Al Quds

ABD AL-FATTAH EL-AWAISI, MUHITTIN ATAMAN
T AL-QUDS
he controversial decision of U.S. President Donald
Trump to formally recognize the Holy City of al-
Quds (Jerusalem) as the capital of Israel overturned
decades of official U.S. policy. This decision resulted
in moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem
on the eve of the Palestinian commemoration of 70 years of the
Nakbah (Catastrophe) on May 15, 2018, during which Pales- HISTORY, RELIGION,
AND POLITICS
tinians have been suffering persecutions, massacres, and ethnic
cleansing. Not only is this decision against international law,
but it is also in direct conflict with a number of resolutions
by the UN Security Council. It brings an end to the two-state
solution, which the international community has been trying
to achieve for a long time. Moreover, this action is a practical
step of the “Deal of the Century” which the Trump administra-
AL-QUDS HISTORY, RELIGION, AND POLITICS

tion is trying to impose in the region.
These developments require urgent publications to address dif-
ferent dimensions of this delicate issue, which lies at the heart
of most of the regional problems. In order to develop a better
understanding of this issue and other related regional prob-
lems, it is necessary to produce inclusive materials about the
city. Accordingly, at this critical time, we have designed this
edited book to provide a better understanding of this core issue
to intellectuals, academics, politicians, and the wider public in-
terested in the Holy Land.
MUHITTIN ATAMAN ABD AL-FATTAH EL-AWAISI KHALID EL-AWAISI

l
l l
STEPHEN SIZER SHARIF AMIN ABU SHAMMALAH BERDAL ARAL

l ABD AL-FATTAH EL-AWAISI
ABDULSALAM MUALA HOSSAM SHAKE MOHAMMAD MAKRAM BALAWI
MUHITTIN ATAMAN
l l
HELIN SARI ERTEM MOHD ROSLAN MOHD NOR MUHAMMAD KHALIS IBRAHIM
l l
SECOND EDITION
9 786057 544773
AL-QUDS
HISTORY, RELIGION,
AND POLITICS
AL-QUDS
HISTORY, RELIGION,
AND POLITICS
EDITORS
Prof. Dr. Abd al-Fattah EL-AWAISI
Prof. Dr. Muhittin ATAMAN
S E TA
SETA Publications 51
First Published in 2019 by SETA
Second Edition Published in 2021
ISBN: 978-605-7544-77-3
© 2021 SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi
All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means,
without permission in writing from the publishers.
Cover: Erkan Söğüt

Proofreading: Dr. Eva Stamoulou Oral
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD7
PROLOGUE11
PART ONE
HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND
CHAPTER I
Whose Holy Land? The Meanings and Origins of
the Names of Bayt al-Maqdis 19
Khalid El-Awaisi
CHAPTER II
Jerusalem, The Eternal Capital of Faith 37
Stephen Sizer
CHAPTER III
Bayt al-Maqdis: A Short History from Ancient to Modern Times 43
Sharif Amin Abu Shammalah
PART TWO
THEORETICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
CHAPTER IV
Bayt al-Maqdis: A Muslim Model for Aman 71
Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi
CHAPTER V
An International Legal Analysis of the Status of al-Quds (Jerusalem) 93
Berdal Aral
CHAPTER VI
The Status of al-Quds in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process 111
Abdulsalam Muala
PART THREE
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
AND CURRENT PROBLEMS
CHAPTER VII
Official Arab Positions on the Trump Administration’s
Jerusalem Decision 133
Hossam Shaker
CHAPTER VIII
The Stances of Global Powers on the Relocation of
the United States Embassy to al-Quds (Jerusalem) 163
Mohammad Makram Balawi
CHAPTER IX 175
Understanding Turkey’s Position on al-Quds, The Noble City 175
Helin Sarı Ertem
CHAPTER X 193
Malaysia’s Stance towards Trump’s Decision
Regarding Bayt al-Maqdis 193
Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor and Muhammad Khalis Ibrahim
AUTHORS212
FOREWORD
Since the end of the 19th century, the Middle East has been the
target of global powers. The region, which was largely under the
control of the Ottoman state as a political unit until the end of the
First World War, was put under the mandate regime of different
colonial states and was divided the region into many artificial states.
From then onwards, controlling the region that hosts almost two
thirds of the world’s energy resources has been considered one of
the main preconditions of global hegemony. All global powers have
tried to develop their own regional strategies regarding the Middle
East and to intervene in the internal affairs of the regional actors.
Today, the Middle East is one of the most penetrated, vulnerable,
and unstable regions in the world. Political clashes have dominated
the modern or the post-Ottoman Middle East, the Palestinian issue
being the most important. The status of the holy city of al-Quds
(Jerusalem) is at the heart of the Palestinian question.
Al-Quds is at the heart of the Middle Eastern region and the
center of various belief systems and cultures. There are many
definitions and considerations of the city. One of the best defini-
tions of al-Quds was made by Sezai Karakoç, a well-known poet
8 / F O R E W O R D
and thinker from Turkey. He describes al-Quds as a “city created

in heaven and brought down to earth” and also as “the city of
God and the city of all humanity.” For Muslims, it is the first
qiblah (the direction that should be faced when a Muslim prays),
a blessed soil and the destination of all prophets. Al-Quds is the
city of peace, mutual respect, and peaceful coexistence. It is not
only the cradle of different civilizations but also the teacher of
the history of humanity. Al-Quds, which was praised in three
holy books, is a symbolic city for three main beliefs, namely
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
For the last one thousand years, al-Quds had been under the
control of Muslims and Arab Palestinians until the colonial powers
occupied it in the wake of the First World War. It is not only the
capital of Palestine and the home of Palestinians but also the third
holy site for all Muslims. It was forcefully occupied first by the
British, and then by the Israelis. According to the main principles
of international law and many decisions of the United Nations,
(Eastern) al-Quds still belongs to the Palestinians. However, with
the help of the global powers, and the United States, in particular,
the state of Israel continues to occupy the city.
As soon as the state of Israel was declared, it immediately occu-
pied the western part of the city. The old and holy part (Eastern) of
the city was occupied in 1967 after the Six-Day War. Since then,
the UN and the world public opinion have considered Eastern al-
Quds as part of the “occupied territories” by Israel. Even though the
illegal fait accompli by Israel was stabilized, the world continues to
discuss the city’s future.
Major discussions about the fate of the city began with the Is-
raeli and American policies since the 1980s. First, Israel declared
the united al-Quds as the eternal capital of Israel in 1981. Then,
the Trump Administration recognized this decision and transferred
the American embassy from Tel Aviv to al-Quds. The UN Gen-
A L - Q U D S : H I S TO R Y , R E L I G I O N , A N D P O L I T I C S / 9
eral Assembly passed a resolution condemning Trump’s decision.

Only some small states forced by the U.S. followed the American
initiative. The majority of states, Western and Eastern, continue to
oppose the Israeli occupation and the American decision of trans-
ferring its embassy to al-Quds.
This timely and articulate book is composed of three parts,
namely Historical and Religious Background, Theoretical and Le-
gal Framework, and Political Developments and Current Problems,
and ten articles explaining the religious, historical, legal, strategic,
and political importance of the holy city of al-Quds. Authors from
different parts of the world, Turkish, Arab, Palestinian, English, and
Malaysian, made contributions to the volume and each of them re-
flected on a different perspective of the subject.
While the first article of the book focuses on the names of al-
Quds and the origins of these names, the second article focuses
on the city’s religious significance. The third article analyzes the
history of the city and the surrounding region. The fourth arti-
cle proposes a theoretical and conceptual model derived from the
Muslim experience. The fifth and sixth articles examine the sta-
tus of Jerusalem in international law and in the Palestinian-Israeli
question. The remaining four articles analyze positions of global
and regional powers towards Trump’s decision for the relocation
of the American embassy to Jerusalem.
Considering the transformation process in the Middle East
and the global transition, it is clear that the Palestinian-Israeli
question and the issue of al-Quds will continue to dominate the
agenda of the Middle East and global system. Recent regional
developments such as Trump’s decision regarding the future of
Jerusalem and the solution proposal called the “Deal of Century”
by the Trump Administration demonstrate that the holy city of
al-Quds will continue to be discussed. This timely book will sure-
ly contribute to the discussion.
10 / F O R E WO R D
I want to thank the editors, Abd al-Fattah el-Awaisi and Muhit-

tin Ataman, and the contributors of the book, who made this sig-
nificant publication possible. I am sure that this book will make an
eminent contribution to the understanding of the Palestinian-Is-
raeli question and to the meaning of the holy city of al-Quds.
Prof. Dr. Burhanettin Duran

SETA, General Coordinator
PROLOGUE
The controversial decision of U.S. President Donald Trump on De-

cember 6, 2017 to formally recognize the Holy City of al-Quds
(Bayt al-Maqdis, Jerusalem) as the capital of Israel overturned de-
cades of official U.S. policy. At the White House, President Donald
Trump declared, “While previous presidents have made this a ma-
jor campaign promise, they failed to deliver. Today, I am deliver-
ing.” Trump described the move as “a long overdue step” to advance
the Middle East peace process and added that “today, we finally
acknowledge the obvious: that Jerusalem is Israel’s capital. This is
nothing more or less than a recognition of reality. It is also the right
thing to do. It’s something that has to be done.”
This decision resulted in moving the United States embassy
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem on the eve of the Palestinian commem-
oration of 70 years of the Nakbah (Catastrophe) on May 15, 2018,
during which the Palestinian people have been suffering persecu-
tions, massacres, and ethnic cleansing. In addition, while the Israe-
lis were celebrating the move of the American embassy on May 14,
2018, the Israeli soldiers massacred an additional 60 Palestinian ci-
vilians, including children and women, who were protesting peace-
fully against the Israeli occupation and its blockade of the Gaza
Strip for more than a decade.
12 / P R O LO G U E
Not only is this decision against international law, but it is also

in direct conflict with a number of resolutions by the United Na-
tions Security Council (UNSC). Recognizing the united Jerusalem
as the capital of Israel brings an end to the two-state solution, which
the international community has been trying to achieve for a long
time. Moreover, this action is happening as a practical step of the
“Deal of the Century” which the Trump administration is trying to
impose in the region, and at a time when there are serious problems
over fragmentations and divisions in a number of Arab countries,
and a serious internal split among the Palestinians.
The issue of al-Quds (Bayt al-Maqdis, Jerusalem) is not only a
Palestinian one, but is also an issue for Muslims and all individuals
who are concerned with justice and freedom. We argue that the cost
of this ideological, political, and corporate decision of the Trump
administration will be a very high and very serious one. Indeed, it
might spark, in the coming years, not only unrest in the region but
also might have a severe impact on global security and possibly lead
to a global war.
In a time when the hegemon of the world, the United States,
neglects the main principles of international order that was estab-
lished by the U.S. itself, the future of the Middle East is more un-
certain and vulnerable than ever. There is no regional and global
power to stop the expansionist policies of the Trump administra-
tion in the U.S. and the Netanyahu government in Israel. Their
arbitrary, unilateral and, therefore, illegal policies have been threat-
ening not only the regional stability but also the protection of the
global order. The American and Israeli decisions regarding al-Quds
will pave the way for other regional and global powers to follow a
similar path, ignore the rule-based global system, and maximize
their national interests through power politics.
It is necessary to examine and criticize these illegal acts in or-
der to prevent or discourage other states and other international
actors from following the same policy discourse. Also, it should

be mentioned that these illegal and unilateral political moves
are self-defeating in the medium- and long-run. Eventually, the
main purpose of this edited volume is to provide a better under-
standing of the Holy City of al-Quds (Jerusalem) for politicians,
intellectuals, academicians, students, and the general public. It
also attempts to reveal the religious and historical significance
of the city, the legal position and its place in international law
and global politics, and the meaning of the illegal steps taken by
both Israel and the U.S. We hope that the volume will make an
important contribution to the academic and intellectual under-
standing of the city.
***
These serious developments require the urgent publication of
many academic and intellectual works to address different dimen-
sions of this delicate issue, which lies at the heart of most of the re-
gional problems. In order to develop a better understanding of the
issue of al-Quds and other related regional problems, it is necessary
to produce inclusive materials about the city. Accordingly, at this
critical time, we have designed this edited book to provide a better
understanding of this core issue to intellectuals, academics, politi-
cians, and the wider public interested in the Holy Land.
The book has been divided into three parts and ten chapters.
The first part presents a historical and religious background of the
Holy City. To better comprehend the historical associations of
the three most well-known religious traditions, namely Judaism,
Christianity and Islam, which still play a major role in the ongoing
conflict, these associations must be understood better. Dr. Khalid
El-Awaisi’s chapter (Chapter One) “Whose Holy Land? The Mean-
ings and Origins of the Names of Bayt al-Maqdis” begins with a
discussion of the perceptions of Abraham, the most important fig-
ure associated with this land, whom all three faiths try to claim as
14 / P R O LO G U E
their own. Then, he traces the importance of the region through

studying the names attached to it and their origins.
In Chapter Two, “Jerusalem, The Eternal Capital of Faith,” Rev-
erend Dr. Stephen Sizer theologically challenges the core idea of
Christian Zionists about Jerusalem. In his relatively short but inter-
esting piece, he concludes that “far from justifying, or even tolerat-
ing, an exclusive claim to Jerusalem, in the Hebrew and Christian
Scriptures, God reveals that he expects Jerusalem to be a shared,
inclusive city of faith, hope, and love.” Dr. Sharif Amin Abu Sham-
malah presents an evaluation of this holy city from early centuries
to our time in Chapter Three, “Bayt al-Maqdis: A Short History
from Ancient to Modern Times.”
The second part of the book establishes the theoretical and le-
gal framework for interpreting political developments. In Chap-
ter Four, “Bayt al-Maqdis: A Muslim Model for Aman,” Dr. Abd
al-Fattah El-Awaisi develops and presents the forgotten model
of Bayt al-Maqdis as a Muslim model for Aman, the principle of
peaceful coexistence and mutual respect. Although this holy city is
the most delicate issue of the dispute between the two conflicting
parties, it is hoped that El-Awaisi’s model will provide a better un-
derstanding for the world leaders who are trying to return peace
to the region.
Dr. Berdal Aral analyzes the international legal status of al-
Quds in Chapter Five “An International Legal Analysis of the
Status of al-Quds (Jerusalem).” He concludes that “al-Quds is
currently under the military occupation of Israel and, therefore,
ought to be returned to the rightful owners of the city, who are
the Palestinians.” In Chapter Six, “The Status of al-Quds in the
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process,” Dr. Abdulsalam Muala tries to
address a core question: can the peace process continue while the
problem of al-Quds exists? To address such a question, he exam-
ines the significance of al-Quds in the peace process, the reality
of the peace process within the international political context,

and the balance of power between the parties in conflict, and the
extension of the peace process.
The third part address the political developments and current
problems by examining the reactions of regional and global actors
to Trump’s decision and his policy towards region. In Chapter Sev-
en, “Official Arab Positions on the Trump Administration’s Jerusa-
lem Decision,” Hossam Shaker analyzes the official Arab reactions
to the American decision. To have a better understanding of the
Arab positions, he first examines the international reactions, and
the context and dimensions of the decision. In addition, he identi-
fies the foundation of their official positions and studies the factors
and determinants of the Arab positions. Dr. Mohammad Makram
Balawi tries to explore the positions of the European Union (EU)
and the EU countries such as Britain, Germany, and France, and
Russia and China towards the American decision in Chapter Eight,
“The Stances of Global Powers on the Relocation of the United
States Embassy to al-Quds (Jerusalem).”
In Chapter Nine, Dr. Helin Sarı Ertem discusses the meaning of
al-Quds for Turkey and Turkey’s policy towards the Holy City. She
first focuses on al-Quds under the Ottoman rule and the official
position in the Ottoman state. Then, Sarı Ertem examines Turkey’s
policy discourses and practices towards al-Quds emphasizing hu-
manitarian and developmental assistance. In the end, she assess-
es the challenges that Turkey has been facing while resisting the
American and Israeli illegitimate policies such as the transfer of the
capital of Israel to Jerusalem violating the main principles of inter-
national law. In Chapter Ten, “Malaysia’s Stance towards Trump’s
Decision Regarding Bayt al-Maqdis,” Dr. Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor
and Muhammad Khalis Ibrahim examine Malaysia’s stance, both
state and non-state actors, towards the U.S. decision. Malaysia
provides a good example of the Muslim state that has no political
16 / P R O LO G U E
problems with Israel, but still opposes the occupation of al-Quds

by Israel due to the city’s religious dimension. Malaysia, especially
the current government of Mahathir Mohamad, is one of the most
active countries playing an effective role in the Palestinian issue.
Ankara, May 15, 2019
Prof. Dr. Abd al-Fattah EL-AWAISI and

Prof. Dr. Muhittin ATAMAN
ONE HISTORICAL
AND RELIGIOUS
BACKGROUND
18 / H I S TO R I C A L A N D R E L I G I O U S B A C K G R O U N D
CHAPTER I
WHOSE HOLY LAND? THE MEANINGS AND

ORIGINS OF THE NAMES OF BAYT AL-MAQDIS
KHALID EL-AWAISI*
Bayt al-Maqdis, al-Quds, UrShalim, Yebus, Aelia, and the Holy

Land mean different things to different people, i.e. the people
of the three main faiths. Therefore, the holy city and the holy
region around it carry symbolism for at least half of the world’s
population. For Jews, it is rich in significance since Moses ordered
the Israelites to enter the Holy Land, and also as Jews trace their
origin back to Abraham. For Christians, it is the land where Jesus
walked and the place where he was crucified and resurrected, and
houses their holiest place of worship. For Muslims, it is import-
ant not only because it has a bearing on Muhammad and is the
destination of his Night Journey and the starting point of his as-
cension, but also because the earlier prophets lived there, and they
established and rebuilt the al-Aqsa Mosque. Today, these histori-
cal and religious associations still play a major role in the ongoing
conflict and to better comprehend the conflict these associations
have to be better understood. Accordingly, no one can deny the
spiritual attachment that exists between the people of these three
*
Dr. Khalid El-Awaisi is assistant professor at the Department of History at the
Social Sciences University of Ankara (ASBU).
faiths and this Holy Land and that it is the key to resolving the
ongoing conflict.
The associations have been part of the shaping of the region’s
identity, just as its different names. The names may differ from time
to time, but the place and its importance are still the same. The
inhabitants of the region have attached different meanings to these
names and have sought to own and monopolize them. Names of
sites and places are initially given by their first inhabitants. Yet these
names are sometimes replaced by entirely new ones, sometimes
modified, at other times reduced or expanded, or in some cases
completely forgotten. Over the centuries, they develop their own
identities and are understood differently by different people. This is
true not only for names, but also for the associations of these places,
which are also perceived differently by different people. The com-
peting religious and political claims over the Holy Land have made
it a prime example of this. Studying the use of names and terms is
essential if we wish to come to a clear conceptual understanding of
the associations.
In history, too, each group creates its own narrative, which has
led to distortions. The competing religious and political claims have
tinted the narratives of this land; even modern archaeology is used
as a tool to forge such narratives. The history of who had the first
connection and who first settled there is at its heart. It is historical-
ly accepted that the Canaanites were the earliest to have settled in
this land, as they are inferred to in the Bible. By contrast, Muslim
Arabs who came in the seventh century are considered to be the
latest group to have had an association with this land, preceded by
Christians and Jews. Arabs believe that they are the descendants
of the region’s first inhabitants, the Canaanites, whereas Muslims
consider themselves to be the inheritors of the legacy of the earlier
religions, contending that they have superseded the religions of the
Jews and the Christians, just as the Christians see themselves as the
inheritors of Judaism.
Trying to trace back the earliest connections with this land, one
major figure comes up in the three faiths: Abraham. He is believed
to have migrated and settled in this land and to have been bur-
ied there. Thus, this chapter will initially discuss the perceptions
of Abraham, the most important figure associated with this land,
whom all three faiths try to claim as theirs. Then it will trace the
importance of the region through the names attached to it and the
origins of these names.
ABRAHAM, THE MUSLIM

One of the first contested figures in all three narratives is Abraham,
who is considered the father of the three faiths. Both Jews and Arabs
consider Abraham to be their biological progenitor. The Jews claim
that he was the first Jew, and Jewish rabbinic traditions assert that
he observed the Torah; “our father Abraham observed the entire
Torah before it was given to Israel” (Mishnah, Kiddushin 14: 4).
Additionally, they restrict God’s promise to Abraham’s descendants
to the offspring of Isaac, excluding those from his other son, Ish-
mael. Christianity challenged the Jewish narrative of the promise
to the gentiles and claimed that Christians are the rightful heirs to
Abraham. Jesus’s apostle Paul clearly tackles this issue, stating that
Abraham is “the father of all those who have faith without being
circumcised” (Roman 4: 11-12), thus changing the discourse from
being born into a Jewish family to the acceptance of the Christian
faith, through which one becomes the descendant of Abraham.1
The Qur’an, on the other hand, speaks of the connection of
Abraham to this land as well as reflecting debates in the seventh
century over this issue. It discusses the context for the claim that
1
Jon Douglas Levenson, Inheriting Abraham: The Legacy of the Patriarch in Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam, (Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2012), pp. 6-7.
Abraham was either a Jew or a Christian, and contests it rational-

ly. The Qur’an in its third chapter (al-Imran) discusses this issue
at length; it deals with the question when Judaism and Christi-
anity emerged, affirming that they were subsequent to the reve-
lation of the Torah and the Gospel; “O People of the Book! Why
do you argue about Abraham, while the Torah and the Gospel
were not revealed until long after him? Do you not understand?”
(Qur’an 3: 65). Thus, Abraham who preceded the emergence of
these religions cannot be a follower of subsequent religions. The
Qur’an does not stop at this crucial point but follows on to ques-
tion why Christians and Jews would argue about what they have
no knowledge of and that they should stick with what they know.
It further adds that those who have claim to Abraham and are
nearest of kin to him are his real followers, the Prophet Muham-
mad and the true believers (Qur’an 3: 68). Thus, the descent is
not important, what is important is following the message that he
brought, which is part of a long chain of prophethood from Adam
to Muhammad.2
The Qur’an goes on to assert that Abraham was neither a Jew
nor a Christian but an upright (Hanif ) Muslim (Qur’an 3: 67).
But, how can Abraham be a Muslim, when Islam is perceived to
have only started with Muhammad? The Qur’an disputes this un-
derstanding and asserts throughout that Islam is the religion of all
the prophets of God and it is the only religion accepted by God
(Qur’an 3: 19). It also declares that Muhammad was only the last
in the chain of these earlier prophets of Islam (Qur’an 3: 144; 46:
9). Not only Abraham and his sons were thus Muslims (Qur’an 2:
128-133; 3: 67) but also Noah (Qur’an 10: 72), Moses (Qur’an 10:
84), the disciples of Jesus (Qur’an 3: 52), and even Solomon invit-
ed others to Islam (Qur’an 27: 30-31). The Qur’an invites people
2
Levenson, Inheriting Abraham: The Legacy of the Patriarch in Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam, pp. 8-9.
to the religion of Abraham “so follow the religion of Abraham”

(Qur’an 3: 95) and that the term “Muslim” was known from the
time of Abraham and even proceeded him (Qur’an 22: 78). What
confuses minds today is the association of Islam with only Muham-
mad, or Muhammadans, which the Qur’an and Prophet Muham-
mad unequivocally rejected. Muhammad came with a Shariah that
could be different in some of its laws from the Shariah of Moses,
like Jesus came with a different Shariah from that of Moses, but
it still is under the same umbrella of God’s religion, Islam, which
all prophets followed. The Qur’an mentions this; “for each of you
We have ordained a Shariah (code of law)” (Qur’an 5: 48, see also
Qur’an 42: 13).
The Qur’anic and the biblical coverage of the Journey of Abra-
ham to the Holy Land is similar in its overall narrative. He moves
from his home to this holy land, which the Qur’an declares as “a
land blessed for all beings” (Qur’an 21: 71). Thus, this blessing
proceeds the arrival of Abraham and Lot to this land. From the
biblical narrative, we can infer that Abraham came to a land already
inhabited and that he interacted with Melchizedek (Genesis 14).
This King of Salem, Priest of the God Most High, was the ruler
of the area where Abraham settled and according to the biblical
narrative Abraham offered to pay a tenth of everything he had, thus
acknowledging Melchizedek’s sovereignty. Although not much is
known about this figure, it is mentioned that he was a believer and
worshipped God, the Most High. What these passages show is that
the religious significance of this land preceded Abraham, and that
it already had such significance for its inhabitants. The accounts of
the Qur’an and the Bible allow us to trace the importance of this
land to the times before Abraham. The best way to obtain a clear
picture is to focus on the earliest names, as historical and archaeo-
logical evidence is scarce.
URSHALIM
One of the first names related to this holy city is the name “UrSalim”
or “UrShalim,” which seems to have its roots in Semitic languages:
in the Akkadian Uru-Salim and in the Syriac name Urishlem.3 Its
meaning is highly contested and the popular understanding that it
means “city of peace” is not etymologically or philologically cor-
rect.4 The first part Uru or Yuru is understood to mean “founded
by” or “city of,” while it is argued that Shalim or Salim could mean
“whole or complete” or the name of a Canaanite Amorite deity, giv-
ing an Amorite origin to the name.5 The Amorites were the original
inhabitants of the land of Canaan, and acknowledged in the Bible
as an offshoot of the Canaanites, who originally came from the
Arabian Peninsula.6
The earliest record of this name is believed to have come from
an Egyptian execration text, dating to the nineteenth century BC,
where we encounter the forms Rusalimum or Rosh-ramem (3wš3m-
m).7 A few centuries later, it was mentioned again in the Tell-Am-
arna tablets in the letters from chiefs of the Canaanites to the pha-
raoh of Egypt. These tablets refer to Urusalim and the land(s) of
Urusalim a few times. The Bible uses the same name with reference
to the period before the arrival of the Israelites (Joshua 10: 1, 3,
5; Judges 1: 7, 21). The name is mentioned again in the eighth
3
James Montgomery, “Paronomasias on the Name Jerusalem”, Journal of Biblical
Literature, Vol: 49, No: 3, p. 277.
4
Othmar Keel, Jerusalem and the One God: A Religious History, (Fortress Press, Min-
neapolis: 2017), p. 28.
5
Hendricus Jacobus Franken, “Jerusalem in the Bronze Age”, Jerusalem in History,
ed. Kamil J. Asali, (Olive Branch Press, New York: 1990), p. 18. And see also: Kamil
J. Asali, “Jerusalem in History: Notes on the Origins of the City and its Tradition of
Tolerance”, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol: 16, No: 4, (1994), p. 38.
6
Kamil J. Asali, “Jerusalem in History: Notes on the Origins of the City and its
Tradition of Tolerance”.
7
Nadav Na’aman and Ramat Aviv, “Canaanite Jerusalem and its Central Hill Coun-
try Neighbours in the Second Millennium B.C.E.”, Ugarit-Forschungen, Vol: 24, (1992),
pp. 278-279.
century BC in Akkadian as “Ursaliimmu” and in a later century

in Hebrew as Yĕrûšālēm. The Greek version of the name, which is
attested from the fourth century BC, is Hierousalēmēn.8 The name
continues to live on as is evident in seventh-century Arabic usage,
where the famous Arab poet al-A’sha uses it in his poetry in the
form “Uri-Shalim.”9
To summarize, UrSalim is the earliest documented name for
the city, which was then modified in many different ways - which
however sound all too similar. Today, Israel tries to claim it for itself
as a Hebrew name, but the name existed long before the Israelites
existed or came to this land, thus actually preceding them by many
centuries. It is generally accepted that the first inhabitants of this
land, the Canaanites, would have used it even before the nineteenth
century BC.10 The name “Yabus” or “Jebus” would have been intro-
duced at a later period and is considered the second name for the
city, since the Jebusites built the fortress of Zion in the city. The
word was then later associated with Judaism and Zionism but is
actually a Canaanite name meaning “hill” or “height.”11 The name
“Bayt al-Maqdis” might be even much earlier, but there is no mate-
rial evidence for how far it may be traced back.
BAYT AL-MAQDIS
As for the name “Bayt al-Maqdis,” it was the name preferred by
the Prophet Muhammad and he used it constantly as is recorded
in the Hadith traditions. It may be considered one of the most
ancient names, as it was also used in other Semitic languages
8
Othmar Keel, Jerusalem and the One God: A Religious History, (Fortress Press, Min-
neapolis: 2017), pp. 27-32.
9
Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, Mapping Islamicjerusalem: A Rediscovery of Geographical
Boundaries, (ALMI Press, Dundee: 2007), p. 86.
10
Al-Hilu, Taḥqiqāt Tārīkhiyah Lughawiyah fī al-Asmā’ al-Jugrafiyah al-Suriyah: Is-
tinādan lil-Jografīn al-‘Arab, (Beisān, Beirut: 1999), p. 88.
11
Kamil J. Asali, “Jerusalem in History: Notes on the Origins of the City and its
Tradition of Tolerance”.
such as Aramaic and Hebrew. Arabs before Islam were aware of

this name as is implied in the poetry of one of the most famous
Arab poets Imr’u al-Qays in the sixth century AD, where mention
is made of a Maqdisi (Jerusalemite), that is, one coming from
Bayt al-Maqdis.12 In the seventh century then, following Prophet
Muhammad’s Night Journey, the Arabs of Makkah understood
the name “Bayt al-Maqdis” to correspond to the city of Aelia,
that is, Jerusalem. This name can be read as Bayt al-Maqdis or
Bayt al-Muqaddas. It consists of two words, the first Bayt literally
meaning in modern Arabic a house. It is used in the Qur’an on its
own to refer to a place of worship, the Ka’bah, with the definite
article “al,” al-Bayt (Qur’an 2: 125, 127, 158; 106: 3; etc.). As for
al-Maqdis or al-Muqaddas, it is derived from the passive partici-
ple of qaddasa from the trilateral root q-d-s (qāf-dāl-sīn), which
carries many meanings: holy, pure, and blessed. However, the first
is a noun and the second is an adjective. Thus, literally it means
“the Holy House” or “the House of Holiness” - especially when
the definite article “al” is used before the name. The claims that
this name entered Arabic from the Hebrew Beit HaMikdash (the
Sanctified House) are unfounded.
There are many similarities between Semitic languages and such
an argument would need evidence to prove it. The name “Bayt
al-Maqdis” or “Bayt al-Muqaddas” does not necessarily have this lit-
eral meaning, as it is common in that region to use Bayt for names;
for example, Bayt Lahm (Bethlehem) is not translated literally into
“the house of meat” in Arabic or “the house of bread” into Aramaic.
It had an earlier form “Beit Lachama,” referring to the Canaanite
god Lachmo.13 This type of composite name has been popular from
12
I’mr’u al-Qays, Dīwān ’Imr’u al-Qays, (al-Maktab al-Islamī, 1st Edition, Beirut:
1998).
13
Richard R. Losch, The Uttermost Part of the Earth: A Guide to Places in the Bible
(Eerdmans Publishing, Michigan: 2005), p. 51.
the time of the Canaanites in the region.14 It is part of the name of

many ancient Canaanite cities in the Holy Land such as Bayt Jibirin
(in Aramaic: Beth Gabra), Bayt Hanina, Bayt Taffuh (today Taffuh),
Bayt Dajan (Bīt Dagana in Assyrian and Ancient Egyptian texts),
Bait Shean (in modern Arabic Beisan), and Bayt Shemesh. Fur-
thermore, the word for holiness existed in early Semitic languages
and it is similar to the Arabic form. In Canaanite, it is Qudšu and
in Ugaritic the name of Qudshu (qdš) similarly means “holiness”
or “sanctuary.”15 Clermont-Ganneau suggests that the name is de-
rived from the immemorial sanctity of the city and that the name
“al-Muqaddas” or “al-Quds” is a reminiscence of a dedication of the
sanctuary at Jerusalem to a Canaanite deity Kadish.16
Could the name “Bayt al-Maqdis” accordingly be the earliest
name used by the Canaanites, as is the case with other cities they
established in the Holy Land? Or could it be associated with the
building of the first site of worship in the city? In the biblical narra-
tive, it was King David who built an altar on the threshing floor he
bought from Araunah the Jebusite and it was King Solomon who
completed its building. Yet, even earlier it is also associated with
Abraham when he first came to this land. In the Muslim narrative,
the building of the Holy House took place in connection with the
building of the Sacred House in Makkah. Prophet Muhammad was
asked about the first places of worship on the Earth and he replied,
al-Masjid al-Haram (the Sacred Mosque) and then al-Masjid al-Aq-
sa (al-Aqsa Mosque), the time period between the construction
14
tinādan lil-Jografīn al-‘Arab, pp. 138-139.
15
William F. Albright, Yahweh and the Gods of Canaan: A Historical Analysis of Two
Contrasting Faiths, (Eisenbruns, Indiana: 2001), p. 121. And see also: John Day, Yahweh
and the Gods and Goddesses of Canaan, (Sheffield Academic Press, London: 2002), p. 62.
16
George Adam Smith, Jerusalem: The Topography, Economics and History from the
Earliest Times to A.D. 70, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2013), p. 270. See
also: Charles Clermont-Ganneau, Archaeological Researches in Palestine During the Years
1873-1874, (Palestine Exploration Fund, London: 1899), p. 186.
of these two sites being forty years.17 The Qur’an proclaims that
the first house established for prayer was that in Bakka (Makkah)
(Qur’an 3: 96). Muslim scholars have taken this to refer to the first
building of the Ka’bah, the mosque of Makkah, at the time of the
first human on Earth, Prophet Adam, and concluded that forty
years later, the mosque of Bayt al-Maqdis was established.
The Ka’bah is known in the Qur’an as “al-Bayt,” with the
definite article “al” (Qur’an 2: 125, 127, 158; 106: 3; etc.). It is
also encountered in the form Baytī (My [God’s] House) (Qur’an
2: 125; 22: 26; etc.). In one verse it is clearly called al-Bayt
al-Haram, the sacred house; “God has made the Ka’bah, al-Bayt
al-Haram, an asylum of security for the people” (Qur’an 5: 97).
What is intriguing is that the second mosque is known as al-
Bayt al-Muqaddas, the Holy House. This takes us back to where
the name Bayt al-Maqdis might have derived. The name “Bayt
al-Maqdis” or “Bayt al-Muqaddas” does not necessarily have this
literal meaning, as it is common in that region to use Bayt for
names. To distinguish between the Ka’bah, which was called al-
Bayt (the House) or al-Bayt al-Haram, al-Aqsa would have been
called al-Bayt al-Muqaddas (the Holy House). This supports the
argument that the name could have stemmed from the name first
introduced by the initial builder of the mosque in the holy city,
and the name thus, would have been given by a prophet or have
a divine origin.
The use of Bayt al-Maqdis in the Muslim literature is not re-
stricted to the mosque only. Within prophetic traditions, it is some-
times used in reference to the city and in other instances in refer-
17
Muhammad Ibn Isma’il Al-Bukhārī, Sahih al-Bukhārī: al-Musnad al-Sahih al-
Mukhtasar min ’Umūr Rasul Allah Salā Allah ‘Aliyh wa-Sallam wa-Sunnanih wa Ayyāmih,
(Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, Vaduz: 2000), pp. 661, 676. See also: M Muslim, Sa-
hih Muslim: al-Musnad al-Sahih al-Mukhtasar min al-Sunnan bi-Naql al-‘Adl ‘An al-‘Adl
‘An Rasul Allah Salā Allah ‘Aliyh wa-Sallam (Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, Vaduz:
2000), pp. 209-210.
ence to the wider holy region of al-Ard al-Muqaddasah.18 The term

“al-Ard al-Muqaddasah,” which is mentioned in the Qur’an, stems
from the same root of q-d-s, that is, holy, thus being the Holy Land.
Prophet Muhammad used this name from the start of his prophet-
hood, as Bayt al-Maqdis was his first Qiblah, which he faced daily
during his prayers. Ibn Abbas, states that the Qiblah of Prophet
Muhammad was towards Bayt al-Maqdis while in Makkah.
Prophet Muhammad’s companions also used this name. After
the Muslim conquest, Tamim Ibn Aws al-Dari was appointed by
Caliph Umar as Amir (Prince) of Bayt al-Maqdis.19 In addition,
an endowment (waqf) attributed to Umar, the second caliph, sur-
vives on an engraving in the al-Umari Mosque in the village of
Nuba northwest of Hebron, which bears the name Bayt al-Ma-
qdis.20 Moreover, other names were also in use in the seventh
century such as the Roman name Aelia, which was used for a
good few centuries.
AELIA
Aelia, which became popular from the second century AD on-
wards, was the Roman name of the city and region, coming from
the Latin name given by Emperor Hadrian (Publius Aelius Hadri-
anus) in AD 135.21 The name “Aelia Capitolina” was not just given
by the emperor but the first part was his own name, Aelius, and
18
Boundaries.
19
Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (d. 1071 CE), al-Istī’āb fī Ma‘ifat al-Ashāb, ed. A. Mu‘awad and
A. Abd al-Mawjūd, (Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah, Beirut: 2002), p. 82. See also: Ibn Tamīm
al-Maqdisī, Muthīr al-Gharām ilā Ziyārat al-Quds wal-Sham, ed. A. al-Khatimī, (Dār
al-Jīl, 1st Edition, Beirut: 1994), p. 319.
20
Abu Sarah, “al-Nuqush al-‘Arabiyah al-Islamiyah fi Khalil al-Rahman”, (Master
dissertation, Jordan University, Amman, 1993), pp. 3-7.
21
tinādan lil-Jografīn al-‘Arab, p. 91.
the second part “Capitolina” refers to the Roman god(s).22 Hadrian

rebuilt the city in the third decade of the second century AD and
established a new colony around it, where no Jew was allowed to
reside. The colony or city district extended from south of Nablus
to the north of Hebron, together with other city districts around
it such as, among many others, Eleutheropolis to the south and
Neapolis to the north.23 In the seventh century, this name was used
in Arabic in its Arabized version “Iliyaa’.” The celebrated Assur-
ance of Umar to the Christians of Bayt al-Maqdis used the name
Aelia. In the text of the assurance recorded by al-Tabri, the name
Aelia is mentioned five times; it was mostly used in the form “Ahl
Iliyā’” (the people of Aelia), as well as “Iliyā’” on its own. In addi-
tion, some of the companions of Muhammad used the name Aelia.
Sometimes the city was referred to as “Madinat Iliyā’,” city of Aelia,
the al-Aqsa Mosque was referred to as the “Mosque of Aelia,” while
the region was referred to as Aelia.24
The Umayyads continued to use the name Aelia in official
documents and in poetry that have reached us from that period.
The Umayyads from the time of Caliph Mu’awiyah minted coins
bearing the name “Iliyā’” (Aelia) in Arabic.25 Another medium
that gives an accurate record of what names were used during
the Umayyad reign comes from distance signs or markers – mile-
stones – found on many major routes. These were mainly erected
during the time of the fifth Umayyad Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn
22
Jodi Magness, The Archaeology of the Holy Land: From the Destruction of Solomon’s
Temple to the Muslim Conquest, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2012), p. 271.
23
Michael Avi-Yonah, The Holy Land: from the Persian to the Arab Conquest (536
B.C. to A.D. 640) A Historical Study, (Baker Book House, Michigan: 1966), pp. 155-
159. See also: Wilkinson, J. 1990, “Jerusalem under Rome and Byzantium”, Jerusalem in
History, ed. Kamil J. Asali, (Olive Branch Press, New York: 1990), p. 89.
24
Boundaries, pp. 112-113, 121-125.
25
Boundaries, pp. 124-125. See also: Nayef G. Goussous, Ummayyad Coinage of Bilād
al-Sham, (Aquamedia, Amman: 1996), pp. 84-85.
Marwān (r. AH 66-86/AD 685-705). Some of the milestones

dating back to his reign have survived to this day bearing the
name “Aelia.”26
Yet, as time went by this name steadily became less popular,
with Bayt al-Maqdis and later al-Quds becoming more widely
used. Some of the later generations of Muslims, Tabeen, encouraged
the adoption of the name “Bayt al-Maqdis” instead of the Roman
name “Aelia.” One of those who discouraged the usage of the name
“Aelia” and endorsed the use of the name “Bayt al-Maqdis” was
the scholar Mu’awiyah ibn Salih, who would say, “Do not name
Madinah, Yathrib nor Bayt al-Maqdis, Aelia.” He adds the reason
why it should not be used, stating that it is a name of one of the Ro-
man emperors.27 Another individual who promoted the use of the
name “Bayt al-Maqdis” instead of Aelia was the controversial figure
Ka’b al-Ahbar who was a Jewish convert to Islam, stating, “Do not
say Aelia, but rather say Bayt Allah al-Muqadas.”28 He also gives a
reason why it should not be called so, “Don’t call Bayt al-Maqdis
Aelia, call it by its name; Aelia is a name of the woman who built
the city.”29 It is clear that Ka’b disliked the use of the name Aelia,
which could be due to his Jewish background and to the impact of
Hadrian on the Jews.
26
Boundaries, p. 125. See also: Max Van Berchem, Matériaux pour un Corpus Inscriptionum
Arabicarum: Jerusalem, Ville, Mémoires Publiés Par Les Membres De L’institut Français
D’archéologie Orientale Du Caire, (Imprimerie de L’institut Français D’archéologie Ori-
entale, Cairo: 1992), pp. 19-21. For further: George Foucart, Corpus Inscriptionum Ara-
bicarum: Jerusalem, Mémoires Publiés Par Les Membres De L’institut Français D’archéologie
Orientale Du Caire, (Imprimerie de l’Institut Français D’archéologie Orientale, Cairo:
1922), p. 1.
27
Ibn Tamīm al-Maqdisī, Muthīr al-Gharām ilā Ziyārat al-Quds wal-Sham, p. 211.
28
Abu Bakr al-Wasiti, Fadā’il al-Bayt al-Muqddas, ed. I. Hasson, (The Magnes Press,
Jerusalem: 1979), p. 21. See also: Ibn Tamīm al-Maqdisī, Muthīr al-Gharām ilā Ziyārat
al-Quds wal-Sham, p. 211.
29
Yaqut al-Hamawi, Mu‘jam al-Buldān, ed. F.al-Jundī, (Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah,
Beirut), p. 194.
AL-QUDS
The name “al-Quds” was the latest name the city and the region
acquired with a later addition to it, al-Sharif, meaning “the noble.”
The name itself, al-Quds or al-Kudus, comes from the same Arabic
root as “Bayt al-Maqdis,” and has the meaning of holiness attached.
This is a later development, which can be traced back to the be-
ginning of the third Muslim century/ninth century AD. Evidence
of this change dates to the reign of Caliph al-Ma’mun, (ruled AH
197-218/AD 813-833), with the first record of its occurrence in
the year AH 217/AD 832 when coinage bearing the new name
“al-Quds” was minted.30 The previous generations of Muslim mints
had the Arabic form “Iliyā’.” The new name immediately appeared
in contemporary and later literature, becoming the most common
name for people in the region, whilst Bayt al-Maqdis continued to
be used in other regions of the Muslim world.31
EPILOGUE
Bayt al-Maqdis that was established around al-Bayt al-Muqaddas,
the Holy House, where believers would purify themselves from sin,
had become a city where grave sins were committed, the killing of
fellow humans. Since its establishment, it has been destroyed and
rebuilt many times, with its name and identity changing from time
to time. Its name has been changed repeatedly: Bayt al-Maqdis, Ur-
Shalim, Yabus, Aelia, al-Quds were amongst the names it acquired
over time. The holy city and its Holy Land is at the heart of the
ongoing conflict and is the key to resolving it. Whose Holy Land
30
Boundaries, p. 141. See also: Yaakov Meshorer, “Coinage of Jerusalem under the Uma-
yyads and the Abbāsids”, The History of Jerusalem: The Early Muslim Period 638-1099,
ed. Joshua Prawer, Haggai Ben-Shammai, (New York University Press, New York: 1996),
p. 417.
31
Boundaries, pp. 147-148.
is it? And who should have sovereignty over it? How should it be
governed? These are the questions we need to answer by going back
in history and learning lessons from the past. In some sense, it is the
same issue as that related to whom Abraham belongs to. If we delve
into his life, we see Abraham, within the biblical tradition, accept-
ing the sovereignty of the inhabitants of the land. Many examples
testify to this; even when he wanted to bury his wife, he bought
the land where he buried her, and did not take it by force with the
claim that God had granted him this land.
From UrShalim that welcomed Abraham, it became an exclu-
sive Aelia where some of Abraham’s children were banned. They
awaited the opportunity to take revenge, which was only possible a
few centuries later and did so when the Persians took the Holy City
in AD 614 and savagely massacred Christians. This was recorded
by Antiochus Strategos, who writes that the Jews “rejoiced exceed-
ingly, because they detested the Christians… they purchased Chris-
tians out of the reservoir; for they gave the Persians silver, and they
bought a Christian and slew him like a sheep… the Jews were left in
Jerusalem, they began with their own hands to demolish and burn
such of the holy churches… How many of the people were bought
up by the Jews and butchered.”32 When the Christians took back
the city, they did the same to the Jews and massacred the Jews.33
Only when Bayt al-Maqdis was reestablished under the Muslim
rule did Jews and Christians coexist under the umbrella of an inclu-
sive rule that allowed the sharing of the holiness of the Holy Land.
As Armstrong argues, “When Caliph Umar conquered Jerusalem
32
Frederick C. Conybeare, “Antiochus Strategos’ Account of the Sack of Jerusalem
in A.D. 614”, English Historical Review, Vol: 25, (1910), pp. 508-509. See also: Francis
Edward Peters, Jerusalem: The Holy City in the Eyes of Chroniclers, Visitors, Pilgrims, and
Prophets from the Days of Abraham to the Beginnings of Modern Times, (Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton: 2017), p. 172.
33
Alfred J. Butler, Arab Conquest of Egypt and the Last Thirty Years of the Roman
Dominion, (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1902), p. 134.
from the Byzantines in AD 638, he was faithful to this inclusive

vision. Unlike the Jews and Christians, Muslims did not attempt to
exclude others from Jerusalem’s holiness… Umar invited the Jews,
who had been forbidden to reside permanently in Jerusalem for
over 500 years to return to their holy city.”34 Following the first and
second Muslim Fath (conquest) in the seventh and twelfth century,
peaceful coexistence was reintroduced. This was interrupted twice,
during the Crusades and the current Zionist occupation.
The Crusader and Zionist occupations are not but anomalies in
the long, peaceful history of this Holy Land. The last century has
seen one of the most brutal occupations of this land, starting with
the British occupation in 1917, followed by the creation of a Zion-
ist state in 1948. The whole region was forcibly given new names
and identities. The names of “Jerusalem” and the areas around it
such as “Palestine”, “Syria” and “Jordan”, which are mentioned dai-
ly in the press and in political discussion, are not the indigenous
names for the locations they were thought to have represented. Je-
rusalem has become two Jerusalems: the eastern and the western.
The Zionist state driven by fear, insecurity, and greed insists on
Yerushalem as its “eternally unified capital,” whereas it is the most
divided city in the world.35
The United States’ governments have encouraged the Zionist
state on this issue over the years and the recent move of the Ameri-
can embassy to Jerusalem and the announcement of U.S. President
Donald Trump that Jerusalem is the “eternal capital of the Jew-
ish people,” excludes others who have had a long connection with
this land. The attempt to make it an exclusively Jewish Jerusalem
will ultimately be defied as the city cannot be only Jewish.36 In
34
Karen Armstrong, “Sacred Space: The Holiness of Islamic Jerusalem”, Journal of
Islamic Jerusalem Studies, Vol: 1, No: 1, (1997), p. 14.
35
Colin Chapman, Whose Holy City? Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
(Lion Hudson, Oxford: 2004), p. 224.
36
Ibid., p. 197.
fact, comprehending the movement of history, it can be observed

that the exclusive vision of occupiers deprives the Holy Land of its
unique nature and will inevitably bring such occupations to an end.
The longest stretch of rule by Muslims - over a millennium long -
was based on the idea of inclusivity and to this day, churches and
other religious sites are a testimony to their inclusive vision. Thus,
the only way to a lasting peace is through an inclusive vision that
allows everyone to share the holiness and Barakah (blessing) of this
land, to coexist side by side, thus making it everyone’s Holy Land.
CHAPTER II
JERUSALEM, THE ETERNAL

