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CASE DIGESTS

People v. Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76

Doctrine

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all


offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

The provision granting an exemption to Members of Congress as a special privilege


cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended
by intendment, implication, or equitable considerations.

Facts

The Accused-Appellant Romeo Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress,


convicted of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts lasciviousness.
Nevertheless, his conviction is pending appeal while he is confined in the New Bilibid
Prison. During the pendency of his appeal, he won a reelection bid as Representative
for the First District of Zamboanga Del Norte. As such, he filed a motion to be allowed to
discharge his mandate on the grounds that his election win must be given priority over
any ruling.

Issue

Whether or not the Accused-Appellant must be exempted from penal laws by reason of
his election win.

Ruling

NO. The Supreme Court held the immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily as Congressmen,
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication, or equitable considerations. No less than
the Constitution provides that members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason is a legitimate one, more so a confinement for a crime
committed which is punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 months.

In the present case, firstly, the Accused-Appellant has been convicted for the crimes
committed. Although pending appeal, confinement is public self-defense whereby
society must protect itself. Secondly, the Condonation Doctrine cannot be applied
because the case involves criminal offenses, not administrative offenses. Finally, the
election to the position of Congressman or Representative is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
ANTONIO TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL SR. (D)
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials. On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling
out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup
d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.
4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June
30, 2007. Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion
for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:
No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees
for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit
their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights
more limited than those of the public.
When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be
bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during
the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance.
Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political
rights.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system.

DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J. GORDON


GR No. 175352, 2009-07-15

Facts:

Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners)


filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His
Seat in the Senate. Officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors. Respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the
Philippines,[1] he was elected Chairman of the PNRC. Petitioners allege that by
accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board... of Governors, respondent has ceased
to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI

No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during
his... term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which
may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
he was elected.

Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled


corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does
not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office
nor an... employment.

Issues:

Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or


controlled corporation;

Ruling:

Petition without merit. Republic Act No. 95,[7] otherwise known as the PNRC Charter.
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose
mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate... humanitarian assistance for
the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social
status, or political affiliation.

PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster Management, Safety
Services, Community, Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service. In
order to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and
must operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.

The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as


neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers
must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict.

To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot
be owned or controlled by the government. The Philippine government does not own
the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress.[13] The PNRC is financed primarily by
contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation
campaigns organized by its Board of Governors.

The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter, as amended,
only six of the thirty members of the PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the
President of the Philippines. An... overwhelming majority of four-fifths of the PNRC
Board are elected or chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC.

The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC,
elects the PNRC Chairman and all other officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman
of PNRC, respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC Chairmen are elected,
by a private sector-controlled

PNRC Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC
Chairman is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.
The PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his
appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the
PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads
us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of
the Philippine Government. Not being a... government official or employee, the PNRC
Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment.

Puyat vs De Guzman
G.R. No. L-51122
Facts

On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International
Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyat’s rival)
claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed a quo warranto
proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to
Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group. And
during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 ’79) to
have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance
as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is unconstitutional for an
assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such
as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel
for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for
him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the
motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved to question
the Commissioner’s action.

Issue:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the


SEC case without violating Sec. 14, Art. VI of the Constitution.

Ruling

No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks
before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel
but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead
presented himself as a party of interest–which is clearly a work around and is clearly an
act after the fact. A mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What
could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

Rep. Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. Vs. Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez


G.R. No. 227757
FACTS

Prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Rep. Jose Atienza
elicited the following from Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas: (a) all those who vote for
the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other
candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall
likewise be considered part of the Minority; and(c)the Minority Leader shall be
elected by the members of the Minority. Thereafter, the Elections for the Speakership
were held, with 252 Members voting for Speaker Alvarez, eight voting for Rep. Baguilat,
seven voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one registering a no vote. Speaker
Alvarez was declared as the Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was a long-
standing tradition of the house to declare the candidate who garnered the 2 nd
highest number of votes as the minority leader. However, despite numerous follow-
ups, Rep. Baguilat was never declared as such. Later on, Rep. Abayon who voted for
abstain, manifested before the Plenary that those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez
(including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority
Leader. This was opposed by Rep. Lagman arguing the following:

(a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as he voted for Speaker Alvarez,
and that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and

(b) that the "abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's
election as Minority Leader are supposed to be considered independent members of the
House, and thus, irregularly deemed as part of the Minority.

