Grantham DoctrinalBasisRights 1998

The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders
Author(s): Ross Grantham

Source: The Cambridge Law Journal , Nov., 1998, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Nov., 1998), pp. 554-588
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Editorial Committee of the
Cambridge Law Journal
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4508493
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frmica m ureat tfritatn
Year 1998
Based in Great Britain
THE DOCTRINAL BASIS OF THE RIGHTS OF

COMPANY SHAREHOLDERS
Ross Grantham*
I. Introduction
The concept of ownership is a complex, powerful and controv

the concept idea.1 In law it explains, justifies and gives moral force to a hos
of
ownership rights and duties as well as serving to legitimate the allocation
wealth and privilege. The influence of this idea is, furthermo
everywhere embodied in the law.2 In company law, legal and econom
conceptions have both rested on and have been shaped by
ownership
in normative implications of ownership. Historically, ownership wa
company
law principal explanation and justification for the central rol
historically shareholders in corporate affairs.3 As owners, shareholders w
it was the entitled to control the management of the company and to
justification
for the role exclusive benefit of the company's activities. Ownership also se
of the
shareholder to legitimate the corporate form itself. So long as it was owned
s and their individuals the economic and political power of the company w
rights and
privileges - both benign and a bulwark against the intrusion of the state.4
ki jab tak
individuals
Scnior Lecturer, University of Auckland. I am grateful to my colleagues Professor C
own the
shares the Rtckctt and Thomas Telfer for their comments on earlier drafts. The usual caveats apply.
company is Generally see, Harris, Property and Justice (Clarendon, Oxford, 1996) p. 3; Penner, The Id
liek a wall Property in Law (Clarendon, Oxford, 1997) p. 1; Honore, "Ownership" in Guest (ed.), O
against the Essay* in Jurisprudence (O.U.P., Oxford, 1961) p. 107; Reich, "The New Property" (19
intrusion of Yale L.J. 733, 771; Vandevelde, "The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Develo
the state of the Modern Concept of Property" (1980) 29 Buffalo L.R. 325; MacPherson, "Li
Dcmocracy and Property" in MacPherson (ed.), Property: Mainstream and Critical Pos
(Uni. Toronto Press, Toronto, 1978) p. 199; Locke, Two Treatises of Civil Government (
London, 1949); Lucy and Mitchell, "Replacing Private Property: The Case for Steward
[1996] C.L.J. 566; Gray, "Property in Thin Air" [1991] C.L.J. 252.
Harris, op. cit.; Vandevelde, ibid. "Property" has been invoked to justify all manner of thi
from the right to use a shopping mall (Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center 592 P.2
(1979) S.C., Calif., affd 447 US. 74 (1980)) to the right to prevent development of the wilde
(Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727 (1972) to rights to personal autonomy (Radin, "Pro
and Personhood" (1982) 43 Stanford L.R. 957) and the right to empioyment (Collins, Justic
Dismissal; The Law of Termination of Empioyment (Clarendon, Oxford, 1992) p. 88.
Dallas, "Working Toward a New Paradigm" in Mitchell (ed.), Progressive Corporat
(WestView, Coiorado, 1995) p. 37; Hill, "Changes in the Role of the Sharehoider" in Gra
and Rickett (eds.), Corporate Personality in the 20th Century (Hart Oxford, 1998) Chap
Radin, "The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality" (1932) 32 Columbia L.R
Sappideen, "Ownership of the Large Corporation: Why Clothe the Emperor?" (1996-1
King's College L.J. 27; Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power (Cambridge
Cambridge, 1981); Werner, "Corporation Law in Search of its Future" (1981) 81 Columb
1611.
Stokes, "Company Law and Legal Theory" in Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) pp. 156-157; Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in
554

14.139.58.153 on Fri, 18 Aug 2023 09:12:32 +00:00
C.L.J. The Rights of Company Shareholders 555
Despite the recognition of the company's status as a di

even though
the company entity and the consequential displacement of shareholders a
has been
given a owners of the company's assets, shareholder ownership has re
distinct
ownership,
the central doctrinal explanation of the position of sharehold
shareholders
being the
century.5 Typical of this is Parkinson's description of the pre
owners of "legal model" of the company: "The underlying shareholders
theory
the company believe that
has been shareholders as having an entitlement that the company
the be op
the reason company
behind the for their benefit . . . by virtue of their position as members
must or
position of
the The law respects the right of shareholders to determine operate
the objec
for
their benefit
shareholders
of their association . . . and that by virtue of their because
capital
they are the
butions they should be regarded as the owners of the comp
members or
owners
A similar view is echoed in the leading Australian compa
text: "The directors must consider the interests of existing m
because they are the proprietors of the company . . .",7 wh
leading Canadian text shareholders are described as an "ab
proprietor".8 Indeed, the persisting notion that the company
owned, and is owned by its shareholders,9 has been the unde
assumption of much of corporate law scholarship this century
Berle and Means' identification of the separation of owners
control in the 1930s,10 the concern of corporate law has been
to mitigate the effects of this separation.11
This century, however, has seen a steady weakening of the po
the Theorv of Companv Law (Clarendon, Oxford, 1993) pp. 33-40; Reich, "The New
(1974) 73 Yale L.J. 733.
The assumption is even more prevalent amongst business commentators. For a ran
indicative selection of recent comments which rely upon or discuss this assum
"Reforming the Firm", The Economist, 9 August 1997, p. 14; "Kid's Stuff", 77m? E
21 June 1997, pp. 74-75; Bughin and Copeland, "The Virtuous Cycle of Shareho
Creation" (1997) McKinsey Quarterly 156; Geddes, "Ownership, Regulation, and M
Monitoring in the Electric Utility Industry" (1997) 40 J. of Law and Economics 261; Fr
"New World Order in the Board Room" (1996) 20 Directors and Boards 6; Useem a
"Employee Shareholders or Institutional Investor?" (1996) 33 J. of Management Stu
Samuels, Greenfield and Piper, "The Role of Non-Executive Directors Post-Cadbury"
J. of General Management 1; Boatright, "Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Man
Relation: Or, What's So Special About Shareholders?" (1994) 4 Business Ethics Quart
"Shareholders of the Nations, Unite!" (1994) 108 Investors Chronicle 12.
' Parkinson, op. cit. n.4, pp. 75-76. See also, Morse (ed.), Palmer's Company Law (25th
& Maxwell. London, 1992) Vol. 1, para. 6.001: "the shareholder is the proportionate
the company ..."
Ford, Austin and Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (8th ed., Butterworth
1997) para. 8.095. See also, Gilles, The New Corporations Law (2nd ed., Federat
Sydney, 1992) p. 22. As for New Zealand, see Beck et al. (eds.), Morison's Com
Securities Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) Vol. 2, para. 13.1.
! Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles (2nd ed., Butterworths
1991) p. 456. See also, Buckley, Corporations: Principles and Policies (3rd ed.,
Montgomery, Toronto, 1995) p. 185; Canada Corporations Law Reporter (CCH Canad
Ontario, 1997) para. 7000: "the shareholders of a corporation are the owne
corporations ..."
1 Sappideen, "Ownership of the Large Corporation: Why Clothe the Emperor?" (19
King's Coilege L.J. 27.
' Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (rev'd ed., Harcourt, B
World, New York, 1967)
1 Werner, "Corporation Law in Search of its Future" (1981) 81 Columbia L.R. 1161.

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shareholders have been given rights by
virtue of their ownerhsip, but this century
has also seen the limitation and denial of
many rights - so there is a shift from them
being regarded highly as owners and
556 The Cambridge Law Journal [1998]
being given the control to realising that
business does not exclusively run for their
benefit
and influence of shareholders. Although they sti

rights, the law has progressively limited or denie
of those rights which were most obviously an
shareholders' proprietorship of the company. Thu
been denied any proprietary rights in the assets o
are no longer able directly to control the ma
company, and there is an increasing recognition
not run exclusively for their benefit. While for
the idea of ownership is both the natural and desirable stat
shareholder
ownership is developments suggest that the concept of owners
becoming
weak and is
key doctrinal construct in explaining the posi
the shift
becoming shareholders. In particular, these developments ofsugge
incapable of ownership
explaining idea of sharehoider ownership is now so weak not beingan
what rights
shareholders that on its own it is incapable of explaining able
whatto
provide
should have
should have or, more radically, that the prevailin
doctrinal
explanatio
once conceived of the company as little more n to whyth
sharehold
owned and controlled collectively by the ersmem are
vested
Either way, it is clear that ownership no longer
with
doctrinal explanation of why shareholders certain
are v
rights
rights.12
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to describe the
law's progressive attenuation of sharehoider rights. The purpose in
doing so is to demonstrate that, whatever the popular perception, the
the AIM law no longer conceives of sharehoider rights as a consequence of a
OF THE status as owners. Secondly, the paper seeks to identify new doctrinal
ARTICLE
bases upon which the rights of shareholders might now rest and the
consequences of this new doctrinal framework. In doing so the aim
is neither to present a normative account nor to suggest that the law
is capable of entirely consistent explanation. Such is the nature of the
common law that even major changes in the underlying theory will
be reflected only in those rules which are most obviously inconsistent.
Rather, the aim is to offer a doctrinal basis upon which, with respect
to the position and rights of shareholders, the law as it presently
stands may be explained.
Before passing on to the substance of the paper it is important to
say something about the unitary nature of company law. Companies
come in all shapes and sizes, from the publicly listed multi-national
to the "quasi-partnership". The law, however, has steadfastly refused
to recognise the differences between closely held and other companies.
Although there are some concessions to reality13 and while attempts
Generally, see Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic
Society (University of California Press, 1986) pp. 21-22.
Closely held companies are excused many of the formalities and reporting requirements of larger
companies (see, for example, section 381A of the Companies Act 1985) and, through section 459

14.139.58.153 on Fri, 18 Aug 2023 09:12:32 +00:00
company law moreover recognizes only one kind of
company which is medium to large and where the
involvement of the shareholders is limited to investment -
unitary nature of the company law
have been made over the years to develop a distinct small-business

entity,4 the law has developed,15 and largely continues to develop, on
the basis that there is an archetypical company and that that is a
medium to large company where the involvement of shareholders is
limited to their investment.'6 Thus, while there may be advantages to
separate regimes for different types of companies, and while the
developments outlined in this paper are perhaps more apposite to a
large company, the law currently draws no such distinction.
II. THE SHAREHOLDER AS PROPRIETOR
When Queen Victoria ascended the throne in 1837 there were two
principal vehicles for the conduct of large scale business ventures-the
corporation and the joint stock company.17 The corporation owed its
existence to Royal Charter or an Act of Parliament and, like its
predecessors dating back at least two centuries, it had a separate
legal existence.'8 By far the most important vehicle, however, was the
joint stock company. In law the joint stock company was nothing
more than a large partnership.'9 While it had shares that were freely
transferable,20 a board of directors and a constitution still recognisable
as such today,21 the joint stock company did not enjoy a separate
of the Companies Act, the law will give effect to the actual agreement or expectations of the
"quasi-partners".
'4 Freedman, "Small Businesses and the Corporate Form: Burden or Privilege?" (1994) 57 M.L.R.
555, chronicles these attempts both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. See also, Hicks,
"Corporate Form: Questioning the Unsung Hero" [1997] J.B.L. 306.
5 It is arguable that incorporation was not intended for, and should not be made available to,
small business ventures. While it is clear that Robert Lowe, the architect of the early companies
statutes, wanted limited liability extended to small traders, a wish frustrated for a short time by
the Lords, it seems that he did not feel it appropriate to allow small traders to be incorporated.
As discussed below, one of the central features of the 1844 Companies Act was to restrict
incorporation to large enterprises. See also Hicks, ibid., pp. 311-316.
6 Sealy, "Perception and Policy in Company Law Reform" in Feldman and Meisel (eds.), Corporate
and Commercial Law. Modern Developments (Lloyd's of London Press. London, 1996) p. 26;
Freedman, n.14 above.
17 See generally, Grantham and Rickett, "The Bootmaker's Legacy to Company Law Doctrine" in
Grantham and Rickett (eds.), Corporate Personality in the 20th Century (Hart, Oxford, 1998)
Chapter 1.
ts Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th ed.), Vol. 9, para. 1209.
'9 Sealy, "Perception and Policy in Company Law Reform" in Feldman and Meisel (eds.), Corporate
and Commercial Law: Modern Developments (Lloyd's of London Press, London, 1996) pp. 11-13;
Davies, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (6th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997)
p. 31; Lobban, "Corporate Identity and Limited Liability in France and England 1825-67"
(1996) 25 Anglo-American L.R. 397, 401. It is of course true that there were differences between
ordinary partnerships and the large joint stock form (see Ireland, "The Triumph of the Company
Legal Form 1856-1914" in Adams (ed.), Essays for Clive Schmitthoff (Professional Books,
Abingdon, 1985) p. 32. The difficulty for the courts was to find a legal structure between an
incorporated entity and a partnership without the assistance of Parliament.
20 Although the creation of freely transferrable shares was prohibited by the Bubble Act 1720, this
did not prevent the creation of "companies" with shares that were, at least in substance if not
formally, freely transferrable.
21 See Du Bois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act 1720-1800 (New York
Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1938) p. 291 and Davies, op. cit. n.19, p. 29.
Joint stock
company and
application of This content downloaded from
partnership 14.139.58.153 on Fri, 18 Aug 2023 09:12:32 +00:00
justification All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
for ownership
identity from its "members". In regulating this

