G.R. No.

81567 October 3, 1991

UMIL v RAMOS

FACTS.

 The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision
did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or
New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision
merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among
these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and
penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these
laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected
representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.

ISSUE/S.

That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant,
and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest),
disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested.

RULING. We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the
legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before
rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were
made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the
detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.

There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to
arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. The law expressly
allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds
upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule
113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural
had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member)
did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other
policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that
subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-
called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the
repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing
organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will
be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the
arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two
(2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just
committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense.
Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention
and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. sedEven the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration,
believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in
compliance with the directives of the law, and, therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers
who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have
conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their
official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in
arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance
with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against
Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed
under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa
convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on
appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also
justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit
unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught
in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of
Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant,
informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and
disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the
authorities.

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which
compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military
authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon)
were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the
names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information
they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain
crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second:
found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking
member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications
equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the
CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in
the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations were
filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests
without warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque
house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named
persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have
been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an
unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. An arrest is therefore in the
nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long
as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest
in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth
in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of
public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons
are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do not strictly
comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary
detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other
hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the
CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their
possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that
truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by
probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in
compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is
not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests
were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not
proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

A Final Word - This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court
predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere
unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of
Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace
officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting
the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the
Court be right.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

After a deep and thorough reexamination of the decision of Julv 9, 1990 and an exhaustive evaluation of the
motions for reconsideration of the said decision, I am inclined to agree with the, majority's resolution on
said motions for reconsideration except for the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu for the crime of inciting to sedition and petitioner Alfredo Nazareno for the crime of
murder.

In the words of the resolution, Espiritu "was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any
'continuing offense,' but for uttering" the following: "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa
magkagulo na." Apparently, such statement was, in the perception of the arresting officers, inciting to
sedition. While not conceding the validity of such perception, realizing that it is indeed possible that
Espiritu was merely exercising his right to free speech, the resolution nonetheless supports the
authority of peace officers "only for purposes of the arrest."

I find this position to be adverse to the very essence of the resolution which sanctions warrantless arrests
provided they are made in accordance with law. In the first place, Espiritu mav not be considered as having
"just committed" the crime charged. He allegedly first uttered seditious remarks at the National Press Club
in the afternoon of November 12, 1988. The second allegedly seditious remark aforequoted was made at
around 5:00 o'clock in the same afternoon (Decision, pp. 23-24). Under these circumstances, the law
enforcement agents had time, short though it might seem, to secure a warrant for his arrest. Espiritu's
apprehension may not therefore be considered as covered by Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which allows
warrantless arrests "when an offense has in fact just been committed."
Secondly, warrantless arrests may not be allowed if the arresting officer are not sure what particular
provision of law had been violated by the person arrested. True it is that law enforcement agents and even
prosecutors are not all adept at the However, erroneous perception, not to mention ineptitude among their
ranks, especially if it would result in the violation of any right of a person, may not be tolerated. That the
arrested person has the "right to insist during the pre-trial or trial on the merits" (Resolution., p. 18) that he
was exercising a right which the arresting officer considered as contrary to law, is beside the point. No
person should be subjected to the ordeal of a trial just because the law enforcers wrongly perceived his
action.

Thirdly, inciting to sedition is not a continuous crime for which the offender may be arrested without a
warrant duly issued by the proper authority. By its nature, a single act of urging others to commit any of the
acts enumerated in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code may suffice to hold anyone liable for inciting to
sedition. While the crime is aimed at anarchy and radicalism and presents largely a question of policy
(Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil, 524 [1951]), it should be remembered that any of the prohibited acts in Article
142 may infringe upon the fundamental freedoms of speech and expression. There arises, therefore, the
necessity of balancing interests; those of the State as against those of its individual citizen. Here lies the
urgency of judicial intervention before an arrest is made. Added to this is the subjectivity of the
determination of what may incite other people to sedition. Hence, while the police should act swiftly when
a seditious statement has been uttered in view of the jeopardy it may cause the government, speedy action
should consist not in warrantless arrests but in securing warrants for such arrests.

On the legality of warrantless arrests of violators of the Anti-Subversion Law, it should be underscored that
anyone who undertakes such arrest must see to it that the alleged violator is knowing member of a
subversive organization as distinguished from a nominal one (People vs. Ferrer, L-32613-14, December 27,
1972, 48 SCRA 382). Thus, a subversive may be arrested even if has not committed overt act of overthrowing
the government such as bombing of government offices trie assassination of government officials provided
there is probable cause to believe that he is in the roll of members of a subversive organization. It devolves
upon the accused to prove membership by force or ciorcion. Certainly, one may not be in such a roll without
undergoing the concious act of enlistment.

