Threat Spotlight Lockbit Black 3.0 Ransomware

TLP:WHITE Threat Spotlight: Lockbit Black 3.
0 Ransomware
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provisions that have been stipulated in the General Data Protection Regulation and Personal Data Protection Law. It shall be noted that INFINITUM IT provides
this information “as is” according to its findings, without providing any legally applicable warranty regarding completeness or accuracy of the contents. Therefore,
neither this report nor any of its contents can be used as admissible proof before legal authorities
TLP:WHITE Threat Spotlight: Lockbit Black 3.0 Ransomware
TABLE OF CONTENTS
What’s New on Lockbit Black 3.0 ................................................................................................... 3

First Sample Publication .................................................................................................................. 5
Insides From Real Life Incident Response .................................................................................. 6
Initial Access Point ............................................................................................................................ 6
Technical Analysis of Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware ........................................................................ 7
Encrypted file structure .................................................................................................................. 12
Mitigation and Prevention .............................................................................................................. 13
LockBit 3.0 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures ................................................................... 14
Indicators of Compromise.............................................................................................................. 15
Sigma Rules ....................................................................................................................................... 15
Threat Spotlight: Lockbit Black

3.0 Ransomware
What’s New on Lockbit Black 3.0

Lockbit Ransomware has been one of the most notorious groups since 2019, and they have a
wide range of attack scopes, including critical infrastructures like hospital systems. According
to Cyber Threat Intelligence members of Infinitum IT, the LockBit Ransomware group made
several updates on the publication site and the Ransomware itself.
Figure 1 Lockbit 3.0 has launched its Bug Bounty program paying for web security exploits and more.
This update on the publication site of Lockbit 3.0, such as the Bug Bounty program, aims for
more affiliation. Most notably, they wanted affiliate members to share critical internal data with
the Ransomware group members, this can cause an increase in insider threats amongst
organizations.
The major updates for Lockbit Black 3.0 Ransomware are:
 Anti Analysis technique to hide themselves against various AV vendors.

 Lockbit Black 3.0, requires an “access token” to be supplied as a parameter upon
execution which is similar to BlackCat Ransomware.
 It has a command line argument feature.
 Much more evasive then Lockbit 2.0
 New Anti Debugging feature.
 Main code base is very similar to BlackMatter/Darkside Ransomware.
 Disabling the Windows Defender and Event Log Tampering.
New ransom note and wallpaper after the execution of Lockbit Black 3.0:
Figure 2 Ransom note
Figure 3 Changed wallpaper image.
First Sample Publication

The first-ever publication was done on July 3, 2022, by Arda Büyükkaya, the Malware
Research Team Leader of Infinitum IT. The malware sample has been obtained from an
Anonymous source ( J. L) who suffered from Lockbit Ransomware attack in a real-life Incident.
https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1543661557883740161
After the first publication, “access token” of Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware has been shared with the
public to help Malware Analysts from all over the world.
https://twitter.com/WhichbufferArda/status/1543669679637553158
Insides From Real Life Incident Response

To obtain the first-ever Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware sample, Cyber Threat Intelligence team
members in Infinitum IT successfully contacted one of Lockbit victim and gathered necessary
data to analyze during an Incident Response process. We believed this data could help other
companies protect themselves against Lockbit and other Ransomware groups.
Figure 4 The first execution of Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware, supplied with “access token” (-pass).
Initial Access Point

According to the data obtained from the victim, Lockbit affiliate members used the BlueKeep
(CVE-2019–0708) vulnerability and valid stolen credentials of a Local Admin user to gain
access to the victim network via abusing the publicly facing Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
on a Windows 7 installed device.
This Initial Access gives the attacker Local Administrator rights on the victim network, which
could lead to mass infection of Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware.
https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/AA19-168A
Technical Analysis of Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware

