Criminal Complaint

Case 1:23-mj-04368-EGT Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2023 Page 1 of 22
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. r2 3,. /j{,::;-;, ~ f ' -Totz#>

IN RE COMPLAINT
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CRIMINAL COVER SHEET
l. Did this matter originate from a matter pending in the Northern Region of the United States
Attorney's Office prior to August 8, 2014 (Mag. Judge Shaniek M. Maynard)? No
2. Did this matter originate from a matter pending in the Central Region of the United States
Attorney's Office prior to October 3, 2019 (Mag. Judge Jared M. Strauss)? No
3. Did this matter involve the participation of or consultation with now Magistrate Judge
Eduardo I. Sanchez during his tenure at the U.S. Attorney ' s Office, which concluded on
January 22, 2023? No
Respectfully submitted,
MARKENZY LAPOINTE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
By:
ssistant United States Attorney

FL Bar No. 93075
99 Northeast Fourth Street
Miami , Florida 33132-2111
Tel: 305-961-9151
Email : jonathan.stratton@usdoj .gov
AO 9 I (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for th e
Southern District of Florida
United States of America )

V. )
)
Victor Manuel Rocha , )
)
)
)
Defendant.
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
1, the complainant in thi s case, state that the followi ng is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
On or about the date(s) of November 1981 to December 1, 2023 in the county of Miami-Dade in the
-----------
Southern District of ____F_lo_ri_d_a_ _ _ , the defendant(s) vio lated:
Code Section Offense Description

18 U.S.C. § 371 Conspiracy to Act as An Agent of a Foreign Government and to Defraud the
United States
18 U.S.C. § 951 Acting as an Illegal Agent of a Foreign Government
18 U.S.C. § 1542 Use of a Passport Obtained by a False Statement
This criminal com plaint is based on these facts:
SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT.
~ Continued on the attached sheet.
Michael J . Haley, Special Agent, FBI

Printed name and title
Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.
Date: 12/01/2023
City and state: Miami , Florida Honorable Edwin . Torres, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Printed name and title
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Case No. J3;'MJ'- 'r3~-TotfR&J

v.
VICTOR MANUEL ROCHA,
Defendant.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -I
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
I, Michael Haley, being duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows :
INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND
1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), currently
assigned to a national security squad in the Miami Division. I have been an FBI Special Agent
since August 2020, and have been assigned to the Miami Division since January 2021 . My duties
involve the investigation of a variety of federal offenses, including espionage and other
counterintelligence matters relating to Cuba. As a result, I am familiar with the methods of
foreign agents acting in the United States at the direction or control of foreign governments,
including efforts to conceal the transmission of nonpublic information by persons who possess,
or have possessed, a U.S . government security clearance. I am also familiar with the tradecraft
used by Cuban intelligence officers. Finally, I have received training on U.S. classified
information and the system used by federal agencies to protect this information, including the
rules and regulations that govern its storage, use, and lawful transmission.
2. As a federal agent, I am authorized to investigate violations of U.S. laws and
execute warrants issued under the authority of the United States.
3. I make this affidavit in support of a criminal complaint for VICTOR MANUEL

