A PRACTICAL START FOR PTC AND SIGNAL ENFORCEMENT SAFETY

Glen T. Fisher, Abstract

This paper introduces a new device that works with existing End-Of-Train (EOT) braking

devices as a practical start for Positive Train Control and Signal Enforcement. It is fast

and easy to implement, low cost, interoperable with existing systems and between

railroads, with minimal or no new on-board equipment. Operating the EOT to slow or

stop the train - with or without the driver’s knowledge or consent - will prevent accidental

or deliberate encroachment into an occupied block. Thus, it provides an override

capability against a deliberate attempt to cause a collision, as well as an independent

means of stopping a train separate from the locomotive controls. It will work in "dark" un-

signalled territory and existing conventional signal blocks, and it will perform the same

back-up function with new moving-block systems of Positive Train Control that will derive

their location information from GPS and local markers. For an early start-up, no new on-

board equipment is required on freight trains already using EOTs, and it is simple to add

an EOT system on any passenger train. The device would be located at trackside near

existing signals in its start-up configuration, and relay to the EOT the necessary

command if the train operation does not conform to the signal indication. In this

conceptual mode, quick implementation and low cost are both possible with no changes

to the EOT concept. Later design evolution would see the device as the link between the

moving-block and GPS data to provide redundant and secure vital train-stop capability.

© AREMA 2009 ®
A PRACTICAL START FOR POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL

AND SIGNAL ENFORCEMENT SAFETY

INTRODUCTION

The Signal Enforcement Controller (SEC) is a new device that works with the existing

End-of-Train braking devices currently required on the major freight trains in North

America of over 4,000 tons, to provide an immediate solution for train protection on

North America's passenger and freight railway systems. This solution will be both fast

and easy to implement and at minimal cost. Furthermore it will be interoperable with

existing systems within and across railway companies and will not require any additional

cost or equipment on board most existing caboose-less freight trains

In the proposed solution, accidental or deliberate (vandalism, terrorism) encroachment

into an occupied block of railway track will be prevented and catastrophic collision will be

avoided or minimized by the rapid engagement of the end of train device, which will slow

or stop the train without the driver's (engineman's) knowledge or willful action. Thus the

proposed system will provide an override capability on the encroaching train and provide

an automatic driver-independent means of stopping the train without any long distance

communication network or remote computer data processing. It is not dependent upon

GPS signals and will augment any GPS driver assistance methods already in use. It will

work in existing "dark territory", conventional signal blocks and will perform the same

back-up function with new moving-block systems of Positive Train Control which will

derive their location from both GPS and local position markers.

© AREMA 2009 ®
As almost all freight trains currently have an EOT, this solution will be quick to implement

It will be easy to add EOT systems to passenger trains for about $12,000 per train.

A trackside device would be located at or near signals in the initial configuration where it

would relay the appropriate command if the train operation does not conform to the

signal indication.

In this conceptual mode, quick implementation and minimal expenditure are both

possible by extension of the EOT concept. Later design evolution would see the device

as the link between the moving-block and GPS data to provide redundant and secure

vital train-stop capability.

Thus, the Signal Enforcement Controller meets the two requirements of the Railway

Safety Improvement Act as it uses the EOT system in use by the freight railroads for

more than 20 years, and it is interchangeable and interoperable now. All of the

accessories that are to be interconnected with the SEC at trackside that are required for

train occupancy detection, speed sensing, train radio and remote consent by radio at a

work site are all devices that are available and on the market now.

The Signal Enforcement Controller can be applied to a passenger railroad by applying

the same EOT Sense and Brake Unit at the rear coupler of any passenger train and the

same Locomotive Cab Unit (CBU) in the engineman's console in any passenger

locomotive or cab-car.

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THE NEW AND COST-EFFECTIVE APPROACH

The need for Positive Train Control has been recognized and pursued for many decades,

from serious beginnings of a proposed universal Advanced Train Control System (ATCS)

in 1985 to the beginning of a GPS-based Positive Train Control proposal to Congress in

1994. The extensive communications requirements of central-based systems and the

necessity of universal interoperability have obscured the focal point of the immediate

needs and the object of preventing train accidents at the site of the probable incident.