CAPITAL OF FAITH
STEPHEN SIZER*
President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the

capital of Israel and move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jeru-
salem, destroyed in the stroke of the pen any lingering illusions of
a shared city, the two-state solution or an independent sovereign
Palestine. Jewish and Christian Zionists regard Jerusalem as the ex-
clusive, undivided and eternal capital of the Jewish state, justifying
the annexation, segregation, and ethnic cleansing of Palestine.
Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the capture of
Eastern Jerusalem, in June 1971, a conference took place in Jeru-
salem of over 1,200 Evangelical leaders from 32 different coun-
tries. Welcomed by David Ben Gurion, the conference was billed
as “the first conference of its kind since AD 59.” The capture of
Jerusalem was portrayed as “confirmation that Jews and Israel still
had a role to play in God’s ordering of history” and that the return
of Jesus was imminent.37
*
Reverend Dr. Stephen Sizer is the former vicar of the Anglican parish of Christ
Church, Virginia Water, in Surrey, England.
37
“Prophets in Jerusalem”, Newsweek, June 28, 1971.
The wider international community saw things rather different-

ly. In protest of Israel’s unilateral annexation of East Jerusalem and
the West Bank, the United Nations passed Resolution 242, calling
on Israel to withdraw its troops to the June 1967 borders and end
the occupation. Refusing to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel, the few remaining government embassies were closed and
relocated to Tel Aviv. In 1980, however, the International Christian
Embassy (ICEJ) was founded in Jerusalem, to express solidarity
with Israel and to recognize a divine blessing in the ‘Reunification’
of Jerusalem under the Israeli sovereignty.
In 1997, the ICEJ also gave support to a full-page advert
placed in the New York Times entitled, “Christians Call for a
United Jerusalem.” It was signed by 10 Evangelical leaders in-
cluding Pat Robertson, the chairman of Christian Broadcasting
Network and president of the Christian Coalition; Oral Roberts,
the founder and chancellor of Oral Roberts University; Jerry Fal-
well, the founder of Moral Majority; Ed McAteer, president of
the Religious Roundtable; and David Allen Lewis, president of
Christians United for Israel.
The advert starts with the following sentences: “We, the under-
signed Christian spiritual leaders, communicating weekly to more
than 100 million Christian Americans, are proud to join together in
supporting the continued sovereignty of the State of Israel over the
holy city of Jerusalem. We support Israel’s efforts to reach reconcili-
ation with its Arab neighbors, but we believe that Jerusalem, or any
portion of it, shall not be negotiable in the peace process. Jerusalem
must remain undivided as the eternal capital of the Jewish people.”38
Ironically, this claim flatly contradicts the Hebrew and the
Christian scriptures which envisage Jerusalem to be an inclusive
city of peace for all who acknowledge the one true God. In Psalm
38
“Christians Call for a United Jerusalem”, New York Times, April 18, 1997.
87, for example, we have a beautiful picture of a shared Jerusalem,

an international and inclusive city where residency rights are de-
termined by God on the basis of faith not race. “He has founded
his city on the holy mountain. The LORD loves the gates of Zion
more than all the other dwellings of Jacob. Glorious things are said
of you, city of God: “I will record Rahab and Babylon among those
who acknowledge me –Philistia too, and Tyre, along with Cush–
and will say, ‘This one was born in Zion.’ “Indeed, of Zion it will be
said, “This one and that one were born in her, and the Most High
himself will establish her.” The LORD will write in the register of
the peoples: This one was born in Zion.” As they make music they
will sing, “All my fountains are in you.” (Psalm 87)
As Colin Chapman has observed, “This is a message which must
have challenged many nationalistic prejudices.”39 And one might
add –still does. The Prophet Isaiah’s vision of Jerusalem is also an
inclusive one. In Isaiah 2, for example, we learn that people of many
different nations will come to Jerusalem and put their faith in God
and walk in his ways. One of the glorious consequences of this is
that Jerusalem will become associated with the end of war, and with
peace and reconciliation between the nations (Isaiah 2: 3-5).
The image of Jerusalem found in the New Testament is of a
new inclusive city built by God –one in which there is no dark-
ness– and where the gates are never shut but open to people of all
nations. “I saw the Holy City, the new Jerusalem, coming down out
of heaven from God, prepared as a bride beautifully dressed for her
husband… I did not see a temple in the city, because the Lord God
Almighty and the Lamb are its temple. The city does not need the
sun or the moon to shine on it, for the glory of God gives it light,
and the Lamb is its lamp. The nations will walk by its light, and the
kings of the earth will bring their splendor into it. On no day will
39
Colin Chapman, Whose Holy City?: Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
(Lion Hudson, Oxford: 2004), p. 30.
its gates ever be shut, for there will be no night there. The glory and
honor of the nations will be brought into it. Nothing impure will
ever enter it, nor will anyone who does what is shameful or deceit-
ful, but only those whose names are written in the Lamb’s book of
life” (Revelation 21: 2, 22-26).
In this one all-consuming vision, God’s people now embrace all
nations, God’s land encompasses the whole Earth, and God’s holy
city has become the eternal dwelling place of all who remain faith-
ful –literally the Bride of Christ (Revelation 21: 9).
Far from justifying, or even tolerating, an exclusive claim to Je-
rusalem, in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, God reveals that
he expects Jerusalem to be a shared, inclusive city of faith, hope,
and love. Indeed, the Scriptures reveal a glorious future for Jerusa-
lem, one that impacts and benefits the entire world. The vision is of
an inclusive and shared Jerusalem in which all nations are blessed.
Perhaps this is why, when Jesus rebuked the religious leaders for
exploiting the international visitors to the temple, he quoted from
Isaiah, “For my house will be called a house of prayer for all na-
tions” (Isaiah 56: 7, cf. Matthew 21: 13).
But today, we have to live with the reality of a Jerusalem that
is associated with apartheid and racism, with exclusive claims that
can only be sustained by oppression and injustice, by military occu-
pation, the denial of human rights, the disregard for international
law, denial of access to religious sites, and freedom of expression.
Living between Jerusalem past and Jerusalem future, what is our
religious responsibility in the present? Following the decision of the
U.S. president to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, the
patriarchs and the heads of churches in Jerusalem wrote an open
letter to Donald Trump.40 The letter included this assertion, “Our
40
“Churches React to Donald Trump’s Proclamation on Jerusalem”, Churches To-
gether in Britain and Ireland, ctbi.org.uk/churches-react-to-donald-trumps-proclama-
tion-on-jerusalem/, (Accessed on January 24, 2019).
solemn advice and plea is for the United States to continue recog-
nizing the present international status of Jerusalem. Any sudden
changes would cause irreparable harm. We are confident that, with
strong support from our friends, Israelis and Palestinians can work
towards negotiating a sustainable and just peace, benefiting all who
long for the Holy City of Jerusalem to fulfil its destiny. The Holy
City can be shared and fully enjoyed once a political process helps
liberate the hearts of all people, that live within it, from the con-
ditions of conflict and destructiveness that they are experiencing.”
On Palm Sunday, when Jesus entered Jerusalem on a donkey, it
is recorded, “As he approached Jerusalem and saw the city, he wept
over it and said, ‘If you, even you, had only known on this day
what would bring you peace –but now it is hidden from your eyes’”
(Luke 19: 41-42).
I believe God continues to weep not only over Jerusalem, but
for all his children in the Middle East, as well as those who from a
distance, promote a theology of war and conquest in his name. It
is a very long way from the simple teaching of Jesus who promised
“Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called children of
God” (Matthew 5: 9). May God give us the courage and strength to
fulfil this role which is needed more now than ever before.41
41
For a longer article on the status of Jerusalem see “The Battle for Jerusalem” which
is based on a chapter from my book Zion’s Christian Soldiers.
CHAPTER III
BAYT AL-MAQDIS: A SHORT HISTORY

FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES
SHARIF AMIN ABU SHAMMALAH*
History represents a natural approach to understanding the real-

ity and the interactions of the present. And in the case of a city
such as Jerusalem al-Quds, also historically known as Bayt al-Ma-
qdis, its present’s correlation to history is clearly manifest. The city,
with its deeply rooted heritage, its religious stature, its holy status,
its political uses, its alternation between various sovereign states,
and its overall unique experience make the awareness of its history
an urgent need.
This chapter provides a focused presentation of the develop-
ment of the city’s history in its various periods starting from the
emergence of the city until it was declared by the United States as
the capital of “Israel,” the Zionist occupation state. The chapter
summarizes the history of the city in order to show who owned
the Holy City and who brought peace and stability or violence and
chaos to the city.
*
Dr. Sharif Amin Abu Shammalah is the chief executive officer of the Al-Quds
Foundation, Malaysia.
THE GENESIS AND BEGINNINGS

Though there are signs that Palestine was inhabited by humans
thousands of years ago, the archaeological evidence indicates that
the emergence of al-Quds dates back to the ancient Bronze Age
(3200-2000 BC) when the Arab Canaanites, the Jebusites in par-
ticular, founded al-Quds as a city-state, like many Canaanite cities,
dozens of which appeared in Palestine during that period.
In the 19th century BC, Allah’s prophet Abraham (pbuh) arrived
in the city conveying the call of monotheism (Tawhid) and the mes-
sage of Islam. It is likely to be the territory indicated in the glorious
Qur’an: “And We (Allah, SWT) delivered him (Abraham) and Lot
to the land which We had blessed for the worlds” (21: 71). It is
commonly understood in the classic sources that the blessed land
is Bayt al-Maqdis; Abraham’s migration to the city was a prologue
to the era of prophets in Bayt al-Maqdis. Abraham settled there
and had prophet children and grandchildren, such as Ismail, Isaac,
Jacob, and Joseph (pbut), whose prophet careers were associated
with its history.42
THE ERA OF DAVID AND SOLOMON

As we briefly write this history of the Holy City, it is important to
notice the Hebrew Bible’s hegemonic narrative on the details of
this era despite all flaws that undermine its historicity and histori-
cal credibility. Moreover, these accounts were written and compiled
far away from their historical theater and centuries after the events
took place. However, it is regrettable that some Western historio-
graphical works founded their pillars on these biblical narrations
42
For details see: Muhsen Saleh, The Road to Al-Quds: A Historical Study in the Is-
lamic Experience on the Land of Palestine since the Eras of Prophets until the End of the 20th
Century, (Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultation, 5th Edition, Beirut: 2012).
‫ دراسة تاريخية في رصيد التجربة اإلسالمية على أرض فلسطين‬،‫ الطريق إلى القدس‬،‫محسن صالح‬
،‫ مركز الزيتونة للدراسات واالستشارات‬،‫ (بيروت‬،‫منذ عصور األنبياء وحتى أواخر القرن العشرين‬
.)2102 ،5‫ط‬
without sufficient examination, scrutiny, or auditing. It was also

followed by an archaeological school shaped by religious and colo-
nialist motives as it literally began its scholarship from the accounts
of the Hebrew Bible. Thus, its mission has become to attribute
every site or place in Palestine to biblical scripts and to conduct
research with a biblical eye and without the due methodology and
objectivity. Therefore, its results have been distorted and politicized
to the point of being infallible.
The Israelites exited Egypt under the leadership of Moses es-
caping the persecution of the Pharaoh (approximately in the 13th
century BC), then entered the Holy Land under the leadership of
one of their prophets, Joshua, or Jehoshua (Hebrew: Yehoshuʿa) the
son of Nun, after forty years of wandering in the desert. Then, in
the 10th century BC, David (pbuh) appeared, as one of the Israelite
prophets and able leaders. He managed to conquer Bayt al-Ma-
qdis, which became part of his dominion. David was succeeded
by his son Solomon (pbuh). It may be said that the reign of Da-
vid and Solomon in Bayt al-Maqdis during the 10th century is the
most obvious Israelite era in the area, and it is estimated between
70 to 80 years that represent the golden age of the Islamic rule in
the sense of its ideological concept in Bayt al-Maqdis before the
Muslim conquest.43
As for urbanization and development, biblically informed
studies imagine it as a capital of a great and magnificent unit-
ed monarchy. According to the latter, David’s era witnessed the
emergence of what is allegedly called the “City of David,” i.e. Bayt
al-Maqdis, with fortresses, palaces, warehouses, and a marvelous-
ly constructed huge temple with elaborate architectural details.44
43
Muhsen Saleh, The Road to al-Quds: A Historical Study in the Islamic Experience on
the Land of Palestine since the Eras of Prophets until the End of the 20th Century, pp. 27-30.
44
Karen Armstrong, Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, (Ballantine Books, New York:
1997). ،‫ محمد عناني‬،‫ فاطمة نصر‬:‫ ترجمة‬،‫ القدس مدينة واحدة عقائد ثالثة‬،‫كارين أرمسترونج‬
1998 ،‫ سطور‬،‫)(القاهرة‬.
However, some archaeological studies, that are methodologically

liberated from the authority of the Hebrew Bible’s script, indicate
that Bayt al-Maqdis, “during the 10th and 9th centuries BC was
a little modest town with mainly some administrative buildings,
i.e. in certain times in the 10th and 9th centuries BC, a new town
was established to accommodate public (administrative) build-
ings but without sufficient residential area. But it is unlikely to
be a capital of an important state such as the one described in the
biblical script regarding the unified kingdom of Israel. Notewor-
thy, ancient Jerusalem largely resembles the rest of Palestinian
towns in the 10th and 9th centuries BC.”45 These findings and
other serious studies delineate the extent of exaggerations that
cannot be assumed in accounts of the history of the holy city. It is
clear that political and ideological tendencies contributed to the
spread of such narratives without being subject to the standard
academic methodology.
COLLAPSE: BETWEEN BABEL AND PERSIA

Solomon (pbuh) passed away in 923 BC.46 His monarchy split,
after his death, into two small monarchies; one of them, known
as Israel, which fell apart within two centuries whereas the other
one, known as Judah and including Bayt al-Maqdis, continued and
lasted longer until it showed signs of corruption and weakness and
was exposed to invaders.
45
Margaret Steiner, “Expanding Frontiers: The Development of Jerusalem in the
Iron Age”, Jerusalem in Ancient Times between the Old Testament and History, ed. Thomas
L. Thompson and Salma al-Khadra al-Jayyousi, (Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut:
2003), pp. 115-116.
‫ القدس أورشليم العصور‬:‫ في‬،‫ تطور أورشليم في عصر الحديد‬:‫ حدود متوسعة‬،‫مارغريت شتاينر‬
‫ فراس‬:‫ ترجمة‬،‫ سلمى الخضراء الجيوسي‬،‫ تومبسون‬.‫ توماس ل‬:‫ تحرير‬،‫القديمة بين التوراة والتاريخ‬
611-511 ‫ ص‬،)3002 ،‫ مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية‬،‫ (بيروت‬،‫السواح‬.
46
Zafarul Islam Khan, Ancient History of Palestine from the First Jewish to the Last
Crusade, (Lebanon: Dar al-Nafaes, 1992), pp. 45-46.
Late in the 6th century BC, the king of Babylon Nebuchadnezzar,

invaded, besieged the city, exiled the ruling class to Babylonia in
Iraq, and appointed a subordinate to govern the city. Later, when this
appointed governor rebelled, Nebuchadnezzar returned and exiled
the rest of the population to Babylonia. Thus, that monarchy col-
lapsed completely by 586 BC concluding the independent Israelite
rule of Bayt al-Maqdis. Centuries later, the Jewish presence in the
city took the shape of a religious class that ruled by proxy on behalf
of various empires and states that alternated in controlling the city.
The Babylonian hegemony did not last very long; it was termi-
nated by the Persian Empire lead by Qurush II who allowed the
Jews of Babylonia to move to Bayt al-Maqdis as a reward for sup-
porting him in his war against Babylonia in 539 BC. They settled
there without full autonomy but as local agents of Persia.
GREECE AND ROME

In 332 BC, Alexander the Great occupied Palestine, as part of his
campaign in the area; he treated the Jews in the same manner as
the Persians did, leaving them as a ruling class in Bayt al-Maqdis
on behalf of the Greeks. The process of Hellenizing the city started
whereby the city acquired a Greek character in architecture, lan-
guage, culture, literature, systems, and lifestyle.47 After the anti-Hel-
lenistic revolution of the Maccabees triumphed, the Jews were
allowed to practice their own rituals side by side with the Hellenis-
tic-oriented inhabitants of Bayt al-Maqdis.
The Greek period continued until 63 BC when the Roman
commander Pompey besieged Bayt al-Maqdis, demolished its walls,
seized the city, and preserved the rule of the Jewish Maccabean fam-
ily under the Roman hegemony. In 40 BC, Persia attacked Palestine
47
Ziad Muna, Introduction to the Ancient History of Palestine, (Beesan Publishers and
Distributers, Damascus: 2000), p. 110. :‫ (دمشق‬،‫ مقدمة في تاريخ فلسطين القديم‬،‫زياد منى‬
110 ‫ ص‬،)2000 ،‫بيسان للنشر والتوزيع‬.
and also preserved the Maccabean rule there. The Persian domi-
nance, however, did not last long as the Romans waged war again,
regained control of the city, and installed Herod, the Idumaean, as
a king in 37 BC.
During the Roman reign that continued until AD 325, the city
witnessed two revolts against the Romans and both were suppressed
with extreme violence. In AD 66, Jews revolted against the Roman
rule, but the Roman commander Titus managed to put this revolt
down by AD 70, stormed the city after a strong siege, launched
a spree of killing, looting and burning, and destroyed the temple
built by Herod by leveling it to the ground.48
In AD 132, the Jews revolted again against the Romans and
Emperor Hadrian sent a large army that put down the revolt in
AD 135. The army destroyed and plowed Bayt al-Maqdis, killed
and captivated a large number of Jews, and subsequently prevented
them from dwelling in or inhabiting the city or even approaching
it. On its ruins a new city called Aelia Capitolina, after the first
name of Emperor Hadrian, was erected. Later on, the city came to
be known as Aelia.49
AL-QUDS IN THE CHRISTIAN ERA

The ascension of Constantine the Great to the throne of the Roman
Empire in AD 306 was a foreteller of a new stage in the history of
al-Quds and the world. Under his reign, Christianity was recog-
nized as a formal faith via the Edict of Milan issued in AD 313.50
48
John Wilkinson, “Jerusalem under Rome and Byzantium: 63 BC -637 AD”, Jeru-
salem in History, ed. Kamil J. Asali, (Jordan University, Amman: 1992), pp. 95-128. ‫جون‬
‫ ترجمة‬،‫ القدس في التاريخ‬:‫ في‬،‫م‬.‫ ب‬637 – ‫م‬.‫ ق‬63 ‫ القدس تحت حكم روما وبيزنطة‬،‫ولكنسون‬
128-95‫ ص‬،)1992 ،‫ الجامعة األردنية‬،‫ (عمان‬،‫كامل العسلي‬.
49
Muhsen Saleh, The Road to Al-Quds: A Historical Study in the Islamic Experience
on the Land of Palestine since the Eras of Prophets until the End of the 20th Century, p. 39.
50
‘Ali ‘Ukasha et al., Greeks and Romans, (Al-Amal Publishers and Distributors, 1st
Edition, Irbid: 1991), pp. 205-211. ‫ دار األمل‬،‫ (إربد‬،‫ اليونان والرومان‬،‫علي عكاشة وآخرون‬
211-205‫ ص‬،)1991 ،1‫ ط‬،‫للنشر والتوزيع‬.
As for al-Quds, the edict’s consequences resulted in getting rid of all

pagan symbols and idols which were replaced with a wave of Chris-
tianizing culture and architecture as the city had become the heart
of Christendom. Constantine and his mother Helena erected many
buildings and historical monuments, the most important of which
was the Church of the Holy Sepulcher while the queen erected the
so-called Via Dolorosa, “Way of Grief,” in Bayt al-Maqdis.
It is noteworthy that since the city fell in the hands of Babylo-
nians (586 BC) until the end of the Byzantine reign (AD 637), that
is to say for nearly 12 centuries, a number of states such as Persia,
Greece, Rome, and Byzantium governed the city alternately. This
period witnessed several cultural and political upheavals and violent
events endured by the city and its inhabitants.
THE EARLY ISLAMIC ERA

Since the emergence of Islam in Mecca, Bayt al-Maqdis was present
in the Muslim imagination as the first Qibla of their prayers which
continued for a year and a half after Hijrah. Prophet Muhammad’s
miraculous Israa, his Night Journey to the city, and Mi’raj, his as-
cension to Heaven from there, represent the Muslim peak spiritual
and physical attachment to Bayt al-Maqdis and its al-Aqsa Mosque.
Referring to the numerous pieces of evidence from the Glorious
Qur’an and the traditions and practices of the Prophet (pbuh) that
indicate the status of the city, its stature, the great reward of trav-
eling there, and praying in its mosque, its virtue as a safe haven
from the Apocalypse, and its status as the site of the demise of all
falsehood, we can appreciate the zealous spirit that enticed early
Muslims to conquer the city which was given a top priority. The
first caliph, Abu-Bakr al-Siddeeq, wrote to his commander in Iraq,
Khalid ibn al-Waleed, urging him, “rush (with your army) to sup-
port your brethren in the Levant. To acquire one village around al-
Quds, by Allah’s providence, is better to me than a whole rostaaq,51

a fertile region of villages and groves, in Iraq.”52
The conquest of Bayt al-Maqdis was completed in the year
AH 16 after the conquering armies had besieged the city for
four months during which battles took place and exhausted both
sides. Thus, the city’s commanders and its patriarch, Sophro-
nius, realized that Muslims are not giving up the city; so, they
retreated and requested peace stipulating that the Muslim Ca-
liph Omar bin al-Khattab comes in person and grants them the
peace covenant, a unique situation given only to Bayt al-Maqdis
amongst all cities conquered in that era - a clear indication of
the city’s high stature and importance. The caliph accepted their
request, and granted the city a peace covenant that has since been
known as the “Omar Covenant.” His covenant grants immunity
for their lives, properties, and churches against inhabitation and
demolition.53 This makes the Muslim conquest of Bayt al-Ma-
qdis very different from the conquests by previous nations which
were mostly characterized by destruction and architectural and
cultural eradication.
As for what some sources mention that the Omar Covenant
stipulates banning Jews from inhabiting Bayt al-Maqdis, it is clear
that it is an addition and not an authentic text, as it differs from the
51
Rastaaq signifies a region that includes numerous groves and villages. Sometimes
it is pronounced as “rozdaaq.” See: Mustafa ‘Abd al-Kareem Khateeb, Mu’jam al-Mussta-
lahat wa al-Alqab al-Tarikhiyyah, (Glossary of Historical Terms and Titles), (Mu’ssasat
al-Risalah, 1st Edition, Beirut: 1996), p. 210 ‫ معجم المصطلحات‬،‫مصطفى عبد الكريم خطيب‬
210‫ ص‬،)‫م‬1996 ،1‫ ط‬،‫ مؤسسة الرسالة‬،‫ (بيروت‬،‫واأللقاب التاريخية‬
52
Abu al-Ma’aali al-Musharraf ibn al-Marji ibn Ibrahim al-Maqdissi, Fadha’il Bayt
al-Maqdis, (Virtues of Bayt al-Maqdis), ed., Ayman Nasr al-Deen al-Azhari, (Dar al-Ku-
tub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1st Edition, Beirut: 2002), p. 67.
53
Ahmad al-Ya’qoubi, Tarikh al-Ya’qoubi (The al-Ya‘qoubi History), ed. Abd al-
Ameer Muhanna, (Sharikat al-A’lami for Publications, 1st Edition, Beirut: 2001), p. 37.
‫ عبد األمير‬:‫ تحقيق‬،‫ تاريخ اليعقوبي‬،‫أحمد بن أبي يعقوب بن جعفر بن واضح المعروف باليعقوبي‬
37‫ ص‬،2‫ ج‬،)2001 ،1‫ ط‬،‫ شركة األعلمي للمطبوعات‬،‫ (بيروت‬،‫مهنا‬.
general trend of peace treaty models of the time and it might have
been added for political or religious reasons.54
Although the period that Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab spent in
Bayt al-Maqdis was short, he was very interested in renewing the
al-Aqsa Mosque, removing the rubble and dirt of previous eras,
and restoring what could be considered as the first Muslim musalla
(praying place) in al-Aqsa Mosque at the front of the shrine that is
oriented toward Qibla. It was characterized by its simplicity like the
Prophet’s Mosque at the time.
A number of Sahaba, the Prophet’s companions, and many of
their followers, Tabi’un, settled in the city of Bayt al-Maqdis. The
city began to attract visitors wishing to make a pilgrimage to the
al-Aqsa Mosque and seeking its blessings. Visitors’ presence grew
more active with time and stability.
With the advent of the Umayyad caliphate, Bayt al-Maqdis re-
ceived great attention for religious and political reasons. The city’s
sanctity and its high Islamic stature gave the Umayyad dynasty a
lot of prestige in the Muslim world; thus, the Umayyad dynasty
translated this attention, since the reign of their first caliph, Mu’aw-
iyah ibn Abi-Sufyan, by accepting the homage of the Muslim pub-
lic to Bayt al-Maqdis at the beginning of each caliph’s reign. The
Umayyad caliphs were keen to visit and stay in the city or install
an Umayyad prince as its governor, and the city saw a number of
reconstruction projects. Although the Umayyads claimed Damas-
cus as the capital of their dynasty, the Damascus–Bayt al-Maqdis
axis was very active and effective and the caliph Sulayman ibn ‘Abd
al-Malik considered transferring the capital of the caliphate to Bayt
al-Maqdis, but changed his mind.
54
For a detailed discussion in this matter, see: ‘Abd al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi,
Introducing Islamic Jerusalem, (Al Maktoum Institute Academic Press, UK: 2007), pp.
69-74.
Throughout the Umayyad period, especially during the reign

of ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan (AH 65-86/AD 685-705), al-Aqsa
Mosque witnessed a monumental construction renaissance and
projects that continued to exist to this day. The most important of
its features is the Dome of the Rock, which emerged as an archi-
tectural monument commemorating the Prophet’s Night Journey,
Israa, and his ascension to heaven, Mi’raj, and protecting the hon-
ored Rock. The Dome of the Rock became a symbol of al-Aqsa
Mosque and Bayt al-Maqdis and a place of pride for Muslims in the
city which was notoriously famous for its great churches and large
buildings. As for what had been once said that the construction of
the Dome was meant to distract Muslims from the pilgrimage to
Mecca, it is a dismissed argument that was alleged by the Shiite
historian, al-Ya’qoubi, out of political bias.
Also, the sanctuary area of al-Aqsa Mosque was configured
and constructed by building its southeastern part, now known as
the Marwani Musalla. Moreover, the central masjid was built in
the place of the masjid established by Caliph Omar in the south-
ern part to be larger and finer so as to accommodate the growing
numbers of worshipers, visitors, scholars, and the devoted. Large
gates and beautiful domes such as the spacious Dome of al-Silsilah
(chain) were erected to provide shade for people and to provide rest
for governors and caliphs when they visit al-Aqsa.55
The fall of the Umayyad dynasty and the assumption of the ca-
liphate by their opponents, the Abbasids, did not affect the stature
of the city, its stability, and its role as one of the important urban
centers of teaching, learning, knowledge, and jurisprudence and
55
For an in-depth account of this period and its details, see: Sharif Abu Sham-
malah, The Urban and Architectural Development of al-Quds in the Early Islam (16-132
AH/637-750 AD): A Historical and Analytical Study, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
Malaya University, Kuala Lumpur, 2015). ‫ التطور العمراني والمعماري‬،‫شريف أبو شمالة‬
،‫ (جامعة ماليا‬،‫م) دراسة تاريخية تحليلية‬750-637/‫هـ‬132-16( ‫لمدينة القدس في صدر اإلسالم‬
2015 ،‫)أطروحة دكتوراة غير منشورة‬.. And see also: Abd al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi,
Introducing Islamic Jerusalem, pp. 69-74.
holiness in the Muslim world. The classical biographical sources

are rife with the names of scholars, teachers and students from Bayt
al-Maqdis or who came to Bayt al-Maqdis from other regions, as
well as their academic works.
This first Islamic period of Bayt al-Maqdis, nearly five centuries
(AH 16-492), is one of the richest stages of the Islamic history of
Bayt al-Maqdis and the prelude of the city’s long reign with Is-
lam. But the city’s conditions worsened at the end of the Islamic
Caliphate, as it had clearly witnessed weakness, strife, and discord
during its latest decades and the caliphate had turned nominal and
ineffective. A number of conflicting mini-states emerged which re-
flected negatively on Bayt al-Maqdis in the late centuries of its first
Islamic period. Bayt al-Maqdis was disputed by the Fatimids and
the Seljuks or among the Seljuks themselves. None of these mini-
states were able to protect the city from the coming crusades that
occupied it by means of horrible carnage, eliminated its character
and existence, and took over its role.
BAYT AL-MAQDIS UNDER THE CRUSADER

OCCUPATION
At the end of the 5th century AH/11th century AD, the crusader
armies moved from Europe towards the Mashriq with the direct
incitement of the Catholic Church and clerics under the pretense
of ridding the Holy Sepulcher from infidels (Muslims). However,
the economic objectives and colonial ambitions of these campaigns’
leaders were too clear to be hidden under religious pretenses. The
Crusader hordes invaded the Muslim lands led by European princ-
es and knights, taking advantage of the state of weakness of the
conflicting Muslim states and emirates.
The Crusaders arrived at Bayt al-Maqdis, which was under
Fatimid control, and besieged it for forty days until they were able
to enter, in AH 492/AD 1099. According to the accounts of the
Crusader historians, for three days they killed all those who were in
the city, whether they were residents or people who fled to the city
seeking protection until corpses of the victims filled all streets and
alleys, estimated by some sources at 70,000, and movement within
the city became very difficult. In turn, al-Aqsa Mosque witnessed
a horrible chapter in its history when thousands of people fled to
it hoping that its sanctity would spare their lives but the Crusaders
slaughtered them there.
Over the corpses of Bayt al-Maqdis’s population, a cruel phase
in the history of the Holy City began and spanned nearly ninety
years. This is, however, a short period if compared to the city’s an-
cient history. It began with the ethnic cleansing of its inhabitants,
triggering a killing spree, the resettlement of the European invaders
in the city, and the changing of its social and topographical struc-
tures. Thus, the Latin “Kingdom of Jerusalem” was erected in Bayt
al-Maqdis.56 Al-Aqsa Mosque was turned into Crusader facilities.
They turned the Dome of the Rock into a church called “Church
of the Holy of Holies” and raised a huge golden cross over it. The
Templar Knights, who were among the most extreme and fiercest
Crusader groups, turned the Qibli (southern) Mosque into hous-
es, offices, and warehouses. They also turned the southern eastern
part of al-Aqsa (Marwani Musalla) into a stable for their horses and
named it “Solomon’s Stables.”
The news of the fall of Bayt al-Maqdis in the hands of the Cru-
saders was very tragic for Muslims, and they felt the great loss.
The lesson they received was painful and they realized the internal
reasons for their defeat, i.e. their division and the strife amongst
themselves led to the loss of Bayt al-Maqdis. Although from the
beginning of the Crusader invasion the jihad and liberation move-
56
See: Fulcher of Chartres, A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 1095-1127,
Chronicle of the First Crusade, against the Infidels, (Shorouk Publishing House, Cairo:
2001), pp. 135-139 ،‫ قاسم عبده قاسم‬:‫ ترجمة‬،‫ تاريخ الحملة الى بيت المقدس‬،‫فوشيه الشارتري‬
139-135‫ ص‬،)2001 ،‫ دار الشروق‬،‫(القاهرة‬.
ment did not stop, it began to make a difference with the integra-
tion of Muslim’s intellectual, social, political, and military forces.
Jihad became more powerful, effective and organized in the era of
‘Imad Ad-Din Zanki, his successor Nur Ad-Din Zanki, and then
Salah Ad-Din the Ayyubid who completed the path of jihad and
built on the achievements of his predecessors. In particular, he pur-
sued a strategy of unifying Muslim forces along the axis of the Le-
vant-Egypt. Thus, the liberation and restoration of Bayt al-Maqdis
was completed by AH 583/AD 1187.57
AL-QUDS UNDER THE AYYUBID

AND MAMLUK REIGNS
The liberation of Bayt al-Maqdis by Sultan Salah Ad-Din (Saladin),
the Ayyubid, was a rebirth of the city. It came after a series of vic-
tories by the Muslim armies against the crusader forces, particularly
the great victory in the battle of Hattin (AH 583/AD 1187), which
was followed by the siege of the Holy City until he entered it after
he granted the besieged crusader population a covenant of security
in the same year. The Muslim conquerors treated the Crusaders
with great tolerance and allowed them to leave the city safely unlike
what the Crusaders 90 years before.58
Salah Ad-Din restored the city’s Muslim character; he especially
removed the changes precipitated by the Crusaders in the al-Aqsa
Mosque, its premises, and buildings. It is noteworthy and interest-
ing to know that Nur Ad-Din Zanki had prepared a beautiful and
perfectly made wooden minbar (pulpit) to be installed in the al-Aq-
sa Mosque when it is liberated. Since Zanki was martyred before
57
Muhsen Saleh presents a useful summary of this stage and its various aspects from
an Islamic perspective. See: Muhsen Saleh, The Road to al-Quds: A Historical Study in the
Islamic Experience on the Land of Palestine since the Eras of Prophets until the End of the
20th Century, pp. 87-116.
58
See: Ibn Shaddad, al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyyah wa al-Mahasin al-Yusufiyyah,
(al-Khanji Bookshop, Cairo: 1994), p. 135 ،‫ النوادر السلطانية والمحاسن اليوسفية‬،‫ابن شداد‬
135‫ ص‬، )1994 ،‫ مكتبة الخانجي‬،‫(القاهرة‬.
the liberation of Bayt al-Maqdis, Salah Ad-Din carried the wooden

minbar and installed it in al-Aqsa Mosque.59 Since then it had been
known as the “minbar of Salah Ad-Din” and had remained in use
until 1969 when a Zionist Australian bigot set it ablaze. Salah Ad-
Din exerted an obvious effort in fortifying the city, renewing its
walls, erecting public buildings, hospitals, and Sufi ribats, i.e. small
fortifications. The sultan also established several endowments to
sustain these institutions, a tradition that was continued by several
Ayyubid sultans that succeeded him.
However, this situation did not last long. Under the reign of
King Issa, the city’s walls were demolished fearing the Crusaders’
invasion! Thus, many of its inhabitants deserted it. And as a result
of the acrimonious conflicts within the Ayyubid dynasty and out
of advancing narrow personal interests, King al-Kamil the Ayyubid
handed over Bayt al-Maqdis to the Crusaders amid strong condem-
nation from the Muslim world. Muslims then took it back for a
short time at the hands of King al-Nassir the Ayyubid, but he re-
turned it again to the Crusaders. Finally, the city returned to Mus-
lims in AH 642/AD 1229.
When the Mamluks assumed the sultanate, succeeding the
Ayyubids, they dedicated a great deal of attention to Bayt al-Ma-
qdis as a holy city. So, it stood out again as an effective urban learn-
ing center that became rife with religious institutions, schools, and
civil facilities. Al-Aqsa Mosque had its share of facilities and re-
construction projects. A water supply network was established to
bring water from al-Aroub spring to the mosque. Several schools
were established in al-Aqsa such as al-Madrasah al-Ashrafiyya and
al-Madrasah al-Tankaziyya; many of these institutions still exist in
modern day al-Quds. Under the Mamluk reign, the city became
59
Taj al-Din Shahanshah ibn Ayyub, Muntakhabat min Kitab al-Tarikh li Sahib
Hamah. In: Seerat Salah ad-Din, (al-Manar Publishing House, Cairo: 2000), pp. 234-
235. ‫ سيرة صالح‬:‫ في‬،‫ منتخبات من كتاب التاريخ لصاحب حماة‬،‫تاج الدين شاهنشاه بن أيوب‬
235-234‫ ص‬،)‫م‬2000 ،‫ دار المنار‬،‫ (القاهرة‬،‫الدين‬.
one of the most important centers of academic excellence as it was

a destination that attracted numerous scholars, teachers, and stu-
dents from various regions.60
Late in the Mamluk reign, the political, economic, and religious
situation deteriorated in the city and in many cities under their rule
to the extent that Muslim pilgrims from Egypt and Maghreb were
unable to visit Bayt al-Maqdis due to the chaos and turmoil.
AL-QUDS IN THE OTTOMAN ERA

