set out in various parts of this
Report (see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation, paragraphs
496, 505 and 507; and Chapter 12, The Treatment of the Family paragraphs 90 and 233 for
some of the examples). Other officials at senior levels reiterated the assurances based on
briefings they received from the police. Some of the repetition may have been due to uncritical
1071
reliance on what had been said in the past by senior police officers and reaffirmed over many
years. The documentation shows that the conflict between public assurances and internal
suspicions of corruption remained unresolved for decades.
295. The most recent failure to tackle corruption relates to the investigations into the alleged
conduct of former DCS David Cook during and after Operation Abelard Two.
296. Some of these allegations were investigated under Operation Megan and Operation
Megan Two. Among the allegations, it was asserted that:
i. Gary Eaton was prompted and/or coached by the Operation Abelard Two Investigation
team, particularly by DCS David Cook, and was tipped off by the Operation Abelard
Two Investigation team that Defence lawyers had discovered that Gary Eaton had lied
about his father being dead;
ii. former DCS Cook lied in court when giving evidence during bail applications (it is
noted that DCS Cook did not in fact give evidence during the bail application);
iii. the procedures for the debriefing of Assisting Offenders who were willing to
give evidence under the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 were not
complied with; and
iv. the Operation Abelard Two Investigation team were aware of, but failed to disclose to
the Defence, relevant material.
297. The details of these allegations and the account of these investigations are to be found
in Chapter 9.
298. The allegations investigated in Operations Megan and Megan Two were very serious.
The evidence in respect of some of those allegations did not meet the threshold for criminal
prosecution but, in respect of some of those allegations, would have met the threshold for
disciplinary proceedings to determine whether there had been gross misconduct. However,
since former DCS David Cook had retired from the Metropolitan Police in 2007, and then from
the Serious Organised Crime Agency in 2013, there could be no disciplinary proceedings.
299. Despite the fact that neither criminal nor disciplinary proceedings were brought against
former DCS David Cook at any stage (and as explained previously, no disciplinary proceedings
could be brought following the retirement of a police officer), his behaviour was corrupt, as
was ultimately recognised by all three judges sitting in the Court of Appeal in 2018, hearing
the appeal by Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian and Garry Vian against the findings of Mr Justice
Mitting. Exemplary damages were awarded to the three appellants, to ‘highlight and condemn
the egregious and shameful behaviour of a senior and experienced officer DCS COOK’.222 The
claimants also received payment of their costs.
300. The investigations of former DCS David Cook’s conduct were very protracted, starting in
2011 and finishing in 2020. The Metropolitan Police wanted the Independent Police Complaints
Commission to carry out the investigation of Jonathan Rees’s complaints. The Commission
was not obliged to investigate such complaints and had the right to refer them back to the
Metropolitan Police. On 14 June 2013, the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints
Commission, Deborah Glass, wrote to Commander Allan Gibson declining to investigate
Jonathan Rees’s complaints and the comments made by Mr Justice Maddison in 2011, saying
1072
that ‘[w]hile the IPCC [Independent Police Complaints Commission] does investigate a small
number of corruption cases you are aware that we are not currently resourced to carry out many
or large corruption enquiries’. 223
301. On 25 October 2013, DCI Fiona McCormack was appointed as the Senior Investigating
Officer to conduct an investigation into part of these matters224 but was unable to secure
the resources necessary to conduct the investigation until January 2014.225 Finally, while the
Metropolitan Police searched former DCS David Cook’s home in November 2014, and found
evidence of significant wrongdoing, even the partial investigation of the matter, which became
known as Operation Edison, did not conclude until April 2020, in part because of the limited
staff resources.
302. Ultimately, the investigation of the various matters was shared between the Metropolitan
Police and the Independent Police Complaints Commission as indicated above (see also
Chapter 9, Post-Abelard Two). However:
i. Jonathan Rees’s complaints, initially made in 2012, were not finalised by the
production of a statement of complaint until 2014;226
ii. the Independent Police Complaints Commission initially declined on 03 July 2012
to investigate Jonathan Rees’s BBC Panorama complaint and the allegations about
coaching witness Gary Eaton;227
iii. some 15 months later, on 25 October 2013, it was decided that the Metropolitan
Police would investigate the matters referred to in (ii) above.228 Resources were not
made available to enable the investigation to commence until January 2014; and
iv. it transpired that there were links between Operation Longhorn (unauthorised
disclosure to Michael Sullivan) and the BBC Panorama investigation. On
08 January 2015, it was agreed that the investigation into the Panorama leakage would
be conducted wholly by the Independent Police Complaints Commission.229
303. The searches of former DCS David Cook’s home in 2014 resulted in the recovery of
massive amounts of material. Before any investigation of possible criminal offences could occur,
the material had to be examined and classified, and personal material belonging to former DCS
Cook and legally privileged material had to be removed, and it had to be assessed for security
purposes. Lack of resources meant that the material was made available to the Metropolitan
Police investigators, and to the Panel by the Metropolitan Police between 2017 and October
2019. This matter was investigated by the Metropolitan Police under the title Operation Edison
(see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation; and Chapter 9, Post-Abelard Two).
304. During Operation Abelard Two and in the Post-Abelard Two period, multiple serious
failures and wrongdoing became evident: the failure to manage the investigation properly,
the failure to disclose evidence to the Defence, the failure to abide by the procedural
requirements regarding protected witnesses, the disclosure of large amounts of police
information to third parties and the probable prompting of a witness.
225 Decision 49 and Decision 50, SIO Decision Log, MPS109903001, pp3-5, 26 November 2013.
226 Witness statement of Jonathan Rees, MPS109704001, pp40-64, 13 June 2014.
228 Decision 42, SIO Decision log, MPS109902001, p49, 14 October 2013.
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305. The Panel recognises that a great deal of positive work was accomplished by
members of the Abelard Two Investigation team. However, the failures identified had
significant consequences, including the following:
i. Possible risk to the lives and safety of individuals who might be identified as a
consequence of the unauthorised disclosures.
ii. Possible risk to those to whom information was disclosed as a consequence of

their having possession of the material.
iii. Suspects being wrongly remanded in custody for lengthy periods of time
awaiting trial, and the awards of damages and costs to those remanded in
custody because a judge was not provided with all the relevant information.
iv. Potential compromise of future criminal investigations and consequential

prosecutions.
v. Breaches of data protection legislation affecting many individuals who may not
have known that their personal details had been disclosed to third parties.
vi. Potential further criminality resulting from use of the information disclosed.
vii. Distress to the families of victims of crime, including the family of Daniel Morgan.
viii. The cost of the ongoing investigations and the cost of investigations such as
those which have occurred since 2011 in establishing what had happened and
the consequences of what had happened.
ix. Damage to the reputation of policing generally and specifically of the

organisations which employed former DCS David Cook and whose investigation
materials he unlawfully retained, particularly the Metropolitan Police and the
National Crime Agency (which succeeded the Serious Organised Crime Agency).
x. Consequential mistrust in the future conduct of policing and of the operation of

the Rule of Law.
306. After reviewing the Operation Edison file, the Crown Prosecution Service provided
investigatory advice to the Metropolitan Police in April 2020, who subsequently decided not to
proceed further with the investigation into former DCS David Cook.
307. The Metropolitan Police and the Independent Police Complaints Commission were
reluctant to investigate the allegations against former DCS David Cook, in part because
of serious deficiencies in the way in which anti-corruption investigations are resourced.
As a result, the investigations were not conducted in a timely and effective manner.
Former DCS Cook was under investigation for eight years. It is essential that such
investigations can be conducted in a timely manner so that justice is done. Only then will
the police communicate to officers that alleged corrupt activities will be properly and
robustly dealt with.
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RECOMMENDATION
308. The Metropolitan Police must ensure that the necessary resources are allocated
to the task of tackling corrupt behaviour among its officers. Without proper resources
there can be no effective fight against corruption. Since the Independent Office for
Police Conduct has responsibility for investigating such matters, it must also be properly
resourced to do so.
309. Former DCS David Cook was able to operate outside many of the laws, policies
and procedures which govern policing, without being called to account. The Panel has
not been advised of any systematic attempt to identify the procedural weaknesses which
facilitated his ability to remove from police custody such vast amounts of sensitive police
material, and the onward dissemination of much of it. The Panel can see no reason why
the same situation could not arise today.
7 Corruption in the linkages between police officers, private

investigators and the media
7.1 Introduction
310. The connections between Southern Investigations, former police officers working as
private investigators, serving police officers and representatives of the media, were part of the
landscape of Daniel Morgan’s working life.
311. One theory as to why Daniel Morgan was murdered was to prevent him revealing evidence
of police corruption. Evidence was received during the first investigation supporting this theory.
312. Much later, in November 2006, in evidence to the Abelard Two Investigation, a friend of
Daniel Morgan reported that Daniel Morgan had told him that he had found out some ‘damning
evidence’ about Metropolitan Police officers. The friend said that Daniel Morgan had not
disclosed the content of that evidence but had described it as ‘so serious that he could not go
to the Met police’ and that he had ‘made contact with another force to tell them about it’. Daniel
Morgan’s friend could not remember which force Daniel Morgan had contacted but thought that
it was perhaps the West Midlands Police. He said he believed that Daniel Morgan had arranged
to see officers from the other force the week that he was murdered.230 In fact, an officer from
the West Yorkshire Police had arrived at the Southern Investigations offices to speak to Daniel
Morgan the day after he was murdered (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
313. The Panel has made clear that it has found no convincing evidence as to by whom
or for what reason Daniel Morgan was murdered. Information which emerged long
after the event lends plausibility to a possible motive not fully pursued by the murder
230 Message M328 Abelard Two Investigation, MPS073227001, pp1-2, 14 November 2006.
1075
investigations: namely, that Daniel Morgan’s immediate professional circle included

corrupt police officers and non-police associates, some of whom considered Daniel
Morgan to be a threat to their corrupt interests.
314. A number of former and current police officers working in South London during the
1980s and 1990s had links with Southern Investigation and former DS Sidney Fillery.
315. In 2006, when Operation Abelard Two was initiated, the Metropolitan Police examined
historical intelligence concerning 19 former police officers associated with former DS Sidney
Fillery, Jonathan Rees and Southern Investigations/Law & Commercial. Ten of the police officers
had been convicted and imprisoned for criminal offences; their offences ranged from false
imprisonment, perverting the course of justice and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice,
drugs offences, accepting a bribe, obtaining property by deception, supplying drugs, accepting
bribes for confidential information and theft of files, fraud related to computer misuse, and
bribing an officer to destroy case files.
316. As well as the ten convicted and imprisoned officers, one officer had resigned while under
investigation, one had been dismissed from the Metropolitan Police for failure to meet standards
of honesty and integrity, and one had been demoted but later reinstated before retirement on
a full pension. Two police officers were acquitted (one of inciting a police officer to commit
a corrupt act, namely providing access to the Police National Computer, and the other of
misconduct in public office). The remaining four were not charged or convicted of offences.
317. The historical intelligence examined does not reflect a ‘rotten apple’ model of
corruption. It is indicative of systemic failings, including the existence of a corrupt culture.
318. The investigations did not fully consider whether or not the motive for the murder
was to prevent Daniel Morgan exposing local police corruption (occurring in the South
East London area) of which he was aware during the course of his work and through
his immediate contacts There is an uncomfortable disjunction: over time it has become
increasingly unlikely that evidence can be found to bring those responsible for the murder
to justice, and the Metropolitan Police have conceded ever more readily and publicly
that police corruption compromised the initial investigations. They have done so without
spelling out precisely what that corruption comprised.
7.2 Corrupt links and illegal activities at Southern Investigations/Law

& Commercial
319. Several of the former police officers who figure in the investigation chapters of this Report
established or joined private detective agencies upon retirement from the police. DS Sidney
Fillery of the Catford Crime Squad retired on medical grounds from the Metropolitan Police in
1988 and became Daniel Morgan’s successor, joining Jonathan Rees at Southern Investigations
in June 1989, as predicted in Kevin Lennon’s testimony in 1987 (see Chapter 1, The Morgan
One Investigation).
320. In 1989, PC Timothy Gratton-Kane told the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority

Investigation that DS Sidney Fillery and other Catford police officers had carried out work
involving use of police resources for Southern Investigations231. There is no evidence that this
information was reported to the Metropolitan Police, nor was it properly investigated by the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation, to determine whether there was any
231 Report by Dennis Stephens, MPS023075001, pp1-2, 12 September 1988.
1076
information which might assist police in identifying Daniel Morgan’s murderer(s). The information
would have been reported and investigated had that investigation been exploring seriously the
network of corrupt and corrupting relationships involving Southern Investigations.
321. The Morgan One Investigation into Daniel Morgan’s murder had found some evidence of
links between Southern Investigations and individual journalists (see Chapter 1, The Morgan
One Investigation). At the time insufficient documentation was gathered to indicate whether
work generated by newspapers formed a significant proportion of the company’s income prior
to Daniel Morgan’s murder.
322. After Daniel Morgan’s murder, former DS Sidney Fillery replaced Daniel Morgan as
Jonathan Rees’s business partner. There is evidence that a substantial proportion of their
business income thereafter involved payment by newspapers for confidential information,
some of which had been provided by police officers. During their successive attempts to solve
the murder of Daniel Morgan, the Metropolitan Police discovered evidence that Southern
Investigations (later Law & Commercial) sold the media a variety of confidential data obtained
illegally (see Chapter 4, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges).
323. The Panel’s Terms of Reference refer specifically to ‘the incidence of connections between
private investigators, police officers and journalists at the News of the World and other parts of
the media and alleged corruption involved in the linkages between them’.232
324. There is no evidence to establish exactly when Southern Investigations started to work
with the News of the World. The records of Southern Investigations’ activities in 1986 and 1987
are inadequate; the first available invoice was for £1,305.25 in October 1988.233
325. Ian Paye, the bookkeeper for Southern Investigations from around 1989 or 1990, stated
in May 2000 that by 1989/1990, ‘over 50% of their income was from News International,
investigating stories and supplying stories’.234
326. If, as Ian Paye stated, over half of the firm’s income came from News International by the
time that he took up his post, this volume would have taken time to develop. The absence of
proper record-keeping at Southern Investigations prevents analysis of whether these links were
already developing in 1987. The bookkeeper who was employed by Southern Investigations
after the murder of Daniel Morgan told the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation about the
firm’s work during the period from April 1987 to 1989. The bookkeeper stated that ‘[d]uring the
time I worked at Southern Investigations, the News of the World was their main client, being
invoiced up to 500 times a month’.235 The bookkeeper also stated that ‘Southern Investigations
had very good contacts with an Editor at the News of The World’ and that she had heard in the
office that the firm had paid the Editor’s credit card bill which amounted to ‘between £5,000
and £7,000’ and his child’s school fees.236 When the police showed her a list of five names, she
immediately recognised the name of Alex Marunchak, and stated ‘I am sure that this is the name
of the News of the World Editor concerned’. In 2020, Alex Marunchak denied that any such
payments were made.

233 ‘Financial Profile Southern Investigations’, MPS008128001, p23, 27 September 2002.
234 Witness statement of Ian Paye, MPS061694001, p3, 04 May 2000.
235 Witness statement of a bookkeeper at Southern Investigations, MPS060405001, pp1-2, 08 August 2002.
236 Witness statement of the bookkeeper at Southern Investigations, MPS060405001, p2, 08 August 2002.
1077
327. Alex Marunchak of the News of the World denied having known or worked with Daniel
Morgan before Daniel Morgan’s murder.237 He was later suspected, with former DS Sidney
Fillery, of arranging surveillance on DCS David Cook, the Senior Investigating officer of the overt
side of the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation.
328. John Peacock, who was casually employed as a process server at Southern Investigations
at the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder, was asked by the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation
about work done on behalf of the News of the World. He stated that:
‘I can recall that at some time and I can only say about the time of the murder, REES
had indicated to me that there was going to be some work done with the News of
the World. He never told me what it was about or who it involved and as far as I know
I have never done any work associated to the News of the World to my knowledge.’238
329. It is not possible to establish definitively when Southern Investigations began to do work
for the News of the World.
330. Southern Investigations/Law & Commercial was the subject of intelligence-gathering

during the 1990s (Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges) as the result of suspicions that it was the hub
of corrupt linkages involving police officers and the media.
331. Former D/Supt Robert Quick’s statement to the Leveson Inquiry gave insights into the
intelligence which led to the establishment of Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges:
‘The Anti-Corruption Command was established in response to significant intelligence

indicating serious corruption was being perpetrated by a minority of officers. This
included officers passing to criminals, information and intelligence held on them by
the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] in return for payment or other benefits; corrupt
relationships between police officers and police informants where police officers were
complicit in plans to commit crimes and share insurance reward monies; the sale of
information from police computers to criminals; the sabotaging of evidence; and the
unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information to journalists for payment. These were
some of the main strategic threats identified through a long term covert operation
named Operation “Othona” which ran between 1993 — 1998.’239
332. The Metropolitan Police produced a number of charts showing the wider links among
individuals in Law & Commercial, police officers suspected or convicted of corruption, and
journalists.
333. The historic intelligence relating to Southern Investigations (later Law & Commercial) was
summarised in a Metropolitan Police report as follows:
‘Both FILLERY and REECE [sic] have been subjects of interest to CIB for a considerable
period of time. Long term and wide ranging intelligence shows them to be deeply
involved in corruption, using a network of serving and retired police officers to access
sensitive intelligence for the purpose of progressing crime, frustrating the course of
justice, and selling sensitive information to the press.’240
237 Witness statement of Alex Marunchak, MPS079262001, p1 13 October 2009.

238 Witness statement of John Peacock, MPS062398001, pp9-10, 27 September 2002.
239 Witness statement of former D/Supt Robert Quick to the Leveson Inquiry, pp1-2, 13 February 2012.
240 Application for renewal of surveillance approval, MPS099739001, p69, 08 December 1998.
1078
334. Intelligence gathered in 1999 included the following:
i. Jonathan Rees was recorded describing the commissioning of illegal Police National
Computer checks from serving police officers for payment. Jonathan Rees gave the
nickname of an officer who had been a member of the Catford Crime Squad at the
time of Daniel Morgan’s murder.241
Jonathan Rees claimed he had been told by his contact that his (Jonathan Rees’s)
name was included on the Police National Computer in connection with an allegation
of drugs offences. He gave a nickname for the officer he said had entered his name on
the system and said that he had confronted him about this and had said to him ‘why
did you fucking do that to me […] I’ve helped you out, all the times.’242
Attempts were made by the Complaints Investigation Bureau Intelligence Cell (CIBIC)
on 13 August 1999 to identify the officer. A potential link was made to a former police
officer with a similar sounding name, however no firm positive identification was
actually made as to the officer to whom Jonathan Rees had referred.243
ii. Jonathan Rees had obtained copies of a Special Branch Intelligence Bulletin, copies
of The Police Gazette (a confidential and internal police publication) and details of
police operations – all of which were then sold on to journalists and used as the
source of articles. The Police Gazette was allegedly obtained through a Metropolitan
Police officer (PC Thomas Kingston) suspended at the time on a matter involving the
unauthorised disclosure of information from the Police National Computer, for which
he was subsequently dismissed.244
Investigation showed that PC Thomas Kingston had been provided with copies
of The Police Gazette by PC Paul Valentine, a serving officer and a member of the
Special Escort Group, which was predominantly responsible for ‘the escort of royalty,
diplomats, visiting heads of states, high risk prisoners and high security loads’.245
iii. Jonathan Rees was recorded discussing the contents of various issues of The Police
Gazette with a journalist, Douglas Kempster of the Sunday Mirror, on a number of
occasions, including one instance in which it appears that Douglas Kempster’s Editor
had lost a copy of The Police Gazette due for return to the police.246
335. Listening-device evidence had also revealed that Jonathan Rees had been commissioned
by a man called Simon James to help him obtain custody of his child. Jonathan Rees with
others arranged for Class A drugs to be placed in the car belonging to Simon James’s
estranged wife, and for DC Austin Warnes to arrange for the police to ‘discover’ the drugs. The
police duly arrested Simon James’s wife. She was later released.247
241 Record of interview (listening device transcript), MPS099531001, p645, 05 August 1999.
242 Record of interview (listening device transcript), MPS099531001, p645, 05 August 1999.
243 Action 00592, MPS099304001, p187, raised on 12 August 1999 and completed on 15 June 2000.
244 ‘Advice File re Valentine, Kempster, Kingston, & Rees, MPS099594001, pp4-5, 11 February 2000.
245 ‘Advice File re Valentine, Kempster, Kingston, & Rees’, MPS099594001, p5, 11 February 2000.
246 ‘Advice File re Valentine, Kempster, Kingston, & Rees’, MPS099594001, p, 11 February 2000.
247 ‘Operation ‘Two Bridges Closing Report’, MPS099294001, pp19-23, 20 July 2001.
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336. Jonathan Rees, DC Austin Warnes and Simon James were convicted of conspiracy
to pervert the course of justice. James Cook was found not guilty of any criminal offences
(see Chapter 4, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges).248 These events, and the conviction and
imprisonment of Jonathan Rees and DC Warnes fuelled suspicions that police corruption had
been a factor in the murder of Daniel Morgan because it demonstrated that Jonathan Rees
acted corruptly with a police officer.
337. During the investigation of the conspiracy case referred to in the previous paragraph,
police officers searching the offices of Law & Commercial in relation to a separate matter had
found copies of The Police Gazette.
338. In February 2000, Metropolitan Police data249 revealed 273 instances in which journalists
were provided with confidential police information by Law & Commercial. Of this total of 273
illegal transactions, 216 (79 per cent) involved various journalists from the Mirror Group and the
remaining 21 per cent involved one journalist from the News of the World.
339. The 273 instances can be divided into two categories:
1. those in which there was evidence of an offence, although a further search – including
of journalists’ records – was required to retrieve additional evidence; and
2. those where there was insufficient evidence at present, and a search warrant would be
required to retrieve files.
Category 1 totalled 81 instances (30 per cent of instances) and category 2 totalled 192.
340. Of the 81 instances in which there was prima facie evidence of an offence, 75 instances
involved Mirror Group journalists; the names of 57 of those journalists were not recorded. The
six remaining instances involved the journalist Alex Marunchak of the News of the World.
341. An advice file was submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service in relation to Jonathan
Rees, PC Thomas Kingston, PC Paul Valentine and journalist Douglas Kempster. The evidence
consisted of audio-tape transcripts from the listening devices in Law & Commercial.250 A police
summary of listening-device evidence retrieved on 30 June 1999 contained the following
information about PC Valentine:
‘KEMPSTER [Douglas Kempster, journalist] visits Law & Commercial and REES tells
him that [a notorious criminal figure] is due to attend Kilburn Police Station next
Tuesday for an Identification Parade. REES says that he will be able to get the exact
time of the parade and the route that will be taken.
‘This information did not come from the gazettes and is believed to have come from
[PC Paul] VALENTINE, through [PC Thomas] KINGSTON, who was part of the escort.
KEMPSTER used this information to pen an article that was published in the Sunday
Mirror on 11/07/99.’251
248 ‘Operation ‘Two Bridges Closing Report’, MPS099294001, pp37-38 and p46, 20 July 2001.
249 Memorandum from a Detective Constable, MPS099704001, pp28-50, 10 February 2000.
250 ‘Summary of Evidence’, EDN001497001, undated.
251 ‘Advice File re Valentine, Kempster, Kingston, & Rees’, MPS099594001, p8, 11 February 2000.
1080
342. PC Thomas Kingston, PC Paul Valentine and the journalist, Douglas Kempster,
were arrested and questioned in respect of the supply of The Police Gazette; each made
‘No comment’ responses to questions put to them in interview.
343. A case conference was held on 20 June 2000, involving the Metropolitan Police, the
Crown Prosecution Service and Counsel, to discuss the Simon James conspiracy case and
the evidence in relation to Jonathan Rees, PC Thomas Kingston, PC Paul Valentine and the
journalist Douglas Kempster. The Crown Prosecution Service noted that:
‘the probe clearly showed Rees negotiating Police Gazette material not only to
Kempster but also to two other journalists employed by national newspapers, […] and
Alex Marunchak, who have not been the subject of investigation. On this basis it could
be said that Police have adopted a selective approach to this enquiry.’
344. In response, DCI Barry Nicholson said that this was solely due to ‘a lack of manpower
and resources for this aspect’. DCI Nicholson’s policy files/decision logs relating to Operation
Nigeria/Two Bridges refer to the reasons for the large number of offences still to be investigated:
‘1. Due to command being unable or unwilling to support current operation with
analytical.
2. Staff being seconded or transferred to CIBIC [Complaints Investigation Bureau

Intelligence Cell] or other ops are not being returned to assist Operation Two Bridges.
3. Delays would prejudice potential prosecutions.
4. Unable to produce charts, analytical work to support cases currently before courts.’
345. Ultimately, no criminal charges were brought. The Metropolitan Police did, however, bring
disciplinary proceedings against PC Paul Valentine, both in respect of The Police Gazette
issue and for providing other sensitive information to Law & Commercial. As a result of those
proceedings, PC Valentine was dismissed from the Metropolitan Police in September 2002.
346. Over 30 examples of information gathered by Law & Commercial from various financial
institutions were identified. Illegal banking checks were apparently conducted for Law
& Commercial by private investigators. The Metropolitan Police investigated two private
investigators, one of whom had admitted obtaining private telephone information for Law
& Commercial and the other had admitted obtaining private financial data by deception.252
Neither of them were prosecuted.
347. The listening device deployed within Law & Commercial by Operation Nigeria/Two
Bridges captured Jonathan Rees, talking about the legality of obtaining confidential information
and passing it on to the media, in conversation with a journalist from the Daily Mirror on
06 July 1999. Jonathan Rees is recorded as saying:
‘we are not going to put the numbers in there because what we are doing is illegal,
isn’t it, you know, I don’t want people coming in and nicking us for criminal offence,
you know.’253
252 Operation Two Bridges, MPS099672001, pp4-8, 18 August 2000.

253 Enhanced audio summary, MPS000862001, p3, 06 July 1999.
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348. Although this intelligence post-dated the murder, it is evidence of Jonathan Rees’s
involvement in corrupt practices, notably passing to the media confidential information obtained
from the police, despite being aware that it was illegal.
349. At this stage, Jonathan Rees and others had been charged with perverting the course
of justice in the conspiracy case and the Crown Prosecution Service advised in respect of
Jonathan Rees that he should not be charged with obtaining confidential material:
‘[A]lthough any public interest issues must be considered it may be that any
further prosecution would appear either vindictive or malicious on the part of the
prosecuting authority.’254
350. There was a wealth of evidence concerning multiple instances of unauthorised

individuals obtaining confidential information. There was no reason to consider charges
against Jonathan Rees as ‘vindictive or malicious’, as there was probable cause and
reasonable grounds for the charges. Although the Crown Prosecution Service said that
‘any public interest issues must be considered’, there was a failure to take into account
the deterrent effect of prosecuting these serious matters.
351. Notwithstanding the decision not to bring criminal charges, there was evidence
proving the source, route and the final use of confidential police material. This sheds
light on the corrupt use of connections between the police and private investigators (and
specifically by Jonathan Rees) and journalists.
352. In February 2012, former AC Robert Quick made a written statement to the Leveson
Inquiry into the culture, practice and ethics of the press. He stated that, during Operation
Nigeria/Two Bridges:
‘it became clear that, amongst other criminal activities, “Southern Investigations” was
acting as a “clearing house” for stories for certain newspapers. Many of these stories
were being leaked by police officers who were already suspected of corruption or by
unknown officers connected to officers suspected of corruption, who were found to
have a relationship with “Southern Investigations”.’255
353. He also referred to journalists identified as having direct relationships with Southern
Investigations and recollected that The Sun and the News of the World were among the
newspapers involved. According to former AC Robert Quick, during Operation Nigeria/Two
Bridges it became clear that officers were being paid ‘sums of between £500 and £2000 for
stories about celebrities, politicians, and the Royal Family, as well as police investigations’.256
254 ‘Summary of evidence against William Jonathan Rees’, MPS049760001, p5, undated.
255 Statement of Robert Quick, The Leveson Inquiry, EDN001938001, p4, 13 February 2012.
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354. Former D/Supt (later AC) Robert Quick, who had been involved at a senior level in
Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges, referred to the disappearance from Metropolitan Police records,
including the archives, of his own short report written in 2000 on ‘the role of journalists in
promoting corrupt relationships with, and making corrupt payments to, officers for stories about
famous people and high profile investigations in the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service]’.257
In it he had recommended an investigation into such activities. He had submitted his report to
Commander Andrew Hayman of the Professional Standards Department at the time.258
355. Commander Andrew Hayman reportedly had reservations based on potential procedural
and legal difficulties pertaining to journalistic material. Former D/Supt Robert Quick did not
believe that the journalists would be entitled to use that legal protection in the circumstances in
which these stories were being obtained. He stated to the Leveson Inquiry that he did not know
whether the matter was referred further up the command chain or what action was taken.259
356. The Metropolitan Police were not able to provide a copy of former D/Supt Robert Quick’s
report to the Panel. The Panel has seen a report produced by a Detective Sergeant after
suspects, including Jonathan Rees, his client Simon James and DC Austin Warnes, were
arrested in August 2000 in connection with a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, which
expressed concerns that the press was being used to disrupt and compromise the prosecutions
of former officers awaiting trial and those already convicted. There were allegations that
Jonathan Rees was engaged in a campaign to discredit the Anti-Corruption Squad and the
officers connected with his prosecution by publication of misleading and incorrect information.
357. Commander Andrew Hayman took action in August 2000 while Jonathan Rees was
awaiting trial for conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. He wrote to The Guardian Editor,
Alan Rusbridger, about proposals by journalists, Michael Gillard and Laurie Flynn, to publish an
article relating to the work of the Metropolitan Police Anti-Corruption Squad:
‘Whilst I understand and support the need to report on issues of public interest, I have
concerns that in their research your journalists may be at risk, perhaps unwittingly of
assisting Rees in unethically or unlawfully seeking his acquittal […].’260
358. Michael Gillard and Laurie Flynn made a complaint in relation to Commander Andrew
Hayman, and the Metropolitan Police Authority asked an outside police force to investigate the
complaint. This was carried out by Commissioner Perry Nove of the City of London Police.261
359. His ensuing report to the Metropolitan Police Authority traced the interest of the two
journalists in the Complaints Investigation Bureau (CIB) from around 1999, describing them as
‘proactive journalists’ making approaches to serving and retired police officers and to criminals
who they believed might be able to provide them with an insight into the workings of the
Complaints Investigation Bureau.262 According to the report:
‘[t]he journalists had a particular concern that CIB [Complaints Investigation Bureau]
was using questionable and discredited methods in its efforts to deal incisively with
corrupt police officers and that it’s [sic] record of success was unsatisfactory.’263
260 Letter from Commander Andrew Hayman to Alan Rusbridger, MPS107534001, p52, 02 August 2000.
261 Report by Commissioner Perry Nove, MPS107534001, pp130-138, 21 June 2002.
262 Report by Commissioner Perry Nove, MPS107534001, pp130-138, 21 June 2002.
263 Report by Commissioner Perry Nove, MPS107534001, p133, 21 June 2002.
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360. Commissioner Perry Nove reported that the Metropolitan Police conducted a number of
discreet or linked investigations into serving and former officers. He considered many of these
investigations were proactive and involved a range of investigative methods designed to deal
successfully with difficult suspects, most of whom were knowledgeable about how they might
be investigated. Commissioner Nove explained that the Metropolitan Police became aware of
the journalists’ activities through its information sources and that ‘MPS [Metropolitan Police
Service] officers believed the journalists were in contact with one of the principal suspects in a
major CIB [Complaints Investigation Bureau] enquiry’.264
361. On 12 December 2002, a decision was taken by the Metropolitan Police Authority that
‘there was nothing to indicate DAC Hayman was motivated by malice or an improper agenda’
and so, under the regulations in place at the time, the Authority had ‘no jurisdiction’ to consider
the complaint by Michael Gillard and Laurie Flynn.265
362. In 2014, there were various high-profile prosecutions of journalists, on charges including
conspiracy to hack voicemails, conspiracy to pay public officials and conspiracy to pervert the
course of justice.
363. Of the nine individuals who were convicted of criminal offences, most had worked for the
News of the World:
i. Andy Coulson, former News of the World Editor;266
ii. Ian Edmondson, former News of the World News Editor;267
iii. Jules Stenson, former News of the World Features Editor;268
iv. Greg Miskew, former News of the World News Editor;269
v. Neville Thurlbeck, former News of the World News Editor and Chief Reporter;
vi. James Weatherup, former News Editor at the News of the World;270
vii. Dan Evans, a journalist at the News of the World and at the Sunday Mirror;271
viii. Glenn Mulcaire, private investigator used by News of the World;272
ix. Graham Johnson, former Sunday Mirror journalist.273
264 Report by Commissioner Perry Nove, MPS107534001, p134, 21 June 2002.

265 Letter from Catherine Crawford, Clerk to the Metropolitan Police Authority to CCL Solicitors, PNL000102001, p283, 13 December 2002.
267 Lisa O’Carroll, 2014, ‘Phone hacking: News of the World’s Ian Edmondson pleads guilty’, The Guardian, 03 October, found at
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/03/phone-hacking-trial-news-world-ian-edmondson-pleads-guilty.
268 BBC, 2014, ‘Ex-News of the World journalist admits phone-hacking charges’, 12 December, found at
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30450603.
269 Lisa O’Carroll, Caroline Davies, 2013, ‘Phone-hacking trial: three ex-News of the World staff plead guilty’ The Guardian, 30 October, found
at https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/30/phone-hacking-trial-news-of-world-staff.
270 Lizzie Dearden, 2014, ‘Andy Coulson jailed for 18 months: News of the World journalists sentenced for phone hacking’ Independent,
04 July, found at
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/andy-coulson-jailed-news-world-journalists-sentenced-phone-hacking-9583769.html.
271 James Cusick, 2014, ‘I hacked 200 phones for NOTW, says ex-reporter Dan Evans’ Independent, 27 January, found at
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/i-hacked-200-phones-notw-says-ex-reporter-dan-evans-9088795.html.
273 BBC, 2014, ‘Ex-Sunday Mirror reporter Graham Johnson admits phone hacking’, 06 November, found at
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29933698.
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364. Rebekah Wade (now Brooks), Editor of News of the World from 2000 to 2003, Editor of
The Sun from 2003 to 2009 and Chief Executive Officer of News International from 2009 to
2011, was acquitted.274 The News of the World ceased publication in 2011.
7.3 Surveillance of DCS David Cook by the News of the World

365. In summer 2002, DCS David Cook, the Senior Investigating Officer for the overt side
of the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation into Daniel Morgan’s murder, was subjected
to surveillance by the News of the World (see Chapter 6, the Abelard One/Morgan Two
Investigation).
366. On 26 June 2002, DCS David Cook had fronted a second BBC Crimewatch appeal for
information about the murder, with the offer of a substantial reward.
367. The next day, T/D/Supt David Zinzan, who was leading the covert side of the Abelard One/
Morgan Two Investigation, rang DCS David Cook to report that sensitive intelligence had been
received indicating that Southern Investigations and a journalist from the News of the World
were seeking information to discredit DCS Cook.275
368. The following week, a payroll officer at Surrey Police – DCS David Cook’s former employer
– received a suspicious phone call, purporting to be from the Inland Revenue and relating to the
tax affairs of DCS Cook. The call was from an unobtainable number.276 He did not provide any
information and reported the incident to his superiors.
369. Shortly thereafter DCS David Cook noticed a discreetly parked vehicle which had a
clear view of his home. It was established that the vehicle was leased to News International.
DCS Cook later noted a suspicious van, the driver of which showed an interest in his home
address. The van subsequently followed DCS Cook’s car when he left the house.277
370. In response, a Metropolitan Police counter-surveillance team was deployed. The drivers
of both suspicious vehicles were identified as News of the World staff photographers.278
Dick Fedorcio, Head of Media at the Metropolitan Police Directorate of Public Affairs, contacted
the News of the World. He was told that the journalists believed that they were following a
legitimate story, namely that DCS David Cook was having an affair with Jacqui Hames, the
BBC Crimewatch presenter. Jacqui Hames later told the Leveson Inquiry that this explanation
was ‘utterly nonsensical’, that she and DCS Cook were married and had two children, and their
relationship had been the subject of a Hello! magazine article.279
371. In the following months, other possible surveillance incidents caused DCS David Cook and
Jacqui Hames concern. They noticed someone in a van taking photographs of their house,280
believed that items in the garden had been moved,281 and post had been opened and re-sealed.
An email was sent from an unnamed source to the producer of BBC Crimewatch, suggesting
275 Draft witness statement of former DCS David Cook, MPS102164001, p28 (unsigned and undated).
276 Email from Surrey Police payroll officer, MPS102164001, p52, 8 July 2002.
277 Draft witness statement of former DCS David Cook, MPS102164001, p28 (unsigned and undated).
278 Report by DS Gary Dalby, MPS102164001, p5, 2 December 2011. Although one driver was identified as a News of the World employee at
the time of the incident in 2002, the second driver was not identified as such until 2011.
279 Witness Statement of Jacqui Hames to the Leveson Inquiry, p15, para 39, 22 February 2012.
281 Meeting with Jacqui Hames, p1, 18 January 2016.
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that Jacqui Hames was having an affair with a senior police officer.282 The Metropolitan Police
were unable to attribute any of these further possible surveillance incidents to particular
individuals or organisations.283
372. On 09 January 2003, a meeting took place, of which no contemporary record was taken,
between Dick Fedorcio, Commander Andre Baker, DCS David Cook and Rebekah Wade, Editor
of the News of the World (and shortly to become Editor of The Sun). Evidence subsequently
submitted to the Leveson Inquiry suggested that this was essentially a ‘welfare’ meeting to
support DCS Cook rather than an operational meeting to deal with the issue.284 Rebekah Wade
reportedly indicated that she understood the story being pursued by her newspaper was a
legitimate story about a marital affair. DCS Cook and Commander Baker told Rebekah Wade
that they had information indicating that one of her journalists was being paid by Southern
Investigations and that ‘she should be aware’.285
373. In 2012, over nine years after these events, following a police investigation, advice was
sought from the Crown Prosecution Service as to whether there were grounds to prosecute
anyone for the surveillance of DCS David Cook. An advice was provided by Gregor McGill,
Deputy Chief Crown Prosecutor,286 approved by Alison Levitt QC, Principal Legal Adviser to the
Director of Public Prosecutions, in accordance with the processes adopted at that time by the
Crown Prosecution Service. It stated that the following facts were considered to be established:
i. Sidney Fillery had regular contact with Alex Marunchak over the relevant period and a
number of large payments were made by Sidney Fillery to Alex Marunchak, a curious
fact ‘given that normally journalists pay private investigators, not the other way around’.
ii. Within a few days of the BBC Crimewatch broadcast, an effort was made to discover
DCS Cook’s home address, via a technique known as ‘blagging’,287 the inquirer
purporting to be from the Inland Revenue.
iii. DCS Cook’s personal details were found in a notebook belonging to Glenn Mulcaire,
who at the time was employed by the News of the World on a freelance basis and
who was known to engage in phone-hacking and ‘blagging’ on the newspaper’s
behalf. Glenn Mulcaire’s habit was to write the name of the journalist who tasked him
in the top left-hand corner: the name written was ‘Greg’ (this was established to be a
reference to Greg Miskew).
iv. Shortly after the blagging attempt, the van leased by News International was seen
near DCS Cook’s home address and, two days later, the police established that the
van was being used by News of the World staff. Subsequent investigation revealed
Alex Marunchak, News of the World journalist, was ‘investigating’ DCS Cook and
Jacqui Hames.288
283 Draft witness statement of former DCS David Cook, MPS102164001, pp29-30, (unsigned and undated).
284 Witness Statement of Dick Fedorcio to the Leveson Inquiry, EDN000690001, pp20–21, 28 February 2012.
285 Dick Fedorcio, Leveson hearing transcript, pp54-57, 13 March 2012.
286 ‘2nd Advice relating to the Circumstances Surrounding Surveillance Conducted on ex-DCS C and JH by New of the World in July 2002’
by Gregor McGill, approved by Alison Levitt QC, MPS102164001, pp16-21, 27 January 2012.
287 The action of obtaining private or confidential information by impersonation or another method of deception.
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374. The Deputy Chief Crown Prosecutor concluded that it was not possible to infer that
the motive/intention of Alex Marunchak and Glenn Mulcaire had been to disrupt the police
investigation. Jacqui Hames was a public personality with a high profile; a story suggesting that
she was having an affair with a police officer would be attractive to the News of the World in its
own right. The fact that the ‘story was plainly a nonsense gives rise to the possibility that AM
[Alex Marunchak] and GM [Glenn Mulcaire] may in fact have been deceived. I do not see how
the prosecution could disprove this, were it to be advanced by the defence.’289
375. The Deputy Chief Crown Prosecutor advised that ‘[a]lthough there is no direct evidence,
a jury would be entitled to infer that the tip-off about the “affair” is likely to have come from
Southern Investigations’, for, among other reasons:
‘the tip-off must have come from a source which the NOTW [News of the World]
journalists trusted to the extent that they would not question it, given that a very brief
investigation would have revealed that this was not a story at all.’290
376. As for the evidence that payments had been made by Southern Investigations to Alex
Marunchak, a jury might infer that, although this was ‘plainly highly suspicious’, the payments
‘cannot be linked’291 to the incident of surveillance. There was therefore insufficient evidence
to substantiate any allegation of doing an act tending and intending to pervert the course of
public justice.292
377. At the time of the surveillance on DCS David Cook, Jonathan Rees was serving a seven-
year custodial sentence.293 Former DS Sidney Fillery was in regular contact with Alex Marunchak
of the News of the World.294
378. The Panel agrees with the advice offered by the Crown Prosecution Service that
there was insufficient evidence capable of proving that the News of the World surveillance
of DCS David Cook was instigated by either Jonathan Rees or former DS Sidney Fillery.
Nonetheless, the circumstantial evidence suggests very strongly that intrusive activity
suffered by DCS Cook, his wife Jacqui Hames and their family was arranged by former DS
Fillery and Alex Marunchak (see Chapter 6, The Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation).
379. The Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder and the
inevitable close police scrutiny of Law & Commercial posed a threat to the activities
of the partnership. Jonathan Rees and former DS Sidney Fillery had a clear vested
interest in seeing DCS David Cook discredited and the Abelard One/Morgan Two
Investigation subverted.
by Gregor McGill, approved by Alison Levitt QC, MPS102164001, p19, 27 January 2012.
293 Police National Computer print-out in respect of Jonathan Rees, MPS004001001, p3, 14 July 2009.
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380. The surveillance of DCS David Cook and Jacqui Hames caused them and their
family considerable anxiety, both then and after the events. There is no evidence that the
surveillance of DCS Cook by the News of the World either shaped the conduct of the
Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation or had an impact on the conclusions to which the
investigation came. The experience almost certainly deepened DCS Cook’s long-term
commitment to bringing to justice those responsible for Daniel Morgan’s murder and/or
for attempting to subvert the police investigation of the case.
7.4 Linkages between senior police officers and the media

381. Deputy Commissioner John Stevens was responsible for anti-corruption matters at the
time of Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges. As he subsequently revealed in his autobiography, he
had been specifically recruited by the then Commissioner Sir Paul Condon, to tackle corruption
in the Metropolitan Police,295 and corruption prevention became one of his key interests. During
his time as Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner, and later, following his retirement in 2005,
he delivered a series of high-profile lectures on the topic, both in the UK and internationally.
382. In 2000, Deputy Commissioner Stevens was appointed Commissioner of the Metropolitan
Police and served in that capacity until 2005. Lord Stevens (as he later became), as his evidence
to the Leveson Inquiry296 and his autobiography297 made clear, pursued a concertedly open
media strategy with a view to getting across to the media a better informed and more favourable
account of the work of the Metropolitan Police. As part of that strategy, he had regular meetings
with the editors of all the leading newspapers of the day, including The Guardian and the News
of the World.
383. As Deputy Commissioner, John Stevens’ responsibilities included reviewing and

authorising the continued use of a probe placed in the offices of Law & Commercial.298
The briefing documents provided directly to the Deputy Commissioner referred, among
other things, to ‘corruption between journalists, private investigators, suspended and serving
police officers’, ‘selling them on to newspapers’ and ‘stories leaked to the press’.299 Deputy
Commissioner Stevens endorsed his initial authorisation of the probe on 06 January 1999 with
the request, ‘Please keep me updated as to progress in this case’.300
384. On 21 September 2002, a lengthy and detailed article appeared in The Guardian
newspaper containing an exposé of Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges. It was written by Graeme
McLagan301 and included details of the operation, including the bugging of the offices of Law
& Commercial (referred to in the article as ‘Southern Investigations’). It also mentioned, among
others, the journalists Alex Marunchak and Douglas Kempster and their employers, the News
of the World and The Mirror newspapers respectively. The article contained direct quotes from
the police probe transcripts, including conversations between Jonathan Rees, Alex Marunchak
and Douglas Kempster. Graeme McLagan could not have written the article without receipt of
295 Nor for the Faint-Hearted: My Life Fighting Crime, p 217, p231.
296 Leveson Report Vol 2, Chapter 2, The History of the Relationship: Different Approaches – Metropolitan Police Service: The Commissioners,
Lord Stevens para 1.12. www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/witness-statement-of-Lord-Stevens.pdf
297 Not for the Faint-Hearted: My Life Fighting Crime, pp 251-2.
298 See Chapter 4, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges, for details.
299 Application for intrusive surveillance, MPS105390001, 05 August 1999.
300 Intrusive Surveillance Application Bundle re Law & Commercial, MPS099739001, p23, 06 January 1999.
301 New Scotland Yard Press Bureau file, MPS047984001, 21 September 2002.
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information, authorised or leaked, by an unknown police source. Publication of the article also
meant that the link between Jonathan Rees and former DS Sidney Fillery of Law & Commercial
on the one hand, and Alex Marunchak of the News of the World on the other, became
public knowledge.
7.4.1 The Leveson Inquiry

385. The question as to what senior Metropolitan Police officers knew about the corrupt trade
of confidential information to journalists subsequently became, a decade later, one focus of the
Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the British press following the News
International (then the owner of the News of the World) telephone hacking scandal.
386. In the course of his explanation as to the approach that his Inquiry would take, Lord
Justice Leveson made reference to the Daniel Morgan case and the fact that connections with
the News of the World were allegedly involved, and that this connection ‘has been the subject of
media comment’. Lord Justice Leveson stated:
‘I can well understand why Mr Morgan’s family saw the Inquiry as an opportunity to
uncover information about his death (and Mr Rees clearly visualised that possibility
because he applied for Core Participant status on the basis that he might be the
subject of criticism). Whether there should be an inquiry into this particular case is
not for me to say: it is sufficient if I repeat the explanation that to have examined the
issues arising would have taken weeks or months and I did not consider that the very
limited time available for this Inquiry was best deployed in that way. In the event,
although I made it clear that Mr Rees could make a statement for the Inquiry, he has not
done so.’302
387. From this it is clear the Leveson Inquiry did not have the capacity to and would not explore
the detailed connections arising in the Daniel Morgan murder enquiry between the police,
private detective agencies and the News of the World. That would be the task of this Panel.
7.4.2 Lord Stevens’ evidence to the Leveson Inquiry

388. When cross-examined during his evidence to the Leveson Inquiry, Lord Stevens was
asked about corruption generally in the police. He stated:
‘Corruption is always there in a Police Service the size of the Metropolitan Police and
every now and again I was hearing stories that people either within the service or
who had retired from the service might well be paid for newspaper reports, or tipping
off people as to when certain raids were taking place and therefore a strong anti-
corruption strategy and squad was essential.’303
389. However, when more specifically questioned, he stated: ‘I don’t know of any issue
[concerning corruption] that came up, real issue, on my watch.’
390. At this point Lord Justice Leveson asked Lord Stevens if he had any recollection of it
actually happening on ‘his watch’, to which Lord Stevens responded: ‘No, I don’t. No Sir.’
302 Leveson Report, Vol 1, Chapter 2, para 2.10, pp23-24,

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/270939/0780_i.pdf.
303 Examination of Lord Stevens at the Leveson Inquiry, 06 March 2012.
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391. On 06 March 2012, Lord Stevens was further asked at the Leveson Inquiry about his
knowledge of the BBC Crimewatch appeal for evidence that, as part of the Abelard One/Morgan
Two Investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan, had in 2002 been fronted by DCS David
Cook. Lord Stevens said that he was aware of the Crimewatch appeal and the fact that
considerable resources were being invested in the re-investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder,
but that at the time he had not been aware that DCS Cook and his family had been put under
surveillance by the News of the World.304
392. Subsequent to this evidence, Lord Stevens made a supplementary witness statement, in
which he said:
‘I understand that Mr Fedorcio [then Director of Public Affairs for the Metropolitan
Police], will say that he informed me of a meeting which took place at New Scotland
Yard on 9 January 2003 between Commander Baker, Detective Superintendent Cook
[sic], Rebekah Brooks and Mr Fedorcio. I am also now informed that after the meeting,
Mr Fedorcio arranged for Rebekah Brooks to attend a press reception at New Scotland
Yard that I was present at.
‘This may well be an accurate account but I have no recollection or note of either their
meeting or the content of what was discussed. If the content of the meetings was
as I have now been informed, I would expect there to be a formal record of it on the
relevant case correspondence file.’305
393. Dick Fedorcio informed the Leveson Inquiry that he had informed Commissioner Stevens
before the meeting that it was to take place.306
394. Lord Stevens was also asked questions at the Leveson Inquiry regarding the activities
of Southern Investigations and the News of the World. He testified that during his time as
Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner he had not been aware that the News of the World
was making extensive use of Southern Investigations illegally to obtain information about
police officers.307
395. Lord Stevens was then asked by the Leveson Inquiry questions arising out of his
autobiography, Not for the Faint-Hearted: My Life Fighting Crime, published soon after his
retirement as Commissioner in 2005.
‘Q Can I ask you please about page 263 of your book.... You say in your book: “At the
end of the 1990s, an independent detective agency called Southern Investigations,
based in Sydenham, was frequently coming on the anti-corruption squad’s radar”.
So when did you become aware of that?
A: As Deputy Commissioner, a presentation was made to me to try and get a probe

into Southern Investigations’ offices. The probe took an extraordinarily long time
to get fitted in, in legal terms. It was all done legally. And having authorised that,
which was part of an effort to find out what they were up to, that led to certain
prosecutions and those prosecutions are a matter of record.

305 Statement number 2 of Lord Stevens to the Leveson Inquiry, MPS109559001, pp3-4, 23 March 2012.
306 Statement of Dick Fedorcio to the Leveson Inquiry, pp24-25, paras 102-105, 28 February 2012.
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Q: The probe you’re referring to is a hidden microphone, is that right?
A: It was, yes.
Q: Because your book goes on to say: “Eventually, it became possible to monitor

conversations and the hidden microphones picked up much intelligence about the
activities going on inside. Via the agency, corrupt officers were selling stories about
their investigations to newspapers and being paid quite handsome amounts of
money, an unsavoury business all around.”
A: Yes.
Q: So when did you become aware of that?
A: When prosecutions took place and one or two people were successfully
prosecuted.’308
7.4.3 Lord Stevens’ interview with the Panel

396. In interview with the Panel on 09 December 2020, Lord Stevens was asked about his
evidence to the Leveson Inquiry. What period of time had he been referring to when he had
said that there was ‘no real issue’ of police corruption occurring ‘on his watch’? He said he
had meant his time as Commissioner from February 2000 to February 2005. He also made
clear that by ‘no real issue’ he had not meant that there was no police corruption, for there
was always some police corruption, but he could not recall it being a significant issue. Indeed,
he said that complaints, including allegations of police corruption, halved during his time as
Commissioner.309
397. Lord Stevens was then asked what he had learned about the activities at Law &
Commercial when he was authorising continued use of the probe in their offices. Did he recall,
for example, being regularly briefed by D/Supt Robert Quick throughout Operation Nigeria/Two
Bridges on the nature of the relationship between Alex Marunchak of the News of the World
and Jonathan Rees of Law & Commercial? Former AC Quick had told the Panel that he and
Lord Stevens ‘were talking about Mr Marunchak quite a lot’.310 Lord Stevens told the Panel that
he could not recall talking about Alex Marunchak with former D/Supt Quick or with anyone
else.311 He accepted that, if he had repeatedly signed off the continued covert surveillance of
the offices of Law & Commercial in 1998/9, then he would have been briefed on the intelligence
being gained. However, he had no recollection of the detail and thought his senior subordinates
would have been more involved in the operational detail. As Deputy Commissioner he had more
strategic and managerial responsibilities.
398. Lord Stevens was asked whether his evidence to the Leveson Inquiry meant that he was
unaware of the selling of confidential information to, among other newspapers, the News of
the World, until the arrests, prosecutions and convictions of journalists took place. He said he
thought that was the case, though he could not recall precisely when he became aware. Asked
whether that might have been at the time of the so-called ‘phone hacking’ court cases during
the years 2011-2014, he replied that he could not recall exactly when he had learned about the
various corruption cases, including those involving Law & Commercial.

309 Panel Interview with Lord Stevens, pp3,4 and 12, 09 December 2020.
310 Panel Interview with former AC Robert Quick, PNL000197001, p2, para 15, 10 November 2014.
311 Panel Interview with Lord Stevens, p13, 09 December 2020.
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399. Lord Stevens emphasised that these events, both the cases of police corruption in
connection with Law & Commercial and the evidence he had given to the Leveson Inquiry, had
occurred a long time ago – twenty and eight years ago respectively. He emphasised that as
Commissioner he had been responsible for and preoccupied with major policy and strategic
managerial issues. Whatever he might have been told at different times about the Daniel Morgan
murder enquiry, or the corrupt activities of serving or retired police officers and journalists
trading confidential information through Law & Commercial, they would not have been among
his priorities. It was therefore unsurprising that he could not remember. Furthermore, his
autobiography had been ghost-written and he could not remember the detail.312
400. The Panel asked Lord Stevens whether, in September 2002, he had seen the major article
on the corrupt trade being conducted by Law & Commercial by Graeme McLagan, published
in The Guardian newspaper on 21 September 2002, which had specifically named Alex
Marunchak, employed by the News of the World, as a major purchaser of corruptly obtained
confidential information. Lord Stevens said that he had no recollection of seeing the article.313
401. Lord Stevens was asked by the Panel whether he would have expected Dick Fedorcio,
his Director of Public Affairs, to inform him about a major newspaper article of this character
about leaks of confidential police information to the Press. He replied: ‘Absolutely. I’d expect to
be informed of that.’ He stressed once again, however, that his responsibilities were strategic.
He would have expected one of his senior subordinates to be aware of the article and to do
whatever needed to be done in response.314
402. Dick Fedorcio informed the Panel in 2021, that he, too, would have expected Lord Stevens
to be made aware of the article, and if he was not aware of its existence, the article would have
been brought to the attention of another senior officer.
403. Lord Stevens was also asked about the meeting on 09 January 2003 at New Scotland Yard
which, according to the testimony to the Panel of both former Commander Andre Baker and
former DCS David Cook, was convened specifically to discuss the surveillance by the News of
the World of former DCS Cook and his family.315 Lord Stevens reiterated what he had told the
Leveson Inquiry, namely that he was now aware of the purpose of the meeting, but he had not
known at the time.316
404. Lord Stevens also repeated to the Panel what he had told the Leveson Inquiry, namely that
he was aware that Dick Fedorcio had stated to the Leveson Inquiry that, following the meeting,
he (Dick Fedorcio) had escorted Rebekah Wade to a reception that she and the Commissioner
were both attending and that he had told Sir John Stevens that he ‘thought the meeting had
been useful’, wording which suggested that the Commissioner knew about the nature of
the meeting.317
405. However, Lord Stevens also told the Panel what he had told the Leveson Inquiry
concerning this, namely that the evidence given by Dick Fedorcio was no doubt accurate, but
he was unaware that DCS David Cook and his family had been placed under surveillance by the
312 Panel interview with Lord Stevens, pp9-14, 09 December 2020

313 Panel interview with Lord Stevens, pp9-10, 09 December 2020
314 Panel interview with Lord Stevens, p6, 09, December 2020.
315 Panel interview with former Commander Andre Baker, PNL000256001, p3, 07 March 2018 and Panel interview with former DCS David
Cook, paras 48-49, 04 June 2015.
316 Statement number 2 of Lord Stevens to the Leveson Inquiry, MPS109559001, p4, 23 March 2012
317 Statement of Dick Fedorcio to the Leveson Inquiry, p25, para 105, 28 February 2012.
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News of the World and that Southern Investigations (Law & Commercial) had been ‘gathering
evidence on senior MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] personnel’.318 He had no recollection of
being told about these matters.319
406. Lord Stevens further reiterated what he told the Leveson Inquiry, namely that ‘[i]f the
content of the meetings was as I have now been informed, I would expect there to be a formal
record of it on the relevant case correspondence file’.320 He told the Panel that he found it
surprising that Dick Fedorcio, according to his testimony to the Leveson Inquiry, had said that
he had made no record of the meeting.321
407. The Panel also finds it surprising that Dick Fedorcio made no record of the meeting
with DCS David Cook and Rebekah Wade.
408. The Panel drew Lord Stevens’ attention to the fact that D/Supt Robert Quick, who joined
the Complaints Investigation Bureau 3 (CIB3) in January 1999 and took over management
of Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges at the time that Lord Stevens was regularly authorising the
continued use of the probe at Law & Commercial, had written a short report on the character
and incidence of corruption in the Metropolitan Police.322 The Panel had asked the Metropolitan
Police for a copy of that report but had been told that no copy of it could be found. Lord
Stevens said he was unaware of the report and he had not read it.323
409. The Panel asked Lord Stevens if, with regard to the meeting with DCS David Cook and
Rebekah Wade on 09 January 2003, he wished to comment on the fact that Commander Andre
Baker had been alleged to have told DCS Cook, before entering Mr Fedorcio’s office, that ‘[t]
he boss doesn’t want a fuss about this’, the implication being that ‘the boss’ was Lord Stevens.
He responded that it was not unusual for people to go around using the Commissioner’s name
and that there were also ‘lots of bosses’ in the Metropolitan Police. He said that he had no views
on the matter and could not remember anything in relation to it.324
410. The Panel informed Lord Stevens that the evidence from the probe at Law & Commercial
indicated that Alex Marunchak with Douglas Kempster, of the Mirror Group, had been
purchasers of corruptly obtained personal information through the offices of Law & Commercial,
but that whereas Douglas Kempster had been prosecuted, Alex Marunchak had not. Lord
Stevens was adamant that if there had been evidence of criminal offences against Alex
Maranchak, whom he did not know and did not believe he had ever met, then he should have
been prosecuted.325
411. Lord Stevens said that he had never said anything which could be interpreted to suggest
that, if there was evidence of criminal behaviour, proceedings should not be brought. He was
adamant that if there was evidence of criminal offences against Alex Marunchak, then he should
have been prosecuted.326
318 Statement number 2 of Lord Stevens to the Leveson Inquiry, MPS109559001, pp3-4, 23 March 2012.
319 Examination of Lord Stevens at the Leveson Inquiry, 06 March 2012 and Panel interview of Lord Stevens, 09 December 2020.
320 Statement number 2 of Lord Stevens to the Leveson Inquiry, MPS109559001, p4, 23 March 2012.
321 Panel Interview with Lord Stevens, pp6-7, 09 December 2020.
323 Panel interview with Lord John Stevens, p6, 09 December 2020.
325 Panel interview with Lord Stevens, p14, 09 December 2020.
326 Panel interview with Lord Stevens, p14, 09 December 2020.
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7.4.4 Former AC Andrew Hayman’s evidence to the Leveson Inquiry

412. Lord Stevens was not alone among senior Metropolitan Police officers whose connections
with News International, the publisher of the News of the World and The Times, attracted
the interest of the Leveson Inquiry. Former AC Andrew Hayman also signed a contract with
News International on his retirement from the police. He was paid an annual retainer to act as
an occasional columnist.327 In 2009, following the emergence in The Guardian of the ‘phone
hacking’ allegations which led to the establishment of the Leveson Inquiry, he wrote an article in
The Times which was widely interpreted as a rebuttal of the allegation that ‘phone hacking’ was
widespread.328
413. Former AC Hayman’s rebuttal, which as subsequent discoveries made clear was shown
to be ill-founded,329 attracted attention because he had, from 1998 to 2002, been a senior
officer with responsibility for Professional Standards and in 2006 had been in charge of the
Metropolitan Police’s initial internal enquiry into ‘phone hacking’. When examined by the
Leveson Inquiry, it was pointed out to him that Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner at the time of former
AC Hayman’s resignation from the police, had in his autobiography been critical of former
AC Hayman for being too close to the media,330 a proposition with which former AC Hayman
did not agree.331
7.4.5 Other senior Metropolitan police officers and the News of the World
414. In 2011 and 2012, controversy regarding links between senior Metropolitan Police
personnel and the News of the World was reignited. On 14 July 2011, a former Executive Editor
of the News of The World, Neil Wallis, was arrested in connection with the ‘phone hacking’
scandal.332 Furthermore, it was disclosed that Neil Wallis had been paid to act as a media
consultant to the Metropolitan Police in 2009 and 2010.333
415. The following day, on 15 July 2011, AC John Yates also resigned amid allegations from
several directions, including from an MP, that in 2009, when he had conducted a review into
the 2006 allegations of hacking of telephones of members of the Royal Family by a private
investigator working for the News of the World, he had inappropriately found no fault with the
original investigation and had also misled a House of Commons Select Committee about the
matter. The Select Committee did not, however, find that former AC Yates had misled them.
416. The issue was later examined at the Leveson Inquiry. Former AC John Yates was the
subject of serious criticism in Lord Justice Leveson’s report, which stated that former AC
Yates had failed adequately to address the matter and had mischaracterised the evidence he
had reviewed.334
417. Some months later, in March 2012, Dick Fedorcio resigned when it was announced
that, following an investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission, it had
been decided to initiate proceedings against him for gross misconduct related to his hiring
327 Leveson Report, Vol 2, paras 5.22 to 5.25, pp905-906.