ROCHA (the "Defendant") for violations of 18 U.S.C § 951 (acting as an agent of a foreign
government), § 371 (conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, specifically 18
U.S.C § 951), and§ 1542 (use of a United States passport secured by false statement).
4. The facts and information contained in this affidavit are based on my personal
knowledge of the investigation, my training and experience, the observations and reports of other
law enforcement officers, and information obtained from other agents and witnesses. This
affidavit is intended to show only there is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint
and does not set forth all my knowledge or all facts known to the United States about this
investigation.
THE CRIMINAL CONDUCT
The Defendant
5. The Defendant, VICTOR MANUEL ROCHA, was born in Colombia on or about
October 23 , 1950. ROCHA became a naturalized United States citizen in 1978, and currently
resides in Miami, Florida. ROCHA possesses multiple United States passports as well as a
passport from the Dominican Republic.
6. As discussed below, by his own admission, beginning no later than approximately
1981, and continuing to the present, ROCHA secretly supported the Republic of Cuba and its
clandestine intelligence-gathering mission against the United States by serving as a covert agent
of Cuba's intelligence services.
7. To further that role, ROCHA obtained and maintained employment in the United
States government in positions that provided him: (1) access to nonpublic information, including
classified information; and (2) the ability to affect United States foreign policy. After his
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employment ended, ROCHA held other positions and engaged in other acts intended to support
Cuba's intelligence services. ROCHA always kept his status as a Cuban agent secret in order to
protect himself and others and to allow himself the opportunity to engage in additional clandestine
activity. For example, ROCHA: (1) provided false and misleading information to the United
States to maintain his secret mission; (2) traveled outside the United States to meet with Cuban
intelligence operatives; and (3) made false and misleading statements to obtain travel documents.
8. At no time did ROCHA provide notification to the United States Attorney General
or the Secretary of State as required by law that he was, in fact, acting as an agent of a foreign
government, specifically the Republic of Cuba.
The Republic of Cuba and its Intelligence Services
9. The Republic of Cuba is an authoritarian, Communist state.
10. From in or around 1961 until July 2015, the United States did not maintain
diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of Cuba. From in or around 1977 until
July 2015, the United States Interests Section of the Swiss Embassy in Havana, Cuba, was
designated as the official representative of the United States government to Cuba.
11. Between 1982 and 2015, and from 2021 until the present, the United States
Department of State has designated Cuba as a state sponsor of international terrorism in its State
Sponsors of Terrorism List, due to Cuba's support for international terrorism and subversion of
United States justice.
12. Since the Cuban Revolution, members and associates of Cuba' s Communist
Party, including Cuba's intelligence services, used the Spanish term "Comandante" to refer to
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Cuba' s former leader Fidel Castro, and the term "Compafiero," which means comrade in English,
to refer to fellow regime loyalists.
13 . Starting with Fidel Castro' s ascent to power, the Republic of Cuba viewed the
United States as its primary threat, and Cuban government officials referred to the United States
as an enemy of Cuba.
14. Cuba' s intelligence services include numerous intelligence and counterintelligence
entities, including the Directorate of Intelligence, also known as the General Directorate of
Intelligence, or in Spanish, "Direcci6n de Inteligencia" or "Direcci6n General de Inteligencia"
(collectively, the "DGI"). The DGI is charged with gathering worldwide intelligence information
of interest to Cuba and its allies.
15. Members and associates of Cuba' s intelligence services use the Spanish term
"Direcci6n" to refer to the DGI.
16. The United States was, and continues to be, the principal target for Cuba' s
intelligence gathering. To that end, the DGI spots and assesses persons within the United States,
including employees of the United States government, who may be suitable for recruitment to
serve a variety of roles on behalf of Cuba' s interests.
17. One of the most important of these roles is that of agent - that is, a person who is
not an officially-recognized employee of the DGI but who is aware he or she is working for the
service and is willing to engage in clandestine operational activity, including intelligence
gathering, at the direction, and on behalf, of the DGI.
4
The Defendant's Positions at the Department of State
18. Between in or around November 1981 and August 2002, ROCHA was employed
by the United States Department of State ("DoS"), a department of the United States government
that manages the United States' relationships with foreign governments and implements U.S.
foreign policy.
19. From in or around December 1982 until in or around January 1985, as a DoS
employee, ROCHA served as a Political Officer at the United States Embassy in Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic.
20. From in or around February 1987 until in or around February 1989, as a DoS
employee, ROCHA served as a Political-Military Affairs Officer at the United States Embassy in
Tegucigalpa, Honduras.
21. From in or around February 1989 until in or around November 1991 , as a DoS