While the Mamluk state was enduring deterioration and decline,
the Ottoman state was expanding, strengthening, and becoming
more effective. It inherited the rule of Bayt al-Maqdis after dislodg-
ing the Mamluk authority in the Levant in the aftermath of their
defeat in the battle of Marj Dabiq in AD 1516. The Ottoman reign
in Bayt al-Maqdis spanned four centuries with a very promising
onset for the city that received an unmistakable attention from the
early Ottoman sultans.
Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent had undertaken several con-
struction and development projects that benefited the city and
al-Aqsa Mosque such as replacing the mosaics around the walls of
the Dome of the Rock with blue Kashani tiles and renovating the
Dome’s windows and doors. The reconstruction campaign includ-
ed the dome of al-Silsilah, as well as other facilities of al-Aqsa. Over
the course of five years (AD 1536-1540), the great wall of the city
was erected, which is still the same today. The city had been with-
out walls for more than three centuries since they were demolished
by King Issa the Ayyubid in AD 1219. The city’s water supply prob-
60
See: Kamil Jamil ‘Asali, “Madrasahs, Learning Institutions and ‘Ulama in Pales-
tine (5th to 12th Centuries AH)”, The Franco-Islamic Conflict over Palestine, ed. Hadia
Dajani Shakeel, in Arabic, (The Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut: 1994), pp. 501
onwards. ‫ المدارس ومعاهد العلم والعلماء في فلسطين (القرن الخامس إلى الثاني‬،‫كامل العسلي‬
،‫ (بيروت‬،‫ الصراع اإلسالمي الفرنجي على فلسطين‬،)‫ هادية دجاني شكيل (محرر‬:‫ في‬،)‫عشر للهجرة‬
‫ وما بعدها‬501 ‫ ص‬،)1994 ،‫مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية‬.
lem received special attention; large sums of money were allocated

for the construction and maintenance of water facilities such as
canals, ponds and cisterns, as well as charitable and educational
institutions such as the Takiyyah (hospice) of Khaski Sultan and
al-Rasasiyyah Madrasah.61
The city witnessed a long period of Ottoman reign enjoying
political stability and economic prosperity as well as an academic
and architectural renaissance. It even attracted numerous Jews that
fled the inquisition courts in Spain and the Ottomans treated them
with tolerance and lenience. However, this state of stability, pros-
perity, and scholarly activity was affected by the Ottoman decline
as a result of the 18th century wars. Furthermore, the documents
reveal corruption and the mismanagement of numerous waqfs en-
dowed by the early Ottoman sultans or by the Mamluk sultans.
Bayt al-Maqdis continued under the Ottoman reign until Ibra-
him Pasha took over the city for a short period (AD 1831-1841)
that was full of turmoil and revolts. During this decade, the people
suffered from the Egyptian rule until the city returned to the Otto-
man dominion after the withdrawal of the Egyptian army of Ibra-
him Pasha. At the time, the city received a new wave of stability and
care, represented by the sultans’ patronage for several renovation
and maintenance projects of the Dome of the Rock, which cost the
state treasury a lot; the courtyards of al-Aqsa also saw a number of
new Ottoman buildings.62
The political and military circumstances of that period provid-
ed a wide door for Western foreign intervention in Bayt al-Ma-
61
See: Kamil Jamil ‘Asalai, “Al-Quds under the Ottoman Rule 1516-1831”, Al-
Quds fi Al Tarikh (Jerusalem in History), ed. Kamil Jamil ‘Asali, (Jordan University,
Amman:1992), pp. 233 onwards. -1516 ‫ القدس تحت حكم العثمانيين‬،‫كامل جميل العسلي‬
،)1992 ،‫ الجامعة األردنية‬،‫ (عمان‬،‫ القدس في التاريخ‬،)‫ كامل جميل العسلي (محرر‬:‫ في‬،1831
‫ وما بعدها‬233.
62
‘Arif al-‘Arif, Tarikh Al-Quds (The History of Jerusalem), (Dar el-Ma’aref, Kahire:
2002), pp. 117-118. 118-117‫ ص‬،)2002 ،‫ دار المعارف‬:‫ (القاهرة‬،‫ تاريخ القدس‬،‫عارف العارف‬.
qdis. Thus, the city became an arena of competition between the

Western powers which opened their consulates under the pretext
of protecting the Christian communities. These are the consulates
that will play a dangerous role in bringing Jewish migration to the
city and undertaking its protection, especially the British consulate
which was opened in 1839, followed by the consulates of Prussia,
France, America, Austria, and Russia.63
This stage of the city’s history and the subsequent rapid and
successive developments are particularly important since they are
directly and effectively related to all subsequent developments, es-
pecially with regard to the empowerment of the Zionist project
in Bayt al-Maqdis (al-Quds) and Palestine. In 1872, the al-Quds
Sanjaq was separated from the state of Syria and made an inde-
pendent mutasarrifate (governorate) directly linked to the Cabinet
in Istanbul.64 This administrative situation came as part of preven-
tive measures taken by the Ottoman government to protect in a
more effective manner the city from foreign influence, especially
the greedy Zionist ambitions in al-Quds and Palestine.
The Ottoman state, in its last decade in Palestine, was aware of
the dangers threatening Palestine and the Holy City, but its move-
ment to confront these dangers was shackled by European pressures
and corruption in the administrative apparatus. Although the Ot-
toman government placed many protection restrictions, they were
not effective as Zionist Jews managed to continue their migration
and expansion in al-Quds. In fact, the Zionist movement tried to
obtain an official Ottoman approval giving them the land of Pales-
tine. The Zionist leader Theodor Herzl met with Ottoman Sultan
Abdulhamid II offering to solve the financial problems that were
63
‘Adil Manna’, Tarikh Filasteen fi Awakher al-‘Ahd al-Othmani, (History of Pales-
tine in the Late Ottoman Era), (Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut: 2003), p. 159.
،‫ مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية‬:‫ (بيروت‬،‫ تاريخ فلسطين في أواخر العهد العثماني‬،‫عادل مناع‬
159 ‫ ص‬،)2003.
64
‘Adil Manna’, Tarikh Filasteen fi Awakher al-‘Ahd al-Othmani, p. 197.
endured by his government. However, the sultan took a decisive

stand rejecting these offers and pledging to keep the holy city.65
AL-QUDS UNDER THE BRITISH OCCUPATION

The First World War broke out in 1914, and the Ottoman state en-
tered the war beside their German allies against Britain and France.
While the British forces were fighting to wrest Palestine from the
Ottoman Empire, the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour
issued, on November 2, 1917, the famous “Balfour Declaration”
pledging to establish a national home for Jews in Palestine.66 Al-
Quds fell in the hands of the British and General Allenby entered
the city on December 9, 1917.
The fall of al-Quds had a great moral and historical significance
due to its religious stature. Its fall into British hands ended a long
historical period of nearly 1,300 years, in which it was an import-
ant Muslim city, except for the short period of the Crusader occu-
pation. A new phase began under the British rule whose policies
and purposes – both overt and covert - became rapidly evident,
especially with the leakage of the Balfour Declaration.
Britain initially ran al-Quds through a British military governor,
and it was evident that the British practice and undertaking were to
enable the Zionist movement to usurp the land of Palestine and in its
heart, al-Quds. That, in turn, called on the people of al-Quds, who
felt betrayed, to declare their discontent and fight a battle to preserve
their sanctities and protect the city from the aggression of Zionist ac-
tivity. Demonstrations broke out and disturbances took place in the
city. The British occupation authorities confronted them with great
violence, declared martial law, and imprisoned the city youth and
65
Ishaq Rabah, Tarikh al-Quds ‘abr al-‘Usur (History of Jerusalem through the
Ages), (Kunouz al-Ma’rifa Publishers, Amman: 2010), p. 250. ‫ تاريخ القدس‬،‫إسحق رباح‬
250‫ ص‬،)2010 ،‫ كنوز المعرفة‬،‫ (عمان‬،‫عبر العصور‬.
66
Zafarul-Islam Khan, Palestine Documents, (Pharos Media & Publishing, New Del-
hi: 1998), p. 64.
leaders. They were tried before military courts that issued them harsh
sentences varying between imprisonment and execution.67
In 1920, Britain replaced the military governor with a civilian
administration and appointed Herbert Samuel, a British Zionist,
as the first high commissioner to Palestine, who went on to fur-
ther the project of establishing a national homeland for the Jews
in Palestine. The Hebrew language became the official language,
opening the door for the Zionists to migrate in order to multiply
their numbers. They erected Jewish settlements on the mountains
of al-Quds, took control of the city’s economy, and Britain gave
them large areas of the city including land for the construction of
the Hebrew University in 1925. They also transferred the import-
ant Zionist institutions to al-Quds.
The Zionist project, in its essence, is a colonial project with its
physical, political, and economic dimensions as was the Crusaders’
project eight centuries before. But disguising themselves under a re-
ligious cloak, both projects, included a necessity to give themselves
an imagined legitimacy and, thus, justification. Hence, Bayt al-Ma-
qdis and its sanctuaries became a clear target to further both projects.
While the Crusaders raised the slogan of “Liberating the Holy Sepul-
cher,” the Zionists made their slogan “The Return to the Holy City
and land of Promise” in order to carry out their own colonial program.
After the first decade of the British mandate (occupation),
challenging the feelings of Muslims and their sanctuaries became
relatively easier. This reached a peak in 1929 by trying to change
the status quo beside the Western wall of the al-Aqsa Mosque, the
al-Buraq Wall. Muslims have exclusively possessed its adjacent road
throughout history, i.e. Jews may not introduce or claim anything
there. However, Jews came in with chairs, tables, and drapes to take
over the Wall. They exclaimed, “The wall is ours.” In response to
67
‘Arif al-‘Arif, Tarikh al-Quds, pp. 139-142.
this move, an insurgency broke out in defense of the wall’s Muslim

identity and the al-Aqsa Mosque, known as the “al-Buraq Revolu-
tion.” In the wake of this revolt, an international committee came
to examine the issue of the al-Buraq Wall (1930) and concluded
with important findings that the ownership of the wall belongs ex-
clusively to Muslims.68
After the failure of the long-lived Palestinian attempts to reach a
settlement with the British mandate to stop the Zionist threat, the
Great Palestinian Revolution (1936-1939) erupted, and al-Quds
participated actively under the leadership of the mujahid ‘Abd al-Qa-
dir al-Hussyni, with the great support of al-Quds Mufti Hajj Amin
al-Hussyni, who exerted great efforts in combating the Zionist proj-
ect in political and revolutionary ways and preserving the city and its
sanctuaries, especially the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque, which witnessed
two projects of maintenance and reconstruction under his reign.
It remains to be mentioned that the last Zionist-biased episodes
of that difficult period were the United Nations Resolution 181 (No-
vember 29, 1947), which divides Palestine into a Jewish state and an
Arab state and expropriated al-Quds from its owners to be a corpus
separatum, i.e. a separated body, under an international regime ad-
ministered by the United Nations.69 The decision was rejected by the
Palestinians due to its violation of their right to self-determination
and granting their country and sanctuaries to other parties.
AL-QUDS UNDER THE ZIONIST OCCUPATION

Before passing the UN Partition Plan and prior to Britain’s announce-
ment of its intention to withdraw from Palestine in May 1948, the
Zionist movement, under the auspices of Britain, had completed the
68
See: The International Committee Report to the League of Nations in 1930,
published by the Institute for Palestine Studies.‫تقرير اللجنة الدولية المقدم إلى عصبة األمم‬
‫ منشورات مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية‬،‫ (بيروت‬،1930 ‫)عام‬.
69
Zafarul-Islam Khan, Palestine Documents, p. 261.
formation of its large, highly-armed, and well-trained army. And as

the UN partition decision was formally passed, the Zionist forces
embarked on a war of ethnic cleansing, that ended up with occu-
pying 78 percent of the area of Palestine and displacing more than
750,000 of its population. As for al-Quds, in addition to the terrible
massacre of its neighboring village Deir Yassin, they managed to oc-
cupy the western neighborhoods of the city, which amounted to 84
percent of the city’s municipal area, expelled their Palestinian popu-
lation and seized their property and luxury homes. With the signing
of the 1949 truce between the Jordanian and Zionist sides, the city
became divided into two parts: West al-Quds under the Zionist con-
trol, while the Arabs retained East al-Quds (including the Old City
and al-Aqsa Mosque) under the Jordanian sovereignty.70
In 1967, Israel unilaterally waged war again, occupying the rest
of Palestine and parts of three neighboring Arab countries, and
completed the control of the entire city of al-Quds by occupying
its eastern part. Immediately after storming the eastern part of the
city, the Israeli bulldozers demolished the historic Magharibah
neighborhood (Moroccan Quarter), adjacent to the western side of
al-Aqsa Mosque, including its endowments, mosques, schools, and
zawiyas. Thus, the sidewalk of the al-Buraq Wall was turned into a
large plaza so as to hold Jewish celebrations and rituals. This can be
considered one of the biggest measures of Judaization of the Holy
City and aggression on its cultural heritage, together with tragedy
of displacing the population of the neighborhood.71
70
For detailed accounts on the Zionist occupation of al-Quds, the formation of “West
Al-Quds” and what happened to the Arab properties and possessions, see a collection of
well-researched studies in: Salim Tamarai, ed., al-Quds 1948: al-Ahya’ al-‘Arabiyyah wa Ma-
seeruha fi Harb 1948 (Jerusalem 1948: Arab Neighborhoods and Their Fate in the 1948
War), (Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut: 2002). ‫ األحياء‬:1948 ‫ القدس‬،)‫سليم تماري (محرر‬
2002 ،‫ مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية‬،‫ (بيروت‬،1948 ‫)العربية ومصيرها في حرب‬.
71
Michael Dumber, Siyasat Israel tijah Al Awqaf Al Islamiyyah fi Filasteen 1948-1988
(The Israel Policy towards Muslim Endowments in Palestine 1948-1988), (Institute for
Palestine Studies, Beirut: 2002). ‫ سياسة إسرائيل تجاه األوقاف اإلسالمية في‬،‫مايكل دمبر‬
1992 ،‫ مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية‬،‫ (بيروت‬،1988-1948 ‫)فلسطين‬.
The international community called on Israel to withdraw from

the territories it occupied during the 1967 War, including al-Quds,
as stated in the UN Security Council Resolution 242 (passed in
November 1967),72 but Israel did not abide by it. In 1980, the
Zionist state declared a basic (constitutional) “Jerusalem law” that
deems the occupied al-Quds as the “eternal and indivisible” capital
of Israel. The UN Security Council rejected this law via Resolution
No. 478 of 1980, which states that the application of this Israeli law
is considered a breach of international law. The UN Security Coun-
cil also declared the “Jerusalem law” null and void internationally
and called on Israel to nullify it. Finally, the council called upon the
member states of the UN that had established embassies there to
withdraw their diplomatic missions from the Holy City.73 All UN
member states committed themselves to this resolution.
Israel has proceeded with its plan to Judaize al-Quds by follow-
ing a series of settler, colonial, and Judaization policies that affected
the city and its social, cultural, and political structure. The bound-
aries of the al-Quds municipality were amended to implement its
policy of controlling as much land as possible with as few Pales-
tinians as possible. The Israeli occupation embarked on erecting
foundations for Jewish neighborhoods in East al-Quds establishing
a series of settlements surrounding the Holy City from all sides
to settle Jewish settlers there imposing new geographic and demo-
graphic realities and creating a demographic imbalance.74
As for the population, Israel considered the Palestinians in al-
Quds to be “residents, not citizens,” and they are treated in accor-
dance with the Israeli residence law which gives the Israeli minister
72
Zafarul-Islam Khan, Palestine Documents, p. 296.
73
Ibid., pp. 365, 366.
74
Ibrahim Abu-Jabir et al., Qadiyyat al-Quds wa Mustaqbaluha fi al-Qarn al-Hadi
wa al-‘Ishreen, (Al-Quds Cause and Its Future in the 21st Century), (Middle East Studies
Center, Amman: 2001), pp. 89-90.‫ قضية القدس ومستقبلها في‬،‫إبراهيم أبو جابر وآخرون‬
2001 ،‫ مركز دراسات الشرق األوسط‬،‫ (عمان‬،‫)القرن الحادي والعشرين‬.
of the interior extensive powers to withdraw identification doc-

uments. During the previous period, Israel revoked the status of
more than 14,500 inhabitants from al-Quds, nullified their iden-
tification/residence cards, and continued to impose laws and con-
ditions aimed at emptying the city of its Palestinian population. In
1998, Israel issued the “Center of Life” law, which stipulates that
every documented Palestinian from al-Quds who has a home or
work outside of the city, will have his residence/identification status
and documents revoked, he and his family will be denied educa-
tion and healthcare, and they will be driven out of “Jerusalem.”
Excessive taxes have also been imposed to suffocate the Palestinian
economy and force Palestinians in al-Quds to leave their shops and
neighborhoods and move elsewhere.
In order to restrict the population under occupation, Israel had
adopted a policy of house demolitions and reduction of Palestinian
reconstruction activities. According to the UN Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Israel has issued more
than 14,000 demolition orders between 1988 and 2014. The pace
of house demolitions had increased to 1,236 buildings during the
period (2000-2015), displacing thousands of Palestinian families.
In contrast, the policy of confiscating Palestinian lands and estab-
lishing or enlarging settlements has been firmly on the agenda of
successive Israeli governments.
Since 1967, the Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf (endowments)
has continued to manage the affairs of the al-Aqsa Mosque until
the present day. However, this did not prevent aggressions against
the mosque. The occupation forces confiscated the keys of Bab
al-Magharibah, the Maghrebi Gate, immediately after they occu-
pied the city and put it under restricted control. In 1969, a Zionist
Australian bigot attempted to set al-Aqsa Mosque ablaze which led
to the burning of the minbar of Salah Ad-Din, which was men-
tioned above, and large parts of the Qibli Mosque were also burnt.
In the wake of this aggression, the Organization of the Islamic

Conference was subsequently formed (currently known as the Or-
ganization of Islamic Cooperation). The long list of aggressions in-
cludes taking over some of al-Aqsa Mosque facilities and such as the
first massacre of al-Aqsa (1990); the breaking into al-Aqsa by large
numbers of Zionist extremists and politicians which was enough
to ignite the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000) when Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon entered it. As the danger of breaking into al-Aqsa by
Jewish extremists increased, a popular movement was established in
al-Quds known as the Murabits, women and men who committed
themselves to be present in al-Aqsa Mosque on a daily basis and for
long hours to confront the intrusion peacefully.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In July 2017, the Israeli occupation regime installed electronic gates
at the entrances of al-Aqsa Mosque to increase control, a process
that was faced by decisive popular rejection, and the people of the
city rallied at the gates in what became known as the uprising of
Bab al-Asbaat, the door of the tribes. They applied great pressure
until their will triumphed and the occupation authorities removed
the electronic gates. The success of this uprising, which came in the
context of a continuous and growing aggression by the occupation,
represented a great moral boost to the people of the city.
Among the grave assaults against al-Aqsa Mosque are the exca-
vations and tunnels beneath the mosque and surrounding it. The
excavations began in the early years of the occupation of the city and
continue to this day. These excavations are undertaken by extremist
religious organizations and biblical archeological schools. They weak-
ened and continue to weaken the foundations of al-Aqsa Mosque.75
75
Sharif Abu Shammalah, al-Quds wa al-Aqsa fi Qabdhat al-Tahweed (Al-Quds
and al-Aqsa Mosque in the Grip of Judaization), (Al-Quds Foundation, Kuala Lumpur:
2017). 2017 ،‫ مؤسسة القدس‬،‫ (ماليزيا‬،‫ القدس واألقصى في قبضة التهويد‬،‫)شريف أبوشمالة‬.
As we document this difficult period of life in al-Quds under

the constant aggression of the occupation, we must acknowledge
with admiration the steadfastness of the city’s population and their
adherence to their city, despite severe restrictions and constraints,
poor economic conditions, and the practices of the occupation and
its agents (the Zionist settlement organizations, etc.) such as se-
ducing inhabitants with money and facilitations so as to leave their
homes in exchange for prices that exceed - dozens of times - the
real value of their real-estate assets. The inhabitants, however, have
remained steadfast, despite the lack of official Palestinian backing.
Politically, the first Palestinian uprising (1987-1993) represent-
ed a popular lever for the al-Quds cause, but it was directly affected
when the Fatah-led Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in-
dulged in secret negotiations with Israel which culminated with
signing the Oslo Accords in 1993 that gave the PLO a self-rule
over some of the occupied territories (The West Bank and the Gaza
Strip without al-Quds and without the settlements), while the is-
sue of al-Quds was deferred to the final status negotiations.76 The
Palestinian Authority did not make a real effort to preserve al-Quds
or strengthen its steadfastness. The PLO’s political ceiling does not
exceed demanding “East al-Quds” as the capital of the (future) Pal-
estinian state within the June 4, 1967 borders.
Two years after the Oslo Accords, the Congress of the Unit-
ed States, the sponsor of the agreement, passed a law recognizing
al-Quds as the capital of Israel and calling on the U.S. president
to transfer the U.S. embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to al-Quds,
while allowing the U.S. president to postpone its implementation
76
This stage has not taken place as of yet (2019). On the status of al-Quds in
the Oslo agreement, see: ‘Imad Yusuf et al., al-In‘ikasat al-Siasasiyyah li Ittifaq al-Hukm
al-Thati al-Filisteeni Ghazza-Ariha Awwalan (Political Consequences of Palestinian Au-
tonomy Accord Gaza-Jericoh First), (Middle East Studies Center, Amman: 1995), pp.
29-36. ‫أريحا‬-‫ االنعكاسات السياسية التفاق الحكم الذاتي الفلسطيني غزة‬،‫عماد يوسف وآخرون‬
1995 ،‫ مركز دراسات الشرق األوسط‬:‫ (عمان‬،‫)أوال‬.
every six months. Since then, U.S. presidents postponed moving

their embassy. Then, current U.S. President Donald Trump, under
the apparent influence of the Zionist lobby in the United States,
announced, on December 6, 2017, his decision to recognize Jeru-
salem as the capital of Israel and ordered the transfer of the U.S.
embassy from Tel Aviv to al-Quds.
Trump’s decision was met with global, official and popular re-
jection. Several protest rallies were convened across the world, the
UN General Assembly held an emergency meeting, and the major-
ity (128 votes) of member states approved a resolution rejecting the
U.S. decision, which is a clear violation of the international law and
an aggression against the city of al-Quds and its status. However,
the United States has maintained its decision and the U.S. embassy
has been moved to al-Quds coinciding with the commemoration of
the 70th anniversary of the Palestinian people’s Nakba in May 2018.
The above text is a brief history of Bayt al-Maqdis. It covers var-
ious historical eras, their interactions, and how these eras influenced
each other, which is evident in the late periods that left their marks
on the city’s present. We can note that the city itself is characterized
by great energy that grants it life and vitality, time and again, after
each adversity. Its recent history stands witness to a high state of un-
relenting resistance, which gives great hope that the city and its cause
are both too solid to be Judaized, liquidated, forgotten, or forsaken.
TWO
THEORETICAL AND
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
CHAPTER IV
BAYT AL-MAQDIS:
A MUSLIM MODEL FOR AMAN
ABD AL-FATTAH EL-AWAISI*
INTRODUCTION
Bayt al-Maqdis (Islamicjerusalem) is claimed as a sacred space by
three of the world’s major monotheistic faiths: Judaism, Christi-
anity, and Islam.77 For the author, as a Muslim scholar from Bayt
al-Maqdis, when he thinks of Bayt al-Maqdis, he thinks of several
concepts including those of hope and justice. Indeed, one could
argue that “history has proved that there can never be peace nor
stability without justice. The road to peace starts in Bayt al-Maqdis
and the solution to its current issue is the key to a just peace in
*
Dr. Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi is a professor of International Relations at the Social
Sciences University of Ankara (Turkey).
77
“Islamicjerusalem (one word) is a new terminology in English for a new concept,
which may be translated into the Arabic language as Bayt al-Maqdis. It can be fairly and
eventually characterized and defined as a unique region laden with a rich historical back-
ground, religious significances, cultural attachments, competing political and religious
claims, international interests and various aspects that affect the rest of the world in both
historical, contemporary, and future contexts. It has a central frame of reference and a
vital nature with three principal intertwined elements: its geographical location (land
and boundaries), its people (population), and its unique and creative inclusive vision,
to administer that land and its people, as a model for multiculturalism, cultural engage-
ment, and Aman (peaceful coexistence and mutual respect).” See the original definition
of Dr. Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi is a professor of International Relations at the Social
Sciences University of Ankara (Turkey)
72 / T H E O R E T I CA L A N D L E GA L F R A M E WO R K
the region.”78 As Karen Armstrong argues in her paper at the First

International Academic Conference on Bayt al-Maqdis Studies in
1997, “From the very earliest days, it seems the cult of Jerusalem
was inextricably bound up with the quest for social justice. Thus,
in the Hebrew Bible, prophets and psalmists repeatedly reminded
their people that Jerusalem could not be a holy city of Shalom (of
peace) unless it was also a city of Tseddeq (of justice).”79 Late Mi-
chael Prior adds that “the lesson of history is that it cannot belong
exclusively to one people or to only one religion. Jerusalem should
be open to all, shared by all. Those who govern the city should
make it ‘the capital of humankind’.”80
However, this article is not a study of the Muslim history or pol-
itics/theology of Bayt al-Maqdis, but an examination of its history to
develop a Muslim model for Aman (peaceful coexistence and mutual
respect) as an example of non-Western contributions. In other words,
instead of examining the general history of this Holy Land, the ob-
jective of this article is namely to develop and present this forgotten
model of Bayt al-Maqdis as a Muslim model for Aman.
Moreover, the aim of this article is to present this Muslim model
to intellectuals, academics, politicians, and the wider public interest-
ed in this Holy Land. It is hoped that this model could set the scene
to advance the current research on the Muslim contributions to this
important topic at this critical time in the 21st century; to enrich
our understanding of this region; to address some of the sensitive,
important, and key issues on the subject; and open up and promote
intellectual, academic and political debates and understandings of
this Muslim model to shed light on new lines of explanation.
78
Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, “The Significance of Jerusalem in Islam: An Islamic
Reference”, Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies, Vol: 1, No: 2, (1998), p. 47.
79
Karen Armstrong, “Sacred Space: The Holiness of Islamicjerusalem”, Journal of
Beytülmakdis (Islamic Jerusalem) Studies, Vol: I, No: I, (1997), p. 7.
80
Michael Prior, “Christian Perspectives on Jerusalem”, Journal of Islamicjerusalem
Studies, Vol: 3, No: 1, (1999), p. 17.
Although Bayt al-Maqdis is the most delicate issue of dispute

between the current two conflicting parties, it is hoped that this
model will provide a better understanding for the world leaders
who are trying to return peace to the region. However, this may be
a provocative and challenging issue for those in academic and po-
litical establishments who are interested in the region and who may
not accept these results/findings on the basis that it goes beyond
their political agenda and attachments, or for those who cannot
go along with innovation and new ideas. Indeed, to advance such
knowledge, understanding, and approaches is to challenge long-es-
tablished traditionalist and Orientalist claims.
For these reasons, the author did not embark on his research
with a defined model for Aman (peaceful coexistence and mutual
respect). Instead, his findings/results have emerged in the course
of his examination and analysis of the data collected systematically
throughout the process of his research, in particular his critical an-
alytical study of Umar’s Assurance of Aman to the People of Aelia
(Bayt al-Maqdis).81 This means that this model was developed from
the author’s long research on this assurance.
THE MODEL
The first Muslim Fath (conquest) of Bayt al-Maqdis was a funda-
mental landmark event which reshaped the relationships between
the people of diverse faiths and cultures who inhabited the region.
The arrival of Umar Ibn al-Khattab in the region –five years af-
ter the death of Prophet Muhammad in AH 16/637 CE– marked
the beginning of a new and distinguished phase in the relations
between the followers of the three great Semitic faiths, Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam. Instead of continuing to implement the
81
Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, “Umar’s Assurance of Safety to the People of Aelia (Is-
lamicjerusalem): A Critical Analytical Study of the Historical Sources”, Journal of Islamic
Jerusalem Studies, Vol: 3, No: 2, (2000).
Byzantines’ exclusionist policy, Umar, as the head of the Muslim

state, not only rejected the idea of excluding others who would like
to live in the region, he was categorically proactive in establishing
a new policy and system. Armstrong argues that “the Muslims had
established a system that enabled Jews, Christians, and Muslims to
live in Jerusalem together for the first time.”82
The arrival of Umar in the region also marked the start of a
golden age and the beginning of a new era in which Bayt al-Maqdis
became a common and open space for everyone and a model for
Aman. This model was based not only on fostering the culture of
diversity, plurality, and implementing recognition of others, but on
determining their rights, duties, and treatment as a means to en-
courage and establish a peaceful coexistence between the different
communities in Bayt al-Maqdis.
During his historical visit, Umar laid down the foundation of
fostering diversity and plurality in Bayt al-Maqdis in the form of
what is well-known in history as al-Ahd al-Umariyya or Umar’s As-
surance of Aman to the People of Aelia (Bayt al-Maqdis, Islamicje-
rusalem), which is regarded as being a major turning point in both
historic, juristic, and international relations terms. Not only did
he recognize and appreciate others’ presence in Bayt al-Maqdis, he
accepted them and offered a framework to show that it could be
shared with them. Indeed, as well as respecting and determining
non-Muslim rights, he also took practical steps to grant them pro-
tection, safety and security for their rights, lives, and properties.
He granted them freedom and enabled them to become citizens
and members of the Bayt al-Maqdis society, without interference in
their culture and religious life. In short, Umar not only identified,
he also accommodated the presence and needs of his diverse citi-
82
Karen Armstrong, A History of Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, (HarperCollins
Publishers, London: 1996), pp. 246, 233.
zens and established a system to protect their rich cultural diversity,

identities, and belongings.
Umar’s model for a multicultural Bayt al-Maqdis was based on
the core Muslim teachings, the Qur’an and Sunnah, which consider
diversity and plurality as part of the design of the universe and to be
the basis of everything apart from God. The author argues that the
first step in establishing a model for peaceful coexistence and mutual
respect is to identify and recognize diversity and plurality. In respect
of their cultural, religious, or gender differences, the Qur’an address-
without interference in their culture and religious life. In short, Umar not only identified, he
es humans
also and reminds
accommodated them that
the presence andthey
needsbelong
of his to the same
diverse family,
citizens and established a system to
protect
“O their rich We
humankind! cultural diversity,
created you allidentities, and belongings.
from a single pair of a male and a
Umar’s model for a multicultural Bayt al-Maqdis was based on the core Muslim
female” (Qur’an,
teachings, 49: 13).
the Qur’an In another
and Sunnah, verse,
which the Qur’an
consider says,and
diversity “Ifplurality
God as part of the design
of the
had souniverse andcould
willed, He to be surely
the basis
haveofmade
everything
you allapart fromone
human God. The author argues that the
single
first step in establishing a model for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect is to identify and
community (nation)”
recognize diversity and(Qur’an,
plurality.5:In48). From
respect of this
theirpoint of reference,
cultural, religious, or gender differences,
the “made
He Qur’an you
addresses humansand
into nations andtribes.”
remindsThethem that
main they belong
purpose for thisto the same family, “O
humankind! We created you all from a single pair of a male and a female” (Qur’an, 49: 13). In
creation is “so that you should get to know one another (li ta’arafu)”
another verse, the Qur’an says, “If God had so willed, He could surely have made you all
human one
(Qur’an, single
49: 13), community
not that you(nation)” (Qur’an,
may despise one5:another.
48). From
Onthis
thepoint
oth- of reference, He “made
you into nations and tribes.” The main purpose for this creation is “so that you should get to
er hand, the unique region of Bayt al-Maqdis can be argued as the
know one another (li ta’arafu)” (Qur’an, 49: 13), not that you may despise one another. On the
model placethe
other hand, where thisregion
unique one family canal-Maqdis
of Bayt live together.
can be argued as the model place where this
one family can live together.
DIAGRAM 1: BAYT AL-MAQDIS A MUSLIM MODEL FOR AMAN
Diagram 1: Bayt al-Maqdis a Muslim Model for Aman
Core Muslim teachings: Qur’an

and Sunnah
Humans belong to
ONE FAMILY
Nations and
Tribes
Li ta’arafu (“so that you

should get to know one
another”)
Moreover, the methodology of tadafu’, the concept of ‘adl, and the principle of non-
exclusion, 81 together not only emphasize the recognition of others but also take great care to
preserve the dignity of humans and what belongs to them as prescribed in the Muslim core
teaching sources. Preserving human dignity is a very central issue in Muslim thought and
attitude. 82 The explicit and sharp declaration of Umar to his governor of Egypt, Amr Ibn al-As,
argue that this understanding and attitude to preserving human dignity and the recognition
others led Umar to implement the principles of mutual respect.
DIAGRAM
Diagram 2:
2: BAYT AL-MAQDIS,
Bayt al-Maqdis, A MUSLIM
A Muslim MODEL
Model FOR AMAN
for Aman
Umar’s Assurance of Aman
Implementation of Preservation of human

mutual respect dignity & belongings
Fostering diversity & No compulsion in

plurality religion
Acknowledgement,
recognition, & appreciation of
others
Respect & valuing of Acceptance of others

other people’s rights
Moreover, the methodology of tadafu’, the concept of ‘adl, and

the principle of non-exclusion, 83 together not only emphasize the
recognition of others but also take great care to preserve the dig-
nity of humans and what belongs to them as prescribed in the
Muslim core teaching sources. Preserving human dignity is a very
centralDiagram
issue in3:Muslim
Bayt al-Maqdis,
thoughtA Muslim Model 84
and attitude. Aman
forThe explicit and
sharp declaration of Umar to his governor of Egypt, Amr Ibn al-
As, that “howto:
Leading could you have enslaved people, when their moth-
ers have born them free,”85 is a very clear example of this thought.
83
Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, Introducing Islamicjerusalem.
84
Ibid. 36
Abu al-Faraj Abd al-Rahman Ibn Ali Ibn al-Jawzi, Sirat wa Manaqb Amir al-
85
Mu’minin Umar Ibn al-Khattab, (Dar al-Da’wah al-Islamiyyah, Cairo: 2001), p. 89.
By establishing this model, one can argue that Umar’s aim was
to preserve the human dignity of the people of Bayt al-Maqdis in
status and rights regardless of their culture, religion, race, and gen-
der. This clearly manifested itself in the personal liberty, freedom,
and equality granted to the people of Bayt al-Maqdis in Umar’s
Assurance of Aman. Moreover, one may argue that this understand-
ing and attitude to preserving human dignity and the recognition
of others led Umar to implement the principles of mutual respect.
Leading to:
DIAGRAM 3: BAYT AL-MAQDIS, A MUSLIM MODEL FOR AMAN

Freedom of
movement
Protection
Security
Support
Citizenship
Belief
of property
No interference in
Practicing
Freedom
of rights
religion
of lives
their lives
Place
Individual
and their contents

Places of worship
The Management of Diversity in Bayt al-Maqdis

One of the most important elements for this model’s success was how the state and its
established power and authority managed the diverse society of Bayt al-Maqdis. The
foundations for managing the future relations between the three faiths were laid down during
that historical visit in the form of Umar’s Assurance of Aman to the people of Aelia. Although
THE MANAGEMENT OF DIVERSITY

IN BAYT AL-MAQDIS
One of the most important elements for this model’s success was
how the state and its established power and authority managed the
diverse society of Bayt al-Maqdis. The foundations for managing
the future relations between the three faiths were laid down during
that historical visit in the form of Umar’s Assurance of Aman to the
people of Aelia. Although this was a practical application of the
core Muslim teachings, the Qur’an and Sunnah, it was the major
outcome of the first Muslim Fath of Aelia. Indeed, it was the prac-
tical management initiative to implement the new vision for the
region. In addition, it formed the cornerstone of managing and
implementing the new vision where Umar granted the people of
Aelia an Assurance of Aman for themselves, their properties, their
churches, and their religion. Indeed, Umar’s Assurance of Aman
is an important reference text and a theoretical framework which
laid down the foundation principles and the essential criteria to
establish and manage a multicultural society in Bayt al-Maqdis for
the first time. It introduced, defined, and legislated the status and
rights of non-Muslims in Bayt al-Maqdis and ensured a peaceful
coexistence between the different communities there.
On this basis, Umar not only implemented this theoretical
framework but demonstrated his protection practically during his
first visit to Bayt al-Maqdis. Among the early events during this vis-
it, which emphasized his keenness to protect non-Muslim holy plac-
es, was Umar’s refusal to pray either in the Church of the Holy Sep-
ulcher or its atrium when he was visiting the place and was invited to
do so by Patriarch Sophronious. Abu-Munshar86 quoting Eutychius,
Sa’id Ibn al-Batriq, reconstructed the content of the conversation
between Umar and the patriarch. Umar’s justification for his refusal
86
Maher Abu-Munshar, Islamic Jerusalem and Its Christian: A History of Tolerance
and Tensions, (I. B. Tauris, London: 2007), p. 110.
was “if I prayed inside the Church, it would have been lost by you
and would have slipped from your power; for after my death the
Muslims would take it away from you, together saying that ‘Umar
prayed here’.” According to this account, it seems that Umar was not
satisfied that his verbal explanation might be enough to convince
the Muslims following his death not to change the church into a
mosque. Umar wrote Sophronious a decree which read, “The Mus-
lims shall not pray on the stairs, unless it is one person at a time. But
they shall not meet there for a congregational prayer announced by
the prayer call.”87 Moreover, Umar also succeeded during his visit
in establishing mutual respect with the people of Bayt al-Maqdis.
Sophronious trusted Umar with the Christians’ holiest shrine when
he entrusted him with the keys of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher.
In addition to establishing this mutual respect, Sophronious secured
the protection of the Church from intra-Christian dispute. Accord-
ing to this account, Umar passed the keys to one of his companions,
Abd Allah Ibn Nusaibah.88
All the changes introduced by Umar were essential steps towards
implementing his new vision, policy, and system. However, certain
aspects relating to Bayt al-Maqdis were not altered. For example,
this area was not chosen as the capital.89 In addition, there was no
thought of making Muslims the majority in Bayt al-Maqdis. Karen
Armstrong argues that Muslims were the minority in Bayt al-Ma-
qdis until the Crusader period.90 A young Malaysian postgraduate
student, Fatimatulzahra Abd al-Rahman, examined Armstrong’s
argument and presented an interesting discussion which concluded
87
Ibid.
88
Although this account was not mentioned in any early sources, Abu-Munshar’s
satisfaction with its authenticity is based on the fact that the keys are still in the hands of
the al-Nusaibah family. See: Maher Abu-Munshar, Islamic Jerusalem and Its Christian: A
History of Tolerance and Tensions, pp. 111-112.
89
90
Karen Armstrong, “Sacred Space: The Holiness of Islamicjerusalem”, pp. 14-15.
that this was the case .91 One can argue that the main issue for Mus-
lims at that time was not to change its demographical population
by excluding non-Muslims and transferring Muslims from Arabia
to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis so they would become the majority. In-
deed, this matter highlights the unique nature of this model where
the subject of majority and minority was not the issue. The main
concern was to establish a new vision for Bayt al-Maqdis, which
would lead to a peaceful coexistence and mutual respect between
the different communities in the region.
THE INCLUSIVE VISION OF

BAYT AL-MAQDIS UNDER MUSLIM RULE
What prevented Muslims from doing all this was their vision of
Bayt al-Maqdis. If Makkah and Madinah were exclusive areas for
Muslims, Bayt al-Maqdis was made by Muslims into an inclu-
sive, multireligious, and multicultural region where all traditions
and cultures could live in peace and harmony under the Muslim
rule. According to one verse in the Qur’an, Bayt al-Maqdis is “the
land which We have given Barakah for everyone in the universe”
(Qur’an 21: 71). This is the main vision of Bayt al-Maqdis –an
inclusive not an exclusive one. Karen Armstrong argues that Umar
Ibn al-Khattab was “faithful to the Islamic inclusive vision.”92 Un-
like the Jews and Christians, Muslims did not attempt to exclude
others from (Islamic) Jerusalem’s holiness and, instead of excluding
these religions, “Muslims were being taught to venerate them.” In
addition, Armstrong argues,
From the first, Muslims showed that the veneration of sacred space
did not have to mean conflict, enmity, killing … and exclusion of
91
Fatimatuzzahra Abd Rahman, “Political, Social and Religious Changes in Islamic
Jerusalem from the First Islamic Fath until the End of Umayyad Period (637 to 750
CE): An Analytical Study”, (Unpublished Master’s dissertation, al-Maktoum Institute
for Arabic and Islamic Studies, Dundee, 2004), p. 55.
92
Karen Armstrong, “Sacred Space: The Holiness of Islamicjerusalem”, p. 14.
others … From the start, the Muslims developed an inclusive vi-

sion of [Islamic] Jerusalem which did not deny the presence and
devotion of others but respected their rights and celebrated plu-
rality and co-existence. This inclusive vision of holiness is sorely
needed by the people of [Islamic] Jerusalem today.93
This Muslim vision for Bayt al-Maqdis was to establish peace

and stability in the area. To achieve this goal, one could argue that
sovereignty is necessary. However, it is the Muslim vision of inclu-
sion that is important, and not having sovereignty over the region
and its people –although that too is important. However, sover-
eignty (siyadah) over territory and people does not mean ownership
(milkiya) as it does not give the right of the ruling power to con-
fiscate individual ownership of property or to own individuals. As
quoted by Aminurraasyid Yatiban, the late Wahbah al-Zuhayli,94 a
Syrian prominent scholar, argues that “[s]overeignty gives the legal
power to the state to take any suitable action regarding the land
under its authority, such as introducing certain regulations. It does
not have the right to abandon the individual ownership of private
land, unless to be used for public necessity but also with compatible
value of compensation.”95 Indeed, sovereignty only gives power to
administer the well-being of the people and safeguard their terri-
tory. In short, Umar used his power to reshape a good relationship
between the different communities establishing Bayt al-Maqdis as a
model for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect.
One can argue that sovereignty alone does not lead to peace,
security, and stability. Without the vision coming first, there will
never be peace or security and stability. It is the inclusive nature
of the vision that allows people to live in peace, even if this is a
93
Ibid., p. 18-19.
94
Wahbah al-Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuh, (Dar al-Fikr, 4th edition, Bei-
rut: 2002), p. 6331.
95
Aminurraasyid Yatiban, The Islamic Concept of Sovereignty: Islamicjerusalem during
the First Islamic Conquest as a Case Study, (Unpublished Master’s dissertation, al-Mak-
toum Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies, Dundee, 2003).
Muslim vision and those living under the vision are not all Mus-
lims. Generally, during the Muslim rule, people in Bayt al-Maqdis
enjoyed safety, peace, security, stability, and prosperity –with the
exception of the period of the Crusades (1099-1198 CE). Indeed,
Bayt al-Maqdis enjoyed, in particular, the special care of the Ca-
liphs and the Muslim rulers. In addition to being a spiritual and
political center, Bayt al-Maqdis was also a cultural, learning and
teaching center from which a large number of scholars graduated.
Scholarly activities took place on a wider scale and at various levels,
and schools, mosques, and hospitals were founded.96
BAYT AL-MAQDIS: A REGION OF HOPE,

