Political Theory

POLITICAL THEORY
An Introduction
Edited by
Rajeev Bhargava
Ashok Acharya
An imprint of Pearson Education
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Contents
Preface
PART - I WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY AND WHY DO WE NEED IT?
1. What Is Political Theory?
Rajeev Bhargava
Introduction
What Is Theory
The Distinctiveness of Theory?
Cosomologies and Common Sense
What Is Political?
Points for Discussion
2. Why Do We Need Political Theory?
Rajeev Bhargava
Introduction
The Big Questions of Human Life
The Emergence of Western Modernity
Explaining Human and Non-human Nature
Understanding Humans
The Difference Between the Human and Non-human Worlds
Decline of Political Theory?
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Types of Political Theories
Little Theories, Grand Theories
Cosmologies and Political Theory
History of Political Thought and Political Theory
PART - II CONCEPTS
3. Liberty
V. Sriranjani
Introduction
Meaning
Evolution of the Concept
Classification: Negative and Positive Liberty
Liberty and Other Concepts
The Concept of Liberty in India
4. Equality
Ashok Acharya
Introduction
Why Equalize?
Equality of What?
In Conclusion: The Politics of Equality
5. Justice
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Krishna Menon
Introduction
The Issue of Distributive Justice
Procedural Justice
John Rawls: Justice as Fairness
Limitations of Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Communitarian Critique
Feminist Critique
Justice, Capabilities, and Freedom: Amartya Sen’s Extension of John Rawls’

Theory of Justice
End-State Theories
Feminist Accounts of Justice
Conclusion
6. Rights
Papiya Sengupta Talukdar
Introduction
The Idea of Rights
Theories of Rights
Human Rights
Some Recent Debates on Rights
Conclusion
7. Democracy
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Janaki Srinivasan
Introduction
The Concept
Direct Participatory Democracy
Liberal Democracy
Objections to Democracy
Perspectives on Democracy
Key Debates in Democratic Theory
Conclusion
8. Citizenship
Anupama Roy
Introduction
What Do We Mean by Citizenship?
Historical Development of the Concept of Citizenship
T. H. Marshall: Equal and Universal Citizenship
Limits of Liberal Citizenship: Uniformity and Generality
The Search for Alternatives
New Contexts and Changing Concerns: Multiculturalism and Globalization
Conclusion
9. Power
Nivedita Menon
Introduction
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Conceptions of Power
Power as Exploitation
Authority, Legitimacy and Hegemony
Feminist Theories of Power
Foucault on Power
Conclusion
10. Sovereignty
Krishna Menon
Introduction
Historical Evolution of Sovereignty
Theories of Sovereignty
The Changing World and the Concept of Sovereignty
Conclusion
11. State
Swaha Das
Introduction
What Is the State?
The Modern State
What the State Is Not: Civil Society and the Nation
Justifying the State
Human Nature
The State of Nature and the Social Contract
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Utilitarianism
The Neutral State: Liberalism
The Class State: Marxism
The Patriarchal State: Feminism
Governmentality: Foucault on the State
Recent Debates: Challenges to the Sovereignty of the State
12. Civil Society
Mohinder Singh
Introduction
Historical Evolution of the Idea of Civil Society
Civil Society in Early Liberal Political Theory
Rise of Political Economy and the Enlightenment Concept of Civil Society
Critiques of the Enlightenment Concept of Civil Society
Contemporary Revival of the Concept of Civil Society
Civil Society in the Post-colonial Context
Modernity and Civil Society in Post-colonial States: Critical Issues
Conclusion
13. Property
Mohinder Singh
Introduction
The Extent and Limits of Property Rights
The Concept of Property in Political Theory
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Property in Ancient and Medieval Political Thought
Modernity and the Concept of Property
Developments in the 20th Century: Socialism, Welfarism, Libertarianism
Gender and Property Rights: Feminist Perspectives on the Concept of

Property
14. Gender
Nivedita Menon
Introduction
Sex Is to Nature as Gender Is to Culture
Male/Female in the Non-West
Developments in the Sex/Gender Distinction in Feminist Theory
Masculinity
PART - III IDEOLOGIES
15. Liberalism
Ashok Acharya
Introduction
A Brief History
Classical Liberalism
Contemporary Liberalism
The Foundations of Liberalism
Conclusion
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16. Socialism
Sunalini Kumar
Introduction
Responses to Inequality
The Problem: Capitalism
The Socialist Alternative
Socialist Schemes: Old and New
Conclusion
17. Nationalism
Sunalini Kumar
Introduction
The History of an Idea
Non-European Nationalism
Theoretical Questions
Analysis and Critique
Conclusion: The Future of an Idea
18. Secularism
Rajeev Bhargava
Introduction
Secularism: The Broad Definition
Political Secularism
Crisis for Secular States
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Theocracy, States with Established Religions and Secular States: A Normative
Comparison
An Alternative Conception: Indian Secularism
Is Secularism a Christian and Western Doctrine?
Conclusion
PART - IV POLITICAL ARGUMENTS
19. Affirmative Action
Ashok Acharya
Introduction
Justice and Social Disadvantage
Defining Affirmative Action
Affirmative Action in India
The Limits of Affirmative Action
20. Freedom of Speech and the Question of Censorship
Aarti Sethi
Introduction
Speech and the ‘Lesser Harm’ Hypothesis
Freedom of Expression and the Search for Truth
Freedom of Speech and its Relation to Self-government
Free Speech and Tolerance
The Autonomy Defence of Free Speech
What Do We Do with Hate Speech?
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Conclusion
The Editors and the Contributors
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The Editors and the Contributors
THE EDITORS
Rajeev Bhargava is Senior Fellow and Director, Centre for the Study of
Developing Societies. He was formerly professor at Jawaharlal Nehru
University and between 2001 and 2005, Professor of Political Theory and
Indian Political Thought and Head of the Department of Political Science,
University of Delhi.
His publications include Individualism in Social Science (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992); Secularism and its Critics (ed.) (New Delhi: OUP,
1998); Multiculturalism, Liberalism and Democracy (ed. with A. Bagchi
and R. Sudarshan) (New Delhi: OUP, 1999); Transforming India (ed. with
Francine Frankel et al.) (New Delhi: OUP, 2000); and Civil Society, Public
Sphere and Citizenship (ed. with H. Reifeld) (New Delhi: Sage, 2005). His
forthcoming publications include Politics and Ethics of the Indian
Constitution. He has contributed to several international books and
journals, including the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the
Oxford Handbook of Political Theory. He contributes regularly to
openDemocracy He was a consultant to the UNDP report on cultural
liberty and diversity.
Ashok Acharya is a reader in the Department of Political Science,

University of Delhi. He holds a PhD in political science from the
University of Toronto. His areas of interest are in contemporary political
theory, including thematic issues of justice and rights in multicultural
societies.
THE CONTRIBUTORS
Swaha Das is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science,

Indraprastha College, Delhi.
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Sunalini Kumar teaches political science at Lady Shri Ram College, New
Delhi. She has an MPhil on theories of nationalism from Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi and an MA in social and political sciences from
Cambridge University, UK. Her area of interest is political theory, and in
particular debates on the public sphere, urban protest movements, and the
nation-state.
Krishna Menon teaches political science at the Lady Shri Ram College,
New Delhi. She has a PhD in the subject from the University of Delhi. Her
areas of interest include political theory, Indian politics, and feminist
theory and politics. Apart from academics, classical music and dance are
her other areas of involvement.
Nivedita Menon is a reader at the Department of Political Science,

University of Delhi. She is the author of Recovering Subversion. Feminist
Politics Beyond the Law (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004). Her recent
publications include an edited volume, Sexualities (New Delhi: Women
Unlimited/Zed 2007) and a book co-authored with Aditya Nigam, Power
and Contestation: India After 1989 (New Delhi: Zed/Orient Longman,
2007).
Anupama Roy is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Women’s Development

Studies, New Delhi. She is the author of Gendered Citizenship: Historical
and Conceptual Explorations (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005); and co-
editor of Poverty, Gender and Migration (New Delhi: Sage, 2006) . Her
research articles have appeared in various journals, including
Contributions to Indian Sociology, Indian Journal of Gender Studies,
Economic and Political Weekly, Indian Social Science Review, and
Contemporary India.
Papia Sengupta Talukdar teaches political theory at Kirori Mal College,

University of Delhi. She has done her MPhil from the Centre for Political
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
Aarti Sethi received her master’s degree in political science from the
Faculty of Arts, University of Delhi, in 2004. She is currently pursuing an
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MPhil from the School of Arts and Aesthetics, Jawaharlal Nehru
University. She is also associated as a researcher-practitioner with the
Sarai programme of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies,
Delhi.
Mohinder Singh teaches political science at Ramjas College, University

of Delhi. His specialization is in political theory/political philosophy, and
his PhD work is on Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin. His other areas
of interests are Western philosophy, the philosophy of social sciences, and
political economy.
Janaki Srinivasan is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science,

Panjab University, Chandigarh. She holds an MPhil from the Centre for
Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and is currently pursuing
her doctoral research. Her research interests are in development studies
and political theory.
V. Sriranjani is currently working on a research project on uniform civil

code in Goa. She was associated with Lokniti at the Centre for the Study
of Developing Societies (CSDS) as a research associate for a project titled
State of Democracy in South Asia. She has taught for a brief period at
Lady Shri Ram College and Gargi College, University of Delhi.
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Preface
This introductory book is meant primarily to help Indian students learn to

do and evolve an Indian political theory. This is a bold and somewhat
controversial objective and requires elaboration.
Indian universities tend generally to be lukewarm to social and political
philosophy, partly because of a lack of interest in normative issues but also
because of certain features of mainstream, academic political philosophy.
Notwithstanding the occasional universal content, the form of mainstream
political philosophy (MPP) is largely parochial. MPP takes little
inspiration from non-Western societies, makes hardly any references to
their problems and takes scant notice of how cross-cultural issues acquire a
distinct inflection in different cultures. Most of the examples discussed in
MPP have no immediate relation to these societies. Besides, there are few
nonWestern philosophers who could be role models for an Indian student.
These difficulties are compounded by the unavailability of good political
theory journals. No wonder that Indian academics evince disinterest in
political philosophy and Indian students, though enthused by political
philosophy, do not display self-confidence or competence at it.
How do we transform this condition? Do we need and can we evolve an
Indian political theory? Allow me to clarify straightaway that by Indian
political theory I do not mean a theory born out of and reflecting the
‘genius’ of Indians, or something uniquely Indian. Neither the editors nor
any of the contributors to this volume believe in this kind of political
theory. We do believe, however, that if we are engaged in our social and
political practices and are properly concerned about issues that grow out of
them, if we reflect on them and if creatively use the multiple traditions of
theorizing regardless of where they are born, then something like an Indian
political theory, a political theory with a distinctive contextual flavour, is
bound to emerge. The difference between this political theory and political
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theory in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe and in the United
States, may be tiny. But since the devil is in the small detail, these little
differences are bound to make a big difference to how our own political
theory is shaped.
A bit of personal history might help illustrate and extend my point
further. I have taught political theory for 25 years. If I draw from this
experience, I may divide this period into two phases. In the first phase, say
between 1979 and 1989, political theorists were generally obsessed with
reading and thinking about Western texts.We were commentators, at best,
analysts of texts that make up the canon of Western political philosophy or
that emerge out of the context of Western societies. In this period, I
frequently heard a complaint from some of my own students and several
colleagues: what is the applicability or relevance of political theory? I used
to find this refrain odd, tiresome and, frankly, very irritating. It was
particularly frustrating to find a change in the attitude of good students.
Several of them who glowed with enthusiasm in their class and took
optional courses in political theory in their MA began to show indifference
or impatience when they moved up to do their M.Phil. Never failing to
mention how much they enjoyed our classes, they shied away from doing
political theory. An unbridgeable gap opened up between us as two camps
were forged, one for political theory and the other against it.
But with hindsight, I feel that this division grew from a collective
inability to understand the complex nature and function of political theory.
Neither camp really properly distinguished two different questions: (a)
What is the relevance of political theory? (b) what is the relevance of the
kind of political theory that then occupies many of us? The fact is that a
general scepticism about political theory must be kept entirely separate
from the more specific scepticism directed against particular kinds of
political theorizing. The propolitical theory camp should have realized that
they ended up defending not only the more worthwhile and relevant forms
of political theory but also its considerably less-significant variants. The
anti-political theory camp made the same mistake and quite sweepingly
attacked not merely the largely indefensible versions but even their
indispensable cousins. What was the point of endlessly explicating what
this or that Western thinker said or meant? No doubt, this is a small
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component of studying and teaching political theory, but is this all there is
to this important human practice? Even if we were interested only in
normative issues, why could we have not turned to a sustained defence of
democracy, of the autonomy of institutions, of what it means to have a
committed judiciary or bureaucracy? Why were we not able to properly
distinguish an honourable religious sensibility from an ignoble communal
assertion? Why were we unable to distinguish different forms of equality
or justifiable inequalities from those which were morally illegitimate?
Why had we not constructed a proper moral argument in favour of
affirmative action or minority rights? Why were only platitudes on
secularism available to us? Why had we forgotten the moral worth of
many of our constitutional provisions?
By the end of the1980s, the climate, I am pleased to report, began to
change and by the early 1990s, in what from a purely personal point of
view is the second phase, several of us were beginning to get an idea of
what kind of political theory is necessary and relevant to our context. In
short, a new kind of political theory was taking birth. This textbook is
written in this period of transition, in a phase when the world of a purely
Western-oriented political theory is dying and a new political theory
rooted in our own world is emerging.
This textbook would never have seen the light of day had I not moved to
the University of Delhi (DU). In Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU),
somehow its need was never felt as acutely. In DU, it was experienced
instantly and with lightning urgency. So, when Kamini Mahadevan, the
ever patient commissioning editor of Pearson Education approached me
with a proposal to write a textbook, I jumped at what I thought was a
terrific idea. Alas, I also knew that I did not have the time to do so. I first
proposed that we should get someone to tape classroom lectures. This did
not happen. Instead, we agreed to give a small remuneration to a group of
students who were to take down notes with the unambiguous objective of
seeing their handiwork transformed into a textbook. The result, I must
confess, was pretty disastrous, though I would never know whether it was
due to the poor quality of my teaching or the even poorer note-taking
ability of students. It took just three classes for me to realize that my
original proposal was unworkable. I then suggested that we have other
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editors—Ashok Acharya, who agreed, and Nivedita Menon, who tried
hard to find time for the work it entailed but could not—and put together a
team of contributors. The two criteria of inclusion were (a) they should
have fresh experience of teaching particularly in an undergraduate college,
which effectively meant that they should be from the University of Delhi;
and (b) that they should work in a democratic spirit as a team loosely knit
together by the unity of the purpose outlined above.
No specific guidelines were given by the editors to the contributors. The
only relevant instruction was that all must adopt the point of view of a
good teacher. Good teachers enable students to enter the conceptual world
of the text, to see the point of view of its author, and provide the broader
context within which it is written. They are able to draw students into the
loop of the argument, where there is one, and to help understand an issue
from the inside of both its defenders as well as its opponents. Good
teachers must connect well with students, something assisted by a
conversational style, though one that is not entirely informal. They do so
by a rich use of examples from their own context. Given this simple but
clear understanding of good teaching and despite the knowledge of an
unbridgeable gap that stretches between the written and oral text, our
attempt was to try and replicate face-to-face teaching in the textbook.
Other qualities of good teachers were also kept in mind. For instance,
though they never cease to be political, they are always careful not to be
over-ideological. This is particularly important in the case of political
theory. Indeed, it is important that teachers not wear their politics on the
sleeve, if only on grounds of prudence. No one in the class must feel that
the teacher has erected such an ideological wall in the course of teaching
that it cannot be breached. But what if students themselves create such a
wall? To my mind, the tone, demeanour and stance of the teacher, indeed
his entire manner of teaching should be such that it enables students to
themselves break it. Teachers must create an open space not only between
themselves and the students but also amongst students so that every
viewpoint can be articulated, discussed, debated, and collectively
deliberated. An over-ideologically charged teacher may temporarily carry
some students along, may even convert a few, but would eventually fail
because of an unwillingness to create an open space for conversation. This
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textbook marks an attempt to re-create this flavour of the classroom—an
open space for conversation and argument—inside its covers.
In the last instance, though, this book is driven by one unflappable
motivation: to make available to good students the textbook they deserve.
These books must not only be accessible but also be something to which a
student can easily relate. We realize that we may not succeed in stopping
every single student from relying on kunjis but we hope that a majority of
them would not lean only on them. We are guided by the belief that the
eventual purpose of the text is to contribute in a small way to help each
student to do a bit of political theorizing on her/his own.
Political theory is increasingly becoming inter-disciplinary. It is,
therefore, our hope that this book will be read not only by students and, I
dare say, teachers of political science, but also historians, sociologists,
anthropologists, economists, even natural scientists—anyone interested in
socio-political concepts, arguments and perspectives.
This book is dedicated to all the students from whom the editors and
contributors have learnt during the course of their teaching.
Rajeev Bhargava
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PART I
What Is Political Theory and Why Do We Need It?
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CHAPTER 1
What Is Political Theory?
Rajeev Bhargava
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
What Is Theory?
The Distinctiveness of Theory
Cosmologies and Common Sense
What Is Political?
INTRODUCTION
A cursory glance at the newspaper brings us face-to-face with dozens of
political issues. The Supreme Court pronounces that there should be no
reservations in private colleges, university students demonstrate against
the government to demand the proper implementation of the Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (REGA), women’s organizations complain
bitterly about the unequal treatment of women and girls in our society,
trade- union leaders condemn police brutality against workers, animal-
right activists demand better protection for endangered species of tigers,
the prime minister apologizes to the Sikh community for moral
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indifference and neglect by the Congress Government at the time of the
1984 massacre of Sikhs, the government gives up the sale of public sector
units (PSUs), the Rajya Sabha passes a bill to grant Hindu women an equal
right in ancestral property, the chief minister of Gujarat insists that
Gujarati identity and pride is wounded by opponents of the Sardar Sarovar
project.
What in your opinion makes all these issues political? Do all these
issues have some one thing in common which defines them as political?
Consider the examples that refer to reservations, REGA, the massacre of
Sikhs, equal rights to women in ancestral property and the sale of PSUs.
All these refer to some institution of the state: the judiciary, the
government, the legislature, the office of the prime minister. They also
refer to the decisionmaking power of these institutions. Does it follow that
the term ‘political’ refers to any public agency with the power or authority
to take decisions? Notice, too, that all these decisions possess the potential
to have an impact on almost every member of the society in question. Even
when a particular decision appears to target a specific group, it relates to
and has an impact on other groups. Does the term ‘political’ then refer to
the common power to take decisions about the common life of a society?
It would be a mistake to confine this term only to this common power of
state institutions. Consider once again the example of women’s
organizations protesting against the exclusion or unequal treatment of
women. On the understanding of ‘political’ arrived thus far, this action of a
group of women is not political. Why so? Because women’s organizations
are clearly not part of the state. But, surely, on any intuitive understanding
of a political act, such a protest by a women’s group is political. If so, this
must compel us to change or broaden our understanding of the term
‘political’. This protest is political not merely because it is a collective act
by a group against some continuing social practice or an earlier decision of
the government but also because the very object of this protest, namely the
unequal treatment of women, is part of what we understand by the term
‘political’. And why is this so? Because to treat women unequally is to
exercise power over them—men make women do things which, left to
themselves, they may not do. This exercise of power is also part of what
we mean by ‘political’.
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A closer look at most of the examples points to another feature of the
political. The political is that domain or dimension of our collective life
where we fight for our interests, make claims (including moral claims) on
each other, where important and urgent issues are contested. But demands,
claims, protests and complaints cannot but generate conflict. The political,
it appears, is inherently conflictual. Finally, we might look at the political
in a still different sense. Implicit in almost every example is a vision of a
future world, one where all are equal, or where even animals are treated
with some respect, or where force is replaced by deliberation and so on.
The political, then, is also where new worlds are imagined. Clearly, the
term ‘political’ has no fixed or unique meaning. It has multiple, though
related meanings. One objective of these introductory chapters is to
enhance our understanding of the political and to draw the attention of the
reader to its multiple meanings.
Our second task is to understand what we mean by the term ‘theory’.
Though not easy, it is important that this be done so that eventually we can
put the terms ‘political’ and ‘theory’ together and have a better grasp over
what is meant by political theory. Consider once again the examples in the
first paragraph. Many of us have an opinion on most of these issues. Some
of us are interested in seeking an explanation of the actions of the police,
the Supreme Court and the government. Are there any motives behind the
actions of these agencies? Do their actions serve the interest of the entire
community or the narrow interests of a class or perhaps a tiny political
elite? For instance, some might argue that the issue of a ‘Gujarati’ identity
is used to further the interests of rich peasants. Others may claim that
identity is a non-issue, that the real motive underlying every public action
is class interest. The academically minded amongst us may claim that there
exist structural reasons underlying these actions. For example, the slow
implementation of REGA might be due to systemic institutional biases
hidden from the consciousness of power wielders.
Is doing political theory the same, then, as explaining an act, practice,
event or process? This does not appear to be so. Although explaining is
part of political theory, surely, it is not the whole of it. And this, for two
different reasons. First, because an explanatory statement does not on its
own constitute a theory. If I say that I fell down because I stumbled
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unknowingly upon a stone, I have offered an explanation of why I fell
down, but have I offered a theory of what has happened? Or, if I said that
the United States has invaded Iraq in order to have easy access to oil, I
would have offered some explanation of why the United States
government acted the way it did. But is this the same as articulating a
theory of it? No. Why so? Second, although explaining may be part of
theorizing, it is not the whole of it. There are other functions of theory. For
example, theories offer justifications of actions. Take the examples of the
first paragraph again. Some of us might silently condemn equal rights to
women in ancestral property or justify police brutality. Others may
disagree. They might denounce police action as violative of the most basic
human rights or rejoice that equality now covers an important gender issue
that had hitherto been neglected. These justificatory statements do not
constitute theory but they may be its crucial components. Moreover, in
denouncing police action, we are necessarily evaluating it negatively. All
justifications presuppose evaluation. Behind these evaluative judgments
are deeper issues. Why should women and men be treated as equals? What
is the appropriate response of the government to mass-killings? What is
the connection between ensuring employment to everyone and social
justice? What is the proper function of the police in a modern democratic
state? Workers are beaten up, apparently for disobeying the state? But why
should we obey the state at all? Why should we be law-abiding citizens?
Similarly, we might ask; why should tigers who sometimes turn man-
eaters still be protected? Such questions have to do with right and wrong,
good and bad, in short, with ethics and morality, with the normative.
Admittedly, answers to these questions may not on their own constitute
theory, but what additional features are necessary for them to be deemed
theoretical?
As theory, political theory must share features with theories of other
phenomenon. It may even have some features in common with theories of
the physical or the biological world. However, by virtue of being political
theory, it must possess characteristics that are distinctive. Some of these
distinctive features separate it from theories of nature but not from theories
pertaining to human affairs more generally. But its truly distinctive
features must flow from its focus on the political. In what follows,
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therefore, we outline the more general features of any theory and in
particular elucidate features of a theory of human condition and action. In
order to do so, we relate theory to and differentiate it from other forms of
systematic reflections such as art, literature and religious worldviews.
Finally, we ask the question what is political and outline the specific
features of political theory.
WHAT IS THEORY?
Humans as Concept-bearing Animals

Let us begin with some truisms. No one denies that we are physical
creatures, part of the physical universe and subject to the same laws as any
physical object. Nor will anyone deny that unlike purely physical objects,
but like other biological creatures, we are sentient creatures: we breathe,
we eat, we grow and have sensory experiences. However, what
distinguishes us from most, though not all, biological creatures, is that we
are concept- bearing animals. As conceptual creatures, we are born in a
world that is already arranged thoughtfully in particular ways. Consider
the following. A child is told to sit on a chair. From a purely physical point
of view, chairs are just wood, nothing else. But it would be odd to tell the
child to sit on a piece of wood. What we wish to convey to the child is that
a particular piece of wood when crafted in a particular manner serves a
particular purpose, that it is something on which we sit or with which we
can do certain things such as eating, reading, writing, talking and so on. It
is these purposes that we wish to convey to the child, purposes which
would not exist unless conceptually formulated. This is true not only of
objects—such as chairs, tables, blackboards, chalk, the classroom in the
school building— but also of human beings themselves. A student
interacts with the person standing in front of the blackboard and talks to
her not as if she is any odd person but as one who is there to perform a
certain role, that of a teacher. Once again, no teaching is possible unless all
of us already have a rough idea of the social role of students and teachers.
The same is true of bus conductors, drivers, ticket inspectors, shopkeepers,
government officials and so on. A society cannot function without these
elementary understandings and so every child is initiated into the social
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world by an informal instruction in these concepts. Unlike the purely
physical, chemical or the biological world, the human world is conceptual
through and through. Plants and most lower order animals live in this
world and sense it, but by virtue of living the world through concepts,
humans do not merely have sensory experience. Because their experience
is mediated by images, concepts and representations, we might say that
human experience is always thoughtful. Humans do not merely live but
have a thoughtful experience of living—what we might call lived
experience.
Concepts Embedded in Practices

As hinted above, most concepts that we use in everyday living are not
formally learnt in the classroom but are acquired by participating in
various practices. Since we use concepts, we may liken them to tools but
this should not lead us to think that we have mental boxes in our head from
which we pick them out as and when we need them. Much of our
conceptual understanding is available to us as a practical skill or is directly
embedded in practices. We are not even aware most of the time that we
possess this skill or understanding. This may appear implausible to you at
first. But really, the matter is quite simple. Several activities you do
routinely are not thoughtless but are mostly absent in the stream of your
consciousness. (How many times do you really interrupt the flow of your
activity and think?) You just do them without explicitly thinking about
them, just as the bus driver changes gears without first asking himself
whether or not he should. You see the object in front of you as a table or a
book and you understand that what you are doing is sitting at the table and
reading. When we see a person entering the poll booth and approaching
the ballot box, we understand that he is voting. This understanding is direct
and practical, not inferred from something that first takes place in your
consciousness. It is usually the same with people and social relationships.
We might call this an embedded understanding of things, practices, people
and relationships.
Human Expressions
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All humans have the ability not only to have thoughtful experiences but to
express these thoughts in different media. A child experiences a piece of
wood as a chair or a table but she may express this experience in a
drawing, by representing these objects on paper. An actor, a mime artist or
a dancer may use her body to say the same thing. A photographer may use
the camera for the same purpose. There are multiple ways of expressing an
experience, some word-dependent and others not. Besides, we may express
this experience in words to other people: ‘Hey! I see a table there.’ Or I
may express it to myself, privately, ‘That’s a table, isn’t it?’. So, some of
these expressions are in the outer world, in public spaces and some may
occur inside, privately as ideas in our heads. These private expressions
may be called subjective reflections, a kind of mirroring of the world in
our own heads.
Ad hoc and Systematic Reflections

All expressions, including subjective reflections, may occur randomly, on
the spur of the moment or be arranged systematically. All of us, from time-
to-time have spontaneous and random reflections. The chalk with which I
unthinkingly and effortlessly write on the blackboard keeps crumbling one
day. When that happens, I may interrupt the flow of my action, examine
the chalk and ask if I could not have a chalk of better quality. I have an
embedded understanding of what a chalk is and practical knowledge of
what is to be done with it; but confronted with a piece of chalk literally
melting in my fingers into dust, I may think to myself, just what it is made
of, whether it really is what it is meant to be. ‘Is this really a piece of
chalk?’ Such, random thoughts may occur and then disappear for no
ostensible reason, but they arise invariably when there is an unexpected
interruption of my activities, when I am faced, for example, with a
problem.
Word-dependent and Word-independent Reflections

Suppose then, that I don’t let this thought disappear: I engage with it,
indeed pursue it obsessively. Suppose that I now examine not merely the
chalk in hand but the entire box, indeed not just one but all the boxes
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bought by the department of my college, and arrive at the conclusion that
the entire lot is defective. I identify the manufacturer and begin to look at
the quality of other lots used elsewhere. Quite obviously, I have begun a
kind of sustained and systematic empirical enquiry. When I write a report
on chalk produced by the manufacturer, it becomes an expression of
systematic reflection on an issue selected for sharper focus. A report is
systematic and word-dependent. But humans have the ability to
systematically reflect and express themselves in a variety of non-linguistic
media. Systematic expressions and reflections on the world and on
ourselves are also found in music, sculpture, painting, dance, pottery,
architecture and so on. A filmmaker or a painter may reflect on the human
condition, on a social environment, on the problems of a society in
transition, on the predicaments of modernity or on the futility of war but
without deploying words to convey their meaning. Have you seen the
paintings in Ajanta caves? Or Madhubani and Worli paintings? Or a
replica of the Spanish painter Pablo Picasso’s Guernica? Many of you
may have heard Amir Khan’s rendering of Bhairavi or Kumar
Gandharva’s rendering of Bhim Palasi. These, too, are systematic
reflections. Other forms of systematic reflections use language but in
interestingly different ways.
Varieties of Word-dependent Reflections

Word or language-dependent systematic expressions or reflections can also
be accomplished in multiple modes, in interestingly different ways. The
essay is one form; a written dialogue is another, poetry is yet another.
Newspaper articles, a mixture of short description and analysis, provide
another form. A record of one’s experience in a village, the ethnography of
a good anthropologist is a systematic expression of collective lived
experiences. Folk tales, moral fables, myths and legends, epic poetry, short
stories and novels are all systematic reflections.
What has all this got to do with theory? I propose that theory, too, be
seen as a particular form of language-dependent systematic expression
different from, but related to, other forms of systematic reflections on the
world. Like other expressions, a theory articulates in a particular medium a
conceptual world lived practically by a specific set of human agents.
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Moreover, it does so in its own distinctive way. What marks a theory out
from other language-dependent systematic expressions? I propose that
there are six such features, four of which it necessarily shares with
philosophy and two that are specific to it.
THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THEORY

The first feature is an almost obsessive and self-conscious concern with
the internal structure of concepts, with how concepts relate to one another
and come in clusters, and how in turn, they mark their own boundaries. A
philosopher or a theorist—for my purpose I will often use these terms
interchangeably—focuses on the meaning of words, on the different ways
in which the words are used so that she can eventually answer questions,
such as ‘what is justice?’ What is the meaning of the phrase ‘social
revolution’ and how is it different from ‘social reform’ or ‘social
engineering?’ What is the core idea of freedom, if there is one? What are
the different interpretations of this core idea? What is the relationship
between freedom and equality? And, between freedom, equality, and
justice? What distinguishes power from influence, force, violence or
persuasion? In ordinary life we use words more or less unself-consciously
and we are not normally compelled to ask such questions. But
philosophers must raise these questions and understand them in a
particular way. When asked what ‘Time’ is, we don’t expect philosophers
to look at their watches and tell us the precise time of the day.
Philosophers are expected to convey to us what the meaning of time is and
what it is for us to live in time. Likewise, if a philosopher is asked a
question about basic needs, he is not expected to supply us with a list of
our most urgent desires but rather to make us understand how needs are
different from ordinary desires and what the distinction is between our
most inescapable and significant needs and others that at least temporarily
we may live without.
As long as our purpose is served, we don’t ordinarily care whether a
word is used literally or metaphorically, or both. Poets, novelists, essayists
use words self-consciously and with extreme care, but it is not their
business to elucidate why they have chosen to use this rather than some
other word or to make explicit connections between different concepts.
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The job of a philosopher and insofar as philosophy is part of theory, the
job of a theorist is to accomplish precisely this. A full-blooded sensitivity
to the entire web of concepts and a commitment to its articulation is the
first feature of theory.
Let me illustrate this further with an example. Suppose that someone
gives a call for freedom: ‘We should all be free’. What are people to make
of this call? For a start they must understand what it means to be free.
Once they have understood the meaning, or rather, the different meanings
of freedom, they may ask why they should be free or at least why they
should be free in this rather than in some other sense. To be free of, or
from, something is to get rid of it. What you wish to get rid of must be
something that you evaluate negatively. In the literature on freedom such
things that you wish to get rid of are usually called constraints. So, to be
free is to be free from constraints. But what is the nature of these
constraints? Surely, our ideas of freedom will depend upon our
understanding of what these constraints are. Are these constraints purely
physical? Take the paradigmatic example of freedom: a man is in chains.
Get rid of the chains and he is free. The same is true of birds in a cage. The
cage imprisons, restricting the flight of the bird, that which it is most prone
to doing and is its nature. To set the bird free is to get rid of the cage. In
the same way prisoners are set free when they are released. Have you
noticed that our notion of constraint may already have changed with this
last example? For at issue here is not merely the idea of physical but of
legal constraints. A person may have been put behind bars because he has
been caught stealing. He stole because he was physically free to steal and
yet he was imprisoned because it is illegal to do so. Appropriating a thing
that by law belongs to another is illegal and it is because of the presence of
this legal constraint that the man was put in jail. To be free then is to be
free not just from physical but from legal constraints.
Is this all there is to freedom? Notice that both physical and legal
constraints are external to the agent. Can a person be unfree not because of
the presence of physical and legal constraints—there may be none—but by
virtue of psychological barriers, obstructions that are present within his
mental make-up. So, consider a slave who is set free and who is now
pronounced as formally equal to his former master. Suppose that they both
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compete in an open exam, and while the former master always does well,
the former slave simply cannot perform. Centuries of slavery have taken
away from him the basic self-confidence required for a good performance.
He is unable to achieve his objectives not because of physical or legal
constraints but due to internal psychological ones. A conception of
freedom in purely physical or legal terms is unable to capture the
mechanism of unfreedom which is at work here. We can similarly talk
about constraints which are neither purely external nor purely internal but
a bit of both—I mean social constraints. A person is physically and legally
free to enter the higher education system. He has done well in his school
examinations, well enough to get a place in a decent college. But higher
education is costly. There are no subsidies or scholarships. The person is
confident that he would do well and he has every reason to feel so. And
yet, he cannot get higher education. He is severely handicapped by his
relative poverty which is a major socio-economic constraint on what he
wishes to do. Implicit in this is a still different conception of freedom:
freedom from not merely physical, legal and psychological but also socio-
economic constraints.
Hitherto we have focused on constraints. However, our conception of
freedom changes with our ideas about what we should do once freed from
constraints. Some argue that it is enough that we are able to fulfil whatever
we happen to currently desire. So, if I desire to smoke and no constraints
exist to prevent me from doing so, then I am free. Others argue that by a
focus on current unevaluated desires we misunderstand what is really at
issue in discussions of freedom. Such people work with a less
instrumentalist, more robust conception of reason and argue that one is
free only when there is absence of constraints and a real opportunity to do
what we evaluate to be good for us. On this view, if information that
cigarettes are gravely injurious to health is available to us but we continue
to both desire smoking and fulfil this desire, then we are not really being
free. We are not free because we succumb to a habit or addiction,
completely bypassing, ignoring or evading what our reason says is good
for us. To fall prey to one’s current unevaluated desires, in this view, is to
be in a state of unfreedom. Freedom is a condition of leading a life and of
doing things that are evaluated to be good for us, to fulfil desires that are
32
judged to be worth having in the first place. This view slowly leads to the
idea that freedom is identical with self-realization. The detailed elaboration
of different conceptions of freedom is one task of political theory. The
other one is to reason why we should choose one rather than the other
conception; why, if at all, one conception is better than others.
This brings me to the second distinctive feature of theory or philosophy,
i.e. that it is a rational enterprise, where the term rational is understood
very broadly to mean that the conclusion arrived or hinted at has some
discernable structure of reasons behind it. To say this is not to imply that
philosophers or theorists do not rely on instincts, emotions, or flashes of
insight. Nor does it mean that a philosophical or theoretical enquiry must
possess a definite argumentative structure of the kind made familiar by
logicians, although some philosophies and theories may have some such
pattern. However, it does mean that philosophers and theorists are not
satisfied with bland assertions, the flat announcement of a claim or the
presentation of a readymade proposal. When they make an assertion or
proposal, they must state why they do so. In other words, they must give a
reason. Indeed, they cannot be satisfied with providing one reason and
stopping the process of questioning at this point. There can be a reason for
a reason already supplied and a reason for the reason for the initial reason.
In other words, whether stated explicitly or not there is a chain of reasons
that is discernable in a theoretical or philosophical work. Does this mean
that we can reach the final reason, a reason beyond which there is no
reason—the foundation of all reasons? Some philosophers appear to be
obsessed with this idea of ultimate cause or justification of an event or act.
But I doubt if we humans can ever get to the bottom of all things.
Take the example of scientific theories. Suppose that it is claimed that
water is a compound. This must be backed by some evidence
demonstrating that it is composed of two elements: hydrogen and oxygen,
and that this composition is not a mere mixture of features of both but
rather a new substance with features of its own. Furthermore, this evidence
must itself be supported by more general claims about the mechanism by
which such a process takes place. Similarly, suppose that it is proposed
that all children must be provided elementary education, and suppose in
answer to the question ‘Why?’ it is asserted that education is a
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fundamental right, then it must also be argued that at least in modern times
there is a connection between education, employment, and a life of dignity
and, further, that a dignified life is a crucial component of human well-
being and so on. This rational structure of theories, their internal
requirement that they persistently ask for reasons makes them, albeit with
some qualifications, subversive—with the potential to transform societies.
The rational component of theory also illuminates another of its
important features, namely, its aspiration to truth and objectivity. This
claim must be made very cautiously but clearly. The truths that theories,
particularly social and political theories, aspire to are not valid for all times
and all places. The truth of most theories is context-dependent and
therefore limited to specific times and places. Only the very exceptional
theories have a reach that cuts across time and space. Nor is this very
achievable but limited truth in any way final. We must rid ourselves of the
illusion that like God, we humans can stand outside all perspectives and
attain God-like objectivity or an eternal truth of the matter. The truth that
we achieve is dependent on the collective reasoning of human beings and
even if all rational persons can agree at any given point of time that they
have arrived at the truth of a certain matter, new information or a flaw in
an argument detected much later by other reasonable beings can force us to
revise our earlier truth-claims. Human knowledge can neither altogether
escape subjective viewpoints nor be imprisoned within the subjective
biases of wealthy classes, powerful political blocs or even intellectuals.
Such views may pass off as knowledge for sometime but sooner or later
their limitations are bound to come to light. We might, then, arrive at some
acceptable version that can be rightfully claimed as the truth of the matter,
an achievement not possible without the use of reason, although reason
alone cannot help us attain it.
A fourth feature of philosophy/theory is that it is committed to
unearthing the background assumptions and presuppositions of our
statements, beliefs, actions and practices. For example, the force of gravity
is presupposed by all our situated action. We don’t always articulate this
nor are many of us aware that this is so. Yet, without the force of gravity,
embodied persons cannot exist on this earth. Similarly, when we set out to
attend a class we make many assumptions which remain in the
34
(A utopia is an imagined community or society that possesses highly desirable or nearly perfect
qualities for its citizens. Dystopia is opposite of utopia.)
(Eg. of abstraction:
digital india, utopia,
equal rights)
background, as part of our pre-reflective understanding. For example, the

classroom is exactly where we left it on the previous day, that the teacher
would arrive to take the class, that at least some other students would be
present, that the teacher will give the lecture in a language that we speak or
understand and so on. All of us exist, think and act with these assumptions
and presuppositions but do not always articulate them. To take another
example, in 17th century England, politicians had begun to think and
speak of politics without appeal to religious principles. But frequently,
they did not acknowledge this. It was left to Hobbes to articulate these new
background assumptions and to show that it was possible to conduct
politics in a purely secular manner. Thus, within reasonable limits,
philosophers and theorists are committed to articulating these background
assumptions and presuppositions. (Generality is something common for all i.e. a theory must
have something that all can relate to)
The fifth feature of theory—and here philosophy and theory may begin
(Abstractio
n is
to diverge—is this. A theory aspires to some degree of generality and
different abstraction. It does so because it aims to cover a wide variety of related but
from disparate phenomena. This does not mean that all theories must be (Theories can
imagination be general)
, avengers universal in scope. But it does mean that a theory cannot deal only with a
is concrete particular, something in the singular. Thus, we have a theory of
imaginary
and women motion that applies equally to planets as it does to rolling stones. Such a
getting theory has a very high degree of generality appropriate to the object of its
equal rights study. There cannot be a theory exclusively for rolling stones. Likewise,
is abstract)
we could have a descriptive study of Indian nationalism or an empirical
study of the causes of Indian nationalism. But, it is unlikely that we will
have a theory of nationalism that applies to India and to India alone.
Finally, a sixth feature of theories, one that is a product of modern (Modern sciences:-
Observation,
conditions and has emerged more particularly with the birth of modern verification therefore
and
science, has to be mentioned. Modern theories cannot be purely generalisable)
speculative and must pass through and then transcend the empirical world.
They cannot bypass the empirical world altogether. This feature is related
to the point mentioned above. The data collected by the sciences, the
collective lived experiences of a people captured in the work of insightful
observers, socially engaged thinkers or consummate social scientists
cannot be ignored by theorists. These general and interconnected
reflections must take into account all of these. For this very reason a theory
35
must be simultaneously rooted in and transcend the lived experience of a
people, the collective practices of a society, and the embedded
understandings and common sense of a community. There is no theory if
there is mere description of lived experience and common sense, but we
have theory only in name if theoretical propositions are altogether
disconnected from experience, practices and the data collected by sound
empirical enquiries.
Let me sum up. A theory is a form of systematic reflection with six
features. (a) Conceptual sensitivity, (b) rational structure, (c) aspiration for
a humanly achievable truth and objectivity, (d ) generality, (e) an explicit
mandate to unearth assumptions and presuppositions, and (f) strong non-
speculative intent—the need not to bypass results of microenquiries into
the particular. It is not identical to any one feature but must possess all six.
Thus, a theory must be distinct from ad hoc reflections, speculation,
empirical enquiry into the particular, rich insights, imaginative but fictive
prose and other related narratives. It must also be distinguished from
ideology, worldview and cosmology—a point that will emerge more
clearly below. A rare specimen of theory may be universalist or reach the
foundation, but on the whole, the constitutive features of a theory do not
include a commitment to foundationalism or universalism.
COSMOLOGIES AND COMMON SENSE

I have used the terms ‘embedded understandings’ and ‘common sense’
above. Let me remind the reader what I mean by them. I made a distinction
between conceptually organized lived experience and reflection on that
experience. This distinction presupposes that though conceptual, lived
experience may not be present in our consciousness. We may use our
concepts in practice but be unable to speak about them, quite like a skilful
cook who can make delectable dishes without quite being able to tell us
how. (Conversely, the possession of a good recipe book is not sufficient to
make a good cook.) By embedded understanding, I mean, this practical
knowledge that remains pre-reflective and inarticulate. It is an
understanding we acquire by being initiated into the practices of a society.
The term ‘commonsense’ is broader and covers embedded understanding
but also, at the very least, our spontaneous and ad hoc reflections,
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including reflections that are closely aligned to our practices, which might
be called practical reflections. It usually also includes stories, epics, folk
tales, legends, myths that have been passed on from one generation to
another and with the help of which we make sense of and evaluate the
entire universe. Such nearly systematic but non-theoretical reflections
which knit together in a seamless web the physical, biological, social,
mental and spiritual worlds may be called cosmologies. Cosmologies
frequently inform and become part of a society’s common sense.
If this is true of the relationship between cosmologies and common
sense, can it also be true of the relationship between theories and
commonsense? Can theories shape and inform our common sense?
Though they can do so (indeed, good theories must aspire to do so), the
two remain and perhaps must remain distinct entities. The common sense
of a society is the collective possession of an entire people. A theory is a
specialized activity or product dependent on and generated by specific
skills. Does this mean that theorizing is an elite activity from which the
common man will remain forever estranged? I don’t think so. First,
distance does not mean estrangement. Many cricket lovers in India have
never played cricket. Some do play it but quite badly. Still others play well
but are not exceptional.But all of them can love or admire the skills of a
Sachin Tendulkar or Azharuddin. In some ways they are distant from them
but surely no one can claim that distance here necessarily means
estrangement. Second, and more importantly, though the practice of theory
involves skills, these can be acquired, in principle, by anyone who has
some talent and a lot of opportunity and commitment. Just as cricket is not
the preserve of a special class or caste of people, so also theory is not the
monopoly of a particular kind of people.To think so is to be committed to
a deplorable and outdated form of casteist Brahminism.We must avoid
both the view that theory is the monopoly of the special, naturally talented
or genetically endowed group and the claim that it is available effortlessly
to the masses.To the objection that there is a sense in which everyone is a
philosopher or a theorist, an appropriate response is to draw the distinction
between having a philosophy/theory and doing it. Though all of us have a
philosophy, we do not all do philosophy. Everyone may have a systematic
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worldview, a theory of the world, a philosophy, but it does not follow that
all these are the result of his or her own theorizing philosophizing.
The emphasis on the distance between theory/philosophy and common
sense as also between theory and practice should not be misunderstood or
exaggerated. As I pointed out earlier, there is also a close relationship
between theory and common sense and between theory and practice. As
we will see in Chapter 2, the most fundamental questions asked by
philosophers are the same to which answers are implicit in our practice and
in common sense. A philosophy of the human world articulates what is
already implicit in human practice. In this sense and unlike what many
believe, philosophy is down-to-earth. Yet, it is also up there. It takes flight
and is up there because like other systematic reflections— and this close
relationship between theory and the arts is equally worth emphasizing—it
frequently tries to do more than merely describe human practice. It also
attempts to explain and justify it in general terms and less directly to
endorse, modify or change it.
WHAT IS POLITICAL?
The term ‘political’ has multiple meanings. The first goes back to classical
Greece and is derived from the word ‘polis’ which literally means the city,
but is better, more properly understood as a place with a common world or
even more simply, a community. ‘Political’, then, pertains to whatever is
done within or by the community. More specifically, it refers to decision
making within and about the community. Decision making itself has a
specific connotation. To be political, to live in the polis, as Hannah Arendt
tells us, means that everything is to be decided through words and
persuasion and not through force and violence. The term ‘political’ then
points to a specific mode of decision making—by words, not force.
However, the term ‘political’ also refers simultaneously to what decisions
are about. When we use the term ‘political’ in this first sense, we speak not
merely about life but necessarily about the good life of a community.
Thus, we may ask, given that we live by a certain conception of the good
life, who is to be a member of the community and why, who is to rule, i.e.
take fundamental decisions about the community and for what reasons,
how resources are to be distributed, to whom and why. In this conception,
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as we can see, the empirical and the normative are completely
intermeshed. Nor has the distinction emerged in this context between
political and social spheres. Nothing that we now consider to be merely
social, i.e. falling between the public-political and the private-household is
outside the political. On this classical view then, there is no distinction
between social and political theory. Political theory is about how and with
what justification decisions are made concerning the good life in a
community.
Over a period of time and particularly with the advent of modernity, the
meaning of the term ‘political’ appears to have changed. To understand
this change let us go back to what I said above. In classical Greece, the
term ‘political’ had to do with fundamental decision making about the
affairs of the community. To make decisions, however, one must first have
the power to do so. If the entire community is involved in decision
making, then decision making presupposes the collective power of the
entire community. The term ‘political’ then may also refer to this
collective power, to the use of this power to make decisions, and political
science or philosophy may be viewed as the study of this collective power.
However, as is well known, even in Greek societies, decisions were not
made by everybody. Power was not exercised by everyone. Slaves, women
and aliens were excluded from the decision-making process. One might
then say that decisions about the entire community were taken by some,
only by excluding others from the processes within which they were made.
Some people had the power to make decisions about everyone only on
condition that they also exercised power over some others. Of course, this
can be said only with hindsight. People living at that time did not see their
own condition as we now describe it.
With the advent of modernity, this meaning of the term ‘power’ became
far more explicit. Indeed, the classical meaning of power as the collective
capacity to decide about the community was almost completely obscured
and replaced by the second meaning of power as the capacity of some
people to act in a manner that thwarts the significant interest of others, that
marginalizes and excludes them, so that they are left with no ability or
capacity to take decisions about themselves or about the whole
community. Power came simply to mean power over others.
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Correspondingly, the term ‘political’ refers to this power over others.
Political science, then, came to mean an empirical enquiry into the
exercise of this power. And political theory, the most general reflection on
the processes, mechanisms, institutions, and practices by which some
people are excluded by others from significant decision making.
Yet another related meaning emerged under conditions of modernity
when major sites of decision making were relatively separated from the
rest of society and were concentrated in a specific set of institutions
designated by the term ‘state’ (this is related to the point that a new
concept of the social emerged which was distinguished from the political).
If politics, considered as a comprehensive enquiry, is the study of
decision-making power, then the birth of the modern state naturally
implied that the major object of study of political science and political
theory is the state. Indeed, the term political was itself identified with
anything pertaining to the state rather than to the entire society. Political
science and political theory studied the institutions of the state—the
government, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the military, the police and so
on. Sociology and social theory, on the other hand, studied all those
structures, processes and institutions that fell outside the state. Some
people continued to believe that a study of the state was the study of how
power was exercised on behalf of and in the interest of all the individuals
who make up a particular society. Others, cynical of this view, saw
political science and political theory as the study of how these institutions
take major decisions on behalf of a small elite or the dominant class to the
exclusion of the interests of the subordinate classes or subaltern people.
To summarize, the term ‘political’ has multiple meanings: (a) The
collective power to take decisions about every aspect of the good life in
the community. Notice that ‘political’ here refers both to power and to
ethical values. (b) The power of some groups to control or subordinate
others in order to realize not the good of the entire community but their
own narrow interests. In short, to get others to do things that might go
against their own interest. Here, the term ‘political’ is used to relate power
and self-interest. It also refers to power embodied in a separate
institutional apparatus, i.e. the state and, therefore, (c) to state power used
40
to realize the common good/values, or (d) state power used to exercise
domination by one group over others.
But how can (a) or (c) coexist with (b) or (d)? How can the entire
community take decisions when a group excludes others from collective
decision making? Well, in this case we might say that a split has occurred
between the empirical and the normative. The subordinate group may be
excluded from decision making but may have the desire to forge a new
world where everybody is involved in taking decisions about shared
interests and values. Then (a) and (c) become normative/ethical notions
capturing something which is hitherto unrealized or realized very
marginally while (b) and (d) capture what really exists on the ground. A
final meaning is related to but still different from how we have hitherto
conceived (a). The reader may have noticed that so far (a) refers to the
good life of the community, to values of specific communities. But what if
we begin to use the term ‘political’ for values common to the entire
humanity in abstraction from both power and specific communities? What
if it refers to values common to all living species? Here, polis coincides
with cosmopolis. So (a) splits into two and gives us a fifth meaning of the
political. This meaning, (e), refers to values common to the entire
humanity, even all living species. Recall that the political sphere may also
include the art of imagining new values and devising new worlds.
Therefore, (e) is maximally abstracted from really existing lives. Thus,
today, we use the term ‘political’ in each of the five senses and as both an
empirical and a normative concept.
Political theory then is a particular form of word-dependent systematic
reflection on any or all of the following: (a) the collective power to take
decisions about the good life of a community, (b) the mechanisms by
which power is exercised by one group over another, (c) the use of state
power to achieve the good of the community, (d) the use of the state by
one group to exercise power over another, and (e) on the values by which a
particular community governs its life. Finally, (f) there can be a grand
political theory that reflects on the general condition of the entire human
kind or the values by which the entire humanity may govern its life.
POINTS FOR DISCUSSION
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1. A child complains to his father that he has got fewer chocolates than his
brother. Women’s organizations complain to the state that women are often
given unequal pay for the same job. Are both these acts political?
2. Can you think of things in the world which are not ‘concept-bearing’? Is
concept-bearing a unique feature of human beings? Can you think of
worldviews which reject this idea?
3. Do you think that even in our ordinary life we are frequently engaged in
explaining or justifying our acts? Can you think of examples?
4. The term ‘political’ refers both to power and to values, sometimes together and
at other times separately. Do you find this puzzling? Can you explain why?
READING LIST
Ball, Terence, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (eds), Political Innovation and
Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Barry, Brian, Political Argument (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990).
Dryzek, John, B. Honnig and Anne Philips (eds), A Handbook of Political Theory
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
Goodin, Robert E. and Philip Pettit, A Companion to Contemporary Political
Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
Kleinberg, Stanley S., Politics and Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
Lukes, Steven, ‘Power and Authority’, in Tom Bottomore and Robert Nisbet (eds), A
History of Sociological Analysis (London: Heinemann, 1979).
Nagel, Thomas, What Does it All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Wolff, Jonathan, An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
42
CHAPTER 2
Why Do We Need Political Theory?
Rajeev Bhargava
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
The Big Questions of Human Life
The Emergence of Western Modernity
Explaining Human and Non-human Nature
Understanding Humans
The Difference Between the Human and Non-human Worlds
Decline of Political Theory?
Types of Political Theories
Little Theories, Grand Theories
Cosmologies and Political Theory
History of Political Thought and Political Theory
INTRODUCTION
43
What in general are theories meant to do? What are the functions of
theory? In the first chapter, some of these functions have already been
listed. However, here we ask a different, deeper question. Do we really
need political theory? One may ask how this question is different from the
one mentioned in the previous line? Consider then the following: doctors
of modern, Western, allopathic medicine undeniably perform a function in
our society. However, we might ask, in the critical spirit of Gandhi’s Hind
Swaraj, if we really need doctors who practise modern Western medicine?
Can the function of healing and restoration of health not be performed by
other practices and their practitioners? Analogously, we might ask: can the
function of political theory be better performed by something else, say
ideologies or cosmologies? Why do we need political theory?
I propose that this question cannot be answered unless we ask the big
questions of human existence and collective life. I suggest that many of
these answers are now provided, though not exhaustively, by natural-
scientific theories and the social sciences. However, this was not always
the case. Most of these answers were once provided only by religions,
cosmologies and philosophy Moreover, political philosophy
simultaneously performed both explanatory and normative functions. In
what follows, I suggest that political theory now performs three key
separate functions. It explains at the most general level possible, it
evaluates and tells us what we should do and it speculates about our
current and future condition. It also tells us who we are. In some sense,
these functions are no different from the tasks performed by cosmologies
and ideologies. Yet, I argue that political theory is distinct from both. I
also try to claim that political theory has a special function under modern
conditions. Far from being dead, it not only lives but needs to flourish.
THE BIG QUESTIONS OF HUMAN LIFE

Consider the following abstract but significant questions:
What is there/going on in the world? (Understanding)
Why are things there/going on in the world? (Explanation)
Will something that is currently going on continue to go on in the future?
(Prediction)
Is that which is there/going on good or bad, right or wrong? (Ethics)
44
What am I to do? What is to be done? (Normative)
Who am I? Who are we? (Metaphysical self-knowledge)
Human life is virtually impossible without the availability of answers to

each of these questions. One might say that one becomes a human being,
or at least a certain kind of human being, as answers to these questions are
learnt. Humans can live in a society only if they have some understanding
of what the nature of the society is. For example, it is crucial that in a
hierarchical society a person has an understanding of his own rank as well
as the social standing of others. A person who is part of the ‘lower’ order
has a practical understanding of this status and knows that he must be
deferential to someone superior to him. A member of this society
understands what is going on when a person stands bowing his head and
lowering his eyes before another man. He also understands why this is
going on; he knows that a person must bow before another person because
he is inferior. Such understandings and explanations are part of common
sense and crucial to the functioning of the society. Similarly, members of
such a society have some idea of what is in store for them in the future,
indeed what they can hope for. For the lower castes, practically nothing.
For the upper castes, the permanence of privilege. And all this is linked
further to a fairly common understanding of what is right and wrong, good
and bad in that society and to a certain self-understanding. Given that I am
a member of the lowest caste and therefore inferior, I must perform this
action. In a properly functioning hierarchical society, the person deemed
inferior believes that bowing before his superiors is the right thing to do,
that it would be wrong to violate this norm. Thus, the possession of
answers to all these questions is vital to the working of a hierarchical
society. The availability of different answers to roughly the same questions
makes possible a functioning egalitarian society.
Of course, to possess a fairly comprehensive understanding of one’s
society does not mean that this knowledge is available as answers to
questions. As a matter of fact, we do not first have questions for which we
seek answers. We begin to have an understanding of our world that is
reformulated as answers to these big questions when, as reflective
creatures, we learn to raise these questions. But what are the circumstances
in which we learn to raise these questions? There are many reasons why
45
this might happen. I mention three. It might happen first if, for whatever
reason, an individual or a group is alienated from the rest of the
community. It might then be asked by alienated persons: do I really belong
here? Who really am I? This estrangement leads to a crisis of mutual
understanding. Second, this could occur with the entry of the stranger
whose opaque actions provoke curiosity and internal dissonance. Why is
that man doing whatever it is that he is doing? How should we relate to
him and others like him? Third, it may be caused by unpredictable changes
in the natural world: disease, flood, earthquake, any natural disaster. Why
do such dramatic changes occur in nature? Why do they cause suffering in
this world? Why is there suffering in the world? Why are we born at all if
we must suffer?
Now, I want to suggest that small communities develop their own local
cosmologies in the face of any of the three changes mentioned above.
Unpredictable changes in nature, the coming of the stranger, the possibility
of the break-up of the community—all of these lead human beings to seek
re-familiarization with what has become unfamiliar. In order to make a
fresh sense of the world and their own place within it or to lend larger,
deeper significance to our somewhat shaken existence, revisions in
common sense become necessary. Cosmologies perform this function and
help us tell a story about ourselves and our relations to others and to nature
and make sense of the existing chaos. By making sense of something that
is going out of control, becoming meaningless or discordant, they help in
endowing it with meaning, make it harmonious with other things and bring
it under some semblance of control. Cosmologies inform and re-fashion
common sense. They frequently extend and even challenge the common
sense of the day by raising some of these questions afresh. Is the world
that is apprehended by our senses real? (A question remarkably similar in
form to: is the chalk that is crumbling and falling through my fingers really
a piece of chalk?) Does life end with the physical destruction of the body?
Am I to be identified exclusively with the physical body? Several
cosmologies provide negative answers to these questions and thereby
oppose our common sense. The world of senses is illusory or there is a life
of the soul after death, they say. Whatever the case, cosmologies are never
identical with common sense.
46
THE EMERGENCE OF WESTERN MODERNITY
Several ancient cosmologies tied to relatively small communities tended to
see these questions as pertaining to one unified universe. A distinction
between the human and the natural world was neither drawn sharply nor
seemed significant. Metaphysical self-knowledge was believed to be
related to an understanding of the whole universe including nature. As
Charles Taylor points out, identities in these worlds were not self-defining
but defined in relation to the rest of the universe. Moreover, ethics
frequently pertained not merely to human action but also to natural events.
There was no distinction between science and philosophy and certainly no
clear lines were drawn between a philosophy of the natural and the human
world.
This judgement might seem over-simplistic about all cosmologies. But it
is certainly true of several European cosmologies and Aristotelian sciences
and it is not too off-the-mark to claim that elements of such cosmologies
are present in virtually every ‘pre-modern’ cosmology, including in several
world religions. Let me stick, however, to ‘pre-modern’ European
cosmologies. For example, before the rise of modern science, much of
what we call the Western world believed that the universe is a meaningful
whole signifying something higher than humans or embodying some
important purpose, goal or final cause and that everything which exists
was moving towards the fulfilment of that cause. This was the great design
or pattern in the world. Moreover, some cosmologies believed that this
design was part of the intention of a transcendent God. To find fulfilment,
human beings simply had to relate to this pattern, one that existed in
society, nature and the whole of the universe. This pattern could be known
either by revelation, by the grace of God, or by pure reason.
EXPLAINING HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN NATURE
Around the 15th century, a change began to occur in the intellectual

climate of several Western societies. For many of its members, nature no
longer appeared to be meaningful. It expressed neither an idea nor perhaps
the intention of some transhuman subject. Aristotelian physics was
challenged by a new perspective. The elements of nature were no longer
believed to be purposeful. Fire does not move upwards because this is its
47
purpose; likewise water does not flow downwards to serve this purpose. It
is mistaken to understand nature in terms of final causes, as if its design
was pre-ordained. Rather, for the moderns, nature was composed of
discrete things, in themselves meaningless and independent of one another.
They were not related to one another by virtue of some overall design. If
related, this relation was more accidental. A ball moves because one hits it
with one’s foot, not because it is destined to fit into some larger cosmic
pattern. Its movement in a particular direction is not pre-ordained. It is due
to a variety of contingent reasons, i.e. that a person happened to hit it with
his foot and the ball remains hit, keeps moving till some other force stops
it. How does one find this out? Not, by relying on cosmologies that talk of
deeper significance. This interpretative move, the ‘moderns’ felt, must first
be jettisoned. Instead, one discovers this by ‘seeing’ the world unmediated
by these meanings. One observes what an entity is like, how it happens to
relate to other entities. If they happen to relate regularly, then this
observed, de-facto regularity is what constitutes causation. There are no
final causes at work here. Explanation is nothing but recording this pattern
of regularity. By recording regularities one can explain not only why
something occurred in the past but also why it is likely to occur in the
future. If you go near the fire and feel warm and this happens each time
you have been there, then this is also likely to happen at a future time. This
fact can be predicted. Thus, these new sciences are not just telling stories
about nature but, so it appeared to modern thinkers, also explaining and
predicting it.
Before the birth of modern empirical sciences, the only form of rational
enquiry abroad was philosophy, which used the a priori method of
reasoning to arrive at answers to each of the six important questions
concerning both the worlds taken together. In other words, a speculative,
largely non-empirical mode of enquiry was expected to answer all the
questions. With the birth of modern natural science, the traditional role of
philosophy was transformed. For it now transpired that reason by itself can
not arrive at knowledge of the natural world. It could not by itself answer
questions concerning the nature and activity of the physical world, nor to
explain or predict what goes on within it. This could be done only with
some partnership with the human senses. Some considered this a
48
partnership between unequals, with reason playing a subsidiary role.
Others thought that reason and the senses were joint authors of our
cognitive world. What the precise nature of this partnership is remained
contested but the sole authority of reason had been permanently debunked.
This meant that philosophy became, in the now famous words of John
Locke, ‘a hand maiden of science’.
Several thinkers—Hobbes, for example—tried to apply to human
behaviour what was earlier applied to natural phenomena. Hobbes tried to
replicate the idea of a unified universe, by talking of an all-embracing
materialism. To him, it appeared that what held true for the physical world
was also true of the socio-historical world. Later, some philosophers drew
the conclusion from this Hobbesian standpoint that a rational enquiry of
the moral world or the self was impossible. As in the natural world, the
task of the rational enquirer was to seek the guidance of the senses, to
gather data about the social world and to try and understand its structure,
and to explain and predict all the manifold events that take place within it.
Theory was a more generalized form of explanation, rooted in and
dependent upon data-based enquiry into the particular. Direct observation
yielded a knowledge of particular things. Reason saw connections between
all these different things and offered generalized explanations and
predictions. These generalized explanations were theories of both the
natural and the social world.
UNDERSTANDING HUMANS
However, soon a second perspective emerged in which the universe began
to be segmented into at least two worlds. Though some questions were
relevant to each, their form became different. Other questions could be
raised only in relation to one of these worlds and not to the other. Modern
understanding allows for a much sharper distinction between at least two
worlds: the non-human natural world—the world of physical and chemical
objects, and the world of plants and animals—and the world of humans
that is already constituted by pre-reflective and reflective understanding.
To admit the existence of two worlds does not imply that they are
completely disconnected from one another. But no matter how deep the
49
relationship between the two, there also exist some fundamental
differences.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN WORLDS