employee, ROCHA served as the First Secretary at the United States Embassy in Mexico City,
Mexico.
22. From in or around November 1991 until in or around July 1994, as a DoS employee,
ROCHA served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Santo Domingo,
Dominican Republic.
23. From in or around July 1994 until in or around July 1995, as a DoS employee,
ROCHA served as the Director of Inter-American Affairs on the United States National Security
Council, with special responsibility for, among other things, Cuba. The following is a photograph
of the defendant from that time:
5
24. From in or around July 1995 until in or around July 1997, as a DoS employee,
ROCHA served as Deputy Principal Officer at the United States Interests Section in Havana,
Cuba.
25 . From in or around July 1997 until in or around November 1999, as a DoS employee,
ROCHA served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Buenos Aires,
Argentina.
26. From in or around November 1999 until in or around August 2002, as a DoS
employee, ROCHA served as Ambassador to Bolivia at the United States Embassy in La Paz,
Bolivia.
The Defendant's Conduct to Gain Access to Nonpublic Information
27. Throughout his employment at the DoS, ROCHA had unique access to nonpublic
United States government information.
28. At no time was ROCHA authorized, directly or indirectly, to deliver, communicate,
or transmit nonpublic information to agents, officers, or employees of any hostile foreign
intelligence service, during or after his employment.
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29. Throughout his DoS employment, ROCHA repeatedly was required, in
questionnaires, security briefings, interviews, and other settings, to affirm that he understood and
would adhere to laws and regulations restricting the use and sharing of nonpublic information,
including classified information subject to greater restrictions.
30. For example, on November 25, 1981 , ROCHA signed a Security Agreement in
which he acknowledged he could not publish or reveal to any person, either during or after his
DoS employment, any classified or administratively controlled information, or any other
information transmitted to him in confidence in the course of his official duties.
31 . In another example, on January 12, 1989, ROCHA signed a Classified Information
Nondisclosure Agreement, in which he acknowledged that unauthorized disclosure of nonpublic
information could cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage a
foreign nation.
32. Through his career, ROCHA also was required to affirm his loyalties to the United
States and absence of covert activity on behalf of any foreign nation. ROCHA repeatedly
answered these questions falsely.
33 . For example, in a 1981 questionnaire, ROCHA falsely responded "no" to the
questions "Are you now or have you ever been an agent or representative of, or otherwise
employed by or acted for a foreign principal, either personally or through association with a firm?"
and "Are you now or have you ever been a member of any foreign or domestic organization,
association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, fascist, communist,
or subversive?"
7
34. On September 22, 1991 , ROCHA falsely stated in a SF-86 Questionnaire for
National Security Positions that he had not ever "been employed by or acted as a consultant for a
foreign government, firm or agency."
35. On May 8, 1994, during an FBI background investigation interview conducted at
the United States Embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, regarding his appointment to
the United States National Security Council, ROCHA falsely stated, among other things, that he
did not know of any situation, past or present, which could have a bearing on his suitability for
employment with the United States government; that there was nothing in his personal life that
may negatively affect his appointment to the National Security Council or that could be used
against him; and that he had no foreign contact with Cuban nationals.
36. On August 25, 1999, in a SF-86 Questionnaire for National Security Positions,
ROCHA falsely answered "no" to the following questions, among others: (a) "Are you now or
have you ever been employed by or acted as a consultant for a foreign government, firm, or
agency?"; (b) "Have you ever had any contact with a foreign government, its establishments
(embassies or consulates), or its representatives, whether inside or outside the U.S. other than on
official U.S. Government business?"; (c) "Is there anything in your personal life that could be used
by someone to coerce or blackmail you?; and (d) "Is there anything in your life that could cause
an embarrassment to you or to the President if publicly known?"
Summary of Activities After Leaving the State Department
37. Since leaving DoS, ROCHA has held a series of lucrative private-sector jobs.
ROCHA currently is employed by LL YC USA as a "senior international business advisor."
8
38. From in or around 2006 until in or around 2012, ROCHA was an advisor to the
Commander of the United States Southern Command, a joint command of the United States
military whose area of responsibility includes Cuba.
39. Travel records show that ROCHA has traveled frequently and widely outside the
United States, including multiple trips to Cuba.
The Defendant's Contacts in 2022 and 2023 with an Undercover DGI Representative
40. Prior to November 2022, FBI received information that ROCHA was a covert
agent of the DGI.
41. On November 15, 2022, while in Miami, ROCHA responded to a WhatsApp
message from an individual purporting to be a covert DGI representative, but who was, in fact, an
FBI undercover employee ("UC"). The message read: "Good Afternoon ambassador, my name is
Miguel and I have a message for you from your friends in Havana. It is in regards to a sensitive