Execution Process
The first execution of Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware done by a “access token”:
 <Ransomware.exe> -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -pass

db66023ab2abcb9957fb01ed50cdfa6a
This code protection mechanism encrypts the Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware code and help to evade
malware detection. To execute the Ransomware successfully it needs a parameter (-pass),
this key will decrypt the source code of the Lockbit 3.0 and execute it on victim device.
When Lockbit 3.0 started on the victim device, sub_41B000 function is responsible for
decryption of Ransomware code via decryption key supplied from the execution parameters.
sub_41B000 function
Ransom note wallpaper and .ico file written into C:\ProgramData\:
The icon (.ico) file being used to change icons of every encrypted files on the victim device and
also every encrypted file renamed by random characters.
WriteFile Operation for the creation of README.txt and icon file
Below Procmon data showed us the WriteFile operations done by Lockbit 3.0 after the
execution.
Killing Windows Defender and tempering Windows Event Log
Ransomware developers wanted to disable the default security product of the victim device, in
Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware we found that; it changes the bellowed registry keys to disable all
Windows Event Log Messages.
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINE
VT\Channels\<Log Name>
After the registry key change, Enabled key set to 0 and new Security Descriptor
(O:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x1;;;SY)(A;;0x5;;;BA)(A;;0x1;;;LA) add it to temper the Event Logs.
After the execution of Lockbit 3.0 (Lockbit Black), it stopped the Windows Defender Service as
shown in image below.
Hiding the Windows APIs (import tables) for increasing the evasiveness
When we looked at the original sample of Lockbit 3.0 at IDA (Disassembly tool), sample have
few function and Windows APIs, but in reality Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware developers hiding the
function calls and Windows APIs by using Stack String Obfuscation and simple XOR
Encryption.
This way Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware will load all of the Windows APIs during the execution time
, which is increases the evasiveness, so in order to see the hidden API calls we can execute
the sample and see the results under a Debugger or we can use HashDB on IDA to resolve
the APIs .
After the decryption/unpacking of Ransomware code via -pass parameter ,Win32 APIs
dynamically resolved by function sub_407C5C that receives as input an obfuscated string that
is XORed with the key 0x4506DFCA, so to decrypt the Win32 API name to be resolved.
Figure 5 This part is very similar to BlackMatter Ransomware.
Now we can see the all loaded Windows APIs successfully under debugging screen, including
the bcrypt.dll which is being used during file encryption process by Lockbit 3.0
10
While performing the Debugging, we can identify the Windows Service blacklist, this String
data used by Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware to kill a specific named Service from victim device
before the encryption starts, for example if I execute Lockbit 3.0 on Sophos installed device,
first it will kill a Service named Sophos (AV vendor) to evade the detection. We also observed
similar behavior on Lockbit 2.0
Normally the ransom note itself is also stored as encrypted, which means it can only be opened
by a given “access token”, this way they can evade AV detection. After the execution we can
see the ransom note on a memory dump.(Full ransom note can be seen here)
11
Encrypted file structure

Each encrypted file has a same marker at the end of the file, this marker has been used during
the decryption process and this is the reason why Lockbit affiliates wanted an example of
encrypted file after a negotiation process.
12
Mitigation and Prevention
 Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. This
practice will ensure the organization will not be severely interrupted, and have
irretrievable data.
 Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can

help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between and access
to various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
 Require multi-factor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for
webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
 Keep all operating systems and software up to date. Prioritize patching known exploited
vulnerabilities. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an
organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats.
 Remove unnecessary access to administrative shares, especially ADMIN$ and C$
 Block public facing Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). If remote access to RDP or
terminal services is required, it should only be made accessible through a secure Virtual
Private Network (VPN) connection (with Multi-Factor Authentication) to the corporate
network or through a zero-trust remote access gateway.
 Remove dependencies through upgrades and reconfiguration: Upgrade to SMBv3 (or

