Journal of Strategic Studies

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A conceptual framework of defence innovation

Tai Ming Cheung

To cite this article: Tai Ming Cheung (2021) A conceptual framework of defence innovation,
Journal of Strategic Studies, 44:6, 775-801, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2021.1939689
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JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
2021, VOL. 44, NO. 6, 775–801
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2021.1939689

ARTICLE

A conceptual framework of defence innovation

Tai Ming Cheung
School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA

ABSTRACT
Gaining a decisive technological edge is a never-ending pursuit for defence estab­
lishments. Intensifying geo-strategic and geo-economic rivalry among major
powers, especially the U.S and China, and the global technological revolution
occurring in the civilian and military domains, promise to reshape the nature and
distribution of global power. This article provides a conceptual framework for
a series investigating the state of global defence innovation in the twenty-first
century. The series examines defence innovation in small countries with advanced
defence innovation capabilities (Israel, Singapore), closed authoritarian powers
(North Korea, Russia), large catch-up states (China and India) and advanced large
powers (U.S.).

KEYWORDS Defence innovation; technology; great powers; military

Gaining a decisive technological edge is a never-ending pursuit for defence

establishments and the states they protect. This long-run competition for super­
iority has mostly occurred at a steady incremental pace, but has been occasionally
punctuated by periods of disruptive upheaval.1 The world is currently in one of
these whirlpools of revolutionary change brought on by the confluence of two
transformational developments. First is the intensifying geo-strategic and geo-
economic rivalry among major powers, especially between the U.S. and China.
Second is a global technological revolution that is occurring in both the civilian
and military domains. These dynamics taken together promises to fundamentally
reshape the nature and distribution of global power.
This quest for game-changing innovation has become a pressing priority
for the world’s leading military powers, which has led to the mushrooming of
organisations set up to expressly develop advanced military technologies and

CONTACT Tai Ming Cheung tcheung@ucsd.edu School of Global Policy and Strategy, University
of California San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
1
For technological deterministic perspectives, see Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes
and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 2010) and
Jeremy Black, War and Technology (Indiana University Press, 2013). For the political, social, and domestic
drivers behind military revolutions, see MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (Eds), The Dynamics of
Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001); and Geoffrey Parker, The
Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1996).
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
776 T. M. CHEUNG

attendant doctrinal and operational strategies in the past decade. The

U.S. has been especially prolific, standing up dozens of innovation entities
that are part of what is now defined as the national security innovation base.
Prominent organisations include the Defense Innovation Unit, Defense
Innovation Board, Strategic Capabilities Office, Army Futures Command and
NavalX. This augments an already strong innovation bench anchored by
storied organisations such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA). Other countries have followed suit to differing degrees of
urgency and scale, with China second in effort and ambition to the U.S.
The rise of these organisations is a teasing indicator of the importance that
defence establishments are attaching to innovation. But this observation by itself
offers little explanatory power into how well organised, how effective and how
serious these countries are in the pursuit of defence innovation and what types of
innovation they are seeking. In order to comprehend the dynamics of the global
defence innovation landscape, to identify where countries are in this pursuit for
the technological frontier, to determine how fast and effectively they are run­
ning, and to assess who is winning now and over the long term, it is imperative to
look at the entirety of a country’s defence innovation enterprise and how it is
connected with the national and global defence technological orders.
This special volume investigates the state of global defence innovation in the
twenty-first century through the examination of a select number of states. Seven
countries were picked that are representative of the diverse make-up of the
global defence innovation community. There are small countries with advanced
defence innovation capabilities (Israel and Singapore), closed authoritarian
powers (North Korea and Russia), large catch-up states (China and India), and
advanced large powers (U.S.). In addition, there is also a case study of emerging
technologies focusing on China’s efforts in the development of quantum
capabilities.

Defining defence innovation

The starting point of our examination into the global state of defence
innovation is to have a clear and precise definition of what is and is not
meant by defence innovation. This is because defence innovation is some­
times used interchangeably with other terms and concepts that appear
similar, if not identical, but have important differences such as military
innovation or national security innovation. Tom Mahnken, Andrew Ross and
Tai Ming Cheung have defined defence innovation as the transformation of
ideas and knowledge into new or improved products, processes and services for
military and dual-use applications.2 This refers primarily to organisations and

2
Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas G. Mahnken, and Andrew L. Ross, ‘Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense and
Military Innovation’, in Tai Ming Cheung (Ed), Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing
Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 777

activities associated with the defence and dual-use civil–military science,

technology and industrial base. They distinguish defence innovation from
military innovation, which they say is principally focused on warfighting
innovation that encompasses both product innovation and process innova­
tion, technological, operational and organisational innovation and is
intended to enhance the military’s ability to prepare for, fight and win wars.
In other words, defence innovation is broader and encompasses the civilian
domain, especially the defence industrial base and related dual-use commer­
cial base, whereas military innovation is more narrowly focused on the
military domain.
Mahnken et al. identify three key components for both defence and
military innovation: technological, organisational and doctrinal. Technology
serves as the source of the hardware dimension of defence and military
innovation and its concrete products. Organisational and doctrinal changes,
the software of innovation, provide what is characterised in the broader
literature as process innovation. While defence and military innovation
address the interrelationships between these three dimensions, there are
inherent biases in their primary areas of focus. For defence innovation, the
technological dimension occupies a more prominent role because of
a greater focus on research, development and acquisition processes.
Military innovation has tended to place more emphasis on doctrinal and
warfighting issues. This volume reflects this bias by paying more attention
to the technological domain, but organisational and doctrinal perspectives
are still given plenty of consideration.

