Mathematics in Modern World

◊ Apportionment

- it is a method of dividing a whole into various parts. This mathematical analysis has its roots in the United
States Constitution.

Types of Apportionment Methods

1. Hamilton Plan
it was proposed by Alexander Hamilton which was only adopted later at about 1850. To illustrate
Hamilton plan works, consider a fictitious country named Kolob with a population of 33,000 and having a
twelve state is given below.

State Population
Andersen 3 250
Ballard 2 750
Bednar 3 000
Christofferson 2 500
Cook 3 500
Hales 3 300
Holland 2 500
Nielson 2 250
Nelson 4 000
Oaks 3 750
Rasband 1 000
Renlund 1 500
Total 33 000

To determine the number of representative of each state under Hamilton Method, divide first the
total population by the number of representatives (70). This number is called the standard divisor.

Standard Divisor

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

For Kolob, the standard divisor is

33 000
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 = ≈ 𝟒𝟕𝟏. 𝟒𝟑
70
 Types of Quota

• Lower Quota (L) – it is the standard quota rounded down to a whole number.

• Upper Quota (U) – it is the standard quota rounded up to the next whole number.

For the state of Andersen, dividing its population (3 250) by the standard divisor (471. 43) yields
3 250
= 6.89. In the Hamilton Plan, we use the lower quota. Hence, the standard quota for Andersen is 6.
471 .43
The next table shows the computations for the rest of the states.

State Population Quotient Standard Quota (L)

Andersen 3 250 3 250 6
= 6.89
471.43
Ballard 2 750 2 750 5
= 5.83
471.43
Bednar 3 000 3 000 6
= 6.36
471.43
Christofferson 2 500 2 500 5
= 5.30
471.43
Cook 3 500 3 500 7
= 7.42
471.43
Hales 3 300 3 300 7
= 7.00
471.43
Holland 2 500 2 500 5
= 5.30
471.43
Nielson 2 250 2 250 4
= 4.77
471.43
Nelson 4 000 4 000 8
= 8.48
471.43
Oaks 3 750 3 750 7
= 7.95
471.43
Rasband 1 000 1 000 2
= 6.89
471.43
Renlund 1 500 1 500 3
= 6.89
471.43
Total 65

In this table, we can see that the total of standard quota is 65 but the required number of
representatives is 70. So, we must add one (1) to the highlighted States because these are the number with
highest decimals to get the exact value of the required number of representatives (70).

The next table shows the computed sum of the standard sub-quotas for the rest of States.

State Population Quotient Standard Quota (L)

Andersen 3 250 3 250 7
= 6.89
471.43
 Ballard 2 750 2 750 6
= 5.83
471.43
Bednar 3 000 3 000 6
= 6.36
471.43
Christofferson 2 500 2 500 5
= 5.30
471.43
Cook 3 500 3 500 7
= 7.42
471.43
Hales 3 300 3 300 7
= 7.00
471.43
Holland 2 500 2 500 5
= 5.30
471.43
Nielson 2 250 2 250 5
= 4.77
471.43
Nelson 4 000 4 000 9
= 8.48
471.43
Oaks 3 750 3 750 8
= 7.95
471.43
Rasband 1 000 1 000 2
= 6.89
471.43
Renlund 1 500 1 500 3
= 6.89
471.43
Total 70

2. The Jefferson Plan

it was proposed by Thomas Jefferson. Under the Jefferson Plan, the standard quota is computed
in the same way as the Hamilton Plan. But if the total of the standard sub-quotas does not yield the correct
number of representatives, a modified standard divisor is employed. This number is chosen by trial and
error. The modified standard divisor must be less than the standard divisor (471.43). This is in order to get a
larger quotient and eventually get a larger sum of the standard sub-quotas.

