GlenbrookSouth ArZu Neg 01 - Niles Octas
GlenbrookSouth ArZu Neg 01 - Niles Octas
GlenbrookSouth ArZu Neg 01 - Niles Octas
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Fiscal redistribution is taxes and transfers. They're not.
Sheffield Department of Economics 16, citing Professors Kammas and Sarantides (“Fiscal redistribution
ahead of elections to bolster democracy,” Medium,
https://medium.com/@sheffeconomics/democratic-government-policies-tackling-inequality-
before-elections-supports-democracy-17006e6eb29)
Fiscal redistribution is defined as the reduction in income inequality, brought about by government via
taxes and transfers. Their findings indicate that only in countries characterized as young democracies do elections exert a positive
impact on fiscal redistribution. Moreover, their work suggests that the effect of elections is strongest in young democracies characterized by
relatively higher political instability. Further details can be found at: Kammas P. and V. Sarantides (2015). Fiscal redistribution around elections
when democracy is not “the only game in town” SERPS 2015019.
The question is why we allow a "hobgoblin of little minds" over a hundred and seventy years old to continue to rule over us? Why, when even a
total economics amateur like myself can pick up Keynes and learn about the "paradox of thrift," do we continue to allow the political cliche that
"well, families have to balance their budgets, so the government should too" to be the conventional wisdom of the stump speech? (Incidentally,
given the fact that most American families are horribly in debt and are relying on their credit cards to make ends meet, this couldn't be less
accurate).
A 50-State Solution:
One of the things that's often puzzled me about the progressive movement is our lack of willingness to use the initiative process to our
advantage in both achieving policy ends and mobilizing the electorate - consider the way in which the Republican Party used anti-gay marriage
propositions in 2002 and 2004 to gin up their right-wing base, change the political debate from economic issues to their wedge issues, and
attack the civil rights and civil liberties of queer Americans. In 2006, we saw a little bit of this strategy on the progressive side, using minimum
wage initiatives to increase working class turnout in states like Ohio, but to the best of my knowledge it hasn't become a standard part of the
Democratic Party political toolkit.
Hence, the
first step in establishing "50-state Keynesianism" is to promote, state-by-state an "Anti-
Recession Budget Reform Initiative." (if anyone has a better name for it, I'm open to suggestions). This initiative should
amend the state constitution's balanced budget requirement to allow the state, when the economy is in
recession (i.e, two quarters of negative economic growth) to run a limited deficit (two years maximum) for the
purposes of funding counter-cyclical stimulus programs (limited to say, 5-10% of state GDP). We should begin
our push in those areas which are deep blue states and which tend to have weaker balanced budget requirements - New England would be a
good starting place, especially with Vermont as the lone non-balanced budget state sitting there as a model for how deficit spending won't
destroy western civilization. The Rust Belt states that have been especially hit hard, like Michigan or Ohio, would probably be receptive to a
message that it's better to spend money to create jobs than to balance a budget by throwing teachers and other state workers out of their jobs.
As usual, the major prizes would be New York and California, given their size and political weight.
Second, in
order to build state capacity for Keynesian economic policy, we should also push for the
creation of State Reserve Banks. Here, I really have to credit Ellen Brown over at the Huffington Post for promoting this idea and
bringing it to my attention. This amazingly simple yet powerful idea takes its example from, of all places, the state of North Dakota, which has
operated the Bank of North Dakota since 1919. It works like this - the
state charters a public bank, and instead of placing
its reserves, tax revenues, deeds for public lands, and so forth in a variety of state banks (as most states do), it puts all of
them in the public bank to act as the bank's capital base. (Note: as long as the bank only circulates U.S
dollars, it's perfectly constitutional, avoiding the Article I, Section 10 bar against states issuing coin or bills of credit) The bank
then acts like a reserve bank, using the power of "fractional reserve lending" (i.e, that a bank can
generate much more money in loans than it keeps in its vaults, thus multiplying many times over its
actual reserves, as long as it keeps back a portion to redeem deposits) to generate loans, act as a local
"lender of last resort" (thus buttressing the work of the Federal Reserve and FDIC during credit crises),
and (this is the key bit) allowing the State to borrow money in order to deficit spend in a recession
without relying on the ideologically-biased bond market and the credit agencies who've taken a
hammer to state bond ratings while maintaining A ratings for AIG and Lehman Brothers. The State could then use these
loans (which would be much cheaper than ordinary bonds, given that its essentially paying interest to
itself) to maintain public services and fund public works and other stimulus measures in a recession.
Third, as I've suggested before, one of the best ways to fight a recession is to create jobs directly. Hence, with all this
new fiscal and monetary muscle, we should set up a WPA-like system of State "Job Insurance." While the Federal government is best suited to
this task, in that it has superior powers to deficit spend and print money, state governments could run their own permanent job insurance
systems, establishing State J.I Funds, contributions from workers and employers, and assistance from the general fund. The idea would be to
create short-term jobs (say 6-month duration, with a right to re-apply after a job search at the end of 6 months) at $10 an hour - the number of
jobs directed at reducing unemployment by whatever proportion (say, 50% in the example below) needed to keep unemployment at or below a
specific level. As the economy turned around, these jobs could be gradually eliminated (at 1/2 the rate of job growth, for example) in order to
not damage the recovery as happened when the WPA was suddenly downsized in 1937-8. In return for a monthly contribution, workers would
have a right to one of these jobs, as allocated by some fair procedure (order of application, random lottery, etc.).
In recent years, states have relied more frequently on formal multi-state regional and national compacts to cooperate in settling shared
problems (Welch and Clark 1973; Florestano 1994). As more states join compacts, this mechanism's potential to solve major national problems
becomes greater. Since
the early 1990s, state leaders have called for greater cooperation and coordination
among states in the design of common policies as a means to forestall further erosion of state power to
the national government (Bowman 2002). Indeed, it is only a short leap from there to begin thinking of
national compacts as potential alternatives to federal legislation. These cooperative actions empower
the states, vis-à-vis the national government, generating what Daniel Elazar called "federalism without
Washington" (quoted in Krane 2002, 23). Compacts that are national in scope - that is, compact membership open to all states - offer an
ideal point from which to consider the question of interstate cooperation. In this article, we explore the role that interstate compacts play in
rebalancing the federal system. Our analyses assess the factors that cause states to join interstate compacts, focusing on state capacity, politics,
and vertical and horizontal forces. Our results suggest that each of these factors plays a role in generating compact participation.
When the Supreme Court issued its Dobbs decision on abortion in June 2022, there was a brief moment when it
seemed that Nixon’s top-down devolution might resurface. In its decision, the court wiped out the precedent set in Roe v. Wade
that guaranteed a national right to abortion and passed the decision back to the states.
But with liberals back on their heels, conservatives saw an opportunity to enforce a national ban on abortions, whether
through medical procedures or the abortion pill mifepristone. They weren’t content with limiting abortions in ways that varied from one red state to another.
Instead, they have mobilized to push abortion policy up from statehouses to Washington. That’s led to a scramble
among Republican hopefuls about how best to capture the coalition — and a debate about how activists could pressure Congress to pass some form of a national
ban.
The movement has stretched past abortion to proposed limits on transgender rights and gender-transitional medications, a
rollback of state environmental actions, and an attack on anything that can be labeled as “woke.” That’s all
caught the left flatfooted.
The result is an effort on the right to define a new-new federalism . Instead of Nixon’s effort to shrink
the federal government’s power by devolving decisions to state and local governments, we’ve got red
states pushing to centralize decisions in Washington.
In his 19th-century classic, Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville described the American system as “neither precisely national nor precisely federal.” It’s now
precisely not anything at all.
In the space of half a century, we’ve
flipped federalism on its head. Instead of worrying about how to devolve
power to the states, we’re seeing a push for a centralization of power so all states could be brought into
a single line.
Nixon’s New Federalism and its grant programs are a distant memory. So
too is the last real effort to sort out federal and state
roles, advanced by Reagan. Those Republicans would not recognize the ones who carry the flag today .
While theUnited States struggles to revitalize its own democracy, it cannot ignore this global trend of democratic
backsliding. To paraphrase Martin Luther King Jr., a threat to democracy anywhere is a threat to democracy everywhere. The last time
America ignored massive democratic backsliding abroad, the second world war exploded and dragged America into its horrors. Though it
cannot begin in earnest until Trump leaves office, America
must adopt a new foreign policy focused on defending and
expanding the ranks of democracies around the world. This will require re-orienting assistance to
democracies, finding more effective ways to support democratic movements abroad , and other efforts such as
those outlined in a new report by me and my colleagues at the Center for American Progress. And since the notion of “democracy promotion”
has been confused with the Iraq war and regime change, let’s be clear: This
policy is not about transforming autocracies
into democracies, fostering violent revolutions, or imposing democracy by force; it is about helping
democracies succeed and pushing back against autocratic encroachments on democracy. At the core of
this effort must be building a robust infrastructure for democracies to unite to protect their own
democratic systems and push back against autocracy. The skeleton of this system already exists: The
European Union is built on democratic principles; the G7 knits together some of the world’s richest democracies to tackle challenges such as
the Community of Democracies (CD) convenes democracies to share lessons
poverty and climate change; and
learned about strengthening democracy. Today, the United States must lead a global effort to stitch
together the best parts of these structures into a robust democracy organization. The CD could serve
as the home, with three main goals: First, enable democracies to share lessons and provide technical
support to one another to strengthen democratic institutions. Democracies must learn from one another
to overcome challenges such as how to balance free expression with hate speech and disinformation .
The CD already provides this platform, and with a reformed membership that meets at the head of state
level every year it could expand its efforts. Second, develop common approaches to strategic issues. The threats
are significant: Russia invaded a neighboring state struggling with democrac y and threatens others; China is
bullying neighbors in Asia. Russia and China frequently prevent United Nations action on issues related to democracy and human
rights, and so democracies must band together to coordinate their own pushback against Russia, China, and
others when international norms and democracy are threatened. Third, coordinate responses against
attempts by autocracies to sow discord in democracies. Russia attacked America in an attempt to sway
the 2016 presidential election to Trump, and it uses similar tactics to influence politics across Europe.
China is now looking to export its own “digital authoritarianism” to equip other states with the
technology to repress their peoples. Democracies must work together to understand how these threats
impact them and develop strategies for defending themselves and fighting back. Supporting democracy abroad, of
course, is not new. But today, the need is as great as ever. This will be a generational effort. One or two elections at home or
abroad will not signal victory or defeat. And for America, it will hinge in part on whether or not America can emerge from its current struggles
as a stronger democracy. But for democracy to survive, democracies around the world must band together.
Solves the economy and innovation, creates follow-on funding and private sector
matching – now is key.
SSTI ’16 (SSTI; 11/10/2016; nationwide network of practitioners and policymakers dedicated to improving the economy through science,
technology, innovation and entrepreneurship, supplies information about tech-based economic development; “Recent Research: Local Impacts
of Federal R&D Investments,” http://ssti.org/blog/recent-research-local-impacts-federal-rd-investments; Date Accessed: 7/5/2017; DS)
Counterplan competes, solves the aff, and avoids legal challenges – facilitates a
consensus decision with greater compliance and legitimacy
Freeman & Langbein 2k (Jody Freeman, Harvard Law Professor and previous Counselor for Energy
and Climate Change at the White House, & Laura I. Langbein, Professor of public administration and
policy at American University, “Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit”, New York University
Environmental Law Journal, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl L.J. 60, Lexis)
Consensus decision rules used in reg neg are thought to engender two different effects: while they raise
conflict and cost during the decision-making process itself, they increase satisfaction once the parties
reach agreement. This view presupposes that conventional rulemaking involves no informal consensual
decision making, a presupposition contradicted by the study. In fact, conventional rulemaking
participants reported informal contact with both EPA and other parties. One-quarter of conventional
rule participants reported that they engaged in informal negotiations.
Despite this evidence of informal contact, the data suggest that negotiated rulemaking achieved a
higher level of consensus among participants. When asked what constituted a consensus, 90% of reg
neg participants responded either “unanimity” or “what we could all live with,” both consistent with a
consensual process. By contrast, 45% of conventional participants responded “what EPA wanted”; no
reg neg respondents defined consensus in this manner. “What EPA wanted” does not describe a
consensual process.
When the more consensual reg neg process was used, respondents reported greater satisfaction both
with the process and with the net benefits of the final rule to their organization. Moreover, the standard
deviation of judgments was smaller under reg neg. These results support the theory that relatively more
consensual decision rules lead to greater satisfaction with outcomes, greater homogeneity in judgments
about those outcomes, and less conflict.
In sum, more consensual processes yielded significantly higher net benefit ratings and possibly more
agreement. Kerwin and Langbein asked reg neg participants what constituted consensus in their formal
negotiation sessions, expecting that more consensual decision rules would be associated with greater
satisfaction, higher ratings of organizational net benefits, and less conflict (i.e., more homogeneity)
about those judgments. The results were consistent with these expectations: ratings of the overall
process were lowest and the standard deviations were usually highest when the decision rule was “what
EPA wanted.”
Overall, then, the study supports the claim that negotiated rulemaking is more consensual than
conventional rulemaking. Further, if litigation measures conflict, then reg neg seems to perform as well
(or as poorly) as conventional rulemaking. Litigation rates for both kinds of rules, according to Kerwin
and Langbein, were about the same. (Section II.C.1.c.)
The compliance implications of consensus-based processes remain a matter of speculation. No one has
yet produced empirical data on the relationship between negotiated rulemaking and compliance, let
alone data comparing the compliance implications of negotiated and conventional rules. However, the
Phase II results introduce interesting new findings into the debate. The data shows reg-neg participants
to be significantly more likely than conventional rulemaking participants to report the perception that
others will be able to comply with the final rule. Perceiving that others will comply might induce more
compliance among competitors, along the lines of game theoretic models, at least until evidence of
defection emerges.
Moreover, to the extent that compliance failures are at least partly due to technical and information
deficits—rather than to mere political resistance—it seems plausible that reports of the learning effect
and more horizontal sharing of information might help to improve compliance in the long run. The claim
that reg-neg could improve compliance is consistent with social psychology studies showing that in both
legal and organizational settings, “fair procedures lead to greater compliance with the rules and
decisions with which they are associated.”
Similarly, negotiated rulemaking might facilitate compliance by bringing to the surface some of the
contentious issues earlier in the rulemaking process, where they might be solved collectively rather than
dictated by the agency. Although speculative, these hypotheses seem to fit better with Kerwin and
Langbein’s data than do the rather negative expectations about compliance. Higher satisfaction could
well translate into better long-term compliance, even if litigation rates remained the same. Consistent
with our contention that process matters, we expect it to matter to compliance as well.
In any event, empirical studies of compliance should no longer be so difficult to produce. A number of
negotiated rules are now several years old, with some in the advanced stages of implementation. A
study of compliance might compare numbers of enforcement actions for negotiated as compared to
conventional rules, measured by notices of violation, or penalties, for example. It might investigate as
well whether compliance methods differ between the two types of rules: perhaps the enforcement of
negotiated rules occurs more cooperatively, or informally, than enforcement of conventional rules.
Possibly, relationships struck during the negotiated rulemaking make a difference at the compliance
stage. To date, the effects of how the rule is developed on eventual compliance remain a matter of
speculation, even though it is ultimately an empirical issue on which both theory and empirical evidence
must be brought to bear. (Section III.D)
Although reg neg participants report higher satisfaction with the overall process than their conventional
counterparts, many of the reasons for that satisfaction remain unclear. The parties might be more
satisfied because of the kinds of issues that tend to arise in regulatory negotiation, because they feel
negotiation improves rule quality, or because they value particular features of the process, such as the
opportunity to engage each other face to face. Higher satisfaction might be due to a factor that Kerwin
and Langbein did not test.
To more closely identify the reasons for satisfaction (and dissatisfaction), Kerwin and Langbein used a
multiple regression analysis to isolate individual factors by holding others constant. Their results show
that, overall, participants prefer reg neg to conventional rulemaking partly because they get a better
rule out of the process, and partly because some aspects of the process, but not all, work well—that is, a
combination of substance and process variables. Three substantive variables exerted a positive effect on
satisfaction ratings, when other variables were held constant. When respondents rate either the net
benefits of the rule to their organization or the “economic efficiency” of the rule to society higher, their
overall evaluation of the rule-writing experience goes up. In addition, when one of the primary issues to
be decided concerned the standard (level, measurement, or timing), participant evaluations of the
process are consistently and significantly higher (by 1 point on an 11-point scale) than was detected
when the primary issue concerns compliance or implementation.