A conceptual framework of defence innovation

A conceptual framework is offered here to provide a foundation for general
comparative inquiry of defence innovation across countries, technologies and
products. This framework specifies a comprehensive set of factors, the relation­
ships between them, levels of analysis and examination of other relevant attri­
butes such as soft and hard innovation factors, and a typology of innovation
outcomes. This framework, however, is not intended to provide explanations of
behaviour or outcomes, which is the purview of theories and models.3
This framework is informed by an extensive body of academic research on
systems of innovation and public policy processes over the past few
decades.4 The basis of this framework is the concept of a defence innovation
3
See Edella Schlager, ‘A Comparison of Frameworks, Theories, and Models of Policy Processes’, in Paul
A. Sabatier (Ed), Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, Co: Westview 2007).
4
Charles Edquist and Bjorn Johnson, ‘Institutions and Organizations in Systems of Innovation’, in Charles
Edquist (Ed), Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organizations (Oxford: Routledge,
2005); and Charles Edquist, ‘Systems of Innovation: Perspectives and Challenges’, in Jan Fagerberg,
Richard Nelson, and David Mowery, The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
778 T. M. CHEUNG

system, which derives from the notion of the national innovation system that
was put forward in the 1990s.5 National innovation systems are complex,
constantly evolving eco-systems that includes ‘all important economic, social,
political, organisational, institutional and other factors that influence the
development, diffusion and use of innovations’.6 The different ways that
organisations and institutions are set up and operate within countries help
to explain the variation in the national style of innovation.
Frameworks and theories from the study of the public policy process have
also been useful in the shaping of the defence innovation systems framework.
Three in particular stand out. First is the family of institutional rational choice
frameworks that focus on how institutional rules shape the behaviour of
rational actors.7 Second is the punctuated equilibrium framework that argues
that policy-making usually takes place incrementally over long periods but is
punctuated by brief periods of major change.8 Third is the advocacy coalition
framework that examines the interaction of coalitions within policy
subsystems.9 The defence innovation systems framework incorporates
a number of concepts put forward in these frameworks such as networks
and subsystems and institutional factors.
Defence innovation is defined as the transformation of ideas and knowl­
edge into new or improved products, processes and services for military and
dual-use applications. This definition refers primarily to organisations and
activities associated with the defence and dual-use civil–military science,
technology and industrial base. Included at this level are, for instance,
changes in planning, programming, budgeting, research, development,
acquisition and other business processes.
A defence innovation system can be broadly defined as a network of
organisations and institutions that interactively pursue science, technology
and innovation-related activities to further the development of defence
interests and capabilities, especially related to strategic, defence and dual-
use civil–military activities (See Chart 1). While defence innovation systems
have traditionally been bounded by national borders, there has been
a growing trend of multi-national defence collaboration, mergers and acqui­
sitions in the post-Cold War era, especially among U.S. and European states,
that has eroded this national identity.

5
See Richard Nelson (Ed), National Innovation Systems (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
6
Edquist, ‘Systems of Innovation: Perspectives and Challenges’.
7
Elinor Ostrom, ‘Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and
Development Framework’, in Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process.
8
Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1993), and Bryan Jones, Frank Baumgartner, and James True, ‘Policy Punctuations: U.S.
Budget Authority, 1947–1995 , Journal of Politics, 60 (February 1998).
9
Paul Sabatier and Christopher Weible, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework’, in Paul A. Sabatier (Ed),
Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, Co: Westview 2007).
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 779

Two aspects of this definition of defence innovation systems are worth

highlighting. First, organisations refer to entities that are directly or indirectly
involved in supporting the innovation process. They would include research
institutes, universities, state and party agencies, military units, defence indus­
trial agencies and public and private enterprises at the central and local
levels. Second, understanding the nature of interaction between organisa­
tions is critical. This is carried out through well-defined institutional arrange­
ments, which are norms, routines, habits, established practices and other
rules of the game that exist to guide the workings of the system and the
interactions between organisations.10
Defence innovation systems come in many shapes, sizes and levels of
technological advancement, but only a small number of states, on their
own or collectively with partner nations, are willing and able to afford to
build and sustain the research, development, engineering and production
capabilities required to deliver state-of-the-art armaments and military equip­
ment. These complex systems are comprised of numerous components that
relate and interact with each other in varied ways.

Categories of factors
A diverse array of factors are involved in the defence innovation process, and
the framework distinguishes seven categories (See Chart 2):

● Catalytic factors: Catalysts are the sparks that ignite innovation of

a more disruptive nature. These powerful factors are normally exter­
nal to the defence innovation system and their intervention occurs
at the highest and most influential levels of the ecosystem and can
produce the conditions for enabling considerable change and dis­
ruption. Without these catalytic factors, the defence innovation sys­
tem would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to engage in
higher end innovation and remain tied to routine modes of incre­
mental innovation.
● Input factors: These are material, financial, technological and other
forms of contributions that flow into the defence innovation system.
Most of these inputs are externally sourced but can also come internally.
Resource allocations, technology transfers and civil–military integration
are important input factors.
● Institutional factors: Institutions are rules, norms, routines, estab­
lished practices, laws and strategies that regulate the relations and
interactions between actors (individuals and groups) within and

10
Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1990), 4–5.
780 T. M. CHEUNG

outside of the defence innovation system.11 Rules can be formal

(laws, regulations and standards) or informal (routines, established
practice, and common habits). Norms are shared prescriptions guid­
ing conduct between participants within the system. Strategies refer
to plans and guidance that are devised by actors within and outside
the defence innovation system.
● Organisations and other factors: The principal actors within the defence
innovation system and main units of analysis of the framework are organi­
sations, which are formal structures with an explicit purpose and they are
consciously created. They include firms, state agencies, universities, research
institutes and a diverse array of organised units. Other types of actors are
also involved, such as individuals, and they are taken into consideration.12
● Networks and subsystems: Social, professional, virtual and other types
of networks allow actors, especially individuals, the means to connect
with each other within and beyond defence innovation systems, both
domestically and internationally. Networks provide effective channels of
sharing information, often more quickly and comprehensively than tradi­
tional institutional linkages and they help to overcome barriers to innova­
tion such as rigid compartmentalisation.13 Subsystems are issue or
process-specific networks that link organisations and other actors with
each other to produce outputs and outcomes.14 Numerous subsystems
exist within the overall defence innovation system and they can overlap
or be nested with each other. The procurement and research and devel­
opment subsystems are two of the most prominent subsystems.
● Contextual factors: This category covers the diverse set of factors that
influence and shape the overall defence innovation environment.
Contextual determinants that exert strong influence include historical
legacy, domestic political environment, development levels and the size
of the country and its markets.
● Output factors: This category is responsible for determining the nature
of the products and processes that come out of the innovation system.
They include the production process, commercialisation, the role of
market forces such as marketing and sales considerations and the
influence of end-user demand.