328 The Times, 11 July 2009 & Leveson Report, Vol 2, paras. 5.28-5.33, pp907-908.
329 The Times, 11 July 2009 & Leveson Report, Vol 2, paras. 5.28-5.33, pp907-908.
330 Ian Blair Policing Controversy, 2009, p 237.
331 Former AC Andrew Hayman’s examination at Leveson Inquiry, 01 March 2012.
332 Leveson Report, Vol 2, paras 5.88 to 5.95, pp926-928.
333 Leveson Report, Vol 2, paras. 4.91 to 4.113, pp879-886.
334 Leveson Report, Vol 1, para 12.13(a) & (c), pp417/8.
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of Neil Wallis.335 Earlier in the month, the Leveson Inquiry had heard that Dick Fedorcio had
invited people from two leading public relations firms to submit rival bids for the contract that
was awarded to Neil Wallis. However, Lord Justice Leveson suggested that the companies
had been chosen because Dick Fedorcio knew they would be more expensive than Neil Wallis.
Dick Fedorcio denied this but confirmed that he initially wanted to award the contract to Neil
Wallis without any competition.336
7.4.6 Conclusions
418. As Commissioner from 2000 to 2005, Sir John Stevens cultivated the media, including the
News of the World, with a view to improving the picture being given by the media of the work
of the Metropolitan Police. On retiring as Commissioner in 2005, Lord Stevens signed contracts
with the News of the World to write articles for the newspaper, a potentially compromising
relationship to which the Leveson Inquiry paid close attention. However, the Leveson Report
made no criticism of Lord Stevens’ conduct in this respect.
419. The Panel recognises that as both Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner, Lord
Stevens had major managerial and strategic roles which make it entirely understandable that
he would not be informed about most day-to-day operational details with regard to particular
investigations. Furthermore, even if informed, the passage of time would make it probable that
he would not remember many of the details about which he possibly was told, or which were
the subject of papers which crossed his desk.
420. However, given the importance that Lord Stevens was attaching as Commissioner to
both the extirpation of police corruption and being more open with the media, it is surprising
that his attention was not drawn to the very serious allegations about the illegal trade in police-
derived information between Law & Commercial and the News of the World, and the allegation
that the News of the World was attempting to subvert the Senior Investigation Officer, former
DCS David Cook, leading the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation. Following publication of
the article in The Guardian in 2002, the first of those allegations had become public knowledge.
It was therefore inevitable that Lord Stevens’ relationship with the News of the World and his
subsequent contract with the newspaper would give rise to suspicions of partiality unlikely to
inspire confidence that police corruption was being tackled.
421. It is clear that, at the very least, Lord Stevens failed to exercise due diligence about
the News of the World, police and Law & Commercial connections before entering into a
contract with the News of the World. The Panel notes that Lord Stevens did not complete
the contract with the News of the World after two of its employees were convicted.
However, a cursory check of intelligence records would have revealed the wealth of
data held by the Metropolitan Police about the linkages between the News of the World,
Law & Commercial and illegally obtained police information and the role of corruption in
those linkages.
422. By the same token, former AC Andrew Hayman, given his senior operational
responsibilities when serving with the Metropolitan Police, must have been aware that
‘phone hacking’ was a serious matter and that parts of the press, including the News of
335 Report of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, Investigation into the decision to employ Mr Neil Wallis of Chamy Media Ltd. as
a specialist advisor to the Metropolitan Police, para 140
336 Leveson Report, Vol 2, paras 4.102-4.106, pp882-884.
1095
the World, part of the same newspaper group that went on to employ him, were culpable
recipients of the confidential information being supplied. His public downplaying of the
practice compromised the integrity of the police.
423. The absolute need for clear boundaries to be maintained between senior police
personnel and those working in the mass media is demonstrated by the events
summarised above. While the Panel’s Terms of Reference do not encompass the specific
matters that led to the resignations, it is appropriate for the Panel to state that the
demonstrated links between personnel at the highest levels of the Metropolitan Police and
people working for a news organisation linked to criminality associated with the murder of
Daniel Morgan, are of serious and legitimate public concern.
424. For senior police officers to take up employment with media outlets or other
organisations, whose record involves criminal activity, is profoundly damaging for the
reputation of the police service. In this instance, it contributed to the establishment
of the Leveson Inquiry and the inclusion of a specific provision within the Terms of
Reference of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel. The Panel therefore welcomes the
adoption in 2018, of the recommendation contained in Lord Justice Leveson’s Report
that consideration be given to whether limits should be placed upon the nature of any
employment of Chief Officers within or by the media, post-service.337 It is now national
policy that all officers in England and Wales of Assistant Chief Constable/Commander
rank and above, should notify and obtain the approval of their Chief Officer or Police and
Crime Commissioner of their intention to take up any paid or unpaid position, whether
with media organisations or elsewhere, within 12 months of leaving the police service.338
7.5 Misuse of police information from 2006 onwards

425. Following the acquittal of the five Defendants in March 2011, former DCS David Cook was
investigated over a period of nine years by both the Metropolitan Police and the Independent
Police Complaints Commission (later Independent Office for Police Conduct) because of
alleged criminality and misconduct. The allegations related to: elements of former DCS Cook’s
conduct of the Abelard Two Investigation; unauthorised possession of official information and
documentation belonging to or originating from the Metropolitan Police, Essex Police, Surrey
Police, the Serious Organised Crime Agency, the Metropolitan Police Authority, and material
belonging to Jonathan Rees who had been charged with the murder of Daniel Morgan; and
unauthorised disclosure of some of that material to third parties. In addition to the disclosure
which can be identified from email chains, there is evidence that documents may, on occasion,
have been hand-delivered to recipients. The disclosures took place over a period from
2006 until 2014.
426. There were the following five investigations:
i. Operation Longhorn, 2011-2015: alleged unauthorised disclosure of 5,846 pages of

official documents covering the period between 23 August 2006 and 07 September
2011, attached to some of 620 emails between former DCS David Cook and the
journalist, Michael Sullivan. Although all the emails and attachments sent by former
337 Leveson Report, Vol 2, para. 4.151, p898.

338 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/chief-officers-post-service-employment#chief-officer-ranks-where-approval-for-post-service-
employment-is-required.
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DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan were analysed, the report of the Independent Police
Complaints Commission focused on 46 emails with 43 attachments which had been
sent from former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan (see Chapter 9, Post-Abelard Two).339
ii. The BBC Panorama investigation, 2012-2017: alleged unauthorised disclosure of

confidential material belonging to Jonathan Rees, to a BBC Panorama programme
which was broadcast on 14 March 2011, three days after the Defendants in the
prosecution for the murder of Daniel Morgan were acquitted (see Chapter 9, Post-
Abelard Two).
iii. Operation Megan, 2012-2018: alleged misconduct in relation to protected witnesses,

and deliberate failure to disclose material to Defence lawyers.
iv. Operation Edison, 2014-2020: alleged possession of material belonging to the

Metropolitan Police and the Serious Organised Crime Agency and other police
agencies and unauthorised disclosure by former DCS David Cook of material to
journalists and other third parties (see Chapter 9, Post-Abelard Two).
v. Operation Megan Two, 2017-2019: statements by Mr Justice Mitting that former

DCS Cook had done an act which tended to pervert the course of justice by breaching
the sterile corridor and prompting witness evidence and concealing the fact that
he had done so from the Crown Prosecution Service and Prosecution Counsel (see
Chapter 9, Post-Abelard Two).
427. The investigations arose from a series of events, including:
i. the fact that material was found in 2011 at the home of the journalist Michael Sullivan
by police officers from Operation Elvedon, which was enquiring into allegations of
inappropriate payments by journalists to police officers and other public officials;
ii. comments made by Mr Justice Maddison in the Crown Court in 2011 and Mr Justice
Mitting in the High Court in 2016;
iii. a complaint made by Jonathan Rees initially in January 2012, the content of which
was finalised in 2014; and
iv. a realisation by the Metropolitan Police that former DCS David Cook was
in possession of material belonging to the Metropolitan Police in 2014, and
a consequential search of his home, during which very large quantities of
material were found.
428. There are very strict rules governing the handling and dissemination of investigation
materials, and the disclosure or discussion of investigative techniques and methodologies.
These rules exist to ensure the integrity of criminal investigations so that any prosecution will not
be compromised, and the processes of investigation will be protected.
429. Unlawful access to police information occurs whenever details are provided by corrupt
officers or police staff from the Police National Computer database or from other police
documentation, such as The Police Gazette. In some cases, unlawful disclosure of information
339 ‘Investigation into the actions of Mr David COOK unauthorised disclosure of documents to a journalist whilst he held a public office’,
1097
enables journalists to publish material to which they should not have access. In other cases, it
may impede or prevent a prosecution, because suspects become aware of what is happening
during a police investigation and can take action to protect themselves.
430. In some cases, no money changes hands, but a benefit to an officer can be identified.
Before the passing of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, there was no general offence
of ‘corrupt or other improper exercise of police powers and privileges’.340 The offences which
might be committed by an officer who unlawfully disclosed information or material before 2015
included misconduct in public office.
431. Operation Longhorn, the BBC Panorama investigation and Operation Edison all involved
unauthorised disclosure of police material to third parties by former DCS David Cook. Those
to whom information was disclosed without lawful reason included a number of journalists:
Michael Sullivan of News International, Glen Campbell, Peter Jukes, Laurie Flynn, Douglas
Kempster and Tom Harper; and others such as former AC Robert Quick, Alastair Morgan, and
Alastair Morgan’s solicitor, Raju Bhatt.
432. During and after the Abelard Two Investigation, former DCS David Cook and Michael
Sullivan were writing a book together. The draft chapters of the book referred extensively to
Daniel Morgan’s murder and its investigation, but it also appears to have been intended to deal
with police and media corruption on a wider scale. As time passed, former DCS Cook gathered
very significant numbers of confidential investigation files and materials relating to police
corruption. The documents and material sent by former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan and
examined in Operation Longhorn were not limited to material relating to the murder of Daniel
Morgan. A further 620 emails and 5,846 pages of documents covering the period between
23 August 2006 and 07 September 2011 were provided to the Metropolitan Police by News
International. These documents were analysed, and a report in July 2014341 concluded that:
‘what is evident from reviewing these 5846 pages of documents is that David COOK
was intent on advancing his career as a future author of books and as a result provided
Mike SULLIVAN with unrestricted access to material belonging to the Metropolitan
Police Service and Operation ABELARD II. Although it is apparent from the content
of some of these emails and from his prepared statements to the IPCC [Independent
Police Complaints Commission] that he was experiencing both health and personal
problems, he was undeterred in his mission to publish this book.’342
433. In the BBC Panorama investigation, video footage of a boat trip by Jonathan Rees and
invoices belonging to him, which had been stored on his computer, were found to have been
given by former DCS David Cook to journalist Glen Campbell, who was making the BBC
Panorama programme ‘Tabloid Hacks Exposed’.343
434. A search warrant was obtained and executed at former DCS David Cook’s home address
in November 2014. Forty-two exhibits were seized, including a large number of electronic
storage devices including laptops, memory sticks and mobile telephones.344
340 Introduced under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s26.
341 Report by a Detective Constable, MPS109840001, 31 July 2014.
342 Report by a Detective Constable, MPS109840001, pp17-18, 31 July 2014.
343 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, p14, undated.
344 Operation Megan Report, MPS109687001, paras 6.3–6.5, p13, undated.
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435. Operation Edison produced a report which stated that ‘there is material present that
originates from major crime investigations conducted in the mid-1990s during his work with
Surrey Police, including many murder enquiries and high profile investigations, through to
his leadership of Operation Morgan 11 (Daniel Morgan murder enquiry) from 2001-2002, his
work with SCD1 Homicide (2003-2005) and the further investigation of Operation Abelard 2
from 2006-2011 and beyond’345 (see Chapter 9, Post-Abelard Two). This material included
reports, intelligence logs, intelligence reports, case papers, research and analysis documents,
Metropolitan Police legal advice and email correspondence, and reports to the Crown
Prosecution Service for advice.
436. The recovered documentation varied in its classification, from open source material which
is freely available to the public, to highly sensitive, secret documents.346 They ranged in date
from 1987 to 2014.347,348 As stated above, former DCS David Cook shared some of this material,
including material marked ‘Secret’ and ‘Confidential’, with third parties. The Operation Edison
investigation focused on disclosure to journalists, although the disclosures identified included
disclosures to other individuals, some of whom were interested in matters of media corruption,
such as the issues dealt with by the Leveson Inquiry. Material was disclosed which could have
put at risk the lives of people identified in those documents had their content become known.
437. Documents relating to the investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan which had been
disclosed unlawfully by former DCS David Cook to various people included the following:
i. Many witness statements dating from 1987;349
ii. Details of witnesses and suspects;350
iii. Debrief reports containing intelligence naming individuals;351,352
iv. Intelligence reports;353
v. An interim report on Operation Two Bridges;354
vi. A spreadsheet summarising 200 audio listening-device recordings from Operation

Two Bridges; 355
vii. Gold Group meeting minutes marked ‘Confidential’;
viii. Surveillance logs;356
345 Edison Report, EDN002277001, p2, para 1.8, 04 February 2020.

346 Briefing note re Operation Megan Report, Metropolitan Police Service Directorate of Professionalism, p1, 26 January 2015.
347 Report by DS Gary Dalby, Review of Edison Tranche 2, EDN001054001, 23 May 2018.
348 Report by DS Gary Dalby, Retention and Redaction Op Edison – Tranche 3, EDN001055001, 24 May 2018.
349 Operation Edison Appendix B review of emails and attachments, EDN002279001, p.4, 04 April 2010.
350 Operation Edison Appendix B review of emails and attachments, EDN002279001, p.1, 13 October 2009.
352 Operation Edison Appendix B review of emails and attachments, EDN002279001, p.6, 04 August 2010.
1099
ix. Extensive quantities of material from the Abelard Two Investigation,357 including a
tabular analysis of the evidence given by all the major witnesses to date and evidence
derived from the Inquest against each of the four Defendants charged with the murder
of Daniel Morgan;358,359
x. Material relating to other police operations which derived from the investigation of
Daniel Morgan’s murder, such as the Asda supermarket robbery file; 360
xi. Email exchanges with members of the family of Daniel Morgan and others, including
journalists, concerning matters relating to the investigation.361 One hard drive alone
was found to contained 15,797 emails;362 and
xii. A strictly confidential letter to the Editor of The Guardian in relation to the activities of
two journalists working for the newspaper.363
438. In addition to this, multiple ‘Secret’ and ‘Confidential’ documents, including investigation
reports, intelligence documents, and other sensitive material from many other investigations and
operations not related to the murder of Daniel Morgan, were disclosed by former DCS David
Cook to various people. Some of these documents related to the identity of police informants
and were classified as ‘Secret’ to protect the lives of the individuals involved.
439. There is no evidence of payment for any of the unauthorised disclosures made by former
DCS David Cook. However, there is evidence that he hoped to profit from his activities in the
future. For example:
i. DCS Cook began to discuss with Michael Sullivan the prospect of writing a book,
‘the Book Project’, about the investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan as early
as 2006.364 It was for this purpose that he provided material to Michael Sullivan.
One email from DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan stated:
‘The main thing I ask is that we
1. Make an early agreement as to how we are going to do this and work

towards it
2. Keep it to ourselves to prevent professional problems and infiltration as

you will soon find out
3. Keep it absolutely factually based
4. Do not expose secret police methodology
5. Split everything 50/50[.]’365
357 Operation Edison Appendix B review of emails and attachments, EDN002279001, various dates.
358 Email from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, EDN001819001, 28 June 2010.
359 Evidence summary, document attached to email dated 28 June 2010, EDN001820001, undated.
360 Email from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, EDN001121001, 09 April 2010.
362 Operation Edison material held by the Metropolitan Police DPS, PNL000267001, p2, para 5ii, 10 September 2017.
363 Edison Report, EDN002248001, pp6-7, paras 35-38, June 2019.
1100
ii. An email from former DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan, dated 02 June 2010, enclosed
information about two of the Defendants in the Abelard Two Investigation, extracts
from listening-device material obtained during Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges, and a
list of corrupt former police officers associated with the Defendants, including details
of their convictions. DCS Cook wrote, ‘[t]he attached file may be of some interest re
background […] the project is lodged in my mind about hoping to get something out of
this otherwise I am saddled with a mortgage that I neither want or need’.366
iii. In an email dated 26 February 2011, DCS Cook enquired of Glen Campbell, ‘[n]ot sure
there is much on it but what would a copy of a certain PI’s367 hard drive [sic] worth’.368
440. There is ample evidence that former DCS David Cook knew that he was disclosing
information which should not be disseminated. For example:
i. Attached to an email dated 27 October 2009 from former DCS Cook to Michael
Sullivan was a report on an unrelated and unsolved murder in 1996 which named
suspects and had been sent to the Abelard Two Investigation by Essex Police.369
It was described as being ‘[n]ot for further circulation’.370
ii. An email on 02 November 2009 contained information relating to violent crime.

DCS Cook wrote: ‘Mike, This will give you some great background of the levels of
violence the Vians are engaged in. It is absolutely not for further circulation.’371
iii. On 09 October 2010, Glen Campbell emailed former DCS Cook: ‘Let me know when
I can collect the 1999 Southern document […].’ Former DCS Cook replied saying
that he had them electronically and could send them anytime, but he wanted ‘some
assurances about how they will be used. I cannot afford for them to be blazoned
across a TV screen.’372
iv. An email dated 23 February 2011 from DCS Cook to Michael Sullivan referring to a
matter unrelated to the murder of Daniel Morgan stated, ‘attached is the conspiracy by
Glenn [Vian] and Garry [Vian] that was captured by the probe we deployed through the
house we purchased. With regards the other stuff, if I can find a way of getting it out
without causing any problems I will see what I can do.’ This document was classified
as ‘Restricted’.373
v. By 05 October 2013, former DCS Cook had obtained possession of a Metropolitan

Police document wanted by writer/journalist Peter Jukes, and emailed to say that that
he had obtained possession of the documentation ‘totally on the QT via a circuitous
route and I would not want the person who has control of it to know I have it’.374
367 The letters ‘PI’ were interpreted by the Independent Police Complaints Commission as being an abbreviation for Private Investigator.
371 ‘Review of Exhibit KRR/50’, Review of Exhibit KRR/50’, Emails from former DCS David Cook to Michael Sullivan, IPC001321001, p5,
item 23, undated.
372 ‘Investigation into complaint made by William.J. REES’, IPC001411001, p18, paras 135-136, 14 December 2016.
374 Edison Report, EDN002277001, p34, para 5.33, 04 February 2020.
1101
441. Former DCS David Cook is reported to have told the Independent Police Complaints
Commission that ‘he accepted that he should not have sent confidential documents and this
would never have been authorised. He did not attempt to argue that there was any legitimate
investigative purpose for disclosing the information and it would appear to have been sent
simply to assist the book project.’375
442. Former DCS David Cook’s reason for the ‘Book Project’ was to set ‘the record straight’,
and in justification of his many disclosures to journalists, former DCS Cook spoke repeatedly of
correcting misapprehensions, his wish to ‘show the integrity of his investigation’, protecting the
reputation of the police and acting in the public interest.376
443. The unauthorised disclosures by DCS David Cook were investigated, as stated above, in
three different enquiries (see Chapter 9, Post-Abelard Two).
444. In Operation Longhorn, it was decided by the Head of the Crown Prosecution Service
Organised Crime Division, Gregor McGill, that there would be no prosecution:
‘I am satisfied that the broad extent of the criminality has been determined and that
I can make a fully informed assessment of the public interest. I am satisfied that the
public interest does not require a prosecution in this case and that this case should not
445. In the BBC Panorama case, the matter was not referred to the Crown Prosecution Service
by the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, Deborah Glass, who
decided that there was no indication ‘that criminal offences may have been committed’ and that
even if there were, ‘there is no realistic prospect of the full code evidential and public interest
charging tests being met and so it would be inappropriate for the matters in the report to be
considered by the DPP [Director of Public Prosecutions]’ and ‘I have accordingly decided not
to refer this investigation to the DPP.’378 The matter was not referred on the basis that it could
not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that former DCS David Cook had provided the
documents to the BBC Panorama programme broadcast on 14 March 2011.
446. In the report of Operation Edison, it was noted that, despite being under investigation in
Operation Longhorn, former DCS David Cook continued to disclose material to journalists.379
The nature of that material in large part related to the alleged corrupt relationship between
members of the press and private investigators.380 The purpose of disclosing the information
from reading the email content, appears to have been in part to expose this corrupt
relationship.381
447. As was the case in Operation Longhorn, there was no full investigation of all the
unauthorised disclosures and the retention of police materials. A very limited preliminary
investigation report was sent to the Crown Prosecution Service.
378 Commission delegate decision regarding early referral to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), p10, 03 January 2017.
379 Investigative advice of Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, pp62-63, para 6.23, 04 February 2020.
380 Investigative advice of Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, p61, para 6.16-6.18, 04 February 2020.
381 Investigative advice of Senior Specialist Prosecutor Michael Gregory, EDN002277001, p61, para 6.16-6.18, 04 February 2020.
1102
448. The Reviewing Lawyer noted that ‘the disclosure of information covering these headings
[occurred] in 2012-2014 when there was a real national focus on the conduct of journalists
and those who worked for them, was capable of raising or contributing to an important matter
of public debate about serious impropriety, significant unethical conduct and significant
incompetence. Given that the issues were still current in the public domain, the likely public
interest served by this information in my view was medium to high.’382 It was therefore decided
that there would be no prosecution, because of the existence of a potential defence by former
DCS David Cook that his activities were justified as being in the public interest.
449. Former DCS David Cook was a very senior officer with direct access to the
Assistant Commissioner at the Metropolitan Police until 2011, and to senior managers
in the Serious Organised Crime Agency until his resignation in 2013. There were
mechanisms available to him through which he could have brought his concerns about
failings in the investigations of Daniel Morgan’s murder, and his concerns about the
activities of corrupt police officers, the media and private investigators to the attention
of his managers in both organisations. He had written a report in 2006 which was
submitted by AC John Yates to the Metropolitan Police Authority about the investigations
into the murder of Daniel Morgan. He had access to all the material he needed to bring
concerns to the attention of the police in both the organisations in which he served (see
Chapter 7, The 2006 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority). Since 1998, there
have been statutory protections against detrimental treatment or victimisation for those
who in the public interest raise a concern about alleged wrongdoing including corrupt,
illegal or unethical behaviour under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. Former DCS
Cook could have taken this route had he felt unable to take any other route. He chose
not to do so.
450. It is surprising that a senior police officer, faced with the possibility that there would
be no successful prosecution of a murder because of lack of evidence, should conclude
that the suspects were guilty and that he was justified in removing confidential and
secret investigation materials to his own home in order to write a book which would ‘set
the record straight’. It is equally surprising that a senior officer, concerned about police/
press corruption (which inevitably involves unlawful dissemination of material), should
conclude that these matters would be best dealt with by engaging in further unlawful
dissemination of material to journalists and others.
451. It is even more surprising that senior lawyers should conclude that former DCS
David Cook had a public interest defence for his criminal behaviour that was so strong
that it could not be challenged. This sends an appalling message to officers of all ranks
about how the criminal justice system views such conduct, which is in breach of all the
fundamental duties of a police officer.
1103
452. It is accepted that policing has long been understood as a profession in which officers
stand together – a ‘blue wall’. That blue wall was intended to enable and support the fight
against crime. Those working in policing are often in a unique position to bring evidence of
wrongdoing by colleagues to their superiors. However, in some circumstances those within
policing ranks who have sought to report wrongdoing have also experienced the blue wall,
and have been ostracised, transferred to a different unit, encouraged to resign, or have faced
disciplinary proceedings themselves. Members of anti-corruption units in police forces have
experienced hostility and rejection because of the work which they have been appointed to do.
453. Standard 10 of the Police Code of Ethics 2014 now tells officers, ‘[y]ou have a positive
obligation to question the conduct of colleagues that you believe falls below the expected
standards and, if necessary, challenge, report or take action against such conduct’. It also states
that ‘[i]f you feel you cannot question or challenge a colleague directly, you should report your
concerns through a line manager, a force reporting mechanism or other appropriate channel’
and that ‘[t]he policing profession will protect whistleblowers according to the law’.383
454. There are now statutory protections against detrimental treatment or victimisation for those
who in the public interest raise a concern about alleged wrongdoing including corrupt, illegal
or unethical behaviour under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. There is also national
guidance published by the College of Policing on their website in 2016, which provides for
the following:
i. If a person raises a genuine concern, there should be no risk of reprisal or

consequence if they are mistaken.
ii. Forces need to put robust processes in place to ensure harassment or victimisation of
those reporting concerns is not tolerated.
iii. Reports should be kept confidential and if a person reporting a concern wishes to
remain anonymous, they should be able to do so.
iv. The person reporting concerns must be consulted and kept updated throughout the
investigation.384
455. Police officers and police staff who report alleged wrongdoing are, therefore, not only to be
protected against discrimination but also to be supported by line managers, to be encouraged
to seek the assistance of their union or staff association and, where necessary, to be referred
for specialist help from occupational health units. The recent approach to whistleblowing is a
significant improvement in terms of principles and policy. The Panel notes that there may be a
considerable gap between theory and practice when it comes to safeguarding whistleblowers.
383 College of Policing, Code of Ethics, p15, paras 10.2-10.4, July 2014.
384 https://www.college.police.uk/News/College-news/Pages/reporting_concerns.aspx
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456. The Public Disclosure Act 1998 introduced arrangements to support ‘protected
disclosure’ in specified circumstances. The act of protected disclosure is more
commonly referred to as ‘whistleblowing’. Until very recently there has been continuing
cultural resistance to measures to protect whistleblowing. Despite this, there are, and
have been for a long time, processes through which police officers who wish to address
corruption can do so. Officers are under an ethical duty to report known wrongdoing and
do not have the right to act unlawfully themselves in the pursuit of their aims. To do so is
to act corruptly.
RECOMMENDATION
457. It is recommended that Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire &
Rescue Services conduct a thematic investigation of the operation of the practices and
procedures introduced following the adoption of the Code of Ethics in 2014 to determine
whether sufficient resources are available to ensure appropriate protection of those
police officers and police staff who wish to draw alleged wrongdoing to the attention of
their organisations.
7.6 Concluding remarks

458. The Panel has found evidence of corruption in the linkages between serving police
officers and private investigators, and in particular with Southern Investigations (later Law &
Commercial) at the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder and afterwards. The Panel has also found
corruption in the linkages between Southern Investigations and former police officers, some
of whom had been dismissed and others who had retired while disciplinary procedures were
pending, but who continued to obtain information and assistance from former colleagues within
the Metropolitan Police. The documentation indicates that these linkages were used in an illegal
trade in confidential information, much of it police information, via private investigators to the
media. In particular, the information was sold to the News of the World, the media organisation
named in the Panel’s Terms of Reference385 and which accounted for an increasing proportion of
Southern Investigations’ business by the early 1990s. The involvement of serving police officers
in trading in confidential information obtained illegally is a form of corruption. It was also a
breach of the rules of professional conduct for editors.386
459. The Panel has traced in the documentation the increasing concern of the Metropolitan
Police about this illicit trade in information that continued to develop in the 1990s and was
reflected in the intelligence gathered by operations such as Nigeria/Two Bridges, which showed
that Southern Investigations/Law & Commercial was operating as a hub of corruption.

386 ‘Editors’ Code of Practice’, The Press Complaints Commission, https://accountablejournalism.org/ethics-codes/UK-Press-Complaints.
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460. The discussion above reflects the concerns expressed in the advisory report by Elizabeth
Filkin QC,387 commissioned to assist the Metropolitan Police in preparing its evidence for the
Leveson Inquiry388 in the wake of the 2011 ‘phone hacking’ scandal involving the News of the
World. The report called for more extensive, open and impartial provision of information to the
public and drew attention to concerns about:
i. senior police officers working in the media after retirement;
ii. the lack of a coherent policy for police relations with the media;
iii. police media contacts being mediated by former police officers, some of them private
investigators; and
iv. the lack of a corporate media strategy in the Metropolitan Police.
461. The report of Elizabeth Filkin quoted the allegation made by John Whittingdale MP,
Chairman of the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sports Select Committee:
‘The only reason that I can think that the hacking enquiry was not fully pursued was
that it was a story that the police did not wish to uncover. They did not want to damage
their relationships with News International. It was appalling negligence if not corruption.
I fear that the damage to public confidence in the police as a result of the hacking
scandal will be colossal.’389
462. In December 2020, the Metropolitan Police told the Panel that its current media policy
describes the principles underpinning the way the Metropolitan Police communicates with the
media. It explained that ‘it is aligned to the College of Policing’s Guidance on Relationships with
the Media and has been updated, taking account of Lord Justice Leveson’s public inquiry and
other recent relevant reports including the Filkin report.’
8 Confronting corruption and incompetence

463. An inability to explain its acknowledgment of the impact of corruption on the Morgan
One Investigation and institutional defensiveness were a hallmark of the Metropolitan Police
responses to challenges to its failure to bring anyone to justice for the murder Daniel Morgan.
The admissions of corruption in 2011, more than 24 years after the murder, were unclear.
Confronting corruption required a fresh, thorough and critical look at the original investigation
and those which followed.
8.1 Integrity and conflicts of interest

8.1.1 Freemasonry
464. The possible impact of relevant police officers’ membership of the Freemasons, and
their consequential Masonic loyalties, has been a cause of suspicion and distrust by those
investigating the murder of Daniel Morgan. Membership of the Freemasons requires the
swearing of solemn oaths, on pain of death if breached, of secrecy and obedience to the
387 Elizabeth Filkin, ‘The ethical issues arising from the relationship between the Police and the Media: Advice to the Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis and his Management Board’, p33, January 2012.
388 Lord Justice Leveson, Inquiry into The Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, 2011-2012. (Report 29 November 2012).
389 Elizabeth Filkin, ‘The ethical issues arising from the relationship between the Police and the Media: Advice to the Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis and his Management Board’, p8, January 2012.
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mysteries of Freemasonry. The Panel has seen no evidence that Masonic connections were
a factor in Daniel Morgan’s murder, nor that they were improperly deployed to frustrate the
investigations into it. However, there is evidence of the concern about the extent to which
Masonic loyalties might conflict with those which police officers owe to each other and to
the public by virtue of their office. Although the Panel has seen no evidence that Masonic
connections were a factor in the murder, or that they were improperly deployed to frustrate
the investigations into it, the documentation shows that suspicions were entertained by
investigating officers over several decades.
465. Some of the police officers prominent in the first investigation of the murder of Daniel
Morgan were Freemasons. It is known that DS Sidney Fillery was a Freemason, and became
Master of two different Lodges in 1993 and 1996.390 The following were also Freemasons:
DC Alan Purvis,391,392,393 DC Peter Foley,394 DI Allan Jones,395 DS Malcolm Davidson (in the
1970s),396 DC Duncan Hanrahan,397 PC Derek Haslam,398 DC Michael Crofts,399 DC Kinley
Davies400 and DCI Wallis.401 The police officer whose death by suicide was thought by some
to be linked to the murder of Daniel Morgan, DC Alan Holmes, was the Master of his Lodge.402
No link was established between the death of DC Holmes and the murder of Daniel Morgan.
The evidence indicates that the suggestion originated with Jonathan Rees.
466. Evidence showed that DC Alan Holmes’s death by suicide was linked to a major anti-
corruption investigation against Commander Ray Adams. Commander Adams described himself
as ‘a lapsed member’ of the Freemasons. DC Holmes left a suicide note which stated among
other things that ‘I have been forced to inform on a CID Police Commander’.403 By some this
was construed as referring to his Freemason’s oath, but it could as easily have simply referred
to the personal and professional loyalty he had for a senior officer.
467. When in 1988 Jonathan Rees made a complaint against D/Supt Douglas Campbell and
other police officers involved in the original investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan,
D/Supt Campbell was told that Jonathan Rees’s complaint against him was being financed
by ‘Police Officers with Masonic connections’.404 Jonathan Rees was questioned about this in
March 1988. He did not respond to the questions put to him.405 Jonathan Rees was initiated into
the Freemasons on 20 November 1991.406
468. DCI David Zinzan, who led the covert side of the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation,
was aware that suspects in the case were ‘corrupters of police’. The possibility that Masonic
connections might be used for corrupt purposes caused DCI Zinzan to be concerned about the
proximity of his incident room to the offices of Law & Commercial (alternative premises were
390 Intelligence report, MPS099613001 p679, 24 January 2000.

391 Witness statement DC Alan Purvis, MPS036855001, p7, 26 November 1992.
392 Witness statement of a Detective Constable l, MPS035995001, p3, 07 August 1990.
393 Interview of DC Peter Foley on 03 April 1987, PNL000052001, pp317-318, 03 April 1987.
394 Interview of DC Peter Foley, MPS010609001, pp64 and 68, 03 April 1987.
395 ’Result of A1881’, MPS068415001, 08 April 2008.
396 Panel interview with former DS Malcolm Davidson, PNL000196001, p10, 20 October 2015.
397 Intelligence report, MPS099714001, p315, 02 November 2009.
398 Officers report, MPS008801001, 02 December 1988.
399 Officers report, MPS008801001, 02 December 1988.
400 Panel interview with former DC Kinley Davies, p4, 12 June 2016.
401 Witness statement of Police Officer N21, MPS077976001, p2, 02 February 2007.
402 The report of Wagstaff, para 9, 05 November 1987.
403 The report of Wagstaff, para 319, 05 November 1987
404 Interview of Jonathan Rees, MPS011591001, p56, 03 March 1988.
405 Interview of Jonathan Rees, MPS011591001, p56, 03 March 1988.
406 Information report, MPS099613001, p679, 24 January 2000.
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located) and he was insistent that his team should be vetted by the Complaints Investigation
Bureau, and that enquiries should be made as to whether the officers were Freemasons, which
in DCI Zinzan’s view would ‘preclude them from being on the enquiry team’.407
469. In 2007, a statement to the Abelard Two Investigation by former Police Officer N21, who
had worked on the Catford Crime Squad at the time of the murder of Daniel Morgan, highlighted
the significance of Freemasonry in the Catford Crime Squad:
‘In relation to the hierarchy DCI Wallis was in charge however I believe he was very
much influenced by Sid [DS Sidney Fillery]. It was well known that membership to the
masons was rife in the police especially in the CID. Sid and DCI WALLIS were masons.
Sid held a higher position in the same lodge as DCI WALLIS. Later on in my career
when Sid had actually left the police he got me to drive him to a lodge meeting where
I remember seeing a lot of police officers. They appeared to still show Sid respect even
after the murder of Daniel Morgan.’408
470. The Panel has received information from a former police officer in the Metropolitan
Police at the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder. He stated that he believed that ‘the corruption
of freemasonry influenced every attempt at seeking the truth in the initial Morgan criminal
investigation and subsequent enquiries’.409 He wrote about the adverse influence of Freemasonry
on Operation Countryman, about prosecuted police officers’ associations with criminals
and about officers who were protected by Freemasonry during investigations conducted in
Operation Countryman, investigations that were alleged by some to have been obstructed and
flawed (see paragraph 60).
471. The question as to whether Masonic membership is incompatible with a police officer’s
duty to serve all citizens impartially was systematically reviewed in a report, Freemasonry in the
Police and the Judiciary, from the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons in March
1997. Some commentators have argued that ruling Masonic membership incompatible with the
position of a police officer would breach human rights principles. The Committee did not find
membership of the Freemasons to be ‘incompatible’ with the holding of public office, but the
Committee did conclude that the fact of membership should be known.410
472. Some prominent police spokespersons continue to believe that Masonic membership has
a corrupting influence within the police. For example, in 2017 Steve White, outgoing Chair of the
Police Federation, publicly expressed the view that certain police reforms were being blocked
by police officers who were members of the Freemasons. Their influence in the service was, he
felt, thwarting the progress of women and officers from black and minority ethnic communities.
He stated that:
‘[w]hat people do in their private lives is a matter for them. When it becomes an issue
is when it affects their work. There have been occasions when colleagues of mine have
suspected that Freemasons have been an obstacle to reform.
407 Report by DCI David Zinzan, MPS054322001, p2, 14 March 2001.

408 Witness statement of former Police Officer N21, MPS077976001, p2, 02 February 2007.
409 Letter from a Detective Sergeant, PNL000271001, p3, 26 September 2019.
410 Freemasonry in the Police and the Judiciary, Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, March 1997.
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‘We need to make sure that people are making decisions for the right reasons and there
is a need for future continuing cultural reform in the Fed [sic], which should be reflective
of the makeup of policing.’411
473. Steve White was not in favour of prohibiting officers from being Freemasons but thought
that they should have to declare their membership. There was an inequity. Police officers
were prohibited by law from being members of trade unions and political parties because of a
possible conflict of interests,412 but there is/was no such regulation/rule against membership
of the Freemasons which demands an oath of secrecy and obedience to the organisation
above all else.
474. The former Metropolitan Police officer (referred to at paragraph 470 above) contacted the
Panel in 2018 and said that the notion that the influence of Freemasonry was now ‘peripheral’ in
the police was ‘laughable’. Officers, particularly Criminal Investigation Department (CID) officers,
joined the Freemasons as a means to ‘get on in the job’. Their seniority in the Freemasons
meant that their influence within the police was sometimes at odds with their rank in the police.
He cited the example from his own experience of a uniformed Police Constable driver being
able to challenge a senior officer.413
475. Public trust, and trust between police officers, is vital for the operational effectiveness
of the police. It is for this reason, following the Nolan Principles of Public Life, in particular
Principles 4 and 5 – Accountability and Openness414 – that the College of Policing Code of
Ethics stipulates that:
‘[m]embership of groups or societies, or associations with groups of individuals,

must not create an actual or apparent conflict of interest with police work and
responsibilities.
‘The test is whether a reasonably informed member of the public might reasonably
believe that your membership or association could adversely affect your ability to
discharge your policing duties effectively and impartially.’415
476. At the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder, there was no official record of whether or not a
police officer was a member of the Freemasons. This is still the position in the Metropolitan
Police, unless officers volunteer the information. After the introduction of a voluntary register
of Freemason membership in 1999, the Home Office reported on the database of voluntary
responses by police officers, indicating that ‘only 37% of police officers and support staff
declared whether or not they were Freemasons’416 compared with a 96 per cent reply rate by
judges and an 88 per cent reply rate by magistrates.
411 Vikram Dodd, 2017, ‘Freemasons are blocking reform, says Police Federation leader’ The Guardian, 31 December,
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/dec/31/freemasons-blocking-reform-police-federation-leader.
412 Panel interview with Steve White, p3, 07 March 2018.
413 Panel interview with a former Detective Constable who related information about an alleged Flying Squad practice, pp2-3, 12 June 2018.
414 Principles of Public Life, Committee of Standards in Public Life, 1995, commonly known as the “Nolan Principles” after Lord Nolan, first
chairperson of the Committee.
415 College of Policing, Code of Ethics, p10, paras 6.3-6.4, July 2014.
416 ‘Freemasonry in the Police Service’, Note by the Home Office, 17 January 2002, p.2 in Metropolitan Police Service document compilation
MPS109461001, p22, 17 January 2002.
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477. On the issue of whether the voluntary registration information is disclosable, the Home
Office concluded that the information would be disclosable, taking into account security
considerations: ‘[o]ur understanding is that, because the consent is both explicit and informed,
then the data has been processed and is held fairly in line with the requirements of Data
Protection legislation and ECHR [European Convention of Human Rights]’.417
478. The Panel has considered the legal implications of a requirement to declare membership
and, in particular, whether it would conflict with the rights to privacy and freedom of association
of police officers and staff. The Panel is not persuaded that it would. In its consideration, the
Panel has taken into account both domestic and European law and reviewed the relevant
guidance issued by the European Court of Human Rights.418 Declarations of membership could
be held by the relevant Chief Officer of Police (the Commissioner or Chief Constable) or, in
the case of a Chief Officer, by the relevant Police and Crime Commissioner419 and could be
discoverable from them on the making of a complaint that the suspected connection called into
question the proper exercise of the functions of a constable or other police force employee as
required by the Police Regulations Act 2003. The Regulations state the following:
‘A member of a police force shall at all times abstain from any activity which is likely
to interfere with the impartial discharge of his duties or which is likely to give the
impression amongst members of the public that it may so interfere.’420
RECOMMENDATION
479. All police officers and police staff should be obliged to register in confidence
with the Chief Officer of their police force, at either their point of recruitment to the
police force or at any point subsequent to their recruitment, their membership of any
organisation, including the Freemasons, which might call their impartiality into question
or give rise to the perception of a conflict of loyalties.
8.2 Lessons not learned

480. In 2013 Lord Condon, Commissioner between 1993 and 2000, assessed the
Metropolitan Police’s approach to confronting corruption in relation to the murder of Stephen
Lawrence, saying:
‘it would have been better in terms of the Met as a whole if there had been an individual
officer who was corrupting the inquiry.
‘[t]he irony is that I actually think it would have been not damaging to the Met, in a way
it would actually have been far better for the Met, because the notion of one rogue
417 ‘Freemasonry in the Police Service’, Note by the Home Office, 17 January 2002, p.2 in Metropolitan Police Service document compilation
MPS109461001, p22, 17 January 2002.
418 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Right to respect for private and family
life, home and correspondence, updated 31 August 2019; European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 11 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, Freedom of assembly and association, first edition 31 May 2020; European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 14 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, Prohibition of Discrimination, first edition 31 December 2019.
419 In the Metropolitan Police area of London, the Mayor of London is the Police and Crime Commissioner although this function is undertaken
by the Deputy Mayor responsible for the Mayor’s Office of Policing and Crime.
420 The Police Regulations 2003, sch1, para 1.
1110
officer corruptly sabotaging the inquiry would have been less damaging than the notion
that there was [sic] systematic failures in that inquiry.
‘I actually think it would have been better in terms of the Met as a whole if there had
been an individual officer who was corrupting the inquiry.’421
481. The Panel has identified the following lessons not learned over the years:
i. The ‘rotten apple approach’ to dealing with corruption does not meet the needs
of a police service seeking to minimise, and even prevent corruption, in its ranks:
The Metropolitan Police’s focus on corruption as a ‘debilitating’ factor in the Morgan
One investigation and a ‘significant factor’ in preventing the Metropolitan Police from
bringing those responsible for Daniel Morgan’s murder to justice, mainly centred on
the alleged corrupt behaviour of one officer, DS Sidney Fillery. This has had the effect
of deflecting attention from multiple wider organisational failings.
ii. The failure to acknowledge corruption means that associated management

issues are not dealt with: Had the Metropolitan Police admitted in the 1980s
and 1990s that it believed that corruption had played a part in the failure of the
investigation to bring to justice those responsible for the murder of Daniel Morgan,
safeguards against corruption could have been improved, including for example,
better management and oversight of individual officers.
iii. National and local policing policies should be complied with unless there
is reasonable justification for non-compliance recorded in a reasoned
decision: There has been a failure or inability to ensure compliance with national
and Metropolitan Police policies and procedures for investigation over much of
the 34 years since the murder of Daniel Morgan (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One
Investigation; and Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation).
iv. Proper oversight and management are essential to the effective conduct of
investigations: By 2006 there were national standards and procedures for the
management and oversight of police investigations, yet those procedures were not
adhered to during the Abelard Two Investigation. AC John Yates was determined
to retain control of the investigation, and he overruled all attempts to introduce
proper governance, yet he did not provide the necessary control of the investigation.
The consequence of this was that the integrity of the investigation was irreparably
damaged, despite the best efforts of many of those who worked on it.
v. Those who oversee investigations must in their turn be subject to scrutiny:

There is a need for oversight of senior officers to prevent the kind of situation which
evolved during Abelard Two. The Panel has seen no evidence of any oversight of AC
John Yates in the context of his role in the Abelard Two Investigation. His stature within
the Metropolitan Police made it impossible even for senior officers to challenge him
successfully, though some less senior officers did their best to manage the situation
and limit the damage caused. Had his performance been appraised effectively, it is
probable that DCS Cook would have been removed as Senior Investigating Officer and
proper governance would have been introduced.
421 Lord Condon interview with Mark Ellison, p2, 08 October 2013.
1111
vi. Any review of an investigation, particularly where there have been identified
failures in that investigation, must be conducted in a manner which is calculated
to identify, explain and provide remedies for any defects: During 2011-2012, the
Metropolitan Police and the Crown Prosecution Service carried out a review of the
Abelard Two Investigation to identify the lessons which might be learned from what
had happened. There were multiple instances in the review report of situations in
which many of the failures in the Abelard Two Investigation were not clarified and the
opportunities to learn from them were lost. These included not dealing:
a. adequately with the lack of governance, particularly after 2008, in the Abelard Two
Investigation, saying merely that it ‘had been managed outside the “mainstream”
governance systems already in place [….] Whilst that may have had some
merit and maintained confidentiality […] it resulted in a complex management
arrangement.’422
b. with the detail of the problems consequential upon the multiple roles held by
former DCS David Cook both before and after his departure from the Metropolitan
Police, and simply saying that the Senior Investigating Officer ‘should be
employed by the police force that holds primacy’ so that they are ‘directly
accountable to the GOLD Group and associated governance arrangements’
(bold emphasis in original).423
c. with the delayed disclosure of material relevant to witness James Ward which was
a critical factor in the collapse of the criminal proceedings against the Defendants
who were acquitted.
The way in which the detailed facts were presented in the review report of the Abelard
Two Investigation (in a number of appendices) had the effect of simplifying and
minimising the content of the main review document and did not assist the reader to
learn from the failures of the past. The consequence of the lack of a fully reasoned
analysis of what went wrong was that further opportunities to prevent such situations
recurring were lost.
vii. The statutory arrangements under which the Independent Police Complaints
Commission was operating424 did not enable it to make representations to
the Serious Organised Crime Agency (now the National Crime Agency) or
the Metropolitan Police about possible organisational learning which might
derive from the investigation which had been conducted. There was therefore
no opportunity for the Independent Police Complaints Commission to alert these
agencies to the damage potentially caused by the unauthorised disclosure, nor to the
opportunity for organisational learning about the Metropolitan Police’s process for and
controls over the disclosure of information to journalists.
424 Police Reform Act 2002, s26.
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9 Conclusion
482. It is generally acknowledged that corruption is endemic in policing across the world.
History shows that its recurrence is cyclical: new structures, training, policies and practices
are introduced, and there is a period during which significant attention is paid to the risks of
corruption, to preventing it from re-establishing itself in a particular policing organisation. Then
gradually the focus diminishes, attention turns to other valid and pressing problems, and the
time is ripe once more for corruption to grow.
483. During the years since Daniel Morgan was murdered, the Metropolitan Police has made
attempts to limit corruption within its ranks. Most importantly, the anti-corruption drive of Lord
Condon in the 1990s and the establishment of a new anti-corruption initiative in the late 1990s
are testament to the recognition by senior officers that corruption is a very serious problem
which will only be defeated in particular circumstances if there is robust and determined action.
484. Policing has as its primary purpose the protection of life and property. Its targets are those
who engage in crime. Criminals need the help of corrupt police officers and police civilian staff
to counter the activities of those good officers who seek to investigate and prosecute crime.
Corruption can take the simplest of forms – the provision of a name, maybe even an address
to someone who wants it for nefarious purposes, the decision not to issue a speeding ticket in
return for some benefit. These are crimes and what is needed, if the anti-corruption strategy is
to succeed, is an ability to recognise and deal with corrupt activities on every occasion on which
they occur. A zero-tolerance approach to corruption sends a very serious message to those
who contemplate ‘bending the rules’ or ‘doing someone a good turn’ by the corrupt use of the
powers which attach to the office of constable.
RECOMMENDATION
485. Security clearance processes for police officers and police staff are fundamental to
any anti-corruption strategy. Regular updating of the security status of each individual
is essential to identify any concerns and to enable action to be taken in respect of such
concerns. Notwithstanding the assurance received by the Panel from the Metropolitan
Police in December 2020, the Metropolitan Police should remain vigilant at all times to
ensure not only that it vets its employees in accordance with its new measures, but also
that it has adequate and effective processes to establish whether its staff are currently
engaged in crime.
486. Such are the means of those engaged in more serious crime, and particularly of those
engaged in organised crime, that they can devote very significant resources to corrupting
individual officers. Once corrupted, such officers are on a downward slope and are susceptible
to blackmail and other criminality. It is for this reason that the fight against corruption must be
ever present in policing, and that every police officer, regardless of rank, should comply with the
primary obligation to uphold the Rule of Law at all times.
487. The Panel has not found any evidence in any of the investigations conducted over the past
34 years, capable of proving police involvement in the murder of Daniel Morgan. It is accepted
that this does not demonstrate that there was no involvement by a police officer or officers in
the planning and execution of the murder. However, the Rule of Law demands that there can
1113
be no conclusions about guilt unless they are evidence-based and proved in a court. No such
trial has ever occurred despite the repeated arrests of individuals and the carrying out of four
investigations.
488. The Panel has, however, found evidence of police corruption in relation to the investigation
of Daniel Morgan’s murder.
489. The Metropolitan Police placed its concern for its own reputation above the public interest,
when it concealed from the family of Daniel Morgan and from the wider public the failings in
the first murder investigation and the role of corrupt officers in the lack of success in gathering
evidence to convict those responsible.
490. The lack of candour displayed by the Metropolitan Police in relation to the investigation of
the murder Daniel Morgan over so many years constitutes a barrier to the proper accountability
of the Metropolitan Police (see subsection 5.3 above, Lack of candour).
491. In calling the Metropolitan Police and other relevant agencies of the Criminal Justice
System to account, the Panel has experienced significant impediments.
492. While the appropriate protection of investigation materials is obviously important and
necessary, the way in which material was released to the Panel was unsatisfactory and slow.
The Panel began work in September 2013 but did not begin to receive the investigation
documentation held by the Metropolitan Police until January 2015.
493. The Panel’s offices were fully secured and equipped for the storage of sensitive and secret
material, in accordance with Government rules. However, the Metropolitan Police imposed
additional and restrictive conditions on how sensitive material could be accessed and, in most
cases, would not allow copies of such material to be held at the Panel’s offices, even when
that material comprised complex, bulky and lengthy documents, which demanded careful
analysis (see Chapter 11, The Challenge of Securing Cooperation). Instead, on each occasion
on which a Panel member needed to access information classified as ‘Secret’, a lengthy
journey to Metropolitan Police premises situated on the outskirts of East London was required.
This caused considerable delay.
494. The problem was compounded by the fact that some material was excessively and
inconsistently redacted before being placed on the Panel’s database. On occasion the
redactions were found to be clearly unnecessary. This also contributed to delay, as the
unredacted versions of the documents were held in the Metropolitan Police premises in
East London.
495. There was not insignificant obstruction to the Panel’s work. At times the contact between
the Panel and the Metropolitan Police resembled police contact with litigants rather than with a
body established by the Home Secretary to enquire into the case, and to which the Metropolitan
Police had promised to make ‘exceptional and full disclosure’.425 The Panel concludes that,
despite the express commitment by the Metropolitan Police in the Terms of Reference to
support the Panel’s work, the Metropolitan Police did not approach the Panel’s scrutiny with
candour, in an open, honest and transparent way, making exceptional and full disclosure of
relevant documents. The way in which material was disclosed or withheld had the effect of
making the Panel’s work more difficult (see Chapter 11).
425 Terms of Reference, para 5(c).
1114
RECOMMENDATION
496. In the interest of transparency and public accountability, all public institutions
should be under a duty to cooperate fully with independent scrutiny bodies created by
Government, such as the Panel.
497. Institutional defensiveness and lack of transparency is not unique to the investigation
of the murder of Daniel Morgan. In 2013, the Francis Report426 referred to defensiveness
and lack of openness to criticism among the negative aspects of the culture identified in the
healthcare system in Mid Staffordshire. The Gosport Independent Panel referred in its report
published in June 2016 to ‘the tendency of individuals in organisations, when faced with
serious allegations, to handle them in a way that limits the impact on the organisation and
its perceived reputation’.427 Again the context was the healthcare system. In relation to the
Hillsborough disaster, the Right Reverend James Jones wrote of ‘an instinctive prioritisation of
the reputation of an organisation over the citizen’s right to expect people to be held to account
for their actions’.428
498. Concern about the lack of transparency linked to institutional defensiveness has led to the
establishment of a statutory duty of candour in the National Health Service. There have been
calls for a similar duty in relation to the police. In 2017, a Bill was introduced429 in the House of
Commons which sought to require public institutions, public servants and officials to act in the
public interest with candour and frankness. The Bill fell after first reading, with the calling of the
2017 General Election, but the concerns that inspired the 2017 Bill remain.
499. The Panel recognises the complex challenges of guaranteeing public accountability
of an organisation such as the police, not least because of the requirement to protect
information in accordance with the law. However, the challenges should not prevent
frank and prompt accounts to the public about mistakes and wrongdoing. Rather than
undermining public trust in the police, such candour would in the long run restore and
maintain public confidence, which is essential for effective policing. The Panel agrees
with other independent inquiries about the need for a duty of candour for public services,
including the police. Such a duty of candour would not result in any compromise of the
necessary protection of information in accordance with the law.
426 Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, Sir Robert Francis QC (The Francis Report), pp85-86, para
1.116, 2013.
427 Report of the Gosport Independent Panel, p321, para12.51, 20 June 2016.
428 The Right Reverend James Jones, ‘The Patronising Disposition of Unaccountable Power’, HC 511 2017-18, 01 November 2017.
429 The Public Authority (Accountability) Bill 163 2016-17, introduced as a Private Members’ Bill by Andy Burnham, Member of Parliament for
Leigh, 29 March 2017.
1115
500. Following the Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel and the attempt to
introduce the Hillsborough Bill, the Right Reverend James Jones proposed a charter to which
organisations such as the police service should commit themselves, which would include a duty
to ‘approach forms of public scrutiny – including public inquires and inquests – with candour,
in an open, honest and transparent way, making full disclosure of relevant documents, material
and facts’.430
RECOMMENDATION
501. The Panel recommends the creation of a statutory duty of candour, to be owed by
all law enforcement agencies to those whom they serve, subject to protection of national
security and relevant data protection legislation.
502. The family of Daniel Morgan suffered grievously as a consequence of the failure to
bring his murderer(s) to justice, the misinformation which was put into the public domain,
and the denial of failings in investigation, including failures to acknowledge professional
incompetence, individuals’ venal behaviour, and managerial and organisational failings.
Unwarranted assurances were given to the family, and the Metropolitan Police placed
the reputation of the organisation above the need for accountability and transparency.
The lack of candour and the repeated failure to take a fresh, thorough and critical look
at past failings are all symptoms of institutional corruption, which prioritises institutional
reputation over public accountability.
Most people become police officers to serve the public, not to engage in corrupt
activities. They do very difficult and, at times, dangerous work without compromising
their integrity. It is accepted that the management of policing is a very complex process,
but there has been a failure over decades to tackle police corruption effectively and to
resource anti-corruption work properly.
There is evidence that, despite efforts over many years, a culture still exists that inhibits
both organisational and individual accountability. The response to corruption in all its
forms must comply with the law and demonstrate candour and adherence to the Police
Code of Ethics. The internal and external structures designed to ensure integrity and
ethical conduct must be properly resourced, in order for policing to be truly accountable,
for corrupt officers to be confronted and for honest officers to be affirmed.
430 The Right Reverend James Jones, ‘The Patronising Disposition of Unaccountable Power’, HC 511 2017-18, p7, 01 November 2017.
1116
Chapter 11: The challenges of
securing cooperation and lessons
for future Panels
Contents
1 Introduction
2 The Metropolitan Police, Home Office and the Panel: Securing access to documents
and other important material
3 Panel access to the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES)
4 Obtaining historic and current police policy documentation
5 Obtaining material from other criminal justice agencies
6 Access to retired and serving Metropolitan Police officers
7 Access to sensitive Metropolitan Police documents
8 Support from the Home Office
9 Conclusion
1 Introduction
1. The Panel’s Terms of Reference required it to ‘obtain and examine all relevant documentation
from all relevant bodies, governmental and non-governmental alike, including but not limited to
papers held by;
• The Metropolitan Police;
• The Hampshire Police;
• The Crown Prosecution Service and the Attorney General’s Office;
• The Police Complaints Authority (as it was then);
• The Independent Police Complaints Commission;
1117
• Southwark Coroner’s Court; and
• The Home Office.’
and to ‘interview and receive relevant information from individuals who are willing to provide
that information’.
2. The Panel commenced work formally on 17 September 2013. The Terms of Reference
stated that ‘[i]t is envisaged that the Panel will aim to complete its work within 12 months of the
documentation being made available’. This created an expectation that the Panel’s work would
be done within a year. There was, however, no anticipation of the very significant difficulties and
delays which would be encountered in accessing documentation, in all its forms, nor of the large
volume of material (in excess of a million pages) which would have to be considered. The Panel
was acutely aware of that expectation and of the distress caused to the family of Daniel Morgan
by the length of time which has been necessary to do this work. In fact, the final documents
were not received from the Metropolitan Police until March 2021.
RECOMMENDATION
3. Prior to the establishment of any future non-statutory inquiries or panel, there should
be an honest and full discussion between the relevant police force(s) and the sponsoring
Government department, to enable a realistic, informed assessment of the nature
and volume of documentation in all its forms, and of the scope and depth of the work
required. Framework procedures, capable of being customised, for the disclosure of
material to such panels should be available, so as to avoid excessive delays in reaching
agreement for access to material. Deadlines should only be established when the
relevant inquiry or panel has had the opportunity to review the programme of work it is
required to do. Any such deadline should be supported with an analysis explaining how
the projected deadline has been identified, and why that is a reasonable time within
which the work should be completed.
2 The Metropolitan Police, Home Office and the Panel:

Securing access to documents and other important material
4. In July 2013, after the formation of the Panel was announced, but before the Panel itself was
established, discussions were initiated between the Home Office, the Metropolitan Police and
Sir Stanley Burnton, who was appointed as the first Chair of the Panel in May 2013, about the
disclosure arrangements necessary to enable the Panel to start its work in September 2013.
These arrangements included ensuring the Panel had access to the vast amount of materials
(including documents, exhibits and evidence in other forms)1 held by the Metropolitan Police
and other organisations.2 The great majority of the material required by the Panel was held by
1 The Panel was established by the Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, following the precedent of the Hillsborough Independent Panel and
was intended largely to involve a review of documentation. Unlike the Hillsborough Independent Panel, the Panel was not charged with
establishing an archive.
2 Including but not limited to the Metropolitan Police, the Hampshire Constabulary, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Attorney General’s
Office, the Police Complaints Authority, the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the Southwark Coroner’s Court and the Home Office;
see Terms of Reference, para 4(b).
1118
Chapter 11: The challenges of securing cooperation and lessons for future Panels
the Metropolitan Police. It included both material originating within the Metropolitan Police
and material held by the Metropolitan Police but originating from other police forces and
organisations.
5. During these preliminary discussions, the Metropolitan Police favoured sole access by the
Chair of the Panel, Sir Stanley Burnton, to highly sensitive documents, relating to ongoing
enquiries, informants and other issues. The Metropolitan Police envisaged that the Chair of the
Panel alone would review these documents and make decisions about their relevance on behalf
of the Panel. AC Cressida Dick, the senior officer in the Metropolitan Police with responsibility
for supporting the Panel’s work, believed she had reached agreement with Sir Stanley Burnton
at a meeting on 13 July 2013 as to how to proceed. This was not reflected in documents
produced by the Panel or the Home Office at the time, and the proposed approach was rejected
by the Chair and the other members of the Panel as being inconsistent with the concept of a
Panel reviewing material together. The arrangement was unworkable.
6. It was necessary to prepare a Disclosure Protocol to set out the terms, responsibilities and
expectations of both the Panel and the Metropolitan Police, about sending and receiving the
documents required for the Panel to be able to do its work.
7. On 29 August 2013, a draft Disclosure Protocol was sent by the solicitor acting for the
Panel to the Metropolitan Police solicitor. The draft Protocol said the Panel would need access
to all documents in unredacted form, except where this was prohibited by law, and that special
provisions might be necessary for the most sensitive documents. Provision was also made for
the ultimate publication of documents with the Report, with the final decision as to publication
resting with the Panel. Any documents published without the owner’s consent would have
had to be redacted, which would mean some content would be blacked out within the Panel’s
Report. The Panel decided it would keep any content which was redacted in the final published
Report, so that the public would know content had been redacted. The Panel reserved the right
to bring the full unredacted contents of the Report to the attention of the Home Secretary.
8. On 27 September 2013, the Panel’s solicitor met lawyers for the Metropolitan Police and
stressed that all the members of the Panel had agreed that they must view the most sensitive
material in unredacted form, so as to be able to confer and decide on its relevance. The Panel
was not willing to proceed on the basis that the Chair of the Panel alone would decide on the
relevance of the most sensitive material. The meeting concluded with a proposal for work
on the Disclosure Protocol to focus on speeding up delivery of the overwhelming majority of
documents which were not considered to be highly sensitive, and for further consideration of
whether a separate Disclosure Protocol was needed for the most highly sensitive material.
9. On 09 October 2013, AC Cressida Dick wrote to the Chair of the Panel that ‘we have now
reached an impasse’. She affirmed that ‘the Metropolitan Police is absolutely committed to
demonstrating transparency and assisting the Home Office appointed Independent Panel’. She
described an approach ‘whereby you, as Chairman of the Panel, are able to see all the sensitive
documentation and pass to the remaining members what you feel appropriate (broadly mirroring
the statutory position in respect of public inquiries)’ as ‘absolutely necessary given the risk
issues associated with the revelation of sensitive information’.3
3 Letter from AC Cressida Dick to Sir Stanley Burnton, 09 October 2013.
1119
10. In order to achieve better clarity as to what was proposed by the Metropolitan Police in
respect of disclosure to the Panel, the Panel’s lawyers sent a revised draft of the Disclosure
Protocol to the Metropolitan Police on 23 October 2013 which provided for disclosure of
sensitive material to be made in the first instance only to the Panel Chair. This was then followed
by a further amended draft of the Disclosure Protocol by the Panel’s lawyers which was sent
to the Metropolitan Police on 28 October and provided for sensitive disclosure to be made to
the entire Panel in redacted form. The Metropolitan Police responded on 12 November 2013,
rejecting the revised Protocol of 28 October, but confirming its agreement to the revised draft
Protocol sent on 23 October.
11. Consequently, and after further discussion, on 19 November 2013, the Panel advised the
Home Office Senior Responsible Officer for the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel that it was
the unanimous view of the Panel members that disclosure must be to the Panel in its entirety
and not just to the Chair of the Panel. The letter was sent just after the resignation of Sir Stanley
Burnton as the Chair of the Panel,4 but was agreed by the Panel, including the Chair, prior to
his departure.
12. On 23 November 2013, AC Cressida Dick met the Home Office Senior Responsible Officer,
and confirmed the Metropolitan Police’s commitment to the principle of full and exceptional
disclosure to the Panel as a whole.
13. On 04 December 2013, the Home Office Senior Responsible Officer advised the Panel
that AC Cressida Dick was no longer insisting on the approach to disclosure which she had
previously described. On 05 December 2013, following a meeting between Michael Kellett,
the lead Panel member, the Home Office Senior Responsible Officer, and AC Dick to address
the practicalities relating to disclosure of material to the Panel,5 the Panel and all its staff
signed confidentiality agreements to ensure the security of the material disclosed to it by the
14. On 13 December 2013, the Panel sent a full outline of the work it had undertaken to obtain
documentation from the Metropolitan Police to both the Metropolitan Police solicitor and to the
solicitor representing members of the family of Daniel Morgan.6 It sought disclosure of material.
It had already agreed to reimburse the Metropolitan Police for the services of the officers
appointed to assist the Panel. On 18 December 2013, the Metropolitan Police responded,
and provided a catalogue of documents and initial reading materials to the Panel. This was
to enable the Panel to identify more easily the sequence in which materials to be disclosed
by the Metropolitan Police should be prioritised for indexing and digitisation,7 and to begin
refining its strategy for starting work on the substantive material. The Panel was grateful to the
Metropolitan Police for the provision of initial reading material and the catalogue of documents.
The Metropolitan Police had still not agreed to the Disclosure Protocol. The Panel at this time
did not have a Chair.
15. While waiting for the Disclosure Protocol to be agreed, and the actual provision of the
documents, the Panel employed staff and a team of data-indexers (also sometimes known
as ‘box-loggers’)8 to review the material in the hundreds of crates identified as relevant by the
Metropolitan Police (originally identified as 613 crates) so that the contents of each crate could
4 Sir Stanley Burnton resigned from the Panel for personal reasons on 13 November 2013.
5 Metropolitan Police minute of 5 December 2013 (in email of 13 October 2020).
6 Letter from Panel members to Raju Bhatt, 13 December 2013.
7 Digitisation on Lextranet could be carried out at a rate of 20,000 pages per week. Report from the Home Office box-logging manager,
September 2013.
8 Employed under contract with the legal firm Fieldfisher LLP.
1120
be catalogued in preparation for scanning onto Lextranet.9 The task of the data-indexers was
to index and code each item in each of the crates in preparation for its digitisation and transfer
to Lextranet, which would be the point when the Panel would be able to access the documents
and commence its work. The Metropolitan Police team were helpful and professional in their
cooperation with the indexers employed to assist the Panel.
16. The data-indexing was conducted systematically after an initial review by the Metropolitan
Police to identify material too sensitive to be made available to the data-indexers and digitised
onto Lextranet. Any such sensitive material was either redacted or removed by the Metropolitan
Police, and markers were inserted in the documentation indicating where redaction or removal
of material had occurred.
17. On 29 April 2014, in preparation for taking up her work and to help inform her decisions as
to whether to accept the post of the Chair of the Panel, Baroness Nuala O’Loan met with AC
Cressida Dick. This was to discuss matters of priority for the Panel including disclosure. At the
meeting of 29 April 2014, Baroness O’Loan stated that she and the Panel would require full
access to all documentation and to the relevant HOLMES accounts. AC Dick agreed that Panel
members and lawyers would have full access, ‘so long as the Panel were security cleared to the
appropriate level’, and that there should be standalone access to the Daniel Morgan HOLMES
accounts.10 On the basis of these assurances, Baroness O’Loan confirmed to the Home
Secretary that she would agree to become the Chair of the Panel. However, she was receiving
medical treatment and was unable to start work in London until September 2014. The Panel
became fully operational at that point having been restricted in its work at the request of the
family of Daniel Morgan since March 2014.
18. On 05 September 2014, the Panel sent a revised version of the draft Disclosure Protocol to
the Metropolitan Police, based on the discussions previously held and reflecting AC Cressida
Dick’s agreement to all members of the Panel having access to all documents, as agreed with
Baroness O’Loan in April 2014.
19. On 17 September 2014, at a further meeting between members of the Panel and AC
Cressida Dick to discuss disclosure, the Metropolitan Police said that, while they accepted that
they needed to make arrangements for the disclosure of material, an agreement still needed to
be reached as to who in the Panel should have access to the most sensitive documents. This
was not acceptable to the Panel and Baroness O’Loan emailed AC Dick on 18 September to
say this, and to highlight the difference between what was now being offered and what had
been said in the meeting in April 2014, before she had agreed to become Chair.11
20. Two months later, on 18 November 2014, the Panel’s solicitor informed the Panel that he
had reached agreement on the Disclosure Protocol with the Metropolitan Police’s Directorate
of Legal Services. On 16 December 2014, the Panel received written notification that the
Metropolitan Police had agreed the content of the Disclosure Protocol, a Confidentiality
Agreement and a Data Processing Agreement with the Panel.12 The Disclosure Protocol
9 Lextranet is an electronic document management system. It can only hold documents marked to the level ‘Restricted’ in the Government
Security Classification system. The Government Security Classification Policy came into force on 02 April 2014 and describes how HM
Government classifies information assets to ensure they are appropriately protected. It applies to all information that Government collects,
stores, processes, generates or shares to deliver services and conduct business. There are three classifications of material – ‘Official’, ‘Secret’
and ‘Top Secret’. Under the historical Government Protective Marking Scheme material was divided into ‘Unclassified’, ‘Protected’, ‘Restricted’,
‘Confidential’, ‘Secret’ and ‘Top Secret’.
10 Email from Baroness O’Loan to AC Cressida Dick referring back to the meeting, 18 September 2014.
11 Email from Baroness O’Loan to AC Cressida Dick, 18 September 2014.
12 Letter from AC Cressida Dick to Baroness O’Loan, 16 November 2014. (The letter was dated 16 November 2014 but sent in an email on
16 December 2014.)
1121
provided that all members of the Panel and its Counsel should have access to all of the
documentation. The agreements were essential to the Panel beginning its work and fulfilling its
Terms of Reference, and the delay in getting agreement resulted in a very significant delay to the
Panel’s ability to start work.
21. The Panel received its first documentation, digitised and accessible on Lextranet, in
January 2015. It took almost a year for the process of identifying and cataloguing all the
individual documents, available at that time, to be completed. During this period the documents
were added to Lextranet incrementally. The material, once uploaded, was then accessible to
the Panel and its Secretariat. However, access to sensitive material which could not be placed
on Lextranet was only available to the Panel, its Counsel and its Secretary at Metropolitan
Police premises on the outskirts of East London. This required two hours travelling time on each
occasion for which there was a need to examine such documentation. This inevitably caused
delay to the Panel’s work. On only a few occasions were such documents made available in
Central London.
22. After the Disclosure Protocol and related documents had been agreed with the Metropolitan
Police, the Panel was able to enter into similar agreements with the other document providers.
23. The Panel had no statutory powers to compel production of documents by the Metropolitan
Police or the other bodies and agencies with whom it dealt. It had, therefore, to proceed with
the consent of the organisations concerned, who had been committed in the Panel Terms
of Reference to ‘exceptional and full disclosure’13 as agreed between each of the relevant
organisations and the Home Secretary.
24. Both the Panel and the Metropolitan Police had a duty to ensure that the material
disclosed to the Panel was treated appropriately at all times, and that no harm to
individuals potentially at risk should occur as a result of disclosure to the Panel.
The Panel was, and has continued to be, fully aware of the security implications of
its work and has done everything in its power to ensure the safe handling of all the
information disclosed.
However, the Panel considers it was neither necessary nor proportionate for the
processes for disclosure and document handling to have taken such a long time to be
agreed with the Metropolitan Police. The Panel, having been announced by the Home
Secretary in May 2013, did not have access to all the initial documentation, and thus
was unable to commence its work properly, until December 2015.
RECOMMENDATION
25. Arrangements must be made in future to ensure that any Panel has timely access
to the material required to do its work. Organisations that promise to make ‘exceptional
and full disclosure’ should be prepared to do so both within the letter and the spirit of
such a promise.
13 Terms of Reference of the Independent Panel, para 5(c).
1122
2.1 Requests for further information and the Metropolitan Police response
26. Once the Panel was able to start looking at and understanding the contents of the material
disclosed to it by the Metropolitan Police, it began to make necessary requests for additional
disclosure of documents and other material relevant to its Terms of Reference. In addition, it had
become clear that the Panel needed a single point of contact in the Metropolitan Police to act
as a ‘clearing house’ for answers to the questions that the Panel had as it worked through the
material now uploaded onto Lextranet. To this end, the Panel and Metropolitan Police agreed on
an ‘additional disclosure and information request’ process to enable this to happen effectively.
27. By 13 May 2015, the Panel had already submitted 63 Additional Disclosure and Information
Requests, which required cooperation from a range of different departments in the Metropolitan
Police. By May 2016, the total of Additional Disclosure and Information Requests had increased
significantly to 253. The following list provides examples of the range of requests the Panel
submitted, once material had started to be disclosed and uploaded to Lextranet:
i. Disclosure of personnel files, professional standards records, and intelligence held in

relation to former and serving Metropolitan Police officers of interest to the Panel.
ii. Requests for the disclosure of specific documents referred to in the material disclosed
that could not be found within the documentation provided.
iii. Disclosure of historical policy documents, guidelines and standard operating

procedures relating to murder investigations, murder reviews, exhibit-handling,
informant-handling, public affairs and media liaison, family liaison, liaison with
coroners and freemasonry.
The Panel asked, in 2015, for policy documents relating to murder investigations and
did not receive anything specific to the Metropolitan Police.
iv. Disclosure of documents from the Directorate of Legal Services.
v. Clarification of the context of police investigations referred to in the material

disclosed, including investigation suspects, offences being investigated and
investigation outcomes.
vi. Disclosure of investigation reports and advice reports to the Crown Prosecution
Service and, where relevant, underlying investigation material.
vii. Requests for clarification of the information management aspects of historical and
contemporary anti-corruption intelligence-gathering and investigations.
viii. Disclosure of intelligence reports provided to Mark Ellison QC for his review of police
corruption in connection with the investigation into Stephen Lawrence’s murder
(these were requested because there had been a suggestion that one or more officers
involved in the Morgan One Investigation had also been involved in the Lawrence
investigation, although that later proved not to be the case).
1123
ix. Requests for explanatory notes from the Metropolitan Police in terms of (i) how
the most recent investigation into Daniel Morgan’s murder, Abelard Two, reviewed
historical probe material and the quality assurance mechanisms in place, (ii) all forensic
activities that have been conducted since the withdrawal of the Prosecution case
during the pre-trial proceedings in 2011, and (iii) all non-forensic lines of enquiry that
had been pursued since the withdrawal of the Prosecution’s case in 2011.
x. Administrative requests to locate material.
In total, the Panel had submitted 415 Additional Disclosure and Information Requests to the
Metropolitan Police by 2020.
28. The Panel recognises the demands that the Additional Disclosure and Information
Requests placed on the Metropolitan Police, and the Panel’s work benefited significantly
from having a single point of contact in the Metropolitan Police. Where the single point
of contact could respond directly, the Panel received prompt acknowledgement of the
request made and very often received a substantive response on the same day. It was
also most helpful to the Panel that, on occasion, the single point of contact readily
volunteered information to assist the Panel and help identify relevant material to meet
its requests.
3 Panel access to the Home Office Large Major Enquiry

System (HOLMES)
29. The Panel knew that access to the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES)
would be essential if it was to fulfil its Terms of Reference effectively and with expedition.
HOLMES is a computerised database designed to support the police investigation of major
crimes – mainly murders but also any complex serious incident such as stranger rape or even
large-scale fraud. It was introduced in the mid-1980s and was one of the consequences of the
Yorkshire Ripper investigation, which had demonstrated the inability of the police to manage
effectively major investigations of linked crimes across more than one police force area. It is the
primary tool used during major and complex criminal investigations in all police forces in the UK.
30. An examination of how HOLMES has been used by the police in an investigation can reveal
an enormous amount about the nature of the investigation that would not be revealed simply
by reading hard-copy documents from the investigation. The database is searchable using free
text, and also searchable by other standard criteria such as name, description, address, etc.
People within the system can be linked to addresses, locations, exhibits or any other category
within the system. Accounts given by witnesses can be cross-referenced and compared.
Documents are also cross-referenced, so that for example, an action (a written instruction to
carry out a task in connection with a particular line of enquiry) will be linked to statements,
officers’ reports, exhibits and follow-on actions. The system is also able to produce useful legal
documents such as disclosure schedules and exhibit lists, and management tools such as lists
of outstanding actions, completed actions, personnel lists, etc. It is far more effective than the
Lextranet system with which the Panel was provided.
1124
31. Access to HOLMES was essential to the Panel’s ability to carry out its task efficiently,
effectively and fully. Among other things, it can be used to inform a judgement as to whether
investigations were carried out in accordance with established policy at the time, to enable
the detection of any anomalies in procedures, to help to identify where there might be missing
documents, and to establish whether actions were carried out in accordance with instructions.
32. The Panel notes that the need for access to HOLMES for the purposes of reviewing
the investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder was clearly apparent to DAC John
Yates when, in 2005, he wrote about the Terms of Reference for the Metropolitan
Police Authority’s proposed review of the investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder:
‘This will require substantial and dedicated resources, accommodation and access to
IT (HOLMES) etc.’14
33. A central theme of the Panel’s enquiries has been an examination of possible police
corruption in the investigations of the murder of Daniel Morgan. Had the Panel omitted to
investigate the considerable scope for anyone in a police investigation team to divert an
enquiry by manipulating the computerised records, it would have failed in its work. The Panel
needed to be able to compare what was on the HOLMES accounts with what was in the hard
copy documents which had been made available, as the way in which the information flow in
the investigation was handled might reveal practices pointing to corruption by police officers.
The most effective and expeditious way to examine this risk was by using HOLMES, and the
management and audit systems built into it, rather than solely by examining the paper records.
34. The Panel also needed access to the HOLMES accounts to assure itself that all the paper
records had been provided by the Metropolitan Police, and to establish whether any relevant
documents were missing. From the outset, the Panel had requested both secure access to the
relevant HOLMES accounts and disclosure of all the documentation related to the murder of
Daniel Morgan, for digitisation and uploading to Lextranet. Ultimately, the Panel found that some
documents were only available on the HOLMES accounts and others were only available in hard
copy. Without access to the HOLMES accounts, those documents which were not available in
hard copy were unavailable to the Panel.
35. Lengthy negotiation with the Metropolitan Police about the Panel’s access to HOLMES
caused further considerable delay to the Panel’s work.
36. In September 2013, at a meeting between the lead Panel member, Michael Kellett, and
DCS Mick Duthie, who had lead responsibility within the Metropolitan Police for HOLMES
and liaison with the Panel, the Panel formally sought access to the HOLMES database in
respect of the investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder. Discussions followed and access to
HOLMES appeared to be accepted by the Metropolitan Police. Indeed, on 17 October 2013, in
response to Michael Kellett’s reply to an email of 11 October, in which he had stated that he was
arranging for the Panel’s staff to receive training on the use of HOLMES, DCS Duthie stated that
the Metropolitan Police could provide the training at cost if required.
37. In October 2013, DCS Mick Duthie sent Michael Kellett an email discussing some
of the features of the Daniel Morgan investigation ‘accounts’ on the HOLMES database.
He concluded:
‘The accounts are not in a great state to be honest but we would be happy for you to
visit us and have a look. We could get an officer, with an in depth knowledge of the
14 File note by DAC John Yates, MPS109484001, p55, 18 October 2005.
1125
case and accounts to show you them over a day or so and then you might be able to
consider how you want to go forward. If you or another researcher etc wanted access
then they would need to have been given the necessary training, be up to date on
HOLMES and then have a vetting level to view “Confidential” documents. I’m sure we
will be able to do all of this if you require it but I think it would be better to have a look
at the system first.’
38. Michael Kellett arranged to view the database on 26 November 2013. He was told by former
DI Noel Beswick that the Abelard Two account contained ‘Confidential’ and ‘Secret’ material.
This was contrary to HOLMES conventions, which restrict input of data onto the system to that
protectively marked ‘Restricted’15 or below. Michael Kellett agreed that this issue would have to
be resolved.
39. On 05 December 2013, Michael Kellett and the Home Office Senior Responsible Officer
met with AC Cressida Dick and DCS Mick Duthie to discuss a number of issues. Towards the
end of the meeting, access to HOLMES was mentioned in passing by Michael Kellett. AC Dick
expressed a strong reluctance to allow the Panel to access the system, although she did not
explicitly refuse it at that point. She did not give any explanation for her stance, other than
that the Panel was not carrying out a ‘review’ of the Morgan investigations (in the sense of an
internal review as set out in the Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures
(MIRSAP)). The Metropolitan Police minute of the meeting notes her saying, ‘[The Panel] is not
there to give a view on how well or badly the investigation was run. The [Terms of Reference are]
about why people have not been brought to justice.’
40. On 20 January 2014, in response to an email from Michael Kellett in which the Panel’s
draft research strategy was shared with the Metropolitan Police, DCS Duthie observed that the
strategy appeared to indicate that the Panel was ‘again’ seeking access to HOLMES. Michael
Kellett replied to the effect that he was unclear why DCS Duthie would have thought that the
Panel had changed its view about this at any point.
41. On 13 March 2014, Michael Kellett, the Panel’s solicitor and two members of the Panel’s
Secretariat met DCS Mick Duthie, the Metropolitan Police solicitor and former DI Noel
Beswick. DCS Duthie informed the meeting that AC Cressida Dick was ‘not supportive’ of the
Panel’s desire to access HOLMES, primarily because almost the entire database (not just the
Abelard Two Investigation) contained ‘Secret’ classified material in the form of the identities
of informants, and the material on the system could not be redacted.16 This came as a further
surprise to the Panel and its representatives, as under national guidelines governing the use of
HOLMES, the identity of informants should never be entered into an investigation’s HOLMES
account. The HOLMES system is not designed to hold secret material. The Panel is aware
that redaction of HOLMES accounts is not impossible, although it is time-consuming. It was
pointed out that access to HOLMES was a fundamental requirement for the Panel. DCS Duthie
requested that the Panel write to AC Dick to that effect.
42. On 20 March 2014, the Panel wrote to AC Cressida Dick pointing out, among other things,
that the Panel had received advice that it was possible to redact the HOLMES system in order
to protect the security concerns that the Metropolitan Police had, and that it required access to
the HOLMES accounts.17
15 These were the classifications in use at the time.

16 Minute of meeting, 13 March 2014.
17 Letter from Michael Kellet to AC Cressida Dick, 20 March 2014.
1126
43. The Panel was restricted in its work from March to September 2014 (see paragraph 17
above) but in order to prepare for access to HOLMES, basic HOLMES training was provided to
the Panel’s staff and it purchased a HOLMES user licence. Despite this, the Metropolitan Police
maintained its refusal to provide the Panel with access to the HOLMES accounts created in
respect of the Daniel Morgan investigations. It did so on the grounds that the Panel had no need
to have access to HOLMES as all the information was in the documentation which would be
provided to the Panel subject to the agreement being reached on the Disclosure Protocol.
44. Without access to HOLMES, the Panel would have been unable to verify that all the
information relating to the various investigations was in the documentation provided, and the
Panel would also not have had access to the search functions available on HOLMES.18 The
Panel repeated its explanations about why access to documentation did not equate with access
to HOLMES, enumerating the advantages, including the information which HOLMES contained
relating to the decision-making process and management of police investigations, such as the
investigations into the murder of Daniel Morgan.
45. On 17 September 2014, Baroness O’Loan and Michael Kellett had a meeting with AC
Cressida Dick to discuss disclosure (see paragraph 19 above) and access to HOLMES by the
Panel and its staff. AC Dick’s stance at this meeting appeared to be to restart the negotiations
from the very beginning. On 18 September 2014, Baroness O’Loan emailed AC Dick expressing
surprise that the matter of access to HOLMES by the Panel was being treated by the
Metropolitan Police as if it were a fresh issue, and with no reference to what had been agreed
in April 2014 at the meeting she had had with AC Dick.19 The Panel’s position was, consistently,
that it required access at the Panel’s secure offices to unredacted HOLMES accounts for all
materials relating to the murder of Daniel Morgan.
46. On 15 October 2014, Michael Kellett, the Panel’s Counsel, the Panel’s solicitor and the
Panel’s consultant expert on HOLMES met the Metropolitan Police’s solicitor and others. At this
meeting, former DI Noel Beswick queried why the Panel wished to access HOLMES, given that
everything that was on HOLMES was in the material being made available via Lextranet but that
not everything on Lextranet was on HOLMES. Michael Kellett stated that it was not simply a
question of viewing the material but also of checking the integrity of the way HOLMES had been
used. Former DI Beswick suggested in that case the Panel could send its own expert to do an
integrity check of the system. Michael Kellett said that a ‘one-off’ check was insufficient and
constant access would be needed for the researchers.
47. The Metropolitan Police’s solicitor also questioned why the Panel wanted access to
HOLMES and why access at New Scotland Yard (the Metropolitan Police headquarters) would
not be sufficient. Michael Kellett pointed out that the Panel had been consistent from the outset
in requiring access to HOLMES at its offices. The Metropolitan Police solicitor then claimed that
this was the first time access had been requested in this way, that it had implications for the
Disclosure Protocol, and he would therefore have to take instructions.
48. The Metropolitan Police then offered to provide unrestricted access to HOLMES for Panel
members and legal advisors at New Scotland Yard. The effect of what was being offered by
the Metropolitan Police was that none of the Panel’s staff would have been able to access
the HOLMES accounts, which would have seriously disrupted the planned work and caused
18 The Panel considered it has a duty to check that this is the case, in light of the revelation in Mark Ellison QC’s report about shortcomings
in disclosure to Sir William Macpherson’s Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, to the 2012 Metropolitan Police Corruption Review and to Mark Ellison’s
Independent Review.
19 Email from Baroness O’Loan to AC Cressida Dick, 18 September 2014.
1127
further delay. Following the meeting, the Panel’s solicitor wrote to the Metropolitan Police with a
number of questions and asked for a response within two weeks.20 No reply was received, and a
reminder letter was sent.
49. On 30 October 2014, the Panel’s solicitor wrote to the Metropolitan Police stating: ‘As we
made clear at the meeting on 15 October 2014, the Panel requires two things in respect of the
relevant HOLMES account(s) in order to complete its task. The first is access to the complete
account(s) for members of the Panel and its legal advisers and there is an acceptance that this
access is likely to need to take place at MPS premises. The second is access to a standalone
copy of the relevant account(s) which has been redacted or sanitised so that it contains material
at RESTRICTED/OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE level which may be loaded on to a computer and
reviewed by the Panel’s research team at the DMIP office.’21
50. On 25 November 2014, the Panel agreed to appoint a HOLMES specialist, who would
view the HOLMES database at Metropolitan Police premises. This was solely as an interim
measure pending resolution of the requested access to the database at the Panel’s secure
offices. That expert was appointed so that the research on Lextranet could be informed by
knowledge of the content of the various HOLMES accounts.
51. On 10 December 2014, Michael Kellett had a further meeting with DCS Mick Duthie who
said that Metropolitan Police would not agree to the Panel having access to the HOLMES
accounts at the Panel’s offices and that a great deal of work would be needed to put the
database into a state in which there was no material remaining which should not have been
stored on HOLMES because of its security classification. The Metropolitan Police should
already have done this work, because, quite apart from the Panel’s request for access, by
keeping highly sensitive material, including ‘Secret’ classified material, on the HOLMES
system they were breaching the protocols concerning HOLMES. Michael Kellett reiterated
that the Panel needed HOLMES access at the Panel’s offices.
52. On 16 December 2014, AC Cressida Dick confirmed by letter the existence of six different
HOLMES accounts for the investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder and stated that there
were no HOLMES accounts for 11 other investigations which were relevant to the Daniel
Morgan murder investigation. AC Dick stated that it was not feasible for the Metropolitan Police
to provide access at the Panel’s offices to redacted HOLMES accounts for the Panel on the
grounds of ‘security, cost, time and benefit gained’. Her letter indicated that existing HOLMES
accounts could not be effectively edited. The Metropolitan Police could provide Panel members
and the Panel’s legal advisers with supervised access at Metropolitan Police premises to
unredacted HOLMES accounts.22 The Panel rejected the suggestion that there was a need to
edit the HOLMES accounts for the Panel’s purposes, as the Panel required access only for staff
with the appropriate level of security clearance.
53. AC Cressida Dick suggested in her letter of 16 December 2014 that, if the integrity of the
accounts was of concern to the Panel, the Metropolitan Police could permit a vetted HOLMES
expert to have supervised access to the HOLMES accounts at Metropolitan Police premises.
Following representations by the Panel, on 30 December 2014 AC Dick wrote to the Panel
confirming that the Panel, its legal representatives and the Panel’s HOLMES expert could have
20 Letter from Fieldfisher to the Metropolitan Police, 15 October 2014.

21 Email from Fieldfisher to Metropolitan Police solicitors, 30 October 2014.
22 Letter from AC Cressida Dick to Baroness O’Loan, 16 November 2014. (The letter was dated 16 November 2014 but sent in an email on
16 December 2014.)
1128
access to the unredacted material on HOLMES, but only at Metropolitan Police premises.23
In 2020, Commissioner Dick informed the Panel that her position with regard to the Panel’s
access to HOLMES was always made on the basis of the expert advice she had received.
54. AC Cressida Dick left the Metropolitan Police at the beginning of 2015 and AC Martin Hewitt
was appointed to succeed her. On 27 January 2015, Baroness O’Loan wrote to AC Hewitt
accepting the offer for the Panel’s HOLMES specialist to attend Metropolitan Police premises
and use the unredacted HOLMES databases. In her letter, the Chair emphasised that the Panel
was confident, given the HOLMES specialist’s background and security clearance, that there
was no necessity for supervision while he was undertaking his work at Metropolitan Police
premises. The letter also underlined the continuing importance to the Panel of having access to
HOLMES at the Panel’s secure offices, giving as an example the need to interrogate the Morgan
One database on HOLMES in the absence of a coherent murder investigation file.24 The letter
said the Panel was seeking access only to the particular HOLMES accounts which related to the
investigations concerning the murder of Daniel Morgan and, in the first instance, to the Morgan
One database.25 The letter pointed out that it is not uncommon for access to HOLMES to be
given to inquiries of this nature.26
55. On 25 February 2015, the Panel’s HOLMES specialist was provided with supervised access
to the HOLMES database at New Scotland Yard, but only under supervision. The Panel’s
specialist therefore could only access the HOLMES database in the presence of Metropolitan
Police staff. Every transaction he carried out on the database was recorded, as is normal, in
the audit log on the computer server. On every occasion on which the HOLMES expert wanted
to use the HOLMES system, he had to travel across London and was escorted throughout
his visits to the Metropolitan Police premises. On occasion he was told that he could not
be accommodated, because there was no-one to supervise him. However, the imperative
was getting access to HOLMES, even though the terms on which access was given were
unacceptable. The terms were also contrary to the principles of conducting an independent
inquiry. The Metropolitan Police subsequently offered to provide a pass for the Panel’s
HOLMES specialist so that an escort was not required. This offer was accepted, but no pass
was provided.
56. On 23 March 2015, in its regular report to the Home Secretary, the Panel explained the
very significant difficulties it had experienced including the unacceptable delay in reaching
agreement on access to documents and the consequential delay in the Panel’s work, and the
denial of the requested access to the computerised HOLMES system accounts relating to the
murder of Daniel Morgan.
57. On 25 March 2015, Michael Kellett, the Panel’s Secretary and its HOLMES expert
met DCS Mick Duthie and the head of the Metropolitan Police HOLMES Support Unit to
resolve the issue of the Panel’s access to the HOLMES database, which by then had been
outstanding for 18 months. Michael Kellett reiterated that the Panel wanted access at its offices.
The Metropolitan Police HOLMES Support Unit representative said that this was not possible
as it was contrary to policy, not just in respect of the Panel, but generally. DCS Duthie said that,
in any case, the Panel’s offices were not a secure police environment and that this was another
23 Letter from AC Cressida Dick to Baroness O’Loan, 30 December 2014.

24 As stated by AC Cressida Dick, ‘confusingly, part 1 of this file is split into two parts and is spread between the Morgan 1 and Hampshire
case material’.
25 The initial Morgan One Investigation account on MICA had been transferred to HOLMES by Hampshire Constabulary in 1988 during its
investigation.
26 Letter from Baroness O’Loan to AC Martin Hewitt, 27 January 2015. AC Hewitt took over responsibility for cooperation with the Panel after
AC Dick took up a post with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office.
1129
reason that such access would not be possible, despite the fact that security at the building had
been approved by the Metropolitan Police, and that the Panel was not the only sensitive body
housed there.
58. When asked whether the Metropolitan Police transferred the HOLMES database to the
Independent Police Complaints Commission when it was carrying out an investigation into the
Metropolitan Police, DCS Duthie confirmed this to be the case, saying the Commission had
statutory powers, whereas the Panel did not.
59. The head of the HOLMES Support Unit had earlier stated that she estimated that redacting
the ‘Secret’ and ‘Confidential’ material on the database would take about ten months to
complete. When asked how she had arrived at that estimate, she said that it was a rough
estimate and while it was not exactly a case of ‘finger in the air’ it was not far off being so.
DCS Duthie undertook to have another look at the timescale and to report back as soon
as possible.
60. On 05 May 2015, the Metropolitan Police agreed that the Panel could have a HOLMES
terminal at the Panel’s offices subject to Metropolitan Police satisfaction with regard to security.
The Panel’s offices had met all Government security requirements and had been assessed by
the Metropolitan Police prior to the Panel commencing its work. Enhanced security provision
required by the Metropolitan Police had been installed. On 23 June 2015, the Metropolitan
Police’s Directorate of Legal Services wrote to the Secretary to the Panel, advising that installing
HOLMES at the Panel’s offices would cost £26,278.31. The costing included almost £18,000
which would be payable to BT for cabling, network design, management of ordering supplies
and liaison with suppliers and senior technical assistance. Over £8,200 would be payable to
the Metropolitan Police contractor responsible for providing HOLMES, for project management,
technical assistance and its site survey (which alone would cost over £700 to do). It was stated
that there was also a real possibility that costs would increase further following a site survey of
the Panel’s offices.
61. In Autumn 2015, the Metropolitan Police undertook the survey of the Panel’s offices and
provided further estimates of the cost of installing the secure system for HOLMES access.
When challenged on the additional work which they had said would have to be carried out,
the Metropolitan Police subsequently indicated that it did not require further work after all.
At the end of 2015, when the Panel reviewed its outstanding work and estimated timescale
for completion, it decided in view of the cost of installing HOLMES, that it could not justify this
expenditure of public money at the (then) advanced stage of its research and so decided not to
pursue the matter further.
62. However, significant new information and voluminous material about the investigations
into the murder of Daniel Morgan continued to come to light. It became clear that the Panel’s
decision not to pursue the installation of a HOLMES terminal was premature. The Panel
subsequently revisited its decision not to proceed, and on 25 January 2018, a new request was
made to the Metropolitan Police for a HOLMES terminal to be installed in the Panel’s offices.27
63. On 16 March 2018, the Panel was told that the cost of installing a HOLMES desktop at its
offices had increased significantly from £26,278.31, as work would need to be done to establish
links from the Panel’s offices to the Metropolitan Police’s IT network. This could add a further
£40,000 to the cost. The Panel considered the cost (over £65,000) was now far too high for it
to commit to this. On 27 March 2018, the Panel requested a HOLMES laptop, to be used by its
27 Email from the Panel to DS Gary Dalby, 25 January 2018.
1130
HOLMES expert in the Panel’s offices. On 27 June 2018, the Metropolitan Police denied this
request on the grounds of security at the Panel’s offices.28 This was despite the fact that the
Metropolitan Police had, as stated previously, approved the Panel’s facilities to store ‘Secret’
material securely in its offices.
64. In view of the rejection of the request for a laptop with access to HOLMES, on the grounds
of inadequate security at its offices, on 27 July 2018 the Panel sought another site survey of its
offices by the Metropolitan Police and was given a cost for the further site survey of £4,000-
5,000. The Panel challenged this relatively high cost for such an exercise in its offices, but on
10 October 2018 approval was granted to commence the survey.
65. The Metropolitan Police completed its survey on 04 December 2018, and its survey
report was made available to the Panel on 30 January 2019.29 The report asked for
significant structural enhancements to allow a HOLMES laptop to be used in the offices. The
enhancements recommended to be made included new strengthened walls, a new stronger
secure door and reinforced windows.30 The Panel challenged the structural enhancement
requirements identified by the survey, and it was subsequently agreed by the Metropolitan
Police that these enhancements would not be required.
66. Finally, on 28 February 2019, the Panel decided, reluctantly, not to pursue HOLMES
installation any further due to the timescales for the work needed which was estimated to last
months. In view of the stage the Panel had reached with its research for this Report, it was
difficult to justify expenditure of over £60,000, especially since the Panel had been advised that
the work would take five to six months to complete, and the Panel had been quoted a further
£20,000 for the decommissioning of the HOLMES platform in due course, bringing the total
cost to £85,000. Additionally, the Panel and Metropolitan Police would have had to come to
agreement on a Memorandum of Understanding to provide the basis for access to HOLMES at
the Panel’s premises before it could be used. In light of the Panel’s experience of delays with
similar agreements since 2013, it was considered that this would take too long to achieve.
67. The Panel has therefore had to prepare its Report with limited access to the relevant
HOLMES databases by its HOLMES specialist visiting Metropolitan Police premises and
conducting checks supervised by the Metropolitan Police.
68. During the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, when staff had to work from home, the
Metropolitan Police agreed that the Panel’s HOLMES expert could use an encrypted HOLMES
laptop to access the relevant HOLMES databases at his home. The laptop was provided on
02 September 2020. It should have been provided in 2013.
69. In December 2020, the Metropolitan Police told the Panel that the facility to provide remote
access to HOLMES securely via the Cloud was not available when the Panel first requested
HOLMES access. However, from 2005 the Independent Police Complaints Commission (later
the Independent Office for Police Conduct) received copies of HOLMES accounts from police
forces, including the Metropolitan Police Service, upon request. The accounts were loaded on
to their server for use by their staff in their investigations. HOLMES was used on both desktop
computers and on secure laptops, although where the material had a Government security
28 Email from Metropolitan Police to Fieldfisher, 27 June 2018.

29 Email from the Metropolitan Police to the Panel, 30 January 2018.
30 Report on the Suitability of the Use of DMIP […], 05 December 2018.
1131
classification of ‘Secret’ or above, separate considerations have applied. Moreover, a member

of the Panel, while working in a different capacity in 2012 and 2013, was able to have a secure
laptop on which HOLMES was available.
70. There can be little doubt that the Metropolitan Police were determined not to permit
access to the HOLMES system which would have enabled the Panel to carry out its work
far more efficiently and effectively. Very significant resources had to be spent challenging
the continuing Metropolitan Police assertions about the difficulties of enabling the
requested access to the HOLMES system. This should not have happened. The Panel
would have been greatly helped in its work preparing this Report and would have been
able to complete its Report much sooner, had it had access to the HOLMES system in its
own offices from September 2013.
71. The Panel has never received any reasonable explanation for the refusal over seven
years by AC Cressida Dick and her successors to permit proper access to the HOLMES
accounts to the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel. The consequential major delays to the
Panel’s work, which inevitably added to the Panel’s costs, caused further unnecessary
distress to the family of Daniel Morgan.
RECOMMENDATION
72. All independent panels and inquiries examining police investigations should be given
full access to the associated HOLMES accounts at their secure premises when they
begin their work.
4 Obtaining historic and current police policy documentation

73. When assessing the behaviour of the police, and what they did or did not do to investigate
or review the murder of Daniel Morgan, it was necessary to consider the law, relevant police
policies, guidelines and standing orders as they existed in 1987 and as revised during the
subsequent investigations and reviews of the case. The Panel had significant difficulty in
accessing these documents.
74. Historical policing documentation is held by a variety of organisations, many of which, like
the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), have ceased to exist or have been replaced
by other organisations. Many of the relevant policy documents for the Metropolitan Police
were archived at its Heritage Centre in West Brompton, London, which was most helpful to the
Panel. Other organisations such as the College of Policing, The National Archives, the National
Crime Agency and the Crown Prosecution Service have also been of assistance to the Panel
in its work.
75. The National Crime Agency was particularly helpful in searching for and providing the Panel
with documentation originating with its predecessor organisation, the Serious Organised Crime
Agency. It also readily agreed to carry out research of the National Injuries Database and the
Home Office Homicide Index, so as to provide the Panel with a report concerning the frequency
and circumstances of homicides in which axes have been used.
1132
76. The material sought by the Panel included guidance manuals produced by the
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) – now the National Police Chiefs’ Council – which
were restricted documents and not publicly available. The first request for such material
– the Guidance on Debriefing Assisting Offenders, which was essential for the Panel’s full
understanding of the issues surrounding the debriefing in the Abelard Two Investigation –
was made in December 2013. The request and a follow-up reminder were not acknowledged.
Therefore, on 11 March 2014, the Panel sent a letter to the President of ACPO, Sir Hugh Orde,
explaining the Panel’s attempts to date to obtain documentation from ACPO and requesting his
personal assistance in the matter.31 The Panel was referred to the ‘ACPO lead’, a senior officer in
Merseyside Police. Over the next few months, the Panel was referred in turn to Nottinghamshire
Police, the Metropolitan Police, West Midlands Police and then back to the Metropolitan Police.
Only in December 2014 was the document finally made available to the Panel, a year after it was
first requested.
5 Obtaining material from other criminal justice agencies

77. Hampshire Constabulary conducted the second investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder.
Following agreement of the Disclosure Protocol with the Metropolitan Police in December 2014,
Hampshire Constabulary entered into a Disclosure Agreement in May 2015, and documents
were received between July 2015 and January 2017.
78. In September 2014, the Panel’s Counsel contacted the Crown Prosecution Service seeking
assistance to obtain Crown Prosecution Service documentation relevant to the Panel’s work.
Although the Disclosure Protocol and the Data Protection Agreement were designed to enable
the different providing organisations to release documentation to the Panel, it was understood
that the Crown Prosecution Service might face problems as regards its obligations under
section 19 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. After lengthy discussions,
agreement on disclosure was reached in June 2015.
79. The Panel received the first documentation from the Crown Prosecution Service in
November 2015. It sought from the Crown Prosecution Service only documentation which
had not already been provided by the Metropolitan Police or Hampshire Constabulary, but the
Crown Prosecution Service has limited archives, and document retrieval was, on occasion,
very difficult.
80. In the course of its work, it became necessary for the Panel to seek documentation from the
Criminal Cases Review Commission. However, under the terms of the legislation governing its
activities, the Commission is not permitted to share material with non-statutory inquiries.32 It was
therefore necessary for a Statutory Instrument to be passed by Parliament to enable disclosure
by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. The process of getting agreement, drafting, and
passing the Statutory Instrument into law took 13 months from June 2018 to July 2019. There
was some delay in passing the necessary Statutory Instrument because of the priority given to
Brexit-related work. However, disclosure by the Criminal Cases Review Commission happened
rapidly once the necessary legislative change had been made.
81. When the Panel was appointed, there was limited awareness of all the facts surrounding
the case. As the situation unfolded, more and more documentation was sought by and made
available to the Panel over several years. The Panel had no expectation when it started that
31 Letter from Panel to Sir Hugh Orde, 11 March 2014.

32 The Criminal Appeal Act 1995.
1133
court hearings and criminal investigations relating to the conduct of the investigation of Daniel
Morgan’s murder and associated issues would continue until April 2020. However, this is what
happened. As a consequence of the ongoing criminal investigations, the Panel was temporarily
denied access to documentation relevant to its work on a number of occasions. Its final receipt
of documentation occurred in March 2021.
RECOMMENDATION
82. In order to avoid most of the delays and difficulties inherent in this case, and in so
many other unsolved cases, there is a need for a review of the processes for archiving
historic material with a view to creating a system which can produce national and local
documents as required.
6 Access to retired and serving Metropolitan Police officers

83. During its work, the Panel found it necessary to contact serving and former police officers
to assist the Panel. Once the Panel began to access Metropolitan Police documentation
in December 2014 (the initial briefing pack and catalogue), and subsequently actual
documentation from January 2015 onwards, the Panel was in a position to identify the police
officers who had been involved with the investigations into the murder of Daniel Morgan,
and to consult with the Metropolitan Police about appropriate arrangements for confidential
communications from the Panel to be forwarded by the Metropolitan Police to relevant former
and serving police officers.
84. On 17 December 2014, the Panel became aware that the Metropolitan Police had circulated
a notice requiring any Metropolitan Police personnel who wished to contact the Panel to do so
through a Metropolitan Police single point of contact ‘to ensure that we have a full record of
these requests and any potential responses’. The Chair of the Panel wrote to AC Cressida Dick
that same day (17 December) asking the Metropolitan Police to ‘make it clear to all Metropolitan
Police officers and staff that it is open to them to contact the Panel directly and to provide it with
any information they consider relevant, in confidence and without reference to the single point of
contact or anyone else in the Metropolitan Police’.33
85. On 18 December 2014, a procedure was agreed with the Metropolitan Police for them to
forward confidential correspondence, under sealed cover, to retired police officers whom the
Panel wished to contact. Accordingly, the Panel provided the Metropolitan Police with letters to
two former officers, with a request for the letters to be delivered in the New Year.
86. On 06 January 2015, the Panel was informed that an email had been circulated to all
Metropolitan Police officers and staff stating that staff could contact the Panel directly, rather
than going through the Metropolitan Police’s Panel support team. The Panel’s solicitor arranged
a single point of contact and dedicated phone number for Metropolitan Police staff who wished
to contact the Panel.
33 Letter from Baroness O’Loan to AC Cressida Dick, 17 December 2014.
1134
87. On 16 January 2015, the Metropolitan Police’s solicitor, by email, asked that the Panel
provide assurances that natural justice principles would be followed by the Panel in its contact
with potential interviewees. Attached to the email was a draft letter which the Metropolitan
Police proposed to send to current and former employees in tandem with the Panel’s private
correspondence (such as the two letters handed to the Metropolitan Police in December 2014,
which remained undelivered to the former officers). This draft letter included a statement of
the duty of care of the Metropolitan Police to current and former employees, and a set of
questions to be put by the Metropolitan Police to any officer whom the Panel might decide to
approach. The Panel viewed the contents of the Metropolitan Police letter as an attempt by the
Metropolitan Police to interfere with the independence of the Panel and to warn off potential
interviewees.
88. While reiterating its commitment to complying with all of its obligations with regard
to fairness at every stage of the process, the Panel insisted that no Metropolitan Police
correspondence should be sent with any letter from the Panel. Baroness O’Loan also spoke
to AC Martin Hewitt about the matter, and he arranged for the letters to be forwarded
immediately without any accompanying correspondence by the Metropolitan Police to the two
former officers.
89. On 27 January 2015, after Metropolitan Police consultation with the Panel, a message was
sent to all Metropolitan Police staff inviting anyone with information to contact the Panel directly.
Baroness O’Loan welcomed this but stated that ‘the Panel finds the deliberate withholding of
correspondence by the Metropolitan Police destined for retired officers to be in contravention
of the agreement made on 18 December 2014, to be unacceptable and completely without
justification. The Panel does not expect such a failure to be repeated’.
7 Access to sensitive Metropolitan Police documents

90. The processes agreed for the Panel to receive documents from the Metropolitan Police did
not include access to sensitive material. Separate arrangements for access to such material
required the Panel to visit Metropolitan Police premises on the outskirts of East London which
entailed a two-hour return journey from the Panel’s offices in Central London. On 13 May 2015,
Baroness O’Loan wrote to AC Martin Hewitt about this issue. In earlier discussions, it had been
suggested that material might be moved to New Scotland Yard, or to alternative Metropolitan
Police premises, for viewing by Panel members.
91. On 01 June 2015, AC Martin Hewitt replied to Baroness O’Loan stating that he could
facilitate Panel members’ access to this material at police headquarters. However, he said:
i. Two police officers would be required to convey sensitive material to and from New
Scotland Yard, to avoid the risk of such highly sensitive material, including that relating
to threats to life, being lost or misplaced during its move between locations. This
would have resource implications and could delay other work, including preparing
material for the Panel.
ii. The quantity of sensitive redacted material would increase as more documents
were disclosed, so the frequency of transportation to New Scotland Yard would
inevitably increase.
1135
iii. The sensitive material was required for reference, during the preparation of the less
sensitive material for data-indexing and digitalisation for the Panel. Relocation of these
documents away from the bulk of the papers could cause delays.
iv. Access would only be permitted at New Scotland Yard to the sensitive material. As
a consequence, Panel members would have been unable to check the surrounding
material which was sometimes helpful when viewing the sensitive documents.34
92. The Panel concluded eventually that it would have to continue with the existing
arrangements of viewing sensitive documents at the Metropolitan Police premises in East
London. This was far from satisfactory, and significant time continued to be wasted.
93. All staff employed by the Panel received appropriate security clearance before starting
work. That clearance was reviewed as required by the appropriate authorities. This is a very
necessary part of any strategy to prevent corruption. However, the Panel discovered that the
Metropolitan Police officer responsible for providing documents to the Panel, who had full
access to all the material held by the Metropolitan Police relating to the investigations into
Daniel Morgan’s murder, was not cleared to a level which allowed him to have access to all the
material he was handling. The situation was severely aggravated by the fact that, as part of his
role, he was allocating security classifications to documents (some of which were ‘Secret’) and
redacting sensitive material contained in them. It was he who was deciding which documents
should be redacted before being downloaded onto the Panel’s database, and which documents
Panel members would have to view in unredacted format in East London. When it discovered
this at a late stage, the Panel had to arrange for the Home Office to conduct security clearance
of the police officer, a task that ought to have been carried out by the Metropolitan Police many
years earlier.
94. Some material was excessively and inconsistently redacted before being placed
on the Panel’s database, necessitating trips to the outskirts of East London to examine
the original unredacted documents. On occasion, the redactions were found to be
clearly unnecessary. While appropriate protection of investigation materials is obviously
important and necessary, the way in which material was released to the Panel was
unsatisfactory. There was not insignificant obstruction to the Panel’s work.
RECOMMENDATION
95. In any future Panel inquiry, arrangements should be made for the storage of sensitive
material in the Panel’s premises, in a similar manner to provision made for inquiries being
conducted under the Inquiries Act 2005.
7.1 Access to Operation Othona material

96. The report by Mark Ellison QC for the Stephen Lawrence Independent Review, published in
March 2014, looked at possible corruption and the role of undercover policing in the Stephen
Lawrence case. The report included details of Operation Othona, a Metropolitan Police
anti‑corruption initiative established in 1994, which sought to assess how serious corruption
was within pockets of the Metropolitan Police, and in particular some of the specialist squads.
34 Letter from AC Martin Hewitt to Baroness O’Loan, 01 June 2015.
1136
97. Mark Ellison QC said that the Stephen Lawrence Independent Review was unable to
see documentation in connection with Operation Othona as it could not be located by the
Metropolitan Police. The only information related to Operation Othona was intelligence that
was discovered on a computer hard drive in 2013. Mark Ellison QC commented in his report
that ‘[i]f the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] searches for all relevant material cannot reveal
such reports of central significance to the issue of police corruption in the Stephen Lawrence
murder investigation, there must be serious concerns that further relevant material has not
been revealed’.
98. In Summer 2013, Mark Ellison QC made enquiries of the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel
because the Panel’s Terms of Reference required it to examine the role that police corruption
played in the murder of Daniel Morgan. He was concerned that there was ‘a real possibility that
the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel may hold or acquire material relevant to our review of the
corruption issue’. The Metropolitan Police were therefore alerted to the possible importance of
the Operation Othona documentation to the work of the Panel.
99. Following the publication of the report by Mark Ellison QC, the Metropolitan Police
created the Assistant Commissioner’s Public Inquiry Team to investigate, among other matters,
allegations of missing or destroyed historical anti-corruption intelligence. On 15 July 2016, AC
Martin Hewitt wrote to the Panel confirming that significant progress had been made in locating
and digitising historical anti-corruption intelligence. A computer hard drive had been found in
a cardboard box in November 2013, containing a standalone intelligence database (Bawsdey)
covering material from 18 July 1994 to 24 January 2003. On 07 September 2016, the Panel
sought disclosure of all material relevant to its Terms of Reference. It was particularly interested
in the electronic database, Bawsdey. The Panel did not understand why digitisation was
essential before material could be examined.
100. On 16 February 2017, the Panel’s solicitor wrote to the Metropolitan Police’s solicitor
indicating that the Panel would shortly be concluding its review of the papers before it and
would be seeking to finalise any conclusions drawn from them. It was important therefore to
ensure that the Panel had had sight of all potentially relevant material held by the Metropolitan
Police. The Panel asked for written confirmation that no further disclosure, as required under the
Panel’s Terms of Reference and as agreed in the Disclosure Protocol, was anticipated.
101. In this letter, the Panel’s solicitor referred to the volume of materials from Operation
Othona, which might be relevant to the Panel’s work.35 It asked the Metropolitan Police to keep
it fully appraised of the potential for future disclosure and asked for confirmation of:
i. the scope of both digitised and non-digitised material held in respect of

Operation Othona;
ii. the steps taken by the Metropolitan Police to identify any digitised materials potentially
relevant to the Panel’s work and for written confirmation of the method(s) of searching,
the outcome of any searches to date, whether this review was ongoing and the
anticipated date of completion; and
iii. whether any review had been undertaken to identify any non-digitised materials
potentially relevant to the Panel’s work, and if the material had been indexed or
catalogued in some way, and whether consideration had been given to prioritising
35 Letter from Fieldfisher to Metropolitan Police solicitors, 16 February 2017.
1137
the review of those documents/boxes which were more likely to contain material
potentially relevant to the work of the Panel. The Panel asked when the work would
be completed.
102. On 19 June 2017, AC Martin Hewitt assured the Panel that the Metropolitan Police ‘has
continuously searched for Daniel Morgan related documents to ensure that everything possible
is done to try and locate them’ and that, were any newly discovered material falling within the
Terms of Reference to be found, the Metropolitan Police would notify the Panel. He referred to
the size and complexity of the Operation Othona documentation and the probability that the
material did not represent the entirety of the Metropolitan Police Operation Othona records.
103. AC Martin Hewitt said that the Metropolitan Police had identified 600 crates holding
material of interest to the Panel, which were being transferred to Lextranet for review. He also
said that the estimated date for completion for this work was May 2018. The process of data-
indexing was completed in December 2018 when some material became available to the Panel.
104. In view of the sensitivity of this documentation, the Panel and its Secretariat could only
access and view documents at the Metropolitan Police’s premises in East London.
8 Support from the Home Office