matter. Are you available for a telephone call?" ROCHA replied: "I don 't understand but you
can call me."
42. Later that day, ROCHA participated in a recorded phone call with the UC, in which
the UC informed ROCHA his name was "Miguel" and that he was "representing your friends in
Havana." The UC further informed ROCHA that he was "ordered ... to make contact with you
to give you a message. I know that you have been a great friend of ours since your time in Chile." 1
The UC then explained "we have little problems in the island and in our embassy in Santo
Domingo as well, but don't worry, I'm here to resolve the situation, but these are very delicate
1
Independent evidence, to include travel records, confirm that ROCHA lived in Chile in or around
1973 .
9
issues, and it would be best to talk about it in person." ROCHA agreed to meet the UC in person
the following day in front of a church on 6th Street in the Brickell neighborhood of Miami at 10:00
am.
The First UC Meeting: November 16, 2022
43. On November 16, 2022, as directed, ROCHA met the UC in front of the First
Miami Presbyterian Church at approximately 10:00 am. This meeting was audio and video-
recorded, as were ROCHA's two subsequent meetings with the UC. All three meetings between
the UC and ROCHA took place in Spanish and have since been translated to English.
44. While traveling to the meeting location, ROCHA engaged in a Surveillance
Detection Route ("SDR") consistent with DGI tradecraft. In my training and experience, the
purpose of an SDR is to determine whether the individual is being followed or observed on the
way to a covert meeting. Specifically, law enforcement observed ROCHA taking an indirect,
longer, circuitous route to the church, rather than going there in a direct manner. In addition,
among other things, he stopped during the route at a location for several minutes so that he could
observe the meeting place from a safe distance. ROCHA's use of counter-surveillance techniques
is consistent with prior training in covert operations. Indeed, he later told the UC that "they are
not going to see me when I come out over here ... that's what I did today because I did a whole
route .. . It's what I've always been told to do."
45 . At the start of his meeting with the UC, ROCHA guided the UC to a "food court"
at their location with "low-level employees ... who don 't want to spend too much money. So,
there's no possibility for - for anyone to see me." ROCHA referred to this as a "measure ... out
of precaution" because "I have always ... received sufficient training to know that you must be on
the alert to - to provocations."
46. When the UC told ROCHA he was "a covert representative here in Miami" whose
m1ss1on was "to contact you, introduce myself as your new contact, and establish a new
communication plan," ROCHA answered "Yes," and proceeded to engage in a lengthy
conversation with the UC, during which ROCHA repeatedly described and celebrated his activity
as a DGI agent.
47. During this meeting, ROCHA told the UC: "I want you to tell my Compai'ieros that
I appreciate, and I am very thankful for this alert," explaining that during his last contact with the
DGI, "I was able to travel ... to the capital and while there I had a long meeting ... [i]n Havana."
ROCHA added, regarding the UC 's explicit reference to "Havana" during their initial
conversations: "we have another name. We never utilize Havana ... I tend to say 'The Island.' .. .
I never use C or H ... [T]hat was the only thing that ... I thought, if someone has betrayed and told
the enemy 's counterintelligence ... why are they utilizing ... Havana ... But ... Miguel is what I
remembered, because I don't write anything down ... I try to memorize things ... for security
reasons."
48. ROCHA said that "since the Direcci6n asked me ... to lead a normal life ... I have
- have created the legend of a right-wing person." I know from my training and experience that a
legend is an agent's artificial background or a feature of his biography used to maintain his covert
status.
49. ROCHA said this meeting was "my first contact - ... since my - my last trip to []
Havana," which ROCHA stated was in "2016 or 2017," when he traveled to Havana via Panama
11
and "[f]rom Panama, I went to ... I mean, I entered as - as a Dominican," referring to his use of
his Dominican Republic passport instead of his American passport.
50. ROCHA further explained that "I always told myself, ' The only thing that can put
everything we have done in danger is - is ... someone' s betrayal, someone who may have met me,
someone who may have known something at some point. "'
51. ROCHA assured the UC that "my number one concern; my number one priority
was the .. . any action on the part of Washington that would - would endanger the life of - of the
leadership, or the - or the revolution itself."
52. ROCHA asked the UC to send "my warmest regards to the Direcci6n," and after
the UC promised to do so, ROCHA said the following:
ROCHA : [I]t was decades - it was decades. I mean, decades that were
deep -
UC: How many years?
ROCHA : Almost 40.
UC: Wow.
ROCHA: Uh - of a lot of danger. Uh . . . They must have told you
something because you mentioned Chile. . . . That ...
inspired trust in me and at the same time I thought, if there ' s
a traitor and they know that I was in Chile[.] ... I have to tell
you something.
UC: Tell me.
ROCHA: Uh ... It gives me a lot of ... pride and satisfaction to see that
- that people like Miguel, who are - who are much younger,
but-
UC: Thank you.
ROCHA: - who are there -
UC: Thank you.
ROCHA: - doing .. . This is not easy -
UC: No, no, it is not easy. No, it is a struggle -
ROCHA: - it is not easy -
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UC: - but we are fighting.