11
Edquist and Johnson, ‘Institutions and Organizations in Systems of Innovation’, 46; and Elinor Ostrom,
‘Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework’, in Sabatier, Theories of the Policy Process, 26.
12
Edquist and Johnson, ‘Institutions and Organizations in Systems of Innovation’, 56.
13
Mark Zachary Taylor, The Politics of Innovation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 157–68.
14
Christopher Weible, Tanya Heikkila, Peter deLeon and Paul Sabatier, ‘Understanding and Influencing
the Policy Process’, Policy Sciences 45/1 (March 2012); and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Daniel Nohrstedt,
Christopher Weible, and Karin Ingold, ‘The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Overview of the
Research Program’, in Christopher Weible (Ed), Theories of the Policy Process (New York: Routledge,
2018).
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 781

Chart 1. The defence innovation system framework and factor categories.

Chart 2. The defence innovation system framework and listing of key variables within
the factor categories.
782 T. M. CHEUNG

Table 1. List of key categories of factors in the defence innovation system.

Factor Categories Variables
Catalytic Top-Level Leadership Support; External Threat Environment; Revolutionary
Product or Process Breakthrough Opportunities
Inputs Foreign Technology Transfers; Resource Inputs (State Budget Allocations,
Capital Market Investments); Human Capital (Size and Quality of Workforce,
Cultivation of Top Talent), Civil–Military Integration
Institutions Plans and Strategies; Regulatory and Standards-Based Regime; Incentives
(Intellectual Property Protection); Governance Norms; State-Market Relations;
Technology Push Vs. Demand Pull Dynamics
Organisations Defence Corporations, State Agencies, Military Entities; Research and
Development System
Networks and Manufacturing Process; Acquisition (Research, Development, and Engineering)
Subsystems system; Social Networks; Diffusion
Contextual Historical Legacy; Domestic Political Environment; Development Level, Country
and Market Size
Outputs Production Process; Maintenance; Sales and Distribution; End-User Demand;
Commercialisation

This extensive list of categories and factors, summarized in Table 1, is by

no means exhaustive and is intended as an initial effort to capture the most
salient and significant components and drivers of the defence innovation
system. It should be pointed out that the boundaries between these
categories are porous and there are instances where factors can overlap
between classes. For example, the external threat environment can be both
a catalytic and contextual factor, especially if security concerns are suffi­
ciently grave that states mobilise their defence innovation systems to
respond to these dangers.

Relationships between factors

The relationship between these factors determines the performance and
outcomes of the defence innovation system. Individual factors by themselves
are insufficient to make a far-reaching impact on the innovation process and
it is only when they link and interact with other factors that these clusters are
able to exert a more profound influence. A number of observations can be
made to highlight prominent patterns of association and interaction between
factors.
First, catalytic factors have an outsized influence on innovation, especially
on higher and more novel types of innovation. But they are only effective if
closely linked to other classes of factors in key parts of the defence innovation
system, especially those in the input, organisational, institutional, network
and subsystem categories. If top leadership support, for example, is coordi­
nated with resource allocations and the research and development subsys­
tem, this offers the opportunity for engaging in higher more disruptive forms
of innovation. If leadership support though is absent or weakly connected
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 783

with these other categories of factors, then any intervention is unlikely to

produce meaningful results.
Second, different cluster patterns of factors can be identified depending
on the level of development and strategic goals of the defence innovation
system:

● Incremental catch-up regimes: In economically and technologically

underdeveloped countries and their defence innovation systems,
absorption-oriented factors are the most important drivers at
work (See Chart 3). They include technology transfers, organisational
and institutional factors that emphasise the importance of the role of
the state such as government agencies, and subsystems that are
primarily engaged in engineering and production. Catalytic factors
do not play a prominent role in these regimes, which means their
innovation trajectories are incremental in nature. Examples include
India and Brazil.

Chart 3. Framework of incremental catch-up regimes.

784 T. M. CHEUNG

● Rapidly catching-up regimes: Many of the same absorption-oriented

factors found in incremental catch-up regimes are present in developing
countries seeking rapid advancement, but a critical difference is that
catalytic factors, especially leadership support and the threat environ­
ment, are prominent and link closely with input factors such as resource
allocations along with institutional factors like strategies and plans (See
Chart 4). Moreover, many more factors are engaged in the innovation
process compared to its incremental catch-up counterpart, such as the
research and development subsystem. China is the proto-typical example
of this type of regime.
● Advanced developed regimes: Factors that promote original innovation
are the most important and powerful drivers at play for advanced defence
innovation systems (See Chart 5). They include bottom-up institutional
factors such as market-based governance regimes and incentives support­
ing risk-taking and intellectual property protection, organisations that
encourage market and research activities such as corporations and uni­
versities and research institutes and subsystems focused on the generation
of original knowledge and products such as the research and development
apparatus. The U.S. is a leading example of an advanced developed regime.
● Emerging technological domains: In areas focused on the nurturing of
emerging technologies, the most important factors are not organisa­
tional, institutional, or subsystem classes of factors that are the pillars of

Chart 4. Framework of rapidly catching-up regimes.

 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 785

Chart 5. Framework of advanced developed regimes.

Chart 6. Framework of emerging technological domains.

786 T. M. CHEUNG

conventional well-established defence innovation systems, but factors

that emphasise new innovation approaches (See Chart 6). This would
include (1) a technological environment (counted as both a contextual
and catalytic factor) in which revolutionary breakthrough opportunities
are possible because of far-reaching shifts underway in the existing
techno-economic paradigms; (2) social and professional networks that
connect entrepreneurs and those entities focused on early stage, high-
risk research; and (3) the embrace of input, market-oriented organisa­
tional and institutional factors that encourage risk-taking, experimenta­
tion, and new ways of collaboration such as civil–military integration,
and the role of start-up and private enterprises.

Levels of analysis
The defence innovation systems framework can be applied to different
levels of analysis from the international level to looking at specific
projects. In the examination of the country case studies in this volume,
the level of analysis is at the national level. But the framework can also
be used to look at lower levels such as at the industry sector (e.g. the
aviation and shipbuilding industries) or sub-sectoral level (the fighter
aviation and surface warship construction sub-industries), at specific
technologies (such as artificial intelligence and hypersonics), and also at
individual programmes and projects.