One such difference is this; while the natural world in principle exists
independently of human beings, the human world is largely constituted by
and is therefore dependent on human action. The force of gravity is not
contingent on whether or not we exist. Neither is the movement of planets.
Even if the entire human species were to perish tomorrow, rainfall,
thunder, a flash of lightening will still occur. Not only are these
independent of our actions, they are also independent of our thoughts.
There is rainfall whether or not it is apprehended by us, whether or not we
have a concept of it. This is not the case with the human world, which is
both action-dependent and concept-dependent. Let me explain.
Consider the act of raising one’s arm. This is already different from the
expression, ‘the upward movement of the limb’. The latter is a purely
physical description, while the former is an intentional act, a movement
guided by or possessing an intention. To raise my arm, I must already be in
possession of the concept of an arm and I must know what it means to
raises something. The concept of raising something is constitutive of the
physical movement of the hand going upwards. Now focus on the phrase
‘raising my arm’. This, in turn, may mean different things in different
settings, i.e. in different conceptual worlds. In the classroom it means that
the student wishes to raise a question or offer a comment on what she has
heard. In the board meeting it may signal the act of voting on an issue. On
the cricket field it signals a bye and so on. Outside these settings it is
simply the raising of the arm. In other settings, it signifies questioning,
voting or signalling a bye. In each of these settings, therefore, the relevant
concept of questioning or voting or signalling a bye is constitutive of the
purely physical upward movement of the arm and involves an enrichment
of the simple idea of raising one’s arm.
All human actions, practices and situations are constituted by concepts.
To understand them is to understand these concepts. This is why an
interpretative component is crucial to what we mean by the empirical in
the human sciences. Understanding the human world is to grasp the
50
complicated structure of concepts that partly constitute it. This is not true
of the understanding of the natural world. So, this is the first qualitative
difference between empirical social sciences and natural sciences; indeed,
the word ‘empirical’ itself has an entirely different connotation in the
human sciences. The term ‘empirical’ is related to experience but the
nature of our experience of the natural world is different from experience
in the human world. The natural world cannot be apprehended without
concepts but it is not constituted by them. In this sense, the natural world
exists independently of the concepts we have of them. As I said, it existed
even before we had any concepts of them, before we even existed on this
earth. This is not true of human or social phenomena.
What is true of human sciences in general is also true of social and
political studies. The state is not just an ensemble of material things and
movements. To describe it materially is absurd. Besides, such a purely
physical understanding fails to distinguish the state from other social and
political institutions. The modern state is a form of public power, relatively
independent of the ruler and the ruled, embodied in an apparatus that has
virtual monopoly of violence in a particular community or territory and
that functions to reproduce the conditions of existence and perpetuation of
that community. This is just one way of understanding of the state but
notice how many different types of concepts we must have already learnt
in order to grasp the concept of the state: power, ruling, the distinction
between ruler and ruled, monopoly, violence, community, conditions of
existence and so on. Take a relatively simple example: A man called John
F. Kennedy has just died. Physically speaking, a living body has turned
into non-living matter. But we humans describe this event as death. The
person in question was no ordinary man, however. He was the President of
the United States. To understand this fact about Kennedy is to already
grasp a complex institutional setting. Moreover, we must ask: is it true that
President John F. Kennedy simply died? Yes, and No. To say that he has
died does not convey that he has been killed. Indeed, to say that he was
killed still does not capture what has happened. For one can be killed in an
accident. Would it then be right to say that he was murdered? This, too, is
true but only up to a point. For Kennedy was a President of the United
States of America and his murder had a political motive. He was murdered
51
probably by a network of rival political groups, state agencies and the
mafia. His was a political assassination. When a person says that Kennedy
was assassinated, we assume that he understands the distinction between
dying, being killed, murdered or assassinated. Each of these concepts and
the distinctions among them are part of, and implicit in the event of
Kennedy losing his life.
Thus, we arrive at the following conclusions:
The question of understanding, explanation and prediction about the non-
human natural world is answered by the natural sciences.
Given the difference between human and non-human nature, the question
pertaining to the understanding, explanation and prediction about the human
world is answered by the human sciences (by political science, sociology,
anthropology, economics, etc.), though always aided by humanities and the arts.
What then is the proper role of social and political theory? Why we do
need it? Let me straightaway elucidate two functions of political theory
which it shares with social theory. Indeed, the first is not a separate
function but an integral feature of all social sciences, including political
science. If all human phenomena are constituted by pre-reflective or
conceptual understanding and if philosophy/theory helps us understand
this and make it explicit, then given the first feature mentioned above of
political philosophy or political theory, the latter is an integral part of
empirical social science. You can neither identify what you wish to explain
nor what you are to explain it by unless you have a conceptual grasp of
what these are. Philosophy is not merely a handmaiden of the human
sciences but its integral feature. This is the interpretative and explanatory
role of political theory.
The second function of political theory is this. Some social and political
phenomenon have such a large scale that no specific empirical enquiry can
do justice to it. Nor can it result from a collection of all the empirical
detail. Data gathering and controlled enquiry can never suffice for the
understanding of large social formations and for the explanation of
changes within them or changes from one type to another. So the
explanation of the rise of capitalism or the transition from feudalism to
capitalism can never be understood or explained without some degree of
speculation which is independent of empirical enquiry. Nor can we fully
52
understand the nature of modernity or the variety of human predicaments
in the modern world or the general attributes of subordination in a society
that is colonized by another society merely by controlled empirical
enquiry. This job is best done by social and political theory. The object of
this enquiry itself is identified at a very general level and its fuller
understanding or explanation cannot be properly controlled by empirical
data but requires a speculative jump. Political theories must perform this
second function of providing insight and understanding into the most
general pattern of human practices and social change. Bhikhu Parekh calls
this the contemplative role of political theory.
To grasp the third function of political theory, it is important to register
the second qualitative difference between the natural and the social world
and therefore between the natural and the human sciences. It makes no
sense to ask moral and self-related questions about the physical world. It is
no longer sensible to ask: how do we morally evaluate the force of
gravity? Is there anything good or right about the laws of motion? Do
chemical compounds have self-knowledge? However, such ethical and
normative questions are at the heart of the human world.
Why is this so? Consider once again our claim concerning the action-
dependence of the human world. Also, consider any human action. It is
true that human action can be explained and to explain it is to provide the
reason for why it was done. In this respect, explaining an action is no
different than explaining any natural event. But in the case of human
action we could ask another question. Is the reason for action a good one?
Now, to say that it is a good reason is to endorse the action, to justify it.
An action is not merely explained, it is also justified and as I said this
justification is always accomplished in the light of some idea of good and
bad, right and wrong.
This idea of justification can be explained in another way. Take the
example from cricket again. When a batsman faces a ball bowled outside
his off stump, he also faces a number of distinct possibilities. He can leave
the ball alone or flash at it. If he decides to hit the ball, he must make a
quick decision whether to drive, slice or cut it, to hit the ball towards long
off, to cover drive or square cut. If he is audacious, he can even pull it
towards midwicket. This judgement must be made on the spot, within a
53
split second. Now suppose, the ball is a perfect out swinger, the batsman
flashes at it, gets an edge and is caught behind. He must ask himself if he
had good reason to go after the ball, whether or not he made a correct
judgement. Could he justify what he did to himself, to his captain, his
team, the team’s coach? Indeed, he is answerable to a much wider public.
He is answerable because he could have acted otherwise. There is a reason
why he got out. But it is not a good reason. His rash act can be explained
but it cannot be justified.
Now, I want to draw a general conclusion from this example. To say
that the human world is action-dependent is to say that it is grounded in
one set of reasons from among several available and that the choice to act
on one rather than another is made in the light of the person’s own
understanding and judgement of what is good or right for the agent in the
context. This understanding can be evaluated by others. We can ask if the
person’s judgement of what is good is really so. Moreover, what is true of
human action is also true of the state of affairs it brings about. Any thing
which is a result of human action is out there from among many
possibilities and part of the reason why it is there is because the agent or
agents in question undertook it in the light of their own understanding of
what is good or right. Human action and the world it creates must be
necessarily evaluated because a normative component is an integral part of
it.
The example I took involves an evaluative but not an ethical dimension.
But cricket does possess an ethical aspect, too. Consider once again a
bowler who has been hit for three consecutive fours. This assault is not
merely on his bowling but on his own reckoning also on his sense of self-
esteem and dignity. As he goes towards his bowling mark, he is angry and
resentful. Indeed, he is so angry that he cannot contain himself. It occurs to
him that to avenge the treatment meted out to him, he should bowl a
beamer. Should he, really? He has a second to decide whether to do so or
not. Should he use unfair means to remove the batsman from the crease?
This is not all. A bookie has offered that if he is hit for four consecutive
fours, he would earn twice the match fee paid to him by the Board. Should
he succumb to this temptation? He must assess these reasons in the light of
some conception of the good life, some idea of right or wrong. A cricketer
54
has this choice. So do all other human beings in their respective contexts.
In short, a human being has some degree of ethical or moral autonomy.
Similar ethical considerations also arise in politics. Consider that the
state is withdrawing from the public sector, say public educational
institutions. The policy of reservations is predicated upon the availability
of seats or jobs in the public sector. If admission or employment
opportunities get limited in this way, the policy of reservations becomes
practically toothless. What must now be done for those who have been
historically disadvantaged? At least two options are available. One is to
pretend helplessness and to become indifferent to the plight of the
‘Scheduled Castes’. The other is to compel the private sector to have, for
example, a proportion of seats or jobs reserved for them. Whatever policy
the state adopts will be guided by some reason. The question is whether
the reason guiding the policy is a good one. And whether it is really good
or not must take into account the policy makers’ understanding of what is
good or bad, right or wrong and the assessment of this understanding by
others. It will depend upon whether these considerations are given any
weight at all, which itself is a matter of ethics. To fail to assess one’s
reason in the light of any ethics is itself unethical, if ethics has a bearing on
these issues.
DECLINE OF POLITICAL THEORY?

This view that all human actions including public policy can be evaluated
in the light of ethical considerations was not accepted by scientific-minded
early modernists and resistance to it has somehow persisted to this day. A
number of persons believe that a rational evaluation or enquiry of the
moral world is impossible. The moral and political philosophy of
yesteryears expressed merely the opinions, tastes and preferences of the
individual enquirer and did not deserve the status of knowledge. Our
experience yielded a wide variety of forms of self-understandings and
moral opinions which can not be rationally evaluated. If they come into
conflict, reason cannot arbitrate between them.
Perhaps for this reason, several philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon world
began to claim that political theory was in an irretrievable decline. If
political theory is a rational and normative enterprise, as indeed classical
55
political philosophy from Plato to Hegel had sought to be, then after the
‘new discovery’ about the impossibility of such an enterprise and the rise
of the empirical sciences, political theory was believed to have no future.
Indeed, as someone put it, it was already ‘dead’.
This view, associated with Positivism, is now widely believed to be
deeply mistaken. Everything seen, heard or touched by human beings is
already constituted by concepts and therefore everything in the human
world has to be properly understood even as it is observed. Moreover,
most of these concepts carry a normative import. The human world has to
be, to some degree and extent, good or bad and human action, right or
wrong. There is no feature of the human world entirely free from
evaluative significance.
Of course, from this we could draw two different conclusions. If values
are impervious to reason but constitute the human world, then all we can
have is subjective opinion of this world. This means the impossibility of
social sciences. This is a radical conclusion that the positivists did not
reach because they rejected the first premise, namely, that facts and values
are intertwined. Alternatively, we must abandon the assumption that
values are beyond reason, and that therefore, it is possible to have
objective knowledge of the human world. If values can be known and
rationally assessed, then their permeation in the human world is no barrier
to its understanding or rational assessment. This not only brings out the
difference between the character and method of the natural and social
sciences but also paves the way for a kind of systematic reflection that is
exclusive to the human world, namely normative, moral or ethical
theorizing.
So, in addition to two functions of political theory mentioned above, we
have a third function, one that is special because exclusive to human
phenomena: to bring out the normative import of concepts embedded in
social practices and used in social sciences and to subject them to detailed
critical reasoning. Indeed, for some people this has become the defining,
perhaps even the sole function of political theory. Much of Anglo-Saxon
political theory focuses only on the normative at a sufficient level of
generality. In contrast, political theory on the Continent refuses to separate
the normative from the explanatory/ interpretative and the contemplative.
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Continental political theory has a broader scope for another reason
which needs explication and brings into relief the fourth function of
political theory; to tell us who we are. Recall the point made earlier that in
a hierarchical society, people perform actions in accordance with their
social role, what in contemporary parlance we might call their identity. A
person stands bowed with folded hands or walks at a safe distance from
others, given that he is from a lower caste and the other has a much higher
rank in the caste hierarchy. What he does now depends on what goes on in
society and who he is. More generally, almost everywhere what one
should do and who one is are related issues. When we ask the question,
what are we to do? There is another question that we do not always ask.
The implicit form of the question is: given that this is what we are, what
are we to do? Classical political philosophers almost always asked these
questions together: given the essence or purpose of human beings, what
should they do? In contemporary theory, these questions are separated.
Thus, political philosophy remains both a practical philosophy, i. e. one
that has an action-guiding character and a systematic enquiry into the self,
a kind of metaphysical self-knowledge.
At the cost of repetition, let me once again answer the question: What is
the function of political theory? Given that empirical political science is
meant primarily to understand, describe and explain how decisions are
taken in a society and how some individuals, groups or classes are
excluded from such decision making, one task of political theory is to help
empirical political science to perform this role. However, it performs three
roles not undertaken by the social sciences. First, to offer a general
reflection on ‘the human condition’, on the predicament of modern
societies, on who we are and so on (in Chapter 1, see point [e]). Second, a
general reflection on a relatively narrow topic: the exercise of power in
societies and the mechanisms by which power, i.e. domination is exercised
by some over others. This includes the most general reflection on state
power but if power resides in the capillaries of a society, then political
theory is a reflection not only on the state but on the myriad capillaries in
society (in Chapter 1, points [b], [c] and [d]). Third, it is the study of how
this power should be wielded, by whom and why, and in the light of which
values and ideas of the good life. This is a prescriptive, normative and
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broadly ethical enterprise. (In Chapter 1, point [f] and partly [a]). These
three constitute the distinctive functions of political theory.
We can put the point differently by once again examining the six big
questions. If the first three are answered primarily by the natural and the
human sciences, the next three questions, of ethics and normativity and of
metaphysical self-knowledge are answered by normative political theory
along with philosophy, humanities and the arts.
TYPES OF POLITICAL THEORIES

Allow me to elaborate in somewhat greater detail these three different
types of political theory.
Explanatory
Suppose that we wish to understand the birth of capitalist socio-economic
formations. In the social sciences we have several different explanations.
For example, Marx offered a general theory of fundamental social change.
In one version of this theory humans have a fundamental interest in
improving their material well-being and, therefore, in raising their level of
productivity. Thus, Marx believed that this interest explains why there is a
constant improvement in the level of productive forces. However, he also
believed that a thing became a productive force only in use, and the use of
productive forces presupposes that human beings relate to each other in
particular ways. Marx called these relations social relations of production.
Marx proposed the thesis that a certain type of social relations of
production is appropriate, roughly speaking, to a particular level of
development of productive forces. For Marx, a particular type of social
relations of production facilitates the development of productive forces.
However, beyond a point these very relations begin to hinder the further
development of these forces. The level of productivity fails to rise,
productive forces get into crises and yet the human urge for better material
well-being does not cease. In short, a contradiction develops between the
ever-developing productive forces and the existing but outdated relations
of production. This contradiction, according to Marx, is resolved not by
preserving the level of the development of productive forces but rather by
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changing the social relations of production. The new set of social relations
of production comes into existence in order to facilitate the further
development of productive forces. Marx developed this general theory to
explain the rise of capitalism, which he defined largely in terms of the
relation between capital and labour mediated by a free market. Such
relations had to come into existence in order to increase human
productivity at the time of the emergence of capitalism. Other thinkers
offered different explanations. For example, Weber argued that capitalism
could not have come into existence without a change in the cultural
climate, in the attitudes of a specific set of people. This change of attitude
was a component of and was brought about by a transformation in the
dominant religion of particular societies. For Weber, the Protestant ethic
that emphasized a certain degree of this-worldly asceticism and disciplined
work was crucial both for the accumulation of capital and an efficient
labour force, both of which were crucial for the emergence of capitalism.
Normative
Suppose that in a poverty-stricken country such as India, there is a demand
that the right to work and therefore, that the right to an adequate minimum
income be entrenched not just as a desirable goal but as a legal guarantee.
Suppose also that there is a great deal of resistance to this idea. For
example, it might be argued that while social justice is important, it should
not take precedence over the decisions of elected representatives and that
therefore the government of the day, backed by the parliament may, from
time to time, decide to have welfare schemes for the poor, and no welfare
measure should be guaranteed by law. Thus, we have two broad positions
on this issue, one for the right to work and the other against it. How do we
break the deadlock? How do we advance further to resolve this dispute?
We can settle the dispute in a number of ways. One, by a simple recourse
to power. A position that is backed by greater power may override the
other, irrespective of its moral strength. A pro-poor government may enact
a law that entrenches the right to work as a judiciable right. Alternatively,
a coalition of wealthy classes may buy off the fence sitters and block the
constitutional entrenchment of this right. Both sides may arouse passion
and let the matter be decided in the heat of the moment. In all such cases, a
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decision is made in favour of one or the other position without examining
the merits of the case, without a detailed review of possible justifications
in favour of either of the two positions. Normative political theory does
not accept this way of proceeding on this issue. While it does not disregard
the importance of emotion, rhetoric, negotiation and even power, it begins
with the assumption that rational argument, in whatever form, must play a
pivotal role in decisions on such matters.
So how would a normative political theorist proceed? A brief account
may be as follows. The normative political theorist must begin with
assumptions that most people can endorse. For example, few would deny
that all citizens have a basic interest in living a minimally decent life. Nor
would anyone deny that absence of physical suffering is part of a
minimally decent existence. Thus, a modicum of material well-being is
important for everyone, regardless of caste, religion, gender, inherited
wealth and so on. We all have an equal moral right to a minimally decent
existence. Once these assumptions are accepted, we are left with the more
contentious issues. Does minimal well-being include simply the absence of
physical suffering that can be remedied by welfare schemes or does it
include the guarantee of work? Here we have to bring in two further
issues. First, whether or not the democratically elected government of the
day can be relied upon for initiating these schemes? Second, whether apart
from the avoidance of physical sufferance, dignity is also an important
component of well-being? What psychological impact does merely
receiving benefits have on the poor? Is it not important that even the poor
feel not that they are living on charity but that they have earned what they
receive? Once dignity is included in the concept of well-being, which, if
we think of humans not just as biological organisms but as persons, we
must, we are committed to the view that, at least in modern societies, work
is crucial for well-being. Therefore, a right to well-being, a right to be free
from suffering must include the right to work.
To go to the second issue now: can we rely on democratically elected
governments of the day to guarantee well-being? This is to be decided
partly by the political history of societies and our understanding of the
behaviour of people with wealth and power. My own answer is that the
government of the day cannot be relied upon for such guarantees. This
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may be true even for governments with the best of intentions. Indeed, this
assurance is even less likely in democratic societies where governments
may change every four to five years, and people have to live with a
government that might initiate policies that go against their interests.
Democratic governments cannot be trusted with the promises they keep,
no matter how sincere they are. If so, such guarantees must be made an
integral part of the constitution so that every democratically elected
government is constrained to ensure the fulfilment of the right to work. An
argument such as this neither undervalues democracy nor presents itself as
the final word on the matter. It shows that this is one way in which we
might proceed in democratic societies. In the last instance, it is meant to
take a brief glance at and to illustrate how normative political theory may
be done.
Contemplative
In her famous book, The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt begins by
drawing our attention towards how in 1957, a satellite, an earth-born, man-
made object stayed in skies, circled the earth and ‘dwelt and moved in the
proximity of the heavenly bodies as though it had been admitted
tentatively to their sublime company’. She spoke of how for many this was
the first ‘step toward escape from men’s imprisonment to the earth’. She
also spoke of other new developments: the splitting of the atom as well as
of the birth of a new language of mathematical symbols that contains
statements which cannot be translated back into speech. With these
introductory remarks, she proposed that in her new book she would offer a
‘reconsideration of the human condition from the vantage point of our
newest experiences and our most recent fears’. For Arendt, political theory
was not reducible to its explanatory or normative functions, although
clearly these functions are part of its defining features. Political theory for
her, as indeed for many others, continues to be what it was for classical
thinkers: a deeply contemplative enquiry into the general condition of
human kind either over a very long period or at a certain stage of their
changing existence.
LITTLE THEORIES, GRAND THEORIES
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I have claimed that there are three types of political theories,
explanatory/interpretative, normative and contemplative. All theories
contain each of these dimensions. However, most of them implicitly
emphasize either the explanatory (e.g., Weber’s theory on the rise of
capitalism or Marx’s historical materialism) or the normative dimension
(e.g., liberalism). These might be called little theories. On the other hand,
some explicitly possess both. Let these as well as deeply contemplative
theories be called grand theories (e.g., there are traditions of Marxism that
claim to have each of the three features). Grand theories need to be
distinguished from ideologies, worldviews and cosmologies that possess
one of the six features mentioned above, namely, generality. In addition
they may possess one or two other features, but rarely all. For example,
they may attempt conceptual clarity or possess a rational structure but
simply ignore the requirement to unearth hidden presuppositions. Besides,
unlike theory, their commitment even to these is half-hearted. They may
start off with conceptual elaboration or the construction of an argument but
stop mid-way— arbitrarily and abruptly. Almost always, they bypass
controlled enquiry into the particular and are, therefore, largely
speculative.
Theory and Ideology

The relationship of normative political theory and by implication of grand
theories to modern ideology is particularly complex. Both try to persuade
—in a crude sense, if we believe that we are roughly equal, we all try to
convert one another to our own viewpoint. But there are important
differences. While political theory tries to give the fullest possible reason
for why a certain stand-point must be adopted, or why an act must be
performed on the basis of one set of principles rather than another,
ideology lacks a commitment to spell out all reasons. Reason is short-
circuited and principles reduced to formulae. This is true of nationalism
and fascism but also of liberalism and Marxism when they function as
ideologies.
The case of liberal and Marxist ideologies shows that an ideology need
not be entirely disconnected from reason. It may have a strategic
connection. But it is in the nature of strategic connection that it is snapped
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if it no longer serves a specified end. As explained above, theory has an
intrinsic commitment to reason that an ideology does not have. When
liberalism and Marxism function as ideologies, they have merely a
strategic connection with reason. This is not so when they function as
political theories. It is possible then for Marxist or liberal political theory
to come into conflict with Marxist or liberal ideology.
If all that I have said above is true, then political philosophy is even
more different from another mode of persuasion and conversion, i.e.
propaganda. For in propaganda, conversion is sought by opaque,
manipulative methods. Advertising is a good example because here
anything goes. Not only is transparency abandoned and reason short-
circuited but everything hinges on pure rhetoric. Lies are permitted, so are
half-truths. The bad points of a product are never mentioned and the good
ones are exaggerated.
Before I end this section, one misunderstanding must be dispelled.
Grand theories do share with ideologies and cosmologies another feature;
they all perform one function—all of them attempt to formulate a common
understanding of the world as well as provide a common normative
orientation. When they do both, they provide a common selfdefinition, an
identity. In the performance of this function, grand theories, ideologies and
cosmologies may on the one hand compete with, rival, and substitute one
another and on the other hand be mutually complementary. Thus, I am not
suggesting that ideologies should be replaced by political theory. This can
never happen. Ideologies have a function in society. Nor am I saying that
we must always be rational and that there should be no place in the public
sphere for emotion, rhetoric, or even condensed statements or formulae.
But none of these should have such an overwhelming place in society that
political theory is seen or made to be entirely redundant.
COSMOLOGIES AND POLITICAL THEORY

I have proposed that there is something distinctive about political theory
and implied that something socially valuable is lost without it. In other
words, I have suggested that we all need political theory. This might seem
an odd claim. After all, many societies have lived without political
philosophy or theory. At least, political philosophy has not existed as a
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separate entity in most societies. At best, we might say with hindsight that
it lies hidden within cosmologies. My claim would be more defensible if it
was made in favour of cosmologies for it is hard to imagine any society
that is not accompanied by a cosmology.
One might then ask why cosmologies alone cannot suffice for the
functions I have claimed for social and political theory? This brings us to
the question of the difference between cosmologies and theories. And to
why in modern societies, cosmologies probably do not suffice. I have three
reasons to offer in support of theories. First, cosmologies are local and too
tightly tied to contexts. Under modern conditions, however, we live in
several contexts at once. Moreover, these contexts are not insulated from
one another. They interact, intersect, inter-communicate. In these
circumstances, anything with a purely local significance will not do. We
need inter-contextual thinking. We need something which does not merely
pretend to be general but is really so. Since theories possess this inter-
contextual generality, they are better likely to serve us in these conditions.
Furthermore, we live in times and in places where people with remarkably
different cultural backgrounds and cosmologies have been thrown
together. This has happened not merely with globalization but much earlier
with the formation of nation-states. Despite their claims of cultural
homogeneity, nation-states have had to deal with diverse local traditions
and deep cultural heterogeneity. Nation-states bring together strangers.
Recall my point that cosmologies are required to re-familiarize what was
once familiar and is currently not. Now, this condition of almost
permanent unfamiliarity with everything around us, including other human
beings with whom we interact, is pervasive in modern societies where,
frequently, the very distinction between insiders and outsiders collapses.
Second, the situation in our times is one of a near-permanent crisis of
mutual understanding and common agreement. Nation-states are built
around a rough consensus on some issues, a mixture of indifference and
forgetting on the part of its members, a fair amount of illegitimate force
and huge areas of difference and disagreement. Such large societies can
hardly be stable. But they are unlikely to survive without a good deal of
open communication among its diverse people. Conceptual clarity enables
better communication. Through argument, differences which are the norm
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in our societies can be managed if not resolved. We need to give reasons to
one another for and against why some policy is to be initiated. We need to
be more critically self-aware of why we are doing what we do. The
rational structure embedded in theories appears to offer some hope towards
a possible resolution of some of the most significant differences that
remain between us. Third, modern societies no longer have one locus of
authority. In the past, community-based cosmologies frequently gave
answers in a manner that gave the impression that they were emanating a
single authoritative source. Some theories which imitate these cosmologies
give the same impression. But the truth is that such a source does not exist
anymore. We have multiple sources of authority and to communicate
amongst them, we need a space where reasons are offered, examined,
questioned, challenged, endorsed, rebutted or mediated. A theory provides
such a space which local cosmologies may be unable to provide. Apart
from these, there is a wholly separate reason: Questions answered by
normative political theory need to be even more urgently addressed. There
are no easy answers to the questions: ‘how are we to live?’ ‘What am I?’
‘What are we to do?’ These questions have acquired urgency because old
certainties are gone, everything is up for grabs and therefore, everything
needs to be justified. Nothing today can be taken for granted. Secularism,
democracy and equality cannot simply be assumed. Their ethical
importance will always be questioned. Their value has to be justified not
only to those who oppose but also to those who defend them. Besides,
these concepts do not come in one unique form. Therefore, we have to
justify which conception of secularism or democracy or equality is worth
having in our context. Normative political theory is meant to do just that.
To sum up, both the task of general understanding and prescribing are
crucial in modern societies. A theory of both how power is really exercised
and how it should be used is crucial for two reasons. First, because
modernity disperses communities and yet connects societies in such an
intensified manner that understanding and explanations of specific groups
and societies will never yield a relevant, comprehensive understanding of
any issue. Disparate but related phenomena must be brought together
under a general rubric to give us a satisfactory knowledge of them.
Second, traditional knowledge systems and older cosmologies are unable
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to tell us what we need to do and in the light of which values. Modern
political theory appears to have the potential to do so, as long as it
performs this task with modesty and with the help of social science,
humanities and the arts.
HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT AND POLITICAL THEORY

I need to address one final issue before bringing this discussion to a close.
I have written of political theory as if its history is irrelevant. If I have
given that impression, it is because of paucity of time and space. Let me
address it very briefly. Consider a social practice. Suppose that it is being
challenged by a group but you are not among those who oppose it. You
wish to defend the practice and therefore ask the legitimate question: what
is the good embedded in the practice. In fact, you may be more neutral and
may wish to examine and evaluate the practice so that it may be critiqued
or endorsed. But before you begin to do so you must identify it. You need
to articulate both what it is and the underlying point behind it. This,
however, is not as easy as it seems. Sometimes that with which you are
excessively familiar, that which appears to you to be obviously valuable is
among the least understood. It is not properly understood because it has
receded into the background, almost merged with it. It is so much taken for
granted that one does not even notice that it exists. After all, this is
precisely what is meant by taking something for granted. This excessive
familiarity has then become an obstruction to its proper understanding and
to an understanding of its underlying values. If we are to better understand
it, a change of stance towards it becomes mandatory. To begin to notice it,
we need to make it unfamiliar, to defamiliarize it. Some strategy of radical
estrangement is required to counter an already existing familiarity. We
need to introduce a part-existential and part-reflective disquiet about the
practice. Only then will we begin to better recognize it. Among the
strategies of estrangement and refamiliarization is to place the practice
along with other similar yet related practices. Locating a practice among
others may be accomplished either by the use of one’s imagination or by
cross-cultural comparison. When this is done one gains the awareness that
it is one among several practices, one of the several ways in which the
objective or value underlying the practice is accomplished. One realizes
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that what had appeared natural, what one had taken for granted is one of
the many possible ways of doing roughly the same thing and that it is not a
natural, permanent phenomenon but a social construction carved out of
one set of choices.
Now, this defamiliarization can be accomplished not just by travelling
in space, that is, by moving from one cultural location to another existing
at the same time but also by moving back in time. In short, by asking the
question: what were the analogues of this practice in the past that achieved
if not the same, other similar values, values that belong roughly to the
same family? Or else, we can go back not to the very distant past where we
would find entirely different practices for comparison but to that moment
of transition when this very practice began to first take shape? Indeed, to
go back to its moment of origin is useful for another reason. It is useful
because when the practice was born, there may have been something
startlingly new about it. Therefore, it must have been noticed by everyone.
This is precisely the time when it was least taken for granted, when those
in favour of it were keen to offer a fully explicit defence on its behalf and
those opposed to it were equally keen to rebut it. At that period and in that
context it is likely that a very rich set of arguments surrounded the
practice, one that by now is forgotten. By going back in time, we retrieve
those arguments, that one must remember, are once again desperately
needed, now that it has become contentious. Rather than put all our labour
into a de novo articulation of the conceptual and normative structure of the
practice, understanding the history of the practice is a more economical
way of achieving the same result. We re-articulate what is currently in a
hopeless condition of inarticulacy. This remembering is also a process of
recovery of the richness of that practice. This is why a proper political
argument about rights must take us back to the writings of John Locke, a
proper understanding of nationalism must compel us to return to Herder,
and in order to properly debate about Western modernity and colonialism,
we cannot set aside Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj. For a full disclosure of all the
complex reasons for and against a practice, for the values that inspired it
and the murk in which it was entangled we need to uncover the origins of
that practice and to fully grasp these origins we need to do the history of
political philosophy.
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In this chapter, I tried to answer the question what theories in general
are meant to do. I suggested that, in their own distinctive way, theories
also answer the big questions of human existence. I then suggested that
some of these answers are now best provided by systematic empirical
enquiry and natural-scientific theories. The natural sciences understand,
explain and predict events and processes in the non-human natural world.
Scientific theories do the same at the most general level. The social
sciences—including political science—understand, explain and seek to
predict events and processes in the human world. Political theory is then
left to perform three important functions: the explanatory function at the
most general level, but more distinctively the contemplative and the
normative. In this chapter, I also (a) distinguished between political theory
on the one hand, and ideologies and propaganda on the other; (b) claimed
that political theory may be able to respond to our needs under conditions
of modernity somewhat better than cosmologies do; (c) briefly explained
why in the 1950s, there was widespread belief that political theory was
either dead or in decline, and; (d) explained the relationship between
contemporary political theory and the history of political thought.
1. Charles Taylor has called humans ‘self-interpretating animals’. Gadamer says

that interpretation is the distinctively human mode of being. What sense can
you make of these statements in the light of what you have read in this chapter?
2. There is a widespread belief that all evaluations are subjective. Good and bad,
right and wrong are relative to each individual, at least to every society. This
makes normative political theory impossible. Discuss.
3. If cosmologies can explain, understand, evaluate and give effective answers to
questions about who we are, then modern political theory is redundant. Discuss.
4. Deep down, political theories are ideologies. Therefore, political theory is an
intellectual passion of the elite. Discuss.
READING LIST
Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
Cohen, G. A., Karl Marx’s Theory of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
MacIntyre, Alisdair, ‘The Indispensability of Political Theory’, in David Miller and
Larry Siedentop (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
68
1983).
Parekh, Bhikhu, ‘Political Theory: Traditions in Political Philosophy’, in Robert Goodin
and Hans- Dieter Klingemann (eds), A New Handbook of Political Science (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1966).
Plamenatz, John, ‘The Use of Political Theory’, in A. Quinton (ed.), Political
Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
Taylor, Charles, ‘Philosophy and its History’, in Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and
Quentin Skinner (eds), Philosophy in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1984).
———, Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985a).
———, Philosophical Papers II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985b).
Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1930).
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PART II
Concepts
70
CHAPTER 3
Liberty
V. Sriranjani
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Meaning
Classification: Negative and Positive Liberty
Liberty and Other Concepts
The Concept of Liberty in India
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following sentences—
The BA class wants to have a free period (state of affairs).
I feel free to talk to my teacher (perception).
I am totally free to choose my career (choice).
Even in the 21st century, a substantial part of South Asia’s population is not free
from the clutches of poverty (denial of material needs).
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No country should be denied its freedom (denial of a sense of dignity).
Now, let us substitute the term liberty wherever ‘freedom’ has been used
in the above instances. Each of these sentence brings to the fore a different
dimension of the concept, defying a single definition of liberty. They also
highlight concepts other than liberty— equality, right, justice, etc. How
does one then delineate and distinguish the concept of liberty?
MEANING
Let us take the following sentence as an example—‘I am at liberty to learn
how to drive a car.’ To begin with, it means there are no hindrances to
your decision. Nobody physically stops you from learning how to drive a
car. Second, the existence conditions for learning how to drive a car are
available and accessible. So, you would have to have access to a car, a
person who is willing to teach you how to drive, streets where it is safe for
you to practise driving, etc. Third, and in a certain sense this precedes the
first two, you have a choice to learn how to drive a car. So, the concept of
liberty carries three connotations—the notion of choice, the absence of
constraints to make and exercise such a choice, and the existence
conditions that enable you to actuate the choice.
EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT

Liberty as a concept has been viewed variously by thinkers in various
stages of the history of political thought. Each of these views expresses the
thinker’s understanding of the historical phase in which the concept
evolved and is in sync with the larger philosophical outlook of the thinker.
Let us understand the views of the various thinkers and see to what extent
each of them mirror the three connotations of liberty—choice, absence of
constraints, and existence conditions.
Read the following sentence and observe the meanings that it gives rise
to—‘I am free to take my political theory exam.’ Invariably, the first thing
that comes to one’s mind is that one is not restrained from taking the
exam. Now, let us look at the reasons for which one wants to take the
exam. Broadly, one wants to take the exam to clear it and secure career
prospects. Two immediate reasons can be stated—first, it is necessary to
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take the exam if one has to be promoted to the next level; second, if one
does not take the exam, one is declared to have failed the paper. So, the
fear of failure impels one to take the exam. Let us take the example
further. My future security depends on clearing the exam. But I am not
prepared for the exam. In this context, if I am at liberty to take my exam
and do whatever I can to secure my future, does it include the liberty to
cheat in the exam?
It is this understanding of liberty that is put forward by Thomas Hobbes
in his fictional state of nature. According to Hobbes, liberty or freedom
signifies the absence of all impediments to action that are not contained in
the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent. As Hobbes would explain, it is
proper to state that the person who is tied with chains wants the liberty to
leave, as the impediment is not in the person but in his chains, whereas that
cannot be said of one who is sick or lame, because the impediment is in
oneself. Fear and necessity, for Hobbes, are the motivating factors in
human nature that impel them towards liberty As he explains, a man
sometimes pays his debts only for fear of imprisonment, which because
nobody hindered him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty.
Two issues emerge. One, can the act of one to preserve oneself be
justified as an act of liberty even if it violates the safety of another human
being(s)? Two, do you think the action of a person based only on fear or
necessity is an act of liberty? Would you say that the act of begging due to
the fear of starvation or the necessity to eat one square meal a day is an act
based on liberty? After all, the beggar is not physically restrained by
anybody in the act of begging.
While such an understanding of liberty does take into account the
‘absence of constraints’ aspect, it totally undermines the notion of choice
and does not recognize any kind of moral framework. Going back to our
example of wanting to learn how to drive a car, one may want to learn to
drive a car as there is no other mode of transport available or because one
is coerced into it. However, for it to be a decision based on liberty, the
decision has to be based on the fact that one wants to learn or does not
want to learn driving. It is this notion of choice that is conspicuously
absent in the examples by which we understand Hobbes’s view of liberty
The beggar does not have a choice on whether s/he wants to beg or not.
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Similarly, a dacoit cannot rob or kill anyone and explain it as an act of
liberty to preserve herself/himself.
Hobbes’ understanding of liberty, based on considerations of fear and
necessity rather than choice, does not make a clear distinction between acts
of liberty and acts under the threat of coercion. For choice to be exercised
in the exercise of liberty, existence conditions have to exist. Such
conditions can include material resources as well as a moral framework.
The scope to exercise choice in a moral framework finds place in Locke’s
understanding of the concept.
Let us reconsider the example of choice cited at the beginning of the
chapter—‘I am totally free to choose my career.’ This basically throws up
two points—‘no one should dictate to me what my career should be. So, if
I want to be a VJ (video jockey) or a writer, I should not be forced to
become an IAS (Indian Administrative Services) officer or do an MBA
course. However, my choice of career should not harm anybody. So, I
should not choose a career as a thief or murderer.’
It is this view of liberty as choice exercised in a moral framework that
comes across in Locke’s understanding of the concept. This moral
framework is based on the Laws of Nature of which equality is a central
tenet. The Law of Nature, according to Locke, is that no one ought to harm
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions. Liberty as a natural right,
for Locke, is no more than the liberty to do what the Law of Nature allows
—in other words, what is morally permitted. For Locke, each individual is
free to the extent the exercise of freedom does not violate the tenet of
equality. The exercise of liberty should not be at the cost of equality.
Now, what does liberty as a natural right imply for Locke? As a natural
right, liberty is a universal right. It is a right held equally by all in the state
of nature. It is also a right that is bestowed by nature along with the right
to life and property. As a natural right, liberty is innate in human nature, is
universal and can be apprehended by reason. As a right bestowed by
nature, Locke views it as inalienable. In other words, one cannot waive
from one’s person the right to liberty. As Locke states, ‘Every One … is
bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully; so by the
like reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he,
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as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind’ (Locke 1988: p. 271,
emphasis added).
As a natural right, liberty precedes civil and political society in Locke’s
thought. The contract of civil society is drawn to preserve natural rights,
including liberty. While the political society regulates liberty, it has no
power to constrain it. The Lockean individual is guided by the faculty of
reason in the exercise of freedom in conditions that are alterable. So, the
Lockean individual will not seek the freedom to want to fly like a bird but
will seek the freedom to be heard even if in a minority.
While the moral framework of Locke ensures existence conditions that
qualify the ‘absence of restraint’ and the element of choice, it does not
specify ways to bring about existence of conditions to facilitate choice. Let
us understand this through the earlier example—I am free to choose my
career. In the Lockean scheme, this will amount to the following—Nobody
has a right to dictate to me my choice of career. I have as much right to
choose my career as any other person. My choice should not harm
anybody.
These implications, however, do not take into account restraints on
choices that are not natural. Again, going back to the example of a beggar
who begs for a living—nobody need have dictated the beggar to choose
begging for a living and neither does it harm anyone. Does it mean that the
beggar chose to beg as a natural right?
Till now, the concept of liberty or freedom has been discussed basically
at the level of the individual. Also, the exercise of liberty is either
preserving oneself (Hobbes) or operating within a moral framework
(Locke). But neither of these conceptions addresses the hindrances of
hierarchy and inequality in the exercise of liberty. While Locke does
consider natural equality as a prerequisite, social inequalities are not
addressed at all. It is this hindrance to liberty that is addressed in
Rousseau’s thought.
Consider the instance that some of us own a vehicle and travel by it in
the city. This can have two possible effects. One, it introduces a hierarchy
between those who own a vehicle and those who do not. Two, it increases
pollution levels that is harmful to all. So, liberty here can be understood as
liberating the people of the city from the hierarchy and inequality between
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a few people owning vehicles and those who do not. Liberty is also
choosing the right option, in this case, a pollution-free option.
Rousseau considered freedom as a collective venture, and as freeing
oneself from selfish motives towards a larger good for the entire group.
His conception of liberty liberates human beings from the hierarchical and
unjust inequality of society. Rousseau views this inequality as the
constraint in the realization of liberty. Unlike Hobbes and Locke, liberty is
not a natural right for Rousseau. Liberty for him is liberation from a state
of unfreedom which comes into being with the emergence of civil and
political society. Constraints on liberty refer to the constraints of one’s
baser nature that does not facilitate human nature to think of the good of
all. Constraints also refer to the inequality in society that does not allow
for the exercise of liberty.
A people is liberated only through obedience to law. Law is equated
with the expression of the general will of the whole community. The
individual in obeying the laws obeys one’s own self as the author of those
laws, authored by virtue of the capacity of uniting with others in the
community. An individual can be free only by being a part of a free people
who obey laws.
For Rousseau, one is liberated when one is free of personal servitude.
His way out is to make individuals dependent not on other individuals or
institutions, but upon the whole community, which protects the goods and
persons of every citizen with the united force of all. The individual is
liberated from subjection to one’s lower nature in uniting with the whole
community. As Rousseau states, ‘a free people obeys, but it does not serve,
it has leaders but no masters; it obeys the laws, but it obeys only the laws,
and it is due to the strength of laws that it is not forced to obey man’. It is
the understanding of freedom through obedience to law that is captured in
the famous phrase of Rousseau in The Social Contract—‘Man is born free,
but everywhere he is in chains.’
The element of choice in Rousseau’s thought is quite interesting. It
appears that he seems to equate choice with the right to choose the right
option, where the right option is pre-decided. For example, driving a car
can be seen as something that contributes to pollution. Pollution is harmful
to all. It can then be decided that the right option is to ride a bicycle rather
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than drive a car. So, the existence conditions would be tailored not towards
conditions that enable them to drive a car but conditions that are friendly
to cyclists and pedestrians as also conditions that would check pollution
levels and be in the interest of the larger good.
The word freedom may also have a parallel, though simplistic, reference
to the idea of pleasure. Utilitarians see a positive correlation between
freedom and pleasure. Freedom is about seeking pleasure and avoiding
pain. This is best captured in Bentham’s works. Liberty for Bentham is
viewed through the utilitarian maxim of ‘Greatest Happiness of the
Greatest Number’. In this view, the liberty of the rapist or the murderer
comes into practical competition with that of the victim.
Let us look at two examples of pleasure giving activities—
a. Watching sunset is an activity that gives me pleasure. I should be free to watch
the sunset.
b. Taking drugs gives me pleasure. I should be free to take drugs.
Since the utilitarian understanding of freedom does not make any

distinction between different kinds of pleasures, there is no difference
between the kind of pleasure felt under (a) and (b).
There can be four possible reasons because of which one can’t endorse
such a view of freedom in an unqualified manner. One, such an
understanding of freedom is not accompanied by a sense of moral
responsibility. The drug addict may indulge in anti social activities that
may cause pain to a large number of people. Two, it violates the harm
principle—that one’s exercise of liberty should not harm the life, liberty
and possessions of others—that Locke qualifies his understanding of
liberty with. Three, because the pleasure of one person (the drug addict)
can cause pain to several people, the utilitarian maxim of the ‘Greatest
Happiness of the Greatest Number’ is violated. Four, this understanding
though very similar to the Hobbesian understanding of liberty, does not
have the sole qualification that Hobbes sets for the exercise of freedom,
namely, self preservation. So, the drug addict’s freedom to take drugs as it
gives him/her pleasure may even be a self-destructive move.
This simplistic understanding of liberty within the utilitarian framework
has been fine- tuned to a great extent in the work of Bentham’s disciple—
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J. S. Mill’s On Liberty. This view will be discussed in detail in the next
section.
J. S. Mill on Liberty
Look at yet another example cited in the beginning of the chapter—The
BA class wants to have a free period. On the face of it, it appears as a
collective decision of the class. Now, there might be a few students (as few
as even one student) who may want the lecture to take place. What do you
think should be the decision of the teacher? An almost immediate response
may be that since a majority of the students do not want the class to take
place, the opinion of a few students (or one student) who want to attend
the lecture should not be considered. This can generally be justified as a
democratic decision. Such a ‘democratic decision’, however, is at the cost
of suppressing the individual decisions of the students who want to attend
the lecture.
The liberty not to have one’s individual opinion suppressed by
collective decisions of society and state is at the core of J. S. Mill’s
understanding of liberty.
Mill’s views on liberty are based on his understanding of utility ‘in the
largest sense grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive
being’. His essay On Liberty seeks to protect individual liberty from the
interference of state and society. He takes the concept of liberty beyond
the utilitarian doctrine of Bentham by holding the view that a proper
conception of happiness includes freedom as individuality. For Mill,
individuality was a prerequisite for the cultivation of the self. This would
enable society to progress as each individual is useful in proportion to the
extent they differ from the rest.
J. S. Mill qualified utilitarianism with two considerations—(a) in
applying the principle of utility, consideration has to be given both to the
quality and quantity of pleasure, and (b) utilitarianism need not involve a
radical break with traditional morality. Instead, everyday rules of morality
can be seen as the utilitarian thumb rule.
It is almost inevitable for conflicts to emerge from these qualifications.
After all, it is very difficult to prove that watching a classical dance recital
is more pleasurable than eating bhelpuri on the streets (or vice versa).
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Conflicts can emerge even for Mill’s second qualification. Take the
statement ‘Honesty is the best policy.’ One can find arguments as to how
this will result in greater pleasure as well as greater pain. Liberty for Mill
can be regarded as a principle that mediates such conflicts. Freedom or
liberty, for Mill, is also valuable as an end in itself. This is not to say that
even a ‘wrong’ act is to be valued if it is freely chosen. What it indicates is
freedom as an essential component of the ideal of individuality. It is by
virtue of the freely chosen actions that an individual is regarded as a
worthy person.
Mill discusses liberty under three aspects—liberty of thought and
discussion, principle of individuality, and limits of authority over an
individual’s action.
Liberty of thought and discussion is often understood as freedom of
expression. It is not just the right of an individual to express an opinion but
also includes the right of individuals to hear opinions expressed. So, while
freedom of expression is sought to be exercised minimally at the level of
an individual, the good derived from the freedom is for humankind at
large.
Mill enumerates four reasons in favour of the freedom of expression.
They are—
a. If an opinion is suppressed as against the prevailing notion and the suppressed
opinion is right, then humankind stands deprived of its benefit. And, even if it
is the prevailing notion that is right, suppression of the ‘wrong’ deprives
humankind of the opportunity to reinforce what is right. So, to facilitate the
expression of opinions, true or false, that are against the prevailing notions in
society, freedom of expression is needed.
b. In the field of social and political belief, truth rather than being of one view or
the other, emerges from the conflict of two or more opposing views. It is only
freedom of expression that facilitates the airing out of several views.
c. Freedom of expression can throw up right views as well as wrong. But even
views that are wrong or false should not be suppressed as they may contain
elements of truth. Such elements of truth may be lost to humankind if freedom
of expression is not exercised.
d. Even prevailing views that are true and right need opposition to reinforce their
truth and to prevent themselves from being frozen into inert clichés. Indeed, it
is only by being exposed to contradictions that views become reliable guides
for action.
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According to Mill, it is the clash of views facilitated by the freedom of
expression that provides the intellectual impetus for thought, discussion,
and progress. Mill is convinced that without such freedom society finds
itself enfeebled by dogma. Beliefs held by such a society degenerate into
prejudices and opinions lack a rational foundation.
Individuality enables a human being to choose rather than blindly follow
accepted modes of behaviour, customs, and practices. There is no pre-
decided concept of the ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ way of life. The content of ‘right’
choices depends on the kind of person one is.
Mill defends the principle of individuality against governmental
interference and social tyranny. The sphere of non-intervention in an
individual’s life is demarcated by drawing a distinction between self-
regarding and other-regarding activities. Self-regarding actions are actions
over which the individual is sovereign. Whether an action is other-
regarding or is of concern to others depends on whether such action is
harmful to others. Now, there can be several instances where the
boundaries between self-regarding and other-regarding actions are quite
blurred. For example, addiction of an individual to drugs is as much a self-
regarding as an other-regarding issue. To counter this, some readings on
Mill state that a self-regarding action cannot be viewed as other-regarding
if it causes offence, it can be viewed so only if it causes injury. This
exempts intervention in self-regarding action on grounds of moral beliefs
as to the appropriate form of social behaviour.
Liberty: A Liberal Good?

It is often felt that liberty is a concomitant value of liberalism. As a
multifaceted concept, the value of liberty or freedom is present in the
writings of even those who are not considered liberals. Of the thinkers we
have discussed so far, Rousseau is one such example. Yet another thinker
is Karl Marx. Marx’s understanding of liberty is through instances of what
is not liberty.
Let us go back to our example—‘I am free to choose my career’—to
understand the way in which Marx perceives the absence of liberty. Let us
be more specific—‘I view myself as a writer and want to choose writing as
my career.’ Now, let us assume that due to lack of the right material
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existence conditions, in order to survive I have to work as a factory
worker. To have a career as a writer would be to realize the writer in
myself. My job as a factory worker disables me from relating to myself. In
that sense, my own labour confronts my sense of self and alienates me.
According to Marx, what defines human nature is the ability to express
creativity. The circumstances that create situations of inability of
expression of self are those that deny liberty. Marx explains the denial of
liberty, what he terms alienation, as a four-stage process. The agent is
alienated from the product, from productive activity, one’s own human
nature and from other human beings. Marx explains this by saying, ‘As a
result, therefore, man (the worker) no longer feels himself to be freely
active in any but his animal functions—eating, drinking, procreating or at
most in his dwelling; and in his human functions he no longer feels
himself to be anything but an animal.’
Marx’s understanding of the term ‘liberation’ is leading a life of self-
realization. Self realization can be defined as the full and free actualization
and externalization of the powers and abilities of the individual. Marx held
capitalism responsible for the lack of opportunities for self-realization. He
also emphasized, however, that capitalism creates the material bases for
another society in which the full and free self-realization of each and every
individual becomes possible.
Capitalism hinders self-realization in two ways. One, the formation of
desires occurs through a process the individual does not understand and
with which one does not identify. Often, one’s own desires appear as alien
powers, not as freely chosen. Two, the realization of desires is often
frustrated by lack of coordination and common planning. The aggregate
outcome of individual actions appears as an independent and even hostile
power, not as freely and jointly willed. The non-identification with one’s
desires and confrontation of one’s self by those desires is what he termed
alienation.
CLASSIFICATION: NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY

Let us have another look at the example—The BA class wants to have a
free period. Now, the students of the class do know that this may mean that
they may not cover their course before the exam. This will cost them their
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marks and affect their future career prospects. Nobody is forcing the class
to miss the lecture. Yet, the temptation to have some free time stops the
class from doing what it ought to do—attend the class. In this example, no
one is stopping the students from bunking the class and in this sense the
students in the class are free. On the other hand, if being free is being self-
determined and entails control over temptations to take care of real
interests, then the students of the class are not free.
It is to explain this distinction that the concept of liberty was classified
in 1969 as negative liberty and positive liberty by Isaiah Berlin in his
celebrated work—Two Concepts of Liberty.
Negative Liberty
The term ‘negative’ in negative liberty indicates injunctions that prohibit
acts that restrict freedom. Popularly understood as freedom from
interference, the scope of negative liberty is the answer to the question
‘Over what area am I master?’ (Berlin 1969: 121–22). Berlin further states,
‘If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to
that degree unfree: and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a
certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be,
enslaved’ (Berlin 1969: 121–22). For example, if an individual who is
otherwise qualified to contest elections is prevented by others from doing
so by the use of coercion, the liberty of the potential candidate is being
infringed. Berlin, however, makes it clear that incapacity to attain a goal is
not unfreedom. As he states, ‘only restrictions imposed by other people
affect my freedom’.
Negative liberty rests on two main axioms—
a. Each one knows one’s own interest best. This is based on the assumption of the
individual as a rational agent with a capacity to deliberate and make an
informed choice.
b. The state has a limited role to play. This follows from the earlier axiom: with
the individual agency foregrounded, the state cannot decide ends and purposes
for the individual.
For Berlin (1969), negative liberty as freedom is the opportunity to act,

not action itself. As ‘opportunity concept of freedom’ it focuses on the
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availability rather than exercise of opportunity. The central problem with
the negative concept of liberty is its indifference to the quality of action.
For example, it makes no distinction between being liberated to pursue the
occupation of one’s choice and the liberty to starve. Indeed, poverty is not
always seen as an infringement of freedom in negative liberty.
Two thinkers who illustrate negative liberty in their writings are
Frederick Hayek and Robert Nozick. Hayek views liberty as a negative
concept, because ‘it describes the absence of a particular obstacle—
coercion by other men’, and it becomes positive only through what we
make of it. This is complimented by Hayek’s definition of individual
freedom as ‘the state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the
arbitrary will of another’. Hayek does not view negative liberty as
exhaustive of the concept of freedom as he postulates a necessary
connection between liberty, justice and welfare. He explains this by stating
that ‘the conception of freedom under the law rests on the contention that
when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules irrespective of
their application to us, we are not subject to another man’s will and are
therefore free’.
In Nozick’s conception, the primary threat to liberty is the imposition of
obligations to which one has not consented. Liberty is to be safeguarded
by keeping such obligations to a minimum, leaving the greatest possible
scope for voluntary agreements and exchange. The idea that respect for
individual liberty requires consent is a necessary condition for all
obligations beyond the requirements of a minimal framework of rights.
Positive Liberty
The concept of positive liberty proceeds with the idea that each self has a
higher self and a lower self. The higher self, the rational self, should attain
mastery over the lower self for an individual or a people to be liberated in
the understanding of positive liberty. As Berlin (1969) states, ‘The positive
sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the
individual to be his own master…. I wish to be the instrument of my own,
not of other men’s acts of will…. I wish, above all, to be conscious of
myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for his
choices and able to explain them by reference to his own ideas and
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purposes’. It does not just refer to non-interference, but includes the idea
of self-mastery where the higher self is in command of the lower self.
Positive liberty is the freedom to do. It is what can be called the
‘exercise concept of freedom’. It is exercising and availing of the
opportunities while negative freedom is just having opportunities. Unlike
negative liberty, positive liberty is open to the idea of directing the
individual either by law or an elite. As long as the law directs the
individual towards rational ends, it liberates rather than oppresses the
individual’s personality. Rousseau is a votary of positive liberty when he
states that true liberty is in obedience to moral law. He also refers to it as
the function of the will of the enlightened people. From a neo-Marxist
perspective, Herbert Marcuse also favours a positive conception of liberty.
The reason given is that the working class is incapable of seeing its true
end and needs to be directed towards liberation by the revolutionary elite.
Positive liberty also includes the idea of collective control over common
life. Maintaining a pollution-free environment is a collective effort for the
common benefit. While this may allow a certain degree of coercion, it is
usually justified by the larger good involved.
Many liberals, including Berlin, have suggested that the positive
concept of liberty carries with it a danger of authoritarianism. Consider the
fate of a permanent and oppressed minority. Because the members of this
minority participate in a democratic process characterized by majority rule,
they might be said to be free on the grounds that they are members of a
society exercising self-control over its own affairs. But they are oppressed,
and so are surely unfree.
J. S. Mill and Negative and Positive Liberty

Mill, often viewed as a defender of the negative concept of freedom,
compared the development of an individual to that of a plant: individuals,
like plants, must be allowed to grow, in the sense of developing their own
faculties to the full and according to their own inner logic. Personal growth
is something that cannot be imposed from without, but must come from
within the individual.
Critics, however, have objected that the ideal described by Mill looks
much more like a positive concept of liberty than a negative one. Positive
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liberty consists, they say, in exactly this growth of the individual: the free
individual is one that develops, determines and changes her own desires
and interests autonomously, and from within. This is not liberty as the
mere absence of obstacles, but liberty as self-realization.
While the emphasis on non-intervention in the life of the individual
tends to classify Mill as a theorist of negative liberty, the defence of
individuality to facilitate deliberate cultivation of certain desirable
attitudes, does not preclude the possibility of understanding Mill as a
theorist of positive liberty.
Insufficiency of Negative Liberty: Charles Taylor

While Mill does not limit himself to the negative concept of liberty and
Berlin discusses the role of positive liberty as self-mastery that
complements the view of negative liberty as non-interference, Charles
Taylor points out why negative liberty may be a necessary prerequisite but
not a sufficient condition for freedom. Taylor discusses the two types of
liberty as the opportunity concept of freedom (negative liberty) and as the
exercise concept of freedom (positive liberty). For Taylor, the concept of
freedom is inclusive of the concept of self-realization. This notion of self-
realization is unique to each individual and can only be worked out
independently. Taylor feels that a pure opportunity concept of freedom is
inadequate to attain freedom inclusive of self-realization. As Taylor states,
‘We can’t say that someone is free, on a self-realization view, if he is
totally unrealized.’ For example, if you have the potential to sing well, to
the extent that nobody goes out of the way to deny you opportunities, your
sphere of negative liberty has not been violated. However, you are not
liberated till you don’t exercise the freedom to realize your potential as a
singer.
This exercise of freedom is further qualified. Merely exercising freedom
does not lead to the attainment of self-realization. There are certain
conditions put on one’s motivation to qualify the exercise concept of
freedom as a quest for the attainment of self-realization. One is not free if
one is motivated ‘through fear, inauthentically internalized standards, or
false consciousness’. So, if you exercise your potential to be a good singer
because somebody coerces you, or you think it will elevate your social
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standing or you think of it as a way to be popular among friends, then the
quest for self-realization is a motivated one. Taylor also states that the
subject cannot be the final authority on whether one’s desires are
authentic. This is because others may know us better than we know
ourselves.
On the one hand, one has to be cautious that the quest for self-
realization, even if decided by the subject, is not motivated by fear or false
consciousness. On the other hand, since the subject is vulnerable to having
her/his quest for self-realization motivated, the question arises as to who
decides the authenticity of the quest for self-realization. One way out is the
Rousseauan way, where the ‘right’ path helps in the realization of one’s
higher self. This, however, can have authoritarian, totalitarian
implications. For, if the subject is to realize a good that is pre-decided by
someone other than her/him as consonant with one’s higher nature, it is an
anachronic situation in which the subject needs to relinquish the freedom
to make an independent judgement of the ‘right’ path to attain freedom.
Taylor acknowledges that the concept of positive liberty, understood in
the Rousseauan framework is prone to totalitarian manipulation. However,
according to him, the quest for self-realization need not be subject to
totalitarian manipulation. The reason given by him is that since each
person has his/her original form of realization, nobody can possess a
doctrine or a technique to manipulate with a totalitarian intention as such a
doctrine or a technique cannot in principle exist if human beings really
differ in their self-realization.
Liberty: Freedom as a Triadic Relation

As Gerald MacCallum (1967) pointed out, there is no simple dichotomy
between positive and negative liberty; rather, we should recognize that
there is a whole range of possible interpretations or ‘conceptions’ of the
single concept of liberty. He explains liberty as a triadic relationship in the
following manner—X is free from Y to do or become (or not to do or
become) Z. According to MacCallum—a subj ect, or agent, is free from
certain constraints, or preventing conditions, to do or become certain
things. Freedom is, therefore, a triadic relation—that is, a relation between
three things: an agent, certain preventing conditions, and certain doings or
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becomings of the agent. Any statement about freedom or unfreedom can
be translated into a statement of the above form by specifying what is free
or unfree, from what it is free or unfree, and what it is free or unfree to do
or become. Any claim about the presence or absence of freedom in a given
situation will, therefore, make certain assumptions about what counts as an
agent, what counts as a constraint or limitation on freedom, and what
counts as a purpose that the agent can be described as either free or unfree
to carry out.
Indeed, as MacCallum says, a number of classic authors cannot be
placed unequivocally in one or the other of the two camps. Locke, for
example, is normally thought of as the father of classical liberalism and,
therefore, a staunch defender of the negative concept of freedom. He,
indeed, states explicitly that ‘[to be at] liberty is to be free from restraint
and violence from others’. But he also says that liberty is not to be
confused with ‘licence’ and can be exercised only within a moral
framework (Locke 1988: paras 6, 57). Locke also seems to endorse an
account of MacCallum’s third freedom-variable (Z) that Berlin would call
positive, restricting this to actions that are not immoral (liberty is not
licence) and to those that are in the agent’s own interests (I am not unfree
if prevented from falling into a bog).
LIBERTY AND OTHER CONCEPTS
Liberty and Equality