courts quite naturally employed the principles of
The members, as partners, owned the assets, were joi
liable for the debts incurred by the business and
and powers which ownership implied. Their entitlem
and benefit of the company was, therefore, an inc
ownership of the business.
The application of partnership concepts, howev
of acute problems. The principles informing par
issues with
applying the predicated upon a genuine relationship between th
partnership
principles to
typical joint stock company, however, had hundre
the joint
stock
of members. The assumption of a personal wo
company - between partners was simply stretched beyond br
too many
partners it was sought to be applied to a venture where t
difficult to
identify "interested" people.24 The application of partnersh
joint stock company also posed real difficulties i
form into the general private law. For example, if
to be sued it was necessary to make all the partners
While in a partnership of five or six this presen
discovering the identity of all the members of a join
where the shares were freely transferable, po
obstacle.25 Indeed, it was said that a joint stock c
practically, be made to pay any debt it chose not to
The Companies Act of 1844 was enacted to
introducing
problems.27 The reform pursued a twofold strategy.
the
companies
of the joint stock company was regularised. This
act 1844 for granting separate legal existence to any venture w
addressing
the issues - the statutory machinery in the Companies Act.28
the reform
was two to the reforms was to restore the validity of th
fold - w. joint
stock partnership law: the personal relationship between
company
was given a
separate 22 ireland, "The Triumph of the Company Legal Form, 1856-1914" i
legal entity Clive Schmitthojf (Professional Books, Abingdon, 1983) p. 31; Lobban
and 2.
Limited Liability in France and England 1825-67" (1996) 25 Anglo-A
putting a cap
for partners, 2? Thus, the assumption reflected in the Partnership Act of 1890 was o
so that so the partners together.
many 24 Gower, "Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporat
partners L.R. 1369, 1372.
cannot be
involved and 25 Davies, op. cit. n.19, p. 31.
the joint 26 Lobban, "Corporate Identity and Limited Liability in France and E
stock Anglo-American L.R. 397. 404.
company will 27 Sealy, "Perception and Policy in Company Law Reform" in Feldman a
have to be
and Commercial Law: Modern Developments (Lloyd's of London Pr
incorporated
Lobban, ibid.; Davies, op. cit. n.19, p. 38; Ireland, "The Triumph of
1856-1914" in Adams (ed.), Essavs for Clive Schmitthojf (Profession
p. 32.
28 It is worth noting in this respect that although we now tend to assume that the Companies Act
of 1844 and subsequent companies acts created a separate legal entity the Act itself says that
the "subscribers of the memorandum . . . shall be a body corporate . . .": Companies Act 1985
s. 13(3).

14.139.58.153 on Fri, 18 Aug 2023 09:12:32 +00:00
was achieved by limiting the size of partnerships and comp

Partnerships were limited to a few partners, thus forcing th
joint stock ventures to take on corporate form. Companies,
other hand, could not be established with too few members.30
did not bring

Apart, however, from regularising the position of the join
in much company, the reforms which began in 1844 seemed to have re
actual impact
as the little impact. As Sealy has commented, for the mid-nineteenth c
partnership
principles lawyer the reforms did no.t affect the underlying nature o
were still
being applied company: "The members of a company did not simply assoc
and the court
was looking law, they associated as partners."31 Thus, the leading academ
at companies
as unique
on company law in this period was tellingly entitled, Treatise
partnerships Law of Partnership, including its Application to Companiesn a
and
shareholders as late as 1916 the courts were still invoking partnership princip
were being
seen as the resolve company law problems.33 Although a company create
owners
the Act of 1844 was formally, like the old chartered corpora
separate right and duty bearing entity which owned the unde
of the business, the prevailing paradigm had not change
company remained in the law's eye a peculiar kind of partn
and the shareholders its collective owners. The shareholders'
to control the business and to have it run for their exclusive ben
were thus still necessary consequences of that status.
III. Attenuation of Shareholder Proprietorship
As long as the company was viewed through a partnership lens,

initially it was
okay to justifyposition and rights of shareholders were fully explicable and justifie
the
shareholder as a natural consequence of the shareholders' status as the ultim
rights by them
being owners proprietor of the undertaking. Ownership confers upon the hold
perspective ofthe rights, inter alia, to determine how the property should be u
from the
partnership to the exclusive benefit of the property, and to freedom fr

principles but
since the expropriation.34 It was thus entirely proper that, as owne
company has
been given a
legal status Davies, op. cit. n.19, pp. 38-39; Lobban, n.26 above, p. 428; Ireland, "The Triumph o
and entity it Company Legal Form 1856-1914" in Adams (ed.), Essays for Clive Schmitthojf (Profess
becomes Books, Abingdon, 1985) p. 32.
difficult to do
The number has been steadily reduced, virtually from the moment a minimum numbe
so, and that is
why there is introduced. (See Sealy, "Perception and Policy in Company Law Reform" in Feldman
this shift Meisel (eds), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments (Lloyd's of London P
London, 1996) p, 13), though the Companies Act still restrains large partnerships (Comp
Act 1985 s, 716). The permission for a single person to incorporate, while bowing to pra
realities, nevertheless has its own problems. For example, the difficulty of reconcilin
protection afforded by the corporate veil to one-man companies with the aims of tort
Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. [1997] I B.C.L.C 131, noted by Grantha
"Company Directors and Tortious Liability" [1997] C.L.J. 259, reversed on appeal: [1998
W.L.R. 830.
Sealy, ibid. p. 23.
Lindley, Treatise on the Law of Partnership. including its Application to Companies (Sweet &
Maxwell, London, 1860).
Re Yenidje Tabacco Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch. 426 (C.A.).
Honore, "Ownership" in Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (O.U.P., Oxford, 1961)
Chapter V.

14.139.58.153 on Fri, 18 Aug 2023 09:12:32 +00:00
shareholders should have the right to manage the

the company run for their exclusive benefit
regularise transactions that did not conform to
did not serve their interests.35
The last decade of the 19th century, however, s
of a fundamental change in the law's perception
This manifested itself in the progressive attenua
which most clearly and unequivocally flowed
necessary to give content to, the shareholders' claim
While, true to the methodology of the common
and pace of change have not been constant, the
rejected the associative underpinnings of incorp
which the shareholders had to the ownership of t
the right of shareholders to override manageme
most recently, that the company was conducted
benefit.
A. The Company as an Association

It is perhaps not surprising, given the seminal nature of the decision,
that the first definite signs of this change should appear in Salomon
v. A. Salomon & Co. Ltd.36 As mentioned, despite the general
availability of incorporation the courts persisted with the idea that
the company was in essence little more than a large partnership. The
conclusion that the members were the proprietors was thus quite
logical, while the separate legal personality of the company was
neither obvious nor particularly significant. In relation to the creation
of the company this meant, first, that it was the members who were
incorporated, rather than a new "person" being created37 and,
secondly, that if there was no genuine association of the members as
partners the incorporation was improper.38 As Sir Frederick Pollock
commented in a contemporary note of Salomon s case, "[wjhen the
founders of company legislation spoke of seven or more persons
being 'associated', they meant such an association as, without the
help of the statute, would have made those persons members of an
ordinary partnership".39
An owner's right to determine the use of the property implies not only that shareholders may
control the day-to-day management of the company but also that their will as to what should
be done with their property should prevail over the constitution. See Honore, ibid.
[1897] A.C. 22. It is interesting to note that despite the quite different histories of English and
American company law, the seminal decisions in both jurisdictions establishing the company's
identity as a person occurred at about the same time. In England it was Salomon's case in 1896,
while in America is was Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
Section 13(3) of the Companies Act 1985 still provides that the "subscribers to the memorandum
. . . shall be a body corporate ..."
Sealy, "Perception and Policy in Company Law Reform" in Feldman and Meisel (eds.), Corporate
and Commercial Law: Modern Developments (Lloyd's of London Press, London, 1996) pp.
12-13.
(1897) 13 L.Q.R. 6,6-7.

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It was against this background, then, that Salomon fe

decided. The facts of the case are well known, but in essence
concerned an attempt by the liquidator of the company to
from Mr. Aron Salomon in respect of losses incurred by the com
The basis of this claim was that the company was a fraud d
to shield Aron Salomon from his creditors. Thus, it was sai
although there were seven subscribers as required by the Ac
them were "dummies" under Aron Salomon's control. In the Court
of Appeal,40 this argument was upheld. The Lords Justices were in
no doubt that when Parliament had stipulated for seven subscribers,
it had intended there to be seven genuine participants in the business.
In the House of Lords, however, their Lordships were equally clear
that the claim could not succeed.
Although hidden beneath an ingenuous reliance on the literal
wording of the relevant Companies Act,41 the judgments in the House
of Lords represent a fundamental paradigm shift. In holding that the
company was properly incorporated, even though Mr. Aron Salomon
was the only active member of the business, their Lordships departed
from the assumption that had formerly underpinned the law's view
of the company.42 As indicated above, the Companies Act of 1844
was not seen as creating a new form of trading institution. Rather, it
took the partnership that was the joint stock form and conferred a
separate existence upon it. The existence of a genuine partnership
was, therefore, a prerequisite to incorporation, both legally and
historically. In holding that the company was properly incorporated
the House of Lords thus radically reformulated the corporate
concept. It moved the law's paradigm from that of an association of
individuals, governed by partnership principles, to something that
more closely resembled the old chartered corporation. Incorporation
was now to be viewed as the creation of an entity distinct from its
members rather than as merely a means for the members to trade as
a collective.43 the decision in solomon was regarded this much because this is the first time that the court had
moved away from the partnership principles and it was kind of held that an association of people or
partners was not a prerequisite for an incorporation or a company and now we were recognizing the
separate legal entity of the company
40 Reported as Broderip v. Salomon [1895] 2 Ch. 323.
4} In this respect. Michael Whincop's recent critteism of what he describes as the formalistic
conception of the company in Salomon misses the point f*Overcoming Corporate Law:
Instrumentalism, Pragmatism and the Separate Legal Entity Concept" (1997) 15 Co. & See. L.J.
411). In asserting the superiority of the modern law and economtcs approach to company law,
Whincop treats Salomon as an exemplar of an arch-formalism which is unable to resolve
complex legal issues While such a formalistic approach may well be guilty of such a charge,
quite simply it is not an accurate description of approach in Salomon. In any event, the Privy
Council's decision in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission
[1995] 2 A.C. 500, takes much of the wind out of Whincop's sails.
41 See Pollock's comments referred to above at note 39.
43 The significance of this shift can also be illustrated in etymological terms. The origins of the
word company lie in an association or collection of individuals. Indeed in the Oxford Dictionary
of English Etymology (O.U.P., Oxford, 1996) "company" appears under the entry for
"companion". "Corporation", on the other hand, derives from the Latin corporare, to fashion
into a body.