Hard vs. soft innovation factors

Another way to distinguish factors in the defence innovation system is to
divide them into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ innovation categories (See Table 2).15 Hard
innovation capabilities are input and infrastructure factors intended to
advance technological and product development. This includes research
and development facilities such as laboratories, research institutes and uni­
versities, human capital, firm-level capabilities and participation, manufactur­
ing capabilities, access to foreign technology and knowledge markets,
availability of funding sources from state and non-state sources, and geogra­
phical proximity, such as through clusters. These hard innovation capabilities
attract the most analytical attention because they are tangible and can be
measured and quantified.
Soft innovation capabilities are broader in scope than hard factors and
cover political, institutional, relational, social, ideational and other factors that
shape non-technological and process-related innovative activity. This is what
15
For an expanded discussion, see Tai Ming Cheung, ‘The Chinese Defence Economy’s Long March from
Imitation to Innovation’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011).
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 787

Table 2. List of key factors driving the defence innovation system incorporating the
hard, soft, and critical factors categories.
Factor
Categories Hard Innovation Factors Soft Innovation Factors
Catalytic Revolutionary Product or Process Top-Level Leadership Support; External
Breakthrough Opportunities Threat Environment
Contextual Historical Legacy; Development Level;
Political System
Input Foreign Technology Transfers; Resource
Inputs (State Budget Allocations,
Capital Market Investments); Human
Capital (Size and Quality of Workforce,
Cultivation of Top Talent)
Organisational Corporations; Government Agencies;
Research Entities; Individuals; Military
Organisations
Networks and Procurement Subsystem; Research and Social Networks; Professional Networks;
Subsystems Development Subsystem Technology Push Vs. Demand Pull;
Technological Diffusion
Institutional Plans and Strategies; Regulatory and Standards-Based
Regime; Incentives (Intellectual
Property Protection); Governance
Norms; Market Forces
Output Production Process; Maintenance; Sales End-User Demand
and Distribution

innovation scholars define as ‘social capability’.16 These soft capabilities

include organisational, marketing and entrepreneurial skills as well as gov­
ernance factors such as the existence and effectiveness of legal and regula­
tory regimes, the role of political leadership, promotion of standards,
corporate governance mechanisms and the general operating environment
that the eco-system is located within.
It should be pointed out that the ‘hard–soft’ and functional factor frame­
works are not dueling approaches but can be integrated to offer an even
more nuanced categorisation of the factors at play in the defence innovation
system.

Types of innovation outcomes

There are an array of innovation outcomes resulting from the interactions
among the various factors of this framework that extend from simple copying
at one end to highly sophisticated disruptive innovation at the other:

(1) Duplicative Imitation: Products, usually obtained from foreign

sources, are closely copied with little or no technological improve­
ments. This is the starting point of industrial and technological
16
Moses Abramovitz, ‘Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind’, Journal of Economic History 46/
386 (June,1986).
788 T. M. CHEUNG

development for latecomers. The process begins with the acquisition

of foreign technology, which then goes directly into production with
virtually no technology development or engineering and manufactur­
ing development.
(2) Creative Imitation: This represents a more sophisticated form of
imitation that generates imitative products with new performance
features. Domestic research input is relatively low, but is beginning
to find its way into modest improvements in components or non-core
areas. The development process becomes more robust with more work
done in the technology development and engineering and manufac­
turing stages. The work here is primarily how to integrate domestic
components into the dominant foreign platform.
(3) Creative Adaptation: Products are inspired by existing foreign-
derived technologies but can differ from them significantly. This can
also be called advanced imitation. One of the primary forms of creative
adaptation is reverse engineering. There is considerably more research
conducted here than in the creative imitation stage, especially in
product or concept refinement, and there is also significantly more
effort and work to combine higher levels of domestic content onto an
existing foreign platform.
(4) Crossover Innovation: This refers to products jointly developed by
Chinese and foreign partners with significant technology and knowledge
transfers to the local side that result in the creation of a R&D base able to
conduct independent and original innovation activities. However, there is
still considerable reliance on foreign countries for technological and
managerial input to ensure that projects come to fruition.
(5) Incremental Innovation: This is the limited updating and improve­
ment of existing indigenously developed systems and processes.
Incremental innovation can be the gradual upgrading of a system
through the introduction of improved subsystems, but it is also often
the result of organisational and management inputs aimed at produ­
cing different versions of products tailored to different markets and
users, rather than significant technological improvements through
original research and development.
(6) Architectural Innovation: This can be distinguished between product
and process variants. Architectural product innovation refers to ‘innova­
tions that change the way in which the components of a product are
linked together, while leaving the core design concepts (and thus the
basic knowledge underlying the components) untouched.’17 Architectural

17
Rebecca Henderson and Kim Clark, ‘Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Product
Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms,’ Administrative Science Quarterly 35/1 (March 1990)
10.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 789

process innovation refers to the redesign of production systems in an

integrated approach (involving management, engineers and workers as
well as input from end-users) that significantly improves processes but
does not usually result in radical product innovation. The primary enablers
are improvements in organisational, marketing, management, systems
integration, and doctrinal processes and knowledge that are coupled
with a deep understanding of market requirements and close-knit rela­
tionships between producers, suppliers and users. As these are also the
same factors responsible for driving incremental innovation, distinguish­
ing between these different types of innovation poses a major analytical
challenge. While many of these soft capabilities enabling architectural
innovation may appear to be modest and unremarkable, they have the
potential to cause significant, even discontinuous consequences through
the reconfiguration of existing technologies in far more efficient and
competitive ways that challenge or overturn the dominance of estab­
lished leaders.
(7) Component or modular innovation: This involves the development
of new component technology that can be installed into existing
system architecture. Modular innovation emphasises hard innovation
capabilities such as advanced R&D facilities, a cadre of experienced
scientists and engineers, and large-scale investment outlays.
(8) Radical or disruptive innovation: This requires major breakthroughs
in both new component technology and architecture and only coun­
tries with broad-based, world-class R&D capabilities and personnel
along with deep financial resources and a willingness to take risk can
engage in this activity.