The concepts of liberty and equality conflict or complement each other
depending on how they are defined. The most common reason for the
conflict is scarcity of resources and the nature of its distribution. To
understand the nature of conflicts between equality and liberty, let us start
with an example. Let us take the example of a family with meagre
resources to be divided between the education of two siblings, one of
whom wants to become a doctor and another an engineer—arguably both
incur fairly high expenses. Either the family can divide the resources in an
equal way between the two siblings or allow one of them to pursue her/his
vocation of choice. However the resources are divided, the values of
equality and liberty end up in a relation of conflict.
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Liberty and equality conflict with each other when equality is
understood as equality of outcome, and liberty is understood as freedom to
choose. Equality as equality of outcome tends to work as a levelling
mechanism. This consequently reduces the freedom of choice by
restricting the availability of outcome. In the above example, if the
resources are divided into two equal halves, what is achieved is an equal
outcome with both siblings having the same amount of resources. This
equality is, however, accompanied by the fact that neither can pursue the
vocation of their choice. The stress on equality of outcome, thus, is at the
cost of the liberty to choose.
Liberty and equality also tend to conflict with each other when either
concept is equated with fairness. A fair state of affairs is however very
subjective. Any state of affairs can be fair if some arbitrarily believe it to
be fair and vice versa. In the example discussed above, giving all the
resources to one of the siblings can be seen as fair to the extent that at least
one of them can exercise the freedom of choice. The same situation can
also be seen as unfair as the other sibling is totally deprived of any share of
resources. An equal division between both the siblings, too, can be
arbitrarily described as fair (as neither is totally deprived of her/his share)
as well as unfair (neither is now capable of pursuing the vocation of their
choice).
Equality and liberty can also conflict with each other when the practice
of one is at the cost of the other. The extent to which liberty is attained can
be gauged by the extent to which a trade-off has taken place with the
concept of equality and vice versa. Again, going back to the example
above, the liberty of any one sibling to pursue the vocation of her/ his
choice is in proportion to the extent of equality that is violated by the other
sibling’s equal share of resources. The liberty of each sibling is violated to
the extent that the equal division of resources has limited their choice.
John Rawls, a social contract theorist of the 20th century, attempted to
reconcile the values of liberty and equality through his ‘veil of ignorance’
argument. The motive behind this was as much to secure the inviolability
of liberty as welfarist and redistributivist ideals of equality.
Rawls developed a scheme of basic liberties in his work, A Theory of
Justice. The basic liberties are those that free and equal persons with the
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relevant moral capacities would choose in what he calls the ‘original
position’. This original position is a position where individuals divide
liberties and resources in society without knowing their placement in
society (see the chapter on Justice). According to Rawls, these basic
liberties consist in freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the
political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the freedoms
specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally, the rights
and liberties covered by the rule of law. To resolve conflict between
various liberties, Rawls suggests that the institutional rules that define
these liberties must be adjusted so that they fit into a coherent scheme of
liberties. This scheme is secured equally for all citizens. In the Rawlsian
scheme, redistribution of resources to bring about equality is qualified by
two conditions—that the basic liberties will not be infringed upon and that
increase of resources at any level should not be at the cost of the worst-off
person.
Equality and Liberty: A Complementary Relation? A complementary

relation between equality and liberty also depends on the way they are
defined. To examine the possibility of a complementary relation liberty
can be understood as being in control of one’s life. This implies three
things—
a. Leading one’s life according to one’s beliefs, desires and purposes
b. Being able to examine and revise them
c. Being able to pursue alternative paths
Equality can be understood as non-discrimination. As non-

discrimination, it entails elimination of disadvantages of those who suffer
from them, yet are not responsible for them. It entails protection of
essential interests that are harmed by such disadvantages. Without an equal
opportunity to be liberated, neither equality nor liberty can attain its
purpose in totality.
Equality accompanies the concept of liberty in the view of most
thinkers. For Locke, natural rights (inclusive of liberty) are regulated by
natural law characterized by equality. For Rawls, any method of
distribution of liberties or social resources has to conform to the norm of
equality.
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Liberty and Rights
While there is a strand in Western political thought that equates the
concept of right with the concept of liberty (Hobbes, Locke, Nozick),
contemporary theory is of the opinion that they are two distinct concepts.
The traditional view understood the equation between the two concepts as
the idea of having a right to do or be something is the same as the freedom
to do or be something. Later, it was felt that while liberty cannot be
equated with the concept of right, a right is a liberty in a restricted sense—
a liberty that is protected, recognized or allowed by the law (Holmes 1881;
Lamont 1946).
The concept of liberty differs with the concept of right in at least three
ways.
a. There can only be a right to something, whereas freedom can be freedom to, as
well as, freedom from. One does not have a right from something (this is
distinct from a right not to do or be something).
b. There are degrees of freedom, but not of rights. One can be more or less free,
but one cannot have more or less of a right.
c. Liberty cannot be delegated, transferred or waived unlike a right.
In contemporary theory, Dworkin admits that the concept of liberty can

be related to a concept of right in a weak sense. As he explains, someone
has a right to liberty if s/he either wants it or if it is good for her/him to
have it. But a right to liberty cannot be always sustained in a stronger
sense of right. As in, if someone has a right to something, then it is wrong
for the government to deny it to her/him even though it would be in the
general interest to do so.
THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN INDIA

The term closest to liberty in the Indian tradition is mukti; its connotations,
however, are entirely other-worldly. Understood either as renunciation or
as deliverance from the chain of rebirths, the initial understanding of mukti
did not refer to freedom from social restrictions.
Ideas of modern liberty entered colonial India through three different
routes—colonial legal arrangements accompanied by tacit understandings
of rights and freedoms of individuals, institutional spread of Western-style
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education, and intellectual influence of Western social thinking. With the
rise of the middle class and spread of non-ancestral salaried jobs, freedom
began to be expressed in an individualistic manner. Women were elevated
from their hierarchically subordinate position in the joint family to that of
a companion. Freedom was also expressed in the religious sphere through
the formation of associations. Voluntary associations were also formed for
the establishment of educational projects, advancement of women, sports
clubs, etc. However, opportunities to form and enter these associations
were limited to the upper-caste elites. Two pioneers of freedom from
social restrictions in India— Rabindranath Tagore and Raja Rammohun
Roy—were a part of this elite.
In western India, unlike Bengal, thinkers from lower-caste groups began
to use ideas of social freedom to attack caste hierarchy, notably Jyotiba
Phule and later, B. R. Ambedkar. The meaning of freedom came to be
located in the everyday life of caste indignities. Freedom had two aspects
to it—liberation of lower castes from upper-caste domination, and
affirmative action with regard to jobs in the colonial administration. This
strand remained in a state of potential conflict with the nationalist strand—
freedom from colonial rule. By the first decade of the 20th century, the
meaning of freedom came to be dominated by the idea of freedom from
colonial rule.
Both the strands of freedom found a place in the views of Gandhi.
Gandhi adopted the term ‘swaraj’ as an analogue to the concept of
freedom. The very term swaraj carries with it the two main components
that it embodies—swa as in ‘self’ and raj as in ‘rule’ and can be
understood as ‘self-rule’ in two senses—‘rule of self’ and ‘rule over self’.
Gandhi understood and sought to apply freedom as swaraj in both senses
of the term. Swaraj, in the context of the freedom struggle in India,
referred to freedom as a constitutional and political demand, and as a value
at the social-collective level. It meant not just freedom from British rule,
but also freedom from the cultural authority of the West.
It is the understanding of swaraj as ‘rule over self’ that was highlighted
by Gandhi in his work Hind Swaraj, where he states, ‘It is swaraj when we
learn to rule ourselves’. Swaraj, in this understanding, is about redeeming
one’s self-respect, self-responsibility, and capacities for self-realization
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from institutions of dehumanization. Understanding the real ‘self’, and its
relation to communities and society, is critical to the project of attaining
swaraj. Such an understanding of swaraj advocated that people must
continuously strive to create a different set of institutions, structures and
processes consistent with diverse cultures, traditions as well as principles
of the natural world. Gandhi believed that the development that follows
would liberate both individual and collective potentialities guided by the
principle of justice.
Liberty and the Indian Constitution

The Indian Constitution discusses liberty in Part III of the document under
Fundamental Rights. These rights are primarily in the form of negative
injunctions rather than positive directions to the state. While the rights are
fundamental, they are not absolute. Liberty as a principle, is protected not
just by the right to freedom and the right to personal liberty, but also by the
Directive Principles of State Policy.
While Article 19 of Part III of the Constitution—Right to Freedom—
enumerates the various freedoms, Article 21 defines the scope of the
liberty principle.
Article 21—worded in the following manner: No person shall be
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law—is the only article in the entire gamut of Fundamental
Rights that does not have exceptions or qualifications to its application. In
fact, one need not even be a citizen of India to invoke Article 21. In not
demanding the criterion of citizenship, the Indian Constitution has elevated
the right to life and personal liberty to the status of a human right.
Judiciary in India and Article 21 Statutes do not cover every

conceivable case, and even when a statute does control a case, the courts
may need to interpret it. Judicial decisions are known collectively as case
law. A judicial decision legally binds the parties in the case, and may also
serve as a law in the same prospective sense as does a statute. In other
words, a judicial decision determines the outcome of the particular case,
and also may regulate the future conduct of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the court.
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It is instructive to note the way courts in India have understood and
applied the concept of liberty. Its multifaceted aspects as mirrored in the
application of law facilitate the structure of reality and prevent liberty from
being restricted to the abstract realm. The Indian judiciary is replete with
instances of case law on the concept of liberty. Through its judgements
and observations it has substantially contributed to the expansion of the
right to life and personal liberty. The four instances cited below indicate
the role of judicial decisions in the expansion of the scope of liberty.
The judiciary initially restricted itself to limiting the concept of liberty
to tangible constraints. The Supreme Court in 1963 in the Kharak Singh
case pointed out, that ‘in dealing with a fundamental right such as the right
to free movement and personal liberty, that only can constitute an
infringement which is both direct as well as tangible and it could not be
that the constitution makers intended to protect or protected mere personal
sensitiveness’.
A far more expansive understanding of liberty was visible in 1981 when
a Supreme Court judge observed (Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator,
Union Territory of Delhi) that
the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along
with it, namely, the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and
shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms,
freely moving about and mixing and commingling (sic) with fellow human beings.
Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would
depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in
any view of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the
right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum
expression of the human self.
The expansive understanding was further reiterated in 1984 in the

Bandhua Mukti Morcha case—the scope of Article 21 was broadened by
drawing on the Directive Principles of State Policy. The judgement noted
—
This right to live with human dignity (as) enshrined in Article 21 … must include
protection of the health and strength of workers … of tender age of children against
abuse, opportunities and facilities … to develop in a healthy manner … in
conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane
conditions of work and maternity relief.
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A holistic interpretation of Article 21 was put forward in 1989
(Ramsharan v. Union of India) where it was held that ‘all that gives
meaning to a man’s life including his tradition, culture and heritage, and
protection of that heritage in its full measure would certainly come within
the encompass of an expanded concept of Article 21 of the Constitution’.
In a 1991 judgement, the Supreme Court went on to include ‘the right of
enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of life’ under
Article 21.
1. Peer pressure often colours our preferences on many issues ranging from
consumer brands to career choices. To what extent do we exercise our liberty as
freedom in making choices?
2. Liberty loses its meaning as well as legitimacy when viewed outside the civil
and political system. Do you think unquestioned obedience to law will ensure
the right to enjoy liberty?
3. According to Marx, capitalism hinders self-realization. Which ideology do you
think best ensures the right to liberty as self-realization?
4. In 1996, the renowned painter M. F Husain portrayed goddess Saraswati in the
nude. Again, in 2000, the film director Deepa Mehta tried to shoot Water, a
film on the plight of Hindu widows, in Kashi. In both cases, conservative
elements went on a rampage, and declared these efforts as obscene, as against
Indian culture and ethos. How would you discuss these incidents against the
reasons enumerated by Mill under the freedom of expression?
5. It is necessary to speak against and resist the practice of dowry. Can you apply
Mill’s views on the freedom of expression, individuality, and limits on social
coercion to this instance? Would Mill be regarded as a theorist of positive or
negative liberty?
6. Can you see a correlation between the judgement of the judiciary in India and
the manner in which the concept of liberty evolved in political theory?
READING LIST
Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
Chappell, Vere (ed.), Hobbes and Brahmall on Liberty and Necessity, Cambridge Texts
in History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).
Elster, John, An Introduction to Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986).
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Gray, John, Liberalism: Essays in Political Philosophy (London and New York:
Routledge, 1989).
Hayek, F. A., The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).
Kaviraj, Sudipta, ‘Ideas of Freedom in Modern India’, in Robert H. Taylor (ed.), The
Idea of Freedom in Asia and Africa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988).
Lukes, Steven. ‘Equality and Liberty: Must they Conflict?’ in David Held (ed.),
Political Theory Today (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991).
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, The Social Contract, ebook available at
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/r/rousseau/jean_jacques/r864s/
Scanlon, Thomas, ‘Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property’, in Jeffery Paul (ed.),
Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1981).
Taylor, Charles, ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty’, Nigel Warburton (ed.),
Freedom: An Introduction with Readings (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).
Ten, C. L. (ed.), Mill’s Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy (England: Dartmouth
Publishing Company Limited, 1999).
White, Alan R., Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
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CHAPTER 4
Equality
Ashok Acharya
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Why Equalize?
Equality of What?
In Conclusion: The Politics of Equality
INTRODUCTION
Among the billions of human beings in this world, innumerable
inequalities abound. People are different and unequal in many respects.
They belong to different races, religions, sexes, and so on. Their physical,
genetic and mental endowments are also dissimilar. People differ with
regard to their dispositions and abilities and the ways in which they lead,
and are taught to lead, their lives. The range of inequalities and disparities
that humanity displays is indeed very wide and this is an empirical fact.
Yet, as humans, we believe, and rightly so, that we are essentially equal
and possess equal worth especially when it comes to realizing this ideal in
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social, economic and political structures of our society. We invoke the
concept of equality when we want to be counted as an equal, to be treated
—and aspiring or claiming to be treated—as an equal, to be equally
entitled to social goods. But what does it mean to be treated as an equal?
What sense do we make when we say that irrespective of our differences
and certain inequalities—whether as Brahmins or Dalits, black or white,
men or women—we, as humans, possess equal worth? We are clearly here
not referring to anatomical similarities, save the difference between men
and women, and the common facts of our social existence that we, as
humans, possess: to wit, the use of language, ability to reproduce, living in
societies, and so on. But we are alike in more fundamental respects. Our
capacity to feel pain or to suffer, capacity to experience affection for
others and to be able to bear relevant consequences of the same are
capacities that have a moral resonance. As Bernard Williams (1962)
highlights, these are moral capacities that are universal to humanity.
However, there are other characteristics as well that we possess and these
connect us to other humans in important ways. One of these would be a
‘desire for self-respect’, which helps us unravel our own goals without
being instruments of others’ will. In short, there is something common in
our collective experience that forms the core of our egalitarian beliefs.
This makes certain causes worthy of pursuit and helps realize the
significance of some of our struggles against unequal relationships and
social order. Along with other political values such as justice or liberty,
equality offers us a moral framework that we draw upon to make political
judgements, and explain, prescribe or criticize certain political views and
forms of political action.
The concept of equality lies at the heart of normative political theory. In
a very general sense, equality is a relationship between two or more
persons or groups regarding some aspect of their lives. The idea of
equality is not, however, a simple one and hence it is not always easy to
speak with accuracy what that relationship ought to be and in respect of
what. There is no one way in which we may define a relationship between
two or more persons (or groups), determine the goals of the relationship,
and give primacy to one aspect of it over another by attaching pre-eminent
value to the same. There are multiple ways of doing so. In other words, the
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suggestion here is that the concept of equality can yield various
conceptions depending on how we unpack the building-blocks—
relationships, persons, relevant attributes—and propose an appropriate
relationship between them.
EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT

The history of political philosophy is replete with many references to the
ideal of equality. Starting from the ancient Greek civilization till the 20th
century, notable for its many egalitarian experiments, the idea of equality
has evoked some of the strongest human passions. The content of the
concept has undergone momentous transformations across centuries
shaping, and being shaped by, the millions of people that have been
inspired to fight various political battles sometimes against an autocrat, at
other times against unjust social conditions, and on other occasions against
undemocratic regimes or policies.
Tracing the history of an idea is fraught with difficulties, one of which is
the problem of recovery of an interpretive exercise. Quite a lot has already
been said on how we should go about interpreting texts and events, the
focus of disagreement being on whether or not we can successfully employ
contemporary lenses to judge contributions of past authors. Some say we
can, and others claim this is impossible. Those who deny the possibility
suggest that in order for interpretation to be authentic, it needs to be
contextual, not textual. There are merits on both sides and many scholars
are persuaded to adopt a pluralist approach, or at least concur to the
validity of the same. The one further issue that remains, however, is that
either the recovery of an idea can promise progressive revelation
culminating in some contemporary set of ideals or it may very well be an
account of degeneration concluding in a set of dangerous trends visible in
contemporary times. The project of recovery, in other words, is laden with
either hope or despair.
Most exercises of recovering the history of normative concepts in
political theory aim at a progressive revival, noting in the process how
ideas widen and deepen in scope. This is usually helped by drawing on the
role that other ideas or values have also played in enriching the one under
study. Thus, an account of the idea of equality cannot be separated from
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parallel accounts of liberty, justice, rights, popular sovereignty or
democracy from which it feeds and is inspired by.
In what follows, we will selectively use some thinkers (Aristotle,
Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, and Tocqueville) who had decisive roles in
giving shape to the idea of equality.If we consider the fact that the idea of
equality also derives its strengths from similar normative concepts, we
may well find other chapters in this book complementing the present
exercise.
Alexis de Tocqueville, the author of the classic Democracy in America,
writes that there is something irresistible and inevitable about the spread
and progress of equality in the history of humankind. ‘The gradual
progress of equality is something fated’, he declares. The main features of
this progress, he claims, are its universality and permanence and the fact
that the ideal ‘is daily passing beyond human control, and every human
and every man helps it along’ (Tocqueville 1969: 12). How did something
that is now ‘universal’ and ‘permanent’ ‘begin its journey?
Aristotle
In what by now are well-known facts of the Greek experiments in popular
rule, we are well aware of how citizens exercised an equal voice in the
governance of their city-states. Aristotle’s Athenian Constitution contains
many references of egalitarian reforms initiated in Athens that prepared the
passage for testing the democratic ideal. At the heart of the reforms were
attempts that sought to reduce inequalities in many spheres of social life
including, most importantly, the ending of aristocratic stranglehold over
land, power and honour. Practices of equality established by law were a
sine qua non of democratic rule. A word that competed in common usage
with demokratia in ancient Athens was isonomia, meaning equality before
and within the law, a form of political equality that secured the equal
participation of ‘the many’ who were poor in the regime.
Yet, ancient Athens also had other classes of people who were excluded
from the domain of citizenship: metics (foreigners), slaves and women.
Aristotle’s Politics, both documents and justifies this exclusion. Aristotle’s
conception of equality, it is evident, was limited to the class of citizens
only. The political equality of citizens lay in acknowledging the virtue of
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‘ruling and being ruled in turn.’ In Book III, Chapter 9 of Politics,
Aristotle draws a straightforward correlation between justice and equality
when he says that ‘justice is held to be equality, and it is, but for equals
and not for all; and inequality is held to be just and is indeed, but for
unequals and not for all’. This is the first classic statement of formal
equality, reiterating the dominant conception of legal equality of treating
like cases alike, and unlike cases unlike. However, unlike other
conceptions of formal equality which are generally shorn of substance, this
conception captures Aristotle’s defence of natural inequality among men
to rule. Note that in Aristotle’s view, nature, which does nothing in vain,
divides people into the ruling and the ruled, where, to belong to the ruling
category one must have rational, deliberative and authoritative capacities
(true for some men, but not all). This inequality between the ruling and the
ruled—the unequals—is just.
Hobbes
If Aristotle defends natural inequality and then proposes a corresponding
political equality between some humans (usually male citizens), Hobbes,
who quarrels with Aristotle the most, defends a view of the natural
equality between all humans in the state of nature. In Leviathan, his most
famous work, Hobbes claims that
(n)ature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind; so that though
there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind
than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and
man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any
benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. (Hobbes 1968: 183)
As to the strength of the body, Hobbes proclaims that even the weakest
has enough strength to kill the strongest either by secret plot or by
conspiring with others. In addition, as to the faculties of the mind, Hobbes
argues that prudence, borne out of experience, is equally bestowed upon
men. What Hobbes proposes is the equal ability of individuals in the state
of nature which gives rise to an equality of hope to achieve our ends. What
drives individuals is an equal ability to work as well as an equal and
irresistible passion for power. From this condition of equality, beset
however by the passions of self-glorification and competition for more
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power, emerges the first threat to equality when men try to dominate and
subjugate others. In this quest for more power, men forgo the need for
security and live in a state of depravity. Unless men agree to cede a part of
their power to the political authority and accept to lead a civilized but
equal existence under the domination of authority, they can never be fully
secure. In the Hobbesian vocation, it is important to acknowledge the
achievement of natural equality among men freed from all non-political
sources of authority, including the religious.
Rousseau on Inequality
In his Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality (also called
the Second Discourse), Rousseau speculates on human psychology and the
history of social institutions. This is where he delves deep into the issue of
human inequality, describing its various types that exist among human
beings and determining which kind of inequality are ‘natural’ and which
ones are ‘unnatural’. Rousseau presents his analysis of society and the
origins of inequality as a historical narrative. The narrative is relatively
simple but bears a powerful message. For Rousseau, man in his state of
nature is essentially an animal like any other, driven by two key
motivating principles: pity and self-preservation. In the state of nature,
which is more a hypothetical idea man neither is a rational creature nor
possesses the concept of good and evil, has few needs, and is essentially
happy. The only thing that separates him from the beasts is some sense of
unrealized perfectibility. This notion of perfectibility is what allows human
beings to change with time, and according to Rousseau, it becomes
important the moment an isolated human being is forced to adapt to his
environment and allows himself to be shaped by it. When natural disasters
force people to move from one place to another, make contact with other
people, and form small groups or elementary societies, new needs are
created, and men begin to move out of the state of nature towards
something very different. Rousseau writes that as individuals have more
contact with one another and small groups begin to form, the human mind
develops language, which, in turn, contributes to the development of
reason. Life in the collective state also precipitates the development of a
new, negative motivating principle for human actions. Rousseau calls this
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principle amour propre, and it drives men to compare themselves to
others. This drive towards comparison with others is not only rooted in the
desire to preserve the self and pity others, but it also drives men to seek
domination over their fellow human beings as a way of augmenting their
own happiness.
Rousseau states that with the development of amour propre and more
complex human societies, private property is invented, and the labour
necessary for human survival is divided among different individuals to
provide for the whole. This division of labour and the beginning of private
property allow the property owners and all those who live off the labour of
others to dominate and exploit the poor. Rousseau observes that the poor
resent this state of affairs and will naturally seek war against the rich to
end their unfair domination. In Rousseau’s history, when the rich
recognize this, they deceive the poor into joining a political society that
claims to grant them the equality they seek. The universal consent of
humanity is needed to justify the institution of private property. The rich
suggest that everyone associate together to use their common force to
‘secure the weak from oppression, restrain the ambitious, and secure for
everyone the possession of what belongs to him’. The naïve and
unsuspecting poor ‘ran to meet their chains thinking they secured their
freedom, for although they had enough reason to feel the advantages of a
political establishment, they did not have enough experience to foresee its
dangers’ (Rousseau 1964: 159–60). Instead of granting equality, however,
the rich sanctify their oppression and make an unnatural moral inequality a
permanent feature of civil society.
In the progress of inequality through the different epochs of civilization,
Rousseau notes how the changing nature of institutionalized inequality
transforms the dynamic of social relations. If the right to property and the
establishment of law was the first stage, it authorized the status of rich and
poor. The institution of magistracy was the second stage and it established
the relations between the powerful and the weak. The last stage effected
the transformation of legitimate power into arbitrary power (which we just
discussed above) that authorized the existence of masters and slaves. In
Rousseau’s inequality-continuum, the property owners or the rich amass
power and become masters. For the poor the metamorphosis would follow:
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poor→weak→slaves. That is a powerful statement but is soon followed up
by Rousseau’s claims that when no more inequality is possible and things
have been stretched to their limits, ‘new revolutions dissolve the
government altogether or bring it closer to its legitimate institution’
(Rousseau 1964: 172).
Rousseau’s argument in the Second Discourse is that the only natural
inequality among men is that which results from differences in physical
strength, for this is the only sort of inequality that exists in the state of
nature. As he explains, however, in modern societies the creation of laws
and property has corrupted natural men and created new forms of
inequality that are not in accordance with natural law. Rousseau calls these
unjustifiable,unacceptable forms of inequality. It is, in other words, moral
inequality, and he concludes by making clear that this sort of inequality
must be contested. From this analysis and the prescribed prognosis of ‘new
revolutions’, a straight road leads to the work of Karl Marx.
Marx
At one level, Marx’s views on equality can best be described as a critique
of liberal equality. In his polemic against the prevalent socialist conception
of equality, Marx derided his contemporaries for their inability to account
for the materialistic conception of history. It was necessary for Marx to
correct popular misconceptions surrounding the ideal whose uses were
more in the interest of the bourgeois. In The German Ideology, Marx seeks
to unravel the ideological bind that certain concepts have in a historical
period. A ruling class has its own ideology to which society subscribes.
The parallel between Rousseau and Marx here is pretty evident. As
Rousseau laments how the poor get duped by the promises made by the
rich to secure the consent of the former to institute ‘legitimate’ power,
Marx also shows how the ruling class produces a legitimating ideology to
perpetuate the system of economic exploitation. Towards that end, the
division of labour in the ruling class of a capitalist society will ensure a
division between mental and material labour, and correspondingly the
division between the ‘the thinkers of the class’ and the capital owners will
emerge. The former are ‘the active, conceptive ideologists, who make the
perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of
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livelihood’. All historical epochs provide their own ruling ideas: ‘during
the time the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc.,
were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie, the concepts
freedom, equality, etc.’ (Marx 1978: 173). These concepts are abstract and
hold sway by taking on the form of universality to which even some
socialists sometimes fall prey. But they are hollow and bereft of substance
unless accompanied by a communist vision.
What Marx envisions for the final stage of history—the communist,
classless society— becomes clear only when we understand the
impossibility of human emancipation under conditions of exploitative
social relations. The question of human emancipation is linked to freedom
from economic inequalities. The capitalist system intensifies and heightens
economic inequality. In the transitional socialist stage, emancipation is not
complete but equal access to the means of production is ensured. In this
transitional stage many capitalist practices, including the necessity of
labour and material incentives, do not vanish. The distributive principle in
operation during the stage is guided by the principle of ‘to each according
to his work’. Socialism, in the transitional phase, realizes the ethical
principle of liberalism. Here, man is seen only as a worker. In his Critique
of the Gotha Programme, however, Marx declares that in the final phase of
communism, society would be able to inscribe on its banner: ‘From each
according to his ability, to each according to his needs!’ (Marx 1978: 521).
Under communism, man will no longer be regarded simply as a producer
but as a person with needs and desires, which, rather than his contribution
of labour, will be the basis for the distribution of goods. The distribution of
goods, properly understood, is the consequence of the distribution of the
conditions of production. Scarcity and conflict of economic interests are
contingent aspects of class societies. These will disappear with the
inauguration of communist society.
Tocqueville
The central thrust of Tocqueville’s work was to study equality as a
tendency of modern history. His study of the American democratic
revolution was designed to understand the historical transition from
feudalism to democracy in the Western society as a whole. His study was
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not meant to just identify the transition, but to account for it as well. Why
was the triumph of equality inevitable? The project involved explaining
the gradual and progressive development of social equality. Equality as an
ideal appeals to people who wish to escape conditions of servitude and
dependence. It makes democratic life possible. In comparing aristocracy
with democracy, Tocqueville notes: ‘Aristocracy links everybody,from
peasant to king, in one long chain. Democracy breaks the chain and frees
each link’ (Tocqueville 1969: 508). In democracies, men prefer equality to
liberty, and hold on to it tenaciously. ‘The charms of equality are felt the
whole time and are within the reach of all; the noblest spirits appreciate
them, and the commonest minds exult in them. The passion generated by
equality is therefore both strong and general’ (Tocqueville 1969: 505).
However, Tocqueville warns us of the dangers of excessive equality. There
are times when the passions for equality may turn into a delirium.
Tocqueville is equivocal about the consequences of social equality on
political life. Although passions for equality may be found to exist very
strongly in democracies, it is vital, in his view that a single-minded pursuit
of equality at the expense of liberty may prove detrimental to the political
health of democracies.
WHY EQUALIZE?
Reduction of inequalities may be considered as the primary objective of
equality. But, why reduce inequalities? The objective of inequality-
reduction can be inspired, for example, by a commitment to the ideal of
uniformity. One way to bring about uniformity in an unequal world is to
fix for everyone equal income irrespective of the individuals’ abilities, or
to design and distribute identical houses irrespective of the size of the
family. This we know raises more problems than helps resolve. For
instance, the idea of an equal income militates against what we deserve by
way of differential talents, skills, occupations and efforts. No one can
make a plausible argument that irrespective of our social positions we all
deserve equal income. No one as well can make a convincing case that
every family, whatever the size, gets to have a two- or three-room house.
Or, for that matter, no one would ever argue that irrespective of
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performance in the examinations, every student should get the same
grades.
Uniformity, in spite of some of its attractions, cannot be the end of
equality, at least the way we understand and extend the latter in
distributional terms. Equality must appeal to some other and better
standards. However, a caveat is in order. Uniformity is a valuable standard
when we speak of fair procedures. The idea here is that, rich or poor, high
or low- ranking, each one of us is entitled to the uniformity of equal
treatment, say, in the court of law, where our wealth or social rank should
not affect the dispensation of justice. The usefulness of the yardstick of
uniformity, however, ceases to have a moral significance in the
distributional sphere.
Equality achieves certain ends and, by doing so, augments its moral
appeal and its separate standing as an autonomous value. Equality is
valuable for fulfilling four different ends to which it has an intrinsic
connection. First, equality is sometimes required in order to be fair. If
there are benefits or burdens to distribute, then, other things being equal, it
is unfair to distribute them unequally. It is unfair, say, to award unequal
marks or grades to two equally talented students who have performed
identically in their examinations. In the absence of good moral reasons for
an unequal distribution, fairness requires equality.
Second, equality is desirable because some measure of equality is
necessary for self-respect. People may belong to different positions in
society but that should not reflect on how they perceive each other. When
a person feels that in spite of the status differences that she shares with
others she is as good as none, her self-respect is in danger. A fundamental
way of understanding the need for self-respect is to acknowledge that the
gap between a person’s self-image and how others who are better off
perceive that person is not too huge. Often, this calls for correcting unjust
external conditions—by way of, for example, ensuring a minimally just
material condition—that have a bearing on a person’s self-image.
Third, equality enjoins a duty to show respect to others. The ability to
possess self-respect is not the only thing that matters, but how one treats
others. Showing equal respect implies recognizing that all people have
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capacities to deliberate for themselves and to engage in activities and
relationships that are considered intrinsically valuable.
Finally, equality is necessary to foster fraternity. Conditions of equality
induce some measure of solidarity among the inhabitants of a society by
way of removing systematic barriers to social intercourse. Most
commuters in buses and on trains do not worry about the caste or religious
affiliation of their fellow passenger. Across caste and communal divide,
people join hands to fight various forms of injustice. This is possible
because we believe in the ideal of equality. Inequalities are objectionable
in part because they place barriers to friendship, community and love.
All the above four justifications for equality are complementary to each
other. Together, they capture different reasons for a general defence of
equality and each separately highlights a special aspect as significant. The
argument to be fair on grounds of distributive justice focuses on the equal
satisfaction of basic needs. The argument from the perspective of
selfrespect makes a case for equality of status by requiring that material
inequalities should not be glaring. The case for equal respect demands
prerequisites of equal opportunities for selfdevelopment. Finally, the
argument from the perspective of fraternity makes a case for social
equality (Miller 1996).
EQUALITY OF WHAT?
In contemporary political philosophy, a lot of discussion surrounds the
‘equality of what?’ debate. Any attempt to apply the principle of equality
between individuals must first come to terms with what exactly we must
be concerned to equalize. In addition, the ‘what’ of equality has a
distributional aspect to it; we are chiefly talking here about distributional
equality. Although the final word on the debate on ‘equality of what?’ is
yet to be said, scholars generally identify three metrics of equality:
welfare, resources and capabilities. Besides the above, there is an
alternative conception of equality that is less a competitor to distributional
equality and more of a complement. This is the idea of complex equality.
We shall examine each one of them below.
Equality of Welfare
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Utilitarians generally argue that the project of distributional equality
amounts to the distribution of welfare. ‘Welfare’ here is primarily
understood in two ways. According to the classical utilitarian thinking, as
espoused by Jeremy Bentham (also see Chapter 3), welfare refers to the
happiness which is understood as the net balance of pleasure over pain that
the individual experiences. According to this view, in assessing how well-
off someone is in life, we should look at how happy he or she is, that is, at
the net balance of pleasure over pain in his/her life. In more recent
writings, however, welfare is identified with desire or preference-
satisfaction; people have more or less welfare, and so have better or worse
lives in a fundamental sense, depending on how far they satisfy their
desires or their preferences. In deciding which preferences matter most to a
person, the person must be able to form his/her own judgements
independently and with full information without any scope for errors of
reasoning.
A society that believes in distributing welfare equally will not worry
much about how much resources individuals get, but whether or not these
resources are instrumental in securing for each individual a level of
satisfaction or happiness (whether in terms of pleasure or preference-
fulfilment) equal to everyone else. Under such a scheme, it is imperative
that we fulfil everyone’s welfare equally irrespective of the inequality
entailed in the distribution of resources. Someone who has a taste for an
expensive car or jewellery is to be treated at par with someone who is
happy riding a bicycle or owning a lantern. There is a moral issue here,
however, that is bound to engage our intuitive notions of fairness. Should
our society subsidize people’s expensive tastes? Why should those who are
unhappy without expensive cars have more of a claim on social resources
than those who are content with bicycles? Or, for that matter, why should a
society underwrite a gambler’s professional risks and treat it at par with
someone who needs much fewer resources to be trained as a car mechanic?
Demands to treat preferences equally can at times be morally worrisome
and unsustainable. The ideal of equality of welfare, let us be clear,
certainly does not promote the cause of fairness, self-respect, or fraternity.
In many ways, the ideal is considered morally objectionable by most
liberals and is held to be unattractive as a yardstick for social policy.
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Equality of Resources
The resourcist view of equality or ‘resource egalitarianism’ is most
expressly identified with the views ofJohn Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and
Eric Rakowski. Equality of resources, Dworkin maintains, holds that a
distributional scheme treats people as equals ‘when it distributes or
transfers so that no further transfer would leave their shares of the total
resources more equal’ (Dworkin 1981: 186). But one needs to know when
precisely equality of resources is likely to be achieved. Dworkin suggests a
two-stage process: (i) the ambition-sensitive auction, and (ii) the insurance
scheme. But let us start with a simpler story, a story—much like a
philosopher’s fiction—that Dworkin himself uses.
Imagine we are shipwrecked immigrants washed ashore on a deserted
island. Let us further assume for the moment (though we will qualify this
later) that everyone has the same natural talents. Huddled together in an
island with abundant resources and no native population, we set upon the
task of equally dividing the available resources. We elect one amongst us
to effect an equal division of resources. The division will follow the
auction procedure. In view of the fact that our goals in life may differ, we
need to exercise our choices on which resources we need and hence bid
for. To that extent, we are each given 100 clamshells to bid for all the
available resources in the island that are up for sale in a perfectly
competitive market. Each one of us is likely to have different preferences
and our preferences will determine on what we wish to spend our
clamshells. Someone who wishes to engage in farming will spend a major
part of the clamshells on agricultural land, and those others who wish to
spend time near the sea will bid for the beaches. And a person who wishes
to set up a dairy farm will bid for cattle and some grazing land. In this
manner, each one will bid for different resources in accordance with one’s
ambitions and each will end up with a bundle of resources that he or she
would not wish to trade away with someone else’s. The division, so
effected by the purchase of a different but equal bundle of resources in the
auction, meets the envy test, which implies that ‘no division of resources is
an equal division if, once the division is complete, any immigrant would
prefer someone else’s bundle of resources to his own bundle’ (Dworkin
1981: 285). We could say that if the envy test is met, then people have
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been treated with equal consideration, and differences between them
owing to different bundles of resources are a reflection of their different
ambitions.
We have just met the requirement of choice in the resource egalitarian
conception. However, in the real world it is difficult to imagine that
everyone would be similarly endowed in natural assets. We are re-opening
an issue that we had assumed to be non-existent earlier. Will the envy test
succeed if we assumed that people were differently endowed? Suppose
some of us are physically challenged and are born with natural handicaps,
say, without eyesight. Now, in the auction scheme where all of us enjoy
equal ability to bid for equal bundles of resources, no two persons with
different natural endowments will find themselves under conditions of
equal circumstances. A person who is physically challenged, for instance,
will have special needs and the resources that she purchases with her 100
clamshells will leave her less well-off than others. She shares the burden
of unequal circumstances. Where the more fortunate than her make more
meaningful choices with their resources, a disproportionate amount of her
resources will be spent in meeting her special needs. This is not fair
considering that her handicap was involuntarily acquired. How do we then
meet the envy test?
One way out would be to compensate for her natural disadvantage from
the common pool of resources before we start the auction process. In order
to be fair to her we may be required to design a distributional plan that
offsets her brute luck before giving her a fair go at the auction. The plan is
simple: we need to be both endowment-insensitive and ambitionsensitive.
This is another way of acknowledging, as Dworkin suggests, that people’s
fates in any distributional scheme is as much determined by their choices
as by their circumstances. Hence, although the auction takes care of
people’s choices, compensating people—or, better still, securing insurance
for them against brute luck—is morally required. However, the matter is
not as simple as it mayfirst seem. One cannot simply concede that we
compensate all natural disadvantages of the unlucky. Some disadvantages
cannot just be compensated, and some need not be a cause of great
concern. And in cases where compensation is due we can only partially
equalize unequal circumstances—not wholly—no matter how much we
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compensate. We need to strike a balance somewhere between being fair to
people’s choices and taking moral responsibility for their disadvantages.
An ambition-sensitive auction needs to be balanced by an insurance
scheme that takes care of natural, undeserved inequalities. Before the
auction can take place, all of us may be required to put aside, say, 25 or 30
clamshells to meet the obligations towards the disadvantaged and then bid
for the available resources. A central objective of Dworkin’s proposal is to
invite us to see the parallels between what we commit ourselves to in an
ideal setting, and what the transposed implications are to the non-ideal,
real world. A rough parallel of the insurance scheme in the real world is
the practice of progressive taxation. Taxing the rich proportionately more
than the poor enables the state to secure welfare for the disadvantaged. A
resourcist conception of equality lays emphasis on the centrality of state
responsibility towards remedying unequal circumstances among people.
Equality of Capabilities
The economist Amartya Sen pioneers the idea that distributional equality
should concern itself with equalizing people’s capabilities, instead of
emphasizing on resources or incomes. We should be able to, Sen argues,
focus on the real freedoms that people enjoy such as being able to read,
being healthy, having self-respect, being politically active, being able to
take part in the life of the community, and so on. The proper focus should
be on what people are able to be and do, that is on their functions, and not
on how much resource is allocated to them. Resources only secure for us
what makes us happy, lead valuable lives, and are therefore, to be
considered as means of well-being.
In contrast to the resource approach, Sen proposes the notion of well-
being understood in terms of function. Reading is a function vital to
leading a valuable life. However, Sen does not argue that social policy
should be concerned with function. Social policy, according to Sen, should
instead focus on capabilities. A capability is the ability to achieve a certain
sort of function. For example, literacy is a capability, while reading is a
function. In a society where people are illiterate, a state should actively
promote people’s ability to read, i.e. literacy. Whereas a resource
egalitarian may insist that resources such as books and educational
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services may be provided for in regions that are deficient in literacy, the
capability advocate would argue that more than a provision of external
means what matters is the capability— an internal ability—of the target
population to read and write. This way of addressing the problem of
inequality is indeed a novel one.
The novelty of the capability approach is further brought home by Sen’s
observation that a proper analysis of inequality needs to go hand-in-hand
with facts of human diversity. We are, Sen argues, ‘deeply diverse in our
internal characteristics (such as age, gender, general abilities, particular
talents, proneness to illnesses and so on) as well as in external
circumstances (such as ownership of assets, social backgrounds,
environmental predicaments, and so on).’ (Sen 1993: xi) To take one
example of an internal characteristic (gender) made worse in the presence
of some adverse external factors (discrimination and patriarchal
institutions), Sen points to the mortality differential between males and
females (that also accounts for the phenomenon of ‘missing women’ in
countries such as China and India), especially among rural families in Asia
and Africa (Sen 1993: 122–25). If other social characteristics such as
identity and social disadvantage are factored in, our understanding of
inequality deepens. Hence, it will be plausible to maintain, for instance,
that beyond the simplistic account of gender inequality, most Dalit women
are worse off than other women in terms of high mortality. However, the
buck may not stop here. It will be a real test to determine further whether
Dalit women of Delhi, for example, fare as badly as, say, widows from
upper-caste rural Rajasthan. Some would argue, and with good reasons,
that the latter—due to rigid external constraints—are probably worse off
than the former. We need to be sensitive to such differences and not be
misled by appearances. Since many characteristics can impinge on
people’s functioning, it is essential that policy makers amass as much
information as possible before they design suitable policies to equalize
people’s capabilities. Social policy must be attuned to facts of human
diversity. A simple minded approach (for example, of equalizing incomes)
towards correcting complex modes of inequality will simply not do.
Complex Equality
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Michael Walzer gives currency to the idea of complex equality. Walzer is
an egalitarian but finds himself ill at ease with the intellectual enterprise
involved in identifying the single most important metric of equality—
welfare, resources or capability. This enterprise, to him, is somewhat
misplaced. It is misplaced due to the egalitarians’ unrelenting insistence on
a single point of access to the plurality of distributive arrangements. This
needs unpacking. Often, in our quest to distribute goods, we harp more on
the principles of distribution and less on what meaning we attribute to
goods. Walzer argues that people conceive of and create goods, which they
then distribute among themselves. It is important that we shift our attention
from distribution to the conception and creation of goods. We give
meanings to goods, which determines their social value. The same goods
have different meanings in different societies. There is no single set of
basic goods which could be universally conceived of and given the same
value. Rawls, Walzer would argue, was off the mark when he suggested
that what mattered was how a set of primary goods needed to be fairly
distributed across societies. If one knew how goods were socially created,
one would have difficulty agreeing with Rawls in giving a universalist
account of justice that would apply across time and space. ‘All
distributions are just and unjust relative to the social meanings of goods at
stake’ (Walzer 1983: 9). These meanings change across time and space.
For instance, the idea that childcare is solely a family responsibility no
longer holds true in some societies unlike in others. Every society will give
value to goods in a particular way, and will be sustained by a shared
understanding among members.
What, however, is typical to the understanding of how goods ought to be
distributed is that when meanings given to goods are distinct, distributions
must be autonomous. Every set of goods constitutes a distinct distributive
sphere within which only certain criteria of distribution are appropriate
(Walzer 1983: 10). Economists may be right to impute a certain measure
of rationality and acquisitiveness to the behaviour of people in the markets.
However, the same does not hold true in all social domains. Fathers and
mothers are supposed to be loving, trusting, caring and altruistic. Citizens
are supposed to be equal, impartial, and motivated by views of the
collective good. Resources within families are not distributed as wages;
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political offices in a democracy ought not to be distributed among
relatives. Walzer maintains that there is no reason to expect that the same
distributive standards must prevail in different ‘spheres’ of social life.
Thus, the spheres of the market and political power, to take two examples,
are distinct and separate. The norms for distributing goods within each are
internal to each and ideally should not spill over. Critics, however, may
reason that this is easier said than done. Of course, inequalities from
economic life do spill over into political life and vice versa. Wealth can
buy votes, and elected representatives can misuse their offices to further
the interests of business. This, Walzer would be quick to point out, is
highly undesirable. Nations do indeed erect barriers, with limited success,
to restrict the extent to which wealth leads to political power.
Within each sphere, there might well be inequalities and there is nothing
wrong with that. If the distributional norm in the economic domain lays
emphasis on effort and because of which inequalities emerge between
those who work hard and those who do not, the indolent or the lazy cannot
expect to be similarly rewarded as the diligent. This inequality is
acceptable with the caveat that hard work at times goes unrewarded in
some societies. What is not acceptable, however, is when people who
enjoy a certain pre-eminence in other spheres are disproportionately
rewarded in the economic sphere. A case in point could well be to ask
whether reward for work should be related to religious affiliation. In
Walzer’s scheme, it is clear it cannot be. But, what if it does? That would
lead to tyranny. Tyranny is the disregard for the distinctness of spheres and
the principles internal to them and in ways in which it multiplies
inequalities. Some groups can monopolize a particular category of goods
and then use their monopoly to achieve unequal distribution of other
goods. That would lead to dominance. Our effort should be on the
reduction of dominance. Equality requires a diversity of distributive
criteria that mirrors the diversity of social goods.
Complex equality is the opposite of tyranny. ‘It establishes a set of
relationships such that domination is impossible. In formal terms, complex
equality means that no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with regard to
one social good can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with
regard to some other good’ (Walzer 1983: 19). The idea of complex
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equality is a refreshingly different perspective than those struggling over
the metrics of equality. In contrast to the abstractions of individual
responsibility and personhood that characterizes the three conceptions we
discussed above, Walzer’s approach focuses attention on the social
meanings of goods and the plurality of the spheres of justice.
IN CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY

The politics of egalitarianism in the 20th century was instrumental in
justifying the idea of a welfare state, among other things. That idea,
successful in its heyday, has declined over the past two decades. What
went wrong? We cannot detail all the causes, but a short checklist may
help. Many democratic societies today are witnessing the rise of right-
wing politics. This trend started in the 1980s when governments headed by
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher unleashed a backlash against the
welfare state. The legitimacy of the welfare state was called into question
and it was largely discredited for having given short shrift to individual
responsibility, creativity and economic efficiency. Right-wing politics in
recent times is sustained by citizens who wish to pay less tax and
consequently vote to power parties (usually right-wing) who promise less
tax. In the global political landscape, moreover, one notices a decisive
ideological shift toward the right. The politics of globalization has further
caused a setback to the practice of redistribution and the idea of welfare-
state policies.
Yet another distinct political phenomenon is also visible: the political
struggles of identity groups. This parallels new concerns in normative
political theory, too. The ‘equality of what?’ debate is being replaced by
‘equality of whom?’. Egalitarians are increasingly shedding their
individualist bias and are keener to engage in concerns surrounding
inequality between groups that owe more to non-material factors. The
struggles for greater equality by women, minorities, Dalits, linguistic
groups and others are a pointer to the continuing relevance of the bases of
social equality and a corresponding search for new paradigms of
groupsensitive equality.
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1. In drawing up a will between five children with different tastes and ambitions,
how would a parent divide the inhertitance among them? The following
information is provided about the children:
One is blind.
One does not wish to work and has expensive tastes.
One is a prospective politician with expensive ambitions.
One is a teacher with humble needs.
One is a fashion designer who works with expensive material.
2. As a representative of your class, you have been invited by the college
Governing Council to discuss policy issues related to
a. The translation of the most popular English textbooks to your native language
b. The expansion of Braille resources in the college library for visually challenged
students
c. The provision of wheelchair access to the entire college premises
Would you justify any of these policies? Why and how?
READING LIST
Aristotle, Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1984), an ebook version from MIT available at
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html
Cohen, G. A., ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics, 99(4), 1989: 906–44.
Dworkin, Ronald, ‘What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare’, Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 10(3), 1981: 185–246.
———, ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’, Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 10(4), 1981: 283–345.
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (London: Penguin Books, 1968), complete text available at
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/
Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Indian Edition
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Lakoff, Sanford A., Equality in Political Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
Marx, Karl, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton
and Co, 1978).
Miller, David, ‘Arguments for Equality’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 7, 1996: 73–
88.
Pojman, Louis P. and Robert Westmoreland (eds), Equality: Selected Readings (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, The First and Second Discourses (New York: St Martin’s
Press, 1964).
Sen, Amartya, Inequality Re-examined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
116
Tocqueville, Alexis de, Democracy in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1969),
entire text and background available at
http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/DETOC/home.html
Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York:
Basic Books, 1983).
Williams, Bernard A. O., ‘The Idea of Equality’, in Peter Laslett and W G. Runciman
(eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Series II (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997).
117
CHAPTER 5
Justice
Krishna Menon
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
The Issue of Distributive Justice
Procedural Justice
John Rawls: Justice as Fairness
Limitations of Rawls’ Theory of Justice
Communitarian Critique
Feminist Critique
Justice, Capabilities, and Freedom: Amartya Sen’s Extension of John Rawls’

Theory of Justice
End-State Theories
Feminist Accounts of Justice
Conclusion
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INTRODUCTION
Procedural theories of justice do not make a distinction between
production and distribution. Such theories contend that there can be no
abstract principle of distribution that takes the whole society into account.
Such theories work with the idea of individual entitlements. In this
context, the chapter deals with the principles of justice formulated by
Robert Nozick and John Rawls, as well as with a critique of Rawls’ work.
The last part of the chapter discusses feminist accounts of justice that have
opened up a completely new way of arguing about issues such as justice.
The concept of justice that we will discuss in this chapter is closely
related to the concepts of liberty and equality discussed in the preceding
chapters. In everyday life, justice is seen as an attribute of law. But if we
think closely, we shall realize that all laws are not always just. In fact,
many great political and social movements the world over have focused
upon opposition to unjust laws, e.g. the movement against the apartheid
laws in South Africa.
The other commonly held belief about justice is that it is always
impartial—we only need to think of courtroom scenes in popular Hindi
films where the camera inevitably focuses upon the statue of the goddess
of justice, who is blindfolded and holds the scales of justice in her hands.
Thus, impartiality and fairness are understood to be aspects of justice.
One of the earliest accounts of justice is found in Plato’s Republic. In
this book, Plato tries to establish the ‘true nature of justice’ and then goes
on to construct an ideal state that would be an embodiment of his
understanding of justice. For Plato, justice was one of the four principles
of virtue, the other three being temperance, wisdom, and courage. An ideal
state would be the embodiment of justice, where every individual would be
true to his nature, some men being philosophical and intellectual, and
others good workers or artisans and so on. In a just state each individual
would fulfil his duty diligently. (Needless to add, women hardly figure in
Plato’s scheme of things.) For Aristotle, justice lies in incorporating
concerns of equality, proportionality and the maintenance of equilibrium in
society. Thus, in him we find a shift away from the notion of hierarchy that
informed the Platonic concept of justice.
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Subsequent to the concern for justice displayed by Greek philosophy,
there was a general lull on this subject. Either divinity and God were
invoked, or the ideal of natural justice or else traditions and conventions,
determined the ideas on justice. With the gradual secularization of life in
Europe, thanks to a variety of changes ranging from the Renaissance to the
Industrial Revolution, new ways of thinking about justice emerged. Justice
came to be located as an idea firmly within the secular framework of the
modern nation-state. What it meant and how it was to be maintained
evoked different answers, but it was clear that justice was no longer seen
as a religious principle or as based on traditional social practices. It was
seen as a set of principles to be upheld by the state in order to make life
and business well regulated.
Plato presented his account of justice more than 2,000 years ago, but
even today some of the most interesting debates and discussions in
politics, and more specifically in political theory, are around the question:
‘what is justice?’.
THE ISSUE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Politics is to a great extent about who gets what and why In our country
we know that school facilities, food, safe drinking water, health care and
many such things are not available to all our citizens. What do you think is
the basis on which this distribution is justified? The criteria commonly
employed for distribution of goods and services are ‘desert’, merit and
need. Justice is, thus, more often than not linked with distribution; it is a
distributive concept.
The concept of desert (from the old French word deserte, meaning to
deserve) refers to the actions of men and women that result in special
treatment either in the form of rewards or in the form of punishments. It is
to suggest that the rewards or punishments that a man or a woman receive,
or is subjected to, are a consequence of his or her efforts and actions.
The criterion of merit is very similar, implying that the meritorious need
to be rewarded. For instance, when a student fails an exam it is often said
that she or he deserved the failure, but it is possible that the student could
not attend classes and devote much time to studies because of various
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problems like an ailing family member or an alcoholic parent. Under such
circumstances, can we still say that the student deserved to fail?
In other words, it is very difficult to isolate individual actions and
efforts from what goes on in society, especially what the society considers
desirable, valuable or meritorious. For instance, men and women might be
working very hard at the various flyover construction sites in our cities,
but the reward they get is far less than the reward a cricketer might get.
Don’t you think this has something to do with what our society considers
to be more deserving of rewards and what is considered meritorious?
‘Need’ as a criterion suggests that people might differ in their
capabilities as well as needs; the principle of justice based on need would
argue that irrespective of people’s capabilities their needs ought to be
fulfilled. Imagine a situation where a safai karmachari (cleaner) with her
family of seven children and old parents gets a four-bedroom flat and a
neurosurgeon, on the other hand, with her two children and spouse gets a
two-bedroom flat, based on the criterion of need.
If we lived in a world of abundant resources, then perhaps the question
of justice would not have risen. Since we don’t, the question of who
should get what and why will always be an important one. Political
theorists divide their answers to these questions into two broad categories
—procedural and social. There are obviously many variations within these
theories, but there are some main features that can be summarized. In
procedural theories, demands of justice are satisfied if certain rules are
followed. The outcomes of these procedures are not relevant to the
evaluation of justice. Justice is only a property of individual behaviour and
cannot be a feature of ‘society’. Individuals are understood as autonomous
and rational beings who make their own independent choices and are,
therefore, responsible for the consequences of their actions.
In theories of social justice, justice is seen a feature of society, so
evaluation is done in terms of not what an individual gets or does not get,
but in terms of how just or unjust a society or state of affairs is according
to some agreed upon criterion. Such theories would be far more likely to
advocate the use of the state to uphold the principles of justice. For
example, a society might consider it just to allow only a certain section of
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its people access to education; anyone else trying to get access would incur
the wrath of the authorities.
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The basic point that needs to be highlighted about procedural justice
theories is that such theories do not make a distinction between production
and distribution. This means that each individual is on his or her own and
has entitlements that are individual in character and not dependent on any
abstract principle of distribution that takes the whole society into account.
This also implies that the state would have no authority to interfere in the
matter of individual entitlements; in fact, it would be terribly unjust if the
state was to do so. Based on a strong current of individualism these
theories do not accept that societies have any ‘ends’ or purposes that need
to be collectively strived for. This is, indeed, a very attractive idea and
makes the individual very powerful, autonomous, and completely in
control of his/her life, and also totally responsible for the successes or
failures that s/he may encounter. But when we think closely about this idea
we might feel a bit uncomfortable; it implies, for example, that cotton
farmers in Andhra Pradesh are solely responsible for the hardships that
they are facing, or that they ought to have worked harder.
Procedural theories of justice are more often than not based on a close
association with the workings of market economy. It is believed that the
market would, if not intervened with, make the best and most efficient use
of resources. Any attempt to tamper with this would be unjust and
detrimental to everyone. Besides, intervention would have to be based on
some agreed upon principles of desert or need. This, in the opinion of
procedural theorists, is not possible because in a free society there can be
no general agreement about what constitutes needs or what is a just desert.
While they would be concerned about those who cannot do well in the
market, and might even accept that the state needs to step in to help, they
would not accept that this has anything to do with justice.
Robert Nozick’s theory of justice as explained in his book, Anarchy,
State and Utopia, is a good example of the procedural theory of justice.
The distinction that he makes between historical and end-state principles
of justice is crucial to our understanding of his theory of justice. He argues
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that the historical principle holds that an individual’s past actions
determine the deserts s/he would be entitled to, and since actions are
different so would be the entitlements to deserts. The end-state principle
suggests that there would be a set of goals to which the distribution pattern
should conform.
Nozick argues that individual property holdings are just if they are a
consequence of fair acquisition or even transfer. This means that no fraud
or force should have been used in the acquisition of the property. The idea
is that at the heart of competitions, such as races, fairness is upheld if all
contestants obey rules and there is no cheating, no one jumps the gun or
indulges in substance abuse. Nozick allows for rectification if unfair
practices have been followed in the acquisition of property. If, under these
circumstances, some individuals are able to acquire and amass huge
amounts of property without using force or fraud, Nozick would not allow
for a redistribution of this property. By arguing in this vein, Nozick
ensures that the state would have only a very limited role to play in
redistribution. Individual liberty, Nozick argues, is thus safeguarded.
Nozick does not think of restrictions as being necessary so long as
acquisitions are fair and exchanges are voluntary in nature. In other words,
no acquisition or exchange must worsen the position of others. But this is
indeed interpreted very narrowly. Nozick prohibits the appropriation of the
total supply of something that is essential to life. The example that he
gives illustrates this point effectively: no one should appropriate the only
water hole in the desert and charge what he will. But this still leaves the
possibility for the producer of a drug that cures a fatal disease to charge
prohibitively, for nobody’s condition is being worsened! A person afflicted
by a fatal illness is in any case going to die, and by denying him/her a drug
no new element of suffering has been introduced that worsens the
individual’s condition. By limiting the role of the state Nozick hopes to
ensure individual autonomy. This, he believes, would help individuals take
intiative and use their rationality effectively, creating conditions
favourable for the protection of individual liberty. Thus, Nozick’s theory
of justice is a fierce and interesting defence of individual liberty.
JOHN RAWLS: JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS
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John Rawls’ well-known book, Theory of Justice, presents a very strong
defence of the idea of justice based on the basic tenets of procedural
theory, i.e. justice requires a meticulous following of rules. Rawls’ theory,
however, takes care to respond to the most common criticism levelled
against procedural theory—that despite the meticulous following of rules,
unjust conditions might be created. In order to avoid this, Rawls suggests
that under controlled conditions rational human beings would choose
principles that would uphold ideas consistent with the basic idea of
distributive justice.
Rawls insists that justice prevails only when every departure from
equality can be rationally justified. Unlike in Nozick’s entitlement theory
where equality as an idea is conspicuous by its absence, Rawls’s theory of
justice is premised upon the need for equality. Rawls sets out his theory by
placing individuals abstracted from their social and economic contexts
behind what he calls the ‘veil of ignorance’. Individuals behind this veil
are unaware of who they are and what their interests, skills, needs and so
on are. Why does Rawls do this? Because usually people are prevented
from upholding just principles guided as they are by their selfish interests.
So, imagine a group of people who do not know whether they are Dalit or
Brahmin, Kuki or Naga, Muslim or Hindu and so on. Such a group of
people will then not know which way the fault lines of discrimination run
in their society. But in Rawls’ hypothetical situation called the ‘original
position’, these people would have an elementary knowledge of
economics, psychology and what Rawls calls a ‘sense of justice’. These
people, Rawls suggests, would be self-interested but not egoists. They
would have no particular vision of what constitutes the good life but would
be interested in maximizing their primary good—liberty, opportunity,
income, wealth and self-respect and, having no scope for envy, they would
not be affected by the position of others. Rawls hoped this would enable
them to pursue whatever conception of good they might discover to have,
when the veil is removed. He also assumes that these hypothetical people
would be conservative risk- takers and in a situation of uncertainty would
obviously opt for the least disadvantageous outcome in any choice
presented to them. Hence, they would choose those principles which
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would maximize the position of the worst-off, assuming that when the veil
is removed, they themselves would turn out to be the worst off.
Such people, Rawls argues, would choose the following principles of
justice:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible
with similar liberty to others.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
a. to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and
b. attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality and
opportunity.
These principles are arranged by Rawls in a specific order and are

subject to the priority rule. The first principle must always come before the
second, and 2a) has to come before 2b). Thus, there is no risk of individual
liberty being compromised for the liberty of others. It also ensures that any
departure from the principle of equality brings maximum benefit to the
least advantaged; in other words, inequalities should be so arranged that
they benefit the worst-off.
In the Indian context, Rawls’ fierce commitment to equality and the
insistence that any departure from this principle can only be in the interest
of justice is a familiar idea. The strong tradition of democratic politics with
its roots in the national movement recognized that commitment to the
ideals of equality, liberty and fraternity in the context of intense and deep-
rooted social inequality called for some imaginative and creative political
thinking.
Dr B. R. Ambedkar with his varied personal, educational, professional
and political experiences provides us with insightful thinking on the
subject of inequality and democracy Despite the differences, the wide
spectrum of groups that fought against colonialism in India were united by
their commitment to the ideal of equality. This commitment, in the
background of an elaborate and well-entrenched system of social
inequalities, particularly in the form of caste, made it a rather difficult one.
After Independence when it was time for drafting the Constitution,
Ambedkar, as the Chairperson of the Drafting Committee steered the
Constitution in the direction of justice and equality. This was based on the
fundamental assumption that systematic departures from norms of equality
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would have to be made in the pursuit of justice. These departures were
justified on the grounds that it would guarantee against persistence of
discrimination in subtle and indirect forms, and that it would promote
integration and better utilization of talents and a more equitable
distribution. Apart from all this, it would constitute a kind of historical
reparation to offset centuries of deprivations faced by the lower castes in
the past. Ambedkar argued that political democracy could not be sustained
on the base of social inequality. Thus, the Indian Constitution permits the
creation of an elaborate and diverse range of programmes that permit the
departure from formal equality, for the purpose of favouring certain
historically deprived groups.
The Constitution further bans discriminatory practices (caste-based) in
government institutions. Apart from this is, of course, the whole policy of
reservation of seats in legislative bodies, administration and educational
institutions. All these together constitute the core of the constitutional
commitment to compensatory discrimination. The beneficiaries of
compensatory discrimination are three major groups consisting of the
Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and the Other Backward Classes.
Preferences are of three basic types: 1) reservations to allot or facilitate
access to resources and positions that are valued; 2) provision of services
like scholarships, grants, loans and land allotments, health care, legal aid
and so on; and 3) special protection schemes to prevent discriminatory
economic and social practices that victimize the backward classes.
Thus, in its original conceptualization, these proposals and policies were
seen as necessary extensions of the commitment to egalitarianism, where
every member is seen as having equal stakes in the common resources of
the Indian society. Thus, Ambedkar was suggesting that members of the
Dalit and backward classes had long been denied their rights and
independent India with its commitment to equality and freedom could not
afford to ignore the claims being made by this section of its citizens.
LIMITATIONS OF RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE

C. B. Macpherson in his book Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval
argues that Rawls’ theory of justice is actually a rather elegant defence of
what is essentially a liberal-democratic capitalist welfare state.
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Rawls accepts that despite equality of opportunity and education,
inequalities would remain because of the institution of the family. To
illustrate this point, Rawls contrasts the difference between the son of a
member of the entrepreneurial class and the son of an unskilled labourer.
He argues that such inequalities create differences in expectations,
providing incentives for the economy to become more efficient and
generate greater material wealth, thus benefiting everyone (including those
who are the worst off). Hence, Rawls would argue that not much is to be
gained by making attempts to iron out such inequalities. It is such a
defence of inequality that Macpherson finds inconsistent, given Rawls’
initial commitment to the idea of equality. Rawls accepts the inevitability
of class divisions based on income and wealth. Macpherson argues that
such inequalities would adversely affect individual liberty by creating
inequality of power in society.
Macpherson argues that Rawls does not really present a universal
account of justice but an account that rationalizes liberal beliefs and
values. Rawls admits that his theory is based on the existence of a
particular kind of individual who is free and equal, and inhabits a
pluralistic society that has no shared agreement about social institutions
and ends, towards which they ought to work. His account, he argues,
would in such a society provide stability and social unity. Thus, in
Macpherson’s opinion, far from being a universal account of justice
applicable to all rational human-beings, Rawls’ theory is culture-specific
and appropriate only for liberal-democratic societies with a welfare
orientation. Besides, the Rawlsian individual is hardly a stripped-down
abstract individual; the rational, self interested, individualistic and
autonomous individual is too similar to the liberal conception of the
individual to have any universal application.
COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE
The main focus of the communitarian critique of Rawls is on the idea that
people in the original position choose a set of principles that become the
foundation of supposedly universal ideas of justice. Communitarians point
out that individuals can only be identified as members of pre-existing
social organizations. This means that whatever ideas men and women
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have, have come out of the society and community they belong to. Hence,
their notions of what should be the distributive criterion will obviously
emerge out of this context. For example, people in many communities
believed that a part of their agricultural harvest belonged to the temple
deity and to the priestly class. To us, in the present context, this would be
unacceptable, but it obviously made sense to those people who lived in
another time and another context.
Communitarians object to the idea that individuals abstracted from their
social, economic and cultural contexts can make choices. They argue that
such a ‘stripped-down’ individual will be unable to make choices. Since
the Rawlsian veil of ignorance keeps individuals out of a real social
context, communitarians ask the question of how the choices they make
can ever be relevant in an actual social context. Communitarians argue that
individuals are determined by their communitarian contexts and the
choices they make are determined by their notion of what is good. This
notion of the good is not in their opinion a consequence of individual
rationality and determination but is created and held together by what the
community—to which the individual belongs—thinks of as being the
‘good’.
Michael Walzer in his book Spheres of Justice represents the
communitarian case against Rawls. Walzer’s basic point is that no system
of justice can be evaluated as inherently just or unjust; evaluation is
possible only on the basis of the social meanings attached to the goods at
stake. The example that Walzer himself gives is of a society based on the
caste system, where purity and pollution are determined by birth. Birth,
thus, decides access to a variety of goods, e.g. water, land, education.
Walzer argues that as long as all the members of the society share the
social meanings of the caste system, justice would constitute being true to
those meanings and upholding the principle of distribution that follows
from it. Thus, the distribution of goods cannot be decided without
understanding the specific meanings of those goods which are socially
constructed and embedded in the community, its practices and institutions
rather than in individual deeds and thoughts. Therefore, Walzer suggests
that the goods that need to be distributed are social goods because their
meaning and values are created socially. Justic, thus, can only be
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understood within a communal framework and not on the basis of abstract,
universal principles. He is of the opinion that different social goods should
be distributed for different reasons according to different procedures and
by different agents. Needless to add, these differences would emerge out
of the different understandings of the social goods themselves because of
diverse and particular histories and cultures.
FEMINIST CRITIQUE
Susan Moller Okin in her book Justice, Gender and the Family points out
that most grand and philosophical works on justice rarely consider the
working of the family as being significant for any discussion on justice.
Rawls is no different. The family is considered to be ‘private’ and justice
as an idea has a bearing on the ‘public’ sphere. This assumption overlooks
the fact that the family and its working is itself to a very great extent
constituted by the ‘public’ world of laws and institutions and ideas of
justice that constitute it. Think of the number of laws that govern our
family lives—property, inheritance, divorce, adoption, and so on. Thus,
the ‘public’ has a direct bearing on the ‘private’. People’s lives in the
‘public’ shapes, and is also shaped by their ways of participating in family
life. For instance, unequal division of labour within the family creates
obstacles for women in their lives outside the family and these inequalities
are often supported by social traditions. Cooking, child care and
housekeeping are, for instance, supposed to be solely women’s
responsibilities, giving them very little time or energy and gradually even
robbing them of a desire to enjoy an active life outside the family.
Okin argues that any theory of justice which is silent about the
inequalities within the family is an incomplete one. If young people grow
up within families where injustice is a norm and is rendered acceptable,
masquerading as it does in the garb of either virtues like ‘nobility’,
‘sacrifice’ and ‘patience’ or nature, they can hardly be expected to acquire
a sense of justice. Rawls is also guilty of this omission.
In Rawls’ scheme it is only the heads of households—assumed to be
men—who come together and agree to accept the principles of justice.
Rawls accepts the family as the basic structure of society for which the
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principles of justice are being chosen. But he does not think it necessary to
ponder about the injustices within the family.
Okin’s suggestion while retaining the Rawlsian spirit is to deny people
in the original position any knowledge of whether they are men or women
and then insist that they undertake an evaluation of the family, for it is part
of the basic structure of the society. This, she argues, will result in an
evaluation of the injustices within the family and thus a truly humanist
notion of justice could be created.
Some feminists argue that the model of a self-interested, autonomous,
rational and individualistic person is a typically male conception and
leaves little scope for values and practices like nurturing, caring, co-
operation and empathy that are typically female qualities. Thus, they argue
that female qualities are not represented in Rawls’ original position.Yet
another set of feminist arguments point out that Rawls’ emphasis on
impersonality, rationality and universality are based on male norms of
moral reasoning; women’s style of moral reasoning is different arising as it
does out of considering the particular needs of each person. Therefore, the
individual in the original position is a man and Rawls’ theory can hence
have little significance to women and specific situations and contexts. It
would be worth debating whether men and women are essentially so
different. Are all women always caring and full of empathy? Communal
riots in our country have time and again shown us that this need not be the
case. And are men never nurturing and caring?
JUSTICE, CAPABILITIES, AND FREEDOM: AMARTYA SEN’S EXTENSION OF

JOHN RAWLS’ THEORY OF JUSTICE
The Rawlsian paradigm of justice assigns a central role to the achievement
of liberty. Amartya Sen has certain reservations about this freedom-
oriented evaluation of justice. In his opinion, the Rawlsian framework
concentrates only on the means to freedom rather than on the extent of the
freedom that a person actually has. Sen would like to describe his
approach to justice as a capability-based one, wherein it is not just the
access to primary goods but the extent of capabilities that each individual
has to convert these primary goods into lives that they value living and that
would determine freedom and ultimately uphold justice.
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To explain this further, assume that there are two individuals both with
access to the same set of primary goods. Does this ensure that both
therefore enjoy the same amount of liberty? Sen’s answer would be no.
There could be various reasons like for example, physical limitations and
challenges that impose restrictions on capabilities. So, despite similar
access to primary goods there would be difference in the extent of
capabilities to convert these into freedom. Sen clarifies that capability
means a person’s freedom to choose between alternative lives and there
need be no unanimity about what would be considered a valued way of
life.
Capability thus represents freedom, whereas the Rawlsian primary
goods are just means to this freedom. Sen argues that equality of freedom
to pursue our ends cannot be guaranteed by equal distribution of what
Rawls describes as primary goods. Sen would want an examination of
interpersonal variations in people’s capabilities to pursue ends and
objectives. People not only value different things as good but they also
have varying capabilities to achieve freely the ends that they value. Rawls
is sensitive to the first mentioned diversity. Sen would, however, like him
to add to this a concern for variations in people’s ability to convert
resources into actual freedoms. Variations could be related to age, sex or
genetic endowments. These variations influence people’s abilities
differently to build freedom in their lives, despite having the same primary
resources.
END-STATE THEORIES
End-state theories of justice, i.e. theories that suggest a set of principles to
control the process of exchange between individuals, can also be referred
to as social justice theories. These theories require an evaluation of the
society as whole, and not only of individual actions. Marxist theory is a
good example of this approach. In his book, Critique of the Gotha
Programme, Marx undertakes a detailed discussion of the concept of
justice. He works with two types of concepts, one for the transitional
socialist society and the other for the communist society that would no
longer need the concept.
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In the transitional socialist society justice would mean that each person
should receive that which is in accordance with his or her labour
contribution to the social product. Marx, however, was not satisfied with
this contribution principle because it continued to regard people as workers
only and did not acknowledge the fact that different workers vary both in
talent and in need. Marx was dissatisfied with the contribution principle
because it did not incorporate the crucial factor of needs.
In contrast, in communist society the principle would be from each
according to his or her ability, to each according to his or her needs. This,
of course, means that people would produce goods and services without
the need for differential rewards and that they would be completely
unaffected by what others get. This would clearly not be possible in
conditions of scarcity and conflict between individuals; hence, material
abundance is crucial for this principle to be upheld.
At the heart of the Marxist critique of justice is an objection to a
community that has to be held together by a network of rights and
principles of justice. For Rawls, justice is the first virtue of social
institutions, but for Marx a truly good community would have no need for
the concept of justice. Marx accepts that under circumstances of scarcity
and conflict over goals, there would be a need for justice as a principle for
operation of society. This would, however, inhibit the possibility of a
higher form of community, where people would be spontaneously loving
and cooperate with each other. Thus, justice is at best seen as an
unavoidable but not very desirable necessity for societies flawed by
conflict and scarcity. Marx advocates the abolition of private property as
an essential step towards the creation of a cooperative and harmonious
community. In Marx’s opinion, the regime of private property that creates
conditions for wage-labour in capitalism is both exploitative and
alienating, and thus unjust.
Marx argued that labour is the source of value and that it is the worker
who creates the immense wealth of capitalist society, but gets only a
fraction of it as wage. This was unacceptable to Marx. Socialization of the
production process is Marx’s solution to this problem. This would, Marx
argued, make it possible for workers to have an effective say in
production, thus generating satisfaction for the worker and fulfilment of
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the most genuine human needs. From the Marxist perspective, pursuit of
profits in a market-driven society can never be the basis for creating
justice; it is only fulfilment of genuine human needs in conditions of
unalienated labour that can be the basis for justice.
Thus, we see that the Marxist theory of justice, like most end-state
theories, claims that certain ways of life constitute human perfection or
excellence. Such ways of life should be promoted and other ways of life
penalized. It is this privileging of one notion over others that lead critics to
distrust it and suggest that these theories are potentially tyrannical in
nature. Such theories, critics fear, would not hesitate to use the authority of
the state to interfere and take away people’s liberty on the pretext of
upholding the perfect and just way of life. This is in sharp contrast to, say,
Rawls’ position; he tries to steer clear of favouring any one notion of the
good life.
FEMINIST ACCOUNTS OF JUSTICE

One of the central debates within the feminist theory of justice revolves
around the question of whether there is a specifically female way of moral
reasoning distinct from the universal, objective and impersonal ethic of
justice that much of mainstream political theory works with.
Carol Gilligan, for instance, argues that there are two distinct ethics
correlating to two distinct conceptions of subjectivity: the abstract
individual (as in Rawls) and the connected self (as in Gilligan and other
feminist’s works), manifested by men and women, respectively. They
argue that women’s morality is characterized by care, nurture, love, values
and peace above all. This they would describe as an ethic based on care;
and the impartial, objective and universal framework as the male ethic of
justice. Nell Noddings demonstrates the difference between these two
ethics by using the examples of Abraham and Ceres. Abraham was
prepared to sacrifice his son for the sake of principles (neutral, universal,
rational), whereas Ceres was prepared to sacrifice any principle for the
sake of her child (specificity, love and subjectivity). This to Noddings is
the essential difference between justice and care.
Many feminists are obviously troubled by this bifurcation. Catharine
Mackinnon and Joan Tronto among many others have disputed this
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dichotomy and pointed out that such a dichotomy merely reaffirms the
existing sexist stereotypes of women’s traditional roles. After all, no one
would like to believe that men are incapable of loving and nurturing. There
is nothing inherent to women, which makes them incapable of rational,
universal and objective sentiments. Feminists have argued that even if
such a bifurcation is sensed today it has not always been the case and that
this is a consequence of various changes that took place in Europe post-
18th century. They seek to point out that this bifurcation is a cause for
concern since both women’s interconnectedness and men’s autonomy are
consequences of a largely unequal context. This generates very different
and unequally valued sense of self. While a sense of interconnectedness
surely needs to be valued it needs to be rounded-off by having an
autonomous sense of self and should not necessarily be pitted against it.
The overwhelming majority of feminists would be keen to reconcile the
two ethics. Susan Moller Okin’s is one of the most articulate attempts to
refashion the ethic of justice from a feminist standpoint. We have already
discussed her point of view while examining Rawls’ theory of justice.
Most feminists today would suggest that an ethics of care could be made
effective only if it is grounded in justice. They would rather see care and
justice as complimentary to each other. In fact, feminist writers like Seyla
Benhabib argue that the feminist theory of justice should work within a
framework that acknowledges that every time we generalize the other
(rational, impersonal, objective, universal way of thinking about people)
we should remember that this other is also a concrete other (subjective,
specific way of thinking about people). Thus, feminist theories of justice
seek to reconcile care and justice.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we examined the liberal position on justice and the
modifications within this position as envisaged by people like John Rawls.
A critical look at Rawls’ attempts to revise the standard liberal tenets led
us to MacPherson’s works. The communitarian and feminist criticism of
Rawls was discussed next. Amartya Sen’s very sympathetic account and
further extension of the Rawlsian theory of justice might interest you
enough to read his book Inequality Re-examined. We then moved towards
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an examination of the Marxist theory of justice. Interestingly, we found
that Marx would like to not have to talk about justice because the need for
such a discussion, according to him, was typical of societies characterized
by conflict and scarcity. Finally, we took a brief look at feminist debates
on the concept of justice.
What seems to emerge from the discussion on justice is that there can be
no one uniform or universally acceptable definition of justice. Our
understanding of justice would depend to a great measure on our
understanding of the world around us and our opinion of how it is
structured and how we would like to intervene to change it. Thus, it is a
political concept and can be understood only politically.
1. The liberal position holds that no social or community practices can have such
authority over the individual that he or she cannot evaluate and be detached
from. In your opinion to what extent is this possible? Every year newspapers in
our country report with a certain amount of disdain and horror the practice of
mass child marriages that take place in some parts of Rajasthan. The parents of
those small children obviously support and believe that it is a practice that is
good for their children. What would you do if you were a parent in that
context? Do remember that we don’t get our notions of what is good and
desirable out of nowhere.
2. Do you think that the controversy over the ban on turbans and headscarves in
schools in France is just?
3. There could be conditions in society or situations in life when special
provisions might be required. (a) Would making such special provisions be a
violation of justice? (b) Can you think of any such situation that might require
special provisions? (c) How will you defend the special provisions against the
charge of being unjust? (d) The issue of reserving seats for students from
certain socially and educationally backward communities in government-run
educational institutions in our country is one possible example. Do you think
this policy is unjust?
4. What would Nozick’s response be to Vinobha Bhave’s Bhoodan movement?
READING LIST
Barry, N. P., An Introduction to Modern Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan,
1992).
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Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Indian edition (New Delhi:
Macpherson, C. B., Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1973).
Marx, Karl, Critique of the Gotha Programme, 1875, full text with annotations
available at http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar/gotha.pdf.
———, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W W Norton and
Co, 1978).
Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (London: Basil Blackwell, 1981).
Okin, Susan Moller, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
Ramsay, Maureen, What’s Wrong with Liberalism: A Radical Critique of Liberal
Philosophy, new edited edn (London: Continuum, 2004).
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York:
Basic Books, 1983).
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CHAPTER 6
Rights
Papia Sengupta Talukdar
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
The Idea of Rights
Theories of Rights
Human Rights
Some Recent Debates on Rights
Conclusion
Points for Discussions
INTRODUCTION
That individuals have rights and the fact that rights mark important limits
on what may be done to them by the state, or in the name of other
conceptions, is now a familiar position in modern political philosophy.
When the founders of the United States stated in the Declaration of
Independence (1776) that certain rights were inalienable, they were at the
forefront of a moral movement that continues to exert a profound impact
on society even today. Indeed, at the same time, the French were also
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developing their own equivalent, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen (1789). Thus, the two most influential political documents of
the modern age take the notion of rights as the central concept upon which
their political organizations are built.
This chapter attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of rights, kinds
of rights, rights and duties, and different theories of rights. Recent
developments and issues concerning rights are also discussed.
The interest in rights was not restricted to the 17th and 18th centuries
only; the second half of the 19 th century also witnessed a major
resurgence of interest in the notion of human rights. Issues of rights play a
central role in our political life. The civil rights movement from the 1960s
onwards took rights as the cornerstone upon which the rebuilding of our
society was to be based. More recently, issues about rights of women and
disadvantaged minorities have been a matter of debate. With the increasing
medical advancements, we are now discussing whether persons have a
right to die, i.e. euthanasia.Discussions about using animals in research
and testing are often phrased in terms of animal rights. Sexual choice is
discussed in terms of gay and lesbian rights. Human rights have become a
major concern in recent times. Thus, discourse about rights has become
persuasive in our society. The language of rights has proved to be the most
powerful language for moral change in the 20th and early 21st centuries.
THE IDEA OF RIGHTS

Now the question arises: what is a right? Simply speaking, a right is to get
‘one’s due’, i.e. to get what is due to someone as a human, citizen,
individual or as a member of a group, etc. To have a right, then, is to be
entitled to do something or to have something done; for example, to vote,
to speak, to avail of healthcare, etc. It is different from obligation, as
Hobbes points out—on any occasion you have a choice whether or not to
exercise your right. You are not obliged to do what you are entitled to do.
For example, it is your right to vote, but you are not obliged to vote; you
are free to exercise your choice, to vote or not to vote. While rights and
obligations are not the same, they are still connected. Whenever you
decide to do what you have a right to do, others have an obligation to let
you do it.
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But upon what grounds can the claim to have a right be justified? What
is it that entitles me and obligates you? The right is conferred and the
correlative obligation imposed by a law in a society of which you and I are
both members and whose legal system we are both subjected to. But all
rights are not legal in nature, moral rights for example. Thus, rights and
their correlative obligations are essentially social in character. One has
them as a member of a social group, be it a society or a nation. Rights need
recognition from society and from the state. Rights, therefore, are claims
which can be justified on legal, moral, ethical or human grounds.
A right must be justified in the first place as something I have as a
member of some social group. Second, what I claim as a right must be
something which is necessary for me if I am to play my proper part as a
member. Third, my claim to have it as a right is justified only if I am able
to and willing to respect the rights of the other members of the group.
Rights express a certain kind of relationship between two parties: the
right-holder and the right-observers. Rights thus have two faces,
depending on whether they are viewed from the perspective of the holder
of the right or from those with whom the right-holder is interacting. From
the standpoint of the right-holder, a right is permission to act, an
entitlement ‘to act, to exist. To enjoy, to demand’. But from the standpoint
of the right-observers, the right usually imposes a correlative duty or
obligation, as I mentioned earlier. This duty can be either negative (to
refrain from interfering with the right-holder’s exercise of the right) or
positive (to assist in the successful exercise of the right). Finally, to have a
right entails certain responsibilities. This brings us to the distinction
between negative and positive rights.
Negative and Positive Rights

Negative rights are rights that entail non-interference from the society at
large. For example, the right to liberty, life, property, etc. The right to life
prevents others from killing me but it does not obligate them to do
anything positive to assist me in living my life to the full or to live happily.
Positive rights are rights that impose obligations on other people or the
state to do something for a fuller enjoyment of our rights. For example, the
right to health, basic subsistence, etc. requires positive interference to do
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something. But negative rights restrict us from doing something. Negative
rights entail only negative obligations of non interference; positive rights
entail positive obligations on the part of the right-observer to do something
to assist in the right-holder’s exercise of the right. Rights can be classified
in various ways—moral, legal, human rights, etc. or civil, political, social
rights. I will now discuss the difference between civil, political and social
rights.
Civil, Political, and Social Rights

In contemporary political thought, the term ‘civil rights’ is indissolubly
linked to the struggle for equality of African Americans during the 1950s
and 1960s. The aim of that struggle was to secure the status of equal
citizenship in a liberal democratic state. Civil rights are the basic legal
rights a person must possess in order to have such a status. They are the
rights that constitute free and equal citizenship and include personal,
political, and economic rights. No contemporary thinker of any
significance holds that such rights can be legitimately denied to a person
on the basis of race, colour, sex, religion, national origin, or disability.
Until the middle of the 20th century, civil rights were usually
distinguished from ‘political rights’. The former included the rights to own
property, the rights to make and enforce contracts, the right to legal
recourse and the right to one’s religion. Civil rights also covered freedom
of speech and of the press; but they did not include the right to hold public
office, vote, or to testify in court. The latter were political rights, reserved
for adult males.
The civil-political distinction was conceptually and morally unstable
insofar as it was used to sort citizens into different categories. It was part
of an ideology that classified women as citizens who were entitled to
certain rights but not to the full panoply to which men were entitled. As
that ideology broke down, the civil-political distinction began to unravel.
The idea that a certain segment of the adult citizenry could legitimately
possess one bundle of rights, while another segment would have to make
do with an inferior bundle, became increasingly implausible. In the end,
the civil-political distinction could not survive the cogency of the principle
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that all citizens of a liberal democracy were entitled, in Rawls’ words, to ‘a
fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties’.
The claims for which the American civil rights movement in the 1950s
and 1960s initially fought belong to the first generation of civil rights
claims. Those claims included the 18th-century set of civil rights—such as
the right to legal recourse and to make and enforce contracts—but covered
political rights as well. However, many thinkers and activists argued that
these first-generation claims were too narrow to define the scope of free
and equal citizenship. They contended that such citizenship could be
realized only by honouring an additional set of claims, including rights to
food, shelter, medical care and employment. This second generation (19th
century) of economic ‘welfare rights’, they argued, helped to ensure that
the political, economic and legal rights belonging to the first generation
could be made effective in protecting the vital interests of citizens and
were not simply paper guarantees.
Yet, some scholars have argued that these second-generation rights
should not be subsumed under the category of civil rights. The traditional
political and civil rights can be readily secured by legislation. Since the
rights are for the most part rights against government interference the
legislation needed had to do no more than restrain the executive’s own
arm. This is no longer the case when we turn to the ‘right to work’, the
‘right to social security’, and so forth.
The third generation of claims (20th century) has received considerable
attention in recent years, what may be broadly termed ‘rights of cultural
membership’. These include language rights for members of cultural
minorities, and the rights of indigenous peoples to preserve their cultural
institutions and practices, and to exercise some measure of political
autonomy. There is some overlap with the first-generation rights, such as
that of religious liberty, but rights of cultural membership are broader and
more controversial.
Another classification of rights can be made: on the basis of legal and
moral grounds. Let us now distinguish between legal and moral rights.
Legal Rights
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Laws differ from ordinary life or moral discourse in that the truth of any
legal statement depends ultimately on the acts of certain authorities.
Whatever is legal or illegal is so because it was declared so by legal
authorities. The ultimate touchstone, therefore, of all legal statements are
the acts of these legal authorities. It is because courts have defined terms in
a certain manner; whether these agree with the moral meaning is
irrelevant.
Legal authorities used the term ‘right’ to refer to four different
properties: the correlate of a legal duty (claim), the absence of duty
(privilege or liberty), the capacity to change legal relations (power), and
the protection against change in one’s legal position (immunity).
Moral Rights
In ordinary language, we use the term ‘right’ in at least two ways; we say
that someone has the right to something, and we also say that someone has
a right to do certain things. In the first instance, the existence of the right
concerns the behaviour of someone other than the right-holder, since to say
that I have a right to something is to say that someone has the duty to act
in a certain manner towards me. In the second instance, it is the right-
holder’s behaviour that is in question, and to say that he has a right to act
in a particular way is to say that he is morally free to do so—that it is not
wrong for him to do so. These two uses of the term ‘right’ correspond in
part to Dworkin’s (1977: 188) ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ senses of right,
respectively.
The standard interpretation of a claim-right is that another person has
the duty to act in a certain way with respect to the ‘thing’ to which the first
person has a right. But does a right- to-something merely imply a duty in
others or is it a package of normative advantages? Either way, the core
idea of right appears to be that an object or interest protected by a duty has
some things that are considered to be good, and to say that one has a right
to such a thing means that one’s interests in that thing deserves protection.
Not all goods or interests generate rights; it is only when there is a
particularly important moral reason for protecting the good or interest in
question that we speak of there being a right attached to it. This idea is
expressed in Dworkin’s (1977: 189–90) well-known claim that individual
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rights are political trumps held by individuals. He goes an to add that
individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a
sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to
have or to do, or is not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or
injury upon them. The idea is also expressed in Raz’s (1995: 166) claim
that a right exists if an aspect of a single person’s well-being is a sufficient
reason for holding some other person or persons to be under a duty.
Political theories will differ in their estimate of the importance of certain
goods or interests for human beings, and therefore in their ascription of
particular rights, but the central idea remains that of important interests of
individuals protected against wider moral considerations. That is why,
according to Hartney (1991), giving rights to the society would simply
annihilate any competing individual rights. But he ignores the very
important issue of individuals not as atomized entities but as culturally
embedded, and the idea of ‘good’ as rooted in one’s culture.
THEORIES OF RIGHTS
We will now discuss different theories associated with the idea of rights.
Rights are not only of different kinds but there are various theories on the
origin of rights. The first and the oldest theory of rights is the natural rights
theory.
The Theory of Natural Rights

The most influential statement on natural rights was given by John Locke
in his Second Treatise on Civil Government published in 1690 (repr.
1946). But before Locke, Thomas Hobbes had also propounded a theory of
natural rights. Hobbes’ idea of natural rights can be traced to his
conception of the ‘state of nature’. This state is the condition of human life
in the absence of organized political authority and government, the natural
condition of man in contrast to his artificial condition under a government.
According to Hobbes (1946: 80–81), the right of nature or what he calls
‘Jus Naturale’,
is the liberty each man hath to use his power as he will himself for the preservation
of his own nature, i.e. to say his own life, and consequently of doing anything
which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means.
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This liberty is a right to nature because each man has it in the state of
nature. It is the only right anyone can have in the absence of a government.
But this is not a worthy right because, as Hobbes (1946: 82) later points
out, the state of nature is a condition of war where everyone is against
everyone, and in which everyone is governed by his or her own reason.
Thus, Hobbes concludes that the natural right of every man to everything
must be given up as a necessary condition for the establishment of a
government and to end the anarchy of the state of nature. All must agree to
obey unconditionally one supreme authority. Hobbes, however, retains one
natural right and that is the right to life. If the government orders a man to
kill himself, he may resist.
John Locke (1946) also thinks of the state of nature as being the
condition of human beings in the absence of government. But unlike
Hobbes, he does not think that it is inherently a state of war. ‘Men live
together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with
authority to judge between them are properly in a state of nature.’
According to Locke, in the state of nature men are in perfect freedom to
order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they
think fit within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave or
depending upon the will of any other man. He also adds that it is ‘a state of
equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one
having more than the other’. But this natural freedom is not freedom to do
as you like. It is freedom ‘within the bounds of the law of nature’. The
state of nature has a law of nature to govern it. This law teaches all
mankind, who will consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.
Locke speaks of man as being born with a title to perfect freedom and
an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of
nature. But what are these rights and privileges? To this, Locke’s answer is
that every man has a natural right to his life and freedom of action to use
his property as he thinks fit, provided that he does not interfere with any
other man’s enjoyment of the same conditions.
The theory of natural rights has been criticized by many thinkers, but
the most vehement critics of this theory are the utilitarians.
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The Utilitarian Theory of Rights
The utilitarian theory of rights was outlined by the English philosopher
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832). Bentham was dissatisfied with the aimless
and ‘unscientific’ character of the legislation of his day and critical of the
idea that significant and genuinely reforming legislation could be based on
the traditional idea of ‘rights’. He argued that lawmakers should use what
he called the ‘principle of utility’ to construct morally sound legislation.
By utility he meant that ‘property in any object, whereby it tends to
produce benefits, advantages, good or happiness or that which prevents the
happening of mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness to the party whose
interest is considered—if that party be the community; then the happiness
of the community; if a particular individual then the happiness of the
individual’ (Burns and Harts 1970: 14).
Bentham defines the principle of utility as that which commands a state
to maximize the utility of the community. The measure of a government is
said to be dictated by the principle of utility when it takes care of the
greatest happiness of the community, rather than the happiness of some
people. He goes to the extent of bringing out a mathematical way of
calculating utility to give an air of scientific authority.
Bentham’s principle of utility has been persistently alluring to
generations of politicians, policy makers and theorists ever since he
promulgated it. It is not only simple, seemingly scientific, and can be
given a mathematical formulation, but is also centrally concerned with
what we may take to be the core of morality—human welfare. Yet, the
principle of utility has been heavily criticized, so that over the years the
advocates of that principle have felt the need to modify and redefine it to
make it plausible. To appreciate these criticisms, consider the interesting
theoretical assumptions built into the Benthamite principle of utility. First,
Bentham takes it for granted that each of us can evaluate our own
happiness. Second, he assumes that this evaluation can also be made by
those who are determining policy in a state. Third, his principle assumes
that this evaluation is quantitative, that is, happiness is something inside
each of us that can be measured and represented by a single number, as if
it were ‘stuff’ that came in degrees. Fourth, his principle assumes that the
happiness of each person can be added to the happiness of any other
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person, allowing us not only to compare the happiness of persons but also
to add their ‘happinesses’ together to get a sum total of ‘happinesses’.
It was not long before these assumptions were attacked. Consider the
third assumption, that the evaluation of happiness is purely a quantitative
matter: can we really measure people’s happiness, assuming that happiness
is only one kind of thing that comes in degrees but does not differ in kind?
Bentham insisted that happiness was not a word that denoted multiple
experiences or feelings in a human being but only one kind of feeling—the
feeling of pleasure. However, John Stuart Mill, himself a follower of
utilitarianism, thought that this view was incorrect, since we intuitively
think that experiences of ‘pleasure’ not only differ in quantity but also
quality. Mill sympathized with critics of Bentham who contended that the
idea that life has ‘no higher end than pleasure’ was ‘utterly mean and
grovelling’.
Many people who are attracted to the principle of utility have argued
that we should not abandon Bentham’s idea but only redesign it. They
argue for a better way of identifying human welfare, such that it can be
quantified, measured and aggregated. Moreover, contemporary utility
theory, developed by John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern and Leonard
Savage, has generated a way of doing something like ‘measuring’ the
satisfaction of preferences, so that we come up with a number that
accurately reflects how well a person has received what she wants,
showing the intensity of those wants. However, these ‘measurement
numbers’, as they stand, cannot be added together as the principle of utility
requires.
Critics have argued that such an idea is wrong—and that expected utility
theory is misused if it is seen as a source for the foundation of a notion of
welfare that will be serviceable to the utilitarians. Such critics raised the
technical issues about the nature of the ‘measurement’ of preferences that
game theory gives. These sorts of problems have eroded the popularity of
utilitarianism in our times. Yet, critics have argued that there are even
more serious problems plaguing the theory, having to do with the kind of
policy recommendation it would generate if its foundational assumptions
could be better clarified and defended. Consider, for example, that the
theory tells us to maximize total happiness. Now, if maximizing total
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happiness depended upon impoverishing some members of the society, the
principle of utility would nonetheless tell us to do so. Yet, this intuitively
strikes us as unfair.
Some people have actually put forward a moral theory called
intuitionism. According to this view, we have fundamental moral ideas
within us that are the source of our conceptions of justice and to which any
adequate moral conception must answer. However, such a theory has not
proven popular: first, it has no resources within it to systematize or
interpret intuitions if they come to us in an inchoate form. Second, it has
no theoretical resources to prioritize among intuitions or decide between
them when they conflict. Third, and perhaps most important, given that
many intuitions held by people reflect the prejudices, injustices and
peculiarities of their culture, intuitionalism must be able to identify which
intuitions should be morally relied upon—and yet it does not have the
theoretical resources to do so. Hence, philosophers critical of utilitarianism
have attempted to formulate alternatives to intuitionism that could not only
show the failure of the principle of utility in a way that relies less on
intuition but also yield a satisfactory conception of justice based on reason.
The most prominent of these attempts, by John Rawls, is the topic of our
next section.
John Rawls on Rights

John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) is the most influential
contemporary work on rights. For Rawls, what is directly relevant for
social ethics and justice is the individual’s means to pursue their own ends
to and to live whatever ‘good life’ they choose for themselves. Rawls’
vision of the just state is deeply egalitarian in spirit. His argument makes
use of the idea of a hypothetical social contract, applied not to the nature
of the state’s authority over the people but to the nature of justice. We are,
says Rawls, to imagine ourselves in a contract situation in which we must
agree with all those people who will live with us in a society based on the
principles of justice that will govern it. He argues that any principle of
justice that results from this hypothetical agreement process should be
understood to be the best defensible conception of justice available to us.
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Rawls also believes that the contract takes the individual seriously. He
was greatly influenced by Kant, who seems to think that the idea of
contract acknowledges the way in which people should be treated as ‘ends’
in themselves and not solely as ‘means’. A social contract test of political
policies is, in Kant’s view, a way to secure that acknowledgement by
hypothetically involving each member of the society in the assessment of
those policies in a way that respects her interests and perspectives as an
individual.
Rawls also believes that a contract test takes the individual seriously in a
way utilitarianism does not. Rawls argues that in the utilitarian calculation
the boundaries of the individuals are merged, and what is morally
important about them—i.e. their welfare—is aggregated together. Instead
of endorsing a moral reasoning procedure that explicitly conflates
individuals, Rawls argues that an adequate theory of justice must morally
respond to and preserve the ‘distinction of persons’. Rawls’ theory of
justice as fairness consists of the two principles:
First principle: ‘Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others’.
Second principle: ‘Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both (a) reasonably expected to be in everyone’s advantage and in
particular, to the advantage of the least well-off persons; and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all’.
Rawls’ arguments have been attacked by many critics. There have been
right-wing and left-wing attacks. On the right, critics have charged that
Rawls has failed to acknowledge the proper role that effort, merit and
responsibility should have in the distribution of resources. Why should
people receive roughly equal allotments when some work harder than
others, when some invest more wisely than others, or when some are lazy
and fail to contribute effectively to the community? They claim that a
system of distributive justice that ignores differences in effort undermines
individual responsibility, promotes sloth and allows the lazy to free ride on
the efforts of the industrious in a way that will likely lead to social unrest
and eventual diminishment of the economic pool. Now, if it produces the
latter results, Rawls’ own theory would disallow that distribution, because
in this situation giving more to the industrious is justified in order to
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increase the economic pool and to yield more for everyone. Hence, he
would allow unequal distributions in order to forestall a drop in
productivity. In contrast, he would not allow them if the economic pool
were increased but the only people to benefit from the increase were the
most advantaged.
Rawls’ right-wing critics would object, however, if the more advantaged
by virtue of creating those increases are allowed to enjoy their share of the
increased economic pool even if that adds to societal inequality. On the
left, critics have pointed to Rawls’ willingness to depart from strict
equality of holdings and some have wished for a conception of equality
that focuses more on the equality of people’s welfare than the equality of
their resources. The critics from the left have also been troubled by his
failure to incorporate more fully the idea of personal responsibility into his
theory.
The Libertarian Theory of Rights

Shortly after the publication of Rawls’ book, Robert Nozick published
Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), which is in some respect a libertarian
reply to A Theory of Justice. Nozick argues against what he calls
‘patterned’ and ‘end-state’ conceptions of justice. The former are
conceptions of justice that seek to implement a distributive scheme
according to some patterning principle. The latter are conceptions that seek
to attain a certain kind of telos, or goal, via a certain distribution of
resources.
What is important in Nozick’s view is the idea that each individual has
certain rights and in particular, certain property rights that are ‘absolute’ in
character in the sense that no amount of good accruing to the community
generally or to other individuals can justify the infringement or overriding
of these rights.
Nozick’s ultimate concern is with the way end-state and patterned
conceptions of justice interfere with liberty. Hence, he argues for a
historical conception of justice, on which he bases the theory of rights.
Nozick’s particular version of historical principle is what he calls the
‘entitlement theory of justice’ which consists of three principles:
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1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in
acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in
transfer from someone entitled to the holding is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by repeated applications of (1) and (2).
In addition to these principles, Nozick also endorses a principle of

rectification that would provide for the redressal of past injustices. But this
conception of justice essentially entails the defence of the free market and
the capitalist system. His argument is a way of defending the free market
insofar as it realizes justice by respecting the liberty of the individual
regardless of its effects on aggregate welfare and regardless of its
economic implications.
There have been many criticisms of libertarian views in general and
Nozick’s version of libertarianism in particular—some of them passionate.
The most obvious and popular criticism has been of the libertarian notion
of rights: for why should we think that morality demands that we accord
people such absolute rights? How could rights be thought to trump so
decisively all considerations of others’ welfare in the community?
Moreover, what if the economy flourishes better if the state interfered in
the market economy? Libertarians may not allow it, and yet most citizens
and firms might actually want it and even demand it, insofar as they
believe they will be better off with such governmental interference.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights are international moral and legal norms that aspire to protect
all people everywhere from severe political, legal and social abuses.
Examples of human rights are the right to freedom of religion, the right to
a fair trial when charged with a crime, the right not to be tortured and the
right to engage in political activity. These rights exist in morality and in
law at the national and international levels. They are addressed primarily
to governments, requiring compliance and enforcement. The main source
of the contemporary conception of human rights is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the many human rights
documents and treaties that have followed in its wake.
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The philosophy of human rights addresses questions about the existence,
content, nature, universality and justification of human rights. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) sets out a list of over two
dozen specific human rights that countries should respect and protect. We
may group these specific rights into six or more families: (i) security rights
that protect people against crimes such as murder, massacre, torture and
rape; (ii) liberty rights that protect freedom in areas such as belief,
expression, association, assembly and movement; (iii) political rights that
protect the liberty to participate in politics through actions such as
communicating, assembling, protesting, voting and serving in public
office; (iv) due process rights that protect against abuses of the legal
system such as imprisonment without trial, secret trials and excessive
punishments; (v) equality rights that guarantee equal citizenship, equality
before the law and non-discrimination; and (vi) welfare rights (or
‘economic and social rights’) that require the provision of education to all
children and protections against severe poverty and starvation. Another
family that might be included is group rights. The UDHR does not include
group rights, but subsequent treaties do. Group rights include the
protection of ethnic groups against genocide and the ownership by
countries of their national territories and resources.
The general idea of human rights can be explained by setting out some
defining features. It answers the question of what human rights are with a
general description of the concept rather than a list of specific rights. Two
people can have the same general idea of human rights even though they
disagree about whether some particular rights are human rights.
Human rights are political norms dealing mainly with how people
should be treated by their governments and institutions. They are not
ordinary moral norms applying mainly to interpersonal conduct (such as
prohibitions of lying and violence). As Thomas Pogge (2000) puts it, ‘to
engage human rights, conduct must be in some sense official’. But we
must be careful here since some rights, such as rights against racial and
sexual discrimination are primarily concerned to regulate private
behaviour. Still, governments are directed in two ways by rights against
discrimination. They forbid governments to discriminate in their actions
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and policies, and they impose duties on governments to prohibit and
discourage both private and public forms of discrimination.
Not every question of social justice or wise governance is a human
rights issue. For example, a country could have too much income
inequality, inadequate provision for higher education, or no national parks
without violating any human rights. Deciding which norms should be
counted as human rights is a matter of some difficulty. And, there is
continuing pressure to expand lists of human rights to include new areas.
Many political movements would like to see their main concerns
categorized as matters of human rights, since this would publicize,
promote and legitimate their concerns at the international level. A possible
result of this is ‘human rights inflation’, the devaluation of human rights
caused by producing too much bad human rights currency.
SOME RECENT DEBATES ON RIGHTS
Communitarian Perspectives
Communitarians critique the earlier discussed notions of rights on the
ground that they take the ‘individual’ as the unit for the distribution of
resources. Communitarians argue that the ‘individual’ is not an abstract
category but is deeply embedded in his/her culture. Thus, they assert that
the ‘community’ or ‘group’ identity of an individual should be taken into
account, rather than the ‘individual’. For many communitarians, the
problem with liberalism is not its emphasis on justice, nor its universalism,
but rather its individualism. According to this criticism, liberals base their
theories on notions of individual rights and personal freedom, but neglect
the extent to which individual freedom and well being are only possible
within a community. Once we recognize the dependence of human beings
on society, our obligations to sustain the common good of society are as
weighty as our rights to individual liberty. The central argument of
Michael Sandel’s book, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982: 183) is
that liberalism rests on a series of mistaken metaphysical and meta-ethical
views, for example, that claims of justice are absolute and universal; that
we cannot know each other well enough to share common ends, and that
we define our personal identity independently of socially given ends.
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Hence, communitarians argue, the liberal ‘politics of rights’ should be
abandoned for a ‘politics of common good’.
Many communitarians agree about the importance of rights and justice,
but they claim that liberals misinterpret justice as an ahistorical and
external criterion for criticizing the ways of life of every society.
Utilitarians, liberals, egalitarians and libertarians may disagree about the
content of justice, but they all seem to think that their preferred theory
provides a standard that every society should live up to. They do not see it
as a decisive objection that their theory may be in conflict with local
beliefs—this is sometimes seen by liberals as the point of discussing
justice—it provides a standpoint for questioning our beliefs and for
ensuring that they are not local prejudices. As Dworkin (1985: 219) puts it,
… in the end political theory can make no contribution to how we govern
ourselves except by struggling against all the impulses that drag us back into our
own culture, towards generality and some reflective basis for deciding which of
our traditional distinctions and discriminations are genuine and which are spurious.
Michael Walzer (1983) argues that this quest for a universal theory of
rights is misguided. The only way to identify the requirements of rights
and justice is to see how each particular community understands the value
of social goods. A society is just if it acts in accordance with the shared
understandings of its members, as embodied in its characteristic practices
and institutions. Hence, the identifying principle of rights and justice is
more a matter of cultural interpretation than of philosophical argument.
Walzer asserts that the shared understandings in our society require
‘complex equality’, i.e. a system of distribution that does not try to
equalize all goods, but rather seeks to ensure that inequalities in one
‘sphere’ do not permeate other spheres. However, he acknowledges that
other societies do not share this understanding of justice and for some
societies justice may involve virtually unlimited inequality in rights and
goods.
Multicultural Perspectives on Rights

One of the central theoretical and practical conundrums of our age is the
problem of reconciling the aspirations to political equality with the fact of
social and cultural differences within liberal democratic states. The liberal
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democratic state is increasingly being challenged both by theorists of
democratic equality and by political movements to recognize that the ideal
of universal citizenship in which each person is treated with ‘equal
concern and respect’ can no longer be easily identified with a programme
of uniform rights. They assert that the ideal of universal citizenship is
based on the conception of equality as ‘difference- blindness’, which
multiculturalists argue is ‘formal’ and not ‘real’ in nature. Real equality,
according to the theorists of multiculturalism, is ensured not through
‘uniformity of treatment’ but by keeping in mind their social and cultural
location.
Many defenders of group rights for ethnic and national minorities insist
that they are needed to ensure that all citizens are treated with genuine
equality. According to this view, the accommodation of difference is the
essence of true equality, and group-specific rights are needed to
accommodate our differences. Proponents of individual rights respond that
individual rights already allow for the accommodation of differences, and
that true equality requires equal rights for each individual regardless of
race or ethnicity. But some minority rights eliminate—rather than create—
inequalities. Some groups are unfairly disadvantaged in the cultural
marketplace, and political recognition and support rectify this
disadvantage. Kymlicka (1989a, 1989b) gives the example of the national
minorities, the viability of their societal cultures may be undermined by
economic and political decisions made by the majority. They could be
outbid or outvoted on resources and policies that are crucial to the survival
of their societal cultures. The members of majority cultures do not face
this problem. Given the importance of cultural membership, this is a
significant inequality, which becomes a serious injustice if not addressed.
Any plausible theory of rights should recognize the fairness of protection
for the minorities. Giving minority rights to members of minority cultures
may eliminate the disadvantages faced by them. Group-differentiated
rights—such as territorial autonomy, veto powers, guaranteed
representation, land claims and language rights—can help rectify these
disadvantages by alleviating the vulnerability of minority cultures to
majority decisions. Given that it is important for minorities to preserve
their culture and their differences, they demand special rights that are
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essential for preserving their culture. Is giving special rights to some
people not against the idea of equality? Should all minorities be granted
group-differentiated rights? What if by giving group-differentiated rights
the minorities demand a separate state for themselves? What will happen
to national integration? These are some important issues that come up, but
which are beyond the scope of this discussion.
Although multiculturalism has found many supporters, there are
problems within it regarding women’s rights, since most cultures endorse
and permit control over women by men. Also, multiculturalism would
pose a challenge to the liberal notion of nation-state, i.e. it may lead to
cessationist movements like the ones in Kashmir and the North-East in
India, Tamils in Sri Lanka, etc. Either way, the apprehensions are well
founded and deserve serious consideration. We need to examine whether
communities should be given special rights to preserve their culture.
Should they have the right to protect all prevalent practices? Are all
existing practices crucial for preserving a particular way of life? Should
there be some minimum conditions that all cultures must adhere to? These
are important questions that need to be analysed further within the
framework of multiculturalism—in this regard it is important to consider
the issue of intra-group equality, too.
Multiculturalism has raised important questions about the status of
minorities within the nation-state. They have revealed the other side of the
so-called neutral politics of liberal democracies as being biased against
minorities. Above all, it has compelled the liberal democracies to analyse
the implications of their socio-cultural policies, to see if they discriminate
against minorities. Multiculturalism, like postmodernism, has raised
questions about universals. It has raised a finger on one standard, i.e.
Anglo-American conception of rights, justice, equality, good life, value
system and meanings. Multiculturalists say that a society with strong
collective goals can be liberal, provided it is also capable of respecting
diversity, especially when dealing with those who do not share its common
goals, and also offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights. There
will undoubtedly be tensions and difficulties in pursuing such goals, but
such a pursuit is not impossible. The sense of multiculturalism as it is
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debated today has a lot to do with the imposition of some cultures on
others, what they intend to fight is forced assimilation.
As Bhikhu Parekh (2000) asserts, in multicultural societies, cultural
communities generally demand various kinds of rights they think they
need to maintain their collective identity. Some of these rights, usually
called group, collective, or communal, are not easy to accommodate within
liberal jurisprudence and raise difficult questions such as whether the
concept of collective rights is logically coherent and what kind of
collectivities may legitimately claim what kinds of rights.
Just as individual rights are those rights of which the individuals are the
bearers, collective rights are those of which human collectivities are the
bearers. Human collectivities are of several kinds, ranging from groups
united by transient or long-term common interests to historical
communities based on a shared way of life.
The Feminist Challenge

According to feminists, justice should be understood from a ‘group’
perspective, as groups or communities play a crucial role in shaping one’s
perspectives on justice. Feminists believe that social or political systems
based on the individual perspective of justice are highly biased because
they are shaped by the dominant individual male and not by women or
other marginalized groups. Thus, such political and social systems of
domination, such as that of men over women or of the privileged over
marginalized groups, can distort society so severely that none of the
theories of justice will prove acceptable unless these systems of oppression
are overturned. The feminists argue that if women live in a society where
they are not allowed to hold certain forms of property or vote or engage in
certain occupations, then merely distributing resources in some kind of
‘equal’ fashion will not be enough to secure justice. Greater resources do
not solve or ameliorate the fact that in such a society women are partially
mastered.
Susan Moller Okin’s Justice, Gender and the Family (1989) offers both
a critique and a reconstruction of Rawls’ original position as an analytic
tool used to define workable standards of justice for liberal democratic
societies. She says that Rawls’ own characterization of the original
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position, despite its occasional claims to gender neutrality, in fact contains
many implicit assumptions that would tend to reinforce the current
inequality of women in the gendered structure of social institutions.
Rawls’ characterization of parties to the original positions as heads of
families and as member of the paid workforce suggests an implicit
assumption that the parties are the male heads of relatively traditional
families. Okin argues that the social structure of gender relations and the
nature of family certainly raise issues of justice. In a society where
domestic labour is performed mainly by women, women’s inequality in
other spheres is virtually assured. The equal value of political liberties is
out of reach in a gender-structured society, because involvement is time
consuming and women who bear responsibilities for domestic labour have
little time for political activities as it imposes the constraint of a ‘double
workday’ on them. Finally, the most important argument is that the
primary goods for the social basis of self-esteem are less sure for girls than
for boys. The consequences, Okin (1987: 107) contends, is that ‘in a
gender-structured society there is such a thing as the distant standpoint of
women and . this standpoint cannot be adequately taken into account by
male philosophers’, whose moral reasoning abstracts from gender
altogether.
Iris Marion Young (1989: 258) in her widely cited article argues that
‘the ideal of universal citizenship’ contains three meanings of universality:
The first—universality as inclusion of all in full citizenship status and in
participation in public life—this stands in tension with the other two
meanings of universality, i.e. universality as a focus on the common good,
defined in terms of what citizens share rather than what divides them; and
universality as equal treatment, defined as same treatment without regard
to group differences. Young says that a genuine commitment to
universality in the first sense will require a conception of differentiated
citizenship both with respect to deliberation about the common good and
with respect to the allocation of rights. Young’s critique is aimed directly
at the republican tradition. She acknowledges that contemporary
republicans emphasize on what citizens have in common.This undermines
the differences between groups. Different social groups have different
needs, cultures, histories, experiences and perceptions of social relations,
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which influence their interpretation of the meanings and consequences of
policy proposals, and the form of their political reasoning. These
differences in political interpretation are not merely or even primarily a
result of differing or conflicting interests because groups have differing
interpretations even when they seek to promote justice, and not merely
their own self-regarding ends. Thus, a genuine commitment to the
inclusion of all in public deliberation requires that differences be not
suppressed but acknowledged and respected. The best way to do this is to
establish special forms of representation for disadvantaged groups that
ensure that these groups have the resources needed to organize themselves,
and their perspectives are seriously considered in public decisions.
The attempt to realize an ideal of universal citizenship that finds the
public embodying generality as opposed to particularity, commonness
versus difference, will tend to exclude or put at a disadvantage some
groups even when formally they have an equal citizenship status. The idea
of the public as universal and the concomitant identification of
particularity with privacy make homogeneity a requirement of public
participation. All citizens should assume the same impartial general point
of view. Young criticizes the view of universal citizenship on the grounds
that societies have certain privileged groups and some oppressed groups,
and in such a situation to leave behind particular affiliations and to adopt a
general point of view would mean that the interests of the privileged will
dominate. Thus, instead of a universal citizenship in the sense of this
generality, Young proposes ‘a group differentiated citizenship’ and a
heterogeneous public.
A liberal theory can accept special rights for a minority culture against
the larger community so as to ensure equality of circumstances between
them. But it will not justify special rights for a culture against its own
members. Liberals are committed to supporting the right of individuals to
decide for themselves which aspects of their cultural heritage are worthy
passing on. Liberalism is committed to the view that individuals should
have the freedom and capacity to question and possibly revise the
traditional practices of their community should they come to see them as
no longer worthy of their allegiance.
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CONCLUSION
To sum up this discussion, there is no intrinsic reason to assign rights to
individuals alone, for if individuals are incomplete without the cultural
resources that communities provide them, individual rights are incomplete
without community rights. But we cannot buy peace between the
communities at the expense of individuals. Thus, we need to think of
community rights as conditional rights. But these cultural rights should not
override the core rights, i.e. the right to life, freedom, equality, and the
right to assert rights.
1. A person is terminally ill, and is suffering from pain. There is no chance of

recovery at any cost. Should the person have the right to die?
2. Do smokers have a moral obligation towards non-smokers to not smoke in
public places even if it is not illegal to do so?
3. Two adults decide to get married against the wishes of their communities.
Should they be allowed? In this situation which rights, i.e. individual or group
rights should prevail?
4. Does the unborn child have rights?
READING LIST
Burns, T. H. and H. L. A. Hart (eds), Jeremy Bentham: An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: Athlone Press, 1970).
Daniels, Norman, Reading Rawls (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).
———, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
Chandoke, Neera, Beyond Secularism: The Rights of Religious Minorities (New Delhi:
Gilligan, Carol, ‘In a Different Voice’, in Sandra Kemp and Judith Squires (eds),
Feminism (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Hampton, Jean, Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1993).
Hartney, Michael, ‘Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights’, Canadian Journal
of Jurisprudence, 4(2), 1991: 293–314.
Hinman, Lawrence M., Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory (Fort Worth:
Harcourt, Brace, 1997).
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), complete e-text available
at http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hobbes/thomas/h68l/
159
Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1989a).
———, ‘Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality’, Ethics, 99, 1989b: 883–905.
———, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1995).
Mill, John Stuart, ‘Utilitarianism’, in H. B. Acton (ed.), Utilitarianism, Liberty and
Representative Government (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1972).
Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
Okin, Susan Moller, ‘Justice and Gender’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16(1), 1987:
42–72.
———, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
Parekh, Bhikhu, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
Pogge, T., ‘The International Significance of Human Rights’, Journal of Ethics, 4,
2000: 45–69.
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
Raz, Joseph, ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, in his Ethics in Public Domain:
Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (rev. ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge
Sheth, D. L. and Gurpreet Mahajan (ed.), Minority Identities and the Nation-State (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1983).
Young, Iris Marion, ‘Politics and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal
Citizenship’, Ethics, 99, 1989: 250–74.
———, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1990).
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CHAPTER 7
Democracy
Janaki Srinivasan
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
The Concept
Direct Participatory Democracy
Liberal Democracy
Objections to Democracy
Perspectives on Democracy
Key Debates in Democratic Theory
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
The concept of democracy is at the centre of fierce debates in political
theory as well as in commonplace discussions on politics. This chapter
examines the ways in which democracy has been conceptualized, defended
and critiqued. In doing so, it discusses the evolution of democracy as a
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concept, the various criticisms levelled against the concept, followed by
perspectives and debates in contemporary democratic theory. It concludes
with some of the key debates which characterize democratic theory today.
Consider situations in your everyday life where you are part of a group
and decisions have to be made for the group as a whole: whether it is a
group of friends deciding if they should watch a movie or a family
deciding where to go for a vacation. Suppose that among a group of ten
friends, seven want to see a movie but three want to go for an art
exhibition. What should the group decide to do? Consider another situation
where a university class has been asked by their teacher to arrive at a
convenient date for having a class debate. And here, in a class of thirty,
everyone is agreed on a date except for five students. These five, however,
have important and unavoidable reasons why that particular date is not
convenient to them. What should the class do? Should it go by the decision
of the maj ority? But doing so will deprive those five students from the
chance to take part in the debate. Would that be a fair decision? Now,
suppose the class has to decide on the topic of the debate. The number of
opinions and suggestions made increase manifold and decision making
becomes that much more difficult.
ln all such situations of collective existence, there is a constant need to
arrive at common decisions. Who takes these decisions and how? How do
we judge whether these decisions are fair or the best possible? The idea of
democracy provides one basis for making such judgements. A democratic
decision is one that takes into account and reflects the wishes of the people
who come under the purview of that decision. There are, of course, other
ways to take decisions. A father can decide where the family will go for a
vacation without taking the opinion of other family members, or a teacher
can give no choice to the students on the topic or the date for the class
debate. But advocates of democracy argue that a decisionmaking
procedure which reflects a commitment of taking into equal consideration
the preferences of members of the concerned group/s is a legitimate one.
Democracy is, thus, both a method to arrive at collective decisions and a
set of values and behaviour with which people approach decision making.
THE CONCEPT
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How should a political community then arrive at collective decisions? In
other words, who should rule? What should be the principle guiding
government formation and what are the institutional arrangements required
for this purpose? Democracy is now the universally accepted answer to
this question, so much so that everyone—even military juntas, dictators
and monarchs—claim to be democrats. The charge of being called
‘undemocratic’ is taken seriously now. However, this positive value
accorded to democracy is recent in history; for a long time it was
associated with ‘mob-rule’ and inefficient governments. The term
democracy translates as ‘rule by the people’. Who are the ‘people’ and
how do they rule? On what matters? To what extent? Through what
institutions? To secure which goals? Is this a desirable arrangement?
There are varied views on the nature, purpose, extent, effectiveness and
desirability of democratic rule, as well as varied critiques on the practice
of functioning democracies. Indeed, democracy is often called an
‘adjectival concept’ because of the endless number of ‘types’ or ‘models’
into which democracies are classified, for example; liberal, social,
people’s, direct and indirect, radical, associational, deliberative, strong and
weak, procedural and substantive, pluralist and elitist … the list goes on.
Before we examine some of these debates, let us briefly discuss the
concept and look at the various theories and types in the light of their
differences and areas of consensus.
At the heart of all democratic theories is the concept of popular power.
According to Anthony Arblaster (1994), it refers to a situation where
power and authority ultimately rest with the people. A democratic
government is contrasted with an authoritarian one where decisions are
imposed on the people and exercised without their consent. Democracy
ensures the accountability of those holding power to the people who are
the ultimate source of that power. It is the consent of the people which
makes government authority legitimate.
How is this consent to be given? The question of consent immediately
connects with that of participation. How much participation is desirable?
In a direct democracy, there is a high degree of participation as citizens
collectively decide, often through mass meetings, on almost all major
issues. In effect, people rule themselves. This form of democracy is
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associated with the classical Athenian model. In India, the gram sabha is
such an institution of direct democracy as are a number of devices like
referendum, initiative and recall practised in contemporary societies. In
contrast, in an indirect or representative democracy, government functions
through representatives who are chosen through popular elections. These
representatives provide a link between the governments and the people and
elections allow the people to control the action of the representatives and
prevent abuse of power. Liberal democracy is a representative form of
government. While these two methods are seen in opposition to each other,
we shall see in the last section how contemporary debates on the question
of participation seek to combine the two.
Democracy refers to a government based on political equality, i.e.
consent is required of all the individuals who form part of the political
community. It is informed by the belief that all people are equally capable
of, and have a stake in making, collective decisions that shape their lives.
In a democracy, no one person’s opinion or interest is of more value than
the other, hence the principle of ‘one person one vote’. It is based on the
idea of the equal moral worth of all individuals and against the exclusion
of anyone from the political process. Thus, it is against hierarchy or
inherited privileges and discrimination. Today, when we say ‘the people’
we usually refer to all adult citizens in a polity. This was not always so and
a long struggle was waged by hitherto excluded groups demanding the
right of suffrage. From being initially restricted to the property-owning
white men in Europe and America, eventually educated men, working-
class white men, black men, and women (in that order) were subsequently
recognized as full citizens with the right to vote and contest elections.
Meanwhile, in the colonies of Asia and Africa, democratic struggles took
on a specifically anti-colonial character and the peoples of colonies like
India claimed the right of self-government as a people.
In a democracy it is assumed that there will be a diversity of opinions
and interests on almost every matter of common concern. Indeed, this
diversity is seen as its main strength and it calls for tolerance for all shades
of opinion. A democratic society is also called an ‘open society’ where
there is space for all voices, however unpopular or conventional they may
be, to be heard. This requires a range of political freedoms like freedom of
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expression, association and movement among others, which are protected
by the state. People must have access to information and be able to protest
and freely criticize the government and others in order to make informed
uncoerced choices and intervene in the decision-making process. Thus, the
practice of democracy is unthinkable without rights.
But do these freedoms by themselves ensure that all voices are in fact
heard, and heard equally? Equal distribution of political power, however,
does not mean that everyone manages to have equal influence on the
decision-making process. Is it the same for an influential industrialist and a
poor farmer or a slum-dwelling labourer to have the right to vote? Do they
have equal influence on policy making? For democracy to be effective,
then those factors which discriminate against sections of people and hinder
their effective intervention in collective decision making need to be
addressed. The presence of structures of power that are sources of
inequality in a society are an impediment to democracy.Equality, thus, is a
condition of democracy and democratic societies are expected to devise
arrangements which further equality.
What is the nature of a democratic decision? There has been much
debate on this. As a conflict-resolution model, democracy is often
identified with majority rule and this raises the problem of oppression of
minorities. On the other hand, democracies are expected to arrive at a
consensus. But in plural and complex societies that are also unequal,
consensus is difficult to achieve.
We will see in the last section how these very issues of equality,
participation, representation and diversity pose important questions and are
the concerns of contemporary democratic theory. Before that we will now
examine the two main models of democratic practice, namely, the direct
participatory model and the liberal democratic models. Later, we examine
some of the major critiques of democratic practice.
DIRECT PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY

The most celebrated form of direct participatory democracy was the one
practised in the Athenian city-state of ancient Greece during the 5th and
4th centuries B.C. Athenians prided themselves on the ‘happy versatility’
of citizens and their ability to perform all tasks of governance, i.e. in
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enacting, implementing and adjudicating of laws. They met in open
assemblies to debate and deliberate on all matters and shared magisterial
and judicial offices. All major decisions were made by the assembly to
which all citizens belonged. Citizens were also meant to sit on juries and
adjudicate on disputes. Offices were filled by either election or draw of
lots and no officer was to enjoy perpetual tenure. The idea was to ensure
that at least the short-term offices went to as many people as possible.
What is remarkable in this model is that it ensured a high level of political
accountability and political activity of the citizen.
Indeed, citizenship entailed participation; it was a sacred duty and the
full-time occupation of the citizen. The purpose of political participation
was the common good of the state. This common good was independent of
and prior to individual interests and desires. It is when citizens set aside
their private interests, completely identify with the community, and give it
their best that common good can be achieved. The underlying philosophy
was that there was a single, shared, substantive idea of good life for the
whole community; the separation between state and society did not exist.
Participation in the collective affairs of the community was considered
important for the rational self-development of the citizens; it was the
highest form of good life that they could hope to achieve, fulfil
themselves, and live honourably.
Republican Rome shared some features of Athenian democracy,
namely, the notion of popular participation in civic life, a strong sense of
duty to the community, the idea of public good and civic virtue as being of
higher value than private individual interests. This is also called civic
republicanism.
Rousseau, an early critic of liberal democracy, was heavily inspired by
this model. Writing in the 18th century, Rousseau was critical of electoral
democracy and representative mechanisms which were emerging in
various European states. For Rousseau, democracy was the way by which
citizens could achieve freedom. By freedom he did not mean the absence
of constraints on the individual’s pursuit of self-interest. Instead, he
articulated a positive notion of freedom. (See Chapter 3 on liberty for the
distinction between negative and positive freedom.) Individuals are free
only when they participate directly, actively and continuously in shaping
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the life of the community, especially in the making of laws. For him, law-
making was an exercise of sovereignty—which cannot be transferred or
represented by anyone else—and an expression of the will of the people.
For Rousseau, participation was essential for the self-development of
the individual and democracy was a means of individual development, but
not the pursuit of selfish interests.
Rousseau made a distinction between private will and what he called
‘general will’. General will is not an aggregation of private will or interests
of individual citizens. Instead, general will is that which emerges when
people set aside their selfish interests and deliberate on the collective
common good of the community. Freedom lies in obedience to the general
will; by doing so they are obeying their own true nature. Rousseau goes to
the extent of saying that people can be ‘forced to be free’, i.e. obey the
general will.
Such conceptions of participatory self-governance, active citizenship
and community life have been an attractive one for all those critical of
liberal democracy. Socialists, feminists, radical and deliberative democrats
have drawn on this legacy. However, the very conditions in which this
model has been practised provides a note of caution. The successful
operation of the Athenian democracy depended on a system of exclusivity
and inequality. Only citizens were worthy of the good life and a majority
of the population—women, slaves and resident aliens—were kept out of
citizenship. Indeed, it was on the basis of their labour and economic
activities that the free adult male could be freed for citizenship. Aristotle,
even as he was critical of democracy, justified this denial of political
equality to women and slaves both on the grounds of necessity and the
latter’s natural inferiority. (We shall examine Plato and Aristotle’s critique
of democracy in a later section.) Rousseau, too, explicitly kept out women
from political participation. He argued that women were primarily meant
to perform sexual and domestic roles and their public presence would be a
distraction.
Rousseau did, however, consider a certain measure of economic
equality essential for the exercise of citizenship. For any renewal of strong
and active participation a society has to work out a balance between the
satisfaction of material needs and political participation in a framework
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which treats all adults equally. A further point of debate is whether present
societies can work with a single notion of common good which can be
oppressive not just to individual freedom, as liberals fear, but also to the
diverse groups and cultures which comprise most societies. In other words,
a participatory system is seen to put pressure on attaining homogeneity.
Rousseau’s theory, as we observed, has totalitarian implications.
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Today, when we talk of democracy, we often have what is known as
liberal democracy in mind. It is the dominant form of democracy as most
countries seen to practise this model in one form or the other. However, it
is important to remember that liberal democracy is a product of a long
history and it contains many strands.
Protective Democracy
For early liberals, democracy was meant to be protective, in the sense that
it was meant to protect the rights of citizens and safeguard them from the
tyranny of state power. The ‘liberal’ element in liberal democracy
preceded the democratic element and has shaped its nature. Liberalism
emerged in the context of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. In
this process, the newly emerging bourgeoisie/middle class sought to put
limits on the absolute powers of the monarchs and the feudal aristocracies
in European states from the 16th century onwards. (See the chapters on
Liberalism and the State.)
Underlying this challenge to absolute and unaccountable power is the
new doctrine of individualism. According to this notion, all individuals are
free and autonomous, masters of themselves, and makers of their own
destiny. Individuals are primarily rational and selfinterested beings, intent
on pursuing their desires and goals. Each individual has his/her own
preferences, values and goals, i.e. his/her own conception of a good
life.What individuals require are the basic conditions to pursue these self-
defined goals. Liberals identify these conditions as rights, namely, of life,
liberty and property, which are fundamental and inviolable in nature. What
binds individuals to each other is a common interest in protecting these
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rights which would allow them the maximum freedom for free exchange
among themselves. The emergence of liberalism is linked to that of
capitalism and market society. That is why property is understood as a
fundamental right. An individual’s property is considered an extension of
the self and an individual is the master of his/her own self. According to
liberal thinkers like Hobbes and Locke, individuals do not derive their
identity from the community and are not bound to it by any sense of duty,
nor do they see themselves as part of a hierarchical system or a divine
plan. Thus, liberalism’s lasting contribution to political thought is a radical
notion of equality among human beings. This view on human nature meant
a re-conceptualization of the role and purpose of government.
Liberals make a distinction between the state and civil society or the
public and the private life of individuals. The public realm is the realm of
politics; this is where they are bound to take collective decisions. The
economy, family, associations, etc., are part of the civil society, the realm
where individuals interact with each other in the pursuit of their interests.
This is the realm of competition, conflict and co-operation among them. It
is in order to resolve these conflicts that a regulated framework is required.
Thus, the role of the government is to create and maintain a system of
individual rights, and undertake activities to that end. The coercive power
of the state is required to ensure that individuals in their interaction with
each other in a civil society do not encroach on each other’s rights.
Governments were not meant to arrive at or promote a common good,
since individuals do not share a substantive notion of good life. The state is
a neutral arbiter; it is not supposed to interfere in the functioning of civil
society.
At the same time, liberals share a deep fear that governments will abuse
this power and encroach on these rights. Liberals were giving voice to the
struggle by the bourgeoisie to unshackle the restrictions of feudal and
aristocratic authority. In other words, there is need for a strong but limited
government. Moreover, among free and equal individuals any institution
of authority over them requires their consent, otherwise it will be
illegitimate. Thus, there is need for a mechanism through which people
can consent to a government and retain control over it to ensure the
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performance of the tasks entrusted to it and restrain it from exceeding its
limits. This is where liberals turn to democracy as a solution.
Liberals advocate a representative democracy. The task of governance
requires expertise, but those in power must be made accountable. Political
participation is not considered a good in itself, like in Athenian
democracy, but a means to control the government and ensure the
protection of individual liberties. Through franchise and competitive
elections, individuals choose representatives who then form governments
on the majority principle. Political decisions can be made only by these
representatives, because only they enjoy the consent of the people. This
ultimate authority of the people is affirmed, and people can keep a check
on the representatives through periodic elections.The powers and tasks of
the government are defined through the constitution, especially by
including within the provision of fundamental rights, and through the
principle of rule of law and the presence of an independent judiciary (for
example, the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution and the Fundamental
Rights in the Indian Constitution). The separation of powers among
different branches of government is meant to provide a system of checks
and balances, preventing the concentration of power.
Even though the model of representative democracy was based on the
principle of equality, in early liberal democracies, franchise or political
equality was in effect restricted to a few. They were more in the nature of
oligarchies. Early liberals were as fearful of the ‘tyranny of the masses’ as
they were of the tyranny of state power. Locke, James Mill, Madison and
Montesquieu were all opposed to universal franchise. For example, John
Locke, who was the first to articulate the key ideas of liberal democracy,
restricted franchise to property owners, defended property as a ‘natural’
right as well as the unequal distribution of property, and modified his
powerful notion of consent to mean ‘active’ consent of the propertied and
‘tacit’ consent of the rest. Even John Stuart Mill, who supported universal
adult franchise and was among the first to support enfranchisement of
women, sought to restrict the right to vote to those with basic educational
qualifications and desired provisions for giving extra votes to educated and
better qualified individuals. It was feared that if vested with political
freedoms, the majority would not use their right to vote responsibly but
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would overturn the distribution of (unequal) property in society. In Indian
courts, a series of cases came up after the adoption of the Constitution
which challenged the land redistribution policies of the government as
being violations of the fundamental right to property. Understood as
popular rule without the restrictions of individual rights, democracy, thus,
becomes a threat to liberty. There is a conflict between the ‘liberal’ and
‘democratic’ components.
It was in the aftermath of the French and the American Revolutions that
popular democratic struggles emerged. The 19th and 20th centuries were
marked by increasing and often violent struggles by the working class,
African Americans, and women, demanding the extension of suffrage on
the basis of the very ideas of individualism that had been invoked by the
propertied male to win freedom from aristocracies and monarchies. The
implicit radical potential of the notion of individualism, rights and equality
was realized by these struggles. It is only with this acceptance of universal
adult franchise that liberal democracy acquired its current form.
John Stuart Mill and Developmental Democracy

Predominantly, liberal democracy is concerned with the protection of
individual rights and prevention of abuse of power. Participation in this
context is of value because it allows the individual to put forward his/her
interests and keep a check on the activities of those in positions of power.
It is of no intrinsic value in terms of the self-development of the
individual. James Mill controversially claimed that since individuals find
political activity a distraction from the pursuit of self-interest, franchise
need not be extended to those whose interests are subsumed under those of
others. Not only did he exclude women in this way but also men under the
age of 40, whose fathers could represent their interests.
The views of John Stuart Mill, known as the best advocate of liberal
representative democracy, present a contrast to this. For Mill, a
representative system must create maximum space for people to take part
in the functioning of the government and not restrict their involvement by
merely allowing them to vote. He considered participation important
because it develops the confidence of the people in their ability to govern
themselves. Mill, thus, understood democracy as a system which allows
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for the development of an individual’s personality. It develops the
intellectual talents of people and is the best condition for liberty to
flourish. Participation makes informed and intelligent debate possible. It is
through thorough debate and discussion, where there is space for rational
persuasion of each other, that the best argument emerges and this helps in
solving the problems affecting the whole community. This is why he
regarded the parliament as the forum where all kinds of opinion should
find a space and be vigorously debated. Mill considers a measure of socio-
economic equality as necessary for democracy and liberty to be actualized.
Despite his insistence on the value of participation, he was sceptical of the
capability of every citizen to govern and considered governance a task
requiring expertise. He sought to balance this by recommending maximum
participation at the local level so that people get educated in the task of
governance. In the next section, we shall see how he suggested
institutional measures to counter the ills of democracy.
Policy Making and the Pluralist View

Decision making in a liberal democracy is an outcome of the aggregation
of individual preferences or choices. In a protective model, these choices
are aggregated over the choice of government personnel and not over the
activities of the government. That is, the vote and electoral processes allow
people to choose or reject a representative or a political party but not to
determine what policies the government should undertake. This is because
protective democracy offers minimal scope to government activity.
However, as the functions and activities of the government increased,
the focus turned to the policy-making process itself. Utilitarian thinkers
like Bentham and James Mill propounded the principle of ‘greatest
happiness of the greatest number’ (see the chapter on liberty) as the basis
of determining functions of the government. While they advocated
minimal government and free market, they did make space for selective
state intervention in the economy for welfare activities like education and
wage reforms. But the idea that government policies must reflect the
aggregate choices of the majority became important for liberal
democracies. The welfare state model of liberalism assigns more tasks to
the government in the economy and these tasks, like the provisions for
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social security, education, regulation of industry and making employment
opportunities available, are justified in the name of democracy. John
Rawls, for example, justifies extensive intervention in the economy to
provide equality of opportunity to all (for more details see chapter on
justice), but most liberals are sceptical of extensive redistribution of
wealth.
How do people influence policy? The pluralist theory provides an
answer. The pluralist view, associated with the work of Robert Dahl, is a
specifically American understanding of political processes, but still has
relevance for understanding liberal democratic practice in general. Power,
according to Dahl, is the capacity to influence … the process and outcome
of decision-making. People form groups and associations based on their
specific interests; so in any society there will be a wide variety of interest
groups. Interest or pressure groups are the mechanisms that people adopt
in order to advance their interest, promote their causes and achieve
preferred policy outcomes. For example, kisan sabhas, teachers’ and
students’ unions, women’s organizations, trade unions, associations of
industries like FICCI or CII in India. and The policy making arena is like
the market, where different groups pursue their interests and the outcomes
are not pre-determined, but a balance is achieved out of conflicts; through
a sort of an ‘invisible hand’ mechanism. Political decision making is a
complicated process and involves bargaining between various actors. In
the process, people use a wide range of means at their disposal like
economic and social position, education, organization skills, reputation,
religion, etc. Unlike elitist and Marxist views, pluralists understand power
as not concentrated in a particular class, but as spread throughout society.
It is a democracy that provides opportunities for everyone to articulate
interests, mobilize support and seek representation. A vigorous interest
group activity keeps the wielders of political power in check. Democracy
here is identified with certain institutional mechanisms and procedures,
representative institutions, accountability of executive to elected
assemblies, basic liberties for all including the freedom of expression and
organization and an independent judiciary. As long as these procedures are
followed, a system can be referred to as being democratic. This is also
called procedural democracy as distinguished from a substantive
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democracy. The latter is concerned with the attainment of certain ends,
like equality or justice.
The chief merit of the pluralist analysis is that all modern democracies
do have a plurality of forces struggling and competing for their interests.
However, procedural democracy is compatible with the results which are
always skewed in favour of particular interests and groups. Social and
economic inequalities reduce the opportunity of disadvantaged groups to
influence policy outcomes. Thus, an agricultural landless labourer’s
collective effort cannot hope to match CII or FICCI either in resources or
in influence. In his later writing, Dahl does acknowledge the fact that
inequalities can be debilitating and consistently leave certain groups out of
the political process, despite the formal freedoms of a democracy, in which
every citizen has the right to participate in the decision-making process.
Thus, there are structural and ideological constraints which prevent
democracies from operating as an open, equal marketplace of competing
interests.In this process, the existence of democratic procedures and its
openness to conflicting views, interests and methods of influence is
valuable for a democracy, but the outcomes are liable to be undemocratic.
Thus, in the liberal view, the aim of democracy is to aggregate
individual choices and preferences in the best possible way. This
aggregation of choices could be restricted to the choice of government (by
voting for a representative who usually belongs to a political party) or
should constitute a mechanism of policy making. In the first view, the role
of democracy is to basically provide a defence against arbitrary and
unaccountable government through elections and constitutional
government. In the second view, democracy has a more direct link with
choosing and influencing the activities of the government. This is usually
done through a wide range of interest groups, political parties and pressure
groups.
Today, liberal democracy is both at a moment of triumph and crisis. On
the one hand, the collapse of the communist bloc, introduction of liberal
democratic institutions in the former communist countries as well as the
military intervention of the USA in West Asia to introduce democratic
regimes signal its near universal acceptance as the only practical model of
democracy. Indeed, the key ideas and institutions of liberal democracy like
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representative governments, rule of law, individual rights, electoral
competition and multi-party system have become central to any conception
of democracy. Francis Fukuyama in his ‘end of history’ thesis argues that
there is no credible alternative to liberal democracy. On the other hand,
liberal democracy continues to be subjected to a scathing critique by
socialists, feminists, multiculturalists and deliberative democrats for not
being democratic enough and these critiques have sharpened in the context
of globalization.They observe how the form of liberal democracy currently
advocated is minimalist or what Benjamin Barber calls a ‘weak
democracy’ emphasizing elections and a choice of political parties. Before
we examine these critiques, let us look at some of the common objections
to democracy.
OBJECTIONS TO DEMOCRACY
Critics of democracy can be classified into two groups—those who are
dissatisfied with a particular kind of democratic practice and seek to
deepen it and those who are critical of the democratic principle as such.
We have observed how the positive value attached to democracy is a
recent one in history. The very principle of popular power continues to be
subjected to trenchant critiques. Let us examine the main objections to
democracy.
A key objection to democracy is that it produces incompetent and
inefficient governments. In his critique of Athenian democracy, Plato
argues that governance is a matter of skill and expertise and therefore
should be left to experts. Human beings are by nature fundamentally
unequal. However, democracy presumes that every-one can handle
complex matters of governance and is, therefore, based on a false
understanding of human nature. Thereby, it substitutes ignorance and
incompetence for excellence and expertise. Because it allows nonexperts
to rule, democracy is an irrational form of government. He recommended a
strict division of tasks depending on one’s ability. Matters of the state
would thereby be left to a particular class of people who by nature and
training were most fit to rule—whom he called ‘philosopher-kings’. To
rule meant ensuring that everybody else performed tasks they were most
fit for.
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A distinction is made here between popular rule and public interest,
whereby governments are prevented from functioning in public interest
and taking strong purposive action due to the compulsions of democracy.
In India, for example, democracy is often blamed for the ills afflicting the
country. Common middle-class assessments blame the government for
following ‘populist’ policies (and not ‘correct’ or ‘rational’ policies), like
providing slum-dwellers with ration cards because of the compulsion to
seek votes. A deep fear and distrust of the ‘masses’ runs through the
history of democracy. Aristotle in his classification of governments placed
democracy as an ‘impure’ system where the multitude rule in their own
interest.
As already observed, early liberals were sceptical of mass suffrage and
considered political equality a threat to liberty. Constitutionalism and an
elaborate system of checks and balances were devised to prevent
majoritarianism.Writing in the 19th century in the context of the emerging
democratic society in Europe and America, Tocqueville coined the phrase
‘tyranny of the majority’ to describe the threat that democracy posed to
minorities and individual liberty. He particularly feared its cultural
repercussions. Since the cultural standards of the majority are dominant,
general morals, manners and creativity are debased in a democracy. For
example, when Bollywood films are discussed, a distinction is often made
between films for the ‘masses’ and those for the ‘classes’, or between
‘popular’ and ‘art’ films.
Even J. S. Mill for all his defence of democracy and political
participation considered majoritarianism and mediocre government as the
biggest weaknesses of democracy. Not only does majoritarianism exclude
minority voices but it lowers the standards of the government.
Subsequently, people with a lower level of intelligence perform the most
important task of legislation and administration. Mill suggested a number
of institutional mechanisms to counter these ills. Through proportional
representation, minorities can obtain a place in the legislative assembly
and, through plural voting, educated and intellectually superior individuals
can have more say in the choice of representatives. He was particularly
concerned about the opinion of minorities the experts and the geniuses—
who get sidelined when the majority principle is applied. Majority rule has
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a tendency to promote uniformity and conformity, whereas the main
catalysts of progress are the non-conformist geniuses. This system of
plural voting, in fact, violates the basic democratic principle of political
equality. He also recommended a separation of the tasks of government,
wherein the all-important task of law formulation would be done by an
expert constitutional committee, and the administrative tasks were to be
carried out by a skilled bureaucracy. The task of the representative
assembly was to debate and deliberate on the legislation and to monitor the
functioning of the government.
Mill’s philosophy, thus, combines a value for participation and equality
(which is unique among liberal thinkers) with elitism, where governance is
seen as the task of the educated and the experts. Moreover, despite his
egalitarianism, he did not recommend representative governments for
colonies like India. Democracy was possible only in ‘civilized’ countries
and not in ‘barbaric’ ones and, therefore, despotic rule was suitable till the
time the people of the colonies were ready and capable of democracy.
While Plato and Mill draw attention to the dangers of majority rule, elite
theorists consider a functioning democracy impossible because of the
inevitability of concentration of power. While Mill and Plato among others
are elitist in their views, elitist theory is attributed to a specific critique
developed by Pareto, Mosca, Mills and Michels about the inevitability of
elite rule. Classical elite theorists like Pareto and Mosca say that political
power in every society has always been in the hands of a minority, the
elite, which has ruled over the majority in its own interest. These elite
manage to dominate because they possess exceptional skills, especially the
psychological attributes and political skills of manipulation, and coercion.
They are far better organized than the masses and also possess qualities
which are considered valuable and hence use it to justify their privileged
position in the society. C. Wright Mills’ study of the American political
system refers to a ‘power elite’ which dominated executive power and
members of this class were closely knit, sharing the same background and
common values. Thus, they dispute the pluralist contention that power is
widely distributed in society. In his study of socialist parties, Michels
noted how despite socialist principles, the actual working of the decision-
making process tended to concentrate power in the leadership due to
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bureaucratization and centralization. Not only did the leaders not consult
the working-class members, the decisions taken were often contrary to
their interests. This led Michels to postulate an ‘iron law of oligarchy’
which applied to all organizations resulting in undemocratic outcomes.
In India, we note the wide prevalence of dynastic rule and the
involvement of all members of a family in politics. This phenomenon is
observed in almost all countries and is an evidence of the tendency of
concentration of power among a few who have access to the political
system.
The merit of these critiques lies insofar as they expose the myths of
democratic practice by exposing who actually wields power. But in
considering this concentration of power as inevitable, these critiques
affirm a belief in the natural inequality among human beings, and are
pessimistic in nature.
In this view, the value of democracy, given the inevitability of elite rule,
is that it allows people to choose among the elites. Joseph Schumpeter in
his influential work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy puts up a model
of competitive elitism as the most workable one in modern industrial
societies. He has a low opinion of the ability of people to develop an
informed opinion on key issues and opines that it is better to let experts
rule. Passive citizenship is good for governance. The only role that people
have is in the selection of the government among rival competing political
elites through voting. Democracy, thus, performs the crucial function of
legitimating a government. The unanswered question is one of how people
who are incapable of reflecting on key issues can make an informed choice
among political groups.
PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY
Let us now examine those perspectives on democracy that affirm it as an
ideal but critique its practice. Since liberal democracy has been the
dominant form of democratic practice in modern times, critics who seek a
deepening of democracy begin with an assessment of liberal democracy
and develop their alternative with reference to it.
Socialist View
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Socialists share the elitist view that even in a democracy, political power is
used to protect and advance the interests of a minority. While elitists
attribute psychological, social and economic attributes to the elite which
allow them to dominate; for socialists, the power of the minority derives
from their economic class position, that is, their control over the means of
production. The inequality then is not ‘natural’ but a product of specific
social and economic arrangements. The capitalist market economy
produces systemic inequality. All strands of socialism draw attention to the
incompatibility between democracy that is based on political equality, and
capitalism which is based on the right to private property and market
economy. In a market economy people have unequal access to economic
resources and this also is the source of unequal access to knowledge and
information. Thus, the existence of private property and the unequal
distribution of wealth is the source of socioeconomic inequality in society
and this prevents most people from effectively exercising their political
freedoms. In a market economy most people neither have the time nor the
resources for more political involvement.
Marxists challenge the liberal conception of the state as a neutral body.
The state insofar as it is committed to securing the right to private property
is deeply implicated in civil society. There are two strands of thinking
about political power in the writings of Marx and Engels. In the first
instance, the state and its agencies are the instruments of dominant class
interest. As Marx declared in The Communist Manifesto (1848), ‘the
executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the
common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’. In the second instance, Marx
and Engels talk about the ‘relative autonomy of the state’ from the
dominant class. The practice of parliamentary democracy and the
compulsions of elections do lead governments to respond to some
demands of the working class majority. Many liberal democracies do
undertake policies to correct the uneven outcomes of the market, like
restrictions on wealth, employment guarantees, etc. But for Marxists this is
at best a short-term measure because the state cannot go against the long-
term interests of capital. This is why, for Marxists, the vote cannot be used
to transform the system, because any welfare policies will be corrective at
best and will not address the structural reasons of inequality. The ability of
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the governments to undertake welfare policies is constrained by the
constitution.
Marxists acknowledge the emancipatory potential of liberalism because
it rejects hierarchy and affirms the equal moral worth of all individuals.
However, the liberal distinction between the state and the civil society, or
the public and the private marks the economy out as the private realm of
freedom and therefore, out of the purview of political decision making.
The socio-economic divisions generated in civil society render the political
equality guaranteed by the state ineffective. A democracy which does not
tackle the inequities of class power is inadequate at best and a sham at
worst. As against the fear of people like Tocqueville that democracy can
lead to the tyranny of the masses, Marxists fear that it will not. The
ideological and cultural hegemony of bourgeois values secure the consent
of the working classes. This includes telling the poor that the reasons for
poverty are because they are not hard-working enough. (See Chapter 9 on
power for the concept of hegemony.) Liberal democracy and its
institutions thus provide an ideological facade of equality and thereby act
as a legitimizing shell for capitalism. While democracy provides the ‘road
to socialism’ it is incompatible with capitalism.
Marxists and socialists are further critical of the nature of individualistic
rights which are the corner stone of liberal democracy. Marx terms these
the rights of the egoistic man, separated from his community and
perceiving everyone else as a competitor and a threat. The socialist aim is
a situation where the free development of each is compatible with the free
development of all. Thus, they endorse a more participatory democracy
where democracy extends to the management of all collective affairs,
including the workplace. The idea of a cooperative without the divisions of
owner and wage labour informs socialist conceptions of economic
democracy.
Communist countries seek to achieve socialist aims through a
revolutionary break and they advocate a model of people’s democracy
where a single party—the communist party— assumes leadership and
directs the country in its transition to socialism. Social democracy, on the
other hand, seeks to reconcile socialist aims and liberal democratic
institutions. It perceives the establishment of socialism as a longer gradual
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process in which electoral democracy can be used to correct the injustices
of capitalism. This is to be done by extensive regulation of the economy,
provision of employment and educational opportunities including
affirmative action and social security measures. We shall elaborate on
social democracy in the next section.
Marxists have usually ignored the concentration of power in the party
and the state. The experience of one-party communist states, the
distortions of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the fall of USSR
have led to a reappraisal of democracy within Marxist thought. The debate
had usually been structured as prioritizing between political freedom and
economic freedom. Contemporary thinkers on the left, on the other hand,
affirm that socialism and the attainment of economic equality do not
necessitate giving up the gains of liberal democracy, and particularly those
of individual rights. What is needed is a deepening of democracy which
can both tackle inequalities and allow more participation. They also draw
attention to the rise of corporate power and the unaccountable nature of
international financial organizations that dominate world economy. They
understand neo-liberal globalization as posing the biggest threat to
democracy in present times.
Indian Debates on Democracy

In India and the rest of the Third World, democratic ideas emerged as part
of anti-colonial struggles which claimed that colonial rule was a violation
of the principle of self determination and that the people had a democratic
right to self-rule. These movements further claimed that the backwardness
of their countries was because of colonial exploitation wherein the
resources of the colonies were used not for the benefit of its people but for
those of the colonizer. With independence all Third World countries had to
address the need for rapid economic development and social
transformation. The possibility and desirability of democracy and the
nature of democratic arrangements were debated in this context. The
Indian Independence movement was inspired by socialist ideas and
impressed by the achievements of the Soviet Union. Thus, socialist
analysis was sought to be applied to understand Indian problems. In this
section, we will examine the views of two thinkers, Jawaharlal Nehru and
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Ram Manohar Lohia, both of whom sought to adapt socialism to the
Indian context, and see how their understanding of socialism had an
impact on their approach towards democracy.
Jawaharlal Nehru is credited for the strong foundation of India’s
constitutional and democratic institutional traditions. He was influenced
both by the liberal democratic traditions of the 19th century and the Fabian
socialism of the early 20th century. At the same time, he was also
impressed by the rapid economic transformation achieved by the Soviet
Union. His views on democracy reflect all these influences.
He considered democracy a peaceful way to achieve the goals of
individual freedom and social justice. For Nehru, the well-being of the
individual was of principal value and the highest goal of the society and
the state. His thought reflected respect for the freedom and dignity of the
individual and the need to allow all individuals to grow and develop their
potential. He had faith in the power of debate and discussion in the pursuit
of truth and the possibility to educate and persuade people through rational
means to think in terms of common interests. This required free public
discussion, tolerance for differing points of view and dissent. He
advocated the institutional framework of liberal democracy for India, i. e.
fundamental political and civil rights of the individual, freedom of the
press, secularism in terms of the separation of religion and the state, rule of
law, parliamentary government and an independent judiciary.
Nehru shared the socialist critique of capitalism. He defined equality not
just in terms of political equality but as equal opportunity for all and
progressive economic equality. He recognized that in the context of
economic inequalities the democratic machinery can be hijacked by the
ruling class. As he said, equality before law cannot make a millionaire and
a pauper equal. Democracy can flourish only in the context of social and
economic equality. So, political democracy can be of value only if it can
be used to achieve what he called economic democracy. This meant active
involvement of the state in the economy and he advocated a state-led
economic development programme through the device of planning as well
as redistributive mechanisms like land reforms. While he admired the
prosperity and equitable redistribution of wealth achieved by the Soviet
Union, he was critical of communism because it had a tendency to become
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authoritarian, violent and to suppress political dissent. He did consider that
political liberties slow the pace of growth and achieve lesser redistribution,
but he preferred slower growth and lesser equity to the sacrifice of political
liberties.
In this way democracy was to make possible both economic justice and
individual freedom. Thus, Nehru advocates a model of social democracy.
Democracy in the international scenario was another area of concern for
him and the policy of non-alignment was formulated in order to secure
independence in foreign affairs and equality in international forums,
especially for weaker countries.
Lohia’s views are significantly different from Nehru’s. He is critical of
both communism and Nehru’s democratic socialism. Both, according to
him, understand socialism as involving only a transformation of capitalist
relations of production. That is, they are concerned primarily with
redistributive mechanisms. However, the inequalities of capitalism lie not
just in its production relations but in its technology. Capitalism specifically
requires large-scale industrialization and a centralized production process.
In the political domain, this requires a centralized state apparatus. Thus,
capitalism has a tendency towards centralization of power and this makes
it authoritarian. Nehruvian socialism was nothing but state capitalism with
some welfare features. While Nehru recognized the tendency towards
centralization, he considered the provision of fundamental rights and
universal franchise as guarantees of the freedoms of the individual. Lohia
considered electoral and parliamentary mechanisms as important but
inadequate to achieve either the active involvement of the people or in
achieving social transformation. Lohia, thus, drew attention to the way
communist states concentrated power in the state apparatus.
Socialist transformation can be achieved only with the active
participation and struggles of the people. Democracy involves people
taking control over their lives. It is a process of empowerment. This means
preventing the concentration of power and energizing the civil society’s
constant struggles against oppressive social and cultural injustices. Lohia
advocated a two-pronged strategy to tackle centralization and
concentration of power decentralization of political power through the
four-pillar framework and decentralization of the economic production
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process through the small-unit machine. Use of the latter along with
appropriate technology would help technology address the specific needs
of Indian society. This meant rejecting a singular model of economic
development based on the experience of the Western capitalist countries.
With the four-pillar framework, the sovereign power of the state would be
constitutionally diffused into four levels—namely, village, district,
province, and the Centre. Areas like the army or core industries would
come under the Centre, smaller industries under the district, and
agriculture under the village level. What is significant about this
decentralization was that it was meant to be decentralization not just in
executive powers but in the legislative and planning process, too. This
would ensure decision making by the smallest of communities in human
activities like production, ownership, administration and education. Lohia
was particularly concerned about the interlinked structures of caste and
gender oppression that characterized Indian society. Empowerment of this
majority and making them take an active and effective part in the affairs of
the country required decentralization.
Lohia’s views assume importance because there is a renewed focus on
participation and decentralization as a way to tackle bureaucratization and
centralization of power. We will look at this issue in the last section.
Feminist View
Feminists have further critiqued the liberal distinction between the public
and the private. They characterize relations between men and women as
one of unequal power relations. In the sphere of the family and the
household, the division of labour is unequal as the bulk of the child-rearing
and household tasks is done by women. Further, these tasks are devalued
and not considered productive enough to constitute paid labour. Thus, the
domestic arena is a site of unequal power structures and is, therefore, an
arena of democratization. In liberal theory, the family is part of the private
sphere and hence kept out of politics and therefore, out of democratization.
This is one dimension of the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’. The
other dimension is that this gendered division of labour and power in the
private sphere is linked to the unequal distribution of political status and
power in the public sphere. In Western countries, which have the longest
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history of democracy, women were the last category to get the right to
vote. Switzerland, for instance, enfranchised women as late as 1971. Most
political thinkers explicitly excluded women from the category of
citizenship on the grounds of their natural inferiority and incapability.
Despite formal political equality, women continue to be grossly
underrepresented in political institutions and decisionmaking structures. In
India, for example, the proportion of women in the Lok Sabha has never
exceeded 12 per cent.
Further, political equality has been undermined on the grounds of
sexual, social and economic inequality. Thus, specific policies are required
to enhance participation and representation and deliver equality, for
instance, redistribution of domestic work (both through sharing and
through public provisions for child care) and electoral reforms. In India,
the proposal to reserve 33 per cent seats for women in the Parliament and
the Legislative Assemblies is a proposal of the latter kind.
Feminists, however, note that the measures to ensure substantive
equality for women have to be of a distinctive kind; they have to
incorporate a notion of difference. Typically, democratic theory
understands equality as the removal of differences. So, formal political
equality recognizes no difference among people and socio-economic
equality understands difference as a disadvantage, and seeks to remove
them. But the idea of disadvantage is based on a notion of comparison
which is always based on a particular standard. The concept of the
individual that is central to liberalism is that of an independent, rational,
self-interested person. Understanding differences between men and women
solely as a disadvantage is to adhere to a male norm. For example, politics
has always been construed as a male domain and women politicians have
to prove they are ‘tough’ and ‘strong’ according to this standard. At the
level of policy too, for example, pregnancy is understood as a disease or
illness because it is the male body which is the standard of normality.
Understanding differences as disadvantages has meant that democratic
theory has been insensitive to the realities of women’s lives. Using a
particular norm as the standard and imposing it on others is an act of
discrimination. This disadvantages women as a group. Thus, feminists
contend that there is a gender bias in the democratic theory itself. In order
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to ensure substantive equality, democracy has to think in terms of
recognizing and accommodating differences.
Like the deliberative democrats (see next section), feminists have also
been critical of liberal democracies for taking people’s preferences as
given and for the restrictive view it has of participation. If interests and
preferences are taken as given, then democratic decision making will
simply reproduce the status quo. Unequal power structures sustain
themselves through ideologies and socialization. Thus, for women, the
process of democracy is also a process of empowerment, where they
become aware of exploitation, gain confidence, and seek to transform their
conditions.This, however, calls for a more active and participatory
democratic practice.
Deliberative View
In contemporary political theory, a key idea is that of deliberative
democracy. It is associated with people like David Miller, J. Drysek and
Joshua Cohen, among others. Liberal democracy views decision making as
an outcome of aggregating the preferences of individuals. In this sense, it
is believed that people’s preferences and interests are formed
independently and the political process only negotiates between the
conflicting interests. Deliberative democrats, on the other hand, believe
that people’s preferences are formed during the political process and not
prior to it. Democracy, then, is a process of arriving at an agreed upon
judgement or a consensus. Such an agreement is an outcome of
deliberation, i.e. a process where people try to persuade each other through
the give-and-take of rational arguments. In this way, people become aware
of information and perspectives that they are previously unaware of and
then they can question each other’s views. In this process, preferences or
interests get transformed to reflect a common agreement. Deliberation,
thus, reinvents a participatory model of democracy and the key idea is that
of a dialogue. Through open participation and unlimited discourse, a better
argument emerges. But this needs what Habermas calls ‘an ideal speech
situation’, i.e. a situation where free and equal participants are able to
communicate with each other without discrepancies of power and
constraints of particular circumstances. There is an inherent danger of
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preferring certain dominant forms of communication and knowledge as
more authoritative. Moreover, deliberative democrats hope for a consensus
which is difficult, if not impossible to achieve in diverse and complex
societies.
KEY DEBATES IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

In this section, we briefly discuss those issues which have emerged as
areas of debate in contemporary democratic theory.
Democracy and Difference

Historically, democracy has been a movement that has aimed at the
removal of differences. It was assumed that equal political rights and
recognition of citizenship would counter the discrimination people faced
on account of differences on the grounds of caste, race, ethnicity, and
gender. This idea of eliminating differences in consideration of equality
has been important for emancipatory politics because it affirms the idea of
equal moral worth of all individuals. We have seen how feminists consider
that a substantial notion of equality must incorporate a notion of
difference.
On the notion of difference, feminists are joined by multiculturalists
who argue that in culturally plural societies, treating all differences among
people as a disadvantage is to use the dominant group’s culture as a norm.
Most contemporary societies are culturally diverse and are composed of
many communities, for example, immigrants, indigenous people, racial
minorities. India itself is multireligious, multilingual, multicultural, and
also has adivasi communities. Not only are communities socially and
culturally different, they are often in relations of domination and
subordination with each other. Further, liberal democracies claim to be
neutral with respect to conceptions of good life and leave these to
individual choice. However, the laws and practices of a country reflect the
cultural bias of the majority. Feminists and multiculturalists say that
liberalism, which values the abstract selfinterested individual, is itself a
particular notion of the good life. For an adivasi group, where property is
common, the insistence on private property is alien.
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Liberalism values diversity, but in terms of opinions it recognizes
diversity only at the individual level. But an individual’s identity is formed
in a cultural context, and ignoring or devaluing the culture is
discriminatory both to the individual and to the group. Thus, a
commitment to the equal worth of all individuals means equal respect to
their culture and equal treatment of all groups. It is only when this
diversity is valued and respected that people can develop their capacities
and contribute to collective life meaningfully.
Not recognizing the differences among groups is to ignore the diversity
of the ways of life and experiences among people. Such a democracy
assimilates and evaluates everyone, keeping the culture of the privileged
groups as the standard. Those not conforming to this standard either have
to lose their identity to assimilate or get marked out as the ‘other’. Ignoring
the specificity of a minority group is to marginalize it.
Democracy involves equality in setting standards, too. Thus, according
to the late Professor Iris Marion Young of the University of Chicago,
asserting the value of group differences provides a standpoint to both point
out that the norm presented as universal is culturally specific, and criticize
them by presenting an alternative. Some feminists say that care and
nurture, which women have been associated with, are desirable values for
everyone. Tribal communities and forest-dwellers compare their
harmonious co-existence with the environment to the destructive
industrialization which is presented as ‘development’.
As democracies are concerned with equality, it must have procedures
and mechanisms which recognize difference. Iris Marion Young
recommends procedures that ensure additional representation for all
oppressed groups, affirmative action and public funding to promote the
self-organization of groups, consultation with the groups on policy matters
affecting them and a veto power over specific policy decisions which
directly affect the group. The meaning of representation in this context
requires that a democratic polity must be representative of the diversity
within it. Will Kymlicka recommends self-governance rights for
indigenous peoples and cultural rights for ethnic groups. The Scheduled
Tribes and other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Right)
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Bill, 2005, passed in the Lok Sabha in December 2005, likewise proposes
that forest-dwellers have a right to the forest and mineral resources.
These proposals, however, raise significant issues. There is a danger of
freezing identities and privileging a particular identity of an individual
over the other identities s/he may have. Further, there is the question of
internal democracy in the groups. Whose views are to be seen as
representative of the group? In India, for example, in the debate over the
uniform civil code, personal laws of religious communities are sought to
be replaced on the lines of the Hindu Code Bill, which ignores the
differences among communities. However, all personal laws are
discriminatory to women. The right of a group to maintain its identity
conflicts with the equal rights of women within the group.
Thus, the recognition of difference is both a requirement of and poses
important issues for democratic theory.
Representation and Participation

Most practising democracies are indirect or representative in nature.
However, what does it mean to represent? Are representatives meant to be
delegates, i.e. give voice to the wishes of their electors? In territorial
constituencies, however, the process of amalgamating the interests of a
diverse electorate is a challenge. J. S. Mill rejects the idea that
representatives are delegates because that would tie them down to the
preferences of the electorate. Instead, he says, representatives must be free
to act according to their own judgement. However, they are meant to act
on behalf of the people and not merely reflect their views. In that case,
what kind of control can people hope to have over their representatives?
The other view of representation is that people mandate a person or a
political party to carry out a specific set of policies, and thus direct the
government. But in most countries the election manifestos tend to be very
general in nature and are not concrete policy documents. Moreover,
elections are fought and won on a variety of grounds as political parties try
to incorporate all sections. Political parties, which are the main players in
an electoral system, themselves constitute the political elite and are often
deliberatively vague about policies. Elections are media-orchestrated
events.Besides, in most countries either a first past the post (FPTP/FPP) or
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a proportional system of election is followed. In the former system in
particular, the victorious party that forms the government has most often
not secured the majority of votes. There is, hence, a mismatch between the
number of seats won and the percentage of vote secured by the party.
Thus, an election, which is the main vehicle of representation, is an
inadequate mechanism to convert people’s views into policy directives.
All these developments have meant a renewed attention to participation.
Even in order to ensure that there is a check on representatives, and to
prevent abuse of power (protective democracy), there is need for more
active citizen involvement. The remedy for bureaucratization, corruption,
centralization, lack of transparency, and accountability is sought in
participation. In that sense, the traditional line dividing a direct and
indirect democracy is being redrawn. The recent Right to Information Act,
which seeks to make government functioning open, is one such initiative
in India. Critics of centralized government also advocate decentralization
through local self-government institutions like panchayats.
The main objection to participation has been that it is difficult to make it
work in a large and diverse society. However, the advancement of
technology, the spread of the reach of the media and the Internet, devices
like the jan sunvai or public hearing, devolution of powers to local bodies
wherever possible, and involvement of citizen groups like resident welfare
associations, make increased participation possible. The point being made
is that both representative and participatory mechanisms can be combined.
Democracy and Development

Indian democracy has often been analysed as a miracle because it has
survived in the context of widespread inequality, poverty and
unemployment. Democracy is often blamed for the slow rate of
development achieved by India. We often hear popular calls for a ‘strong
political leadership’ or even a ‘dictator’ who can lead the country towards
economic growth. Democracy here is seen as a luxury that poor countries
cannot afford. It is also seen as an impediment to development and so
suspension of democratic rights or political freedoms is desirable. This is
popularly known as the ‘Lee Thesis’ attributed to Lee Kuan Yew, the
former Prime Minister of Singapore, who held that the denial of political
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and civil liberties and a measure of authoritarianism is advantageous to
economic growth. The notion that democracy slows growth is popular and
we saw how communist regimes made it a choice between political
freedom and economic rights.
Amartya Sen contests this thesis and says that it is not supported by
satisfactory empirical evidence. He further argues that in poor societies,
democracy has both an instrumental and a constructive role to play in
promoting development. In a democracy where the rulers have to face the
electorate, there is an incentive to listen to the needs of the people.
Political freedoms and civil rights, a free press, the presence of opposition
parties—all of these mean that the actions of the government are subject to
the evaluation and criticism of society and that has a direct impact on the
political fortunes of those in power. Democracy, thus, plays an
instrumental role in promoting the economic needs of the people.
Additionally, he argues that democratic arrangements play a constructive
role in the sense that they even allow for the conceptualization of what
constitutes economic needs. Democracies create a set of opportunities, and
through open debate, discussion and dissenting opinions, people get
involved in formulating their needs and priorities.
This view is important because there are contending views on what
constitutes development. The idea that economic growth constitutes
development is contested not just by those critical of the way the benefits
of growth are concerned by the powerful but also by environmentalists.
Movements like the Narmada Bachao Andolan contest the claims of
benefits that high-level industrialization and multipurpose river projects
are supposed to bring. Many tribal and local communities claim the right
to use natural resources in a way that is beneficial to the community. They
contest the notion that there is a single model of development which is
applicable to all. Social and environmental movements assert the need to
formulate alternative, people-centred, sustainable models of development.
If by development one means improvement of living conditions, then the
precise mode of development to be adopted by a society is a matter of
democratic decision making.
The Scope of Democracy
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Socialist, feminist and multicultural critiques as well as anti-race and anti-
caste movements draw attention to the presence of various structures of
power and inequity in society. Since these power structures affect the way
people exercise their political freedoms and their ability to influence
collective decisions, removal of these structures becomes a concern for
democracy. That is, a democratic society is the basis for democratic
political arrangements. Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau identify the
task of radical democracy as a struggle against all modes of oppression and
subordination in society by fully realizing the ideals of liberty and equality
for all. As the concept of equality expands from formal equality to include
equality of opportunity and equal treatment of culturally diverse
communities, thus requiring a notion of difference, the scope of democracy
will widen.
Democracy, conceived in this form, is of relevance to all spheres of
human collective life, be it the family, association, workplace, community
or the nation. Within the framework of the nation-state, the agenda of
deepening democracy involves enhancing participation and the devolution
of power to regional and local levels. However, the principle of democracy
is relevant beyond the level of the nation-state as well. Our globalized
world is characterized by a high degree of interdependence among nation-
states due to changes in production, communication, and trade.
International financial agencies like the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank, and transnational corporations, are powerful players in the
world economy and exercise much influence over Third World states.
They are not subject to any transparent system of accountability. On the
other hand, many pressing issues like environmental protection and human
security require co-operation among states, and on issues like violation of
human rights and peace, international intervention in nation-states is
required. The current UN system and international organizations like the
World Trade Organization are skewed in favour of the most powerful
states. These underline the need for effective and democratic global
systems of governance. David Held suggests a cosmopolitan model of
democracy as a way to respond to these changes and democratize the
global system. It envisages setting up political, legal, administrative and
regulatory institutions at global and regional levels, which would help
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create methods to ensure transparency and accountability in international
government and non-government institutions; secure world-wide
consultation and referenda on certain issues; and enforce peace and human
rights within nationstates. This model of democracy is not meant to be an
alternative to the nation-state but a system that complements democracy at
the national and local levels.
CONCLUSION
Everybody’s for democracy in principle. It’s only in practice
that the thing gives rise to stiff objections.
—Noam Chomsky
The history of political theory is witness to divergent views on the

desirability of democracy as well as its nature and extent. These
differences emerge from what one expects democracy to achieve. In this
chapter, we examined the key ways in which democracy is understood and
the dilemmas faced when it is sought to be applied.
1. Movements for self-determination exist in many parts of the world. Can

democratic principles be applied to resolve them, and how?
2. Is it possible to combine the political participation valued in the classical model
with equality of all individuals in the community? What sort of changes in the
life of the society and the arrangement of its activities would be required for
this purpose?
3. World War I was fought to make the world safe for democracy. Similarly,
today we face a situation where the US leads an attempt to introduce
democratic regimes in many parts of the world. Given this situation, do you
think democracy can be imposed from above?
4. In your opinion how can the conflict between the cultural rights of a community
and the equal rights of women be democratically resolved, as in the case of the
Uniform Civil Code in India?
READING LIST
193
Arblaster, Anthony, Democracy: Concepts in the Social Sciences (New York: Open
Carter, April and Geoffrey Stokes, Democratic Theory Today: Challenges for the21st
Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
Cunningham, Frank, Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction (London, New
York: Routledge, 2002).
Elstub, Stephen, ‘Democracy’, in Iain Mackenzie (ed.), Political Concepts: A Reader
and Guide (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2005).
Held, David (ed.), Prospects of Democracy: North, South, East, West (London: Polity
Press, 1993).
———, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
Mahajan, Gurpreet (ed.), Democracy, Difference and Social Justice (Delhi: Oxford
Marx, Karl, Communist Manisfesto, first pub. 1848 (London: Penguin, 2002), entire text
with study guides and questions available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm
Parekh, Bhikhu, ‘The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy’, Political Studies,
XL, Special Issue, 1992.
Phillips, Anne, Engendering Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
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CHAPTER 8
Citizenship
Anupama Roy
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
What Do We Mean by Citizenship?
Historical Development of the Concept of Citizenship
T. H. Marshall: Equal and Universal Citizenship
Limits of Liberal Citizenship: Uniformity and Generality
The Search for Alternatives
New Contexts and Changing Concerns: Multiculturalism and Globalization
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
The form and substance of citizenship in each historical period reflect the
dominant configuration of socio-economic and political forces of each
historical period. The specificity of citizenship in each historical period
can be understood by seeking answers to questions like—Who are the
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citizens? Who are excluded from citizenship and what is the process/basis
of exclusion? What is the nature of citizenship? Is it a legal status
indicating entitlements or does it also involve active participation in
political life? What kind of relationship between the individual and the
religious-cultural community is envisaged in the rights and responsibilities
of citizenship? What are the avenues of participation towards building a
responsible citizenship? Answers to such questions would give us an
insight into the manner in which the notion of citizenship has evolved
historically, and grasp the complexities of contemporary
debates.Contemporary debates on citizenship raise questions around
notions of equality and rights, issues of individual, group and community
rights, active and passive citizenship and the relationship between, and
relative primacy of, rights and duties.
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY CITIZENSHIP?

More often than not, citizenship is seen in terms of a legal/formal status—
having a specific nationality, holding a passport, and deriving from this
status, entitlements and claims, rights guaranteed by the constitution, as
well as specific duties and responsibilities which the constitution may lay
down. The idea of citizenship, however, goes beyond the legal-formal
framework to denote substantive membership in the political community.
The commonly accepted definition of citizenship by T.H. Marshall in
Citizenship and Social Class (1950) as ‘full and equal membership in a
political community’ holds the promise of equality and integration within
the political community. While citizenship may be identified with an ideal
condition of equality, it may actually remain elusive and fettered, as
societies are always marked by hierarchies of class, caste, sex, race, and
religion, rather than equality of status and belonging. Equality and
integration as constitutive elements of citizenship give it, however, its
unique character as a momentum concept—citizenship’s internal logic that
demands that its benefits necessarily become progressively more universal
and egalitarian (Hoffman 1997: 71–72). Citizenship may then be seen as a
condition that is continually evolving and changing. At different moments
in history, ‘becoming a citizen’ has involved either an extension of the
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status to more persons, or a liberatory dismantling of hitherto existing
structures of oppression.
The constituent elements of citizenship have been uncertain and often
contradictory, making it difficult to outline a precise notion of citizenship.
There are divergent responses, for example, to questions pertaining to
whether rights or duties are the defining elements of citizenship, or
whether the arena of politics or state activities is its rightful domain as
opposed to the spheres of culture, economy, and society. Again, there is no
consensus on whether citizenship is only a status or a measure of activity,
or what is of primary significance for citizenship—the autonomy of the
individual or the community and the societal contexts that shape the needs
of the individual. Even on questions pertaining to the legitimate unit of
citizenship identity, viz., the nation-state, or the global civil society, there
is a lock of consensus. In order to understand why these contradictions co-
exist in the conceptual framework of citizenship, it is important to see
them in terms of historically emergent strands. It is important, moreover,
to explore these various strands in their specific historical contexts,
keeping in mind, however, that at each historical moment the earlier
strands co-existed, keeping alive the tensions and uncertainties over the
form and content of citizenship.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP

The word ‘citizenship’ is derived from the Latin civis and its Greek
equivalent polites, which means member of the polis or city. The manner
in which citizenship is understood today as a system of equal rights, as
opposed to privileges ascribed by conditions of birth, took roots in the
French Revolution (which started in 1789). With the development of
capitalism and liberalism, the idea of the citizen as an individual bearing
rights irrespective of her/his class, race, gender, ethnicity, etc., became
further entrenched. Since the 1980s, globalization and multiculturalism
have provided the contexts within which this notion of citizenship has
been challenged. Thus, the development of ideas that surround the concept
of citizenship can be attributed to four broad historical periods: (a)
classical Graeco-Roman period (4th century b.c. onwards); (b) late
medieval and early modern period including the period of the French and
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American Revolutions; (c) the developments in the 19th century
corresponding to the growing influence of liberalism and capitalism; and
(d) the contests over the form and substance of citizenship in the late 20th
century, with an increasing preoccupation with multi culturalism and
community rights. Two dominant strands or traditions of rights and
citizenship can be seen to have developed over these periods: civic
republicanism, characterized by the ideas of common good, public spirit,
political participation and civic virtue; and liberal citizenship with an
emphasis on individual rights and private interests. The Marxists and
feminists have criticized both these traditions as exclusionary and have
suggested radical changes in the theory and practice of citizenship.
Similarly, cultural pluralists, radical pluralists and civil society theorists
have offered alternative ways of thinking about citizenship and rights.
The Classical Period and Civic Republican Citizenship: Civic Virtue,

Freedom and Active Citizenship
The term civic republican denotes a constitutional government founded on
principles of sharing of power to prevent arbitrary authority, and the
involvement of citizens in public affairs to the mutual benefit of the
individual and the community. The Greek republics or city-states, Athens
and Sparta, were exponents of the classical institution of citizenship that
we identify with the civic republican tradition. Athens and Sparta were
based on opposing political principles—Sparta on stern authoritarianism
and Athens on democracy. But they were both exponents of the principles
of classical citizenship as public service and civic duties. If Athens
required commitment from her citizens for ready participation in
governmental and juridical functions, for Sparta, civic duty involved
selfless devotion of her citizen-soldiers. In Politics, Aristotle explicates
what citizenship should ideally be and what the conditions are, in which
such an ideal may be realized.
In its earliest forms in the Greek republics or city-states, citizenship was
an expression of the inherent centrality of the political element in human
nature, and remained the primary organizing principle of human life.
Greek republics like Athens and Sparta were closely knit, self-governing
political communities characterized by small populations and minimum
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social differentiation. The organization of the republic was based on
familiarity and trust, principles of active political participation, the
prioritization of the public and political aspects of life, and the primacy of
the identity of man as citizen. The idea of citizenship around which the
city-states were organized may be seen as manifesting the conditions in
which human beings may, following the Aristotelian dictum, realize their
natural selves. In its classical formulation, therefore—as a binding force in
the community and as the means by which human beings could be in touch
with their true nature—citizenship emerged as ‘a framework for securing
freedom for citizens’. This notion of citizenship as the means as well as the
state or condition of freedom, has been an enduring element of citizenship
since classical times.
An important element of citizenship as a means and condition of
freedom was participation in civic life. Greek citizens were described by
Aristotle as ‘all who share in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in
turn’. While the idea of participation in the act of ruling continues to be a
significant component of active citizenship—zealously cherished by those
who espouse citizenship as a civic ideal—in the context of classical
Greece, not everyone could share in the civic life, which consisted of the
ruling and the ruled. Citizenship was limited to those having the capacity
to participate in the process of governance and was confined to ‘free
native-born men’, excluding women, children, slaves and resident aliens.
In the ultimate analysis, citizens constituted only a small part of the
population, whose participation in public life was made possible by the
exclusion and subordination of the private sphere of the family and
economic life, and by the existence of slaves, who were responsible for
performing the principal economic functions. Thus, the classical notion of
citizenship, while handing down the legacy of citizenship as a ‘realm’ of
freedom and participation, also spelt its association with privileges and
exclusion.
The Greek idea of citizenship as active participation was modified
during the time of Roman Imperialism, dictated by the need to hold
together a large and heterogeneous empire. Even as fresh grounds of
inclusion were added to meet the need of integrating a diverse population
into the Roman Empire, a gradation within the framework of citizenship
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was introduced. While within the polis there existed only one kind of
citizenship, whereby all citizens enjoyed equal privileges of participation
and governance in a manifestation of what may be called ‘imperial
inclusiveness’, the idea of citizenship was modified by the introduction of
a passive notion of citizenship as a legal status. The introduction of this
element brought large numbers of people, ethnically different from
Romans, within the purview of Roman influence by extending to them the
protection of a uniform set of laws. Subsequently, citizenship could now
be imagined not solely as participation in the making and implementing of
laws (as was the case in the Greek tradition), but also as a legal status
involving certain rights and equal protection of the law. The new element
of citizenship as legal status, while making possible a degree of
inclusiveness (i.e. including non-Romans to Roman citizenship), also
added a hierarchy of status by introducing the second-class category of
civitas sine suffragio (citizenship without franchise, i.e. legal but not
political rights). Moreover, women and the (chiefly rural) lower classes
continued to be denied the status of citizens. The characteristics of a
citizen, however, remained marked in a way that citizenship ideally
denoted activity or manifested the potential or capacity for activity.
Citizens were required thus to develop qualities of ‘civic virtue’, a term
derived from the Latin word virtus, which meant ‘manliness’ in the sense
of performing military duty, patriotism, and devotion to duty and the law.
The Late Medieval and Early Modern Periods: Legal Protection of Liberty
and Passive Citizenship
Around the 16th century, the notion of citizenship as a legal status seemed
to have become dominant. The aim of absolutist states to impose their
authority over heterogeneous populations provided the context in which a
citizen came to be defined by Jean Bodin (1945), the 16th-century jurist, as
‘one who enjoys the common liberty and protection of authority’. In this
view, the citizen was, unlike the Greek citizen, not himself an authority,
but following the Roman tradition, someone who was under the protection
of the state. Unlike the Greek and Roman traditions, however, citizenship
was primarily a passive idea. Citizenship in this period did not stand for
common (shared) public responsibilities and civic virtues. Instead, the
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notion of ‘common liberty’ became the primary concern of citizenship.
This concern embodied a ‘passive’ or ‘negative’ notion of citizenship,
involving claims for ‘security’ or protection that was to be provided by the
authorities. For the early modern liberals what was to be protected was
one’s physical life (as in Hobbes), the family and home (as in Bodin and
Montesquieu), or conscience and property (as in Locke). The principle of
liberty thus established the primacy of the private and the familial world.
The protection of authority was needed primarily to preserve this domain.
Again, unlike the classical idea of citizenship, citizens were not political
people. The political community was not the predominant core of their
lives but rather the outer framework, in which each citizen enjoyed the
liberty of private pleasures and pursuits of happiness and, as mentioned
earlier, the protection and security of the (private/familial) domain in
which these pleasures were realized. Thus, in this period the principle of
imperial inclusiveness seems to have brought about a passive notion of
citizenship as a legal status.
A nostalgia for citizenship as activity, as in classical Greece and Rome,
with an emphasis on civic virtue and public duty persisted, however.
Alongside the notion of citizenship as a status that guaranteed the
enjoyment of liberty, the emphasis on public responsibilities and civic
virtue remained influential as an ideal. Machiavelli, for example, praised
the ideal of ‘civic virtue’ in classical republicanism. He firmly believed
that men had to be kept constantly alert to their performance of civic
obligations, which could be achieved by education, religion, and a fear of
consequences in case of dereliction of citizenship duties. For Machiavelli,
not only was good citizenship essential for a secure state and republican
government, citizenship was possible only in a republic. Machiavelli’s
citizens, however, had to be made of sterner stuff and tougher moral fibre
than their classical counterparts, equipped with ‘courage, fortitude,
audacity, skill and civic spirit’—the latter meaning spirited action.
Montesquieu likewise argued that a state based on the principle of popular
participation, as distinct from other forms of government, depends on its
stability on the civic virtue of its citizens. For Rousseau, civic virtue and
participation were the necessary elements of citizenship. He saw the
‘general will’ as citizens contributing without thought of personal
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advantage to political decisions. It may be pointed out that all the thinkers
of this period looked at ‘civic virtue’ as an ideal to be pursued, and
lamented the lack of citizenship qualities in their own social-political
contexts. Machiavelli, for example, lamented the fact that few of the
Italian states of the 16th century displayed the qualities of the ancient
republics and even fewer men, the qualities of virtue. Most thinkers of this
period (16th-18th centuries), including Rousseau and Montesquieu, whose
ideas influenced the American and French Revolutions, favoured the
revival of the civic ideals of the classical republican tradition, which had
been sidetracked by pursuits of private pleasures and personal interests.
It was this strand of civic republicanism, a feature of classical tradition
and remained an elusive ideal in the medieval and early modern periods,
that was revived by the French Revolution in 1789. The French Revolution
was a revolt against the passive citizenship of the early modern times. It
attempted to resurrect the republican ideals of participation against the
claims of the empire and the monarchical state. Apart from attempting to
transform the apolitical lives of the citizens, the French revolutionary
tradition introduced an important element to citizenship that changed the
way in which rights were incorporated into the notion of citizenship. In
fact, the manner in which citizenship is understood today as a system of
horizontal (equal) rights as against the hierarchical (feudal) system of
privileges, has its roots in the doctrines of the French Revolution. The
French Revolution and the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen’ gave rise to the notion of the citizen as a ‘free and autonomous
individual’, participating in making decisions that all had agreed to obey.
Thus, the conception of the citizen established by the French Revolution
combined the classical connotation of citizenship as civic participation
with modern liberal individualism.
The revival of civic republicanism, and its association with the idea of
the citizen as an autonomous and rational individual was due to
nationalism, which was a powerful force that redefined the form of socio-
political solidarity and paved the way for a more democratic notion of
citizenship. Generally understood, nationalism refers to the self-definition
and selfconsciousness of the ‘nation’ or ‘a people’ as a unified entity. An
expression of solidarity or interconnectedness among people and a
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recognition by others of this solidarity are integral to nationalism. In other
words, nationalism involves (a) the self-awareness by a people that they
constitute a nation; (b) the consciousness that there is something about
them as a nation that makes them different from other nations; and (c) that
there is a larger imperative from which the self-definition as a nation
derives. The definition of nationalism by Anthony Smith (1983) as ‘an
ideological movement, for the attainment and maintenance of
selfgovernment and independence on behalf of a group, some of whose
members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential nation like others’
captures the essence of nationalism, which he sums up in the phrase ‘ideal
of independence’. The aspiration for solidarity and sovereignty implies,
argues Smith, that the group should be free from external interference and
internal divisions to frame its own rules and set up its own institutions, in
accordance with its needs and ‘character’. The group is self-determining,
because its individuality gives it laws that are peculiar to it. Only the
assembly of all the citizens of the community acting in concert can make
laws for the community; no section, no individual, and no outsider can
legislate.
The 19th and 20th Centuries: Capitalism, Liberalism and Universal

Citizenship
With the development of capitalist market relations and the growing
influence of liberalism in the 19th century, the combination of the two
traditions—civic republicanism and liberal individualism—proved
tenuous. The idea of citizens as individuals with private and conflicting
rather than a commonality of interests gradually gained precedence. A
much less demanding liberal citizenship involving a loosely committed
relationship to the state took over, held in place by a set of civic rights
honoured by the state, which in turn interfered as little as possible in the
citizen’s life. The emergence of a market economy and an influential
bourgeoisie was accompanied by the dismantling of the existing (feudal
and quasi-feudal) socio-economic structures that had fettered individual
initiative and autonomy with their emphasis on personal subservience and
entrenched social and economic hierarchies. The idea of citizenship that
emerged in this context was characterized, according to Derek Heater
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(1990), by individual rights and individual mobility across social class—
made possible by the idea of equality among citizens and the replacement
of a localized civil society by an all-encompassing national political
community.
T. H. MARSHALL: EQUAL AND UNIVERSAL CITIZENSHIP

T. H. Marshall, in his influential account of the growth of citizenship in
England, states that the concept developed in a peculiar relationship of
conflict and collusion with capitalism. Marshall’s widely accepted
definition of citizens as ‘free and equal members of a political community’
comes primarily from the study of citizenship as a process of expanding
equality against the inequality of social class, the latter being an integral
element of capitalist society. In Citizenship and Social Class (1950),
Marshall distinguishes three strands or bundles of rights constituting
citizenship, viz., civil, political and social. Civil rights, defined by
Marshall as ‘rights necessary for individual freedom’, include freedoms of
speech, movement, conscience, the rights to equality before the law, and
the right to own property. These were ‘negative’ rights in the sense that
they limited or checked the exercise of government power. Political rights,
viz., the right to vote, the right to stand for elections and the right to hold
public office, provided the individual with the opportunity to participate in
political life. The provision of political rights required the development of
universal suffrage, political equality, and democratic government. Social
rights, argued Marshall, guaranteed the individual a minimum social status
and provided the basis for the exercise of both civil and political rights.
These were ‘positive’ rights ‘to live the life of a civilized being according
to the standards prevailing in society’. These standards of life and the
social heritage of society are realized through active intervention by the
state in the form of social services (the welfare state) and the educational
system. Each of these three strands has, he suggests, a distinct history
confined to a particular century—civil to the 18th, political to the 19th, and
social to the 20th—and corresponds with the development of specific state
structures—the judiciary, parliamentary institutions of governance, and the
educational system and the welfare state, respectively.
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The elements of equality and universality are emphasized by those
espousing the virtues of liberal citizenship. Marshall’s definition of
citizenship as ‘full and equal membership in a political community’ is seen
as encapsulating the two promises that modern citizenship makes: (a) a
‘horizontal camaraderie’ or equality, as opposed to hierarchical
inequalities among members of the political community, and (b) the
promise of ‘integration’ whereby the expanding circle of citizenship
gradually brings into its fold various excluded and marginalized sections
of the population. This membership is thus also the expression of an
identity, of a sense of belonging to the political community that is the
nation-state, and assures a share in a common (national) culture and social
heritage.
Citizenship’s promise of equality is, moreover, premised on effacing or
masking ascriptive and hierarchical inequalities of culture, caste, gender,
ethnicity, etc. For example, the provision of equal rights by state, or equal
protection by the state to its citizens, irrespective of class, caste, gender,
race etc., has at its core the idea of a neutral state. This basically means
that for the liberal state the citizen is like an individual wearing a mask, so
that attributes of class, caste, gender race, etc., are not visible. Logically,
then, all citizens appear the same to the state and it would therefore treat
everyone equally by applying uniform standards, so that irrespective of
whether a person is an upper-caste man or a Dalit woman, they possess the
same rights and are protected by the state in the same manner and measure.
LIMITS OF LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: UNIFORMITY AND GENERALITY

The notion of equality proposed in liberal citizenship has been seen both as
the basis of its achievements, as well as the source of its limitations. As far
as achievement is concerned, it holds out the promise of including all
persons irrespective of their caste, class, gender, race, and religion, as
citizens—in other words, generalizing citizenship across social structure.
The promise of inclusion involves the assurance that all persons are equal
before the law and, therefore, no person or group is legally privileged, and
that the state shall not discriminate among persons on the basis of any of
these differences. The provision of citizenship in this manner, in terms of
uniform application of same rules, disregards, however, the differential
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situation of persons across classes to exercise the rights or legal capacities
that constitute citizenship. This basically means that, in effect, the status of
citizenship will not be available equally to all. Those disadvantaged by
class, caste, race, gender, etc., will be unable to participate in the
community of citizenship in which they have legal membership. The
disability is a double one because in such circumstances citizenship rights
that are only formal cannot influence the conditions that render the
possession of citizenship ineffective, if not worthless.
Critics of liberal citizenship including those on the left, the feminists,
communitarians, multiculturalists, etc., have pointed to the contradictions
and ambivalences that surround citizenship’s relationship with capitalism.
While Marxist and feminist critiques will be examined later, it is important
to point out that even within liberalism these ambivalences and the limits
they put on citizenship’s potential as a ‘momentum concept’ have been
visited at various points in time. Marshall himself located the roots of this
contradiction and its potential for conflict in future, in the element of
citizenship that assured to each citizen ‘equal social worth, not merely of
equal rights’, which would guarantee to citizens an equality of status—‘a
minimum supply of certain essential goods and services’ (Marshall 1950:
24).
These contradictory impulses were addressed by John Rawls in the
1970s (A Theory of Justice, 1971) and then again in the 1990s (Political
Liberalism, 1993). Generally speaking, Rawls’ citizens are free and equal
members of a constitutional democracy, each with his/her distinctive
conception of the good. To pursue these goods, they need the same
primary goods, i.e. the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities as
well as the same all-purpose means such as income and wealth and some
social basis of self-respect. In order to ensure that the same primary goods
are available to all, they agree on a conception of justice that states that ‘all
social primary goods—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the
bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally, unless an unequal
distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least
favoured’. Rawls’ two principles of justice provide the framework within
which a liberal democratic citizenship could now unfold, viz., (a) ‘a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties’, and (b) equal
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opportunity combined with the most clearly distinguishable feature of
Rawls’ approach of justice as fairness, ‘the difference principle’, viz., that
‘social and economic inequalities’ would be acceptable only insofar as
they operate ‘to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society’ (quoted in Shafir 1998: 7).
THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES
Marxist Critique of Bourgeois Citizenship