The accidents that are the object of these efforts are those caused by human error of all

kinds. These causes range among simple distraction from immediate second-by-second

observance and control, to fatigue, possible legal medications, illegal drugs or alcohol, to

deliberate intended damage or terrorism.

The solution suggested in this paper is achieved by the adoption of a new device, for

convenience called a "Signal Enforcement Controller" that would usually be installed at

suitable wayside locations. It is an adaptation and evolution of the more than 20 years of

service of the End-Of-Train braking system developed to stop long freight trains in a

specific emergency situation. Where an error has occurred in the train coupling or re-

coupling after a car intermediate in the train length has been added or dropped off, and

the brake manual closing valve (angle-cock) at the brake hose to car brake pipe has

been left closed, a reduction in air pressure from the locomotive train brake

(independent-brake) valve is prevented from being passed beyond the car affected.

The pressure reduction from the locomotive control stand train-brake is what activates

the local brake application in every car in the train within just a few seconds, even on a

mile-long train. An inadvertently closed angle-cock, or any other obstruction to the train

© AREMA 2009 ®
brake pipe, will prevent the freight cars beyond that point from receiving the brake

application instruction, at which point the train will stop only under the influence of the

car brakes back to the point of closed angle-cock or obstruction. Serious runaways can

occur from this kind of incident causing extensive damage and potential loss of life to

both train crews and people living close to the site of the probable derailment.

The EOT system was developed to provide a separate means of control, with the SBU

partly replacing the responsibility of the conductor or the brakeman who used to ride in

the caboose of a freight train. A runaway resulting from the cause described in the

scenario above as a possible closed angle-cock somewhere in the train could have been

stopped by the brakeman (or conductor) in the caboose applying the train brake from an

air valve in the caboose.

Another function of that crew was to monitor the train brake pipe pressure from the

caboose and note brake application pressure reductions and the pressure and time to

restore brake releases. With the elimination of cabooses, the EOT system’s SBU took

over this function too, relaying actual brake pressure readings by radio to the locomotive

cab to confirm to the engineman the functioning of the train air brakes.

The EOT, then, represents a ready, proven, reliable and low-cost system currently

required and in use on freight trains for most of the last 20 years.

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The Sense and Brake Unit of the
EOT installed on a trailer flat car
coupler at rear of a freight train.

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As there have been a few instances of freight train derailments during emergency

braking, the Canadian Transportation Safety Board has recommended that the engineer

apply the EOT at the trailing end of the train with his Locomotive Control Unit (LCU) Red

switch, before putting the automatic brake valve into "Emergency". This application of

the EOT first will reduce any in-train slack action thereby reducing any tendency to derail

because of possible run-in action due to the heavy braking of the emergency brake

application.

While originally powered only by a replaceable battery in the SBU (Sense and Brake

Unit) at the rear coupler of the last car on the train, newer systems use a small, low-

power air-turbine battery recharging generator that uses less air from the main brake

pipe than normal joint leakage and therefore has no effect on the performance of the

existing brake application and control of the existing air brake systems.

The Signal Enforcement Controller is a radio device (usually to be installed at the

wayside) that receives an enforcement condition message and then communicates it to

the SBU of an oncoming train. Depending on the protocol in use by the operating

railroad, that message can demand a service brake application or an emergency brake

application completely separately from any action or inaction by the locomotive crew.

The Signal Enforcement Controller may be installed at an existing ABS signal post

where it will receive an occupied block indication from the signal-block track-circuit relay

or any other speed restriction indication (approach, yellow signal), or from an added

electrical contact on an un-signalled switch indicating whether the switch is in an unsafe

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position. The SEC will sense the radio signals from the EOT on an approaching train and

will acknowledge its presence and functioning status to the head-end EOT panel or by

voice radio to the engineman. The SEC would usually be powered by its own solar cell

panel so that it is an independent device, with repair or maintenance done by

substitution of the entire unit on its support.