Case studies
This special issue explores in detail the defence innovation systems of seven
countries. Altogether, these case studies provide a rich and varied application
of the defence innovation framework that offers insightful comparative per­
spectives. We will begin by briefly summarizing the major categories of
innovation factors shaping each of these defence innovation systems and
then discuss the key findings. The cases can be sorted into the four frame­
work variants: incremental catch-up, rapidly catching-up, advanced devel­
oped and emerging technological regimes.

Incremental catch-up regimes: India

India is the only state among the case studies that fit the definition of an
incremental catch-up regime, although many other countries would fall into
this category. Laxman Kumar Behera paints a portrait of a country with a sub-
790 T. M. CHEUNG

optimal performance in defence innovation. This is because of a diverse array

of reasons, of which several stand out. First is the absence of catalytic factors
in providing leadership, direction, or any outside impetus to a slow-moving
and dysfunctional defence innovation system. Behera points out that the role
of leadership in defence innovation ‘does not often go beyond lip service’.
Second, several contextual factors exert an influential role in shaping the
fundamental characteristics of India’s approach to defence innovation. They
include the backward state of the overall science and technology ecosystem
and the powerful historical legacy of a state-dominated central planning
system.
Third is the throttling of inputs going into the defence innovation system.
In the late 2010s, only 6% of the Indian defence budget was annually ear-
marked for research and development, significantly less than the likes of the
U.S. and China. Other input factors are similarly less than sufficient for enga­
ging in moving up the innovation ladder. Behera says that civil–military
integration is largely neglected while the nurturing of human capital is
underwhelming with only 10% of defence scientists receiving PhDs. One
input factor that has had some positive impact is the inflow of foreign
technology transfers from the Soviet Union/Russia, Western Europe and
more recently the U.S., but the Indian DIS has only been able to partially
absorb these foreign capabilities.
Fourth, institutional factors within the Indian DIS hinder more than facil­
itate innovation. Norms, routines and the governance regime are overly
bureaucratic, strictly compartmentalised and risk-adverse. Moreover, Behera
argues that there is a lack of strategic planning and guidance and develop­
ment programmes are often undertaken in ad hoc style. Fifth, organisational
factors also contribute to the weak innovation performance of the Indian DIS.
The most significant factor is the tight monopoly on the R&D held by the
Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), whose track
record is mixed. Manufacturing is also dominated by a limited number of
state-owned entities composed of Defence Public Sector Undertakings and
ordnance factories. There are a couple of public firms, Hindustan Aeronautics
and Bharat Electronics, but Behera points out that they have only modest
intellectual property portfolios.
Sixth, the Indian DIS has a proliferation of subsystems, but there is deep
horizontal separation between them, which adds to truncated innovation
dynamics. For example, the links between the procurement and production
subsystems are limited, and the procurement system itself is characterised
by dysfunction caused by strong distrust and competition between end-
users and producers and developers. Seventh, output factors reflect the
incremental nature of the Indian DIS. The manufacturing base is able to
produce third generation conventional platforms, but lacks the
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 791

technological capabilities to upgrade to more advanced cutting-edge weap­

ons and equipment.
One important caveat though is that the strategic weapons component of
the Indian DIS has demonstrated a much better track record for innovation
than its conventional counterpart. Innovation in nuclear, ballistic missiles and
space capabilities has been a bright spot in an otherwise lackluster Indian
innovation landscape.

Rapidly catching-up regimes: North Korea

In contrast to India’s weak efforts at defence innovation, North Korea has
been far more successful in its efforts to advance up the innovation ladder
primarily limited to strategic capabilities. The focus of the essay by Stephan
Haggard and Tai Ming Cheung is on North Korea’s accomplishments in
indigenously building nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles.
The North Korean case is particularly fascinating because of this extraordinary
development of advanced military capabilities in a severely underdeveloped
and isolated country.
Catalytic factors in the form of leadership intervention and a severe exter­
nal threat environment have been outsized influences in driving the devel­
opment of North Korea’s strategic weapons capabilities. A highly
authoritarian and intensely focused leadership has been able to mobilise
the entire resources of the country for an extended period to pursue its
strategic goal of the indigenous development of a nuclear deterrence cap­
ability regardless of the enormous economic and social costs at home and
isolation abroad. This is especially the case under Kim Jong Un, who has
shown a laser-like focus and dedication to the development of strategic
weapons capabilities far greater than his father and grandfather.
This single-minded determination of the Kim dynasty to produce
a homegrown nuclear deterrence has been driven by a deep-seated fear
that its survival is under threat from the U.S. and its regional allies, especially
South Korea and Japan. North Korea has been on a permanent war-footing
ever since its founding in the late 1940s. Up until the 1990s, Pyongyang’s
foremost priority was on building up a conventional military industrial com­
plex. But after losing access to military assistance from the Soviet Union, who
had been a long-time patron and strategic ally, North Korea’s attention
turned to the development of strategic weapons capabilities. North Korea’s
already profound sense of external threat became even more acute from the
1990s onwards with its protracted nuclear standoff with the international
community as well as the spectre of the fall of other pariah regimes such as
Libya and Iraq from Western military intervention.
A central focus of Haggard and Cheung’s chapter is the close relation­
ship between external technology inputs and domestic innovation
792 T. M. CHEUNG

capabilities. North Korea has benefited greatly from access to foreign

technology and knowledge, especially in the early stages of research and
development but also in the later engineering and testing stages. The
North Korean state has cultivated a well-connected international network
of suppliers and collaborators stretching from Pakistan and India to Libya,
Iraq and Syria. The cultivation of human talent is another important input
factor accounting for North Korea’s progress in developing its strategic
weapons capabilities. North Korea has nurtured a cadre of well-trained and
experienced scientists and engineers across the full range of scientific,
technological and engineering disciplines needed for nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles.
Haggard and Cheung point out that North Korea’s ability to effectively
marshal its limited resources and push ahead with its nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile programmes shows the advantages of its state-socialist sys­
tem to establish discreet highly functioning and tightly integrated networks
and subsystems so long as they enjoy top-level support. The North Korean
strategic weapons innovation system has fostered an effective systems inte­
gration capability able to manage the complex design, research, develop­
ment and engineering processes involved in the absorption and reverse
engineering of foreign technologies and marrying this with domestically
developed technologies.
Another distinctive characteristic and strength of the strategic weapons
innovation system is an institutional culture that is willing to take risks, learn
from mistakes, be flexible and adaptive, and to learn while doing. Haggard
and Cheung say that this attribute stands in sharp contrast with the strict
ideological, risk-
adverse and tightly regimented norms of the overall North Korean political
system.
In conclusion, Haggard and Cheung argue that the effectiveness of North
Korea’s strategic weapons innovation system ultimately rests on the relent­
less buildup of domestic research and heavy industrial capabilities under
a highly centralised, state-led and top-down ‘big engineering’ approach.
The North Korean strategic weapons system, along with its conventional
weapons counterpart, has become a mainstay of the regime, enjoying privi­
leged status and representation at the highest levels of the state, party and
military apparatuses. It has also become the indispensable insurance policy
for the Kim dynasty’s continued hold on power.