Two process variables exerted an impact on overall evaluations, when the other variables were held
constant. The perceived complexity or “messiness” of the rule contributed to lower evaluations, while
clarity (participant understanding of the issues) contributed to higher satisfaction. Recall that while
complexity measures the number of issue/sides identified per participant in rulemaking, clarity
measures the number of different issues or sides that respondents could identify. Specifically, each
additional side or issue per respondent (more messiness) reduces the overall evaluation by 2 points on
an 11 point scale, while the ability to see more different issues and sides had a consistently positive, but
not particularly large, effect. However, although perceived complexity contributes to lower evaluations,
and even though reg negs are perceived as entailing greater complexity, reg neg participants continue to
give higher ratings to the overall process, even after numerous statistical controls, including a control for
complexity.
We do not claim that acceptability to participants renders either the reg neg process or the outcomes of
it, in some objective sense, fully or wholly legitimate. It is possible that some form, or forms, of cognitive
consistency processes are really at play, and that they explain why participants evaluate reg neg so
positively. Were this the case, the legitimacy benefit might be limited to those closely connected to the
particular reg neg process itself. Any claim to a legitimacy benefit under these conditions would rely on a
less expansive understanding of legitimacy than we frequently encounter in administrative law and
political theory.
Certainly a process cannot be called legitimate if outsiders think insiders achieve gains at their expense
—if they capture the agency, for example—or if the results favor only a minority of interests. However,
at a minimum, reg neg should fare no worse when assessed on legitimacy grounds than conventional
rulemaking, at least according to positive political theory. That is, if politicians get re-elected by faithfully
representing “outsiders” and unorganized interests, and if agencies garner support by being generally
accountable within the bounds set by their politically elected principals, then neither rulemaking process
should be more subject to capture than the other.
Still, we recognize the possibility that outsiders to any process might view as illegitimate an outcome
that insiders find satisfying. However, no empirical study we know of has tried to measure this potential
insider/outsider split over legitimacy in the context of either conventional rulemaking or regulatory
negotiation. It is difficult to know what the “general public” or median voter thinks of the regulatory
process, given that most complaints about its legitimacy or illegitimacy come from either insiders, like
lawyers, regulators, and politicians, or from academics, who represent only a narrow class of outsiders.
As noted above, a lack of participation by outsiders does not necessarily signal dissatisfaction, nor does
it indicate that they view the process as illegitimate. We note that non-participants in the conventional
rulemaking process may choose not to participate out of satisfaction that their concerns have already
been considered. So too with non-participants in the reg-negs, whose interests may be represented by
other parties.
Although Kerwin and Langbein did not directly investigate the potential insider/outsider split over
legitimacy, no data emerged that might fuel outsider suspicion about reg neg versus conventional
rulemaking. For example, they found no evidence of skewed outcomes or results that seemed, on their
face, to undermine the legitimacy of the reg neg process. Were the reg neg process exclusive to a few
repeat players and disproportionately beneficial to them, we might worry more about the possibility
that insider satisfaction could in fact undermine legitimacy rather than further it. However, the data
suggest that the reg neg process is broadly inclusive—more so, specifically, than conventional
rulemaking. There is no reason to believe that exclusive access and increased influence were the reasons
for higher satisfaction rates, which might lead us to infer that “insider” legitimacy was procured at the
expense of “outsider” legitimacy. (Section III.B)
Administrative rulemaking is a collaborative effort between the state and public undertaken in the
interest of promulgating administrative rules. (1) Typically, this effort takes the form of what will be
referred to herein as the traditional rulemaking process. This process mandates that public input,
received in the form of comments offered at various forums and via written submissions, be considered
by the promulgating agency as a rule progresses toward final adoption. (2) The traditional rulemaking
process is an adequate vehicle for the promulgation of most rules. However, rules occasionally present
challenges that the traditional process is ill-equipped to address. It is for these situations that the
legislature has provided agencies with an alternative mechanism of rule promulgation: negotiated
rulemaking.
In contrast to the traditional process, negotiated rulemaking invites interested members of the public , in
both a figurative and literal sense, to take seats at the negotiating table. It is here that these individuals,
typically representing different interested groups, negotiate among themselves and with agency
personnel in an attempt to reach consensus on a rule's content. (6)
Reg-neg prevents litigation caused by command-and-control regulations
Fernandez 18 (Daniel P. Fernandez, associate professor at Florida Gulf Coast University, Juris Doctor
of Law from University of Florida, and previously practicing attorney of Administrative and
Environmental Law, “COLLABORATIVE RULEMAKING IN THE WORLD OF WATER MANAGEMENT”, Journal
of Land Use and Environmental Law, 34(1), Fall 2018, 151-168)
The traditional “command-and-control” model for administrative regulation quite often has ignited
litigation either challenging a proposed or final rule, or its implementation. In the area of water
resources protection, allocation, and regulation, traditional rulemaking has resulted in conflicts, such as
the SWUCA rule challenge litigation,129 and the Tampa Bay Water Wars litigation. 130 Implementation
of water policy is not conducive to a single geo-political arena.131 Water does not observe political
boundaries, and, competing demands for water requires a balancing of interests.132 In today’s complex
world, command-and-control rulemaking often seems to be an inefficient, and sometimes ineffective,
mechanism for accomplishing the purpose of the rules being challenged. Yet, the concept of
collaborative rulemaking stands in stark contrast. The efforts of the DEP, in consultation with the water
management districts and the DACS, provides a novel and positive approach to minimizing, and possibly
avoiding, the contentiousness, expense, and inefficiency of traditional rulemaking in the CFWI. While the
proposed DEP rules are intended to apply only in the CFWI, they may ultimately serve as a rulemaking
model for the entire state. Perhaps this novel process will open the door to collaborative rulemaking in
other complex areas. Based on the CFWI experience, administrative agencies have the potential to
effectuate policies through collaborative processes, with expansive stakeholder involvement , instead of
using the “command-and-control” rulemaking model and its associated potential for litigation.
There is no simple formula for reconciling the war on terrorism’s short-term requirement for speed and
flexibility with the same war’s long-term need for legitimacy. Nonetheless, understanding the
importance of judicial procedures and legitimacy requires a long-term view of the problem of terrorism
that the United States lacks. The long French experience with terrorism provides some perspective and
demonstrates why judicial institutions that can handle terrorist cases are a critical piece of a nation’s
counterterrorism arsenal.
[CONTINUES]
The unique nature of terrorism means that maintaining the appearance of justice and democratic
legitimacy will be much more important than in past wars. The terrorist threat is in a perpetual state of
mutation and adaptation in response to government efforts to oppose it. The war on terrorism more
closely resembles the war on drugs than World War II; it is unlikely to have any discernable endpoint,
only irregular periods of calm. The French experience shows that ad-hoc anti-terrorist measures that
have little basis in societal values and shallow support in public opinion may wither away during the
periods of calm. In the U.S., there is an enormous reservoir of legitimacy, established by over 200 years
of history and tradition, in the judiciary. That reservoir represents an important asset that the U.S.
government can profit from to maintain long-term vigilance in this type of war. Despite the unusual
opportunity for innovation afforded by the crisis of September 11, the U.S. government has not tried to
reform American judicial institutions to enable them to meet the threat of terrorism. To prevent the
next wave of attacks, however far off they might be, and to avoid re-inventing a slightly different wheel
each time will require giving life to institutions that can persist and evolve, even in times of low
terrorist activity. Given the numerous differences between the two countries, the U.S. cannot and
should not simply import the French system, but it can learn from their mistakes. Their experience
suggests a few possible reforms: • A specialized U.S. Attorney tasked solely with terrorism cases and
entirely responsible for prosecuting such cases in the U.S. • Direct and formal links between that U.S.
Attorney’s office and the various intelligence agencies, allowing prosecutors to task the intelligences
agencies during judicial investigations • Special procedures for selecting and protecting juries in
terrorism cases and special rules of evidence that allow for increased protection of classified information
in terrorist cases Creating a normal, civilian judicial process that can prosecute terrorists and yet retain
legitimacy is not merely morally satisfying. It may also help to prevent terrorist attacks in the long run.
Not incidentally, it would demonstrate to the world a continuing faith in the ability of democratic
societies to manage the threat of terrorism without sacrificing the very values they so desperately
desire to protect.
Extinction
Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New
Zealand – Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic
Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33(7), July)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in
the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed,
there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the
category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that
would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess
these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might
bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have
wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons
states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the
possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors
themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic
interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist
attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a
massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this
context, today's and tomorrow's terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold
War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a
catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in
the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem.
It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an
act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event
of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or
China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as
the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too
responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten
them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the
United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear
terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for
nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a
case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a
nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it
detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis:
the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the
nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete
surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or
responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally
countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in
Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program
continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in
this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a
backdrop of existing tension in Washington's relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when
threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not
be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase
if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or
China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these
developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear
terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict
with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to
consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington's early
response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted
(and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion
during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to
place the country's armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense
environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow
and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear
force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it
must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of
its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to
order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of
the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially
the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for
their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their
sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in
Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such
as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents' … long-
standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost
certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington
that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.
DA
Momentum now for legislation to avoid shutdown with limited time window –
avoiding unnecessary fights is key.
Groves and Jalonick 9/5 [Stephen Groves is a correspondent for AP News based in South Dakota. Mary
Clare Jalonick covers Congress for the Associated Press in Washington., 09-05-2023, "GOP weighs
impeachment inquiry as Congress tries to avert shutdown," PBS NewsHour,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/gop-weighs-impeachment-inquiry-as-congress-tries-to-avert-
shutdown]
WASHINGTON (AP) — After months of struggling to find agreement on just about anything in a divided Congress, lawmakers are returning to
Capitol Hill to try to avert a government shutdown, even as House Republicans consider whether to press forward with an
impeachment inquiry into President Joe Biden.
A short-term funding measure to keep government offices fully functioning will dominate the
September agenda, along with emergency funding for Ukraine, federal disaster funds and the Republican-driven probe into Hunter Biden’s overseas
business dealings.
Time is running short for Congress to act. The House is scheduled to meet for just 11 days before the
government’s fiscal year ends on Sept. 30, leaving little room to maneuver. And the deal-making will play out as two top
Republicans, Sen. Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Rep. Steve Scalise of Louisiana, deal with health issues.
The president and congressional leaders, including Republican House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, are focused on passage of a
months-long funding measure, known as a continuing resolution, to keep government offices running
while lawmakers iron out a budget. It’s a step Congress routinely takes to avoid stoppages, but McCarthy faces resistance
from within his own Republican ranks, including from some hardline conservatives who openly embrace the idea of a government shutdown.
“Honestly, it’s a pretty big mess,” McConnell said at an event in Kentucky last week.
Here are the top issues as lawmakers return from the August break:
When Biden and McCarthy struck a deal to suspend the nation’s debt ceiling in June, it included provisions for topline spending numbers. But under pressure from
the House Freedom Caucus, House Republicans have advanced spending bills that cut below that agreement.
Republicans have also tried to load their spending packages with conservative policy wins. For example, House Republicans added provisions blocking abortion
coverage, transgender care and diversity initiatives to a July defense package, turning what has traditionally been a bipartisan effort into a sharply contested bill.
But Democrats control the Senate and are certain to reject most of the conservative proposals. Senators
are crafting their spending bills
on a bipartisan basis with an eye toward avoiding unrelated policy fights.
Top lawmakers in both chambers are now turning to a stopgap funding package, a typical strategy to give the lawmakers time to iron out a long-term agreement.
The House Freedom Caucus has already released a list of demands it wants included in the continuing resolution. But they amount to a right-wing wish list that
would never fly in the Senate.
“Thelast thing the American people deserve is for extreme House members to trigger a government
shutdown that hurts our economy, undermines our disaster preparedness, and forces our troops to work without guaranteed pay,” said White House
spokesman Andrew Bates.
In a letter to his colleagues Friday, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer wrote that the
focus when the Senate returns Tuesday will be
“funding the government and preventing House Republican extremists from forcing a government
shutdown.”
It leaves McCarthy desperate to get the votes to keep government offices running and avoid the political blowback. As he tries to persuade Republicans to go along
with a temporary fix, McCarthy has been arguing that a government shutdown would also halt Republican investigations into the Biden administration.
“If we shut down, all of government shuts it down — investigations and everything else — it hurts the American public,” the speaker said on Fox News last week.
Impeachment inquiry
Since they gained the House majority, Republicans have launched a series of investigations into the Biden administration, with an eye towards impeaching the
president or his Cabinet officials. They have now zeroed in on the president’s son, Hunter Biden, and his overseas business dealings, including with Ukrainian gas
company Burisma.
The inquiries have not produced evidence that President Biden took official action on behalf of his son or business partners, but McCarthy has called impeachment a
“natural step forward” for the investigations.
An impeachment inquiry by the House would be a first step toward bringing articles of impeachment. It is not yet clear what that may look like, especially because
the speaker does not appear to have the GOP votes lined up to support an impeachment inquiry. Moderate Republicans have so far balked at sending the House on
a full-fledged impeachment hunt.
But Donald Trump, running once again to challenge Biden, is prodding them to move ahead quickly.
“I don’t know how actually how a Republican could not do it,” Trump said in an interview on Real America’s Voice. “I think a Republican would be primaried and lose
immediately, no matter what district you’re in.”
The White House has requested more than $40 billion in emergency funding, including $13 billion in military aid for Ukraine, $8 billion in humanitarian support for
the nation and $12 billion to replenish U.S. federal disaster funds at home.
The request for the massive cash infusion comes as Kyiv launches a counteroffensive against the Russian invasion. But support for Ukraine is waning among
Republicans, especially as Trump has repeatedly expressed skepticism of the war.
Nearly 70 Republicans voted for an unsuccessful effort to discontinue military aid to Ukraine in July, though strong support for the war effort remains among many
members.
It is also not clear whether the White House’s supplemental request for U.S. disaster funding, which also includes funds to bolster enforcement and curb drug
trafficking at the southern U.S. border, will be tied to the Ukraine funding or a continuing budget resolution. The disaster funding enjoys wide support in the House,
but could be tripped up if packaged with other funding proposals.
Legislation on hold
The Senate is expected to spend most of September focused on funding the government and confirming
Biden’s nominees, meaning that major policy legislation will have to wait. But Schumer outlined some priorities for the
remaining months of the year in the letter to his colleagues.
Schumer said the Senate would work on legislation to lower the costs of drugs, address rail safety and provide disaster relief after floods in Vermont, fires in Hawaii
and a hurricane in Florida.
Senators will also continue to examine whether legislation is needed to address artificial intelligence. Schumer has convened what he is calling an “AI insight forum”
on Sept. 13 in the Senate with tech industry leaders, including Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg and Elon Musk, the CEO of X and Tesla, as well as former Microsoft CEO Bill
Gates.
Extinction.
Peck 2018 - Contributing Writer for The National Interest. Senior analyst for Wikistrat
Michael, "How Russia, China or America Could Accidentally Start a Nuclear War," Aug 14,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-russia-china-or-america-could-accidentally-start-nuclear-
war-28692
Accidental nuclear war, that's what could happen.
That's the warning by a Washington think tank, which argues that the
U.S. is inviting nuclear war by using the same
command and communications systems to oversee both nuclear and conventional forces. But such "dual
use" systems risk an inadvertent nuclear war, because an attack on non-nuclear assets, such as satellites
or radars, could be perceived as an attempt to cripple [harm] America's nuclear deterrent.
The Trump administration's draft nuclear policy already states that cyberattacks against America, or attacks on U.S. satellites, could constitute a
strategic threat that merits a nuclear response. But this raises a problem called "nuclear entanglement," where the traditionally bright lines
between nuclear and non-nuclear systems become blurred.
In a study earlier this year , the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace pointed out that Russia and China were guilty of entanglement. For
example, Russia keeps nuclear submarines and bombers at the same bases as conventional ships and planes: thus a strike by conventional U.S.
forces against conventional Russian forces -- the sort of operation common in World War II -- could be mistaken by Russia as an American strike
on its nuclear forces, triggering Russian nuclear retaliation. China plans to attack American satellites to disable U.S. command systems and
smart weapons that rely on satellite guidance, because China believes this to be a part of conventional warfare -- despite the Trump
administration declaring otherwise.
But a new Carnegie study says the U.S. is making the same mistake. "Starting in the last decade of the Cold War, the United States has increased
reliance on dual-use systems by assigning nonnuclear roles to C3I assets that used to be employed solely for nuclear operations," writes James
Acton, co-director of Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program. "Until the mid-1980s, for example, U.S. early-warning satellites were used exclusively
for detecting the launch of nuclear-armed missiles. Today, they enable a variety of nonnuclear missions by, for example, providing cuing
information for missile defenses involved in intercepting conventional ballistic missiles."