It bears repeating that warrantless arrests are governed by law and subject to stringent application. Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure now requires that an offense "has in fact just been
committed. "connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense
'has in fact been committed' no how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must have 'personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it' (instead of just 'reasonable ground believe that the
[arrestee] has committed it' under the old rule)." (Dissenting opinion in Ilagan vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748,
October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349, 408).

I deem it apt herein to recall other Court rulings provide guidelines in effecting arrests without warrants.
In People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. 68955, September 4, 1986,144 SCRA 1), the Court considered as illegal the
warrantless arrest of a subversive not based on the arresting officer's personal knowledge such subversion
and held that any rule on arrests without warrants must be strictly construed. We categorically state therein
that warrantless arrests should "clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary was provided by the Rules" (144 SCRA at 14). Moreover. "it is not enough that there
is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually (has just) been committed first. That crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of
the perpetrator. (Supra, at p. 15).

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I, therefore, vote for the strict application of Section 5 (a) and (b) of Rule 113 on arrests without
warrant, to wit:
 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

xxx xxx xxx

Only in the cases found in the Rule should we allow arrests without warrants. In case of doubt, the tendency
should be to declare the warrantless arrest illegal.

Insofar as G.R. Nos, 84581-82, G.R. Nos. 84583-84 and G.R. No. 83162 involving Amelia Roque, Wilfredo
Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Vicky Ocaya are concerned, the petitioners were
arrested after having been apprehended while in possession of illegal firearms and ammunitions. They were
actually committing a crime when arrested. I concur in the denial of their motions for reconsideration.

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 85727 where Deogracias Espiritu was arrested
while urging jeepnev and bus drivers to join a strike of transport workers on the ground that that was
inciting to sedition.

This impresses me as Court validation of a clear infringement of an individual's freedom of speech. "Inciting
to sedition" is a term over which the most learned writers and jurists will differ when applied to actual
cases. I doubt if there are more than a handful of policemen in the whole country who would know the full
dimensions of the fine distinctions which separate the nation's interest in the liberty to fully anfd freely
discuss matters of national importance on one hand and the application of the clear and present danger rule
as the test when claims of national security and public safety are asserted, on the other. In fact, the
percentage of knowledgeability would go down further if we consider that "inciting to sedition" requires the
ability to define, among other (1) what kinds of speeches or writings fall lander the term "inciting" (2) the
meaning of rising publicly and tumultously; (3,) when does a certain effort amount to force, intimidation.
or illegal method; (4) what constitute the five objects or ends of sedition; and (5) what is a scurrilous libel
against the Philippines. If we allow public speakers to be picked up simply because what they say is
irritating or obnoxious to the ears of a peace officer or critical of government policy and action, we will
undermine all pronouncements of this Court on the need to protect that matrix of all freedoms, which is
freedom of expression. At the very least, a warrant of arrest after a preliminary examination by a Judge is
essential in this type of offense.

Insofar as G.R. No. 81567 is concerned, I join the other dissenting Justices in their observations regarding
"continuing oftenses." To base warrantless arrests on the doctrine of continuing offense is to give a license
for the illegal detention of persons on pure suspicion. Rebellion, insurrection, or sedition are political
offenses where the line between overt acts and simple advocacy or adherence to a belief is extremely thin.
If a court has convicted an accused of rebellion and he is found roaming around, he may be arrested. But
until a person is proved guilty, I fail to see how anybody can jump to a personal conclusion that the suspect
is indeed a rebel and must be picked up on sight whenever seen. The grant of authority in the majority
opinion is too broad. If warrantless searches are to be validated, it should be Congress and not this Court
which should draw strict and narrow standards. Otherwise, the non-rebels who are critical, noisy, or
obnoxious will be indiscriminately lumped up with those actually taking up arms against the Government.

In the case of Dural. the arrest was made while he was engaged in the passive and innocuous act of
undergoing medical treatment. The fiction was indulged that he was even then, as he lay supine in his
sickbed, engaged in the continuing offense of rebellion against the State. In further justification, the Court
says that the arresting officers acted on "confidential information" that he was in the hospital, which
information "was found to be true." This is supposed to have validated the determination of the officers that
there was "probable cause" that excused the absence of a warrant.

My own impression is that probable cause must be established precisely to justify the issuance of a
warrant, not to dispense with it; moreover, probable cause must be determined by the judge issuing
the warrant, not the arresting officer who says it is not necessary.

In the case of Espiritu, the arrest was made while he was actually sleeping, and for allegedly seditious
remarks made by him the day before. The Court says his case is not covered by the Garcia-Padilla doctrine
but approves the arrest just the same because the remarks were supposed to continue their effects even to
the following day. The offense was considered as having been just committed (to make it come under Rule
113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court) despite the considerable time lapse.

It was worse in the case of Nazareno, who was also arrested without warrant, and no less than fourteen days
after the killing. In sustaining this act, the Court says that it was only on the day of his arrest that he was
identified as one of the probable killers, thus suggesting that the validity of a warrantless arrest is reckoned
not from the time of the commission of an offense but from the time of the Identification of the suspect.