It is generally pointed out that for Marx the claims of liberal citizenship to
equality and freedom were incompatible with capitalism. The explanation
for this incompatibility has been sought in Marx’s interpretation of the
modern state as a bourgeois state, as a manifestation and guardian of
bourgeois interests, incapable of delivering the promises of equal
citizenship. ‘Equal right’ in a capitalist society is a bourgeois right
consisting only in the application of an equal/uniform standard. This works
out in effect as ‘a right of inequality in its content’, since with the
application of an equal standard, people’s (unequal) location in a
hierarchized society, their needs, social contexts, relationships, etc., are
ignored. Such rights, moreover, are embedded in the notion of ‘alienated’,
‘isolated’. ‘circumscribed’ and ‘egoistic’ individuals. Marx’s treatment of
citizenship and rights is, however, more nuanced and differentiated. As
pointed out by Amy Bartholomew (1990), in his work On the Jewish
Question, Marx, distinguished ‘the ‘rights of man’ from the ‘rights of
citizens’, directing his criticism of rights primarily towards the ‘rights of
man’ or the so-called natural rights.
Marx rejects the ‘rights of man’, viz., freedom of religion, equality,
liberty, security and private property, embodied in the French and
American declaration of rights. None of these rights, he argued, went
‘beyond the egoistic man … that is as an individual separated from the
community….’ The only bond that they admit between people is one
deriving from necessity, need and private interest. These rights, therefore,
not only reflect but also constitute competitive, egoistic and atomistic
individuals who view the community and others as potential enemies.
None of these rights, he points out, addresses or embraces communal or
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social concerns, human sociality or the species being. Marx had a different
view of citizens’ rights, and political participation in general. Citizens’
rights in Marx’s schema included political and civil rights, and rights of
democratic participation. Marx is appreciative of citizen’s rights because
they could be exercised by individuals only as members of a community,
and their content was ‘participation in the community life’, in the ‘political
life of the community’, and the ‘life of the state’. They are, moreover,
embedded in the political life of the community, and envisage an
individual without egoistic boundaries. Marx was supportive of citizens’ or
political rights, both in terms of restricting the freedom of the state and in
providing the participatory rights that encouraged some kind of collective
action. He supported freedom of speech, dissent, and organization as well
as universal franchise because he admitted the possibility of achieving
socialist transformation through the vote. Marx’s criticisms of rights can,
therefore, be better understood as pertaining to the actually existing ‘rights
of man’ (e.g. right to liberty, which he argued emerged from and
contributed to a particular form of individualism—bourgeois
individualism), and were ‘wholly preoccupied with his private interest and
acting in accordance with his private caprice’.
Feminism and Citizenship

As discussed above, the idea of ‘general’ and ‘uniform’ citizenship has
been criticized by Marxists for overlooking the inequalities that exist in
real life. Feminists have shown how the idea of citizenship has been
especially inimical to women. Feminists of all strands have criticized the
dominant conceptions of citizenship on two counts. They argue, first of all,
that citizenship is gender-blind. By focusing on uniform and equal
application, it fails to take cognizance of the fact that modern societies are
steeped in patriarchal traditions, which make for male domination and
privileges. Equality in such conditions remains a façade and the inequality
of women is sustained by policies that work within the framework of
formal equality. Second, most historical conceptualizations of citizenship
have thrived on the division between members and non-members. The
discursive practices surrounding the notion of citizenship have produced
dichotomies where the space for citizenship became increasingly identified
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with male and public activities. The universality and generality demanded
by citizenship required that concerns around particular contexts of caste,
class, race and gender be removed from the public domain and be
relegated to the private. While the public/private distinction was essential
for the assertion of the liberal notion of citizen as the autonomous
individual, it also led to the identification of the private with the domestic,
which played an important role in the exclusion and subordination of
women. Thus, feminists have argued that both the ancient and modern
concepts of citizenship have been inimical to women, either excluding
them from citizenship altogether as in the classical tradition, or integrating
them indirectly as citizen-consorts, as in the French revolutionary
tradition. Modern citizenship, while not entirely excluding women,
incorporated them on the basis of their socially useful and dependent roles
as mothers and wives, thereby placing them outside the sphere of politics,
and distancing them from resources and opportunities like education,
property, etc., which equip individuals for political participation.
Feminists have taken different routes to overcome their exclusion from
the political community. One strand has focused on political participation,
viewing citizenship as an aspect of public/political activity and as
embodying the transformative potential of democracy. They have argued
for women’s inclusion in the public sphere as equals, laying emphasis on
revitalizing/democratizing the public sphere through communication,
speech, and action (which are seen as empowering), and through alliances
for a shared common objective. Thus, it is the exercise of rights in the
political sphere which is seen as crucial to the full development of
women’s citizenship as part of what Rian Voet (1998) calls ‘an active and
sex-equal citizenship’.
A second major strand of feminism is, however, sceptical of what is felt
to be a merely ‘add women’ approach, which while looking for avenues of
inclusion into the public sphere, does not question its ‘maleness’. This
view approaches citizenship from the vantage point of what women do in
the private realm. Questioning the patriarchal state, it argues for the
inclusion of women’s specific functions into the public realm of
citizenship, hoping thereby to promote the suppressed private side of the
public/private divide into the realm of democratic politics. This has led to
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two distinct lines of argument: the personal is political, which implies a
continuity of power between the state and the so-called private domains,
and submits them both to the norms of justice and equality of the public
realm; and maternal citizenship, which advocates that women should value
their particular skills and interests, rather than merely enter the bastions of
male-defined politics on its terms. By emphasizing the ‘public’ role,
maternalists like Carol Gilligan (1982), Jean Elshtain (1981) and Sara
Ruddick (1989) feel that the degradation of the ‘private’ role, the
domestic, becomes unavoidable. They would prefer to see the dismantling
of citizenship based on male personalities, and the development of new
notions based on female characteristics of love and compassion.
NEW CONTEXTS AND CHANGING CONCERNS: MULTICULTURALISM AND

GLOBALIZATION
Differentiated and Multicultural Citizenship

Contemporary debates on citizenship and rights have questioned the idea
that the citizen can enjoy rights independent of the contexts to which s/he
belongs. A significant terrain of contention has opened up since the 1980s
in citizenship theory, with multiculturalism, plurality, diversity and
difference having become significant terms of reference for retheorizing
citizenship. This contest pertains in effect to the unmasking of those
differences that were earlier seen as irrelevant to citizenship. There is a
growing effort to redefine citizenship by giving due importance to cultural
differences among individuals and striking a balance between the
numerous religious, ethnic, and linguistic identities while constructing a
common political identity of the citizen of the nation. Notions of
multiculturalism and minority rights have been invoked in contemporary
times as democratic values, whereby cultural communities can lay claims
to inherent rights and negotiate fair terms of inclusion in the national
political space. This influential strand within citizenship theory has sought
to invest in multiculturalism as the core element of democratic citizenship
that cherishes cultural diversity and envisages a society in which different
communities forge a common identity while retaining their cultural
provenance.
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The case for a differentiated citizenship was put forth by theorists who
felt that the common rights of citizenship, originally defined by (and for)
white men in a class-differentiated society, could not accommodate the
needs of large numbers of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, who feel
excluded from the ‘common’ rights to citizenship. They emphasized that
instead of masking these differences in the allocation of rights, effort must
be made to take account of the specificity of the different circumstances of
citizens. An increasing number of theorists argue that different groups can
be accommodated into common citizenship only by adopting what Iris
Marion Young (1989) calls ‘differentiated citizenship’, which means that
members of certain groups should be accommodated not only as
individuals but also through their group, and their rights would partially
depend upon their group membership. Young argues against a society
where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that
as citizens, persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and
experiences and adopt a general point of view. Reinforcing the perspective
and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public,
marginalizing or silencing those of other groups.
Seeking to redefine the principle of equality, to make it compatible with
the ‘multicultural present’, Will Kymlicka (1996) provides a framework of
representation and membership that accommodates cultural and group
differences in a way that a person’s group membership and membership in
a cultural community is not of any disadvantage to her. Moreover, he also
seeks to find a meeting ground between cultural communities, the right to
self-preservation, and rights to individuals as defined in terms of civil and
political rights. Kymlicka suggests the following ways in which the
demands of national minorities and ethnic groups may be accommodated
within a framework of democratic citizenship: (a) By protecting the
common rights of all citizens, which basically means the protection of civil
and political rights of individuals; freedom of association, religion, speech,
mobility and political organization for protecting group difference. (b) By
accommodating cultural diversity through special legal and constitutional
measures, with members of specific groups being guaranteed special
rights, or as Young (1990) would call them, group-specific or group-
differentiated rights.
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Kymlicka identifies three forms of group-differentiated rights: (i) self-
government rights, (ii) poly-ethnic rights, and (iii) special representation
rights.
Self-government rights recognize some kind of political autonomy or
territorial jurisdiction of national minorities, which they claim were not
relinquished by their (often involuntary) incorporation into the larger state.
Such rights may be manifest in federal structures where the boundaries of
federal sub-units give some autonomy.
Poly-ethnic rights concern themselves with specific rights of immigrant
communities and represent a challenge to the Anglo-conformity model,
which assumes that they should abandon all aspects of their ethnic heritage
and be assimilated to existing cultural norms and practices. At first, such
rights may take the form of demanding the right to express their
peculiarities and differences without fear of prejudice or discrimination in
the mainstream society. Ethnic groups have, however, expanded this right
demanding positive action in the form of protection, preservation, and
nurture from the state to root out discrimination and preserve their
existence as distinct entities. Some ethnic and religious minorities have
also demanded various forms of public funding of their cultural functions
—funding of ethnic associations, magazines and festivals. The most
controversial demands have perhaps been those that demand exception
from laws and regulations that disadvantage them given their religious
practices, for example, Jews and Muslims in Britain have sought
exemption from Sunday closing, Jews in the United States have sought to
wear the yarmulka during military service, Muslim girls in France and
Britain have asked for exemption from the school dress code—to be
allowed to wear the hijab or chadors.
Special representation rights have evoked interest amongst national and
ethnic groups, as well as non-ethnic categories—women, the poor and the
disabled. This basically translates into democratizing the structures of the
state by making it more representative, for example, making legislatures
more representative by including members of ethnic and racial minorities
and women, the poor, disabled, etc. Defence of these rights has come both
on the basis of rectification of oppression and also for providing
opportunities for self-determination.
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The arguments made in favour of multiculturalism are, thus, not only for
the correction of ‘historical wrongs’, or even the removal of
discrimination. The commitment to sustain the community is primarily
rooted in the belief that communities have much to offer the political
community. The investment in diversity is also based on the assumption
that every culture has valuable elements that can be shared and learned
from. This assumption immediately opens up possibilities of conceiving
the political community as a shared public space where equality is a
significant norm. An important contribution of multiculturalism to the
theory of citizenship has thus been that it has altered the way in which the
political community has been thought of. Far from being a homogeneous
whole, the political community is seen as heterogeneous. Moreover, this
heterogeneity is seen as valuable for a democratic public space. Yet, in its
enthusiasm to establish the primacy of the community and the idea of the
individual-in-community, multiculturalism runs into the danger of denying
the individual the right of critical and creative membership in the
community and overlooks the hierarchies and oppressions that
communities themselves sustain and promote. By focusing
disproportionately on the preservation of com-munity, it leads to
arguments favouring not only the protection of the community from
external constraints, but also the acknowledgement of its right to apply
internal restraints. By empowering the community to apply internal
restraints, it preserves structures of authority that work to the detriment of
individual freedom. Moreover, by acknowledging the community’s power
to apply internal restraints, it seems to subscribe to the notion that the
rights and freedoms of all individuals do not matter. In other words, within
such a framework, the rights of individuals who belong to minority
communities appear to be dispensable.
Return of Civic Republicanism: Civic Virtue and Good Citizenship

Alongside the recognition of cultural contexts for the formulation of
citizen’s rights, the republican ideals of ‘civic virtue’ and ‘good
citizenship’ have also been revived in various ideological strands. The
ideal of good citizenship defined by civic virtue, patriotism, and
participatory citizenship, as discussed earlier, emerged in classical
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antiquity, and was revived as an ideal in Renaissance Italy, 18th century
America, and France. From the late 18th century the civic republican
tradition gave way to the liberal. The revival of civic republicanism or
‘neo-republicanism’ has come about in the non-liberal as well as liberal
articulations of citizenship, taking different forms depending on the
specific ideological tradition in which it is placed. By and large the revival
has been attributed either to the implications the liberal ‘style’ of
citizenship has had for social relations, or the intrinsic values of civic
republicanism itself.
Broadly, two strands of ‘neo-republicanism’ may be identified. One
strand exhibits disillusionment with the ‘thin democracy’ that liberal
citizenship has generated over the years, manifested in political apathy and
passivity While theorists on the Left would like to roll back passivity by
enabling and ‘empowering’ citizens through democratic participation,
radical pluralists like Chantal Mouffe (1992) believe that a relation of
‘democratic equivalence’ may be established through political
participation and the articulation of difference. These notions of active
citizenship conform to the distinction between civil society and political
society, where civil society is an extra-political arena in which individuals
enter in order to articulate their purely private concerns. On the other hand,
political society is generated whenever individuals communicate not their
purely private concerns but rather matters of shared importance, in order to
influence or make demands on the state.
A different articulation of active citizenship is found in Michael
Walzer’s works. Acknowledging the plurality of social life, Walzer
proposes that citizenship provides a common binding principle.
Citizenship as a binding principle makes itself manifest in civil society,
‘the setting of settings’ (Walzer 1989), which provides the space where
individuals as part of diverse social groups are trained in civility and self-
restraint. It is in this articulation of public life, in the shared forum of
participation of diverse groups, that individuals think of a common good
beyond their own conceptions of the good life. Critical of the growing
numbers of people who are ‘radically disengaged’ or ‘passive clients of the
state’, Walzer is equally uncomfortable with political participation as the
only form of active citizenship. He places faith in the idea of ‘critical
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associationalism’, which is based on the belief that in the modern world
the density of associational life and the activities and understandings that
go with it need to be recaptured and relearned, and proposes that
participation in voluntary organizations of the civil society—churches,
families, ethnic associations, voluntary groups, schools—inculcate the
civic virtues that bind citizens in mutual obligation.
On the other hand, another strand represented by communitarian
theorists such as Alisdair MacIntyre (1981), Amitai Etzioni (1995), and
Michael Sandel (1982) blame the passivity of liberal citizenship for the
disintegration of social bonds and the rise in anomie and alienation in
modern societies. Broadly speaking, this strand, like those discussed
earlier, extracts from the republican tradition the focus on community and
duty. Yet, it is distinct from them, since it omits from its programme direct
political participation and the republican concern for freedom. Moreover,
in their quest for ways to a ‘restored sense of neighbourhood’, and even a
‘national togetherness’, they are intolerant of the political and plural
diversity that the other strands of theorizing espouse. MacIntyre and
Sandel represent, therefore, the growing strand of social and political
conservatism, which dismisses the idea of the ‘unencumbered self’, but
rejects all forms of pluralities, arguing that the ‘politics of right’ should be
replaced by a ‘politics of common good’. We may recall that in Marshall’s
formulation, social rights constituted the third phase of the evolution of
rights, coinciding with the development of the welfare state, and
instrumental in integrating the poor, migrants, and racial minorities into
the fold of citizenship. Theorists of the ‘New Right’, however, see social
rights as promoting passivity and a culture of dependency among the poor.
Working within a framework of common good and common obligation of
all citizens, they argue for a workfare programme instead of a welfare
programme, cutting back the safety net of the poor, and tying welfare
benefits to work responsibilities. Unlike the civil society theorists, who
argue for the enhancement of responsible citizenship through participation
in institutions of civil society, the New Right sees the market,
characterized by free trade, deregulation, tax-cuts, the weakening of trade
unions, and the tightening of unemployment benefits, as the ‘school’
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where citizenship ‘virtues’ of initiative, self-reliance, and selfsufficiency
are learned.
Globalization, World Citizenship and Human Rights

An influential strand of citizenship theorists argues that an increasingly
globalized, interdependent and interconnected world, marked by
transnational movement of populations and multicultural national
populations one can no longer talk of citizenship in terms of membership
in a territorially limited nation-state, the hitherto uncontested unit of
membership. They propose the delinking of the relationship between
citizenship and the nationstate, replacing it with global/world citizenship
with its basis in human rights. Yasemin Soysal (1994), for example, argues
that globalization has brought in a ‘new and more universal’ concept of
citizenship that has ‘universal personhood’ rather than ‘national belonging’
as its core principle. Universal personhood delinks legal rights from
citizenship status and national belonging and is reflected in the status of
guest workers in Europe, who have lived in Europe for years without ever
acquiring citizenship, primarily because the countries of residence assured
their legal and social rights. These assurances, feels Soysal, are further
augmented by the global system of human rights law, the United Nations
network, regional governance, etc., that have ushered in the idea of a
global civil society. The assurances guaranteed by membership of this
global civil society make the securities of nation-state membership
redundant. Much of this assurance, it is argued, has emanated from the
high degree of agreement on the need for human rights, and the
recognition that violations of human rights have global ramifications, and
their protection must, therefore, involve transnational efforts.
The emphasis on world citizenship with human rights at its core is,
however, riddled with contradictions. Despite the increased role envisaged
for a transnational network and cooperation, human rights by themselves
are not able to ensure the development of participatory networks essential
for safeguarding rights. In the case of Soysal’s guest workers, for example,
the denial of political rights, even when social and civil rights are assured,
deprives them of a right to participate in the formulation and
implementation of policies, which may impact their social entitlements and
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civil liberties. Moreover, the emphasis on human rights and the world
citizen is counterbalanced by a simultaneous lament of a ‘crisis in
citizenship’ which is addressed with the invocation of stringent
immigration laws, the fortification/reinforcement of national and regional
boundaries, and emphasizing ‘descent’ and ‘blood ties’ in theconsideration
for citizenship. Moreover, human rights, like ‘citizens’, are almost always
articulated in abstract and universalistic, i.e. context-free terms, masking
the diversity and historicity of citizenship and rights. The idea of human
rights as the replacement for citizenship rights can be retained only when
citizenship is construed in passive terms, and rights themselves are
detached and distanced from the social and political structures that sustain
them, and the specific struggles that produce them.
CONCLUSION
The significance of contemporary debates on citizenship lies in their
admission that the political community is complex, hierarchical, and
culturally and ideologically plural. Even the fact that they envisage a
public sphere beyond the boundaries of the nation-state is important, since
it gives an analytical framework to understand the politics of a
heterogeneous public. This assures, as Iris Marion Young (1990) puts it,
that (a) ‘no persons, actions or aspects of a person’s life [may] be forced
into privacy; and (b) no social institutions or practices [may] be excluded a
priori from being a proper subject for public discussion and expression’
(Young 1990: 120, 178). The significance accorded to the contextualized
self too, is crucial in building a substantive notion of citizenship. The idea
of the individual as a part of the community, bound to other individuals not
by necessity or private interest, but by community or social concerns, is an
important aspect of such a formulation. At the same time, the notion of
community and what constitutes common concerns must be worked out
continually through processes of interaction and dialogue. It is through a
concerted effort at the retrieval of the political as an interactive public
space that collective energies can be congealed into shared bonds of
citizenship. What is required therefore, is not the essentialization of
community/cultural identities into compartments that exclude dialogue, but
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to see how economic, social and political factors, constitute the life
experiences of people within and across communities.
1. While legal and political rights were being won in Europe, colonization was
proceeding in many parts of the world. Do you think Marshall’s evolutionary
threefold typology of citizenship rights hold true for other societies?
2. Do you think positive discrimination in the form of reservation of seats in
recruitment or in political representation can be understood within the
framework of differentiated citizenship?
3. The practice of citizenship in the contemporary world has seen simultaneous
and contradictory trends towards both transnational citizenship and fortification
of nation-state boundaries and sovereignty. Do you agree? Identify such
patterns in state practices in India and abroad.
4. The manner in which individual, group and community rights figure in the
Constitution, manifests the ways in which the different strands of citizenship
have sought to address the limits of liberal rights. Discuss.
READING LIST
Bartholomew, Amy, ‘Should a Marxist Believe in Marx on Rights?’ Socialist Register,
1990: 244–64,
http://socialistregister.com/socialistregister.com/files/SR_1990_Bartholomew.pdf
Bodin, Jean, Method for the Easy Comprehension of History, trans. Beatrice Reynolds
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1945[1566]).
Elshtain, Jean Bethke, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political
Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).
Etzioni, Amitai, The Spirit of Community: Rights Responsibilities and the
Communitarian Agenda (London: Fontana, 1995).
Faulks, Keith, Citizenship (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).
Gilligan, Carol, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Moral Development
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1982).
Heater, Derek, Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education
(London: Orient Longman, 1990).
———, What Is Citizenship? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman, ‘The Return of the Citizen’, Ethics, 104(January),
1994.
MacIntyre, Alisdair, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
218
Marshall, T. H., Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1950).
Marshall, T. H. and Tom Bottomore (eds), Citizenship and Social Class (London: Pluto
Press, 1992).
Mouffe, Chantal (ed.), Dimensions of Radical Democracy (London: Verso, 1992).
Ruddick, Sara, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (Boston: Beacon Press,
1989).
Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge
Shafir, Gershon, The Citizenship Debates: A Reader (Minnesota: University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998).
Smith, Anthony D., Theories of Nationalism (London: Duckworth, 1983).
Soysal, Yasemin, Limits of Citizenship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
Voet, Rian, Feminism and Citizenship (London: Sage, 1998).
Walzer, Michael, ‘Citizenship’, in Terence Ball, James Farr and Russel L. Hanson (eds),
Political Innovation and Conceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1989).
Young, Iris Marion, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Yuval-Davis, Nira, ‘Women, Citizenship and Difference’, Feminist Review, 57(1),
1997: 4–27.
219
CHAPTER 9
Power
Nivedita Menon
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Conceptions of Power
Power as Exploitation
Authority, Legitimacy and Hegemony
Feminist Theories of Power
Foucault on Power
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with an overview of the debates centred on the
different conceptions of power, which leads to the idea that power is an
‘essentially contested’ concept. This is followed by the consideration of
power in different forms—as exploitation, as legitimate power and
authority, and as hegemony Thereafter, feminist theories of power are
220
briefly discussed. The chapter concludes with Foucault’s conception of
power, which marks a radical break with the earlier notions.
CONCEPTIONS OF POWER
Power in ordinary usage is understood as an ability, strength, or capacity;
for instance, in the term ‘electric power’. In social and political theory,
however, power refers to the ability to do things and the capacity to
produce effects within social interaction. In this sense, power is a type of
behaviour and specifically derives from the existence of social
relationships and organized social interactions.
The most well-known definition of power is given by Robert Dahl—‘A
has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something which B
would not otherwise do.’ This definition assumes two things about power:
a. power is an attribute of individuals which is exercised over other individuals,
and
b. power is domination over others, that is, power is used to make others do what
one wants, against their own will.
But both these assumptions are challenged by other theorists. There are
those, for example, who locate power at the collective level, and attribute it
to collectivities and structures. Marxist theory views power as distributed
unequally in a class-divided society, such as a capitalist society, where the
ruling classes own the means of production and exercise power over the
working class, which owns no property, but produces surplus value
through its labour power that is appropriated by the capitalists. Similarly,
feminist theorists understand power as located within structures of
patriarchy, which ensures that there is a systematic domination of women
by men. In both analyses, power is seen as located within structures, and
individuals derive power from their location within a structure.
The second assumption is challenged by theorists who view power not
simply as domination; that is, not only as power over but as power to—
power as an enhanced capacity emerging from collective action. This view
is associated with Hannah Arendt, who theorizes power as enabling and
generated when people communicate and act together in a shared
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enterprise. In this sense, having power is the basis of being able to act as a
morally responsible human being.
Power as power to can be understood in a different way, too. Renowned
sociologist Talcott Parsons developed an account of political power, which
treated it as the analogue of money in economic systems. That is to say, he
thought of power as something that circulates in society the way money
does. In this sense, just as the possession of money enables the capacity to
secure economic goods and services, so the possession of power enables
the capacity to secure the performance of political obligations. Just as
money circulates, so does power. Parsons, thus, emphasized on both the
facilitative dimension of power—that is, its capacity to get things done—
as well as its systemic character, that it is a property of the entire social
system, not merely of individuals.
In view of the debates on the notions of ‘power’, Steven Lukes suggests
that power is an ‘essentially contested’ concept. This notion was first
outlined by W B. Gallie. The argument is that there are concepts, the very
description of which are value laden. For example, when you term
something as an ‘art’ or when you refer to a ‘democracy’, you are not
merely objectively describing it, you are ascribing a value to it. That is,
non-art and nondemocracy are implicitly devalued in this description.
William Connolly points out that when we describe something we
‘characterize a situation from the vantage point of certain interests,
purposes and standards’. That is, any description, however value-free it
may appear, is subjective to the extent that it has embedded in it the
intention with which the thing is described. In that sense, every description
is made with some interest or purpose in mind, and assumes some
standard. Thus, when you describe something as a ‘lever’, you are ruling
out other descriptions of the thing as a piece of wood or iron, or when you
refer to a tulsi leaf, for example, as a ‘medicine’, you are ruling out its
description as a green leaf. Similarly, when you describe a women as ‘tall’
you have a standard of height in mind. This means that to choose one
description as more appropriate over another depends on the purpose
which the description is to be put to. Values are involved in choosing the
‘correct’ description. The choice is not made in a vacuum, nor is it
dependent on some inherent objective quality that the concept possesses.
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According to Lukes, there are three dimensions of political power,
which explains why he considers power to be an essentially contested
concept.
a. At the most explicit level, power may be exercised to ensure that a more
powerful set of interests prevails over others. This is closest to the view of
power, as expressed by Dahl, which we began with.
b. Less obviously, power may be exercised to ensure that certain issues and
options never come up for debate at all. That is, power can shape the setting of
the agenda for debate itself, and exclude certain issues from the beginning. This
view of power is put forward by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz. They argue
that if political theorists look for power only at the explicit level, they will
remain unaware that even in situations of apparent equality among participants,
power may already have been exercised. That is, power may have been used to
prevent the articulation of certain demands and views. These demands and
views then never reach the public domain, which can as a result appear to be
homogeneous and equal.
c. Steven Lukes goes even further and presents what he considers to be the most
radical view of power. The second view still depends on observable conflict,
but Lukes argues that power should be understood as structural, and working in
various ways to shape the very perceptions of people. Power can work in a way
that what people consider to be in their interest is, in fact, what is desired by
those in power— people’s real interests are hidden from them. In this view,
power should be assumed to be operating even when there is no apparent
conflict. This view is closest to the Marxist view of power.
Why Lukes calls power an essentially contested concept is because

whether we agree that the second and third dimensions also express power
relations will depend on our overall understanding of politics, morality,
and ethics. That is, you might disagree that the third dimension can be
recognized at all as power, because you believe that society is plural and
equitable, that everybody has the opportunity to be powerful, and that
there is no hidden dimension that hides from people what is in their best
interests. Thus, Lukes suggests that since people differ in their
understanding of how society functions, and what is just or unjust,
equitable or not, we will not be able to arrive at a mutually and rationally
agreed-upon notion of what power is. It is in this sense that power is an
‘essentially contested concept’.
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POWER AS EXPLOITATION
Exploitation is a specifically Marxist understanding of power. In any
society in which technological advancements have made possible the
production of a surplus—when more is produced than the minimum need
for survival of the population—this surplus is appropriated by or taken
over by one section of the population. Exploitation occurs when the
surplus produced by one section of the population is controlled by another
section.
In the Marxist understanding of history, society develops through
several modes of production. In such a situation, exploitation takes place
in specific ways. Under capitalism, exploitation takes the form of
extraction of surplus value from the working class mainly by the industrial
capitalists, but other fractions of the ruling class also share in this
appropriation of the surplus.
Capitalism differs from other non-capitalist modes of production in that
exploitation can take place without the direct intervention of force. Thus,
exploitation is hidden from the participants by the language of the contract,
in which every individual is equal. In a capitalist society, the myth of free
and equal exchange between equal partners to the contract is perpetuated
by law and the state, through juridical equality (which implies that
everybody is equal under law). For Marxists, this is a fiction because
freedom of contract, equality before the law and the right to vote are all
severely restricted in the absence of economic democracy. To quote a
saying in 19th century England, ‘Everyone is free to sleep under the
bridges of London, from the King to the pauper’—the point being that the
king would never have to sleep under the bridges, and the pauper does not
have the corresponding right to sleep in a palace!
In the previous modes of production, exploitation was transparent. For
example, the peasant had to give a part of the crop produced to the
landlord, or work for a fixed number of days in the landlord’s fields. If the
peasant did not do so, the landlord would use force to extract what was
expected. Such modes of exploitation continue even today in many parts of
our country. The modes of extraction of surplus value involved force,
which can be referred to as extra-economic coercion.
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Under capitalism, however, the coercion is purely through economic
means—since the contract involves a wage paid in exchange for the labour
performed, the exchange is seen to be equal. In the Marxist understanding,
however, the surplus produced by labour far exceeds the wage paid for it
in exchange and is appropriated by the capitalist. This appropriation is
exploitation.
AUTHORITY, LEGITIMACY AND HEGEMONY

When rules are complied with or obeyed, it suggests that it has the consent
of the citizens; that they affirm a belief in legality. Such a system is
assumed to be legitimate, and power that is complied with because it has
legitimacy is termed authority.
Max Weber’s discussion of authority is the classic one. He distinguished
between three kinds of authority—rational-legal, traditional, and
charismatic.
Rational-legal authority is characteristic of the modern industrial
bureaucratic state. Here, those who occupy positions of power, exercise
their power and are obeyed on the basis of impersonal rules that can be
justified on rational grounds. Thus, when you stop at a signal from the
traffic police, you are not obeying that particular person, but what s/he
represents—the rules of traffic in an urban society, where the absence of
such rules would spell chaos.
Traditional authority exists because of historical and cultural reasons.
Instances of traditional authority are those vested in tribal chiefs and
religious leaders.
Charismatic authority exists because of some personal quality possessed
by an individual who may not have either modern official status or
traditional authority. Jesus, Mohammed, Hitler and Gandhi would all be
examples of those wielding such authority.
Weber presented these types of authority as ‘ideal types’, that is,
theoretical devices to help in social analysis, rather than as descriptions of
empirical reality. So, no one institution or individual in authority
exemplifies one type entirely—charismatic authority often draws on
tradition; rational-legal authority and charismatic authority may go
together, and so on.
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A related distinction is between de facto and de jure authority. The latter
refers to the authority that has legal sanction, while the former refers to the
person or institutions actually exercising power. This is best exemplified in
the situation of coup d’etat in which an elected government is overthrown
by the military. Here, the deposed government represents the de jure
authority while de facto authority is exemplified in the military dictator
and the army.
However, David Held is one of those who questions the equation of
obedience to a system with legitimacy. Held points out that the reason or
ground for obedience is not necessarily normative agreement amongst
everyone about what a society as a collective should do. Only in this case
can we say that obedience to rules proves that the system has legitimacy.
Held argues that, in fact, the reasons for obedience to rules can be varied—
people may obey because of coercion, because they do not question
tradition, or simply because of apathy.
We have already seen how the Marxist concept of exploitation offers a
similar challenge to the idea that obedience to a system proves that it is
legitimate. It provides an alternative understanding of how obedience to
power is enforced through legal codes. Economic compulsion is an
important medium of ensuring obedience—modern capitalism has created
a mass of propertyless wage workers who have no option but to sell their
labour to owners of capital in order to survive. This ensures conformance
and obedience to rules.
Another dimension of legitimacy is provided by the notion of
hegemony. This concept was developed by the Marxist theorist Antonio
Gramsci. Hegemony is the control of society by purely cultural means.
Thus, he distinguished between the repressive function of state power on
the one hand, and the ability of the ruling class to control society by
generating consent on the other. In this understanding, power is not
exercised only through ‘coercion’, but is complemented by the ‘direction’
provided by the ruling classes. Thus, the consent of the ruled is a crucial
part of the power exercised through hegemony.
In this understanding, therefore, the state has a wider, more organic
meaning than the simpler Marxist understanding of the state as a coercive
apparatus serving the interests of the ruling classes. The state in Gramsci’s
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sense is understood as an equilibrium between ‘political society’ (the
coercive apparatus) and ‘civil society’. (Located therein are a multiplicity
of private associations, both ‘natural’ and ‘contractual’—such as the
family, Church, schools, and so on. These generate a web of social
relations and ideas that create and re-create the hegemony of the dominant
class, which, in Marxist understanding, is the class that owns the means of
production.) Thus, in Gramsci’s view, ideology does not simply reflect or
mirror class interest. But a dominant hegemonic ideology provides a
coherent systematic worldview that influences the entire population. A
whole complex of institutions, public and private, legitimize bourgeois
dominance, rendering its values universal.
A striking illustration of hegemony is provided by the following
example by Gramsci. When we look at a map of the world we know
immediately which direction is North and which is South. We understand
this to be a simple physical fact of nature. Gramsci illustrates this
understanding with Bertrand Russell’s statement that though we could not
think of the cities of London or Edinburgh without the existence of man on
earth, we could still think of the existence of two points in space, one to
the North and one to the South, where Edinburgh and London now are.
Gramsci’s objection to this common sense understanding is that locating
fixed points on the globe as north/south or east/west is not a fact of nature
but a convention or a ‘historico-cultural construction’. He puts it like this:
‘What would north-south or east-west mean without man? They are real
relationships and yet they would not exist without man and without the
development of civilization. Obviously, east and west are arbitrary and
conventional, that is, they are historical constructions, since outside real
history every point on the earth is east and west at the same time.’
Is this not true, that since the earth is roughly spherical, every point on it
is simultaneously east and west, north and south? But we always look at
the globe or a map only from a particular direction or angle. This is, in
fact, the viewpoint of the European imperialist nation-states. That is why
West Asia is the ‘Middle East’ (even to people in India for whom it is on
their immediate West) or Australia is ‘Down Under’ (but if we look at the
globe from the perspective of Australia, it is the rest of the world which is
underneath!) Through this illustration, Gramsci shows us that east and
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west are historically constructed conventions reflecting power relations—
the ‘world-wide hegemony’ of ‘the European cultured classes’, whose
point of view was naturalized across the globe. Such a point of view that
reflects and is produced by power relations and is made to appear natural
and innocent of power—this is how hegemony operates to produce
consent.
FEMINIST THEORIES OF POWER

Feminism is a political viewpoint that holds that the oppression and
subjugation of women is not simply a matter of individual behaviour, or
individual strength and weakness. Rather, a category of human beings
called ‘women’ are systematically dominated, subjugated, and denied
equal access to resources through the structural operation of patriarchal
ideology. Patriarchy is a key category in feminist analyses of power, and
refers to an overarching system of male dominance operating at every
level—economic, political, and cultural. An understanding of patriarchy
enables us to see that power or powerlessness cannot be explained in terms
of individuals alone.
Under patriarchy, it is possible that individual women may have some
power, but it would be strictly within the limits set by patriarchal rules.
Thus, in the South Asian context, for example, women as mothers-in-law
may have some power, but not as daughters, wives or sisters (of men).
Note also that women in this understanding are defined entirely in terms of
their relationship to men. Single women are, thus, invisible and
disempowered.
Patriarchy is not understood to be a single homogeneous structure,
rather feminist scholars now think in terms of patriarchies—differentiated
over historical epochs, geographical regions, and cultural communities. In
addition, patriarchy overlaps and interacts with other systems of
oppression—on the basis of class, caste, imperialism, race, etc.—and
produces specific effects. Thus, a white woman in the USA is affected by
patriarchy differently from a Dalit woman in India, and feminist
scholarship and politics attempts to negotiate these differences in complex
ways.
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It is also important to note that there is not one feminist analysis of
power; feminists coming from varied political traditions analyse the
sources of patriarchy differently. Liberal feminists would try to show the
deficiencies of liberal conceptions of liberty, equality, and justice to the
extent that they do not take into account gender, while Marxist feminists
would produce a critique of the gender-blindness of class analysis. Radical
feminists hold gender to be the primary category of analysis, and argue
that all later forms of power imitate the original power relationship of men
over women. At the same time, liberal feminists would have a critique of
Marxist analyses, and Marxist feminists of liberal philosophy—there are
more debates within feminism than there are between feminists and non-
feminists.
FOUCAULT ON POWER
Michel Foucault radically reconceptualized the notion of power.
According to him, power is not repressive—that is, in the modern era,
power does not operate by preventing us from doing what we want.
Rather, Foucault sees power as productive—power produces identity and
subjectivity. Further, power does not emanate from a single source,
whether the state or the ruling classes. Power is conceptualized by
Foucault as capillary—flowing throughout the system like blood in the
capillaries of our body. At first glance, then, there may appear to be
similarities between Arendt’s understanding of power as power to, and
Parson’s conception of power flowing like money through the system. But
both terms—productive and capillary—have entirely different meanings in
Foucault’s conception of power. In his understanding the identities
produced by power are ways of controlling through naming, and this
control is exercised in a variety of locations, in our everyday lives. How
does this happen?
Through the mechanisms of what Foucault calls ‘governmentality’ (also
see Chapter 11), we are produced as the subjects of governance. By
governmentality he refers to the increasing homogenization and
organization of society in modern times—through a huge bureaucratic
machinery that evolves endless ways of classifying people. This subject is
created and subjected to classification and surveillance through all sorts of
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things we take for granted—identity cards, passports and so on—through
which we can be tracked, and in which we have to state who we are—
Indian/Pakistani, Hindu/Muslim, educated/illiterate, etc. But we are also
produced as subjects by discourses of medicine (healthy/sick), psychiatry
(sane/insane), biology (male/female) and by legal discourses that judge
your identity on the basis of the authority of these discourses. So, the
mechanisms of governmentality are not located at the level of
‘government’ in a narrow sense, but operate through a variety of
discourses. Governmentality operates through normalization, by which
Foucault means the processes through which every individual is made to
conform to the dominant norm.
Note the pun on the word ‘subject’, which means both the independent
actor or agent, the thinking person (‘I’ as Subject) as well as that which is
ruled (for example, the ‘subject’ of a monarch). What this means is that the
moment you are produced as subject you are also subjected to the
mechanisms of governmentality.
Thus, when asked—‘Who are you’?—which is a question about your
identity, every single answer you can possibly give is the result of different
systems of classification that you don’t think about, but which are
produced by the mechanisms of governmentality.Take one possible
answer, which appears to be ‘purely biological’, that is, natural—I am a
man, or I am a woman. This identity is, in fact, produced by the language
of the biomedical sciences, which use the notions of chromosomes,
hormones, and organs to determine what you are. However, there is
enough evidence to show that no human being fits exactly a two-sex model
—this is the reason that ‘gender verification tests’, which were commonly
conducted for the Olympic games, were suspended in 2000. It emerged
after years of conducting the tests that atypical chromosomal variations are
so common that it is impossible to judge femininity and masculinity on the
basis of chromosomes. Similar evidence is available for hormones too, that
every human being has both kinds of hormones in their bodies, and large
numbers of bodies cannot be rigidly classified as either male or female on
the basis of hormones. But whenever such cases are encountered, medical
dis-courses are brought into play to treat them as diseased, treated, and
made ‘normal’. This rigid classification of all bodies as belonging to one
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or the other sex means that a large range of bodies are rendered invisible.
We have no language to refer to trans-gendered people (He? She?), and
babies that are born with no clearly determined sex are made to undergo
invasive surgery.
This subjection through the production of governable identities is even
more obvious when we think of identities based on race, caste, religion and
so on.
Thus, the construction of subjectivity by those who tell us the ‘truth’ of
about who we are—doctors, psychologists, the law—is at the same time a
subjection to the power they exercise.
Hence the concept of ‘power/knowledge’ in Foucault; he does not
simply mean that knowledge is power. Rather, he means that knowledge is
already a function of power relations— knowledge is produced and gained
in order to be put to certain use; in order to achieve power. ‘Far from
preventing knowledge, power produces it’, he says. Understanding power
as being merely repressive means failing to see that what needs to be
explained—how the knowledge required for controlling the human body
and labour have emerged. Foucault’s study of history is intended to show
that the human body could have been constituted as labour-power only if
there were a technology or knowledge of the body that made it possible to
organize and subjugate bodies into useful and docile roles. Further, this
subjugation is not imposed by one class on another—it permeates and
characterizes all aspects of society.
Power is not a thing or substance, it is not embodied in an institution or
a group of people—power is exercised as a technique. The only way it can
be identified is when it is exercised by some people over others. This is
why, for Foucault, an important indication of the existence of power is a
display of resistance to it. ‘At the very heart of the power relationship, and
constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the
intransigence of freedom.’ It is clear, then, that while at first glance
Foucault’s understanding of power might appear to offer no way out, in
fact, he suggests quite the reverse—that wherever there is power, there is
the possibility of resistance.
In Foucault’s understanding, there are three types of struggles against
power:
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a. Against ethnic/social/religious domination—typical of feudal societies.
b. Against exploitation (which separates individuals from what they produce)—
typical of 19th century capitalist societies.
c. Against forms of ‘subjection’ (meaning both ‘to be a subject’ and ‘to be
subjected to’). In this kind of struggle, the attempt should be to promote new
forms of subjectivity through the refusal of the kind of identity and
individualization linked to the state and to governmentality.
At each stage, of course, the earlier forms of struggle continue alongside

the new ones.
CONCLUSION
To conclude this discussion of the various debates around the idea of
power, it can be argued that political theory cannot be restricted to the
study of institutions of the state or to the laying down of norms of public
behaviour. Such an understanding must be complemented by an awareness
of how power operates to produce both institutions, as well as apparently
universal and neutral norms. In short, an awareness of power must inform
the theorizing of politics.
1. Do you think power is an ‘essentially contested concept’? Do you agree with

the argument that all concepts in political theory are essentially contested?
2. Discuss the idea of legitimate power. How does the concept of hegemony
complicate the notion of legitimacy?
3. How would you relate the Marxist conception of exploitation to Steven Lukes’
view of power?
4. How does Foucault’s conception of power as productive and capillary differ
from earlier conceptions of power both as repressive as well as power as ‘power
to’, in the sense in which Hannah Arendt and Talcott Parsons used the term?
5. How would you relate the feminist conceptualization of patriarchy to the
concept of hegemony?
6. A ‘map projection’ is a way of projecting the three-dimensional spherical earth
on to a flat twodimensional surface, such as the page of an atlas. Search the
Internet for Peter’s Projection, which is a map projection that produces a
completely different map of the world than the one which we are accustomed
to, which is called Mercator’s Projection. How would you relate the issues
raised by the debate over Peter’s Projection to the discussion on hegemony
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above?
READING LIST
Arendt, Hannah, ‘What Is Authority’, in Between Past and Future (London: Faber,
1961).
Barnes, Barry, ‘Power’, in Richard Bellamy (ed.), Theories and Concepts of Politics
(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993).
Bottomore, Tom (ed.), A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
1991).
Connolly, William, The Terms of Political Discourse (Oxford: Martin Robertson,
1983).
Dahl, Robert, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1956).
Foucault, Michel, ‘Power, Right, Truth’, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge
(Brighton: Harvester, 1980).
———, ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’, James D. Faubion (ed.), Essential Works of
Foucault 1954–1984 (London: Penguin Books, 2000).
Held, David, ‘Power and Legitimacy’, in Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays
on State, Power and Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989).
Hoy, David Couzens (ed.), ‘Power, Repression, Progress’, in Foucault: A Critical
Reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
Lukes, Steven, Power A Radical View, second edn (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005).
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CHAPTER 10
Sovereignty
Krishna Menon
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Historical Evolution of Sovereignty
Theories of Sovereignty
The Changing World and the Concept of Sovereignty
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
National and international politics today is dominated by the notion of
sovereignty and contests over it. The debate also reflects the changing
contours of the relationship between the state and civil society Sovereignty
according to its defendants, both in theory and in practice, aims at
establishing order and clarity in what they describe as a turbulent and
incoherent world. It is one of the central ideas of modernity and its
antecedents can be traced back to changes that took place in Western
history and politics around the 16th century a.d.
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This chapter discusses the historical evolution of the concept of
sovereignty and an attempt is made to locate it within the history and
politics of Europe. It also looks at some significant theoretical
formulations that shape our understanding of sovereignty, ranging from
Bodin to Hobbes to Austin. The last section engages with the more
contemporary debates questioning the validity of the concept of
sovereignty in the context of a rapidly changing world economy and
politics.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY

The concept of sovereignty is relatively new, although in contemporary
discourse it has an almost universal usage. In earlier civilizations,
sovereignty would have meant little. Tribal communities in Africa, for
instance, were primarily organized around the ties of lineage and kinship.
China had a multi-state system with a very fluid relationship between the
monarch and the feudal lords. Again, medieval Europe was certainly not
divided into sovereign states. To understand sovereignty, therefore, we
need to look at a particular set of social and economic conditions specific
to Europe.
In medieval Europe, both the rulers and the ruled were governed by
universal laws supposedly derived from the authority of God and the
society was a patchwork of various overlapping political loyalties and
allegiances that cut across geographically interwoven jurisdictions and
political enclaves. In this maze, it was the Church that provided an
overarching, organizational, and moral framework transcending both legal
and political boundaries. Feudal Europe knew no difference between the
domestic and external spheres of organization, nor was there any dividing
line between the public and the private.
By the end of the 15th century, Europe comprised some 500 more or
less independent political units. But this order was clearly in decline. A
new set of social and economic conditions were emerging characterized by
increasing trade. The manufacturing class was gaining in strength, and was
supported by increasingly centralized monarchies. These, along with
competent civil servants and hired armies, began to levy royal taxes, and
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individuals now no longer owed their allegiance to the overlord and their
village.
The end of the 16th century saw further changes; the Renaissance led to
a secularization of life and a corresponding decline in the authority of the
Church. Reformation, counterreformation and the wars of religion further
facilitated the acceptance of a secular state. Papal sovereignty was
undermined and this prepared the way for secular absolutism. The bloody
Thirty Years’ War came to an end with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
This led to the recognition of a religious stalemate in Europe. The
economic practices of the new trading and manufacturing classes on the
one hand, and the power of new science and technology on the other,
effectively undermined the authority of the Church.
The decentralized political arrangements that characterized Europe, now
replaced by the Westphalian state system, became a thing of the past. The
latter came to be characterized by territorially bound sovereign states; each
with its own centralized administration and a monopoly over the legitimate
use of violence. A new form of political control and relocation of
population and reorganization of territory facilitated the expansion of trade
and growth of industry. The new form of state based on the notion of
sovereignty redefined the idea of private property; it came to be
understood as the right to exclude others from the possession of a
commodity, be it land, labour or capital. Private and public spheres of life
came to be demarcated very strongly. The royal court became the supreme
authority in the public sphere and paternal authority took on this role
within the family, thereby consolidating patriarchy. Laws supporting
paternal authority and inheritance in the male line thus dovetailed into a
new form of sovereign state.
The feudal state in Europe was replaced by the absolutist state based on
the notion of absolute sovereignty, wherein the king/queen was believed to
have absolute right over their domain, and acquisition of new territories
was simply a matter of extending sovereignty. This later became the
instrument through which colonial expansion was carried out.
THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY
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The sovereign state system in Europe emerged as a response to specific
historical circumstances. By the 16th century, the Church in Europe was
beginning to lose control over the state and societal structures since these
were moving in a secular direction for a variety of reasons, some of which
have already been discussed. Expanding avenues of trade, new forms of
manufacturing industries, new developments in art, culture, philosophy,
and, of course, a systematic expansion of scientific and technological base
accompanied by a challenge of doctrinaire religion were the main
components of the new cultural and political milieu of which the idea of
sovereignty is a product.
There are two sides of sovereignty, internal and external. Internally, the
state is considered to be sovereign and has supreme authority within its
borders. This implies that no higher authority exists internally above the
state to take any coercive or any other action. In its external dimension it
implies that no state can interfere or dictate terms to any other state.
Feudal laws were undermined by Roman law, which was based on the
simple but fundamental principle that a political community had the
inherent power to exact unlimited obedience from its citizens. Machiavelli,
writing in 1513–14, clearly revived Roman law. He defined the state as an
organization of force that ensures security of persons and property.
However, it was Bodin and later Hobbes who articulated more sharply the
contemporary understanding of sovereignty.
The theory of sovereignty typically conceives of the state as a structure
with absolute power and authority in the society. In this formulation it has
to address three separate but closely related issues: (a) the limits of
sovereignty; (b) the location of sovereignty; and (c) the question of the
relationship between state, sovereignty, and civil society. We find various
answers to these questions; let us begin by considering Bodin’s analysis.
Bodin’s answers are to be found in De la Republique (1577). According
to his basic thesis, a central authority should wield unlimited power. In the
context of the deeply divided politics of France, this seemed the only way
out. Such a centralized authority was advocated to steer France away from
‘disorder’ and hopefully create greater security and order. Such a power,
he argued, should be endowed with sovereignty, that is, the supreme power
over citizens and subjects unrestrained by law and unlimited in extension
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and duration. Bodin, however, accepted that the laws of God and nature on
the one hand, and the customary laws of the land on the other, would limit
the sovereign. There is even room in his conception for a pluralist view of
the community consisting of associations like the family, church, market
and the guild. These, he believed, would have their own life and
organization. How this would be reconciled with his absolute notion of
sovereignty is a question that remains unanswered.
The next set of answers to the questions on sovereignty come from
Hobbes in his book, The Leviathan (1651). The backdrop of this book was
the civil war in England. Hobbes did away with every limitation on
sovereignty by insisting that every right of the people (except for the right
to self-preservation) has to be given unto the sovereign. He suggested a
contract in which individuals would agree to give up all their rights to the
sovereign. The consequence of such a universal surrender of rights by
people would be a ‘multitude united in one Person’—a Leviathan. In
Hobbes’ formulation there would thus be no distinction between the
society and the state as also between the state and the government. Groups
in the community existed so long as they were sanctioned by the sovereign
and allowed to exist.
According to Hobbes, human beings are basically selfish and
competitive by nature. In order to demonstrate the need for an all-powerful
state, he describes a hypothetical situation without the state—a ‘state of
nature’—where intensely selfish and competitive people would be fearful
and distrustful of each other and life would become, to quote Hobbes,
‘nasty, brutish and short’. Thus, life in the state of nature would be no
better than a constant state of war, and individuals in this state, though free
and equal, would be gripped by perpetual feelings of insecurity. The only
way out would be to voluntarily give up their conditions of equality and
autonomy to create a sovereign with absolute powers. This sovereign
would guarantee protection to all by enforcing laws. No authority,
religious or moral, should limit the sovereign. Nor would religion or
natural and customary law have any force unless they are consented to by
the sovereign. Hobbes, thus, responded to both the anarchy within England
and to the need for security and order felt by the emerging trading classes
by arguing for an absolute sovereign who would be beyond challenge.
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Political absolutism was revised by Locke’s framework that was based
on a reinterpretation of natural law as a claim to innate, inalienable rights
inherent in each individual. The primary purpose of the state and society
for Locke was the protection of these individual rights. Locke argued that
governments are held in trust by the people and derive legitimacy from
their consent, given only in return for adequate protection of individual
rights. Or else, the government would lose its authority to rule. Sovereign
power, Locke seems to imply, finally rested in the people. Hence, he
argued that state power needed to be circumscribed by devices such as
representative government and a constitutional framework. He was clearly
uncomfortable with the idea of absolute sovereignty and articulated the
scepticism of the now stronger English bourgeoisie vis-à-vis an
unchallenged sovereign. His writings represented the desires of this class
for greater freedom and autonomy, which would be possible only if the
state’s sovereignty could be kept in check and the state made accountable.
This discomfort with handing over sovereign powers to the state while
claiming that people have the ultimate sovereignty is referred to as the
‘paradox of sovereignty’ by James Buchanan. Jean Hampton (1988) refers
to this dilemma and illustrates it with the example of babysitters who are
hired to supervise a group of unruly children and then it turns out that the
former are themselves unruly, making the supervision useless. The
relationship between the citizens and the modern nation-state is somewhat
like this: political institutions are created because people cannot govern
themselves, but the assumption of the political regime that is created
thereafter is that it is the people who rule. In such a situation, what really is
the point of creating a sovereign state that is expected to rule? Of course,
the answer provided by conventional political theory is that this
relationship between the citizens and the modern nation state is based on
the idea of tacit consent. Jean Hampton is, however, not entirely persuaded
by this and prefers to use the term ‘convention consent’, which she says is
the consent extended to a sovereign nation-state, but not sufficient to
extend moral legitimacy in full. Authority exercised by elected office
holders would be acceptable only if the basis of the exercise of such an
authority is rational and moral, or else, Hampton argues that ‘convention
consent’ to the regime would not be extended.
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Rousseau in his book Social Contract (1762) begins with the
assumption of a community of citizens united by a commitment to
collective good, distinct from the private interests of its members. This
collective good was characterized as the general will, and it endowed the
state with absolute power over all its members.
Taking the arguments on sovereignty to a new direction, Rousseau
argued that all individuals in the political community should be involved
in law making. Thus, it would be the people themselves who would be the
sovereign authority, making the laws by which they are governed. Hence,
in Rousseau’s scheme of affairs, there was no distinction between the state
and the community or between the government and the people. Rousseau,
like Hobbes, held that state sovereignty would be unlimited and
indivisible, but unlike Hobbes, Rousseau does not distinguish between the
state and the body politic, thus reducing the government to a mere
commission.
While appearing to agree on several issues, Hobbes and Rousseau also
say completely different things, and it would be interesting to evaluate
them as representing two opposing ends of the debate on sovereignty. A
criticism common to both would be the potentially tyrannical implications
of their projects. In Hobbes’ framework, the state was accorded an all-
powerful position with respect to the community, but according to
Rousseau, it was the community that was accorded a similar status vis-à-
vis the individual.
Many questions remained unresolved. Once the sovereign made laws,
were the citizens ever entitled to disobey these laws? Was the basis of law,
moral authority or did it rest on the state’s sovereign coercive power?
These unanswered questions led to the enunciation of a fairly simple
framework within the notion of sovereignty generally known as the legal
theory of sovereignty. John Austin, the English utilitarian philosopher, best
represents it.
For Austin, the state was a legal order in which a clearly determinate
authority would be the ultimate source of power and be habitually obeyed
while the sovereign state would be immune to the command of others.
This sovereign would have unlimited authority, and the moral worth of the
laws would be irrelevant. All that matters would be the effectiveness of the
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laws. Laws are conceptualized as the command of the sovereign, who
would be responsible for formulating all laws, direct as well as indirect.
Pluralist critics like Laski have tried to limit the monistic assumptions of
the legal theory of sovereignty advanced by Austin by pointing that laws
do not emanate from a single source as the command of the sovereign.
Rather, laws are to be seen as an expression of the multiple associations
that make up the community. Pluralists, in keeping with their democratic
orientation, argue that no law can be above the scrutiny of the individual
citizen who has a moral obligation to obey only those laws that are in
keeping with the tenets of justice.
Despite over three centuries of theoretical engagement with the notion
of sovereignty, it still remains a contested concept. The location of
sovereignty is a keenly debated question. The monistic position has been
criticized for being unsuitable for the requirements of a democratic polity.
Most of the theories that have been examined so far have conceived
sovereignty as an attribute of the state and have ignored its relationship
with the civil society. The other drawback of these theories is that they
tend to be divorced from the historical context from which they actually
emerge. Because of this the theories appear unreal and as an exercise in
abstraction.
One theoretical presentation that stands apart is, however, Marx’s. For
him, the claims of the sovereign state representing the general interests of
the society had to be seen as an illusion that masks the reality of a state
that expresses the will of private property. Marx disagreed with the view
that the sovereign state represented public power and public will.
According to him, it is a structure representing particular interests,
economic processes, and institutions.
This brings us to a discussion on the important function of a sovereign
state which are as follows:
The most obvious function of the modern state endowed with
sovereignty would be the organization of physical space. Sovereignty is
exercised within a clearly defined territory. This, in turn, reinforces the
territorial conception of community. This function is linked with the
economic responsibilities of the modern state. Besides, the sovereign state
is also charged with the responsibility of securing an organized market,
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defend private property, and the resulting property relations. Such a
sovereign state is also responsible for levying taxes and erecting a legal
order that would facilitate all these activities.
The sovereign state in Europe also became the vehicle for cementing
cultural identities within the framework of a state, thus creating a nation-
state. National sovereignty came to be seen as the defining principle of
political organization and the world as consisting of political units, i.e.
each state with supreme authority enjoying allegiance of its citizens and
possessing unlimited powers within its territory and over its resources.
This idea was initially applied only to the European context, but eventually
societies in Asia and Africa also began to articulate similar claims. Today,
of course, it is an idea inscribed in the United Nations Charter. In fact,
today we live in a world where all sovereign states are considered to be
equal and independent of outside authority in matters of control of territory
and population. Territorial integrity and legal equality is considered to be
the hallmark of sovereign states.
The state system continues to perform two other very vital functions:
military protection and legitimation. But nuclear weapons, especially since
their proliferation, have been able to overcome the notion of the sovereign
nation-state to a great extent, especially in the context of the fear of these
weapons falling into the hands of non-state actors and groups. It is true that
national borders are no longer defensive.
Critics of the concept of sovereignty point to the emergence of federal
and decentralized governance patterns that have emerged in most states,
accompanied by an elaborate system of checks and balances. They wonder
where the concept of sovereignty can be located internally under such
circumstances. Externally, they point to numerous international laws and
organizations that have considerably limited the sovereignty of the states.
Besides these questions is, of course, the whole issue of compatibility
between the democratic ethos that most nation-states seek to uphold and
the absolutist claims of the concept of sovereignty.
Charles R. Beitz draws our attention to the issues that emerge while
applying the concept of sovereignty in the context of international affairs.
In the modern context, sovereignty has a dual reference: first, to the
constitution of political and legal authority within the boundaries of the
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state; and second, with reference to the state in relation to the other states
and agents in the international environment. Beitz is of the opinion that
this duality emerged primarily in the context of the European states, quest
for effective independence from the Pope. Several problems, however,
emerge in the context of external sovereignty, for instance, disagreements
about the nature and character of international law and the extent to which
it could be binding on states is fairly common. In the face of increasing
economic interdependence and political integration, the concept of
external sovereignty does appear to be of limited applicability. The
concept of external sovereignty seems further limited when applied to the
context of disputes about rights and duties of states and their citizens with
respect to the rest of the world.
As a normative ideal, the idea of external sovereignty advocates a world
political system organized into separate states which recognize each
other’s political independence and respect each other’s rights to conduct
their internal affairs without deliberate outside interference. In an
increasingly integrated and functionally complex international system the
application of the idea of external sovereignty is problematic. An example
that Beitz gives should illustrate the nature of the problem effectively:
intervention by State A (on the basis of the concurrence of some
recognized international agency) in the affairs of State B (on the basis of
the latter’s violation of internationally accepted norms of human rights and
dignity). This immediately raises the possibility of State B objecting to the
intervention on the grounds that it has domestic jurisdiction over which it
has sovereign powers.
Beitz identifies four possible responses to this dilemma:
a. One extreme point of reaction would be to deny the consideration of any ethical
or moral principles when it comes to the pursuit of national interest undertaken
by a sovereign state.
b. The second would be what Beitz has characterized as the cosmopolitical
response, seen in the writings of Leo Tolstoy and others. They argue that there
is a need, under all circumstances, to uphold cosmopolitical morality even if it
conflicts with narrow sectional definitions of domestic welfare.
c. The third position accepts the hypothetical possibility of such a conflict but
denies its possibility in reality. This response is built on the argument that an
international convention of respect for the sovereignty of states is the best way
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of ensuring respect for the rights, entitlements, and dignity of the individual
citizens of the state.
d. At the other end of the spectrum is the communitarian position that argues
against global standards of social value and worth. According to them, the
determination of what is good or how a human being ought to be treated cannot
be the result of global, universal values. Instead, they recommend referring to
the values held in esteem by consensus within a particular community. Such a
position is not to be misunderstood as advocating national chauvinism; it
should not descend into an obtuse and complacent position but should be open
to self-criticism and correction. Despite this, however, the truth is that conflict
over morality in the context of international affairs are bound to emerge and
have a bearing on the issue of sovereignty.
THE CHANGING WORLD AND THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

In the world that we live in, most of the functions that the sovereign state
is expected to perform are being subjected to new limitations and
considerations. Economic functions have, by far, been the most important,
and it is these that have undergone a major transformation. National
economies are no longer insulated spaces and have become very
interdependent; processes of production, exchange, circulation, and
consumption are all interlinked. Technological changes and the increasing
integration of international finances have further facilitated this process.
Transnational corporations are the most significant agents of these new
changes. Immanuel Wallerstein describes this as a new stage in the
development of the ‘world system’ whose defining characteristic is the
transnational scope of capital.
Wallerstein argues that a ‘world economy’ has been in the making for
some time now, running parallel to the growth of capitalism and the
formation of the modern state. In the earlier stages of the development of
capitalism, national economies and nation states were decisive in the
internationalization of economic activity. In the contemporary world,
however, systemic interaction seems to have acquired a dynamic of its
own. Wallerstein visualizes the world system as universal, and by virtue of
its universality and regularity, he argues, it exercises a constraining
influence on all the subsystems, including the nation states.
We cannot understand the functions performed by the states purely in
terms of requirements of global economic integration. The fact is that
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individual states and the state system as a whole retain a degree of
autonomy, although it might fall short of the attributes of a sovereign state.
It would not be wrong to say that there are, in fact, two competing systems
in today’s world: the global market on the one hand, and the sovereign
state system on the other.
Paul Hirst examines more closely the issue of sovereignty in the context
of a rapidly changing world characterized by many as a globalized world.
Hirst wishes to make a distinction between an internationalized economy
and a globalized economy. In the former system, companies continue to
trade from their bases in distinct national settings; whereas in the latter,
national policies are redundant. In fact, the state itself is so because it is
understood that the global market forces would provide governance and
solution to all the problems.
Hirst argues that what we are witnessing today is a highly
internationalized economic system. In such a system national policies
remain viable and in fact, are essential so as to preserve the distinct
national styles and strengths of the economies. Thus, from this perspective
the nation-state and its most defining characteristic—sovereignty—remain
essential and relevant.
Those who see the contemporary world as a globalized economy argue
that it is only the global market and transnational companies that have
relevance and it is to them that the task of governance should be handed
over. They contend that global market forces will replace the need for any
form of public governance and thus the rationale for the state and by that
implication of its sovereignty is undermined.
Hirst suggests that a world economy with a high degree of international
trade and investment is not necessarily a globalized economy. In such a
system, he observes, nation-states and forms of international regulation
created and sustained by nation-states have a crucial role to play especially
in providing governance of the economy. So long as nation-states remain
important, sovereignty would remain relevant, although he suggests that its
role and manifestation have altered.
The internationalized economy as Hirst describes, has mechanisms of
international governance and needs re-regulation; he argues that for all this
to happen, the role of the nation-state is pivotal. Nation-states, therefore,
245
have sovereignty but not in the sense of being the sole governing power
able to impose outcomes on all dimensions of policy within a territory, but
as loci from which forms of governance can be proposed, legitimated and
monitored. Nation-states continue to have sovereignty, albeit of a changed
nature, because now they are one class of power and political agency,
extending from the world to the local level.
The nation-state’s centrality over determining the relationship of
population to its territory remains sovereign more or else in its earlier
form. People are still identified by the boundaries of the nation-state within
which they live, and so its territorial limits continue to determine
citizenship. It is only the very highly skilled and educated and the very
impoverished, who are desperate to flee their poverty, who are able to
move. For the bulk of the people such mobility is really not an option,
although there is tremendous mobility of finance and greater integration of
communication, information and entertainment.
Hirst maintains that states remain sovereign not in the sense of being all-
powerful and omni-competent within their fixed territories, but are
sovereign because they police the borders and can claim to represent the
people within the borders more so if the system is a credible democracy. In
the changed scenario that Hirst is drawing our attention to, sovereignty is
definitely ceded to supra-state agencies created by the nation-states
themselves. However, even as the nation-state is doing so it is also
acquiring new roles in the context of legitimating and supporting the
authorities that they have created by grants of sovereignty that the states
have themselves made.
Thus, sovereignty in this changed context is of significance as a
distinguishing characteristic of the nation-state because the state now has a
legitimate role in transferring power or sanctioning new powers to
agencies both ‘above’ and ‘below’ it. This happens when the state
determines along with other states, the creation of new international
agencies and bodies to re-regulate trade, investment and other related
issues—thus, the state uses its sovereignty to create agencies above it.
Similarly, through constitutional ordering within its own territory, it
restructures the relationship of power and authority between central,
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regional, and local governments. Thus, it uses its sovereignty to determine
the re-ordering of power and authority below it.
Hirst, thus, senses a paradox: the more the world economy has been
internationalized (as opposed to globalized), the greater is the need for the
sovereign nation-state, understood not in its traditional guise of undisputed
sovereign power, but as an agency that by virtue of its sovereignty can
guarantee the stability of the global economy.
The shift towards world government is cited by many as a vital reason
for the erosion of state sovereignty. The example cited more often than not
is the emergence of the European Union (EU). While this is an interesting
development that is bound to have a strong impact on the state system, the
capacity of the EU to coordinate and mobilize military forces and the
potential of its members remains rather limited. This is very clear from the
EU’s response to the wars in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.
The other challenge to the sovereign state system comes from the
development of what is often referred to as a global civil society. A rather
amorphous concept, it probably refers to a range of new social movements
and public opinion that cut across national boundaries, and work through
international non-governmental organizations. Bodies such as Amnesty
International, International Greenpeace and even the International Football
Federation (FIFA) are apt illustrations. Needless to say, it would be a
mistake to exaggerate the influence of these bodies.
CONCLUSION
In the context of a rapidly changing world, sovereignty seems to have
become a redundant notion. It is important to remember at this point that
the concept of state and sovereignty are rooted in a particular historical and
socio-political context. The re-evaluation of the concept of sovereignty
emerges from the needs of an altered context. Sovereignty has acquired all
the dimensions of a framework that we might refer to as a totalizing
discourse not allowing space for other ways of conceptualizing the state
and civil society and the arrangements of power through social institutions.
In the existing framework, sovereignty has come to be seen as necessary
and natural. To challenge the concept of sovereignty means to challenge
one of the foundational truths of our times. Power has systematically been
247
centralized within state structures and there is acceptance of this as a
natural fact. Ironically, even those who oppose existing oppressive states
or seek secession are merely hoping to create their own state structures in
the future rather than thinking of any alternative ways of social
arrangements.
1. If sovereignty is unique to the modern nation-state then how did states prior to
the modern nationstate assert themselves? For instance, how did the state
system in ancient India evolve and assert its authority?
2. Imagine a country in the neighbourhood in the grip of a horrible natural
calamity. What should the role of our armed forces be? Would our country be
guilty of violating the principle of sovereignty if our army were to march into
the neighbouring country with humanitarian relief and aid?
3. All of us depend on the Internet for communication, leisure, information and
entertainment. Sitting in our country it is possible to chat with our friends and
family living far away. The Indian state has very little control over our forays
into the Internet. What implications do you think all this has for the concept of
sovereignty and the position of the modern nation-state?
4. Satellite radio and television have changed our entertainment patterns and our
tastes in cinema, fashion, music and so on. Nation-states no longer have a
monopoly over questions of culture and identity. What do you think is the
future for the nation-state in this context?
5. Terrorism and nuclear proliferation have threatened the idea of a sovereign
nation-state like nothing else has. Discuss.
READING LIST
Hampton, Jean, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
Held, David, Political Theory Today (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1989).
Hinsley, F H., Sovereignty (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
Wolff, Jonathan, Introduction to Political Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Oxford
248
CHAPTER 11
The State
Swaha Das
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
What Is the State?
The Modern State
What the State Is Not: Civil Society and the Nation
Justifying the State
Human Nature
The State of Nature and the Social Contract
Utilitarianism
The Neutral State: Liberalism
The Class State: Marxism
The Patriarchal State: Feminism
Governmentality: Foucault on the State
Recent Debates: Challenges to the Sovereignty of the State
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INTRODUCTION
The ubiquity and the power of the state shapes the conditions within which
we lead our lives. Our interaction with the state begins much before we
gain awareness of it. The registration of our birth, travel on roads, the
police, board exams and certificates, voter identity cards and passports—
these are a few instances of our routine encounters with the state, which
point to the pervasiveness of the modern state in our daily lives. The state
compels us to do certain things, and to refrain from doing others. Besides,
it aims to provide us with basic protection against an attack on ourselves
and our possessions, and also restrains and regiments us in several ways. It
provides us with a wide range of benefits: health care, education, roads,
telephone, parks, movies, etc. Christopher Morris, pointing to the
omnipresence of the state in our lives, says in an adaptation of Leon
Trotsky’s quip about war: ‘You may not be interested in the state, but the
state is certainly interested in you.’
WHAT IS THE STATE?