The U.S. has also scrapped its Cold War land-based communications systems for controlling nuclear forces. Which
means that
satellites have become virtually the only means for nuclear command and control, and those precious
satellites are also handling non-nuclear communications.
Even as cyberwarfare and anti-satellite weapons have emerged as major threats, U.S. satellite systems
have become less redundant. In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. had two satellite-based communication systems for nuclear weapons.
"Today, the United States is in the process of deploying just four Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites that will be the nation's
sole space-based system for transmitting nuclear employment orders once legacy Milstar satellites have been retired," writes Acton. Similarly,
one of two radio networks for communicating with nuclear missile submarines has been shut down.
Acton explores several scenarios where the U.S. could overreact. "Russia might attack ground-based or space-based U.S. early-warning
assets to defeat European missile defenses that were proving effective in intercepting its nonnuclear missiles," he writes. " Washington
might see such attacks, however, as preparations to ensure that limited nuclear strikes by Russia could
penetrate the United States' homeland missile defenses."
Adv 1
1NC---Solvency
Federal Jobs Guarantee fails—shifts the balance of power, decks small businesses, and
invites corruption
Earle 18 - Peter C. Earle is an economist and Financial markets professional. He trades and studies in global equity, derivative, commodity,
and currency markets, as well as offbeat and esoteric markets. Pete has published numerous articles on economic history, spontaneous order,
and liberty. He is currently the chief economist of Humint (Earle, Peter C. “‘federal Jobs Guarantee’ Idea Is Costly, Misguided, and Increasingly
Popular with Democrats.” Investor’s Business Daily, 19 Nov. 2018, www.investors.com/politics/commentary/federal-jobs-guarantee-
democrats/. Accessed 7/16/23 )/kp
Currently, individuals in the job market "sell" their labor to firms as much as firms "purchase" labor. Mutually, this transaction —
employment — arises because both the employee and employer benefit; value is recognized
reciprocally. With a federal jobs guarantee program, the government is inserted between the employee
and the employer; the value proposition is limited at best. Centralized plans such as these forgo the most
fundamental elements of markets — information, competition, and incentives — in favor of rote
bureaucratic reckoning.
A Daunting Task
Simply finding work for tens of millions of job guarantee enrollees would be a formidable task; finding
productive, impactful work catering to an individual's skills, in a given locality and in a timely manner,
would be staggeringly difficult — if possible at all.
The costs, too, are daunting. Both the CBPP and LEI reports project costs ranging from $450 billion to more
than $600 billion, which put the proposed programs in the same league with the Pentagon in terms of discretionary spending.
And while it is true that the cost of any of the federal jobs guarantee programs would be offset by savings in current unemployment insurance
and poverty mitigation programs, neither of the estimates include costs of designing, staffing, and managing the
proposed agency.
In terms of potential
enrollees, estimates start at roughly 10 million. According to LEI's high-end estimate of 17.5
million enrollees, the program would have more employees than the combined head count of the U.S. Department of Defense, the
Chinese People's Liberation Army, Walmart, McDonalds, the U.K.'s National Health Service, the China National Petroleum Corporation, the
State Grid Corporation of China, the Indian Railways, and the Indian Armed forces.
A government organization of that size — 17.5 million job guaranteed individuals, with an untold
number of administrators, managers, and other employees to attend to them nationwide — would become
the largest public or private organization in history. It would also be the largest experiment in
organizational efficiency in history, with the livelihoods of millions of newly government-dependent
citizens hanging in the balance.
Wage Inflation
Another issue is the wage, which several plans recommend should be (or average) $15 per hour. With the
increasing focus on "living wages," it will not be long before program directors discover that $15 per hour goes far
further in Alabama than Hawaii, and the tendency will be to equalize cost-of-living disparities up, further
increasing already massive costs.
At present, more
than 40 million Americans earn less than the proposed guarantee wage of $15 per hour, which
could trigger a major shift of the U.S. workforce away from private employment, on to public rolls . It
would also effectively force small businesses to compete directly against the federal government on the
labor market.
Prone To Fraud
Finally, a
government operation as colossal as a federal jobs guarantee program would inevitably be
vulnerable to both political corruption and private rent seeking.
There is a vastly better way: not only far less costly, but more consistent with traditional American values and respectful of the full potential
that unemployed, underemployed, and employers offer.
We must allow labor markets to work without the fetters of artificial controls such as minimum wages, restrictive licensing, coercive collective
bargaining agreements and others, thereby permitting market signals to allocate labor to their greatest possible social benefit.
AT: Inequality
No internal link to the aff solving inequality—none of their cards describe reasons why
the aff is specficially key
Inequality’s declining.
Wright et. al ‘19 [Joshua D., Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick, and Jan M. Rybnicek; University Professor
and Executive Director, Global Antitrust Institute at Scalia Law School; Attorney Advisor to Commissioner
Noah Joshua Phillips, United States Federal Trade Commission; Professor of Law, University of
Pennsylvania; Counsel in the antitrust, competition, and trade practice of Freshfields, Bruckahus
Deringer LLP; Arizona State Law Review, “REQUIEM FOR A PARADOX: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable
Fall of Hipster Antitrust,” vol. 51]
Figure 3, which plots the ratio of the share of US income among the fifth quintile of income-earning households to the share among the first
quintile of households167 tells a similar story.
Robert Kaestner and Darren Lubotsky underscore the point that inequality measures can be significantly affected by a
failure to account for government transfers and employee benefits that presumably substitute for cash
income.168 Given that healthcare costs have grown faster than inflation in recent years, a failure to
account for health insurance benefits could significantly affect economic inequality measures.
Reviewing estimates from the literature, Kaestner and Lubotsky find that including health insurance substantially
reduces the gap between incomes at the high end of the distribution and those at the low end .169
Interestingly, however, the authors find that there is still an upward trend in inequality over time when the cash
equivalent of health insurance and government transfers are included.170 The trend, however, is
substantially muted.171 Specifically, including government transfers and the imputed value of employer
subsidized health insurance, Kaestner and Lubotsky indicate that the ratio of income between households at
the ninetieth percentile and the tenth percentile was about five in 1995, growing to 5.2 in 2004 and to
5.6 in 2012.172
AT: sec stag
No secular stagnation.
The Economist ’15 [The Economist; March 5; Finance & Economics, “Still, not stagnant,”
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2015/03/05/still-not-stagnant]
IS AMERICA stuck in a rut of low growth, feeble inflation and rock-bottom interest rates? Lots of economists believe in the
idea of
“secular stagnation”, and they have plenty of evidence to point to. The population is ageing and long-run growth prospects look dim.
Interest rates, which have been near zero for years, are still not low enough to get the American economy zipping along. A new paper published
by the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, however, reckons that secular stagnation is not quite the right diagnosis for America’s
ills.*
A country in the grip of secular stagnation cannot find enough good investments to soak up available savings. The drain on demand from these
underused savings leads to weak growth. It also leaves central banks in a bind. If the real (ie inflation adjusted) “equilibrium” interest rate (the
one that gets an economy growing at a healthy clip) falls well below zero, then central bankers will struggle to push their policy rate low enough
to drag the economy out of trouble, since it is hard to push nominal (ie, not adjusted for inflation) rates deep into negative territory. Worse, in
the process of trying, they may end up inflating financial bubbles, which lead to unsustainable growth and grisly busts.
Stagnationists argue that this is not a bad description of America since the 1980s. Real interest rates have been falling for years, they note, a
sign of a glut of savings. Recoveries from recent recessions have been weak and jobless. When growth has perked up, soaring asset prices and
consumer borrowing appear to have done the heavy lifting.
The authors of the Chicago paper—James Hamilton, Ethan Harris, Jan Hatzius and Kenneth West—dispute this interpretation
of events. Stagnationists are right, they note, that real interest rates have been falling, and have in fact been negative for much of the past 15
years. But low real rates do not necessarily imply that future growth will be weak, as many economic models assume. The authors
examine central-bank interest rates, inflation and growth in 20 countries over 40 years. They find at best a weak relationship
between economic growth and the equilibrium rate. If there is a long-run link, they argue, it tends to be overshadowed by other factors.
After the second world war, for example, government controls on rates (“financial repression”) prevented the market from having its say. In
recent years short-run woes have dragged down the equilibrium rate, such as the “50-miles-per-hour headwinds” that Alan Greenspan, the
chairman of the Federal Reserve, described in 1991, when bad loans pushed big American banks to the brink of insolvency. The authors note
that such stormy periods are usually short-lived, and that when the headwinds abate the equilibrium rate tends to pop back up.
They also reckon the stagnationists are misinterpreting some of the evidence. Growth in the 1990s was not illusory,
they argue. The stockmarket boom only really got going in 1998, after America’s unemployment rate had already fallen below 5%.
The expansion of the 2000s looks like a better example of secular stagnation. Investment in housing, which rose from 4.9% of GDP in 2001 to
6.6% at the market’s peak in 2006, helped sustain the boom. Rising house prices made Americans feel flush, propelling consumer spending.
Expanding credit added about one percentage point to growth each year, says the paper.
Yet the behaviour of the economy in this period looks more like a product of distortion than stagnation. At the time
China and oil-producing states were running enormous current-account surpluses with America and building up large foreign-exchange
reserves, contributing to what Ben Bernanke, Mr Greenspan’s successor as Fed chairman, labelled a “global saving glut”. Expensive oil and rising
Chinese imports placed a drag on growth that more or less offset the boost from housing. Take away the savings glut and the housing boom,
and the American economy would not necessarily have grown any faster or slower, just more healthily.
AT: Regulation
Can’t solve state governance failures either—1AC bednar only talks about why state
regulation is good—nothing about the aff
No ‘regulation’ impact.
Coad ’20 [Alex, Paul Nightingale, Jack Stilgoe, and Antonio Vezzani; September 15; Researcher at
Waseda University; Ph.D. and Professor at the University of Sussex; Ph.D. and Professor at University
College London; Researcher at Roma Tre University; Industry and Innovation, “Editorial: The Dark Side of
Innovation,” vol. 28]
1. Introduction
1.1. From optimism to pessimism
For writers such as Steven Pinker (for example, in his book ‘Enlightenment Now’), the human condition is steadily improving, and this
improvement can be picked up across a range of indicators: fewer homicides, fewer infant deaths, longer life expectancies, improving human
rights, increasing literacy, increasing average education, increases in mean (and also median) wealth, fewer people in extreme poverty (less
than 1 USD/day), etc.
However, while not denying significant progress in some areas, particularly the reduction in violence, cherry-picking
data to support a comforting Whiggish conclusion is unlikely to generate robust evidence.
To show that the picture is more nuanced, it is worth compiling an alternative, complementary list of dimensions where public health
and environmental wellbeing are deteriorating, and highlighting that many of these are probably due to
innovation: for example, the appearance and rise of lung cancer (it was relatively unheard of, even among doctors, by 1900: Proctor 2012);
the problematic increase of allergies such as asthma (which are somehow conspicuously absent in Amish communities, Holbreich et al. 2012);
the rapid increase of anaphylactic shock (Lee et al. 2017); the prolonged decrease in human sperm counts (Levine et al. 2017); the positive
relation between new cancer cases and per capita income (which cannot be explained by improved detection potential or longer lives: Luzzati,
Parenti, and Rughi 2018); the rise of childhood obesity (Ebbeling, Pawlak, and Ludwig 2002); the global burdens posed by air pollution (Akimoto
2003), the collapse of insect populations (Kunin 2019); pervasiveness of fluorinated chemicals in the environment (Lim 2019), plastic waste
accumulating in the oceans (Cressey 2016); the ‘annihilation’ of vertebrate populations in the context of the current human-induced mass
extinction event (Ceballos, Ehrlich, and Dirzo 2017); the increasing share of Earth’s surface made desolate and uninhabitable by human activity
(e.g. Chernobyl, Fukushima, polluted battlefields such as Verdun in France (Bausinger, Bonnaire, and Preuß 2007; Cooper 2018), the Union
Carbide disaster area in Bhopal with continuing groundwater contamination, perhaps also including landfill sites, nuclear waste
disposal areas, former mining sites, landmine fields); and so on.
Rather than cherry picking data to support a preconceived view that innovation is either always good or
always bad, we should seek to better understand the nature of innovation (in order to better design innovation policy), and hence there
is a need for a more nuanced discussion that rearticulates an old point: innovation has a direction as well as a rate of
change (Nelson 1962). Innovation can have good and bad effects, and those positive and negative outcomes
are typically unevenly distributed. Choices about innovation are therefore complex and often
contested, and the selection environment that weeds out the ‘bad’ innovations is not something that
can be taken for granted. Nor can it be assumed in a pluralistic society, let alone world, that definitions of
what counts as good or bad are universally or even widely shared. It would be concerning if people who occupy important positions in
society overlook the fact that the definitions of good and bad are reflected in the selection environment for innovation, and think that
innovation produces good outcomes naturally.
In recent years, policymakers have seemingly neglected that innovation has a direction, and usually take it
for granted that ‘innovation is good’ and hence, ‘more innovation is better’. For example, when they directly
compare the performance of countries using indicators such as R&D spending or patenting, more is assumed to be better. Understanding
the downsides of innovation, and how those downsides are distributed, might therefore help inform
better policy. This editorial, and the special issue, seeks to provide a bit more balance by giving space to suggestions that innovation is not
always a force for good.
Adv 2
1NC---Turn
FJG’s stoke inflationary chaos
Bhandari 19 - Bhandari is a Phd student studying economics at the University of Illinois Chicago. He is a former Senior Economic Policy
Advisor at Third Way where he reported policy memos and research reports related to issues on tax policy, human capital development, the
business cycle, and venture capital. (Bhandari, Ryan. “What Is the ‘Federal Jobs Guarantee’ and What Are People Saying about It?” Third Way,
25 Mar. 2019, www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-and-what-are-people-saying-about-it. Accessed 7/17/23)
It could crowd out tens of millions of private sector jobs. There are currently 54 million people who
earn $15 an hour or less. When they find out the federal government is offering $15 an hour plus
benefits and permanent job security, many of those workers would quit their current job and join the
federal workforce.3 Companies that could afford to would raise wages to keep some of these
workers; other companies would simply go out of business. The labor markets would be controlled by
the government in ways never seen before in America. And even if just half of low-wage private sector workers quit, the
number of federal employees would rise by between 35 and 40 million.4 Costs to the government would then rise to
anywhere from $1.6 trillion to $2.24 trillion per year, and the private sector would see massive
repercussions.
#4: Inflation
would rise. A sudden increase in the cost of labor for businesses will lead to inflation
throughout the economy because of higher business costs that will need to be passed on to consumers.
In addition, when only those at the bottom of the income distribution get a defacto raise to $15, there are upstream consequences. Workers
who were making $15 an hour may demand $20 an hour now. Workers making $20 an hour might want $25 an hour and so on. This may seem
like a benefit, but “this is a story of serious wage-price spiral, unless we introduce other measures,” warns progressive economist Dean
Baker.5 We have been very fortunate that inflation has been well under control for the last few decades. A federal jobs guarantee could change
that pretty quickly.
Luckily, federal policymakers have short- and long-term options to mitigate families’ economic stress and prevent racial and ethnic disparities
from widening.
Food insecurity and debt in collections spotlight families’ struggles to meet financial needs
Two primary indicators of financial distress underscore the effects of inflation on families of color: food
insecurity and debt in collections.
When experiencing financial uncertainty, families must make trade-offs between food and other
expenses, sometimes leaving them with insufficient financial resources to afford food to live an active, healthy life. Having debt in
collections—or when families struggle to repay debts hurts credit health, which can constrain families’ access to low-cost credit in emergencies
and employment opportunities. Together, these indicators help us understand disparities in financial resilience (PDF), or whether families have
the economic, social, and institutional resources to buffer against a shock and remain financially secure.
Higher food prices, alongside diminishing safety net supports, have left families with little
assistance to help buffer against economic shocks. Though food insecurity increased among all
households between 2021 and 2022, rates are disproportionately higher among households of
Black and Hispanic/Latinx adults. These gaps predate the pandemic and reflect a history of
structural disinvestment and exclusion of communities of color from key wealth-building
opportunities. They also mean that today, roughly 3 in 10 Black and Hispanic/Latinx adults can’t meet their
household food needs (see black bars in the figure below), and may experience negative long-term health
effects.
To meet their financial and food needs, families often turn to credit, loans, borrowing from friends and family, selling assets, or using high-cost
loans—especially if they have limited or fixed incomes.
Before the current inflationary shock, credit health was improving across communities, although racial gaps in credit health stemming from
historical inequities in families’ wealth-creation opportunities persisted. In communities with a majority of Black and majority of Native
American residents, the share of residents with debt in collections remained more than twice as high in August 2021 than for residents living in
majority-white communities.