14.139.58.153 on Fri, 18 Aug 2023 09:12:32 +00:00
initially shareholders
were seen as holders
of the assets in the
company but later the
court started treating
them as not562 having The Cambridge Law Journal [1998]
any direct or severable
interest in the
company's interest B. The Nature of Company Shares
Originally, a share in a company44 was the mem
common property of the business. The "shareho
settlement company, like ordinary partners, held an
in the assets of the company45 and, despite their
but still the
shareholders a similar analysis was initially applied to charter
are being
seen as corporations.46 The shareholders were treated as the
propretors it of the assets, with the company holding the a
is just the
realisation shareholders.47 From the early 19th century, ho
that the
shares were
began to treat shareholders as having no direct, se
not realty the company's assets. This change, however, the b
and that
their may be seen in Bligh v. Brent?% did not initially
interests from the idea of shareholders as proprietors. In
had no
severable the denial of the shareholders' interest was intend
intert in the
company's
that the shares were not realty and that like
asset shareholders had no severable interest in the compan
By the beginning of the 20th century the idea
had no direct interest in the company's asset
established. In what is still the leading formulat
Borland's Trustees v. Steel Brothers & Co. Ltd. said: "A share is the
interest of a sharehoider in the company measured by a sum of
money, for the purposes of liability in the first place, and of interest
in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants
entered into by all the shareholders inter se. . . ."50 As well as its
contractual emphasis, Farwell J.'s definition is notable for one other
feature. In describing the share as an interest in the company
Farwell J. seemed to suggest that although they held no interest in
the assets the shareholders nevertheless owned a share of the
company itself. The theory, as noted in Gower's Principles of M
Company Law, is that the "company itself is treated not merely
person, the subject of rights and duties, but also as a res, the o
of rights and duties".51
44 Generally see, Davies, op. cit. n.19, p. 299; Rice, "The Legal Nature of a Share" (1957) 2
(N.S.) 433; Pennington, "Can Shares in Companies Be Defined?" (1989) 10 Co. Lawyer 1
45 Buckeridge v. Ingram (1795) 2 Ves. Jun. 652; Howse v. Chapman (1799) 4 Ves. Jun. 542. Se
Rice, ibid. pp. 433-434 and Pennington, ibid. p. 140.
46 Suttons Hospital Case (1612) 10 Co. Rep. I; Salmon v. Hamborough Co. (1671) 1 Ch. Ca
Navlor v. Cornish (1648) l Vern. 311. See also Pennington, ibid.\ Davies, op.cit. n.19, p. 299
47 Child v. Hudson's Bay Co. (1723) 2 P. Wms. 207; Harrison v. Pryse (1740) Barn. Ch. 324
48 (1836) 2 Y. & C. 268. See also Myers v Pcrigal (1852) 2 De G.M. & G. 599; Watson v. Sp
(1854) 10 Ex. 222; Edwards v. Hall (1855) 6 De G.M. & G. 74; Linley v. Taylor (1859) 1 Gi
Entwistle v. Davis (1867) 4 Eq. 272.
49 Rice, "The Legal Nature of a Share" (1957) 21 Conv. (N.S.) 433, 434-435.
50 [1901] 1 Ch. 279, 288.
51 Davies, op. cit. n.19, p 301. See also Beck et al. (eds.), Morison's Company and Securit
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) para. 13.1. Thus, although it is often cited for the propo
that shareholders do not own the company (see, for example, WelHng, Corporate Law in C
The Governing Principles (2nd ed., Butterworths, Toronto, 1991) p. 602; Wishart, Compan

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In the years following, however, the emphasis placed on Farw

definition in Borland's Trustees shifted from an "interest in the
company", measured by the particular rights which made up the
share, to the rights themselves. In describing the share the court
increasingly omitted reference to the share as an interest in the
company and defined the share exclusively in terms of the rights to a
dividend, to a return of capital on winding up and to vote. Thus, i
Peters American Delicacy Co. Ltd. v. Heath52 Dixon J. said "[p
rimarily a share in a company is a piece of property conferring rights
in relation to distributions of income and capital", while in the Ne
Zealand case of Coleman v. Myers53 Mahon J. held that the share
"only vests in the holder that collection of rights provided by th
memorandum and articles of association".54 Although outwardly th
was merely a shift in emphasis, this focus on the specific rights
reflected a significant conceptual change. Rather than identifying the
company itself as the res (the "thing" that is at the heart of the share
and which justifies its categorisation as property), the courts bega
to identify the rights comprising the share.55 This analysis reached its
high point in Short v. Treasury Commissioners.56 The entire sha
capital of the company was. being compulsorily acquired by t
Crown. In assessing the compensation payable it was contended tha
as all the shares were being acquired the shareholders were entitle
to the entire value of the company, which was greater than t
aggregate value of the shares. The Court of Appeal rejected th
contention. The shareholders were not entitled to compensation fo
the value of the company, but only for what was being expropriate
that being their shares.57
While it remains true that the share gives the holder rights no
in Context (O.U.P., Auckland, 1994) p. 110), it is not clear that Borland's Trustees stands for th
proposition.
(1939) 61 C.L.R. 457, 503-504. See also the comments of Lord Wrenbury in Bradbury v. English
Sewing Cotton Co. Ltd. [1923] A.C. 744, 767: "A share . . . forms, however, a separate right
property. The capital is the property of the corporation. The share . . . is the property of the
corporator."
[1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 225, 295 (H.C).
See also I.R.C. v. Crossman [1937] A.C. 26, 66, where Lord Russell described the share as an
"interest being composed of rights and obligations which are defined by the Companies Act and
by the memorandum and articles of association of the company."
This focus also manifested itself in the largely instrumentalist conferral of proprietary status on
the share. The share was treated as property not because it was an interest in the company, but
simply in order to secure the shareholders' rights and to emphasise that shareholders might
pursue their own self-interest in the exercise of these rights. See, Peters' American Delicacv v.
Heath (1939) 61 C.L.R. 457, 504; Carruth v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. [1937] A.C. 707,
765; Pennington, Company Law (7th ed., Butterworths, London, 1995) p. 70.
' [1948] 1 K.B. 122. In Mellon v. Alliance Textiles Ltd. (1987) 3 N.Z.C.L.C. 100,086, 100,092.
Hardie Boys J. said "when the subject matter is a holding in a large public company, the share
can only be regarded as an investment
' This conclusion also seem to be reflected in the principles which govern the valuation of shares.
The shares will only be valued on an asset-backing basis where the company is unlikely to
continue as a going concern.

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only against the company but also in the company i

in the company are no longer seen as a consequence of the
shareholders' status as proprietor. The rights in the company arise as
a consequence of ownership of the share and are limited to those
rights. Thus, once these rights are satisfied, there is no residual claim
to the company itself because, as Short illustrates, the shareholders'
entitlement is then exhausted. Shareholders have thus been
transformed from owners of the assets and undertaking to
merely of certain rights in and against the company. The imp
implication of this change is that while rights specifically em
in the share, and those reasonably implied as necessary to prot
shareholder's investment, can be explained as an inciden
ownership,58 as a result of the identification of the res at the hea
the share as comprising only the specific rights, it is no
possible to explain all sharehoider powers in that way.
C Control of the Company

By the beginning of this century legal opinion had begun to e
the long-standing commercial belief that it was no longer appr
for shareholders to have direct control over the day-to
management of the company,59 It had long been the practice
of settlement companies for management to be vested in the b
but this practice was now enshrined in the law. In a ser
decisions, the Court of Appeal established the exclusivity of the r
held by each "organ" of the company.61 This was achieved in
through the adoption of a contractual model of the company
Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd. v. Cuningh
and Salmon v. Quin & Axtens Ltd.64 the Court conceived
company as merely an agreement between its members
agreement being embodied in the memorandum and articles. A
of this agreement, the right to manage the company was entruste
the board. For a sharehoider or even a majority of sharehold
assert control over the management of the company was
For example, the right to vote on matters such as the alteration of the constitu
ratification of irregular transactions. See section V(A) below.
Ford, Austin and Ramsay, op. cit. n.7, pp. 224-225. See also Davies, op. cit. n.19, p. 18
Du Bois, The English Business Company After the Bubble Act 1720-1800 (N
Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1938) p. 291.
Davies, op. cit. n.19, pp. 14-15; Ford, Austin and Ramsay, op. cit n.7, p. 220.
Stokes, "Company Law and Legal Theory" in Twining (ed.), Legal Theorv and Comm
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) p. 163.
{1906] 2 Ch. 42 (C.A.). In this line of authorities see also: Thomas Logan Ltd. v. Dav
104 L.T. 14; Scott v. Scott [1943] 1 All E.R. 582; Breckland Group Holdings Ltd. v. L
Suffolk Properties Ltd. (1988) 4 B.C.C 542; Black White and Grey Cabs Ltd. v. F
N.Z.L.R. 824; Clifton v. Mount Morgan Ltd. (1940) 40 S.R.(N.S.W) 31; Winthrop Inve
Ltd. v. Winns Ltd. [1975] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 666.
[1909] 1 Ch. 311 (C.A.), affirmed [1909] A.C. 442 (H.L.).

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contrary to their own agreement. A court would be just

restraining this action, as it would be in restraining the thr
breach of any other contract. In this way, the Court of
established that the right of management, which had for so
been conferred upon the board, was exclusive and that the bo
not subject to the direction of the general meeting.
Although the effect was to secure day-to-day autonomy f
board, the contractual analysis was still consistent with a shareho
centred view of the company. The directors' authority still
from the members' agreement and in principle the unanimous co
of shareholders was still effective to bind the board.65 The contr
analysis, however, had a number of difficulties.66 Most significa
the company was merely a contractual association of indivi
was unclear how its separate existence, as explained in Salom
to be established or why the shareholders should not be full
for the debts of the association.
These difficulties soon led to a fundamental change in th
the law conceived of the source and allocation of control within the
company This new model took as its starting point the separateness
of the corporate entity from those persons who constituted th
organs through which the company must necessarily act. Thus, rather
than the right to bind the company arising, as it does with a
partnership, from a delegation by the members, the rights (of bot
the board and shareholders) were conceived of as flowing from the
company itself. The legal personality of the company was thus th
ultimate source of rights and the articles, transformed from mer
agreement to something akin to the constitution of the State,67 w
the mechanism by which the company delegated its authority.68
An important corollary of the new analysis was that those to
whom the articles had granted rights held them free from
encroachment by other agencies.69 Despite the ambiguity of th
The comments of the Court of Appeal in Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley [1908]
K..B. 89, which are often taken to contrary effect, must be seen in their special context. The cas
involved an attempt by the Revenue to lift the veil and assess the shareholders for the profits o
the company. To succeed it was necessary for the Revenue to establish that it was th
shareholders in their personal capacity that controlled the company, not merely that the genera
meeting had authority to direct the board. As it is to this that the comments of the Court wer
addressed the case says little about the internal division of power.
Stokes, "Company Law and Legal Theory" in Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1986) pp. 163-164.
Davies, op. cit. n.19, pp. 14-16.
See, for example, Brennan J.'s description in Northside Developments Ltd. v. Registrar-General
(1990) 170 C.L.R. 146, 172, of the source and delegation of power within the company. As Ford
Austin and Ramsay (op. cit. n.7, p. 221) note. on this approach "company law vests in certai
groups of people an original authority to commit the company or delegate to others. . . . Th
relationship between the board and general meeting is not hierarchical. According to the organ
approach, whatever may have been the case in the past, the power to bind the modern company
is divided between the board and the general meeting . . .".
1 Clifton v. Mount Morgan Ltd. (1940) 40 S.R. (N.S.W.) 31.