Advanced developed regimes: U.S., Israel, Singapore and Russia

Four of the case studies can be categorised as advanced developed regimes.
They are the U.S., Israel, Singapore and Russia. While the defence industrial
bases of these states share the common characteristics of being
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 793

technologically advanced and industrially mature, there are wide variations

among them such as size, breadth of technological specialisation and nature
of political systems, so it is unsurprising that their defence innovation systems
are organised and operate in very different ways.
The U.S. has been the world’s unrivalled defence innovation leader since
the end of Cold War, and although there is growing debate that its superiority
is at serious risk because of fierce external competition and domestic dys­
function, Eugene Gholz and Harvey Sapolsky say they are ‘sanguine’ that
U.S. dominance is intact because the US defence innovation system has a very
different and unique set of factors that keeps the country far ahead of any
potential rivals. They argue that the combination of hard and soft innovation
capabilities that the U.S. excels in will allow the country to ‘remain at the
cutting edge’ and unlikely to be challenged for the foreseeable future. Gholz
and Sapolsky highlight a number of factors within the input, organisational
and institutional categories that stand out as being central to U.S. defence
innovation leadership.
First is the input factor of strong defence R&D spending that extends back
over more than seven decades. This mobilisation of resources on such a vast
scale and over such a long period means the U.S. ‘will not readily fall behind in
weapons technology or quality’, Gholz and Sapolsky argue. Second is the
organisational factor of special public-private hybrid organisations called
federally funded research and development centres and university affiliated
research centres that provide unbiased technical advice and a mechanism for
the accumulation of knowledge. Gholz and Sapolsky say these entities play
a vital role in creating and preserving the ‘soft’ innovation capabilities of the
U.S. defence R&D system as a reservoir of institutional memory of past R&D
efforts and their independence that prevents capture by the state.
Gholz and Sapolsky also point to three types of institutional factors that act
as powerful incentives for innovation. The first is a strong aversion to casual­
ties that is shaped by labour shortages and the democratic nature of the
U.S. political system. This has created an institutional culture that favours
substituting technology for manpower. Second is the bureaucratic rivalry that
exists among different branches of the U.S. defence establishment, especially
inter-service competition. Third is a welcoming approach to immigration that
has allowed for the importation of new ideas.
While Gholz and Sapolsky also believe that the threat environment plays
a highly influential role, they view the threat argument as self-serving, or
more precisely self-licking as spelled out in the title of their chapter. They
argue that the U.S. is a very secure country surrounded by two big oceans and
two unthreatening neighbours. The ‘large threat assessment apparatus’ that
was established during the Cold War is now looking for ‘every imaginable
threat’ to justify the maintenance and upkeep of the huge and very costly
U.S. defence innovation system.
794 T. M. CHEUNG

Richard Bitzinger contrasts Israel and Singapore and points out that
although Israel and Singapore share many similar geo-strategic, national
security and defence technological attributes, there is a ‘marked gap in
achievement’ in defence innovation between the two countries. This differ­
ence can be teased out when comparing the critical factors at play in the
shaping, orchestration and conduct of their defence innovation systems. First,
in terms of catalytic factors, the threat environment exerts a profound influ­
ence on Israel, which views itself as under permanent siege by hostile
neighbours. Singapore also sees itself in a dangerous regional security envir­
onment, but its neighbours are far less militant or capable than those in
Israel’s backyard and so the threat environment is less of a catalytic factor and
more of a contextual factor.
Second, Israel and Singapore share a number of similar contextual factors
that have played fundamental roles in shaping the foundations of their
approaches to defence industrialisation and innovation. They both share
a historical legacy of being born in hostile circumstances and needing to
arm and defend themselves with overwhelming firepower as quickly as
possible. Moreover, they both have similar geographical profiles of a lack of
strategic depth and consequently require advanced military capabilities for
a strong forward defence. The critical difference though is that Israel has gone
to war several times, while Singapore has managed to avoid conflict so far.
Third, there is considerable overlap in the make-up of the input factors of
both countries. They both invest heavily in defence S&T. Ten per cent of
Singapore’s defence budget, for example, is spent on research and develop­
ment. They both have a very strong and well-educated pool of scientific and
technological talent to feed into their defence innovation systems. Both
countries are also heavily dependent on foreign acquisitions of military
capabilities, especially from the U.S., although Israel is able to modify some
of these imports with its own indigenous sub-systems. Civil–military integra­
tion is also pursued vigorously by both countries as their industrial economies
are too small to compartmentalise between civilian and defence activities.
Fourth, the organisational configuration of the Israeli and Singaporean
defence innovation systems is also broadly comparable. State-affiliated actors
are the dominant players in the corporate and research and development
realms. Three of the four top Israeli defence firms are state-owned, as is
Singapore’s monopoly defence enterprise. Government agencies exert
a powerful grip on the defence S&T apparatus in both countries.
Fifth, one category though where there are significant differences
between Israel and Singapore is in institutional factors. Israel has an institu­
tional culture that emphasises improvisation, has limited interest in planning
and developing long-range strategies, and embraces continuous ongoing
innovation. Singapore by contrast has a far more rigid innovation culture
that is risk adverse, strongly embraces planning and strategies, emphasises
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 795