ROCHA: - this is not easy. Uh ... uh .. .
UC: Thank you for your friendship and help for so many years.
Right? Thank you very much.
ROCHA: Of course, no problem ... This is a huge sacrifice ... huge,
with a lot of tension that you have to manage internally ...
uh ... with self-discipline - ... all the time .... When you
have the conviction, you have self-discipline -
53 . ROCHA agreed to meet the UC again on February 10, 2023 , with February 17,
2023 , as a backup date. ROCHA also proposed a backup location if the pair could not meet in
Miami. ROCHA described a specific location in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, where
"low-income people ... go to the food court" so that ROCHA would not be identified.
54. ROCHA also agreed to utilize a Colombian Pesos bill as a parole at the next
meeting to ensure operational security. I know from my training and experience that a parole is
a password or recognition phrase or item used between an agent and his handler, or between
intelligence officers, as a security protocol.
The Second UC Meeting: February 17, 2023
55. Prior to February 10, 2023 , the FBI learned ROCHA had left the country on a
business trip. Out of an abundance of caution, the UC arrived at the agreed-upon location, but
ROCHA did not attend.
56. On February 17, 2023 , the backup date agreed upon at the first meeting, ROCHA
met the UC as planned at the Brickell outdoor food court where they had met previously.
57. When traveling to the meeting, ROCHA used counter-surveillance techniques
similar to those for the first meeting. Additionally, upon meeting the UC, he utilized a
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Colombian Pesos bill as a parole, and complimented the UC on his cover story for their meeting.
ROCHA told the UC, regarding their meeting location: "I have my bank here ... So, it's my
legend for being here."
58. ROCHA assured the UC "But of course" when told the DGI wanted to confirm
"that you continue to be a Compafiero of ours."
59. ROCHA said, regarding how he obtained his DoS employment: "I went little by
little ... It was a very meticulous process ... very disciplined - but very disciplined .... I knew
exactly how to do it and obviously the Direcci6n accompanied me .... they knew that I knew
how to do it ... It' s a long process and it wasn't easy."
60. When asked by the UC whether "if there was an opportunity, where we can work
together again," ROCHA replied: "No - no ... you guys don't even have to propose that ... if
I had access to something that was worthwhile, I - I would propose it [points at himself] . Uh ...
and the access ... it's having access to information that' s important."
61. During their meeting, ROCHA celebrated his activities on behalf of the DGI and
against the United States' interests, and explained why and how he continued to preserve the
secrecy of those activities, stating among other things: (1) "[F]or me, what has been done, has
strengthened the Revolution. It has strengthened it immensely ... [W]e can' t put - put that in
danger ... I'm very zealous in regards to what we have done and with what I have to protect, and
what we have done."; (2) "I have to protect what we did because what we did ... because what
we did is ... the cement that has strengthened the last 40 years. I mean, that cement is concrete.
It's not [UI] , it' s concrete. You know?"; (3) "I wouldn't put what we have done in danger ...
because ... they would react strongly against the Revolution ... strongly because of the fact that
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through my participation we - we did what we did."; (4) "They underestimated what we could
do to them. We did more than they thought"; and (5) "the Direcci6n knows" what ROCHA did.
62. During this meeting, ROCHA further said, as confirmed in the screenshot below
from close-captioned video of the meeting: "What we have done ... it's enormous ... More than
a grand slam."
63. During their meeting, ROCHA also lamented "the blows that the enemy," meaning
the United States, "has dealt to the current revolution."
64. ROCHA agreed to meet the UC a third time, and made arrangements for that
meeting including a backup plan, reassuring the UC that "you can ask the Direcci6n ... I was