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standard article conferring the right to manage

courts were nevertheless clear that it was unconstitutional for
shareholders to interfere with the right of the board.71 Thus, althou
shareholders might still subjugate the board by altering the artic
and assuming overriding control, until the articles were altered th
wishes, even if unanimous,72 were not binding on the board.73
Greer L.J. said in John Shaw & Sons Ltd. v. Shaw the shareholde
"cannot usurp the powers which by the articles are vested in th
directors . . ,".74
The significance of these developments lies in the fact that t
exclusion of shareholders from the day-to-day management of
company was not a mere qualification of the rights of sharehold
as proprietors of the company. In the deed of settlement compa
shareholders were also excluded from management but they remai
the legal owners of the company. Rather, the establishment
the autonomy of the board reflected a reconceptualisation of th
company. The collective will of shareholders was no longer t
original source of authority. The right to control the company n
flowed from the company itself and shareholders like directors h
only those rights which the company conferred upon them.
shareholders' lack of control over management thus did not aris
because they had delegated that right to the directors but becau
the law no longer recognised them as having that right to delegat
D. The Right to the Benefit of the Company

Along with the right to control, the right to the exclusive benefi
an asset is a key incident of the ownership of that asset. T
shareholders' exclusive right to the benefit of the company's activitie
in the deed of settlement companies was thus in law a consequen
of their ownership of the business. In the early years of this century
however, shareholder claims to ownership of the company's asse
Until changed in 1985 (Art. 70, Table A, Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 (S.I
805, 1985)), the articles conferring power on the board (Art. 80 of Table A of the First Sched
to Companies Act 1948) qualified the conferral by providing that it was "subject nevertheles
any regulation of these articles, to provisions of the Act and to such regulations, being
inconsistent with the aforesaid regulations or provisions, as may be prescribed by the compa
in general meeting". As other commentators have pointed out (Goldberg, "Article 80 of
A of the Companies Act 1948" (1970) 33 M.L.R. 177; Sullivan, "The Relationship Between
Board of Directors and the General Meeting in Limited Companies" (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 569
article seemed to provide for sharehoider control of management. However, the case law
century deprived the words quoted above of any meaning. The difiiculties with the wording
the empowering article, however. indicates how strong was the courts* resolve to exclu
shareholders from any involvement in the management of the company.
HowardSmith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroieum Ltd. [1974] A.C 821, 837.
Grantham, "The Unanimous Consent Rule in Company Law" [1993] C.L.J. 245.
Timstall v. Steigmatm [1962] 2 Q.B. 583; Timaru Herald Co. Ltd. v Commissioner of Taxes [19
RZ.L.R. 978 (C.A.).
[1935] 2 K.B. 113, 134. For a recent example of how entrenched this view is see the decision of
the Supreme Court of New South Waies in N.R.M.A. v. Parker (1986) N.S.W.L.R. 517.

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were rejected and it was established, perhaps as a corollary

company's separate existence, that the duties of the directo
owed to the company. These developments made it incr
difficult to treat the shareholders as owners of the business and
consequently to explain why the company's interests should b
exclusively equated with the interests of shareholders. It wa
nevertheless, assumed by most commentators that in managing th
business the exclusive concern of the board was the interests of the
present shareholders.75 As Parkinson notes, "[b]y reason of their
ownership rights, and given the 'traditional logic of ownership', it is
taken that the shareholders are entitled to have the company run in
their interests: it is their company".76
Although this assumption undoubtedly informed the theoretical
conception of the law in the first half of this century and continues
to be reflected in the leading company law texts,77 there is surprisingly
little evidence to suggest that the courts in fact adopted this
approach.78 The principal authority cited in the commentaries is
Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd.19 where Evershed M.R. said "the
phrase, 'the company as a whole', does not (at any rate in such a
case as the present) mean the company as a commercial entity
distinct from the corporators. It means the corporators as a general
body". Most of the other authorities cited for this proposition, of
which there are only a modest number, merely adopt and repeat
Evershed M.R.'s formulation without further analysis.80
This already slim body of authority is further weakened by the
fact that it is far from clear that Evershed M.R. intended to lay
down a principle of general application. His Lordship expressly
limited his comments to "such a case as the present",81 and in
75 Davies, op. cit. n.19, p. 602; Ford, Austin and Ramsay, op. cit. n.7, p. 303; Pennington, Company
Law (7th ed., Butterworths, London, 1995) p. 584; Parkinson, op. cit. n.4, pp. 76-79. See also
Heydon, "Directors' Duties and the Company's Interests" in Finn (ed.), Equity in Commercial
Transactions (Law Book Co., Sydney, 1987) p. 123. This assumption also underlies American
company law. It underpinned Berle and Means' analysis (The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (rev'd ed., Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1967) and continued to be the
orthodox position for much of this century.
76 Ibid., pp. 75- 76, emphasis as in the original. See also, Austin, "Commentary on Hill" in
Grantham and Rickett (eds.), Corporate Personality in the 20th Century (Hart, Oxford, 1998)
Chapter 11.
77 See the texts referred to in note 74 above.
78 In contrast to America where this was explicitly adopted: Dod^e v. Ford Motor Co. 170 N.W.
668(1919).
79 [1951] Ch. 286, 291. Evershed M.R.'s dictum is relied on as the principal authority by Davies,
op. cit. n.19 p. 602, Parkinson, op. cit. n.4, p. 76 and Ford, Austin and Ramsay, op. cit. n.7.
p. 303.
80 For example, in Parke v. Daily News [1962] Ch. 927, this dictum was relied upon to hold that
the directors' consideration of the interests of employees was a breach of duty to the company.
81 [1951] Ch. 286, 291. As Rixon, "Competing Interests and Conflicting Principles: An Examination
of the Power of Alteration of Articles of Association" (1986) 49 M.L.R. 446, 448-454, notes, it
is difficult to work out precisely what Evershed M.R. intended. Certainly, in Allen v. Gold Reefs
of West Africa Ltd. [1900] 1 Ch. 656 (C.A.) and the cases immediately following it, "company"
meant the corporate entity. It may be, therefore, that Evershed M.R. adopted a stipulative

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Greenhalgh the dispute was between shareholders. Mr. Greenhalgh

objected to a proposed alteration of the articles which he felt
sacrificed the interests of the minority to those of the majority. In
such a context, it is hardly surprising that the interests of shareholders
should be to the fore and, arguably, the interests of other corporate
constituencies and the company as a commercial entity were simply
not at stake.82 It is, therefore, more likely that Evershed M.R.'s
formulation was only ever intended to apply in the context of inter-
shareholder disputes. This conclusion is reinforced by two further
considerations. First, even in those cases that pit shareholders against
each other, if the commercial interests of the company as an entity
are relevant it seems that the corporate interest will not be defined
exclusively in terms of shareholder interests. Thus, in cases such as
Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd.,83Sidebottom v. Kershaw, Lesse & Co. Ltd.,84
Gaiman v. National Association for Medical Health,85 Mills v. Mills86
and Mutual Life v. Rank Organisation,87 discrimination between
shareholders was justified on the basis of "paramount considerations
which affect the company itself as a commercial or corporate
entity".88 Secondly, the context-specific nature of the Evershed M.R.'s
comments has been recognised by other courts. In Re Halt Garage
Ltd. and Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd,90 Geeenhalgh was
expressly limited to the inter-shareholder context, while in Peters'
American Delicacy Co. Ltd. v. Heath91 the contextual limitation led
Dixon J. to reject reference to the company altogether.92
It may also be that any equation of the corporate interest with
the interests of shareholders simply reflected the fact that it was too
difficult to give effect to other interests. Since the 1930s there had
been widespread acknowledgement that in managing the company a
definition of the term to avoid the illogical insistence that shareholders act in the interests of the
entity when the dispute is essentially about the personal rights of shareholders.
82 Rixon, ibid., p. 467.
83 [1942] Ch. 304 (C.A.).
4 [1920] I Ch. 154 (C.A.).
85 [1971] Ch. 317.
8 (1938) 60 C.L.R. 150.
87 [1985] B.C.L.C. 11.
8 Rixon, op. cit n.81., p. 473. See also Sealy, "Company Law-When Discrimination is Legitimate"
[1985] C.L.J. 365, 367. In Ganbotto v. WCP Ltd. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 432, 446, the High Court
held that a benefit to the entity was not sufficient to justify expropriation of minority shares.
This aspect of the decision was based more on what the Court held were the proper purposes
of the power to expropriate than a position indicating that the interests of the company should
be equated with the interests of shareholders. Thus, the Court accepted that potential harm to
the entity would justify expropriation.
89 [1982] 3 All E.R. 1016 (Ch.D.).
(1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 22 (S.C., N.S.W).
' (1939) 61 C.L.R. 457.
92 It was precisely because the dispute to which the test related was between shareholders that
Dixon J. felt it inappropriate. In such a dispute the interests of the company are not at stake.
Dixon J.'s approach has recently been affirmed by the High Court of Australia in Gambotto v.
WCP Ltd. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 432.

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range of interests besides those of shareholders were at stake.93 Yet it

was felt there was no way to give effect to these other interests
without losing control of directors.94 The point for present purposes
is that the continued centrality of shareholder interests may not in
any event have arisen from a persisting view of shareholders as
owners, but rather from a concern with the accountability of
management.
E. The Corporate Interest and Other Constituencies

Whether or not the law ever embraced shareholder primacy as firmly
as has been believed, in recent years there has been a clear rejection
of the notion that the company's interests are defined necessarily
exclusively and exhaustively by the interests of shareholders. Thi
manifests itself most obviously in the consideration which directo
may give to the interests of employees and creditors. In respect o
employees, section 309(1) of the Companies Act 1985 provides tha
the "matters to which the directors are to have regard in the
performance of their functions include the interests of the company's
employees .. .". While there are doubts about the proper
interpretation of the section,95 the Court of Appeal's comments in
Fulham Football Club Ltd. v. Cabra Estates plc96 suggest that the
section has profoundly changed the conception of the company.
Neill L.J., speaking for the Court, said: "The duties owed by the
directors are to the company and the company is more than just the
sum of its total members. Creditors, both present and potential, are
interested, while section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 imposes a
specific duty on directors to have regard to the interests of the
company's employees in general."97 Although many commentators
doubt whether the section will have any real effect on management
93 See the famous debate between Professors Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd: Berle, "Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust" (1931) 44 Harv. L.R. 1049 and "For Whom Corporate Managers
-Are Trustees: A Note" (1932) 45 Harv. L.R. 1365; Dodd. "For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees? (1932) 45 Harv. L.R. 1145. See also. Davies, op. cit. n.19, p. 602.
94 Professor Berle's point in the aforementioned debate was not whether management should
consider the interests of other stakeholders, but whether the price of doing so was too high.
Berle later conceded the argument to Dodd (Berle, "Corporate Decision Making and Social
Control (1968) 24 Bus. Lawyer 149, 150), though his concession was somewhat premature. See
also Prentice, "Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders" in McKendrick, (ed.), Commercial Aspects
of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Clarendon, Oxford. 1992) pp. 76-77. and Dickerson, Howard
and Getz, Proposals for a Newt Business Corporations Law for Canadla (Information Canada.
Ottawa, 1971) Vol. 1, para. 32.
95 Sealy, "Directors 'Wider' Responsibilities-Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural"
(1987) 13 Monash U.L.R. 164, 184; Boyle. Gore-Browne on Companies (44th ed., Jordans, Bristol.
1986) para. 27.4 and 27.4.1; Parkinson, op. tit. n.4, p. 82; Xuereb, "The Juridification of
Industrial Relations Through Company Law Reform" (1988) 51 M.L.R, 156.
[ (19921 B.C.C. 863.
"7 bid., p. 876. See also, Re Saul D. Harrison plc [1994] B.C.C. 475 (Ch.D. and C.A.) where a
petition under section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 was dismissed on the basis that the
directors were entitled to act in the interests of employees.