state control over market forces in picking winners and losers, and has
cultivated a conservative governance regime.
Sixth, yet another category that highlights the differences between the
Israeli and Singaporean defence innovation systems is networks and subsys­
tems. A central characteristic of Israeli networks is that they are non-
hierarchical, informal and adaptive. This allows for excellent access among
participants at all levels, strong flows of information and ultimately a highly
effective diffusion process. By contrast, Singapore is a more traditional hier­
archical regime. One important similarity between these two countries due to
their conscription systems is that they both have tight elite networks of
politicians, cabinet ministers, corporate chiefs and other well-placed leaders
who knew each other while serving in the military. This allows for the leader­
ships of these defence innovation systems to have access to their counter­
parts elsewhere within these countries.
Seventh, there are some notable similarities in output factors between
Israel and Singapore. The influence of end-user requirements from the war­
fighters is strong in both the two countries. Another similarity is that they
both have specialised niche manufacturing bases as they are both unable to
afford or maintain a comprehensive suite of defence production capabilities.
Israel though has a more extensive and sophisticated portfolio of products
compared to Singapore that has made its companies successful on the
international arms market.
In conclusion, while the Israeli and Singaporean defence innovation sys­
tems share many common traits, especially in contextual, organisational and
output factors, it is the differences that are more significant and explains why
the innovation performances and profiles of these two countries are so
divergent. These differences are primarily catalytic, institutional and network
factors such as the severity of the threat environment, social networks and
institutional culture, which are also ‘soft’ in nature.
Russia has been drawing global attention to its defence innovation devel­
opments since the late 2010s. In major policy speeches, President Vladimir
Putin has showcased his government’s investment in the development of
new generations of advanced defence technological capabilities as
a cornerstone of his efforts to ensure that Russia remains a leading global
military power. Vasily Kashin examines how motivated, capable and ambi­
tious Russia actually is in the pursuit of world class defence innovation.
Kashin points to two events that were catalytic in shaping Russia’s strate­
gic and conventional defence innovation efforts in the twenty-first century.
The first was the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty in 2002, which led Russia to significantly step up the development of
strategic capabilities to ensure strategic stability and deterrence. Kashin said
Russia focused its efforts on a limited number of highly ambitious but also
risky breakthrough projects such as hypersonic glider re-entry vehicles for
796 T. M. CHEUNG

ICBMs and new generations of strategic cruise missiles at the expense of the
continued upgrading of its existing arsenals.
For the conventional sector, Kashin says the catalytic turning point was
Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008. Although Russia won the conflict against its
much smaller and weaker neighbour, it exposed critical weaknesses in Russia’s
command and control structure, weak reconnaissance capabilities and inade­
quate personnel training. Kashin makes an interesting comparison between
the May 1999 US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the
Georgia campaign. The embassy bombing sparked Beijing to embark on
a major effort to improve its defence innovation system. In the Georgia
conflict, Kashin says that there were widespread suspicions among Russian
decision-makers that the U.S. was a key instigator behind Georgia’s activities
against Russia. The conflict led to Russia’s reassessment of its relations with the
West, which turned from cooperative to more competitive and adversarial.
Kashin offers a detailed layout of the organisational actors and institutional
features of the Russian defence innovation system. The principal organisa­
tional actors include the Ministry of Defence and the Advanced Research
Foundation, which is sometimes compared to DARPA in the U.S., but is very
different in set-up and focus. The most important entity though is the
Defence Industrial Commission, a government inter-agency body that is
directly under the leadership of the Russian President. Vladimir Putin is
actively engaged in defence innovation matters and is the supreme arbiter.
An important point that Kashin makes is that these organisations are not
simply content with focusing their efforts in the defence domain but are keen
to broaden their responsibility for promoting innovation across the rest of the
Russian national innovation system as well.
But with the limited financial and other resources that the mid-sized Russian
economy is able to generate and afford to devote to defence needs compared
to the U.S., China and other advanced states, Kashin argues that Russia’s only
viable option to keep up militarily with the global frontier is to concentrate its
efforts in a select few areas such as nuclear-armed long-range intercontinental
ballistic missiles, a non-nuclear strategic deterrence such as hypersonic weap­
ons, air defence systems and a limited array of ground-based weapons. Areas
not deemed of sufficiently high priority in current Russian military doctrine such
as long-range air and naval power projection capabilities are being sacrificed.
Kashin points out that Moscow views the long-term international threat envir­
onment to be increasingly complex and hostile, which requires continued
commitment to the modernisation of its nuclear triad and more attention
and resources to be devoted to emerging technologies such as artificial intelli­
gence, directed energy weapons, hypersonic weapons and robotics.
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 797

Emerging technological domains: China’s efforts in quantum

technologies
In addition to the country case studies, there is one emerging technology-
focused case study by Elsa Kania on China’s development of quantum tech­
nologies that have both military and civilian applications. In Kania’s examina­
tion of China’s efforts to develop its quantum capabilities, she sees innovation
being driven by some of the same factors that are also prominent in conven­
tional domains, of which top-level leadership support and the threat environ­
ment stand out. Kania paints a picture of a rapidly developing Chinese
quantum innovation eco-system that enjoys strong high-level support
among party, state, military and corporate elites, of which Xi Jinping stands
out at the very top. This was highlighted most prominently by a Politburo
study session on quantum development that was hosted by Xi in
October 2020. Underpinning the leadership’s vigorous backing for the devel­
opment of quantum capabilities are their concerns about the rising threat
environment, especially the vulnerability of the country’s communications
infrastructure through sophisticated technology-based intelligence gather­
ing activities led by the U.S. Kania points to the Edward Snowden incident in
2013 in which the National Security Agency contractor leaked extensive
details of U.S. penetration of foreign networks, including within China, as
a pivotal event behind the Chinese leadership’s embrace of quantum tech­
nologies that would provide highly secure communications capabilities such
as through unbreakable cryptography.
The development of the Chinese quantum innovation ecosystem offers
useful insights into how China more generally is going about in establishing
itself as a leading player in a broader array of emerging technology sectors.
The general approach is through what can be described as a selective author­
itarian mobilisation development model, in which the Chinese authorities
mobilize and concentrate resources through a statist top-down allocation
process to a highly selective group of sectors.18 This is done through various
mechanisms that Kania points out, such as state-directed plans and policies in
the form of Five-Year Science and Technology Development Plans, the
Strategic Emerging Industries initiative and the Made in China 2025 industrial
plan. But there are also new tools being adopted such as the use of provincial
and market-supported funding mechanisms that Kania identifies.
Human talent is another prominent characteristic in driving quantum
innovation. While high-end human talent is critical across all defence S&T
fields, it is doubly so in the quantum realm. Kania points to a number talent
recruitment and educational programmes and activities and argues that
China has had considerable success in nurturing a homegrown quantum