105. The Home Office is the sponsoring department for the Panel. A senior civil servant in
the Home Office is given the role of Senior Sponsor to the Panel as part of their wider set of
responsibilities. The relationship with the different officials who have been Senior Sponsor (also
referred to as Senior Responsible Officer) since 2013 has been positive, but the relationship with
the Home Office as a department has been more challenging.
106. An Inquiry or Panel looks to its sponsoring department to provide effective support in
the form of good IT systems and office equipment, and to recruit staff. Without these, a Panel
cannot perform its role effectively. Since 2013, the Panel has experienced some slowness in
responses, lack of communication, delay in the delivery of computer equipment, and delay in
vetting staff. Initial delay in the provision of desktop computers and laptops when the Panel was
first established meant that the Panel did not have the essential computers to do its early work.
This damaged the confidence of members of Daniel Morgan’s family in the Panel process in the
crucial initial stages.
107. The Panel has, throughout, communicated the difficulties and delays it has experienced in
accessing documentation and the HOLMES system to the Home Office. However, although on
occasion it was most helpful, the Home Office did not always advocate in support of the Panel’s
requirements.
108. Without access to the HOLMES database for its research staff, the Panel had to rely
entirely on Lextranet, which was supplied by DIT, the service recommended by the Home Office.
However, the Panel was informed in 2018 that risks to security of data held on the system could
only be addressed by moving to a new platform, Relativity, run by EPIQ.
109. Discussions between the Home Office, EPIQ and the Panel’s Secretariat about the transfer
of material from Lextranet to Relativity began in April 2018 and lasted 12 months. The transfer
of data started in April 2019 and was completed by the end of September 2019. However, in
December 2019, the Home Office identified security issues with Relativity which had to be
resolved through a system upgrade by EPIQ. Relativity was only given its security accreditation
1138
by the Home Office in July 2020, and shortly after that, Lextranet became unavailable. Moving
to a different digital management system, and then working on two digital management systems
for 15 months from April 2019 to July 2020, further delayed the Panel’s work.
110. In November 2020, the Home Secretary, Priti Patel MP, acknowledged to the Panel that,
although there may have been some initial delays in establishing the necessary infrastructure
for the Panel’s work, ‘lessons have been learned since the Panel was set up’, which includes
the establishment of a central Home Office Sponsorship Unit including a dedicated Inquiry
Sponsorship Team, with processes which now exist to support the setup of new inquiries.
9 Conclusion
111. The events around the murder of Daniel Morgan and the subsequent police investigations
are very complex. However, the Panel faced major, unnecessary problems in accessing material
and systems. While it received great assistance from organisations such as the National
Crime Agency, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and the Criminal Cases Review
Commission, it did not experience, particularly from the Metropolitan Police, the necessary level
of cooperation. Many of the difficulties described here could have been anticipated and resolved
before the Panel was established in 2013. This was not the case, and the Panel has had to deal
with them as best it could, but, as a non-statutory Panel, it has done so without the powers
accorded to statutory inquiries.
112. The Panel received its first set of documents from the Metropolitan Police in
January 2015, and it received its final documents from the Metropolitan Police in March
2021. The Panel has presented its Report to the Home Secretary within 12 months of
receipt of the final set of documents.
It is important that lessons are learned about planning and preparation before the
appointment of panels and similar public scrutiny bodies, to avoid unnecessary distress
to the families of those affected, and unnecessary delays and cost to the public purse.
RECOMMENDATION
113. It is recommended that, whenever a major incident remains under investigation

or inquiry, documents should be retained in digitised form, subject to appropriate
security measures and made available to those who subsequently and justifiably require
access to them.
RECOMMENDATION
114. In the interest of transparency and public accountability, all public institutions
should be under a duty to cooperate fully with independent scrutiny bodies, created by
Government, such as the Panel.
1139
Chapter 12: The Treatment of
the Family
Contents
1 The Panel’s approach to this chapter
2 Introduction
3 The murder of Daniel Morgan, its investigation and the Inquest
4 The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation and its report
5 Campaigning for further investigation, the 1996 Review, Operation Nigeria/Two

Bridges and the 2000 Murder Review
6 The Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation
7 The 2006 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority
8 The Abelard Two Investigation
9 Unwarranted assurances and Metropolitan Police apologies
1 The Panel’s approach to this chapter

1. The treatment of members of Daniel Morgan’s family by the police and other parts of the
criminal justice system is central to the Panel’s Terms of Reference.1 The Panel’s Report is
intended to provide the family with answers to their questions as well as an opportunity for them
to voice their perspectives on the handling of the investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder. The
next two chapters are closely linked as they both focus on the family of Daniel Morgan: this
chapter looks at the treatment of the family by the criminal justice system, especially the police,
since the murder of Daniel Morgan in 1987; and the next chapter focuses explicitly on the
personal perspectives of their experience by members of the family.
2. How a family is treated by those investigating the murder of a loved one is vitally important.
The trauma experienced by the family as a consequence of the murder can be seriously
exacerbated by adverse experiences of the investigation. Such adverse experiences can also
rapidly diminish trust between the family of a murder victim and the police. The views expressed
by members of the family in this and the next chapter reflect the experiences which they had
1141
over the decades. They should not be taken as those of the Panel. Panel findings, here as
elsewhere, highlighted in green boxes, reflect instances where the research into the concerns of
the family has produced evidence upon which the Panel has felt compelled to comment.
3. Since its formation, the Panel has met members of the family on a regular basis in
accordance with its ‘family first’ principle. There have been at least 40 meetings and multiple
telephone calls and email exchanges with members of the family in which the Panel has
discussed its Report and the work underway. The Panel conducted interviews with members of
Daniel Morgan’s family, and used comments and notes made by members of the family; records
retained by Daniel Morgan’s brother, Alastair Morgan; as well as contemporaneous police
records. However, the Metropolitan Police have produced no records for many of their meetings
with Daniel Morgan’s family. The Panel has found the insights of the family to be very helpful in
preparing this Report.
Family Liaison Policy throughout this period

Today, the relationship between police officers and a bereaved family is considered
vitally important, with clear policies, processes and structures regulating family liaison
activities. However, at the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder, the provision of family
liaison was not formalised. The responsibility for communicating with the family of a
victim rested with the Senior Investigating Officer. Beyond the initial contact with the
family, there was little systematic liaison, unless the investigation required it, or there
was significant information to pass on. Prior to its formalisation, family liaison has been
described as ‘something that a few committed investigators did on an ad hoc basis’.
Family Liaison Policy in the 1990s

In the 1990s, Family Liaison Policy became more formalised. This was recognised in the
Association of Chief Police Officers ‘Murder Investigation Manual 1998’, which stated
that ‘it is recognised good practice to appoint Family Liaison Officers to work very closely
to and support the immediate family of the deceased’.2
Family Liaison Policy in 2001

Sir William Macpherson’s inquiry report on Stephen Lawrence’s murder, published in
February 1999, had included six recommendations relating to family liaison practices in
the police,3 and on 23 March 2001 the Metropolitan Police introduced its ‘Family liaison
policy and fundamental guidelines’.4 With this, the role of Family Liaison Officer in the
Metropolitan Police became formalised, training was provided and family liaison logs
were introduced.5,6 The mission statement of the Metropolitan Police policy reads:
2 Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Crime Committee, Murder Investigation Manual, MPS109705001, p180, September 1998.
3 Sir William Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, pp377-378, 24 February 1999.
4 Metropolitan Police, Family liaison policy and fundamental guidelines, MPS109906001, 2001.
5 Metropolitan Police, Family liaison policy and fundamental guidelines, MPS109906001, p6, 23 March 2001.
1142
Chapter 12: The Treatment of the Family
‘One of the most important considerations throughout any investigation into a

sudden, violent or unexplained death is the relationship between the family and
police. Families will be considered as partners in an investigation. Families must
be treated appropriately, professionally, with respect and in accordance with their
diverse needs. This principle must be reflected at all levels of the police service.’7
The policy established a management coordination role and defined processes for
selection and training. The importance of the guidance was reinforced in the foreword by
then Deputy Commissioner Ian Blair.8,9,10
T/D/Supt David Zinzan, in a report to his management on 07 May 2002, demonstrated

his familiarity with the Metropolitan Police’s family liaison guidance when he described
the relationship with Daniel Morgan’s family as ‘assessed as level 2 bordering
on level 3’.11
The levels of assessment are summarised in the 2001 ‘Family liaison policy and
fundamental guidelines’ as follows:
‘Level 1 – The police/family relationship is stable with no ongoing or

anticipated problems.
Level 2 – The police/family relationship is or is anticipated to give cause

for concern.
Level 3 – The police/family relationship is consistently unstable or non-

existent and may require the involvement of an intermediary, mediator and/or
crisis intervention.’12
In February 1999, the Stephen Lawrence Public Inquiry, headed by Sir William
Macpherson, published its findings. The report highlighted the failings in family liaison
strategies employed by the Metropolitan Police and produced recommendations to
tackle these apparent failings.13
2 Introduction
4. Daniel Morgan was married to Iris Morgan and they had two children, Sarah Morgan and
Daniel Morgan, whom we refer to as Dan Morgan. Daniel Morgan was also survived by his
mother, Isobel Hülsmann, who very sadly died during the preparation of this report, his brother,
Alastair Morgan, and his sister, Jane Morgan. The family’s grief has been compounded since
the murder by their treatment at the hands of some police officers and representatives of
other organisations.
8 Metropolitan Police, Family liaison policy and fundamental guidelines, MPS109906001, pp19-22, 23 March 2001.
9 Metropolitan Police, Family liaison policy and fundamental guidelines, MPS109906001, pp6-8, 23 March 2001.
11 Report from T/D/Supt David Zinzan to DCS Shaun Sawyer, ‘Re: Operation Abelard formation of Gold Group’, MPS047329001, p1,
07 May 2002.
12 Metropolitan Police, Family liaison policy and fundamental guidelines p9, 23 March 2001.
13 Sir William Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, pp377-378, 24 February 1999.
1143
5. Many of the interactions between police officers and Daniel Morgan’s wife, his mother and
brother, were not well managed, during the first hours, days and weeks following the murder;
the way in which Iris Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann were informed of Daniel Morgan’s murder
was particularly regrettable.
6. In the year following the murder, the Inquest was held. This was a difficult and traumatic time
for the family.
7. During the 1990s, developments directly related to the murder of Daniel Morgan were few
and far between. Members of the family had the attention of some key officers, such as the
Commissioner, Sir Paul Condon, who met and gave positive assurances to Isobel Hülsmann
and Alastair Morgan, but there was a scarcity of new and tangible information. It was a time of
continuing frustration for the family.
8. The decade closed with a significant development, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges,

which sought to expose corruption within Law & Commercial, the successor of Southern
Investigations, the private detective agency which Daniel Morgan had run with Jonathan Rees.
Its objectives also included seeking further information about the murder of Daniel Morgan.
9. The 2000 Murder Review, which was conducted by DI Steve Hagger, gave rise to a new
and focused covert operation in 2001, referred to as Abelard One, led by DCI, later T/D/Supt,
David Zinzan. By March 2001, the Metropolitan Police had introduced ‘Family liaison policy and
fundamental guidelines’, which formalised the appointment and role of Family Liaison Officers
in investigations. For members of Daniel Morgan’s family, this proved to be a significant new
era in their relationship with the Metropolitan Police and their involvement in matters relating
to the murder.
10. In 2002, DCS David Cook became Senior Investigating Officer of Morgan Two, the overt
arm of the joint operation referred to here and throughout this Report as the Abelard One/
Morgan Two Investigation. Together, DCS Cook and T/D/Supt David Zinzan were determined
to do all they could do to bring the perpetrator(s) to justice. The ultimate decision of the Crown
Prosecution Service that there were insufficient grounds to bring a prosecution was a huge
disappointment to the family, and their earlier feelings of despair and disillusionment returned.
11. In 2006, the Metropolitan Police Authority required the Metropolitan Police to carry out a
review of the investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder and to report to the Authority. Following
this, after the emergence of new evidence, a further investigation, Abelard Two, was established.
This led to the prosecution of Jonathan Rees, James Cook, Glenn Vian and Garry Vian for
murder, and the prosecution of former DS Sidney Fillery for doing an act tending and intended
to pervert the course of justice. All the Defendants were acquitted in 2011. Although the family
had experienced a much-improved working relationship with the police since 2001, they were
extremely disappointed when the Defendants were acquitted. The family received public and
official apologies from the Metropolitan Police, but they were still left devastated. They again
argued at the highest level for a public inquiry, and in May 2013 the then Home Secretary,
Theresa May MP, announced in Parliament the launch of a Panel Inquiry and the appointment of
the Daniel Morgan Independent Panel.
1144
3 The murder of Daniel Morgan, its investigation

and the Inquest
3.1 Receiving the news of Daniel Morgan’s death
12. Iris Morgan’s first police contact was in the early hours of Wednesday 11 March 1987, when
officers visited her home to break the news of her husband’s death.14
13. D/Supt Douglas Campbell, the Senior Investigating Officer of the first investigation into the
murder, the Morgan One Investigation, asked Jonathan Rees, Daniel Morgan’s business partner,
to confirm Daniel Morgan’s home address and whether Iris Morgan would be there. D/Supt
Campbell then asked Jonathan Rees, who was already at Catford Police Station because he
had been asked to assist the police, if he would inform Iris Morgan of her husband’s death.15
14. Jonathan Rees was taken by PC Laurence Hart and DC Noel Cosgrave to Iris Morgan’s
home.16,17 Both officers subsequently explained that they wanted to ensure that Iris Morgan
would not be left alone after she was told of her husband’s death, so they relied on Jonathan
Rees to advise who should be present.18 Two of Iris Morgan’s friends were contacted and
accompanied the police officers and Jonathan Rees to Iris Morgan’s home.19
15. PC Laurence Hart stated that they ‘knocked on the door but got no answer’.20 Jonathan
Rees then informed the officers that Iris Morgan kept the back door unlocked when Daniel
Morgan was out, and the officers and the two friends of Iris Morgan were able to gain access
through the back door.21 One of Iris Morgan’s friends went into her bedroom, spoke to her and
brought her out onto the upstairs landing where DC Noel Cosgrave informed Iris Morgan of
her husband’s death, as he stated he did not believe it was right for Jonathan Rees to do so.
After Iris Morgan had been informed, PC Hart went through the personal telephone index and
telephoned some members of Iris Morgan’s family.22
16. After being informed of her husband’s death, Iris Morgan was understandably very upset.
DC Noel Cosgrave decided to call a doctor and one attended later that morning.23
17. Iris Morgan has not criticised the way in which the police informed her of her husband’s
murder. She has, however, said that she does not know why Jonathan Rees attended, and that
he was not welcome in the house.24,25
18. Jonathan Rees informed the Panel in November 2020 that he did not wish to attend Iris
Morgan’s house to inform her of Daniel Morgan’s death and did so on instructions from D/Supt
Douglas Campbell.
14 Witness statement of a neighbour of Iris Morgan, MPS002154001, pp3-4, 22 April 1987.

15 Witness statement of DC Kinley Davies, MPS028043001, pp2-3, 7 July 1988.
16 Witness statement of DC Noel Cosgrave, MPS003327001, pp1-2, 22 June 1988.
17 Witness statement of PC Laurence Hart, IPC001017001, p4, 17 December 1987.
18 Witness statement of PC Laurence Hart, MPS028066001, p2, 22 June 1988.
19 Witness statement of DC Noel Cosgrave, MPS003327001, p2, 22 June 1988.
24 Panel meeting with Iris Morgan, p2, 19 May 2015.
25 Panel meeting with Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan, and Dan Morgan, p1, 8 August 2016.
1145
19. WDS Christine Fowles became the primary police contact for Iris Morgan26 effectively
fulfilling the role of Family Liaison Officer. DC Richard Davis worked with WDS Fowles. DC Davis
stated that they were given the task of ‘looking after’ Iris Morgan and the immediate family,
including Alastair Morgan.27
20. It was appropriate to have someone present who knew Iris Morgan in order to
comfort her when the police left, and her two friends fulfilled that role. It was also
appropriate that the police asked Jonathan Rees to identify such people. However, it
was inappropriate that Jonathan Rees went with the police into the Morgan’s home, as
he was the last known person to see Daniel Morgan alive.
21. Isobel Hülsmann, Daniel Morgan’s mother, lived in Wales at the time of her son’s death. She
was informed of his death during a telephone call from a member of the Metropolitan Police at
4.00 am on 11 March 1987.28 She was not informed of the circumstances of his death.29
22. Isobel Hülsmann should not have been told of her son’s death during a telephone
call from the police at 4.00 am. The police should either have asked a member of her
family to tell her, or they should have asked a local police officer to inform her in person.
3.2 Early interactions between family members and the police

23. At the time of Daniel Morgan’s murder, police family liaison was less developed. Some
of the effort made by individuals to inform and support members of Daniel Morgan’s family
was appreciated, such as the support provided to Iris Morgan by WDS Christine Fowles.
Nevertheless, at times, members of Daniel Morgan’s family felt let down by police failures
of communication.
24. Iris Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan have all told the Panel that
they felt that some members of the first police investigation team were arrogant, unnecessarily
distant or offensive, and showed a lack of basic respect and consideration for the family
during this period (see Chapter 13, The Morgan Family’s Experience: A selection of personal
perspectives from the family of Daniel Morgan).
25. Iris Morgan has told the Panel that her experience with the police in the early stages of
the first murder investigation ‘upset her’.30 She explained that while she established a good
relationship with WDS Christine Fowles, she felt that D/Supt Douglas Campbell should have
come to see her.31,32 She has recounted to the Panel that it was not until she went to Sydenham
Police Station some days after Daniel Morgan’s murder that she met D/Supt Campbell.33
26 Witness statement of WDS Christine Fowles, MPS021582001, p1, 05 July 1989.

27 Witness statement of DC Richard Davis, MPS000188001, p1, 06 June 1989.
28 Witness statement of Isobel Hülsmann, MPS001977001, p1, 26 May 2000.
29 Witness statement of Isobel Hülsmann, MPS000002001, p3, 17 March 1987.
31 Witness statement of WDS Christine Fowles, MPS021582001, p1, 05 July 1989.
32 Witness statement of DC Richard Davis, MPS000188001, p1, 06 June 1989.
1146
26. It would have been courteous, professional and consistent with best practice for
D/Supt Douglas Campbell, as the Senior Investigating Officer, to have travelled to Iris
Morgan’s home to introduce himself to her, as she was an important witness as well as
Daniel Morgan’s widow.
27. DI Allan Jones, D/Supt Douglas Campbell’s deputy, made a similarly poor first impression
on Iris Morgan. On 17 March 1987, Iris Morgan provided a statement noting that Daniel Morgan
had been wearing a Rolex watch on the day that he was murdered.34 No watch was retrieved
from Daniel Morgan’s body.35 She described DI Jones as abrupt, adding that his demeanour
when discussing her husband’s missing Rolex watch upset her.36 Daniel Morgan’s missing
Rolex watch became an important issue for the family and one which caused them a great deal
of distress. The police searched for Daniel Morgan’s watch because its disappearance was
potentially linked to the murder. In addition to this, D/Supt Campbell recognised the importance
of the lost Rolex watch to the family (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
28. Alastair Morgan’s first contact with the police was a meeting with DI Allan Jones.37 Alastair
Morgan told the Panel that DI Jones treated him like a suspect when asking where he was at
the time of the murder, (he was in Wales) and that DI Jones made a poor first impression by
the manner of his questioning.38 When interviewed by the Panel, former DI Jones accepted
that he had asked Alastair Morgan about his whereabouts on the night of the murder, and that
Alastair Morgan had been offended by this and their relationship never improved.39 Former
DI Jones expressed regret that he had made a poor impression on Alastair Morgan and said that
asking him about his whereabouts on the night of the murder may have unintentionally made
him feel like a suspect. DI Jones also told the Panel that DS Malcolm Davidson accompanied
him to subsequent discussions with Alastair Morgan, as he felt DS Davidson had a ‘calming
influence’.40 While it is legitimate for everyone to be questioned about their whereabouts in
connection to a murder, such questions must be handled with sensitivity.
29. Alastair Morgan has spoken to the Panel about a meeting with DI Allan Jones and DS
Sidney Fillery on 12 or 13 March 1987, where he said he explained his concerns about the
Belmont Car Auctions robbery (which occurred on 18 March 1986 and involved the theft of
auction takings from Jonathan Rees) and how it could provide a ‘probable motive for murder’.41
He said that neither DI Jones nor DS Fillery took notes of the discussion, and he ‘didn’t see
a notebook, or a pen the whole interview’, which struck him as odd and ‘unprofessional’.42
Former DI Jones stated to the Panel in November 2020 that notetaking when speaking to family
members of the deceased was not always appropriate, and at the stage that Alastair Morgan
was spoken to, the aim was to give him reassurance and establish a relationship.
34 Witness statement of Iris Morgan, MPS000006001, p7, 17 March 1987.

35 Witness statement of DS Graham Frost, MPS018107001, p2, 26 April 1989.
37 Witness Statement of Alastair Morgan, MPS001922001, p17, 16 May 2000.
38 Panel meeting with Alastair Morgan, p17, 23 February 2015.
39 Panel interview with DI Allan Jones, PNL000201001, p2, 04 March 2015.
40 Panel interview with DI Allan Jones, PNL000201001, p2, 04 March 2015.
1147
30. Alastair Morgan has told the Panel that he thinks former DS Fillery deliberately gave him
the impression that he knew nothing about Belmont Car Auctions.43 At the Inquest DI Jones,
when asked, did not recall the meeting on 12 or 13 March 1987, to which Alastair Morgan had
referred.44 However, DS Malcolm Davidson confirmed to the Coroner during the Inquest that
he had had an ‘informal conversation’ with Alastair Morgan on 12 March 1987 with DS Fillery,
but that DI Jones was not present.45 Former DS Fillery described the meeting in response to
questioning at the Inquest as a brief two or three minute conversation in which the Belmont Car
Auctions robbery was not mentioned.46 As there is no contemporaneous record of the Belmont
Car Auctions issue being raised by Alastair Morgan before 1988, it has not been possible to
verify the date and extent to which Alastair Morgan first communicated this to the Metropolitan
Police (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation).
31. Members of Daniel Morgan’s family have described to the Panel how, on 13 March 1987,
Iris Morgan’s brother-in-law received a telephone call which they were told was from a police
officer urging the family to persuade Alastair Morgan to leave London.47,48 Alastair Morgan later
interpreted this to have been an attempt to prevent him from giving the police investigation
further information about the Belmont Car Auctions robbery, and the related pending civil
proceedings.49 Alastair Morgan has told the Panel he believed that former DS Sidney Fillery was
trying to contain suspicions connected to Belmont Car Auctions, because it would involve DC
Alan Purvis and DC Peter Foley, two officers allegedly ‘moonlighting’ at Belmont Car Auctions.50
Members of Daniel Morgan’s family later reported this matter to the police, and Alastair Morgan
testified about it at the Inquest.51,52
32. This phone call was important to members of Daniel Morgan’s family and caused them a
great deal of concern.53,54 The Panel sought to interview Iris Morgan’s brother-in-law, but was
unable to contact him despite numerous attempts. Furthermore, the Panel has been unable to
locate any evidence, within the available material, as to who made the call and what motivated
it, and nor has the Panel found any evidence that the matter was investigated.
33. DCI Paul Blaker, Deputy Senior Investigating Officer of the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation, later wrote that the ‘Hampshire Enquiry was aware of the alleged phone
call but it was not pursued, it being considered non material’.55

44 Transcript of Inquest into the death of Daniel Morgan, Inquest Day Six, INT000006001, p15, 18 April 1988.
45 Witness DS Malcolm Davidson, examined by the Coroner, Inquest Day Five, INT000005001, p23, 15 April 1988.
46 Transcript of Inquest into the death of Daniel Morgan, Inquest Day Six, INT000006001, p105, 18 April 1988.
47 Witness statement of Alastair Morgan, MPS001922001, p22, 16 May 2000.
48 Witness statement of Isobel Hülsmann, MPS001977001, p4, 26 May 2000.
50 Panel meeting with Alastair Morgan, p1, 15 April 2015.
52 Transcript of Inquest into the death of Daniel Morgan, Inquest Day Five, INT000005001, pp24-31, 15 April 1988.
53 Panel meeting with Jane Morgan, p3, 16 November 2015.
54 Panel meeting with Alastair Morgan, pp17-18, 23 February 2015.
55 Letter from DCI Paul Blaker to D/Supt Colin Smith, MPS020684001, p7, 09 May 1995.
1148
34. The allegation by members of Daniel Morgan’s family that a police officer had called
the family and suggested that Alastair Morgan should leave London should have been
fully investigated. Moreover, it was also relevant for the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation, and it should have been investigated to establish whether a
police officer was acting unprofessionally or criminally by attempting to obstruct the
investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder.
3.3 News of the arrests of six people on 03 April 1987

35. On 03 April 1987, six people were arrested in connection with the murder of Daniel Morgan,
three of whom were serving police officers.56,57,58,59 The arrest of serving police officers for Daniel
Morgan’s murder caused great concern to members of his family. The family were not informed
of the arrests by the police: Alastair Morgan found out about the arrests through a telephone
call from a friend who had heard about them on the news. Isobel Hülsmann also saw a report
of the arrests on the television news.60,61,62 Their concern was increased by the fact that DS
Sidney Fillery, one of the police officers arrested, had been involved during the early days of the
murder investigation.63
36. These events affected the way in which members of Daniel Morgan’s family perceived
the police. Iris Morgan told the Panel that she had been brought up to respect the police,
and had seen no reason not to, until her experience of them after Daniel Morgan’s murder.
Alastair Morgan has described his view of the police as ‘smashed to bits’64 within three weeks.
Isobel Hülsmann explained her view in a letter to the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary on
21 April 1987:
‘I had always held the police in great esteem and felt that the tasks set them were
almost impossible in view of manpower shortage and the tremendous rise in crime of
all types. To the great majority of their members my feelings remain the same. However,
in view of the facts which have emerged from the Incident Room at Sydenham, press
and television reports on the murder enquiry I am to say the least very disturbed to be
informed that C.I.D officers and policemen were detained for some considerable time in
connection with the murder and in fact were quoted as being “arrested”. Three officers
were subsequently released. A situation such as this quite naturally, I find exceedingly
unnerving and makes me seriously doubt the integrity of the police.’65
56 Witness statement of D/Supt Douglas Campbell, MPS006082001, pp2-3, 24 May 1990.

57 Witness statement of DC Kinley Davies, MPS016925001, pp1-2, 09 April 1987.
58 Sylvia Jones and Georgina Walsh, ‘Three Cops Quizzed Over Axe Murder’, Daily Mirror, 4 April, MPS014827001, p69, 04 April 1987.
59 Message M545, MPS008172001, p1, 02 November 1987.
62 Morgan, A, and Jukes, P, 2017, Untold: The Daniel Morgan murder exposed, Blink Publishing, p56.
63 Policy file for the case of Daniel Morgan (Morgan One Investigation), MPS004821001, p4, 11 March 1987 to 07 February 1989.
65 Letter from Isobel Hülsmann to the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, MPS015324001, p42, 21 April 1987.
1149
37. It was not appropriate for members of Daniel Morgan’s family to learn of the arrests
of the police officers from the media. Notwithstanding the operational considerations
and need for confidentiality, members of the family should have been informed by the
Metropolitan Police immediately after the arrests had taken place in order to lessen the
shock and worry that these arrests caused.
To have made no effort to inform members of Daniel Morgan’s family of the arrests for
the murder, including the arrest of police officers, was indefensible. When the individuals
who had been arrested were released from custody without charge, Daniel Morgan’s
family should also have been informed by the police.
3.4 The media’s portrayal of Daniel Morgan

38. During an episode of BBC One’s Crimewatch, on 23 April 1987, a reconstruction and
discussion of Daniel Morgan’s murder was screened in a public appeal for information.66 It was
an important event for the investigation, but the portrayal of Daniel Morgan in the programme
caused members of his family distress.67,68 The family had not been consulted about the
programme, nor were they aware of its content.
39. The profile of Daniel Morgan was physically inaccurate, and family members feared its
depiction of his profession appeared unnecessarily ‘seedy’.69,70 Only hours after the programme
had been aired, a message was recorded by police from Isobel Hülsmann in which she said
that she was ‘disgusted’ at the portrayal of Daniel Morgan in Crimewatch as it was ‘false and
distasteful’ and that she would complain to the Prime Minister about the BBC.71 Alastair Morgan
also told the Panel how the family were upset by Daniel Morgan’s portrayal in Crimewatch.72
They could not understand why Crimewatch had not consulted anyone in the family about his
life and interests.73
40. The portrayal of Daniel Morgan and the manner in which he conducted his business,
on Crimewatch upset his family. Had the family of Daniel Morgan been consulted family
consulted about the possible content of the Crimewatch programme, the portrayal
of Daniel Morgan would have been more balanced and may have resulted in a better
intelligence-gathering opportunity.
41. On the first anniversary of the murder, 10 March 1988, an article in the Evening Standard
described Daniel Morgan as a ‘sexual braggart with dozens of enemies’.74 Alastair Morgan
recorded that the author of the article told him that the description of Daniel Morgan had been
66 Letter from BBC to D/Supt Douglas Campbell enclosing briefing notes, MPS011208001, pp9-10, 16 April 1987.
68 Message 197, MPS083124001, p370, 24 April 1987.
70 Message M197, MPS083124001, p370, 24 April 1987.
71 Message M197, MPS083124001, p370, 24 April 1987.
74 Peter Wilson, ‘New bid to solve murder’, Evening Standard, 10 March, MPS060785001, 10 March 1988.
1150
given to him by the police. Alastair Morgan had then called the incident room and spoken to
DS Malcolm Davidson, who denied that the quote had come from the police.75,76 The Panel has
seen no corroborating evidence that the quote originated from the police.
3.5 The family’s experience of the Inquest

42. The Inquest into the death of Daniel Morgan took place on Monday 11 April 1988, more
than a year after his murder.77 It was initially scheduled for June 1987 but was postponed
several times. It appears, from D/Supt Douglas Campbell’s report which informed the Coroner’s
conduct of the Inquest, that the Crown Prosecution Service hoped that the Inquest might
generate further evidence.78
43. Iris Morgan has told the Panel that she did not feel well informed about what would happen
at the Inquest.79 In the months leading up to the Inquest, members of Daniel Morgan’s family
experienced a growing sense of frustration at what they perceived to be a lack of progress.80,81
44. Daniel Morgan’s family were not warned about the evidence that the former bookkeeper for
Southern Investigations, Kevin Lennon, was to give at the Inquest.82,83 On the first day, Kevin
Lennon testified that Jonathon Rees had persistently asked him to kill Daniel Morgan. He had
refused to do so. Kevin Lennon also alleged that Jonathan Rees had told him that police officers
from Catford Police Station would either be involved in the murder or would arrange it and that
DS Sidney Fillery would retire from the police and join Jonathan Rees as a business partner.
Kevin Lennon’s evidence stunned Daniel Morgan’s family and caused them great distress.
It attracted a great deal of interest from the local and national media. By the time of the Inquest,
DS Fillery had, indeed, resigned from the Metropolitan Police (see Chapter 2, The Inquest).
45. The failure to warn and inform members of Daniel Morgan’s family of Kevin Lennon’s
testimony before they heard it at the Inquest indicated a lack of care, consideration and
respect for the family. As with the arrests that had occurred in April 1987 (see paragraph
35), this testimony attracted significant public attention, which focused not only on the
murder itself, but also on the integrity of the police because of the alleged possible
involvement of police officers in the planning and execution of the murder. It was very
wrong that no member of Daniel Morgan’s family was given any warning before hearing
Kevin Lennon’s testimony in the Coroner’s Court.
75 Morgan, A, and Jukes. P, 2017, Untold: The Daniel Morgan murder exposed, Blink Publishing, p78.
76 Message M780, Telephone call from Alastair Morgan to DS Malcolm Davidson, MPS012840001, 10 March 1988.
77 Transcript of Inquest into the death of Daniel Morgan, Inquest Day One, INT000001001, p1, 11 April 1988.
78 Report by D/Supt Douglas Campbell, ‘Murder of Daniel Morgan’, MPS016005001, p1, 12 May 1988.
80 Message M422, Telephone call from Alastair Morgan to DS Malcolm Davidson, MPS012482001, 06 August 1987.
81 Message M425, Telephone call from Alastair Morgan to a Detective Constable, MPS012485001, 11 August 1987.
83 Report by Alastair Morgan, ‘A report on police involvement in the murder of my brother Daniel Morgan and police activities designed to
conceal this from the public’, MPS020707001, p6, 29 July 1994.
1151
46. The Inquest finished on 25 April 1988,84 and members of Daniel Morgan’s family were left
wondering what would happen next. Alastair Morgan described it as follows: ‘The vacuum after
the inquest was frightening. I’d never felt as exhausted physically and mentally as I did after
those three weeks of hell.’85
47. On 22 July 1988, it was agreed by the Metropolitan Police and Crown Prosecution Service
that, as no fresh evidence had emerged, the likelihood of securing a conviction against
Jonathan Rees for murder was ‘extremely remote’, and therefore no prosecution would
occur.86 On 26 July 1988, DS Malcolm Davidson telephoned Alastair Morgan to advise him of
the decision.87 On the same day, Isobel Hülsmann telephoned DS Davidson to notify him that
Alastair Morgan had informed her of the decision not to prosecute.88 As was normal at the time,
there was no formal letter from the Crown Prosecution Service to any member of the family of
Daniel Morgan in relation to this decision. (See Chapter 1, The Morgan One Investigation.)
48. There were some positive interactions between the family and members of the
police during the investigation, but there was also thoughtless treatment of members
of Daniel Morgan’s family by the police during the year following the murder. This,
combined with an absence of progress in solving the murder, generated a lack of trust
and confidence in the investigation among family members. This negatively affected the
relationship between members of the family and the police in the years to follow.
4 The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation

and its report
49. On 12 May 1988, following the Inquest and subsequent press attention, Gabb & Co
solicitors, acting on behalf of Isobel Hülsmann and Alastair Morgan, wrote to the Police
Complaints Authority, stating that there were:
‘certain matters of various public concern that appear to have surfaced as a result of
the unlawful killing of Mr Daniel Morgan and we write on behalf of our Clients to make a
formal complaint against the Metropolitan Police.’89
50. The letter went on to say that their clients trusted:
‘that the appropriate machinery for investigating this matter which our Clients would
prefer to be undertaken by officers outside the Metropolitan Police Force could […]
be put into operation.’90
51. Roland Moyle, Deputy Chair of the Police Complaints Authority, wrote to DAC Peter
Winship, Director of the Metropolitan Police Complaints Investigation Bureau (CIB), asking
him to consider whether the contents of the letter from Gabb & Co should be registered as a
84 Transcript of Inquest into the death of Daniel Morgan, Inquest Day Eight, INT000008001, 25 April 1988.
86 Witness statement of D/Supt Douglas Campbell, MPS015272001, p46, 05 February 1991 (unsigned).
87 Message M913, Telephone call from DS Malcolm Davidson to Alastair Morgan, MPS012973001, 26 July 1988.
88 Message M914, Telephone call from Isobel Hülsmann to DS Malcolm Davidson, MPS012974001, 26 July 1988
89 Letter from Gabb & Co solicitors to the Police Complaints Authority, MPS030019001, 12 May 1988.
90 Letter from Gabb & Co solicitors to the Police Complaints Authority, MPS030019001, 12 May 1988.
1152
complaint.91 On 30 May 1988, AC John Smith, DAC Peter Winship’s line manager, decided that
Hampshire Constabulary should be asked to investigate (see Chapter 3, The Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority Investigation).92
52. On 24 June 1988, Commander Kenneth Merton of the Metropolitan Police sent a
memorandum to DCS Alan Wheeler of Hampshire Constabulary appointing him Senior
Investigating Officer with the following Terms of Reference: ‘[t]o investigate allegations that
police were involved in the murder of Daniel MORGAN and any matters arising therefrom’.93
53. During this period, there were four separate, concurrent police enquiries into issues related
to or arising from the investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder. The Morgan One Investigation
was still in progress, as was the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation. DCS
David Lamper of the Metropolitan Police was investigating complaints against the police
relating to the investigation of the murder made by Jonathan Rees;94 D/Supt Alec Button of the
Metropolitan Police was investigating matters of alleged police wrongdoing relating to Belmont
Car Auctions.95
4.1 Interaction between family members and the Hampshire/Police

Complaints Authority Investigation
54. Alastair Morgan has recorded that he ‘couldn’t help feeling hopeful’ about this new
independent enquiry by the Hampshire Constabulary which was supervised by the Police
Complaints Authority.96 At the outset, DCS Alan Wheeler told the family that they should contact
the office at Fareham Police Station, where the investigation was based, with ‘any information
which may assist our enquiry’. At a meeting on 26 August 1988, DCS Wheeler explained to
Isobel Hülsmann and her solicitor, Glyn Maddocks, that he could not tell them ‘lines of enquiry
or the finer points of our investigation’.97
55. The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation sought to obtain information from
members of Daniel Morgan’s family, while members of the family were in turn trying to obtain
information from the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation. Both sides became
frustrated when the information that they sought from each other was not forthcoming.
56. A Detective Sergeant wrote a short report on 29 September 1988, on the evidence
previously provided by Alastair Morgan. He concluded, ‘[i]n a nutshell, Alistair [sic] Morgan has
plenty to say about the case, but little, if any, of it amounts to actual hard evidence’.98
57. On 07 December 1988, DCI Paul Blaker made a note that Isobel Hülsmann was anxious due
to a lack of information: ‘Mrs Hulsman [sic] expressed her anxiety since she had wondered what
was happening. Explained to her that enquiries were continuing but the detail of such enquiries
must remain with the investigation team alone at this stage.’99 DCS Alan Wheeler then spoke
with Isobel Hülsmann, who told him: ‘I am concerned because I have heard nothing from you.
I don’t even know whether you are still working on Daniel’s murder.’100
91 Letter from Roland Moyle to DAC Peter Winship, MPS026448001, 18 May 1988.
92 Letter from AC John Smith to DAC Peter Winship, MPS030002001, p4, 30 May 1988.
93 Memorandum from Commander Kenneth Merton to D/Supt Alan Wheeler, HAM000168001, 24 June 1988.
94 This became the Report of DCS David Lamper, Complaint against Police, MPS005459001, 17 November 1988.
95 Report of D/Supt Alec Button, Complaint against Police, MPS038384001, pp 3-4, 07 October 1988.
97 Note of meeting between DCS Alan Wheeler, Isobel Hülsmann and Glyn Maddocks, MPS040016001, p1, 26 August 1988.
98 Report by a Detective Sergeant, MPS031812001, p2, 29 September 1988.
99 Message M461, Telephone call from DCI Paul Blaker and DCS Alan Wheeler to Isobel Hulsmann, MPS030416001, p1, 07 December 1988.
100 Message M461, Telephone call from DCI Paul Blaker and DCS Alan Wheeler to Isobel Hulsmann, MPS030416001, pp1-2,
07 December 1988.
1153
58. A Woman Police Constable took a note of her telephone conversation with Alastair Morgan
on 13 December 1988, after he had called to speak to DCI Paul Blaker.101 She recorded
‘[m]uch ramblings’, the ‘basis of which appears to be that he is concerned about the lack of
communication between SIO/DSIO [Senior Investigating Officer/Deputy Senior Investigating
Officer] and Mrs Hulsmann [sic] or her solicitor’.102
59. According to files provided by Alastair Morgan and police notes, between July 1988 to
September 1989, a period of 15 months, there were 17 meetings between the Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority Investigation and members of Daniel Morgan’s family. Members of the
family made 80 calls to the investigation team, while they received 24 calls from the team.103
60. Alastair Morgan told the Panel that, during this time, the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation did not tell him anything. Although the Panel has seen records of
contact between Alastair Morgan and members of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation,104 Alastair Morgan has told the Panel that he felt as though they did not keep him
sufficiently informed as he ‘did not know anything about what Hampshire were doing’.105
61. The fact that DCS Alan Wheeler had taken the decision to distance his investigation
from members of Daniel Morgan’s family contributed to the family’s lack of confidence in the
police investigation.
62. The extent to which information about a murder investigation can be shared with the
family of a murder victim is limited by a significant number of factors, not least the need
to preserve the integrity of the investigation for the purposes of any future prosecution.
While the family had the right to bring to the attention of the police matters about which
they had concerns and in respect of which they sought answers, and while DCS Alan
Wheeler was entitled to preserve the integrity of his investigation, it would have been
possible to have facilitated more constructive engagement. This would have helped to
mitigate the levels of distrust which emerged as the investigation continued.
4.2 The arrests and charging of three people

63. On 31 January 1989, Jonathan Rees,106 Paul Goodridge107 and Jean Wisden108 were
arrested. Alastair Morgan found out about the arrests from the local television news just as
he had heard of the six arrests on 03 April 1987.109,110 He had understood the police to be
investigating police officers in accordance with their terms of reference. The arrest of Jonathan
Rees and others was completely unexpected.
101 Message M467, Telephone call from Alastair Morgan to a Woman Police Constable, MPS028840001, p1, 13 December 1988.
102 Message M467, Telephone call from Alastair Morgan to a Woman Police Constable, MPS028840001, p1, 13 December 1988.
103 Analysis of police documentation and files provided by members of Daniel Morgan’s family.
104 Witness statement of Alastair Morgan, MPS001922001, pp35-36, 16 May 2000.
105 Panel Meeting with Alastair Morgan, pp4-5, 15 April 2015.
106 Custody record for Jonathan Rees, HAM000307001, p2, 31 January 1989.
107 Custody record for Paul Goodridge, HAM000302001, p3, 31 January 1989.
108 Charge sheet for Jean Wisden, MPS021624001, 02 February 1989.
109 Morgan, A, and Jukes. P, 2017, Untold: The Daniel Morgan murder exposed, Blink Publishing, p96.
1154
64. On 02 February 1989, Jonathan Rees111 and Paul Goodridge112 were charged with the
murder of Daniel Morgan, and Jean Wisden113 with doing an act tending and intended to pervert
the course of justice, but members of Daniel Morgan’s family were not told immediately after the
event. The solicitor for Isobel Hülsmann and her family, was told of the charges a day later, on
03 February 1989.114
65. Following the arrests and charging of the suspects, Alastair Morgan made further attempts
to discuss the case with the investigation team.115 In a call on 06 March 1989, DCI Paul
Blaker told Alastair Morgan that he could not discuss the case with him because he was a
‘prosecution witness’. A message noting the call described a ‘[l]engthy conversation’ in which
Alastair Morgan:
‘stated he was preparing a brief for Richard Livesay [sic] MP and he would continue to
pursue matters to bitter end, no matter what.
‘DCI: told him he was a prosecution witness and matters could not be discussed.
Rees being on bail. Police governed by rules of evidence. Enquiry not yet complete.’116
66. The subsequent decision by the Director of Public Prosecutions to discontinue the
proceedings against Jonathan Rees, Paul Goodridge and Jean Wisden was communicated
by telephone to Isobel Hülsmann and Iris Morgan on 10 May 1989, the day before the relevant
Magistrates’ Court hearing.117 Iris Morgan was recorded as being ‘clearly upset’ but agreed to
DCI Paul Blaker’s suggestion that he would ‘attend court on 1105 and then drive to her home
and tell her of the decision personally’.118
67. As agreed, on 11 May 1989, after the court hearing at which the proceedings were
discontinued, DCI Paul Blaker and DI Rex Carpenter visited Iris Morgan at her home
address to inform her of the reasons behind the Director of Public Prosecutions’ decision to
discontinue proceedings.119
68. In a record of this meeting, dated 12 May 1989, DI Rex Carpenter noted that Iris Morgan
said to them that ‘her initial reaction to the news of the decision was one of anger and
hostility’.120 DCI Paul Blaker explained the decision ‘in some depth’, and also told her that
‘the police did not agree’ with the Director of Public Prosecutions’ decision, but had to accept
it. Iris Morgan was recorded as being ‘thankful for all the hard work the police had done’.121
DCI Paul Blaker also discussed the possibility of a private prosecution against Jonathan
Rees by members of Daniel Morgan’s family. The note of their meeting read: ‘Mr Blaker also
mentioned that the Hulsmans [sic] and Alistair [sic] Morgan were considering taking out a private
111 Charge sheet for Jonathan Rees, MPS033010001, 02 February 1989.

112 Charge sheet for Paul Goodridge, MPS021442001, 02 February 1989.
113 Charge sheet for Jean Wisden, MPS021624001, 02 February 1989.
114 Message M565, MPS028742001, 02 February 1989.
115 Message M707, Telephone call from DCI Paul Blaker to Alastair Morgan, MPS029014001, p1, 02 March 1989.
116 Message M707, Telephone call from DCI Paul Blaker to Alastair Morgan, MPS029014001, p1, 02 March 1989.
117 Message M859, Telephone call from DCS Alan Wheeler to Isobel Hülsmann, MPS029221001, 10 May 1989.
118 Message M858, Telephone call from DCI Paul Blaker to Iris Morgan, MPS029222001, 10 May 1989.
119 Note of meeting between DI Rex Carpenter, DCI Paul Blaker and Iris Morgan, MPS039698001, 11 May 1989, pp1-2.
120 Note of meeting between DI Rex Carpenter, DCI Paul Blaker and Iris Morgan, MPS039698001, p1, 12 May 1989.
1155
prosecution against Rees. Mrs [Iris] Morgan then became very tearful and said that she didn’t
think she could be put through that ordeal.’122 However, later that month, Iris Morgan did express
an interest in pursuing a private prosecution but found the likely costs to be prohibitively high.123
69. Alastair Morgan’s concerns that he did not know what was happening were correct
– for example, the arrests or that Hampshire Constabulary had acted further to their
Terms of Reference – and he should have been informed that the investigation had
widened to incorporate matters other than police involvement in the murder.
4.3 Concerns about the effectiveness of the Hampshire/Police Complaints

Authority Investigation
70. In a letter to Roland Moyle, Deputy Chair of the Police Complaints Authority: Alastair
Morgan expressed the view, shared by his mother, that DS Sidney Fillery’s role in the Morgan
One Investigation had never been satisfactorily investigated or explained.124
‘We believe that there is overwhelming evidence supporting our suspicions that Det.
Sergeant Sidney Fillery, a member of the murder squad who originally investigated
Daniel’s killing, actually conspired with those recently charged to murder my brother,
and that after the killing he actively perverted the course of the inquiry [….] I have
spoken to D.C.I. Blaker of Hampshire concerning this issue and have received the
repeated answer that “they do not have enough evidence to charge Fillery.” I myself,
my mother, and our solicitor find this utterly incomprehensible even outrageous […].’125
71. DS Sidney Fillery’s role was examined by the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation. In his report to the Police Complaints Authority dated 04 September 1989,
DCS Alan Wheeler acknowledged that DS Fillery’s close association with Jonathan Rees
compromised his ‘professional policemanship’, and that the statement DS Fillery had taken
from Jonathan Rees on 11 March 1987 was ‘not acceptable’.126 However, DCS Alan Wheeler
concluded that this was ‘not sufficient to show Fillery deliberately assisted Jonathan Rees’.127
72. The report by DCS Alan Wheeler did not address the issue of the Belmont Car Auctions
file allegedly taken by DS Sidney Fillery on 11 March 1987 (see Chapter 1, The Morgan One
Investigation). Alastair Morgan had raised this issue in his statement to DCI Earnest Anderson
who was involved in the investigation of alleged police wrongdoing relating to Belmont Car
Auctions,128 on 05 May 1988.129
124 Letter from Alastair Morgan to Roland Moyle, PNL000127001, p1, undated.
125 Letter from Alastair Morgan to Roland Moyle, PNL000127001, pp1-2, undated.
126 Report of DCS Alan Wheeler to the Police Complains Authority, MPS020651001, p21, 04 September 1989.
127 Report of DCS Alan Wheeler to the Police Complaints Authority, MPS020651001, p21, para 344(k), 04 September 1989.
128 Report of D/Supt Alec Button, Complaint against Police, MPS038384001, pp 3-4, 07 October 1988.
129 Witness statement of Alastair Morgan, MPS026450001, pp1-2, 05 May 1988.
1156
73. DCS Alan Wheeler’s report also did not address the phone call urging the family to persuade
Alastair Morgan to leave London, despite members of Daniel Morgan’s family raising specific
concerns about it.130,131 Iris Morgan had asked members of the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation in May 1989 why she had been called by ‘the murder squad’ asking her
to ‘come and get Alastair because he was being a nuisance to the investigation’.132
74. Following the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation, in March 1990,

Alastair Morgan expressed concern that the problem of police corruption, and alleged police
involvement in his brother’s murder, had not been adequately investigated.133 On 27 March 1990,
the Police Complaints Authority wrote to Alastair Morgan informing him that ‘[t]he extensive and
very thorough enquiry carried out by the Investigating Officer from the Hampshire Constabulary
has revealed no evidence of involvement by any police officer in the murder of your brother’.134
On 28 March 1990, Alastair Morgan replied to the Police Complaints Authority raising a number
of points relating to former DS Sidney Fillery, concluding that ‘[m]y family and I have, in view of
developments lost all hope of seeing fair play done by the police, and like many other cases had
to resort to the media as a last ditch attempt at having the truth brought out’.135
75. Alastair Morgan and the Police Complaints Authority continued to correspond. Alastair
Morgan wrote on 01 April 1990 informing the Police Complaints Authority that:
‘my mother and I are less than pleased with the final outcome of all that has taken
place. As far as we can see the result of it all has been absolutely nothing. Over the
past three years we have observed with increasing concern the ineffectuality of police
investigations into police malpractice. We don’t think this is ever going to work.’136
76. Alastair Morgan had complained about police corruption in relation to the murder
itself and the possible role of DS Sidney Fillery in undermining the Morgan One
Investigation. Given the Terms of Reference of the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation, the family’s expectation was that it would focus on the possible
role of DS Fillery and other officers in the murder of Daniel Morgan. The members of
Daniel Morgan’s family were not informed of DCS Alan Wheeler’s change of focus in
his investigation in November/December 1988. They subsequently became aware that
the focus of the investigation had changed but could not find out what was happening.
Understandably, this compounded their suspicions that the police would not investigate
their allegations properly.
4.4 Family access to the investigation report

77. Isobel Hülsmann had asked DCS Alan Wheeler whether they would be informed of the
outcome of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation,137 to which DCS Alan
Wheeler replied:
130 Witness Statement of Isobel Hülsmann, MPS001977001, pp4-5, 26 May 2000.