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behaviour, principally because employees are una

duty,98 for present purposes the significance of the
legislative, and judicial,99 acceptance that the interes
are not exclusively those of shareholders. In recen
have also accepted that in fulfilling their duty to
of the company the directors must have regard to th
company's creditors.100 This duty is reflected in
concept of the "interests of the company" to em
well as shareholders and employees.101
Although the interests of employees and credit
obvious and widely discussed examples, the reject
equation between the corporate and sharehoid
limited to these instances. It also manifests itself, in
context of hostile takeovers. That a takeover sho
clear example should not be surprising.102 It is n
beyond dispute, that it is in the interests of the
target company, first, to have the opportunity to ac
secondly, to be presented with an offer at the be
Yet despite the unequivocal dictates of the shareh
clear that directors are allowed considerable scope to deny
shareholders the benefit of the takeover offer and seemingly have no
duty to secure a bid at the best price.
In the United States, this is now explicit in both statute and the
common law. Following the rash of hostile takeovers in the 1980s
many states enacted provisions104 which allowed, and in some cases
Section 309(2) of the Companies Act 1985 provides that the duty is "owed to the company (and
the company alone) and is enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a
company by its directors".
See note 97.
0 Generally see, Prentice, "Creditor's Interests and Director's Duties" (1990) 10 O.J.L.S. 265;
Prentice, "Directors, Creditors, and Shareholders" in McKendrick (ed.), Commercial Aspects of
Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Clarendon, Oxford, 1992) p. 73; Sappideen, "Fiduciary
Obligations to Corporate Creditors" [1991] J.B.L. 365; Wishart, "Models and Theories of
Directors' Duties to Creditors" (1991) 14 N.Z.U.L.R. 323. Grantham, "The Judicial Extension
of Directors' Duties to Creditors" [1991] J.B.L. 1.
1 Prentice, "Creditor's Interests and Director's Duties" (1990) 10 O.J.L.S. 265; Grantham, ibid.
2 Parkinson, op. cit. n.4, p. 77.
3 The shareholders of the target company do in fact benefit from the bid. As Gordon,
"Corporations, Markets, and Courts" (1991) 91 Columbia L.R. 1931, 1949, notes "empirical
evidence available to the court overwhelmingly shows that shareholders make out exceedingly
well in takeovers, that shareholders of firms that successfully rebulT a hostile bid lose out on
average. and that shareholders sufler significant losses when states adopt more protective anti-
takeover regimes". See also, Black, "Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers" (1989) 41 Stanford
L.R. 597, and Jarell et al., "The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since
1980" (1988) 2 J. Econ. Persp. 49.
14 For an overview of the history and general thrust of these provisions see, Millon, "Redefining
Corporate Law" (1991) 24 Indiana L.R. 223; Gordon, "Corporations, Markets, and Courts"
(1991) 91 Columbia L.R. 1931; Henning, "Corporate Law After the Eighties: Reflections on the
Relationship Between Management, Shareholders, and Stakeholders" (1992) 36 St. Louis
University L.J. 519; Tyson, "The Proper Relationship between Federal and State Law in the
Regulation of Tender OfTers" (1990) 66 Notre Dame L.R. 241; Chandy, Foster, Braswell and

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required, directors to take account of constituencies oth

shareholders when assessing how to respond to the bid.1
displacement of shareholders as the exclusive concern of mana
is also in evidence in the courts' approach to the rights and d
target directors.106 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,1
Supreme Court of Delaware held that the directors might be j
in blocking a takeover bid by the "impact [of the bid] on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally) . . .",08 This
approach reached its high point in Paramount Communications Inc. v.
Time Incorp.109 where the directors were permitted to deny the
shareholders the opportunity to accept the offer in order to protect
the distinctive editorial culture of Time Magazine.m
Commonwealth courts take a similar approach, although less
transparently so. In cases dealing with control contests111 the courts
have in effect allowed directors to act other than in the interests of
shareholders.112 In Re a Company No. 008699 of 1985m Hoffmann J.
(as he then was) held that the directors were not under a positive
duty to recommend or facilitate the highest bid, a proposition
adopted by the Court of Session in Dawson v. Coats Patons plc.m
Although in Heron International Ltd. v. Lord Grade115 Lawton L.J.
held that the directors did owe such a duty the facts of the case were
Poe, "The Shareholder Wealth EfTects of the Pennsylvania Fourth Generation Anti-Takeover
Law" (1995) 32 American Bus. L.J. 399.
While often formulated in permissive terms and ostensibly limited in application to the takeover
context, the effect of these statutes is, as Millon notes, to "reject the orthodox shareholder
primacy principle. . . . By decentering the shareholder, these statutes also reject corporate law's
traditional fixation with the shareholder-manager relationship thrust non-shareholders into
the limelight as legitimate objects of corporate law's attention": Millon, "Redefining Corporate
Law" (1991) 24 Indiana L.R. 223, 277.
Generally see, Fink, "The Rebirth of the Tender Offer? Paramount Communications Inc v. QVC
Network Inc." (1995) 20 Delaware J. of Corp. Law 133; Millon, "Redefining Corporate Law"
(1991) 24 Indiana L.R. 223; Gordon, "Corporations, Markets, and Courts" (1991) 91 Columbia
L.R. 1931; Henning, "Corporate Law After the Eighties: Reflections on the Relationship
Between Management, Shareholders, and Stakeholders" (1992) 36 St. Louis University L.J. 519.
493 A.2d. 946(1985).
Ibid., p. 955.
571 A.2d. 1140(1990).
Although in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. 637 A.2d. 34 (1994) the
Court has refined the boundary it set in Time between Unocal and Revlon Inc v. MacAndrews
& Forhes Holdings Inc. 506 A.2d. 173 (1986) (which requires the directors to get the best price
where they have resolved that the company should be sold), by accepting that the directors
might unintentionally put the company up for sale, the decision does not indicate a recantation
of the rejection of the principle of shareholder primacy.
This embraces both hostile takeovers as well as any situation where shareholders seek to remove
the incumbent board.
Carracher, "Takeovers, Directors and Auctions: A Duty to Sell?" (1991) 7 Australian Bar Rev.
75, considered the application of the Revlon "auction duty" to the Commonwealth. He
concludes that "Australia is on the cusp of rejecting the Easterbrook and Fischel approach and
accepting the legitimacy of defensive tactics simpliciter to defeat takeovers." (p. 82)
1 (1986)2 B.CC 99,024.
1 (1988) 4 B.CC 305, 314 (Outer House).
' [1983] B.CL.C 244 (CA.).

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unique, the company having been put up for sal

proposition to that effect was rejected in Re a Com
Directors have also been allowed considerable lee
takeover bids. In Pine Vale Investments Ltd. v. M
directors, faced with a hostile takeover bid, enter
in considerable haste to purchase a chain of reta
paid for by an allotment of shares. Although th
McPherson J. accepted was prompted by the app
frustrated the takeover his Honour declined a req
for an injunction.117 In Canada it was establishe
Millarm that the frustration of a takeover was irrel
was in the company's interests, a matter on whi
simply accept the directors' word.119
It is, of course, true that the law reports are l
attempts by management to block takeover b
allotting shares to friendly parties.120 However,
courts' intervention does not, it is suggested, flow f
to the exclusive equation between the company's i
shareholders. Rather, it flows from more specif
preventing self-interested behaviour by the board
the constitutional allocation of power within the
most of the early cases, such as Frazer v. Wh
Symons & Co. Ltd.}11 the directors' actions we
being in bad faith. In the more recent cases, it ha
attempts to manipulate the internal constitution
which has attracted judicial intervention. In How
Ampol Petroleum Ltd.m Lord Wilberforce ma
objection to the allotment lay in the board's atte
existing majority. That the courts are concerned
constitutional consequences of the action,124 rath
(1983) 1 A.CL.C 1294 (S.C, Qld.).
On similar facts, an injunction was also refused in the New Zealand case of Baigcnt v. D.McL.
Wallace Ltd. (1984) 2 N.Z.C.L.C 99,122. The recent New Zealand decision of Vtilicorp NZ
Inc. v. Power New Zealand Ltd., (1997) 8 N.Z.C.L.C 261, 465 (noted by Grantham, "Caretaker
Directors?" [1997] N.Z.L.J. 411) where Giles J. attempted to limit the powers of the directors to
frustrate the wishes of the majority is both per incuriam and out of step with the trend of
authority.
(1972) 33 D.L.R. (3d.) 288.
1 Re Olympia & York Enterprises Ltd. and Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. (1986) 59 OR (2d) 254
(Ont. S.C, Ont. Div. Ct.). For comment see, Graftstein, "Whose Company is it Anyway?:
Recent Developments in Canadian Takeover Law" (1988) 46 U. Toronto Faculty of Law Rev.
522.
' Davies, op. cit. n.19 p. 605; Ford, Austin and Ramsay. op. cit. n.7, p. 313ff.
(1864)2 H. & M. 10.
; [1903] 2 Ch. 506.
1 [1974] A.C. 821 (P.C).
1 It is often overlooked that, while in Canada the law has developed on the basis of an acceptance
that the only limitation on the purpose of corporate powers is that they be used for the benefit
of the company. so that the duty of proper purpose and good faith collapse into a single
standard, this is not true of the rest of the Commonwealth (see for example, Whincop,

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frustrates sharehoider wishes, has on occasion been ex

recognised. In Pine Vale McPherson J. accepted that the
general principle which precludes directors from using the
to defeat a take-over, but simply a principle preventing directo
issuing shares in order to create a new majority",125 while
v. North Sydney Brick & Tile Co. Ltd Clarke J.A. said that
proposition that it is improper to take action to defeat a ta
too widely stated to constitute a legal principle".126
The point of the foregoing discussion is not to sugg
shareholders' interests are not relevant, or even that in m
they will not be determinative of the corporate interest. R
reveals that the equation of corporate and sharehoider inter
longer a consequence of the shareholders' perceived ownersh
company. The right of shareholders to have the comp
exclusively in their interests arose initially because they owned
rejection of this right must, therefore, strongly suggest
"traditional logic of ownership"127 has been broken.
F. Limitations on the Sharehoider Powers
Much of the explanation for the persistence of the notion that

shareholders are the proprietors of the company lies in the rights of
shareholders to appoint directors, change the constitution and
regularise defective transactions. These rights in particular seemed to
emanate from and be explicable as incidents of ownership. That
shareholders held these rights as a consequence of their ownership of
the company was further reinforced by the fact that historically there
were few limits on their rights. Unlike directors, shareholders were
not subject to fiduciary duties and could thus exercise the rights in
their own partisan interests. Thus in North- West Transportation v.
Beattym the directors in their capacity as shareholders could pardon
their own breach of duty. The limits that did exist on sharehoider
rights (for example limitations on how the constitution could be
altered and what actions might be ratified) did not contradict this
position. All could be explained either as a consequence of prevailing
"Gambotto v. WCP Ltd.: An Economic Analysis of Alterations to Articles and Expropriation

Articles" (1995) 23 Australian Bus. L.R. 276). The courts of England, Australia and New
Zealand insist that there may be more narrowly defined purposes for corporate powers.
125 (1983) 1 A.CL.C 1294, 1305 (S.C, Qld.). Sir Robert Megarry V.-C in Cayne v. Global Natural
Resources pk (unrep., Chancery, 1987) also envisaged situations where the directors would be
permitted to defeat a bid.
126 (1989) 15 A.CL.R. 230, 296. See also Whitehottse v. Carlton Hotel Pty. Ltd. (1987) 162 CL.R.
285, where the High Court of Australia accepted that if the constitution allowed the allotment
of shares for this purpose there could be no objection.
127 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (rev'd ed., Harcourt, Brace and
World, New York, 1967) p. 294,
128 (1887) 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C).