If inflation continues pushing the cost of living outside of families’ earnings, they may need to borrow
money, which is increasingly more expensive as interest rates rise in response to inflation ; sell
assets; or make hard choices between essential expenses—all of which can deepen material hardship,
make families less equipped to weather a future economic shock and widen the racial wealth gap.
AT: Climate
Literally no internal link to solvency—Juniper card does not specifically say that fjg is
key to solving climate issues just that a regular “employment guarantee” is good
Not even 20 degrees gets to extinction.
Ord 20, research fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, has advised the World
Health Organization, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, and the UK Prime Minister’s Office
and Cabinet Office. (Toby, “4. Anthropogenic Risks”, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of
Humanity, Oxford)
Major effects of climate change include reduced agricultural yields, sea level rises, water scarcity,
increased tropical diseases, ocean acidification and the collapse of the Gulf Stream. While extremely important
when assessing the overall risks of climate change, none of these threaten extinction or irrevocable
collapse.
Crops are very sensitive to reductions in temperature (due to frosts), but less sensitive to increases. By all
appearances we would still have food to support civilization.85 Even if sea levels rose hundreds of
meters (over centuries), most of the Earth’s land area would remain. Similarly, while some areas might conceivably become
uninhabitable due to water scarcity, other areas will have increased rainfall. More areas may become susceptible
to tropical diseases, but we need only look to the tropics to see civilization flourish despite this. The main
effect of a collapse of the system of Atlantic Ocean currents that includes the Gulf Stream is a 2°C cooling of Europe—
something that poses no permanent threat to global civilization.
A landmark paper by Steven Sherwood and Matthew Huber showed that with sufficient warming there would be parts of the world whose
temperature and humidity combine to exceed the level where humans could survive without air conditioning.88 With 12°C of warming, a very
large land area—where more than half of all people currently live and where much of our food is grown—would exceed this level at some point
during a typical year. Sherwood and Huber suggest that such areas would be uninhabitable. This may not quite be true (particularly if air
conditioning is possible during the hottest months), but their habitability is at least in question.
However, substantial regions would also remain below this threshold. Even with an extreme 20°C of
warming there would be many coastal areas (and some elevated regions) that would have no days
above the temperature/humidity threshold.89 So there would remain large areas in which humanity and
civilization could continue. A world with 20°C of warming would be an unparalleled human and environmental tragedy, forcing mass
migration and perhaps starvation too. This is reason enough to do our utmost to prevent anything like that from ever happening. However, our
present task is identifying existential risks to humanity and it is hard to see how any realistic level of heat stress could pose such a risk. So the
runaway and moist greenhouse effects remain the only known mechanisms through which climate change could directly cause our extinction or
irrevocable collapse.
AT: Grids/Infra
No reason why fed is key—1AC chinowsky only talks about how infrastructure
requires “maintenance ” in general and that it requires “fed AND state funds” and the
markey ev sats why grid investment is good—does not mention the aff
COVID proves we had resilient grids—no impact
No impact to grids
Uchill ’18 [Joe Uchill, journalist, “Why ‘Crashing the Grid’ Doesn’t Keep Cyber Experts Awake at Night,”
AXIOS, 8—23—18, https://www.axios.com/why-crashing-the-grid-doesnt-keep-cyber-experts-
awake-at-night-a40563a5-f266-493d-856a-5c9a5c1383dd.html , accessed 10-28-21]
**edited for language
In news stories, TV shows and at least one bestselling non-fiction book, you'll see warnings that hackers
are coming to take out the U.S. electric grid, plunging the nation into democracy-ending darkness. An
attack on that scale was even raised by leading intelligence officials in an Axios deep dive on global
security threats.
Reality check: The people tasked with protecting U.S. electrical infrastructure say the scenario where
hackers take down the entire grid — the one that's also the plot of the "Die Hard" movie where Bruce
Willis blows up a helicopter by launching a car at it — is not a realistic threat. And focusing on the wrong
problem means we’re not focusing on the right ones.
So, why can't you hack the grid? Here's one big reason: "The thing called the grid does not exist," said a
Department of Homeland Security official involved in securing the U.S. power structure.
Think of the grid like the internet. We refer to the collective mess of servers, software, users and
equipment that routes internet traffic as "the internet." The internet is a singular noun, but it’s not a
singular thing.
* You can’t hack the entire internet. There’s so much stuff running independently that all you can hack is
individual pieces of the internet.
* Similarly, the North American electric grid is actually five interconnected grids that can borrow
electricity from each other. And the mini-grids aren't singular things either. Taking down "the grid"
would be more like collapsing the thousands of companies that provide and distribute power accross
the country.
* "When someone talks about 'the grid,' it's usually a red flag they aren't going to know what they are
talking about," says Sergio Caltagirone, director of threat intelligence at Dragos, a firm that specializes in
industrial cybersecurity including the energy sector.
Redundancy and resilience: Every aspect of the electric system, from the machines in power plants to
the grid as a whole, is designed with redundancy in mind. You can’t just break a thing or 10 and expect a
prolonged blackout.
* On some level, most people already know this. Everyone has lived through blackouts, but no one has
lived through a blackout so big it caused the Purge.
* 'The power system is the most complex machine ever made by humans," said Chris Sistrunk, principle
consultant at FireEye in energy cybersecurity. "Setting it up, or hacking it, is more complicated than
putting a man [person] on the moon."
* An attack that took out power to New York using cyber means would require a nearly prohibitive
amount of effort to coordinate, said Lesley Carhart of Dragos. Such a failure would also tip off other
regions that there was an attack afoot. Causing a power outage in New York would likely prevent a
power outage in Chicago.
AT: Pandemics
1AC defined the internal link to pandemics is grids—c/a they can’t solve for it did that
above—means that the aff can’t enable responses to pandemics—and no terminal
Pandemics don’t cause extinction
Ord ’20 [Dr. Toby Ord, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy
from the University of Oxford, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Hachette
Books, Kindle Edition, p. 124-126]
Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten
humanity’s future?10
The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only
great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it
took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11
When Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely
novel diseases. Over thousands of years each population had built up resistance to their own set of
diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by far the worse end
of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox.
During the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose
scale may never be known, due to great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We
can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the Americas during that century,
though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this
should be attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the
Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent of the world’s people.13
Centuries later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible. Near the
end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu)
spread to six continents, and even remote Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were
infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the First World War, and
possibly both World Wars combined.
Yet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential.15
[FOONOTE]
In addition to this historical evidence, there are some deeper biological observations and theories suggesting
that pathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction of their hosts. These include the empirical anti-
correlation between infectiousness and lethality, the extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% of
those infected, the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they progress and the theory
of optimal virulence. However, there is no watertight case against pathogens leading to the extinction of
their hosts.
[END FOOTNOTE]
In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional 25 to 50
percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization. It changed the
relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it
gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death
rates, even if they were global in scale.
The 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development
despite its global reach. It looks like it was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a
smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of history.16
It is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its
mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we
don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the accompanying violence and
imperial rule. The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record argument
from Chapter 3. Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the
evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted. But this argument only works where the
risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but
not for pandemics. We have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics
more likely to occur, and some that could increase their damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should
be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk.
Adv 3
JGs fail.
Pethokoukis ’20 [James; September 13; a columnist and blogger at the American Enterprise Institute;
“A Federal Jobs Guarantee Will Not Solve America's Economic Woes,” The National Interest,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/federal-jobs-guarantee-will-not-solve-americas-economic-
woes-168754]
A federal jobs guarantee is an underwhelming idea. And perhaps if Dave were remade as an HBO mini-series or something, the many,
many downsides would become evident. To think it is a good idea means thinking that (a) Washington could anytime
soon successfully direct a workforce that would be multiples (maybe many multiples) larger than the
number of K-12 teachers (but less educated) to do meaningful, socially productive work that they are
not currently trained to do; (b) even if that managerial Manhattan Project took decades to accomplish,
it could be sustained amid “stories about how these are disorganized make-work programs” and the “stigma” that follows; (c) running such a
program might not be made even more maddeningly complicated by the possible inability to actually
fire anyone; (d) these permanent government gigs would not “crowd out” existing jobs that actually matched the
skills of the workers; (e) we could ever figure out if these new government-supplied jobs were replacing existing
jobs or jobs that would have been created anyway; (f) private employers in high poverty areas would
not see an employee drain to these probably better-paying jobs; (g) these voluntary jobs would not
become mandatory; and (h) the cost would not be crazy tremendous.
AT: Civil Wars
No civil war
Hanania 20 - research fellow at Defense Priorities, and a postdoctoral research fellow at the Saltzman
Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. (Richard, Oct. 29, 2020, “Americans hate
each other. But we aren’t headed for civil war,” washingtonpost.com/outlook/civil-war-united-states-
unlikely-violence/2020/10/29/3a143936-0f0f-11eb-8074-0e943a91bf08_story.html)
The men arrested in early October and charged with plotting to kidnap Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer (D) apparently hoped that doing so
might help set off a civil war — pitting lovers of liberty like themselves against treasonous statists. The goal may sound outlandish, but fringe
militia members aren’t the only ones who think a second civil war could occur in the United States. Recently, New
York Times columnist Thomas Friedman said that the situation in this country reminded him of his time in Lebanon, where in the mid-1970s
street clashes between sectarian militias erupted into multifaceted strife that lasted a decade and a half. David Kilcullen, an Australian scholar
and adviser to the U.S. Army, described America in June as being at the point of “incipient insurgency,” while the academic Peter Turchin
recently wrote — pointing to riots and rising economic inequality — that “we are getting awfully close to the point
where a civil war or revolution becomes probable.” The logic underlying most of these predictions is
consistent and straightforward. Americans are more divided on social and political issues than in previous
decades, and they hate each other more. Violence is boiling over: Armed right-wing militants traveled to sites of left-
wing protests this summer, supposedly to enforce order, and deadly clashes occurred. If tensions continue to grow, these
isolated incidents could become more common — and the United States might follow the path of other
nations that have experienced full-blown armed conflict in recent decades. Despite its appeal, this view
betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of political violence. Historically, the academic literature on
the causes of civil war was divided into two categories: Some scholars viewed such conflicts as a
predictable outcome whenever there were deep grievances within national populations, while others
stressed the importance of citizens having an opportunity to act on those resentments. Much of the
discussion about violence in the United States today centers, implicitly, on the grievance model, holding
that if we know how much different tribes of Americans hate each other, we can predict the likelihood
of fighting in the streets. But scholars now prefer the opportunity model, thanks to large-scale studies
that examine political violence worldwide with cutting-edge statistical methods. Grievances and
societal cleavages exist everywhere, waiting to be exploited. What distinguishes the countries that
descend into civil war from those that do not is the lack of state capacity to put down rebellion — for reasons
rooted in politics, economics or geography. Gun laws were meant to ban private militants. Now, our hands are tied. You
might expect, for instance, states that lack democracy, that have diverse populations or that discriminate
against minorities would be at the highest risk of internal conflict, because such conditions foment bitter
grievances. But in fact, those qualities are at most loosely correlated with civil war , as scholars like the Stanford
University political scientists James Fearon and David Laitin and the University of California at San Diego’s Barbara F. Walter have shown.
Rather, civil wars happen where the state is weak. Lower levels of wealth predict civil war, because poor
countries lack the law enforcement and military capability to put down armed rebellions. That helps to explain
recent conflicts in such varied countries as Yemen and Congo. Power vacuums, as occurred during and after decolonization, after
American regime-change wars and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, create uncertainty about who is in charge and can
inspire those who seek power to take up arms. There are other factors, too: States that are rich in oil see more civil war
because the potential payoffs of a successful rebellion are higher — but this applies only up to a certain level of income, after which point the
government is often able to buy off or destroy any potential challengers. The Balkans offer a ready example of how grievance based on ethnic
tension must be intertwined with the collapse of order for groups to take up arms against one another. While various ethnolinguistic
communities there long eyed each other with suspicion, going back to the days of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, those tensions
did not lead to violence for most of the region’s history, including during the nearly half-century of communist rule. But when the Soviet empire
fell and communist governments were discredited, parts of Yugoslavia began to declare independence. Serbs, Bosnians, Croats and Albanians,
incited by political opportunists and demagogues, fought wars against one another for a decade, drawing in the international community, until
sovereign states emerged with new, widely accepted borders. In one influential 2006 study representative of the new
school of thought — one that examined 172 countries from 1945 to 2000 — the political scientists Havard Hegre, of
the Center for the Study of Civil War, and Nicholas Sambanis, of Yale University, used advanced statistical tools to determine
which of 88 factors most consistently predicted civil war. Grievance-based measures like authoritarian
government and ethnolinguistic diversity ranked low or had no discernible effect (although the latter did predict internal conflict
when the analysis included the lowest level of conflict measured, defined as 25 or more deaths in a year). In contrast, Hegre and Sambanis
found that measures of opportunity like a small military establishment and rough terrain — which offers a base from which
rebels can strike — had a much stronger and more consistent effect. Geography is a surprisingly potent variable in predicting
civil war — and can confound even moderately strong states. During such conflicts, governments usually control the cities, and rebels form
bases in relatively inaccessible regions like mountains, forests and swamps. Countries that have had problems with mountain-based minorities
include Russia, which has confronted rebels in Chechnya, and Turkey, which is still fighting Kurds in the southeast of the country. (Until the
1990s, the Turkish government even referred to Kurds as “Mountain Turks,” denying their identity while acknowledging the geographical
nature of the problem.) Even with the most difficult geographic conditions, however, wealth and government power tend to erase
opportunities for rebellion. Consider that in 1948 and 1949, South Korea faced a communist-led uprising on Jeju Island — which lies in the
Korea Strait, about 60 miles from the mainland — in a conflict that cost as many as 30,000 lives, mostly civilian. A poor, newly independent
South Korea had difficulty bringing that island under control and relied on brutal tactics to do so, including summary executions. But now that
South Korea has joined the club of modern, industrialized states with advanced militaries, the idea of a region like Jeju rebelling has become
unthinkable. Wealth and military power explain why, in the United States, civil war is likely to remain a
metaphor. Its per capita gross domestic product is about $62,000 a year, among the highest in the world, and its
military is clearly capable of wiping out any challenges to state power. (The U.S. Civil War occurred when the nation
had a per capita GDP comparable to that of a developing nation today, and when military technology was limited to rifles and cannon.) The
Pentagon has 1.3 million active-duty personnel, can find terrorists on the other side of the world and
wipe them out with the push of a button, and boasts a command-and-control structure with no recent
history of factionalization. There is no swamp or mountain peak that is beyond the easy reach of the U.S. military. A recent survey by
Nationscape revealed that 36 percent of Republicans and 33 percent of Democrats thought that violence was at least somewhat justified to
accomplish political goals. The opportunity model suggests that while a survey result like this reveals disturbing things about our political
culture, it does not presage civil war. To be sure, riots
and general discord can happen as long as leaders lack the
political will to respond (or if, as today, leaders disagree about the line dividing peaceful protest from lawlessness). But as soon as
the authorities perceive a serious enough problem, they can move quickly and decisively, a lesson
learned by the anarchists who recently took over part of Seattle, declaring it the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone. They
were tolerated for just over three weeks until they were cleared out by local police in partnership with the FBI. Law enforcement at the local
and national levels, from police to the military, remains united and under civilian control, willing and able to put down potential threats to our
governing system or territorial integrity. Five myths about militias The wide availability of guns does make the American situation unique
among developed countries — and leads to more horrific low-level violence, such as the 2019 El Paso shooting, in which a White racist angry
about immigration is accused of targeting innocent Hispanics, killing 23 people. (He had apparently sought, but failed, to provoke a larger
conflict.) But that is not civil war — and using such hyperbolic language may actually lead to more violence, as radicals come to believe that true
civil war is possible and undertake copycat attacks. In fact, the situation in Michigan suggests how intoxicating the idea of civil war can be. Had
the recently arrested anti-government extremists not been under close federal surveillance — itself a reassuring sign of state capacity — they
might have committed hideous political violence. Yet their goal of inciting civil war would have remained out of reach. Those predicting civil war
have correctly identified serious problems in American society: Ever-widening divisions based on factors including race, geography and
partisanship make it difficult to respond to such varied threats as pandemics, economic crises and climate change. But our problem
remains bitter polarization and distrust, not the literal disintegration of the country. The United States faces
monumental challenges in the coming months and years, from a rancorous election (and its aftershocks) to difficult racial issues to continuing
environmental calamity. Extreme partisanship and political discord will absolutely make everything harder. But the sooner we realize
that civil war is highly unlikely, the sooner we can focus on real problems.