131 Panel meeting with Alastair Morgan, p13, 15 April 2015.
133 Letter from Alastair Morgan to the Police Complaints Authority, PNL000133001, p2, 28 March 1990.
134 Letter from the Police Complaints Authority to Alastair Morgan, PNL000099001, pp284-285, 27 March 1990.
135 Letter from Alastair Morgan to the Police Complaints Authority, PNL000133001, p2, 28 March 1990.
136 Letter from Alastair Morgan to the Police Complaints Authority, PNL000134001, 01 April 1990.
1157
‘I explained that I would not be in a position to do so. But it may be that [the solicitor]
will be told by the Police Complaints Authority. I also explained that if he had any
queries then they should be routed to Mr Roland Moyle of the PCA [Police Complaints
Authority] [...].’138
78. On 04 September 1989, DCS Alan Wheeler provided his final report to the Police
Complaints Authority.139 Some members of Daniel Morgan’s family had assumed that they would
have access to the report as well as details of any decision in relation to ‘the officer or officers to
whom [the family’s] complaint was directed’.140
79. The letter from solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family to the Police
Complaints Authority illustrated clearly why his clients were dissatisfied and confused.
They had made a complaint. The matter had not been discussed further with them. An
investigation had ensued. It was not in fact an investigation of their complaint, but they
were unaware of the fact. The Terms of Reference for the investigation had indicated
that it was an investigation into police involvement in the murder, but they could see no
evidence of any such investigation. The relationship between the family and the police
was at a very low ebb as a consequence of this situation. This could have been avoided
through more precise and fulsome communication with the family.
80. On 27 March 1990, the Police Complaints Authority wrote to Gabb & Co Solicitors
explaining that they were unable to supply them or their clients, with a copy of the Hampshire/
Police Complaints Authority Investigation report because it was protected by public interest
immunity.141 The explanation was as follows:
‘With regard to the report itself, I should point out that reports and statements made for
the purpose of Part IX of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 are protected by
public interest immunity which cannot be waived by either the Authority or the police.
In addition, under Section 98 of the Act it is made a criminal offence for a member,
officer of servant of this Authority to disclose such information except in very limited
circumstances. For this reason I am afraid that I am unable to supply you or your clients
with a copy of the report of the investigation.’142
81. It is regrettable that the Police Complaints Authority had not explained at an earlier
juncture that there was no automatic right to have access to the report of the Hampshire/
Police Complaints Authority Investigation.
139 Report of DCS Alan Wheeler to the Police Complaints Authority, MPS020651001, 04 September 1989.
140 Letter from Gabb & Co Solicitors to the Police Complaints Authority, MPS039301001, p2, 06 March 1990.
141 Letter from Police Complaints Authority to Gabb & Co Solicitors, MPS039301001, p3, 27 March 1990.
142 Letter from Police Complaints Authority to Gabb & Co Solicitors, MPS039301001, p3, 27 March 1990.
1158
5 Campaigning for further investigation, the 1996 Review,

Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges and the 2000 Murder Review
82. By 1989 there had been two investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder. During the decade
which followed members of his family campaigned for further investigation.
83. On 29 July 1994, Alastair Morgan produced a report, entitled ‘A report on police
involvement in the murder of my brother Daniel Morgan and police activities designed to conceal
this from the public’.143 This set out Alastair Morgan’s understanding of the case history, as
well as his interpretation of the evidence of police involvement in the murder. In his concluding
paragraphs, he wrote:
‘I want the case into my brother’s murder to be re-opened. I know that neither inquiry
was serious in its intention to bring my brother’s murderers to justice whatever
the police or PCA [Police Complaints Authority] say. I shall not rest until this has
been done.’144
84. Chris Smith MP forwarded Alastair Morgan’s report to the Home Secretary, Michael Howard
MP,145 and the Metropolitan Police.146
85. In October 1994, Alastair Morgan attended a meeting with a Detective Inspector and a
Detective Constable.147 The Detective Constable’s subsequent report of the meeting provided a
detailed account of Alastair Morgan’s concerns at that time. It concluded:
‘MORGAN strongly feels that police officers were involved in the conspiracy to murder
his brother and that police officers conspired to pervert the course of justice ensuring
that his brother’s murderers would never be brought to trial.’148
86. In November 1994, Isobel Hülsmann wrote to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police,
Sir Paul Condon, and again in January 1995, in an attempt to achieve further interest in her
son’s murder.149 In her letter of January 1995, she wrote:
‘My sole aim in writing to you personally as Commissioner was that you would attempt
to attend to this grievous case at top level and in particular with an urgent view that the
case be re-examined [...].’150
87. Three weeks later, a memorandum from A/DCS Roger Gaspar was sent to Commander Ian
Quinn of the Metropolitan Police Complaints Investigation Bureau, setting out three options for
responding to the requests made by Isobel Hülsmann.151 He wrote:
‘There seem to be three possible ways forward:
conceal this from the public’, MPS020707001, 29 July 1994.
conceal this from the public’, MPS020707001, p10, 29 July 1994.
145 Letter from Chris Smith MP to the Home Secretary, MPS020706001, 11 August 1994.
146 Letter from Chris Smith MP to Commissioner Sir Paul Condon, MPS020703001, 19 October 1994.
147 Meeting with Alastair Morgan, MPS020716001, p1 11 October 1994.
148 Meeting with Alastair Morgan, MPS020716001, p5, 11 October 1994.
149 Letter from Isobel Hülsmann to Commissioner Sir Paul Condon, MPS062336001, p4, 18 November 1994.
150 Letter from Isobel Hülsmann to Commissioner Sir Paul Condon, MPS062338001, p4, 05 January 1995.
151 Memorandum from A/DCS Roger Gaspar to Commander Ian Quinn, MPS022188001, 26 January 1995.
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• Respond to Mrs Hulsmann [sic] that her letter raises no new information or evidence
upon which a fresh enquiry should be commenced;
• Scan the two sets of case papers [original murder investigation papers and the
Hampshire papers] to see whether there are viable lines of enquiry, based upon what is
now being said; or
• Conduct a major review of all the evidence in both enquiries.’152
88. There is no record among the papers available to the Panel of any decision made on this
issue. However, two months later, on 16 March 1995, D/Supt Colin Smith wrote to DCI Paul
Blaker, the Deputy Senior Investigating Officer on the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation, asking that he review copies of the correspondence with members of Daniel
Morgan’s family and provide a written response.153 DCI Paul Blaker responded two months later,
on 09 May 1995:
‘Throughout the course of the Hampshire Enquiry, Alistair [sic] Rodric MORGAN,
the brother of the deceased, kept in contact with the incident room and there were
numerous conversations between Mr WHEELER and myself with him. He constantly
sought reassurance that all issues he raised were being actively pursued and would/
could not accept that much of what he said was not evidential, was speculative, was
uncorroborated and could not evidentially advance the enquiry.
‘His stance throughout our enquiry was that there was malpractice within the
Metropolitan Police, that the actions of Detective Sergeant FILLERY in particular were
pivotal to any successful prosecution and that the intelligence/supposition he imparted
would be of evidential value. He could not be dissuaded from that view.
‘His intimate knowledge of the Hampshire investigation was extremely limited and
whilst he was privy to the generality of the progress, he was not made aware of it
in detail.
‘One of the reasons for not allowing him to be privileged to detail is that he was
considered what could best be described as a “loose cannon” and as such could
possibly compromise the investigation.
‘Alistair [sic] MORGAN I confidently believe will not be satisfied by any explanation
other than that which he wishes to hear and will go to any lengths to enlist help to
further his belief.’154
89. DCI Paul Blaker concluded that the correspondence from members of Daniel Morgan’s
family contained ‘no evidence or information which was not available during the course of the
Hampshire Constabulary investigation’, and ‘there appears to be no information which indicates
any fresh line of enquiry into the murder of Daniel MORGAN’.155
90. Two weeks later, on 22 May 1995, Commander Ian Quinn wrote to Isobel Hülsmann in the
following terms:
152 Memorandum from A/DCS Roger Gaspar to Commander Ian Quinn, MPS022188001, pp4-5, 26 January 1995.
153 Letter from D/Supt Colin Smith to DCI Paul Blaker, MPS060689001, p3, 16 March 1995.
154 Letter from DCI Paul Blaker to D/Supt Colin Smith, MPS062325001, p2, 09 May 1995.
155 Letter from DCI Paul Blaker to D/Supt Colin Smith, MPS062325001, pp7-8, 09 May 1995.
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‘I have to say that an exhaustive review of the investigations, conducted in [sic] Daniel’s
tragic death, show that all matters now raised have been properly considered and
dealt with. The two major enquiries that have taken place, the second by an outside
Constabulary supervised by the independent Police Complaints Authority, were as
thorough as is possible.’156
In November 2020, former Commander Ian Quinn told the Panel that the review included a
consideration of the papers in the Morgan One and Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigations, in order to establish whether the concerns expressed by members of Daniel
Morgan’s family in their letter of 05 January 1995 were ‘viable’.
91. The claim that ‘an exhaustive review of the investigations’ was conducted refers to
the exchange of letters between D/Supt Colin Smith and DCI Paul Blaker. This did not
constitute ‘an exhaustive review’. Commander Ian Quinn’s assertion that the ‘two major
enquiries that have taken place, the second by an outside Constabulary supervised by
the independent Police Complaints Authority’, were ‘as thorough as is possible’ is not
supported by the facts. Neither investigation was as thorough as possible, and the
Hampshire /Police Complaints Authority Investigation was not independent.
5.1 The 1996 Review

92. Alastair Morgan wrote to Commander Ian Quinn on 21 November 1995 expressing his
dissatisfaction.157 Two meetings occurred between Alastair Morgan and Commander Quinn,
and Alastair Morgan was informed by him that the Morgan One and Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority investigations were being re-examined to see if there were ‘any avenues
worth pursuing’.158
93. The re-examination was conducted by Inspector Geoffrey Pierce, Commander Quinn’s staff
officer, and appears to have concluded by 11 April 1996.159 The re-examination report identified
one avenue of enquiry relating to former Police Officer Z31 (see Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation).160 This was investigated but no further action was recommended.161
Commander Quinn wrote to Alastair Morgan on 22 May 1996 informing him that there were
‘no further avenues of enquiry open’.162 The letter concluded that Commander William Griffiths
would assume responsibility for the case, but that he would not be able to ‘take the case any
further in the absence of new information’.163
156 Letter from Commander Ian Quinn to Isobel Hülsmann, MPS020683001, p1, 22 May 1995.
157 Letter from Alastair Morgan to Commander Ian Quinn, MPS020681001, 21 November 1995.
158 Branch note by Inspector Geoffrey Pierce, MPS020677001, 21 March 1996.
159 Briefing note re 4 area crime OCU confidential inquiry, MPS040114001, p1, 11 April 1996.
160 Report by DCI Thomas Smith, MPS007382001, 8 May 1996.
161 Report by DCI Thomas Smith, MPS007382001, p11, 8 May 1996.
162 Letter from Commander Ian Quinn to Alastair Morgan, MPS040052001, p1, 22 May 1996.
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5.2 From 1997 to 2000, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges

5.2.1 DAC Roy Clark’s briefing note to Commissioner Sir Paul Condon
94. Alastair Morgan continued to seek answers, and a meeting was arranged between Alastair
Morgan and his Member of Parliament, Chris Smith, and DAC Roy Clark and the Commissioner,
Sir Paul Condon, to discuss the Metropolitan Police’s handling of the investigation into Daniel
Morgan’s murder.164 A briefing note for the Commissioner was produced by DAC Roy Clark, on
28 October 1997. It stated:165
‘He [Alastair Morgan] wishes to discuss police failure to identify the person/people
responsible for the murder of his brother – Daniel MORGAN – in 1987. The meeting
will be difficult. Alistair [sic] MORGAN is obsessed with the thought that police officers
were either directly responsible for his brother’s murder, were aware it was to happen
or responsible for a cover up. I have spoken to him on a number of occasions in recent
weeks and consider he is exhibiting signs of paranoia.
‘He makes it absolutely clear that he has no regard whatsoever for the Police Service
and the Metropolitan Police in particular. He has spoken to a number of senior officers
over the years and will imply that since they have failed to solve his brother’s murder
they in turn must be part of the cover up.
‘There can be little doubt that he will quickly make the content of your meeting public
and every possibility that he may covertly tape record the proceedings.’166
95. The briefing note also referenced Alastair Morgan’s report (see paragraph 83 above), which
DAC Roy Clark described as ‘a document in which all [Alastair Morgan’s] bitterness at every
and anybody who has not seen things his way becomes apparent’.167 The briefing note made no
attempt to engage with the information and concerns put forward in Alastair Morgan’s report.
96. The briefing note concluded with the following recommendation:
‘Whilst the meeting with Alistair [sic] MORGAN will need careful handling I feel we
have no option but to indicate there is no possibility of progressing this case in the
absence of new evidence. Obviously if new lines of enquiry become known they will be
rigorously pursued.’168
97. The following day, Alastair Morgan telephoned DAC Roy Clark and ‘asked if there was
evidence his brother was murdered because he was about to reveal police corruption’.169
DAC Clark replied that, from his knowledge of the papers, there was ‘no evidence or indication
that Daniel MORGAN was murdered because he was about to reveal police corruption’.170
DAC Clark also noted that Daniel Morgan ‘must have been aware that his company “Southern
Investigations” had been profiting from the services of a small number of police officers contrary
to their duty’, but that although ‘these matters amounted to discipline offences under the Police
Discipline Regulations they do not amount to corruption’.171
164 Briefing note by DAC Roy Clark, MPS046679001, p52, 25 June 1998.
165 Briefing note by DAC Roy Clark, MPS046679001, pp73-80, 28 October 1997.
166 Briefing note by DAC Roy Clark, MPS046679001, p73, 28 October 1997.
169 Witness statement of DAC Roy Clark, MPS054304001, pp2, 30 October 1997
170 Witness statement of DAC Roy Clark, MPS054304001, pp2, 30 October 1997
171 Witness statement of DAC Roy Clark, MPS054304001, pp2-3, 30 October 1997.
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98. At the meeting attended by the Commissioner, DAC Roy Clark, Chris Smith MP and Alastair
Morgan on 07 November 1997, it was agreed by the Commissioner that that ‘senior officers
would “review” the case’.172
5.2.2 Briefing for the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office
99. Eighteen months later in May 1999, Alastair Morgan wrote to Kate Hoey MP, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, telling her that he was ‘quite certain’,
‘a) that there was police involvement in the murder
b) that police efforts to catch my brother’s killers were inadequate
c) that information I have had about the activities of the suspects before and after the
murder was systematically suppressed by two investigating squads (primarily because it
incriminated a Met Detective Sergeant).’173
100. In his letter, Alastair Morgan noted that despite Commissioner Sir Paul Condon’s
agreement that the case would be reviewed, no effort had been made by police to take a
statement from him until February 1999 following an intervention by Chris Smith MP.174
101. Alastair Morgan’s letter also stated that he had received a death threat and claimed that
his request to the Metropolitan Police for ‘minimum security steps’ had ‘received no response
whatsoever’.175 In fact, the Metropolitan Police had responded to concerns raised by Alastair
Morgan about incidents which occurred in 1996 and 1999. An offer of security measures was
subsequently declined by Alastair Morgan on 10 May 2000.
102. In Alastair Morgan’s expressed view, ‘DAC Roy Clark’s behaviour throughout has been
scandalously negligent and irresponsible.’176
103. This comment does not reflect fairly the work done by DAC Roy Clark in the matter
of the investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan.
104. DAC Roy Clark then wrote a briefing note, dated 11 May 1999, ‘to assist Rt Hon Kate
HOEY MP respond to a letter from Alistair [sic] MORGAN’.177 The briefing note did not address
a number of issues raised by Alastair Morgan in his letter (as set out above). Further, the briefing
note concluded:
‘It is appropriate to indicate that Alistair [sic] MORGAN has a long history of vilifying
those with whom he comes into contact during his (understandable) campaign to keep
the investigation of his brother’s murder alive. For example of his former MP he wrote
“...whom I regard as unspeakably arrogant, self interested and corrupt”. The relevance
172 Letter from Alastair Morgan to Kate Hoey MP, MPS071715001, p1, 04 May 1999.
177 Update Note to the Metropolitan Police Committee Secretariat from DAC Roy Clark, MPS071712001, p1, 11 May 1999.
1163
of including this fact is that he regards it as a legitimate tactic and all with whom he
comes into contact can expect to be denigrated in due course.’178
105. The briefing note did sympathise with members of Daniel Morgan’s family at points.
It noted that Alastair Morgan had ‘rightly and understandably kept up a campaign to ensure
everything is done to bring the murderers to justice’.179 It also noted that while an enquiry had
concluded that DS Sidney Fillery had committed disciplinary offences in relation to the Belmont
Car Auctions matter, no proceedings could be brought against him as he was no longer a police
officer.180 The briefing note stated that ‘[i]t is clear the effect this must have had upon Alistair [sic]
MORGAN and his family’.181
106. The briefing note further stated that a ‘decision not to take Mr MORGAN into full
confidence on some matters was taken as he is in regular contact with journalists and may reveal
the secret detail in error’.182 Initial enquiries were made to inform the Minister, Kate Hoey MP, but
she was moved from the Home Office and there is no evidence that anything further occurred.
5.2.3 02 July 1999: The article in the Daily Telegraph

107. On 02 July 1999, members of Daniel Morgan’s family were shocked and distressed to see
an article in the Daily Telegraph concerning the murder. The Metropolitan Police had placed
a ‘trigger’ article in the Daily Telegraph to assist in an intelligence-gathering exercise. The
article began:
‘One of the most perplexing unsolved murder inquiries to face the Metropolitan Police
— the axe murder 12 years ago of a private detective — has been re-opened following
the emergence of what the force describes as “crucial” new information. Daniel
Morgan, 37, was bludgeoned to death with an axe in a pub car park on March 10, 1987.
The Daily Telegraph understands that the new information concerns the hiding and
disposal of the getaway car.’183
108. Members of the family had not been informed prior to the article’s publication. While they
had been told by Commander Ian Quinn that ‘no unsolved murder is ever closed’,184 they had
not been informed of new evidence from Person F11 which had prompted the article, nor had
they been told of the ongoing and covert Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges.
109. Alastair Morgan has expressed strong dissatisfaction that he was not informed of the
covert operation either in advance of its commencement or prior to the publication of the Daily
Telegraph article.185 When the existence of Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges was made known to
the family as a consequence of the newspaper article, they were informed that it was a covert
investigation into Daniel Morgan’s murder. However, this was not the case. Ongoing anti-
corruption activities by the Metropolitan Police had resulted in intelligence indicating corrupt
associations between Jonathan Rees and former DS Sidney Fillery and serving and former
police officers and criminals. Southern Investigations/Law & Commercial then became the
183 John Steele, ‘Car clue to 12-year-old axe death mystery’, Daily Telegraph, MPS040636001, p2, 02 July 1999.
185 Morgan, A, and Jukes, P, 2017, Untold: The Daniel Morgan murder exposed, Blink Publishing, p213.covert
1164
subject of Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges, the purpose of which was to gather intelligence about
those corrupt associations, and it was also hoped, in the process, to secure further information
which might assist a further investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan.
110. The covert nature of Operation Two Bridges was a proper factor for the
Metropolitan Police to consider when deciding whether and when to brief members of
Daniel Morgan’s family. The Panel makes no criticism of the decision not to inform the
family of the operation’s initiation. However, the family should have been briefed before
the article appeared in the Daily Telegraph, so that the important new information which
it contained did not come as a shock to them. They should also have been informed of
the true nature of Operation Nigeria /Two Bridges – that it was an intelligence gathering
exercise, not an investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan.
111. Following publication of the Daily Telegraph article, at the request of the family, a briefing
meeting was arranged for 15 July 1999.186 In the event, because of confusion as to dates,
Alastair Morgan, who was to have attended was not present, and the meeting took place
between his solicitor and DAC Clark. A note of the meeting taken by the police read as follows:
‘DAC Clark said we had […] now gained what we believed to be a true picture of what
happened the night that Daniel Morgan was murdered. He stated I believe we have
identified the man who used the Axe in the murder of Daniel Morgan. We believe we
can also say who else was there. The murder appears to have arisen from a serious
fallout between Daniel Morgan and Jonathan REES over business matters. One being
the Belmont Car Auction incident but other matters as well.
‘As Daniel Morgan left the Pub associates of REES were waiting in the car park [and]
one of them struck Daniel Morgan with an axe. This man left the scene in a getaway car
driven by another man. [The] getaway car was left in a garage for some time to conceal
it. After some time the car was destroyed. We now have information about the people
who dealt with the car. This is not evidence at the moment but credible intelligence.’187
112. The role of the police was also discussed:
‘DAC Clark states that the information available at this time indicates that no police
officers appear to have been involved or on the fringes of this crime. There is also
no evidence that FILLERY gave information to REES when he was on the squad
investigating the murder although the possibility cannot be discounted.’ 188
113. A further comment made in the meeting was recorded as follows:
‘DAC Clark explained that although Alastair Morgan would not agree, his assessment of
the original MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] investigation was that it was good. It had
showed a motive for REES and other circumstantial evidence. He felt the investigation
was honest and thorough but perhaps not innovative.’189
186 Note of meeting between DAC Roy Clark and Raju Bhatt MPS054182001, p1, 15 July 1999.
187 Note of meeting between DAC Roy Clark and Raju Bhatt, MPS054182001, p1, 15 July 1999.
1165
114. Further meetings took place in the remaining months of 1999 and throughout 2000.190
For the most part, the Metropolitan Police appears to have briefed the family members openly
and in detail in these meetings.
115. The evidence available does not support DAC Roy Clark’s positive assessment of
the Morgan One Investigation. However, it is clear that there was an unprecedented and
necessary development in police engagement with members of Daniel Morgan’s family
after the publication of the Daily Telegraph article.
5.2.4 Corruption and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice

116. Intelligence gathered during Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges led to 11 arrests and the
prosecution of Jonathan Rees and others including a serving police officer in a case unrelated
to Daniel Morgan’s murder (see Chapter 4, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges). During this time,
Daniel Morgan’s family were routinely updated on the progress of these matters. Late in
September 1999, DAC Roy Clark gave some members of Daniel Morgan’s family an outline of
progress.191 Further details were given to family members in meetings held in November and
December 1999.192,193
117. In November 1999, Jonathan Rees and Simon James were tried on charges of conspiracy
to commit acts tending and intended to pervert the course of justice, because Simon James
had paid Jonathan Rees £11,000 to secure custody of his child from his wife by planting drugs
in her car.194 A serving police officer DC Austin Warnes was charged with conspiracy to supply
Class A drugs, conspiracy to supply Class B drugs, conspiracy to pervert the course of justice
in a Criminal Court, and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice in a Civil Court. In return
for payment,195 he had put false information into the police intelligence system that Simon
James’s wife was dealing in drugs in night clubs. James Cook had planted 15 wraps of cocaine
in Simon James’ wife’s car. They had been removed by police and she had been arrested.
The drugs were removed by officers from CIB under evidential conditions.196 He pleaded
guilty and was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. Jonathan Rees and Simon James were
convicted and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment on 15 December 1999. 197 James Cook
was acquitted. Members of the family were given daily updates on the trial’s progress through
Alastair Morgan.198
118. Following the trial, Isobel Hülsmann was ‘not optimistic about a successful outcome to or
continuance of the investigation by police into her son’s murder’.199 She was informed that DCI
Barry Nicholson was anxious for an early meeting with members of Daniel Morgan’s family to
discuss a way forward.200
190 Notes of meetings with the family of Daniel Morgan, MPS046679001, various dates between 1999 and 2000.
191 Note of meeting between DAC Roy Clark and the family of Daniel Morgan, MPS046659001, p16, 28 September 1999.
192 Note of meeting between DAC Roy Clark and the family of Daniel Morgan, MPS054292001, pp1-4, 04 November 1999.
193 Note of meeting between DAC Roy Clark the family of Daniel Morgan, MPS054290001, p1, 13 December 1999.
194 Report by a Detective Sergeant, MPS099294001, p46, 20 July 2001.
195 £1,500 MPS04899001
196 Note of meeting between DAC Roy Clark and Isobel Hülsmann and Alastair Morgan, MPS054186001, 13 December 2000.
197 Jonathan Rees’s sentence was increased to seven years when he appealed.
198 Family liaison update report, MPS048914001, p4, 05 January 2001.
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5.3 The 2000 Murder Review

119. On 23 May 2000, DCI Barry Nicholson briefed DCS Barry Webb on potential
leads identified during Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges. DCI Nicholson recorded that
DCS Webb ‘agreed to review the MORGAN murder and treat the investigation as a
“Special Investigation”’.201
120. DI Steve Hagger was appointed to conduct the 2000 Murder Review of the investigations
of Daniel Morgan’s murder.
121. The review was completed on 06 October 2000. In relation to family liaison, the report
found that in the original investigation, ‘contact with the family was less structured and more
focused on the needs of the investigation rather than on the requirements of the family’.202
One of the recommendations it made was that a Level 2 trained Family Liaison Officer should be
appointed to the family.203
122. There was effective communication and reporting between officers involved in
commissioning the 2000 Murder Review. Although DI Steve Hagger had no contact with
the family, he clearly was aware of the regrettable history of liaison with the family, and
made the recommendation, welcomed by the Panel, that Family Liaison Officers trained
to manage more complex issues should be appointed in the future.
5.4 1999 to 2001: Safety and risk

123. After giving a witness statement to police in March 1999, Alastair Morgan became
concerned for his safety and was unwilling to sign his statement. This prompted a Detective
Constable to write a report on 07 April 1999 to DAC Roy Clark, headed ‘Request by Alistair [sic]
MORGAN to be a protected witness’, and explaining the following:
‘One main concerns [sic] that Alistair [sic] MORGAN has is that he believes that REES
and FILLERY are aware of the fact that he knows of their involvement in his brothers
[sic] murder […]. [H]e is of the opinion that if REES and FILLERY were to gain the
knowledge that he had made a statement giving evidence against them he too would
be murdered. MORGAN believes that his statement will be the one thing that will
provide the evidence to convict REES and FILLERY of the murder.’204
124. Alastair Morgan related two incidents to the Detective Constable that ‘caused him
concern’.205 In around 1996, he had ‘received a telephone call from a female with a foreign
accent who said “Hello, we’re going to kill you like we killed your brother[.]” The caller then hung
up.’206 Alastair Morgan believed this may have been prompted by a recent newspaper article
discussing the murder of another private detective.207
201 Letter from DCI Barry Nicholson to DCS Robert Quick, MPS049767001, p1, 02 August 2000.
202 2000 Murder Review report by DI Steve Hagger, MPS020525001, p77, para 9.3, 06 October 2000.
203 2000 Murder Review report by DI Steve Hagger, MPS020525001, p79, para 9.15, 06 October 2000.
204 Report regarding request by Alastair Morgan, MPS046832001, p3, 07 April 1999.
1167
125. The second incident had occurred in 1998 when Alastair Morgan was living in Glasgow.
Alastair Morgan,
‘returned to his home one evening and saw two men standing on the street corner
looking towards his house. [...] When he relayed these details to his mother she stated a
man had been outside her address the previous day with a camera. He then contacted
his sister, who lives in GERMANY, and she told him that on the same day a man was
lying in a ditch near her house and he also had a camera. Alistair [sic] MORGAN states
that he believes these incidents are all linked.’208
126. Alastair Morgan told his Family Liaison Officer that he felt that ‘these incidents were
connected and also understood that they were orchestrated by Hampshire Constabulary, who he
believed were motivated by revenge over adverse publicity he had generated in the light of their
failure to convict his brother’s killers’.209
127. Alastair Morgan refused to sign the draft of his witness statement ‘until an alarm had been
fitted to his flat and he had a designated CIB [Complaints Investigation Bureau] liaison officer’.210
128. DAC Roy Clark wrote to Alastair Morgan on 29 April 1999 thanking him for his unsigned
witness statement,211 noting that ‘[w]e did agree to meet at this stage to discuss matters but I
understand that you now only want to be contacted through your Solicitors’.212 DAC Clark also
asked Alastair Morgan to get in touch.213
129. On 10 May 2000, Alastair Morgan’s solicitor was informed by the Complaints Investigation
Bureau 3 (CIB3) that a risk assessment would be conducted regarding the safety of Alastair
Morgan and his family.214 Alastair Morgan was offered a review of his security.215 The offer was
declined by Alastair Morgan following discussion with his partner.216 Alastair Morgan signed his
witness statement on 16 May 2000.217 The family liaison log, dated 19 May 2000, recorded that
Alastair Morgan ‘was asked if he had current fears for his safety or that of his family and agreed
that he didn’t’.218
130. On 26 May 2000, it was recorded that Isobel Hülsmann told the Family Liaison Officer that
‘she had no fears for her safety’. However, the officer noted that ‘several comments she made
raised fears for her emotional welfare’. She had received a number of unpleasant telephone calls
which she had reported some months previously, but no more had been recorded since the
installation of a British Telecom call-monitoring system.219
131. Iris Morgan was contacted by the family liaison team in June 2000 following an expression
of concern for her wellbeing from Alastair Morgan. She explained that she did not feel vulnerable
but talking to the team reminded her of the murder of her husband.220 In mid-October 2000, Iris
Morgan contacted the family liaison team to inform them that her son, Dan Morgan, had been
209 Fax to DAC Roy Clark from DS Richard Oliver, MPS049773001, p2, undated.
211 Letter to Alastair Morgan from DAC Roy Clark, MPS046831001, 29 April 1999.
217 Witness statement of Alastair Morgan, MPS001922001, 16 May 2000.
1168
assaulted in an incident unrelated to Daniel Morgan’s murder. The family liaison team assured
Iris Morgan they ‘would monitor the investigation’ into Dan Morgan’s assault and recorded that
she was ‘very appreciative’ of their intervention.221
132. The family liaison team discussed Alastair Morgan’s risk assessment with him in late
November 2000.222 Alastair Morgan was satisfied that he was not under further threat.223 A few
days later Alastair Morgan, despite being told to stay away from Jonathan Rees’s trial (see
Chapter 4, Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges), was recorded as having ‘attended the Central
Criminal Court in a disguise to see if he could see REES leaving the court [….] He was advised
as to how potentially dangerous this was both in terms of compromising the case but also to his
own safety.’224
133. While the police had legitimate concern for the safety of Alastair Morgan if he
attended the trial, in the circumstances described it was not appropriate to ask him
to stay away from the trial. The Panel rejects the contention that the presence of
Alastair Morgan at the trial could have compromised the Prosecution case against
the Defendants.
134. On 19 December 2000, Alastair Morgan informed the family liaison team that he was,
‘concerned about his family’s safety, specifically Iris Morgan and her children Sarah and
Daniel. He believed that the situation had changed and those connected with REES
would interfere with or cause distress to the Morgan family. He was asked whether he
felt that he was in fear of any reprisal or under threat. He assured police that he was
comfortable, as were his immediate family, Isobel [Hülsmann] and Jane [Morgan]. He
did not feel in danger.’225
135. On the same date, Alastair Morgan contacted DAC Roy Clark to express his concern that
the level of threat to his family had increased. Although he was on leave, DCI Barry Nicholson
was contacted by DAC Clark and told of Alastair Morgan’s concerns.226 DCI Nicholson advised
DAC Clark that the threat against members of Daniel Morgan’s family had not changed, and this
message was conveyed back to Alastair Morgan.227 Alastair Morgan was again offered a review
of his security, which he again declined.228
136. When contacted by police, Iris Morgan expressed no concerns for her safety or that of
her children and reported that she was ‘extremely satisfied with the contact and service police
had provided’.229
221 Family liaison update report, MPS048917001, p4, 19 October 2000.

222 Family liaison update report, MPS048933001, p9, 24 November 2000.
223 Family liaison update report, MPS048933001, p9, 24 November 2000.
226 Telephone call between DAC Roy Clark and Alastair Morgan, MPS046678001, p8, 19 December 2000.
227 Telephone call between DAC Roy Clark and Alastair Morgan, MPS046678001, p8, 19 December 2000.
1169
137. During the period from late 1999 to 2001, officers in the Metropolitan Police
responded well to concerns raised by members of the family about their personal safety.
Risk assessments were carried out, some level of personal protection was offered
and, generally, a more considerate and professional approach was adopted by the
Metropolitan Police than had previously been the case.
5.5 Further attempts to get access to the Hampshire/Police Complaints

Authority Report
138. In February 1999, the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, headed by Sir William Macpherson, had
published its findings.230 Recommendation 10 of the report was ‘[t]hat Investigating Officers’
reports resulting from public complaints should not attract Public Interest Immunity as a class.
They should be disclosed to complainants, subject only to the “substantial harm” test for
withholding disclosure.’231 This provided new grounds for members of Daniel Morgan’s family to
seek access to the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report.
139. On 21 March 2000, Alastair Morgan informed Chris Smith MP that, following
recommendation 10 of the Macpherson Report, he would again be seeking access to the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report.232 On 29 March 2000, Chris Smith
MP wrote a letter to DAC Roy Clark expressing Alastair Morgan’s desire to have access to the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report.233
140. On 04 April 2000, members of Daniel Morgan’s family met DAC Roy Clark and DCS
Robert Quick. At the meeting, DAC Clark said he would consider the family’s request to view
the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report but noted that ‘the issue for
the police is if reports are disclosed routinely candour between the investigating officer and
the Police Complaints Authority will no longer be possible’. He added that another point of
consideration was Alastair Morgan’s position as a potential witness.234 Between 17 April 2000
and 19 May 2000, Alastair Morgan telephoned DAC Clark a number of times to ask about
gaining access to the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report and to
express his anxiety over the delay.235,236,237
141. On 06 June 2000, Alastair Morgan made several calls to Hampshire Constabulary.238
DAC Roy Clark called Alastair Morgan back that evening and informed him that Hampshire
Constabulary had agreed to let him read the report but not to have a copy. However, before he
could read it, they required ‘an indemnity’ to the effect that he would ‘not use the contents of the
report in a civil action against them’. Alastair Morgan found these conditions ‘outrageous’ and
did not accept this offer to read the report.239
230 Sir William Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, 24 February 1999.
231 Sir William Macpherson, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry, p376, 24 February 1999.
232 Fax from Alastair Morgan to Chris Smith MP, PNL000101001, p242, 21 March 2000.
233 Letter from Chris Smith MP to DAC Roy Clark, PNL000101001, p247, 29 March 2000.
234 Note of meeting between members of Daniel Morgan’s family, Raju Bhatt, DAC Roy Clark and DCS Robert Quick, PNL000101001, p253,
04 April 2000.
235 Note of telephone call from Alastair Morgan, MPS071654001, 08 May 2000.
238 DAC Roy Clark’s notes of telephone communications with Alastair Morgan and Family, MPS046678001, p38, 06 June 2000.
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142. The manner of providing the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation

report to the family was a matter for Hampshire Constabulary to determine. As such,
the police were entitled to place conditions upon the provision of the report in June
2000, such as only allowing the family to read the report and not be provided with a
copy. However, the restriction proposed by Hampshire Constabulary in June 2000 that,
if members of Daniel Morgan’s family were to see the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation report, then they could not use it in any civil action against
Hampshire Constabulary, was inappropriate. Even if the members of Daniel Morgan’s
family had given this undertaking, it would not have protected the police from any future
civil action, since an undertaking preventing an individual from using a document in civil
action would not be legally recognised and would not have been enforceable in court.
It is not only inappropriate for this undertaking to have been requested, it is also legally
and morally questionable, particularly in the circumstances when the police are dealing
with the family members of a murder victim.
143. A Family Liaison Officer described Alastair Morgan’s reaction to this offer of conditional
access to the report: ‘His mood [had] ranged between anger; frustration; betrayal; suspicion and
the feeling that the relationship that had been painstakingly built up on both his side and from
the police had returned to where it had started ie. Distrust.’240
144. Alastair Morgan continued to contact DAC Roy Clark during June 2000.241,242,243 In a call
on 08 June 2000, Alastair Morgan was described in the following terms: ‘He is very emotional.
He says he is very unhappy. He says he wants the Commissioner to be told and to make a
decision.’244 Alastair Morgan said he was determined to see the report because he felt it was the
only way to understand what had happened.245
145. Three weeks later, Alastair Morgan received a letter from DAC Roy Clark informing him
that the terms of access to the report remained the same, which Alastair Morgan considered
‘unacceptable’.246 According to DAC Clark’s note of telephone conversations between them,
Alastair Morgan said he would ‘do anything he thought was necessary to gain access’247 to the
report, which he clarified to mean ‘go to court, lobby parliament, go to the press or do whatever
he thought appropriate to get access to the report but he would not reveal anything about the
current enquiry’.248 Alastair Morgan told DAC Clark that the proposed restriction was ‘in itself
injurious to the family especially when the long history of distrust between the family and the
police was considered’.249
240 Family liaison update report, MPS048919001, p1, 06 June 2000.

241 Note of telephone call from Alastair Morgan, MPS054270001, 06–07 June 2000.
242 Note of telephone call from Alastair Morgan, MPS054271001, 08 June 2000.
243 Note of telephone call from Alastair Morgan, MPS054269001, 15 June 2000.
246 DAC Roy Clark’s notes of telephone communications with Alastair Morgan and Family, MPS046678001, p36, 6 July 2000.
1171
146. On 08 September 2000, Isobel Hülsmann spoke to DAC Roy Clark, who suggested some
terms on which she could see the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report.250
Isobel Hülsmann ‘felt that any pre condition to her and her son seeing the report would be a
step too far’.251
147. Alastair Morgan continued to call DAC Roy Clark’s office regarding access to the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report.252,253 A Metropolitan Police family
liaison report recorded Alastair Morgan’s reasoning that ‘if there wasn’t something to hide
then the pre-conditions would not have been imposed’. The family liaison report continued,
‘[b]oth Alastair and his mother believe that Hampshire Constabulary deliberately covered up
Metropolitan Police corruption’.254
148. Alastair Morgan was angered and dismayed to receive a letter from DAC Roy Clark, dated
13 October 2000, 255,256 apparently laying down conditions that he felt to be ‘even worse than
before’.257 DAC Clark proposed reading the report to members of Daniel Morgan’s family, who
would not be permitted to record or take notes.258 This was not acceptable to the family.
149. In February 2001, DAC Roy Clark’s successor, DAC Andrew Hayman, agreed to provide
a response to Alastair Morgan’s request for access to the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation report. When DAC Hayman’s assessment was not forthcoming, Alastair
Morgan again became frustrated by the delay in answering his concerns and was ‘harbouring
the suspicion that MR. HAYMAN was employing delaying tactics’, and further complained on
numerous occasions about lack of access to the report.259,260
150. On 20 June 2001, DAC Andrew Hayman wrote to Alastair Morgan’s solicitor explaining
his decision not to disclose the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report,
because it was subject to public interest immunity. The Hampshire Constabulary did not
wish the report to be disclosed, because if material from the report was released, it could
compromise the current murder investigation (see Chapter 6, The Abelard One/Morgan Two
Investigation). However, DAC Roy Clark’s offer to read the report to the family remained open.261
151. On 05 November 2002, nearly a year and a half later, solicitors, acting on behalf of Isobel
Hülsmann, applied for judicial review of the refusal of the Metropolitan Police to disclose the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report to members of Daniel Morgan’s
family.262 The judicial review of the claim was listed for hearing on 07 and 08 July 2003.263
152. On 24 April 2003, Colin Gibbs, a Crown Prosecutor at the Crown Prosecution Service,
made a witness statement at the request of the Metropolitan Police, in relation to the judicial
review, in which he stated ‘[i]t is not possible to anticipate all potential consequences of
251 DAC Roy Clark’s notes of telephone communications with Alastair Morgan and Family, MPS046678001, p27, 8 September 2000.
252 DAC Roy Clark’s notes of telephone communications with Alastair Morgan and Family, MPS046678001, p29, 07 September 2000.
254 Family Liaison update report, MPS046817001, p1, 12 September 2000.
255 Family liaison update report, MPS048917001, p3, 17 October 2000.
256 Letter from DAC Roy Clark to Raju Bhatt, MPS071630001, 13 October 2000.
257 Family liaison update report, p3, 17 October 2000
258 Letter from DAC Roy Clark to Raju Bhatt, MPS071630001, pp2-3, 13 October 2000
259 Family liaison update report, MPS048904001, 12 April 2001.
260 Minutes of meeting between Abelard One investigation team and Alastair Morgan, MPS040533001, pp3-4, 14 May 2001.
261 Letter from DAC Andrew Hayman to Raju Bhatt, MPS071592001, p2, 20 June 2001.
262 Fax of letter from Bhatt Murphy Solicitors to Hampshire County Council enclosing copy of Judicial Review, HAM000717001, pp3-9,
7 November 2002.
263 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Alastair Morgan, PNL000102001, pp338-339, 17 June 2003.
1172
disclosing the [Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation] report. However there

might be a potential prejudice to the present consideration of the case and, if there is to be a
prosecution, to the case itself, if the report were to effectively enter the public domain.’264
153. In a meeting chaired by DAC Barbara Wilding on 09 June 2003, it was decided that a
redacted version of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report should be
disclosed to the family. However, by this time, following the further investigation into Daniel
Morgan’s murder, the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation, a report had been submitted
to the Crown Prosecution Service seeking advice as to whether there was sufficient evidence
to charge Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian and James Cook with conspiracy to murder Daniel
Morgan. A decision was awaited. Therefore, on 01 July 2003, the Metropolitan Police made
an application to adjourn the Judicial Review by Isobel Hülsmann pending the making of
that decision.265
154. On 02 July 2003, the Crown Prosecution Service concluded that the disclosure of the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report, with necessary conditions, would
not prejudice any future charging decision and therefore the Metropolitan Police decided to
share the report with the family.
155. On 04 July 2003, the High Court ordered that disclosure of the report would be subject to
the following conditions:
• ‘The Hampshire Report may be copied only to the named members of the Claimant’s
[Isobel Hülsmann’s] family, as set out in the Schedule attached hereto (which is not
disclosed to the public), her solicitors and counsel.
• The Hampshire Report will not be copied further or shown to any other person and its
contents will not be made known to any other person, whether orally or in writing or by
any other means whatsoever.
• The Hampshire Report will not be used for any purpose other than informing the named
members of the Claimant’s family, as set out in the Schedule attached hereto, her
solicitors and counsel of its contents. In particular, no part of the Hampshire Report
may be published or provided for publication by others.’266
156. By 03 August 2003, the report, in redacted form, had been delivered to the family.
157. In March 2005, the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family had made an
application to the Metropolitan Police for the unredacted Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation report, and other documents, to be made available for use by Isobel
Hülsmann in proposed Judicial Review proceedings against the Home Secretary because of
her refusal to direct a public inquiry into the circumstances of Daniel Morgan’s death.26718 years
after the murder of Daniel Morgan and 17 years after the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation had been commissioned, the Metropolitan Police agreed that unredacted access
should be granted.
264 Witness Statement of Colin Gibbs quoted within witness statement provided by DLS, HAM000702001, p11, 24 April 2003.
265 Letter to Hampshire County Council from Metropolitan Police Service enclosing Adjournment Application, HAM000702001, 01 July 2003.
266 Order of the High Court, R on the application of H v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, PNL000111001, pp.236-237,
07 July 2003.
267 Letter from Raju Bhatt, HOM000053001, pp1-3, 4 March 2005.
1173
158. Although it is accepted that there was no right of access to the report during the
period from 1989 to 2003, the continuing refusal of the Metropolitan Police to grant the
full access to the report of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation
until 2005 caused members of the family significant anxiety and distress, because they
did not know the outcome of the investigation and because of their suspicions about
police corruption.
6 The Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation

159. The Metropolitan Police acted on the 2000 Murder Review’s recommendation that a
focused reinvestigation should be undertaken,268 and by January 2001, planning had begun for a
new and significant investigation (see Chapter 6, The Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation).269
The operation was initially a covert intelligence operation, Abelard One. Later, an overt murder
investigation was created named Morgan Two. Both operated concurrently from this point,
forming a single investigation, the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation.
160. DCI David Zinzan was asked to attend a meeting with members of Daniel Morgan’s family
on 16 February 2001 and was270 appointed as Senior Investigating Officer of the covert Abelard
One Investigation in early 2001.271
161. On 14 March 2001, following his initial reading of the case papers and having met
members of Daniel Morgan’s family, DCI David Zinzan reported a number of concerns which he
believed required consideration prior to any reinvestigation.272 This included consideration of
Recommendation 83 of the 2000 Murder Review Report, which advised that the investigation
team be recruited ‘from outwith the South East London area’.273 His report unequivocally
stated ‘[i]f this advice is not followed then a clear reason at a senior level needs to be
documented’. He continued that, otherwise, ‘[t]he suspicion of corruption by the family may
be reinforced’274 (see Chapter 6, The Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation). DCI Zinzan
also wrote, ‘this investigation has the potential to damage the reputation of the [Metropolitan
Police], conversely, it also has potential to visibly demonstrate our commitment to transparency,
rooting out corruption and obtaining justice. It presents a great opportunity and should be
viewed as such.’275
162. By 03 April 2001, former DAC Roy Clark had retired and when Alastair Morgan telephoned
the investigation team he was informed that DCI David Zinzan was now in post and would be
anxious to meet up with him soon to ‘discuss the way forward’.276 Alastair Morgan replied that
he had been advised by his solicitor to communicate with the Metropolitan Police through
the Family Liaison Officers.277 This reflected the ongoing tension about the Metropolitan
268 2000 Murder Review Report, MPS020525001, p82, para 10.7, 06 October 2000.
269 File Note review of the Investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan, MPS094325001, p7, 09 January 2001.
271 Panel interview with former DCI David Zinzan, PNL000220001, p1, 15 March 2016.
276 Family Liaison update report, MPS048904001, p5, 12 April 2001.
1174
Police’s refusal to grant the family full access to the Hampshire/ Police Complaints Authority
Investigation report.278 Alastair Morgan further indicated that ‘he was willing to participate in any
re-investigation of his brother’s murder but would not take any role in a media presentation’.279
He said that his solicitor would be writing to DAC Andrew Hayman with an ultimatum regarding
the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report and that a failure to respond
would result in legal action.280
163. On 05 April 2001, a Family Liaison Officer phoned Iris Morgan to provide an update on
the latest proposals.281 Iris Morgan expressed the opinion to the Family Liaison Officer that
she thought the police should be aiming towards a conclusion of the investigation into Daniel
Morgan’s death.282
164. The Metropolitan Police 2001 family liaison guidance allowed for different provisions to be
made for different family members,283 and accordingly both DCI David Zinzan and the Family
Liaison Officer adopted a largely reactive approach to liaison with Iris Morgan, being available if
required. A more proactive approach was taken with other members of Daniel Morgan’s family,
such as Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann.
165. The decision to engage with Daniel Morgan’s family at different levels was in line
with the available guidance at the time and was handled well.
166. DCI David Zinzan attempted to arrange a meeting with Alastair Morgan for 25 April 2001,284
to provide details on current strategy, to allow Alastair Morgan to meet the team and to facilitate
contact and meetings between the investigation team and Daniel Morgan’s family.285 However,
Alastair Morgan cancelled the meeting on the day, due to the ongoing issues of access to the
Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Report.286,287 DCI Zinzan subsequently wrote to Alastair
Morgan stating that, although he understood the importance of access to the report, it was a
separate issue that was out of his control:
‘I would personally like to establish a working relationship between you and my team.
I believe that this could bring a positive benefit to my investigations. I feel that by
including you, listening to your ideas and giving you personal updates you may feel that
progress is being made. I would ask you to reconsider this decision. Trust is something
that has to be earnt. I would like to be given the opportunity to earn yours.’288
167. Alastair Morgan replied to DCI David Zinzan on 04 May 2001, stating that ‘[r]esolving the
issue of the Hampshire inquiry must come first for us’.289
278 Risk assessment of Alastair Morgan, MPS048905001, p1, 05 April 2001.

283 Metropolitan Police family liaison policy and fundamental guidelines, MPS109906001, p25, 23 March 2001.
284 Letter from DCI David Zinzan to Alastair Morgan, MPS040571001, p2, 25 April 2001.
285 Minutes of office meeting, MPS040530001, p5, 23 April 2001.
287 Decision log, MPS040527001, p19, 27 April 2001.
289 Letter from Alastair Morgan to DCI David Zinzan, MPS071598001, 04 May 2001.
1175
168. DCI David Zinzan briefed his team that he wanted them to meet Alastair Morgan because
‘it has, in the past, proved to be beneficial to the team members to meet relatives in order that
they may meet the family for whom they would be striving to get a result’.290
169. On 14 May 2001, DCI David Zinzan and his team met Alastair Morgan and his
partner. DCI Zinzan commenced the meeting by introducing the Abelard One Investigation
team. He then provided a detailed update on current lines of enquiry.291 The record of the
meeting noted:
‘[DCI David Zinzan] points out that trust has to be earned and will do his best to
establish good working relationship. Informs Mr Morgan that he will not lie to him and
will be honest.’292
170. In response to a question from Alastair Morgan, DCI David Zinzan stated that he had read
the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report, and not only did he state that
it would not answer the questions Alastair Morgan had, but that it also clearly stated there was
no evidence of police corruption.293 He advised Alastair Morgan that he was concerned that if it
were released it would set a precedent294 but said that he would seek authority for the family to
have access to the report.295
171. Following a request from Isobel Hülsmann for a meeting with senior officers, of which
Alastair Morgan informed the investigation team at the meeting on 14 May 2001,296 on
23 May 2001 DCI David Zinzan and DS Richard Oliver met Isobel Hülsmann.297 In a similar
manner to the meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann was updated on the investigation,
and a working relationship was established. At the meeting, DCI Zinzan expressed his
intention to be honest with the family of Daniel Morgan and was recorded as stating that, in his
experience, it was ‘very difficult to recover from a position of mistrust’.298 DCI Zinzan explained
that there would be occasions when, for reasons of security, he would be unable to provide
certain information to the family, but that he would tell them when these situations arose.299
172. DCI David Zinzan added that the current investigation of Daniel Morgan’s murder was the
most difficult investigation he had ever been involved in.300 The Metropolitan Police meeting note
recorded that, in reply to a comment from Isobel Hülsmann that there had been a lack of will to
solve the murder in the past, DCI Zinzan commented: ‘I cannot refute that, you have a point.’301
173. Isobel Hülsmann asked whether a new BBC Crimewatch programme would be broadcast,
as she believed that the previous one had been based upon biased information supplied by
Jonathan Rees. (In October 2020, Jonathan Rees told the Panel that he did not have any input
into the original BBC Crimewatch programme.) DCI David Zinzan replied that arranging for a
new appeal to be broadcast should not be a problem. Isobel Hülsmann then raised the issue
of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report, and her belief that it would
290 Minutes of office meeting, MPS053331001, p1, 14 May 2001.

291 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, MPS040533001, pp1-2, 14 May 2001.
292 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, MPS040533001, p3, 14 May 2001.
297 Minutes of meeting with Isobel Hülsmann, MPS071597001, 23 May 2001.
298 Minutes of meeting with Isobel Hülsmann, MPS071597001, p1, 23 May 2001.
1176
never be released to the family. DCI Zinzan replied that the main stumbling block was the
issue of public interest immunity, and that if reports such as the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation report were routinely released, it would become impossible to claim
public interest immunity at other stages. He provided an undertaking that the family of Daniel
Morgan would hear of any developments regarding the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation report first, and before reading about them in the press. Finally, DCI Zinzan stated
that the average posting was for two years and gave an assurance that he would remain in
position for ‘at least that long’ and that he would ‘see it out’.302
174. On 28 June 2001, DCI David Zinzan and the Family Liaison Officer met Jane Morgan and,
as with her mother and brother, provided an update on the reinvestigation, including those
involved and wider issues around the case.303 DCI David Zinzan stated he felt it was imperative
that communication between the investigation team and the family of Daniel Morgan was ‘open
and honest’, again adding that in his experience it was ‘very difficult to recover from a position
of mistrust’.304
175. Jane Morgan said that she had received a copy of DAC Andrew Hayman’s letter, dated
20 June 2001, regarding the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report, and
that it thoroughly explained the reasons why the report had not been disclosed to the family.305
However, she was concerned by the final paragraph in the letter, which pointed out that, if
the family were to pursue legal action in relation to reading the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation report, this could impact on communication with the Metropolitan Police,
including the severing of all lines of communication between the family and the investigation
team.306 The Panel has noted that DAC Hayman in his letter did not suggest that all lines of
communication with the investigation would be severed, but rather that, ‘Whilst I can understand
why you may wish to take such action, I would ask you to fully consider the negative impact that
may have on our investigation and the restriction it would impose on my ability to communicate
with you other than through the Metropolitan Police Directorate of Legal Services.’ 307 DCI David
Zinzan said that he considered the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report
to be a totally separate issue from the reinvestigation, and that his team would always be
responsive to the family’s needs.308
176. DCI David Zinzan and DS Richard Oliver developed a good working relationship
with the family, which contrasted with some of the relationships formed with officers
investigating the murder previously. They were open with their communication and
shared information regarding their plans for the investigation. DCI Zinzan was also
honest about the areas that he thought would prove difficult or impossible, such as
gaining full access to the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation report.
303 Minutes of meeting with Jane Morgan, MPS071596001, p1, 28 June 2001.
304 Minutes of a meeting with Jane Morgan, MPS071596001, p1, 28 June 2001.
308 Minutes of meeting with Jane [Morgan], MPS071596001, p2, 28 June 2001.
1177
6.1 The Crimewatch broadcast

177. DCI David Zinzan and his team had further meetings with members of the family of Daniel
Morgan on 26 July 2001,309 10 October 2001310 and 16 January 2002, in which they provided
updates regarding the investigation. During the meeting on 16 January 2002, DCI Zinzan
advised that intelligence received by the investigation team had supported his belief that
Jonathan Rees had organised the murder, that Glenn Vian had committed the murder, that
James Cook had driven the getaway car, and that Person P9 had stored the vehicle before
assisting in its disposal. DCI Zinzan also explained that ‘he had been successful in the
deployment so far of a probe within the home of Glen [sic] VIAN’.311
178. DCI David Zinzan went on to detail proposals for a Crimewatch appeal, which he hoped
would act as a ‘trigger’ and raise new information on the case by encouraging the suspects to
communicate with one another.312 Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann both agreed that they
‘had been surprised and heartened by the developments’.313 Their solicitor said that prior to
the meeting, both Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann had decided they would have nothing
further to do with the investigation team. However, following the updates from DCI David Zinzan,
‘they have both been heartened and decided to continue’.314
179. At a family liaison meeting on 23 April 2002,315 T/D/Supt David Zinzan (as he was now)
advised Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann that the Crimewatch programme had been
agreed with the BBC for broadcast at the end of June 2002, to be fronted by DCS David
Cook. On 17 May 2002, DCS Cook became the Senior Investigating Officer for the Morgan
Two Investigation, which was the overt enquiry supporting the covert activities of Abelard
One.316 T/D/Supt Zinzan added that ‘the BBC thought that the involvement of family in the
programme would add to the effect of a 15-year-old murder’,317 but that he was reluctant for
them to do so, for fear of increasing their personal risk. If the family wished to appear in the
Crimewatch programme, T/D/Supt Zinzan was clear that it would be their own decision, and
not at his request.318 Isobel Hülsmann later took the decision to appear and make an appeal for
information during the programme.319,320
180. T/D/Supt David Zinzan explained that a reward of £10,000 had been authorised, which he
said was disappointing as he had requested £50,000.321 Isobel Hülsmann and Alastair Morgan
expressed ‘deep disgust’ at the figure, and described it as ‘insulting’ and ‘derisory’.322
T/D/Supt Zinzan said that he had not given up on increasing this figure, and would be
re‑applying.323 Concluding the meeting, Alastair Morgan commented to T/D/Supt Zinzan that
‘you seem to be doing the absolute best you can’, and Isobel Hülsmann agreed.324
309 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, MPS054194001, 26 July 2001.

310 Minutes of meeting with Isobel Hülsmann and Jane [Morgan], MPS054195001, 10 October 2001.
311 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann, MPS054196001, 16 January 2002.
312 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann, MPS054196001, pp3-4, 16 January 2002.
313 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann, MPS054196001, p4, 16 January 2002.
314 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann, MPS054196001, p6, 16 January 2002.
315 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and Kirsteen Knight, MPS046659001, p74-80, 23 April 2002.
316 Minutes of Gold Group meeting, MPS042643001, pp7-10, 17 May 2002.
317 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and Kirsteen Knight, MPS046659001, p74, 23 April 2002.
319 Risk Assessment of Isobel Hülsmann, MPS053734001, p6, 10 June 2002.
320 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and Kirsteen Knight, MPS046659001, pp77-78, 23 April 2002.
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181. Following this meeting, T/D/Supt David Zinzan made a further request to Commander
Roger Pearce for the sum of £10,000 to be reviewed.325 On 16 May 2002, Commander Pearce
authorised a reward of £25,000,326 and following further representations by T/D/Supt Zinzan,327
the figure was increased to £50,000 on 17 June 2002.328
182. The reward featured as an incentive for the provision of information during the Crimewatch
broadcast,329 which was aired on 26 June 2002330 (see Chapter 6, The Abelard One/Morgan
Two Investigation).
183. On 31 July 2002, DS Richard Oliver and a Family Liaison Officer met Iris, Sarah and Dan
Morgan.331 The meeting note recorded that Iris Morgan stated that she was ‘more than satisfied
with the information being relayed to her and her family’. It was agreed that Family Liaison
Officers would provide regular updates.332 The meeting note also recorded that DS Richard
Oliver ‘presented a comprehensive review of the proactive and reactive investigation conducted
by officers’.333
184. The Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation team worked closely with members of
Daniel Morgan’s family and trusted them with a vast amount of significant information
and updates on the investigation, some of which went further than had previously been
the case. T/D/Supt David Zinzan’s persistence which resulted in the increase of the
reward money from £10,000 to £50,000, was significant and welcomed by the family.
6.2 A change of Senior Investigating Officer

185. In early August 2002, T/D/Supt David Zinzan was unavoidably unavailable temporarily from
the covert investigation, and D/Supt Michael Taylor took over as Senior Investigating Officer.334
Alastair Morgan was informed of the change on 06 August 2002 and the following day he wrote
to Deputy Commissioner Ian Blair, noting ‘[w]e have had excellent relations with DCI Zinzan and
[...] would also like to thank him for what he has already achieved in this investigation’.335
186. In a family liaison meeting on 05 September 2002, the solicitor for Isobel Hülsmann, Jane
Morgan and Alastair Morgan stated that the continuing absence of T/D/Supt David Zinzan ‘was
a concern to the family because of the confidence that MR. ZINZAN had inspired in them’.336
At the same meeting, D/Supt Michael Taylor advised those present that the probe material
from the first phase of the covert investigation had corroborated the original intelligence, and
325 Report from T/D/Supt David Zinzan to Commander Roger Pearce, MPS042516001, p20, pp22-23, 02 May 2002.
326 Minute from Commander Roger Pearce to DAC Andrew Hayman, MPS042516001, p26, 16 May 2002.
327 Minute from T/D/Supt David Zinzan to Commander Roger Pearce, MPS042516001, p28, 17 June 2002.
328 Minute from Commander Roger Pearce to T/D/Supt David Zinzan, MPS042516001, p29, 18 June 2002.
329 Minutes of office meeting, MPS040535001, p1, 05 June 2001.
330 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and Kirsteen Knight, MPS047357001, p3, 25 July 2002.
331 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and Kirsteen Knight, MPS047356001, 31 July 2002.
332 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and Kirsteen Knight, MPS047356001, p1, 31 July 2002.
333 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and Kirsteen Knight, MPS047356001, pp1-3, 31 July 2002.
334 Panel interview with former DCI David Zinzan, PNL000220001, p11, 15 March 2016.
335 Letter from Alastair Morgan to Deputy Commissioner Ian Blair, MPS046674001, p7, 07 August 2002.
336 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann, Kirsteen [Knight] and Jane [Morgan], MPS047992001, p2, 05 September 2002.
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that the investigation team ‘were confident that we were well on the way to solving the case’.337
He further stated that the intention was to commence the second phase338 of the covert
investigation on 30 September 2002.339
187. At the conclusion of the meeting, the solicitor for Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and
Jane Morgan outlined a family liaison strategy which he would like to have adopted: that until
the end of September, his clients would only expect to be updated with significant occurrences,
and once the proactive phase commenced they would like daily updates, with Isobel Hülsmann
being updated first, followed by Alastair Morgan. DS Richard Oliver explained that family
liaison policy was to update a single point of contact, primarily to avoid confusion, but with that
proviso he accepted the suggestion from the solicitor. D/Supt Michael Taylor also agreed to the
proposal. The minute of the meeting concluded with the note: ‘At the conclusion of the meeting
all family members expressed themselves satisfied with the commitment and reassurances
asserted by MT [D/Supt Michael Taylor] and RO [DS Richard Oliver].’340
188. Further family liaison meetings were held on 01 November 2002,341 16 January 2003342
and 11 February 2003.343 At these meetings members of the family were provided with further
operational updates. At the meeting on 11 February 2003, DCS David Cook explained that he
hoped to send an advice file to the Crown Prosecution Service within two to three weeks, and
that he would be ‘disappointed if REES and [James] COOK were not charged in connection with
the murder’; he added that the evidence against Glenn Vian was not as strong.344
6.3 March 2003: DCS David Cook’s advice file to the Crown
Prosecution Service
189. Senior Investigating Officer DCS David Cook submitted an advice file to the Crown
Prosecution Service on 10 March 2003, which stated that the investigation team was ‘of the firm
belief that there was sufficient evidence to charge William Jonathan REES, Glen [sic] VIAN and
James COOK with a Conspiracy to Murder Daniel MORGAN’. The Crown Prosecution Service
were asked to provide advice, not only as to the proposed charge of conspiracy to murder,
but also as to whether identified individuals should be charged with additional offences, some
of which did not relate to Daniel Morgan’s murder345 (see Chapter 6, The Abelard One/Morgan
Two Investigation).
190. On 28 April 2003, a meeting was held between Counsel and members of the Abelard One/
Morgan Two Investigation team. The note of the meeting recorded that Counsel was of the
opinion that, ‘although it came tantalisingly close’, there was not enough evidence to charge
the various Defendants. The note of the meeting further recorded that ‘[t]he police did not
agree with this assessment’, and that after a lengthy discussion, Counsel ‘said that they would
like to go away from this meeting and have the opportunity to digest and consider some of the
comments made by the police’.346
337 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann, Kirsteen Knight and Jane Morgan, MPS047992001, p2, 05 September 2002.
338 The strategy for the second phase was explained as to ensure that every effort was made to get audio equipment inside the car of former
DS Sidney Fillery.
339 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann, Kirsteen [Knight] and Jane [Morgan], MPS047992001, pp2-3,
05 September 2002.
340 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann, Kirsteen [Knight] and Jane [Morgan], MPS047992001, p6, 05 September 2002.
341 Minutes of meeting with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Kirsteen [Knight], MPS071571001, 01 November 2002.
342 Minutes of meeting with Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan, MPS046666001, 16 January 2003.
343 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Kirsteen [Knight], and Dan Morgan, MPS048518001, 11 February 2003.
344 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, Kirsteen Knight, and Dan Morgan, MPS048518001, p3, 11 February 2003.
345 Advice file R v Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian and James Cook, MPS060058001, p130, 7 March 2003.
346 Minute of Operation Abelard conference held on 28 April 2003, CLA000245001, p1, 29 April 2003.
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191. On 01 May 2003, three days after the meeting with Counsel, T/D/Supt David Zinzan and
DS Richard Oliver visited Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan in Wales.347 At this meeting,
T/D/Supt Zinzan advised Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan that the Crown Prosecution Service
had come to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support a prospect of a
conviction, and therefore that the police were minded not to pursue a prosecution. DS Oliver’s
note of the meeting records that T/D/Supt Zinzan advised Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan
that both he and DCS David Cook had argued strongly in favour of a prosecution and reminded
them that the decision was provisional but that he felt it unlikely that the Crown Prosecution
Service would reverse their decision.348
192. Both Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan were very upset. Jane Morgan said, ‘[t]here is not
much more to say is there, I don’t know why you came all this way ……just to tell us this’.
T/D/Supt David Zinzan replied that he had wanted to inform the family in person. Isobel
Hülsmann also stated during this meeting that ‘[t]here will now be a huge media attack’. T/D/
Supt Zinzan cautioned against going to the media for fear of jeopardising a future prosecution.349
193. Following the meeting with Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan, T/D/Supt David Zinzan
and DS Richard Oliver returned to London for a meeting with Alastair Morgan and his solicitor.350
Alastair Morgan was already aware of the Crown Prosecution Service’s provisional decision,
having been informed by Jane Morgan.351 At this meeting, T/D/Supt Zinzan discussed the
case conference that he had had with Counsel, and explained that Counsel believed there
was insufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of a conviction. T/D/Supt Zinzan advised that
Counsel would prepare a written advice for the Crown Prosecution Service, but until that was
done the decision was not to be considered final.352 T/D/Supt Zinzan stated that he and DCS
David Cook had expressed disappointment with the decision and forcefully put arguments
forward to counter the points raised, which Counsel had promised would be examined and
reported on in due course.353
194. The way in which T/D/Supt David Zinzan and his colleagues conducted the
process of advising family members about the preliminary Crown Prosecution Service
decision not to prosecute was exemplary; they were honest and frank and went to great
lengths to meet with the family involving as it did both travel and meetings.
6.4 The Crown Prosecution Service decision not to prosecute

195. On 07 May 2003, a meeting of the Gold Group for the Abelard One/Morgan Two
Investigation was held,354 at which DCS David Cook outlined the contents of the meeting held
with the Crown Prosecution Service and Counsel on 28 April 2003.355 Following the update
347 Minutes of meeting with Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan, MPS054570001, 01 May 2003.
348 Minutes of meeting with Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan, MPS054570001, p2, 01 May 2003.
349 Minutes of meeting with Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan, MPS054570001, p3, 01 May 2003.
350 Minutes of meeting with Alastair Morgan, MPS048533001, 01 May 2003.
351 Minutes of a meeting with Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan, MPS048532001, p2, 01 May 2003.
354 Minutes of Gold Group meeting, MPS108276001, 07 May 2003.
355 Minutes of Gold Group meeting, MPS108276001, p24, 07 May 2003.
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from DCS Cook, Commander Andre Baker suggested that, should the final Crown Prosecution
Service decision be not to prosecute, then the Crown Prosecution Service and Counsel should
be encouraged to meet the family.356
196. On 08 August 2003, copies of Counsel’s advice357 were received by the Abelard One/
Morgan Two Investigation team,358 confirming Counsel’s earlier recommendation that the
decision be taken not to prosecute Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian or James Cook for any offence
connected with the killing of Daniel Morgan, nor any person for any ancillary offences.359
This decision was expected to be confirmed officially by the Crown Prosecution Service early
the following week.360
197. On 02 September 2003, Colin Gibbs from the Crown Prosecution Service wrote to DCS
David Cook, D/Supt David Zinzan and the Deputy Senior Investigating Officer, DCI Neil Hibberd,
stating that, following receipt of the advice file, the Crown Prosecution Service had considered
the matter and agreed with Counsel that there was ‘insufficient evidence to provide a realistic
prospect of a conviction for the offence of murder and other offences arising from the death of
Daniel Morgan’.361
198. On 05 September 2003, DCS David Cook and D/Supt David Zinzan held a meeting with
Isobel Hülsmann and her solicitor. DCS Cook explained the Crown Prosecution Service’s
decision not to proceed. The notes record that while DCS Cook expressed his disappointment
at this, he stated that, in light of the arguments that the Crown Prosecution Service had put
forward, he accepted the decision. DCS Cook further advised that it was possible the case
would be referred to a Murder Review Group, who would review the investigation. Isobel
Hülsmann’s solicitor responded that he ‘understood the situation’ and saw the referral of the
case to a Murder Review Group as ‘one way forward’.362
199. Following a question from the solicitor as to whether the investigation team was still
engaged, DCS Cook replied that three officers were continuing to investigate former DS Sidney
Fillery, who was next due at Court on 16 September 2003 for a matter unconnected with Daniel
Morgan, and decisions would be made regarding whether and how to proceed based on the
outcome of those hearings.363
200. Isobel Hülsmann’s solicitor explained that his clients were considering the options
available to them, which included bringing a private prosecution or a civil action or calling for
a public inquiry. The solicitor also said he wished to view the report that DCS David Cook had
submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service in March 2003, the advice from Counsel, and a
record of the points put to Counsel by DCS Cook at their conference on 28 April 2003, along
with Counsel’s response to those points. DCS Cook replied that, personally, he had no objection
to these requests, but that it would be for the Metropolitan Police as an organisation to decide.
Finally, Isobel Hülsmann requested that the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir John
Stevens, visit her at home in Wales to discuss the matter personally.364
356 Minutes of Gold Group meeting, MPS108276001, p26, 07 May 2003.