State Population Standard Quota (L) Quotient No. of representatives

Andersen 3 250 6 3 250 7
= 7.22
450
Ballard 2 750 5 2 750 6
= 6.11
450
Bednar 3 000 6 3 000 6
= 6.71
450
Christofferson 2 500 5 2 500 5
= 5.55
450
Cook 3 500 7 3 500 7
= 7.78
450
Hales 3 300 7 3 300 7
= 7.33
450
Holland 2 500 5 2 500 5
= 5.55
450
 Nielson 2 250 4 2 250 5
= 5.00
450
Nelson 4 000 8 4 000 8
= 8.00
450
Oaks 3 750 7 3 750 8
= 8.33
450
Rasband 1 000 2 1 000 2
= 2.22
450
Renlund 1 500 3 1 500 3
= 3.33
450
Total 65 69

In this table, we can see that the total of standard quota is 69 but the required number of
representatives is 70. Observing the Oaks is closed to 9 representatives, thus, if we adjust the standard
divisor to 440. We can get a table like this:

State Population Standard Quota (L) Quotient No. of Representatives

Andersen 3 250 6 3 250 7
= 7.39
440
Ballard 2 750 5 2 750 6
= 6.25
440
Bednar 3 000 6 3 000 6
= 6.82
440
Christofferson 2 500 5 2 500 5
= 5.68
440
Cook 3 500 7 3 500 7
= 7.95
440
Hales 3 300 7 3 300 7
= 7.50
440
Holland 2 500 5 2 500 5
= 5.68
440
Nielson 2 250 4 2 250 5
= 5.11
440
Nelson 4 000 8 4 000 9
= 9.09
440
Oaks 3 750 7 3 750 8
= 8.52
440
Rasband 1 000 2 1 000 2
= 2.27
440
Renlund 1 500 3 1 500 3
= 3.41
440
Total 65 70

3. The Adam’s Method

it was proposed by former U.S. President John Quincy Adams. To determine the number of
representatives of each state under this method, the same formula is used to compute the standard quota of
each state but this time, upper quota is applied instead.
 State Population Quotient Standard Quota (U)
Andersen 3 250 3 250 7
= 6.89
471.43
Ballard 2 750 2 750 6
= 5.83
471.43
Bednar 3 000 3 000 7
= 6.36
471.43
Christofferson 2 500 2 500 6
= 5.30
471.43
Cook 3 500 3 500 8
= 7.42
471.43
Hales 3 300 3 300 7
= 7.00
471.43
Holland 2 500 2 500 6
= 5.30
471.43
Nielson 2 250 2 250 5
= 4.77
471.43
Nelson 4 000 4 000 9
= 8.48
471.43
Oaks 3 750 3 750 8
= 7.95
471.43
Rasband 1 000 1 000 3
= 2.12
471.43
Renlund 1 500 1 500 4
= 3.18
471.43
Total 76

Here, we can see that the computed sum of the standard sub-quotas is 76. To make this 70, we
need to reduce the standard divisor from 471.43 to 499.65 to get the exact value of the required sum of the
standard sub-quotas.

State Population Quotient Standard Quota (U)

Andersen 3 250 3 250 7
= 6.50
499.65
Ballard 2 750 2 750 6
= 5.50
499.65
Bednar 3 000 3 000 7
= 6.00
499.65
Christofferson 2 500 2 500 6
= 5.00
499.65
Cook 3 500 3 500 7
= 7.00
499.65
Hales 3 300 3 300 7
= 6.60
499.65
Holland 2 500 2 500 5
= 5.00
499.65
Nielson 2 250 2 250 5
= 4.50
499.65
 Nelson 4 000 4 000 9
= 8.01
499.65
Oaks 3 750 3 750 8
= 7.51
499.65
Rasband 1 000 1 000 2
= 2.00
499.65
Renlund 1 500 1 500 3
= 3.00
499.65
Total 70

4. Huntington-Hill Method
To simplify the procedure using Huntington-Hill Method apportionment method, consider the
following steps:
Step 1: Calculate the standard quota, lower quotas, and upper quotas of each of the subgroups.
Step 2: Determine the geometric mean (rounded to the two decimal places) of each sub-group’s lower
quota and upper quota.
 If the standard quota is less than the geometric mean, round the quota down.
 If the standard quota is greater than or equal to the geometric mean, round the quota up.
Step 3: If the sum of the rounded standard quotas equals the number of representatives, you are done.
Otherwise, choose a modified standard divisor and calculate the modified quotas and rounded modified
quotas. Repeat this process until the required number is achieved.

Let us now apply this method to the same problem in this section.