always there."
The Third UC Meeting: June 23, 2023
65. On June 23 , 2023 , ROCHA met the UC in person at the outdoor food court where
they had met the previous two times. When traveling to the meeting, ROCHA again used an
SDR.
66. During their meeting, when told by the UC that "the Direcci6n wants to ensure that
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you are still a Compaiiero of ours ... Are you still with us?," ROCHA responded later: "I am
angry. I'm pissed off ... Because of the question that was asked ... It's that - that ... it' s like
questioning my manhood ... It' s like you want me to drop them .. . and show you if I still have
testicles." Later, when told that with "the help that you have given us for so long ... you must
have a great pair of balls not to be worried," ROCHA replied: "I have them - I have them."
67. ROCHA promised the UC that, if there were an investigation, he knew "how to
handle it," and assured the UC: "I know how to defend myself ... I have the intelligence .. . and
I have the knowledge. I mean ... in the course of my duties, how many times did I meet with -
with them ... to answer questions .. . I know how it works the - the system."
68. ROCHA stated to the UC that "I never - never have in 40 years put a Compafiero
in danger. Or others, never. And there are certain rules ... from this type of work that, be it us,
be them, be the Russians ... So then, whoever is in a mission doesn't see the other one in another.
That is simply a no, because it jeopardizes everything."
69. ROCHA promised the UC that "I protect - I protect everything that has been done.
I have always protected it and will protect it and I know how to protect it."
70. ROCHA made arrangements to meet the UC a fourth time on December 8, 2023 ,
also selecting backup dates.
Diplomatic Security Service Interview on December 1, 2023
71. On December 1, 2023 , two Diplomatic Security Service ("DSS") agents from the
DoS conducted a consensual, voluntary interview of ROCHA. During the DSS interview,
ROCHA lied repeatedly. For example, he denied ever having met someone with the UC ' s
description, even after being shown a picture of the UC. When ROCHA was shown a picture
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of him sitting across from the UC during one of their meetings, ROCHA said the UC approached
him, but one time only. When told the interviewers possessed information that he met with the
UC on more than one occasion, ROCHA stated he did not want to comment.
Summary of Criminal Violations Supported by Probable Cause
72. Title 18, United States Code, Section 951 makes it unlawful for a person to act
within the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the
Attorney General; in relevant part, the statute defines an agent as a person who acts "subject to
the direction or control" of the foreign government. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3 71
makes it unlawful for a person to conspire to commit an offense against the United States,
including to violate Section 951.
73 . ROCHA, aided by unnamed conspirators within Cuba' s intelligence services,
agreed to act and did act as a clandestine agent of the Cuban government during at least the
period of 1981 (when ROCHA started at DoS) through the present.
74. The audio and video-recorded conversations summarized above in themselves
establish unequivocally that ROCHA, in his own words, has acted for decades as a covert agent
of the DGI.
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75. Throughout the meetings, ROCHA behaved as a Cuban agent. ROCHA
consistently referred to the United States as "the enemy," and used the term "we" to describe
himself and Cuba. ROCHA additionally praised Fidel Castro as the "Comandante," and referred
to his contacts in Cuban intelligence as his "Compafieros" (comrades) and to the Cuban
intelligence services as the "Direcci6n," tell-tale terms used by Cuban operatives.
76. ROCHA also made other statements during the meetings that the investigation
confirmed to be true. For example, in the November 2022 meeting, ROCHA described the
"moment that I lived through it because I was in charge, it was the knock down of the small