357 Counsel Advice by Orlando Pownall QC and Jonathan Rees, MPS062209001, undated.
358 Message M193, MPS060053001, 08 August 2003.
359 Counsel Advice by Orlando Pownall QC and Jonathan Rees, MPS062209001, pp1-57, undated.
360 Minutes of Gold Group meeting, MPS071568001, p1, 12 August 2003.
361 Letter from Colin Gibbs to DCS David Cook, D/Supt David Zinzan and DCI Neil Hibberd, MPS072321001, p2, 2 September 2003.
362 Minutes of a meeting with Isobel Hülsmann, MPS071567001, p1, 05 September 2003.
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201. On 08 September 2003, the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann wrote to DCS David Cook
as a follow-up to their meeting three days earlier.365 His letter stated:
‘You […] made it clear that it would be appropriate for Mrs Hulsmann [sic] and her
family to assume that the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] has reached the end of the
road for all practical intents and purposes. You indicated that the Gold Group would
convene specifically to consider any requests or proposals on the way forward that
might be put forward on behalf of Mrs Hulsmann [sic] and her family, and you invited
me to do so in writing to you with the assurance that the [Metropolitan Police] will
want to do whatever is possible to support, assist and co-operate with them. You are
of course already aware of the proposals set out below, which were rehearsed at our
meeting and are now put forward on the understanding that they should not meet with
any objection or obstruction from you or Supt Zinzan.’366
202. The letter said that DCS David Cook:
i. Had, on his own analysis made it clear that the ‘real mischief’ lay in the Morgan One
Investigation;
ii. had found the case to be the ‘worst mess’ he had ever seen;
iii. had confirmed that DS Sidney Fillery’s role in the Morgan One Investigation was ‘at the
heart of the mischief’; and
iv. had conceded that, in his view, those around DS Fillery ‘who had protected him
included other police officers’.367
203. The letter continued by listing proposals which his clients wished to be considered, as
summarised below:
i. That the focus of the Metropolitan Police should be changed from the immediate
‘actors’ in the murder to instead look at the involvement of Sidney Fillery in the Morgan
One Investigation, and at those who had protected him.368
ii. That the Metropolitan Police should provide a copy of the reinvestigation report
submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service in March 2003, the response of Counsel
to that report, and their response to issues raised at a conference at the end of
April 2003.369
iii. That the Metropolitan Police should consider whether there would be support for a call
for a public inquiry, should the family of Daniel Morgan pursue that option.
204. On 24 September 2003, Isobel Hülsmann wrote to Commissioner Sir John Stevens.370
The letter expressed her ‘disappointment and frustration’ upon being formally notified that the
Crown Prosecution Service would not proceed with this case, particularly ‘bearing in mind some
of the most disturbing comments made by DCS Cook at my most recent meeting with David
365 Letter from Raju Bhatt to DCS David Cook, MPS108273001, pp9-11, 08 September 2003.
366 Letter from Raju Bhatt to DCS David Cook, HOM000011001, p1, 08 September 2003.
370 Letter from Isobel Hülsmann to Commissioner Sir John Stevens, MPS108276001, pp29-30, 24 September 2003.
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Zinzan and my solicitor’.371,372 The letter concluded with a further request that the Commissioner
visit Isobel Hülsmann at her home ‘to discuss the very many unanswered and relevant questions
relating to this horrendous unsolved murder’.373
205. The Commissioner’s Staff Officer, DCS Hamish Campbell, replied to Isobel Hülsmann’s
letter on 01 October 2003, explaining that the Commissioner could not intervene in decisions
made by the Crown Prosecution Service, as they were independent of the police, but that
Commander Andre Baker, with responsibility for murder investigations, had been asked to
respond to Isobel Hülsmann’s unanswered questions.374
206. On 14 October 2003, Commander Andre Baker wrote to Isobel Hülsmann stating that,
following the Crown Prosecution Service’s decision that no charges would be brought against
anyone for the murder, the case would, in line with Metropolitan Police policy, be passed to a
Metropolitan Police review team.375
207. The solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family replied to this letter on
24 October 2003,376 noting that he had not received a response to the points raised in his letter
sent to DCS David Cook on 08 September 2003 (see above, paragraph 201), and that ‘the
continuing absence of any substantive response has become a cause of increasing concern and
anxiety to Mrs Hulsmann [sic] and her family, calling into question the good faith with which they
have sought to work with the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] as a whole in relation to this
tragic and difficult case’.377
208. On 27 October 2003, the Directorate of Legal Services in the Metropolitan Police replied to
the letter of 08 September 2003 received from the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her
family,378 confirming that the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation would be reviewed by the
Murder Review Group, under the direction of DAC Michael Fuller. The letter also refuted some of
the statements in the letter from the solicitor, stating that:
i. DCS David Cook had made it clear that his opinion of the Morgan One Investigation
was by reference to current investigative standards, not those which were applicable
at the time; and
ii. DCS Cook did not ‘concede’ that former DS Sidney Fillery had been ‘protected’ and
said that no evidence had been found to support that assertion.379
209. The letter of 27 October 2003 also said that: DCS Cook had stated that the investigation
had looked for evidence, intelligence or other information which would suggest any corruption,
and had found none; and that allegations of police corruption were not explicitly within the
ambit of the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation; however, the review under the oversight of
DAC Michael Fuller would consider whether it was appropriate to treat the enquiry into police
corruption as complete.380
371 Letter from Isobel Hülsmann to Commissioner Sir John Stevens, MPS108276001, p29, 24 September 2003.
372 Due to the meeting note, the Panel has been unable to determine which of DCS David Cook’s comments were found to be ‘most disturbing’
by Isobel Hülsmann.
373 Letter from Isobel Hülsmann to Commissioner Sir John Stevens, MPS108276001, p29, 24 September 2003.
374 Letter from DCS Hamish Campbell to Isobel Hülsmann, MPS108276001, p28, 01 October 2003.
375 Letter from Commander Andre Baker to Isobel Hülsmann, MPS108276001, p16, 14 October 2003.
376 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Commander Andre Baker, MPS108276001, pp11-12, 24 October 2003.
377 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Commander Andre Baker, MPS108276001, pp11, 24 October 2003.
378 Letter to Raju Bhatt, HOM000009001, 27 October 2003.
379 Letter to Raju Bhatt, HOM000009001, p1, 27 October 2003.
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210. The letter further said that none of the documents requested would be provided to the
family and that they had no legal entitlement to such material, concluding with the following:
‘As stated above, DCS Cook did not concede that Fillery had been protected.
Should a public inquiry be directed then the [Metropolitan Police] would, of course,
co‑operate.’381
211. Although the Panel understands that it is not normal to disclose an investigative
report to a victim’s family, no explanation was given to Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair
Morgan and Jane Morgan for the decision not to disclose either the Crown Prosecution
Service report or for the decision not to recommend a prosecution. It would have been
helpful had the letter from the Directorate of Legal Services explained that to disclose
the reasons for not proceeding had the potential to jeopardise future investigations or
prosecutions. This was not explained to the family, leaving them to suspect that there
may have been other, underlying issues.
212. On 02 December 2003, the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family replied
to the Directorate of Legal Service’s letter of 27 October 2003.382 The letter opened with
the following:
‘I am surprised that you now seek to dispute the views expressed by Det Ch Sup Cook
with regards to the sorry history of this matter, the role of ex PS [sic] Sidney Fillery at
the heart of that history and the protection he enjoyed from those around him including
other police officers. My understanding of those views, as reflected in my letter of
8 September, was rehearsed before Det Ch Sup Cook and Sup Zinzan at our meeting,
and I did not hear any dissent or dispute from either of them at that stage. It is of
course open to Det Ch Sup Cook to depart from the views that he expressed at our
meeting, but that cannot alter what he had in fact said.’383
213. The letter further said that, as the Metropolitan Police seemed to accept that allegations of
police corruption were not within the ambit of the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation, and
because the recent review under the direction of DAC Michael Fuller had ‘simply looked back
at the recommendations which emerged from the previous MPS [Metropolitan Police Service]
Murder Review [...] in order to ascertain that all such recommendations had been followed
through’, the issue of police corruption did not appear to have been investigated.384
214. The letter from the solicitor said that, if the Metropolitan Police were unable or unwilling to
take this matter further, the ‘burden of taking whatever steps may be necessary to ensure that
those responsible for the murder [...] are brought to justice’ was placed upon the family of Daniel
Morgan, and for that reason it was essential that they knew and understood what material was
available to the Metropolitan Police.385

382 Letter from Raju Bhatt HOM000008001, 02 December 2003.
383 Letter from Raju Bhatt HOM000008001, p1, 02 December 2003.
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215. Regarding the issue of access to DCS David Cook’s advice file, Counsel’s advice, and
the underlying material, the solicitor stated that his clients had been given previous assurances
on behalf of the Metropolitan Police that the police ‘would wish to support, assist and co-
operate with Mrs Hulsmann [sic] and her family on any further steps they might wish to take’.
The solicitor requested an explanation for the decision to deny his clients access to the report or
underlying material relating to the recent reinvestigation.386
216. The solicitor concluded by instructing that this correspondence should be treated as a
letter of claim under the pre-action protocol for judicial review (the first step in seeking a judicial
review) of the decision of the Metropolitan Police to deny Isobel Hülsmann access to either the
report submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service or the underlying primary material arising
from the recent reinvestigation.387
217. On 16 March 2004, the Directorate of Legal Services wrote to the solicitor acting for Isobel
Hülsmann and her family regarding disclosure of DCS David Cook’s report. The letter began
by denying that DAC Barbara Wilding, DCS Cook or D/Supt David Zinzan had previously given
any assurance that the report would be provided his clients. However, it was now agreed,
in principle, that the report would be provided to them, subject to appropriate redactions
and conditions.388
218. On 21 May 2004, the Directorate of Legal Services again wrote to the solicitor, advising
that the Metropolitan Police had agreed to disclose DCS David Cook’s report to his clients,
subject to conditions, which were that:
i. The Report and its contents could only be used to inform specified people including
Isobel Hülsmann, and her lawyers and the persons agreed by the Metropolitan Police;
ii. The Report, could only be copied for those agreed and was not be published or
passed to any other persons;
iii. The recipients of the Report would owe the Commissioner a duty to keep the contents
of the Report confidential.389
On 26 May 2004, the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family replied agreeing to
the majority of the conditions, and on this basis a disclosure agreement was reached with the
Metropolitan Police.390
219. In June 2004, the Metropolitan Police disclosed a copy of DCS David Cook’s report to the
solicitor, who ensured it was received by his clients.391
6.5 Correspondence with the Crown Prosecution Service

220. In addition to ongoing contact between the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and
Alastair Morgan and the Metropolitan Police, Isobel Hülsmann and Alastair Morgan were in
correspondence with the Crown Prosecution Service. On 20 November 2003, Isobel Hülsmann
received an undated letter from Colin Gibbs of the Crown Prosecution Service Casework
386 Letter from Raju Bhatt, HOM000008001, p2, 02 December 2003.

387 Letter from Raju Bhatt, HOM000008001, pp2-3, 2 December 2003.
388 Letter to Raju Bhatt, PNL000103001, p52, 16 March 2004.
389 Letter from MPS Directorate of Legal Services to Bhatt Murphy solicitors, PNL000103001, 21 May 2004.
390 Letter from Raju Bhatt, PNL000103001, p97, 18 June 2004.
391 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Alastair Morgan PNL000103001, p100, 28 June 2004.
1186
Directorate, to which her solicitor responded on 02 December 2003.392 The solicitor said that
previous letters to Colin Gibbs (of 13 February, 31 March and 23 April 2003), which had been
sent in the context of judicial review proceedings underway against the Metropolitan Police, had
been neither acknowledged nor replied to by the Crown Prosecution Service. He continued:
‘Moreover, contrary to the stated practice of the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service]
Casework Directorate in other similar cases – and, indeed, contrary to the CPS policy
statement on the care and treatment of victims in general – I note that you have not
considered it necessary to liaise with Mrs Hulsmann [sic] or myself in any way in
connection with your deliberations upon this matter.’393
221. The solicitor’s letter went on to state that, prior to the undated letter from Colin Gibbs, the
only indication that Isobel Hülsmann or the solicitor had received regarding the decision not
to charge Jonathan Rees and others with the murder of Daniel Morgan was by word of mouth,
during a telephone call from D/Supt David Zinzan on 02 September 2003. The first formal
communication to members of the family of the Crown Prosecution Service’s decision not to
proceed had been the undated letter received by Isobel Hülsmann on 20 November 2003, which
described the process by which the decision not to proceed was taken but gave no indication
of the underlying reasons. While the letter from Colin Gibbs proposed a meeting with members
of Daniel Morgan’s family, at which Counsel would provide ‘as full an explanation as possible
of the reasons for any decision’, the solicitor requested that the Crown Prosecution Service
provide ‘the full and detailed reasons for your decision in writing – this would enable me to assist
[Isobel Hülsmann] to digest the explanation so provided and thereby to make more fruitful any
subsequent meeting with counsel and yourself’.394
222. On 05 December 2003, Colin Gibbs replied to the solicitor, stating:
‘I do not recall not replying to all your letters as I recall speaking to you and sending a
colleague to your office to collect a file.
‘The reason I wrote to Mrs Hulsmann [sic] directly was because she had written to the
DPP [Director of Public Prosecutions] and I assumed, apparently wrongly, that she
wanted a personal reply.
‘I do not understand your point about assuming Mrs Hulsmann [sic] knew the decision
because her letter made it plain that she did know.
‘I will take the time to provide written reasons as you request. I will need to speak to
Counsel about this so it may not get to you until the New Year. If it is taking longer than
I expect myself or a colleague will contact you.’395
223. The solicitor wrote further letters to Colin Gibbs on 16 December 2003396 and 22 January
2004,397 in which he continued to express concerns regarding the failure to disclose to his
clients the reasons for the Crown Prosecution Service decision. In his letter of 22 January 2004,
392 Letter to Colin Gibbs from Raju Bhatt, HOM000004001, 02 December 2003.
393 Letter to Colin Gibbs from Raju Bhatt, HOM000004001, p1, 02 December 2003.
394 Letter to Colin Gibbs from Raju Bhatt, HOM000004001, p2, 02 December 2003.
395 Letter from Colin Gibbs to Raju Bhatt, HOM000003001, 05 December 2003
396 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Colin Gibbs, HOM000002001, 16 December 2003.
397 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Colin Gibbs, HOM000001001, 22 January 2004.
1187
he noted that he had not yet received a reply to his previous letter and stated: ‘I consider the
delay in providing me with reasons for the decision to be unacceptable and deeply disrespectful
to my client [...].’398
224. On 07 April 2004, the Crown Prosecution Service wrote to the solicitor acting for Isobel
Hülsmann and her family advising that a document setting out the reasons for the September
2003 decision not to prosecute was being prepared but that there had been delays.399
225. On 23 April 2004, Isobel Hülsmann’s solicitor wrote to Chris Newell, Principal Legal Adviser
at the Crown Prosecution Service, to ‘draw […] attention to the increasing cause for concern in
relation to the handling of this matter by the CPS Casework Directorate’, and again referred to
the Crown Prosecution Service policy statement regarding the care and treatment of victims.400
226. The solicitor noted that eight months had passed since the decision not to prosecute had
been finalised, and:
‘[w]e are therefore left to wonder whether what we are being asked to await is, not the
reasoning (if any) which actually led to the decision last year, but reasons that are now
being put together to justify that decision.’401
227. On 06 May 2004, Colin Gibbs replied to the solicitor’s letter, enclosing a six-page
document containing the reasons why the decision was taken not to prosecute the suspects for
the murder of Daniel Morgan.402 The letter also advised that the Crown Prosecution Service and
Counsel were still willing to meet with members of Daniel Morgan’s family.403
228. On 10 May 2004, the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family wrote to Chris
Newell, Principal Legal Adviser at the Crown Prosecution Service, acknowledging the letter
of 06 May from Colin Gibbs. He noted that he had not received a reply to his letter of 23 April
from either Chris Newell or the Director of Public Prosecutions, to whom the letter had
been copied.404
229. Chris Newell replied to this letter on 20 May 2004, apologising ‘unreservedly’ for the delays
and stating that he was ‘sincerely sorry for any anxiety or concerns that have been added to the
bereavement that Mrs Hulsmann [sic] and her family suffered in 1987’.405 The letter continued:
‘I understand your concern that the document enclosed with Mr Gibbs’ letter of 6 May
amounted to an ex post facto justification of an earlier decision. I am satisfied, however,
that this was not the case; and that the decision that was (in fact) taken on 1 September
2003 was a properly informed and reasoned decision.’406
398 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Colin Gibbs, HOM000001001, p1, 22 January 2004.
399 Letter from the Crown Prosecution Service to Raju Bhatt, PNL000103001, p70, 07 April 2004.
400 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Chris Newell, PNL000103001, p84, 23 April 2004.
401 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Chris Newell, PNL000103001, p85, 23 April 2004.
402 Reasons for the Crown Prosecution Service decision not to prosecute suspects following the murder of Daniel Morgan, PNL000108001,
pp67-72, 06 May 2004.
403 Letter from Colin Gibbs to Raju Bhatt, PNL000108001, p66, 06 May 2004.
404 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Chris Newell, PNL000103001, p90, 10 May 2004.
405 Letter from Chris Newell to Raju Bhatt, PNL000103001, p113, 20 May 2004.
406 Letter from Chris Newell to Raju Bhatt, PNL000103001, p113, 20 May 2004.
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230. The improvement in the relationship between members of the family and the
Metropolitan Police was adversely affected by the inability to secure evidence to support
a prosecution of any or all of those suspected of Daniel Morgan’s murder. The manner
in which the Crown Prosecution Service and Directorate of Legal Services treated the
family did not enhance their understanding of why there had been no prosecution.
This left the family feeling disillusioned. The letter the family received from Colin Gibbs
of the Crown Prosecution Service on 05 December 2005 was eight months after the
decision not to prosecute the suspects for the murder of Daniel Morgan. This delay was
not acceptable.
6.6 The family’s request for a public inquiry

231. On 26 February 2004, a joint letter from Chris Smith MP and Roger Williams MP, and Lord
Livesey of Talgarth, was sent to the Home Secretary, David Blunkett MP.407 The letter was in
support of a submission from the solicitors representing their constituents which argued for a
formal public inquiry.
232. This request for a public inquiry articulated his clients’ fear that the police had ‘colluded in
or tolerated serious criminal activity, namely the murder of Daniel’,408 and stated the following:
‘In the event, it is submitted that a public judicial inquiry into the whole case may
now be the only realistic option whereby this tragic murder and the whole complex
and murky background to it could be subjected to the fullest scrutiny. Indeed, in the
absence of a criminal trial or any other adequate forum for such scrutiny, it would be
incumbent upon the state to ensure that a public judicial inquiry should take place
in view of its obligations in common law and under Articles 1 and 2 of the European
Convention of Human Rights alike.’409
6.7 Letters and briefings

6.7.1 10 June 2004: Letter from Hazel Blears to members of Daniel Morgan’s family
233. On 10 June 2004, the Home Office Minister, Hazel Blears MP, replied setting out her
reasons for refusing the request for a public inquiry, stating: ‘I do not consider a public inquiry to
be required by law or to be a proportionate or, indeed, a useful course to follow.’ She said that:
‘section 49 of the-Police Act 1996 allows the Home Secretary to cause a public inquiry
to be held into any matter connected with the policing of any area. However, successive
Home Secretaries have reserved such inquiries for circumstances where there has been
serious public disorder, or some similar circumstances where wide ranging and serious
disquiet is felt about a matter affecting a large proportion of a force. I, too, consider that
it appropriate to reserve this power for matters of that nature […].
‘I know you share the reservations of the family about the conduct of the four
investigations and you have a lingering suspicion that police officers were not only
407 Joint Letter from Chris Smith MP, Roger Williams MP, Lord Livesey of Talgarth to the Home Secretary, David Blunkett MP, HOM000016001,
26 February 2004.
408 Submission to the Home Secretary on behalf of the deceased’s family, HOM000014001, p2, 16 February 2004.
409 Submission to the Home Secretary on behalf of the deceased’s family, HOM000014001, p3, 16 February 2004.
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involved with the killing of Daniel Morgan but also involved in their protection. However,
I do not believe that, in itself, that is sufficient to embark on a further inquiry nor am
I persuaded that a public inquiry would be likely to uncover further evidence which
would lead to a different outcome. We cannot ignore the Coroner’s remarks when
delivering his verdict of unlawful killing during the inquest, that there was “no evidence
whatsoever in this inquest to point to any police involvement in this killing”. Neither can
we ignore the conclusion of the (second) investigation into alleged police involvement
and the fact that the Police Complaints Authority was satisfied with the conduct of that
investigation and with the findings.
‘Finally, there is no legal requirement to hold an inquiry in this case.’410
234. This decision was re-stated in the House of Commons on 06 July 2004 by Home Office
Minister, Caroline Flint MP.411 Following further pressure from Daniel Morgan’s family, however,
Hazel Blears MP agreed to meet Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and their solicitor.
235. The Home Office sought a briefing from Hampshire Constabulary in advance of the
meeting about their investigation.412 A letter from the Hampshire Constabulary was sent to the
Home Office on 06 October 2004413 to explain the Terms of Reference set for the Hampshire
Investigation. The letter also included the following statement:
‘In the course of examining the records [of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority
Investigation], nothing was seen to suggest that the family were in any way dissatisfied
with the service they received from the Hampshire Constabulary or that they were not
kept properly informed.’414
236. Hampshire Constabulary provided excerpts from the records of the investigation detailing
communications from Alastair Morgan. They ranged in date from December 1988 to February
1989 and were not exhaustive. They demonstrated that Alastair Morgan had articulated
significant dissatisfaction:
i. A police note of a telephone call from Alastair Morgan to a Police Constable dated
13 December 1988 read:
‘Much ramblings, the [sic] basis of which appears to be that he is concerned

about the lack of communication between SIO/DSIO [Senior Investigating
Officer/Deputy Senior Investigating Officer] and Mrs Hulsmann [sic] or her
solicitor, they are all worried about what is happening.’415
ii. A police note of a telephone call from Alastair Morgan to DCI Paul Blaker dated
15 December 1988 read:
‘[Alastair Morgan]: I’m just ringing to see how things are going and just to say
that my mother is still concerned because of a lack of information from your
office to her.
410 Letter from Hazel Blears MP to Bhatt Murphy Solicitors, HOM000334001, pp1-2, 10 June 2004.
411 Hansard HC Deb, Vol 423, Col 230-237WH, 06 July 2004. 2004; www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040706/
halltext/40706h04.htm.
412 Fax to Hampshire Constabulary from Home Office, HOM000356001, pp1-2, 24 August 2004.
413 Letter to Home Office from Hampshire Constabulary, HOM000367001, 06 October 2004.
414 Letter to Home Office from Hampshire Constabulary, HOM000367001, 06 October 2004.
415 Message M467, telephone call from Alastair Morgan to a Woman Police Constable, MPS028840001, p1, 13 December 1988.
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‘Reply [DCI Blaker]: We discussed a few days ago the reasons why we cannot
tell your mother our lines of enquiry.’416
iii. A police note of a telephone call dated 28 February 1989 from Alastair Morgan to
DCI Paul Blaker read:
‘Above telephoned explaining that he was very upset not to have been
informed of the charging of the three persons or being told that Goodridge
was on bail. [...] He felt he had no option but to start contacting MP’s [sic] etc.
‘DCI explained reasons for secrecy of operation to prevent any leak on

enquiry. Acknowledged with hindsight that courtesy of a phone call would
have been appropriate. [...] If he wanted to contact MP’s [sic] etc then he was
free to do so.’417
iv. A police note of a telephone call from Alastair Morgan to the Family Liaison Officer, a
Police Constable, for the Morgan family, also from 28 February 1989, read:
‘A very long and involved conversation re lack of information supplied from

[the Hampshire/Police Conduct Authority Investigation] to his family.’418
237. The meeting between members of the family and Hazel Blears MP took place
on 20 October 2004419 with Chris Smith MP, Roger Williams MP and Lord Livesey of
Talgarth.420At the end of the meeting, Hazel Blears asked officials to provide her with additional
information on the case.
6.7.2 Briefing to the Home Office from the Independent Police Complaints Commission
238. Following the meeting between Hazel Blears MP and members of the family, a briefing
note dated 03 November 2004421 was provided by the Independent Police Complaints
Commission422 for the Home Office, as the successor organisation to the Police Complaints
Authority. The family of Daniel Morgan had been concerned since 1989 about the fact that the
terms of reference of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation appeared to
have changed from investigating police involvement in the murder of Daniel Morgan to a murder
investigation. The briefing included the following point of discussion:
‘We can find no evidence that there was an actual formal change to the wording of
the terms of reference [of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation].
However, it seems clear that the investigation was proceeding by pursuing Rees and
Goodridge at this time. Indeed, right from the beginning of the IO’s [Investigating
Officer’s] report Wheeler states his intent to pursue evidence that would result
in charges being brought, and that he saw this as a way of investigating police
involvement […].
416 Message M470, telephone call from Alastair Morgan to DCI Paul Blaker, MPS028837001, p1, 15 December 1988.
417 Message M678, telephone call from Alastair Morgan to DCI Paul Blaker, MPS029043001, p1, 28 February 1989.
418 Message M680, telephone call from Alastair Morgan to a Police Constable, MPS029041001, p1, 28 February 1989.
419 Note of meeting with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Kirsteen Knight, HOM000047001, 20 October 2004.
420 Joint Letter from Chris Smith MP, Roger Williams MP, Lord Livesey of Talgarth to Rt Hon David Blunkett MP, HOM000016001,
26 February 2004.
421 Independent Police Complaints Commission ‘Request for further briefing in the case of Daniel Morgan’, HOM000375001,
03 November 2004.
422 The Independent Police Complaints Commission was established in 2003 and replaced the Police Complaints Authority. In its turn the
Independent Police Complaints Commission was replaced in 2018 by the Independent Office for Police Conduct.
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‘What is not clear to us is whether the PCA [Police Complaints Authority] undertook
any detailed consideration as to whether this was congruent with the aims of the
investigation and the effect this would have on the family.’423
6.7.3 Briefing to Hazel Blears MP from Home Office officials and her subsequent response
239. A lengthy briefing dated 30 November 2004 was provided by officials to the Home Office
Minister, Hazel Blears MP, summarising the information that had been received in relation
to each investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan. Appended to this briefing was a
letter drafted by officials for Hazel Blears MP to send to the Isobel Hülsmann’s solicitor as is
normal practice.424
240. The submission document included the following description of the Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority Investigation’s arrest of Jonathan Rees and Paul Goodridge:
‘The “digression” to deal with the non-police officers in regards to the murder and
the on-going but separate investigation of the same officers into their involvement in
Belmont Auctions could lead an uninformed observer to conclude that the focus on
police officer involvement in the killing of Daniel Morgan was lost.’425
241. Hazel Blears has informed the Panel that she carefully considered the matter before
responding to the family.426
242. On 08 December 2004, Minister Hazel Blears MP wrote to Isobel Hülsmann’s solicitor
explaining that she had considered the representations made by him, and material provided to
her by all the organisations which had been involved in the investigations of Daniel Morgan’s
murder. She concluded: ‘I know Mrs Hulsmann [sic], Alastair Morgan and others will be very
disappointed by my decision but, having reconsidered the case, I remain firmly of the view that a
further inquiry would not be an appropriate course to follow.’427
243. She provided an explanation of this decision, saying in respect of the first
investigation that:
‘They [the Metropolitan Police] have acknowledged to me that there were failings
in that first investigation and that it was undermined because of the involvement of
certain individuals within the investigation team. Also, they accept the standards of
investigation in 1987 were much different from those of today. The MPS [Metropolitan
Police Service] has assured me that all necessary exhibits were taken for forensic
examination and that the crime scene was properly protected from the outset.’428
244. However, this was inaccurate. Although the briefing from officials to Minister Hazel Blears
MP had explained that forensic opportunities had been missed by the first investigation into
the murder of Daniel Morgan, in relation to Jonathan Rees’s clothing, and that ‘because the
investigation team did not immediately identify Rees as a principal suspect in the murder,
423 Independent Police Complaints Commission ‘Request for further briefing in the case of Daniel Morgan’, HOM000375001, p1,
03 November 2004.
424 Home Office submission to Hazel Blears MP, ‘Daniel Morgan’, HOM000381001, 30 November 2004.
425 Home Office submission to Hazel Blears MP, ‘Daniel Morgan’, HOM000381001, 30 November 2004.
426 Panel interview with Hazel Blears MP, PNL000238001, p1, 13 July 2016.
427 Letter to Bhatt Murphy solicitors from Hazel Blears MP, HOM000380001, p1-2, 08 December 2004.
428 Letter to Bhatt Murphy solicitors from Hazel Blears MP, HOM000380001, p3, 08 December 2004.
1192
opportunities for detailed forensic examinations in relation to his clothing were missed,’429 other
forensic opportunities had been missed, including, particularly, at the scene of the murder and
during the searches conducted by police on 03 April 1987.
245. The Minister also said that:
‘they [the Metropolitan Police] accept that not all alibis had been pursued although as
I understand it, one important alibi was checked and verified during the second session
by Hampshire Police.
‘Your other concerns are to do with an alleged involvement of a member of the

investigation team in the killing of Daniel and that that person allegedly was protected
by other officers; and that there may have been mischief caused by a member of the
first investigation team.’430
246. She further stated:
‘The first investigation does seem to me to have been less than satisfactory in a
number of respects. However, I do not believe it should be discounted entirely in
the investigations that have been undertaken into the circumstances considering
surrounding the killing. In particular, I note that the view that it was fatally flawed rests
in large part on the allegation of police corruption and involvement, in the killing.
The subsequent investigations unearthed no evidence to support that allegation.’431
247. Of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation, the Minister said

the following:
‘It was conducted by an independent force, Hampshire Police. Its remit was broad,
and included a focus on allegations of police involvement and corruption[.] It was
conducted under the supervision of the Police Complaints Authority. They were
satisfied with the investigation and so certified.’
She declared herself to be ‘satisfied that this was a thorough and effective investigation.’432
248. Minister Hazel Blears MP said in the letter that both Hampshire Constabulary and the
Independent Police Complaints Commission (who held the Police Complaints Authority files for
the period from 1988-1989) had ‘confirmed that there was no change at any time to the terms
of reference for the investigation and, therefore, the focus of the investigation was not lost.’
The letter continued,
‘[n]o links of involvement of any police officers were found and the investigating
officer concentrated his investigation on police officers. Within three months, he had
interviewed all the necessary officers but still found nothing substantive to link a police
officer with the killing of Daniel and was unable to substantiate the evidence given by
Kevin Lennon to the Coroner. For that reason, no officer was interviewed under caution.
429 Home Office submission to Hazel Blears MP, ‘Daniel Morgan’, HOM000381001, p8, 30 November 2004.
1193
‘Both the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] and Hampshire Police have confirmed that
Alan Wheeler had never worked for the MPS and that he had spent the whole of his
service with Hampshire.’433
249. Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges was described in the letter as ‘a covert investigation in
order to gather evidence of the killing and into allegations of police corruption’. The Minister said
of it: ‘[t]hat it was conducted by the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] does not seem to me to
undermine its usefulness or effectiveness as an investigation’.434
250. Operation Nigeria/ Two Bridges was actually an intelligence-gathering operation. It

was not resourced or conducted as a murder investigation. To this extent, the letter was
inaccurate. The Panel does not accept the description in the Minister’s letter of either the
Morgan One Investigation or the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation.
251. Of the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation, the Minister said:
‘The CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] considered the recommendations for

prosecutions of certain individuals made following the fourth [Abelard One/Morgan Two]
investigation and the preparation of the Zinzan/Cook report. Their judgement was that
the evidence was insufficient to support such prosecutions.’435
252. The Minister then referred to the Inquest, saying:
‘[I]t is also correct that when the Coroner said he found no evidence whatsoever in his
inquest to point to any police involvement in this killing, he had relied mainly on the first
investigation. However, he was aware of DS Fillery’s involvement in the investigation
and his association with Rees. Also, he had noted the thoroughness of the investigation
by the number of statements taken, said to be over 1000. Finally, it is evident that the
Coroner’s inquest was itself a thorough one which heard from over 70 witnesses and
which, to a large extent, must have supported the findings of the first investigation.’436
The figure of 70 witnesses is open to misinterpretation. The Coroner may have read
statements from 70 witnesses, but 34 witnesses were scheduled to be called at the
Inquest into Daniel Morgan’s death. Of those, two did not attend.
253. The Minister concluded:
‘So the position is that there have been a series of investigations into the circumstances
of the death, and into possible police corruption. That allegation of police involvement
in the murder and a cover up was made at the Inquest by a witness reporting a
conversation with Daniel’s business partner Mr Rees. The fact is that the series of
investigations has not provided evidential support for that allegation sufficient to
support any prosecution, or indeed any plausible evidence of police corruption.
433 Letter to Bhatt Murphy solicitors from Hazel Blears MP, HOM000380001, pp4-5, 08 December 2004.
1194
‘Whilst I understand the concerns raised about the investigations, I have concluded
that, taken together, those investigations have been effective.’437
254. The family of Daniel Morgan were very disappointed by the decision not to hold a
public inquiry. Although the Panel accepts that the Minister was responding on the basis
of the information provided to her, the Panel has established that there were significant
deficiencies in the investigations.
7 The 2006 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority

7.1 Background to the 2006 Report by DAC John Yates
255. Following the refusal by the Home Office Minister, Hazel Blears MP, to order a public
inquiry into the police handling of Daniel Morgan’s murder,438 Alastair Morgan and Isobel
Hülsmann decided that they would raise the case with the Metropolitan Police Authority to
seek an investigation into the suspected mishandling, collusion and cover-up in the police
investigations into Daniel Morgan’s murder.
256. A meeting was held on 19 May 2005 between members of Daniel Morgan’s family, the
Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority, Len Duvall, and a Metropolitan Police Authority
representative, Jeannette Arnold.439 Following this, Len Duvall wrote to Alastair Morgan
on 14 July 2005 proposing that the Metropolitan Police Authority commission a report by
the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police440,441 (see Chapter 7, The 2006 Report to the
Metropolitan Police Authority).
257. Metropolitan Police Authority Chair, Len Duvall, also proposed that there should be an
independent review of all case papers of the investigation into the murder of Daniel Morgan
by an experienced barrister,442 after the report from the Metropolitan Police had been received
(see Chapter 7, The 2006 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority).
258. On 27 October 2005, the Metropolitan Police Authority formally decided to require the
Commissioner to report to the Authority at its January 2006 meeting, in public session,443 on
the murder of Daniel Morgan and the subsequent investigations. It was recorded that the report
would be shared with the family of Daniel Morgan and that their comments would be received
and considered by the Metropolitan Police Authority.444 Following consideration of the report
from the Commissioner, and the comments of members of the family, the Metropolitan Police
Authority would engage a barrister to independently review the case papers.445
439 Metropolitan Police Authority Agenda Item 10, ‘The Murder of Daniel Morgan’, MPA000004001, p3, 27 October 2005.
440 Letter from Len Duvall to Alastair Morgan, PNL000103001, p304, 14 July 2005.
441 Section 22(3) of the Police Act 1996 was the provision that ‘[t]he chief officer of police of a police force shall, whenever so required by
the police authority, submit to that authority a report on such matters as may be specific in the requirement, being matters connected with the
policing of the area for which the force is maintained’.
442 Letter from Len Duvall to Alastair Morgan, PNL000103001, p304, 14 July 2005.
1195
259. The Metropolitan Police Authority’s Chief Executive, Catherine Crawford, then wrote to
Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, stating that the Metropolitan Police Authority had agreed to receive
the report at its meeting on 26 January 2006, that members of Daniel Morgan’s family would
be given the opportunity to view the report and to submit comments to the Metropolitan Police
Authority, and that the report would therefore need to be completed, or substantially completed,
by the end of December 2005.446 The Terms of Reference for the report are set out in Chapter 7,
The 2006 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority.
7.1.1 January 2006: The rejection of the initial version

260. The ‘2006 Report’ was submitted to the Metropolitan Police Authority on 31 January
2006. When presenting the report to the Metropolitan Police Authority, DAC John Yates, who
had responsibility for the report, expressed his reluctance to make it public. He referred to the
potential new and significant enquiries, he noted the family’s potential reaction and he outlined
the potential damage to any new investigation if the 2006 Report were to be released into the
public domain.447
261. Upon receiving the report, the Metropolitan Police Authority rejected it. A BBC News
article of 03 February 2006 cited a letter sent to Alastair Morgan, in which the Metropolitan
Police Authority was quoted as stating that the report was not adequate and that it would not
be accepted.448
262. The BBC News article also included a response from a Metropolitan Police spokesperson,
who said ‘we have been made aware of the concerns of the chair of the MPA [Metropolitan
Police Authority] and will seek to address these in due course’.449 The Metropolitan Police
Authority records relating to this matter are no longer available.
7.1.2 10 February 2006: A meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority with members
of the family
263. The Metropolitan Police Authority, represented by its Chair, Len Duvall, and David Riddle,
Deputy Chief Executive and Solicitor for the Metropolitan Police Authority, met with members
of Daniel Morgan’s family and others to discuss the initial 2006 Report, on Friday 10 February
2006.450,451 After a short discussion, DAC John Yates presented the report, which had been
prepared for him by DCS David Cook. D/Supt David Zinzan joined the meeting. Members of
the family were not presented with a copy of the report at this meeting. Notes taken for Alastair
Morgan recorded that the family were told that further work was required on the report; that it
was not sufficiently ‘robust’; that it was not ‘backed up’; and that it could not go into the public
domain while the investigation into Daniel Morgan’s murder was ongoing. When asked by the
solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family for a timescale for the revised report, DAC
Yates reportedly proposed that it would be sent to Len Duvall at the end of March.452
446 Letter from Catherine Crawford to Sir Ian Blair concerning the murder of Daniel Morgan, 03 November 2005; available online at www.
policeauthority.org/metropolitan/work/cases/morgan/index.html.
447 Letter from DAC John Yates to Len Duvall, MPS094332001, p23, 31 January 2006.
448 BBC News Online, ‘Met chief murder report rejected’, 03 February 2006.
449 BBC News Online, ‘Met chief murder report rejected’, 03 February 2006; available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/mid/4677472.stm.
450 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, pp30-35, 10 February 2006.
451 David Riddle referred to as Peter Riddle in the note.
452 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p34, 10 February 2006.
1196
264. During the meeting, DAC John Yates reportedly disclosed to the family members present
the existence of a new lead. Alastair Morgan’s notes record that DAC Yates described the new
lead as having the potential to be ‘enormously productive’, and potentially a ‘golden thread’ D/
Supt David Zinzan reportedly stated that it could provide the opportunity to bring the case to
trial.453 It was for these reasons that the 2006 Report could not be in the public domain, as it
would be prejudicial to any ongoing investigation.
265. DAC John Yates also reportedly indicated that a new investigation would use ‘triggers’
which might involve members of Daniel Morgan’s family. Alastair Morgan’s notes recorded
that DAC Yates acknowledged that the family might believe that the Metropolitan Police were
‘putting up the defences’, and that they had ‘heard it before, for 19 years’. According to the
notes, DAC Yates requested that Daniel Morgan’s family accept his experience in dealing with
corruption, and even though they had ‘every right not to trust police’, he said that the new lead
had ‘very significant potential’.454
266. D/Supt David Zinzan was recorded as saying that he had ‘seen what is being referred
to’ and that he would not ‘come here if [he] didn’t think there was a significant way forward’.
He went on to state that ‘this could give us an opportunity for a trial’.455
267. Members of Daniel Morgan’s family understood that DCS David Cook would lead the
proposed investigation, overseen by DAC John Yates. DS Richard Oliver was to be Family
Liaison Officer, and family members present were given the choice to change this if they wanted.
The family were informed that all proposed members of the investigation team would be vetted
appropriately, drawing upon the Metropolitan Police Professional Standards Department. The
family were to be briefed on key information by DAC Yates or DCS Cook. It was understood that
the family should know everything there was to know, unless there was a good reason not to
inform them.456
7.1.3 April 2006: Revisions to the report to the Metropolitan Police Authority
268. A revised version of the report was submitted on 07 April 2006.457 It was accepted by the
Metropolitan Police Authority.
269. The Panel compared the content of the initial report of 31 January to the revised report of
07 April (which is described as ‘the 2006 Report’ in this Report). All substantive additions and
alterations are summarised and analysed by the Panel in Chapter 7.
270. The option to elect an independent barrister to review case papers and produce a
report was not pursued because a new lead had been identified in 2005, and there were,
therefore, grounds for further investigation (see Chapter 7, The 2006 Report to the Metropolitan
Police Authority).
457 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority by DAC John Yates, MPS109479001, pp160-213, 07 April 2006
1197
271. The amended report (‘the 2006 Report’) was provided to Alastair Morgan and Isobel
Hülsmann via their solicitor on 10 April 2006.458 In an accompanying letter to Alastair Morgan’s
and Isobel Hülsmann’s solicitor, David Riddle of the Metropolitan Police Authority requested that
they should respect the confidentiality of the report and not disclose any of its content to any
third party.459
272. Referring to the presence of police corruption in earlier investigations, David Riddle stated:
‘This was a deplorable episode in the history of the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service],
and it is deeply regrettable that the family have not seen anyone brought to justice as
yet; a situation made worse through the probable fact that some of those entrusted to
uphold the law may have deliberately undermined the initial investigation.’460
273. David Riddle’s letter expressed commitment to providing an apology from the Metropolitan
Police for past mistakes. It continued:
‘Len Duvall has previously asked your clients for their views on how an apology from
the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] could most suitably be delivered, and we await
hearing from them or you about that.
‘The MPS remain determined to do everything within their power to put matters right
and to secure justice is finally achieved for Daniel’s murder.’461
274. The letter from David Riddle confirmed that there would be a meeting on 13 April 2006,462
at which DAC John Yates would provide a briefing on the progress of the investigation, and
comments would be invited on the ‘MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] Report [sic]’.463 The
meeting on 13 April 2006 was attended by the Metropolitan Police Authority, Metropolitan
Police, Alastair Morgan, his partner and his solicitor. Before it started, notes taken by Alastair
Morgan recorded that it was clarified that DCS David Cook was working part-time on the Daniel
Morgan case.464
275. Alastair Morgan’s notes reveal that during the meeting several matters were discussed in
relation to the progress of the investigation.465
276. These notes reveal an unprecedented level of information exchange and

consultation between the Metropolitan Police and Daniel Morgan’s family regarding the
details of the case.
458 Letter from David Riddle to Raju Bhatt, MPS094332001, pp6-7, 10 April 2006.
459 Letter from David Riddle to Raju Bhatt, MPS094332001, p6, 10 April 2006.
464 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p36, 13 Apr 2006.
465 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, pp36-44, 13 Apr 2006.
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277. Alastair Morgan’s notes record that the issue of publication of the 2006 Report was
discussed at the meeting. Alastair Morgan’s and Isobel Hülsmann’s solicitor asked if a proposed
letter of apology could be ‘incorporated into the early stages of the report or in the conclusion
where there’s no ambiguity’. DAC John Yates proposed the executive summary as the
best place.466
278. The additional content added by the Metropolitan Police to their report was general
in nature and did not add to an understanding of events between 1987 and 2006 as
envisaged in the Metropolitan Police Authority’s Terms of Reference. The report’s claim
that ‘all papers’ were reviewed had the effect of misleading members of Daniel Morgan’s
family and the Metropolitan Police Authority about the depth of the review that took
place. Nevertheless, the way in which Len Duvall, as Chair of the Metropolitan Police
Authority, handled the process, and the extent to which the family were involved and
kept informed, were commendable.
7.1.4 The 2006 Report: References to members of Daniel Morgan’s family

279. The 2006 Report stated that members of Daniel Morgan’s family were not informed of
Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges in its early stages for reasons of ‘operational security’. However,
it stated that ‘once evidence of criminality started to emerge that suggested a possible impact
on Daniel Morgan’s murder then discussions with the family took place’ and that ‘the Morgan
family and their solicitor […] have been constantly briefed on almost all aspects of the case and
to a degree, as previously described, the level of information given has been unprecedented’.467
280. The members of Daniel Morgan’s family were not ‘constantly briefed on almost
all aspects of the case’. They were briefed only after, and not before, the 02 July 1999
publication of the Daily Telegraph article about the murder. They were briefed on 15 and
22 July 1999 only after their solicitor had contacted the Metropolitan Police.
281. With reference to the report of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation,
the 2006 Report stated that ‘[t]he family had for some time asked for sight of the Hampshire
PCA [Police Complaints Authority] report. This was initially resisted by the MPS [Metropolitan
Police Service]. However, in 2003, prior to the issue being taken to Judicial Review, the PCA
Report was handed over.’468
466 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p44, 13 Apr 2006.
467 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority by DAC John Yates, p208, para 288, MPS109479001, 07 April 2006.
468 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority by DAC John Yates, p208, para 289, MPS109479001, 07 April 2006.
1199
282. The Metropolitan Police had resisted providing members of Daniel Morgan’s
family with access to the report prepared by the Hampshire/Police Complaints
Authority Investigation for over 14 years. A judicial review had been lodged in 2002.
The Metropolitan Police had eventually agreed to hand over the report and, on 04 July
2003, the judicial review was settled on grounds ordered by the High Court: that
disclosure of the report would be made, subject to redactions and conditions. It was only
in 2005 after further judicial proceedings were proposed that the unredacted report was
disclosed – 18 years after the murder of Daniel Morgan. The 2006 Report’s reference to
the Metropolitan Police’s initial resistance to providing the report of the Hampshire/Police
Complaints Authority Investigation to the family was a considerable understatement
of the facts.
7.1.5 The 2006 Report: Views of David Riddle and Len Duvall
283. David Riddle, former Deputy Chief Executive and solicitor to the Metropolitan Police
Authority, was interviewed by the Panel regarding the 2006 Report, including the cooperation
of the Metropolitan Police, their Terms of Reference and specifically the rejection of the
initial report.
284. David Riddle said:
i. The Metropolitan Police’s mindset at the time of the report in relation to the Morgan
One Investigation in 1987, was that the investigation had been conducted based on
the standards at the time in 1987.
ii. Len Duvall had made the case his ‘personal crusade’ and he received a lot of support
from Metropolitan Police Authority members.
iii. He did not detect anything other than sympathy towards the family from Metropolitan
Police Authority members.
iv. Members of Daniel Morgan’s family were treated well by the Metropolitan Police
Authority, and he held Isobel Hülsmann, Daniel Morgan’s mother, in high regard.
v. Alastair Morgan could be ‘unpredictable and sometimes found discussions frustrating

and made that known’.
vi. AC John Yates and Len Duvall were always sincere and respectful towards Alastair
Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and other members of the family, and everyone appreciated
what Alastair Morgan and the family had been through for 20 years and how gravely
the case reflected on the Metropolitan Police.
vii. That the Metropolitan Police were committed to supporting the family in their
search for the truth, that no one from the Metropolitan Police was combative with
Alastair Morgan, and that he did not remember anyone being personally critical of
Alastair Morgan.469
469 Panel interview with David Riddle, PNL000251001, 13 June 2017.
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285. In an additional note provided to the Panel on 14 June 2017,470 David Riddle said that his
experience of working with DCS David Cook was ‘completely positive’. He ‘thought he was a
good copper, a skilled detective, and someone who was straight with the MPA [Metropolitan
Police Authority] and the family and who shared the determination to bring the murderers
to justice’.471
286. Len Duvall, former Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority, in interview with the
Panel, said:
i. One question he asked himself was why a public inquiry had never been established.
The family had asked for his support to get a public inquiry and to obtain information
from the police. Some senior elements of the Metropolitan Police did not want the
case re-opened.472
ii. It appeared that there were still issues of corruption within the Metropolitan Police and
that elements of the Metropolitan Police agreed and were prepared to deal with this.473
iii. It had become clear to him that the Home Office was not going to establish a
public inquiry.474
iv. He considered there was a need to ‘draw a line’ under the case from the police point
of view and that the family ‘needed closure’, and so he requested a report under the
provisions of section 22 of the Police Act 1996.475
v. He and Metropolitan Police Authority members (some of whom were very supportive
of Len Duvall’s stance, others less so, he said) did not want to over-promise what they
could achieve.476
vi. Regarding the rejection of the initial report, the tone had been that ‘everything was
alright’, which was not acceptable.477 There were still questions to be answered, and
the family deserved answers. He had read through the first two pages and ‘lost the
plot telling the Metropolitan Police that the report was not going to be discussed any
further and that it must be worked on again’.478
8 The Abelard Two Investigation

287. The Abelard Two Investigation began in March 2006479 following the identification of a new
significant witness, James Ward, in 2005.
288. In a telephone call on 15 May 2006 in which Alastair Morgan requested an update visit for
Isobel Hülsmann, DCS David Cook told him that a ‘significant event’ would occur on 22 May
2006 but stated that its evidential value could not be assessed for several weeks.480 In the
470 Panel interview with David Riddle additional note, 14 June 2017.
471 Panel interview with David Riddle additional note, p4, 14 June 2017.
472 Panel interview with Len Duvall, PNL000252001, p1, para 5, 20 July 2017.
478 Panel interview with Len Duvall, PNL000252001, pp2-3, para 13, 20 July 2017.
479 Index Policy File, MPS071795001, p2, 31 March 2006.
480 Message M52, MPS072786001, p1, 15 May 2006.
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call, DCS Cook referred to preparatory work for re-examination of exhibits, but had ‘no further
update’.481 He told Alastair Morgan that he was concerned that speaking to his mother when
he had no update would upset her and raise expectations, but he stated that ‘when something
significant happens’ the family would ‘be informed without question’.482
289. On 30 June 2006, Sarah Morgan was told of the Abelard Two Investigation, and
was introduced to her Family Liaison Officer, DC Caroline Linfoot.483 At a follow-up visit to
the Abelard Two offices, Sarah’s brother Dan Morgan was provided similar details of the
investigation on 06 July 2006.484 Iris, Sarah, and Dan Morgan expressed a wish to be informed
of significant stages of the investigation, but Sarah Morgan also indicated that her mother found
the situation hard to deal with. Family liaison notes from a visit on 07 September 2006 identified
that Iris Morgan’s ‘main concern is that any investigation was completed and successful as
she does not want her children to have to deal with future further investigations if this one [the
Abelard Two Investigation] fails’.485
290. The Panel was unable to obtain family liaison logs for Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann,
or Jane Morgan. Former DCI Noel Beswick responded to a Panel request for such logs by
stating that they may not exist for Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann ‘because of the unusual
nature of this enquiry’ and that DCS David Cook ‘took primacy’ in dealing with Alastair Morgan,
with whom DCS Cook spoke ‘almost daily’. Former DCI Beswick also stated that a Detective
Constable maintained contact with Isobel Hülsmann.486
291. As Senior Investigating Officer, DCS David Cook should not have been acting as
a Family Liaison Officer under any circumstances. Notes should have been made of all
contact with members of Daniel Morgan’s family. The manner in which family members
were treated during this period continued to improve and was notably better, in the view
of the family, than their experiences during the earlier investigations (see Chapter 8, The
Abelard Two Investigation).
8.1 The initial meeting with the Crown Prosecution Service

292. Members of the family met Stuart Sampson, the principal Crown Prosecution Service
Prosecutor responsible for Abelard Two on 06 July 2006.487 The meeting was attended by
Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and his partner, Jane Morgan, and their solicitor, and by
representatives of the Metropolitan Police, the Metropolitan Police Authority and the Crown
Prosecution Service. The meeting was led by DAC John Yates.488
293. Alastair Morgan’s notes record that Stuart Sampson outlined his role and stated that
‘it’s my decision whether to go ahead or not’ with the prosecution. Notes recorded that he
stated that as a result of the history of the case there was a ‘huge amount of paper work to go
through.’ He said that because of the large volume of the material, there were likely to be three