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views about the state's role in the creation of the company'29 or on

the basis of an interference with the property rights of other
shareholders.130
In recent years, however, the courts have introduced significant
limitations on shareholder rights. Thus, the right to appoint directors
will be restrained where the shareholders seek to obtain some
advantage that does not accrue to all shareholders.'31 The rig
alter the constitution must be exercised for the purposes for
the right was conferred,'32 while the right to ratify a breach
directors' duties is subject to a host of limitations.'33 The ba
most of the limitations is the general equitable principle of fr
a power.'34 Doctrinally, fraud on a power presupposes two m
about the power held by the donee. First, the power cannot
original one vesting in the holder as of right. Fraud on a
necessarily assumes that the source of the power is a grant
some other entity. Secondly, and as a consequence of the fir
holder, while not necessarily a fiduciary, does not hold the power
from limitation as to what may be achieved by the exercise
the shareholders' position as a donee of delegated power m
dismissed as an unimportant artifice necessitated by the
position of the company as the principal actor, the implication
use of fraud on the power to implement the limitations is th
129 For example, it was quite consistent with the view of incorporation as a concession f
state that the members were not permitted to change the nature of the company'
(initially changes were possible only by Royal Charter or special Act of Parliament)
permitted to only within limits set by the state (even when alteration of the memora
permitted via the Companies Act state scrutiny of the alteration remained). The state's
over the type of business carried on by the company also entailed that the members c
ratify transactions beyond the powers afforded the company by the state.
30 Thus, the members could not ratify a breach of the directors' duty which in
expropriation of the company's property (Cook v. Decks 11916] 1 A.C. 554 (P.C.)), be
was something in which the other shareholders had a stake by virtue of their shareho
Davies, op. cit. n.19, p. 646.
T' Theseus Exploration N. L v. Mining and Associated Industries Ltd. [19731 Qld. Rep. 8
Standard Charterel Bank v. Walker 11992] I W.L.R. 561 (Ch.D.). See also, Yeung, "C
Groups: Legal Aspects of the Management Dilemma" [1997] L.M.C.L.Q. 208, 243
Grantham, "The Liability of Parent Companies for the Actions of the Director
Subsidiaries" (1997) 18 Co. Lawyer 138, 146.
132 Allen. v. Gold Reef. of West Africa Ltd. [1900] 1 Ch. 656; Peters' American Delicacy C
Heath. (1939) 61 C.L.R. 457; Gamnhotto. v. WCP Ltd. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 432.
133 In the recent Australian case of Miller v. Miller (1995) 16 A.C.S.R. 73, 86-87 Santo
"Ratilication is not available where it would constitute a fraud on the minorit
misappropriation of company resources . . .or was entered into by an insolvent com
the prejudice of creditors . . . or defeated a member's personal right . . . or was opp
where the majority in general meeting acted for the same improper purpose as directo
'34 Generally on this subject see: Farwell, A Concise Treatise on Powers. (3rd ed., Stevens,
1916). Chapter 10: Sugden, A Practical Treatise of Powers. (7th ed., Sweet, London.
II p. 181; Finn, Fiduciary Obligations. (Law Book Co., Sydney, 1977) paras. 84 and
Grbich, "Fraud on a Power: Judicial Control of Appointments by Discretionary T
(1977) 3 Monash U.L.R. 210; Benas, "The Nature of Fraud of a Power" (1947) 12 C
106; Hanbury, "Frauds on a Power-An Opportunity for Stocktaking" (1948) 64 L.Q
Grantham. "The Powers of Company Directors and the Proper Purposes Doctrine" (1
5 King's College L.J. 16.

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shareholders' power to appoint directors, alter the constituti

ratify breaches of duty is not perceived doctrinally as arisin
right from their status as proprietor, but because, and only b
the constitution of the company identifies them as the done
although it is clear that much of the courts' objective in intr
such limitations was the protection of the minority from abuse
principle of majority rule,135 the mechanism employed never
reflects a conception of the company that does not rest on share
proprietorship.
G. Summary
Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, the position and influ
shareholders has undoubtedly undergone a radical change. W
shareholders once stood at the centre of the corporate univer
the undisputed right to control the management and direction
company and to have it run for their exclusive benefit, this
shareholders have become little more than bystanders.136 Wh
to the methodology of the common law latent inconsistencies rem
the law has rejected or limited those rights which were crucia
shareholders' claims to proprietorship. In doing so, while it
clear what, if anything, has replaced it, it is clear that the
rejected the 19th century image of the company as a q
partnership.
IV. Residual Rights
It is of course true that shareholder interests still generally

content to the company's interests and that, in being able to a
the board, approve irregular transactions and alter the consti
shareholders still have a position of significant power within
company. However, such rights of themselves do not necessarily p
to the conclusion that shareholders must be seen as the ultimate
proprietors of the company. The vesting of such rights in shareholders
is quite consistent with a doctrinal conception of the company that
does not rely upon a notion of shareholders as proprietors. In
particular, it will always be necessary to make some reference to
human actions and attributes when applying the law to a fictional
entity such as a company.
Much of the common law was developed for application to
Wedderburn, "Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss. v. Harbottle." [1957] C.L.J. 194. 198
Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles. (2nd ed., Butterworths, Toronto.
1991) p. 637.
Bratton, "The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives From History" (1989
41 Stanford L.R. 1471, 1475-6.

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natural persons.137 The common law rules are t

the assumption that the relevant actors possess ce
Most notably for present purposes these rules ass
level, that the bearer of rights and duties is
intention and may be said to have knowledge. W
sometimes easy to forget that it is not in fact the c
a contract,138 conspires to fix prices139 or knows ce
facts140 but rather the natural persons who represe
that purpose. Thus, as Lord Hoffmann has recent
necessarily the law must have regard to the acti
knowledge of natural persons when applying the
function of much of company law is thus to
between the company and natural persons and to
which natural persons are to be treated as tho
company.142
The necessity of these rules referring to natural persons is clearly
seen in the application of the criminal law to companies. Most
criminal offences require mens rea. As a fictional entity the company
is of course unable to form an intention, guilty or otherwise, and
historically this was seen as an obstacle to corporate criminal
liability.143 However, it is now recognised that the mens rea of a
company is necessarily to be found in the intentions of natural
persons. Thus, criminal liability may be imposed on a company either
through vicarious liability144 or through the direct attribution of the
intentions of individuals to the company.145
The application of fiduciary duties to companies also illustrates
the functional necessity of reference to human action. While formally
the beneficiary of the duty is the company, as an artificial entity the
company is not sufficiently analogous to a natural person to support
the functional requirements of the duty. The central feature of the
fiduciary duty is the beneficiary's interest. The fiduciary's principal
Hart, "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" (1954) 70 L.Q.R. 37; Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. (Yale Uni. Press, New Haven, 1923) Chapters
6 and 7; Radin, "The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality" (1932) 32 Columbia L.R. 643.
Northside Developments Pty. Ltd. v. Registrar-General (1990) 170 C.L.R. 146.
Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No. 2) [1995] 1 A.C. 456 (H.L.).
Mcridian Global Funds Management Ltd. v. Securities Commission [1995] 2 A.C. 500 (P.C.).
Meridian Global Funds Management Ltd. v. Securities Commission, ibid., p. 506.
Hart, Kelsen, Radin, Manne, above; "The Limits and Rationale of Corporate Altruism: An
Individualistic Model" (1973) 59 Virginia L.R. 708, 709.
Welsh, "The Criminal Liability of Corporations" (1946) 62 L.Q.R. 345, 346.
While vicarious liability was not employed in English law (Davies, op. cit. n.19, p. 229), it
served as the doctrinal basis for the imposition of corporate criminal liability in the United
States of America: Khanna, "Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?"
(1996) 109 Harv. L.R. 1477, and Walsh and Pyrich, "Corporate Compliance Programs as a
Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?" (1995) 47 Rutgers L.R. 605.
Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No. 2} [1995] 1 A.C. 456 (H.L.); Meridian Global Funds
Management Ltd. v. Securities Commission [1995] 2 A.C. 500 (PC).

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duty to is to act in, and only in, the beneficiary's interests.'46 The
beneficiary's interest thus not only defines the goal toward which the
fiduciary must work, but also provides an objective yardstick against
which to test the fiduciary's assertions of loyalty. When applied to
natural persons these principles work well enough: the beneficiaries
have real interests, independent of the fiduciary's discretion. Their
application to companies, however, poses difficulties. The company as
an artificial entity does not have real interests. If, therefore, the
beneficiaries' interest is to give a justiciable content to the duty, it is
necessary for the law to ascribe to the company the real interests of
some person or group.'47
From this perspective the central issue is: which individuals
should be treated as the company for this purpose? Historically
shareholders were treated as the beneficiaries of the duty because of
their status as ultimate proprietors.'48 It would, however, still be
rational for a system that has never treated shareholders as owners
to make shareholders' interests central. Thus; for example, it may still
be appropriate to treat shareholders as the company because of the
policy of the particular rule being applied'49 or because the selection
of sharcholders is likely to promote the efficient operation of the
company. As residual claimants, shareholders have the greatest
incentive to monitor the conduct of management. Their selection as
donees of rights such as those to appoint and remove the board
could. therefore, be justified on the basis that they are the most likely
to act to prevent managerial abuse and shirking.150
The point of the foregoing discussion is merely to demonstrate
that whatever may have been the historical reasons for vesting rights
in shareholders, their status as proprietor is not a necessary
consequence of their possessing these rights. The important rights
46 For recent statements to this effect see Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew [1997] 2
W.L.R. 436. 449 per Millett L.J.; Aritage v. Nurse [1997] 3 WL.R. 1046, 1053 per Millett L.J.
See also Finn. Fiduciary Obligations (Law Book Co., Sydney, 1977) p. 15; Finn, "Fiduciary Law
and the Modern Commercial World" in McKendrick (ed.), Commercial Aspects of Trusts and
Fiduciary Obligations (Clarendon, Oxford, 1992) p. 9; Finn, "The Fiduciary Principle" in
Youdan (ed.), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell, Toronto, 1989) p. 24
'7 Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Law Book Co., Sydney, 1977) p. 17, says that the fiduciary
obligation is premised upon the "notion that those who are, as a matter of law, the beneficiaries
of a relationship do have also, as a matter of fact, a real interest in the product of the
fiduciaries' activities . . ." See also Grantham, "Reforming the Duties of Company Directors"
(1991) 12 Co. Lawyer 27.
'u Ford, Austin and Ramsay, op. cit. n.7, p. 303; Sealy, "The Director as Trustee" [1967] C.L.J. 83,
89.
'49 Thus in Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd. (in stat. man.) v. Attorney-General (No. 47 [1998] 2
N.Z.L.R. 481, 729-730 Smellie J. explained the power of shareholders to ratify a breach of
directors' duties in terms of the policy of the fiduciary duty and how, since to vest that power
in directors would frustrate that policy, it followed that shareholders should be the donees of
that power.
50 This is most clearly articulated in the modem contractual analysis of the company. See note
152 below.

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which shareholders continue to possess do not, th

contradict the conclusion that ownership is no lo
doctrinal explanation of the position of sharehold
requirements of the rules applied to companies ne
to the actions, intentions and knowledge of natur
selecting which persons, shareholders are for
ownership-related reasons a plausible choice. T
invoking notions of ownership we still might expect
interests as the focus of the directors' duties, and sh
with the rights to appoint directors, alter the consti
wrongs on behalf of the company.151
V. A New Doctrinal Basis for Shareholder Rights
For much of this century the persistent idea that shareholders o

the company served to explain the basis of shareholders' righ
shareholders' status as the ultimate proprietors of the co
entitled them, by virtue of their ownership, to have the co
operated for their benefit and to have their will prevail. Shar
ownership also served to legitimate the corporate form. The e
and social power associated with companies posed no thr
society because it was owned by shareholders, and the r
individuals to own property, regardless of how much, was leg
morally unquestioned.
The law, however, has now rejected that doctrinal foo
rejection manifested in the attenuation of those rights whic
most clearly an incident of the shareholders' ownership
company. In doing so, however, the law seemed to proceed more
a conviction that the ownership model was no longer appro
than from any perception of the superiority of a competing
In respect of those rights which shareholders have held sin
inception of the registered company there is, therefore, someth
a doctrinal vacuum: shareholders acquired the rights on the
a status that the law now denies them. The task facing mod
company law, therefore, is to fill this vacuum. If shareholde
remain donees of rights within the corporate structure and
rights are to range as widely as they have done in the past,
must develop a rational and legitimate doctrinal explanation,
is both sustainable in the present environment and consistent
least the bulk of the present law.
In recent years the most important and academically infl
attempt to articulate the doctrinal basis for sharehoider rig
151 Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd. (in stat. man.) v. Attorney-General (No. 47), above.