planes ... That was a time of a lot of tension, ... that was the time of the ... ' Brothers to the
Rescue ' and other similar people . . . who were pushing politics towards unnecessary
provocations." In fact, from approximately July 1995 until July 1997, as a DoS employee,
ROCHA served as Deputy Principal Officer at the United States Interests Section in Havana.
The incident that ROCHA described as the "knock down of the small planes" occurred during
his tenure, in February 1996, when Cuba shot down two unarmed airplanes operated by members
of Brothers to the Rescue, a U.S.-based group opposed to Castro's government, and killed four
men.
77. Similarly, during the November 2022 meeting, ROCHA admitted traveling to
Cuba in "2016 or 2017" to meet with his DGI handlers in Havana, and said that, to get there, he
traveled via Panama and entered Cuba "as a Dominican." Travel records confirm that in January
2017, ROCHA travel to Cuba exactly as he described to the UC. Specifically, on January 2,
2017, using a United States passport bearing number 530963729, ROCHA flew from Miami
International Airport in Miami, Florida to Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. On January 3,
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2017, using his Dominican Republic passport instead of a U.S. passport, ROCHA flew from
Santo Domingo to Panama City, Panama and then from Panama City to Havana, Cuba. On
January 7, 2017, using his Dominican passport, ROCHA flew back from Havana to Panama
City, and then to Santo Domingo. He subsequently flew back to Miami on January 8, 2017,
using his United States passport bearing number 530963729. Notably, just two months earlier,
in November 2016, ROCHA traveled to Havana directly from Miami on his U.S. passport. He
did so again on his U.S. passport, again directly from Miami, in November 2017. On neither of
those occasions did he use a Dominican passport or travel to Havana via the Dominican Republic
or Panama as he did in January 2017.
78. Simply put, ROCHA's activities with, and admissions to, the UC, corroborated by
other evidence from the investigation, prove he conspired with the DGI to act, and has continued
to act to this day, as an agent of a foreign government contrary to Section 951.
79. ROCHA also violated Title 18, United States Code, Section 1542 while traveling
to and from Cuba in January 2017, as just described. Section 1542, in summary, makes unlawful
to willfully and knowingly use a passport whose issuance was secured by reason of a false
statement.
80. At the start of his trip to Havana to meet with the DGI, as confirmed by travel
records, ROCHA used his United States passport bearing number 530963729 to fly initially to
Santo Domingo. ROCHA secured that U.S. passport in 2016, based upon an application for
U.S. passport dated February 24, 2016. In that application, ROCHA declared under penalty of
perjury that he had not "since acquiring United States citizenship/nationality ... accepted or
performed the duties of any office, post or employment under the government of a foreign state
19
or political subdivision thereof. " For the reasons discussed above, and based upon his own
words, this statement was false, since ROCHA has for decades served as a covert agent of the
Cuban government. ROCHA therefore violated Section 1542 when he used the U.S. passport
obtained via that false statement to (1) travel from Miami to Santo Domingo on January 2, 2017,
and (2) to re-enter the United States at Miami International Airport on January 8, 2017.
CONCLUSION
81. Based upon all of the foregoing, I respectfully submit that this affidavit establishes
probable cause to believe that ROCHA: (1) beginning no later than November 1981 to the
present, conspired to violate 18 U.S.C. § 951 , in violation 18 U.S .C. § 371 ; (2) beginning no
later than November 1981 to the present, violated 18 U.S.C. § 951 ; (3) on or about January 2,
2017, violated 18 U.S.C. § 1542; and (4) on or about January 8, 2017, violated 18 U.S.C. § 1542
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
SPECIAL AGENT
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Sworn and subscribed before me this 1st day of December 2023 .
. TORRES
ITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
20