State Popul Standard Standard Standard Geometric No. of

ation Quota Quota (L) Quota (U) Mean 𝑳𝑼 Representatives
Andersen 3 250 3 250 6 7 6.48 7
= 6.89
471.43
Ballard 2 750 2 750 5 6 5.48 6
= 5.83
471.43
Bednar 3 000 3 000 6 7 6.48 6
= 6.36
471.43
Christofferson 2 500 2 500 5 6 5.48 5
= 5.30
471.43
Cook 3 500 3 500 7 8 7.48 7
= 7.42
471.43
Hales 3 300 3 300 7 7 7 7
= 7.00
471.43
Holland 2 500 2 500 5 6 5.48 5
= 5.30
471.43
Nielson 2 250 2 250 4 5 4.47 5
= 4.77
471.43
Nelson 4 000 4 000 8 9 8.49 8
= 8.48
471.43
Oaks 3 750 3 750 7 8 7.48 8
= 7.95
471.43
 Rasband 1 000 1 000 2 3 2.45 2
= 4.77
471.43
Renlund 1 500 1 500 3 4 3.46 3
= 8.48
471.43
Total 70 69

Here, we can see that the total of representatives is not equal to the required number of
representatives. Thus, we need to slightly reduce the standard divisor into 470.50 to get the required
representatives as shown in the next table.

State Popul Standard Standard Standard Geometric No. of

ation Quota Quota (L) Quota (U) Mean 𝑳𝑼 Representatives
Andersen 3 250 3 250 6 7 6.48 7
= 6.91
470.50
Ballard 2 750 2 750 5 6 5.48 6
= 5.84
470.50
Bednar 3 000 3 000 6 7 6.48 6
= 6.38
470.50
Christofferson 2 500 2 500 5 6 5.48 5
= 5.38
470.50
Cook 3 500 3 500 7 8 7.48 7
= 7.44
470.50
Hales 3 300 3 300 7 8 7.48 7
= 7.01
470.50
Holland 2 500 2 500 5 6 5.48 5
= 5.31
470.50
Nielson 2 250 2 250 4 5 4.47 5
= 4.78
470.50
Nelson 4 000 4 000 8 9 8.49 9
= 8.50
470.50
Oaks 3 750 3 750 7 8 7.48 8
= 7.97
470.50
Rasband 1 000 1 000 2 3 2.45 2
= 2.13
470.50
Renlund 1 500 1 500 3 4 3.46 3
= 3.19
470.50
Total 70 70
 Introduction to Voting
◊ Voting

- it is a sacred right and power that citizens in a democratic country exercise to select their leaders. But it is
sometimes hard to understand why the best candidates do not always win in elections. In 1992, former President
Fidel Ramos won the presidential election not because he was popular but because he gained the most number
of votes in an election based on plurality.

Preference Ballot - it is a ballot in which the voter ranks the choices in order of preference.

Types of Voting Methods

1. Plurality Method
In this method, the choice with the most first-preference votes is declared the winner. Ties are
possible, and would have to be settled through some sort of run-off vote. This method is sometimes mistakenly
called the majority method, or majority rules, but it is not necessary for a choice to have gained a majority of
votes to win. A majority is over 50%; it is possible for a winner to have a plurality without having a majority.

Example:
A vacation club is trying to decide which destination to visit this year: Hawaii (H), Orlando (O), or
Anaheim (A). Their votes are shown below:

Bob Ann Marv Alice Eve Omar Lupe Dave Tish Jim
st
1 choice A A O H A O H O H A
2nd choice O H H A H H A H A H
3rd choice H O A O O A O A O O

These individual ballots are typically combined into one preference schedule, which shows the
number of voters in the top row that voted for each option:

1 3 3 3
1st choice A A O H
2nd choice O H H A
3rd choice H O A O

Notice that by totaling the vote counts across the top of the preference schedule, we can recover the
total number of voters cast: 1 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 10 total votes.

Anaheim (A): 1 3 =
Hawaii (H): 3 =
Orlando (O): 3 =

In our election from above, we can see that the most first-preference vote is Anaheim. Thus,
Anaheim is the plurality winner.
 2. Condorcet Criterion
If there is a choice that is preferred in every one-to-one comparison with the other choices, that
choices should be the winner. We call this winner the Condorcet Winner or Condorcet Candidate.

Example:
In the election, what choice is the Condorcet Winner?