18
See Tai Ming Cheung, Innovate to Dominate: The Making of the Chinese Techno-Security State and
Implications for the Global Order (Forthcoming).
798 T. M. CHEUNG

talent pool that makes it less reliant on foreign talent transfers than in other
technological domains.
An important distinguishing characteristic of the Chinese quantum inno­
vation system that supports the framework put forward of emerging techno­
logical domains is the prominent role played by professional and social
networks in promoting knowledge creation and diffusion. Kania points to
the forging of domestic and foreign productive partnerships, especially
among key quantum hubs such as the Key Laboratory of Quantum
Information at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC)
and quantum centres at Tsinghua and Fudan Universities. USTC appears to
be the most important node for quantum collaboration with foreign and
military entities. This includes a joint research project with the Austrian
Academy of Sciences and partnerships with Chinese defence corporations.
Another novel feature of the Chinese quantum innovation system is the
role of private sector entities that have been generally absent in China’s
defense innovation system. The Alibaba Quantum Computing Lab is a rare
example of a private entity participating in high-end strategic innovation in
China, but whether it is a one-off or represents the start of a new trend of
growing private sector involvement in cutting-edge innovation could have
a profound impact in shaping China’s long-term technology development
trajectory.

Key findings
A number of themes emerge from these case studies. First, catalytic factors
are critically important. The threat environment and the role of high-level
leadership support are highlighted in a number of the cases, especially Israel
and North Korea. Catalytic factors are especially critical for the pursuit of
disruptive innovation. The oft-noted contemporary intensification of geopo­
litical competition can be expected to catalyse competition for defence and
military prowess generally and for defence and military innovation specifi­
cally. Leading and rising catch-up powers perhaps will be the most likely to
pursue ambitious, across-the-board innovation programmes. Their defence
and military planners and operators will be attracted by new, emerging and
over-the-horizon technologies, such as cyber, AI and quantum computing,
that are perceived, correctly or incorrectly, as promising either breakthroughs
or discontinuous, disruptive innovation (even as those planners and opera­
tors struggle with how to effectively employ new cyber, AI, quantum and
other tools).
Innovation by mid-size and small states is more likely to be focused on the
development of niche rather than across-the-board capabilities; architectural
innovation – the reconfiguration of hardware and software, of technology,
doctrine and organisation – may prove particularly attractive to this group of
 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 799

states. In the absence of limits on the development, production, acquisition,

deployment and employment of new capabilities – the next big, new thing,
or game changer, may not be a good thing – the impetus given to defence
and military innovation by an intensification of geopolitical conflict may well
pose risks to regional and global order and stability.
New, emerging and over-the-horizon technologies – which are as likely as
not to be imported by the defence sector from the commercial sector (rather
than, as in the past, exported by the defence sector to the commercial sector)
and, as a result of the globalisation of R&D, will be broadly disseminated –
may be as likely to undermine as to enhance security, even contributing to
the onset of, or exacerbation of, arms races and security dilemmas. As, or
perhaps if, geopolitically spurred competition for defence and military inno­
vation intensifies, it should not be assumed that a competitive advantage
automatically accrues to authoritarian, centrally planned economies that
target a select set of emerging technologies. Matthew Evangelista long ago
demonstrated that a bottom-up, decentralised approach to defence and
military innovation can best a top-down, centralised approach – that the
latter can actually inhibit innovation. Gholz and Sapolsky, too, note the
advantages of the competitive, decentralised approach to defence and mili­
tary innovation enjoyed by the U.S.
A third cluster of attributes identified as having considerable impact on
innovation are social and strategic culture-related factors, although their
influence is more in an indirect context of providing a positive supporting
environment rather than playing a direct role. In the case of the U.S., for
example, social and political dynamics related to technology substitution for
labour and an immigration-friendly social environment are viewed as having
had an important role in shaping the U.S. defence innovation culture. The
influence of social traits is even more pronounced in Israel with the preva­
lence of assertive, risk-taking and non-hierarchical norms a key factor behind
its free-wheeling disruptive innovation environment. The opposite is true in
Singapore where a more risk-adverse and hierarchical social order means that
the preference is for more routine incremental innovation.
Fourth, the nature and intensity of innovation will depend on the level of
sophistication and development of a state’s defence innovation system.
Advanced and well-endowed innovation systems such as the U.S. are much
more able to pursue higher-end innovation than underdeveloped catch-up
countries that will be limited to imitation and lower-end innovation.
Fifth, the linkages between factors, especially different categories of fac­
tors, are important. Close working connections between catalytic factors and
input, process and institutional-related factors would enable higher levels of
innovation outcomes. If top leadership support is closely linked to budgets
and acquisition processes, for example, this would identify pathways for
innovation to take place. But if leadership support is isolated and affiliated
800 T. M. CHEUNG

with critical enabling factors elsewhere in the innovation system, then the
pathways to progress will be absent.
We conclude with a brief discussion about the state of the defense
innovation subfield and the next steps in its development. From the outset,
this article was based on the modest goal of offering a conceptual framework
of defence innovation that pinpoints and bring together the tacit assump­
tions that have been made by the articles in this special volume as well as by
other scholars toiling in the defence innovation sub-field. The framework
offered here represents a summation of the state of the field and is intended
to set the stage for more explicit theory building and testing that will help to
produce more rigorous and generalisable examinations. These next steps in
the research agenda could not be more timely as the world faces the
prospects of a more intensive and disruptive phase in the global defence
innovation race brought on by the global revolution in technology affairs and
the fierce techno-security rivalry between the U.S., China and their allies.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding
This work was supported by, or in part by, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the
U.S. Army Research Office under contract/grant No. W911NF-15-1-0407. Any opinions,
findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Army Research
Office.

Notes on contributor
Tai Ming Cheung is the director of the University of California Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation and a professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at
the University of California San Diego in La Jolla, California.

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