However, Rep. Lagman's opposition was overruled, and consequently, Rep. Suarez
was officially recognized as the House Minority Leader. Petitioners now filed a petition
for mandamus insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as minority leader.
Rep. Suarez, on the other hand, maintains that that the election of Minority Leader is an
internal matter to the House of Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with such
internal matters of a coequal branch of the government.

ISSUE
Whether respondents may be compelled by mandamus to recognize Rep. Baguilat as
Minority Leader and the petitioners as the only legitimate members of the House of
Minority.

RULING

No, the respondents cannot be compelled by mandamus. After a judicious study of this
case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to the relief sought. The
deviation by the Lower House from the long-standing tradition of the House is not
averse to the Constitution. Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives,
its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members. Each house shall choose
such other officers as it may deem necessary.

Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a
majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the
method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its
sole control. Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution vests
in the House of Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the
rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have
the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a
majority [of the House of Representatives]. Hence, as a general rule, the Supreme
Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
realm. Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court
in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments
of government will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it will,
however, strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. However, as may be
gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the questioned
proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-
pressed to find any attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its
intrusion in this case. By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a
coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil
this Court in the realm of politics,

but also lead to its own breach of the separation of powers doctrine. Verily, it would be
an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because it thinks that the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena
to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself."

Avelino v. Cuenco - 83 PHIL. 17 (1949)

Facts
Senators Tañada and Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the
petitioner Senate President Avelino and ordering an investigation thereof. During the
session day when Sen. Tañada was supposed to have his privilege speech, all
members of the Senate were present except two Senators (so that there were 22 in
attendance out of the 24 members of the Senate). When the session was called to
order, Sen. Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour speech
but Sen. Pres. Avelino kept on ignoring him, and announced that he would order the
arrest of anyone who would speak without being previously recognized. A commotion
broke out. A move for adjournment was opposed. Suddenly, Sen. Pres. Avelino banged
his gavel and walked out of the session hall followed by his followers (leaving only 12
senators in the hall). Thereafter, senators who remained went on with the session (so
called “rump session”), and voted to declare vacant the position of the Senate President
and designated respondent Sen. Cuenco as the Acting Senate President. In this
petition, Sen. Avelino prays for the Court to declare him the rightful Senate President
and to oust respondent Sen. Cuenco.

Issues:

(1) Is the rump session a continuation of the morning session?

(2) Supposing the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was
there a quorum when Sen. Avelino was ousted and Sen. Cuenca was elected as the
Senate President?

Held:

(1) Yes. A minority of 10 senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other 12
senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.

(2) Yes. In view of Sen. Confessor’s absence from the country, for all practical
considerations, he may not participate in the Senate deliberations. Therefore, an
absolute majority of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum; that is, 12 senators in
this case constitute a quorum.¹ Even if the 12 did not constitute a quorum, they could
have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members. If one had been so
arrested, there would be no

doubt [that there is a quorum] then, and Sen. Cuenco would have been elected just the
same in as much as, at most, only 11 will side with Sen. Avelino. It would be most
injudicious [then] to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al.,
G.R. No. 196271

FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established
the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA
No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset
the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time
the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date
every 3 years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on
August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA
No. 10153 in toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize
national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from
the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to
which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms
of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional
mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday
of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become
laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the
EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate
enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of the
President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2]
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our
Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate
from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is
constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in
order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order
to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective
officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized
elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective
terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of
the incumbent ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term
through a holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by
Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the
occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly,
i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if
acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of
the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and
an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.
Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that
Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been
statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have
to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no
express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely
removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the
discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this
Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its
own, has no authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections
may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members
of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or
upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the
power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled
August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections
synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so
doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative
wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the
contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision
and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an
act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in
grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to
annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor
to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier
than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen
– a term of less than two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while
synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express
provision of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the
interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No.
10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the
pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only
measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be examined for
any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations
on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these
limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and
consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or
naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls
under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional
basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs
under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the
ARMM executive and legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the
constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-
observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more
apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly
read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM
positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of
the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No.
10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power
is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending
on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in
fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that
must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the
manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order
for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the
adjustments that the synchronization requires.

OSMENA V. PENDATUN
109 Phil 863

Facts

On July 14, 1960, petitioner Congressman Sergio Osmena Jr. filed a petition before the
SC against respondents Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and 14 other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by HR 59.
He asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity. The pertinent portions of HR 59 are as follows:

On June 23, 1960, petitioner accused then President Garcia in a privilege speech that
“free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices.
Even pardons are for sale, and the culprit can always be bailed out as long as he can
come across with a handsome dole.”
The charges of the petitioner, if made recklessly and without basis, would constitute a
serious assault on the dignity and prestige of the Office of the President which is the
one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people.