2NC
Turns Economic Decline
Avoiding excessive litigation and an uncongested court system are key to economic
growth – it allows areas like patent litigation to flourish that are barred off because of
clogged judiciaries
Kesan and Ball 10 (Gwendolyn G. Ball Research Fellow Business, Economics and Law Group Institute
for Genomic Biology and Information Trust Institute University of Illinois, “Judges, Courts and Economic
Development: the Impact of Judicial Human Capital on the Efficiency and Accuracy of the Court System”
4/30/10 https://papers.sioe.org/paper/716.html)
There is a long-standing consensus that the clear definition and enforcement of property rights is an
important element in economic development.1 This consensus is of more than scholarly concern; the experience in the
reforming socialist economies demonstrates that secure property rights play an major role in market
economies.2 But well-designed laws and regulations cannot ensure property rights without an institution that will enforce those rights and settle disputes,
and in nearly all countries the final forum for resolving property rights disputes is the court system. Thus,
a well-functioning court system is crucial for economic growth Following this line of reasoning, economists have considered the operations of court systems an important area
of study. However, economic study of courts has usually focused on the design of incentive mechanisms to ensure an accountable and impartial judiciary. Much of this literature discusses the inherent tradeoff between judicial independence and judicial accountability.3 Nonetheless,
some authors have noted that even if judicial incentives are perfectly designed, the organization of the court system and the rules under which it operates can have a dramatic impact on its effectiveness as an economic institution. While it is true that judges need to be protected from
outside influences which could bias their decision, even unbiased decisions must accurately interpret the law. Inaccurate or well meaning but seemingly idiosyncratic decisions will decrease confidence in the legal system and increase uncertainty in economic activity.4 And accuracy alone
Disputes must be resolved and decisions must be rendered in a timely manner if they
is not sufficient for a high quality court system.
are to provide investors with the security and certainty necessary to promote investment . Thus, a
judicial system must not only be impartial, it must be accurate and efficient as well. International institutions promoting economic development,
such as The World Bank, have recognized this link and launched technical assistance efforts to improve the administration of court systems around the developing world.5 Economic scholarship also recognizes the importance of a well-managed court system. In their study of the
relationship between entrepreneurial investment and the “quality” of the legal systems across states in Mexico, Laeven and Woodruff, define “quality” not only as “the impartiality of judges” but also as “the quality of judges; the adequacy of judicial resources; the efficiency of
enforcement of rulings; the efficiency of judicial administration more generally; the cost, ease of use and completeness of property registries and the adequacy of local legislation related to contract enforcement.”6 Rosales-Lopez explores the impact of recent reforms in the Spanish court
system on its ability to resolve disputes, citing the “problems such as congestion, the high cost and delay of procedures [that weaken] the access and citizens’ equality before the law, as well as the enforcement of laws and the guarantees of property rights and contracts.”7 Choi, Gulati
and Posner8 compare appointed and judges and find ambiguous results regarding the “independence” of the two judicial systems. However, they also evaluate both the “productivity” (as measured by the number of opinons written) and the “quality” (as measured by the number of
citations received by such opinions) of judges in the two systems. Thus, to ensure public confidence and promote investment, courts must not only be impartial in administering justice, but also accurate and efficient in the resolution of disputes.9 . Finally, in their massive international
study of adjudication of simple civil cases, Djankov, et. al.[3] analyze the importance of court procedures on both accountability and also on accuracy and case duration. Thus Recent economic scholarship has acknowledged the importance of case duration in analyzing the operation of
court systems.
2nc – t/c – disease
Decline causes disease outbreaks – most qualified authors
Suhrcke, et al 11 – Professor of Global Health Economics at the Centre for Health Economics with a PhD
in Economics from Hamburg University; Professor of Political Economy and Sociology at Oxford
University with a PhD in Social and Political Sciences from Cambridge University; Senior Expert of Public
Health Emergency Preparedness at the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control with a PhD
in Science and Technology Studies from the University of Edinburgh; Consultant and Public Health
Adviser at the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; researcher at Sheffield Hallam
University; Professor of European Public Health and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine; researcher at the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; Assistant Professor of
Medicine at Stanford University with a MD and PhD from Yale University; Professor in Infectious Disease
Epidemiology at the UCL Institute for Global Health; Professor of Health Protection at the University of
East Anglia; Clinical Lecturer in Public Health at the School of Medicine, Health Policy, and Practice at the
University of East Anglia; Head of Health Determinants Program and CV at the European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control with a MPH in Environmental Health Sciences from the School of Public
Health at the University of California at Berkeley and a PhD in Cell and Molecular Biology at the Swiss
federal Institute of Technology (Marc, David Stuckler, Jonathon Suk, Monica Desai, Michaela Senek,
Martin McKee, Svetla Tsolova, Sanjay Basu, Ibrahim Abubakar, Paul Hunter, Boika Rechel, and Jan
Semenza, “The Impact of Economic Crises on Communicable Disease Transmission and Control: A
Systematic Review of the Evidence,” PLOS One, June 10, 2011,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3112201/)
We found evidence that crises often increased direct and indirect contact rates among human hosts or
common vehicles and between human hosts and disease vectors (Figure 1) [13], [34], [46], [47]. We also observed that
crises can lead to changes in host behaviour that decrease host immunity [30], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52]. As
concerns direct human-to-human transmission, economic downturns may lead to increased crime, especially against
property (although this can be mitigated by effective policing [53] and by increased social welfare spending, as occurred in the Great Depression
[54]), as
well as to increased prison populations. Prisons, in turn, have been shown to act as incubators for
tuberculosis, for example, with overcrowding playing a key role, and subsequent spill-overs to the general
population [12], [13], [34], [55]. Indirect transmission through a common vehicle was documented in Uzbekistan subsequent to the
breakup of the former Soviet Union [56]. High diarrheal disease rates during the summer months were recorded in Nukus, an administrative
centre of a region in Uzbekistan. A randomized intervention trial using home chlorination pinpointed the source of these high disease rates:
cross-connections between the municipal water distribution system and sewer lines were implicated as the common vehicle in disease
transmission. Leaky pipes and lack of water pressure are manifestations of a failing infrastructure,
mismanaged during times of economic hardship, which can cross-contaminate the drinking water
supply. The political, social and economic upheaval at the time resulted in deterioration of water treatment and distribution systems in
Uzbekistan, with serious implications for public health. Environmental changes in vector habitats may occur due to
economic downturns, which could increase contact rates between humans and disease vectors . One study
found that mortgage foreclosures in the Californian housing market in California in 2007 caused homes with
swimming pools to be abandoned, increasing breeding habitats for mosquitoes. This was linked to an
unexpectedly early seasonal increase in West Nile Virus cases [46]. A study of the economic crisis in Kosovo in 1999–
2000 found that economic dislocation resulted in the abandonment of food stores. Subsequent rises in
rodent populations led to the emergence of tularaemia [47]. An ecologic study suggested that people in Central and
Eastern Europe who returned to subsistence agricultural productions, in particular mushroom harvesting, were at greater risk of tick-borne
encephalitis [13]. Behavioural changes induced by economic downturns may lead to increased exposure to disease. Loss of income,
involuntary unemployment and job insecurity appear to lead to increased tobacco consumption,
substance abuse and hazardous drinking, all of which could impair immunity [52]. For example, tobacco use
increases the immediate risk of TB mortality and longer-term risk of TB spread and reactivation [35], [51].
Alcohol can increase susceptibility to some infectious diseases, such as pneumonia and tuberculosis [38]. However,
some research has suggested that risky behaviours associated with affluent lifestyles can decrease during recessions [27], [57], depending on
the price and availability of the substances in question [30], [45]. The implications for infectious disease are not, however, known. Other factors
may also reduce immunity during an economic downturn, but the links are indirect. There is some evidence linking stress to
impaired immunological status, by virtue of the cortisol response, increasing susceptibility to certain infectious
diseases, [49] [48] although responses to stress vary greatly between individuals [58]. Meanwhile, governments which do not
provide food subsidies to indigent populations when faced with rising food prices risk impairing
nutrition, a risk factor for several infectious diseases that appears to reflect weakening immunological
defences against latent infections, for example, reactivation of tuberculosis [38].
2nc – t/c – infrastructure
Infrastructure investment decreases during economic decline – empirics
Fisher 16 – Professor of Economics at Michigan State University with a PhD in Economics from Brown
University (Ronald, “Infrastructure Spending After the Great Recession,” National Tax Association,
November 2016, https://www.ntanet.org/wp-content/uploads/proceedings/2016/143-fisher-
infrastructure-spending-paper.pdf)
How is state and local government spending on infrastructure (capital) faring more than six years after the Great Recession ended formally? The
short (and depressing) answer is that on average the state and local government sector is not investing to the
degree in the past. Of course, governments in some states are doing much better than in others, with the differences quite dramatic. If
permanent, the Great Recession may become an important factor in continuing the decline in the quality
of state and local government capital facilities (roads, bridges, schools, water and sewer systems, and so on). In addition to
reframing the role of state and local governments in the U.S. economy, this trend has implications for environmental quality, safety, and
economic growth. That the financial market crisis and subsequent Great Recession had a historically substantial impact on
the state and local government sector is well known. The Great Recession began officially in December 2007, during fiscal year
2008 for most state and local governments, and ended in June 2009, at the end of fiscal year 2009. Revenue declined substantially,
initially for state governments and later for local governments, requiring adjustments in spending, employment, and
services. The federal government response to the Recession included additional resources and financial options for state and local
governments, which partially mitigated the fiscal effects for a limited period. However, those effects were temporary. State and local
government spending on infrastructure has declined substantially in the last several years and is now
less than before the Great Recession, as shown in Figure 1. State and local governments spent a nominal amount of about $325
billion on capital expenditure in 2007, rising to $357 billion in 2009 as a result of the federal government stimulus, and then falling to $323
billion in 2013. However, these nominal amounts mask real declines in value. State-local capital spending was 2.3 percent of GDP in 2007 but
only 1.9 percent in 2013. Adjusting for changes in population and prices, real per capita state-local capital spending declined from $1,162 in
2007 to $952 in 2013. Moreover, state and local governments together were spending more than 12 percent of their budgets on capital
investment in 2007 but only about 10 percent in 2013. So, public
capital investment has declined not only because
state and local governments are spending less overall, but also because capital investment has become
relatively less important. Obviously, this trend has serious potential implications for the quality of public infrastructure in the future.
At: pdb
Links to the net benefit more --- stakeholders will be more incentivized to sue because
of the perm’s non-binding nature --- binding is key --- empirics prove
Thaw 14 (David, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Connecticut; Affiliated Fellow,
Information Society Project, Yale Law School. Effective July 1, 2014, Assistant Professor of Law and
Information Sciences, University of Pittsburgh. "Enlightened Regulatory Capture" Washington Law
Review, Vol 89:329)
The most critical aspect of ERC is that the capture function is enforced by rule. The participants must
believe that their work will necessarily become part of the rule that is adopted. This is similar to, but more
expansive than, Harter’s “inevitability of decision” factor.211 In Part I, I considered two cases of regulation regarding the NCLB—one by the
DOI, and one by the DOE. The organic statute differs notably between these two cases—both specify the use of negotiated rulemaking, but the
DOI has no exemption for it, whereas the DOE has an exemption. As discussed in the analysis of those examples, the “weaker”
version of capture is likely one of the reasons the DOI example is noted as a negotiated rulemaking
“success” whereas the DOE example is regarded by the literature as a negotiated rulemaking failure.212
Additionally, as discussed in Part II, the consultation requirement that effectively caused HHS to turn over the rulemaking process to
the NCVHS contributed both to the committee members’ perception of their authority213 and their
willingness to act in the public interest—rather than fighting with competitors to advance their own
interests.
-- Severs certainty --- plan must be done immediately --- key to all ground based on
time-sensitive arguments --- if it doesn’t, it links because it cuts-off negotiation mid-
process --- collapsing compliance
Martin 91 (Herbert J., Partner – Crowell & Moring, JD – Catholic University Law School, and BA and MA
– Fordham University, “Alternative Dispute Resolution: Coming to Proceedings Near You”, Public Utilities
Fortnightly, 3-1, Lexis)
The act also includes highly detailed provisions governing the use of binding arbitration in agency
proceedings. The focus on arbitration and the level of detail devoted to it appears to be a function of the
binding nature of this form of dispute resolution. The act allows the head of an agency to terminate an
arbitration proceeding or vacate an arbitration award before it becomes final. If this power is exercised
to vacate an award, parties may recover their attorney fees and expenses incurred in connection with
the arbitration, unless the agency head determines that such recovery would be unjust. These provisions
were inserted to satisfy the concerns of the Department of Justice that arbitration decisions binding the
government would constitute an unlawful delegation of executive authority. The expectation is that this
summary power will be exercised rarely; otherwise, parties will quickly lose faith in arbitrations involving
the government. In fact, despite the focus on binding arbitration in the act, other nonbinding forms of
dispute resolution may find greater favor in agency proceedings.
a. Resolved
OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, “Resolved,” Volume 13, p. 725)
Of the mind, etc.: Freed from doubt or uncertainty, fixed, settled. Obs.
Should
Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”,
1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?
CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)
4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" 13 in the May 18 order connotes
futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must
be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the
critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will
or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered
from the four corners of the entire record.16 [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] 13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative"
synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9,
Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl.
contexts mandate
143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain
a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at
1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of
the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802
P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee
or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215
(Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers
they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In
denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something
legal parlance the phrase
that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27
L.Ed. 201 (1882).
The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially
the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full
existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential , apparent, constructive, and imaginary;
veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing;
true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive. Bass v. Pease, 79 Ill. App. 308, 318.
In short, the existing system of labor law fails to give workers a voice at work, in the economy, or in our democracy. In our view, remedying
these weaknesses of labor law should be a top priority for progressive lawmakers and organizations. In particular, progressives should push for a new and expansive system of sectoral
bargaining, as well as reforms that guarantee all workers real rights to unionize, to strike, and to take other concerted action. 13 See Andrias, supra note 9; Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the
Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1397 (1971); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further “Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor
Relations,” 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990). CREATIVE COMMONS COPYRIGHT 2017 | ROOSEVELTINSTITUTE.ORG 13 Such an effort would not just benefit newly unionized workers; it would also
pass ambitious social programs and reforms, including universal pre-K and child care, Medicare for all, progressive tax and fiscal policy, and even “breakthrough”
reforms, such as a federal job guarantee 14 or steps toward a universal basic income.15 Unions may also be able to counteract some of the harms associated
with employer monopsony, which has become an acute concern of progressives.16 Rebuilding a more fair and equal political economy will be a long-term project, with many components. But
fundamental labor law reform must be central to that effort. Before moving into our analysis and proposals, we should mention an important crosscutting issue: the scope of labor law
preemption. Many of the potential reforms outlined below may be easier to design and implement at the state level, but states’ powers to encourage private sector organizing and collective
bargaining are extremely limited.17 We are hesitant to endorse wholesale repeal of existing preemption doctrine because of the risk that individual states will undermine rather than bolster
workers’ rights. Nevertheless, we believe that Congress should consider enabling state reforms that increase workers’ rights to organize, bargain, and engage in concerted activity—but not
state reforms that undermine such rights. How precisely to draft such statutory language is beyond the scope of this paper.18
A process for allocating bargaining rights to worker organizations and employer organizations—and a process for union funding. A sectoral bargaining process needs to
make clear who has the right to bargain or set wages and benefits—i.e., which worker organizations, which employer organizations. Any system would need to ensure fair
representation of workers and employers in the given sector. With respect to worker representation, the rules governing unions’ access to
workers would need to be revised significantly to make organizing at the sectoral level realistic. For example, it may make sense to give unions that have a demonstrated level of support within
a sector reasonable access to workers, both through access to employers’ physical property and by giving unions contact lists for workers. A new sectoral process might also allocate rights
based on a different principle than exclusive representation. Proportional representation would be one option, for example, though that may create political challenges between unions. A host
of similar questions would need to be considered with regard to employer representation. Finally, the question of how to fund unions’ activities in a sectoral or social bargaining structure
would need to be addressed.84 Ground rules for the bargaining process. Here, there are at least three subsidiary questions. First, what will be legitimate topics of bargaining? Many European
countries set economic terms at the sectoral level while leaving work rules and management policies to be negotiated at the local level. That division of responsibility may make sense in the
United States, assuming that sectoral bargaining is combined with reforms that enable local organization, as discussed in Part 1. Second, what remedies would be available for failure to
bargain in good faith? Congress might grant the NLRB the power to order damages or to order the parties to enter mediation or interest arbitration, or Congress might decide to leave
agreement to the balance of economic weapons. Third, what is the role of the state in the process? There is a continuum of possibilities here. At one end, the state is basically an outsider that
simply polices unlawful acts by the parties; at the other end, it is a party to a tripartite process, and it retains ultimate decision-making power. Coverage and enforcement of sectoral standards.