Where needed for the protection of track gang work, a portable version of the SEC

would be placed at the flagging site with a portable train presence detector (such as a

magnetic wheel detector, an optical sensor, radar sensor or an AEI tag reader). While

the specific details would conform to the protocols of the operating railroad, in generic

terms, a train attempting to pass the flag site would be automatically stopped by either a

service or emergency brake application, unless the work foreman using a remote radio

controller permits the approaching train to pass. An arrangement may be agreed,

however, over the train voice radio: the train engineman would be required to request

permission from the foreman to proceed, and at what speed, before his train reaches the

flagging point.

In un-signalled or "dark" territory, a permanent installation comparable to work gang

flagging would be used with the SEC installed at convenient locations corresponding to

the boundaries of manual blocks. The train engineman would be required to request

radio authorization to pass the point of sensing from the Rail Traffic Controller or

dispatcher, who would then either give or withhold authorization for the driver to pass

each manual block point at his informed discretion.

The SEC can also be used for sensing over-speed at any specific location or at an

approach signal. A speed sensing device would be attached to the SEC to indicate

© AREMA 2009 ®
speed at that point and a train exceeding the allowable speed would be warned by radio

that it is exceeding the defined speed. Automatically a service brake will be applied by

the SEC to the SBU at the end of the train. The choice of a service brake or emergency

brake application depends on the protocol of the operating railroad. Means could be

established to release the service brake application when train speed drops to the

applicable limit before the train has completely passed the SEC location. The safest fail-

safe protocol may in fact be to stop the train completely if its speed has been excessive,

as it might not otherwise stop under the control of its engineman if the next signal is red

(e.g. if the engineman is distracted or for some other reason unable to control the train).

RELIABILITY, INTEGRITY, FAIL-SAFE AND VITAL SAFETY ISSUES

The reliability of the existing EOT equipment as manufactured by several approved

suppliers is considered good, and any in-service failures can be worked around in the

same way as a signal failure. It is not unusual in the railway industry to use a fail-safe

mode where an equipment failure warns and then stops the use of the failed system and

back-up procedures must be implemented. Where vital operation may be needed,

redundancy of equipment and circuits with appropriate failure warning, if one half of the

system fails, may be considered. Then reduced speed or alternate operation would

become mandatory as defined in rules for the specific situation. By using the SEC,

railway operators can meet all of the necessary railway safety standards more easily

than with a system that transmits data over long distances and with the residual time

delay for processing, transmission and acknowledgement. The electric utility companies

find that even the speed-of-light transmission of synchronization data such as 60Hz

generator phase angles is too slow for distances of more than 700 miles, and this

prevents synchronization of large networks with each other. Instead, a DC link is

installed to connect large diverse networks permitting asynchronous connections

© AREMA 2009 ®
between them. Quebec Hydro power frequency and phase angle is not synchronized

with New York State for this reason. Most electric utility companies are well aware of this

limitation.

COST AND IMPLEMENTATION TIME

The current prices of different manufacturers’ EOT systems vary with the features

included but estimates are in the range of $5000 for an SBU for the coupler at the last

car of the train plus $7,000 more or less depending on the features for the LCU. To

equip a passenger train with these on-board devices, as used on freight trains, would

amount to about $12,000 per train consist.

In this perspective, the basic wayside SEC with its mounting pole and radio speed

sensor, switch position sensor or work foreman consent radio will not be high. Specific

cost estimates for quantity production in thousands of units have not yet been made. At

double track and siding end locations, additional SEC units may be needed.

The time to have working field trial models in service should be less than 12 months.

Field trials should be carried out in several different locations and situations, always in

parallel with existing safety systems and procedures until careful testing and monitoring

has proven their safety for general use and has been certified so by the technical and

regulatory authorities.

© AREMA 2009 ®
CONCLUSION

US Congress has already opened the discussion for a solution termed “Positive Train

Control” in:

The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 as enacted by Congress on

October 1, 2008, Division A- The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008

Summary of H.R. 2095, 3) Positive Train Control (PTC)

In this paper, we have demonstrated a readily implementable solution to fulfilling

requirements stipulated in the Rail Safety Improvement Act in the short and long term, at

minimum effort and cost.