PEACE, AND STABILITY
Bayt al-Maqdis represents a region of hope, peace, and stability for
Muslims as it was the region of hope for Prophet Abraham. When
his people in his home country tried to kill him, he was ordered
to migrate to the land of hope, Bayt al-Maqdis. Once again, when
Prophet Muhammad lost hope of any support in Makkah and its
surrounding area, he was taken by night to the land of hope, Bayt
al-Maqdis. Since then, Bayt al-Maqdis has always been a symbol
of hope for Muslims. Even with all the turmoil and troubles in
the region, it still represents for contemporary Muslims the land of
hope for the future.
For non-Muslims, the first Muslim Fath of Bayt al-Maqdis put an
end to centuries of instability, religious exclusion, persecution, and
colonial rule. When Muslims came to Bayt al-Maqdis, the first thing
they did was to solve the existing religious and social problems by
establishing peace between the inhabitants of that region. Before the
first Muslim Fath, Aelia had been a closed and insular region, mainly
for the Byzantine Christians. Indeed, it was very much an exclusive
region, i.e. just for the locals and the Byzantines. Bayt al-Maqdis, on
96
the other hand, was not an exclusive region during the Muslim rule
but an inclusive one. The first Muslim Fath liberated Christians from
the persecution of the Byzantine occupiers; rid the Jews from the
Byzantine oppression; restored their presence to that region after an
absence of five hundred years;97 enabled all the communities to live
side by side peacefully for the first time after a long history of conflict;
and provided the grounds for establishing Bayt al-Maqdis as a model
for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect.
Jewish sources, for example, show that the Jews of Syria were
“patiently awaiting” the arrival of the Muslim armies because they
were groaning under the rule of the tyrannical Byzantines and suf-
fering cruel oppression in the fifth, sixth, and early seventh cen-
turies CE.98 The Jewish response to the first Muslim Fath of Bayt
al-Maqdis was “characterized as generally positive,”99 because it
terminated the Byzantine rule and liberated the Jews from their
oppressors. Indeed, the Jews returned to Bayt al-Maqdis only when
the Muslims took over and opened it up to all nations. The Jews
had been excluded by the Romans (Hadrian) in 135 CE, but the
Muslims brought them back after 500 years to establish peace be-
tween the three Abrahamic faiths, Islam, Christianity and Judaism.
For the first time in history, these three faiths managed to live to-
gether under the new vision of Bayt al-Maqdis.100
After the second Fath of Bayt al-Maqdis by Salah al-Din in 1187
CE, two new quarters were created within the walls of the Old
City: the Maghribi Quarter and the Jewish Quarter with the Sharaf
97
Karen Armstrong, A History of Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, p. 420. See also:
Amnon Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam: Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century, (Harvard
University Press, USA: 1984), p. 14.
98
Ben Zeev (Abu Zuaib), Ka’ab al-Ahbar: Jews and Judaism in the Islamic Tradition,
(Jerusalem: 1976), p. 35.
99
Abd Allah Al-Sharif, “Mawqif Yahud al-Sham min al-Fatih al-Islami”, Majalat
Jami’at Umm al-Qura li Ulum al-Shari’a wa al-Lugha al-Arabia wa Adabiha, Vol: 16, No:
28, (Shawwal 1424 AH/2004), p. 526.
100
Quarter in-between. In short, the Muslim Fath of Bayt al-Maqdis

made it possible for Jews to return to the region. Both Umar and
Salah al-Din invited Jews to settle in Bayt al-Maqdis. When Islam
ruled in that part of the world, both after the first Muslim Fath in
the time of Umar Ibn Khattab and after the second liberation by
Salah al-Din, the different traditions managed to live in harmony
and peace with one another.
The Christians of Aelia also greatly welcomed the first Mus-
lim Fath.101 This could be argued as being related to the new vi-
sion of Bayt al-Maqdis which provided Christians with the respect
which would lead to good treatment, peace, security, and stability.
Runciman argues that Orthodox Christians “finding themselves
spared the persecution that they had feared and paying taxes that,
in spite of the Jizya demanded from the Christians, were far lower
than in the Byzantine times, showed small inclination to question
their destiny.”102 In addition, Runciman quotes Jacobite Patriarch
of Antioch, Michael the Syrian, who stated that God “raised from
the south the children of Ishmael (Muslims) to deliver us from the
hands of the Romans.”103 Moreover, Butler quotes Ibn al-Ibri who
stated that Christians were optimistic towards the Muslims, “God
of vengeance delivered us out of the hand of the Romans by means
of the Arabs. Then although our Churches were not restored to us,
since under Arab rule each Christian community retained its actual
possession, still it profited us not a little to be saved from the cruelty
of the Romans and their bitter hatred against us.”104
101
Maher Abu-Munshar, Islamic Jerusalem and its Christian: A History of Tolerance
and Tensions, pp. 105-109.
102
Steven Ranciman, A History of the Crusades (Cambridge Academic Press, Cam-
bridge: 1987), pp. 20-21.
103
Ibid.
104
Butler, Arab Conquest of Egypt and the Last Thirty Years of the Roman Dominion,
p.158.
Karen Armstrong argues that it was not surprising that Nestori-

an and Monophysite Christians welcomed the Muslims and found
them preferable to the Byzantines.105 The Muslim sources also re-
cord a letter sent to the Muslim army, when Abu Ubayda camped
in Fahl in the Jordan Valley: “O Muslims, we prefer you to the
Byzantines, although they are of our own faith, because you keep
faith with us and are more merciful to us and refrain from doing us
injustice and your rule over us is better than theirs, for they have
robbed us of our goods and our homes.” 106
Crusade historians such as William of Tyre and Michael Foss,107
argue that for 372 years, since the first Muslim Fath in 637 until
1009 CE (al-Hakim ruling), Christians practiced their religion free-
ly.108 Moreover, Bayt al-Maqdis for the Christians was an open and
safe region to travel to.109 In addition, both Christians and Jews were
employed by the Muslim authority in Bayt al-Maqdis in all positions.
Ahmad Ibn Tulun, the local Turkish commander, who established an
independent state in Egypt away from the Abbasid Caliphate from
868-904 CE, appointed a Christian as a governor of Bayt al-Maqdis.
He also allowed a new Jewish sect to establish itself in the region.110
Al-Maqdisi described the situation of both Christians and Jews in
Bayt al-Maqdis before the beginning of the Crusader period as “[e]
verywhere the Christians and Jews have the upper hand.”111
105
Karen Armstrong, A History of Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, p. 232.
106
Muhammad Ibn Abd Allah al-Azdi, Tarikh Futuh al-Sham, (Mu’assasat Sijil
al-Arab, Cairo: 1970), p. 111.
107
Maher Abu-Munshar, Islamic Jerusalem and Its Christian: A History of Tolerance
and Tensions, pp. 125-127.
108
William of Tyre, A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea, (E.A. Babcock Octagon
Books, New York: 1976), pp. 89-93.
109
Michael Foss, People of the First Crusades, (Caxton, London: 2002), p. 29.
110
Karen Armstrong, A History of Jerusalem: One City, Three, pp. 254-255.
111
Abu Abd Allah Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Ahsan al-Taqasim Fi Ma’rift al-Aqalim,
(Brill, 2nd edition, Leiden: 1909), p. 167.
One might argue that the Muslims’ devotion to Bayt al-Maqdis

is not a result of colonialist aims or a desire to expand their rule,
nor is it based on false racist nationalist claims. On the contrary,
the nature of Bayt al-Maqdis and its special qualities constitute the
fundamental reason for their concern for it. Umar’s Assurance of
Aman not only rejected the notion of the supremacy of one people
or race over the others but presented Bayt al-Maqdis as a model
both for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect, and for conflict
resolution. One of the main characteristics of Bayt al-Maqdis is its
competing political and religious claims; it could be argued that
it should be presented as a model for conflict resolution through
constructive argumentation methodology as a means for a ‘con-
structive dialogue’ and positive negotiation with its conflicting
parties.112 The adoption of this constructive dialogue methodology
would open the way for conflict resolution.
The Muslims demonstrated that this model could even work in
conflict situations and areas where there had been long centuries of
war and exclusion. Even at a later stage, Salah al-Din was very faith-
ful and committed to this inclusive vision. During the negotiations
in the third Crusade, Salah al-Din replied to King Richard I (the
Lionheart) of England in October 1191 CE by acknowledging the
Christian rights in Bayt al-Maqdis, asserting the Muslim rights and
refuting Richard’s claim that Muslims were invaders. In his reply, he
stated “Bayt al-Maqdis is ours as much as it is yours.”113
What was the basis of that original peace and stability? It was
the concept of ‘adl (justice). Justice is a prerequisite for peace and
stability. The formula which has been produced on the peace pro-
cess negotiations for the current conflict in West Asia (Middle East)
112
113
Baha’ al-Din Ibn Shaddad, Sirat Salah al-Din al-Ayoubi: aI-Nawadir al-Sultani-
yya wa al-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya, (Dar al-Manar, Cairo: 2000), p. 152. See also: Donald P
Little, “Jerusalem under the Ayyubids and Mamluks”, Jerusalem in History, ed. Kamil J.
Asali, (Scorpion Publishing, Essex: 1989), p. 179.
in the last decade is based on the Arab and the Palestinian point of
view of “Peace for Land,” and on the Israeli point of view, “Peace
for Security.” Neither viewpoint is an appropriate formula. The
exchange of land will not bring peace and security. In addition,
imposing security will not bring peace. The formula based on his
understanding of the history of the region should be that neither
peace nor security will be established without justice. So, the for-
mula should be ‘Peace for Justice’ which will lead to preserving hu-
man dignity and mutual respect. In other words, justice is necessary
before peace can be achieved.
BAYT AL-MAQDIS: THE KEY TO WAR

AND PEACE IN THE REGION
With the peace among the different faiths and cultures during the
Muslim rules, stability was the obvious result; and the whole region
witnessed this very clearly. Indeed, Bayt al-Maqdis had always held
the key to war and peace in the region. Whenever it has been bless-
ed with peace, the whole region has enjoyed peace, security, and
stability. In another words, to achieve global peace and stability, it
is necessary to have peace and stability in Bayt al-Maqdis. Peace and
stability in that region would bring about global peace and stability.
Until this is achieved, the entire world will not rest. Indeed, Bayt
al-Maqdis acts as a center for peace and for conflict in the world.
Some might argue that this may be true for the Muslim world but
not for the rest of the world. The formula is clearly a global one. In
the past, why did the farmers leave their land in Europe to go and
fight during the Crusader period? Today, for example, when there
is a conflict in that region, everyone pays the price of that war in
one way or another: more taxes, higher petrol prices, etc. In short,
settling the issue of Bayt al-Maqdis in a way that ensures justice
and restores the rights of its people holds the key to world peace
and regional stability.
CONCLUSION
In the seventh century, and in particular, during the first Muslim
Fath of Bayt al-Maqdis, the land of hope provided the world with
the famous document known as Umar’s Assurance of Aman to the
people of Aelia (Bayt al-Maqdis). This fundamental landmark of
hope established a new system to manage diversity, laid the foun-
dations for future relations, and led to reshaping the relationships
between people of diverse faiths who inhabited the region, name-
ly, Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Indeed, Umar’s Assurance was
the jewel of the first Muslim Fath of Aelia, and the beacon for de-
veloping Bayt al-Maqdis’s unique and creative vision, nature, and
model. This marked the beginning of a new and distinguished era
of safety, peace, stability, security, progress, development, and pros-
perity. With his global feeling and a local touch, Umar was trying
to resolve a local conflict with an international approach. In other
words, he was “thinking globally” and “acting locally.” In short,
Umar’s global vision and local focus presented Bayt al-Maqdis as a
model for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect.
Umar therefore successfully created, developed, and managed a
new multicultural environment in Bayt al-Maqdis where differenc-
es among its people were not only acknowledged and recognized
but accepted, respected, valued, and protected. Bayt al-Maqdis pro-
vides and promotes a climate of religious and cultural engagement114
114
For this article, multiculturalism –as a process, a particular way of thinking, and
about change– provides the important context for much of what we do, while cultural
engagement has to be our response to it. Indeed, cultural engagement consists of in-
tellectual, emotional, and behavioral components which cultivate the positive attitude
towards others. Moreover, cultural engagement is a two-way traffic and an invitation to
identify a common ground through which coexistence can happen. The end product of
cultural engagement is peaceful coexistence in an environment of mutual understanding
and respect. In short, cultural engagement is clearly the way to address the challenges of
multiculturalism and produce a positive response, which helps the society to challenge
alternative perspectives on multiculturalism and difference. In addition, cultural engage-
ment is essential to contest the notion of a “clash of civilizations” and address the absence
of understanding between cultures –which often amounts to mutual incomprehension–
and the associated climate of suspicion.
and dialogue, mutual respect and diversity, and social justice. It also
encourages, supports, and contributes to fostering a multicultural
ethos of mutual cultural understanding and respect, and a common
understanding between different communities and individuals at
all levels.
One can argue that the differences between cultures, commu-
nities, and religions should give strength to the society as a whole.
Indeed, different cultural lenses which people from diverse back-
grounds bring to their society should enrich their experiences and
add to their pursuit for a common ground. In examining Umar’s
Assurance as a whole, it was seen that Muslims were not afraid of
recognizing the needs of others and dealing with them. On the
contrary, they discovered and established a model where they saw
how practically fostering a culture of diversity, plurality, and mu-
tual respect of differences was a positive and strong opportunity
rather than a threat.
In this critical time of the 21st century, and in particular through
serious scholarly findings, the land of hope is representing itself in
a modern fashion as a model for peaceful coexistence and mutual
respect. Indeed, our understanding of Bayt al-Maqdis as a model
for peaceful coexistence and mutual respect with all its intertwined
elements, nature, and characteristics, as developed and presented
in this article, could be seen as a Muslim contribution in the twen-
ty-first century to establishing a new agenda and a new frame of
reference for safety, peace, stability, security, progress, development,
and prosperity in the region under the Muslim rule.
Indeed, several supporting pieces of evidence have been provid-
ed to support the author’s central argument that Bayt al-Maqdis
under the Muslim rule is not exclusive but inclusive and should
be opened up “to everyone in the universe (lil’alamin)” (Qur’an,
21: 71), “so that you should get to know one another (li ta’arafu)”
(Qur’an, 49: 13), not that you may despise one another. It gives the
world a model of a common and open space in which people from

different backgrounds can live together in peaceful coexistence and
mutual respect. Indeed, under the Muslim rule it is not closed and
insular, but a center in which diversity and pluralism thrive through
mutual respect and coexistence. This unique global common space
of openness and Barakah has made Bayt al-Maqdis an ideal Hope
(Amal) region where the one human family can make li ta’arafu, live
together in Aman and enjoy this Barakah.
DIAGRAM 4: BAYT AL-MAQDIS, A MUSLIM MODEL FOR AMAN
Core Muslim teachings:

Qur’an and Sunnah
Humans belong to
ONE FAMILY Barakah
Concept of ‘Adl Methodology of

(Justice) Tadafu’
Nations and Amal

Tribes (Hope)
Inclusion: Constructive
Principle of argumentation
non-exclusion methodology
Li ta’arafu Lil‘alamin
(so that you should get to (for everyone in the
know one another) universe)
Aman
In conclusion, Bayt al-Maqdis (Islamicjerusalem) was created

by Muslims as an inclusive, multireligious, and multicultural re-
gion where all traditions and cultures could live in peace and stabil-
ity. Indeed, its uniqueness is highlighted through its vision which
presents a model for Aman (peaceful coexistence and mutual re-
spect). It also offers a way for people from different religious and
cultural backgrounds to live together in an environment of multi-
culturalism and religious and cultural engagement, diversity, and
mutual respect. Indeed, under the Muslim rule it was not closed
and limited, but a center in which the richness of cultural diversity
and pluralism thrived in a spirit of mutual respect and coexistence.
It was the model of common space in which people from different
backgrounds lived in peace together. This was the nature, identity,
and vision of Bayt al-Maqdis in the past during the Muslim rule.
When the Muslim rule returns back to this Holy Land in the fu-
ture, Bayt al-Maqdis will serve, once again, as a model for peaceful
coexistence and mutual respect.
CHAPTER V
AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE

STATUS OF AL-QUDS (JERUSALEM)
BERDAL ARAL*
AL-QUDS UNDER THE BRITISH CONTROL

The status of al-Quds (Jerusalem)115 did not feature as a problem
between 1517-1917 when the area was under the undisputed
sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. However, al-Quds –and the
surrounding areas put into the ‘Mandate for Palestine’ by the Brit-
ish– fell to British troops following the Ottoman defeat in the First
World War. Accordingly, the Ottoman armies were forced to evac-
uate the largely Arab territories of the empire to be supplanted by
the invading troops in 1917. It was also in 1917 that the British
announced the ominous Balfour Declaration of 1917 which prom-
ised to establish a ‘national home’ for Jews in Palestine although 90
percent of the inhabitants of the area, which was later designated
as “Mandatory Palestine,” were Arabs. Britain reigned over Jeru-
salem as the “military occupant” between 1917-1922 and then as
*
Dr. Berdal Aral is professor of international relations at Istanbul Medeniyet Uni-
versity, Department of International Relations.
115
In this study, I employ the term “al-Quds,” as has been commonly used in the
Arab and Muslim world for centuries, to designate the city known in the dominant in-
ternational narrative as “Jerusalem.” The word “Jerusalem” will be used if and when the
context so requires. The word “al-Quds” could be translated into English as the “Holy
One,” or, more specifically, the “Abode of Holiness.”
mandatory administrator (1922-1947) under the sponsorship of

the League of Nations (founded in 1919). This means, then, that
when the British took control of Jerusalem for thirty years did not
necessarily establish the British sovereignty over Jerusalem.116
The mandatory regime in Palestine was no different in kind
from other mandatory regimes established in the Arab Middle
East after the First World War. The substance and goals of these
mandatory regimes were enunciated in Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations: “Certain communities formerly belong-
ing to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development
where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally
recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and
assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand
alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consid-
eration in the selection of the Mandatory.”
This injunction was apparently premised on the idea that Pales-
tine, as in the case of other mandated territories in the Middle East
such as Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, would be granted independence
based on the principle of self-determination. This meant that the
community which constituted the numerical majority in a given
territory and had not attained independence, as in the case of, say,
the Arab majorities in Iraq and Syria, would be eventually accorded
independence. No doubt, the overwhelming majority of the inhab-
itants of the Mandatory Palestine in 1922 (88 percent) were Arabs
(most of them Muslim) which suggests that, under international
law, it was only the Arab majority of Palestine which, in the 1920s,
had the rightful claim to form a state.
The British mandatory regime which prevailed in Palestine be-
tween 1922-1948 had been given, by the League of Nations, the
116
Antonio Cassese, “Legal Considerations on the International Status of Jerusa-
lem”, The Human Dimension of International Law: Selected Papers, ed. Antonio Cassese,
et al., (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2008), p. 273.
right of administration in this area. This meant that sovereignty

in the Mandatory Palestine would have to be restored to the Pal-
estinian Arabs once the British, as the mandatory, left the region.
The whole episode of the Jewish immigration into Palestine in the
1920s, 1930s, and 1940s mostly under the protection of the British
administration against the wishes of the indigenous population was
doubtless a breach of the avowed goals of the mandatory regimes,
a violation of the self-determination principle, and a manifestation
of bad faith. This, in my view, is the broader context within which
the status of al-Quds ought to be assessed in the context of inter-
national law.
In the preamble of “The Palestine Mandate,” which is the spe-
cific international text, issued in 1922, regulating the governing
principles of the British mandate in Palestine,117 it is said that, like
other Arab territories put under mandatory regimes, the mandate
for Palestine is accorded to Britain “for the purpose of giving ef-
fect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations.” In this document, no mention is made of the status
of al-Quds (Jerusalem). Suffice to note, however, that Article 13
and 14 of the text give legal pledges about the protection of the
Holy Sites and religious buildings in Jerusalem (al-Quds) and the
rest of Palestine as well as the right of communities to freely exer-
cise their religion inside the sites and buildings of faith. Al-Quds
continued to remain as an undivided city as part of Palestine
during the mandatory period. The city served as the main center
of administration from the early 1920s up until the end of the
British mandate in 1948.
As it became apparent that the British mandatory authorities
could no longer control the interminable tension between the Ar-
abs and Jews in Palestine as well as the escalation of the Zionist
117
“The Palestine Mandate”, Lillian Goldman Law Library, http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp, (Accessed on January 10, 2019)
terror against the British officials, when the latter began to impose
some restrictions on Zionist activities in the later stages of the man-
datory rule, it decided to wash its hands of the Palestinian imbro-
glio by delegating the problem to the United Nations (UN) Gen-
eral Assembly in 1947. The assembly, dominated by the Western
group of states with a miniscule of presence from Asia and Africa,
then adopted a plan (the Partition Plan) by two thirds majority on
November 29, 1947, to partition Palestine.118 The plan granted 56.5
of the Mandatory Palestine to the Jews, although they formed only
one third of its inhabitants, 43 percent to the Arabs although they
constituted two thirds majority, and Jerusalem was designated as a
corpus separatum, meaning that it would become an international
city under the trusteeship of the UN. Not surprisingly, this sinister
plan was strongly opposed by Palestinian Arabs. While Britain was
not necessarily enthusiastic about the UN General Assembly’s pro-
posal, it nonetheless did not seek to obstruct its acceptance in the
assembly and thus opted for abstention when the votes were cast.
All of the then existing Muslim states, alongside Cuba, Greece, and
India, voted against the motion.119 The Arab states considered the
plan as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and denounced it as
an illegal and immoral document. They, therefore, argued that the
Arab world was not bound by Resolution 181.120
118
“Resolution No. 181, Resolution adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on the Palestinian Question”, United Nations, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/038/88/IMG/NR003888.pdf?OpenElement, (Ac-
cessed on January 10, 2019).
119
“How They Voted: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181”, Unit-
ed Nations General Assembly, http://www.theicenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/
icenternov_29_un_general_assembly_resolution_181.pdf. (Accessed on January 10,
2019). For the resolution see: “UN General Assembly Resolution No. 181”, United Na-
tions General Assembly, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NR0/038/88/IMG/NR003888.pdf?OpenElement, (Accessed on January 10, 2019).
120
lem”, p. 274.
Legally speaking, not only was it not a binding decision, but the
Partition Plan also suffered a number of procedural and substantive
defects. To begin with, according to the Charter of the UN, the UN
General Assembly is not mandated to adopt binding legislation;
this meant that, although this body is conferred by Article 10 of
the UN Charter (1945) the power to “discuss any questions or any
matters within the scope of the present Charter,” it could only do
so in the form of “recommendations to the Members of the United
Nations.”121 Even if one assumes that the recommendations of the
General Assembly on the mandated territories “bore more weight
that any ordinary resolution” since this UN body was given special
duties on mandated territories,122 this would still fall short of ren-
dering the resolution binding.
Secondly, Resolution 181 was the product of enormous pressure
exerted by the U.S. and the Zionist lobbies around the world which
in some cases was tantamount to coercion, especially against small
states. That the motion was twice deferred because of the failure of
the Zionists and their supporters to obtain the required majority
in the assembly, demonstrates the degree of pressure, threat, and
intimidation confronted by many delegations and their govern-
ments. This resolution was thus tainted by the existence of “threats”
against targeted states which was prohibited by Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter. This article holds that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force.”
Thirğdly, Resolution 181 was against the principle of self-de-
termination in two respects: first, self-determination was then and
still is in principle based on majority rule. Even in 1947, which
represents a high time for Jewish immigration into Palestine, two
121
“Charter of the United Nations”, United Nations, https://treaties.un.org/doc/
publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf, (Accessed on January 10, 2019).
122
lem”, p. 274.
thirds of the inhabitants of Palestine were Arabs -1,325,000 Arabs

versus 630,000 Jews. Yet, the plan awarded the minority Jews (one
third of the entire population) with 56.5 percent of Palestine123 as
opposed to the mere 43 percent awarded to the Palestinian Arabs.
Second, the Arab majority of Palestine was adamantly opposed to
the partition plan. The imposition of an unwanted plan against the
wishes of the great majority of the people within a territorial unit is
an awesome infringement of the self-determination principle.
THE DIVISION OF AL-QUDS

On the day when Britain withdrew from Palestine on May 14,
1948, the Zionists proclaimed the founding of the state of Israel.
Immediately, the neighboring Arab armies, poorly equipped and
trained and small in number, attacked the new state. As a conse-
quence of the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, Israel defeated the
Arab armies and enlarged its territory beyond that which was fore-
seen in the Partition Plan. Indeed, at the time when the armistice
agreement was signed in 1949, the western part of al-Quds and
parts of Mandatory Palestine, such as Haifa, Safed, and Tiberias,
that had been allocated for the would-be Arab state, had fallen into
the hands of the Zionist state. As a result, Israel came to control 78
percent of the entire landmass of mandatory Palestine.
After seizing the western part of al-Quds during the 1948-49
War, Israel asserted that it was no longer bound by the Partition
Plan, claimed legal title over the area without however officially
annexing it and sought to assimilate the city into Israel proper. In-
deed, after capturing the western part of al-Quds, the Zionist state
gradually extended its jurisdiction into the area and moved some of
the public buildings into it. Israel has since endeavored to change
the demographic, administrative, and juridical character of the
123
Overall, the Jewish lands were more fertile than the lands allotted to Palestinian
Arabs.
western part of al-Quds to an extent which could only be described

as de facto annexation. The eastern part of al-Quds (alongside the
West Bank), meanwhile, was militarily seized by Jordan during the
1948-49 War in order, inter alia, to pre-empt the area’s absorption
by Israel. Although Resolution 181 was not fully implemented in
practice due to its denunciation by Palestinian Arabs and to Is-
rael’s additional capture of territory, it was never repealed by the
UN General Assembly. This suggests that Israel cannot legally ex-
tend its sovereignty over any parts of al-Quds and all the rest of the
territories which it seized outside of areas allocated in the original
partition plan for Jews, including West Bank and Gaza and those
areas such as Safed, Haifa, Tiberias, Jaffa, which are today claimed
as part of Israel.
When justifying its military seizure of the western part of al-
Quds, Israel alleged that it acted in self-defence against Jordan be-
cause the latter had occupied the eastern part of al-Quds at the
initial stages of the war. Even if we assume that in occupying the
western part of al-Quds, Israel acted in self-defence against Jordan,
this did not confer Israel the right of sovereignty over the western
part of the city. The right of self-defence entitles a state only to re-
pel, by force, an armed attack threatening its independence and ter-
ritorial integrity. The right of self-defence is not a legal ground for
obtaining additional territory. Under the UN Charter system, wars
of whatever origins and nature are not considered as a legal, and
thus, an acceptable instrument of sovereignty claims. This is the
case even if the territory did not have a proper sovereign previous-
ly.124 The UN Charter is a colossal roadblock against the territorial
ambitions of aggressive states. Therefore, Jordan’s de facto control of
Eastern al-Quds after 1948 could not legally give Israel the right to
enjoy sovereignty in the area even if one assumes that Israel acted
124
lem”, p. 280.
in self-defence against Jordan. The heart of the matter is, as Cassese

states, that “neither Jordan nor Israel ever acquired sovereignty over
Jerusalem.”125
Even after seizing the western part of al-Quds by force during
the 1948-49 War and alleging that it was no longer bound by the
Partition Plan, Israel conceded that no final status of the city could
be determined without the approval of the UN.126 Combined with
this commitment, the UN Security Council and General Assembly
have for decades adopted scores of resolutions which cautioned Is-
rael not to change the status of Jerusalem.
With some exceptions, the then existing states started to rec-
ognize Israel after the Zionists declared independence in 1948.
This did not however suggest that states recognizing Israel also
recognized Israeli sovereignty over the areas going beyond those
which were apportioned for it in the Partition Plan. Besides, there
is no evidence to suggest that the Israeli claim over the western
part of al-Quds, based on de facto military occupation, has been
internationally recognized as giving it the right of sovereignty
over this area.127 Zionists and their supporters have claimed that
the UN recognized the sovereignty of Israel over West Jerusalem
and Jordan over East Jerusalem by virtue of its silence between
1952 and 1967. This is far from the truth because the UN’s failure
to protest the parties could only be explained away by the inabil-
ity of the UN bodies to get rid of the political stalemate blocking
decision. The UN’s silence alone cannot transform de facto con-
trol over a piece of land into de jure authority.128
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid., p. 277.
127
John Quigley, “The Legal Status of Jerusalem under International Law”, The
Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol: 24, (1994), p. 21.
128
lem”, p. 281.
THE ANNEXATION OF AL-QUDS BY ISRAEL

Another war between Israel and its Arab neighbors broke out
when the former attacked Egypt in June 1967 triggering the Six-
Day War. Jordan joined the war in support of Egypt as part of
a previous agreement envisioning collective self-defence in case of
an armed attack by Israel. The Zionist state defeated all of its ad-
versaries within a few days and broadened its territories threefold.
Consequently, the entire Palestine, including East Jerusalem, fell
into Israel’s hands. The Israeli seizure of the eastern part of al-Quds
was the result of its own aggression. Nonetheless, this did not deter
Israel from immediately taking measures to assimilate this area into
Israel. Israel issued a series of legislations after 1967 to extend its
jurisdiction into the eastern part of al-Quds. The UN viewed this
broadening of Israeli jurisdiction as a de facto annexation which was
a patent breach of the laws of war and territory. Accordingly, this
Israeli move was condemned by the UN. It is known that, there is
a clear prohibition of international law for the belligerent occupant
to avoid replacing its law with that prevailing previously in an oc-
cupied territory. Thus, international legal norms caution occupying
states a fortiori against annexing territories seized by military force.
The UN Security Council Resolution 242 also confirmed this
interpretation by calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied
territories which it seized in the 1967 war, including East Jerusa-
lem. Even if one assumes that Israel acted in self-defence against
Jordan, this still does not change the international legal rules which
consider the seizure of territory by force as illegal and demand its
return to the rightful holders of the title. Thus, the UN considers
Israeli presence in East Jerusalem as an instance of belligerent oc-
cupation. This, in turn, suggests that Israel cannot legally obtain
sovereignty over the eastern part of al-Quds.
However, the Zionist state continued to betray the collective
will of international society and international institutions, like the
UN, in the 1980s. Indeed, the Israeli parliament enacted a Basic

Law on July 30, 1980, which declared that “Jerusalem, complete
and united, is the capital of Israel.”129 This was a clear manifestation
of Israel’s intent to extend its sovereignty into both western and
eastern parts of al-Quds by annexing the eastern side as it had done
through a series of fait accompli with regard to the western side.
Both the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN
condemned the new legislation and declared that it was devoid of
any legal effect. For instance, the Security Council Resolution No.
478 of August 20, 1980, adopted with 14 votes in favor and the
U.S. abstaining, held in Paragraph 3, that the Security Council de-
termines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions
taken by Israel, the occupying power, which have altered or purport
to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and
in particular the recent “basic law” on Jerusalem, are null and void
and must be rescinded forthwith.130
As a result of the fundamental changes that came about in the
nature and composition of international society after the accep-
tance of the UN Charter, as well as in the normative features of
international law, the principle of effectiveness which was based on
the legal endorsement of situations that came about through brute
force has been replaced by the principle of legality. Hence both the
treaty law as well as the customary international law rule out the
possibility of Israel benefiting from the fruits of its military aggres-
sion and thus gaining sovereignty over al-Quds.131 For instance, the
Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970, adopted by consensus in
the UN General Assembly, draws on the inadmissibility of territo-
129
“Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel”, The Knesset, https://www.knesset.gov.
il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm, (Accessed on January 10, 2019).
130
“UNSCR Resolution 478: Territories Occupied by Israel”, United Nations Secu-
rity Council, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/478, (Accessed on January 12, 2019).
131
lem”, p. 286.
rial gains based on military aggression. Indeed, according to Princi-

ple I, “No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of
force shall be recognized as legal.”132
For decades, Israel has been persistently seeking to alter the
demographic and physical characteristics, inter alia, of the eastern
part of al-Quds (and the rest of West Bank). The whole canopy of
Israel’s perverse manipulations in this part of the city is to margin-
alize the Palestinians’ presence so that they are supplanted en masse
by Jews. As of February 2019, about 700,000 Jews have established
themselves as colonial settlers in more than 200 illegal settlements
in the eastern part of al-Quds and the West Bank. Undoubted-
ly, this is a flagrant breach of international law, in particular, the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949133 which, in Article 49, reads,
“Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not,
are prohibited, regardless of their motive.”134 The terms of Article
47, meanwhile, should serve as a restraint against any Israeli at-
tempt at the partial incorporation or annexation of the eastern part
of al-Quds into Israel:
132
“Resolution No. 2625 (XXV): Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations”, United Nations, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/348/90/IMG/NR034890.pdf?OpenElement, (Accessed
on January 13, 2019).
133
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols (1977). The
texts can be accessed via: “The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Pro-
tocols”, International Committee of the Red Cross, https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-
law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm,
(Accessed on January 13, 2019). Specifically, for the Fourth Geneva Convention, see:
“Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War”, Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/
INTRO/380?OpenDocument, (Accessed on January 13, 2019).
134
“Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War”,
International Committee of the Red Cross, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/INTRO/380?OpenDocument (Accessed on January 13, 2019).
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be de-

prived…of the benefits of the present Convention by any change
introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the
institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agree-
ment concluded between the authorities of the occupied territo-
ries and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter
of the whole or part of the occupied territory.
The UN bodies have adopted numerous resolutions since

1967 which held that the Fourth Geneva Convention is, inter
alia, applicable to the occupied East Jerusalem and warned Israel
not to alter the demographic, physical, and administrative struc-
ture of the city. This is a position which was reaffirmed by the
International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion, in 2004,
on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territory.135 In the said case, the court maintained
that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable in any occupied
territory in the event of an armed conflict arising between two or
more High Contending Parties. Israel and Jordan were parties
to the Fourth Convention when the 1967 armed conflict broke
out. The court accordingly finds that the convention is applicable
in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict lay to the
east of the 1949 Armistice Demarcation line established between
Israel and Jordan (The Green Line) and which were occupied
during that conflict by Israel, there being no need for any enquiry
into the precise prior status of these territories.
In 1988, Jordan renounced its legal claim to the West Bank
and East Jerusalem which it had annexed in 1950. Soon after, the
Palestinian National Council adopted the declaration of Palestin-
ian independence on November 15, 1988. The capital of the new
state would be al-Quds. This proclamation was warmly received by
the UN General Assembly which, in December 1988, with over-
135
“Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory Advisory”, International Court of Justice, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-re-
lated/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf, (Accessed on January 13, 2019).
whelming majority, reaffirmed the Palestinian right of sovereignty

in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967.136
The Oslo “peace” process which began in 1993 was a turning
point in the history of the Palestinian drama. At least some Pales-
tinians and most of the international actors hoped that the pro-
cess would lead to some degree of accommodation between Israel
and the Palestinians in the 1990s. The whole rationale of mutual
negotiations between Israel and the PLO137 was premised on the
idea of a gradual realization of a Palestinian state in return for the
Palestinians’ recognition of Israel. Prior to and during the negoti-
ations, the United States and Israel exerted enormous pressure on
the Palestinian delegation to forego, allegedly temporarily, certain
rights which the Palestinians possessed. The Palestinian represen-
tatives bowed before this pressure in the name of “pragmatism.”
According to the Declaration of Principles, signed in 1993 (Oslo
I/Washington Agreement),138 the Palestinian side had to content
itself with autonomy for a few years, rather than independence,
before the final status negotiations commenced. Under the terms
of the agreement, the issue of Palestinian sovereignty was hence
adjourned alongside other key issues, such as the return of refu-
gees, illegal Jewish settlements, and Jerusalem (al-Quds). Hence,
136
“A/RES/43/177: Question of Palestine”, United Nations Security Council, http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r177.htm, (Accessed on January 13, 2019).
137
Palestine Liberation Organization.
138
The international agreements that make up the body of texts constituting the
legal ingredients of the Oslo peace process, are as follows: “Declaration of Principles
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (the Oslo Agreement)”, UNHCR Ref-
world, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e96e4.html, (Accessed on January 14,
2019). See also: “Gaza-Jericho Agreement/Annex IV: Protocol on Economic Relations
between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO, Representing the Palestin-
ian People”, ProCon.org, https://israelipalestinian.procon.org/sourcefiles/1994ParisPro-
tocol.pdf, (Accessed on January 14, 2019). For further information: “Israeli-Palestinian
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”, Economic Cooperation
Organization, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/624, (Accessed on January 14, 2019) and
see: “The Wye River Memorandum”, United Nations Peacemaker, https://peacemaker.
un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IL%20PS_981023_The%20Wye%20River%20
Memorandum.pdf, (Accessed on January 14, 2019).
the text did not contain anything substantial on the future sta-
tus of al-Quds other than stating that Israel and the Palestinians
would begin to negotiate its permanent status after the expiry of
an interim period (1996).139
After signing the agreement in 1993, Israel constantly violated
the terms and spirit of Oslo I and the succeeding implementing doc-
uments emanating from Oslo I by continuing to build illegal settle-
ments in the eastern part of al-Quds (and the rest of West Bank);
to commit massive human rights violations against Palestinians; to
arbitrarily demolish Palestinian homes in al-Quds; and to impose
further restrictions for access to Muslim religious sites. Under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), states that are
parties to a treaty are under an obligation to fulfil their obligations
in good faith. Israel was apparently acting in bad faith by disabling
the proper execution of Oslo agreements. Not surprisingly, the Oslo
“peace” process, conducted under the domineering shadow of a U.S.
ever leaning towards the Zionist state, effectively ended in 2000. The
Oslo “peace” process turned out to be another nail in the coffin of
Palestinian aspirations for independent statehood and an end to the
Israeli occupation, at least inside the 1967 boundaries.
THE TRUMP DECISION

The controversy over the status of al-Quds became more heated
when, during the presidency of Donald Trump, the U.S. recognized
139
Under Article 5 of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements (Oslo I):
“2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later
than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of
Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.”
“3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including:
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooper-
ation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest”. See: “Declaration
of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (the Oslo Agreement)”, UN-
HCR Refworld, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3de5e96e4.html, (Accessed on Janu-
ary 14, 2019).
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moved the U.S. embassy from
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. This ignominious decision and the
United States’ subsequent diplomatic manoeuvring as part of this
new posture are in conflict with the existing norms of internation-
al law in a number of ways. First, under international law, a state
is not permitted to enjoy the benefits of its conquest.140 The UN
Charter explicitly holds that states are not given the licence to use
force in their international relations. Besides, as enshrined in the
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression (1974), “No territorial
acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall
be recognized as lawful.”141 Under the law of occupation, an occupy-
ing power is not legally authorized to annex the territory in order to
put it under its sovereignty. Although the defeated sovereign loses
its de facto control of an occupied territory, it continues to maintain
de jure sovereignty. This is a well-established norm of international
law and suggests that the act of military occupation is a tempo-
rary state of affairs which is incapable of conferring sovereignty to
an occupying power.142 With this provocative and dangerous move,
the U.S. is apparently endorsing an instance of territorial change
brought about by the illegal use of force; thus, it has chosen to
reward aggression. Secondly, the U.S. is also enjoining other states,
particularly those that have “special” relations with it, to follow in
the footsteps of its arbitrary action.
Not surprisingly, this U.S. provocation is almost universally
condemned by the world community, including the UN General
Assembly, the European Union, and the Organization of Islamic
140
Victor Kattan, “Why U.S. Recognition of Jerusalem Could Be Contrary to Inter-
national Law”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol: XLVII, No: 3 (2018), p. 72.
141
“Resolution No. 3314 (XXIX): Definition of Aggression”, United National Gen-
eral Assembly, http://www.un-documents.net/a29r3314.htm, (Accessed on January 15,
2019).
142
Shawan Jabarin, “The Occupied Palestinian Territory and International Human-
itarian Law: A Response to Peter Maurer”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol: 95,
No: 890, (2013), pp. 420-421.
Cooperation which voiced their objections to any changes in the

status quo prior to the 1967 war. This U.S. position is also in con-
flict with scores of the UN resolutions adopted since 1967, includ-
ing a number of Security Council resolutions which it also support-
ed, that cautioned Israel against making any territorial changes to
the boundaries existing before the Six-Day War of 1967.
CONCLUSION
Any sensible student of international law that locates oneself in the
norms of international law, such as the law of territory, use of force,
law of treaties, self-determination, law of war, and the principle
of good faith, will immediately recognize that al-Quds, complete
and undivided, belongs to the Palestinians. The same student of
international law, even if forced to trace the Palestinian tragedy
in the footsteps of international legal practice, which has too of-
ten reflected the crude realities of power politics, by looking into
the decision-making process in the UN, would in all probability
likewise conclude that al-Quds (Jerusalem) does not belong to Is-
rael. This study hopefully demonstrates to all those that have not
been bewitched by the illusions caused by the Zionist distortions
and demagogy, which undeniably exerts discursive hegemony in
the international media, institutions, and intellectual circles, that
al-Quds is currently under the military occupation of Israel and,
therefore, ought to be returned to the rightful owners of the city,
who are the Palestinians.
More specifically, based on the UN resolutions on Palestine ad-
opted by the Security Council and the General Assembly through
the years, Israel is under an obligation to refrain from claiming
sovereignty over any parts of al-Quds (western or eastern). The
Jewish settlements in parts of al-Quds and the change of popu-
lation composition in favor of Jews in the area do not constitute
grounds for extending Israeli territorial entitlements here. Illegal
Jewish settlements, coercive population transfers, agonizing check-

points, confiscations of Palestinian property, the construction of
a wall traversing the West Bank and stealing land, inter alia, from
al-Quds, and the Zionist state’s claim of sovereignty and its annex-
ation policies vis-à-vis al-Quds are all illegal. Neither parts of Jeru-
salem today belong to Israel, which is a natural concomitant of the
prohibition of the use of force in international relations which has
been recognized as a norm of jus cogens from which no derogation is
permitted. It is also a natural corollary of the inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory through military occupation.
The post-Ottoman history of Palestine could be perceived as
a testimony to the brutality, barbarism, and aggression of Zion-
ism and the Zionist state. Neither history nor international law
could possibly vindicate the Zionist case on account of its relentless
crimes against the Palestinian people and humanity. The fact that
most of the Palestinians were forcibly thrown out of their homeland
does not deprive them of the right of self-determination leading to
independent statehood.143 As reaffirmed by the Refugee Convention
(1951) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), under interna-
tional law, all of the nearly seven million Palestinian refugees have a
right to return to their homeland.
As to whether Jerusalem should become a corpus separatum, i.e.
an internationalized city governed by the UN, is a matter for the
Palestinians themselves. Such a plan could only be legally permissi-
ble if this is consented to by the Palestinians because, under inter-
national law, it is only the Palestinians that have the rightful claim
to sovereignty in the whole of al-Quds.144
143
John Quigley, “The Legal Status of Jerusalem under International Law”, p. 21.
144
Ibid., p. 22.
CHAPTER VI
THE STATUS OF AL-QUDS IN THE

PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
ABDULSALAM MUALA*
INTRODUCTION
The Madrid peace conference launched the negotiating track to
resolve the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 1991. When the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization and the Israeli government signed
the Oslo Accord, the history of the peace process began. The Oslo
Accord involved a set of understandings, one of which was to post-
pone considering the core conflict issues,145 of which al-Quds was the
most salient.146 This step reflected the desire of the Israelis,147 and the
Palestinian chief negotiator accepted this due to weak personality as
well as his position. However, the process remains in place, and no
reasonable progress has been made towards finding a resolution for
the seemingly intractable Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
*
Dr. Abdulsalam Muala is a Palestinian freelance researcher based in the West Bank.
He holds a PhD degree from the Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), Malaysia.
145
Burhan Dajani, “An Alternative to Oslo,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol: 25,
No: 4, (1996), p. 5.
146
Hatem Abdulkadir, “24 Years after Oslo Accord: Jerusalem and the Dagger of
Judaization”, Aljazeera, September 13, 2017.
147
Lior Lehrs, “Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table: Analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Talks on Jerusalem (1993–2015)”, Israel Studies, Vol: 21, No: 3, (2016), p. 194.
The status of al-Quds in the current peace process requires cast-

ing more light on the recent developments and on further discus-
sion. Not only because the status of al-Quds was suspended during
the initial peace talks, but because also the city occupies a promi-
nent position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because of the high
symbolic meanings it has for both parties to the conflict and the
potential impacts that the city carries with it for the peace process.
It seems that a linkage exists between the marginalization of al-
Quds in the peace process and the intractability facing the process.
For that reason, highlighting such a relationship is critical. Addi-
tionally, the matter not only concerns delaying the consideration
of al-Quds in the peace process, but also the situation of the city is
clearly worsening day by day.
To break down this problematic issue, the chapter offers an an-
swer to the key question: is it possible that the peace process can
continue while the problem of al-Quds exists? In other words, will
al-Quds remain marginalized and face pain while the peace process
keeps running? This is neither an ordinary nor a simple question
because of the complications associated with the issue, and the mat-
ter requires paying more attention to the multifaceted issue before
answering the question.
Searching for the status of al-Quds in the peace process requires
exploring the reality of the process first; otherwise, the attempt to
seek an answer to that question would be useless given the ambigu-
ity of the objectives pursued by the peace process. Accordingly, pav-
ing the way for the answer will start by highlighting two concerns.
The first section of the chapter deals with the locus of al-Quds in
the peace process, trying to understand the connotations of ne-
glecting it in the initial agreements and what this neglect means.
Comprehending the status of al-Quds in the peace process helps in
diagnosing the nature of the process and in predicting its potential
trends given the vital position of al-Quds in the conflict.
The second section of the chapter tries to recognize the reality

of the peace process, its problematic beginning, the nature of the
context in which it is located, and then, exploring the extent to
which the peace process seems able to achieve the desired goals. It
examines whether the process seeks a fair solution to the conflict,
or it just plays a functional role for achieving other objectives, and
how all of these will reflect on the nature of the peace process, on
the one hand, and the status of al-Quds in the peace process, on the
other. In light of the enlightenment resulting from discussing these
two concerns, the question will be answered in the third section of
the chapter.
THE LOCATION OF AL-QUDS

IN THE PEACE PROCESS
Al-Quds has a highly symbolic value for both parties to the con-
flict. Therefore, searching for a peaceful solution between the two
sides necessitates settling the status of that symbol. Such a step will
form a cornerstone for the comprehensive settlement of the conflict
because the parties to the conflict will have to agree upon the most
complicated issues.148 Otherwise, the situation will worsen. Al-Quds
provokes more intense emotions than any other place on Earth be-
cause of its heritage and meaning to the parties involved in the
conflict and to others.149 This necessarily means that the disputant
parties carry intense emotions. Accordingly, if these are not taken
into consideration while searching for a peaceful solution, the sit-
uation will become more complicated. The matter not only has a
slim chance of reaching a peaceful solution, but also points out the
reality of the Israeli position whereby Israel insists on dealing with
the al-Quds question according to its own point of view. Because of
148
Ibid., p. 179.
149
“Background Paper on the Status of Jerusalem”, World Council of Churches,
https://bit.ly/2slb3Z7, (Accessed on January 15, 2019).
that, al-Quds did not gain a position in the peace process that was
equal to its position as an Islamic symbol and as one of the two ma-
jor perspectives feeding the conflict. The Israelis have determined
the perspectives of the issues relative to al-Quds, and, as a result,
al-Quds remains off the peace process’ agenda.
A review of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, which has ex-
tended more than 25 years, shows that the parties have involved
the al-Quds question into the negotiating agenda in only two con-
cise occasions: from July 2000 to January 2001, and in the talks of
2008.150 In the first round, the former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak urged the Israeli negotiators to avoid discussing the issue of
al-Quds until the last possible moment.151 The marginalization of
al-Quds in the peace process reflects plainly the dominant Israe-
li perspective over the Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim perspective.
This means that the base upon which the peace process rests is im-
balanced and provides monitors with an initial impression of the
nature of the peace process, its trends and expected destiny.
Some researchers opine that delaying the consideration of the
al-Quds question, the borders of Israel, and the Palestinian refugees
in 1948 from the initial peace talks represents a fruitful extension
of efforts to find a creative formula aimed at neutralizing the signifi-
cant impediments that prevent the solution through an agreement.152
Such a vision is inspired from an approach that believes that it is
important to remove the most problematic issues of the conflict
from the peace talks temporarily to ease reaching a solution to the
less problematic issues.153 Those solutions are seen as paving the way
150
Lior Lehrs, “Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table”, pp. 179-180.
151
Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace, (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York: 2004),
p. 612.
152
Shiri Landman, “Barriers to Peace: Protected Values in the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict”, Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, ed. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov,
(The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Jerusalem: 2010), p. 136.
153
Lior Lehrs, “Jerusalem on the Negotiating Table”, pp. 194-195.
for reaching a solution for the complicated issues later on. Despite
the reasonability of such thinking at first glance, other related cir-
cumstances may lead to overall negative results.154 Consequently,
this approach needs to be a multifaceted one.
Conversely, other researchers approach the matter in a different
way. They emphasize the necessity of discussing the most problem-
atic issues first as an application of one of the principles of nego-
tiations.155 These will provide time, money, and the efforts to be
expended on discussing the less problematic issues before clashing
with the solid wall that the most problematic issues create. How-
ever, assessing the conduct of the Israelis who desired to postpone
consideration of the problem of al-Quds depends on an argument
that takes into account both these two approaches and does not
neglect either of them.
The approach for delaying the consideration of the al-Quds
question in the initial peace talks could reflect reasonable diligence,
especially because a theoretical base for doing so exists in the lit-
erature. If this is so, then duty necessitates freezing the position
of al-Quds until a suitable time arrives to put it on the table, as
long as postponing this issue aims at facilitating a solution to the
conflict. Accordingly, did Israel engage in such logic or did Israel
merely begin racing against time to change the circumstances on
the ground relative to al-Quds to tighten its grip on the city? And
do such procedures ease the talks around Jerusalem in the future or
make them more complicated?
The actual Israeli policy towards al-Quds discloses the nature of
the Israeli intentions towards the city. The Israeli settlement activi-
ties in al-Quds have focused since 1967 on controlling the eastern
154
Ibid., p. 195.
155
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, “Overcoming Barriers to Resolving the Israeli Palestinian
Conflict”, Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, ed. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov,
(The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, Jerusalem: 2010), p. 369.
quarters inhabited by the Palestinians. Israel started by demolishing

the neighborhood of Maghreb (Moroccan Quarter) and expelling
Palestinians living there in a step aimed at consolidating the pres-
ence of Jewish settlers in this sector to prevent the possibility of
dividing the city in the future. These activities were synchronized
with the announcement by the Israeli government that the united
al-Quds is considered the capital of Israel. The step that followed
was the transfer of government offices to the city and expanding the
authority of the municipality of al-Quds and its services.156 Notably,
the Israeli settlement works in al-Quds and the imposition of the
policy of fait accompli that began in 1967 did not stop when the
peace process was launched. Instead, it increased plainly in a way
that contradicted any trend aimed at finding a peaceful solution to
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
From 1967 to 1987, Israel destroyed 540 Palestinian homes in
al-Quds, in the five years following the signing of the Oslo Accord
it destroyed another 101 houses,157 and from 2000 to 2012, approx-
imately 1,124 Palestinian buildings were demolished in al-Quds.158
The Israeli authorities did so claiming that no authorizations exist-
ed for such buildings. In fact, successive Israeli governments have
limited construction in neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinians to
a minimum. This was based on a policy that the percentage of the
Palestinians living in al-Quds, which amounted to 28.8 percent in
1967, should never be allowed to grow.159 Hence, every new con-
156
Michael Dumper, “Israeli Settlement in the Old City Jerusalem”, Journal of Pales-
tine Studies, Vol: 21, No: 4, (1992), pp. 32, 39. See also: Rashid Khalidi, “Transforming
the Face of the Holy City: Political Massages in the Built Topography of Jerusalem”,
Journal of Palestine Studies, No: 4, (1999), p. 25.
157
Rashid Khalidi, “Transforming the Face of the Holy City: Political Massages in
the Built Topography of Jerusalem”, p. 27.
158
“Means of Judaization of the city of Quds”, Palestinian News & Info Agency,
https://bit.ly/2F5dWGD (Accessed on February 15, 2019).
159
Meir Margalit, Seizing Control of Space in East Jerusalem, (Sifrei Aliat Gag, Pal-
estine: 2010), p. 44.
struction in the region, even those seen as an expression of the nat-

ural growth of the Palestinian inhabitants of al-Quds, is considered
illegal in the eyes of the Israelis and surely will be soon destroyed.
Consequently, when the Palestinians attempt to make additions to
their homes, either on the land they own next to their homes or
on their roofs, the Israeli authorities demolished them completely.
In contrast, pockets of Jewish settlement have developed in
recent years that have never received Israeli building permits, but
unsurprisingly the authorities have not exercised their authority to
stop the construction or demolition of what has been built.160 Thus,
the facts suggest that the delaying of the consideration of the al-
Quds question in the peace process did not reflect diligence in seek-
ing the best ways to reach the peace. Rather, the Israelis used the
delays to shift the discussion of its dilemma to the future and, while
doing so, to change the facts on the ground in order to enhance its
control of al-Quds.
On the other hand, delaying the consideration on the most
problematic issues did not in reality accelerate reaching a solution
for the less problematic issues. At the end, the so-called peace pro-
cess has lasted for more than 25 years without making a reasonable
difference and no indication exists that the conflict will soon be
settled. Therefore, postponing the issue of al-Quds did not reflect
positively on the peace process. Further, it is clear that the issues
postponed from the initial consideration form the core causes of
the conflict and neglecting them has meant that conditions did not
ripen for fair solutions. Hence, doubts around the peace process
will increase. Accordingly, it seems that delaying the core conflict
issues including the al-Quds question represents an opportunity to
escape from the real commitments necessitated by the peace pro-
160
Meir Margalit, Seizing Control of Space in East Jerusalem, p. 80. See also: Rashid
Khalidi, “Transforming the Face of the Holy City: Political Massages in the Built Topog-
raphy of Jerusalem”, p. 27.
cess.161 In a way, this harmonizes with the position of the Zionist

movement towards al-Quds.
The founder of the Zionist movement, Theodor Herzl, said fifty
years before the establishment of Israel, “If Quds is ever ours, and if
I were still able to do anything about it, I would begin by cleaning it
up. I would clear out everything that is not sacred [for Jews]… burn
all the non-sacred ruins.”162 These words formed a road map for the
Judaization efforts adopted by the successive Israeli governments
from 1948 until now, which were aimed at changing the features
of the city whether it was in the reality or in the international me-
dia.163 Judaization simply means an attempt to erase the history of
al-Quds that had been recorded through 10,000 years164 and which
was produced by different peoples, groups, and religions, and then
projecting that Jews were the only people who had lived there. Ob-
viously, the Judaization efforts that Israel has tried to impose in an
arbitrary way in al-Quds stand in opposition to the rights of the
Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims who have had their own history there
- which is longer than the history of the Jews.
The exclusion of al-Quds does not only indicate the desire to
hide the face of the civilizational battle through isolating al-Quds
from its wide historical, geographical, and spiritual extension. This
isolation also represents an aggression against history and targeting
the diverse human heritage, which has left its mark on the neigh-
borhoods and roads of al-Quds throughout the centuries. It rep-
resents an attempt to surround al-Quds, isolating it from the West
Bank to make it easy to dominate the city forever according to the
Jewish perspective.
161
Edward Said, “The Status of Quds and the Future of the Peace Process”, Journal
of Palestine Studies, Vol: 22, No: 85, (2011), p. 16.
162
Mohsen Moh’d Saleh, The Suffering of Jerusalem and Holly Sites under the Israeli
Occupation, (Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, Bierut: 2011), p. 17.
163
Edward Said, “The Status of Quds and the Future of the Peace Process”, p. 15.
164
Ibid., p. 12.
Israel initiated the annexation procedures for al-Quds as soon

as it occupied the city in 1967 and then executed the decision in
1980.165 Such procedures made the status of al-Quds seem totally
different than the status of the West Bank. Consequently, it will be
difficult to apply the procedures on al-Quds that are applied to the
West Bank according to the developments necessitated by the peace
process. Therefore, the peace process did not reflect positively on
al-Quds. Moreover, the peace process provides a suitable cover for
successive Israeli governments to continue the Judaization works,
tightening their grip on the city, as well as deciding its self-determi-
nation unilaterally.
THE REALITY OF THE PEACE PROCESS

In light of the intractability facing the peace process and the exclu-
sion of the core conflict issues including al-Quds from the initial
peace talks, it is reasonable that the monitors start searching to de-
termine the reality of the peace process and verifying whether it
can, according to the associated circumstances, achieve a solution
to the conflict. Needless to say, substantial issues impact the effec-
tiveness of the peace process and the expected outcomes. An anal-
ysis of such issues helps in exploring the trend of the process and
its problematic launch. Consequently, it will be easy to determine
whether those issues positively impact the endeavors that the peace
process tries to achieve, and whether the peace process is a real one
or it is just used functionally to achieve other goals.
1. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT

Obviously, the international political context helps to determine
the nature of the peace process, because separating the local po-
165
Azem Bishara, Alon Margalit, and Martin Clutterbuck, Displacement and the
‘Jerusalem Question’: An Overview of the Negotiations over East Jerusalem and Developments
on the Ground, (Norwegian Refugee Council Background Report, Oslo: 2015), p. 4.
litical interactions anywhere in the world from the international

political context is difficult.166 This is particularly so, if the partial
issue is a matter of interest on the international level as the Palestin-
ian-Israeli question is.
The international political system comprises the wider context
in which the repercussions of a local and regional scramble appear.
The system keeps control of the outcomes of such scrambles giv-
en the wide overlap between the local, regional, and international
levels.167 The conflict in Palestine has been embodied in the interna-
tional reactions from when it began to the present. When Britain
occupied Palestine in 1918, efforts aimed at establishing a nation-
al home for Jews had accelerated as a reflection of the declaration
made by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs Arthur Balfour in
1917. He promised to support the endeavors aimed at establishing
a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, which was actually
fulfilled after the end of the Second World War.168 This is an import-
ant indicator and emphasized the nature of the conflict in Palestine
and the parties involved and its international extensions.
Some researchers believe that the Palestinian-Israeli peace pro-
cess represents a status that exceeds the mutual frame of the par-
ties to the conflict. Hence, its mission will exceed the objective of
resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict toward establishing new
political, economic, and security arrangements in the region.169 Nei-
ther the force of the parties nor their stances will determine the des-
166
Louis Kriesberg, “Negotiating Conflict Transformations”, Handbook of Inter-
national Negotiation Interpersonal, Intercultural, and Diplomatic Perspectives, ed. Mauro
Galluccio, (Springer International Publishing, Switzerland: 2015), p. 109.
167
Abdulsalam Darweesh, “The Impact of the Imbalance in the Terms of the Pales-
tinian-Israeli Negotiations on Finding a Solution to the Palestinian Issue”, (Master The-
sis, An-Najah National University of Faculty of High Studies, Nablus, 2013), p. 150.
168
Louis Kriesberg, “Changing Conflict Asymmetries Construct Constructively”,
Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways Toward Terrorism and Genocide, Vol: 2, No:
1, (2009), p. 17.
169
Abdullah Turkumani, “Obstacles to the Arab-Israeli Peace and Its Prospects”,
Bredband.net, https://bit.ly/2Jskl0D, (Accessed on January 24, 2019).
tiny of the conflict because they are just a part of the actors dealing
with the conflict.170 The chances of the success of the peace process
in the current Middle East do not correlate only with the will of the
parties to the conflict but also with that of several other factors. As
much as the control of the Middle East is a subject of an interna-
tional gamble, disputes and settlements are part of a larger question
of the determination or assertion of international hegemony.171
In light of what has been mentioned, cognizance of the reality
of the international political system and its relationship with Israel,
on the one hand, and verifying whether the peace process can pen-
etrate the international political context, on the other hand, helps
in comprehending why the peace process faces a deadlock. Such a
step becomes more important in light of the point of view that the
international political context forms one of the impediments that
prevent reaching a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.172 That
means that the Palestinian-Israeli peace process represents a partial
game within a more complicated environment. Consequently, the
scramble in Palestine reflects, in fact, the international political re-
ality and its trends. It is not expected that the peace process can
achieve outcomes to contradict that reality.
2. THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN

THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
The levels of force between the conflicting parties determine the
shape of the relations between them, and, in case they decide to
adopt a negotiating option to resolve their disputes, the relative
170
Hamza Al-Smadi, “PLO Political Experience: From the Armed Resistance to the
Peaceful Settlement 1964-2006”, (Master Thesis, An-Najah National University Faculty
of High Studies, Nablus, 2008), p. 87.
171
Burhan Galion, “The Fate of the Arab-Israeli Political Settlement after Forty
Years of the 1967 War,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol: 18, No: 70, (2007), p. 5.
172
Herbert C. Kelman, “Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotia-
tion”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol: 26, No: 1, (1982), p. 45.
balance of power plays a major role of reaching a solution. Many

scholars consider that a balance of power between conflicting par-
ties plays a crucial role in reaching a negotiated solution.173 Thus,
successfully solving a conflict by peaceful means seems to be the re-
sult of the existence of a balance of power between the parties, and,
when the balance of power is absent, then searching for negotiated
solutions will be useless because the objective base to launch a peace
process does not exist yet.
Force is a pioneering concept in the field of conflict resolution
and is a factor that is firmly present in negotiating processes.174
When the parties to a conflict have reasonable levels of power, this
will give the negotiating process the wanted momentum. A nego-
tiating option will be suitable when one party cannot impose its
will on the other party or use the unilateral procedures to solve the
conflict, as each party is able to stop any unfair agreement.175 Ac-
cordingly, it is of importance to examine the truth of the Palestin-
ian-Israeli peace process because the process lacks the fundamental
basis for success represented in a relative balance of power between
the parties to the conflict.
There are plain hints that illuminate the reality of force of both
parties to the conflict and in favor of Israel in particular. Israel dom-
inates the land under negotiation, controlling the peace talks agen-
da, an obvious example of which was the postponing of the al-Quds
173
Alain Plantey and Frances Meadows (trans), International Negotiation in the
Twenty-first Century, (Taylor and Francis Group, New York: 2007), p. 26. See also: Nina
Burkardt, Berton Lee Lamb, and Jonathan G. Taylor, “Power Distribution in Complex
Environmental Negotiations: Does Balance Matter”, Journal of Public Administration Re-
search and Theory, Vol: 7, No: 2, (1997), p. 247. For further readings: Robin L. Pinkley,
Margaret A. Neale, and Rebecca J. Bennett, “The Impact of Alternatives to Settlement
in Dyadic Negotiation”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol: 57,
No: 1, (1994), p. 100.
174
Burkardt, Lamb, and Taylor, “Power Distribution”, p. 250.
175
I. William Zartman, Negotiation and Conflict Management: Essays in Theory and
Practice, (Taylor and Francis Group: New York: 2008), p. 100. See also: Burkardt, Lamb,
and Taylor, “Power Distribution”, p. 251.
question. Since the international political order stands beside Israel,

Israel and the United States seem to dominate the peace process.176
Obviously, such an unfair distribution of force between the
parties to the conflict will reflect negatively on the outcomes of
the peace process - one of which is represented in postponing the
consideration of the core issues of the conflict including the ques-
tion of al-Quds. The Israelis, who recognized the benefits of this
imbalance, started to invest in preventing the Palestinians from
gaining sources of power. From a position of power, the Israe-
lis demanded that the Palestinians stop using violence (resisting
the occupation) and fight the Palestinian factions who refuse to
accept that position. The Palestinian negotiators accepted such
Israeli demands because they could not oppose the Israeli desires.
That means that the Palestinian negotiators dealt with the peace
process in accordance with the requirements of the Israeli vision.
Accordingly, how would the peace process be able to achieve Pal-
estinian goals and assure their rights?
The Israelis continued their endeavors to gain more power and
to progress militarily. For example, former Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin (1992-1995) remarked on the necessity of develop-
ing and enhancing the striking force of the Israeli army to be able
to execute its duties, denoting that keeping a strong army served as
warranty to continuing the peace process.177 Obviously, the peace
process reflects the Israeli perspective of the logic of force, not the
logic of justice. As long as the Israeli side is the strongest, Israel will
only accept the results of the peace process that favor its position,
without any consideration of the interests of the Palestinian side.
176
Edward Said, “The Status of Quds and the Future of the Peace Process”, p. 15.
177
Fayez Sara, The Israeli Army: Background, Reality, and Future, (Emirates Centre
for Strategic Studies and Research Strategic Studies, 1st Edition, Abu-Dhabi, 1999), p.
37.
This is a result of the imbalance of power between the two parties,

and the way in which each is dealing with the power factor.
3. THE EXTENSION OF THE PEACE PROCESS

The unjustified extension of the peace process indicates a lack of
seriousness and commitment needed for such a process, which
calls for the scrutiny of its roles and the objectives that it seeks to
achieve. The theoretical legacy of negotiation has determined that
the timing of the negotiating process is one of the firm principles
of the negotiation process.178 The time frame means that an obvi-
ous beginning and an obvious end exist to the negotiation process.
This is an important parameter that controls the peace process and
prevents it from being used as a tool to gain time to achieve other
goals, especially by the stronger party. Time manipulation is one of
the world’s most widely known negotiating tactics,179 and the time
frame discloses the extent to which the parties are committed to the
principles of negotiation.
The time factor is an important component of a conflict, as con-
flict reactions do not stop, whilst the associated transformations are
always changing. Because the parties to a conflict are diametrically
opposite, change will be in favor of only one of the parties while the
other will be affected negatively in general. Additionally, the strong
party is the one that can employ the track of the changes in its favor
for subjective and objective reasons.
The opportunity in unequal conflicts remains open to the strong
party to exploit the time factor to enhance its negotiating gains.180
Frank R. Pfetsch, Negotiating Political Conflicts, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York:

178
2007), p. 10.
179
Ilai Alon and Jeanne M. Brett, “Perceptions of Time and Their Impact on Ne-
gotiations in the Arabic Speaking Islamic World”, Negotiation Journal, Vol: 23, No: 1,
(2007), p. 56.
180
Karin Aggestam and Annika Bjorkdahal, “Just Peace Postponed: Unending Peace
Processes & Frozen Conflicts”, (JAD-PbP Working Paper Series, Finland: 2011), p. 6.
Thus, setting a time limit for the peace process would mean putting
an end to the ability of the strong party to invest in the process.
Researchers have stressed that the Israeli negotiating strategy was
based on prolonging the negotiations while ignoring the Palestin-
ian core demands.181 Others have said that the historical record since
1967, and especially since the Oslo Accords in 1993, makes it clear
that the longer the peace process lasts, the more Israel will benefit
from its unrestrained power in the results of the negotiations by
determining facts on the ground.182
Former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir agreed to join the
Madrid Peace Conference in late 1991 and to engage in negotia-
tions with the Arab states to gain the time provided by the peace
process to achieve the goal of a greater Israel.183 Accordingly, the
unjustified extension of the peace process has been an additional
reason for the failure of the process and has further demonstrated
its lack of seriousness and revealed its functional roles, far from
being careful to arrive at a reasonable solution to the conflict be-
tween the parties.
In light of the discussion about the three items above, no sub-
stantive basis exists for the success of the ongoing peace process
between the Palestinians and the Israelis. If there is success, then
that will be the result of Israel employing the peace process as a
public relations game to polish its image. At the same time, the
peace process provides a recipe that removes the embarrassment
181
Iyad Barghouti, “Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations: An Objective in Themselves”,
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol: 26, No: 1,
(2011), p. 15.
182
Jerome Slater, Global Studies, The Collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process:
Where Is the Problem, (Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu-Dhabi:
2002), p. 32.
183
Shlomo Brom, “The Oslo Accord and the Impossible Peace, Israeli Views and
Assessments: The Oslo Process in Balance 20 Years Later”, (The Institute of Palestine
Studies, Beirut), p. 3.
from the international system supporting Israel, which would serve

as cover for that dubious support.
Needless to say, the peace process may reflect two main mat-
ters. The first is the presumed peace process that aims at reaching
a just solution to the conflict, while the other is represented in
the endeavors to exploit the peace process to pursue other goals.
In light of the extrapolation of the nature of the process, the un-
covering of the circumstances of its launch, and the tracing of its
tracks, it turns out that the second reflects what is happening on
the ground, and, therefore, the marginalization of al-Quds ex-
presses this fact.
CAN THE PEACE PROCESS CONTINUE

AS LONG AS THE PROBLEM OF AL-QUDS EXISTS?
At first glance, the answer seems obtainable and does not require
much effort, but it becomes more complicated in light of the am-
biguity of the peace process. This requires answering the question
in the light of two assumptions. The first considers the ongoing
peace process aimed at reaching a genuine solution to the con-
flict, and, therefore, the process is real. The second is based on
the fact that the process plays a functional role that is irrelevant
to the search for peace. Otherwise, it is difficult to address the
question correctly.
Based on the above, it is unreasonable, according to the first
assumption, that the peace process will continue at a time when
the question of al-Quds is being marginalized because of its high
symbolism for Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims. Moreover, the un-
justified extension of the peace process is contrary to the theoretical
concepts of negotiation as determined by the relevant literature,
as explained above. Therefore, no justification exists for the con-
tinuation of the current peace process, and it should have stopped
a long time ago. As the process has lasted for so long without sig-
nificant results, this would confirm the credibility of the view that
the peace process is a false process. The term “false process” is not
arbitrary but has a clear rooting in the literature of negotiations.
“False negotiations” refer to the negotiation process in which one
party is engaged while it has no intention of reaching an agreement
with the other party.184 Thus, the negotiating process is used as an
umbrella to achieve other objectives, which to a great extent applies
to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
There are reasons that push toward false negotiations. One party
may see that it can reap greater benefits by delaying the reaching of
an agreement with its negotiating partner indefinitely or by antic-
ipating external changes that will improve its bargaining position
when they occur. Some false negotiations have taken place already
when there are hidden targets that the negotiator looks for.185 In
the case of false negotiations, it is interesting to note that the party
that is conducting this type of negotiation is keen to maintain the
negotiating process and does not try to stop it because this would
lead to more bad trends.186
The falsity of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process provides a ba-
sis for answering the question in another way. Accordingly, it can
be said clearly and confidently: yes, the peace process will continue
in the light of the exclusion of al-Quds from the circle of talks and
the continuation of its suffering as long as it is a false and unrealistic
process. Not only that, but it is likely to continue for many years to
come if the rules of the game remain the same.
In light of this analysis, it sounds easy to link the fact that the
peace process is extended, and that al-Quds is excluded from the
primary debate, both of which point to the lack of seriousness in
184
Edy Glozman, Netta Barak-Corren, and Ilan Yaniv, “False Negotiations: The Art
and Science of Not Reaching an Agreement”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol: 59, No:
4, (2015), p. 672.
185
Glozman, Barak-Corren and Yaniv, “False Negotiations”.
186
Ibid.
reaching solutions for the conflict. The headline of that linkage

is the falsity of the ongoing peace process. When knowing that
the prolongation of the peace process and the exclusion of al-
Quds from the initial peace talks represent the Israeli will, then
we can venture to understand what Israel aims to achieve from
such a process.
CONCLUSION
The significance of al-Quds in the peace process does not reflect its
great symbolic status among the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims.
This indicates that a clear imbalance exists in the foundations of
this process, which calls for clarifications on the nature of the on-
going peace process and the extent to which Israel seems serious
about reaching a solution for the conflict that addresses its core
causes. The attempt to explore the reality of the peace process has
not led to results that encourage saying it is qualified to fulfil the
tasks normally undertaken by peace operations.
Such an attempt has focused on three main headlines, where the
context in which the peace process is running has revealed that it
is unlikely that it will succeed in achieving the objectives expected
because such a development would contradict the nature of the
context. On the other hand, the force levels of both parties to the
peace process are also not conducive for making gains in the peace
process because peace operations are based on the principle of the
relative balance of power between the parties, which is missing in
this situation.
In light of the above, and as a result of the lack of seriousness
of the Israeli side, the peace process has lasted for a length of
time not necessitated by a peace process in normal circumstanc-
es. This unjustified extension has thus added another negative
dimension to this miserable process. The foregoing indicate that
the current peace process has not met the required conditions
to be a worthy process to achieve its goals. These conditions will

continue to dominate it despite the marginalization of the al-
Quds question and continued suffering of the Palestinian peo-
ple. What is happening on the ground does not reflect a serious
search for peace, does not proceed from the foundations of fair-
ness, and does not even meet the theoretical perceptions of how
best to search for peace.
THREE
POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS AND
CURRENT PROBLEMS
132 / P O L I T I C A L D E V E LO P M E N T S A N D C U R R E N T P R O B L E M S
CHAPTER VII
OFFICIAL ARAB POSITIONS ON THE TRUMP

ADMINISTRATION’S JERUSALEM DECISION
HOSSAM SHAKER*
At the end of 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump made a decision

regarding the city of Jerusalem that had a severe impact on the Pal-
estinian-Israeli issue overall and initiated an even worse stage of the
U.S. bias towards the Israeli occupation 25 years after the launch
of the “Middle East peace process,” which has done nothing to give
the Palestinian people their legitimate rights in determining their
future and establishing an independent sovereign state.
Trump’s decision challenged the international community as it
included a deviation from the set standards and obligations regard-
ing the Palestinian-Israeli issue and frustrated the Arab and Islamic
world because of the implications on the issue of Jerusalem. Ac-
cordingly, the decision was essentially a new test for the official Arab
positions and their interplay with events that occur in the wake of
crises, predicaments, and transformations in the Arab world.
THE U.S. DECISION AND

INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS
Donald Trump’s election to the presidency of the United States
in 2017 marked a shift in the U.S. foreign policy, including that
*
Hossam Shaker is a writer, researcher, and media consultant based in Vienna and
Brussels.
which pertains to the Palestinian-Israeli issue. During his election

campaign, Trump promised to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusa-
lem, a move his predecessors refused to make despite the passing of
the Jerusalem Embassy Act.
On December 6, 2017, before the end of his first year in the
White house, Trump made his decision despite the potential re-
percussions and detriment to the future of the “peace process.” He
announced his official recognition of a united Jerusalem as the cap-
ital of Israel and the plan to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv
to Jerusalem shortly thereafter.187 The embassy was opened with a
grand ceremony on May 14, 2018. The Trump administration took
a step that previous administrations avoided despite the passing of
the 1995 act that, based on the recognition of Jerusalem as the cap-
ital of Israel, called for the move of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv
no later than 1999. However, preceding presidents regularly signed
waivers delaying the relocation.
The relocation of the U.S. embassy five months after the an-
nouncement coincided with the Great March of Return on the 70th
anniversary of the Nakba, fueling the event with particular anger.
The U.S. administration chose this day in particular to relocate the
embassy and celebrate its opening: the occasion of the Nakba Day,
or the Israeli “independence day,” while the Israeli military forces
killed peaceful Palestinian protestors in the Gaza Strip. The bloody
scenes overwhelmed the embassy celebration and drew a lot of me-
dia coverage between the massacre and the embassy opening, which
caused a lot of criticism of the U.S. administration’s move and the
behavior of the Israeli military.
187
“Presidential Proclamation Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of
Israel and Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem”, White House,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-recog-
nizing-jerusalem-capital-state-israel-relocating-united-states-embassy-israel-jerusalem,
(Accessed on January 24, 2019). See also: “Statement by President Trump on Jerusa-
lem”, White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-pres-
ident-trump-jerusalem/, (Accessed on January 24, 2019).
Trump’s decision did not find any substantial support in the world
and was met with rejection, criticism, and reservation by the interna-
tional community, including Western countries. Protests were held all
over the world denouncing it. Individual articulations at the interna-
tional level and the isolation of the U.S. position regarding the issue
indicated that the White House did not find any major foreign posi-
tions in favor of its decision aside from that of Israel.188
Trump’s decision was widely rejected in the Arab and Muslim
world and caused protests and popular events condemning the de-
cision. Arab and Muslim capitals criticized the decision while it was
also opposed and disapproved by the international community. In
fact, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres remarked that “Jerusa-
lem is a final status issue that must be resolved through direct nego-
tiations between the two parties on the basis of the relevant Security
Council and General Assembly resolutions, taking into account the
legitimate concerns of both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides.” He
also maintained that, “there is no alternative to the two-state solu-
tion…living side‑by‑side in peace, security and mutual recognition,
with Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and Palestine, and all final sta-
tus issues resolved permanently through negotiations.”189
The European Union (EU) rejected the U.S. decision in a for-
eign affairs meeting held in Brussels on December 11, 2017, and
the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Af-
fairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini rebuffed Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s call for the EU recognition of Je-
rusalem as the capital of Israel despite talks they had before the
188
“Support for President Trump’s Decision to Recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s
Capital”, White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/sup-
port-president-trumps-decision-recognize-jerusalem-israels-capital/, (Accessed on
January 24, 2019).
189
“SG/SM/18814: Secretary-General Calls Jerusalem ‘a Final Status Issue’ That
Must Be Resolved through Direct Talks, Stressing There Is No Alternative to Two State
Solution”, United Nations, https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sgsm18814.doc.htm,
(Accessed on January 25, 2019).
meeting.190 Similarly, the U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May released

a statement in which she said, “We disagree with the U.S. decision
to move its embassy to Jerusalem and recognize Jerusalem as the
Israeli capital before a final status agreement.”191 German Chancellor
Angela Merkel asserted in a tweet after the announcement of the
decision that the German government “does not support this posi-
tion because the status of Jerusalem can only be negotiated within
the framework of a two-state solution.”
French President Emmanuel Macron called the U.S. move
“regrettable” and called for efforts to “avoid violence at all costs,”
asserting “the attachment of France and Europe to the two-state
solution, Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and securi-
ty…”192 The French position was reinstated numerous times, includ-
ing when French Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean Yves
Le Drian made a statement following the opening of the embassy in
Jerusalem in which he said “France disapproves of the American de-
cision to transfer the United States embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv
to Jerusalem, as President Macron has reaffirmed on several occa-
sions. This decision contravenes international law and in particular
the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.” The
minister continued saying that “international law is unambiguous
on the status of Jerusalem: it must be determined through negotia-
tions, like all internationally agreed parameters, in order to achieve
a just and lasting solution, namely with two states living side by
190
“Statement by HR/VP Federica Mogherini on the announcement by US Pres-
ident Trump on Jerusalem”, European Union External Action, https://eeas.europa.eu/
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/36910/statement-hrvp-federica-mogherini-an-
nouncement-us-president-trump-jerusalem_en, (Accessed on January 25, 2019).
191
“PM statement on US decision to move embassy to Jerusalem: 6 December
2017”, United Kingdom Government Digital Service, https://www.gov.uk/government/
news/pm-statement-on-us-decision-to-move-embassy-to-jerusalem-6-december-2017,
(Accessed on January 25, 2019).
192
“Macron Says Trump’s Jerusalem Move ‘Regrettable’ as France Warns Citizens”,
The Local, December 7, 2017.
side in peace and security, with Jerusalem the capital of both states.
This is what the law says and this is the purpose of our efforts to
promote peace in the Middle East.”193
On December 22, 2017, days after the Trump’s announcement,
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted on the “sta-
tus of Jerusalem.” Turkey and Yemen had presented the draft res-
olution A/ES-10/L.22 on behalf of the Arab group of countries
and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The majority
of member states –128 countries– voted in favor of the resolution
while 9 voted against, 35 abstained, and 21 did not attend. The
resolution reaffirms the UNGA and the Security Council’s previous
relevant resolutions, rejects the U.S. decision, and “affirms that any
decisions and actions which purport to have altered the character,
status or demographic composition of the Holy City of Jerusalem
have no legal effect, are null and void…”194
Correspondingly, the Arab League Summit held in Dhahran on
April 15, 2018, concluded by affirming “the illegality and illegiti-
macy of the U.S. decision to recognize Jerusalem as capital of Israel,
and categorically reject[ed] recognition of Jerusalem as the capital
of Israel, whereas East Jerusalem will remain the capital of the State
of Palestine; and warn[ed] of taking any actions that would alter the
current legal and political status of Jerusalem which shall result in
serious implications on the entire Middle East.”195
193
“International law unambiguous on Jerusalem status – Minister”, Embassy of
France in Reykjavik, Iceland, https://is.ambafrance.org/International-law-unambigu-
ous-on-Jerusalem-status-Minister, (Accessed on January 25, 2019).
194
“A/ES-10/L.22: Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of
the Occupied Palestinian Territory”, United Nations General Assembly, https://undocs.
org/en/A/ES-10/L.22, (Accessed on January 27, 2019).
195
“S29/(18/04)/39-D (0202): Dhahran Declaration”, The Council of the League
of Arab States at the Summit Level, http://www.lasportal.org/ar/summits/Docu-
ments/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%20
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%8A%D8
%B2%D9%8A%D9%87%20%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8-
%A7%D9%86%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B8%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7
%D9%86.pdf, (Accessed on January 25, 2019).
In addition, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the

OIC term president, called for an extraordinary meeting in Is-
tanbul that convened on May 18, 2018, to discuss the U.S. po-
sition on Jerusalem and the bloody developments in Palestine
(i.e. the massacre of the Great Return March). The OIC meeting
embraced the Dhahran Declaration and reiterated the rejection
of the illegal decision of the president of the United States to
recognize al-Quds as the so-called capital of Israel, the occupy-
ing power; rejected the decision as legally null and void, and in
violation of international legitimacy resolutions; and considered
it an assault on the historical, legal, natural and national rights of
the Palestinian people and a deliberate attempt to undermine all
peace prospects, threatening international peace and security. The
OIC members condemned the inauguration of the U.S. embassy
in al-Quds and considered it an act of provocation and hostility
against the Muslim Ummah, Palestinian national rights, and a
flagrant violation of international law and an assault on the inter-
national order, including the UN, that further emboldens Israel,
the occupying power, to step up its illegal and criminal actions
against the Palestinian people.196 The final communique of the
Istanbul summit also “reaffirm[ed] our position that al-Quds shall
remain the eternal capital of Palestine and that the inauguration
of the U.S. embassy in al-Quds neither alters the legal status of
the occupied City, nor legitimizes its illegal annexation by Israel,
the occupying power.”197
The Arab League’s ministerial meeting held in Cairo on Febru-
ary 1, 2018, adopted Resolution 8222 under the title “Arab Moves
to Counteract U.S. Administration Decision on Jerusalem.” De-
196
“Final Communique of the Seventh Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference
in Response to the Grave Developments in the State of Palestine”, Republic of Turkey
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/olaganustu-iit-zirvesi-nihai-bildirisi.
en.mfa, (Accessed on January 28, 2019).
197
Ibid.
spite the overlapping of several detailed points in the document,

most of the document reaffirms the previous position of Trump’s
announcement and reestablishes what was stated after the decision.
Moreover, the document “reaffirms adherence to peace as a strate-
gic option and to the resolve of the Arab-Israeli conflict pursuant
to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002.” It indirectly indicates the
rejection of the “deal of the century” as it states that “peace with
Israel and normalization of relations have to be preceded by an end
to its occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories occupied
since 1967, recognition of the State of Palestine and the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people, inter alia, the right to self-determi-
nation and the right of return and compensation for the Palestin-
ian refugees and a just solution to their question according to the
Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 and General Assembly Resolution
194 (1948); as well as rejection of any deals or initiatives to resolve
the conflict contrary to the international terms of reference of the
Middle East Peace Process.”198
In most of its points, the resolution expresses positions and sup-
ports the official Palestinian pursuits, especially the international
recognition of the State of Palestine. However, the document lacks
the suggestion of certain Arab moves that may pressure the U.S.
administration or the international community, instead calling for
action with international actors to establish an international mul-
tilateral mechanism, under the umbrella of the United Nations
to sponsor the peace process, including the call for the convening
of an international conference to relaunch a credible time-bound
peace process, on the basis of international legitimacy resolutions,
198
“C01/E(18/02)/16-R(0113):ArabMovestoCounteractU.S.AdministrationDecision
on Jerusalem”, The Council of the League of Arab States, http://www.lasportal.org/ar/coun-
cils/lascouncil/Documents/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A9%20
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%20%208222.pdf, (Ac-
cessed on January 28, 2019).
the principle of land for peace, and the two-state solution on the
borders of June 4, 1967.199
Nonetheless, it “emphasizes the right of the Palestinian peo-
ple to exercise all forms of anti-occupation struggle in accordance
with the provisions of international law, including the people’s
peaceful resistance and mobilization of the necessary supportive
Arab endeavors.”200 The document disregards the question of nor-
malization with the occupation and underlines that the boycott
of the Israeli occupation and its colonial regime is one of the most
viable and legitimate means of resistance, termination, and en-
forcement of the two-state solution and the peace process. It calls
upon all states, institutions, enterprises, and individuals to boy-
cott and to stop all forms of transactions with the Israeli colonial
occupation regime and its illegal settlements on the occupied Pal-
estinian territories, inter alia, banning import of or investment in
their products, either directly or indirectly due to their violation
of international law, and to continue cooperating with interna-
tional bodies to establish the database of enterprises dealing with
Israeli settlements, pursuant to relevant Human Rights Council
resolutions.201 What is noteworthy is that the Dhahran Summit,
known as the “Jerusalem Summit” which was held two months
after the ministerial meeting that resulted in Resolution 8222, did
not mention the document in its declaration.
THE FOUNDATION OF THE OFFICIAL