483 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, p10, 30 June 2006.
484 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, p14, 06 July 2006.
485 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, p23,07 September 2006.
486 Email from DCI Noel Beswick to DMIP Secretariat, SS303, 03 December 2015.
487 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, pp49-53, 06 July 2006.
488 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, pp49-53, 06 July 2006.
1202
Counsel working on the case. He would advise the police on what could or could not be done.
It was emphasised that the difficulty would be in assessing the line of defence which would
be taken in light of the evidence. The advantage of involving the Crown Prosecution Service
at this early stage was that they could begin examining key information. He explained the next
important stage would be charging, but this could only be done once fully prepared.489
294. The solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family described his clients’ negative
experience previously with the Crown Prosecution Service stating that it had taken eight months
before they were provided with an explanation of the Crown Prosecution Service decision not
to prosecute in the Abelard One/Morgan Two Investigation. Stuart Sampson said, ‘if we decide
not to proceed [there] will be prompt explanation’. Although Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan
and Jane Morgan’s key point of contact was the police, they were assured that Stuart Sampson
would readily answer major questions which might arise.490
295. DCS David Cook spoke in detail with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan
about the importance of examining all the information coming forward from the new witness,
James Ward. Alastair Morgan’s notes record DCS Cook to have stated that:
• because the new witness was a criminal, there was a necessity to ‘attach substance’
to his evidence;
• the new witness appeared to be standing up to scrutiny;
• the new witness had clearly stated ‘the key suspect’ had admitted to killing
Daniel Morgan;
• the witness had stated that Garry Vian had also been present, although it was not clear
whether he was at the crime scene or guarding the entrance to the car park;
• DAC John Yates considered that Garry Vian and his brother were ‘bloody dangerous’
and he did not ‘want them on the street’;
• as many resources as DAC Yates had were being put into this investigation; and
• steps were being taken in relation to forensics and the examination of exhibits.491
296. Alastair Morgan’s notes record that Len Duvall told family members that he believed there
were opportunities in the Abelard Two Investigation that had not been available previously.
Len Duvall suggested that family members visited the incident room. When asked about the
investigation timescale, DCS David Cook was reluctant to indicate a timeframe ‘because I will
be held to it and then I will [have] let you down. I’m trying to give regular updates.’ When asked
what the family could do to help, DCS Cook said he wanted them to continue maintaining the
confidentiality of the investigation.492
297. Although family members submitted questions, DAC John Yates believed that answering
the questions at that stage would take time away from the investigation. It was decided that the
questions would be answered at a later stage.493 Alastair Morgan’s notes also record that DAC
John Yates mentioned that he believed an apology for their previous negative experience made
489 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p52, 06 July 2006.
1203
in public by the Metropolitan Police would serve as a good trigger in terms of drawing attention
to the matter again. Isobel Hülsmann’s solicitor said that Isobel Hülsmann found it difficult to
accept the apology without first being satisfied herself that what was happening was genuine.494
298. A further meeting was held on 12 or 14 July 2006 between Alastair Morgan, his partner,
his solicitor and DCS David Cook. An update on progress was provided. Alastair Morgan’s
notes record that they were asked not to take notes and that the information provided was to
be ‘just between ourselves’. At this meeting DCS Cook reportedly expressed doubt that the
Metropolitan Police would be prepared to use the apology as a trigger to provoke discussion as
there would be ‘too much politics, protocol and bureaucracy’ and that the publicity would not be
welcome at that time.495
299. On 27 November 2006, for the third time, Daniel Morgan’s death was featured on
Crimewatch.496 Isobel Hülsmann contacted the incident room on the same day to express her
disgust with the broadcast. She was upset that the original reconstruction was featured, the
content of which she believed was obtained from Jonathan Rees.497
300. The following day, 28 November 2006, DCS David Cook updated Alastair Morgan on the
debriefing of James Ward. Alastair Morgan’s notes record that, on the whole, the investigation
team had not been able to find anything to undermine James Ward’s credibility. The notes
record that the family were updated about information from a second witness, Gary Eaton.498
Gary Eaton had contacted The Sun’s news desk, requesting that their Chief Crime Reporter
contact him on 22 July 2006.499,500 This led to Gary Eaton’s contact with the Abelard Two
Investigation team and his debriefing from August 2006 to December 2007.501
301. Isobel Hülsmann and Alastair Morgan were updated about the debriefing of James
Ward by their Family Liaison Officer in Wales on 08 December 2006. Notes taken by Alastair
Morgan’s partner recorded that the Family Liaison Officer conveyed an attitude of commitment
and positivity towards the investigation and that his sentiment echoed that of DCS David Cook
in a previous meeting.502 Likewise, Sarah Morgan received updates on enquiries, later court
processes and Crown Prosecution Service activities, on 04 January 2007503 and 01 March
2007,504 and was in regular contact with her Family Liaison Officer in early 2007505 and again
in late 2007.506
302. Members of Daniel Morgan’s family were further updated on the progress of the Abelard
Two Investigation during formal and informal meetings held by the Metropolitan Police on
26 January 2007,507 02 March 2007 and 13 July 2007.508 No police-recorded notes of the
January meeting were available to the Panel, but notes provided by the family revealed detailed
495 Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p55, 12 July 2006.
496 Details of Daniel Morgan Crimewatch Appeal, MPS102803001, p2, 27 November 2006.
497 Message M382, Telephone call from Isobel Hülsmann, MPS107644001, p245, 27 November 2006.
498 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p57, 28 November 2006.
499 Amended defence Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian and Sidney Fillery v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, CIV000001001, p28,
22 December 2015.
500 Record of Debrief Interview with Gary Eaton, MPS109039001 p318, 01 September 2006.
501 Witness Statement of Gary Eaton, MPS076390001, 20 April 2007.
502 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p61, 08 December 2006.
503 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, p36, 04 January 2007.
504 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, p40, 01 March 2007.
505 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, pp34-45, 03 January 2007.
506 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, pp46-49, 16 August 2007.
507 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, 26 January 2007.
508 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, 2 March 2007.
1204
discussion of lines of enquiry, the investigative team’s approach to evidence provided by the
main witnesses, intended future investigative activities, and lines of enquiry concerning alleged
police corruption which had been followed up from earlier investigations.509 As the investigation
progressed, new witnesses were identified, a review of forensics occurred and the family
received an exceptional amount of information about all aspects of the investigation.
303. DAC John Yates, DCS David Cook and D/Supt David Zinzan were present at the 02 March
2007 meeting. Family members understood from this meeting that DCS Cook believed that
there was ‘a good case to take forward to the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service]’ although there
were potential witnesses who had not come forward because they were too afraid.510 Alastair
Morgan’s notes record that during the meeting, family members were updated in relation to
progress that had been made with the two key witnesses, James Ward and Gary Eaton, and
there was mention of a third potential main witness, Person J5. The notes record that the third
potential witness, Person J5, had been identified in December 2006 but this witness was, at
that point, unwilling to give evidence. DCS Cook wanted to involve family members by including
some information in the forthcoming anniversary press release. Family members understood
that nothing to undermine the case had been found to date, but a great deal of material
remained to be reviewed.511
304. The Metropolitan Police Authority meeting held on 13 July 2007 was attended by
DAC John Yates, DCS David Cook, DCI Noel Beswick, Metropolitan Police Authority
representatives, Isobel Hülsmann512 and her solicitor. It followed the submission of a report to
the Crown Prosecution Service on 13 June 2007 requesting a charging decision.513
8.2 Information received on the arrest of the suspects

305. Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian, Garry Vian, and James Cook were arrested for the murder of
Daniel Morgan on 21 April 2008514,515,516,517,518 and charged with murder on 23 April 2008. Former
DS Fillery was arrested on 21 April 2008 and charged with doing an act tending and intended
to pervert the course of justice (see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation). They were all
remanded in custody in the first instance, although former DS Fillery was released on bail in
August 2008.519 Family Liaison Officer, DC Caroline Linfoot informed Iris Morgan and Sarah
Morgan of the charges in a telephone call on 23 April 2008520 and visited them on 15 May 2008.
During her visit, DC Linfoot explained that interviews ‘had taken place and what had happened’
and informed them of court dates and future phases of the investigation, such as disclosure.521
306. Family members were kept up to date with developments relating to the anticipated trial.
They were involved in more than ten discussions from October 2008 to January 2009 covering
the progress of the pre-trial preparations, the suspects’ bail applications, and a possible
disclosure hearing.522 On 21 and 22 January 2009, Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and Jane
509 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, 26 January 2007.
513 Abelard Two, Report to the Crown Prosecution Service, MPS103338001, 13 July 2007.
514 Custody record of Jonathan Rees, MPS094329001 pp5-24, 21 April 2008.
515 Custody record of Glenn Vian, MPS094329001 pp34-56, 21 April 2008.
516 Custody record of Garry Vian, MPS094329001 pp57-64, 21 April 2008.
517 Custody record of James Cook, MPS094329001 pp68-99, 21 April 2008.
518 Custody record of Sidney Fillery, MPS094329001 pp25-32, 21 April 2008.
519 Successful bail application of Sidney Fillery, MPS104129001, pp2-4, 06 August 2008.
520 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, p52, 23 April 2008.
521 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, p53, 23 April 2008.
522 List of family liaison contact dates and summary, MPS071361001, various dates.
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Morgan were informed by telephone that Mr Justice Maddison had been appointed to the case.
They were updated on the disclosure hearing and the possibility that the Defence could apply to
postpone the court date, about which they expressed concern.523
307. On 30 January 2009, the trial date of 21 April 2009 was postponed as a result of an
application made on behalf of James Cook.524 Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane
Morgan were informed on the same day and were told that October 2009 would be the most
likely date now for the start of the trial. The reason given was to allow the Defence more time.525
308. On 06 March 2009, Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan were contacted to discuss the
recent postponement of the trial date, and the potential new date, and the possibility of Isobel
Hülsmann giving evidence.526 On 30 March 2009, Isobel Hülsmann expressed her concern that
there would be further delays.527 Despite her concerns, she was reassured that the trial would
almost certainly start in October 2009.528 On 20 March 2009, a new trial start date of 05 October
2009 was set.529
309. In response to a telephone call from Isobel Hülsmann on 01 June 2009, DCI Noel Beswick
stated that the investigation team were working towards the trial date of 05 October 2009, but
he could not guarantee the trial would start on that date.530 Isobel Hülsmann531 On 09 June 2009
Isobel Hülsmann was informed that the possibility of her giving evidence at the trial was to be
discussed at the next case conference with the Crown Prosecution Service.532 Family members
were also updated about the progress of the enquiry. For example, during the meeting held on
09 June 2009, Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan were told of the forthcoming arrest of Glenn
Vian’s wife, Kim Vian, and the evidence associating her with the murder weapon (see Chapter 8,
The Abelard Two Investigation).533
310. The Family Liaison Officer for Iris Sarah, and Dan Morgan changed from DC Caroline
Linfoot to another Detective Constable in June/July 2009.534,535 The Detective Constable
provided them with regular updates through July and September, about the investigation into
James Cook and the arrest of Kim Vian.536
311. Family members were informed on 25 September 2009 that the trial would not start until
26 October 2009 at the earliest.537
8.3 Facilitated communication between family members and Person J5

312. In June 2009, Alastair Morgan wrote a letter to the witness Person J5 expressing trust
and confidence in the investigation, and his determination to see his brother’s killers brought to
justice538 (see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation). On presenting the letter to Person J5,
523 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p3, 22 January 2009.
524 R v Jonathan Rees & Others note of hearing, MPS104656001, pp1-4, 30 January 2009.
525 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p4, 30 January 2009.
526 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p4, 06 March 2009.
529 R v Jonathan Rees & Others note of hearing, MPS104966001, p3, 20 March 2009.
530 Message 1422, MPS074383001, p1, 01 June 2009.
531 Message 1422, MPS074383001, p1, 01 June 2009.
532 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p4, 09 June 2009.
533 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p4, 09 June 2009.
534 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS102357001, p53, 12 June 2009.
535 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS105446001, p.6 20 July 2009.
536 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS105446001, pp15-25, 23 July 2009 – 15 September 2009.
537 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p5, 25 September 2009.
538 Message M1488, ‘Updates re Person J5’, MPS006166001, pp1-2, 25 June 2009.
1206
a Detective Constable noted that ‘[t]he letter, written with strong emotion clearly affected’ the
witness, but prompted her to ask several questions concerning the security of the evidence-
giving process.539
313. DCS Cook should not have facilitated this contact between Alastair Morgan and
Person J5. DCS Cook had disclosed too much information about potential witnesses
and this resulted in the sending of the letter by Alastair Morgan. A fearful potential
witness should not be the subject of persuasion by a relative of a murder victim.
314. On 30 June 2009, Person J5 agreed to give evidence540 and provided a first statement
on 01 July 2009.541 Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan received an update on Person J5’s
statement on 07 July 2009, as well as the statement of another new witness, former PC Dean
Vian.542 The content of the statements was explained to family members in relation to what was,
and was not, admissible evidence.543
315. Person J5 wrote to members of Daniel Morgan’s family in August 2009, expressing sorrow
for not helping with the enquiry sooner, but saying that they had been scared.544 Person J5
asked DCS David Cook to pass on the letter to the family.545 Iris Morgan was told about Person
J5’s evidence and given a copy of the letter during a family liaison visit on 13 August 2009 which
Iris Morgan stated ‘meant a lot to her’.546
316. Members of Daniel Morgan’s family received unusually detailed information in

meetings about the progress of the Abelard Two Investigation. They also received
significant sensitive information on the investigative process relating to Assisting
Offenders and witnesses. This should not have happened. The family’s integrity and
adherence to confidentiality in these matters is commendable. However, the provision of
this information was highly irregular with potential high risks to the family members and
to the witnesses, as well as to the investigative process.
8.4 Further pre-trial preparation updates

317. From the end of August and throughout the autumn of 2009, members of Daniel Morgan’s
family received regular updates on the obstacles relating to the trial,547 reasons for the delays
to court dates,548 progress on abuse of process arguments and likely timescale,549,550,551
539 Message M1488, ‘Updates re Person J5’, MPS006166001, pp1-2, 25 June 2009.
540 Unused notes of meeting with Person J5, MPS005407001, p1, 26 June 2009.
541 Witness Statement of Person J5, MPS090646001, 01 July 2009.
542 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p4, 07 July 2009.
543 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p4, 07 July 2009.
544 Letter to the Morgan family from Person J5, MPS109175001, p27, 12 August 2009.
545 Letter to DCS David Cook from Person J5, MPS109175001, p30, 12 August 2009.
546 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, MPS080107001, p1, 13 August 2009.
547 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, pp5-6, 14 November 2007.
548 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS105446001, pp30-31, 21 September 2009.
549 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS105446001, p33, 13 October 2009.
550 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p5, 30 October 2009.
1207
details of court procedure on selecting a jury, and additions to Person J5’s evidence.552
Iris Morgan’s Family Liaison Officer discussed and arranged options to assist Iris Morgan in
giving evidence.553
318. Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan were also informed on 25 September 2009 by their
Family Liaison Officer that former DS Sidney Fillery’s trial for the offence of doing an act tending
and intended to pervert the course of justice would be separate from the other suspects who
would be on trial for murder. Both Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan believed ‘Dark Forces’
were at work again to protect former DS Fillery. Their Family Liaison Officer discussed the
Defence’s application to stay the proceedings as an abuse of process and the effect on the trial
date, and additions to Person J5’s evidence.554 The separation of former DS Sidney Fillery’s trial
from the murder trial was consistent with accepted practice for managing cases in the courts.
319. Despite all the preparation, the trial for the Abelard Two Investigation did not commence in
October 2009. On 18 January 2010, Sarah Morgan was informed that the new start date for the
trial was going to be September 2010.555
320. On 15 February 2010, the evidence of Gary Eaton was ruled inadmissible and proceedings
against former DS Sidney Fillery, which resulted from evidence given by Gary Eaton, were
discontinued.556,557 Iris Morgan and Sarah Morgan were informed by telephone on the same
day.558 No records are available to indicate when Alastair Morgan, Isobel Hülsmann and Jane
Morgan were so informed.
321. On 03 March 2010, the four remaining Defendants – Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian, Garry
Vian and James Cook – were released on bail.559 Sarah Morgan was informed the same day
and told that it was highly unlikely that the Defendants would attempt to contact her.560 Alastair
Morgan contacted the investigation team offices expressing anxiety and requesting police
protection.561 The Metropolitan Police determined that Alastair Morgan was not at risk from the
Defendants. Former DCS David Cook informed him of this and identified himself as the point of
contact should Alastair Morgan continue to have concerns.562
322. The Metropolitan Police kept the members of Daniel Morgan’s family informed
to an appropriate extent of the trial proceedings and the arrangements for the pre-trial
arguments and hearings in court.
552 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p5, 23 August 2009.
553 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS105446001, pp35-37, 13 October 2009.
554 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p5, 25 September 2009.
556 Extract from transcript of discussion between Justice Maddison and Counsel regarding exclusion of Gary Eaton’s evidence,
CLA000128001, p1, 15 February 2010.
557 Extract from transcript of discussion between Justice Maddison and Counsel regarding exclusion of Gary Eaton’s evidence,
CLA000128001, p5, 15 February 2010.
558 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS105446001, pp57-62, 15 February 2010.
559 Document D4421, Bail conditions set at Central Criminal Court, MPS106387001, pp2-4, 03 March 2010.
560 Family liaison log for Sarah Morgan, MPS080129001, p1, 03 March 2010.
561 Email from Catherine Crawford to AC John Yates, MPS109586001, p57, 04 March 2010.
562 Email from Simon Commander Foy to AC John Yates, MPS109586001, p56, 04 March 2010.
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8.5 28 April 2010: Meeting held with members of Daniel Morgan’s family
323. On 28 April 2010, six months after the anticipated trial start date, members of Daniel
Morgan’s family and their solicitor met with Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Paul
Stephenson, AC John Yates, and Kit Malthouse, Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority.563,564
The meeting was to discuss the family’s concerns in relation to the time the case was taking to
come to trial at court.565
324. Alastair Morgan’s notes record that his solicitor explained that ‘the family have seen the
prosecution unravel over the last 6 months. The assessment they have been driven to is that, for
their own sanity, not to pretend that the prosecution is going anywhere.’ The solicitor went on to
explain that his clients ‘have to look at life after this prosecution’. He emphasised that ‘there is
no question of the teams [sic] lack of integrity but that they are withed [sic] with the decades of
what Isobel calls jiggery pokery.’566
325. The notes also record that Isobel Hülsmann said that she thought ‘she’s in for a “big
disappointment” and she can’t understand why after 23 years that this is happening. She doesn’t
know what has gone wrong but that something has gone seriously wrong.’ The family notes
record that Kit Malthouse appeared confused as to why the optimism at the previous meeting
had changed. The notes record that Jane Morgan explained her disappointment, stating that
‘since they last met Fillery has walked and the villains have been bailed so she has no grounds
for optimism’.567
326. The notes record AC John Yates as saying that he could not ‘begin to imagine what the
family have been through’. He was aware of the challenges of the case and said there was still
complete commitment to it, and still the possibility of a trial. Representing them, the police had
‘two of the most able CPS [Crown Prosecution Service] barristers’ who remained ‘of the view
that we will get a trial’ and they would ‘do everything in [their] power to get this to trial’. The
family had the full support of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service; however, in relation
to former DS Sidney Fillery, the police were constrained by the decisions the judge had made.568
327. Former DCS David Cook reportedly highlighted the complexities of the history of how and
when the trial dates had changed. The family notes recorded that the investigation team had
received eight to ten disclosure requests a day from the Defence and that they were able to
meet the vast majority of deadlines. AC John Yates explained the level of resourcing required.
The family said that they had no doubts in relation to the level of commitment to the case.569
328. The notes record that the Commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson, thanked the family for their
comment on the integrity of the investigation, and he believed it was ‘magnanimous’ of them.
He continued:
‘It’s extraordinary that you are willing to say that. Your anguish is palpable and totally
justifiable. This is a difficult and complex investigation and it’s right there’s honesty with
us. Your distress has been multiplied over the years.’570
563 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, pp72-74, 28 April 2010.
564 Letter from Raju Bhatt to AC John Yates, MPS109586001, p25, 28 March 2010.
565 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, pp72-74, 28 April 2010.
566 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p72, 28 April 2010.
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329. The solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann, and her family stated that his clients had lost
confidence in the criminal justice system. The solicitor also said that the review which was
promised by the Metropolitan Police Authority in 2006 into the way in which the case was
handled had never been finalised. Kit Malthouse responded by saying, ‘[o]nce there is a
conclusion there will be a full review of the whole process’.571
330. There was an understandable pessimism expressed by members of Daniel

Morgan’s family. However, the meeting between the family and Commissioner Sir Paul
Stephenson and his team was important. It enabled the family to express their views
and the Metropolitan Police and the Metropolitan Police Authority to hear and react to
their concerns.
8.6 Counsel’s concern about the degree of disclosure to the family

331. In July 2010, lead Prosecuting Counsel, Nicholas Hilliard QC, reportedly expressed
concerns that the family were receiving too much information about the evidence provided by
the key witnesses. He met with family members in the absence of former DCS David Cook.572
The Panel has not seen any note of this meeting. In an email to Nicholas Hilliard QC on 08 July
2010, former DCS Cook sought to justify the amount of information provided as necessary to
maintain the hard-won trust and support of the family, stating that he provided any information
that was likely to come into the public domain.573 He stated:
‘In 2002 the family were clearly very distrustful of Police but the strategy set by others
in terms of almost full disclosure brought about a substantial change, one to which
we, as both the investigation team and I believe yourselves as the Prosecution Team
now enjoy the full support of the family in our endeavours to bring this matter to a
successful conclusion.
‘When I say “almost full disclosure” I mean just that. I/we do not tell the family
everything for naturally there are sensitivities over the identity of informants and some
other sensitive techniques, but if it is something that is likely to come within the public
domain or be brought out during the course of the trial they are informed, whether that
is good news or bad. By doing so we have retained their trust and support, or [at] least
I believe we have. I do however tell them about the existence of things that we cannot
discuss and they have come to respect my decision and judgments in that regards and
not press upon certain issues.’574
332. DCS David Cook also stated that Alastair Morgan had independently come to the same
conclusions as the investigation team regarding the credibility of key witnesses.575
572 Email from DCS David Cook to John Yates, MPS109586001, p2, 08 July 2010.
573 Email from DCS David Cook to Nicholas Hilliard, MPS109586001, pp2-3, 08 July 2010.
574 Email from DCS David Cook to Nicholas Hilliard, MPS109586001, pp2-3, 08 July 2010.
575 Email from DCS David Cook to Nicholas Hilliard, MPS109586001, p3, 08 July 2010.
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8.7 Communication about the pre-trial proceedings and the

collapse of the case
333. On 18 November 2010, the Court was informed of the decision not to use Person J5
as a witness and as a result of this James Cook was formally acquitted576 (see Chapter 8,
The Abelard Two Investigation). Before the hearing on 18 November 2010, Iris and Sarah
Morgan had been informed during a family liaison visit on 16 November 2010, that the case
against James Cook was being discontinued.577 At the meeting the Abelard Two Investigation
also provided details about the Defendants’578 bail conditions applying to and responded to
questions on the status of a range of witnesses.579 Iris and Sarah Morgan were informed that the
investigation team were ‘about 95% there’ but the Defence teams were working hard to prevent
the case from coming to Court.580 At the meeting, Sarah Morgan and Iris Morgan commented
that they dreaded the family liaison visits because they expected ‘bad news’.581 They also asked
whether the trial was still scheduled for January 2011.582
334. On 18 October 2010, the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family wrote to Mr
Justice Maddison on behalf of his clients requesting some degree of certainty in the timetable
of proceedings, to enable them to ‘manage their lives’. The letter set out the steps that his
clients had taken to ensure their availability for the trial, at considerable financial and emotional
cost to themselves, including the need to take unpaid leave from work and the prospect of a
move to London by Isobel Hülsmann. The letter stated that the uncertainty was compounded
by the ‘exclusion’ of Alastair Morgan and Isobel Hülsmann from all court proceedings to date.583
The letter was copied to Stuart Sampson of the Crown Prosecution Service584 with a request
made that it be brought to the attention of the Defence. The solicitor also wrote to AC John
Yates on the same day requesting a further meeting to discuss concerns about proceedings,
and to address family expectations585 as set out in the letter to Commissioner Sir Ian Blair on
05 September 2008.586
335. Further evidence came to light on 17 January 2011 relevant to the Prosecution’s disclosure
obligations in respect of James Ward. Legal argument followed between 17 January and
11 February 2011 (see Chapter 8, The Abelard Two Investigation). Family Liaison Officers held
a further meeting with Isobel Hülsmann and Jane Morgan on 21 January 2011 to discuss what
was happening in Court and the possibility of the start of the trial being delayed further.587
336. DI Douglas Clarke informed Sarah Morgan on 24 January 2011 that James Ward had been
withdrawn as a witness following the emergence of additional documentary material relating
to his criminal history.588 DI Clarke reassured her that the trial was still feasible. She expressed
the belief that the legal system had failed her and the family.589 Following a phone call from a
close family contact, Sarah Morgan contacted DI Clarke on 04 February 2011 with concerns
576 Hearing transcript, p5, 18 November 2010.

577 Family Liaison Log for Sarah Morgan and Iris Morgan, MPS080141001, p1, 16 November 2010.
583 Letter to Mr Justice Maddison from Raju Bhatt, MPS109592001, pp90-91, 18 October 2010.
584 Letter to Mr Justice Maddison from Raju Bhatt, MPS109592001, pp91, 18 October 2010.
585 Letter to AC John Yates from Raju Bhatt, MPS109592001, p96, 18 October 2010.
586 Letter to Commissioner Sir Ian Blair from Raju Bhatt, MPS109592001, p96, 05 September 2008.
587 List of family liaison contact with Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan, MPS071361001, p6, 21 Jan 2011.
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that the court case was not going well and that the trial would not proceed.590 DI Clarke did not
have details but provided more comprehensive updates on 07 February 2011,591 and the Family
Liaison Officer provided further updates on 11 February 2011.592
337. On 02 and 03 March 2011, the Metropolitan Police circulated, internally, drafts of a press
statement to be read out if the case was dismissed the following week, which included an
apology to Daniel Morgan’s family.593
338. On 09 March 2011, DI Douglas Clarke contacted Sarah Morgan to apologise for not
keeping her informed in relation to the recent developments in the investigation. During this
conversation, Sarah Morgan was recorded to have stated that she had heard from another
family member of the possibility of the trial not going ahead, and she felt that the family liaison
team had failed in their obligations to keep her informed of major developments.594
339. The Metropolitan Police should have notified Sarah Morgan promptly about the
possibility that the prosecution might be discontinued.
340. On 10 March 2011, the Crown Prosecution Service decided to withdraw the evidence
against the three remaining Defendants at proceedings scheduled for the following day.595
The family were informed before the final decision was made.596 DCS David Cook spoke to
Dan Morgan,597 and DI Douglas Clarke visited Iris Morgan and Sarah Morgan to inform them.598
DI Clarke gave his personal apology for the failures in the investigation team. He explained the
reasons for the failure, including the loss of documentation relating to James Ward, and the final
discovery of further material which should have been disclosed previously.599
341. Support was offered to the family, and the Metropolitan Police expressed its willingness
to share a draft press statement that was to be issued following announcement of the
discontinuation of the Prosecution’s case. Alastair Morgan was included in discussions about
the inclusion of an apology to the family in the press statement. Iris Morgan and her children
Sarah and Dan were not included in these discussions and felt excluded from the process.
Former DCS David Cook requested that Sarah Morgan, Dan Morgan and Iris Morgan should be
‘considered’ in the preparation of any such apology.600
591 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS105446001, pp118-119, 120, 07 February 2010.
593 Internal Metropolitan Police Service email, MPS109592001, pp47-49, 02 and 03 March 2011.
595 Transcript of hearing, 10 March 2011.
596 Email from Alison Saunders to Commander Simon Foy and DCS Hamish Campbell, MPS109592001, p219, 10 March 2011.
597 Email from DCS David Cook to AC John Yates, MPS109592001, p37, 10 March 2011.
598 Family liaison log for Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, MPS105446001, pp129-130, 10 March 2010.
600 Email from DCS David Cook to AC John Yates, MPS109592001, p37, 10 March 2011.
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342. Iris Morgan, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan, the immediate next of kin of the
victim, Daniel Morgan, should have been included in the discussions regarding the
possibility of a public apology being included in the press statement to be issued by the
343. On 11 March 2011, leading Counsel for the Prosecution withdrew evidence against the
remaining three Defendants and all three were formally acquitted.601 The family attended Court
to hear the outcome.
344. On 18 April 2011, Kit Malthouse, Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority, offered an
ex-gratia payment of £125,000 to Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and Jane Morgan to cover
out-of-pocket expenses and legal costs incurred in their case, in response to a request made on
12 January 2011.602 He offered the payment on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Authority and
the Commissioner ‘in light of the wholly exceptional nature of this matter’, but he added that it
was to ‘be taken into account’ if a compensation claim was pursued and that the payment was
‘to be made without admission of any legal liability’.603
345. On 21 June 2011, the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family replied accepting
the offer as an ‘interim payment’ against any further compensation claim to cover estimated
costs totalling £1,019,407.604 The letter provided a detailed breakdown of such costs.605
Following a telephone call on 15 July 2011, the solicitor clarified that his use of the term ‘interim
payment’ signified only ‘“it would be taken into account” upon the consideration of any wider
compensation claim on behalf of my clients’.606 In a letter dated 25 August 2011, Kit Malthouse
informed the solicitor that his letter of 21 June 2011 would be put before the Metropolitan Police
Authority’s Strategic and Operational Policing Committee for a decision on 13 October 2011.607
9 Unwarranted assurances and Metropolitan Police apologies

9.1 False, inaccurate and misleading assurances about the Morgan One
Investigation
346. In the years following Daniel Morgan’s murder, reassurances were issued to the public,
and Daniel Morgan’s family, describing the Morgan One investigation as ‘adequate’ or ‘of the
standards of the day’. These included:
i. DCS Douglas Shrubsole, who reviewed the Morgan One Investigation between
October and December 1987, confirmed in a witness statement that he was ‘satisfied
that all reasonable lines of enquiry had been identified, and that the Investigation was
completely thorough and professional’.608
601 Final Hearing Transcript of R v Rees and Others, MPS107449001, p12, 11 March 2011.
602 Letter from Kit Malthouse to Raju Bhatt, MPS109585001, p35, 18 April 2011.
603 Letter from Kit Malthouse to Raju Bhatt, MPS109585001, p35, 18 April 2011.
604 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Kit Malthouse, MPS109585001, pp13-14, 21 June 2011.
605 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Kit Malthouse, MPS109585001, pp18-34, 21 June 2011.
606 Letter from Raju Bhatt to the Metropolitan Police Authority, MPS109585001, p8, 18 July 2011.
607 Letter from Kit Malthouse to Raju Bhatt, MPS109585001, p5, 25 August 2011.
608 Witness Statement of DCS Douglas Shrubsole, MPS003406001, p1, 15 June 1988.
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ii. Sir Montague Levine, the Coroner at the Inquest into Daniel Morgan’s death, stated
that ‘no stone has been left unturned’ by the Morgan One investigation.609
iii. The Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation found that the ‘manner
in which the [Morgan One] investigation was conducted by the Metropolitan Police
showed determination to bring those responsible before the court’.610
iv. At a family liaison meeting in 1999, DAC Roy Clark ‘explained that although Alastair
Morgan would not agree, his assessment of the original MPS [Metropolitan Police
Service] investigation was that it was good. It had showed a motive for REES and other
circumstantial evidence. He felt the investigation was honest and thorough but perhaps
not innovative.’611
v. Home Office Minister Caroline Flint MP told Parliament in 2004: ‘I am informed that
the Metropolitan police accept that the original investigation falls below current
investigative standards, but that it was consistent with the standards of the day.’612
vi. Home Office Minister Hazel Blears MP sent a letter on 08 December 2004 to the
solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family, which stated that the Metropolitan
Police had ‘assured me that all necessary exhibits were taken for forensic examination
and that the crime scene was properly protected from the outset’.613
vii. This letter from Hazel Blears MP also stated: ‘I have received information about
this investigation from Hampshire Police and from the IPCC [Independent Police
Complaints Commission] which has access to the PCA [Police Complaints
Authority] files on the case; and am satisfied that this was a thorough and effective
investigation […].’614
347. The Morgan One Investigation was not compliant with investigation procedures and
policies in 1987. It would have been possible for the Metropolitan Police to identify the
Morgan One Investigation’s failings, as the Panel has done. The family of Daniel Morgan,
Home Office Ministers, Parliament and the wider public have been misled, over a period
of many years, as to the quality of the initial investigation into the murder of Daniel
Morgan. This was, in part, due to the fact that successive investigations and reviews did
not examine the Morgan One Investigation in full.
9.2 Admissions of failure and corruption

348. In the years following Daniel Morgan’s murder, allegations were made that former
DS Sidney Fillery had in some way subverted the first murder investigation.
609 Transcript of Inquest into the death of Daniel Morgan, Inquest Day Eight, INT000068001, p132, 25 April 1988.
610 Final Report of DCS Alan Wheeler to the Police Complaints Authority, p81, MPS060685001, 04 September 1989.
611 Note of meeting between DAC Roy Clark and Raju Bhatt, MPS046659001, pp10-11, 15 July 1999.
612 Hansard HC Deb, Vol 423, Col 236WH, 06 July 2004; https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2004-07-06/debates.
613 Letter from Hazel Blears MP to Bhatt Murphy solicitors, HOM000380001, p3, 08 December 2004.
614 Letter from Hazel Blears MP to Bhatt Murphy solicitors, HOM000380001, p4, 08 December 2004.
1214
349. For the reasons set out earlier in this Report, the enquiries into these matters by the
Morgan One and Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority investigations were inadequate. In
2003, 16 years after the murder, the Crown Prosecution Service was asked to consider the
possibility of charging former DS Sidney Fillery with misconduct in public office.615 At that time,
the Crown Prosecution Service decided not to charge former DS Fillery with any offence on
the advice of Counsel.616 Following the Crown Prosecution Service’s 2003 charging decision,
the Metropolitan Police began to refer publicly to the Morgan One Investigation as having
been ‘undermined’ or ‘compromised’, although no specific allegations were made against
former DS Fillery.
350. The first acknowledgement of any failings in the original investigation into Daniel Morgan’s
murder is in the letter dated 08 December 2004, from then Home Office Minister Hazel
Blears MP to the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family. The letter included the
following statement:
‘[The Metropolitan Police] have acknowledged to me that there were failings in that
first investigation and that it was undermined because of the involvement of certain
individuals within the investigation team.’617
351. When giving evidence to the Metropolitan Police Authority on 27 October 2005,
Commissioner Ian Blair stated that ‘[i]t’s clear that the first investigation was compromised’ and
that ‘2, 3 & 4 were attempts to reverse that’.618
352. Neither statement, from Minister Hazel Blears MP nor from Commissioner Ian
Blair, specified how the investigation was undermined. The Panel therefore asked former
Commissioner Blair, now Lord Blair, what he had meant. He explained that it was a reference to
the alleged actions of former DS Sidney Fillery.619
353. The 2006 Report by the Metropolitan Police to the Metropolitan Police Authority, which
had been the responsibility of DAC John Yates (see Chapter 7), also led to an admission of
the initial Morgan One Investigation having been undermined by DS Sidney Fillery. A letter
to the solicitor acting for Isobel Hülsmann and her family, sent on behalf of the Chair of the
Metropolitan Police Authority, Len Duvall, explained that:
‘DAC John Yates has confirmed that in his professional view this case, particularly in its
early stages, suffered significantly from the taint of corruption. In particular, the actions
and conduct of ex-Detective Sergeant Fillery (and his potential associates) fell well
below that which is expected. DAC Yates personally considers that Fillery was both
corrupt and a corrupter of colleagues and others. What he cannot say, to the degree of
certainty required, is that he was corrupt around this particular case.’620
354. The 2006 Report observed:
‘Viewing it from what we now know, Detective Superintendent [Douglas] Campbell was
not far from the truth. Sadly to prove their suspicions they needed evidence but the
615 Advice File R v Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian and James Cook, MPS060058001, p130, 07 March 2003.
616 Counsel Advice by Orlando Pownall QC and Jonathan Rees, MPS062209001, p55, undated.
617 Letter from Hazel Blears MP to Bhatt Murphy Solicitors, HOM000380001, 08 December 2004.
618 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: ‘Proposal Before Full Metropolitan Authority Sitting’, PNL000110001, p27, 27 October 2005.
619 Panel interview with Lord Blair, PNL000210001, p2, 20 July 2015.
620 Alastair Morgan Folder 11: Metropolitan Police Authority report, PNL000109001, pp1-2, 10 April 2006. Letter from David Riddle
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initial weakness in the investigation had probably led to that being destroyed and no
longer available.
‘That weakness was the presence of Detective Sergeant Fillery on the murder
investigation and his corrupt relationship with the prime suspect Jonathon [sic] Rees.’621
355. The 2006 Report was never published, although a copy was provided to the family of
Daniel Morgan.
356. The first public declaration by the Metropolitan Police of corruption in the context of the
murder of Daniel Morgan and its investigation occurred in 2011 following the collapse of the
Abelard Two trial. On 11 March 2011, the day the remaining three Defendants were acquitted,622
DCS Hamish Campbell of the Metropolitan Police’s Homicide and Serious Crime Command
apologised for the Metropolitan Police’s failure to bring those responsible for Daniel Morgan’s
murder to justice. He stated the following:
‘This current investigation has identified, ever more clearly, how the initial inquiry failed
the family and wider public. It is quite apparent that police corruption was a debilitating
factor in that investigation. This was wholly unacceptable.’623
357. Acting Commissioner Tim Godwin echoed that apology in a letter to Daniel Morgan’s
family. He wrote:
‘I am deeply sorry that the MPS has failed to bring to justice those responsible for the
murder of Daniel. The MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] has accepted that police
corruption in the original investigation was a significant factor in this failure. As you
know, corruption in its various forms formed a major line of enquiry in the most
recent investigation.’624
358. The statements above indicate that the Metropolitan Police had a clear
understanding that corruption had undermined the Morgan One investigation. However,
the precise nature of that corruption has never been fully and publicly explained, nor was
it properly investigated.
359. By alleging that corruption was a ‘debilitating factor’ in the Morgan One
Investigation and a ‘significant factor’ in the failure to bring those responsible for Daniel
Morgan’s murder to justice, the Metropolitan Police was able to deflect criticism from
the organisation’s multiple wider failings. This appears to form part of a pattern of the
Metropolitan Police’s inability to address past failings honestly and with candour.
621 Report to the Metropolitan Police Authority by DAC John Yates, MPS109479001, p191, para 187, 07 April 2006.
622 Briefing note and press statement by DCS Hamish Campbell, MPS107588001, p3, 11 March 2011.
623 Briefing note and press statement by DCS Hamish Campbell, MPS107588001, p8, 11 March 2011.
624 Letter from Acting Commissioner Tim Godwin to Alastair Morgan, p17, MPS094332001, 30 March 2011.
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9.3 Apologies to the family and recognition of past wrongs

360. On 10 April 2006, Deputy Chief Executive and Solicitor for the Metropolitan Police
Authority, David Riddle drafted a letter on behalf of the Chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority
Len Duvall to Daniel Morgan’s family. The letter was intended to accompany the 2006 Report
to the Metropolitan Police Authority. This letter explained the theory held by DAC John Yates
that the first investigation had ‘suffered significantly from the taint of corruption’. The letter
went on to say:
‘This was a deplorable episode in the history of the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service],
and it is deeply regrettable that the family have not seen anyone brought to justice as
yet; a situation made worse through the probable fact that some of those entrusted to
uphold the law may have deliberately undermined the initial investigation.’625
361. Even then, this draft letter of apology was not issued to members of the family until
2008 following further requests for an apology. On 05 September 2008, the solicitor acting
for Isobel Hülsmann and her family wrote to Commissioner Sir Ian Blair with reference to a
forthcoming meeting with the Commissioner and DAC John Yates.626 His letter acknowledged
the progress made by the investigating team under former DCS David Cook, DAC Yates and
the Commissioner.627 It referred also to the damage done in previous years.628 The letter set out
some words prepared by his clients, relaying their expectations of what the Metropolitan Police
should acknowledge in any forthcoming apology:
‘We require the Metropolitan Police to acknowledge that from the outset they
deliberately turned their backs on the clear available evidence of police involvement
in relation to Daniel’s murder; that they colluded in the ensuing cover up which was
allowed to continue by Hampshire Police and the Police Complaints Authority following
the inquest; and that for many years thereafter until 2002, the leadership of the
Metropolitan Police deliberately pursued a policy of systematically withholding from us
the details of the way they had handled and were continuing to handle the case while
denying the obvious in this regard to us, to our political representatives and to the
Home Office.
‘We want the Metropolitan Police to acknowledge the extraordinary burden placed
upon us as a family as a result of their failures over the years: the enormous distress
and anxiety we have had to endure; the endless amount of time we have had to take
out of our lives to lobby our political representatives and the media in order to draw
public attention to the alarming state of affairs in which we found ourselves; the acute
loss of confidence on our part in our police and political culture; and, not least, the
huge expense to which we have been put, not only emotionally, but also materially, both
directly and in terms of lost earnings.
‘We find ourselves compelled and duty bound, as Daniel’s family and as citizens of a
country in which we have a stake, to pursue whatever course of action is necessary to
achieve what we require of the Metropolitan Police, whatever the cost and however
long it might take.’629
625 Letter from David Riddle to Raju Bhatt, PNL000109001, pp1-2, 10 April 2006.
626 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Sir Ian Blair, MPS109586001, pp27-28, 5 September 2008.
627 Letter from Raju Bhatt to Sir Ian Blair, MPS109586001, p27, 05 September 2008.
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362. The terms of an apology were discussed in a meeting between Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair
Morgan and his partner, Jane Morgan, Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, AC John Yates (as he now
was), and Simon Vile of the Metropolitan Police Authority on 08 September 2008.630 Alastair
Morgan’s notes of the meeting record Commissioner Sir Ian Blair as saying:
‘This case is a stain on our history and I apologise for what the Met has and equally has
not done over the years […]. It’s almost inconceivable that these events could be as
recent as 1987. If it had been the 1960’s [sic] or fifties or forties then......’631
363. The Commissioner went on to explain that they:
‘[c]an’t negotiate terms of public apology until after the trial. Terms will have to be
negotiated by lawyers.
‘Accept there is a huge amount of personal time and personal expense. I accept that it
must have seemed like an organisation that didn’t want to listen.
‘The apology will not be the only thing that we will want to provide. We all admire the
energy and persistence. There are few family’s [sic] that will not let go.’632
364. In response, Alastair Morgan mentioned that their ‘[d]etermination was spurred on by the
reactions of the police and the brick wall and denial’. The notes record Sir Ian Blair as stating
‘I was in charge of internal inquiry in 1993 (Gallery). Think we’ve got rid of networked corruption.
Difficult to see this kind of thing happening now. Not saying it couldn’t.’ The notes record DAC
Yates stating that ‘all serious crime units [were] vetted independently’.633
365. Jane Morgan complained that former DS Sidney Fillery had not been charged with Daniel
Morgan’s murder. The Commissioner explained the difficulties when trying to secure enough
evidence for a conviction. Jane Morgan felt that ‘the reputation of the Met has been more
important than Daniel’s life and that’s disgusting’. The notes record that the Commissioner
stated ‘[t]he person who will make the apology will [be] me. I can’t promise terms now. I will
be as fulsome as I can. This organisation very defensive. …. Can’t say some things because
Met would be sued.’ Family meeting notes record that the meeting concluded with an
acknowledgement by the Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, that ‘[w]e are capable of creating that
pain’ but that ‘the Met is changing’. He said he was ‘really sorry it wasn’t a competent inquiry
until [DCS David] Cook.’634
9.4 March 2009: A meeting with the Mayor of London

366. Isobel Hülsmann, Alastair Morgan and his partner, and Jane Morgan and their solicitor had
a meeting with the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, Kit Malthouse, Jeanette Arnold, Len Duvall
and Simon Vile of the Metropolitan Police Authority, AC John Yates and former DCS David Cook
on 13 March 2009. The Panel was unable to identify formal Metropolitan Police Authority notes
of this meeting and has had to rely exclusively on Alastair Morgan’s record of events. Alastair
Morgan’s notes of the meeting record that AC John Yates stated that ‘the case of Daniel’s
murder was “one of the most disgraceful episodes in the entire history of the Metropolitan
Police”’ and ‘[h]e added that “this family has been treated disgracefully by the Metropolitan
Police”’. The notes record that former Metropolitan Police Authority Chair, Len Duvall, ‘added
630 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, pp66-68, 8 September 2008.
631 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p66, 08 September 2008.
1218
that he “wanted to make this a landmark case for the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] in the
same way as the Stephen Lawrence case”. He added that whatever the outcome of the coming
trial there should be an inquiry into the way the case was handled by the MPS.’ Jeannette
Arnold added her support to this proposal; she stressed that the Home Office had been entirely
ineffectual and unhelpful over this matter for many years.635
367. The notes provided a summary, from Alastair Morgan, of how he portrayed the case to the
Mayor of London, Boris Johnson:
‘Alastair Morgan attempted to summarise the case from the family’s standpoint,
pointing out that at the end of the first investigation, the MPS [Metropolitan Police
Service] had good reason to suspect that Daniel Morgan had been the victim of a
contract murder – with police involvement – designed to stop him exposing police
involvement in serious crime. He pointed out that only two days before the murder
Daniel had told an associate that he did not know whom he could trust in the Met to
deal with this corruption. Alastair added that, given the way police handled the case,
he could understand his brother’s concerns in this respect. He also said that he felt
sure that the police’s handling of the case contributed to the subsequent corruption
crisis ten years later. Alastair also mentioned that the leadership of the Met had
consistently misled the Home Office over the case. […]
‘Boris Johnson expressed astonishment and asked whether corruption was endemic in
the MPS. He said that the case reminded him of a film script or a novel.’636
368. Alastair Morgan’s notes record that ‘[t]he family praised the input of John Yates and David
Cook. (However, our experience over many years is that we only find out years later about things
that happened in preceding inquiries).’ Jane Morgan mentioned that the family ‘had felt very
isolated and the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] was a formidable adversary’.637
9.5 March 2011: A public apology

369. Following the acquittal of the remaining Defendants on 11 March 2011, DCS Hamish
Campbell, the Head of the Homicide and Serious Crime Command of the Metropolitan Police,
made the following statement:
‘Today the Crown Prosecution Service has decided, after careful consideration, that
no evidence will be offered in the forthcoming trial, against those accused of Mr Daniel
Morgan’s murder. This was a difficult decision to have reached and we recognise the
severe disappointment this will cause and how deeply upsetting it is to Daniel’s family
and friends.
‘Daniel Morgan was murdered 24 years ago; since that time there have been six
separate criminal investigations into his murder and numerous other investigations
linked to his death.
‘Thousands of lines of inquiry have been pursued since 1987 and over ¾ million
documents have accrued and been examined. Within this formidable and complex
murder enquiry it is deeply regrettable that it has not proved possible to guarantee to
the court that all the relevant material has been presented to ensure a fair trial.
635 Alastair Morgan Folder 12: Meeting notes 1999 to 2010, PNL000110001, p69, 13 Mar 2009.
1219
‘On behalf of the Metropolitan Police I sincerely apologise to Daniel Morgan’s family
and it is with considerable regret that a trial cannot proceed.
‘This current investigation has identified, ever more clearly, how the initial inquiry failed
the family and wider public. It is quite apparent that police corruption was a debilitating
factor in that investigation. This was wholly unacceptable.
‘Significant changes have occurred since that time, nevertheless there are
important issues which we need to examine now in order to understand what led to
today’s decision.’638
9.5.1 31 March 2011: Apology and statement at the Metropolitan Police Authority meeting
370. Acting Commissioner Tim Godwin wrote to Alastair Morgan apologising for the
Metropolitan Police’s conduct of the investigation. He read the following extract from that letter
at a Metropolitan Police Authority meeting on 31 March 2011:
‘I am deeply sorry that the MPS [Metropolitan Police Service] has failed to bring
to justice those responsible for the murder of Daniel. The MPS has accepted
that police corruption in the original investigation was a significant factor in
this failure. As you know, corruption in its various forms formed a major line of
enquiry in the most recent investigation.
‘I recognise how important this is to both you and your family and that this is
acknowledged publicly. You are entitled to an apology not only for this failure
but also for the repeated failure of the MPS, over many years following Daniel’s
murder, to accept that corruption had played such a part in failing to bring those
responsible to justice.
‘Furthermore, I am also very sorry that, for many years, your concerns regarding
the failure of the MPS to bring those persons to justice were not properly
addressed, and they weren’t.
‘I recognise that this apology cannot alter the deep sense of loss, frustration,
anger and distress that you and your family experience and have suffered since
Daniel’s murder.
‘The MPS is a very different organisation now to the one it was at the time of
Daniel’s murder. That said, we accept that there are lessons to be learnt arising
from the discontinuance of the latest trial. To this end, and together with the CPS
[Crown Prosecution Service], we are now engaged in a joint review to ensure that
relevant issues, particularly in relation to disclosure and the handling of “tainted”
witnesses, are understood and addressed as soon as possible. Above all, we
recognise the consequences of the repeated failure of the MPS over the years to
confront the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for
the murder from being brought to justice.
‘I am deeply sorry for our failure, you have my sympathies. I don’t know if they
offer any comfort but they are honestly given.’639
638 Metropolitan Police Authority briefing note, ‘re case of Regina v William Jonathan Rees & Others’, DLS000039001, pp20-22, 29 March 2011.
639 Letter from Acting Commissioner Tim Godwin to Alastair Morgan IPC001362001 30 March 2011
1220
371. The two public statements made by the Metropolitan Police admitted only that
corruption, occurring during the first investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan,
prevented the successful prosecution of those responsible for the murder. They focused
only on one officer, former DS Sidney Fillery.
372. Although the Metropolitan Police apologised for its failure ‘to accept that
corruption had played such a part in failing to bring those responsible to justice’,
there has never been an explanation of what it meant by its various statements
about individual police corruption adversely affecting the investigation of Daniel
Morgan’s murder. This is an extraordinary situation, given that the concerns about
police corruption have been the strongest concern (other than the identification of the
murderer(s) of Daniel Morgan) of the members of his family and others, and have created
enormous public interest in this case.
373. These were the only public apologies issued by the Metropolitan Police to Daniel
Morgan’s wife Iris, to his children, Sarah and Dan, to his mother, Isobel Hülsmann, to
his brother Alastair Morgan, and to his sister Jane Morgan. To date there has been no
full public explanation by the Metropolitan Police as to why the lengthy and extremely
costly Abelard Two Investigation ended in the acquittal of all the Defendants, some of
whom subsequently brought civil actions against the Metropolitan Police and received
significant compensation.
374. The multiple police failures over many years, identified in the Panel’s Report, and
the passage of time mean that it is most unlikely there will be a successful prosecution
for Daniel Morgan’s murder. The fact that those failures were not made known to the
family, despite their attempts to find out what had happened during the investigations,
caused further really deep distress to the family, and rapidly growing distrust
in the police.
375. Many of the police officers who dealt with members of the family of Daniel Morgan
over the years displayed arrogance and a serious lack of respect and professionalism in
the way in which they responded to the ongoing attempts of his family to ensure that his
murderers were brought to justice.
1221
376. The Metropolitan Police owe the members of Daniel Morgan’s family, and the
public, an apology for not confronting its systemic failings, for the failings of individual
officers and for its lack of candour to the members of Daniel Morgan’s family. In failing
to acknowledge its many failings over the 34 years since the murder of Daniel Morgan,
the Metropolitan Police’s first objective was to protect itself. In so doing it, compounded
the suffering and trauma of Daniel Morgan’s wife, Iris Morgan, their children, Sarah and
Dan Morgan, his mother, Isobel Hülsmann, his brother, Alastair Morgan, and his sister,
Jane Morgan.
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Chapter 13: The Morgan Family’s
Experience: A selection of personal
perspectives from the family of
Daniel Morgan
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Iris Morgan
3 Daniel Morgan’s children: Sarah and Dan
4 Isobel Hülsmann, Daniel Morgan’s mother
5 Conclusions: past apologies, the present and looking to the future
1 Introduction
1. The experiences of Daniel Morgan’s family are central to the preceding chapter, Treatment of
the Family. However, the Panel thought it was very important that members of the family should
have a specific chapter in the Report where they have the opportunity to record how they felt
about their treatment.
2. The Panel invited members of the family to give their perceptions of successive
investigations and reports and the way in which they felt they had been treated over more than
three decades since Daniel Morgan’s murder on 10 March 1987.
3. The recollections on the following pages were provided to the Panel by Daniel Morgan’s
widow, Iris; Daniel and Iris’s two children, Sarah and Dan, and Daniel’s mother, Isobel Hülsmann,
before her death in November 2017. The chapter is largely in the family members’ own words,
as a collective expression of the acute frustration and series of disappointments that have
compounded their grief.
1223
2 Iris Morgan
4. Iris Morgan was awakened in the early hours of 11 March 1987 to be told of her husband’s
death. The brutality of how he had died would unfold later. That morning, with a friend’s help,
Iris Morgan got the children up and ready for school. She told them about their father’s death
that evening. Iris and Daniel Morgan had been married for just under ten years at the time
of his death.
5. Iris Morgan recounted to the Panel her experience of ensuing weeks:
‘I felt very let down that when something so dreadful had happened to me and the
family, there was no one who came in to take your hand or speak to us as a family.’
She continued, ‘Nobody comes to see you to give you help; it’s what they can get
from you’.
Iris Morgan added that:
‘I had to make choices that would affect my life and my children’s lives. There were
many difficult experiences, with some for example in social and family support services;
those who should have been a support to me in those early days were not so.’
6. Iris Morgan said it felt as though ‘the police almost take away your soul; there were so many
personal questions. They make you think that you are a suspect. All they leave you with is
terrible pain.’
7. Iris Morgan said, however, that with time ‘it got to the point where the information from the
police was always the same and it went in one ear and out of the other’.
8. The Panel asked Iris Morgan if anyone within the Metropolitan Police nevertheless stood
out in her recollections. She considered DCI David Zinzan as one police officer whom she
valued and respected. As the officer who led the covert Abelard One Investigation, he is one
of only a few whom Iris Morgan casts in a positive light. WDS Christine Fowles, who was a key
contact for Iris Morgan during the Morgan One Investigation, and DC Caroline Linfoot, who was
assigned as Family Liaison Officer to look after Iris Morgan and her children during the Abelard
Two Investigation, were both also acknowledged by Iris Morgan for the support they gave to the
family. Iris Morgan believed ‘both were wonderful because you can talk to them. Sometimes you
just need a friend.’
9. Iris Morgan’s recollection of D/Supt Douglas Campbell, who led the first investigation into
her husband’s murder, was that ‘there was no kindness, there was just nothing’, such that she
‘felt the police just did not want to tell me anything’. At one point when speaking with D/Supt
Campbell, Iris Morgan felt she was being ‘shouted at’. Despite this, her impression was that
D/Supt Campbell had ‘admitted he felt there was corruption and that he did arrest police officers
for the murder, but he could not find the evidence to prove it’.
10. Iris Morgan recalled that she was never invited by D/Supt Campbell to the police station:
‘Early on I had one meeting with D/Supt Douglas Campbell because I wanted to know who [the
initials of a person] was, and I also wanted to know about Daniel’s watch’, which, she told police,
he had been wearing on the day of the murder.
11. In the weeks that followed, Iris Morgan ensured that the police always came to the family
home because she ‘felt safe in the house’. She recalled that DI Allan Jones, who assisted
D/Supt Douglas Campbell in the first investigation and whom she has described as ‘abrupt
1224
Chapter 13: The Morgan Family’s Experience: A selection of personal perspectives from the family
of Daniel Morgan
and very rude’, came to see her with DC Richard Davis, to ask ‘various things’. When Daniel
Morgan’s missing watch was mentioned, Iris Morgan recounted that DI Jones had said ‘he had a
watch just like Daniel’s and showed it to me’. This had really upset her.
12. Iris Morgan does not remember when exactly she was told that Daniel Morgan’s watch had
gone missing, and neither she nor her daughter, Sarah Morgan, believe they have ever been told
‘the full story’. All she knows is that ‘it was on his wrist when he left home that morning, I was
told it was on his wrist when he was killed, but it was gone by the time he got to the morgue’.
13. There was confusion about whether Iris Morgan would be called as a witness at the Inquest
and she recounted, ‘I was a wreck by the time I gave evidence’ at the Inquest.
14. The Panel asked Iris Morgan for her views of the different investigations into her husband’s
murder. Iris Morgan’s recollection of the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation
was initially positive, describing her first meeting with DCS Alan Wheeler as ‘quite good’.
She believed ‘that it would all be solved and they would get those who committed the murder’.
The family had said to DCS Wheeler that ‘this must be your swan song’ [referring to his
forthcoming retirement], but Iris Morgan said ‘it never occurred to me that they were to look at
police corruption […]. Never at any time was I told that they were looking into corruption.’
15. Recalling the Abelard Two Investigation, Iris Morgan believes that ‘David Cook did want
the murder solved’. Iris Morgan also commented that ‘there may have been a few promotions
in the police or a few lawyers who have nicer cars’, while others, including the family, ‘have got
nothing out of it’.
16. In conclusion, Iris Morgan said, ‘I’ve had tunnel vision, that after 30 years there will be an
end to it’. She still feels aggrieved that ‘the first investigation got it so badly wrong’. She has
told how, when the letter of apology for the first three investigations was issued, even that ‘was
hijacked in the media’.
17. Iris Morgan has said she ‘cannot understand how the last investigations and pre-trial were
allowed to go on for so many years before they were pulled’. Speaking about the possibility of
corruption in the investigations into her husband’s murder, Iris Morgan summarised:
‘I just want the truth. There’s always been an element of empathy but it’s never felt like
they ever cared. Why did they not stand up against it because it was wrong, not just
because there was a spotlight on it?’
3 Daniel Morgan’s children: Sarah and Dan

3.1 Sarah Morgan
18. Sarah Morgan was six years old at the time of her father’s murder. She remembers being
told about his death with her brother Dan but has said that ‘for a long time we were unaware of
the details’. She said her mother ‘protected us from most of it’. Sarah Morgan recounted that
she was about 13 or 14 years old when she began to find out what had really happened, and
about 15 when she ‘began to understand the enormity of it all’.
1225
19. Sarah Morgan feels that ‘the horror of what happened’ has never left her, and it ‘never
will’. She has described that the collapse of the trial of suspects in the murder in March
2011 (foretelling the end of the Abelard Two Investigation) ‘was when I was most angry and
disillusioned’:
‘The police let us down once again, and now we will never have the justice and the
answers we deserve. No one will ever be held accountable […]. This will torment us for
the rest of our lives.’
20. She recalled it was around the time of Operation Nigeria/Two Bridges in 1999 that she
started to go to meetings with the police. Sarah Morgan told the Panel that, in the early 2000s,
her mother had said ‘she did not have the emotional headspace to consume any more of it’, and
they had distanced themselves from other members of the family.
21. Sarah Morgan has said her mother ‘realised the futility of it and doubted that anything
would ever come of it’, continuing that, had her mother engaged with it, ‘it would have driven
her to the depths’. According to Sarah Morgan, her mother ‘would be tormented by it, having to
continually listen to all these lies’.
22. Sarah Morgan was asked by the Panel about her perceptions of her family’s treatment by
the police. In considering individuals who had stood out over the different investigations, Sarah
Morgan, like her mother, described DC Caroline Linfoot as ‘extremely good even though that
was not her primary role’, adding that ‘there’s never been anyone who was trained to deal with
the family’.
23. Sarah Morgan said about former DCS David Cook that she ‘could not fault him on his
determination’, and that he spoke to them ‘with sincerity’. According to Sarah Morgan, he was
‘the only one who left me with the feeling that this might actually come to an end’.
24. With regard to the most recent, Abelard Two Investigation, Sarah Morgan recalled that
they were invited regularly to the Major Incident Room and spoke with key staff, but that when
she first went there, ‘it didn’t make me feel the police were taking the case seriously’. She had
wondered, ‘Is this all my Dad is worth?’ Sarah Morgan was to reflect, however, that ‘even they
seemed shell-shocked when the case collapsed’.
25. Sarah Morgan also commented, when asked by the Panel about family contact with the
police, that ‘they [the family] did not know what they did not know! So they did not know what
to ask!’ Sarah Morgan believes DI Douglas Clarke made an effort to keep them informed, saying
that ‘even after the case collapsed he would call regularly to check in with the family’.
26. Sarah Morgan, as well as her brother Dan, noted DS Richard Oliver as having been very
kind to the family, but added that ‘not all have been like this’. According to Sarah Morgan, some
have ‘had no empathy whatsoever. Some were in no way family liaison officers; they appeared to
have no understanding of the role they were meant to play’.
27. Sarah Morgan has said she believes ‘some officers were helpful to our mother but none
of the family liaison officers spoke to us individually’. She emphasised how there was ‘no
consistency’ with the family liaison officers, explaining that there were ‘so many changes and
every time you had to meet a new person you had to tell them the whole story again’. According
to Sarah Morgan, ‘often the family liaison officers seemed totally naive and did not appreciate
that the family had lived with this since 1987. With all of them it seemed like it was just a job.’
This sentiment was shared by her brother, Dan Morgan.
1226
of Daniel Morgan
28. When asked by the Panel about her perception of the family’s treatment by the media,
Sarah Morgan recalled a journalist (and known associate of Jonathan Rees) coming to the family
home. Sarah Morgan found the journalist interviewing her mother, the journalist having ‘intruded’
on the pretence of writing an article about the murder. Iris Morgan had been unaware of the
journalist’s connection with Jonathan Rees. Sarah Morgan immediately asked the journalist to
leave the family home.
29. She has found it difficult ‘listening to all these journalists talking about the murder and the
investigations as though they were experts, but they have not had to live through it’. She has
wondered whether the Panel’s Report could ‘change the way the media behaved’, for example
by prompting ‘the BBC to think twice before putting out programmes like the recent Panorama
on police corruption’. But she doubted whether it would have that effect.
30. In conclusion, Sarah Morgan considered that ‘there was always the risk that the family might
just look bitter, but I remained outside of that place’. Sarah Morgan’s overriding perspective has
been that she is ‘just tired of this’ and wants it ‘to come to an end’. She feels ‘everything has
taken so long, it has been all drawn out’ and seeks ‘some closure, including rightful criticism
of how the police acted’. Overwhelmingly for Sarah Morgan, she recognises that ‘the people
responsible for my father’s murder might never face the consequences of it’.
3.2 Dan Morgan