Finally, Congress and the NLRB, or other agencies, would need to determine which employers and employees are covered by a new set of standards and how to enforce those standards. If
standards were set administratively, the first challenge would be less acute, but lawmakers would still need to determine whether workers would have private rights of action and whether
unions would play a role in enforcement. Sectoral collective bargaining agreements would present more complicated issues. Regarding coverage, once a significant number of employers within
an agency
a sector have signed on, it would be best to bind non-signatory employers, yet that is not possible under standard contract law doctrines. To resolve this problem,
could be empowered to apply prevailing standards throughout the industry via administrative
rulemaking, or 84 See Andrias, supra note 9, at 95-97 (discussing alternative funding mechanisms for unions engaged in sectoral or social bargaining). CREATIVE COMMONS
COPYRIGHT 2017 | ROOSEVELTINSTITUTE.ORG 30 Congress could follow a process akin to European “extension” laws, through a form of fast-track legislation. Regarding enforcement of
sectoral agreements, unions and workers are their own best advocates. Many enforcement challenges can therefore be solved through reforms to
enable worker organizing and concerted action, such as those discussed elsewhere in this report. Regarding enforcement, the United States has different approaches today for minimum
investigation and private rights of action, while collective bargaining agreements are generally enforced through private arbitration, with the threat of economic
weapons for serious breach. These issues would be complicated in a sectoral system, since unions that enter into agreements may have little local organization among covered employers. And
yet administrative enforcement of private agreements could trigger concerns about private delegation of regulatory authority.
Certainty is a DA to the aff – only reg neg promotes transparency and input that are
essential to public respect for the law – plan won’t be trusted because it’s a top-down
bolt from the blue—only the CP solves
Siegler 97 (Ellen, Senior Attorney – American Petroleum Institute, “Regulatory Negotiations and Other
Rulemaking Processes: Strengths and Weaknesses from an Industry Viewpoint”, Duke Law Journal, April,
46 Duke L.J. 1429, Lexis)
There can be benefits to participating in a successful reg neg. First, the opportunity for participants to discuss issues and
confront each other sometimes leads to a more creative and more practical regulatory approach than would have occurred in a traditional
rulemaking process, in which parties with different, adverse positions would participate largely by submitting written comments on a proposed
rule. Second, the consensus process - with its expectation of avoiding litigation over final rule - may persuade the agency to adopt a more
creative legal interpretation than it might have otherwise adopted for the purpose of reaching a result that all parties agree makes sense. Third,
a successful reg neg can provide greater certainty than the traditional rulemaking process that a
regulation will not change between agreement and proposal or between proposal and a final rule. This
certainty is extremely valuable to industry, especially if compliance entails major construction projects,
which are costly and require years of advance planning.
Implementation and administration of the plan are uncertain. Reg neg solves.
Kerwin 83 (Cornelius, Assistant Professor and Coordinator of Doctoral Programs in the School of
Government and Public Administration – American University, “Assessing the Effects of Consensual
Processes in Regulatory Programs: Methodological and Policy Issues”, American University Law Review,
32 Am. U.L. Rev. 401, Winter, Lexis)
A parallel development is the attempt to improve the mechanisms for formulating regulations and for the resolution of disputes resulting from
their implementation. To enhance procedural options for regulatory reform, the Congress, the courts, and the administrative agencies have
explored hybrid rulemaking techniques. 2 Such methods combine elements of informal notice and comment rulemaking 3 with those of formal
hearings. 4 These rulemaking mechanisms allow for more thorough consideration of controversial factual matters without requiring compliance
with the formal procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 Increasing attention also is being focused on the use of
consensual processes -- including negotiation, mediation, and arbitration -- to formulate regulatory policy and to
settle disputes. 6 The basic premise of these procedural alternatives is that consensual processes are more likely to
produce successful solutions to recognized policy problems than are traditional procedures. This Article considers
how policy analysis can help determine the proper procedure for making regulatory decisions. The first section briefly reviews the research
techniques best suited to such a complex task. The next section considers the arguments favoring the use of consensual processes to replace
traditional administrative rulemaking and adjudication and sets out the analytic issues such claims raise. The following discussion of collective
ratemaking in the motor carrier industry addresses especially the unresolved issues in the current debate over replacing [*403] this variation on
consensual process with a free market process for setting prices. Throughout this Article a prominent theme is the relationship between
decisionmaking procedures and policy objectives. The essential argument is that policy analysis perspectives and techniques can highlight the
importance of explicit criteria when evaluating a proposed change in decisionmaking procedures. I. POLICY ANALYSIS AND REGULATORY
DECISIONMAKING Policy analysis is a generic term embracing a variety of research methods used in the study of policy formation,
implementation, and effect. The technique most often associated with regulation is benefit-cost analysis. n7 The last two Presidential
administrations have used benefit-cost analysis to bring about important changes in the process of regulatory decisionmaking. President
Reagan's "net-benefit" rule requires responsible officials to formulate the content of major regulations by estimating the likely effects prior to,
rather than after, implementation. n8 Because there is no base of actual performance, making such analyses has proved difficult. The now
familiar problems associated with valuing benefits and isolating indirect costs are intensified when the objective
of the analysis is a forecast rather than an evaluation. Implementation and administration of regulatory programs are
fraught with uncertainties that are difficult to anticipate. Similarly, conflicts between agencies and
affected parties that lead to reduced or delayed compliance are unpredictable . These complications affect both
quantifying and precisely estimating benefits and costs under the current regulatory analysis program.
Solvency deficit to the Aff --- no one will believe the plan
Lawrence 98 (Robert, New Century Chair in International Trade – Brookings Institution and Williams
Chair in International Trade – Harvard University, Gary Burtless, Senior Fellow – Brookings Institution,
Robert Litan, Senior Fellow – Brookings Institution, Robert Shapiro, Founder – Progressive Policy
Institute, Globaphobia: Confronting Fears about Free Trade, p. 95-96)
The case for unilateral free trade rests on the assumption that nations do not have influence over the
behavior of their trading partners. Yet as discussed in chapter 2, much of the liberalization of the world
economy has taken place as a result of international negotiations. There are many reasons why it can be
in a nation’s interest to enter into such agreements, rather than to pursue unilateral free trade. First,
even though a nation may benefit from removing its own barriers to trade, it can do even better if its
trading partners also eliminate their barriers, raising the demand for the nation’s exports and thus
improving its buying power in international markets. If a nation can use the carrot of lowering its own
barriers to induce another nation to do the same, both nations benefit. Reciprocity of some kind may be
desirable, not because it is in some sense “fair,” but because it may be more effective in achieving
mutually beneficial trade. Second, international negotiations can strengthen the influence of those who
gain from free trade. While trade may be in the national interest, it creates some losers in the industries
that compete with imports. If the losers are politically powerful, they may block a unilateral reduction in
barriers. Trade negotiations might mobilize one group of domestic producers—exporters who would
gain from liberalization abroad—to offset the influence of those domestic producers and workers who
would compete with the imports, and thus make it politically easier for leaders to adopt policies in the
nation’s interest. Third, international agreements can give a nation’s liberal trade policies greater
credibility. Before firms will undertake the investments needed to serve foreign markets, they need to
be confident that access to these markets will be forthcoming. When countries, particularly those with a
long history of protection, proclaim a new-found allegiance to open trade and investment, investors
often react quite skeptically. By undertaking commitments that can provoke international sanctions if
they are broken, countries can persuade others of the permanence of their changes. As discussed in
chapter 3, this “lock-in” motive was a principle reason why President Salinas wanted Mexico to join the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The United States and Canada agreed with this
strategy.
Cp solves link to litigation because it takes away stake holders legal right to sue, and a
genuine reg neg spills up and take away incentives
Gray 15 (C. Boyden, Founding Partner, Boyden Gray & Associates PLLC; Special Envoy for Eurasian
Energy Diplomacy, 2008-2009; Special Envoy for European Union Affairs, 2008-2009; Ambassador to the
European Union, 2006-2007; Counselor to the President, 1989-1993; Legal Counsel to the Vice-
President, 1981-1989; former Counsel, Presidential Task Force on Regulator Relief. "NEW APPROACHES
TO INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COOPERATION: UPGRADING EXISTING REGULATORY MECHANISMS
FOR TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION" Law and Contemporary Problems. 78 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 31. l/n)
In the typical notice-and-comment rulemaking in the United States, the agency develops a proposed rule
using whatever sources of information it has available, and it then publishes the proposed rule without
the benefit of formal input from the entities the rule will affect. n63 But only after the proposed rule has
issued do regulated entities and other concerned parties have an opportunity to offer formal input on
the content of the rule.
Foreign governments and regulators have the same opportunity as any other interested party to
comment on proposed federal rules in the United States. The agency is required to consider and
reasonably respond to significant public comments before finalizing a rule, n64 but the influence of such
comments tends to [*42] be limited. n65 They typically represent competing viewpoints of parties with
conflicting interests who disagree about whether the agency does too much or too little. Thus, even if
one party's comments could overcome the inertia of the agency-drafted proposal, these comments are
often effectively canceled out by those of other parties. Typical notice-and-comment rulemaking does
not privilege the comments of foreign governments over those of any other member of the public, so
the capacity of foreign comments to nudge a proposed rule toward harmonization with European law is
limited.
Foreign regulators could have a much greater influence in negotiated rulemaking (reg-neg). In reg-neg,
the entities that will be affected by a rule are included much earlier in the rule-making process - in the
drafting of the proposed rule - and provide input in a collaborative process rather than independently of
one another. n66 The point is to allow stakeholders to strike bargains that would not be feasible through
ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking.
At its most ambitious, transnational reg-neg could work effectively as part of a coordinated plan of
rulemaking in the United States and the EU, to avoid unnecessarily duplicative regulations. The EU's own
2009 Impact Assessment Guidelines could justify a roughly analogous mechanism for input by U.S.
regulators in the EU's impact assessment process. But even a more modest application of reg-neg could
help reduce barriers to trade by inviting European input in the drafting of specific U.S. rules with
anticipated transatlantic effects.
Reg-neg has existed as an idea in the minds of academics since the mid-1970s, n67 but it started gaining
momentum in the 1980s when the Environmental Protection Agency engaged in several negotiated
rulemakings, and it attracted the support of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS).
n68 Congress passed the Negotiated Rulemaking Act in 1990, n69 and made ACUS the implementing
agency. n70
Under the Act, a federal agency has discretion to establish a negotiated rulemaking committee using, if it
chooses, the services of a convener to identify [*43] interested parties to participate in the negotiation.
n71 The agency publishes notice of the negotiated rule-making committee, and interested parties not
already identified by the convener may apply for membership. n72 Under the leadership of a facilitator
nominated by the agency and approved by the negotiated rulemaking committee, the committee then
attempts to reach consensus on a proposed rule. n73
The benefits typically associated with reg-neg include improved information due to the iterative nature
of negotiation and the related incentive to cooperate, n74 the increased sense of legitimacy that parties
involved in the drafting process attribute to the resulting rule, n75 closer correlation between the final
rule and the proposed rule, n76 the avoidance of litigation, n77 reduced delay, n78 and faster
adaptation to the new rule by regulated entities involved from the beginning. n79
Some critics of reg-neg have questioned whether it has actually achieved these benefits in practice. n80
But these criticisms turn on erroneous calculations of the duration of various rule-making proceedings,
and unfair comparisons of traditional rulemaking and reg-neg, which tends, by design, to involve more
[*44] complicated and contentious issues than garden-variety rulemaking. n81 These critics also point
out that negotiated rulemaking has largely fallen into disuse, but this is not because it is ineffective.
Rather, individual agencies perceive reg-neg as diluting their regulatory authority, because interested
parties are brought into the process during the drafting of a proposed rulemaking, and agencies are
deterred by the up-front cost of reg-neg. n82 For its part, OMB perceives rules produced through reg-
neg as less amenable to OMB input because they represent a compromise between the responsible
agency and interested parties. n83 But OMB can always review any rule before it is finalized. n84 OMB
can even participate in the negotiation. n85 And the tendency of negotiated rulemaking to attract
advance support from outside of the government is a benefit, whether or not OMB perceives it that
way.
The reformulated gasoline rule (RFG) is a good example of reg-neg achieving a better result than could
have been accomplished in the absence of stakeholder input at the drafting stage. n86 Like a rule with
transnational implications, the RFG rule was a good candidate for reg-neg because of its complexity, and
because collaboration with affected parties and other regulators would result in better information than
the convening agency could obtain by itself. n87 The process brought together thirty-five interested
parties, including oil interests, alcohol fuel producers, environmental advocates, automotive
manufacturers, state-level regulators, and the Department of Energy.
The inclusion of state regulatory agencies in the RFG rulemaking offers a good model for the
involvement of foreign sovereigns in the rule-making process. Along with environmental advocates, the
state regulators insisted on "a formal, written protocol guaranteeing that their good-faith bargaining
efforts [*45] would not be wasted due to intervention from the Bush Administration." n88 I was among
the small group of high-level executive branch advisors that hashed out the resulting protocol with the
state regulators. n89 Our protocol barred executive branch intervention during and after the reg-neg
and obligated stakeholders not to litigate the final rule as long as it was consistent with the negotiated
rulemaking committee's consensus. This preliminary agreement was crucial to the success of the
rulemaking. n90 State regulators also influenced the negotiation of a key bargain over the means used
to reach compliance. n91 In exchange for allowing refiners to average the emissions of their total fuel
pool, state regulators and environmental organizations extracted a more stringent baseline for
emissions reductions and tougher emissions standards. n92
In the end, the RFG rulemaking was widely considered a success. n93 The compromise that allowed
tougher-than-expected emissions standards in the context of averaging could not have been achieved
through traditional notice-and-comment procedure, which lacks the back-and-forth of reg-neg. As a
result of the negotiation, the rule was based on the best available scientific data, n94 oil interests were
satisfied that they could comply with the new rule, and environmentalists and regulators approvingly
regarded it as more stringent than the rule EPA would have issued otherwise. n95 Most importantly, the
state regulators' satisfaction with the rule meant that individual states were less likely to implement
their own competing emissions programs, which would have resulted in duplicative regulatory regimes
and high compliance costs. n96
This description of negotiated rulemaking in practice shows how reg-neg could be adapted to the
transatlantic context. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act makes clear that the process is open to
"innovation and experimentation," n97 so policymakers should think creatively about its potential as a
device for promoting regulatory cooperation. Reg-neg works best for rulemakings that are complex and
controversial. n98 And introducing transnational corporations and a [*46] foreign sovereign into the
picture adds a layer of complexity that would be well served by reg-neg, even when the underlying
regulation is straightforward.
The link alone causes delay and turns aff solvency – but genuine negotiated
rulemaking avoids the link
Laptosky and Kaleta 17 – Attorney-Advisor at the Office of the General Counsel’s Office of Regulation at
the US Department of Transportation with a JD from the Indiana University Maurer School of Law;
Deputy General Counsel for the US Department of Transportation and adjunct professor at George
Mason University School of Law with a JD from the Loyola University of Chicago School of Law (Jill and
Judith, “THE PLEASURES AND PITFALLS OF NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING,” American Bar Association,
February 24, 2017, https://www.americanbar.org/content/aba/tools/digitalassetabstract.html/
content/dam/aba/administrative/air_space/course/17-update/t4-negotiated-rulemaking-pleasures-
and-pitfalls-2016.pdf)
The adversarial nature of the traditional rulemaking process results in delay and expense. The need to
establish a formal record as a basis for potential litigation sharpens the division between parties and results in an
unwillingness to recognize the legitimate viewpoints of others. Parties take extreme positions. They
may withhold information they view as damaging. The negotiated rulemaking process uses negotiation and consensus to
channel the resources and efforts of the parties toward solving the problem presented. When negotiated rulemaking
committees have to work together to find a consensus-based solution, creativity abounds. In a negotiated rulemaking,
stakeholders have an incentive to work together to develop a creative solution capable of consensus—
that is, if the stakeholders cannot find a middle ground, then the Federal agency will develop the rule on its own. As a result, the solution
developed by the committee very well might be more creative than what the Federal agency may have developed on its own. For example, in
2007, FMCSA published an NPRM to fulfill a statutory mandate to require training for entry-level drivers of commercial motor vehicles.8 The
NPRM proposed a mandatory curriculum with minimum hours for both classroom and behindthe-wheel training. While virtually all commenters
agreed with the basic concept that entry-level driver training would be valuable, many did not support FMCSA’s proposal. The NPRM was
withdrawn; 9 however, the statutory mandate to issue regulations remained. In 2015, FMCSA’s ELDTAC reached consensus in only 3 months on
a creative “hybrid” solution that would emphasize the achievement of performance objectives, while also ensuring that a reasonable amount of
minimum time would be spent on behind-the-wheel training.10 Not only was this recommendation creative, but it was reached quickly as well.