Most of us are members of a state and live within the borders of one.
Statehood today refers not merely to a set of institutions, but also to a body
of attitudes, practices and codes of behaviour that we follow consciously
and willingly at times, and unconsciously and unwillingly at other times.
These codes of behaviour could encompass obedience of state laws,
obligatory voting in elections, compulsory military training, or
conscription. Some political thinkers maintain that the state is the most
important concern of modern political theory Concepts that we study in
political theory—rights, democracy, equality, liberty— are based on the
relationship between state and those living within it. For this reason we
need to be familiar with the idea and functions of the state.
Any discussion about the state would refer to the actual functioning of
the institutions of the state, as well as to what the state is obliged to do. It
is often assumed that the state refers to the government, but as we shall see
in the course of this chapter, the state and the government are not
coincidental. Modern political thinkers of different political persuasions
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would agree with Max Weber, the German sociologist, that the one
common element of all modern states is the monopoly over the legitimate
use of force within a common territory. Weber also stresses on three more
important elements: territoriality, monopoly of the means of physical
violence, and legitimacy.
What does legitimacy mean? Legitimacy is derived from the Latin verb
legitimare, which means to legitimate, and signifies rightfulness in a broad
sense. It confers a binding or authoritative character on an order, thus
transforming power into authority. (See Chapter 9 for the difference
between power and authority.) The state has the authority to ensure that its
laws are obeyed and the power to punish those who disobey. Authority
may be of various kinds, but here we are concerned with the question of
political authority, that of the state over us. For robber instance, can have
the power to harm us, and yet have no authority because his power is
neither legally nor morally rightful. What gives the state this right to rule
over us, and why are we obliged to obey the state? This is a problem that
has preoccupied several political thinkers, and is known as political
obligation.
An obligation is a duty to act in a particular way. Political obligation
necessitates obedience to the laws of the state. We are often made to
accept the laws of the state as binding on us, be it the traffic rules or the
laws regarding marriage, trade, and property. We obey more the state
because it promotes our happiness than any alternative political
organization. Alternatively, we could justify political obligation on the
grounds that we ourselves have consented to the state on the basis of a
social contract, and it is this very reason that binds us to obey the laws of
the state. We shall examine these later in the chapter, but for now, let us
return to our discussion on the state.
The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States in 1933 put
forth what is widely regarded as the classic legal definition of the state.
According to it, states must possess the following a permanent population,
a defined territory, and a government capable of maintaining effective
control over the corresponding territory and of conducting international
relations with other states. Recognition by other states was often seen to be
crucial because it implied acceptance into the international community.
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However, these definitions are not absolute. For instance, international law
does not necessitate settled boundaries or frontiers to accord recognition to
the state.
One of the most important things to remember is that when we talk
about the state, we are referring to a whole gamut of different organized
institutions that are connected to one another and enjoy some cohesion.
That is, the state is organizationally highly differentiated as well as
centralized. Thus, it is not a monolithic structure; it consists of a set of
institutions and organizations. The three arms of the modern state are the
judiciary, the executive, and the legislature—each different, but with a
certain level of cohesion with each other. The different arms of the state
exercise the authority that they have, not on their own behalf, but on the
basics of the authority they are entitled to as part of the state. The
government refers to the administrative organ of the state and is
constrained by the constitution of the state. The government may change
but the state persists. This is the reason why the American governments
are called administrations—the Clinton administration, the Reagan
administration, etc.
THE MODERN STATE

Before getting on with the discussion on the modern state, let us briefly
look at its conceptual history. In political theory, questions are often raised
as what concepts like state, liberty, equality, justice and so on mean. A
particular concept could have several different, sometimes overlapping
conceptions. Conceptual history tries to examine the different meanings
that a concept has had over the ages. Therefore, the question that needs to
be asked is, did the word ‘state’ mean the same thing to people in other
ages and times as it does to us right now? Conceptual history suggests that
words may not change, but their significance does, depending on historical
and social contexts. One could cite several examples. For instance, the
words patriot, revolution, and rights, have all had different meanings in
different times. As Quentin Skinner, a historian of political thought tells
us, when we read some of the classic texts and come across the word state,
we need to understand the meaning of the word according to what it meant
at the time the text was written.
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Thus, how we interpret and evaluate the state as a concept depends on
the values that are derived from the political, cultural, religious, and
economic contexts of a particular time. The word ‘state’ derives from the
Latin word stare (to stand) and more specifically from status (a standing or
condition). Clearly, we need to think how this relates to the function or the
role of the state today. Did the state always mean the same set of
institutions as it does now?
In this chapter, when we use the word ‘state’, it refers to the modern
state, a form of political organization that could be said to have evolved in
early modern Europe, and was transmitted primarily through colonialism
to other parts of the world. Thus, the modern state and the modern system
of states have not been permanent and universal features of human history.
Further, we can say that the trajectory of the development of the state in
other parts of the world has been very different from that in Europe.
Many political philosophers point out that the idea of the modern state
could be traced to the late medieval ages, especially in the writings of
Nicolo Machiavelli, who is often credited with first using the concept of
the state—stato—to refer to a territorial sovereign government in his work
Il Principe or The Prince, which was published in 1532. Skinner points out
that Machiavelli’s use of the word lo stato was different from the use of
the word ‘state’ in modern times. When he used the word for the first time,
it did not have the impersonal standing as it does now. Rather, the state
then meant that it was someone’s state: the prince’s or the monarch’s.
Machiavelli’s treatise was intended as a guide to the ruler for the
maintenance of political power. It attained infamy for advising the prince
to do whatever is necessary to maintain power. What is important for us
here is that when Machiavelli talks about political power, he begins and
ends with one individual: the prince, who is the sovereign. So, the state
meant the prince’s state. In Western political theory, it is with Hobbes that
the theorization of power moves on to an abstract, non-human entity, the
modern sovereign state.
What is distinctive about the modern state in terms of its difference from
earlier kingships is the distinction between the rulers, and the office and
institutions they occupy. Thus, the modern state is characterized by its
impersonal standing. The current holders of power in the government do
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not constitute the state. The state exists before they come to power and
continues to be there after they leave. It aims to gain autonomy from the
contending parties or groups that come to hold political power. It is for this
reason that the state is said to be abstracted from the power holders. The
modern state is a public order distinct from and located above both the
ruler and the ruled.
The emergence of the modern state in Europe is linked to the
differentiation of various spheres of people’s lives. It identifies the
political sphere, and is at its apex. It is concerned only with the political
aspects of the lives of the people living within it, though it is debatable
what the realm of the political is. Is the political concerned only with
formal institutions of power? The distinction between civil society and the
state is based on the recognition that individuals who are subject to the
power of the state also have capacities and interests of a non-political
nature. In the 14th and 15th centuries, political power was held by several
different sources. These included the Church, the king, and the feudal
lords. There was no clear differentiation of political functions. The same
set of political functions: declaration of war, collection of taxes, etc., could
be performed by different sources of authority. The Church and the king
had their own armies and they both had the power to declare war. The
Peace of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 concluded
a series of religious wars among the main European powers, and led to an
undermining of the power of the Church, giving the king authority over his
own realm. It led to the strengthening of a new conception of international
law based on the principle that all states have an equal right to self-
determination. The earlier dispersed political authority was replaced by
what would eventually lead to centralized modern authority, and the state
came to be the source of political authority. David Held identifies the
following features of the Westphalian model:
1. The world consists of, and is divided by, sovereign states that recognize no
superior authority.
2. The processes of law-making, the settlement of disputes, and law enforcement
are largely in the hands of individual states.
3. International law is oriented towards the establishment of minimal rules of
coexistence; the creation of enduring relationships is an aim, but only to the
extent that it allows state objectives to be met.
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4. Responsibility for wrongful acts across the border is a ‘private matter’
concerning only those affected.
5. All states are regarded as equal before the law, but legal rules do not take
account of asymmetries of power.
6. Differences among states are often settled by force; the principle of effective
power holds sway. Virtually no legal fetters exist to curb the resort to force;
international legal standards afford only minimal protection.
7. The collective priority of all states should be to minimize the impediments to
state freedom.
Sovereignty refers to the state being the ultimate source of political

authority within the territory under its jurisdiction. There are two aspects
of sovereignty—internal and external. Internal sovereignty refers to the
fact that higher than the state. The state is supreme, and a citizen cannot
appeal against the state to any other authority. The state has the right to
make binding decisions upon its citizens and upon those who enter its
territory.
External sovereignty of the state refers to the recognition that other
states accord to a particular state, and the acceptance that the state can
speak for its citizens in international affairs. External sovereignty implies
the autonomy and independence of the state in the international sphere.
The sovereignty of the state can be challenged in many ways; the state
might surreptitiously lose its sovereignty despite having voluntarily
entered into international treaties, or other states might intervene in the
affairs of the state on the grounds of a deemed violation of human rights,
the possession of weapons of mass destruction, etc.
The state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of coercion is reflected in
the institutions of the armed forces, the paramilitary forces, and the police.
These the reflect the immense power that the state has over people’s lives.
Imprisonment, death penalty, declaration of war—all these involve the use
of violence, and only the state is entitled to the legitimate use of these
powers. That is why the state is said to have a monopoly over the
legitimate use of violence. The coercive institutions help to maintain the
supremacy or the sovereignty of the state, and to ensure the observance of
laws and the maintenance of order when these are considered to be
infringed.
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The modern state is territorially based. This means that the state
exercises its authority within its territorial borders which are
acknowledged by other states. This acknowledgement distinguishes the
state from other forms of political organizations, where governance is over
people rather than over land, and people allegiances are not territorially
determined. So one’s rights and duties depend on one’s place in the
hierarchical social order within a tribe or clan or other forms of ethnic
organization. For instance, in India, one’s location in the hierarchical
structure of the caste system still tends to determine one’s rights and
duties.
The modern state has no authority outside its borders, and no other state
possesses authority within another state’s borders. Within the boundaries
of the state, there is a single system of governance, distinct from others
that operate externally. The territorial foundations of the state distinguish it
from other types of organizations and associations, which could be
religious. The demands for statehood by groups are often for the
recognition of the claim to territory. One of the most tragic, poignant, and
complex struggles over the claim to territory in the recent past has been the
Palestine-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian struggle for statehood could be a
struggle for the recognition of the claim to land.
WHAT THE STATE IS NOT: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE NATION

The state is distinct from the civil society. The former represents coercion,
while the latter is said to be based on voluntary participation. Do you think
it is desirable that the two spheres be kept distinct? States vary in the
amount of independence that they permit to other social institutions. This
determines the nature of the state as totalitarian or liberal. A state that
seeks to fuse the distinction between its sphere of activity and that of the
society is called a totalitarian state, because it seeks to intervene in the
totality of human life. A totalitarian state might supervise what books you
read, what your political views are, and even what careers you opt for.
The distinction between the nation and the state is particularly important
in view of the struggles by many nations for statehood. When we talk
about international relations, we are actually referring to inter-state
relations. A nation could be defined as community feeling among people
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who recognize that they are distinct from other communities and wish to
control their own affairs. This distinction could be based on their
possession of a common language, religion, political values and attitudes,
a sense of having done things together in the past, and a desire to do things
together in the future. The entire population in same states share this
feeling, giving rise to the term ‘nation-state’. However, this is not the case
with all the states in the world today. So the nation and the state do not
coincide. There are people who feel part of the same nation, and are spread
across different states. The Kurdish people, for instance, are spread across
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey and consider themselves to be a nation. A
question that concerns contemporary political philosophers is whether all
the people who consider themselves to be nations can demand statehood
and whether they are entitled to statehood. (See Chapter 17 for a detailed
discussion on these issues.)
JUSTIFYING THE STATE

Justifying the state has often involved imagining a situation without one
common institution protecting our lives and property and punishing us for
transgressions. Whether such a situation is desirable or not is dependent on
our views on human nature.
HUMAN NATURE
The necessity, or otherwise, of the state is often based on beliefs
concerning human nature. While one could not automatically move from a
premise about human nature to a theory of the state, there is usually some
kind of relationship between human nature and the structure of political
arrangements. One could even say that those who have argued for a strong
centralizing tendency in the state, and those who have argued for greater
powers of the state are usually those who view human nature with distrust.
Thomas Hobbes viewed human beings as naturally selfish and went on to
argue that the necessary solution to this problem was absolute sovereignty.
Gandhi had a much more optimistic and generous view of human nature,
and believed that though human beings were a combination of good and
bad qualities, they could become good and act responsibly even in the
absence of the coercive apparatus of the state.
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The anarchist response to the state was that the state was an unnecessary
evil that curtailed the human spirit by imposing externally devised rules
and regulations on it. The only laws that human beings should admit to are
those that they have made for themselves. The anarchists could be said to
believe in a theory of society without state rule. Peter Kropotkin, the
Russian anarchist believed in the supreme goodness of human nature, and
said that any divergence from that goodness was due to the insidious
influence of state authority and exploitative capitalism. He believed that
any external authority was corrupt by definition.
THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

Imagine a situation without the existence of a government, without a
defined territory over which the government operated and without a
centralized authority having a monopoly over the legitimate use of
coercion. A situation in the absence of the state is called the state of nature.
This is a situation where the laws that operate are natural laws, that is, laws
not made by human beings, but which could be intuited by human
reasoning. For Hobbes, given his assumption of human nature as selfish,
the state of nature was a state of war of all against all. Each person is on
his own, in the sense that there is no higher authority with the power to
command people’s obedience, or with the responsibility of protecting their
interests or possessions. Given this situation, it is most likely that people
would opt for some form of centralized political authority. The issue then
was regarding the kind of political authority that individuals in a state of
nature would agree to.
Hobbes argued that this kind of a situation necessitated the setting up of
a common power to protect us from one another and from external threat.
This implied that the state emerged from a contract that individuals in a
state of nature consented to in order to protect themselves from one
another and from external threat. The social contract argument asserts that
the state emerged from our individual consent, and only our consent can
bind us to obedience. This brings us back to the question of political
obligation. We are bound to obey the laws of the state most of the time
because it has emerged from our consent, which is voluntarily given. John
Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant used the concept of
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the social contract and came up with different answers on what the
government is obligated to do and what the citizens are obliged to obey.
The social contract is not a historical event. Critics of the social contract
have argued that since it is fictitious, it has no moral or political force. To
this, Kant replied that the idea of the contract is important even if no actual
contract exists. He put forth the idea that if an arrangement is such that
free individuals could not have agreed to it, then it is unjust. Let us take an
example. Would any free individual have agreed to be a slave or to be
considered an untouchable? Since it seems highly unlikely that any free,
sane individual would agree to this proposition, the institutions of slavery
and untouchability are unjust. The social contract argument bases political
obligation on our consent to the state. This consent could be expressed or it
could be tacit.
UTILITARIANISM
We can argue that the state is justified because of its utility in bringing
about greater happiness to a greater number of people than any alternative
political arrangement. We would then be concurring with utilitarianism,
which has two basic claims: first, that human happiness and well-being are
important; and second, that we assess an act purely by its consequences.
This is why utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism. Early utilitarian
philosophers like Jeremy Bentham and James Mill believed that the
consequences one should consider were the happiness and unhappiness
that one’s actions would cause. If we put the two claims together, we could
say that utilitarianism aims at bringing about a state of affairs that results
in the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For the utilitarian, the
state is justified on the grounds that it brings about greater and more
happiness than any alternative political arrangement.
The justification of the state in this case is based on its utility, and not
on consent as the social contract argument would assert. Sometimes, the
greatest happiness of the greatest number could be that the number
matters, and not each individual. There could be instances wherein
unqualified utilitarianism would lead to a situation where the greatest
happiness of the greatest number is based on the sacrifice of an
individual’s rights. Liberalism would, however, find the above instance
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unacceptable. It would base its claim on the state showing equal respect to
every individual and respecting each individual’s rights.
THE NEUTRAL STATE: LIBERALISM

The Indian Constitution is characterized as liberal since it recognizes that
the individual citizen is entitled to equal rights and to equality before law.
Liberals believe that the state is a neutral arbiter between different
competing interests and stands to realize what is called the common good
in society. The neutrality of the state is linked to the idea of the moral
equality of individuals, which could be based on any of the following
grounds: their ability to think, feel, or make choices. The emphasis here is
on capacity or ability, and not the actual exercise. So, even if we do not
actually exercise these capacities right now, we do possess them as
individuals. This makes the liberals argue that individuals are entitled to
equal respect from the state. Respect for an individual implies respect for
his/her ability to make choices, as well as for the choices. Some might
argue that individuals differ in their intellectual prowess, in their
possession of wealth and strength of character. Given these differences,
should they be entitled to equal respect from the state? Liberals would
respond by saying that these are not sufficient grounds for the state to treat
an individual as inferior to others. Citizens are entitled to equal respect and
concern from the state because the state is committed to respect the moral
equality of citizens, which means non-discrimination and impartiality at
the very first level. The state should not arbitrarily discriminate in its
treatment of one citizen against other.
Liberals believe that the state should seek to ensure that each individual
has the freedom to exercise his/her choice. The best state of affairs,
according to them, is the set of rules or the framework that would best
ensure that the government treats its citizens with equal respect, and not
impose any conception of what good life is. Thus, for liberals, the state is
concerned with rules that would enable individuals to pursue their own
ideas of what they think is good life, so long as the freedom of others is
not infringed upon.
What do you think the entitlement to equal respect and consideration
implies? According to Ronald Dworkin, liberal equality could have two
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implications: first, equal distribution of certain goods and opportunities.
One instance of this could be the principle of one person, one vote.
Another example could be the equality of opportunity. The second
conception of liberal equality would challenge the identical distribution to
all concerned without taking into account what their needs are and what
kind of situation they find themselves in. Liberals are divided on the extent
of state obligations. Should it be concerned only with the maintenance of
law and order or should it also be concerned with redistribution of
resources, and with the welfare of its citizens—should the state be a
welfare state? Should the state attempt to reserve seats in educational
institutions and in employment for individuals who come from deprived
groups, groups that have suffered systemic discrimination in the past?
Does this violate the liberal state’s commitment to treat its citizens as
entitled to equal respect and concern, or is in consonance with this
principle? On what grounds do liberals justify these provisions? (See
Chapters 3–6 for further discussion on these issues.)
THE CLASS STATE: MARXISM

The liberal view of the state as a neutral arbiter among conflicting interests
is challenged by Marxists. Marxism offers a method of evaluating the idea
and practice of the state in its day-to-day affairs. To understand their view
of the state, it is important that we begin by explaining the materialist
conception of history or historical materialism, which assumes that human
history progresses through contradictions or ‘dialectics’ at the level of the
production of goods in society.
Karl Marx and his collaborator Friedrich Engels borrowed the concept
of the dialectical method from the German philosopher, G. W Friedrich
Hegel. For the ancient Greeks, the dialectic was a form of argumentation
through question and answer, and thus an argumentative technique
involving contradiction. Hegel maintained that history was the
development and conflict of abstract principles that included cultures,
religions, and philosophies. There was always tension between the present
state of affairs and what it was becoming; thus, every state of affairs
contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction and transformation
to a higher stage. Each successive stage was a progress beyond those that
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had preceded and contained elements from them. This could be
represented by the ‘thesis’ which is opposed by the ‘antithesis’, which
consequently produced a new ‘synthesis’. Marx took up the concept of the
dialectic, but instead of abstract principles, he focused on the changing
economic base of the society—and the social classes to which it gave rise.
For Marx, conflicts between these classes were the causes of the changes
taking place in human history.
Historical materialism maintains that the key to changes in society lies
in the way human beings produce goods in common. Production is the real
foundation or the ‘base’ of society. History is the record of increasingly
sophisticated ways of producing goods. Developments in production lead
to a change in the economic structure which, in turn, leads to changes in
the ‘superstructure’, that is, political, religious, legal, and philosophical
realms, accordingly. Production itself has two aspects: the material and the
social. The former refers to the technology and tools used in the process of
production and the latter to property relations, and to the division of
society into two classes: those who own the means of production—land
and the instruments of production—and those who are the direct
producers: slaves, peasants, or wage labourers. The exploitation of the
direct producers by the owners of the means of production leads to
conflicts between the two classes. The economic structure, therefore,
determines whether the state exists and if so, what kind of state it is.
Marx’s ideas of the state developed as a critique of Hegel’s political
philosophy. According to Hegel, the entire process of human history was
the progress of the absolute ‘Spirit’ towards self-realization, that is,
towards a determinant endpoint. In his Philosophy of Right (1821), he
portrayed the state as an ethical ideal and the highest expression of human
freedom, which was realized as human beings acted in accordance with
their reason. Human beings were truly free when they realized that instead
of allowing the forces of history to control them, they could take control of
themselves. If they saw themselves as independent beings with conflicting
wills, they would regard other human beings as alienated from them. This,
in turn, would hamper their own freedom. Their recognition of the
common ability to reason in other human beings would resolve this
problem. If a community could be built on the basis of this common ability
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to reason, it would be acceptable to every human being as an expression of
his or her own rational will and not as something outside oneself. The
coincidence of duty and self-interest would lead to the realization of their
nature as rational beings. According to Hegel, the state is the community
that secures freedom and integration for the individual.
Hegel maintained that there are three moments of social existence: the
family, civil society, and the state. These three spheres of social existence
are different spheres of ethical development in which individual self-
determination is realized in larger ethical communities. Within the family,
a ‘particular altruism’ prevails, encouraging people to set aside their own
interests for the good of their relatives. This, however, does not happen in
a civil society. While the family is constituted by sacrifice and unity, civil
society is the sphere of ‘universal egoism’, that is, ethical life in
competition. Here, individuals place their own interests before those of
others, and behave selfishly and instrumentally towards others, though in
this very process they form a system of complete interdependence wherein
their livelihood, happiness and legal status are interwoven with one
another. However, civil society cannot provide people with a self-
determined ethical life because of its inability to produce freedom and
integration. (See Chapter 12 for more on Hegel’s views). Thus, an ethical
sphere higher than both the family and civil society must be found for the
realization of human freedom.
The state, according to Hegel, is the ethical sphere of universality,
freedom and integration. The state is founded on freedom instead of
coercion and so it is the final realization of the ‘Spirit’ in history. Its
strength rests not on force but on its ability to organize rights, freedom,
and welfare into a coherent whole. Hegel challenged the social contract
argument, saying that it was based on the arbitrary will of the individuals.
It is wrong to say that the foundation of the state is something at the option
of all its members. Instead, he maintained that it is not up to the individual
to separate himself from the state, because we are all citizens of the state
by birth. The state reconciles individual freedom with the values of the
community and in the realization of the community each individual would
find his/her own fulfilment while simultaneously contributing to the well-
being of the whole.
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Marx, on the other hand, maintained that it was illusory to hold that the
state had a universal character that could harmonize the discordant
elements of civil society. According to him, as long as the society is
divided into classes on the basis of the ownership of the means of
production, there would be a dominant class and an exploited class, and
the state would conduct its business in a manner conducive to the interests
of the dominant class. We can find in Marx’s writings two kinds of
theories of the capitalist state. One that is most often quoted from the
Communist Manifesto (1848) says, ‘the executive of the modern state is
but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole
bourgeoisie’. Here, the state is the instrument of the ruling class and is
subordinate to the capitalist class. If it is the instrument of a particular
class, its neutrality and impartiality is then under question.
Marx put forth a second view of the state in The Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Bonaparte (1852) where he examined the revolutionary events in
France from 1848 to 1851. What emerges from this examination is the
‘relative autonomy of the state’. This referred to the capability of the state
to impose its will upon society. This was because Bonapartism was an
opportunistic and populist alliance between part of the bourgeoisie and
part of the proletariat to secure legitimacy for the regime. This represented
the autonomy that the state may achieve when class forces in society are
precisely balanced. Marx’s emphasis here is on the capability of the state
to impose its will. What distinguishes this view from the one expressed
above is that the state is not referred to only as an instrument of the
dominant class. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the
autonomy of the state is only relative and not absolute. While appearing to
mediate between competing class interests, the state keeps the class
structure intact. The state is not a neutral arbiter, but acts to maintain the
division of society into classes. We notice that the abstraction and the
independence of the state from partisan interests are challenged in the
Marxist view of the state.
With the overthrow of capitalism, the capitalist state would also be
overthrown, and in its place, the proletariat, that is, the working class,
would take over the reins of the state and establish its dictatorship. This
would be marked by the working class exercising the kind of hegemony
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that the bourgeoisie had exercised, leaving the actual task of governance to
others. Marx identified a form of government whereby the working class
would actually govern and fulfil many of the tasks hitherto performed by
the state. The socialist state would try to create the conditions for the
eventual transition to a stateless and classless society.
Marx affirmed his view of the state as an instrument by which the
economically dominant class could repress and subdue the other classes.
All states, then, are examples of class dictatorships. The purpose of the
dictatorship of the proletariat is to safeguard the gains of the revolution
and prevent a counter-revolution by the bourgeoisie.
Marx challenged the necessity and the endurance of the state.
Liberalism does not challenge the endurance of the state. By associating
the state with the class system, Marx believed that the abolition of the
latter would lead to a withering away of the former. Can you imagine the
state ‘withering away’? It is not very clear what Marx exactly meant by the
withering away of the state and this has provided other Marxist writers
with further scope to elaborate the analysis of state power.
So far, we have seen that Marxism focused on the coercive role of the
state—the state is essentially the institution whereby a dominant exploiting
class imposes and defends its power and privileges against the
class/classes that it dominates and exploits. The Italian Marxist, Antonio
Gramsci, introduced into Marxist thought the idea that it is not just through
open coercion that the domination of the ruling class is secured. This is
also elicited through ideological manipulation. According to Gramsci, the
state is force plus consent, or hegemony and coercion, in which civil
society provides consent and political society organizes force. Hegemony
refers to the ability of the dominant class to secure the consent of those it
dominates. It is a process through which the bourgeoisie maintains its
dominant position in the society. The system of education, the mass media
—these are part of what could be called the ideological state apparatus.
Louis Althusser, a French Marxist, further developed the idea of the
ideological state apparatus. Althusser wrote that the capitalist state has two
distinct but related coercive instruments to secure the stability and the
continual reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. This includes
the repressive state apparatuses—law courts, police, army, and other state
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functionaries. These rely on violence in the sense that if one fails to
comply with the directives of the state then some form of sanction is
imposed against the person in the form of fines, imprisonment, and so on.
On the other hand, ideological state apparatuses function not by force but
by ideology. These include areas where we acquire and exercise our
individual rights and freedom, such as the family, trade unions, the media,
and the church, but it is primarily the education system that assumes the
role of the dominant ideological state apparatus.
The Marxist evaluation of the state inspired many movements that
sought to change the nature of the existing state. The Russian Revolution
of 1917 and the Chinese Revolution of 1949 were attempts at
overthrowing the existing political structures and creating in their place an
alternative and fairer form of political organization.
THE PATRIARCHAL STATE: FEMINISM

Feminist theory includes within it a wide range of perspectives, and has
thus engendered different attitudes towards state power. Liberal feminists
generally subscribe to a belief in the state’s basic neutrality. The denial of
legal and political equality to women would imply that the laws of the
state are biased in favour of men. Yet, it is possible to rectify these laws by
the intervention of the state. They, therefore, see the state as capable of
playing a role in promoting equality between men and women. This is
evident in many campaigns—for instance, the demand for the reservation
of seats in parliament for women, the extension of welfare schemes for
women—all these are instances of liberal feminism’s belief in the basic
neutrality of the state and the possibility of appealing to the state to
remove legal and political inequality between the sexes.
Radical feminists believe that the power of the state is a reflection of the
patriarchal nature of society. They question the idea of the basic neutrality
of the state, for they view the state as a reflection of patriarchal values in
society. For radical feminists, the origin and roots of the disparity between
men and women lies within the family, in the organization of labour within
the family. The state is an instrument of male power. Catherine
MacKinnon has argued that in a liberal state, it is through law that
women’s subordination and silence are maintained. In an unequal society,
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the definition of the ‘normal’ status of women is determined by the
application of male values and practices. Thus, radical feminism criticizes
the view of the state as impartial and neutral.
Feminist theories have sometimes led to a redefinition of what is
political. The term ‘the personal is political’ contains within it several
implications.
GOVERNMENTALITY: FOUCAULT ON THE STATE

As discussed earlier, the government is the administrative apparatus of the
state. However, according to Michel Foucault, the French philosopher, the
state is the result of the practices of the government. Foucault was
interested in how modernity was marked by the emergence of a broader
field of government of human conduct—of the self, of the family, of
institutions and of the body. He maintained that the state is the result of
this tendency towards the government of conduct. So, rather than saying
that the state is the condition for the existence of government, he turned
around saying that the state flows from this modern practice of ordering
life into structures, something that was not common in the Middle Ages.
Foucault saw governmentality as a rationale of governing that takes the
form of a series of mundane, daily practices of social ordering. (See
Chapter 9 for further discussion on Foucault.)
RECENT DEBATES: CHALLENGES TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE STATE
Globalization
Globalization is the process through which events and decisions in one
part of the world have come to affect people in another part of the world. It
has led to a greater inter-locking of different parts of the world. It has often
been claimed that globalization poses challenges to the sovereignty of the
state. Globalization is a multi-dimensional process, and includes the
economic, cultural, and political aspects of life. The economic aspect
refers to the emergence of an interlocking global economy and the
worldwide spread of capitalism. The indicators of economic globalization
are the growing power of multinational corporations, the
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internationalization of production, and the flow of financial capital
between countries. It has become increasingly difficult, and perhaps
impossible, for any country to regulate the international flow of capital,
thus making it difficult for individual states to manage economic life.
States have also found it difficult to regulate multinational companies for
they can easily relocate production and investment.
Political globalization is reflected in the growing importance of
international bodies like the United Nations (UN), the European Union
(EU), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The membership of the
EU threatens state power, as many decisions on matters like monetary
policy and defence are made by European institutions rather than by the
member-states themselves. It is for these reasons that it is often said that
globalization has challenged the sovereignty of the state.
The above stated case has been challenged by several authors and
commentators who point that we should investigate the ways in which the
state’s role is changing as a result of globalization. According to them,
there is the possibility of states adapting themselves to the transformations
in international society, in the form of ‘pooled sovereignty’—the idea that
states that would be weak and ineffective acting independently could
acquire greater influence by working together with other states through the
vehicle of international or regional institutions. Others believe that
globalization is itself driven by the state. States are themselves the authors
of globalization by promoting and shaping the nature and pace of
globalization. Trade agreements and regionalization are instances of this.
Political elites in different countries often use globalization as an
ideological device to make the move towards market reforms appear
inevitable and irresistible. States are now more concerned about their role
as actors in global markets to protect national economic well-being, and
are entrepreneurial. They are less concerned with political sovereignty and
security than they were earlier. Moreover, as Michael Mann (1997) argues,
we need to make distinctions between states to understand the changing
role of the state. Globalization will affect a powerful European state
differently from a vulnerable country in South America or Africa. Some
states might become stronger and more powerful, while others weaker.
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Therefore, globalization could have different consequences for different
states. As states differ in the degree of international power, they can
assume the role of agents of globalization as well as become its passive
victims. Thus, the impact of globalization on state sovereignty is much
more complex than what the ‘end of the state’ thesis allows for.
The Imported State and its Consequences

As discussed earlier in the chapter, the modern state emerged and evolved
in Europe. Through colonialism, it was transplanted in Africa, Asia,
Australia, and the Americas. The development of the state in these areas
has been along a trajectory different from that in Europe. Independent
India inherited a state structure that colonialism had introduced. It did not
evolve organically from the people. It could be argued that this structure of
the state was imposed on the people from the top. When the state tried to
penetrate into a pre-modern, traditional world by bringing different spheres
of life under its supervision and control—it could be the abolition of child
marriages, the registration of births, the abolition of the practice of
untouchability—it was sometimes met with violence by the state and/or by
those who tried to resist the growing powers of the state. This has often led
to a loss of the meaning of state authority for the people governed by it,
thus straining relations between the government and those governed by it.
Manoranjan Mohanty (2000) points to the emergence of two streams of
critiques of the Indian state in the 1960s and the 1970s. These include,
first, the rise of revolutionary politics and the Naxalite movement, and
second, mass movements like the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini in Bihar
in 1974–75 to which Jayaprakash Narayan provided inspiration and
impetus. The Naxalite movement sought to demonstrate the semi-colonial
and semifeudal nature of the Indian state, which was itself seen as an
institution of violence. The Jayaprakash Narayan movement offered a
critique of state power from the vantage point of civil society.
The monopoly of the state over the legitimate use of violence could be
challenged by the establishment of parallel governments, particularly in
the context of the emergence of the demand and the struggle for statehood
by different groups. For instance, many of these groups might set up what
are termed parallel governments (claiming for themselves the power to
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levy and collect taxes), and create a rival centre of coercion and force,
challenging the monopoly of the state over the use of legitimate violence.
The transplantation of the state and the consequent Westernization of the
political order are held responsible for this state of affairs. The recent
attempts at state-building in Iraq and Afghanistan are often considered to
be attempts to import the Western model of the state into a terrain socially
and politically not suited for this kind of transmigration. It is a matter of
great debate how fruitful such exercises at state-building would be.
Thus, the state represents not merely a set of institutions, but rather a set
of ideas and attitudes. What is the meaning of the state representing a set
of ideas and attitudes? The state is an abstract entity, as are the other
concepts like democracy, liberty, equality, etc. The defining feature of the
modern state is the standard of abstraction from the regime that it is
expected to uphold. Feminists hold that the state is patriarchal in nature,
while according to Marxists it upholds the interests of the dominant
section. Various critiques of the liberal view of the state point to the
inability or the unwillingness of the state to abstract itself from the
dominant sections of the society.
The modern state might share one or more but not all of its defining
features with other associations and organizations. Does the state exhaust
the possibility of our imagining alternative forms of political organization?
Given the role of the state, sometimes benevolent, but always coercive,
there have been many images of alternative forms. However, a paradox
emerges: while the authority of the state is constantly questioned and
challenged, there are also several demands made on the state to confer full-
fledged rights and entitlements on citizens, to confer ever more recognition
to more institutions, and a growing demand from the international
community to address development problems effectively.
1. Sometimes, one could say that the appeal to individual conscience is a valid
claim against state authority. This raises the question: when is it imperative to
disobey the laws of the state? Mohandas Gandhi, John Rawls, and Ronald
Dworkin have addressed the question of civil disobedience. Do you think that
we are obliged to obey all laws of the state at all times?
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2. Imagine the security checking at the airport, at the metro station and the powers
of the guards posted at these places to examine your baggage—many of the
rules and laws are made in the light of a distrust of human nature. If all human
beings were generous, fair and just, would we need the police or the army?
3. Based an our discussion of liberal equality, we notice that people often find
themselves in situations that are not of their own making and these act as
constraints on their choices. Ram wants to study, but his parents cannot afford
to send him to school. Should the state aim to rectify this situation by providing
him with subsidized schooling, or set-up schools that charge no fees from their
students?
READING LIST
Anderson, Perry, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1979).
Badie, Bertrand, The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
Ball, Terence, Transforming Political Discourse: Political Theory and Critical
Conceptual History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
Gill, Graeme, The Nature and Development of the Modern State (Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003).
Hansen, Thomas Blom and Finn Stepputat (eds), States of Imagination: Ethnographic
Explorations of the Postcolonial State (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).
Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
King, Roger and Gavin Kendall, The State, Democracy and Globalization (Hampshire:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
Mackinnon, Catherine, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1989).
Mann, Michael, ‘Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?’
Review of International Political Economy, 4(3), 1997.
Mohanty, Manoranjan, Contemporary Indian Political Theory (New Delhi: Samskriti,
2000).
Poggi, Gianfranco, ‘The Nature of the Modern State’, in Malcolm Waters (ed.),
Modernity: Critical Concepts, Volume III (London: Routledge, 1999).
Skinner, Quentin, ‘The State’, in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit (eds),
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers
Ltd., 1998).
Sorenson, Georg, The Transformation of the State: Beyond the Myth of Retreat
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
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CHAPTER 12
Civil Society
Mohinder Singh
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Historical Evolution of the Idea of Civil Society
Civil Society in Early Liberal Political Theory
Rise of Political Economy and the Enlightenment Concept of Civil Society
Critiques of the Enlightenment Concept of Civil Society
Contemporary Revival of the Concept of Civil Society
Civil Society in the Post-colonial Context
Modernity and Civil Society in Post-colonial States: Critical Issues
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
These days, we often come across the term ‘civil society’ in newspapers or
in television programmes, or in a public meeting. For example, we read a
newspaper report that a ‘civil society organization’ submitted a
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memorandum to the chief minister of Delhi highlighting the problem of
homeless children in the city. Or a newspaper report with information on a
conference of ‘civil society organizations’ that adopted a resolution
demanding that a right to shelter be included in the Constitution as a
fundamental right. There are other occasions when we confront the term
‘civil society’. It has been estimated that Canada has more than a million
civil society organizations. Similarly, India is said to have around two
million such organizations (Mitra 2001). So this brings us to the question,
what does the term ‘civil society’ mean? What does it refer to? Why are
certain kinds of organizations performing certain functions referred to as
‘civil society organizations?’ What should an organization do to be called
a ‘civil society organization’? Which are the organizations and institutions
that are not included in ‘civil society’? In this chapter, we shall try to find
an answer to these and other similar questions.
Like many other concepts of political theory, the meaning of the term
civil society has undergone several changes in its history and there is no
consensus in the meaning of civil society among its contemporary users
and proponents. However, one thing that is common to the various
meanings of the term is the idea that social life is differentiated into
various spheres and civil society is one among them. Civil society, thus,
describes an aspect of social life and not the whole of it. At the very outset,
therefore, it must be clarified that the meaning of the term civil society is
different from that of society. In its contemporary usage—whatever the
specific connotations of that usage might be—civil society is one among
many spheres of the larger society along with family, economy, politics,
etc. The concept of society, therefore, is much broader in scope than that
of civil society. Society, according to Louis Dumont, can be defined as an
organization into which we are born, to which we involuntarily belong and
from where we get all our ideas and education. Society in this way is an
all-purpose organization (Dumont 1986).
Civil society, on the other hand, can be understood as a collective entity
that springs from society and exists for specific and limited purposes. The
purposes, limits and scope of the domain of civil society vary from one
conception to another. Yet, there seems to exist, in the contemporary usage
of the term civil society, some basic attributes of the latter on which the
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differing conceptions tend to agree. What are these attributes? First, one of
the most important attributes is that the domain of civil society is separate
and independent from that of the state. Second, the domain of civil society
is made up of voluntary associations and some involuntary associations
and groups in society, such as family and caste, are not part of it (Bhargava
2005: 14). But, as stated earlier, the contemporary meaning of the term
‘civil society’ has a long history to which we now turn.
It is held that the first articulations of the concept took place in the 17th
and 18th centuries in Europe. At that time, the concept was part of the
economic and political liberalism that arose with John Locke and was
elaborated in the writings of the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment:
David Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, albeit with a different
meaning. The concept then found a significant place in the writings of
Georg Hegel and Karl Marx in the 19th century. The concept went into
disuse for a long time after this, only to appear in theoretical and practical
usage towards the end of the Cold War. It then gained immense popularity
after the end of the Cold War in both the academic and political worlds.
After its newly acquired prominence in East Europe, it gradually acquired
popularity in the political discourses of the West and the Third World. The
revival of the concept of civil society in East Europe had taken place on
the assumption that it was an important part of the heritage of Western
democratic theory. However, if we study the history of concept of civil
society in Western political theory, we find that it has gone through many
changes in meanings.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The idea of civil society evolved with the emergence of the modern age in
Western Europe. As discussed earlier, the basic idea underlying the
concept of civil society is the existence of differentiation in social life.
This means that different institutions perform different functions in society
according to the principle of functional specialization. Modern societies
are more differentiated than the earlier societies which results in clear
separation of different spheres of family, economy, civil society, and state.
Pre-modern societies were less differentiated than modern ones in the
sense that many functions (necessary for social existence) were performed
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by one or a few institution(s). For example, in tribal societies, kinship
performed many social, cultural, political and economic functions. In the
Middle Ages, feudal bonds performed many of those functions. Similarly,
in India, caste performed, and in many areas still performs, multiple social,
political, and economic functions. In many other societies monarchs
performed multiple functions related to the economic, cultural, and
political life of the members. At the same time, there were societies the
members of which thought themselves to be so fully integrated with the
whole that they could not even imagine what it meant to stand in
opposition to the patriarch, matriarch, or head of that particular society.
The idea of differentiation of various spheres of social life, along with the
idea of civil society, is connected to the story of modern Western political
theory.
CIVIL SOCIETY IN EARLY LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY

The first articulation of the concept of civil society took place in the liberal
political theory of the 17th century. In the ancient European political
theories—Greek and Roman—the idea of political life was all
comprehensive. No other sphere of society was expected to play any
political role other than the state. In medieval Europe, however, the
political sphere was considered as one among many spheres. The realm
that provided most competition to the state was the Church. There were
two sources of authority: the Church and political authority. At the same
time, the relationship between the two authorities was unstable, prone to
quarrel with regard to their respective spheres of competence (Taylor
2003). Ideas of modern state and civil society originated against the
background of medieval Christendom with its dual source of authority.
The story of their origins can be divided into two stages. During the first
phase there was a long ideological-political battle on behalf of the
institution of the state and against the claims of the Church. In the second
phase, we see a struggle against the state’s authority and for the rights and
liberties of individuals. It is in the second phase that we can locate the
historical origin of the modern idea of civil society as a space for the
articulation of political interest of individuals against the authority of the
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state. This component is at the core of the concept of civil society and has
remained there from its inception to its latest connotations.
The first phase begins with the historical events of Renaissance and the
Reformation. These historical movements proved to have far-reaching
consequences. Along with the new political theories of the 16th and 17th
centuries these movements led to the strengthening of the claims of the
state against the internationalism of the Roman Catholic Church, leading
to the emergence of a powerful modern state with a new idea of
sovereignty. In the 17th century, the specifically modern order was
elaborated in the political theory, particularly in the writings of Thomas
Hobbes and Jean Bodin, that elaborated the idea of a strong state with
absolute sovereignty as its chief attribute. The political theory of Hobbes
imagined public space as divided into two sharply separate domains: a
domain of political authority or state and a subordinate domain of
individual subjects. Gradually, during the second stage, in the 18th and
19th centuries, political theory started questioning the state’s monopoly of
power by articulating the concepts of individual rights and liberties.
In the first phase, the Reformation played a very important role in the
emergence of the modern state by dividing the European Christendom into
Catholic and Protestant Churches. The Protestant Church supported the
independence of the state from the dominance of the Roman Catholic
Church. But more importantly, the Reformation also facilitated the
emergence of the doctrine of secularism. This doctrine specified that the
spheres of the Church and the state ought to be separate with their own
well-defined arenas of competence. With this separation, religion and
morality were relegated to the sphere of the private concerns of
individuals, whereas the state’s main obligations became law, order, and
security. In other words, by freeing itself from the interference of the
religious authorities and placing itself above the quarrelling religious
denominations, state monopolized political power.
Another important source for the modern ideas of state and civil society
is the tradition of natural law in political theory. The modern natural law
theorists imagined society to be composed of individuals. In their doctrine
of natural law, individuals are given priority over society and are seen as
self-sufficient, as the repository of reason, and as prior to and independent
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of society. Natural law theories derived the authority and legitimacy of the
state from the qualities of man as an autonomous being independent of any
social or political attachment. In a revolutionary transformation, these
theories replaced the earlier basis of political authority, based on the thesis
of the divine origin of the king’s powers, with a new one. The political
authority of the sovereign was no longer seen as flowing from God as its
divine source. The natural law theorist began to explain it without recourse
to any divine source. The starting point of the new theoretical speculation
became the individual, and the state was regarded as a union of
individuals. This was the beginning of the two poles of liberal political
theory: the state and the individual. The revolutionary import of this shift
in the argument lay in the fact that the source of political authority now
was located within the society itself. It is on this basis that later on, in the
second stage, the arbitrary powers of the state would be questioned (von
Gierke 1987). These theoretical developments taking place in the early
modern age proved to be important first steps towards the evolution of the
contemporary concept of civil society One of the most important early
articulations of the natural law doctrine is to be found in the 17th century
works of John Locke.
John Locke’s Concept of Civil Society

John Locke contrasts the concept of civil society with the state of nature
(Locke 2002: 1–59). The state of nature, according to Locke, is a
hypothetical condition of human beings prior to the foundation of political
or civil society Locke refers to it as the state of nature because in the
absence of any positive legal and political authority, the only force that
guides human beings is the law of nature. In other words, it is a ‘state all
men are naturally in’. According to Locke, in this condition there is
freedom and equality amongst the members of a species who share the
same human nature. This condition is governed by the laws of nature that
guide human beings regarding fundamental rules of right and wrong. All
human beings have been endowed with the faculty of reason with which
they can recognize and follow the law of nature. The state of nature is a
condition ‘of perfect freedom’ where man can live within the limits set by
the law of nature. Everybody is independent of the will of the other. It is
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also a state of equality, where no one has more rights than the other. Each
man has the ‘executive power’ of punishing the transgressor of the law of
nature. Locke’s state of nature is a peaceful condition of human living
where rational and free men respect each other’s freedom.
Gradually, due to some reasons, men in the state of nature decide to get
out of it and establish a civil society to get over the problem of the absence
of any common judge to interpret the law of nature in specific situations.
As stated earlier, each man in the state of nature has the ‘executive power’
as far as the law of nature is concerned. But in the absence of a common
judge their judgments are fairly erratic and they are far from being
impartial in their assessment of the rights and wrongs in conflicts between
themselves and others. At some stage in history, according to John Locke,
human societies grow to become richer and there is a division between
people with considerable amount of property and those without, mainly
because the invention of money makes the amassing of infinite amount of
property possible. With the emergence of a propertied class in society the
chances of potential conflicts among people in the state of nature become
very high. And because of this, civil society is established as an alternative
to and a remedy for these problems. The important thing for the present
purpose is that Locke’s conception of civil society is not that of a sphere
separate from the political sphere of the state. Civil society provides a
stable set of positive standing laws, impartial judges, and a coercive
apparatus for enforcing those laws.
In Locke’s schema, the concept of civil society also works as a standard
with which to judge the existing political orders of his time. The main
thrust of Locke’s political philosophy is against the absolutism of political
power. He did not approve of the existing absolutist monarchies prevailing
at that time in France and other states of Europe. Locke was also critical of
the monarch’s monopoly of power in England and was in favour of a
constitutional monarchy. The concentration of power in one place, e.g. in
the hands of the monarch, placed the subjects in a condition of
disadvantage. This arrangement did not provide the subjects with effective
means of restraining the political authority and holding it responsible for
its actions. Such a state, for Locke, is no better than the state of nature. It
does not fulfil the requirements of a civil or political society. What we
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observe here is the normative charge of Locke’s concept of civil society.
In other words, Locke uses the concept of civil society to judge actually
existing states. Authoritarian or despotic regimes do not qualify to the
status of civil. In Locke’s conception, subjects have legitimate right to
revolt against the despotic and tyrannical rulers.
Already in Locke’s political theory one can observe the emergence of
the idea of political authority that can be legitimately challenged if it tends
to take a turn towards despotism and which fails to uphold the trust of the
subjects. With this idea begins the second stage of our story, wherein the
main emphasis is on questioning the state’s monopoly of power. With
Locke, political theory already adopts a critical posture towards the
absolutism of the state. Historically, this was also a period when most of
the European states were ruled by powerful monarchs. They were known
as absolutist states. These states faced a further challenge from the political
theories of the 18th century, a period of intellectual growth known as the
Enlightenment. Locke, thus, became the spiritual father of the
Enlightenment’s struggle against absolutist states.
RISE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT CONCEPT OF

CIVIL SOCIETY
The Enlightenment concept of civil society is closely linked to the
emergence of the sphere of economy by the end of the 18th century. In the
wake of the Industrial Revolution, institutions of capitalist political
economy had acquired a very important place in the social life of countries
in Western Europe (particularly, England) and the United States. One of
the important features of capitalism was the establishment of an
independent sphere of economy with laws of its own. The term ‘economy’,
derived from the Greek word oikos (household) originally meant
household management, but came to acquire a new meaning around this
time. In its new meaning, it referred to the intermediate sphere of
commercial and production activities spatially situated between the family
and the state. Economy, earlier confined to the private domain of the
household, came out in the public sphere and sought independence from
the domestic sphere as well as from state control. Unlike the earlier
agriculture-based feudal society, production in the new capitalist economy
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was fundamentally geared towards trade, commerce and exchange of
goods in the market. The social functions of production and distribution of
things, employment of labour in production became privatized. In other
words, these functions came to be performed more and more by non-
political means under the legal conditions of free, uncoerced exchange in
the market. In contrast to pre-modern practices, the distribution of various
resources and labour in society did not take place by direction of political
authority, hereditary duty, tradition, or religious obligation, but through the
mechanisms of free exchange in the open market.
Thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as David Hume, Adam
Ferguson, and Adam Smith, reflected on the significance of these
developments and constructed theories about them. Smith developed his
influential theory of political economy in which he argued that the
processes of economy are governed by laws of their own and must be kept
free from the control of the state. He conceptualized the state as a
laissezfaire state, with its functions being restricted to law and order,
defence, currency, and communication.
The concept of civil society, as distinct from the state, emerged with this
new idea of ‘political economy’. According to the new concept, commerce
is the source for civility and refinement in ‘civil society’ since it links
completely anonymous individuals in the marketplace. On the other hand,
the state could legitimately monopolize the spheres of law and justice, its
tasks reduced narrowly to the maintenance of peace, order, and security.
Thus, according to Scottish Enlightenment thought, civil society is a name
given to modern commerce-based society, which is a product of capitalist
political economy. In this conception, the sphere of civil society is clearly
demarcated from that of political society or state. This development marks
a concrete step forward from Locke’s conception of civil society in which
this separation is not clearly worked out. At the same time, the ethical
foundations of civil society were located in the philosophy of
individualism which the thinkers of Enlightenment inherited from 17th
century thought, particularly from Locke. Individuals were seen as
autonomous social actors pursuing their private interests in the civil
society where they were not driven purely by the motives of selfish
interests. They were also seen as sociable in nature with sympathy and
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affection, dependent on each other for their needs. These attributes provide
psychological and moral foundations for the idea of civil society as a space
for the social interaction of private individuals.
Historically, the development of an independent economic sphere
played an important role in the gradual emergence in new practices of
politics, particularly the institutions of representative democracy. As a
result of the gradual dominance of the capitalist economy, a new class of
people was created that did not have any significant political role to play
but was playing a leading role in the new economy and had acquired social
prestige and wealth—a class of merchants, bankers, and businessmen.
There were other sections of the middle strata working in the offices of the
state—bureaucrats and people involved in the legal profession—that had
gained social influence and prestige but resented the lack of any political
role. These classes, collectively called bürger or bourgeois, played an
increasingly important role in the politics of 18th and 19th century Europe.
However, they faced a peculiar historical predicament. Although they bore
the financial burdens of the state, they were not allowed to participate in
political decision making, which was the monopoly of the monarchs and
the feudal classes.
With the spread of new ideas of freedom, equality, and the rule of law,
the bourgeois opposed the claims of the absolutist state and called for
limiting their powers. These were expressed in the form of various open
and underground movements, created various public spaces and took
various forms such as clubs, coffeehouses, salons, library societies, and
literary societies (Koselleck 1988: 66). Initially, all these spaces took the
form of ‘social’ entities without any overt political intention of challenging
the established order. This way, they could provide the critique of the
absolutist order thereby cutting the sinews of its legitimacy without posing
any direct challenge to the existing power arrangement. New means of
communication and representation through newspapers, books, reviews,
etc., also helped in the formation of ‘public opinion’. These were the
spaces of early civil society, where political issues were discussed outside
that of the state and often in direct opposition to it.
In the 19th century, the role of various public associations as a bulwark
against the tyranny of the state and for the defence of the freedom of
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individuals was emphasized by Alexis de Tocqueville in his book
Democracy in America. Tocqueville noticed that democratic governments
tend to promote equality in society. But more importantly, he also noticed
that the democratic advancement of equality might pose a threat to the
liberty of the citizens. He argued that in democratic countries, old status-
based social hierarchies and old forms of social solidarity tended to
gradually disappear and there is a general passion for equality. Gradually,
society gets polarized with a powerful centralized state on the one hand,
and isolated individuals on the other. According to Tocqueville, social
conditions of isolated families would promote the despotic tendencies of
the state, if not checked by other social mechanisms. In such a situation,
the only institutions that could prevent democracies from becoming
despotic were associations freely created by the independent initiative of
the individuals. For Tocqueville, political parties, churches, literary and
scientific societies, and professional and recreational groups were the
examples of such associations. These associations, interposed between
individual families and the all-powerful state, could perform significant
functions. First, they could perform an educative function by helping
citizens cultivate civic virtues and democratic values, which, in turn, could
help citizens think beyond their narrow private interests. In this way they
would create bonds of solidarity among citizens. Second, these
associations could also provide a guarantee against the abuse of power by
the state authorities. Thus, they would tend to make the state authorities
accountable to the citizenry.
CRITIQUES OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

In the 19th century, two powerful critiques of the Enlightenment concept
of civil society appeared in the philosophies of Hegel and Marx. As
already discussed, civil society was seen as a self-contained arena with
internal laws and a mechanism of its own. Thinkers of the Enlightenment
placed their hope in the functioning of morality in the realm of civil
society. The task of the state, on the other hand, was to maintain law and
order from above. The individuals in the civil society were supposed to
perform dual roles. They were individuals of a market economy trying to
maximize their own self-interests. On the other hand, they were also
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supposed to play the role of citizens caring for the general interest of the
whole society from time to time. Both Hegel and Marx criticized this split
between morality and legality, and tried to overcome this opposition in
their own ways.
Hegel’s Concept of Civil Society