Section 5 of Rule 113 says that a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the latter "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" or when an offense "has in
fact just been committed." The requirement of immediacy is obvious from the word "just," which,
according to Webster, means "a very short time ago." The arrest must be made almost immediately or
soon after these acts, not at any time after the suspicion of the arresting officer begins, no matter how
long ago the offense was committed.

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result reached by the majority in the Resolution disposing of the Motion for
Reconsideration.

At the same time, however, I feel compelled to dissent from certain statements made by the majority
principally concerning the applicability of the "continuing crimes" doctrine to the problem of arrests without
warrants. It seems clear that these statements are really obiter dicta, since they are quite unnecessary for
sustaining the actual results reached in the majority Resolution. This was summarily pointed out in my very
brief statement concurring in the result reached in the original Decision of the Court dated 9 July 1990. The
subsequent developments in several of the cases here consolidated, which are carefully detailed in the
majority Resolution, make this even clearer. Nonetheless, the majority Resolution has taken the time and
trouble expressly to reiterate the "continuing crimes" doctrine as applicable in respect of warrantless
arrests. Although the above statements are obiter, they have been made and, I believe, need to be
addressed to some extent and the inter-relation of the "continuing crimes" doctrine with constitutional
rights explored.

1. We start at the beginning, that is, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons.
Article III Section 2 of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Emphais supplied)

Under the above provision, arrests, i.e., the constraint and seizure of the persons of individual members of
society, must, as a general rule, be preceded by the securing of a warrant of arrest, the rendition of which
complies with the constitutional procedure specified in Article III Section 2. Arrests made without a warrant
issued by a judge after complying with the constitutional procedure, are prima facie unreasonable seizures
of persons within the meaning of Article III Section 2.

2. There are, however, certain well-recognized exceptions to the norm that warrantless arrests are
unreasonable seizures of persons. Those exceptions are, in our day, essentially found in Section 5(a) and (b)
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Section 5(a) and (b) mark out the situations where an officer of the law,
or a private person for that matter, may lawfully arrest a person without previously securing a warrant of
arrest. The full text of Section 5, Rule 113 follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

3. Before examining the scope and implications of Section 5(a) and (b), it is important to recall that judicial
interpretation and application of Section 5(a) and (b) must take those provision for what they are: they
are exceptions to a vital constitutional norm enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Exceptions to such a norm must
be strictly construed so as not to render futile and meaningless the constitutional rule requiring warrants of
arrests before the persons of individuals may be lawfully constrained and seized. The ordinary rule generally
applicable to statutory provisions is that exceptions to such provisions must not be stretched beyond what
the language in which they are cast fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general
provision, rather than the exception. 1 This rule must apply with special exigency and cogency where we
deal, not with an ordinary statutory provision, but with a constitutional guarantee. 2 Exceptions to such a
guarantee must be read with especial care and sensitivity and kept within the limits of their language so to
keep vital and significant the general constitutional norms warrantless arrests. In Alvarez vs. Court of First
Instance, 3 this Court, stressing that:

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the
highest duties and privileges of the court. these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal
construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment
upon, or gradual depreciation of, the rights secured by them (State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac.,
362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the
general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizures or search warrants must be strictly
construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed. [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U.S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U.S., 14
Fed. [2d], 88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613. (emphasis supplied)

held that:

. . . All illegal searches and seizures are unreasonable whith lawful ones are reasonable. 4

In People vs. Burgos, 5 this Court reiterated the above rule in the following terms:
 There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive
document. Neither was he commit ting any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in
fact plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often vilated and so deserving of full protection. 6 (emphasis supplied)

4. Section 5(a) relates to situations where a crime is committed or attempted to be committed in the
presence of the arresting officer. The fact of the occurrence of the offense, or of the attempt to commit an
offense, in the presence of the arresting officer, may be seen to be the substitute, under the circumstances,
for the securing of a warrant of arrest. In such situation, there is an obvious need for immediate, even
instantaneous, action on the part of the arresting officer to suppress the breach of public order and to
prevent further breaches then and there. Section 5(a) may, moreover, be seen to refer to overt acts
constitutive of a crime taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. The term "presence" in this
connection is properly and restrictively construed to relate to acts taking place within the optical or perhaps
auditory perception of the arresting officer. 7 If no overt, recognizably criminal, acts occur which are
perceptible through the senses of the arresting officer, such officer could not, of course, become aware at
all that a crime is being committed or attempted to be committed in his presence. 8 It is elementary that
purely mental or psychological phenomena, not externalized in overt physical acts of a human person,
cannot constitute a crime in our legal system. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough
that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus. If no such overt acts are actually taking place in
the presence or within the sensor perception of the arresting officer, there would, in principle, be ample
time to go to a magistrate and ask for a warrant of arrest. There would, in other words, not be that
imperious necessity for instant action to prevent an attempted crime, to repress the crime being
committed, or to capture the doer of the perceive criminal act, the necessity which serves as the
justification in law of warrantless arrests under Section 5(a).