1 3 3 3
st
1 choice A A O H
2nd choice O H H A
3rd choice H O A O

Anaheim and Hawaii Anaheim and Orlando Orlando and Hawaii

A: 1 3 = 4 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 A: 1 3 3 = 𝟕 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 O: 1 3 = 4 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠

H: 3 3 = 𝟔 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 O: 3 = 3 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 H: 3 3 = 𝟔 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔

Hawaii is preferred. Anaheim is preferred. Hawaii is preferred.

We see above that Hawaii is preferred over Anaheim. Comparing Hawaii to Orlando, we can see 6
out of 10 would prefer Hawaii to Orlando. Since Hawaii is preferred in a one-to-one comparison to both other
choices, Hawaii is the Condorcet Winner.

3. Instant Runoff Voting

Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), also called Plurality with Elimination, is a modification of the plurality
method that attempts to address the issue of insincere voting. In IRV, voting is done with preference ballots, and
a preference schedule is generated. The choice with the least first-place votes is then eliminated from the
election, and any votes for that candidate are redistributed to the voter’s next choice. This continues until a
choice has a majority (over 50%). This voting method is used in several political elections around the world,
including election of members of the Australian House of Representatives, and was used for country positions
in Pierce Country, Washington until it was eliminated by voters in 2009. A version of IRV is used by the
International Olympic Committee to select host nations.

Example:
Consider the preference schedule below, in which a company’s advertising a team is voting on five
different advertising slogans, called A, B, C, D, and E here for simplicity.

3 4 4 6 2 1
1st choice B C B D B E
2nd choice C A D C E A
3rd choice A D C A A D
4th choice D B A E C B
5th choice E E E B D C
 If this was a plurality election, note that B would be the winner with 9 first-choice votes, compared to
6 for D, 4 for C, and 1 for E. There are total of 3 4 4 6 2 1 = 20 . A majority would be 11
votes. No one yet has a majority, so we can proceed to elimination rounds.

ROUND 1 (1st choice votes): 3 4 4 6 2 1

𝑩: 3 4 2 = 𝟗 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 1st choice B C B D B E
𝑫: 6 = 𝟔 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 2nd choice C D C E
𝑪: 4 = 𝟒 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 3rd choice D C D
𝑬: 1 = 𝟏 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 4th choice D B E C B
𝑨: 0 = 𝟎 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 (𝑬𝑳𝑰𝑴𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑻𝑬𝑫) 5th choice E E E B D C

We then shift everyone’s choices up to fill the gaps. There is still no choice with a majority, so we
eliminate again.
3 4 4 6 2 1
1st choice B C B D B E
nd
2 choice C D D C E D
rd
3 choice D B C E C B
4th choice E E E B D C

3 4 4 6 2 1
ROUND 2 (1st choice votes): st
1 B C B D B
𝑩: 3 4 2 = 𝟗 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 choice
𝑫: 6 = 𝟔 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 2nd C D D C D
𝑪: 4 = 𝟒 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 choice
𝑬: 1 = 𝟏 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 (𝑬𝑳𝑰𝑴𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑻𝑬𝑫) 3rd D B C C B
choice
4th B D C
choice

We make our second elimination. Choice E has the fewest first-place votes, so we remove that
choice, shifting everyone’s options to fill the gaps.
3 4 4 6 2 1
1st choice B C B D B D
2nd choice C D D C C B
3rd choice D B C B D C

3 4 4 6 2 1
st
1 B B D B D
ROUND 3 (1st choice votes): choice
𝑩: 3 4 2 = 𝟗 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 2nd D D B
𝑫: 6 1 = 𝟕 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 choice
𝑪: 4 = 𝟒 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 (𝑬𝑳𝑰𝑴𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑻𝑬𝑫) 3rd D B B D
choice
 Now B has 9 first-choice votes, C has 4 votes, and D has 7 votes. Still no majority, so we eliminate
again. We can make our third elimination, C has the fewest votes.

5 4 4 6 1
st
1 choice B D B D D
2nd choice D A D B B

ROUND 4 (1st choice votes):

𝑩: 3 4 2 = 𝟗 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔
𝑫: 6 4 1 = 𝟏𝟏 𝒗𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒔 (𝑴𝑨𝑱𝑶𝑹𝑰𝑻𝒀)

Considering this now, D has gained a majority, and is declared the winner under IRV.