ARAB POSITIONS
The foundation of the Arab positions about the Trump’s decision
regarding Jerusalem and the relocation of the U.S. embassy is cen-
199
“C01/E (18/02)/16-R (0113): Arab Moves to Counteract U.S. Administration
Decision on Jerusalem”, The Council of the League of Arab States.
200
Ibid.
201
Ibid.
tered on the following elements: the rejection of the decision and

the assertion of its illegitimacy and confliction with the “peace pro-
cess”; the refusal to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and the
insistence that East Jerusalem shall remain the capital of Palestine;
the emphasis of the importance of complete and permanent peace
in the Middle East as a strategic option and commitment to the
2002 Arab Peace Initiative; the increase of the number of states
opposing the U.S. decision and keeping other states from following
suit; and the call for expanding international recognition of the
State of Palestine and East Jerusalem as its capital.
What is made apparent from the foundations of the common
Arab position is that they do not give the impression of subscrip-
tion to the critical and provocative nature of the U.S. action. The
official Arab positions were consistent in their discourse, e.g. the
commitment to peace as a strategic option, the use of diplomatic
terminology, and the maintenance of a calm disposition. This was
what Secretary General of the Arab League Ahmed Aboul Gheit
referred to in his opening speech in the February 2018 ministerial
meeting when he mentioned the “long-term” action in dealing with
the implications of the U.S. decision.202
The foundations of the Arab positions do not include any defi-
nite procedures or practical measures for punishment, protest, or
even escalation with the United States, such as the withdrawal of
Arab ambassadors from Washington or the suspension of commu-
nication with the U.S. administration for example, except for the
position of the Palestinian Authority (PA) which rejected the U.S.
sponsorship of negotiations, which had come to a halt many years
202
Kalimat al-ijtimaa’ al-musta’naf li majlis jami’at ad-duwal al-‘arabiya ‘ala al-mus-
tawa al-wizari fi dawratihigheir al-‘adiyahawli’lan al-wilayat al-mutahida al-amrikiai’ti-
rafihabilquds ‘asima la dawlat al-ihtilal al-isra’iliwanaqlsafaratihailayha [“The speeches of
the resumed extraordinary ministerial Arab League meeting regarding the United States’
announcement of its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the relocation
of its embassy”], (Cairo: 2018), p. 11.
ago anyway. Rather than outdoing the measures taken by inter-

national organizations, the official Arab response merely reiterated
the initial positions. In contrast, the extraordinary Islamic summit
in Istanbul included practical steps like taking a stance against any
countries that follow Washington’s suit and relocating their embas-
sies to Jerusalem as well as other punitive or cautionary measures
against any states, institutions, or officials that may recognize Je-
rusalem as Israel’s capital203 –without direct pressure on the United
States itself. What is taken into account is that the Islamic summit
convened only four days after the opening of the embassy in Jeru-
salem and the massacre carried out by the Israeli army in the Gaza
Strip, causing a global uproar.
The official Arab positions, like their European counterparts,
refrained from making any straightforward statements regarding
the fact that the U.S. decision substantively undermined the po-
litical settlement based on the Madrid Conference of 1991, the
Oslo Accords, and the Middle East Quartet. They merely warned
against violating the foundations and determinants of the settle-
ment but continued to stress their commitment to the Arab Peace
Initiative. Official Arab parties do not seem to want to acknowledge
the collapse of a project they have preached about for nearly three
decades and that has been considered the only Arab strategic option
because doing so would create a void and signify the failure of their
approach. This would then create the need for alternative options,
like an uprising, resistance, armed struggle, and the imposition of
deterrent action against the Israeli occupation, that conflict with
official Arab orientations including those of the PA itself.
In addition, the abundance of common indications in the me-
dia of the disparity between the official Arab positions and the
203
“Final Communique of the Seventh Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference
in Response to the Grave Developments in the State of Palestine”, Republic of Turkey
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
content of the political communication of high-level Arab officials

was striking. What furthers the importance of these indications is
that Trump’s decision does not seem to have had a negative impact
on the Arab relations with the United States or even on the nor-
malization of the Arab relations with Israel. It is critical, therefore,
to understand how international and regional parties, particularly
Israel and the United States, interpreted the Arab positions against
Trump’s decision. In this regard, one must also take into account
the messages sent by the Israeli media to give the impression that
the U.S. move was not met with any substantial opposition by the
Arab capitals, regardless of the credibility of these messages.
Irrespective of the credibility of what is revealed in numerous
media reports, the official Arab positions on the Jerusalem dossier
and the Palestinian issue in general involve a complex dilemma that
is exposed by the comparison between some of the official and un-
official statements and their connotations behind the scenes and
the normalization of relations between some Arab capitals and Isra-
el through explicitly friendly gestures.204
Previous estimates that prevented the U.S. administrations -
prior to that of Trump - from taking a step such as this included
concerns regarding the potential wave of public anger moving the
American embassy to Jerusalem may cause and the political effects
it may have on the course of the “peace process.” What was seen
after Trump’s decision in December 2017 and the relocation of
the embassy in May 2018 is that angry protests throughout the
Arab and Muslim world did in fact erupt but retreated within a
number of days and did not prompt any substantial reactions or
political responses. The PA itself did not appear to want another
uprising/intifada in the West Bank and remained committed to
security arrangements with the Israeli apparatuses, which likely
204
As seen during the visits of key Israeli officials including Netanyahu to Gulf cap-
itals and in some of the gestures made during the February 2019 Warsaw Conference.
restricted the chances of resurrecting public demonstrations pres-

suring the occupation in light of the constraints already imposed
by the Israeli authorities. However, in the Gaza Strip, the Great
Return March was able to create a momentum and overtook the
opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, especially with the
massacre carried out by the Israeli army against the peaceful pro-
testors on the same day, May 14, 2018, which also marked the
70th anniversary of the Nakba.
Although Trump’s decision was, as expected, met with Pales-
tinian, Arab, and Muslim rejection, international opposition, and
popular anger prompting public protests and demonstrations all
over the world, the Arab and Islamic criticisms of and opposition
to the U.S. move did not result in serious measures or “punitive”
procedures except for the warning of other states against following
the footsteps of the United States and the announcement of the PA
of its refusal of the U.S. sponsorship of negotiations with Israel,
which halted years ago anyway.
Many Arab remarks were critical of the “weak reactions” of the
Arab states after the announcement of the decision including the
statement of Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari on Decem-
ber 10, 2017, in which he lamented “the weakness of the Arab de-
cision because it was below the required level and did not rise to the
size of the threat facing” the Holy City (Jerusalem) and “called on
the Arab countries to take more political and economic measures
that would protect Jerusalem.”205
THE CONTEXT OF THE DECISION

The U.S. decision on Jerusalem came with changes in the U.S.
policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli issue that had already been
205
“FM reserves on the decision of the Arab foreign ministers regarding al-Quds”,
Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.mofa.gov.iq/en/news/22570/fm-re-
serves-on-the-decision-of-the-arab-foreign-ministers-regarding-al-quds, (Accessed on
January 28, 2019).
anticipated in the Trump era for he had been clearer than any of
his predecessors about his bias towards Israel during his election
campaign. The decision followed years of stumbling negotiations
between the PA and Israeli governments and an impasse in any
prospective political settlement, which led to the continuation of
the transitional stage of the Oslo Accords and prevented agreement
regarding the final status. Jerusalem was considered the main chal-
lenge in the negotiations, which essentially resulted in the collapse
of the Camp David negotiations between the Israelis and the Pal-
estinians in the summer of 2000 and led to the Al-Aqsa Intifada at
the end of September of the same year.
While the occupation exacerbates in the West Bank, the Juda-
ization of Jerusalem accelerates and the de facto occupation of Area
C (based on the Oslo Accords), which is of strategic value, is bru-
tally being imposed, the PA wagers on international organizations,
the strengthening of the legal status of Palestine, and the pursuit
of Israeli occupation in international courts. However, the wager
has yet to bear any substantial fruit, while the PA’s ability to under-
take the international legal pursuit of Israel and the seriousness of
the repercussions, pressure, and punitive measures by the latter are
questionable. Nonetheless, the PA still rejects the options of anoth-
er intifada and the resumption of armed struggle. This indicates the
chronic impasse the PA is in and the weakness of the options it has
in confronting the occupation of Eastern Jerusalem and the West
Bank, which impacts its ability to confront the Trump administra-
tion’s decisions.
It does not help that the U.S. decision was issued during a mo-
ment of political weakness for the Palestinians and the decline of
the prioritization of the Palestinian issue in the official Arab scene.
The chronic impasse that afflicts Arab common action has wors-
ened, especially with the emergence of newer setbacks like the Gulf
crisis that began in May 2017; the continuation of various crises in
Arab relations; wars and conflicts; and the clash with Iran. These
setbacks and increasing internal and regional crises in the Arab po-
litical and media rhetoric gave the impression of a rearrangement of
the map of alliances serving the interests of Israel.206
There is another context to the Trump decision represented
in the reality on the ground in Jerusalem where Israeli endeavors
center around forcibly changing the city’s identity, landmarks,
and demography. This gives the decision a great deal of impor-
tance particularly to Israel in its pursuit of determining the city’s
future and excluding the city from negotiations in order to estab-
lish its status as the “eternal, unified capital” of Israel. Successive
Israeli governments adopted persistent settlement policies and
increased pressures on the Palestinian demographic component
of Jerusalem in order to change the essential demography of the
city, especially in the eastern part. Difficult and unjust condi-
tions were imposed on the lives of the Jerusalemites but were
not successful overall in definitively clearing East Jerusalem of
Palestinian presence.
Grave and challenging situations in Jerusalem have uncovered
the ability of Jerusalemites to create momentum and overcome
the will of the occupying government, straining coercive mea-
sures affecting the city. This was evidenced, for example, by two
historical events: the 2017 Lions’ Gate uprising, which unveiled
a great deal of popular rejection of the occupation and the la-
tent effectiveness of the Palestinian popular force that remains
sustainable in the face of the occupation; and the 2019 Gate of
Mercy uprising. The occupation faces difficulties in its efforts to
uproot the Palestinians from certain areas in Jerusalem and the
West Bank, as shown by the inhabitants of the Bedouin village
206
“Benjamin Netanyahu: Arab States Agree with Me”, CNN, January 27, 2018.
of Khan al-Ahmar207 who clung to it despite the miserable living

conditions imposed on them by the occupation in its unwavering
effort to uproot them. Khan al-Ahmar exposed the two sides of
the coin in the reality on the ground in Jerusalem between the
sway of the occupation and the popular Palestinian insistence on
challenging it and their relative ability to hinder it.
The Palestinian popular conditions on the ground in Jerusalem
and the West Bank remain a factor that cannot be ignored due
to its ability to shock the occupation and its supporters, especially
with the experiences of the last intifada and popular resistance and
demonstrations. Into the bargain is Jerusalem’s potential ability to
elicit Arab and Islamic public anger that could curb any impulses
intending to reinforce occupation in Jerusalem due to its distin-
guished position in Arab and Islamic hearts and minds.
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE DECISION

The U.S. decision regarding Jerusalem has dimensions that sur-
pass the city and its importance, for it resulted very clearly in the
Trump administration’s resolution of dossiers pertaining to the
Palestinian-Israeli issue in accordance with the “deal of the cen-
tury.” It also portrayed Washington’s great bias towards the Israeli
position regardless of the consequences it will have on the balance
of the conflict.
The decision also surpassed the terms of the Quartet and
the traditional rhetoric for political settlement since the Madrid
Conference and the Oslo Accords. This is what referred “the fate
of Jerusalem” to “final status negotiations.” The Trump adminis-
tration’s move may essentially signify the exclusion of Jerusalem
from the negotiations and settle its subordination to the occu-
207
“Project Uprooting and Exacerbation of Apartheid: The Issue of the Red
Khan”, The City of al-Quds, http://alquds-online.org/items/1119, (Accessed on
January 28, 2019).
pation in one form or another without the partial or symbolic

apportionments of East Jerusalem to future Palestinian presence
through subsequent procedural arrangements or negotiations.
Thus, the decision signifies Trump’s disengagement with the two-
state solution called for by the Quartet, which explains the EU’s
rejection despite the indecisiveness of the Central and Eastern
European capitals that suggest that they too may relocate their
embassies to Jerusalem.
Besides, the decision does not appear to be isolated from other
decisions and steps the Trump administration has taken concerning
the Palestinian-Israeli issue such as the reduction of the U.S. aid to
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which
caused the agency an unprecedented financial crisis; the attempt
to impose a partial definition of Palestinian refugees that does not
include their descendants; complacency with and participation in
settlement expansion; the expansion of the U.S. administrations’
criminalization of the Palestinian resistance both within the United
States and internationally; decreasing funding for the PA and stipu-
lating that the families of martyrs and prisoners receive nothing; at-
tempting to establish the “Judaization of the state” with the passing
of the discriminative Knesset basic law, “Israel as the Nation-State
of the Jewish People,” of 2018.
Ahmed Aboul Gheit touched on this complex orientation, ex-
plaining, “We have all observed indications that the issue is not
solely about Jerusalem, but also the U.S. position on the final status
overall and the extent of the [United States’] commitment to the
two-state solution as a method of ending the conflict between the
Israelis and the Palestinians. We have followed, with great concern
and distress, the U.S. decision to reduce its contribution to the
UNRWA’s budget by 65 million dollars, notwithstanding the fact
that its contribution comprises a third of the agency’s budget. It
is no secret that this approach poses a threat to the refugee issue,

which is one of the main issues of the final solution.”208
In addition to this problem, the United States’ insistence on
encouraging the Arab, especially the Gulf, normalization with Is-
rael was made very clear during the Warsaw Conference (February
2019), which was under direct U.S. auspices and attended by Ne-
tanyahu and many Arab officials. These developments and posi-
tions, in their entirety, suggest that the U.S. administration during
the Trump era seeks to unilaterally impose its approach to the Pal-
estinian issue as a reality and, in doing so, supersedes the terms of
the “peace process” and the Quartet as well as the conventions of
the U.S. sponsorship of negotiations.
Washington’s decision was the clearest declaration of this new
orientation, but Washington waited to present the “deal of the
century” despite the previous messages it relayed regarding its in-
tention to initiate it on different occasions. This implies that the
Trump administration is facing difficulty in introducing its project
openly, officially, and thoroughly as an all-in-one package due to
considerations such as the absence of a Palestinian party willing to
accept it; expected Palestinian and Arab opposition; the sensitivity
of the project to neighboring countries, especially Jordan; and the
possibility of unwillingness on the part of Arab capitals close to
Washington to receive the deal in the absence of a Palestinian cover
and Arab alignment with them.
Because the “Deal of the Century” was not publicized clearly
as a complete package, the concerted steps and positions give the
impression that the United States basically seeks to impose at least
208
Kalimat al-ijtimaa’ al-musta’naf li majlis jami’at ad-duwal al-‘arabiya ‘ala al-mus-
tawa al-wizari fi dawratihigheir al-‘adiyahawli’lan al-wilayat al-mutahida al-amrikiai’ti-
rafihabilquds ‘asima la dawlat al-ihtilal al-isra’iliwanaqlsafaratihailayha [“The speeches of
the resumed extraordinary ministerial Arab League meeting regarding the United States‘
announcement of its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the relocation
of its embassy”], (Cairo: 2018), p. 11.
some of the features of the endeavor partially or gradually as shown

by the Jerusalem, refugee, and settlement dossier; the explicit super-
session of the terms of the two-state solution; and Arab-Israeli nor-
malization that does not stipulate the solution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict based on the Peace Initiative, which was illustrated by the
positions of subsequent Arab summits. In fact, the normalization is
escalating despite the continuance of the occupation and apparent-
ly without consideration of the Palestinian issue.
Through its furtherance of this approach, the United States im-
poses a challenge to the Palestinian arena that appears to be subject
to political and financial pressures, the instability of an official Arab
sponsor, and the increasing preoccupation of certain Arab states
with normalization with Israel. Exacerbating this predicament is
the internal division in the Palestinian political arena that separates
the leaderships of Ramallah and Gaza. Although they both oppose
the “Deal of the Century,” the latter have not developed a uniting
Palestinian strategy of confrontation. All the efforts to unify the
Palestinian position and create a unifying national consensus and
a single government have stumbled, which further complicates the
situation while also preventing the availability of a prospective Pal-
estinian partner to the “deal” in order to eliminate the possibility of
an internal Palestinian consensus on it.
FACTORS AND DETERMINANTS OF

THE ARAB POSITIONS
It is obvious that official Arab positions on the U.S. decision re-
garding Jerusalem were not formed in isolation of the following
factors and determinants. The first is the position of each Arab state
in general towards the Palestinian-Israeli issue, and the relative ex-
clusiveness of its positions. The second factor is the particularity of
the concerned state’s relations with the United States in general and
the Trump administration in particular, including whether the state
is dependent on U.S. financial support or whether there are alliance

or defense ties.209
Third, the Arab state’s approach to the publicized normaliza-
tion and confidential communication and meetings with Israel;
any escalation in the response to the U.S. step regarding Jerusalem
does not appear consistent with the Arab capitals’ approach to the
normalization that was exhibited before the decision and whose
practical steps followed it. What is significant in this regard is that
this perpetual normalization is not a tactical option but a symbol of
a political course that is based on a certain logic and has a certain
rhetoric which may surpass the Arab prioritization of the Palestin-
ian-Israeli issue and its dossiers for the sake of strengthening ties
with Israel without any moral reservations.210
The general orientation of the Arab positions and the extent
of its cohesion in the face of the decision, which either raise or
lower expectations; this also applies to Islamic countries that may
encourage the position of the Arab state in question. The Pales-
tinian position, particularly that of the PA, on the dossier, as it
remains a factor behind the official Arab positions; however, the
Arab satisfaction with the mere announcement of support for the
official Palestinian position and its efforts show a dependent and lax
response that denies obligations that are expected to be fulfilled by
the Arab state. What exacerbates the resulting predicament is the
209
For example, Cairo and Washington have had distinct relations since the 1979
Camp David Accords, the rise of Egyptian Defense Minister Abdelfattah al-Sissi to pow-
er after defeating the democratic experiment, and the Saudi leadership’s narrow margins
of discretion after the October 2018 Khashoggi murder case.
210
Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah illustrated this during
his participation in the Manama Dialogue on October 27, 2018, stating “Israel is one
of the countries in the region… Maybe it is time that Israel had the same privileges and
duties as other countries.” He added, “Our priority is to put an end to the conflict and
move to a new world,” and that “Oman is relying on the United States and efforts by
President Donald Trump in working toward the ‘deal of the century’.” Retrieved from:
Katie Paul, “Oman Says Time to Accept Israel in Region, Offers Help for Peace”, Reuters,
October 27, 2018.
limitedness of the PA’s options for facing the increasing challenges

afflicting the Palestinian-Israeli issue.
The level of escalation on the ground in Palestine, as the se-
verity of developments exemplified in popular uprisings and the
Israeli military campaigns affects the official Arab positions to
some degree. In this regard, the developments that involved the
Great Return March and the massacre carried out by the Israeli
army combined with the global reactions seem to have impacted
the extraordinary OIC meeting in a way that relatively overtook
the Arab summit in Dhahran. Furthermore, the outbreak of the
al-Aqsa Intifada and the resulting brutal Israeli military campaigns
led to the curbing of the wave of extensive normalization that had
begun between a number of Arab countries and Israel in the second
half of the 1990s.
The general direction of international positions towards the
U.S. decision that, for a whole year, appeared isolated and did not
coincide with the positions of important capitals; in fact, what
lightened the impact of the decision was its unilaterality and the
reluctance of the European and Western countries to adopt it as
well as its relative isolation in international organizations as shown
by the UNGA’s vote. The impact of certain domestic and regional
issues, crises, and tensions coupled with the relative decline of the
Palestinian-Israeli issue as a priority in the Arab arena and the rise
of new priorities on the map of conflicts and disputes including
Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and tensions with Iran. The status and
influence of the state within the Arab scene; here, we refer to the
relative weight of the Egyptian and Saudi positions, for example, in
the absence of the past roles of Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen.
The level of general popular interplay with the Palestinian-Is-
raeli issue in general and the Trump decision in particular in the
concerned Arab state as well as the Arab and Muslim world, which
Arab decision makers must take into consideration; the decision
prompted anger in Arab and Muslim societies that was expressed

through protests and public events in some countries as well as on
social media. However, this interaction included only some Arab
countries due to the permission or the lack thereof of popular
demonstrations and protests by authorities, and was short-lived,
thus weakening its impact especially with the lack of serious po-
litical will throughout the Arab world to confront the decision or
pressure Israel.
The level of domestic democracy; parliamentary life; public, po-
litical, and media freedoms; and the effectiveness of civil society in
the Arab state; the absence of these elements limit the state’s mar-
gins of discretion. Furthermore, Kuwait and Jordan, for example,
have shown the effect of having a parliamentary life, active political
parties or groups, and an active civil society. This was evidenced by
their reactions to the Trump decision as well, which allowed for the
integration of popular and official positions and alleviated the state
or the political regime from full accountability.
ARAB POSITIONS ON THE PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI

ISSUE AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE INTERPLAY
WITH TRUMP’S DECISION
There is no doubt that the U.S. decision stirred the general moral
position of the Arab states towards the Palestinian issue even if it
had experienced various changes211 and relative demotions. Howev-
er, in recent years, especially since Trump’s election to presidency,
there have been transformations in the Arab scene that exceeded
expectations. These include the rapid transformations in the Saudi
approaches to certain domestic and regional dossiers and the effects
211
Jeffrey Goldberg, “Saudi Crown Prince: Iran’s Supreme Leader ‘Makes Hitler Look
Good’”, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/04/mo-
hammed-bin-salman-iran-israel/557036/, (Accessed on January 28, 2019). See also:
“Israeli Evangelical Leader Reveals What MBS Told Him in Historic Meeting”, Middle
East Observer, https://middleeastobserver.net/israeli-evangelical-leader-reveals-what-
mbs-told-him-in-historic-meeting-english-subs/, (Accessed on January 28, 2019).
on the Gulf and the Arab spheres caused by Riyadh’s regional influ-
ence. According to visitors, delegations, and third parties, Riyadh
has made several manifestations suggesting a fundamental change
in regional policy orientation. Furthermore, the media rhetoric has
redrawn the map of potential “enemies and allies” in a way that
suits Israel, which is why the latter has been “heralding” a Gulf and
Arab transformation in its favor on the basis that “Iran is a com-
mon enemy” – the same basis that was used as a justification for the
Warsaw Conference.
Meanwhile, Egypt has maintained relatively close ties with Isra-
el, but it is an Arab state that has had fixed peace agreements with
the latter aiming to produce various strategic and political strategies
for over four decades. This protects its role in the Palestinian arena
and its relations with parties to the Palestinian scene, including the
PA and Hamas. Additionally, the Palestinian-Israeli issue has tra-
ditionally been among the priorities of Egyptian national security,
especially due to geographic proximity. Among Cairo’s challeng-
ing dossiers is the possibility of the supersession of its regional role
through the establishment of direct Gulf and Arab relations with
the Israelis; the impact of the new U.S. orientations on the tension
in Palestine that may potentially lead to an intifada or confronta-
tions with regional repercussions; and the consequences of the “deal
of the century” on Egypt, especially in regards to the future of the
Gaza Strip.
Jordan, however, will remain directly concerned with the Pal-
estinian-Israeli issue from numerous standpoints given the relative
overlap of the ties and fates of the west and east banks of the Jor-
dan River. Depending on the Jordanian role in Jerusalem, which
includes the endowment management of al-Aqsa Mosque and the
symbolic custodianship of the holy sites, the collapse of the two-
state project concurs with the Palestinian and Jordanian concerns
about the “alternative homeland” endeavors traditionally promoted
by the Likud under the leadership of Netanyahu and the rightist

Israeli parties. Although it does not seem rational that the “Deal
of the Century” would supersede the Jordanian and the Palestin-
ian roles, Amman’s official and covert positions reveal a cautious-
ness towards the United States’ approach to the Palestinian-Israel
issue. After the announcement of the decision, Jordan witnessed
staggering public demonstrations opposing the former under what
seemed like implicit official sponsorship. Later, King Abdullah II
announced that his country is paying the price for its position,212
citing the ensuing exacerbating economic difficulties that commen-
tators interpreted as the blocking of support for Amman because of
its reception of the “deal” and as a way to pressure it to change its
position on Jerusalem.
Overall, this case revealed the limitedness of the United States’
ability to impose its project regarding the Palestinian-Israeli issue
due to the absence of the necessary receptiveness on the part of
regional parties as well as the challenge of securing an international
cover for it. However, the case also revealed the economic cost in-
flicted on the PA and Jordan as direct or indirect pressure.
PALESTINIAN AND ARAB INTERPLAY WITH

THE EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS
The Arab positions moved within an Islamic and international con-
text opposing the U.S. move, which was made clear in the OIC
meeting and by the positions of the EU, the African Union (AU),
212
Mahmoud Al Abed, “Jordan Paying Economic Price for Its Unrelenting Political
Stands –King”, The Jordan Times, January 31, 2018. See also, in a meeting with jour-
nalists in Amman in June 2018, King Abdullah II said, “The regional impact and our
regional political positions have affected the kingdom, not to mention that the role Jor-
dan plays does not please everyone –and this is one of the challenges we are faced with.”
Many, including Jordanian writer and political analyst Fahad al-Khitan, who attended
the meeting and made statements about it, interpreted the king’s allusion as pertaining
to the pressure to impose the “Deal of the Century” and the punitive measures taken
against Jordan for its position on Jerusalem. Retrieved from: Moaz Freihat, “Does Jordan
Pay for Its Regional Positions”, Al Hurra, June 5, 2018.
and other international bodies as well as the UNGA’s meeting. Ul-

timately, the U.S. position was unaided and isolated by the inter-
national community to a great degree and opposed the positions of
previous U.S. administrations. Despite official Arab criticism and
Arab and Muslim action, the official Arab reaction did not entail
any substantial practical measures to confront the decision, even
if there was mention of punitive measures against states that ex-
pressed willingness to relocate their embassies to Jerusalem.
It appears that the PA was not interested in or ready for the
angry public reactions or the encouragement of popular let alone
armed resistance following the announcement of the decision al-
though it suggested during the Arab League’s ministerial meeting
a clause in favor of the Palestinian people’s right to exercise an-
ti-occupation struggle and popular resistance based on interna-
tional law. (This clause was issued in the document of the Arab
League’s Resolution 8882 entitled “Arab Moves to Counteract
U.S. Administration Decision on Jerusalem.”) On the ground,
however, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has tenaciously
rejected the option of another intifada for years, unlike former
president Yasser Arafat who had encouraged it as an alternative
to negotiations after the failure of Camp David in 2000 and the
intensification of Israeli provocation in al-Aqsa Mosque. In fact,
the al-Aqsa Intifada broke out with the participation of the PA
and Fateh; and field developments carried on for years even after
the mysterious death of Arafat.
However, after the announcement of Trump’s decision and all
that it entails, the PA and certain Arab parties wagered on the res-
toration of balance in international positions towards the decision
and the Palestinian-Israeli issue. This was portrayed in repeated
futile attempts to persuade Europe, which remained committed
to the terms of the Quartet and the two-state solution, to play a
more efficient role and take on international leadership indepen-
dent from the United States through a multilateral mechanism for

managing negotiations under the cover of the UN.213
It was apparent that the EU and active European parties’ ab-
stention from following Washington’s position does not mean that
Europe is interested in embarking on an escalatory confrontation
with the decision or even addressing the Trump administration’s
policy towards the Palestinian issue directly. The European consen-
sus about the rejection of the U.S. move, as shown by the Decem-
ber 2017 foreign affairs meeting whose outcomes Netanyahu tried
to influence, does not imply that Europe or the centers of European
foreign policy’s influence are keen on escalating with Washington.
The most that can be expected is a calm and calculated opposi-
tion that avoids clashes with the U.S. policy. Europe maintained
its approach up to the Warsaw Conference which saw the absence
of the UN and the symbolic, or modest, attendance of the EU.
The irony is that the Arab attendance was unprecedently vast and
encompassed friendly gestures of normalization in spite of the fact
that the conference was at the level of foreign ministers and includ-
ed Netanyahu as the foreign minister of his government.
This generally demonstrates that the European position con-
tributed to the U.S. policy’s deprivation of a sufficient interna-
tional cover, especially with the absence of a Russian and Chinese
cover. However, that does not mean that Europe is ready to pro-
vide a safety net to the Palestinian-Israeli issue in the long run
or compensate for the U.S. disregard for the two-state solution,
especially with the increase of attempts to impose occupation on
the ground and the Trump administration’s efforts to introduce
endeavors to eliminate the Palestinian-Israeli issue altogether
through the “deal of the century.” Also, the various discrepancies
213
“President Abbas Calls for Holding International Peace Conference, Multilater-
al Mechanism to Sponsor Negotiations”, WAFA (Palestinian News and Info Agency),
http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=7crxNEa108560754192a7crxNE, (Accessed on
March 25, 2019).
and tensions between the U.S. and the EU, or between certain
capitals, regarding different dossiers forced the Europeans to refer
back to their direct interests in the perturbed relations with Wash-
ington such as mutual trade disputes based on the U.S. protective
measures, military agreements within the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), and the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement on climate change, etc.
REJECTION WITHOUT ESCALATION

Official Arab positions rejected Trump’s decision but without esca-
lating with Washington, thus giving the impression that the Arab
states are not interested in confronting or clashing with the U.S.
administration or even taking direct escalatory measures with Is-
rael. As a matter of fact, several published press reports claim that
there is preexisting willingness to accept the decision on the part
of Arab states close to the United States, which concords with new
regional alignments that include normalization with Israel. Despite
the difficulty of verifying the accuracy of such claims, there was ev-
idence prompting questions regarding the seriousness of some Arab
positions criticizing Trump’s decision.
Furthermore, ensuing developments indicated the formation of
regional alignments during the publicized visits and meetings be-
tween the Gulf States and Israel, representing the highest wave of
normalization since the mid-1990s. The Warsaw Conference also
displayed an Arab - particularly the Gulf - alignment with Israel
under the pretext of new priorities such as confronting Iran. It was
obvious that the U.S. and Israeli leaderships are keen on reinforc-
ing these courses to give the impression that the Palestinian-Israeli
issue, including the issue of Jerusalem, is no longer a priority to the
Arab states heading in this direction and that the worsening policies
of the Israeli occupation on the ground in Jerusalem and the West
Bank along with the murder of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip do
not prevent the new normalizing alignment and its friendly and
intimate gestures.
Overall, what these developments confirm is that the U.S. deci-
sion, despite the criticism and opposition it was met with by Arab
and the Gulf states, has not affected the relations between Arab
capitals and Washington or normalization with Israel. In fact, the
normalization has experienced a strong, albeit somewhat cautious,
revival since the relocation of the embassy.214 Nonetheless, the Gulf
positions themselves do not seem consistent in the normalization
approach as a series of Kuwaiti positions openly split from it not-
withstanding the participation of the Kuwaiti deputy foreign min-
ister in the Warsaw Conference. But these normalizing alignments
do not require the readiness of the concerned Arab parties to sub-
scribe to the United States’ semi-opaque “Deal of the Century,”
especially in the absence of an endorsing Palestinian partner.
On the other hand, the official Arab positions have been rela-
tively lax in their opposition and were outdone by other regional
roles, as proven by the rapid Turkish response to the event and the
positions of Iran, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Ankara was quick to call
for an OIC meeting regarding this issue, reflecting the importance
of Jerusalem and the Palestinian-Israeli issue to the Muslim world
even if the meeting’s outcomes did not meet expectations.
Although much rhetoric and various statements made by the
Arab states, both individually and collectively, expressed the refusal
to acknowledge Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and relocate their
embassies, the Arab world continues to experience chronic internal
criticism for its single, stereotypical reaction consisting of official
speeches and statements and wagering on international resolutions,
giving the impression that there are no alternative options and sig-
214
The cautiousness is seen, for example, in concerted leaks concerning high-level
Arab-Israeli meetings that have neither been confirmed nor denied, in the nature of the
publicized official visits of Israeli visits to Gulf countries, and so on.
nifying weakness and indiscretion, or the decline of a political will

that seeks to curb the policies and procedures of Israeli occupation.
The dilemma is not limited to the absence of practical mea-
sures that can pressure Israel and impact policies that support it
but includes the inclination of Arab states to normalize relations
with Israel despite their usual denunciation of its occupation pol-
icies and violations, thus exhibiting a duality that prompts suspi-
cion and analysis. On the other hand, internal crises in the Arab
world in recent years have indicated that rivalry and conflict be-
tween Arab countries sometimes extend to escalation, hostility,
the utilization of direct methods of struggle, and various system-
atic punishments including military confrontation. This prompts
suspicion regarding the seriousness of the official Arab positions,
whose rejection of the Israeli occupation and policies endorsing it
seems too lax in comparison.
AFTER THE DECISION

The Trump administration paid no heed to preexisting warnings
when it issued its decision and proceeded to acknowledge Jerusalem
as Israel’s capital and relocate its embassy. It virtually reneged on
the declared terms of the “peace process” and the Quartet. That,
however, is not all, for it took measures to exercise pressure on the
Palestinian people such as reducing aid to the UNRWA; encourag-
ing the Arab-Israeli normalization; and expanding the criminaliza-
tion of Palestinian resistance on the international level, as was the
case when it sought to pass a resolution condemning Hamas in the
UNGA on December 6, 2018.
The Trump administration made a move that the previous U.S.
presidents avoided. Through the decision, Trump effectively and
practically undermined the process of political settlement of the
Palestinian issue in accordance with the bases it was built on in the
last decade of the 20th century, started a new era that supersedes
the process or recreates it on disordered bases, and overtook the

two-state solution with the terms set by the Quartet during the
presidency of George W. Bush.
It does not seem that the unilaterality of Washington’s position
will prevent it from making any more impulsive moves. What pro-
motes this is that the Trump administration is still preparing to
launch the “Deal of the Century,” which is likely to be an attempt
to eliminate the Palestinian-Israeli issue altogether as an alternative
to the previous “peace process” in a manner that may supersede
the international community endorsing the two-state solution in
accordance with the Quartet.
As evidenced by the decision, the Trump administration’s orien-
tations are essentially overturning the “Middle East peace process”
or rendering it futile after the conclusion of the issue of Jerusalem,
one of the most important results of the negotiations. As a result,
Trump’s move caused a standoff for the parties concerned with the
continuation of the Quartet’s promises, the two-state solution, and
the granting of hope to the Palestinian people for the future of the
“peace” option and negotiations involving the EU and certain Arab
states. The PA seems to be directly disadvantaged by the collapse of
the Quartet’s plan, which was supposed to render it an independent
state whose capital is East Jerusalem.
The Trump decision caused a stir in the extensive settlement
rhetoric. The concerned parties clearly did not find an interest in
announcing the collapse of the “peace process” or the Quartet. As
such, the EU, the Arab League, the PA, and certain Arab capitals
continued calling for or depending on the “peace process” before
the decision although the enforcement of serious negotiations and
conclusive effective agreements would not happen without a deci-
sive U.S. role.
What makes matters worse for the Palestinians is that the Unit-
ed States and Israel disregard the priority of resolving the Palestin-
ian issue that was presented in the Arab Peace Initiative as a stip-
ulation for normalization. If anything, normalization is increasing
especially with Gulf states while the Israeli government relentlessly
inflicts occupation on the ground, including in Jerusalem, with the
issuance of “Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People” just
weeks after the relocation of the U.S. embassy.215
The nature of relations between the key Arab countries and the
United States, particularly the Trump administration, do not give
the impression that there is Arab political will to thwart Washing-
ton’s endeavors or even a readiness to challenge its policies and deci-
sions. This puts the Palestinian-Israeli issue in a vulnerable position
without a capable supporter it can rely on to confront the great
challenges of this period, especially with the abandonment of al-
ternative options for negotiation. Indeed, the nature and axes of
current regional alignments, or alignments in formation, ascribed
by Israel and the Gulf rhetoric to the priority of “confronting Iran
as a mutual enemy,” based on new principles, only complicate the
situation further.
215
Hossam Shaker, “English the Knesset: A Parliamentary Vote to Occupy His-
tory and the Future”, MEMO (Middle East Monitor), https://www.middleeastmonitor.
com/20180721-the-knesset-a-parliamentary-vote-to-occupy-history-and-the-future/,
(Accessed on February 25, 2019).
CHAPTER VIII
THE STANCES OF GLOBAL POWERS

ON THE RELOCATION OF THE UNITED STATES
EMBASSY TO AL-QUDS (JERUSALEM)
MOHAMMAD MAKRAM BALAWI*
INTRODUCTION
An efficient superpower is a clever superpower and one way of being
so, is to minimize its enemies and increase the number of its allies
and friends. Imposing its will on others is not the only practice to
stay on the top of nations; in most cases a superpower concentrates
power through negotiations with small powers, states and non-state
actors, in order to cooperate rather than to contradict its policies.
The current president of the United States, Donald Trump,
made a move to relocate his country’s embassy to al-Quds (Jerusa-
lem), which openly contradicts with the UNSC resolutions. He did
not reflect enough on the implication of this decision on the image
of his country which has invested a lot in building its soft power.
Nor has he considered the destructive impact of his decision on the
institutions that sustain the world order such as the United Na-
tions, and that it might lead it, eventually, to crumble. Trump even
ignored the concerns of his Arab, Muslim, and most importantly
*
Dr. Mohammad Makram Balawi is a Palestinian writer and academic based in
Istanbul, and the president of the Asia Middle East Forum.
European allies who already suffer from the backlash of corruption

and instability in Africa and the Middle East in the form of waves
of illegal immigrants crossing the Mediterranean. This might not
only put tremendous pressure on the already worsening European
economy, but also cause social and political reactions that will boost
right-wing radicalism, and carry it into power, reminding Europe-
ans of a bleak era of their history. Other global powers such as Rus-
sia and China did not endorse the American move either. Although
their motives could defer, they seem to share the same concerns
with rest of the world.
This article attempts to analyze and to understand the reactions
of major global powers, namely the European Union (EU), the
major EU countries, Russia and China, to the American move to
transfer its embassy from Tel Aviv to al-Quds. It also tries to reveal
the reasons behind their policies in some detail.
1. POSITIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

AND MAJOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Although the European Union (EU) represents most of the Eu-
ropean countries, still each state has its own foreign policy which
might not necessarily match with the EU’s declared international
positions. Thus, it is deemed important to know the organization’s
position as well as the position of the major European countries
such as Britain, Germany, and France, and those countries whose
policies are different and more independent.
THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Donald Task, the president of the EU, declared in December 2017,
that the position of the EU on the al-Quds issue remains unchanged.
The EU is firmly committed to a two-state solution and the position
of the Holy City is to be decided through negotiations between the
Israelis and the Palestinians. The EU ambassador to Israel, Emanuele
Giaufret, in the same month, affirmed in an interview with the Israeli

TV station Channel 7 that the EU embassy will remain in Tel Aviv.
He stressed that the EU will not follow the example of U.S. President
Donald Trump and will adhere to the UN resolutions in this regard,
and that the fate of Jerusalem should be decided through negotia-
tions between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Jerusalem, he said, is
an important and a sensitive issue for all religions and has to be dealt
with carefully. The EU has warned of the negative consequences of
any unilateral steps to change the status of Jerusalem.216
THE POSITION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

One of the earliest British reactions on the relocation of the Amer-
ican embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, was indicated by
the British Prime Minister Theresa May when she said in December
2017, that Britain “disagrees with the U.S. decision to move its
embassy to Jerusalem and recognize Jerusalem as the Israeli capital
before a final status agreement.” The British spokesman confirmed
by saying, “The British embassy to Israel is based in Tel Aviv and
we have no plans to move it.”217 Britain, as it is declared, was not
convinced to change its position on the way the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict should be resolved. Al-Quds is one point of disagreement
among many issues - albeit the most important one - that both
sides have to resolve by negotiation not by coercion, as the Trump
administration is currently doing.
The British cannot fully contradict the strong American ally or
force it to abide with the related principles of international law, re-
gardless of the dangers they foresee laying ahead. After all, the U.S.
is the leader of NATO and the backbone of the Western world, and
216
Nitsan Keidar, “Our Embassy Will Remain in Tel Aviv”, Israel National News,
December 5, 2017.
217
Toi Staff, “Theresa May: UK Will Not Move Its Embassy to Jerusalem”, The
Times of Israel, (May 14, 2018).
ignoring this fact might amount to suicide. The British position

acknowledges that the American move is against international law,
still it is willing to deal with the new situation as a fact. This ap-
proach indicates that Britain is verbally refusing but in practice is
helping the Americans to create a new fact on the ground, through
normalizing the situation.218
Accordingly, the UK Middle East Minister Alistair Burt rejected
the request of the British Palestinian Policy Council to “boycott
and refuse to work in the new embassy, according to an account
from an attendee.” The Foreign Office confirmed his position and
declared that “while the UK does disagree with the move, diplo-
mats and other representatives will attend meetings at the embassy
going forward.”219
THE POSITION OF GERMANY

Germany’s reaction in this regard, seems to be stronger than the
British one. In terms of verbal expression, Foreign Minister Sigmar
Gabriel called the decision “pouring oil onto the fire.”220 Germany
even lobbied against the move. All those European countries who
had expressed a desire to move their embassies, such as the Czech
Republic and Austria, were persuaded by Germany to ponder over
their decision, and not to act unilaterally contrary to the European
Union. Tom Sandell, the founding director of the European Coa-
lition for Israel in Brussels, believes that Merkel’s move comes to
save the Iran nuclear deal of which he said Germany is in favor.221
218
Dania Akkad, “EXCLUSIVE: UK Will Use US Embassy in Jerusalem Despite
Condemning Move”, Middle East Eye, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclu-
sive-after-boycotting-opening-uk-attend-meetings-us-embassy-, (Accessed on February
25, 2019).
219
Ibid.
Allison Williams, “Berlin Condemns Trump’s Jerusalem Decision”, Handelsblatt,
220
July 12, 2017.