A special committee of 15 members to be appointed by the Speaker is created to


investigate the truth of the charges against the President, and is authorized to summon
Cong. Osmena to appear before it to substantiate his charges as well as issue
subpoena to require attendance of witnesses or production of pertinent papers. If Cong.
Osmena fails to do so, require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the
House. The committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and
recommendations before the adjournment of the special session of Congress.

Petitioner alleged that:

The resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered.
His words constituted no actionable conduct.

After his objectionable speech, the House took up other business, and according to
Rule XVII Section 7 of the Rules of the House, if other business has intervened after a
Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer
therefor.

The House has no power under the Constitution to suspend one of its members.

The majority of the Court decided to hear the case and required respondents to answer
without issuing any preliminary injunction. The special committee continued to perform
its task, and submitted its report on July 18, 1960 finding petitioner guilty of serious
disorderly behavior. The House approved on the same day HR 175, declaring petitioner
guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for 15 months.

On July 19, 1960, respondents filed their answer to the instant petition, challenged the
jurisdiction of the SC to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to
discipline its members with suspension, upheld HR 175 and emphasized that since
Congress had ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee had ceased to exist.

Issue:

WON the Court can prevent Congress from punishing or disciplining one of its members
for his serious allegations against the President in one of his speeches.

Ruling:

Yes.

Parliamentary Immunity under Section 15, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution


guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the
Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. The same provision in our Constitution
was taken from Sec.6 Clause 1 of Article 1 of the US Constitution, and in that country, is
has always been understood to mean that though exempt from prosecution or civil
actions for their words uttered in Congress, members thereof may nonetheless by
questioned in Congress itself.

For unparliamentarily conduct, members of Congress have been censured, imprisoned,


suspended, or even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. In fact, the Philippine
Senate suspended a senator for 1 year in April 1949.

On whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly


conduct, the Court believes that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows

best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for adjudication by the courts. The
theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such
situation a prudent refusal to interfere. The Court refuses to disregard the allocation of
constitutional functions which is their special duty to maintain.

In Clifford v. French, the SC of California ruled that the judicial department has no
power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department.
Every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has
the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.

Courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and the courts have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number
of members have agreed to a particular measure.

In Alejandrino v. Quezon, the Court rules that the Senate had no power to suspend its
members because it would be tantamount to removal, and the organic law Jones Law
gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member. HOWEVER, that remark
should be understood to refer particularly to an appointive senator. At that time, the
Legislature only had those powers which were granted to it by the Jones Law. Now, the
Congress has full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation except as
restricted by the Constitution, including legislative prerogative of suspension.
However, as the House has already closed its session, the Committee has ceased to
exist, and the case should be dismissed for having moot and academic.

Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 126055

Facts:
On October 17, 1988, petitioner, then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation, allegedly, with evident bad faith, approve the application for
legalization of the stay of 32 aliens, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984
in violation of EO 324 which prohibits legalization of said disqualified aliens, thereby
giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully
legalized by petitioner.

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of petitioner fixing bail at P15,000. The
Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until her physical condition improves as
she was recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. On May 24, 1991,
petitioner filed concurrently a Petition for Certiorari seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the
Sandiganbayan to defer her arraignment. The SC dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed
a motion for bill of particulars with Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the
aliens were conspicuously admitted in the complaint. The SC, in its resolution of
November 12, 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioner’s arraignment not
later than 5 days from receipt of notice thereof.

On December 7, 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to admit 32 amended informations. On December 2, 1993, the SC directed the
OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Said informations
were consolidated under Criminal Case No. 16698.

On July 31, 1995, the prosecution filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an
order preventively suspending petitioner. The Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file
her opposition to the July 31 motion for the prosecution within 15 days from receipt
thereof.. Petitioner filed her opposition on August 22, 1995. On January 25, 1996, the
Sandiganbayan suspended petitioner from her position as Senator for 90 days.

Issue:

WON the Sandiganbayan can issue a 90-day preventive suspension order against
petitioner.

Ruling:
Yes. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of RA 3019 has both
legal and jurisprudential support, specifically Section 13 of the said law which states that
any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act shall be suspended from office.

In Segovia v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that the validity of Section 13 of RA 3019,
treating the suspension pendent lite of an accused public officer, may no longer be put
to issue. It applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under the Act,
whether appointive or elective, permanent or temporary, career or non-career service.

In Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that preventive suspension is not a penalty
because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings.

It is also settled that the use of the word “office” in Section 13 of RA 3019 indicates that
it applies to any officer which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.

The accused is given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the propriety of his
prosecution. However, it should be treated in the same manner as a challenge to the
criminal proceeding by way of motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, and should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged
in the information constitute the elements of an offense.

Petitioner claims that the amended informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the officials acts complained of were authorized
under EO 324.
However, in a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact
in the information. Hence, petitioner admitted the facts which constitute the elements of
the offense.

The pronouncement upholding the validity of the information filed behooved the
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to issue the order of preventive
suspension.

Also, the order of suspension prescribed in RA 3019 is different from that of Section
16(3) of Article Vi of the 1987 Constitution because the former is preventive (not a
penalty), and the latter is punitive imposed by either House of Congress upon its
members. RA 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress. The
doctrine of separation of powers simply recognized that each of the 3 co-equal
branches of government has exclusive prerogatives and effectively prevents one branch
from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of another.

US. V. Pons - 34 PHIL. 7291916 ] Journal and records)

FACTS:

• Gabino Beliso (who was engaged in the wine business as a wine merchant),
Juan Pons (sole defendant appellant in this case), and Jacinto Lasarte were charged
with conspiracy with illegal importation of opium, from Spain to Philippines.
• One of the contentions of Juan Pons is that Act No. 2381, under which Pons is
found guilty, is null and void.
o Pons contends that the last day of the special session of the Philippine
Legislature (then composed of the Philippine Commission as the Upper House, and the
Philippine Assembly as the Lower House) in 1914, as enunciated by the Governor-
General, was February 28.
o But, Act No. 2381 was not approved on February 28, but on March 1, contrary to
the date of adjournment of Congress.

ISSUE/RULING:

Can the courts can go beyond the writings in the journal to determine the answer to a
question of fact? NO Courts may not go beyond the journals to determine w/n the Act in
question was indeed approved on Feb 28.

What if evidentiary questions arise on what actually transpired in Congress and the
entries in the journal conflict with extraneous evidence such as testimony of witness or
newspaper reports?

What if evidentiary questions arise on what actually transpired in Congress and the
entries in the journal conflict with extraneous evidence such as testimony of witness or
newspaper reports?

• The journal prevails as it is conclusive on courts. It is well settled in the United


States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question
whether a particular bill became a law or not. The result is that the law and the
adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the
special session of the Philippine Legislature.
• The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required
by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect.
(Arroyo vs De Venecia 1997)

Casco Phil. Commercial Co, V. Gimenez - 7 SCRA 3471963 journal and record

FACTS:
• RA 2609, or the ‘Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law’, promulgated a
memorandum laying out the procedure for the exemption from the payment of the 25%.
• Importation of “urea formaldehyde” is exempt.
• Asks refunds. 2 times.
• Casco contends that the term "urea formaldehyde" in RA 2609 should be
construed as "urea and formaldehyde" and that the Auditor erred in holding otherwise.
• Casco further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde". It further contended
that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately. Casco cited the statements made on the Senate floor.

ISSUE/RULING:

What if the journal conflicts with the enrolled bill on the contents of the law or
discrepancies?

• The enrolled bill prevails.


• It is the official copy of approved legislation and bears the certification of the
presiding. officer of the legislative body.
• The respect due to a co-equal department requires the courts to accept the
certification of the presiding officer of the legislative body. The respect due to coequal
department requires the courts to accept the certification of the presiding officer as
conclusive assurance that the bill so certified is authentic.
• If a mistake was made in the printing of the bill before it was certified by
Congress and approved by the President, the remedy is amendment or corrective
legislation, not a judicial decree.

Morales v. Subido - 27 SCRA 1311969 Journals and records)

FACTS

• This case involves a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Enrique V.


Morales against respondent Abelardo Subido, as Commissioner of Civil Service.
• The petitioner argues that the version of the provision in question, as amended
by Senator Francisco Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third
reading.
• The petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of different drafts of House
Bill 6951 to support his claim.
• However, the court held that it cannot go behind the enrolled act to determine
what actually happened during the legislative process.
• The court emphasized the respect due to the other branches of government and
the need to act upon the faith and credit of the official acts of those branches.
• The court rejected the petitioner's request for an investigation into the matter,
stating that such an investigation is better suited for Congress.

ISSUE/RULING:

Whether the Judiciary can assail the validity of an enrolled bill by investigating the
legislative process?