4. Borda Count
In this method, points are assigned to candidates based on their ranking; 1 point for the last choice, 2
points for second-to last choice, and so on. The point values for all ballots are totaled, and the candidate with
the largest point is the winner.

Example:
A group of mathematicians are getting together for a conference. The members are coming from four
cities: Seattle, Tacoma, Puyallup, and Olympia. Their approximate locations on a map are shown below.

The votes for where to hold the conference were:

51 25 10 14
1st choice S T P O
nd
2 choice T P T T
rd
3 choice O O O P
4th choice P S S S
S

In each of the 51 ballots ranking Seattle first, Puyallup will be given 1 point, Olympia 2 points,
Tacoma 3 points, and Seattle 4 points. Multiplying the points per vote times the number of votes allows us to
calculate points awarded as shown in the table below.

51 25 10 14
st
1 choice – S T P O
4 pts. 4 × 51 = 𝟐𝟎𝟒 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 4 × 25 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 4 × 10 = 𝟒𝟎 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 4 × 14 = 𝟓𝟔 𝒑𝒕𝒔.
2nd choice – T P T T
3 pts. 3 × 51 = 𝟏𝟓𝟑 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 3 × 25 = 𝟕𝟓 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 3 × 10 = 𝟑𝟎 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 3 × 14 = 𝟒𝟐 𝒑𝒕𝒔.
3rd choice – O O O P
2 pts. 2 × 51 = 𝟏𝟎𝟐 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 2 × 25 = 𝟓𝟎 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 2 × 10 = 𝟐𝟎 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 2 × 14 = 𝟐𝟖 𝒑𝒕𝒔.
4th choice – P S S S
1 pt. 1 × 51 = 𝟓𝟏 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 1 × 51 = 𝟐𝟓 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 1 × 10 = 𝟏𝟎 𝒑𝒕𝒔. 1 × 14 = 𝟏𝟒 𝒑𝒕𝒔.
 If a choice has a majority of first-place votes, that choice should be the winner. The election from the
previous example using the Borda Count violates the Majority Criterion. Notice also that this automatically
means that the Condorcet Criterion will also be violated, as Seattle would have been preferred by 51% of voters
in any head-to-head comparison. Borda count is sometimes described as a consensus-based voting system, since
it can sometimes choose a more broadly acceptable option over the one with majority support. In the example
above, Tacoma is probably the best compromise location. This is a different approach than plurality and instant
runoff voting that focus on first-choice votes; Borda Count considers every voter’s entire ranking to determine
the outcome.

5. Copeland’s Method
In this method, each pair of candidates is compared, using all preferences to determine which of the
two is more preferred. The more preferred candidate is awarded 1 point. If there is a tie, each candidate is
awarded ½ point. After all pairwise comparisons are made, the candidate with the most points, and hence the
most pairwise wins, is declared the winner. Variations of Copeland’s Method are used in many professional
organizations, including election of the Board of Trustees for the Wikimedia Foundation that runs Wikipedia.

Example:
Consider our vacation group example from the beginning of the chapter. Determine the winner using
Copeland’s Method.

1 3 3 3
st
1 choice A A O H
2nd choice O H H A
3rd choice H O A O

We need to look at each pair of choices, and see which choice would win in a one-to-one
comparison. You may recall we did this earlier when determining the Condorcet Winner. For example,
comparing Hawaii vs. Orlando, we see that 6 voters, those shaded below in the first table below, would prefer
Hawaii to Orlando. Note that Hawaii doesn’t have to be the voter’s first choice—we’re imagining that Anaheim
wasn’t an option. If it helps, you can imagine removing Anaheim, as in the second table below.

1 3 3 3
st
1 choice A A O H
2nd choice O H H A
3rd choice H O A O
1 3 3 3
1st choice O H
2nd choice O H H
3rd choice H O O
 Hawaii vs. Orlando: 6 votes to 4 votes: Hawaii gets 1 point.
Anaheim vs. Orlando: 7 votes to 3 votes: Anaheim gets 1 point.
Hawaii vs. Anaheim: 6 votes to 4 votes: Hawaii gets 1 point.

Thus, Hawaii is the winner under Copeland’s Method, having earned the most points.