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been the Nexus of Contracts Theory ("the Theory").1

modern contractual analysis treats the company as little mor
a collective noun for the web of contracts that link the various
participants, which include shareholders, management, employ
and creditors. The function of company law is thus conceived
as the facilitation of the parties' bargains. Unlike previous theo
the contractual analysis has no place for a reified notion of
company and as such there is nothing to own.153 The position
shareholders is, therefore, explained in terms of their contra
relationship with the other parties, and their rights as contra
entitlements to which all the parties would agree ex ante.*5
well as explaining crucial features of the corporate structure,
Theory also serves to justify the corporate form in terms of
private consensual rights of the contracting parties. In ess
the company is reduced to the rights and duties of individ
rights which require no further justification than that w
already inheres in the notion of private rights.
Although dominating the corporate law debate for most of
last decade, the Theory has not, however, proved compelling.
the normative level,155 the vision of the company which underlies
Theory remains hotly contested. The Theory asserts that the compa
should be seen as an essentially private arrangement between
contracting individuals, where entitlements are determined b
terms of the relevant contracts. The important implications of
are that there is little room for state regulation, that shareho
interests remain the central concern and groups with only lim
entitlements or with no contractual relationship have no righ
consideration, even if they are affected by the company's cond
While widely supported academically, there is a growing ti
The leading advocates of this approach are Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structu
Corporate Law (Harvard Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1991) and "The Corporate Contract"
89 Columbia L.R. 1416. See also Macey and Miller, "Corporate Stakeholders: A Contra
Perspective" (1993) 43 Uni. Toronto L.J. 401; Jensen and Meckling, "The Theory of the
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) J. Fin. Econ. 3
Cheffins, Company Law: Theory Structure and Operation (Clarendon, Oxford, 1997). For ou
of the history and structure of the contractual analysis by non-believers see: Bratton, "Th
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History" (1989) 42 Stanfor
1471 and Parkinson, "The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection o
Shareholder Interests" in Feldman and Meisel, Corporate and Commercial Law: M
Developments (Lloyd's of London Press, London, 1996) p. 121.
Easterbrook and Fischel. "Voting in Corporate Law" (1983) 26 J. of Law and Econ. 39
Fama. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm" (1980) 88 J. of Political Econ. 28
Parkinson, "The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection of Share
Interests" in Feldman and Meisel (eds.), Corporate and Commercial Law (Lloyds o( Lo
Press. London. 1996) p. 123.
Cheflins, op. cit. n. 152, Chapter 6.
At least in the hands of Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corpora
(Harvard Uni. Press, Cambridge, 1991) the contractual analysis is intended as both a norm
principle as well as an explanatory one: DeMott. "Trust and Tension Within Corpora
(1996)81 Cornell L.R. 1308. 1312.

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opinion which rejects this view. Increasingly scho

social importance and institutional nature of
conceive of the company in "communitarian"
interests of all groups must be respected.156 Indeed,
scholar has already pronounced contractariani
dead.157
From a descriptive perspective the Theory is also problematic. As
Cheffins concedes, the contractual "characterization is at odds with
the legal conceptualization of the company".158 This manifests itself
principally in three areas. First, the Theory relies on a conception of
contracting that modern contract scholars would find quaintly old-
fashioned. In its reliance on consent as both the descriptive and
normative basis of contracting,159 the Theory is clearly out of step
with modern contractual theory which accepts that contract law is
itself informed by a range of considerations.160 Furthermore, in order
to accommodate awkward features of the extant law, the contractual
analysis has been forced to adopt an extremely expansive notion of
contract. In particular, it is clear that, while technically a contract,
the memorandum and articles of association are heavily overlaid by
statute and that for most companies the constitution does not result
from any real bargaining between the participants.161 In expanding
the notion of contract, however, the contractual analysis has lost
much of its explanatory and moral force.162
Secondly, and most importantly, the contractual analysis simply
does not accurately describe the content of company law. In
particular, the presence in the law of non-excludable mandatory rules,
156 See the essays in Mitchell, Progressive Corporate Law (WestView, Colorado, 1995) and the
scholarship collected in the bibliography in Millon, "New Directions in Corporate Law:
Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law" (1993) 50 Wash. and Lee
L.R. 1373.
157 Branson, "The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication of Structure and Authority
Corporate Governance and Corporate Law" in Mitchell, Progressive Corporate Law (WestVie
Colorado, 1995) p. 93.
158 Cheffins, op. cit. n.152, p. 32.
159 The consensual attributes of the "contract" are important to the Nexus theory. It is from th
that it is possible to infer that the corporate structure is efficient.
160 Coffee, "No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Spe
Case of Remedies" (1988) 53 Brooklyn L.R. 919, 937. Generally, see Atyiah, The Rise and F
of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon, Oxford, 1979) and "Contracts, Promises and the Law
Obligations" (1978) 84 L.Q.R. 193. See also, Treitel, The Law of Contract (9th ed., Sweet
Maxwell, London, 1995) pp. 1-7.
161 Eisenberg. "The Structure of Corporation Law" (1989) 89 Columbia L.R. 1641; Brudn
"Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract" (1985) 85 Colum
L.R. 1403.
162 If the corporate governance structure does not result from a bargain, it is difficult to infer t
the resulting structure is efficient. Contract theorists have responded, however, that so long
the governance structure is "priced", through the value of the shares on the stock market, th
it is possible to infer efficiency. The validity of this assumption depends on two furthe
assumptions. First, that the stock market is efficient and, secondly, that shareholders trade o
the basis of this information rather than "noise". Both assumptions are controversial. Se
Cheffins, op cit. n.152, pp. 55-58.

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such as the fiduciary duties of directors,163 the right of dir

consider non-shareholder constituencies and mandatory rules
to takeovers,164 derivative actions and financial assistance,165 is
with the central prediction of the contractual analysis. If c
law is merely facilitative of the parties' bargain there is litt
for rules which the parties cannot modify or exclude. While corp
contract scholars have advocated the removal of such rules,1
exhortations have largely fallen on deaf ears.
Finally, the contractual analysis does not describe the pr
underlying the development of company law. It is sim
plausible, even in the United States, where the Theory origin
suggest that the legislature and the courts have sought to dev
law exclusively on the basis of what, ex ante, the parties wo
agreed to had transaction costs not been prohibitive.167
contrary, it is clear that both Parliament and the courts ha
motivated by other considerations. As Cheffins explains,168 legis
in most jurisdictions have been concerned with issues of fair
social justice170 and the eflfects on society of corporate transact
Thus, for example, concerns with morality underpin the C
Directors Disqualification Act 1985172 and the oppression rem
section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 has been said to be co
with "a visible departure from the standards of fair dealin
violation of the conditions of fair play".173 The appro
Commonwealth courts is also informed, explicitly on occasi
notions of fairness, propriety and morality. Thus in No
Developments Pty. Ltd. v. Registrar-General Mason C.J.
principles of "commercial morality" to justify the balance
163 That a fiduciary's obligations are not entirely excludable was confirmed recently by
of Appeal in Armitage v. Nurse [1997] 3 W.L.R. 1046, 1056 where Millett L.J. said: "th
irreducible core of obligations owed by trustees ..." For an overview of the argu
CofTee, "The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Jud
(1989) 89 Columbia L.R. 1618.
164 For example, the requirement in the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers of equal t
shareholders (General Principle I) and mandatory bids (General Principle 10 and R
165 Cheffins, op cit. n.152, p. 228.
166 Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard U
Cambridge, 1991) p. 15.
167 This largely conceded by Cheffins, op. cit. n.152, p. 142rT.
168 Ibid.
169 Cheffins, op.cit. n.152, p. I42ff.
170 For example, the concern with the position of employees reflected -in section 309 of the
Companies Act 1985.
171 This seems to underlie the anti-takeover statutes in America. In particular, the effect on the
state economy of takeovers which may result in a relocation of the business in another state:
Henning, "Corporate Law After the Eighties: Reflections on the Relationship Between
Management, Shareholders, and Stakeholders" (1992) 36 St. Louis L.J. 519, 526.
172 Wheeler, "Directors' Disqualification: Insolvency Practitioners and the Decision-Making
Process" (1995) 15 Legal Studies 283, 289.
173 Elder v. Elder & Watson Ltd. [1952] S.C. 49, 55 per Lord Cooper, speaking of an earlier
formulation.

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between corporate insiders and creditors by the

174
case.
The failure of the Theory to capture the conte

the law does not mean, however, that contract is n
doctrinal explanation of sharehoider powers. Clea
played and will continue to play an important role in
In particular, the actual agreement between the sh
a central feature in respect of "quasi-partner
However, it is equally clear that contract is not a
sole explanation of the content of company law
shareholders. The historical development of comp
policy considerations which have informed the legi
interventions suggest that in addition there are a
important doctrinal bases for sharehoider rights:
the share and the wider policy goals of company la
A. Ownership of the Share

However much shareholders may have been displa
of the corporate universe, they remain the owner
The share entitles the holder to a bundle of ri
against the company. Central among these rights
the company's income, by way of dividend, and o
winding up. Although in practical terms these are the
rights, they are not in substance much different fro
by other creditors.176 What distinguishes the shar
share also affords rights in the company. By vir
ownership of the share the holder is entitled to a
structure and management of the company, righ
granted to other creditors.177
While ownership of the share, rather than o
company, is clearly of more limited explanatory effec
the nature and extent of the rights implied by th
important points must be made. First, despit
particularly in the public company context,178 to
little more than a contractual entitlement to a por
(1990) 170C.L.R. 146, 164-165.

This continues to be reflected in English and Australian company law t
status afforded the memorandum and articles of association by the Com
Act 1985, s. 14. In jurisdictions such as New Zealand and Canada wh
contractual basis in favour of a wholly statutory one, contract is le
doctrinal explanation in the future.
In the sense that debtors also have a claim on the company's income
(the loan principal).
Although, in the case of preference shares, holders may not get a vote,
vested in some debtors is often greater than shareholders: see Davies, o
Prompted, in part, by the contractual analysis of the company and i
fungibility of public company shares.

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stream,179 the share, and the rights it comprises, cannot be reduced

a mere contractual entitlement. The related concepts of propert
ownership have a normative force and content that goes beyond
inherent in contractual rights. In particular, whether framed
traditional moral terms180 or in terms of the liability rule/prop
rule dichotomy,181 labelling the right as "property" implies th
may not be expropriated. This implication was recently affirme
Gambotto v. WCP Ltd. where the High Court of Australia rejec
characterisation of the share as merely a "capitalised divid
stream"182 and limited the power of the majority to expropri
minority shares, much to the dissatisfaction of Australian comment
tors.183 The concept of ownership is, therefore, still necessar
explain at least some of the rights and powers held by sharehold
Secondly, the unique nature of the shareholders investm
justifies greater rights than might appear to be implied by owne
merely of the share. While creditors are able expressly to stipula
the terms of their bargain, the investment made by shareholde
both indefinite in term and residual in nature. These two factors
combine to make explicit contracting almost impossible.184 The result
of these transactional difficulties is that it is rational for shareholders
to stipulate for rights that are both greater in extent than, and
different in nature from, those rights granted to other creditors. In
particular, because the terms of the investment are necessarily
open-textured and subject to unilateral change by management,
shareholders would rationally insist on some control over the level of
risk which might be undertaken in the future.'85 It is possible,
See, for example, Manne, "Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics" (1967) 53
Virginia L.R. 259, 260-261; Buxhaum, "Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory. and Legal
Doctrine" (1984) 45 Ohio St. L.J. 515, 526.
Which sees property as an outgrowth of the person and a matter of "natural right". This is
most apparent in the work of John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government (Dent,
London, 1949).
Calabresi and Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedrar (1972) 85 Harv. L.R. 1089.
(1995) 182 C.L.R. 432,447.
Ramsay (ed.), Gambotto v. WCP Ltd: Its Imptications for Corporate Regulation (Centre for
Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, Melbourne, 1996).
Other stakeholders in the company, such as employees, also face contracting difficulties. This
has led some to argue that governance structures should also confer rights on employees. This
is explained either in terms of implicit contractual rights (Stone, "Labour Markets, Empioyment
Contracts, and Corporate Change" in McCahery, Picciotto and Scott (eds.), Corporate Contro
and Accountabiiity: Changing Structures and the Dynamics of Regulation (Clarendon, Oxford,
1993) p. 61; O'Connor, "Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers" (1991) 69 N.C.L.R. 1189) or transactional
failure (Daniels, "Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate?"
(1993) 43 Uni. Toronto L.J. 315; Howse and Trebilcock, "Protecting the Empioyment Bargain"
(1993) 43 Uni. Toronto L.J. 751). Proponents of the Nexus approach, however, contend that
governance rights should only be vested in the residual claimant, and that shareholders are the
appropriate residual claimant. Their incentives are to maximise the value of the whole firm, not
(as with employees) merely the value of their return.
1 Macey and Miller, "Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective" (1993) 43 Uni. Toronto
L.J. 401, 423; Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Free Press, New York, 1985)

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therefore, to explain the rights such as thos

directors, approve major transactions and hav
wound up for a failure of the substratum as
ownership of the share.
B. Shareholders as an Instrument of Policy