5. Turning to Section 5 (b), two (2) elements must be coincide before a warrantless arrest may be sustained
under this subsection: 1) the offense must have "just been committed" when the arresting officer arrived in
the scene; and 2) the officer must have "personal knowledge" of facts indicating tha the person to be
arrested has committed the offense. In somewhat different terms, the first requirement imports that th
effects or corpus of the offense which has just been committed are still visible: e.g. a person sprawled on
the ground, dead of gunshot wound; or a person staggering around bleeding profusely from stab wounds.
The arresting officer may not ha seen the actual shooting or stabbing of the victim, and thereto the offense
can not be said to have been committed "in [his] presence." The requirement of "personal knowledge" on the
part of the arresting officer is a requirement that such knowledge must have been obtained directly from
sense perception the arresting officer. That requirement would exclude informtion conveyed by another
person, no matter what his reputation for, truth and reliability might be. 9 Thus, where the arresting officer
comes upon a person dead on the street and sees a person running away with a knife from where the victim
is sprawled the ground, he has personal knowledge of facts which render it highly probable that the person
fleeing was the doer of the criminal deed. The arresting officer must, in other words, perceive through his
own senses some act which directly connects the person to be arrested with the visible effects or corpus of
a crime which has "just been committed."

6. The use of the words "has in fact just been committed" underscores the requirement that the time
interval between the actual commission of the crime and the arrival of the arresting officer must be brief
indeed. In the first place, the word "just" was fairly recently inserted in Section 5(b) by the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedures, no doubt in order to underscore the point here being made. In the second place, a
latitudinarian view of the phrase "has in fact just been committed" would obviously render pointless the
requirement in Section 5(a) that the crime must have been committed "[in] the presence" of the arresting
officer. In G.R. No. 86332, the warrantless arrest of Alfredo Nazareno 14-days after the occurrence of the
killing with which he was charged along with other persons, cannot by any standard be justified under
Section 5(b). In G.R. No. 81567, Dural was arrested without warrant while being treated in a hospital the
day after the shooting of the policemen in which he was suspected to have been a participant. While 1-day
may be substantially different from 14-days, still it must be pointed out that at the time Dural was arrested
in the hospital, the killing of the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City far away from the St. Agnes Hospital in
Quezon City could not reasonably be said to have been just committed. There was no showing, nor did the
Court require it, that the arresting officers had been in "hot pursuit" of Dural beginning at the scene of the
killing and ending the next day in the hospital.

7. It is worth noting that the requisite of "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officer who is
determining "probable cause" right at the scene of the crime, is in a sense more exacting than the standard
imposed by the Constitution upon the judge who, in the seclusion of his chambers, ascertains "probable
cause" by examining the evidence submitted before him. The arresting officer must himself have "personal
knowledge"; the magistrate may rely upon the personal knowledge of the witnesses examined by or for him
in issuing a warrant of arrest. In the present Resolution, the majority begins with noting the requirement of
"personal knowledge" in Section 5(b), but winds up in the next page with a very diluted standard of
"reasonable belief and "good faith" on the part of the arresting officers. The stricter standard is properly
applicable to the officers seizing a person without a warrant of arrest, for they are acting in derogation of a
constitutional right. That the person unlawfully arrested without a warrant may later turn out to be guilty
of the offense he was suspected of in the first place is, course, quite beside the point. Even a person
secretly guilty some earlier crime is constitutionally entitled to be secure from warrantless arrest, unless he
has in fact committed physically observable criminal acts in the presence of the arresting officer or hadjust
committed such acts when the arresting officer burst upon the scene.

8. Examination of the utilization in the majotity Resolution of the doctrine of "continuing crimes," shows
that doctrine is here being used as a substitute for the requirement under Section 5(a) that the offense
"has in fact just been presence of the arresting officer arrived, but rather because the person to be arrested
is suspected of having committed a crime in the future. The pertinent portion of the majority Resolution
reads:

. . . Dural did not cease to be, or because less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSE OF ARREST, simply
because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. . . . That Dural had shot
the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not
end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other
policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense that
subversion like rebelion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-
called "common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the
repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objectives of
overthrowing organized government is attained. (Emphasis supplied)

9. I respectfully submit that an examination of the "continuing crimes" doctrine as actually found in our case
law offers no reasonable basis for such use of the dotrine. More specifically, that doctrine, in my
submission, does not dispence with the requirement that overt acts recognizably criminal in character must
take place in the presence of the arresting officer, or must have just been committed when the arresting
officer arrived, if the warrantless arrest it to be lawful. The "continuing crimes" doctrine in our case law
(before rendition of Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile 10 does not sustain warrantless arrests of person to be arrested
is, as it were, merely resting in between specific lawless and commit the moment he gets an opportunity to
do so.
Our case law shows that the "continuing crimes" doctrine has been used basically in relation to two (2)
problems: the first problem is that of determination of whether or not a particular offense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; the second problem is that of determining whether a
single crime or multiple crimes were committed where the defense of double jeopardy is raised.