• The court emphasized the principle that the enrolled bill, which is signed by the
presiding officers of both houses of Congress and approved by the President, is
considered an official attestation that the bill is the one that has passed Congress.
• The court held that it cannot go behind the enrolled act to determine what
actually happened during the legislative process. The court also reiterated the principle
that the enrolled bill theory prevails in the event of any discrepancy between the
enrolled bill and the journals of the legislature.
• THAT ENROLLED BILL PREVAILS OVER THE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL IS
NOT AN ABSOLUTE RULE.
o We are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals
must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house.
o To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have
such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide.
o All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on
the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

Astorga v. Villegas - 56 SCRA 7141974 Journal and records)

FACTS:

• House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of


Representatives to the Senate.
• Contains amendment of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
regarding the powers, rights and duties of its Vice-Mayor.
o that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of
the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter’s
incapacity to act as Mayor.
• Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which
were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments,
thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and
attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065.
• Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy
of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the
amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate.
• Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their
signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid.
• Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas,
issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as
well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila
to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to
the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
• Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-
Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for
"Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the
Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and
the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
• Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of
the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.

ISSUE/RULING:

• The journal prevails in the following cases —

a. As to matters which, under the Constitution, must be entered in the


Journal (Morales v. Subido)
b. When the presiding officer repudiates his signature in the enrolled
bill.
As the enrolled bill doctrine is based mainly on the respect due to a coequal
department, when such department itself repudiates the enrolled bill, then the journal
must be accepted as conclusive.

Phil. Judges Assn, v. Prado - 227 SCRA 703 (conclusiveness of enrolled bill)

DOCTRINE:

The Court will not look into alleged inconsistencies of in the enactment of a statute
when the enrolled bill and legislative journal both certify its validity.

FACTS:
• RA 7354 entitled “An Act Creating the Phil Postal Corp, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith” provides in sec 35 thereof that all franking privileges
authorized by law are thereby repealed with some exceptions. It thus withdrew the
franking privilege of the SC, CA and trial courts of the Phils among other agencies.
• Petitioners argue, among others, that said Sec 35 is not expressed in the title of
the law, nor does it reflect its purposes contrary to Art VI, Sec 26(1) of the Constitution.
• They further argue that Sec 35 was not included in the original version of the
Senate and House bill from which RA 7354 evolved. As that appeared only in the
Conference Committee Report after the last reading of the bill, its addition, they allege,
violates Art VI, Sec 26(2) of the Constitution.

Did the enactment of Sec. 35 violate the rule requiring that amendment to any bill when
the House and the Senate have differences shall be settled by a conference committee
of both chambers? – NO
• While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question.
• It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in
question as returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
• Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress
before it was presented to and approved by the President.
• Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress.
• The Court declined to look into the charges that RA 7354 was not enacted with
the formalities mandated by the Constitution in Art VI Sec 26(2) holding that both the
enrolled bill and legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted in
accordance to said constitutional mandate.

Marcos v. Manglapus – Residual Power/Unstated Power of the President

Facts

Ferdinand Marcos Sr. was exiled on 1986 through non-violent people power. In his
deathbed, he wishes to return to the Philippines but the then President Corazon Aquino,
prohibited his return because it might pose problems in the country. The government is
facing challenges, and the economy is just starting to get better. So, she has decided
not to allow Mr. Marcos and his family to come back to the Philippines.

This petition for prohibition, seeks a court order to compel the authorities (respondents)
to provide travel documents to Mr. Marcos and his close family members. It aims to
carry out the President’s decision, which ban them from returning to the Philippines.

Issue

Whether the President, while using the powers granted by the Constitution, has the right
to prevent the Marcos family from returning to the Philippines.

Ruling

The specific right in question in this case is not the right to travel in the Philippines or
abroad. Instead, it's primarily about the right to return to one's own country. This right is
distinct and separate under international law, although it's related to the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our
well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land
[Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed

to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative
to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In
that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to
total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of
the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA - (alienation of government property)

G. R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

FACTS:

This is a petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and
agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land
at 306 Roppongi; 5-chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21,
1990.The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into
with Japan on 9 May 1956.The properties and the capital goods and services procured
from the Japanese government for national development projects are part of the
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their
suffering during World War II.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the
Philippine government.
2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents have the authority, and
jurisdiction to sell the Roppongi property.

RULING:

The Court ruled in the negative. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public
service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations
Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the
Philippine government and the Japanese government. There can be no doubt that it is
of public dominion and is outside the commerce of man. And the property continues to
be part of

the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio
vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil 335). It is not for the President to convey valuable real
property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyances must be
authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence. Petition is granted

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