Rules developed through negotiated rulemaking are also more likely to be well-received by
stakeholders than a rule developed unilaterally through the traditional rulemaking process. In theory, if all
of the significantly affected interests in a negotiated rulemaking are represented on the committee, then
the Federal agency should receive fewer and less adverse comments during the proposed rule’s comment period.
Ideally then, the Federal agency would not need to revise the final rule very much from the proposed
rule to address the comments received, which could result in a timelier, more efficient process than
traditional rulemaking. Rules developed by negotiated rulemaking are also developed by people on the
ground in their respective fields, which may result in higher compliance rates. Negotiated rulemakings,
developed by the significantly affected stakeholders, who are also potential litigators, are less likely to
result in litigation because stakeholders are more likely to be satisfied with the final rule. When stakeholders are
involved in the rulemaking process, final rules are less likely to be a surprise, which could also mean stakeholders can start
planning early, Federal agencies can offer earlier implementation and compliance dates, and regulated
entities may be more likely to comply.
Case
Grids resilient
Paul Wagenseil 19, Senior Editor of security and privacy @ Tom’s Guide, Citing Selena Larson,
intelligence analyst @ Dragos Cybersecurity Firm, 3/11/2019, “Hackers Can't Cause Crippling
[Devastating] Blackouts, Expert Says”, https://www.tomsguide.com/us/blackout-hack-threat-
rsa2019,news-29594.html
SAN FRANCISCO — Don't believe the hype. Hackers cannot easily take down the North American
electrical grid to cause massive blackouts, despite numerous news stories, magazine articles and books
claiming that they can, a cybersecurity expert told the last week's RSA Conference.
"There are lots of misunderstandings about threats to the electric grid," said Selena Larson, an
intelligence analyst at Maryland cybersecurity firm Dragos and a former CNN reporter. "The reality is
that a destructive incident at one site would require highly tailored [malware] tools and operations, and
would not effectively scale."
That's because U.S. power plants use different makes and models of hardware and software, are often
at least partly isolated from the internet and from each other, and have already undergone a fair
degree of hardening against cyberattacks. There's very little chance that a single hacker or group of
hackers could knock out the power across a large swath of North America at once.
Scary headlines
Those inconvenient facts haven't prevented journalists and writers from penning what Larson deemed
needlessly alarming stories. One July 2018 opinion piece in The New York Times entitled "To Hackers,
We're Bambi in the Woods" began with a nightmare scenario of an America thrown back to the Stone
Age by a cyberattack that kills the power, stops the trains, empties bank accounts and opens literal
floodgates.
Later that same month, The Wall Street Journal ran a story called "Russian Hackers Reach U.S. Utility
Control Rooms, Homeland Security Officials Say," lending credence to the nightmare scenario. But it was
incorrectly reported — it was based on old information that had been revisited in a DHS presentation.
Larson didn't mention "Lights Out: A Cyberattack, A Nation Unprepared, Surviving the Aftermath," a
best-selling 2015 book by former ABC News anchor Ted Koppel.
"A well-designed attack on just one of the nation's three electric power grids could cripple much of our
infrastructure — and in the age of cyberwarfare, a laptop has become the only necessary weapon,"
reads the jacket blurb following another apocalyptic scenario of a months-long blackout leading to
societal collapse.
State-sponsored attacks
The truth is that Russian hackers do try to get into American power plants, but so far they've only
seemed to be performing reconnaissance, Larson said. Destructive malware has infected the office
networks of some power companies, but the companies weren't specifically targeted, and the malware
didn't cross over into plant operations.
"A ransomware infection at the financial-services division of an electric utility doesn't automatically
translate to a blackout," Larson said.
While most state-sponsored hacker groups targeting power plants and other industrial-control systems
only gather information, two other have gone further, Larson said. Those were the Electrum group,
which used malware dubbed CrashOverride to take down a Ukrainian power plant in 2016, and the Trisis
group, which infected the safety systems at a Saudi petrochemical plant in 2017.
Both attacks have been attributed to Russian state-sponsored hackers, and the Saudi-plant attack led
another presenter at RSA 2019 to conclude that cyberattacks would soon kill people, either deliberately
or accidentally.
But as Dragos founder and CEO Robert M. Lee stated in a 2017 blog posting describing the
CrashOverride malware, "the public must understand that the outages could be in hours or days, not
weeks or months."
Lee said that Dragos had "high confidence" that the CrashOverride hackers were the same who had in
fact targeted U.S. and European infrastructure companies in 2014. And CrashOverride contained
modules to "delete files and processes off of the running systems" to sabotage computer systems.
Larson said, however, that the CrashOverride creators had spent months or years planning the attack,
and that the malware was specifically designed for that power plant. The attacks couldn't easily scale
across the world, or even across Ukraine.
Outlook
There are true cyberattack threats out there, Larson added. For example, the Russian NotPetya
ransomware worm in June 2017 cost the Maersk shipping line an estimated $200 million, and FedEx an
estimated $300 million. The North Korean WannaCry attack the previous month crippled hospital
computer systems in Europe and North America.
But in terms of the North American power grid, small animals such as squirrels, cats and raccoons are a
much larger threat than hackers, and have caused hundreds of localized blackouts, Larson said. That
mundane detail doesn't sell books.
The public should be reassured, she added, that the North American power grid (there are in fact three
grids) has always been engineered to limit both the duration and the geographic reach of blackouts, and
that there's no single power switch that can turn it all off.
"The truth is that the North American electric grid is resilient and segmented,"
No impact to stagnation.
Posen ’16 [Adam; March 2016; Government and Economics PhD from Harvard, economic advisor to
the Congressional Budget Office, faculty of the World Economic Forum, consultant for the International
Monetary Fund and the United States government; Peterson Institute for International Economics
Briefing 16-3, Reality Check for the Global Economy, “Why We Need a Reality Check,” Ch. 1]
Greater confidence in the world economy’s resilience and near-term prospects is justified. Market fears about the ability of
policy to stabilize growth and promote inflation, if understandable, are
exaggerated or in some cases unfounded. All the more
reason then not to allow ourselves to be distracted by a financial market tail wagging the macroeconomic dog. At a fundamental level, most of
the major economies, starting with China and the United States, are growing more sustainably now than a decade
ago, at their slower rates. That growth is not built on rising private or public leverage, with the notable exception of China—and even in
China some restructuring is under way with ample savings to cushion the process. Even where the situation is not so rosy, many in the markets
seem to be confusing strains and suboptimal situations with acute instability, not just for Italian banks and for Brazilian budgets but also for
Latin America more generally or for trends in global trade. A more normal muddling through with poor but stable
conditions is a far better bet. And where some in the markets moving prices fear that normal economic laws have been reversed—
that monetary policy is ineffective or that low oil prices are on net harmful—they are likely to be proven clearly wrong, as they were previously
on inflation and commodity prices. Having some clarity
to distinguish between the more solid underlying economic
outlook and the shadows thrown by financial puppetry is critical to making the right policy decisions to avoid an
unnecessary recession.
A combination of public
policies and decentralized private-sector responses to the crisis have increased our
economic resilience, diminished the systemic spillovers between economies, and even created some room
for additional stimulus if needed. Large parts of the global financial system are better capitalized, monitored, and frankly more risk
averse than they were a decade ago, with less leverage. The riskier parts of today’s global economy are less directly linked to the center’s
growth and financing than when the troubles were within the United States and most of Europe in 2008. Trade imbalances of many key
economies are smaller, though growing, and thus accumulations of foreign debt vulnerabilities are also smaller than a decade ago. Most central
banks are now so committed to stabilization that they are attacked for being too loose or supportive of markets, making them at least unlikely
to repeat some policy errors from 2007–10 of delaying loosening or even excessive tightening. Finally, corporate and household balance sheets
are far more solid in the US and some other major economies than they were a decade ago (though not universally), and even in China the
perceptions of balance sheet weakness exceed the reality in scope and scale.
Turning next to the effects of taxation on consumer confidence, we find that the
impact of higher total direct and personal
direct taxes is negative and highly significant as one would expect: Raising the tax burden faced by
consumers reduces their disposable income, thereby generating negative welfare effects and
impacting negatively on their sentiment. On the other hand, we find that the effect of higher indirect taxes is, in general,
insignificant. We also note that the effect of total direct taxes is slightly larger than that of personal direct taxes and government investment
(columns 2 to 6), but is weaker than that of non wage (and wage) government consumption (columns 7 to 9). This finding highlights the
important role that tax policy changes have on consumer confidence, while at the same time indicates that changes in specific spending
categories e.g. cuts in public spending (such as the government wage bill) can improve confidence, possibly by rendering a fiscal consolidation
effort sustainable.
In Table 2, we report our results regarding the effects of key fiscal variables on business confidence.11 To start with, we note that an increase in
government consumption has no significant effect on business confidence. Similar to our findings regarding consumer confidence, we find the
effect of non-wage government consumption positive while that of the government wage bill negative. However, with one exception (column
8), the estimated coefficients for both wage and non-wage government consumption are insignificant. In addition, we find
that government investment exerts a negative but insignificant effect on business confidence. Note here that one
could have expected that the initiation of public investment projects, involving the private sector, would
have a positive effect on business confidence to the extent that these public investment projects improve prospects of
economic growth. Nevertheless, a contrarian view is that public investment projects do not have a direct
effect on manufacturing (hence on business confidence), since they either do not involve specific
products in the manufacturing sector or the “ receipt of payments ” might be delayed . Alternatively, according
to the standard Keynesian view, an increase in government investment crowds out private investment, which
will be reflected in lower business confidence . In line with the Keynesian argument we do find a negative effect ,
but the coefficient estimate of government investment is not significant.
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Federal law enforcement agencies that keep Americans safe are starting to feel the strain of the
U.S. government shutdown, in its 21st day, with agents working for no pay and investigations delayed, law enforcement officials said.
Training events have been canceled and travel cut back, with President Donald Trump and Congress unable to end the
partial shutdown affecting a quarter of the government in a funding standoff over Trump’s proposed U.S.-Mexico border wall.
“We still have a responsibility for going after those who might be using this time to flood the streets” with drugs, a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) field agent told Reuters, asking not to be identified by name.
“For us, it’s even a more important time to try to target as much as we can. We still have a safety obligation to the public ... with the limited
resources,” the agent said.
Most employees at federal law enforcement agencies - from the FBI and DEA to Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Transportation
Security Administration - have kept working since Trump’s demands on the wall triggered the shutdown on Dec. 22.
“Non-essential” personnel across the government have been staying home on furlough, while “essential” personnel, which includes many in
law enforcement, have been working for no pay.
On Friday, many of roughly 800,000 shutdown-affected federal workers will miss their first paychecks. The shutdown began after Trump
insisted that $5.7 billion for his wall be made a part of any legislation to restore funding for many agencies that expired for unrelated reasons, a
demand Democrats oppose.
As much as 85 percent of the Justice Department’s employees are working, as are nearly 90 percent of the Department of Homeland Security’s
employees, said department spokesmen.
“It
really wears on our members,” said Nathan Catura, the national president of the Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Association, which represents some 27,000 federal agents.
“You feel like a pawn in this big political windstorm. You feel like you’re not worth anything,” he said.
In a memo to U.S. Secret Service agents that was seen by Reuters, service Director R.D. “Tex” Alles urged employees to “keep an eye out for
warning signs of trouble.”
He wrote, “A quick internet search will validate that financial stress is often the precursor to greater issues, including depression, anxiety and
worse.”
While the lack of a paycheck is stressing out some agents, the shutdown has had a limited operational impact so far, several law enforcement
officials said.
Drug seizures are still occurring. Corrections officers are still reporting to work each day and air passengers are not yet facing overly long
security lines in airports.
But funding that law enforcement agencies draw on for investigations and some other operations is
starting to dwindle.
Interviews with witnesses in some DEA investigations have been postponed. Furloughs of some FBI analysts has forced agents to pick up the
slack by doing their own background checks - a process that may slow them down, officials told Reuters.
That means FBI agents doing anti-terrorism or white-collar crime investigations must pull together criminal records and other background
materials on their own, without the help of analysts who specialize in such work, Catura said.
Law Enforcement Activities Halted. The Department of Justice’s civil litigation efforts against bad actors will stop.
Payments to crime victims will be put on hold. Training for Department of Justice employees, even for those still working despite the shutdown, is canceled.
Department of Justice programs to train state and local law enforcement officers and officials have also been canceled.
1NR---Turns Case---Economy
Government shutdowns hurt the economy – empirics.
Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 8-25-2023, Peter George Peterson was an American investment banker who
served as United States Secretary of Commerce from February 29, 1972, to February 1, 1973, under the Richard
Nixon administration., "Four Reasons Why a Government Shutdown is Harmful ," Peter G. Peterson Foundation,
https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2023/08/four-reasons-why-a-government-shutdown-is-harmful
Government shutdowns can harm economic growth and certainty. A 2013 Macroeconomic Advisors paper found that
government shutdowns can impose costs on the economy such as increasing the unemployment rate,
lowering the growth in gross domestic product (GDP), and raising the cost of borrowing. The Bureau of
Economic Analysis estimated that the government shutdown in October 2013 reduced fourth-quarter GDP that
year by 0.3 percentage points. An S&P Global analysis found that a government shutdown in 2017 could have reduced
real fourth-quarter GDP growth by $6.5 billion per week. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the partial
government shutdown that lasted from December 22, 2018 until January 25, 2019 reduced real GDP by $11 billion over the fourth quarter of
2018 and the first quarter of 2019 (although they assumed that much of that reduction would have been made up later in the year).
Additionally, a shutdown can cause disruptions in sectors of the economy. For instance, a Partnership for Public Service
report noted that the last government shutdown (which lasted from December 2018 to January 2019) halted two major Small Business
Administration loan programs. Those programs typically dispense nearly $200 million a day to small and midsize U.S. businesses; lack of
access to such loans hindered business plans and caused economic hardship for thousands of
entrepreneurs and their employees. Shutdowns also impact regulatory offices like the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
within the Department of the Treasury. An example— without the necessary certifications and approvals to operate, production for craft
breweries throughout the country stalled, thereby reducing revenue for over 7,300 producers who provide more than 135,000 jobs.
1NR---Turns Case---Inequality
Shutdowns exacerbate inequality – empirics prove.
Hoxie 19 [Josh Hoxie is an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, a 501(c)3 organization that does not
endorse political candidates, and he is a former staffer for Bernie Sanders., 1-30-2019, "The Shutdown Made
Inequality Worse," InsideSources, https://insidesources.com/the-shutdown-made-inequality-worse/]
Anyone who has experienced joblessness or poverty can attest to the fear and anxiety associated with not having the money to cover the bills. During
the
government shutdown, stories flooded the media from struggling federal workers forced to stay home or work without
pay.
But the shutdown didn’t occur in a vacuum. One unpleasant reality is that how these workers fared may have depended more on the color of their skin than you
might think.
The Guardian newspaper recently profiled black federal workers struggling to get by. While black people make up just 12 percent of the U.S. population, they’re
more than 18 percent of the federal workforce.
Many of these families don’t have savings or other wealth to fall back on, and their stories are gut wrenching.
“I don’t have cash reserves and I’m barely staying above water,” said Lora Williams, an African-American woman and 26-year-veteran of the National Parks Service.
“My mother tells me — bless her heart — there’s a bed here if you need it,” Williams continued. “I’m 50. I’m not going back to my parents’ house.”
Wealth, the sum total of what you own minus what you owe, is the buffer families rely on when uncertainty strikes. It’s the difference between short-term
unemployment being a time to simply “tighten the belt” versus homelessness and financial ruin.
Wealth is heavily skewed in the United States, largely along racial lines. My colleagues and I looked at that divide in a new report for the Institute for Policy Studies.
The median black family today owns $3,600 — just 2 percent of the $147,000 the median white family owns. In other words, the median white family has 41 times
more wealth than the median black family (and 22 times more wealth than the median Latino family).
Our data stretches back three decades. Since 1983, median black family wealth has declined by more than half. Median white family wealth, on the other hand, has
jumped by a third. So, the gap is getting bigger.
Of course, there are other historical trends at play here. For one thing, there have been massive gains in productivity and profit over the past three decades. Where
did the money go? The short answer is: The fabulously wealthy became fabulously wealthier. And those fabulously wealthy households are overwhelmingly white.