10. In respect of the first problem, the gist of our case law is that where some of the ingredients or
elements of an offense taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of one court and some other
ingredients or elements of the same offense occur in the territory of another court, (e.g., estafa or
malversation) either one of the two courts has jurisdiction to try the offense. Where all of the essential
elements of a crime take place within the territory of one court but "by reason of he very nature of the
offense committed" the violation of the law is deemed to be "continuing," then the court within whose
territorial jurisdiction the offense continues to be committed, has jurisdiction to try a person charged with
such offense. In the latter case, the offense is deemed to be continuing because some or all of the elements
constituting the offense occurred within jurisdiction of the second court (e.g., kidnapping and illegal
detention; libel; evasion of service of sentence). The criminal acts are regarded as repeated or as
continuing within the province or city where the defendant was found and arrested. 11 Clearly, overt acts of
the accussed constituting elements of the crime charged must be shown to have been committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court where he is charged.

11. Turning to the second type of problem, the question is normally presented in terms of whether one
crime or multiple crimes were committed by the accused. Where the series of acts actually alleged and
proven to have been committed by the accused constituted only one and the same crime, the defense of
double jeopardy becomes available where a second information is filed covering acts later in the series.
Upon the other hand, where the acts of the accused constituted discrete, multiple offenses, each act
comprising a distinct and separate offense, the double jeopardy defense is non-available. 12 The point
worth stressing is that in passing upon the issue relating to the unity or multiplicity of offense committed,
the overt acts of the accused constitutive either of the single offense or of the plural offenses, must be
shown.

12. My final submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its own legitimate function to
serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional
guarantee against warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the elements of the
offense charged are shown to have been committed by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing
crime" doctrine should not be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or committed elsewhere,
continued to be committed by the person arrested in the presence of the arresting officer. The capacity for
mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is infinitely increased where the crime
charged does not consist of unambiguous criminal acts with a definite beginning and end in time and space
(such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping and illegal dentention or arson) but rather of such
problematic offenses as membership in or affiliation with or becoming a member of, a subversive association
or organization. For in such cases, the overt constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the
unlawfulness of the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note, for
instance, the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of "membership in any subversive
association:" 13

a) Allowing himself to be listed as a member in any book or any of the lists, records, correspondence,
or any other document of the organization;

b) Subjecting himself to the discipline of such association or organization in any form whatsoever;

c) Giving financial contribution to such association or organization in dues, assessments, loans or in

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

h) Preparing documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, or any other type of publication to promote the
objectives and purposes of such association or organization;

xxx xxx xxx

k) Participating in any was in the activities, planning action, objectives, or purposes of such
association or organization;

xxx xxx xxx

It may well be, as the majority implies, that the constitutional rule against warrantless arrests and seizures
makes the law enforcement work of police agencies more difficult to carry out. It is not our Court's function,
however, and the Bill of Rights was not designed, to make life easy for police forces but rather to protect
the liberties of private individuals. Our police forces must simply learn to live with the requirements of the
Bill of Rights, to enforce the law by modalities which themselves comply with the fundamental law.
Otherwise they are very likely to destroy, whether through sheer ineptness or excess of zeal, the very
freedoms which make our polity worth protecting and saving.

REGALADO, J.: Separate Opinion:

While I have heretofore concurred in the ponencia in the above-entitled cases and I reiterate such
concurrence, I wish to unburden myself of some reservations on the rationale adopted in G.R. No. 86332.

It is posited in this resolution that "(a)lthough the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while
Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest falls
under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to
know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II."

I am afraid that there has been a misapplication of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which, while authorizing a
peace officer or a private person to effect a warrantless arrest, specifically conditions that grant of
authority upon the situation "(w)hen an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it."

It is significant that when the corresponding provisions of the 1964 Rules of Court were amended in the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the particular revision of paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section consisted in
imposing the requirements that the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed.

Now, according to the resolution, "the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo
Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5 o'clock in the
morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he
pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same
morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation."

Since, clearly, the arresting police agents merely acted upon the information imparted by one of the
suspects, Ramil Regala, the resolution has emasculated the requirement in Section 5(b) that the person
making the arrest must have had personal knowledge of factual indications regarding the complicity or
liability of the arrestee for the crime. Yet, that amendment requiring such personal knowledge must have
been designed to obviate the practice in the past of warrantless arrests being effected on the basis of or
supposed reliance upon information obtained from third persons who merely professed such knowledge or,
worse, concocted such reports for variant reasons not necessarily founded on truth.