31. Dan Morgan, who was four years old when his father was murdered, has recalled it was
not until he was in his early teens, around the mid-1990s, that he was told details of what had
happened. Dan Morgan described how ‘Sarah and I were actually aware four or five years before
that’, and that they were aware Jonathan Rees ‘was associated in some way or at least was
involved in a circle of friends and people who had been implicated in the murder’.
32. He considers that his mother’s circumstances ‘were not something that the police were
concerned about at all’. He recalled being confused at the time about ‘who these men in suits
were who would come to the house’ to speak to his mother, adding that ‘none of them tried to
approach us as individuals’. He continued: ‘There was always a phalanx – there was a blue line,
the shields came down and the pikes came through. You could not penetrate the blue line.’
33. Dan Morgan has said that at times he felt the police ‘treated us with contempt’.
He questions, ‘Where were the people to look after his mother?’ He believes that ‘the police at
that time, they must at least have had a vague idea on how to assist and support victims. Even if
victim support may not have been as developed as it is now, my Mum as the key victim was
totally let down at that point.’
34. Dan Morgan has said that at certain points it felt as though the family were being ‘wound
up’ by the police and that ‘something good would or was about to happen but then nothing.
There were a lot of ups and downs, so much pain and a lot of emotional turmoil.’
35. He described the attitude from the police as having been ‘you come to us for information’,
whereas he feels ‘the police should have done more to bring the information to us’. He does not
know ‘what good all this information would have done, but we were never offered it’.
36. Dan Morgan reflected that he is ‘mystified how institutions that are supposed to protect
people can turn a blind eye and get things so badly wrong’, describing the situation as
‘institutional dereliction’. Dan Morgan has said that, as he has grown older, he has come to the
1227
view that the police ‘might have thought that they were trying to do the right thing, but they were
merely protecting themselves’. According to both Sarah and Dan Morgan, ‘The real and genuine
needs of our mother and the family were never considered.’
37. With time, Dan Morgan has moved further away from ‘the notion that this could ever be
sorted out’, alluding to ‘false start after false start’. He adds that ‘the hope that the police tried to
instil each time led to the inevitable and bigger disappointment when the cases collapsed. The
truth never got through all of the noise that had built up surrounding the case.’
38. In about 2005, his mother had said something that he felt to be poignant: ‘She said there
is no such thing as justice, only the law.’ Dan Morgan continued, ‘I never really had hope that
my family would see justice done, just the thought that if the people responsible for my father’s
murder were ever caught and sentenced, that it would ruin their lives’.
39. In considering the Abelard Two Investigation into his father’s murder, Dan Morgan’s view is
that, ‘with the benefit of hindsight, it was clear that investigation was massively under-resourced.
It was like a carbuncle on the extremities of policing.’
40. Dan Morgan’s hope is that ‘with the Panel’s Report, there would be a State-endorsed
document that lays out some of what had gone wrong’. Poignantly, Dan now considers the
future, and his own family:
‘I do not want this to be in my son’s future, I want to be able to show my son the
Panel’s Report and to say to him, “Look, eventually the State can get it right.”
That would be good.’
4 Isobel Hülsmann, Daniel Morgan’s mother

41. After the death of Daniel Morgan’s own father when he was a child, his mother, Isobel
(later) Hülsmann, had moved with Daniel Morgan and his siblings, Alastair and Jane, to live in
Wales, and Daniel Morgan held a deep affection thereafter for Wales, even after he had moved
away, and met and married Iris. Isobel Hülsmann recounted that, after Daniel and Iris Morgan
had begun a family of their own with the births of Sarah and Dan, she knew that Daniel ‘adored
his children’.
42. The Panel asked Isobel Hülsmann about her experience of events after the murder of her
son. She recalled that she ‘did not like the atmosphere at the Inquest’, describing that the part
of the Inquest during which the post-mortem was discussed was particularly difficult for her.
She said this was not helped by how the Coroner announced: ‘I understand that the Morgan
family might be squeamish so they can leave the room now.’
43. Isobel Hülsmann said that she was not shocked that three police officers were arrested
in April 1987, but she had been shocked by how she found out: ‘On the national news!’
Nevertheless, she recalled, ‘I was charged up with hope’ when the arrests were made.
44. When asked by the Panel about her recollection of individuals within the police over the
years, Isobel Hülsmann said that she was impressed by DAC John Yates. She described how
‘he was extremely polite and was attentive’, making sure she sat where she could hear everyone
during meetings. Regarding DCI David Zinzan, Isobel Hülsmann said ‘I thought he was OK but
would not describe him as over-enthusiastic’.
1228
of Daniel Morgan
45. Isobel Hülsmann said that she felt ‘very much the underdog’ at the meetings with officers
from Hampshire Constabulary during the Hampshire/Police Complaints Authority Investigation.
She said that she ‘felt that they had already pre-judged things when they came to see me’.
DCI Paul Blaker had said ‘we go for Rees’, according to Isobel Hülsmann.
46. Isobel Hülsmann recounted vividly the trip that she made to the Home Office, on
18 October 2011, to try to see the Home Secretary, Theresa May MP. She described how she
‘felt bold and determined’, exclaiming ‘I had a mission!’ She had thought it would be ‘the last
stand’ that she made, and she lost: Isobel Hülsmann was denied entry to the building and was
not allowed to see the Home Secretary. Isobel Hülsmann reflected: ‘I knew that I would fail to
see the Home Secretary, but I was still going to ask.’ She described getting ‘so near, but I was
so far’. She recalled that the press was there and covered her endeavour.
47. When asked by the Panel whether there was anything else that stood out about how
the police had treated her, Isobel Hülsmann described most of her treatment as ‘just sheer
indifference’. She reflected that ‘the police were always certain about who they thought had
done it. But was it incompetence, or deliberate incompetence?’
48. ‘For certain’, Isobel Hülsmann said that she thought ‘there was police involvement’, and that
‘the police wanted to cover that up, and that they did their best to cover it up’. She said ‘it just
went from bad to worse’. She recalled DAC John Yates putting it like this: ‘This is the biggest
stain ever on the Metropolitan Police.’
49. Isobel Hülsmann described that ‘waiting year after year is so difficult and so frustrating.
Even now, I want so much to see justice, but I fear that it will elude me. But I still have hope.’
50. Isobel Hülsmann died on 23 November 2017.
5 Conclusions: past apologies, the present and looking

to the future
5.1 On past apologies
51. The 2006 Report from the Commissioner to the Metropolitan Police Authority concluded
that the family were owed an apology. On asking her about this, Sarah Morgan responded
that she felt the apology ‘was not worth the paper that it was written on’. According to Sarah
Morgan, ‘as before, and time after time’, the family became increasingly ‘disillusioned’. She
continued: ‘The letter of apology is just a piece of paper; the more I read it the more insulting it is
that someone can think they can write a letter and think that is ok.’
52. Sarah Morgan has described the apologies they have received from the police as ‘an
embarrassment’. She believes ‘the letter of apology from the Metropolitan Police added insult to
injury when media reports go on and say that Jonathan Rees went on to earn £150,000 a year’.
According to Sarah Morgan, Jonathan Rees ‘has done nothing but profit from the murder and
other people’s misery’.
53. Dan Morgan, similarly, has said that the apologies the family received from the Metropolitan
Police ‘were a disgrace’. He explained: ‘They kept on telling us that there might be a future trial,
so they had to be careful about what they told us in an apology.’
1229
5.2 On Alastair Morgan, and the present

54. Family members have acknowledged with gratitude the resolve of Daniel Morgan’s brother,
Alastair Morgan, in seeking answers to the many questions surrounding the undetected murder
of his younger brother. Both Dan and Sarah Morgan have said they felt as though the release
of information over the years was determined only by the pressure that their uncle, Alastair
Morgan, put on the Metropolitan Police and others.
55. Alastair Morgan has taken a prominent role campaigning on behalf of the family. He was
asked whether he wished to contribute with his experiences and reflections to the Report but
declined to do so. However, his views are well reflected throughout this Report, and he provided
the Panel with the manuscript of his book, ‘Untold: The Daniel Morgan Murder Exposed’.
56. Iris, Sarah and Dan Morgan have each said that they ‘would not be anywhere’ without
Alastair Morgan: his ‘tenacity is what got the family to where we are with this today’.
5.3 On hopes for the future

57. Dan Morgan has said about grieving: ‘Now it’s a part of my life that I wish I did not have. It
would have been easier if investigations 2, 3, 4 had not happened. I do not do grief anymore,
I just do anger. I relive my mother’s despair. I can deal with my own grief, but I cannot deal
with the grief of my mother. I have to relive it time and time again.’ Sarah and Dan Morgan also
recognise, in Sarah Morgan’s words, that ‘nothing is going to bring Dad back’.
58. Anticipating the Panel’s Report and what it might say, Dan Morgan felt that ‘the police will
only reform if they want to reform. The Report could say all the right things, but the police will
only change if they want to, and until they want to, they will not change.’
59. Dan Morgan has said he hopes that with the publication of the Panel’s Report, there will
be ‘a State-endorsed document that lays out some of what had gone wrong’. Personally, he
suspects that ‘some sanity will fly out of the window when the Report is published, and I will
have to wait for it to come back’.
60. Dan Morgan has said he believes that ‘this Inquiry is better than an apology from the police
[...]. I want all the mistakes that the police made to be reported and in the press, so that the Met
Police cannot go on keeping it in-house.’
61. He told the Panel that he views the matter as ‘very simple – the Commissioners of the
Metropolitan Police from the past twenty or so years should be stripped of their titles and
put in the dock’. According to Sarah Morgan, ‘these police officers all seemed to have their
own personal career agenda, and justice and good policing was an irrelevance’. She said she
thought ‘things in the police are different now’, that there was ‘more governance’ in policing, but
nevertheless she believes ‘there has to be some genuine accountability for the police and there
is very little’.
1230
of Daniel Morgan
62. The Panel acknowledges the tremendous grief that Daniel Morgan’s murder
caused the members of his family and expresses its deepest sympathy to them: his
wife, Iris Morgan, and his children, Sarah Morgan and Dan Morgan; his brother, Alastair
Morgan, and sister, Jane Morgan. His mother, Isobel Hülsmann, who sadly died on
23 November 2017, is also very much in our thoughts.
The shock of Daniel Morgan’s death was compounded by the fact that he was killed so
brutally. It is clear from the Panel’s discussions with members of Daniel Morgan’s family
that their grief, the trauma caused by Daniel Morgan’s murder and the trauma resulting
from their treatment at the hands of some police officers, and of the Metropolitan Police
and other organisations over 34 years, is something that remains with them today.
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Annex A: Methodology: The Panel’s
approach to preparing the Report
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Engagement with the family of Daniel Morgan
3 The scope and operation of the Terms of Reference
4 Disclosure process
5 Process of analysis
6 Publication
1 Introduction
1.1 Terms of Reference
1. The Daniel Morgan Independent Panel’s Terms of Reference were established by the then
Home Secretary, Theresa May MP, in May 2013 and published in the Library of the House
of Commons. Some members of the family of Daniel Morgan had a significant input into the
drafting process. The Terms of Reference are as follows:
1) The murder of Daniel Morgan in March 1987 was a personal tragedy for Daniel’s family.
In the intervening 26 years, there have been five successive police investigations
but no one has been successfully prosecuted or convicted for the murder; and in
March 2011 the Metropolitan Police acknowledged ‘the repeated failure of the MPS
[Metropolitan Police Service] to confront the role played by police corruption in
protecting those responsible for the murder from being brought to justice’.
2) In these circumstances, the Government is committed through the work of the

Independent Panel to a full and effective review of corruption as it affected the
handling of this case and of the treatment of the family by the police and other parts
of the criminal justice system. The Metropolitan Police support this review through the
Panel process.
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3) The purpose and remit of the Independent Panel is to shine a light on the
circumstances of Daniel Morgan’s murder, its background and the handling of the case
over the whole period since March 1987. In doing so, the Panel will seek to address
the questions arising, including those relating to:
• police involvement in the murder;
• the role played by police corruption in protecting those responsible for

the murder from being brought to justice and the failure to confront that
corruption; and
• the incidence of connections between private investigators, police officers and

journalists at the News of the World and other parts of the media and alleged
corruption involved in the linkages between them.
4) In order to achieve this purpose, the Independent Panel will:
(a) engage with members of the family and take their views into account at all stages
in relation to the methodology of its work and the results of its work;
(b) obtain and examine all relevant documentation from all relevant bodies,
governmental and non-governmental alike, including but not limited to
papers held by;
• The Metropolitan Police;
• The Hampshire Police;
• The Crown Prosecution Service and the Attorney General’s Office;
• The Police Complaints Authority (as it was then);
• The Independent Police Complaints Commission;
• Southwark Coroner’s Court; and
• The Home Office.
(c) interview and receive relevant information from individuals who are willing to
provide that information;
(d) brief members of the family through a final report which would be made available
first to the family and then to the public at large;
(e) explain in the final report what the relevant documentation and information reveal
about the nature and extent of police corruption in relation to the handling of
this case; and
(f) make any recommendations which the Panel concludes should be

made as a result of its work, including recommendations for any further
investigation or inquiry.
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Annex A: Methodology: The Panel’s approach to preparing the Report
5) The principles of the Independent Panel’s work will be:
(a) full, genuine and effective participation of the family at all stages of the Panel’s
work including genuine and full consultation and briefing throughout the process
and payment of legal costs incurred on behalf of the family to this end;
(b) the ‘family first’ in terms of the release of the Panel’s findings and its report;
(c) exceptional and full disclosure to the Panel of all relevant documentation
including that held by all relevant Government departments and agencies and by
the police and other investigative and prosecuting authorities;
(d) maximum possible disclosure of documentation and information by the Panel

to the family.
6) The Independent Panel will present its final Report to the Home Secretary who will
make arrangements for its publication to Parliament.
7) It is envisaged that the Panel will aim to complete its work within 12 months of the
documentation being made available. In the meanwhile, it is also envisaged that
the Panel will brief the family incrementally, both on the progress of its work and
on its emerging findings. The Panel will finalise these and other aspects of its work
after three months when it has been able to assess the scope of its work and the
desirability and practicalities of incremental disclosure.
1.2 Panel membership

2. The Daniel Morgan Independent Panel was initially chaired by Sir Stanley Burnton from May
to November 2013. He resigned for personal reasons and, in July 2014, Baroness Nuala O’Loan
of Kirkinriola in the County of Antrim DBE was appointed to chair the Panel. The Panel had the
following members:
• Dr Silvia Casale CMG
• Mr Michael Kellett
• Professor Rodney Morgan (from December 2014)
• Mr Samuel Pollock OBE (from December 2014).
More information on Panel members can be found on the Panel’s website.
3. Dr Graham Smith was a member of the Panel between September 2013 and July 2014.
The Panel was restricted in its work for a period of six months between March and September
2014 until the new Panel Chair had been identified and was able to commence work.
4. Counsel to the Panel was Kate Blackwell QC, and Solicitors to the Panel were Fieldfisher
LLP , whose work was led by Martin Smith. Both provided legal advice to the Panel on
conducting its work. The Panel was also supported by a Secretariat led by Nick Hunt from
January 2020. Previously it was supported by Lee Hughes, Matt Lewsey, Andrew Dent and
Jennifer Chamberlain, all of whom acted as Panel Secretary for varying periods of time.
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1.3 Principles
5. The Panel’s work has been conducted in accordance with the principles set out in its Terms
of Reference (see paragraph 1). ‘[F]ull, genuine and effective participation of the family’ and the
‘family first’ principle have been fundamental to the approach of the Panel.
2 Engagement with the family of Daniel Morgan

6. Observing the ‘family first’ principle, the Panel sought always to engage with the members
of the family of Daniel Morgan with respect and sympathy, seeking to comply consistently with
its obligations to the family, while preserving its independence. The Panel met members of the
family on a regular basis. There were at least 40 meetings, as well as ongoing communication.
7. The Panel briefed the family on the progress of the Panel’s work and invited them to ask
questions, provide feedback and comments and advise the Panel of their areas of concerns.
The Panel sought always to provide the family of Daniel Morgan with information to help them
understand the Panel’s work and the processes involved in preparing the Report. A member
of the Panel acted as the key contact for family members; initially this was Silvia Casale, and
subsequently it was Sam Pollock.
8. Members of the family were asked to provide the Panel with any relevant documentation
to inform the Panel’s work, especially material relating to the treatment of the family since
1987. In 2013, the Panel was provided with a copy of the manuscript of Alastair Morgan’s
book, Untold: The Daniel Morgan Murder Exposed, which helped it to understand the issues
and questions that were important to some members of the family. Appropriate disclosure
of documentation requested by members of the family was made with the consent of the
document owners, and within the requirements of the law.
9. At all times, while consulting the family and taking into account their representations, the
Panel ensured that it retained its independence.
3 The scope and operation of the Terms of Reference

10. The Panel was not established under the Inquiries Act 2005 and therefore had no statutory
powers to compel the production of material, to compel witnesses to provide evidence, or to
gain access to premises. The absence of these powers meant that the Panel was completely
reliant on the goodwill of those from whom it sought information or material.
11. The Terms of Reference stated that there would be ‘exceptional and full disclosure to the
Panel of all relevant documentation including that held by all relevant Government departments
and agencies and by the police and other investigative and prosecuting authorities’. In some
instances, there was complete cooperation. However, this was not always the case. The
Panel did not always receive the disclosure which could have been compelled had it had
statutory powers.
12. As explained in Chapter 11, the first documents were not made available by the
Metropolitan Police until January 2015. Agreement was then reached with all other document
holders. The last documents were received from the Metropolitan Police in March 2021. In some
instances, no documentation was available.
1236
13. Special arrangements had to be made to access some material. A Statutory Instrument was
passed by Parliament to enable the Criminal Cases Review Commission to release papers to
the Panel. These matters are discussed in Chapter 11.
14. The Panel examined all the material supplied by the various organisations, the criminal court
and Inquest transcripts, and the judgments, submissions and documents relating to the civil
litigation which ensued as a consequence of the conduct of the investigation of the murder of
Daniel Morgan.
4 Disclosure process
4.1 Stakeholder identification
15. The Panel approached the organisations with responsibility for the investigations and
reviews into Daniel Morgan’s murder to request all information held relating to the murder
of Daniel Morgan. The Panel also identified additional organisations which held relevant
information and arranged for the provision of documents to support its work.
16. Where an organisation had originally owned relevant material but had since been
reorganised, abolished or merged, the Panel approached the relevant successor organisation.
In some cases, material was available; in other cases, it had been routinely destroyed or could
not be found.
4.2 Disclosure agreements

17. As the Panel did not have statutory powers and as a result could only request disclosure,
a Protocol on the Disclosure of Information was agreed with material providers, to provide
assurance regarding the process by which material was provided to the Panel and the ongoing
obligations which the Panel and providers had, particularly with regard to document security,
and management.
18. Data Sharing Agreements were also made with relevant organisations. These set out
responsibilities between the Panel, providing organisations, and the Panel’s information
processing provider.
19. Agreements were made with the Metropolitan Police, the National Crime Agency, the
Coroner for Inner South District Greater London, Hampshire Constabulary, the Independent
Police Complaints Commission (now the Independent Office for Police Conduct), the Home
Office, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Criminal Cases Review Commission. News UK
declined to sign an agreement but did provide the Panel with some material.
20. The Panel also registered with the Information Commissioner’s Office and put in place
relevant agreements necessary to meet its responsibilities as a data controller, including a
privacy policy and confidentiality agreements. The documents provided were held in confidence.
Onward disclosure to members of the family was requested on occasion and only occurred
with the consent of the document owner. Members of the Panel and the Secretariat signed
confidentiality agreements accordingly.
21. All the relevant organisations were asked to notify the Panel if they found any further
documentation, and they were also subsequently asked to confirm that they had searched for,
and provided to the Panel, all relevant material.
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4.3 Access to material and redactions

22. The documents provided were uploaded, where appropriate, to the electronic document
management system, Lextranet (later Relativity), which was accredited to hold documents with
a protective marking up to and including ‘Restricted/ Official-Sensitive’.1 All the Panel’s staff had
access to this material.
23. Providing organisations were requested to review their material. Some documents were
redacted by the provider to enable their storage on Lextranet/Relativity. Organisations providing
documents were required to provide the reason for any redaction. The Panel reserved the
right to challenge the necessity for any redactions to the electronic copies of documents if it
considered that redactions had been applied inappropriately.
24. Access to all documents in unredacted form was provided to Panel members and their
lawyers (and later the Panel Secretary). Documents classified as ‘Secret’ or ‘Top Secret’, were
retained by the owner and access to hard copies of such documents was made available to
Panel members and its Counsel (and later the Panel Secretary) in Metropolitan Police premises.
25. Where a document (or part of a document) was subject to a privilege against disclosure
or a legal rule which would prevent disclosure to the Panel, a mechanism was developed by
which unredacted disclosure of the material in question could be made to the Panel, its solicitor
and Counsel. In some cases, legal privilege was waived by the owner. There was ongoing
vigilance to ensure that all documents were appropriately handled. Processes were agreed with
document providers to ensure that the risk of prejudice to ongoing criminal and/or disciplinary
investigations was appropriately managed.
26. Organisations providing documents agreed to ensure that they retained original versions of
all documents relevant to the Panel’s work and that relevant information was not destroyed.
5 Process of analysis
5.1 Processing of information
27. Government security rules and procedures for the transmission, handling, storage and
removal of documents have been followed by the Panel, the Secretariat and all working
on Panel matters. Everyone who had access to disclosed documents was appropriately
security-cleared.
5.2 Appeals for information

28. The Panel created a website and made a media appeal for information. A dedicated
telephone number and email contact address were created to enable those who wished
to do so to contact the Panel. Some contact was made with the Panel and some useful
information received.
1 The Government Security Classification Policy came into force on 02 April 2014 and describes how HM Government classifies information
assets to ensure they are appropriately protected. It applies to all information that Government collects, stores, processes, generates or
shares to deliver services and conduct business. There are three classifications of material - OFFICIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET. OFFICIAL-
SENSITIVE is not a classification: ‘SENSITIVE’ is a handling caveat for a small subset of information marked OFFICIAL that require special
handling by staff. Under the historical Government Protective Marking Scheme, material was divided into UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECTED,
RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET.
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5.3 Method of analysis

29. The Panel and its Secretariat examined documents and other material provided by a range
of individuals and organisations. In doing so, the Panel was mindful that the material had been
produced in a range of contexts for different purposes in a period spanning over three decades.
During this time, expectations of what was considered good practice had changed, and
judgements were made in accordance with the standards of the day.
30. The Panel sought information from The National Archives and the Metropolitan Police
Archives and other organisations holding historic material. It was important to acquire copies of
the legislation, statutory guidance and policing and criminal justice policy and practice, relevant
to the Panel’s Terms of Reference, to inform the Panel’s work. The Panel arranged a series of
training events and seminars for its staff to ensure their understanding of these issues.
31. During the period in which the Panel had virtually no access to official documentation
(from September 2013 to January 2015), it started its work by examining publicly available open
source information and the book manuscript provided to the Panel by Alastair Morgan, and it
engaged in preliminary discussions with members of the Metropolitan Police and the family of
Daniel Morgan. A schedule of what was described as ‘preliminary reading’, containing a small
selection of reports, was supplied to the Panel by the Metropolitan Police in December 2013.
32. The Panel’s later work involved reviewing material and conducting interviews organised in
accordance with a phased programme of analysis, informed by examination of the separate
investigations and reviews into Daniel Morgan’s murder. This strategy was reviewed at regular
intervals as the disclosure of material developed.
5.3.1 Reviewing material

33. Material considered by the Panel included paper or electronic formats of: agendas and
minutes of meetings; policy logs, messages, action logs; briefing materials; policy statements;
paper and electronic correspondence; intelligence reports; investigating officers’ reports;
financial records; police officers’ pocket notebooks; senior police officers’ journals; witness
statements; interview and court transcripts; and photographic and other audio, visual or
physical evidence.
34. There was little order to the material provided. Documents were made available in
numbered crates. Each document in each crate was examined, its date was recorded, and it
was allocated a description, scanned into Lextranet, and allocated a reference number. As the
Panel’s staff (with one limited exception) had no access to the computerised HOLMES accounts
for the investigations,2 there were no investigation files as such, and the Panel had to establish
which documents existed for each investigation so as to establish the sequence of events.
The initial purpose was to develop an overarching understanding of the first investigation, the
Morgan One Investigation. Narratives were then developed in a similar way for subsequent
investigations.
2 HOLMES, the ‘Home Office Large Major Enquiry System’, is a national computerised database designed to support the police investigation of
major crimes. (Further details of its functions and attributes, as well as an account of the challenges the Panel faced in getting access to it, are
set out in Chapter 11.)
1239
35. The Panel was then able to examine the conduct of each investigation having regard to
the standards of the day. The policy logs of the Senior Investigating Officers were examined
(where they were available), as were the messages, actions and documents relevant to each
investigation. This enabled identification of significant lines of enquiry which had not been fully
investigated, and of questions and gaps in the material which needed to be addressed through
targeted review of the source material and led to requests for further information. There were
415 such additional disclosure and information requests made by the Panel up to 2020.
36. From January 2015, one member of the Panel’s staff, appropriately vetted, was able to
access the relevant Metropolitan Police HOLMES accounts in Metropolitan Police premises.
5.3.2 Interviews
37. The Panel had no power to compel the production and provision of evidence, and therefore
conducted interviews with people willing and able to provide information on an entirely voluntary
basis. The Panel invited for interview individuals it felt might or should be able to provide
information and was approached by several people who wished to give evidence. On each
occasion the Panel considered the circumstances carefully before making a decision as to
whether to interview the person in question.
38. The Panel conducted 74 interviews with witnesses between October 2014 and December
2020: 52 serving or former police officers, five journalists, four Members of Parliament, three
members of the public, two legal representatives, and one person from the Crown Prosecution
Service. A small number of individuals were interviewed on more than one occasion.
39. The Panel conducted interviews independently, impartially, rigorously, fairly, objectively and
honestly. Where necessary and appropriate, interviewees were provided with copies of original
statements and correspondence from investigations to aid their recall of events, given the time
since the original investigations. Individuals could choose to be accompanied by a lawyer or
another person, although the Panel had no power to fund legal representation.
5.3.3 Legal reviews

40. The Panel’s Report has been reviewed by the Panel’s Counsel and solicitor to ensure
that its content and findings were evidence-based and in compliance with any relevant legal
requirements.
5.4 Consultant Forensic Scientist

41. The Panel commissioned the services of an independent Consultant Forensic Scientist,
Dr Kathryn Mashiter, in November 2018 to provide quality assurance of the Panel’s findings in
relation to forensic science matters. She reviewed both the scientific and forensic examination
of exhibits and the handling of the crime scene, and statements and other documentation
concerning forensic science techniques and procedures employed by Senior Investigating
Officers, Forensic Scientists, Scenes of Crime Officers and others during the investigations
which have taken place. In particular, the Panel sought comment on the accuracy of any
statement that a specific type of forensic examination or recovery of a scientific sample was or
was not possible at the time of the statement being made.
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6 Publication
6.1 Consent to publish
42. In preparing its Report, the Panel cited information contained in documents provided by
the various organisations. In accordance with the Disclosure Agreements and the Protocol for
Disclosure of Information, the Panel sought consent for the publication of material which it has
quoted and/or paraphrased in the Report.
43. Material providers were supplied with a list of the quotations and paraphrases in question
and given the opportunity to make representations concerning any redactions which might be
necessary prior to publication. Reasons for such redaction might include the protection of life,
the sensitivity of policing methodology and compliance with data protection legislation.
44. The Panel gave careful consideration to any representation made by any material provider.
Where the Panel considered consent to publish was withheld unreasonably, it sought to agree a
suitable change in wording to enable consent to be given. Ultimately, however, the final decision
on publication rested with the Panel. Any such decisions were communicated in a timely fashion
to the material provider.
6.2 Anonymity
45. The Panel agreed an Anonymity Policy to apply to its Report, which enabled it to make
reasoned decisions about whether individuals should be identified in the Report. The policy in
full can be found on its website.
46. The Panel sought to balance the public interest in shining a light on the circumstances of
Daniel Morgan’s murder, its background and the handling of the case as required by the Terms
of Reference, with the need to protect individuals from any risks to their safety and security and
the right to privacy afforded to individuals by the Human Rights Act 1998.
47. In order to fulfil its various obligations, the Panel has ensured that no personal data have
been published by it unless it is in the public interest to do so.
48. The Panel has named individuals in the Report only where there is a significant public
interest in so doing. In determining whether there is significant public interest in naming an
individual, consideration has been given to several factors, such as whether the individual
is so significant to the narrative of the case that not naming them would prevent the Panel
from fulfilling its Terms of Reference, is a public figure, or has already been named in public in
association with the investigation of the murder of Daniel Morgan.
49. The Panel’s decisions on whom to cipher were informed, among other criteria, by risk
assessments prepared by the Metropolitan Police.
6.3 Prejudicing a future trial

50. The Panel was aware of the possibility that its Report could prejudice a future trial of
individuals charged with the murder of Daniel Morgan. It therefore sought the advice of its
Counsel, who was asked to review the Panel’s Report and provide advice on:
• the implications of the 2018 Court of Appeal judgment in the case of Rees & Ors
v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis;
• the likelihood of a possible future trial involving all or some of the same suspects; and
1241
• the level of potential risk of prejudicing a future trial if the Panel were to publish police
and Crown Prosecution Service material relating to the previous investigations.
51. Following the completion of the review by Counsel, the Panel undertook a balancing test
on the advice received to determine whether the Report needed to be amended in any way to
mitigate any risk.
6.4 Fairness process

52. The Panel conducted a ‘fairness process’ to ensure that identifiable individuals and
organisations who may be subject to criticism in its Report were informed of this and were
provided with an opportunity to respond to a summary of the possible criticisms in advance of
publication. As part of this process, letters were sent to 86 individuals and organisations. The
full procedure followed can be found on the Panel’s website.
53. The Panel carefully considered the 57 responses it received from those who had received
fairness letters, prior to finalising the text of its Report. The Panel viewed such a process as
essential to the integrity of its Report.
54. Prior to publication, as a matter of courtesy, the Panel also sought to notify everyone else
named but not subject to criticism in the Report.
6.5 Security check

55. In order to comply with the Disclosure Agreement, a ‘security check’ was undertaken by
Metropolitan Police personnel in order to identify any concerns relating to:
• the protection of current covert police methodologies and intelligence principles; and
• the Metropolitan Police’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights,
including security risks to covert human intelligence sources (informants).
56. The Panel vetted the staff and officers proposed by the Metropolitan Police to undertake
the security check on the basis of the information provided by the Metropolitan Police. None
of the personnel had been involved in any of the previous investigations into the murder of
Daniel Morgan.
57. Due to the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic, the security check of the Report
was conducted remotely under strictly controlled conditions rather than at the Panel’s offices
as originally intended. The officers inspected an edited version of the Report using a restricted
version of Relativity, the Panel’s electronic records system. The Metropolitan Police personnel
were not permitted to review or have sight of any Panel findings, recommendations or policy
discussions as part of the security check. The security check took place as one of the final
stages before the Report was finalised and submitted for printing.
58. The officers signed confidentiality agreements and were barred from sharing or discussing
any content of the Report with any other individuals within the Metropolitan Police or any other
organisation, without the Panel’s express written consent.
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6.6 Archiving post-publication

59. The Panel had no mandate to publish an archive of material with its Report, as other
Inquiries and Panels have been required to do as part of their Terms of Reference.
60. Arrangements were made for material generated by the Panel to be handed over to The
National Archives for archiving, together with a record of the document reference numbers
and titles of the documents which had been stored on Relativity, but not copies of the
documents themselves.
61. Further arrangements were made for all material provided to the Panel to be returned to the
document owners, a copy of the Relativity account to be provided to the Metropolitan Police,
the Panel’s electronic store on Relativity to be destroyed by the supplier of Relativity, and all
material providers to be supplied with a copy of the certificate of destruction.
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Annex B
Timeline of key events and investigations
since the murder of Daniel Morgan 17 May 2002 17 January 2003 15 April 2008
DCS David Cook became Former DS Sidney Fillery Counsel advised that
the Senior Investigating was arrested and interviewed there was enough
22 January 1988 14 April 1999 Officer of the overt Morgan about possible misconduct evidence to charge
DCI Barry Nicholson became the Senior Two Investigation. in public office. Former March 2006 the suspects.
A report from D/Supt Douglas Campbell was sent to the Crown
Investigating Officer of Operation DS Fillery was also arrested The Abelard Two Investigation 10 April 2006
Prosecution Service for their decision on possible prosecutions of
Two Bridges, an evidence gathering 26 June 2000 in relation for offences began with DCS David Cook, then The 2006 Report was
those arrested on 03 April 1987. The decision was made to await
10 March 1987 16 March 1987 operation targeting suspected criminal DI Steve Hagger unconnected with the murder on full-time secondment to SOCA, provided to the family
possible further evidence from the Inquest. No charges were ever
DS Sidney Fillery and other brought by the Morgan One Investigation. activity at Southern Investigations was appointed to of Daniel Morgan. as the Senior Investigating Officer. of Daniel Morgan.
officers of the Catford Crime (which became Law & Commercial from conduct the 2000 26 June 2002
Daniel Morgan was Squad were returned to May 1999). Murder Review. DCS David Cook July 2008
murdered. His body normal duties. appeared on BBC Pre-trial hearings began.
was found in the car 30 May 1988 Crimewatch broadcast.
park of the Golden Assistant Commissioner John Smith of the Metropolitan Police 08 December 2004 13 December 2007
24 October 2003
Lion public house, directed that the circumstances of Daniel Morgan’s murder May 1997 14 November 2000 Home Office 27 October 2005 It was agreed, between
Sydenham in South 03 April 1987 should be referred to the Police Complaints Authority. October 2002 Former DS Sidney
The Metropolitan DI Steve Hagger Minister, Hazel The Metropolitan AC John Yates of the
East London. A decision was subsequently made for a police force other Fillery was sentenced 15 February 2010
Jonathan Rees, his Police began presented his A number of Blears MP, refused Police Authority Metropolitan Police
than the Metropolitan Police to carry out an investigation. for offences
brothers-in-law Glenn anti‑corruption report, containing individuals were a public inquiry commissioned a and David Bolt of the Mr Justice Maddison excluded
unconnected with
Vian and Garry Vian, operations 83 recommendations, arrested in into the police report (henceforth to Serious Organised Crime Gary Eaton’s evidence as a
the murder of Daniel
A murder investigation DS Sidney Fillery, DC against Jonathan to senior officers connection with the handling of Daniel be referred to as the Agency, that former DCS result of breaches of the ‘sterile
Morgan at Bow
began led by D/Supt Alan Purvis and DC Peter Rees and former and it was agreed murder of Daniel Morgan’s murder. 2006 Report) into David Cook could act corridor’ adjourning his ruling
11 May 1989 Street magistrates
Douglas Campbell Foley were arrested DS Sidney Fillery a re-investigation Morgan, including the murder of Daniel as Consultant Senior to another date. As a result,
court. He received
as the Senior on suspicion of Daniel Proceedings against Jonathan Rees, Paul Goodridge at their business of Daniel Morgan’s Person P9, James Morgan and the Investigating Officer former DS Sidney Fillery was
a non‑custodial
Investigating Officer. Morgan’s murder, and Jean Wisden were discontinued by the Director premises, Southern murder would Cook, Glenn Vian subsequent police of the Daniel Morgan formally acquitted of perverting
sentence.
questioned and released. of Public Prosecutions. Investigations. commence. and Garry Vian. investigations. investigation. the course of justice.
1987 1988 1989 1990-97 1998-99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008-09 2010
11 March 1987 20 March 1987 23 February 1988 11 April 31 January 1989 24 September 1999 03 February 2000 04 January 2001 16 December 2002 08 August 2003 January 2005 07 April 2006 07 December 2007 18 November 2010
The Morgan One Michael Mates MP wrote to 25 April 1988 Jonathan Rees, Eleven suspects, Following receipt of Decision that the Jonathan Rees The Crown Prosecution The Metropolitan Police An amended DCS David Cook retired Evidence against James Cook
Investigation began to the Commissioner The Inquest into Paul Goodridge including Jonathan a report summarising re-investigation was produced from Service advised that there provided a briefing note version of the from the Metropolitan was withdrawn because of
Jonathan Rees was enquiries into links suggesting that Alastair Daniel Morgan’s and Jean Wisden on events from March 2006 Report was Police and began concerns about witness reliability.
Rees, were arrested intelligence gained would comprise prison, arrested was insufficient evidence to
identified as Daniel between the murder Morgan’s concern death began and were arrested by the 1987 to December accepted by the working full time for The prosecution decided that there
in connection with from Operation a covert side and interviewed in prosecute Jonathan Rees,
Morgan’s business and the civil action set out in a letter evidence was heard Hampshire/Police 2004 to the Chair of Metropolitan the Serious Organised was no longer a realistic prospect
offences centred Nigeria/Two Bridges, conducted by connection with Glenn Vian, Garry Vian, or
partner and was visited between Southern ‘constitutes a complaint over eight days, Complaints Authority the Metropolitan Police Police Authority. Crime Agency. of conviction. James Cook
on a conspiracy to DCI Barry Nicholson the Metropolitan the murder of James Cook for murder or
at his home address Investigations for investigation’. presided over by investigation. On 02 Authority, Len Duvall, was acquitted.
pervert the course of recommended Police Complaints Daniel Morgan. any of the other individuals
by police officers, and Belmont the Coroner, Sir February, Jonathan and the members
justice. Evidence had that, ‘it may now Investigation in respect of whom charging
including the Deputy Car Auctions. Montague Levine. Rees and Paul of the Metropolitan
been obtained of a be appropriate Bureau and advice was sought for
Senior Investigating Goodridge were Police Authority.
25 April 1988 conspiracy to plant for consideration an overt side unrelated offences.
Officer, DI Allan Jones. charged with the controlled drugs. to be given, to conducted by
The jury delivered
murder of Daniel DC Austin Warnes appointing a Murder the Metropolitan
its verdict that 13 June 2007
Morgan and Jean was later arrested in Review Team’. Police Serious
Mrs Iris Morgan Daniel Morgan 24 June 1988 June-July 2002 21 April 2008
Wisden was charged connection with the Crime Group. DCS David Cook submitted
was informed of her had been 31 January 2006
DCS Alan Wheeler, with attempting to same case. DCS David Cook requested a report to the Crown Jonathan Rees, former DS
husband’s death. unlawfully killed. June-July 2002
the head of Hampshire pervert the course charging advice from the The Metropolitan Police submitted Prosecution Service seeking Sidney Fillery, Glenn Vian,
Constabulary’s of justice. DCS David Cook Crown Prosecution Service in the 2006 Report to the Chair of the advice as to whether the Garry Vian and James Cook
Criminal Investigation 02 April 2001 was placed under respect of bringing conspiracy Metropolitan Police Authority, Len suspects, Jonathan Rees, were arrested and interviewed.
DS Sidney Fillery and
23 April 1987 Department (CID) was surveillance by to murder charges against Duvall. This first version of the report former DS Sidney Fillery, Glenn On 23 April 2008, Jonathan
PC Stephen Thorogood The covert
An appeal for information was made in a BBC appointed as Senior investigation, News of the Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian, was rejected by the Metropolitan Vian, Garry Vian and James Rees, Glenn Vian, Garry
attended Southern
Crimewatch broadcast. The family of Daniel Morgan Investigating Officer Operation Abelard, World journalists. Garry Vian, and James Cook. Police Authority as inadequate on 03 Cook, should face criminal Vian and James Cook were
Investigations and
were not consulted by either the Metropolitan Police for the Hampshire/ led by DCI David Attempts were Also sought advice about February 2006. charges in connection with the charged with the murder of
removed items from
or the BBC during the making of the programme. The PCA Investigation with Zinzan commenced. made to get access bringing conspiracy to pervert murder of Daniel Morgan. Daniel Morgan. Former DS
the office.
way in which Daniel Morgan was portrayed during Terms of Reference to 15 December 2000 to confidential the course of justice charges Sidney Fillery was charged
the Crimewatch programme caused considerable investigate ‘allegations 08 September 1989 Jonathan Rees, DC Austin Warnes information about against James Cook, Person with perverting the course
A witness statement distress to his wife and family, because it is regarded that police were involved The Police Complaints and Simon James were convicted DCS Cook and his D28 and Person D29, and of justice.
was taken from as inaccurate and unfair to Daniel Morgan. The police in the murder of Daniel Authority received of perverting the course of justice. wife Jacqui Hames. bringing a misconduct in public
Jonathan Rees by DS investigation received information that led to several Morgan and any matters DCS Alan Wheeler’s Jonathan Rees received a seven-year office charge against former DS
Sidney Fillery. enquiries being made but nothing of value emerged. arising therefrom’. final report. prison sentence. Sidney Fillery.
07 December 2011 January 2014 08 January 2015
The Serious Organised Operation Megan began. On 18
Crime Agency made a December 2013, DCS Martin Fry of the
Operation Megan investigators referred
referral to the Independent British Transport Police was appointed
the allegation that confidential information
Police Complaints as the Senior Investigating Officer to
belonging to Jonathan Rees was unlawfully 17 February 2017
Commission (now the provide independent oversight. Work
disclosed to the BBC
Independent Office for Police commenced in January 2014 with Mr Justice Mitting found that the
Conduct) regarding former DCI Fiona McCormack appointed Panorama programme (as contained Metropolitan Police was liable
10 May 2013 in Jonathan Rees’s complaint), to
DCS David Cook passing to conduct the investigation under for misfeasance in public office
04 March 2011 information to the journalist, The Home Secretary, DCS Fry’s oversight. Jonathan Rees the Independent Police Complaints in relation to the prosecution of
In the latest of a series Michael Sullivan, during Theresa May MP, was interviewed by Operation Megan Commission. former DS Sidney Fillery, but the
of disclosure failures, a his time in charge of the announced in Parliament Investigators about his complaints. claims of Jonathan Rees, Garry
the establishment of the 05 July 2018
further three crates of investigation into the murder Vian and Glenn Vian failed. The
Daniel Morgan Independent The Panel received its first documents from At the Court of Appeal,
undisclosed material of Daniel Morgan. The claims for malicious prosecution
Panel to shed light into the the Metropolitan Police following agreement Jonathan Rees, Garry Vian and
were discovered by the resulting investigation was were unsuccessful.
circumstances of Daniel on disclosure. Glenn Vian were successful
Metropolitan Police. named Operation Longhorn. March 2014
Morgan’s murder and the with their appeal against Mr
police investigations. The Daniel Morgan Justice Mitting’s judgment of
Independent Panel February 2017.
was paused, at the 21 March 2017 01-02 April 2020
request of the family, The Metropolitan Police opened a After reviewing the Operation Edison
31 March 2011 May 2012 until the new Chair 29 September 2015 new investigation into the conduct file, the Crown Prosecution Service
Formal apology was A joint review by the Crown took up the post The Crown Prosecution Service of former DCS David Cook following September 2019 provided investigatory advice to the
made by Tim Godwin, the Prosecution Service and the July 2013 in September (the provided charging advice on comments made about him by The Operation Edison file was referred by the Metropolitan Police who subsequently
Acting Commissioner of Metropolitan Police into the Former DCS David Cook first Chair of the Operation Longhorn and it was Mr Justice Mitting in February 2017. Metropolitan Police to the Crown Prosecution decided not to proceed further with
the Metropolitan Police, to Abelard Two Investigation retired from the Serious Panel resigned in decided not to prosecute former This investigation was known as Service for investigatory advice in respect of the investigation into former DCS
Daniel Morgan’s family. was completed. Organised Crime Agency. November 2013). DCS David Cook. Operation Megan Two. the activities of former DCS David Cook. David Cook.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
11 March 2011 10 January 2012 17 September 2013 September 2014 January 2015 14 December 2016 January 2017 November 2018 July 2019 June 2020 – March 2021 May 2021
In view of the ongoing Former DCS David Cook The Daniel Morgan The Independent A new investigation called The Independent Police Complaints Jonathan Rees, former DS After reviewing the Operation Jonathan Rees, Garry The Panel received the final The Panel completed
serious disclosure failures was arrested on suspicion of Independent Panel Police Complaints Operation Edison was Commission reported on its investigation Sidney Fillery, Garry Vian Megan Two file, the Crown Vian and Glenn Vian were documents from the Metropolitan its Report.
by the Metropolitan Police, committing misconduct in public formally commenced Commission reported established to investigate into Jonathan Rees’s complaint that and Glenn Vian brought a Prosecution Service decided not to awarded damages in their Police following conclusion of
the Prosecution took the office and offences contrary to work, but had on its investigation, matters relating to the confidential information belonging to civil claim in the High Court prosecute former DCS David Cook. successful appeal in the Operation Edison.
decision to offer no evidence section 55 of the Data Protection no access to the Operation Longhorn, into material seized during the him was unlawfully disclosed to the BBC against the Metropolitan Jonathan Rees asked for a review Court of Appeal against Mr
against each Defendant and Act 1998. Following an initial ‘no investigation papers. former DCS David Cook’s search of former DCS David Panorama programme. No file was referred Police, seeking damages of the decision not to prosecute Justice Mitting’s judgment.
Jonathan Rees, Glenn Vian comment’ interview, former DCS unauthorised disclosure Cook’s home in 2014. to the Crown Prosecution Service. for malicious prosecution former DCS Cook and the review
and Garry Vian were formally David Cook was released on bail of documents to Michael and for misfeasance in by the Crown Prosecution Service
acquitted of the murder pending further enquiries to be Sullivan. A file was public office. The civil claim upheld the original decision.
of Daniel Morgan by Mr carried out by the Independent referred to the Crown was considered by Mr
30 January 2012
Justice Maddison. Police Complaints Commission Prosecution Service. Justice Mitting.
and was suspended by the Serious Jonathan Rees made
Organised Crime Agency. a complaint to the
Independent Police
Complaints Commission 06 December 2017
containing four allegations
The Operation Megan Two
against the Metropolitan November 2014
report was completed
11 March 2011 Police in respect of Police officers from and referred to the Crown
confidential information Operation Megan searched
DCS Hamish Campbell of the Metropolitan Police Homicide Prosecution Service for
being disclosed, former DCS David
and Serious Crime Command read a prepared statement; charging advice on former
being defamed in a Cook’s home. A separate DCS David Cook in respect of
‘This current investigation has identified, ever more clearly, newspaper article, DCS investigation was launched perjury, perverting the course
how the initial inquiry failed the family and the wider public. David Cook coaching into the emails and other of justice, and misconduct in
It is quite apparent that police corruption was a debilitating a witness, and Alastair material recovered from his public office.
factor in that investigation. This was wholly unacceptable. Morgan ‘questioning’ home, named Operation
Significant changes have occurred since that time, the Independent Police Edison.
nevertheless there are important issues which we need Complaints Commission
to examine now in order to understand what led to about the arrest of former
today’s decision.’ DCS Cook.
Annex C: Glossary of Terms
Association of ACPO The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) provided

Chief Police national police coordination and leadership in England,
Officers Wales and Northern Ireland. The National Police Chiefs’
Council replaced ACPO in 2015.
Criminal CID The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) is the generic
Investigation name for the branch of a police force to which most
Department plainclothes detectives belong and who are responsible for
investigating crimes of a more serious nature.
Criminal CCRC The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) is
Cases Review the independent body set up to investigate suspected
Commission miscarriages of justice from magistrates’ courts, the Crown
Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It also deals
with convictions from the Court Martial and Service Civilian
Court after 01 October 2009.
Crown Prosecution CPS The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) prosecutes criminal
Service cases investigated by the police and other investigative
organisations in England and Wales. The CPS is
independent, and its decisions are made independently of
the police.
Directorate of DPS The Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) has
Professional strategic responsibility for setting and maintaining the
Standards standards of professional conduct for all members of
the Metropolitan Police on behalf of the Commissioner.
It has responsibility for all organisational learning in
relation to standards of behaviour and conduct. DPS also
provides the link between the MPS and IOPC, supporting
their independent investigative processes. It provides
professional standards briefings to the Mayor’s Office for
Policing and Crime (MOPAC).
Government GSCP This policy describes HM Government’s administrative
Security system for the secure, timely and efficient sharing of
Classification information. It is not a statutory scheme but operates within
Policy the framework of domestic law, including the requirements
of the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 1989, the Freedom
of Information Act 2000, and Data Protection legislation.
Security classifications indicate the sensitivity of information
(in terms of the likely impact resulting from compromise,
loss or misuse) and the need to defend against a broad
profile of applicable threats. There are three levels of
classification: Official, Secret and Top Secret.
1247
Her Majesty’s HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) was the
Inspectorate of body responsible for independently assessing police forces
Constabulary and policing in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and the
Crown Dependencies.
Her Majesty’s HMICFRS In 2017, it was replaced by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of
Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS). It is
Constabulary and also responsible for inspecting national law enforcement
Fire & Rescue organisations such as the National Crime Agency, HM
Services Revenue & Customs and the British Transport Police.
Her Majesty’s HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) is the UK’s tax,
Revenue & payment and customs authority.
Customs
Home Office HOLMES HOLMES is a computerised database designed to support
Large Major the police investigation of major crimes.
Enquiry System
Independent Office IOPC The Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) oversees
for Police Conduct (replacing the police complaints systems in England and Wales.
the IPCC) It investigates the most serious matters, including deaths
following police contact, and sets the standards by which
the police should handle complaints. It is independent and
makes its decisions entirely independently of the police
and government.
Independent IPCC The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
Police Complaints investigated serious complaints, including deaths in police
Commission custody, and allegations of misconduct against the police in
(replaced by the England and Wales
IOPC)
The IPCC superseded the Police Complaints Authority
(PCA) in 2004 and it was itself replaced by the Independent
Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) in January 2018.
Major Incident MIR The Major Incident Room (MIR) is the base for trained
Room Detectives, Crime Investigators and Major Incident Room
staff responsible for receiving, reviewing and indexing all
material gathered during a major investigation using the
HOLMES database.
It provides the Senior Investigating Officer with an

accurate record of all relevant information relating to
the investigation.
Major Incident MIRSAP The Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative
Room Procedures (MIRSAP) gives guidance for the management
Standardised of major investigations.
Administrative
Procedures
1248
Metropolitan MPA The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), established in

Police Authority 2000, was responsible for scrutinising and supporting
the work of the Metropolitan Police, and was intended
to mark a fundamental change in the policing of
London and to ensure that the Metropolitan Police was
democratically accountable.
The MPA ceased to exist in January 2012 when its functions

transferred to the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime
(MOPAC).
National Crime NCA The National Crime Agency (NCA) leads the fight to cut
Agency serious and organised crime, protecting the public by
targeting and pursuing those criminals who pose the
greatest risk to the UK.
The National Crime Agency replaced the Serious Organised

Crime Agency (SOCA) in October 2013.
National Crime NCS The National Crime Squad (NCS) was a police organisation
Squad staffed by seconded police officers in England and Wales,
which dealt mainly with serious organised crime that
crossed police force and regional boundaries.
The NCS functions became part of the Serious Organised

Crime Agency.
National Police NPCC The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) brings police
Chiefs’ Council forces in the UK together to help policing coordinate
operations, reform, improve and provide value for money.
It coordinates the operational response of police across
the UK to threats such as terrorism, organised crime and
national emergencies. It is funded by police forces in
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland as well as
the armed services and some British Overseas Territories.
Police and PACE The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) governs
Criminal Evidence the use of police powers of investigation including, arrest,
Act 1984 (PACE) detention, interrogation, entry and search of premises,
and PACE Codes personal search and the taking of samples.
of Practice
Issued under the Act are the PACE Codes of Practice, which
police officers should consider and refer to when carrying
out various procedures associated with their work.
Police Complaints PCA The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) was responsible
Authority for supervising the investigation of some complaints made
by the public against the police. It was superseded by the
Independent Police Complaints Commission in 2004.
Police National PNC The Police National Computer (PNC) is a database used
Computer to facilitate investigations and share information between
police forces across the UK.
1249
Police ranks Police ranks in England and Wales.
Metropolitan Police
Commissioner
Deputy Commissioner
Assistant Commissioner
Deputy Assistant Commissioner
Commander
Chief Superintendent
Superintendent
Chief Inspector
Inspector
Sergeant
Constable
City of London Police
Commissioner
Assistant Commissioner
Commander
Superintendent
Chief Inspector
Inspector
Sergeant
Constable
Other Police Forces
Chief Constable
Deputy Chief Constable
Assistant Chief Constable
Superintendent
Chief Inspector
Inspector
Sergeant
Constable
1250
Police ranks Police ranks abbreviated in the Report including

(continued) detective ranks
Assistant Commissioner (AC)

Deputy Assistant Commissioner (DAC)
Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS)
Detective Superintendent (D/Supt.)
Detective Chief Inspector (DCI)
Chief Inspector (CI)
Detective Inspector (DI)
Sergeant (PS)
Detective Sergeant (DS)
Constable (PC)
Detective Constable (DC)
Where a rank is held on a temporary or acting basis, this is

indicated by the prefix T/ or A/ respectively.
Female police officers had the prefix of Woman or W added

to their rank (e.g. WPC) until 1999.
Regulation of RIPA The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, or
Investigatory ‘RIPA’ as it is commonly known, ensures that relevant
Powers Act 2000 investigatory powers are used in accordance with human
rights. It regulates the interception of communications;
the acquisition of communications data (e.g. billing data);
intrusive surveillance (on residential premises/in private
vehicles); covert surveillance in the course of specific
operations; the use of covert human intelligence sources
(agents, informants, undercover officers), and access to
encrypted data.
Serious Organised SOCA Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) was a national
Crime Agency law enforcement agency which existed from April 2006
until it merged into the National Crime Agency (NCA) in
October 2013.
1251
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The Report of the Daniel Morgan

The Report of the Daniel Morgan

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 15th June 2021

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Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum

2 The Disciplinary Review

6 The Report by the Independent Police Complaints Commission on alleged unlawful

7 The civil action in the High Court

8 Operation Megan Two

a. A review, commissioned by Commander Peter Spindler of the Metropolitan Police

c. An investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (now the

d. Another review commissioned on 19 November 2012 by Commander Peter

e. An investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission into an allegation

1.1 Chronology of key events relating to Post-Abelard Two

• 14 March 2011 The BBC Panorama programme ‘Tabloid Hacks Exposed’

• May-December 2011 After a general audit of email contact between journalists

• 11 January 2012 Commander Peter Spindler commissioned a review of the Abelard

• November 2012 After a referral by the Independent Police Complaints Commission

• 21 January 2014 Jonathan Rees was interviewed by Operation Megan investigators.

• 04 November 2014 After a warrant was obtained by Operation Megan, former

• 08 January 2015 Operation Megan investigators referred the allegation that

• 29 September 2015 The Crown Prosecution Service produced a charging advice on

• 14 December 2016 The Independent Police Complaints Commission completed its

2 The Disciplinary Review: January-February 2012

i. the judgment of Mr Justice Maddison, dated 11 March 2011;

ii. a case summary produced by Jonathan Rees QC; and

5. The Terms of Reference for the review were as follows:

• ‘The review will be completed based only on the documents detailed.

• Consider the proportionality of conducting further enquiries/instigating disciplinary

• Provide recommendations setting out the most appropriate way forward.’3

1 Discipline Review by D/Supt Mark Mitchell, MPS109704001, p4, 13 February 2012.

7. In his report, D/Supt Mark Mitchell concluded:

5 Discipline Review by D/Supt Mark Mitchell, MPS109704001, p9, 13 February 2012.

14. D/Supt Mark Mitchell concluded his report as follows:

‘I respectfully recommend that no further action is taken in terms of potential offences

3 The joint review by the Crown Prosecution Service and the

12 Discipline Review by D/Supt Mark Mitchell, MPS109704001, p13, 13 February 2012.

21. Kit Malthouse also advised the Home Secretary that,

14 Metropolitan Police Authority Briefing Note, MPS109561001, p6, 29 March 2011.

24. The Terms of Reference were as follows:

ii. verify their position by looking at relevant documentation/decision logs/notes/Court

vi. produce a report of the findings of the review; and

vii. disseminate any lessons learned.28

3.1 Interviews of the Prosecution team members

37. The following recommendations were made by those interviewed:

3.2 The review report: May 2012

60 Background Case Summary, MPS109599001, p1, 04 January 2007.

i. Failure to disclose fully the 2006 Metropolitan Police Authority Report;

ii. Inappropriate redactions of some transcripts of debriefed Serious Organised Crime

iii. Late disclosure relating to a witness;

v. Late disclosure of general practitioners’ records relating to Gary Eaton; and

vi. Non-disclosure of a statement relating to former PC Derek Haslam and failure to

50. All these complaints had been upheld by Mr Justice Maddison.

i. particular prison records should not be disclosed;

i. On 20 November 2009, T/DCI Noel Beswick emailed the Directorate of Professional

v. On 22 February 2010, Glenn Vian’s solicitor, while inspecting documents, found

60. However, the submissions of Nicholas Hilliard QC to Mr Justice Maddison on

76 Hearing Transcript, MPS109655001, p125, 11 March 2011.

3.2.3 Good Practice Points identified in relation to disclosure