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Case 1:23-mj-04368-EGT Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/04/2023 Page 1 of 22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CASE NO. r2 3,. /j{,::;-;, ~ f ' -Totz#>

ssistant United States Attorney

AO 9 I (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

United States of America )

Code Section Offense Description

This criminal com plaint is based on these facts:

SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT.

~ Continued on the attached sheet.

Michael J . Haley, Special Agent, FBI

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Case No. J3;'MJ'- 'r3~-TotfR&J

VICTOR MANUEL ROCHA,

INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND

1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), currently

counterintelligence matters relating to Cuba. As a result, I am familiar with the methods of

2. As a federal agent, I am authorized to investigate violations of U.S. laws and

execute warrants issued under the authority of the United States.

3. I make this affidavit in support of a criminal complaint for VICTOR MANUEL

THE CRIMINAL CONDUCT

5. The Defendant, VICTOR MANUEL ROCHA, was born in Colombia on or about

passport from the Dominican Republic.

6. As discussed below, by his own admission, beginning no later than approximately

of Cuba's intelligence services.

government, specifically the Republic of Cuba.

The Republic of Cuba and its Intelligence Services

9. The Republic of Cuba is an authoritarian, Communist state.

designated as the official representative of the United States government to Cuba.

United States justice.

to refer to fellow regime loyalists.

14. Cuba' s intelligence services include numerous intelligence and counterintelligence

Intelligence, or in Spanish, "Direcci6n de Inteligencia" or "Direcci6n General de Inteligencia"

of interest to Cuba and its allies.

"Direcci6n" to refer to the DGI.

serve a variety of roles on behalf of Cuba' s interests.

service and is willing to engage in clandestine operational activity, including intelligence

gathering, at the direction, and on behalf, of the DGI.

The Defendant's Positions at the Department of State

of the defendant from that time:

The Defendant's Conduct to Gain Access to Nonpublic Information

United States government information.

28. At no time was ROCHA authorized, directly or indirectly, to deliver, communicate,

or transmit nonpublic information to agents, officers, or employees of any hostile foreign

intelligence service, during or after his employment.

29. Throughout his DoS employment, ROCHA repeatedly was required, in

including classified information subject to greater restrictions.

DoS employment, any classified or administratively controlled information, or any other

information transmitted to him in confidence in the course of his official duties.

31 . In another example, on January 12, 1989, ROCHA signed a Classified Information

Nondisclosure Agreement, in which he acknowledged that unauthorized disclosure of nonpublic

answered these questions falsely.

33 . For example, in a 1981 questionnaire, ROCHA falsely responded "no" to the

association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, fascist, communist,

foreign government, firm or agency."

35. On May 8, 1994, during an FBI background investigation interview conducted at

an embarrassment to you or to the President if publicly known?"