Further, and obviously as an added deterrent to the possibility that such arrest without a warrant may result
from imputations based on dubious motives, it is now required that the crime must have just been
committed. The recency contemplated here, in relation to the making of the warrantless arrest, is the time
when the crime was in fact committed, and not the time when the crime was in fact committed, and not
the time when the person making the arrest learned or was informed of such commission. Otherwise, at the
risk of resorting to reductio ad absurdum, such warrantless arrests could be validly made even for a crime
committed, say, more than a year ago but of which the arresting officer received information only today.

The brevity in the interval of time between the commission of the crime and the arrest, as now required by
Section 5(b), must have been dictated by the consideration, among others, that by reason of such recency of
the criminal occurrence, the probability of the arresting officer acquiring personal and/or reliable
knowledge of such fact and the identity of the offender is necessarily enhanced, if not assured. The longer
the interval, the more attenuated are the chances of his obtaining such verifiable knowledge. In the case
under consideration, the obtention of information of a crime committed fourteen (14) days earlier
necessarily undermines the capacity of the arresting officer to ascertain the reliability of the information he
is acting upon and to acquire personal knowledge thereof after such verification.

It may be granted, as an ad hoc proposition, that the arrest of Nazareno was based on probable cause and it
was not whimsical, at least, in this instance. It is correct to say that prevailing conditions affecting national
security and stability must also be taken into account. However, for the reasons above elucidated, I take
exception to the conclusion that the conditions in Section 5(b) of Rule 113 had been complied with in this
case. It is true that the corresponding information was filed against Nazareno shortly after his arrest but
that, precisely, is another cause for controversy. Definitely, if the rules on arrest are scrupulously observed,
there would be no need for the usual invocation of Ilagan as a curative balm for unwarranted incursions into
civil liberties.

SARMIENTO, J.: dissenting:

I reiterate my dissent. I submit that in spite of its "clarificatory" resolution, 1 the majority has not shown
why the arrests in question should after all be sustained.

According to the majority, Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 815667) was validly arrested without a warrant and that
his arrest was sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113, of the Rules of
Court. According to the majority, he, Dural, was after all committing an offense (subversion being
supposedly a continuing offense) and that the military did have personal knowledge that he had committed
it. "Personal knowledge," according to the majority, is supposedly no more than "actual belief or reasonable
grounds . . . of suspicion," and suspicion is supposedly reasonable:

. . . when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilty of the person
to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 2

As I said, I dissent.
First, and as I held, subversion, as an offense punished by Executive Order No. 167, as amended by
Executive Order No. 276, in relation to Republic Act No. 1700, 3 is made up of "overt acts." 4 In People vs.
Ferrer 5 this Court defined "overt acts" as follows:

. . . Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to
charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more would suffice to secure their
punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and
by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific
intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing government by force, deceit, and
other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.

As Ferrer held, that above "overt acts" constitute the essence of "subversion," and as Ferrer has taken pains
to explain, the law requires more than mere membership in a subversive organization to make the accused
liable. I respectfully submit that for purposes of arrest without a warrant, that above "overt acts" should be
visible to the eyes of the police officers (if that is possible), otherwise the accused can not be said to be
committing any offense within the contemplation of the Rules of Court, to justify police action, and
otherwise, we would have made "subversion" to mean mere "membership" when, as Ferrer tells us,
subversion means more that mere membership.

I find strained that majority's interpretation of "personal knowledge," as the majority would interpret it, as
no more than "actual belief or reasonable suspicion," that is, "suspicion . . . based on actual facts . . . [and]
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith . . . " 6 I submit that personal knowledge means exactly
what it says — that the peace officer is aware that the accused has committed an offense, in this case,
membership in a subversive organization with intent to further the objectives thereof. It is to be noted that
prior to their amendment, the Rules (then Section 6) spoke of simple "reasonable ground" — which would
have arguably encompassed "actual belief or suspicion . . . coupled with good faith" referred to by the
majority. Section 5(b) as amended, however, speaks of "personal knowledge"; I respectfully submit that to
give to "personal knowledge" the same meaning as "reasonable ground" is to make the amendment as useless
exercise.

What, furthermore, we have here was a mere "confidential information" that a "sparrow man" had been
wounded and was recuperating in the hospital, and that that person was Rolando Dural. Clearly, what we
have is second-hand, indeed, hearsay, information, and needless to say, not personal knowledge.

I would like to point out that in the case of People vs. Burgos 7 this Court rejected a similar arrest because
of lack of personal knowledge, and, as the Court held, "[w]hatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers came in its entirety from the information furnished by [another] . . ." 8 I do not see how
We can act differently here.

I do not find the majority's reliance on the case of United States vs. Santos 9 to be well-taken. Santos
involved a prosecution for coercion (against a peace officer for affecting an arrest without a warrant).
Santos, however, did in fact affirm the illegality of the arrest but absolved the peace officer on grounds of
good faith. Santos did not say that so long as he, the peace officer, was acting in good faith, as the majority
here says that the military was acting in good faith, the arrest is valid. Quite to the contrary, Santos
suggested that notwithstanding good faith on the part of the police, the arrest is nevertheless subject to
question.