221
Chris Tomlinson, “Merkel Told EU Leaders to Not Move Embassies to Jerusa-
lem”, Breitbart, December 7, 2018.
He said, “Merkel called the Romanian president, Klaus Iohannis,

to convince him not to relocate his country’s embassy to Jerusalem,
[and] prompted Sandell to go public.”222 Josef Braml of the German
Council on Foreign Relations, deems likely, that Germany will not
take further steps in pressurizing the United States on the issue of
Jerusalem, given the list of concerns that are still to be addressed
such as the economy, the position on Iran, which are more import-
ant than Jerusalem to Germany. “Of course, we’ve heard lawmak-
ers express some consternation, rhetorically, but they wouldn’t risk
their economic relationship with the U.S. They will save their influ-
ence for more critical moments such as when business relationships
are in danger,”223 he said.
THE POSITION OF FRANCE

President Macron made clear in many incidents that France
stands by international law and regrets the American decision
to locate its embassy to Jerusalem. He confirmed where France
stands on the issue, stressing that France will eventually move its
embassy to West Jerusalem after the status of the city is decided
through negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. He
reiterated that the status of the city is a matter of international se-
curity, criticizing the American move by describing it as “regretta-
ble.” Macron said, “France and Europe are attached to a two-state
solution - Israel and Palestine - living side by side in peace and
security within recognized international borders with Jerusalem
the capital of both states.”224
It is reported that the French President Emmanuel Macron
has told Israel’s prime minister that President Trump’s decision
222
Benjamin Weinthal, “Merkel Urged EU Countries Not to Move Embassies to
Jerusalem”, The Jerusalem Post, December 4, 2018.
223
Allison Williams, “Berlin Condemns Trump’s Jerusalem Decision”.
224
John Irish, “France’s Macron Regrets Trump’s ‘Unilateral’ Jerusalem Decision”,
Reuters, December 6, 2017
of recognizing the united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is a

“threat to peace.” He asked the Israeli prime minister to halt the
settlement construction in the West Bank and Jerusalem, which
could be the first step to break the impasse with Palestinians.225 He
said that “the relocation of the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem
led to ‘people dying’ and did not advance peace.” Although Ma-
cron stressed France’s “commitment to the security of Israel,” he
said he was worried about the threats to the peace process, while
condemning any violence against civilians, stressing the European
countries’ concerns over “Israel’s use of live fire during the Pales-
tinian mass protests along the Gaza border.” Macron and May are
expected to bring up the violent escalation in Gaza and urge Israel
to act with restraint.226
Macron justified France’s position on Jerusalem to members of
the CRIF, the umbrella organization of the French Jewish organi-
zations, saying, “If France followed this path (American), it would
lose its role as [a neutral] facilitator, which is the useful role for
this region.” France would not risk its role as an interlocutor be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians, as this might marginalize France in
an issue it considers vital to the French and European interests. It
is worth mentioning that France hosted a conference in 2016 “to
boost international support for a two-state solution based on pre-
1967 lines.”227
THE POSITIONS OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Although most of the EU countries expressed their concerns
against the American move, it was not a unanimous European
225
Noor Nanji, “Macron Tells Netanyahu: ‘I Disapprove of Trump’s Decision on
Jerusalem’,” The National, December 10, 2017.
226
Noa Landau, “Macron to Netanyahu: Jerusalem Embassy Move Led to People
Dying, Didn’t Promote Peace”, Haaretz, June 5, 2018.
227
Tovah Lazaroff, “Macron: France Will ‘One Day’ Recognize West Jerusalem as
Israel’s Capital”, The Jerusalem Post, March 8, 2018.
stand. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Romania blocked a

joint EU statement criticizing the relocation of the U.S. embassy
to Jerusalem, with coordination with Israel. The Israelis discern
the European attempt led by France and other European coun-
tries as an attempt to “to present to the U.S. a common position
against the move, and to embarrass and isolate the Trump ad-
ministration.” Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Romania an-
nounced that they object to the statement and made it impossible
to reach the consensus needed to publish it.228
2. THE POSITION OF RUSSIA

Russia declared a position on the relocation of the American em-
bassy to Jerusalem similar to that of the Europeans. The Kremlin
declared that Trump’s decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel
to Jerusalem could aggravate the conflict between the Israelis and
the Palestinians.229 Mikhail Bogdanov, the deputy foreign minister,
said Russia will shift its embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, only
after the Israelis and the Palestinians settle all issues. Russia’s official
stance recognizes “West Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel and
East Jerusalem as the capital city of the would-be Palestinian state.
Only after that, we will make a decision on our embassy move.”230
Sergey Lavrov, the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian
Federation, stressed that all issues concerning the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict can only be resolved through direct dialogue between the
leaders of the opposing sides. He said, “Russia has many times sug-
gested hosting a platform for such a dialogue. Our proposal is still
228
Barak Ravid, “Scoop: EU Statement Opposing U.S. Embassy Move Is Blocked”,
Axios, https://www.axios.com/hungary-czech-romania-block-eu-statement-against-em-
bassy-move-jerusalem-6b85f6bb-8861-4dab-8473-e542196d1368.html, (Accessed on
February 25, 2019).
229
Dmitry Solovyov, “Kremlin: U.S. Embassy Move to Jerusalem May Further
Worsen Israel-Palestinian Relations”, Reuters, December 6, 2017.
230
“Russia’s Embassy in Israel Might Be Moved Only After Decision on Jerusalem
-Diplomat”, TASS News, June 30, 2018.
on the table.”231 Russian ambassador to Palestine Haidar Aghanin

expressed, on his part, his country’s concerns over the relocation of
American embassy and said “it was no longer acceptable that only
one country sponsors the peace process.”232
3. THE POSITION OF CHINA

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang expressed
worry over the “potential flare-up of regional tensions and warned
‘all parties’ not to trigger new contradictions in the region.”233 Geng
Shuang said that the status of Jerusalem has always been a sensitive
and complicated issue, and in the core of the Palestinian-Israeli dis-
pute. Jerusalem, as Geng stated, touches emotional stings of various
religions. It is universally agreed upon to seek a final solution for
this issue, through dialogue. Geng concluded the Chinese support
efforts to handle the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in accordance with
the relevant UN resolutions, and support the Palestinians in “build-
ing an independent, full sovereignty state along the 1967 borders
with East Jerusalem as its capital.” Geng, called on all parties to
“uphold an objective and just position and contribute to the ear-
ly resumption of negotiations between Palestine and Israel for the
benefit of regional peace and stability.”234
At the 3rd Palestinian-Israeli Symposium in Beijing, Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with the representatives of Palestine
and Israel, and stressed that all parties when solving the status of
231
232
“Moving US Embassy to Jerusalem Violates International Law, Says Russia”,
WASA, http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=3hx9PRa97467121224a3hx9PR, (Accessed
on February 25, 2019).
233
Charlotte Gao, “What’s China’s Stance on Trump’s Jerusalem Decision?”, The Dip-
lomat, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/whats-chinas-stance-on-trumps-jerusalem-deci-
sion/, (Accessed on February 26, 2019).
234
Geng Shuang, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press
Conference on December 7, 2017”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1517747.
shtml, (Accessed on February 26, 2019).
Jerusalem, should implement international consensus and achieve

peaceful coexistence. He said that China’s propositions on Jerusa-
lem, are summed up in four points. The first is acknowledging and
respecting that Jerusalem is a holy site of the three religions. Sec-
ond, only by fair and impartial consideration of the interests of all
parties can we reach a solution acceptable to all parties. Therefore,
according to Wang Yi, it is important to uphold fairness and justice
for this issue is a ruler measuring the conscience of mankind. Third,
the status of Jerusalem should be settled according to international
consensus through negotiations. Fourth, the Palestinians and the
Israelis need to respect each other’s right to exist, and should avoid
taking actions that will lead to further deterioration of the situa-
tion, and should take measures to restore and maintain the peace
and stability of Jerusalem.235
CONCLUSION
For Europeans the Jerusalem issue might, at any moment, ignite
a religious war that would exasperate the situation in the Arab
world which already emitted millions of refugees, due to the af-
tershocks of the Arab Spring, especially in Syria. Any new war
could mean millions of additional immigrants and a complete
destabilization of the whole region including an anticipated effect
on power supply and its prices, which would be damaging for the
European economy.
Europeans, especially those prone to the potential of refugee
waves and those with economic interests in the Middle East re-
gion such as the Western European countries, foresee a very seri-
ous impact of the American move on peace and stability, which
may hamper European economies and lead to further decline in
235
Wang Yi, “Wang Yi Talks about the Status of Jerusalem”, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/
zzjg_663340/xybfs_663590/gjlb_663594/2868_663663/2870_663730/t1522091.sht-
ml, (Accessed on February 27, 2019).
the international role and the emergence of Islamic radicalism and

international terrorism. Yet, due to many strategic and historical
facts, European countries are unable to confront practically the
American decision and confined themselves to verbal reactions.
The British response, in particular, is weaker than the German and
French ones, being more attached, traditionally, to the Americans.
The French government is more vocal on the issue. Germany, on
the other hand, being the most affected by any destabilization in
the Middle East which may lead to the rise of rightist powers in
local politics and the loss of ground of the current ruling elite, has
made further steps as lobbying against the decision. Nonetheless,
this issue, is not at the top of Germany’s priority list, and Germany
is not ready to jeopardize its relations with the United States, while
there are far more important issues such as the Iran nuclear deal, the
economy, and the Russian threat, still pending.
Ostensibly, the Europeans want to distance themselves from the
unbalanced American policy in this regard. Yet, scrutinizing the
European position would lead one to a different conclusion, alto-
gether. Although the EU carefully observes activities in the West
Bank and Jerusalem, including the building of illegal settlements,
the demolishing of Palestinian homes, annexing Palestinian land,
and violating Palestinian basic human rights, it fails to do anything
tangible to compel Israel to adhere to the basic principles of in-
ternational law, and tends to give Israel more time to prolong the
process of annexing what is left of the Palestinian land.
Soon enough, there will be no remaining land for the Palestin-
ians to have their state on, and the whole European approach of
resolving the conflict built on two-state-solution will turn into an
empty rhetoric and the need for a Palestinian capital will be out of
question. This approach that postpones the problem, will manage
only in accumulating more anger and feeling of insult in the hearts
of all those who see the Israeli occupation of the Holy City as an act
of aggression on their faith, and will open the door for catastrophic
future confrontations.
As for other global powers such as Russia and China who are
not directly affected by the implication of the event, their moves
lay a good foundation for bartering in future negotiations on any
breach of law by these powers. American actions undermined its
moral authority pertaining to the rule of law, international peace,
and human rights. Countries like China and India with problems
of their own, will have a free hand to purse their interests when
needed, in ways that might be seen as controversial, based on the
simple fact that it was done before by the United States.
As for Russians, the move of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem
might not be as bad as it is for the Europeans. The Russians, in
fact, might see it as a chance to clear their image with regard to
Ukraine and the failed attempt on the life of Sergi Skripal, the Rus-
sian double spy, and his daughter in Britain last year. Russia is not
the only one who breaks international law, after all. The United
States, which lectures everyone - including Russia - on democracy
and peace, ignored the international law. Moreover, the Russians
see Jerusalem as a chance to reintroduce themselves as mediators,
especially after the Americans lost their role through their bizarre
stance. Russia would like to expand in the vacuum created by the
U.S. and to find a foothold in this strategically important region
and break their isolation, after the conflict with Ukraine.
The Chinese have different reasons for their position that stress-
es adherence to the principles of international law and resolving the
conflict through negotiations. China is very keen on maintaining
peace and stability in this region that represents the other end of its
multi-billion-dollar silk road project and wants to create conditions
that safeguard its future investments in the region.
It is unlikely that the current policies of the countries discussed
in this chapter, will considerably affect the American or Israeli po-
sitions on Jerusalem. Unless major economic, security, or military

deterioration occurs in the region that will drastically harm the
interest of these two countries, Israel will benefit from the Ameri-
can move, and utilize it to consolidate its power over the occupied
city and Judaize what has remained of it. Other countries will be
soon inclined to follow the American footsteps, unless they feel the
pinch of repercussions by Arab and Muslim countries and of the
countries who do not approve of the U.S. policy.
CHAPTER IX
UNDERSTANDING TURKEY’S POSITION

ON AL-QUDS, THE NOBLE CITY
HELIN SARI ERTEM*
INTRODUCTION
The fate of al-Quds al-Sharif, widely known as “the Noble City”,236
has been one of the world’s most contentious issues. When I saw
the city in 1998, as a young university student, I was amazed by
its beauty and profoundness. However, this beauty and profound-
ness were not able to hide the city’s years-long loneliness and suf-
fering under the shadow of the everlasting clashes between the
Palestinians and the Israelis, claiming ownership. Turkey deeply
feels the pain of this city, which was under its rule for centuries.
In the end, it is the place where our grandfathers from Anatolia
were freely traveling to or settling a hundred years ago as part of
their “motherland.” We inherited from them a longing and love
of al-Quds.237
Maybe for that reason, al-Quds reminds me of Atilla İlhan’s
well-known poem, which claims, “separation too is included in
*
Assist. Prof. Dr. Helin Sarı Ertem, Istanbul Medeniyet University, Department of
International Relations.
236
Also known as Kudüs, Jerusalem, Beytülmakdis, Bayt al-Maqdis.
237
Dilan Onur, “Biraz Hasret, Biraz Sevdadır Kudüs”, 5N1Kudüs, http://5n1ku-
dus.com/yazi/biraz-hasret-biraz-sevdadir-kudus, (Accessed on February 05, 2019).
love and those who are separated are still beloved.”238 Although
it has been more than a century since Turkey lost al-Quds physi-
cally, its love for this city, in particular, and Palestine, in general,
has never ended. Thus, despite the territorial break-off and the
physical remoteness of the geography, the city is not lost or for-
gotten by Turkey psychologically, and it is not as far as the current
maps indicate.
Within such a context, this chapter aims to analyze the main
dynamics behind Turkey’s devotion to al-Quds and the policies
by Ankara to relieve this city’s problems and enable it to achieve
a permanent, rightful status as the capital of an independent Pal-
estine. To this end, the article first focuses on the meaning of the
city for Turkey in religious, historical, and cultural terms, which
are strongly affected by Turkey’s Islamic identity and the Ottoman
past. The paper, then, examines Turkey’s position on al-Quds as
part of its comprehensive Palestine policy. While doing so, it takes
into account various systemic, regional and local dynamics that
affect Turkey’s discourse and practice regarding the Palestine issue.
The paper exposes the insufficient support from the international
and regional actors, accompanied by the tangled realpolitik of the
Middle East, as the prominent factors that limit Turkey’s position.
Despite that, in accordance with its wider claim of “being the
supporter of all oppressed peoples,” Turkey continues to vocalize
the rights of the Palestinians in the strongest way possible and
to send a significant amount of foreign aid to Palestine despite
the international and regional pressure to obstruct these efforts.
Turkey’s determination will certainly encourage the Palestinians
in their cause to achieve an independent state of their own, with
East al-Quds as the capital.
238
Atilla İlhan is a well-known Turkish poet. See: Atilla İlhan, Ayrılık Sevdaya Dâhil,
(Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara: 1993), p. 77.
AL-QUDS UNDER THE OTTOMAN RULE AND

ITS MEANING FOR TURKEY
Al-Quds is one of the oldest cities of the world with a history dat-
ing back 6,000 years. All three monotheistic religious traditions,
namely Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, have various holy sites in
this city, especially on the eastern part. The old city, in the east of
al-Quds, is divided into different neighborhoods inhabited by the
members of the abovementioned faiths. For Muslims, the city is de-
fined as one of the prominent centers of the Islamic civilization and
the eternal capital of Palestine. Therefore, it is an inalienable cause
for all Muslims.239 After Mecca and Medina, al-Quds is considered
to be the third divine city of the Muslims, and the holder of a vari-
ety of religious and cultural heritage sites. The most important one
among them is Masjid al-Aqsa, in other words Haram al-Sharif.
Masjid al-Aqsa, which means the farthest masjid to Mecca, is
a 144-acre estate, containing the Qubbat al-Sakhra, where Prophet
Muhammed is believed to have taken his miraculous journey to heav-
en, and the Qiblah Mosque, where he performed his prayers after
the Mi’raj (Night Journey). Qubbat al-Sakhra (Dome of the Rock),
on the other hand, is the place that contains the Hajar al-Muallaq
(Floating Stone), which is claimed to be the place where Prophet
Abraham tried to sacrifice his son and where Prophet Muhammed
stepped for beginning the Mi’raj. When Caliph Umar conquered the
city in AD 638, he first identified the whole area where the Mi’raj is
believed to have taken place and constructed the Qiblah Mosque that
became the first qiblah and the third masjid of the Muslims.240
Apart from its Muslim identity, which takes root from the early
years of Islam, al-Quds gains significance for Turkey as the legacy
239
For details see: Abdul Latif Tibawi, Jerusalem: Its Place in Islam and Arab History,
(Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut: 1969).
240
Fahir Armaoğlu, Filistin Meselesi ve Arap-İsrail Savaşları (1948-1988), (Türkiye İş
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Ankara: 1994), p. 110.
of the 400-year-long Ottoman rule in this region. In fact, the city’s

religious meaning for contemporary Turkey is almost inseparable
from the historical and cultural meaning that it gained during the
Ottoman rule. The region, which was called by the Ottomans Arz-ı
Filistin (Palestine), came under the Ottoman rule in 1516 by Sul-
tan Selim’s defeat of the Mamluks in Syria and Egypt, and his suc-
cession to the caliphate. The Ottomans ruled Palestine by dividing
it into three parts, namely Akka, Nablus, and al-Quds. With a new
regulation in the Damascus Province in the 1880s, al-Quds was ad-
ministered separately, while Akka and Nablus were ruled as part of
the Beirut Province.241 The Ottomans ruled the non-Muslims of the
region through the guidance of the sharia law. This was in accor-
dance with the practices of the previous Muslim rulers of the city.
The Ottomans certainly attached great significance to this city.
After Sultan Selim, the Ottoman rulers such as Sultan Suleiman,
Sultan Murat IV, Sultan Abdulmajid, Sultan Abdulaziz, and Sul-
tan Abdulhamid II constructed various mosques, madrasahs, hos-
pices, bridges, bathhouses, bazaars, fountains and aqueducts, all of
which were owned by different Ottoman waqfs (endowments), but
did not all survive to this day. The city walls, gates, and the cas-
tle, which were restored by Sultan Suleiman, are among the other
remnants of the Ottoman era. During the reconstruction of the
city gates, Sultan Suleiman is believed to have written on the Halil
Gate “Lâ ilâhe illâllah, Ibrahim Halilullah,” which means “There
is no deity but God; Abraham is his friend.” For some historians,
these words were chosen to express the multicultural character of
the city and Sultan Suleiman actually aimed to show that al-Quds
belongs to all three monotheistic faiths.242 During their rule in the
region, the Ottomans constructed at least 15 mosques and masjids
241
M. Lutfullah Karaman, Uluslararası İlişkiler Çıkmazında Filistin Sorunu, (İz
Yayıncılık, Istanbul: 1991), pp. 14-15.
242
Ayça Örer, “Bir Osmanlı Şehri Kudüs”, Gerçek Hayat, December 18, 2017.
inside the city walls, including the al-Quds Castle Minaret, the Red
Minaret, and the Bilal bin Rabah, Rusasi, and Mevlevi Mosques.
Sultan Suleiman and Kasım Pasha Fountains, as well as the Sultan
Bathhouse are also among the Ottoman buildings that can be seen
today. Another remnant of the Ottoman era, the Haseki Sultan
Hospice, has also preserved its soul and has been serving food to
the poor of al-Quds for the last 462 years. The restoration of Masjid
al-Aqsa and Qubbat al-Sakhra were conducted by the Ottomans
during the eras of Sultan Abdulmajid and Abdulaziz, while al-Quds
owes many of its roads and bazaars to Sultan Abdulaziz.
Although the city holds some of the oldest holy sites of the Jews,
such as the Wailing Wall, the Jewish communities’ interest in the
city, and Palestine in general, gradually increased especially with the
World Zionist Congress in 1897, after which leaders like Theodore
Herzl began looking for the ways of establishing a country for the
Jews. Before that, the region received a relatively limited number of
Jewish immigrants, some of whom were given shelter by the Otto-
mans after escaping from the oppression of the Catholic Spanish
Empire in the 15th century. By the beginning of the 20th century,
the number of Jewish migrants moving to Palestine from around
the world had increased and laid the groundwork for the future
clashes with the Arab inhabitants of the region. In 1917, entire
Palestine went under the British mandate and al-Quds was named
as the capital of Palestine. As a result, the Ottomans, who were in a
deep crisis at the time of World War One, lost their physical bond
with the region.
Britain, which took Palestine from the Ottoman Empire, pre-
pared the basis of a Jewish state through the 1917 Balfour Dec-
laration, which is perceived as the main catalyser of the Nakbah.
Nakbah literally means “catastrophe” in Arabic and symbolizes the
saddening mass exodus of at least 700,000 Palestinians especially
after May 14, 1948, when Israel was declared as an independent
state. Under the heavy reaction of the Palestinians to the declara-

tion of the state of Israel in 1948, al-Quds was divided into two:
the west part was left to Israel and the east part was given to the
control of Jordan. With the war of 1967, however, the whole city
was occupied by Israel and in 1980, the city, which is defined as
“Arabs’ symbol of honor,”243 was unilaterally declared as the capital
of Israel.
The problematic legal status of the city has come to the agenda
once again, after U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s recognition of
the city as Israel’s capital in December 2017 and the move of the
American embassy from Tel Aviv to al-Quds in May 2018. This has
created huge frustration to the Palestinians and the majority of the
international community and most countries, which condemned
this highly provocative decision by the U.S. administration. For the
former, the United States’ latest moves aim to establish a fait accom-
pli on the status of al-Quds and on many other issues of this chron-
ic conflict. The Turkish government gave a strong reaction both to
the U.S. decision and the violence of Israel following the relocation
of the American embassy. Declaring a national mourning for the
60 Palestinians who lost their lives during the protests, Ankara ex-
pelled the Israeli ambassador in Ankara and called the Organiza-
tion of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for an emergency meeting. As
the rotating presiding country, Turkey attached great significance
to using the OIC efficiently to consolidate Muslim nations and
carried the issue to the UN immediately. However, this has never
been an easy task.
TURKEY’S CURRENT POSITION ON AL-QUDS:

DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES
Aiming to increase the awareness on the Palestinian issue and the
difficult conditions that the Palestinians are living in, Turkey tries
243
Cengiz Çandar, Direnen Filistin, (May Yayınları, Istanbul: 1976), p. 101.
with every mean to be the voice of al-Quds at the international

platforms and shows a great effort to consolidate the support of the
Muslim world for this holy city. In the end, the unfair treatment
of the Palestinians by Israel addresses people’s moral compass and
requires taking sides with the Palestinians.244 At the 2nd Conference
of the Association of Parliamentarians for al-Quds held on Decem-
ber 14, 2018, with the theme of “Al-Quds: The Eternal Capital
of Palestine,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated, “the
al-Quds cause is not just the cause of a handful of Muslims in Pal-
estine. Al-Quds is the honor, dignity and holy site of all the Muslim
world of 1.7 billion people. This cause is the common cause and
common issue of us all.” Underlining that “al-Quds is a red line for
Muslims,” he added, “defending al-Quds means defending human-
ity, peace, justice, and liberty. That is why we have been defending
this cause in the strongest way possible.”245
In parallel with the statements above, Turkey continues to
express its views on Palestine in various international platforms,
including the UN. At the annual meetings of the UN General
Assembly, President Erdoğan keeps mentioning the suffering of
Palestine to turn the attention of the international community to
this problem, increase its worldwide awareness, and consolidate the
Muslims worldwide around this cause. In his last statement at the
UN Headquarters in September 2018, Erdoğan once again criti-
cized the negligence of the UN Security Council on the oppressed
people of the world, stated that Turkey would continue to stand by
244
See: Mete Çubukçu, Bizim Filistin: Bir Direnişin Tarihçesi, (Metis, Istanbul:
2002), p. 12.
245
“Al-Quds Is the Common Cause of Us All”, Presidency of the Republic of Tur-
key, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/ 100118/-al-quds-is-the-common-cause-of-
us-all-, (Accessed on February 5, 2019).
the Palestinians, and asked the international community to protect

the legal and historical status of al-Quds.246
Turkey’s emotional bond with al-Quds, as well as the whole of
Palestine, is shared by a wide spectrum of the political scene at
home247 and this commonality strengthens Turkish officials’ pro-Pal-
estinian decisions. Many intellectuals support the idea that what
we are talking about is actually “the extortion of a nation’s right for
self-determination and a human rights problem that must be de-
fended by everyone.”248 Similarly, the majority of the Turkish pop-
ulation think that the Palestinians are in a rightful fight to protect
their motherland. For them, this is an aggrieved nation, oppressed,
and expatriated from their territories.249 Especially since 1948, the
Palestinians have been losing their lands acre by acre and are de-
prived of a state while being imprisoned in-between walls and bar-
riers that prevent them from living humanely with the necessary
food and water supplies, employment, and education services as
well as sufficient health care.
Due to Israel’s political and economic violence, the Palestinians
are suffering from high unemployment, food and water scarcity,
and poor health conditions, which gets worse by the ideological
and physical division in Palestine between Fatah and Hamas. To-
day, the poverty threshold in Palestine is around 30 percent and
40 percent of the population between the age of 15 and 29 are
unemployed.250 Gaza, the West Bank, and al-Quds are isolated from
each other through walls, barriers and checkpoints, which makes
246
“Erdogan at UN: Turkey Stands with Palestinians, World Must Protect Jerusa-
lem”, Haaretz, September 25, 2018.
247
Erkan Ertosun, Filistin Politikamız: Camp David’den Mavi Marmara’ya, (Kaknüs
Yayınları, Istanbul: 2013), p. 96.
248
Oral Çalışlar, “Filistin! Ah Filistin!”, Posta, May 16, 2018.
249
Mete Çubukçu, Bizim Filistin: Bir Direnişin Tarihçesi, pp. 169-170.
“Youth, Peace and Security”, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Press
250
Release, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/Press Release/Press_En_10-8-2017-youth-

en.pdf, (Accessed on February 5, 2019).
the Palestinians become heavily dependent on Israel and foreign

aid. At this point, Turkey comes forward as one of the main aid
suppliers to Palestine.
Turkey ranks as the 6th biggest donor country among the world
development assistance providers and the biggest donor country
considering the humanitarian aid supply/GNP. It attaches great sig-
nificance to Palestine, while making its aid policy plans, which are
a part of a wider vision, prioritizing sustainable development and
removal of poverty on the global level. Official and semi-official
institutions such as the Turkish Red Crescent (Türk Kızılayı), the
Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), the Disas-
ter and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) as well as some
NGOs such as the İHH Human Relief Foundation are the key
actors that help Turkey transfer its aid and assistance to the region
both in kind and in cash. Food products, hygiene, and health sup-
plements are the top aid materials being sent from Turkey in kind.
In 2017, Palestine ranked third among the countries most
benefiting from Turkey’s bilateral official development assistance.
The amount of bilateral official development assistance sent by
Turkey to Palestine is 40.6 million dollars, half of which was sup-
plied by TİKA.251 According to Bülent Korkmaz, TİKA’s former
program director for Palestine, since 2005, TİKA brought into
action more than 500 projects, which were shaped according to
the most vital needs of the Palestinians.252 This is basically to im-
prove the socioeconomic conditions of the Palestinians, includ-
ing the inhabitants of East al-Quds. Turkish-led projects cover
various areas, including health, technical assistance, water supply,
251
Online interview with Gökhan Umut from TİKA on May 22, 2018. See also:
“Turkish Development Assistance Report 2017”, TİKA, https://www.tika.gov.tr/up-
load/2019/Turkish%20Development%20Assistance%20Report%202017/ Kalkin-
ma2017EngWeb.pdf, (Accessed on February 5, 2019).
252
“TİKA’dan Gazze’ye 1 Milyon Dolarlık Acil Yardım”, Anadolu Ajansı, May 18,
2018.
school constructions, and scholarships. TİKA’s Korkmaz under-

scores that with these projects, they aim to help the survival of an
independent Palestine, which returns to the 1967 borders with
East al-Quds as the capital, and as he notes, “this strengthens the
resistance of Palestine against the occupation.”253
A similar support comes from the Turkish NGOs, which or-
ganize rallies and aid campaigns to turn the attention to the rights
and needs of the Palestinians. In December 2017, 6 large NGOs
from Turkey gathered the support of more than 100 small NGOs
and organized a rally called “Freedom for al-Quds and Peace for
Humanity.”254 Similarly, through a rally on May 17, 2018, more
than 350 Turkish NGOs protested the U.S. declaration of al-Quds
as the capital of Israel and the violence of the Israeli state against the
Palestinians that followed.255
Turkey’s practices for Palestine are being shaped by another fac-
tor as well. For Turkey, what Israel has been trying to do, other than
oppressing the Palestinians and debarring them from their basic
human rights, is to erase the Islamic legacy in al-Quds and this, in
fact, is a “cultural genocide.”256 Considering the issue of al-Quds a
“national cause,” it attaches great significance to the preservation
and restoration of the Muslim and Ottoman heritage sites there to
prevent the destruction of the city’s spiritual identity. Within this
context, in addition to TİKA, it is worth mentioning about the
activities of the institutions such as the Presidency for Turks Abroad
and Related Communities (YTB), the Yunus Emre Institute (YEE),
and the Presidency of Religious Affairs (DİB). Among the activities
253
Ibid.
“Ankara’da ‘Kudüs’e Özgürlük, İnsanlığa Barış’ Mitingi”, NTV Haber, December
254
17, 2018.
255
“Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Platformundan Kudüs Protestosu”, Haberler.com, May
17, 2018.
256
“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Kudüs’teki İslam Mirasının İzlerini Silemeyecek-
siniz”, Anadolu Ajansı, December 14, 2018.
led by all these institutions, are educational and cultural projects, as

well as architectural conservations and restorations.
The restoration of the Masjid al-Aqsa region, and various other
shops and houses in the old town of al-Quds are some of TİKA’s
projects to safeguard the cultural heritage in al-Quds. The YTB, on
the other hand, conducts a project called the “Palestinian Docu-
ments in the Ottoman Archives,” which aims at revealing the land
registrations and ownership certificates in al-Quds so as to allow the
Palestinians to benefit from them when applying to courts for their
property rights.257 The YTB also provides free material for Turkish
courses given by the Palestinian NGOs and foundations. Similarly,
the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center (YETKM), which works
in al-Quds since 2013, organizes cultural activities in this city as
well as in Ramallah ranging from film screening to photograph ex-
hibitions, from symposiums to music and poem performances. To
this day, the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centers, which are part
of the YEE, have given Turkish courses to 5,000 people in Palestine.
For İbrahim Furkan Özdemir, the director of YETKM in al-Quds,
“culture is the only thing that the Palestinians are holding on to
survive” and for that reason, the YEE helps Palestinians to organize
their own cultural events in addition to introducing them to the
Turkish culture.258
Another actor, which works to increase the domestic and
foreign awareness on the Palestinian cause, is the Presidency of
Religious Affairs (DİB). On a regular basis, DİB organizes con-
ferences to discuss significance of al-Quds for the Muslim world
and expresses the Palestinians’ rightfulness. The DİB strongly en-
courages touristic visits from Turkey to this holy city and tries to
make Masjid al-Aqsa a part of the visits of Muslims performing
257
Online interview with Meryem Uzer from YTB’s International Students’ Depart-
ment on May 10, 2018.
258
Online interview with İbrahim Furkan Özdemir of YEE on May 28, 2018.
Hajj and Umrah worships.259 As a result, the number of touristic

visits from Turkey to al-Quds seems to have increased to a certain
extent and reached around 50,000 people a year.260 For the DİB,
strengthening Turkey’s visibility in the region will help the city to
reach its freedom as soon as possible.261 This approach is in accor-
dance with Turkey’s rising trade volume with Palestine, which has
almost doubled in the last decade and reached 92.4 billion dollars
by 2017.262 The Turkey-Palestine Business Council, which was
founded under the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey
(DEİK), is in utmost effort to improve the financial and econom-
ic relations between the two countries and encourages Turkish
businessmen to increase their investments in Palestine.
LIMITS AND CHALLENGES OF TURKEY’S

AL-QUDS AND PALESTINE POLICIES
The difficulties that are faced by Turkey while putting its Palestine
and al-Quds policies into practice are driven by systemic and re-
gional circumstances, in which the U.S. as a global power, the UN
as the biggest international organization, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as regional powers play sig-
nificant roles. Of course, the oppressive policies of Israel itself are
the leading obstacle before Turkey.
In the post-9/11 atmosphere, policies otherizing Islam and the
Muslims expanded in the Western world, namely the U.S., and
259
“Kudüs, Filistin Devletinin Ebedi Başkentidir”, TRT Diyanet, January 31, 2018.
“İsrail’in Uygulamaları Türklerin Kudüs’e Gidişini Engelleyemedi”, TRT Haber,
260
July 25, 2018.

261
“Diyanet İşleri Başkanı Erbaş, Filistin Direnişinin Sembolü Fevzi el Cuneydi’yi
Kabul Etti”, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, https://www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/
Detay/11221/diyanet-isleri-baskani-erbas-filistin-direnisinin-sembolu-fevzi-el-cuney-
diyi-kabul-etti, (Accessed on February 5, 2019).
262
“Filistin: Türkiye ile Ticaret”, T.C. Ekonomi Bakanlığı, https://www.ekonomi.
gov.tr/portal/faces/home/ disIliskiler/ulkeler/ulke-detay/Filistin/html-viewer ülkeler,
this has mounted the traditional American support given to Israel.

Parallel to that, the right-wing political parties, especially Likud,
have begun to play a much more dominant role in the Israeli poli-
tics. With the increasing tension in the Middle East triggered first
by the post-9/11 atmosphere and then by the Arab Uprisings, the
possibility of a two-state solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,
which is supported by Turkey as well, has begun to fade away. The
changing circumstances that have sped up with the Syrian civil war
have almost precluded an atmosphere of dialogue between Turkey
and Israel, which were in a close relationship during the 1990s,
especially in the military and economic spheres.
Although the UN granted Palestine a non-member observer
state status in 2012, this has been far from the desired outcome for
the Palestinians. Despite its shortcomings, the country continues
its efforts to be an internationally recognized independent state and
Turkey is one of the countries that back Palestine strongly in this
cause. With a liberal internationalist approach, Ankara often criti-
cizes the current structure of the international institutions such as
the UN, because of the heavy dominance of the great powers at the
Security Council. For Turkey, the current world order and the glob-
al justice system have many deficiencies, which directly influence
the problems experienced by the Palestinians. It is worth reminding
here that as a permanent UN Security Council member, the U.S.
has used its veto power at least 44 times to this day to prevent a
common action against Israel regarding its policies on Palestine.
Making the Palestinian-Israeli conflict one of its top priori-
ties, Turkey owes a great amount of its popularity in the Middle
East to defending the Palestinians on the international platforms
and this creates a huge tension with Israel and the U.S. as well
as with some regional actors. Underlining the injustice of the
current international system towards the Palestinians, President
Erdoğan often condemns the Israeli treatment of the Palestinians
and presents himself as the defender of this oppressed nation.

Erdoğan’s scolding of Israel at the 2009 Davos Summit and his
accusation of Israel “knowing well how to kill”263 and calling it a
“terrorist state”264 in 2012 due to its military operations in Gaza
were among Ankara’s severe reactions against Tel Aviv in favor of
the Palestinians. Nevertheless, nothing ruined the Turkish-Israeli
relations as much as the “Mavi Marmara crisis” in 2010, in which
the Israeli military forces launched an operation against an aid
convoy, organized by a number of NGOs including the İHH, and
martyred 10 Turkish civilians who were on board the Mavi Mar-
mara aid flotilla.265 The two could reach a compromise only after
the strong encouragement of the Obama administration, which
did not want to see its two significant allies, namely Turkey and
Israel, being at odds with each other.
The Trump administration, on the other hand, has a relatively
different approach to the issue, preferring very sharp and provoking
policies in favor of Israel, such as the aforementioned declaration of
al-Quds as the capital of Israel and the transfer of the U.S. embassy
from Tel Aviv to this city. President Trump, who is getting ready
for the 2020 presidential elections, recognized Israel’s so-called
annexation of the Golan Heights - and possibly in a near future
he will recognize some settlements in the West Bank - which can
be considered as further actions aiming to create a fait accompli to
prevent an independent Palestinian state. Talking at the summit of
the OIC, President Erdoğan condemned the latest U.S. decisions
and underlined that Turkey would never allow the legitimization of
263
“Recep Erdogan Storms out of Davos after Clash with Israeli President over
Gaza”, The Guardian, January 30, 2009.
264
“Turkey’s Erdogan Calls Israel a ‘Terrorist State’, Reuters, November 19, 2012.
For a detailed analysis of the Mavi Marmara crisis in terms of Turkey’s crisis man-
265
agement strategies, see: Tuğçe Kafdağlı Koru, “Insights of the Mavi Marmara Confronta-
tion: Analysing the Turkish Crisis Management Process”, Analyzing Foreign Policy Crises
in Turkey: Conceptual, Theoretical and Practical Discussions, ed. Fuat Aksu and Helin Sarı
Ertem, (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge: 2017), pp. 83-112.
the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, pointing out the same
Turkish approach for al-Quds, whose unsolved status is also being
bypassed by the U.S. in favor of Israel.266
Despite the above, the current power distributions in world
politics oblige Turkey to pursue a careful diplomacy regarding its
relations with all significant global and regional actors. The tradi-
tional Turkish foreign policy approach in the Middle East is based
on a balance policy, which requires the preservation of a certain
level of dialogue with all actors of the regional power struggle.267 As
a result of that policy, Turkey has never cut its relations with Israel
in economic terms and reached a compromise with it even in the
severe crises like Mavi Marmara. Ironically, Ankara is quite aware
of the fact that the only way for Turkey to reach the Palestinians is
to preserve a certain level of relations with Tel Aviv. For that reason,
cutting all ties with Israel will not ease the situation of the Palestin-
ians, but worsen it, as Tel Aviv is in full control of the foreign aid
being sent to the region. The Turkish aid institutions often criticize
Israel’s attempts to prevent or minimize the supply of humanitar-
ian aid to the region. Medical supplies shipped from Turkey, for
instance, often wait as a result of the Israeli authorities at the Israeli
harbors for weeks.
The fluctuating relations with the regional powers such as Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE also have a decreasing effect on the
full practice of Turkey’s policies for Palestine. Turkish institutions
and NGOs, for instance, are quite critical about Egypt’s arbitrary
actions regarding the control of the Rafah Gate, which has become
the only non-Israeli border of Palestine after the last occupations.
Putting forward security reasons, Egypt opened this gate only 17
266
“Son Dakika: Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’dan Golan Tepeleri Yorumu: Asla İzin
Vermeyiz, Veremeyiz”, Hürriyet, March 22, 2019.
267
On the main dynamics of Turkey’s Palestine policy and its relations with Israel,
see: Tarık Oğuzlu, “Türk Dış Politikasında Filistin Sorunu”, Araftaki Filistin, ed. Süley-
man Seydi and Can Deveci, (Maya Akademi, Ankara: 2014), p. 451.
times in 2017. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, also seems uncom-
fortable with Turkey’s cooperation with Qatar to supply aid to Pal-
estine. As is known, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the two significant
members of the Sunni Arab block in the Middle East against the
Iran-led Shiite block. In the strong tension between these blocks,
Palestine is turned into a center of power struggle and Turkey is
forced to choose sides. The general tendency of the Sunni Arab
block is to prevent any Turkish dominance on the Palestine issue,
which it perceives as a problem of the Arab world.
As a result, despite taking part at the international platforms
such as the OIC, Muslim countries are away from being strongly
united around the common ideal of helping the Palestinian inde-
pendence. Because of that, Turkey needs to deal both with regional
and international challenges and find an optimum solution both
for itself and for the Palestinians. This difficult task obliges a mul-
tidimensional approach that takes into consideration the complex
political atmosphere of the Middle East and the international bal-
ances of power. Preserving a strong Turkish awareness on the signif-
icance of al-Quds, in particular, and Palestine, in general, will in-
crease Turkey’s capacity to overcome the foreign challenges it faces
while defending a fair solution for the Palestinians. For that reason,
Turkey’s efforts to keep the issue at the top of the home and foreign
political agenda is of vital importance.
CONCLUSION
Under the heavy pressure of regional and international politics,
which are mainly shaped by interests rather than values, it is a dif-
ficult task for the countries to back the oppressed nations of the
world such as the Palestinians. For more than a hundred years, Pal-
estinians are in pursuit of establishing their own state and living
freely on their territories in humane conditions. Turkey is one of
the leading countries, which gives support to the Palestinians in
their pursuit of independence. With its deep meaning for Muslims,

which takes root from its Islamic and Ottoman identities, al-Quds
plays a significant role in Turkey’s solid and determined support for
Palestine. Besides taking sides with this oppressed nation, which is
deprived of the necessary means to make its outcry be heard glob-
ally, Turkey shows its utmost effort to hold its ties with Palestine in
general and al-Quds in particular, so as to preserve its bond of love
with this region.
In fact, Turkey with the policies it conducts for Palestine aims
to increase the physical dimension of this bond, which, due to its
emotional strength, has not disappeared despite a hundred-year-
old territorial separation. Turkey’s support for Palestine, ranging
from humanitarian aid and development assistance to cultural and
educational projects, and restorations, aims to make a visible con-
tribution to the socioeconomic life in Palestine. And as Palestine’s
Ambassador to Ankara Faed Mustafa has recently underscored,
they make this contribution by clearly putting Palestinians’ needs
first.268 However, neither regional nor international actors fully ease
Turkey’s efforts due to diverging interests and feelings of rivalry.
Despite that, Turkey is determined to support the Palestinians in
their cause to establish an independent state with East Jerusalem as
their capital. This is a difficult but valuable mission.
268
“Mahmud Abbas’tan Eski TİKA Koordinatörüne Başarı Madalyası”, Anadolu
Ajansı, March 13, 2019.
CHAPTER X
MALAYSIA’S STANCE TOWARDS TRUMP’S

DECISION REGARDING BAYT AL-MAQDIS
MOHD ROSLAN MOHD NOR* AND

MUHAMMAD KHALIS IBRAHIM**
INTRODUCTION
Bayt al-Maqdis is a territory that has always been in dispute due
to the prolonged crisis of the land ownership between Palestine
and Israel. From an Islamic perspective, Bayt al-Maqdis is an im-
portant territory due to its status as a Holy Land to the Mus-
lims as therein lies the al-Aqsa Mosque, which is the third holiest
mosque after Masjid al-Haram and Masjid al-Nabawi.269 This war-
rants much attention from Muslim countries specifically towards
Bayt al-Maqdis.270
Malaysia, even though being geographically far away from Pal-
estine, pays close attention and shows its attentiveness to the tur-
*
Dr. Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor is associate professor at the University of Malaya
(UM), Malaysia.
**
Muhammad Khalis Ibrahim holds a Master’s degree from the University of Ma-
laya (UM), Malaysia.
269
Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor, “Konflik Israel-Palestin dari Aspek Sejarah Moden
dan Langkah Pembebasan dari Cengkaman Zionis”, Journal of Al-Tamaddun, Vol: 5,
(2010), p. 83.
270
Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor and Ruzanah Mohd Rozi, (2016). “Penglibatan Liga
Arab dalam Konflik Palestin-Israel”, Journal of al-Tamaddun, Vol: 11, No: 2, (2016),
pp. 39-48.
bulent state. Malaysia is a sovereign state and is always seen as an

example for other Muslim countries. This is due to it being a free
country that does not side with any world superpower as well as
being a competent nation in terms of development and progress.
Malaysia’s uniqueness also shines in its diversity in culture and reli-
gion and the ability to sustain balance and national harmony.
Even though Malaysia is small in size as compared to other
Muslim nations, it is not lagging behind in playing its own role
in the international arena, especially when it comes to turbulent
countries. For example, Malaysia’s membership in the UN and
the OIC has become a place to show its official stance on interna-
tional issues. The statement of Malaysia’s Prime Minister Maha-
thir Mohammad at the UN Conference in September 2018 clear-
ly stated Malaysia’s principles and attitudes regarding the issues
of Palestine, the Rohingya ethnic group, and other humanitarian
issues.271 Other than stating its stance firmly, Malaysia’s role in the
international arena can also be seen through its material contribu-
tions from the nation’s government. As an example, the Ministry
of Women, Family and Community Development through the
National Welfare Foundation established the Palestine Donation
Fund to help Palestinians who are in dire need of assistance to
continue their daily lives.272
In essence, Malaysia’s stance or initiatives at the international
level is not subject to the government or the state actors only. In-
stead, non-state actors such as political parties, non-governmental
organizations, and individuals also play a role, especially through
donations in many forms to nations that are in need. If seen in
271
Manathir Mohamad, “Teks Ucapan Penuh Dr Mahathir di UNGA ke-73”, BH
Online, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2018/09/479255/teks-ucapan-
penuh-dr-mahathir-di-unga-ke-73, (Accessed on February 23, 2019).
272
Oleh Zanariah Abd Mutalib, “YKN tubuh Tabung Derma Palestin”, BH Online,
https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2018/07/447438/ykn-tubuh-tabung-der-
ma-palestin, (Accessed on February 23, 2019).
general, a government’s official stance on important issues at a

global level will be followed suit with the utmost support from
non-state actors.273 This scenario shows that there is a balance be-
tween state actors and non-state actors in Malaysia which comple-
ments the nation’s role in the international stage, especially with
humanitarian issues.
Based on this premise, the symbiotic role taken by state and
non-state actors in Malaysia can be observed on international is-
sues, specifically like the crisis in Palestine. Therefore, this article
tries to discuss Malaysia’s stance towards the recent developments
in the region by focusing on the discussion of the decisions made by
the United States (U.S.) with regards to Jerusalem. This article will
look into Malaysia’s stance which is represented by state and non-
state actors towards the United States’ decisions during President
Donald Trump’s administration, specifically after President Trump
announced the united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
1. STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN MALAYSIA