There are features of the typical corporate govern
are not readily understandable in terms either of
the participants or of ownership of the share. Thi
true of rights such as those to alter the constitution
transactions and pursue wrongs done to the comp
participate in the income and capital of the c
obviously extend to pursuing claims on behalf of
altering the constitution and, as such powers
statute186 or judicial intervention, they do not seem
shareholders' agreement.187 While historically s
explained as a consequence of the shareholders
rejection of that doctrinal foundation means tha
leave such rights in the hands of shareholders m
bases. A clue to identifying a basis for such right
the function of these rights and the role they play i
for corporate governance. In broad terms, the sta
see that companies are managed efficiently and fa
abuse, and retain flexibility as a vehicle for commer
thus interested in the nature of the business
company, in ensuring that its internal procedure
abuses by corporate management are pursued. Th
reflected in the intervention of the state in ma
company's business,189 the creation of remed
oppressive conduct,190 the statutory mitigation o
pp. 304-306; Williamson, The Economic Analysis of Institutions and

and With Respect to Country Studies, (O.E.C.D. Economic Departmen
Paris, 1993).
The power to alter the corporate constitution is contained in sections 4 and 9 of the Companies
Act 1985. The power of amendment cannot, furthermore, be excluded: Bushell v. Faith [1969] 2
Ch. 438; Russell v. Northern Bank Development Corporation Ltd. [1992] 1 W.L.R. 588 (H.L.).
Of course, as mentioned above, the expansive notion of agreement employed by the Nexus of
Contacts Theory means that almost anything can be justified as consensual. However, it is still
the case that powers which owe their origins to statute do not result directly from the agreement
embodied in the memorandum and article of association. This is reinforced in the case of
alterations to the constitution by the fact that the power of alteration cannot be excluded by
agreement.
1 Thus, for example, see the long title to the New Zealand Companies Act 1993. See also
Cheffins, op. cit. n.152, p. 126rT.
' Historically, a change to the objects set out in the memorandum of association could be
achieved only by special act of Parliament. Even now, alterations to the memorandum are
subject to judicial scrutiny: Companies Act 1985, s. 5.
' Companies Act 1985, s. 459.

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corporate form on outsiders191 and the extent to which abuses

the company may be pursued by state officials.192
Historically, the state sought to achieve its goals for comp
through a strategy of "command and control".193 The state
through legislation or judicial intervention, would specify what
or should not happen and impose sanctions for failure to o
those injunctions.194 The limitations of this approach, howe
been increasingly recognised. Direct stipulation of desired co
outcomes is unlikely to be effective, is likely to divert eff
avoidance and is likely to be costly.195 Increasingly, the st
turned to indirect means to achieve its goals. This approach
variously as constitutive,196 responsive197 or light-handed198 re
seeks to achieve regulatory goals by creating a self-balancing
that creates, and relies upon, incentives for the individuals
to bring about the desired result or conduct. Thus, rather t
state, through the courts or other officials, directly undertakin
such as the approval of irregular transactions, the app
changes in the corporate constitution and the pursuit of de
directors, the state may perform these tasks indirectly by
rights in suitably motivated groups, both within199 and outsid
Thus, the reformation of both the ultra vires doctrine and the rule in Turquand's C
35 and 35A of the Companies Act 1985) reflects a desire to protect those dealin
company from all the consequences of the corporate form. See Prentice, Reform of
Vires Rule: A Consultation Paper (D.T.I., London, 1986) p. 14. This policy is also expli
First Directive on Company Law.
Pursuant to section 432 of the Companies Act 1985 the Secretary of State m
inspectors to investigate the arTairs of the company.
Generally see, Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the D
Debate (O.U.P. Oxford, 1992) pp. 7-18; Shearing, "A Constitutive Conception of Re
Grabosky and Braithwaite (eds.), Business Regulation and Australia's Future (Australi
of Criminology, Canberra, 1993) p. 67; Cheffins, op. cit. n.152, Chapter 5;
"Reconceptualising Company Law: Reflections on the Law Commission's Consult
on Sharehoider Remedies: Part I" (1997) 18 Co. Lawyer 226, 237; Corbett, "A Pr
More Responsive Approach to the Regulation of Corporate Governance" (1995) 2
L.R. 277, 279.
The prohibition on financial assistance in the purchase of the company's shares
Act 1985, s. 151) and the prohibition of insider trading (Criminal Justice Act 1993)
examples.
1 Cheffins, op. cit. n.152, p. 227; Corbett, above, pp. 301-305.
1 Shearing, above
Ayres and Braithwaite, op. Cit. n.193.
The name commonly given to New Zealand's approach to the regulation of the
telecommunications industry: Ahdar, "The Privy Council and 'Light-Handed' Regulation"
(1995) 111 L.Q.R. 217; Vautier and Bollard, "Competition Policy in New Zealand" in Green
and Rosenthal (eds.), Competition Regulation in the Pacific Rim (Oceana Publications, New
York, 1996) p. 382.
One notable example may be found in the New Zealand provisions prohibiting insider trading.
Unlike most other jurisdiction which provide for enforcement by the State, the Securities
Amendment Act 1988 leaves enforcement almost entirely up to the shareholders. For an
overview see, Rickett and Grantham (eds.), Essays on Insider Trading and Securities Regulation
(Brooker's, Wellington, 1997).
* Thus, for example, in Australia the Corporations Law vests rights in creditors to seek an
injunction to restrain corporate conduct: Corporations Law, ss. 1323, 1324.

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company.201 In this respect, shareholders are part

to serve as an agent of the state as their incenti
with those of the state. The state's concern to see
managed efficiently and fairly are goals which share
claimants also share, albeit for different reasons. As
by rational self-interest shareholders can, furth
actively to pursue these aims.
We may, therefore, account for the decision t
shareholders, especially in jurisdictions where com
statutory, in instrumental terms. Shareholders ar
not as a consequence of their status, though the
pursue their self-interest. Rights are vested in sh
they may perform tasks that would otherwise be
state directly. Thus, for example, at one time the
supervisory role over the content of the corpor
requiring a direct appeal to the sovereign or
Parliament. The state's policy goals with respect
amendment of the constitution are now pursued
of shareholders. Their rational self-interest can
permit only those amendments that further the s
and shareholder. The rights to approve irregular
pardon breaches of directors' duties may be explai
in a similar way.
The instrumentalist justification for shareholde
has two important consequences. First, it is only p
in shareholders where to do so serves the regula
state. While for most purposes the state and shareho
be aligned, at the margins shareholder incentives wil
cases it is no longer appropriate for shareholders
and, indeed, this is reflected in the law. The righ
ratify breaches of duty is withdrawn where the com
The incentives of shareholders at this point, to co
company using creditor's funds, do not align with
it is no longer efficient to permit shareholders
liability. The boundaries of the shareholders'
derivative action may also be explained in th
normally it is advantageous to permit share
delinquent directors, there are circumstances
shareholders will wish to pursue the claims it
Ayres and Braithwaite, op. cit. n.193, p. 103: "a form of subcontracti
private actors. In particular, [responsive regulation] envisions that in
be more efficacious for the regulated firms to take on some or all of
and judicial regulatory functions." See also, Hill, "Changes in the R
Grantham and Rickett (eds.), Corporate Personality in the 20th Cen
Chapter 10.

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desirable to do so.202 Thus, the judicial scrutiny to which de

actions are subjected203 and the limitation of derivative action
there is an impartial group within the company204 are expli
terms of the divergence of sharehoider incentives and the
regulatory goals.
Secondly, while shareholders might have the necessary mo
to act as a proxy for the state, the success of "delegatio
regulatory strategy is also dependent upon the ability of shar
to make rational decisions about complex matters. That the
of course a central tenet of the neo-classical economic foundations
of the regulatory strategy now employed in the company an
securities area in most common law jurisdictions. While a detaile
consideration of the empirical validity of this premise is beyond
scope of this paper,205 one point can be made. If shareholders are
have any chance of making rational decisions it is clear thes
decisions must be informed. Yet it is also clear that shareholders had
no right at common law of access to the company's files.206 From this
perspective, then, disclosure requirements such as those which have
come to mark securities laws in most jurisdictions may be a necessary
procedural accompaniment to the substantive powers of review vested
in shareholders.207
VI. Conclusion
Although the company was recognised by the House of Lord

100 years ago as a legal right-and-duty bearing entity, distinc
the natural persons involved with it, the suggestion that shar
do not own the company may strike some as a radical propo
The company, after all, exists by virtue of the will, enterp
capital of the shareholders. The proposition appears even
radical when it is asked: if shareholders are not the owners, th
is? The idea that the company, and its wealth and social pow
202 A shareholder's sense of aggrievement may compel him or her to pursue the claim
the costs to the company in terms of disruption, publicity and staff involvement
warrant prosecution of the claim.
203 See, for example, the Law Commission's proposals for a derivative action: Law Co
Shareholder Remedies, Consultation Paper No. 142 (1996) and Final Report No. LC2
The proposals are outlined and critiqued by Sugarman, "Reconceptualising Com
Reflections on the Law Commission's Consultation Paper on Shareholder Remedies"
Co. Lawyer 226 and 274.
204 Smith v. Croft (No. 2) [1988] Ch. 114.
205 See Hill, "Changes in the Role of the Shareholder" in Grantham and Rickett (eds.)
Personality in the 20th Century (Hart, Oxford, 1998) Chapter 10.
206 Butt v. Kelson [1952] Ch. 197 (CA.). The Companies Act 1985 now creates
information; see, for example, sections 251 and 253.
207 Thus, in the New Zealand statutory provisions which prohibit insider trading, enfor
left up to shareholders, but shareholders' right of access to information is enhanced.
196 above.

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not owned by natural persons is deeply threa

individual and the state.
The heterodox nature of these suggestions, however, does not lie
in the need for a wholesale revision of the content of the present law.
In the course of the past century, as the influence of the ownership
paradigm waned, those rules which were immutably tied to that
paradigm were removed or altered, while in respect of those remaining
the latent inconsistencies inherent in the historical basis of these
powers being the ownership paradigm were ignored. The rejection of
the ownership paradigm does, however, have radical implications for
the legitimation of the corporate form. For much of this century the
persistent idea that shareholders owned the company served this
function. However, once it is accepted that this is not so, then the
benign and hallowed notion of private property cannot perform this
role. While the articulation of a new justification will occupy scholars
well into the next century, the doctrinal bases of shareholder powers
identified here suggests that any such justification will be found in
the undoubted economic benefits which flow from the corporate form
and the extent to which those benefits outweigh the social costs. The
truly radical aspect of the "ownerless"208 company is in the acceptance
that those costs and benefits cannot be viewed through the single
conceptual lens of ownership.
Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory for Bureaucratic Society
(University of California Press, 1986) p. 21.

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The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders

Author(s): Ross Grantham

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4508493

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THE DOCTRINAL BASIS OF THE RIGHTS OF

The concept of ownership is a complex, powerful and controv

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Despite the recognition of the company's status as a di

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and influence of shareholders. Although they sti

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have been made over the years to develop a distinct small-business

II. THE SHAREHOLDER AS PROPRIETOR

identity from its "members". In regulating this

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was achieved by limiting the size of partnerships and comp

did not bring

III. Attenuation of Shareholder Proprietorship

As long as the company was viewed through a partnership lens,

partnership to the exclusive benefit of the property, and to freedom fr

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shareholders should have the right to manage the

A. The Company as an Association

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It was against this background, then, that Salomon fe

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In the years following, however, the emphasis placed on Farw

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only against the company but also in the company i

C Control of the Company

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contrary to their own agreement. A court would be just

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standard article conferring the right to manage

D. The Right to the Benefit of the Company

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were rejected and it was established, perhaps as a corollary

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Greenhalgh the dispute was between shareholders. Mr. Greenhalgh

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range of interests besides those of shareholders were at stake.93 Yet it

E. The Corporate Interest and Other Constituencies

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behaviour, principally because employees are una

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required, directors to take account of constituencies oth

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unique, the company having been put up for sal

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frustrates sharehoider wishes, has on occasion been ex

F. Limitations on the Sharehoider Powers

Much of the explanation for the persistence of the notion that

"Gambotto v. WCP Ltd.: An Economic Analysis of Alterations to Articles and Expropriation

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views about the state's role in the creation of the company'29 or on

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shareholders' power to appoint directors, alter the constituti

IV. Residual Rights