As far as the information leading to the arrest of Dural is concerned, the majority would quite evidently
swallow the version of the military as if in the first place, there truly was an information, and that it was
reliable, and that "it was found to be true;" 10 and as if, in the second place, the hospital authorities (the
alleged informants) could have legally tipped the military under existing laws. We have, it should be noted,
previously rejected such a species of information because of the lack of "compulsion for [the informant] to
state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution." 11 Here, it is worse, because we do not
even know who that informant was.
The majority is apparently unaware that under Executive Order No. 212, amending Presidential Decree No.
169, hospital establishments are required to report cases of acts of violence to "government health
authorities" — not to the military.

I am concerned that if the military were truly armed with reliable information and if it did have personal
knowledge to believe that Dural had committed an offense, there was no reason for the military to ignore
the courts, to which the Constitution after all, gives the authority to issue warrants. As People vs.
Burgos held:

More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought
to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a
warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly
committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on
the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused
were unknown. 12

I do not likewise see how the petitioners Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon
Caspile, and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. Nos. 84581-82; 83162) could have been lawfully picked up under similar
circumstances. As the majority points out, the military had (again) acted on a mere tip-the military had no
personal knowledge (as I elaborated what personal knowledge means). Second, I do not think that the
majority can say that since Amelia Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" (As Roque, et al. allegedly admitted),
immediate arrests were "prudent" and necessary. As I said, that Roque, et al. were admitted "NPA's" is (was)
the question before the trial court and precisely, the subject of controversy. I think it is imprudent for this
Court to pass judgment on the guilt of the petitioners-since after all, and as the majority points out, we are
talking simply of the legality of the petitioner's arrests.

More important, that Roque, et al. "were NPA's anyway" is evidently, a mere say-so of the military, and
evidently, the Court is not bound by bare say-so's. Evidently, we can not approve an arrest simply because
the military says it is a valid arrest (the accused being "NPA's anyway")— that would be abdication of judicial
duty and when, moreover, the very basis of the claim rests on dubious "confidential information."

According to the majority, we are speaking of simple arrests; we are not talking of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. I certainly hope not, after the majority referred to Rolando Dural as a "sparrow man" and
having Amelia Roque, et al. admit to being NPA's."

It is to gloss over at any rate, the nature of arrest as a restraining on liberty. It is to me immaterial that the
guilt of the accused still has to be established, since meanwhile, the accused are in fact being deprived of
liberty. Arrest to me, is something to crow about, even if in the opinion of the majority, it is nothing to
crow about (a mere "administrative measure").

I can not, again, accept the validity of the arrests of Deogracia Espiritu or Narciso Nazareno (G.R. Nos.
85727; 86332). Espiritu was supposedly picked up for inciting to sedition, in uttering supposedly, on
November 22, 1988, the following:

Bukas tuloy and welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulo na. 13

Espiritu however was arrested on November 23, 1988, a day later-and in no way is "inciting to sedition" a
continuing offense. Obviously, the majority is not saying that it is either, but that:
 . . . Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu has not lost the right to insist,
during the trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the
charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the
arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another
thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the
Court has, in this case, titled the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced
from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. 14

And obviously, the majority is concerned about whether or not Espiritu's speech was after all, protected
speech, but apparently, that is also of no moment, since: (1) that is a matter of defense; (2) we are talking
of mere arrests, and as far as arrests are concerned, "the Court has, in this case, titled in favor of
authority," 15 and (3) we have, anyway, given a reduced bail to the accused.

First, that the accused's statement is in the category of free speech is not only plain to my mind, it is a
question I do not think the majority can rightly evade in these petitions without shirking the Court's
constitutional duty. It is to my mind plain, because it does not contain enough "fighting words" recognized to
be seditious. 16 Secondly, it is the very question before the Court—whether or not the statement in question
constitutes an offense for purposes of a warrantless arrest. It is a perfectly legal question to my mind and I
am wondering why we can not answer it.

What the majority has not answered, as I indicated, is that inciting to sedition is in no way a continuing
offense, and as I said, the majority is not apparently convicted that it is, either. Of course, the majority
would anyway force the issue: "But the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant,
at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing." 17 First, Espiritu was picked
up the following day, and in no way is "the following day" "soon thereafter". Second, we would have
stretched the authority of peace officers to make warrantless arrests for acts done days before. I do not
think this is the contemplation of the Rules of Court.

As in the case of Burgos in People vs. Burgos, 18 Espiritu was neither "on the verge of flight or
escape" 19 and there was no impediment for the military to go through the judicial processes, as there was
none in the case of Burgos.

In the case of People vs. Aminnudin, 20 this Court held that unless there "was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed," and unless there existed an urgency as where a moving vehicle is
involved, instant police action can not be justified.