As with other nations, there are entities in Malaysia that could be
categorized as state and non-state actors. Before discussing any
deeper, it is vital to state beforehand the operational definition of
the two terms. Principally, state actors refer to an individual or a
group of individuals which have power in determining policies for
a nation. It also refers to whichever entity is supported directly by
the government. In contrast, non-state actors are individuals and
structured organizations that are free and are not bound by the
government.274 They include entities such as civil organizations, indi-
viduals, the media, private companies, and private entities.
273
Tarikh Kemaskini, “PAS Sarawak sokong pendirian tegas kerajaan terhadap atlet
Israel”, BH Online, http://www.bernama.com/state-news/beritabm.php?id=1688944,
274
“Non-State Actors”, ESCR-Net, https://www.escr-net.org/resources/non-state-
actors, (Accessed on February 23, 2019).
Different from state actors, non-state actors do not have the

authority to determine the state’s policies directly. This is because
non-state actors do not have the political authority and legitimacy,
unlike state actors. Having said that, non-state actors have a role to
play as instigators that are able to influence policy-making, which
is controlled by state actors, at certain levels. Function-wise, non-
state actors, especially NGOs and civil bodies, are mostly seen as
playing their role as agents of check and balance, and as instigators
towards a particular issue. As a result, non-state actors are more
prone to taking a vocal and radical stance in voicing an issue as
compared to state actors who take a more diplomatic and proto-
col-based approach.
As anywhere else, both state and non-state actors in Malaysia
have their roles to play according to their capacities. In this mat-
ter, the area of contribution for state actors is more focused on the
nation’s stance and policies. For instance, the Malaysian govern-
ment through its Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the power to put
in place foreign policies according to the national principles and
interests. This includes Malaysia’s policy of not recognizing the Is-
raeli state as a nation since it was established in 1948.275 The effects
of not recognizing Israel can be seen through recent developments
relating to Malaysia’s stance towards Israel like in the rejection of
Bayt al-Maqdis as the capital city of Israel and not allowing Israeli
athletes to compete in the World Para Swimming Championship
in Kuching, Sarawak.276
275
Oleh Mohd Anwar Patho Rohman et al., “Malaysia tetap tak iktiraf Israel”,
BH Online, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2018/04/407127/malay-
sia-tetap-tak-iktiraf-israel, (Accessed on February 24, 2019).
276
Daripada Ahmad Zaini Kamaruzzaman, “Malaysia iktiraf Baitulmaqdis ibu kota
Palestin”, BH Online, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2017/12/363093/
malaysia-iktiraf-baitulmaqdis-ibu-kota-palestin, (Accessed on February 24, 2019). See
also: Sofian Baharom, “Tetap tidak benarkan atlet Israel masuk –PM”, Utusan On-
line, http://www.utusan.com.my/berita/nasional/tetap-tidak-benarkan-atlet-israel-ma-
suk-pm-1.819589, (Accessed on February 24, 2019).
2. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S DECISIONS

RELATING TO BAYT AL-MAQDIS
President Trump promised the Jewish and pro-Israeli lobbies and
ultra-nationalist power circles during his election campaign that he
would take significant steps if he became president. As soon as he
came to power, Trump made two decisions regarding the Palestin-
ian-Israeli issue, namely declaring the united Bayt al-Maqdis as the
capital of Israel and moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv
to Bayt al-Maqdis.
DECLARING BAYT AL-MAQDIS

AS THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL
On December 6, 2017, Trump made a declaration that caused
global dispute and turmoil. Through his statement issued by the
White House, Trump officially declared the united Bayt al-Maqdis
as the capital for Israel. In his statement, Trump emphasized, “But
today, we finally acknowledge the obvious: that Jerusalem is Israel’s
capital. This is nothing more, or less, than a recognition of reality.
It is also the right thing to do. It’s something that has to be done.”277
Trump’s official statement regarding the declaration of Bayt
al-Maqdis as the state capital of Israel can be seen from several
points of view. First, what is the rationale that drove Trump to state
something that would surely cause polemic and turmoil especially
among the Muslim communities? In his statement, he stated that
the declaration of Bayt al-Maqdis as under the ownership of Isra-
el is a step towards a resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Trump tried to provide the rationale behind his decision in the
following words, “I’ve judged this course of action to be in the best
interests of the United States of America and the pursuit of peace
277
“Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem”, The White House Press State-
ments & Releases, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-presi-
dent-trump-jerusalem/, (Accessed on February 24, 2019).
between Israel and the Palestinians. This is a long-overdue step to

advance the peace process and to work towards a lasting agreement.
Israel is a sovereign nation with the right like every other sovereign
nation to determine its own capital. Acknowledging this as a fact is
a necessary condition for achieving peace.”278
It is here that the authors see that there lies a fallacy in the ratio-
nale that drives Trump to make such a declaration. The justification
of declaring Israel’s ownership over Bayt al-Maqdis is against the logic
of “reaching a peace between Israel and Palestine.” For seven decades,
the conflict between the two nations revolves around land ownership,
even more so the ownership of Bayt al-Maqdis. Recognizing Bayt
al-Maqdis as the state capital of Israel will only bring victory to one
side, which is Israel, and in turn deny the interests of Palestine.
Second, Trump’s declaration can be seen in relation to its back-
ground aspects. If looked at in detail, the sudden decision an-
nounced by Trump is plagued by internal U.S. factors. According
to Farrell,279 it is actually driven by promises made by Trump to
pro-Israeli politicians and lobbies if he were to win in the U.S. pres-
idential elections back in 2016. Trump’s decision was also taken to
fulfil popular demands from conservatives and evangelical Repub-
licans who are Trump’s strong supporters, thus holding on to the
principle of being inclined towards Israel in the dispute of Bayt
al-Maqdis’s status. Other than that, Trump’s controversial step was
to win the hearts of lobbyists and the Jewish elites in the U.S. who
contributed a lot to the Republican Party during the electoral cam-
paign in 2016. Among them is Sheldon Adelson, a millionaire from
Las Vegas, who contributed 82 million dollars to ensure the victory
of the Republicans.280 Therefore, Trump’s recognition is a pragmatic
278
Ibid.
Stephen Farrell, “Why Is the U.S. Moving Its Embassy to Jerusalem?”, Reuters,
279
May 7, 2018.
280
Chris McGreal, “Sheldon Adelson: The Casio Mogul Driving Trump’s Middle
East Policy”, The Guardian, June 8, 2018.
act to fulfil his promises during the electoral campaign and to win
the hearts of those with interests.
Aside from that, the declaration of Bayt al-Maqdis as being
owned by Israel can be analyzed from a standpoint of its impli-
cations. In essence, the implications of such a declaration can be
divided into two: implications for the stability of West Asia, and
towards the U.S. itself. From the first aspect, Trump’s decision in
general will bring a negative impact on the stability of Palestine and
Israel. It is well-known that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been
prolonged for seven decades due to Israel’s constant breach of the
peace treaties. Declaring Bayt al-Maqdis as the state capital of Israel
will not only make the process of peace slower, it has also added fuel
to the flame that is already burning. It has raised people’s anger and
discontentment especially for the people of Palestine. Protests have
been rallied up, and there are possibilities of war between Palestine
and Israel which destabilizes the relations between the two sides.
From the second aspect, the implications of Trump’s declaration
open up a possibility of changing the orientation of U.S. foreign
policy, especially towards the Middle East and Palestine. According
to Trump, “In 1995, Congress adopted the Jerusalem Embassy Act,
urging the federal government to relocate the American embassy to
Jerusalem and to recognize that that city - and so importantly - is
Israel’s capital… Yet, for over 20 years, every previous American
president has exercised the law’s waiver, refusing to move the U.S.
embassy to Jerusalem or to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital
city… Therefore, I have determined that it is time to officially rec-
ognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.”281
If referring to the statement above, it is understood that the
decision to acknowledge Bayt al-Maqdis as the state capital of Israel
shows the difference in the attitude of the U.S. during the Trump’s
281
“Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem”, The White House Press State-
ments & Releases.
administration as compared to previous administrations. One can

say that what Trump has declared is just a continuation of policies
and stances which were already observed by the U.S. leadership
since the early stages of Israel’s existence. But what is clear from
the above statement is that Trump has taken a more drastic ap-
proach and blatantly declared Israel’s ownership over Bayt al-Ma-
qdis, which is different from previous leaders who did not take the
confrontational road when it came to Bayt al-Maqdis. However,
the biggest implication of Trump’s declaration is the moving of the
U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Bayt al-Maqdis, which will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the next part.
THE MOVE OF THE U.S. EMBASSY

FROM TEL AVIV TO BAYT AL-MAQDIS
Starting from the declaration of Bayt al-Maqdis’s status, Trump
stated his wish to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv
to Bayt al-Maqdis. In the same statement he said “consistent with
the Jerusalem Embassy Act, I am also directing the State Depart-
ment to begin preparation to move the American embassy from Tel
Aviv to Jerusalem. This will immediately begin the process of hiring
architects, engineers, and planners, so that a new embassy, when
completed, will be a magnificent tribute to peace.”282 The moving
of the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Bayt al-Maqdis sig-
naled that there is a special relationship between Trump and Prime
Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu. On another aspect, this
has raised a question regarding the future prospects of peace nego-
tiations between Palestine and Israel.283
The relocation of the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to
Bayt al-Maqdis was ordered to be executed on May 14, 2018.
282
Ibid.
David M. Halbfinger, Isabel Kershner and Declan Walsh, “Israel Kills Dozens at
283
Gaza Border as U.S. Embassy Opens in Jerusalem”, NY Times, May 14, 2018.
Trump’s decision on that date was very controversial as it signaled

the 70th anniversary of the official establishment of the modern Is-
raeli state (May 14, 1948.) The choice of this particular date looks
to be a symbolic celebration of the 70th anniversary of the nation’s
establishment, which to this day is still disputed. This makes the
perspective of the people of Israel and Palestine towards the reloca-
tion of the U.S. embassy to Bayt al-Maqdis different. If Israelis see
the relocation as only a matter of relocating to another location, the
Palestinians see it as a form of denial towards the seven-decade-long
hope for Palestine’s freedom.284
In discussing the move of the U.S. embassy in Israel, it is
important to look at the scenarios that accompany the move as
well. If the Israelis celebrate May 14, 2018 as the day of their
nation’s establishment, Palestinians, on the other hand, consider
the date as the “Day of Disaster” because it signified the start of
the land ownership conflict between the two sides. Consequent-
ly, Palestinians, especially those who live in the Gaza Strip, have
held a peaceful campaign to commemorate 70 years of sadness
known as the “Great Return March” (GRM). The GRM refers
to a campaign or a massive movement of Palestinians returning
to their homeland peacefully, demanding their land back which
was taken away 70 years ago. Starting on March 30, 2018 and
targeting the important date of May 15, 2018, the campaign
was joined by thousands of Palestinians marching to the Gaza
Strip-Israeli border. Throughout the GRM campaign, there were
many attacks from the Israelis towards the Palestinian protest-
ers. For instance, Israeli soldiers were reported to be attacking
Palestinians randomly using live ammunition, hand grenades,
and tear gas.285
284
Ibid.
285
“Gaza Protests: All the Latest Updates”, AlJazeera, November 12, 2018.
Looking at the above scene, it is understood that the process

of moving the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Bayt al-Maqdis is
plagued with conflict between the Palestinians and the Israeli se-
curity forces. Other than commemorating the “Day of Disaster,”
the GRM movement is also motivated by opposing the opening
of the U.S. embassy in Bayt al-Maqdis as ordered by Trump.286
This matter has prolonged the Palestinian protest towards Israel
and the U.S. to another phase. Harsh reactions from the Israe-
lis made the conflict between the two sides even more tense; to
this day it is nearly a year since the protest began. As of January
2019, attacks are still being carried out by Israelis towards protest-
ing Palestinians. From the beginning of the Gaza-Israel conflict,
Trump’s cabinet did not respond positively in controlling the ten-
sions in the area. Instead, the U.S. used its veto power to reject the
UN Security Council’s draft which urged restraint in the conflict
and investigations regarding the dispute between Palestine and
Israel at the Gaza-Israel border.287
3. MALAYSIA’S STANCE TOWARDS

TRUMP’S DECISION
As one of the leading non-Arab Muslim countries in South East
Asia, Malaysia has been very sensitive towards the Palestinian-Is-
raeli issue and the position and the future of Bayt al-Maqdis. Ac-
cordingly, Malaysia became one of the first states condemning
Trump’s decisions. Both official institutions and non-state actors
strongly criticized Trump’s decisions. All actors warned the U.S.
administration that its decisions will threaten the global peace
and stability due to its violation of the main principles of inter-
national law.
286
David M. Halbfinger, Isabel Kershner and Declan Walsh, “Israel Kills Dozens
at Gaza Border”.
287
AFP and Khaled Abu Toameh, “US Blocks UN Resolution Condemning Israel
for Deaths in Gaza Clashes”, Times of Israel, April 1, 2018.
MALAYSIAN STATE’S STANCE TOWARDS TRUMP’S

DECISION
The American recognition of Bayt al-Maqdis as the capital city
of Israel is clearly rejected by Malaysia’s premier. Malaysia’s sixth
Prime Minister Najib Razak made his rejection clear not long after
the declaration. He emphasized, “This week when we are shocked
by the U.S. decision to recognize one of the Muslim Holy Lands,
Baitulmaqdis (Jerusalem), as the capital city of Israel, I am certain
that as Muslims we will never be able to accept this… We will for-
ever harshly condemn the proposal of making Baitulmaqdis the
state capital of Israel.”288
In general, Trump’s decision to recognize Bayt al-Maqdis as the
state capital of Israel not only caused criticism from Muslim coun-
tries, it also garnered criticism from the UN Security Council three
days after the declaration. It then was followed by support from
128 members out of the 193 UN members that voted to reject
the U.S. decision to recognize Israel’s ownership over Bayt al-Ma-
qdis.289 In this matter, Malaysia is one of the nations that rejected
the American decision on the status of Bayt al-Maqdis.
Trump’s polemic was met with Malaysia’s stance that is clearly
not in favor of anything that can threaten peace and stability in
Palestine. As an example, then Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad
Zahid Hamidi gave a stern response to the threats given by the
U.S. even before the voting at the UN. According to Zahid, Ma-
laysia will not budge from protecting Bayt al-Maqdis even though
the U.S. has made several threats including to retract its finan-
288
Oleh Irwan Shafrizan Ismail, “Malaysia tolak Baitulmaqdis jadi ibu negara Isra-
el –Najib”, BH Online, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2017/12/360084/
malaysia-tolak-baitulmaqdis-jadi-ibu-negara-israel-najib, (Accessed on February 24,
2019).
289
“128 undi tolak AS iktiraf Baitulmaqdis”, BH Online, https://www.bharian.com.
my/dunia/amerika/2017/12/366279/128-undi-tolak-iktiraf-baitulmaqdis, (Accessed on
February 24, 2019).
cial assistance from nations which supported the UN’s resolu-

tion draft regarding the status of the city. In this case, Malaysia
showed its objectivity on the Palestinian-Israeli issue even though
it is exposed to the possibility of creating tensions in its relations
with the U.S.: “…we have to differentiate diplomatic relations
and trade relations with other relations, because this case (Jeru-
salem) is a specific stance.”290 Through another statement, Zahid
also stressed that “Malaysia has to move collectively with support
from other nations and the international community. It is certain
that many reject this action from the U.S. and Israel. It is time
that the international community joined together to put pressure
on the U.S. and Israel, so they know that they cannot oppress
Palestinians anymore.”291
In regard to the conflict between Palestine and Israel, gener-
ally Malaysia holds on to the stance that a negotiation based on
the framework of settlement of the two nations is the best way
to achieve peace. The former Deputy Foreign Minister of Malay-
sia Reezal Merican Naina Merican stresses, “The U.S. decision was
condemned by the international community; therefore, we do not
want to give the image of the same decision, the best way is to
give an opportunity for negotiations through a bilateral settlement
framework between the Palestine and Israel.”292 Based on this prem-
ise, Malaysia rejects the United States’ decision which acknowledg-
es Bayt al-Maqdis as being under the ownership of Israel because
290
Oleh Rohaniza Idris, “Malaysia tidak berganjak pertahankan Baitulmaqdis”, BH
Online, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2017/12/366200/malaysia-tidak-
berganjak-pertahankan-baitulmaqdis, (Accessed on February 24, 2019).
291
Oleh Zanariah Abd Mutalib, “Palestin tetap dibela –TPM”, BH Online, https://
www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2017/12/365691/palestin-tetap-dibela-tpm,
292
Oleh Nazura Ngah et al., “Parlimen: Malaysia tak terburu-buru isu Baitul-
maqdis”, BH Online, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/nasional/2018/03/396751/
parlimen-malaysia-tak-terburu-buru-isu-baitulmaqdis, (Accessed on February
23, 2019).
it is a form of deviation from the peace plan based on a two-state

solution framework.
The consistency of state actors toward Israel is very clear with
the latest decision under the new government in Malaysia lead by
the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition. As mentioned before, the sev-
enth (current) Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad stressed that
the government will not allow athletes from Israel to compete in
the 2019 World Para Swimming Championships in Kuching that
will take place from July 29 to August 4. In this regard, Mahathir
stressed that “we will not allow them… If they come, then it is an
offence.”293 As a result of this, Malaysia has been withdrawn from
the championships’ hosting rights. Nevertheless, this has shown
that Malaysia has a very clear foreign policy when it comes to Israel.
He also said that the government will maintain its firm stance on
this issue as protest over the continued oppression of the Palestinian
people which have been denied their rights for many years.
MALAYSIAN NON-STATE ACTORS’ STANCE

TOWARDS TRUMP’S DECISION
In Malaysia, the U.S. decision to acknowledge Bayt al-Maqdis as
the state capital of Israel and the relocation of the U.S. embassy
has warranted reactions from non-state actors. In general, non-
state actors are in agreement regarding the U.S. decision on Bayt
al-Maqdis. On this matter, civil bodies and NGOs were the most
vocal in voicing their protest. For example, on December 8, 2017,
the Malaysian Youth Council made an official statement condemn-
ing the declaration of Bayt al-Maqdis as the state capital of Israel.
According to its president Mua’amar Ghadafi Jamal Wira Jama-
ludin, Trump’s declaration clearly shows that the U.S. is behind
293
“Malaysia Will Not Allow Israeli Athletes to Compete Locally”, New Strait Times,
January 10, 2019.
the prolonged conflict between Palestine and Israel. According

to Jamaludin,
The announcement of Baitulmaqdis (Jerusalem) as the state cap-
ital of Israel by the United States President Donald J. Trump
showed America’s true colors as the mastermind behind the pro-
longed conflict. His announcement not only made the peace
process more complicated between Palestine and Israel, but also
created tensions in the Arab region and Muslim countries…The
relocation of the U.S. Embassy to Baitulmaqdis (Jerusalem) is an
act of provocation because it deliberately fueled dispute towards
Palestinians.294
Several humanitarian NGOs, especially those involved in

voluntarism work in Palestine, also showed their protest towards
Trump’s decision on the status of Bayt al-Maqdis. On December
15, 2017, a peaceful rally was held after Friday prayers by over 20
organizations including Citizens International, Aman Palestine,
Malaysia al-Quds Foundation, Malaysia Amal Foundation, and
Penang Muslim League. The director of Citizens International,
Mohideen Abdul Kader, said the fight to oppose Israeli occupation
is an obligation for Muslims and it must be opposed to the very last
bit. “Trump’s declaration is nonsensical and is against international
decisions which are with us in opposing Israel. The Palestinian issue
is not only about Islam, but it is a humanitarian issue and we can-
not even once compromise with the U.S. or Israel.”295
On December 22, 13 Islamic NGOs, which are based in Ke-
lantan, held a solidarity rally at a mosque in Kubang Kerian, Ke-
lantan to oppose the U.S decision of making Bayt al-Maqdis the
state capital of Israel. Among the NGOs involved were Persatuan
294
Mua’amar Ghadafi Jamal Datuk Wire Jamaludin, “Kenyataan Media: Majlis Belia
Malaysia (MBM) Menolak Sekeras-Kerasnya Pengumuman BaitulMaqdis Sebagai Ibu
Negara Israel”, Belia.Org, http://belia.org.my/wp/2017/12/08/kenyataan-mbm-peng-
umuman-baitul-maqdis-sebagai-ibu-negara-israel/, (Accessed on February 23, 2019).
295
Oleh Siti Sofia Md Nasir, “Bantahan terhadap Israel di Masjid Kapitan Keling”,
BH Online, https://www.bharian.com.my/berita/wilayah/2017/12/363850/bantah-
an-terhadap-israel-di-masjid-kapitan-keling, (Accessed on February 23, 2019).
Pengguna Islam Kelantan (PPIK), Pertubuhan Permuafakatan Ma-

jlis Ayahanda Malaysia, Persatuan Sukan Boksing Negeri Kelantan,
Persatuan Orang Kota Bharu, and Biro Aduan Masyarakat Malaysia.
The rally gathered more than 500 people to show their full support
towards the Palestinians. The President of the PPIK Mohd Fared
Abdul Ghani said the U.S. decision is uncalled for since other than
being against the UN resolution, it ensues anger from Muslims all
over the world.
This rally is a symbol of solidarity among Muslims towards the
fate of our brothers and sisters in Islam who are being oppressed
in Palestine. Baitulmaqdis (Jerusalem) is the place where the third
most important mosque of Muslims is. However, Trump’s actions
are seemingly more vicious in wanting to take away Baitulmaqdis
(Jerusalem) as the right of Palestinians. I believe that this rally is a
form of unity of Muslims in defending Palestine.296
Other than NGOs, several political parties in Malaysia also

voiced protests specifically towards the relocation of the U.S. em-
bassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Bayt al-Maqdis. The Youth Chief of
Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS) Muhammad
Khalil Abdul Hadi in an official statement explained that the offi-
cial relocation of the U.S. embassy to Bayt al-Maqdis is a “starting
switch” to dispute and international clashes which are potentials
for war. “Baitulmaqdis (Jerusalem) is not only violated as a right of
the Muslims and its peoples, the actions of the Uncle Sam state are
also violating the rights of the Palestinian people. Provocations like
this will only ensue tensions and instability in the Middle East and
worsen the conflicts that are already in place.”297 At the same time,
People Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR) leader, Saifud-
296
“Pemuda UMNO berkumpul bantah Trump”, Utusan Online, http://www.utu-
san.com.my/berita/nasional/ngo-pemuda-umno-berkumpul-bantah-trump-1.578118,
297
Ustaz Muhammad Khalil Abdul Hadi, “Kecam Pemindahan Amerika ke Baitul-
maqdis”, BeritaPas.Org, https://berita.pas.org.my/kecam-pemindahan-kedutaan-ameri-
ka-ke-baitulmaqdis/, (Accessed on February 23, 2019).
din Nasution Ismail, is also on the same page in giving a response

regarding the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Bayt al-Maqdis by
saying that the act brings potential bad implications to the stability
of the region, its security, and in reaching a solution towards the
Palestine-Israel conflict.298
4. UNDERSTANDING MALAYSIA’S STANCE

TOWARDS TRUMP’S DECISION
If observed closely, state and non-state actors in Malaysia have dis-
played unison in their stance towards Trump’s decision regarding
Bayt al-Maqdis. Both state and non-state actors rejected the deci-
sion acknowledging Bayt al-Maqdis as the state capital of Israel and
the relocation of the U.S. embassy.
In general, the basis of the rejection of both state and non-state
actors towards the decision regarding Bayt al-Maqdis is based on
the premise that the decision is against what is agreed by the UN.
The rejection of Trump’s decision and the UN’s decision can be
understood on two dimensions. First, Bayt al-Maqdis is a heritage
city under the protection of UNESCO based on its immensely
important standing in the three religious traditions, namely Islam,
Christianity, and Judaism.299 With that, the whole of Bayt al-Ma-
qdis must be protected, and its security cannot be jeopardized just
to meet one party’s preferences. Second, the majority of the UN
members that voted on December 22, 2017, rejected the U.S. de-
cision to acknowledge Bayt al-Maqdis as the state capital of Israel.
The UN, as stated by Sani,300 is like a ‘world government’ based on
298
“PKR kecam kekejaman Israel ke atas rakyat Palestin”, Malaysiakini, https://
www.malaysiakini.com/news/425033, (Accessed on February 23, 2019).
299
“Statement by the Director-General of UNESCO on the Old City of Jerusalem
and Its Walls, A UNESCO World Heritage Site”, UNESCO, https://whc.unesco.org/en/
news/1568, (Accessed on February 23, 2019).
300
Sani, M. A. M. (2012), Amerika Syarikat dan Keseimbangan Kuasa Global pada
Era Pasca-Perang Dingin, 1989-2000, (Penerbit Universiti Utara Malaysia, Kedah:
2012).
its role that centralizes and gathers nations from all over the world.
In its function, the UN is the most legitimate entity in determining
a decision which includes the interests of its member nations. In
other words, the U.S. continuing its acknowledgement of Israel’s
ownership of Bayt al-Maqdis even though it is rejected by the ma-
jority of the UN members lays the groundwork for a rift between
the U.S. and the UN.
Other than that, both state and non-state Malaysian actors see
Bayt al-Maqdis as not only a district which should be governed
by the Palestinians geographically, but also see that the city is very
important and meaningful to the Muslims in general. This is be-
cause Bayt al-Maqdis is a stopping place for the Prophet (pbuh) in
his travel Isra’ wa al-Mi’raj (Ascension and Night Journey).301 Oth-
er than that, the city hosts Masjid al-Aqsa which is the third ho-
liest mosque after Masjid al-Haram and Masjid al-Nabawi. Based
on the statements and stances of state and non-state actors, it can
be said that Malaysia’s defense of Palestine and its opposition to
the declaration of Bayt al-Maqdis as being under the ownership of
Israel is based on religious reasons and humanitarian and regional
security purposes.
If compared, we can understand that non-state actors are
more vocal and radical in voicing their opposition towards
Trump’s decision regarding Bayt al-Maqdis. This is clear through
the NGOs who organized rallies, marches, and submitted mem-
orandums to the U.S. embassy. State actors, on the other hand,
are more moderate and softer in their intonation even when op-
posing the U.S. decision. This can be understood when looking
at the characteristics of both actors. According to what has been
discussed, state actors have the legitimacy to form policies and
represent the nation in discussing any matters on a global lev-
301
Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, “The Significance of Islamic Jerusalem in Islam: An
Islamic Reference”, Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies, Vol: 1, No: 2, (1998), pp. 47-71.
el. If seen through its foreign policies perspective, Malaysia has

good relations with the U.S. in terms of trade. The attitude of
Malaysia or the statements it has made towards the U.S. decision
have to take into account the balance between stating its stance
objectively and its need to maintain a good relationship with the
United States. Here lies the rationality of why a state actor, or the
Malaysian government specifically, is not seen to be as vocal as
non-state actors in voicing their rejection. Meanwhile, non-state
actors do not attach any importance on preserving a good rela-
tionship with the U.S. This gives them a bigger stage for them to
be vocal in voicing their objection.
CONCLUSION
Malaysia is one of the countries which is very close to the aspi-
rations of the fight for Palestine and its freedom. Relating to the
issue of Bayt al-Maqdis’s status and the relocation of the U.S.
embassy from Tel Aviv to Bayt al-Maqdis, state and non-state ac-
tors in Malaysia have shown their uncompromised attitude and
stance based on their own capacities. Hence, the decision from
the U.S. to acknowledge Bayt al-Maqdis as the state capital of Is-
rael has led to criticism and condemnation from many Malaysian
political parties. The authors are of the opinion that this seems to
portray the U.S., which has been seen as the mediator for peace
between Palestine and Israel, as no longer being capable of playing
the mediating role because it has shown that it prefers one side
to the other – namely Israel. Therefore, it is vital that coalitions
of Muslim countries such as the OIC and the Arab League take
their own stance in coming up with solutions in the disputes and
conflicts that carry the fate of Arab countries, in general, and Bayt
al-Maqdis, in specific, for the sake of the eventual future freedom
of the Holy Land.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors would like to thank the University of Malaya for pro-
viding a research grant (RP035D – 17HNE) to carry out part of
this research.
AUTHORS
Muhittin Ataman
Dr. Muhittin Ataman is a professor of International Relations at Ankara Social
Sciences University, Department of International Relations, where he teaches
International Relations and Middle Eastern Politics. After graduating from An-
kara University, he received his Master’s degree from the University of Central
Oklahoma and his PhD from the University of Kentucky. He has taught at Abant
Izzet Baysal University and Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University for two decades.
Dr. Ataman worked at the Higher Educational Council of Turkey as secretary
general of the Inter-University Board, as coordinator of the international office,
and as advisor to the president of YOK between 2012 and 2014. Since 2011,
he has been working at SETA, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social
Research, where he is now director of foreign policy research. Since 2014, Dr.
Ataman is a regular contributor on foreign policy issues to different programs
on the TV channel TRT Haber (TRT News). Since 2017, he has been contributing
to the newspaper Daily Sabah. Dr. Ataman has published many articles about
Turkish foreign policy, Middle Eastern politics, and international politics in
some of the leading English, Turkish, and Arabic academic journals, and has
edited several books including Dünya Çatışma Bölgeleri ve Alanları I-II (World
Conflict Zones and Areas, I and II), Küresel Güç ve Refah (Global Power and Wealth),
and July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey. He is the editor-in-chief of the journal Insight
Turkey, one of the leading journals on Middle Eastern politics, and of Ortadoğu
Yıllığı (Middle Eastern Annual).
Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi

Dr. Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi is a professor of International Relations, a fellow of
the Royal Historical Society (UK), and the founder of the Field of Inquiry of Islam-
icjerusalem Beytülmakdis Studies. He has been teaching and researching for 33
years at different Arab, British, Malaysian, and Turkish universities. He currently
works at the Social Sciences University of Ankara and is a distinguished visiting
professor at the Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM). Dr. El-Awaisi has an excellent
record of research publications in both English and Arabic. Some of his publica-
tions have been translated into French, Malay, Turkish, and Indonesian. He has
encouraged and supported the development of a number of academic knowl-
edge-based thoughts and ideas through his supervision of a good number of
master dissertations and PhD theses. Moreover, he has participated and present-
ed academic papers at many international academic conferences. In addition, he
has established a number of international academic projects, such as the Field of
Inquiry of Islamicjerusalem Beytülmakdis Studies, which he founded in 1994; the
annual International Academic Conference on Islamicjerusalem Studies, which
he has chaired since 1997; and the academic refereed journal Journal of Islamic-
jerusalem Studies, where he has been the editor-in-chief since 1997. One of his
major achievements is his contribution to knowledge in the form of a number
of theories and models in the field of International Relations. Examples of the
former include his new geopolitical theory, the Barakah Circle Theory of Islamic-
jerusalem, and his Aman (Peaceful Co-Existence and Mutual Respect) Theory. He
has received a number of awards, including the Stirling Council Provost’s Civic
Award for 1999 (UK); the Special Award for Innovation in 2007 (UK); and recently,
the Islamic World Istanbul “Science” Award (2018). Dr. El-Awaisi is an energetic
scholar and visionary, and an accomplished and innovative academic, who has
dedicated his life to education and knowledge as a base for human develop-
ment with a passionate and grittier commitment to progressive education, re-
search, and community welfare.
Berdal Aral
Dr. Berdal Aral completed his PhD research with a thesis entitled “Turkey and
International Society from a Critical Legal Perspective” in 1994 at the University
of Glasgow, Scotland. His main areas of interest, both in research and teach-
ing, include international law and human rights. He has written three books in
Turkish, namely The Right of Self-Defence under International Law (1999); Collec-
tive Rights as Third-Generation Human Rights (2010); and From Global Security to
Global Hegemony: The UN System and the Muslim World (2016). He has published
articles, both in English and Turkish, on the aforementioned topics and on Turk-
ish foreign policy. Dr. Aral currently teaches at the Department of International
Relations at Istanbul Medeniyet University.
Helin Sari Ertem

Dr. Helin Sari Ertem is an assistant professor of International Relations at Istanbul
Medeniyet University, Turkey. She received her Master’s degree in 1999 from the
Department of Journalism at City, University of London, UK. Between 1999 and
2003, she worked as a broadcast journalist. In 2010, she received her PhD on Inter-
national Relations from Marmara University, Turkey. Since then, Dr. Sari Ertem has
been giving lectures, and writing and editing books, book chapters, and articles
on various foreign policy issues. Her academic interests include Turkish and Amer-
ican foreign policies, Middle East affairs, and the identity-security relationship. She
has co-edited the following books: Analysing Foreign Policy Crises in Turkey: Con-
ceptual, Theoretical and Practical Discussions (Cambridge, 2017); GCC-Turkey Rela-
tions: Dawn of a New Era (Cambridge, 2015); and Turkish Foreign Policy in the 2000s:
Opportunities, Risks and Crises (printed in Turkish) (Istanbul, 2015).
Khalid El-Awaisi
Dr. Khalid El-Awaisi is a graduate of the pioneering field of Islamicjerusalem
Studies where he received his PhD from the University of Aberdeen (2006). His
main specialization is the historical geography of Beytülmakdis/Islamicjeru-
salem and the geographical interpretations of the Qur’an. He has taught at a
number of Turkish and British universities and was appointed the director of
the Centre of Islamicjerusalem Studies in the UK (2007-2011). Currently, he is
an assistant professor at the Department of Islamic History at the Social Scienc-
es University of Ankara (ASBU), and teaches in the field of Beytülmakdis/Quds
Studies in the postgraduate programs.
Sharif Amin Abu Shammala

Dr. Sharif Amin Abu Shammala is a Palestinian researcher who holds a PhD in
the history and civilization of al-Quds from the University of Malaya, Malay-
sia. He has published several books and articles. His research focus is Palestine
and issues pertaining to al-Quds. He received the 2012 Ministry of Youth and
Sports Award (Palestinian Youth Innovation Award) in the category of Islamic
Thought. He is currently the chief executive officer of the Al-Quds Foundation
Malaysia and a member of the Board of Directors of the Palestinian Center for
History and Documentation. Abu Shammala is also the editor-in-chief of al-Aqsa
Online Encyclopedia (Aqsapedia.net).
Stephen Sizer
Revd. Dr. Stephen Sizer is the former vicar of the Anglican parish of Christ Church,
Virginia Water, in Surrey, England. In 2004, he was awarded a PhD by Oak Hill Col-
lege and Middlesex University. His thesis examined the historical roots, theolog-
ical basis, and political consequences of Christian Zionism in Britain and the USA
beginning in1820. Revd. Sizer is the founder and director of Peacemaker Trust.
Abdulsalam Muala
Dr. Abdulsalam Muala is a Palestinian freelance researcher based in the West Bank
who holds a PhD degree from the Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), Malaysia. He
has two books in the process of publication: Unlocking the Palestinian-Israeli Nego-
tiations: A Critical Review of Contemporary Literature and Methodologies (in English)
with Springer Publishing; and Barriers to Reach a Negotiated Solution to the Palestin-
ian-Israeli Conflict (in Arabic) with the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.
Hossam Shaker
Hossam Shaker is a researcher, author, and a consultant in media, public rela-
tions, and mass communication for a number of organizations in Europe. He has
an interest in the analysis of European and international affairs, as well as social
and media issues. Shaker resides in Vienna.
Mohammad Makram Balawi

Dr. Mohammad Makram Balawi is a Palestinian academic and writer based in
Istanbul. He is the founder and president of the Asia Middle East Forum, a pub-
lic diplomacy organization that aims at bridging the gap between Asian coun-
tries and the Middle East, with special emphasis on advocacy of the Palestinian
cause. In 2012, Dr. Makram Balawi co-founded the al-Quds Foundation Malaysia
and worked as its managing director. He also founded a Malaysian coalition for
advocating and supporting the al-Quds cause called “Save al-Quds Campaign”
that consists of about 50 organizations. He holds a PhD in postcolonialism from
the International Islamic University Malaysia. He is a prolific writer who is best
known for his writings on Asian Relations and the Palestinian cause.
Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor

Dr. Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor is an associate professor at the Department of
Islamic History and Civilization, Academy of Islamic Studies, University of Ma-
laya, Malaysia. He was the deputy director (Research & Development) at the
Academy of Islamic Studies between 2012 and 2019. Prior to that, he served
as the head of the Department of Islamic History and Civilization, at the same
academy. Dr. Roslan’s broad academic interests involve Islamicjerusalem Stud-
ies, the Middle East, Islam and multiculturalism, Muslim affairs, religious stud-
ies, and civilization. He has published several academic articles in internation-
al refereed journals. Dr. Roslan participated in the “Study of the United States
Institutes - Religious Pluralism and Public Presence,” University of California
Santa Barbara (2010), and has been a visiting scholar at different institutions
such as the Al-Maktoum Institute, Scotland (2009) and Minzu University, Bei-
jing (2012-2013). He was a recipient of the 2018 MAPIM-KPT (then Ministry of
Higher Education) award for a book published in the social sciences catego-
ry. He also received the prestigious award Anugerah Akademik Negara (AAN)
2018 in the book category for The Significance of Islamicjerusalem in Islam (Uni-
versity of Malaya Press, 2017).
Muhammad Khalis Ibrahim
Muhammad Khalis Ibrahim was a postgraduate student at the Department of Is-
lamic History and Civilization, Academy of Islamic Studies, University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. His Master’s degree was about modern Turkish history
and politics. Muhammad Khalis has published his research in academic journals
such as International Journal of West Asian Studies, UMRAN-International Journal
of Islamic and Civilizational Studies, Online Journal of Research in Islamic Studies,
and MANU-Jurnal Pusat Penataran Ilmu & Bahasa. He also has an article in the
forthcoming issue of AKADEMIKA-Journal of Southeast Asia Social Sciences and
Humanities (indexed in the Web of Science). Ibrahim has presented his work in
several international conferences and is now planning to pursue a doctoral de-
gree focused on the Turkish foreign policy towards Western Asia.
ABD AL-FATTAH EL-AWAISI, MUHITTIN ATAMAN
T AL-QUDS
he controversial decision of U.S. President Donald
Trump to formally recognize the Holy City of al-
Quds (Jerusalem) as the capital of Israel overturned
decades of official U.S. policy. This decision resulted
in moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem
on the eve of the Palestinian commemoration of 70 years of the
Nakbah (Catastrophe) on May 15, 2018, during which Pales- HISTORY, RELIGION,
AND POLITICS
tinians have been suffering persecutions, massacres, and ethnic
cleansing. Not only is this decision against international law,
but it is also in direct conflict with a number of resolutions
by the UN Security Council. It brings an end to the two-state
solution, which the international community has been trying
to achieve for a long time. Moreover, this action is a practical
step of the “Deal of the Century” which the Trump administra-
AL-QUDS HISTORY, RELIGION, AND POLITICS

tion is trying to impose in the region.
These developments require urgent publications to address dif-
ferent dimensions of this delicate issue, which lies at the heart
of most of the regional problems. In order to develop a better
understanding of this issue and other related regional prob-
lems, it is necessary to produce inclusive materials about the
city. Accordingly, at this critical time, we have designed this
edited book to provide a better understanding of this core issue
to intellectuals, academics, politicians, and the wider public in-
terested in the Holy Land.
MUHITTIN ATAMAN ABD AL-FATTAH EL-AWAISI KHALID EL-AWAISI

l
l l
STEPHEN SIZER SHARIF AMIN ABU SHAMMALAH BERDAL ARAL

l ABD AL-FATTAH EL-AWAISI
ABDULSALAM MUALA HOSSAM SHAKE MOHAMMAD MAKRAM BALAWI
MUHITTIN ATAMAN
l l
HELIN SARI ERTEM MOHD ROSLAN MOHD NOR MUHAMMAD KHALIS IBRAHIM
l l
SECOND EDITION
9 786057 544773

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ABD AL-FATTAH EL-AWAISI, MUHITTIN ATAMAN

AL-QUDS HISTORY, RELIGION, AND POLITICS

MUHITTIN ATAMAN ABD AL-FATTAH EL-AWAISI KHALID EL-AWAISI

STEPHEN SIZER SHARIF AMIN ABU SHAMMALAH BERDAL ARAL

© 2021 SET Vakfı İktisadi İşletmesi

All rights reserved.

Cover: Erkan Söğüt

and thinker from Turkey. He describes al-Quds as a “city created

eral Assembly passed a resolution condemning Trump’s decision.

I want to thank the editors, Abd al-Fattah el-Awaisi and Muhit-

Prof. Dr. Burhanettin Duran

The controversial decision of U.S. President Donald Trump on De-

Not only is this decision against international law, but it is also

actors from following the same policy discourse. Also, it should

their own. Then, he traces the importance of the region through

of the peace process within the international political context,

problems with Israel, but still opposes the occupation of al-Quds

Ankara, May 15, 2019

Prof. Dr. Abd al-Fattah EL-AWAISI and

WHOSE HOLY LAND? THE MEANINGS AND

Bayt al-Maqdis, al-Quds, UrShalim, Yebus, Aelia, and the Holy

ABRAHAM, THE MUSLIM

Abraham was either a Jew or a Christian, and contests it rational-

to the religion of Abraham “so follow the religion of Abraham”

century BC in Akkadian as “Ursaliimmu” and in a later century

such as Aramaic and Hebrew. Arabs before Islam were aware of

the time of the Canaanites in the region.14 It is part of the name of

ence to the wider holy region of al-Ard al-Muqaddasah.18 The term

the second part “Capitolina” refers to the Roman god(s).22 Hadrian

Marwān (r. AH 66-86/AD 685-705). Some of the milestones

from the Byzantines in AD 638, he was faithful to this inclusive

fact, comprehending the movement of history, it can be observed

JERUSALEM, THE ETERNAL

President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the

The wider international community saw things rather different-

87, for example, we have a beautiful picture of a shared Jerusalem,

BAYT AL-MAQDIS: A SHORT HISTORY

SHARIF AMIN ABU SHAMMALAH*

History represents a natural approach to understanding the real-

THE GENESIS AND BEGINNINGS

THE ERA OF DAVID AND SOLOMON

without sufficient examination, scrutiny, or auditing. It was also

However, some archaeological studies, that are methodologically

COLLAPSE: BETWEEN BABEL AND PERSIA

Late in the 6th century BC, the king of Babylon Nebuchadnezzar,

GREECE AND ROME

AL-QUDS IN THE CHRISTIAN ERA

As for al-Quds, the edict’s consequences resulted in getting rid of all

THE EARLY ISLAMIC ERA

Quds, by Allah’s providence, is better to me than a whole rostaaq,51

Throughout the Umayyad period, especially during the reign

holiness in the Muslim world. The classical biographical sources

BAYT AL-MAQDIS UNDER THE CRUSADER

AL-QUDS UNDER THE AYYUBID

the liberation of Bayt al-Maqdis, Salah Ad-Din carried the wooden

one of the most important centers of academic excellence as it was

AL-QUDS IN THE OTTOMAN ERA

lem received special attention; large sums of money were allocated

qdis. Thus, the city became an arena of competition between the