The bill requires the implementation of “interoperable” positive train control systems for

Class I freight and passenger rail carriers by December 31, 2015. It also authorizes

$250 million in “Railroad Safety Technology Grants” ($50 million per year) to help

operators implement the technology. The grants require a 20% local match, and priority

will be given to projects that advance PTC technology and benefit both freight and

passenger rail.

1. “Positive Train Control” is defined as: a system designed to prevent train-to-train

collisions, over-speed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits,

and the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position.

2. “Interoperability” is defined as: the ability to control locomotives of the host

railroad and tenant railroad to communicate with and respond to the positive train

control system, including uninterrupted movements over property boundaries.

© AREMA 2009 ®
The Signal Enforcement Controller meets these requirements. It is a positive train

control system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, prevent over-speed

derailments, prevent incursions into established work zone limits, and prevent the

movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position.

It has the added advantage that it works with the existing End Of Train braking devices

currently installed on practically all the major freight trains in North America. It is fast and

easy to implement and at minimal cost. It will be interoperable with existing systems

within and across railway companies and will not require any additional cost or

equipment on board existing caboose-less freight trains. Implementation of the SEC will

help to prevent accidental or deliberate (vandalism, terrorism) encroachment into an

occupied block of railway track and to prevent catastrophic collisions.

It is within our reach now, and has the ability to evolve with any future system.

In the words of Canadian Judge René Foisy who headed the commission of enquiry into

the collision near Hinton, Alberta on February 8, 1986 “The damage to the running

equipment was extensive. The monumental destruction discovered by those first on the

scene was beyond description.” This head-on collision between a passenger train and a

freight train at a combined speed of 110 miles per hour resulted in the violent death of 23

people: “Having regard to the incredible forces of the collision it is nothing short of

miraculous that 95 people survived.”

In his report, Judge Foisy discussed the developments in Advanced Train Control

System (ATCS) Technology that were given in evidence in 1986:

“Emerging remote train intervention and enforcement technologies are not dependent on

the behaviour or capacity of crew members. These systems automatically control

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speeds and stop trains in the event that an order is being disobeyed or an authority

exceeded. The presences such systems would render a collision like that which

occurred on 8 February virtually impossible.”

“In the Commission’s view, it is essential that such remote intervention and enforcement

technology be developed and deployed on the Canadian railway system as quickly as

possible.”

Unfortunately, even by 1989, ATCS Level 30 was not yet ready. Now, in 2009, work is

progressing on a GPS based PTC which will by 2015, achieve the objectives anticipated

by both Judge Foisy in 1986 and the US Congress in October 2008.

In the interim, until a 2015 strategy is proven effective, the Signal Enforcement Controller,

working with the existing EOT systems, will achieve all of the objectives quickly and

economically with proven technology and experience and little or no change to most

freight trains.

Glen T. Fisher, PEng

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FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1

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FIGURE 2

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FIGURE 3

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REFERENCES

1 Pomeroy, US Patent 4,487,060 December 11, 1984.

Railway Brake Pressure Monitor

2 Schmidt, US Patent 4,642,892 February 10, 1987

Railway Emergency Brake System

3 The Commission of Enquiry into the Hinton Train Collision, on February 8,

1986 at Dalehurst, Alberta, The Honourable Mr. Justice René Foisy; Canada

The Privy Council, P.C. 1986-382, submitted December 1986.

4 Fisher, US Patent 6,631,873 B2, October 14, 2003

Protection Device to Prevent Train Incursions Into A Forbidden Area

5 Fisher, Canadian Patent 2,347,400, July 7, 2009

Protection Device to Prevent Train Incursions Into A Forbidden Area

5 Canadian Transportation Safety Board,

Railway Investigation Report, Crossing Accident and Derailment. Drummond,

New Brunswick, October 6, 2001.

7 Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Ch II 232.405 End-of-Train Braking Device on Freight Trains, 2003.

8 The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, October 1, 2008, HR 2095,

Congress of the United States of America.

© AREMA 2009 ®