"In the balancing of authority and freedom," states the majority, "the Court has, in this case, titled in favor
of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction)." 21 It is a strange declaration, first,
because it is supported by no authority (why the Court should "tilt" on the side of Government), and second,
because this Court has leaned, by tradition, on the side of liberty — as the custodian of the Bill of Rights —
even if we were talking of "simple" arrests.

I do not understand why this Court should "tilt" . . . the scale in favor of authority . . . in this case," 22 as if
to say that normally, this Court would have tilted the scales the other way. I do not understand why these
cases are apparently, special cases, and apparently, the majority is not telling us neither. I am wondering
why, apart from the fact that these cases involved, incidentally, people who think differently from the rest
of us.

The majority goes on:

With all due respect, I do not think that the majority is aware of the serious implications of its
pronouncement on individual rights (and statutory construction in general), and I feel I am appropriately
concerned because as a member of the Court, I am co-responsible for the acts of my colleagues and I am
afraid that I may, rightly or wrongly, be in time made to defend such an indefensible pronouncement.

Section 5(b) of Rule 113 is clear and categorical: the offense must have been "just committed" and the
authorities must have "personal knowledge."

In no way can an offense be said to have been "just committed" fourteen days after it was in fact (allegedly)
committed. In no way can the authorities be said to have "personal knowledge" two weeks thereafter;
whatever "personal knowledge" they have can not possibly be "personal knowledge" of a crime that had "just
been committed;" whatever "personal knowledge" they have is necessarily "personal knowledge" of a crime
committed two weeks before.

In no way can Nazareno's arrest be said to be an arrest sanctioned by the exceptional provisions of the
Rules.

I am not saying that the military can not act in all cases, and it is sheer ignorance to suppose that I am
saying it, (or worse, that I am "coddling criminals"). I am not saying that a suspected criminal, if he can not
be arrested without a warrant, can not be arrested at all — but that the military should first procure a
warrant from a judge before effecting an arrest. It is not too much to ask of so-called law enforcers.

As it is, the majority has enlarged the authority of peace officers to act, when the Rules have purposely
limited it by way of an exception, precisely, to the general rule, mandated by the Constitution no less, that
arrests may be done only through a judicial warrant. As it is, the majority has in fact given the military the
broadest discretion to act, a discretion the law denies even judges 24 — today it is fourteen days, tomorrow,
one year, and sooner, a decade. I submit that a year, a decade, would not be in fact unreasonable,
following the theory of the majority, since the military can claim anytime that it "found out only later," as
the majority did not find it unreasonable for the Capital Command to claim that it "came to know
that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II" 25—and none of us can possibly
dispute it.

I would like to stress strongly that we are not talking of a simple "administrative measure" alone—we are
talking of arrests, of depriving people of liberty—even if we are not yet talking of whether or not people are
guilty. That we are not concerned with guilt or innocence is hardly the point, I respectfully submit, and it
will not minimize the significance of the petitioners' predicament.

With respect to Wilfredo Buenaobra, I submit that the majority has, as in the cases of Amelia Roque, et al.,
ignored the fact that Buenaobra's alleged "admission" (actually, an uncounselled confession) was precisely,
the basis for Buenaobra's arrest. It is to beg the question, I respectfully submit, to approve the military's
action for the reason that Buenaobra confessed, because Buenaobra confessed for the reason that the
military, precisely, pounced on him. I am not to be mistaken for prejudging Buenaobra's innocence (although
it is supposed to be presumed) but I can not imagine that Buenaobra would have voluntarily proclaimed to
the military that he was an NPA courier so that the military could pounce on him.
I respectfully submit that the cases Garcia vs. Padilla 26 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 27 have been better days. I do
not see how this court can continuously sustain them "where national security and stability are still directly
challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels." 28 First and foremost, and as the
majority has conceded, we do not know if we are in fact dealing with "Communists." The case of Deogracias
Espiritu, for one, hardly involves subversion. Second, "Communism" and "national security" are old hat — the
dictator's own excuses to perpetuate tyranny, and I am genuinely disappointed that we would still fall for
old excuses. Third, Garcia and Ilagan rested on supposed grounds that can not be possibly justified in a
regime that respects the rule of law — that the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is a valid presidential
document (Garcia) and that the filing of an information cures a defective arrest (Ilagan). Fourth and finally,
it is evident that neither "Communist threat" nor "national security" are valid grounds for warrantless arrests
under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.

I most respectfully submit that Garcia and Ilagan have not only been diluted by subsequent jurisprudence
(e.g., People vs. Burgos, supra), they are relics of authoritarian rule that can no longer be defended, if they
could have been defended, in Plaza Miranda or before our own peers in the bar.

"What is important," says the majority, "is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality,
via habeas corpus proceedings." 29 I supposed that goes without saying. But it is also to patronize the
petitioners and simply, to offer a small consolation, when after all, this Court is validating their continued
detention. 30 With all due respect, I submit that it is nothing for which the public should be elated.