Over the past 30 years, the number of households with $10 million or more skyrocketed by 856 percent, and the richest 0.1 percent have seen their wealth jump
133 percent. Meanwhile, the median American family saw their wealth drop 3 percent.
The deep and growing racial wealth divide was built on a history of intentional public policy — from slavery and Jim Crow to redlining, mass incarceration, unfair
public-school funding formulas, and many other policies.
As many scholars have shown, it’s not the result of collective laziness or bad decision making by poor people. It’s systemic, and thus requires systemic solutions.
WASHINGTON — The WhiteHouse on Thursday asked Congress to pass a short-term measure to fund the federal
government and avoid a shutdown at the end of September.
A spokesperson with the U.S. Office of Management and Budget said a short-term
continuing resolution will be needed in the next
month, keepinggovernment funding at its current levels while negotiations continue over longer-term
appropriations bills.
Funding for the federal government is set to run out on Sept. 30 unless action is taken by Congress. With a month to go until the
deadline, the Republican-led House of Representatives has only managed to pass one of the 12 bills needed to fund the government, according
to Reuters.
Deep divisions remain between the parties with Republicans looking to implement large spending cuts unlikely to pass
in the Democratic-controlled Senate.
Earlier this month, President Joe Biden requested a stopgap measure to cover standard government programs and an
additional $40 billion — $24 billion for Ukraine and other foreign policy challenges, nearly $4 billion for border and migration issues and $12
billion for disaster relief to boost the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Biden warned against a government shutdown while visiting FEMA headquarters Thursday in Washington, D.C., stressing the
effect it would have on agencies.
Leaders of both parties have signaled an openness to a continuing resolution. Both House Speaker Kevin McCarthy
and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer expressed openness to the idea earlier this month.
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell on Wednesday said the current budget negotiations are "a pretty big mess."
It’s on the brink, Republicans are leaning toward an agreement, but maintaining
bipartisanship is key.
Bade ‘9/1 [Rachel; September 1; Journalist; Matt Berg; “Schumer moves to split House and Senate
Republicans ahead of potential shutdown,” POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/2023/09/01/government-shutdown-2023-schumer-00113714]
Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer said he’d blame House Republicans for any government shutdown if
they fail to pass spending legislation by the end of the month.
In a “Dear Colleague” letter sent Friday morning, Schumer sought to drive a wedge between House and Senate Republicans — offering praise
for both Senate Appropriations Chair Patty Murray (D-Wash.) and ranking Republican Susan Collins (R-Maine), a lawmaker with whom Schumer
is often at loggerheads.
“We cannot afford the brinkmanship or hostage-taking we saw from House Republicans earlier this year when they
pushed our country to the brink of default to appease the most extreme members of their party,” Schumer wrote.
The chamber passed all 12 appropriations bills out of committee on a bipartisan basis, he boasts. That drew an implicit
contrast to the House, where Speaker Kevin McCarthy has broken faith on his spending caps deal with President Joe Biden, and is instead
pushing partisan proposals that don’t have a prayer of becoming law.
“The only way to avoid a shutdown is through bipartisanship, so I have urged House Republican leadership to follow the
Senate’s lead and pass bipartisan appropriations bills,” the majority leader continued.
Schumer’s letter comes just a day after Minority Leader Mitch McConnell underscored the need for bipartisanship to keep the
government open in a Kentucky speech that was quickly overshadowed by the Republican’s health scare.
“The speaker and the president reached an agreement, which I supported, in connection with raising the debt ceiling, to set
the spending levels for next year,” McConnell said. “The House then turned around and passed spending levels that were below that level. …
[T]hat’s not going to be replicated in the Senate.”
An official with the Office of Management and Budget said lawmakers would very
likely need to pass a temporary spending
measure in September to prevent a potential partial shutdown. The official was not authorized to discuss the administration’s plans
and spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity.
Without such congressional approval, parts of the federal government could shut down when the new budget
year begins Oct. 1. That would jeopardize federal programs on which millions of U.S. households and businesses rely. The
shutdown is a risk because of disagreements on the annual spending bills to be passed by the Republican-led House and and
Democratic-majority Senate. Neither side wants a shutdown despite their differences.
House Republicans are insisting on sharp cuts to many programs, reopening a tense debate about government finances from
earlier this year when the White House and Congress reached a compromise in June to extend the government’s legal borrowing authority
through January 2025.
White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre outlined the administration’s two-front push on government funding at Thursday’s briefing. On
August 10, the administration sent Congress a request for supplemental funding that would include money for disaster relief, aid to
Ukraine and programs to address fentanyl addiction. The supplemental is separate from Thursday’s request for a short-term funding plan to
keep the government open.
“This is something that Congress can do — they can prevent a government shutdown,” Jean-Pierre said. “They need to
prevent a government shutdown.”
House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., told Fox News on Sunday that he “would actually like” to have a short-term funding
measure because a shutdown “hurts the American public.” He suggested an extension would allow the House to pass its own
spending plans and improve its leverage in talks with the Senate.
The Washington Post first reported on Thursday that the White House said Congress should pass a short-term funding
measure.
It’s close – passes now but ANY external disruption will drive spending discussions off
the tracks.
Richman ‘9/1 [Jackson; 2023; Reporter; “Congress Gears Up for Spending Fight as Government
Shutdown Looms,” https://www.ntd.com/congress-gears-up-for-spending-fight-as-government-shutdown-
looms_939587.html, NTD]
“I do expect a short-term CR will be needed to finish all the work that we set out to do,” McCarthy reportedly told House
Republicans during a closed conference call on Aug. 14.
“I thought it was a good thing that he recognized that we need a CR in September. I’m supportive of that,” Senate Majority Leader Chuck
Schumer (D-N.Y.) reportedly told reporters on a call.
“A CR until early December provides time for consideration of these bipartisan bills,” he continued. “We urge
our House colleagues to emulate the Senate. The only way we’re going to avoid a government shutdown is by bipartisan support in both
houses.
“You cannot keep the government open if you just want to do it with one party. We hope that House Republicans will realize that any
funding resolution has to be bipartisan or they will risk shutting down the government.”
During an appearance on Fox News’ “Sunday Morning Futures” on Aug. 27, Mr. McCarthy expressed interest in doing a CR.
“I would actually like to have a short-term CR, only to make our arguments stronger, because … if we shut down, all the government shuts
down, investigation and everything else. It hurts the American public,” he told host Maria Bartiromo.
“But if we’re able to pass our appropriation bills, we’re in a stronger position to remove those … ‘Pelosi policies’ that are locked
into law right now—the wokeism, the overspending, the nonsecurity of this border,” he continued, referring to Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), who
preceded Mr. McCarthy as Speaker.
A memo from the Republican Study Committee, the largest House GOP caucus—first reported by Fox News and obtained by The Epoch Times—
calls on Mr. McCarthy to not allow a clean CR, which would continue to fund the government at current levels without any changes.
The hardline conservative House Freedom Caucus has said it will not support a CR if it does not include the Secure the Border Act of 2023,
which the House passed earlier this year; address “the unprecedented weaponization of the Justice Department and FBI” and “end the Left’s
cancerous woke policies in the Pentagon undermining our military’s core warfighting mission.”
Moreover, the caucus “will oppose any blank check for Ukraine in any supplemental appropriations bill.”
Mr. McCarthy can only afford to lose four members of his own caucus.
“The last thing the American people deserve is for extreme House members to trigger a government shutdown that hurts our economy,
undermines our disaster preparedness, and forces our troops to work without guaranteed pay,” said White House deputy spokesperson
Andrew Bates in a statement.
“The House
Republicans responsible for keeping the government open already made a promise to the
American public about government funding, and it would be a shame for them to break their word and fail the country
because they caved to the hardcore fringe of their party in prioritizing a baseless impeachment stunt over high stakes needs Americans care
about deeply—like fighting fentanyl trafficking, protecting our national security, and funding FEMA,” he continued.
Rep. Ralph Norman (R-S.C.), a Freedom Caucus member, told The Epoch Times that while “there is talk and questions being asked on both sides
of the aisle,” there are “no meaningful solutions.”
He expressed alarm that Mr. McCarthy will not have spending levels be where they were before the Covid-19 pandemic, at just
over $1.47 trillion, “nor does he intend to give a top-line number for the remaining 11 appropriations still to be voted on, so his intention will be
a CR until December then a massive omnibus” with the help of Democrats.
Mr. McCarthy has repeatedly stated that he will not bring an omnibus bill, allocating government funding and putting in pieces of legislation, to
the House floor.
A $1.7 trillion omnibus bill passed the then-Democrat-controlled Congress and was enacted by Mr. Biden late last year.
The White House has refused to say whether it will push for a CR, though it has asked for supplemental funding.
In an Aug. 10 letter to House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.), Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Shalanda Young asked for
more than $13 billion in military assistance to Ukraine and related expenses.
It also includes a request of almost $68.23 million for the Department of Energy related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and relevant
expenses.During the debt ceiling debate months ago, members of Congress called for a supplemental defense spending bill that includes
assistance to Ukraine. Mr. McCarthy has rebutted these calls, while Mr. Schumer would not commit to bringing up such a bill. OMB also
requested almost $758.6 million for U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement—$714 million to confront migrant surges at the southwest
border and $45 million to combat fentanyl and other drugs coming over the border. Ms. Young asked for $12 billion for the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to respond to major disasters.
She also requested tens of millions of dollars for firefighters combating wildfires as “more than 20,000 heroic firefighters
would face a pay cliff starting as soon as October, with salaries being cut to as low as $15 an hour” if Congress does not take action. This week,
the administration asked for an additional $4 billion in light of the latest natural disasters such as the wildfires in Hawaii and Hurricane Idalia in
the south, including Florida. “The president has been clear that we’re going to stand with communities across the nation as they recover from
disasters for as long as it takes, and the administration is committed to working with Congress to ensure funding for the DRF is sufficient for
recovery needs,” said an OMB spokesperson. “We urge Congress to take swift action on supplemental
appropriations.” White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre declined on Aug. 30 to say whether Mr. Biden would sign a CR, saying
she would not “get into hypotheticals.” She noted that the administration continuously engages with members
of Congress. However, OMB has acknowledged the likelihood of a CR. “It is clear that a short-term continuing resolution (CR) will be
needed next month,” an Office of Management and Budget spokesperson told The Epoch Times in a statement. “OMB is providing Congress
with [the] technical assistance needed to avoid severe disruptions to government services in the first quarter of the fiscal year.”
Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa), the ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee, told The Epoch Times that a government
shutdown is not an option.
“Congresshas a list of to-dos, and in order to get things done on behalf of the American people, the government needs to
remain open,” he said. “It costs taxpayers money to shut down government and even more to re-open it.
Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer said in a letter to fellow Democrats that the top priority for the upper
chamber is avoiding a shutdown.
“Ourfocus will be on funding the government and preventing House Republican extremists from forcing a
government shutdown,” Mr. Schumer said.
No thumpers.
Groves & Jalonick ‘9-5 [Stephen & Mary; 2023; Correspondent based in South Dakota; AP; “Congress
returns to try to prevent a government shutdown while the GOP weighs an impeachment inquiry,”
https://apnews.com/article/government-shutdown-impeachment-congress-funding-
048dee639bb0dcb6604f05ba2f0782a8]
LEGISLATION ON HOLD
The Senate is expected to spend most of September focused on funding the government and confirming
Biden’s nominees, meaning that major policy legislation will have to wait. But Schumer outlined some priorities for the
remaining months of the year in the letter to his colleagues.
1NR---Link---Focus
Fiat forces the plan onto the agenda – that crowds out legislative focus on the
shutdown bill and prevents passage
Spencer Kimball, 8-31-2023, health reporter with CNBC.com.,“Congress returns with the clock ticking to
avert government shutdown, fund U.S. disaster response,” CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2023/09/05/congress-returns-with-the-clock-ticking-to-avert-government-
shutdown.html
KEY POINTS
The U.S. government will shut down at midnight on Sept. 30 if Congress fails to pass spending
legislation.
The White House and the leadership of the House and Senate support a stopgap measure to keep the government running.
But far-right Republicans want to attach conditions that include a crackdown on undocumented immigration and a vote on an impeachment inquiry into President
Joe Biden.
The Federal Emergency Management is also running low on money as the agency responds to multiple natural disasters.
The White House has asked for separate funding to bolster FEMA’s disaster relief fund.
A deeply divided Congress returned Tuesday from a monthlong summer vacation with the clock ticking
to pass spending legislation to avoid a government shutdown and boost U.S. emergency response
funding following multiple natural disasters.
The U.S. government will shut down at midnight on Sept. 30 if Congress fails to pass spending legislation. While the Senate is back in session Tuesday, the House will
not return to work until Sept. 12, leaving nearly three weeks to pass funding before the deadline.
The White House on Thursday asked Congress to pass a single short-term measure, called a continuing resolution, to fund the federal government at current levels
and avoid a shutdown while negotiations continue over a dozen long-term funding bills.
The leaders of both chambers agree that a short-term measure is the best way to avoid a government shutdown. Senate
Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-NY, said in August that he and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., agreed that Congress should pass a continuing resolution
to extend funding at existing levels for a few months.
The continuing resolution is a stopgap measure that would set up for a potential shutdown at a later date if Congress cannot in the interim pass the longer-term
spending bills. The Republican-led House of Representatives has only passed one of a dozen bills needed to fund the federal government through 2024.
McCarthy came out publicly in support of a continuing resolution to keep the government running during an interview with Fox News last month. He sought to
cajole House Republicans into supporting the measure with a warning that investigations into the Biden administration would grind to a halt if the government shuts
down.
“If we shut down, all of government shuts it down, investigations and everything else. It hurts the American public,” McCarthy told Fox News.
But far-right members of the House GOP are pushing back against McCarthy. The House Freedom Caucus is trying to tie
government funding to legislation that would crack down on undocumented immigration and restart construction of the border wall.
The legislative process is laborious and time-consuming, and the time available for Senate floor action each
year is limited. Every day devoted to one bill is a day denied for consideration of other legislation, and
there are not enough days to act on all the bills that Senators and Senate committees wish to see enacted. Naturally, the
time pressures become even greater with the approach of deadlines such as the date for adjournment and the
end of the fiscal year. So, for all but the most important bills, even the threat of a filibuster can be a potent weapon. Before
a bill reaches the floor or while
it is being debated, its supporters often seek ways to accommodate the concerns of
opponents, preferring an amended bill that can be passed without protracted debate to the time, effort, and
risks involved in confronting a filibuster or the threat of one.
1NR---Link---FJG
[2] POLARIZATION – parties can’t agree
Gregory Krieg 18, reporter at CNN Politics, 4-26-2018, "Why a 'federal jobs guarantee' is gaining steam
with Democrats," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/26/politics/federal-jobs-guarantee-gaining-
steam-democrats/index.html
Research published for the Center on Budget Policy Priorities by William Darity Jr., a professor of public policy at Duke University, New School economist Darrick Hamilton and Duke
postdoctoral associate Mark Paul has been influential in shaping both the Sanders and Booker plans. In an interview with CNN, Darity said he has also been in contact with the offices of
The
Gillibrand and Oregon Sen. Jeff Merkley, both of whom, along with Sens. Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts and California's Kamala Harris, are co-sponsors of the Booker bill. "
domestic models (for these new bills) date back to the Great Depression, with the implementation of the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps,"
Darity said. "What would be different about this type of a project is that it would be a universal program of employment -- everyone would be eligible to take
advantage of this public option -- and it would be permanent." Having spent a decade advocating for a job guarantee, Darity reasoned that President Donald Trump's election
-- its "shock effect" -- was the blow that pushed mainstream Democrats in his direction. The party, he said, is no longer working under the illusion
that Republicans would agree to any form of meaningful compromise and has stopped "self-censoring themselves before they put
forth legislation to be considered." The emerging jobs guarantee debate, like with health care, has tracked the broader left's ideological spectrum. Whether to pursue universal programs at the
expense of means-tested or more narrowly targeted ones has roiled Democratic politics for ages. The question lay at the wonky core of the fissure that opened up during the 2016 presidential
primary. Naturally, it looks set to divide minds over the prospects of a jobs guarantee.
Despite the relief plan's popularity outside the Beltway, it is unlikely that momentum from its passage will
hurtle Biden into future legislative wins, Howell said.
“The idea that a legislative win begets a subsequent legislative win in this environment is probably asking for
too much,” he said, noting the prospect of passing COVID-19 relief was higher than more hot-button issues like immigration or health
care.
A legislative defeat would have raised questions about Biden’s ability to pass any meaningful
legislation, but its passage won’t be a “springboard to the production of all kinds of landmark
legislation – far from it," Howell said.