most current version) along with SMB signing.
 Block all versions of SMB from being accessible externally to your network by blocking
TCP port 445 with related protocols on User Datagram Protocol ports 137–138 and
TCP port 139.
 Use application directory allowlisting on all assets to ensure that only authorized
software can run, and all unauthorized software is blocked from executing.
 Apply the principle of least privilege to all systems and services so that users only have
the access they need to perform their jobs. Threat actors often seek out privileged
accounts to leverage to help saturate networks with ransomware.
 Restrict usage of PowerShell, using Group Policy, to specific users on a case-by-case

basis. Typically, only those users or administrators who manage the network or
Windows OSs should be permitted to use PowerShell. Update PowerShell and enable
enhanced logging. PowerShell is a cross-platform, command-line, shell and scripting
language that is a component of Microsoft Windows.
Threat actors use PowerShell to deploy ransomware and hide their malicious activities.
13
LockBit 3.0 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
TA0001 Initial Access
T1190 Exploit Public- Vulnerabilities such as BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) have been

Facing Applications observed being utilized as footholds into the environment.
T1133 External Remote Affiliates have been seen brute forcing exposed RDP services
Services and compromising accounts with weak passwords.
TA0005 Defense Evasion
T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Windows Defender, other anti-malware solutions and

Disable or Modify Tools monitoring tools are disabled.
T1070 Indicator Removal on Indicators, such as logs in Windows Event Logs or

Host malicious files, are removed after the execution of Lockbit
3.0
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware using Stack String Obfuscation.
Information
TA0040 Impact
T1486 Data Encrypted for LockBit 3.0 Ransomware, encrypting devices and demanding a
Impact ransom.
T1489 Service Stop During the defense evasion phase, anti-malware and
monitoring software is disabled.
TA0010 Exfiltration
T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Affiliates can exfiltrate valuable data from victim
Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage device via RClone or Stealbit (Data Exfiltration tool)
14
Indicators of Compromise
Tor Browser Links:

http://lockbitapt2d73krlbewgv27tquljgxr33xbwwsp6rkyieto7u4ncead.onion
http://lockbitapt2yfbt7lchxejug47kmqvqqxvvjpqkmevv4l3azl3gy6pyd.onion
http://lockbitapt34kvrip6xojylohhxrwsvpzdffgs5z4pbbsywnzsbdguqd.onion
http://lockbitapt5x4zkjbcqmz6frdhecqqgadevyiwqxukksspnlidyvd7qd.onion
http://lockbitapt6vx57t3eeqjofwgcglmutr3a35nygvokja5uuccip4ykyd.onion
http://lockbitapt72iw55njgnqpymggskg5yp75ry7rirtdg4m7i42artsbqd.onion
http://lockbitaptawjl6udhpd323uehekiyatj6ftcxmkwe5sezs4fqgpjpid.onion
http://lockbitaptbdiajqtplcrigzgdjprwugkkut63nbvy2d5r4w2agyekqd.onion
http://lockbitaptc2iq4atewz2ise62q63wfktyrl4qtwuk5qax262kgtzjqd.onion
Links for normal browser:

http://lockbitapt2d73krlbewgv27tquljgxr33xbwwsp6rkyieto7u4ncead.onion.ly
http://lockbitapt2yfbt7lchxejug47kmqvqqxvvjpqkmevv4l3azl3gy6pyd.onion.ly
http://lockbitapt34kvrip6xojylohhxrwsvpzdffgs5z4pbbsywnzsbdguqd.onion.ly
http://lockbitapt5x4zkjbcqmz6frdhecqqgadevyiwqxukksspnlidyvd7qd.onion.ly
http://lockbitapt6vx57t3eeqjofwgcglmutr3a35nygvokja5uuccip4ykyd.onion.ly
http://lockbitapt72iw55njgnqpymggskg5yp75ry7rirtdg4m7i42artsbqd.onion.ly
http://lockbitaptawjl6udhpd323uehekiyatj6ftcxmkwe5sezs4fqgpjpid.onion.ly
http://lockbitaptbdiajqtplcrigzgdjprwugkkut63nbvy2d5r4w2agyekqd.onion.ly
http://lockbitaptc2iq4atewz2ise62q63wfktyrl4qtwuk5qax262kgtzjqd.onion.ly
Tor Browser Links for chat:

http://lockbitsupa7e3b4pkn4mgkgojrl5iqgx24clbzc4xm7i6jeetsia3qd.onion
http://lockbitsupdwon76nzykzblcplixwts4n4zoecugz2bxabtapqvmzqqd.onion
http://lockbitsupn2h6be2cnqpvncyhj4rgmnwn44633hnzzmtxdvjoqlp7yd.onion
http://lockbitsupo7vv5vcl3jxpsdviopwvasljqcstym6efhh6oze7c6xjad.onion
http://lockbitsupq3g62dni2f36snrdb4n5qzqvovbtkt5xffw3draxk6gwqd.onion
http://lockbitsupqfyacidr6upt6nhhyipujvaablubuevxj6xy3frthvr3yd.onion
http://lockbitsupt7nr3fa6e7xyb73lk6bw6rcneqhoyblniiabj4uwvzapqd.onion
http://lockbitsupuhswh4izvoucoxsbnotkmgq6durg7kficg6u33zfvq3oyd.onion
http://lockbitsupxcjntihbmat4rrh7ktowips2qzywh6zer5r3xafhviyhqd.onion
Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware samples
SHA 256 - 80e8defa5377018b093b5b90de0f2957f7062144c83a09a56bba1fe4eda932ce
SHA 256 - a56b41a6023f828cccaaef470874571d169fdb8f683a75edd430fbd31a2c3f6e
SHA 256 - d61af007f6c792b8fb6c677143b7d0e2533394e28c50737588e40da475c040ee
Sigma Rules
https://yaraify.abuse.ch/yarahub/rule/RANSOM_Lockbit_Black_Packer/
https://yaraify.abuse.ch/yarahub/rule/LockbitBlack_Loader/
15
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Threat Spotlight Lockbit Black 3.0 Ransomware

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TLP:WHITE Threat Spotlight: Lockbit Black 3.

What’s New on Lockbit Black 3.0 ................................................................................................... 3

Threat Spotlight: Lockbit Black

What’s New on Lockbit Black 3.0

The major updates for Lockbit Black 3.0 Ransomware are:

 Anti Analysis technique to hide themselves against various AV vendors.

Figure 2 Ransom note

Figure 3 Changed wallpaper image.

First Sample Publication

Insides From Real Life Incident Response

Initial Access Point

Technical Analysis of Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware

The first execution of Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware done by a “access token”:

 <Ransomware.exe> -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -pass

Ransom note wallpaper and .ico file written into C:\ProgramData\:

WriteFile Operation for the creation of README.txt and icon file

Killing Windows Defender and tempering Windows Event Log

Figure 5 This part is very similar to BlackMatter Ransomware.

Encrypted file structure

Mitigation and Prevention

 Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can

 Remove unnecessary access to administrative shares, especially ADMIN$ and C$

 Remove dependencies through upgrades and reconfiguration: Upgrade to SMBv3 (or

 Restrict usage of PowerShell, using Group Policy, to specific users on a case-by-case

LockBit 3.0 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

TA0001 Initial Access

T1190 Exploit Public- Vulnerabilities such as BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708) have been

TA0005 Defense Evasion

T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Windows Defender, other anti-malware solutions and

T1070 Indicator Removal on Indicators, such as logs in Windows Event Logs or

Tor Browser Links:

Links for normal browser:

Tor Browser Links for chat:

Lockbit 3.0 Ransomware samples

SHA 256 - 80e8defa5377018b093b5b90de0f2957f7062144c83a09a56bba1fe4eda932ce

SHA 256 - a56b41a6023f828cccaaef470874571d169fdb8f683a75edd430fbd31a2c3f6e

SHA 256 - d61af007f6c792b8fb6c677143b7d0e2533394e28c50737588e40da475c040ee

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