Like the 18th century Enlightenment thinkers, Hegel also conceptualized
civil society as a sphere consisting of people involved in the market
(bürgerliche Gesellschaft : the society of city folks). Thus, civil society in
Hegel’s system comprised an economic system where formally free and
equal individuals could engage in work and trade. Apart from that, it also
included those civil institutions needed to keep such a system going;
institutions like markets, courts and an administration of justice, and
business corporations. Civil society for Hegel was a ‘system of needs’
where individuals pursued their freely chosen economic goals. It was also
a system of mutual inter-dependence of individuals where exchange was
the main medium of need fulfilment. The only thing about civil society
that was problematic for Hegel was that each individual was concerned
with his own interests and no one cared about the whole. It was a sphere
where individuals’ particular interests clashed.
Critique of Civil Society and the Role of the State Modern society,
according to Hegel, is divided into three separate domains: family, civil
society, and state. The three institutions are organized on three different
principles. In Hegel’s formulation, family is the domain of private life
based on love and trust, where there is no space for individual egos. In
contrast, both civil society and state are spheres of individuals’ ‘public’
activities. Civil society is the sphere of pursuit of private or sectional
interests in an open market. The state, on the other hand, makes its
appearance in order to overcome the problems created by modern civil
society. Its justification is based on Hegel’s critique of civil or bourgeois
society.
Civil society, according to Hegel, is based on the principle of
unrestrained individual egoism. Hence, it leads to hitherto unknown
divisions that need to be overcome. The freedom available to individuals
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here is only partial. Complete freedom, according to Hegel, also demands
unity. The institutions of civil society only provide partial space for self-
determination of individuals and the freedom they offer is somehow
formal and empty. There are needs and desires, both natural and socially
accepted, for which there is space in civil society. Civil society also directs
people to choose efficient means to achieve our goals. The only restriction
on the freedom of individuals is that they respect the similar freedom of
others. But the same separation that had liberated persons from their
traditional social roles also creates problems of its own. The form of
sociability available in civil society creates divisions. There is division
among individuals because of the principle of competitiveness in the
economy. There is disunity brought about by the emergence of sectional
and partial interests because of social and economic inequalities. In other
words, a society organized on the principles of gain and profit left to its
own rules would produce grave evils. Hegel finds the thread that could
provide unity missing in civil society. Modern society, therefore, needs
another form of sociability to overcome the problems arising from civil
society. In Hegel’s schema this function is performed by the state.
These divisions mentioned above, can be overcome by the state as a
larger community transcending civil society. However, Hegel is critical of
the liberal theory of the state prevalent at that time, according to which the
state’s functions ought to be minimal and limited to the protection of
individual liberty and property. The state, for Hegel, is a ‘non-minimal
political sphere’ transcending civil society. The basis of the state,
according to Hegel, lies in individuals’ need to live in solidarity with
others in a community. He did not visualize the state as an institution
merely for the protection of self-interest. State, according to him, is a
sphere where human beings do not enter in their capacity as private
individuals with selfinterest, but as citizens concerned about the general
interests of the whole community.
Civil Society in the Marxist Tradition: Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci
Agreeing with Hegel, Karl Marx too claimed that the basic political
contradiction in modern society is between ‘man as citizen’ and ‘man as
private individual’ (Femia, 2001: 135). This split between private
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individual and citizen in modern society was criticized by Jean Jacques
Rousseau in the 18th century and the idea had had a significant influence
on the course of the French Revolution. Rousseau had argued that for the
construction of a political community of citizens the pre-eminence of
private or sectional interests needed to be checked. This idea continued in
Marx’s writings on civil society and capitalist political economy. But
Marx did not understand the state-civil society relation in the same way as
Hegel. Contradicting Hegel, Marx argued that state cannot stand above
civil society to protect universal interests against the private interests
articulated in civil society. The modern state, according to Marx, was
neither independent of nor neutral towards the particular interests of civil
society. On the contrary, state for Marx was deeply embedded in civil
society. Accordingly, to understand the nature of the state it is necessary to
understand the nature of civil society. For Marx, civil society included
within its sphere the whole of pre-state economic and social life. The true
nature of civil society can be understood by analysing the nature of
political economy.
There may be formal equality in civil society but it in itself is divided
into classes. Because of this division there is inequality among the
members of civil society. The state, according to Marx, is an instrument of
the domination of capitalist class, the owner of the means of production,
over the working classes. The capitalist class subordinates the general
interests that the state is supposed to protect, to its own class interests.
Hence, political life is subordinated to economic life in civil society which,
for Marx, is an obvious fact that even the bourgeois political theorists
accept. According to Marx, because of private property and the general
prevalence of selfish interests, life in a modern civil society is essentially
unsocial and the modern state has its foundations in this unsocial life. So,
instead of the state controlling the civil society, it is, in fact, the civil
society that is the determining element. For Hegel, on the other hand, the
existence of classes does not prevent the unification of the community at
the level of the superior ethical order of the state. Marx argued that it is an
illusion to believe that it is possible for individuals to periodically set aside
their selfish, egoistic interests and participate in political affairs as public-
spirited citizens. The prevalence of such illusions also provides a deceitful
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cover that hides the real identity between the interests pursued in the
economic and the political spheres. According to Marx, without abolishing
the capitalist civil society—which meant the abolition of capitalist
relations of production—true citizenship and true political life is not
possible. As long as capitalist relations of production exist, the political
sphere will always be marked by narrow private interests. Only a working-
class revolution can establish conditions free from the tyranny of particular
interests.
In the first half of the 20th century, the Italian Marxist thinker, Antonio
Gramsci, enriched the concept of civil society to a great extent. Retaining
Marx’s idea of class war, he focused as much on the question of war as on
class. He understood politics as a kind of war and used metaphors from
military warfare to explain its many processes. But unlike in military
warfare, in politics the battles are not limited to the use of sheer force.
Although force is used as well, the battle in the field of ideas is more
important. Civil society, for Gramsci, is a space where this battle for the
control of ideas takes place. According to him, the dominance of the ruling
classes is not maintained solely on the basis of their control of the coercive
apparatus of the state, namely, the police and the army. They also need to
acquire a dominant intellectual and moral leadership in civil society.
In Gramsci’s view, exploitative class relations of capitalist society have
to be made to appear right and proper in order to establish the legitimacy
of the ruling exploitative class. In other words, the ruling classes need to
create a false perception among the working classes of their own social
situation. Since human beings define themselves in terms of ideals and
values, the ruling classes need to control those institutions where ideas,
ideals, and values are formed. This function, according to Gramsci’s
conception, is performed by the various institutions of civil society. These
civil society institutions are churches, parties, trade unions, universities,
the press, publishing houses, and voluntary associations of all kinds. By
disseminating the ideology of the dominant class, these institutions ensure
its cultural and moral supremacy over the subordinate classes. In this way,
the ruling class obtains the consent of the latter for their own
subordination. Gramsci used the term ‘hegemony’ to describe all the
processes through which the dominant class attained this intellectual and
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moral leadership. Through the concept of hegemony, he also emphasized
that the ruling classes rely more on the institutions of civil society than
those of the state for obtaining the consent of the subordinated. The
coercive apparatus of the state is used only where ‘spontaneous consent
has failed’. The concept of hegemony had a strategic importance in
Gramsci’s own political practice. He argued that in order to properly fight
the revolutionary battle for the working classes and peasantry, communist
parties in different countries need to contest the hegemony of the ruling
classes in civil society.
CONTEMPORARY REVIVAL OF THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

As already discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the revival of the
concept of civil society took place in East European countries. This revival
was related to people’s struggle against the authoritarian communist states
in some of the East European countries, particularly Poland. Against the
dictatorial regime in Poland, people wanted to seek freedom under the
state. So they started a movement named Solidarity, which invoked the
model of civil society from the Western countries as an independent
sphere of freedom against the state. Similar movements started in other
countries of Eastern Europe like Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
Intellectuals and political activists presented the image of an unrepressed
civil society to mobilize citizens against oppressive states and reclaim the
sphere of privacy in social life. During these movements, dissident leaders
and activists began to assert their rights to free speech and free association
to carve out a public space for their political activities. Such movements
saw the utility of the concept of civil society in its anti-statist charge. Their
leaders and supporters used the concept of civil society in opposition to the
party state that existed in these countries. The main reason for this kind of
reaction against the authority of the state was that communist countries
over-extended the legal jurisdiction and effective control of state
institutions, such as bureaucracy, over nearly all spheres of social life.
After the collapse of this kind of state, encouragement to the institutions of
‘civil society’, outside the legal jurisdiction of the state, was considered
necessary for safeguarding the freedom of citizens.
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At about the same time, the idea of civil society was also gaining
prominence in Western Europe and the United States, though due to
entirely different reasons from the ones in Eastern Europe. The former
were facing a crisis of political apathy and lack of political participation
among citizens after World War II and a decline in the membership of
political parties, trade unions, and other voluntary associations.Similarly,
the participation of citizens in elections had steadily declined, as was
evident from low electoral turnouts in most Western countries. The notion
of civil society was sought to be revived in order to resurrect the structures
of civic solidarity among citizens. There was a marked emphasis on the
role of voluntary associations in the new avatar of civil society, thus
underscoring the contemporary relevance of Tocqueville’s political
thought.
One of the important contributions to the contemporary revival of civil
society in the West has been made by Robert Putnam. Putnam emphasized
the Tocquevillian concern for the role that civil society associations played
in the creation of solidarity among citizens. In his research, he showed that
the quality of political life and the performance of political institutions are
directly affected by the quality of civic engagement in a particular society.
He also showed that democracies function better in regions where there are
long-standing traditions of civic engagements that are defined by
indicators such as voting, political participation, newspaper readership,
and participation in various voluntary associations. He further argued that
norms and values of civic engagement are found in communities with a
substantial stock of social capital. Social capital refers to those features of
social life that make coordinated and efficient social action possible. It also
refers to social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness
that arise from interaction among individuals. In that sense, it is closely
linked to what we in everyday parlance call ‘civic sense’ or ‘civic virtue’.
The important point to highlight here is that social capital is not a function
of individuals taken singularly, but of the connections between them. It
includes such values as mutual trust, cooperation, and a shared sense of
responsibility. These values make trustworthy dialogue among the
members of society possible and help in the creation of social networks
that are necessary for a well-coordinated political action. Participation in
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civic associations aids the development of cooperation, a sense of shared
responsibility for collective endeavours and a means of engaging with the
institutions of a political system.
CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE POST-COLONIAL CONTEXT

In Third World countries, too, the concept of civil society was revived
during the 1980s the 1990s. Soon after the concept of civil society
acquired popularity in Europe, it was revived in many countries of the
Third World, particularly in the Latin American countries. Beginning in
1964 and till the late 1970s, many Latin American countries—including
Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Chile, and Uruguay—came under authoritarian
dictatorships. These regimes established political and economic
domination by a tiny elite within the concerned countries. They also
effectively excluded large masses of people from the process of decision
making by banning elections and suppressing the rights and liberties of
people that are a necessary condition for political participation. A
simmering discontent was present in these countries as the military
regimes were extremely repressive. They did not pursue policies that could
cater to the economic and social demands of the lower and middle classes
of the society. By the early 1980s, most of these regimes were faced with
economic and political crises because of increasing foreign debt and
popular discontent.Soon, various kinds of associations—later called civil
society associations—were formed, particularly in Latin American
countries, to press for the extension of civil and political rights. Like in
East Europe, here too, the idea of civil society was invoked as a sphere of
freedom against the authoritarian state.
The popularity of the concept of civil society is related not only to the
democratic struggle against authoritarianism, it also shows a decreasing
faith in the capacity of the state to cater to peoples’ needs and aspirations.
In other words, the resurgence of the concept also indicates the failure of
most of the post-colonial states to carry out economic and political
development in these societies. Most of the newly independent states in the
Asian, African, and Latin American countries failed to meet the
expectations and aspirations of the people. These states were neither
capable of attaining high economic growth nor were they able to
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institutionalize democratic politics. The crisis of state led to a questioning
of the very ideas of political and economic development that had
dominated political discourse so far.
The challenge to the existing models of development appeared in the
decades of the 1980s and 1990s in the form of new social movements.
They were new in the sense that they carved out an oppositional political
space distinct from traditional political parties and pressure groups. They
were also new in the more important sense that many of these movements
questioned the models of development that had been pursued by the
developing countries. In India, we can think of the Narmada Bachao
Andolan (NBA) and the Chipko Movement as examples of such
movements. The NBA, for example, questioned the sustainability of big
development projects like the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada river
on ecological grounds, and has also been struggling for the rights of the
local people displaced by the dam. It also criticized the project for over-
centralization of the decision-making structure in which there was no
participation of those directly affected by it. These and many such
movements have created awareness about economic development through
various traditionally non-political channels and have been successful in
changing public opinion to some extent.
Recently, we have seen a spate of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), funded by various international agencies, taking up these issues.
These organizations work in a wide range of important social areas like
education, health, human rights, ecological aspect of development, gender
bias in development policies, rights of people affected by development
projects, minority rights and transparency in governance. These
organizations seek to stay aloof from party politics and use methods like
public interest litigations (PILs) in courts, lobbying with political leaders
and legislators, campaign-ing in the mass media and working directly with
people. In the last decade, various NGOs and other independent
organizations have got together to form a worldwide organization called
the World Social Forum (WSF) to coordinate their agendas and activities.
However, there are different ideological positions among different NGOs
on important economic and political issues. For example, there is an
important debate on the role of the state in economic development and
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liberalization of the economy. It is an important issue given the fact that
one of the important sources of support to the contemporary revival of the
idea of civil society is the neo-liberal economic doctrine. The neo-liberal
doctrine is supported by the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to this
doctrine, the old welfare functions of the state need to be dismantled and
developmental work should be carried out by various civil society
organizations.
MODERNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-COLONIAL STATES: CRITICAL

ISSUES
The application of the contemporary concepts of civil society for
understanding and analysing the politics and society of the post-colonial
societies poses unique problems. Such problems arise basically because
these societies have their own historical logic and at the same time they
have been irreversibly affected by Western modernity. The connotations of
the concept of civil society are different in different countries of the Third
World. These depend on the particular cultural contexts in which the
concept is invoked. In this context, there is a need to be sensitive to the
particular intellectual and cultural traditions of a given society (Kaviraj
2001: 306–07).
In the post-colonial set-up, the historical context of the emergence of
civil society in most Third World countries is very different from that of
the West. The main reason for this is that most of these societies did not
experience the reign of an all-powerful sovereign state of the absolutist
kind discussed earlier in this chapter. In most colonized countries, as
Sudipta Kaviraj argues in the case of India, society had an organizing
principle independent of the state. The state authority did not usually
interfere in its functioning and, traditionally, could not be as authoritarian
as the historical absolutist state in Europe. The colonial states, on the other
hand, were driven by the ideology of sovereign power and with that they
tried to establish control over these societies. The beginning of a civil
society-like sphere in the colonial context can be traced historically to
nationalist struggles against colonial regimes. A brief discussion of the
concept of civil society in Indian history will help us understand better the
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problems involved with the institution of civil society in the post colonial
context.
In India, like in other erstwhile colonized countries, modern political
institutions did not originate solely out of civil society’s own historical
dynamics. They were also a result of the colonial encounter. The colonial
state introduced modern institutions necessary for its own functioning, like
a centralized legal system, unified administration, census for counting
population groups, elected legislative assemblies (initially with restricted
franchise), and modern English education. Modern education gradually
produced a section of people in the society that came in contact with
European political ideas and concepts. Through Bentham, Rousseau and
Mill, the ideas of liberty, democracy and equality became known. Under
the influence of the new ideas, the English-educated classes became
critical of some of the liberty and equality-hindering practices of their own
culture. Gradually, they became critical of the colonial state.
By the beginning of the 20th century, leaders of the nationalist
movement had already begun to think in terms of the right to self-
governance. Gradually, this political demand took the shape of a
movement for complete independence from colonial rule. A great part of
nationalist politics was conducted in the vocabulary of Western political
theory, but not all of it. The main problem was that the majority of the
people of India, largely untouched by modern education, were not
conversant with this vocabulary. If we compare this situation with the
situation in European history, we can say that modern ideas like
democracy, rights, freedom, and civil society needed to be translated in the
local idioms of peoples’ languages. In other words, political concepts
grown in the soil of individualism did not match the social situation of this
society. A modern civil society based on the ideals of freedom, equality,
and citizenship instead became a hope and a goal of the dominant section
of the nationalist leadership favouring modernization.
Soon after Independence, a leading group of political leaders,
particularly those who shared Jawaharlal Nehru’s modernist vision,
believed that with the spread of modern education and scientific ideas,
with the new industrialized economy and secular political institutions,
Indian society would be able to break away from its traditional practices
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and modern civil society would emerge. Modernization theories in social
sciences, too, had placed hope in the modernizing capacities of the newly
independent state. At the same time, modernization theories had also
presented the political culture of Western European countries and North
America as a model and goal for the societies of the developing countries.
Gradually, there was a realization in the social sciences as well as in
political theory that the political cultures of Third World societies had
presented them with unfamiliar and unexpected elements (Kaviraj 2001).
As already discussed, the idea of civil society was closely linked to
liberal individualist thought in the early Modern Age. To recapitulate, civil
society in Western political theory is understood as a space for
associations, membership to which is based on the criteria of rational
interests of the individual citizens. Associations with membership based on
traditional criteria do not have any place in this neat model of civil
society. As some observers have noted, beginning in the late 19th century,
there have been both kinds of associations in India, associations based on
modern individualism as well as those based on purely traditional
identities like caste and religion. The spread of modern ideas through
English education was slow. Initially, politics in this sense was basically
an elite affair. Gradually, the modern forms of politics reached the masses
in urban and rural areas. The very idea of association-based politics of
interest articulation and bargaining was definitely a modern form of
politics. So, the interaction of modern political institutions and traditional
elements of Indian society produced new kinds of political organizations
and activities. Some scholars termed such phenomena as the ‘modernity of
tradition’ as it contained politics of associations based on traditional
identities such as caste (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967).
From the above discussion, it is clear that the concept of civil society
has a normative charge when it is presented by liberal and modernization
theories as an essential condition for the modernization of society and
polity. For a post-colonial country like India, civil society is presented as
an ideal to be achieved. Such a predicament poses a problem for the
application of the concept. The problem is as follows: If we take too broad
a view and include all kinds of associations based on caste, religion, and
other traditional identities, the concept tends to lose its normative appeal.
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Such a civil society will be far from the normative ideal that refers to a
sphere of political activities, situated between the institutions of state and
family, carried out by the rational and modernized citizenry. If, on the
other hand, we take a narrow view of civil society which restricts its scope
only to modern associations, there is a risk of limiting civil society to the
urban and the elite. Therefore, it seems that the idea of civil society based
on associational form of politics is gaining popularity in contemporary
times primarily in urban areas. The fact that regional translations of the
term ‘civil society’ have still not become prevalent in regional political
discourses also indicates the inherent limitations on the use of this concept.
Presently, it seems, the usage is restricted to English-speaking sections of
the population. In addition, some important critics of the concept have also
found it difficult to fix the ideological content of civil society. If civil
society consists of associational life per se, then nothing can prevent us
from including the associations of all ideological hues: patriarchal forces
alongside feminist groups; religious fundamentalists alongside reformists;
social groups supporting liberalization of economy alongside those
opposing it (Chandhoke 2003; Seligman 1992).
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the concept of civil society has undergone many
changes in its meaning. The concept of civil society made its historical
journey beginning with Locke’s political theory in the early Modern Age,
went through various mutations in meaning via Enlightenment thinkers—
Hegel, Marx, Tocqueville and Gramsci—until it was rediscovered as a
useful category of social theory in the decades of the 1980s and 1990s. We
have also observed that the current meaning attributed to civil society is a
recent historical phenomenon. In this conception, civil society is
considered as one sphere among many in social life. In its current usage,
the domain of civil society is clearly demarcated from the domain of state
and it consists of a network of voluntary associations. So far, there seems
to be an agreement among the contemporary users of the concept, but there
are considerable differences when we raise the question regarding the type
of groups and associations that should be included within the scope of the
concept. According to one view, civil society is to be located basically in
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the sphere of the economy. This view seeks to defend the freedoms
available in the market economy against the encroachments by the state.
An alternative view, on the other hand, finds the location of civil society in
the space that is independent of both the state and the economy. According
to this view, civil society is constituted by voluntary associations, groups,
and movements that are products of the free exchange of ideas in a
democratic framework and that also seek to keep a permanent check on the
powers of the state in the interest of citizens’ freedom (Cohen and Arato
1994; Khilnani 2001:13–14). In the latter version, civil society also
acquires normative dimensions as it becomes a state of affairs that is
desirable for the sake of democracy and freedom.
1. As we have seen in this chapter, the term ‘civil society’ has had many different
meanings from its use in the 17th century to the present times. How has the
meaning changed from its definitions in John Locke’s political theory and the
theory of the 18th century political economists, to its usage in the last two
decades?
2. When an activist of the People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) was arrested
by the Chhattisgarh government, Tehelka news reporter Shivam Vij wrote in its
21 October 2007 edition: ‘The war on Maoists in Chhattisgarh is beginning to
turn on civil society’ (emphasis added). Try to think about the connection
between the two.
3. In the same paper, a columnist had written: ‘For too long, the idea of civil
society in India had been abdicated to the NGO sector—deemed a professional
activity meant for others.’ What do you think are the dangers of abdicating the
idea of civil society to the NGO sector?
READING LIST
Bhargava, Rajeev and Helmut Reifeld (eds), Civil Society, Public Sphere, and
Citizenship: Dialogues and Perceptions (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005).
Chandhoke, Neera, State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory (New
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995).
———, ‘The “Civil” and the “Political” in Civil Society’, in Carolyn M. Elliot (ed.),
Civil Society and Democracy: A Reader (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Cohen, Jean and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1994).
295
Dumont, Louis, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological
Perspective (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986).
Elliot, Carolyn M. (ed.), Civil Society and Democracy: A Reader (New Delhi: Oxford
Femia, Joseph, ‘Civil Society and the Marxist Tradition’, in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil
Khilnani (eds), Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge University Press,
2001).
von Gierke, Otto, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987).
Kaviraj, Sudipta, ‘In Search of Civil Society’, in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani
(eds), Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001).
Kaviraj, Sudipta and Sunil Khilnani (eds), Civil Society: History and Possibilities
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
Keane, John (ed.), Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988).
Khilnani, Sunil, ‘The Development of Civil Society’, in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil
Khilnani (eds), Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge: Cambridge
Koselleck, Reinhart, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of
Modern Society (Oxford and New York: Berg, 1988).
Kumar, Krishan, ‘Civil Society: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term’,
British Journal of Sociology, 44(3), 1993.
Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Government (New York: Dover Publications,
2002).
Mitra, Amit, ‘Civil Society, Globalization and Sustainable Development’,
http://www.indiaseminar.com/2001/507, 27 November 2001.
Rudolph and Rudolph, Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967).
Seligman, Adam B., The Idea of Civil Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992).
Taylor, Charles, ‘Modes of Civil Society’, in Carolyn M. Elliot (ed.), Civil Society and
Democracy: A Reader (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003).
de Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America (both Volume 1 and 2 ed. by Richard D.
Heffener) (New York: Mentor Books, New American Library, 1956).
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CHAPTER 13
Property
Mohinder Singh
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
The Extent and Limits of Property Rights
The Concept of Property in Political Theory
Property in Ancient and Medieval Political Thought
Modernity and the Concept of Property
Developments in the 20th Century: Socialism, Welfarism, Libertarianism
Gender and Property Rights: Feminist Perspectives on the Concept of Property
INTRODUCTION
Like with most concepts in political theory, the meaning of the concept of
property is not constant. It has changed over time according to the
evolution of the institution of property in history and according to the way
different societies have evaluated the uses of this institution. In its broadest
sense, the concept of property refers to exclusive ownership of a thing or
objects of value. But the practices of property differ from one society to
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another. In common parlance, we sometimes identify things themselves as
property. These things may be concrete material things like a piece of land,
a house, a car, etc. We sometimes see advertisements for sale of things like
a house, a plot of land, a shop as property for sale. What constitutes
property here, is the enforceable legal claim of persons or groups to things,
not the things themselves. Property, thus, refers to a legal relation between
persons with respect to specific things—material or abstract—things such
as copyright. Therefore, for the institution of property to exist, there has to
be some legal authority to enforce property as a legitimate claim. For
example, I own a bag which I somehow lost at a railway station. The bag
is now lying at the lost property counter. The bag is not with me but it is
still my property insofar as I can rightfully claim it as mine, and insofar as
this claim is legally recognized. Property, therefore, is not merely
something I am able to take, occupy, or possess. I must be entitled to
possess it legitimately. Hence, property is necessarily relational and is
possible only in a legally organized community of people.
Property does not only refer to private property. Private property is only
one of the various forms of property. Other forms of property are common
property and public or state property. Private property is a right with a
private individual, a family, a corporation, or a group, which excludes
others from the use, consumption, or enjoyment of things owned privately.
In this sense, property rights grant the owner an exclusive power to decide
what will happen to a particular thing or resource. In the case of common
property, on the other hand, access and utility are not limited to an
individual and his/her family but are shared commonly by many people, a
community or a village. Public or state property refers to those things
controlled by the state for public purposes: transport, railways, historical
monuments, public parks, etc.
THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

As we mentioned above, legal recognition is necessary for the institution
of property. Legally, property is recognized as property right or the right of
ownership. Property rights, however, are never absolute. There are always
some restrictions placed on the use of our property. For example, you may
not be allowed to blow the horn of your car, near a hospital, although the
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car is your property. These rights are restricted by legal systems in order to
protect the rights and freedoms of other persons. The American
philosopher Robert Nozick (1974: 171) gives an example of one such
restriction: ‘My property rights in my knife allow me to leave it where I
will, but not in your chest.’ These are obvious restrictions on people’s right
to the use of their property. The precise extent of ownership rights,
however, depend on their definition by a given legal system. The
commonly recognized elements of ownership are right to possess, right to
use, right to transfer, right to bequeath, right to exclude others, right to
manage, and right to income and capital from one’s property.
THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY IN POLITICAL THEORY

The concept of property can be approached from a legal, sociological,
economic, or philosophical perspective. In this chapter, our focus is on the
concept of property in the history of political theory, and we shall briefly
discuss some of the most influential arguments regarding property.
Traditionally, political theories have investigated the idea of property as
part of their integrated vision of an ideal human life. Instead of providing a
focused investigation of a particular idea or institution, they have dealt
with it in terms of its place in their overall vision of the ideal organization
of political life. In their approaches, traditional political theories have
contained empirical as well as normative statements. In other words, they
have not only described the existing institutions and practices related to
property but also prescribed the best and the ideal possibilities. At the
same time, the bulk of the debate in the history of political theory has been
around the problems of private property. With respect to private property,
two kinds of arguments have been given: arguments for the moral
justification of private property and political arguments as to how property
ownership affects public spirit, virtue, citizens’ behaviour, political ethics,
etc. In a particular theory, we can find a version of either of the two
arguments or a combination of both. We shall now discuss the notion of
property as represented in some of the most important political theories.
PROPERTY IN ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT
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The political thought of Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece was
developed in close connection with their ethics. The central question they
were concerned with was: what are the conditions for a good life for man?
Greek life was communally lived and was organized around the city-state
(polis). A life lived in isolation from the city-state was not considered a
properly human life. It was through the city-state that a good life for man
could be possible. Man, for Plato and Aristotle, was essentially a political
animal. Since they were concerned with the truly good and happy life for
man, and because properly designed political arrangements could enable
the pursuit of that good life, it was imperative for them to determine the
true nature and functions of the state. Citizens would be unable to lead the
good life if the state they lived in were a bad state. With respect to
property, their main concern was the ideal property arrangements
necessary for the good ethical life of the citizens.
In his Republic, Plato argued that private possessions tend to make
human beings selfish. Therefore, in the ideal state described in the
Republic, private property is prohibited for the rulers. Plato argued that if
the rulers were allowed private ownership of property, they would start
amassing property and would primarily be interested in pursuing their
selfinterest instead of taking care of all the citizens of the state. On the
other hand, if whatever belonged to the guardians belonged to them in
common, it would encourage a feeling of public spiritedness among the
rulers and that would be an ideal condition of harmonious living together.
To summarize, Plato criticized private ownership of property for the rulers
because it induces selfishness and destroys public spiritedness among
citizens. In other words, private ownership is a hindrance to the unity and
harmony of the state, whereas ownership in common enhances them. So,
to avoid social divisiveness and to ensure harmony, Plato advocated
collective ownership as the ideal.
Aristotle criticized Plato’s argument for the abolition of private property
on many grounds. First, disputes and quarrels would not necessarily end
because those who hold property in common tend to have more disputes
than those who own privately. Therefore, Plato’s scheme is not a guarantee
of harmony in the state. Second, Aristotle takes Plato to task for this
argument that ‘… all men saying “mine” and “not mine” at the same
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instant of time’ is a sign of perfect unity of a state (Aristotle 2001: 1262a).
Aristotle argues that least care is bestowed on things belonging to many in
common. In such situations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty
which they expect others to perform. In this way, things owned in common
will be neglected by everybody By saying that all persons caring for
common things does not necessarily translate into each person caring for
them, Aristotle has produced an argument which is used very frequently by
the opponents of common ownership. Third, Aristotle says that there are
both good and bad effects of private property. While the bad effects of
private property can be removed without abolishing it, mainly through
education, the good effects cannot be rescued without it. According to
Aristotle, private ownership can promote virtues like prudence and
responsibility: ‘[W]hen everyone has a distinct interest, men will not
complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every
one will be attending to his own business’ (Aristotle 2001).
Interestingly, Aristotle also says that without private property, some
virtues like friendship and generosity cannot be developed. So, property
owned individually provides us with the opportunity to be helpful and
generous towards others—activities that give great satisfaction and joy to
us. The Platonic abolition of private property would, according to
Aristotle, produce morally worse results than its existence. Aristotle
considers ownership of property to be a source of pleasure and happiness.
And a state where the rulers are deprived of this happiness cannot be a
happy state.
Although Aristotle defends private property, he is not in favour of
endless accumulation of property. In fact, he does not approve of one-
sided attention given to the accumulation of wealth. In other words,
property for Aristotle is not an end, rather a means to an end. The desirable
end for Aristotle is a virtuous and good political life spent in the company
of fellow citizens. In itself, property has no great value. Moreover, caring
for property is a private matter to be handled by the master of the
household. For an ideal political organization, he recognized a need to
provide the citizens training, through education, not to desire excessive
wealth.
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The political thought of the Middle Ages shared with Aristotle the idea
that property cannot be an end of human life but only a means. The
political thought of the Middle Ages was dominated by the Christian
worldview. The Christian idea of the end or purpose of human life was
very different from that of Aristotle’s. Unlike the Greeks, the Christian
worldview did not value active political life very highly. True happiness,
according to this worldview, is possible only in the everlasting life of the
other world. In this world, only imperfect happiness can be achieved. Saint
Thomas Aquinas, the most influential Christian thinker of the Middle
Ages, rejected seeking earthly glory, honour, wealth, power, sensory
pleasure, etc., as desirable goals of human life. The best life for human
beings, he felt, is a life devoted to spiritual activities. For leading this kind
of life, human beings need property as a necessary means to such a life.
The most important ethical consideration for Aquinas is that the use of
property should be made subservient to the higher goal of life. Like
Aristotle, Aquinas too justified private possessions only to the extent that
things are used as a means for leading a virtuous life.
MODERNITY AND THE CONCEPT OF PROPERTY

Before the rise of the modern age, the main form of property was land, and
commerce was not a very highly valued activity. As we have seen in the
section on Aristotle and Aquinas, there were significant moral constraints
on the accumulation of property. Medieval ethical and political theories
and the medieval Church had put enormous ethical constraints on the
activity of money earning. Practices like usury, so essential for commercial
activity, were considered sinful and banned. With the emergence of the
modern age, commercial activity gained a prominent place in society. The
modern era is usually identified with the rise of capitalism, a system of
production where production of things takes place largely for commerce
and money plays a very crucial role in commercial exchange. The
preeminence of business and commerce in the modern age would not have
been possible without a struggle against the prevalent medieval moral and
religious values. In the struggle at the level of ideas, modern political
theories played a very important role. They attempt to overcome
traditional moral constraints.
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Modern political theory played a big role in undermining the ancient
and medieval doctrines of society and politics. First of all, political theory
itself underwent significant transformations. The most important change
that took place in political theory was the separation of ethics and politics.
In the 16th and 17th centuries, the writings of thinkers such as Niccolo
Machiavelli, Thomas More, Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke
attempted to shake off the ethical baggage inherited from classical and
medieval doctrines of politics. For the new thinkers, the most important
task of political authority was not that of caring about the good and
virtuous life of the citizens. It was to provide conditions of security under
which citizens could live a peaceful and economically secure life. The
emphasis of the new political theory was on security, particularly
economic security. Gradually, economic concerns started to acquire the
centre-stage in political thinking in place of the ethical. Along with these
changes, another important aspect of the new political thought was that it
provided justification for a commercial, capitalist form of property as
against the feudal form of property. In the following section, we shall
study one of the most influential doctrines of property in the early modern
political theory developed by John Locke in the 17th century.
John Locke on Property

John Locke provided a very strong moral justification of private property
in Two Treatises of Government (1967). The core idea of Locke’s theory
of property is that people are entitled to own as property whatever they
produce by their own labour and initiative. Locke argues that in the state of
nature, nature and its resources have been given by God to mankind in
common. Thus, originally, no one has any private property. At the same
time, human beings have a natural right to self-preservation and
consequently to things necessary for self-preservation. After describing
these conditions, Locke gives a peculiar argument that the fruits of nature,
though given in common, must be appropriated before being of any use to
any particular man. For example, in the case of literally a fruit, Locke is
very clear as to when the fruit begins to be a person’s: “When he digested?
Or when he ate? Or when he boiled? Or when brought them home? Or
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when he pickt them up? And ’tis plain, if the first gathering made them not
his, nothing else would’ (Locke 1967: 288).
For something to become someone’s private property, therefore, it is
necessary that he removes it from the common and makes it his own. Such
an appropriation by removal from the common can create an exclusive
right to property if such a removal, according to Locke, can satisfy three
conditions. These are moral conditions that limit the right to property in
the state of nature (For Locke’s concept of ‘natural rights’, see Chapter 6
of this volume). First, one can make something their property by removing
it out of the common only if they have ‘mixed [their] labour with it’ and
joined to it something that is their own. Locke argued that in applying
labour to something, some part of what that person owns gets mixed with
the object in such a way as to exclude the common right of other people to
own it and to make that thing his/her own property. Locke’s example:a
pitcher of water taken from the flowing river can turn some quantity of the
flowing unowned water into someone’s exclusive property. The second
condition Locke puts on the right to appropriate is that ‘enough, and as
good’ must be left in common for others to appropriate. No one has the
right to appropriate in such a way that the situation of others is worsened
by the act of appropriation. This proviso was given in order to make sure
that others’ situation is not worsened by someone’s appropriation of some
portion of the wealth given to all in common. The third condition is that
one can legitimately appropriate only as much as one can use and consume
before it spoils or decays.
Soon afterwards, in the same section of the book, Locke overcomes all
the conditions he sets for the appropriation of the resources of nature as
private property. The condition that one’s own labour has to be expended
in order to acquire something as private property is overcome if it is
possible to buy and sell labour legitimately. The meaning of this provision
in Locke’s political theory is that if I buy someone’s labour, I am also
entitled to the product of that labour. For example, if I own some amount
of cotton and the machinery to manufacture textile from it, but I employ
another person or persons to work on the machines to produce textile, I am
entitled to the manufactured textile. The assumption here is that transfer of
labour also implies transfer of the labourer’s entitlement to the things
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produced by him. Similarly, Locke argues that the other two limitations
are no more valid once money as a medium of exchange has been
invented. Since natural things of human use such as grains, meat or
clothes, etc., are likely to rot or decay after some time, it is foolish as well
as dishonest to hoard up more than one can use before they decay. But
with money, either in the form of metal coins or paper notes, there is no
such risk. Therefore, one can legitimately accumulate as much money as
one can.
But how is the stipulation that ‘enough, and as good’ must be left for
others for their own use, overcome with the use of money? It is here that
Locke underscores the importance of land as property. Land as property
can become significantly superior to other natural resources only if it is
privately owned. As we saw for the argument relating to labour getting
‘mixed up’ with objects, you can be a legitimate owner of land if you
cultivate it with your own labour. By tilling and cultivating the owned
land, you can get much more produce from it than would be available if
the land remained in an abandoned state. Therefore, Locke says, by
appropriating the land, far from reducing the total share of human beings, a
rational and industrious appropriator actually adds to it by generating new
resources and opportunities for work. The produce from the land owes its
existence to human labour. The introduction of money, on the other hand,
facilitates trade and commerce among individuals and communities.
The private appropriator of land can, in the modern era, produce not
merely for consumption but for trade. Therefore, even if some people
appropriate as much land as not to leave enough for others, the greater
productivity of the appropriated land compensates for the lack of land
available to others. A strong assumption behind this argument is that the
increase in the whole product will be distributed to the benefit of those left
without any or enough land. Private accumulation in a society where trade
and commerce flourish actually increases the amount left for others by
increasing the general level of prosperity. The conclusion of this crucial
argument of Locke’s is that even bare subsistence, at the standard
prevailing in a society where all land is appropriated is better than the
standard of any member of society where land is not appropriated and fully
utilized.
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In Locke’s theory the contribution of human labour is evaluated very
highly whereas natural resources are considered almost worthless. Thus,
Locke’s justification of private appropriation rests on two basic arguments.
First is that one’s labour is one’s own property and second is that before
being privately and exclusively appropriated, resources of nature are
valueless. At the same time Locke’s justification of private property is a
justification of the capitalist form of property because it is under
capitalism that production basically takes place for the purpose of
exchange; the exchange of commodities. (Macpherson 1967) It is on the
basis of the assumed superiority of the capitalist farming and production
for trade that Locke justified the British colonist’s occupation of lands
belonging to the American Indians. Locke argued that the American
Indians did not know how to fully utilize the land; hence the land was
justly available for appropriation.
The Utilitarian Justification of Private Property

According to Locke, the chief function of the government is to guarantee
the protection of individuals’ natural rights and to secure conditions under
which they can peacefully enjoy their properties. However, Locke’s
concept of natural rights entails that the institution of property existed
prior to and without the government. The institutions of civil society and
government originated in order to make property secure. Locke’s natural
rights theory of property was severely criticized by the utilitarian thinkers.
The utilitarians have two main arguments regarding property. First, in
contrast to the natural rights doctrine, utilitarians defend private ownership
on the ground of its enormous utility. And second, they argue that the
institution of property cannot exist without the prior existence of legal and
political authority of the government. Let us elaborate the utilitarian
arguments in more detail.
Modern utilitarianism has its origins in the ideas of the 18th and 19th
century British thinkers, such as, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, James
Mill, and John Stuart Mill. The tradition continued in the ideas of
important thinkers like Henry Sidgwick, R. M. Hare, and J. J. C. Smart.
Utilitarianism is the name given to that branch of ethical and political
theory which judges the rightness of acts and decisions of individuals and
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institutions by their capacity to promote the happiness of those affected by
them. According to Bentham, human beings naturally tend to seek pleasure
and avoid pain. The happiness of an individual can be defined by a
calculation of these two basic elements, and it is calculable. Happiness,
according to Bentham, is to be understood as presence of pleasure and
absence of pain, and unhappiness as absence of pleasure and presence of
pain. According to utilitarian ethical theory, the acts which promote
happiness are right and those which produce the opposite are wrong.
Bentham also believed that it was possible to assess, indeed calculate
pleasures and pains of an individual according to the duration, intensity,
and propinquity of the sensations of pleasure or pain. It is, therefore,
possible to make a judgement on the acts and policies of institutions
according to such a calculation. So, an act is right if it produces a situation
in which the happiness of a maximum number of people is ensured. In
other words, an act is right if the net balance of pleasure over pain of those
affected is greater. The governments and the limit to the governments’
sphere of activity have to be justified by reference to the principle of
utility, i.e. by reference to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
This is the earliest and a crude form of modern utilitarianism, rejected by
almost all the later utilitarians, and replaced by more sophisticated
versions. Bentham’s views on what constituted the individual’s pleasure
were criticized by his successor John Stuart Mill who introduced the
distinction between higher-order pleasure and lower-order pleasure. In the
20th century, the utilitarians have replaced pleasure with individuals’
rational preferences. However, despite disputes within utilitarianism on
what is to be counted as legitimate preference of individuals, the basic idea
has remained the same. The basic idea of the utilitarian political theory is
that it is possible to gather information regarding the sum-total of all the
utilities in a society. The goodness of institutions can be judged by looking
at what they do with respect to this sum total of utilities.
The utilitarians reject the Lockean view that there could be any pre-legal
and pre-political natural rights, including the right to property. They place
great value on legal-political institutions and reject rights in the imaginary
pre-political state of nature as nonsense. On the question of property, the
utilitarians maintain that the right to property is meaningless in the absence
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of positive legal institutions to enforce the right. Property is a creation of
law and is impossible without the coercive institutional apparatus of the
government. Even in the presence of institutions the important questions
are: what kind of right to property do utilitarians defend? And on what
grounds? The utilitarians maintain that individuals should have a right to
exclusive private property. Existence of this right is obviously defended on
the ground that it is compatible with the principle of utility.
Human beings do not live from moment to moment. Rather, they plan
their lives with future material security in mind. Expectations from the
future are an important part of their happiness and a sense of well-being.
Security in expectations leads to peace of mind and promotion of
happiness. Frustrated expectations, on the other hand, are a major source
of hindrance to happiness or a source of unhappiness. If I sow today, I
expect to reap tomorrow. If someone else reaps what I have sown, it leads
to frustration, insecurity, and ultimately to unhappiness. On the other hand,
insecurity in possession, use and control over goods makes an individual’s
achievement of happiness impossible. From the above assumptions, the
utilitarians conclude that a system of property rights is necessary if
individuals are to achieve some degree of happiness.
Another important utilitarian argument in favour of the right to property
is the incentive argument. Utilitarians argue that labour is a painful activity
and human beings would not happily like to engage in it. Therefore, an
individual reward is necessary to overcome the natural disinclination
towards labour. By guaranteeing the security of rewards through a system
of rightful ownership human beings will have the incentive to work. But
also, and more importantly, it is a system of private property that creates
incentives for individuals to work harder. Imagine a situation where you
are working collectively with some people and the rewards of the work are
to be shared equally. You will not get any extra benefit even if you were to
work harder than everybody else. In other words, you do not have the
incentive and consequently no motivation for working more. But if there is
individual entitlement to the rewards of labour, you have the necessary
motivation to work more.
Since the increased wealth due to extra individual effort adds to the total
wealth of the society, the utilitarian argues, that private property rights are
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not only beneficial for the concerned individual; they also increase the
social utility. Therefore, if governments want to promote the overall
happiness of people they should encourage productivity by protecting
individuals’ property rights. Similarly, no government should take away
property some people are expected to possess and enjoy. Taking both the
security argument and the incentive argument together, utilitarianism
justifies private property because such an arrangement not only contributes
to our happiness but also improves our ability to make use of the things of
the world and of our own abilities.
Utilitarians argue further that legal institutions are necessary for
enforcing property rights. They assume that there is a scarcity of goods in
the world, and that human beings have innumerable wants. Given the way
human nature is (Utilitarians have a bleak view of human nature), there are
high chances of conflict and violence. The need for institutions arise from
the need to control potentially violent situations. It is the task of
institutions to create conditions in which individuals can peacefully enjoy
the fruits of their labour and can predict others’ conduct in order to plan
their own activities. In other words, institutions are necessary for creating
the stable conditions necessary for the security of individuals’
expectations. The opposite conditions—the insecurity of possession and
use— make happiness impossible.
Karl Marx’s Critique of Private Property

The historical context of the natural rights and the Utilitarian doctrines of
property was that of the emergence and expansion of capitalism in Europe.
The basic feature of the capitalist mode of production is that production in
society takes place for the market. In the market, one commodity is
exchanged for another through the medium of money. With the Industrial
Revolution in the 18th century, the capitalists started to invest more and
more capital in large-scale production in modern factories. The growth of
industrial capitalism engendered, on the one hand, large-scale
accumulation of wealth in the hands of the capitalist class, and on the
other, an impoverished working class. The condition of industrial
labourers in Europe in the 19th century was very poor. The working
conditions in the early capitalist factory were very harsh. The working
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hours were long and the wages were at the subsistence level. As a result,
the 19th century capitalism was ridden with extreme social and economic
inequalities. Karl Marx’s critique of private property needs to be
understood against this historical background.
Karl Marx advocated the abolition of private property. By private
property, Marx refers to the private ownership of the means of production.
His analysis is historical. He focuses on the specific historical capitalist
form of private property arrangements and methods of production. Marx
specifies abolition of private property as an essential condition for the
establishment of communism, an ideal society imagined by him. However,
he does not advocate abolition of all kinds of property rights, but only
capitalist private property, or in other words, private property as capital.
Marx, in other words, is not hostile to the idea of individuals owning some
amount of property necessary for their basic needs.
Marx’s first arguments against private property appear as a critique of
Hegel’s defence of private property. Hegel believed that possession of
property is essential for the realization of man’s personality. Against
Hegel, Marx argues that private property in the capitalist form is not a
realization but a negation of personality. Marx believed that human beings
under the conditions of the capitalist mode of production were not able to
master the world through their ownership of property. On the contrary, the
forces of market decide what happens to human beings in the world. They
are not the true owners of their own selves, nor can they fully realize their
own will under such conditions. Marx argued that only after the abolition
of the capitalist mode of production can human beings truly master the
world.
This argument of Marx against private property can also be understood
in comparison with Locke’s. The main point of Locke’s justification of
property is that private property is something that is produced by the
application of someone’s labour. Locke was able to overcome this
limitation with the provision that labour could be bought and sold
legitimately and the product of labour belonged to someone who had
bought the labour. So, where there is a labour market, the producer of a
product may not have control over the product of his labour. This ‘lack of
control’ is one of the points in Marx’s critique of private property and
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wage-labour arrangement in a market economy. Marx’s analysis tried to
show that there is no real freedom or choice for those who labour and who
own no property. They must either work by selling their labour or starve.
Marx also showed that capitalism had historically eliminated those
systems of production where individual producers could own the means of
their production. The elimination of such systems of production was a
historical precondition for the emergence of the capitalist mode of
production.
According to Marx, the capitalist mode of production is based on the
monopolization of the means of production by a small class of people, the
capitalist class. The majority of the labourers are those who own no means
of production. This happened through a twofold process in the European
history during the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of
production. On the one hand, large number of peasants and small-scale
producers are deprived of their means of production leading to the
emergence of a class of labourers who have nothing but their ‘labour
power’ to sell in order to survive. On the other hand, all means of
production get concentrated in the hands of a class of capitalists with the
help of the legal mechanism of private property rights. Marx names this
process ‘primitive accumulation.’ The capitalists’ ownership of the means
of production makes sure that labourers sell their labour to the capitalists
since they themselves have nothing to work with or work upon, i.e.
instruments of production, raw material, etc.
Thus, the main method of acquiring property under capitalism is
through the appropriation of the products of labour. How, according to
Marx, does this appropriation take place? Marx argued that labour was the
creator of value of things. The worker, who produces, therefore, should be
entitled to the whole product of his labour. In reality, and because the
worker does not own the means of production, he only gets a portion of the
labour expended for the production of a specific thing in the form of wage.
The wages that are given to the workers are sufficient only to fulfil the
subsistence needs of the worker and his family. Marx attempts to show
through his analysis of the dynamics of capitalist production that the
source of profit in capitalist production is the unpaid labour of the worker.
According to him what the worker gets in the form of wages is only a
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fraction of the value he produces in a particular period of time. The
remaining value created by the labour of the worker is appropriated by the
capitalist. Marx refers to the latter as surplus value, which is shown to be
the source of profit for the capitalist. But for Marx, the appropriation of
surplus value, since its source is unpaid labour, amounts to exploitation of
the workers. In this way, he argues that capitalist private property in
founded upon exploitation.
Another ground of Marx’s critique of capitalist private property is his
theory of alienation worked out in his early work, Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts (1844). Marx argues that in the capitalist mode
of production and under the regime of private property, various kinds of
alienation or estrangement take place. This means a process of becoming
strange or foreign to oneself. Alienation is the effect of property relations
under capitalism. Marx’s starting point is what he considers as the ‘actual’
economic fact. This, according to Marx, is that the more the labourer
produces, the poorer he becomes. This is because under capitalism, wage
labour does not create property for the labourer; it creates capital.
Marx describes three kinds of alienation or estrangement that workers
go through under capitalism.
According to Marx, production in human societies always involves an
interaction between human labour and nature. In all productive activities—be it
agriculture or craftsmanship or industrial production—human beings work
upon nature with the help of certain tools, implements, or machines. While
working on nature, their labour gets embodied in the objects they produce or
create. Through such productive and creative activities man’s labour gets
realized. The producers, therefore, have a special relationship with the products
of their labour. They find something of their own—their labour—in such
things. But under capitalist relations of production, i. e. under the conditions of
wage-labour, where workers, by agreeing to sell their labour, produce for
others, and where the products of their labour are taken away from them, the
relationship between worker and the product of his/her labour changes
completely.
The second kind of alienation results because the capitalist production is
organized in such a way that workers conceive their work as nothing but sheer
drudgery. In the assembly-line factory production, work is repetitive,
monotonous and stressful. It does not involve the creativity of the workers
because work is extremely fragmented. Fragmentation means that labourers do
not get to produce a complete product the way artisans used to in pre-modern
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artisan production. Working under such conditions, i.e. in big modern industries
does not lead to the ‘free’ development of the worker’s personality but
‘mortifies his body and ruins his mind’. The worker does not enjoy the activity
of working and feels happy when he/she is not working. The worker, therefore,
feels alienated from the activity of working.
Very closely related to the second kind of alienation is the alienation from the
species being. According to Marx, every animal species has a specific ‘species
character.’ Man has a specific ‘species character’ that distinguishes him from
other animals: free, conscious activity. What does free, conscious activity
mean, and how does it distinguish human beings from other animals?
According to Marx, ‘Milton produced Paradise Lost for the same reason that a
silkworm produces silk. It was an activity of his nature.’ The reason may be the
same and it may lie in the essential nature of each species, but the activities
themselves are very different. An animal’s life activities are at one with itself. It
does not distinguish the animal from itself. Human beings, on the other hand,
direct and control their activity consciously and with freedom. Under the
condition of capitalist production, where workers find their work repulsive,
they relate to it in a non-human way. In other words, human life under
capitalism is reduced to the level of animals, separating human beings from
their very human essence. As a result of all these alienations human beings get
alienated from each other. Marx, therefore, argues that only after the abolition
of private ownership will human beings achieve full humanity and true
freedom. This, Marx believed, could be achieved with the social control of
production.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 20TH CENTURY: SOCIALISM, WELFARISM,

LIBERTARIANISM
The Socialist idea, indirectly affected the 20th-century politics in many
ways. Within the capitalist economies, strongly organized trade unions
fought for the rights of the workers under the banner of Socialism and
gained important victories. In these countries, important welfare schemes
were implemented to mitigate the bad effects of capitalism on the workers.
Most of the developed capitalist countries and many developing countries
implemented social welfare policies particularly after the World War II.
The main components of these policies were taxation on property and
transfer of basic industries, and basic public amenities like health and
education to state control. These schemes led to the substantial
improvement of the condition of the working class, particularly in the
developed countries of Europe and North America.
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State welfare schemes also found strong theoretical support from the
20th-century developments in utilitarianism as well as from the influential
John Rawls’ theory of justice. Rawls argued that the policies of
redistribution of resources should be judged on the basis of their impact on
the least advantaged sections of society. The utilitarians, on the other hand,
advocated those policies of redistribution which enhanced the overall
utility of the maximum number of people in a society. These theories faced
strong criticisms from the libertarian thinkers like Friedrich von Hayek,
Milton Friedman, Ayn Rand, and Robert Nozick. The libertarians argued
that justice does not demand any particular distribution pattern. They
believed that any outcome arrived at by separate just actions of individuals
could be called ‘just’. Robert Nozick advanced this version of
libertarianism in his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974).
Robert Nozick’s Entitlement Defence of Private Property

Robert Nozick revived the Lockean idea that individuals are absolute
owners of their talents, and capacities. He used this argument to justify
private ownership. Nozick’s theory of property is known as the theory of
historical entitlement. Like Locke, Nozick also favours individual property
rights and starts from the position that individuals are the owners of their
own selves and have certain basic rights and duties, in particular, rights not
to be harmed in life and liberty. Each human being is the morally rightful
owner of his own person and powers. Consequently, he is free to use those
powers as he wishes, provided that he does not employ them aggressively
against others. He may not harm others; he may not be forced to harm
others. He should also not be forced to help them, as is done in case of the
redistribution system of the welfare state.
According to Nozick’s theory, individuals obtain absolute control over
objects through historical processes. This means that they may retain or
transfer the ownership of these objects only at their own discretion. All
compulsory transferences, therefore, constitute an infringement of rights.
Similarly, any coercive regulation of owned objects infringes on the right
of the owner. Further, Nozick’s theory elaborates on procedures by which
individuals may justly acquire titles to particular resources. It is a historical
principle of justice in that it too holds that ‘past circumstances or actions
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or people can create differential entitlements. This principle requires not
that the size of shares be proportioned to past action, but that particular
items are acquired by particular procedures’ (Nozick 1974: 155). The
entitlement theory connects individuals with particular holdings acquired
by particular procedures. Nozick’s entitlement theory has the following
components:
1. The theory of just acquisition of holdings: This component tells us under what
condition a person is entitled to something taken from the state of nature.
According to Nozick, if a person has acquired a holding according to the
principle of just acquisition of holdings, then this person is legitimately entitled
to it.
2. The theory of just transfer of holdings: This component specifies the ways in
which persons can justly transfer their holdings. According to Nozick, market
transactions, charity, and barter are examples of legitimate means of transfer;
theft, extortions, and taxation are examples of unjust means of taking of
someone’s property. This component of Nozick’s entitlement theory states that
if a person acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in
transfer from someone else who is justly entitled to that holding, can
legitimately become the owner of that holding.
3. The theory of rectification: This component describes a procedure through
which the effects of past injustices may be rectified or corrected. According to
this component, if a person owns some holding according to the principle of
rectification, s/he is justly entitled to that holding.
4. No one is legitimately entitled to a holding except by following the above-
mentioned procedures (Nozick 1974: 150–53).
Distribution of property is to be defended or criticized, according to

Nozick, not in the light of consideration of needs or rewards for effort, or
the like, but by reference to information about the whole past history of the
objects in the distribution. With respect to a given item of property, we
have to obtain the required historical information regarding the origins of
that item. In other words, we have to know whether its owner acquired it
justly in the first place according to principle 1 (original appropriation of a
previously unowned object), principle 2 (just transfer of a previously justly
owned object), or principle 3 (property accruing to someone as a result of
rectification of unjust ownership). The legitimacy of an entitlement, thus,
depends on originally just appropriation and subsequently just transfer,
315
except where the holding is a result of rectification of some past unjust
appropriation or transfer.
Now, the most important point is to specify how a person can
legitimately acquire property originally. Nozick begins by considering the
procedures specified in Locke’s theory of property. Locke’s procedures as
discussed above say that a title is acquired by mixing labour with unowned
objects, provided that ‘enough and as good’ is left for others. Nozick does
not assign much importance to the means of acquiring property, as a
matter of fact, he provides a critique of Locke’s labour-mixing argument.
Nozick takes Locke’s ‘enough and as good’ proviso more seriously and
uses it as an important qualifying condition for a legitimate appropriation
of property.
Nozick argues that others’ liberty is not violated as long as ‘enough and
as good’ is left in common for others. If A appropriates some natural
object but there remains enough unappropriated for others to do anything
they might have done before A’s appropriation, then the appropriation has
not violated any rights. Each person has as much a liberty as before. The
‘crucial point’ for Nozick is, ‘whether an appropriation of an unowned
object worsens the situation of others’ (Nozick 1974: 175). If the position
of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is worsened by a certain act
of appropriation, that act is not justified. One has to be sure that ‘enough
and as good’ is left for others.
Locke and Nozick differ on the interpretation of this condition. Nozick
thinks that in certain circumstances loss of liberty by others due to
appropriation of some hitherto unowned object can be legitimately
compensated. If appropriation and enclosure leave no further land or
resources to appropriate and the propertyless have lost the right to use the
resources appropriated, it will be justified if their overall position is not
worsened (if the opportunities gained through others’ appropriations at
least compensate for the liberties lost). Nozick thinks it is enough and as
good to compensate others with equivalent opportunities and resources,
and not necessary for either exactly the same or nearly similar sort of items
to be there as existed before appropriation. Nozick’s argument has been
criticized on the ground that it allows the comparison of only two
situations, those of no ownership and those with private ownership. G. A.
316
Cohen argues that he does not take into account other alternatives like joint
ownership of resources. This alternative, however, does not go against
Nozick’s ideal of self-ownership of individuals (Cohen 1985: 95).
GENDER AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE

CONCEPT OF PROPERTY
In the 20th century, the feminist movement highlighted the inequality
between men and women and provided a powerful critique of it. Feminist
thought developed a very important perspective on social reality by
focusing on the experiences of women in society as well as on the impact
of different theories and practices on women’s lives. One of the most
important feminist arguments is that the distribution of resources in a
particular society is strongly affected by the prevailing gender relations in
that particular society. The resulting iniquitous distribution, in turn,
consolidates and perpetuates the gender bias against women. Feminist
scholars have argued that an important condition of the subjugation of
women throughout history has been the denial of access to resources of
income, such as land. Because of the prevailing patterns of male
ownership and control of such resources, the status of women has been one
of dependence on men. This dependent status is then legitimized by means
of ideologies which claimed that the subordinate status of women has a
grounding in the order of nature. Political theory—both modern and pre-
modern—has played an important role in the production of such
ideologies. Contemporary feminist thought has critically analysed many
important texts of political theory—those of Aristotle, Rousseau, Locke
and others—from this standpoint (Freedman 2002: 26–30). As an example
of this mode of feminist criticism, we shall briefly discuss Carole
Pateman’s critique of early modern social contract theory.
According to Carole Pateman, modern political theory, beginning with
the works of Hobbes and Locke, seeks to define the spheres of society and
politics in a special way. Social and the political spheres gain their
meaning from what they exclude as much as from what they include. One
of the exclusions that takes place in this strategy is that of familial and
kinship relation. Society, or the space for ‘social’ activities, has no space
for particularistic or ascriptive ties. It is a space where free and equal
317
individuals interact and transact their businesses. This understanding of the
social sphere, Pateman claims, leads to the exclusion of women from it.
[Pateman, 1987] How does this exclusion happen?
Pateman questions the belief that the ‘individual’ in modern political
theory includes both men and women, and hence is gender neutral. She, in
fact, shows that the ‘individual’ in modern political theory is masculine.
According to her, Locke’s concept of individual in Two Treatises of
Government excludes women because he does not allow equality between
men and women. Locke argues that women are ‘naturally’ subject to men
because the subjection of wife to husband has ‘a foundation in nature’.
Therefore, this being a given, women can be neither free nor equal to men
in such a conception of society. Although, historically, Locke’s political
theory challenged various feudal inequalities of hierarchies and status, it
fails to challenge inequality present in the family, as the family is excluded
from the social space. Pateman argues that although Locke’s political
theory was presented ostensibly as an argument against Robert Filmer’s
defence of patriarchal power, it ended up justifying a new, modern form of
patriarchy.
The individuals in Locke’s political theory, who go out in the society
and are the owners of private property and bearers of rights—the citizens
—according to Pateman, are the men who are heads of households. They
represent women and children in the public social sphere. Women, on the
contrary, remained confined to the private, non-political sphere without
property and rights. The division between public and private maintained
by this theory is based on patriarchal assumptions. It is men, as heads of
households, who enter into the original social contract that created the
political state. As a result, while men acquired full citizenship of the body
politic, women were reduced to a subordinate position in it. For a long
time later modern democracies denied women many civil rights, most
importantly, the right to vote, on the grounds that they were represented in
the political realm by their husbands (Freedman 2002: 26–30). The
subordinate position of women in the public sphere, however, is a function
of their position of dependence in the private sphere of family because of
the lack of independent source of income or independent access to
property.
318
Thus, the institution of family comes under the critical scrutiny of
feminist thought. From this standpoint the question of distribution of
property within the family is a crucial question, because it is on this
distribution that the status of women as social beings and as citizens
depends. As Pateman’s critique showed, political theory has traditionally
been reluctant to consider the sphere of the family from the point of view
of equality and justice. In the context of South Asia, Bina Agarwal’s work
has criticized such attitudes in the formulation and implementation of
government policies. Agarwal’s article, ‘Gender and Command over
Property’ (1994), is a critical investigation of the development policies of
many South Asian countries in the second half of the 20th century and
questions their underlying assumptions from a feminist perspective. She
also raises the much ignored question of inequality between man and
woman within the household. Agarwal argues that when such policies
undertake the distribution or redistribution of various resources,
particularly land, they give ownership title to the heads of the families,
who are usually men. Agarwal criticizes the basic assumption of such
distributive policies that the sphere of the household is equitable and a just
distribution of resources takes place there in irrespective of gender. Since
family is not a sphere of equality and justice, such development policies
cannot be gender neutral. They ignore the intra-household gender
relations. In her investigation, Agarwal shows that in the land
redistribution policies followed in India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan in the
decades of the 1950s and 1960s, titles were granted only to men, and not to
women independently.
Another important issue raised by Agarwal is the distinction between
ownership and control. She argues that even if gender equality is
guaranteed in legal ownership of property, it does not lead to de facto
scontrol over it. There is a big gap between legal and practical situations.
Because of traditional prejudices and actually existing power relationships,
most of the South Asian women face difficulties in exercising their legal
right in landed property. Therefore, hurdles against women gaining control
over resources occur not only at the legal level but at the social and
cultural levels as well (Agarwal 1994: 159–61). As already discussed, the
underlying assumptions of political theory and of the development
319
practices of the welfare state are deeply problematic from the point of view
of gender relationship. Contemporary feminist scholarship has criticized
this gender order based on the idea of male as the family head with a
single source of family income as patriarchal and anachronistic.
1. What are the basic differences in Locke’s justification of private property and
that of the utilitarian justification?
2. In your opinion, how will it affect the structure of family if individuals are
considered units of society for land distribution rather than family?
3. In Locke’s argument regarding private property, what difference does the
introduction of money make?
4. According to Marx, how does private ownership of means of production in
capitalist society produce alienation?
5. Try to find out the recent changes related to inheritance of family property
made through a parliamentary legislation in India. Try to relate them to the
feminist critique of gender inequality.
READING LIST
Agarwal, Bina, ‘Gender and Command over Property: A Critical Gap in Economic
Analysis and Policy in South Asia’, World Development, 22(10), 1994: 1455–78.
Aristotle, ‘Politics’, in Richard McKeon (ed.), The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York:
The Modern Library, 2001).
Becker, Lawrence C., Property Rights: Philosophical Foundations (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1977).
Cohen, G. A., ‘Nozick on Appropriation’, New Left Review, 150, 1985.
Freedman, Jane, Feminism (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2002).
Locke, John, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1967).
Macpherson, C. B., ‘Political Theory of Property’, in C.B. Macpherson (ed.),
Democratic Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
———, Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).
Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, 1844. Entire text available
online at
http://www.marxists.org/archieve/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/preface.htm.
Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
Parel, Anthony and Thomas Flanagan (eds), Theories of Property: Aristotle to the
Present (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979).
320
Pateman, Carole, ‘Feminist Critiques of Public/Private Dichotomy’, in A. Philips (ed.),
Feminism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
———, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).
Reeve, Andrew, Property (London: Macmillan, 1986).
Ryan, Alan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).
———, Property (Milton Keynes: The Open University Press, 1987).
321
CHAPTER 14
Gender
Nivedita Menon
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Sex Is to Nature as Gender Is to Culture
Male/Female in the Non-West
Developments in the Sex/Gender Distinction in Feminist Theory
Masculinity
INTRODUCTION
One of the key contributions of feminist theory is the creation of a
distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’; a distinction that has subsequently
been developed differently by various strands of feminist thought. This
chapter begins with this basic distinction that is made, and its significance.
This is followed by a brief discussion on how the rigid male/female
opposition is specific to modernity and to Western cultures. Thereby, the
four different ways in which the sex/gender distinction has been
complicated by different kinds of feminist theory is looked at. The chapter
concludes with a brief look at an emerging field in feminist theory—the
322
study of masculinity, how it is constructed, and its implications for men in
patriarchal society.
SEX IS TO NATURE AS GENDER IS TO CULTURE

The initial move was to use the term sex to refer to the biological
differences between men and women, while gender indicated the vast
range of cultural meanings attached to that basic difference. This
distinction is important for feminism to make because the subordination of
women has been fundamentally justified on the grounds of the biological
differences between men and women. The philosophical reasoning which
legitimizes various forms of oppression as natural and inescapable,
because the oppression that arises supposedly from natural and therefore
unchangeable factors, is called biological determinism. Racism is a good
example of this, as is the caste system, because both ideologies are based
on the assumption that certain groups of people are superior by birth, and
that they are born with characteristics such as greater intelligence and
special skills that justify their power in society Biological determinism has
also been one of the most important legitimizing mechanisms of women’s
oppression over the centuries. The challenge to biological determinism is,
therefore, crucial for feminist politics.
Feminist anthropologists, particularly Margaret Mead, have
demonstrated that the understanding of masculinity and femininity varies
across cultures. In other words, not only do different societies identify a
certain set of characteristics as feminine and another set as masculine, but
also, these characteristics are not the same across different cultures. Thus,
feminists have argued that there is no necessary correlation between the
biology of men and women and the qualities that are thought to be
masculine and feminine. Rather, it is childrearing practices that try to
establish and perpetuate certain differences between the sexes. That is,
from childhood, boys and girls are trained in appropriate, gender-specific
forms of behaviour, play, dress and so on. This training is continuous and
most of the time subtle, but when necessary, can involve punishments to
bring about conformity So, feminists argue that sex-specific qualities (for
example, bravery and confidence as ‘masculine’ and sensitivity and
shyness as ‘feminine’) and the value that society attributes to them, are
323
produced by a range of institutions and beliefs that socialize boys and girls
differently As Simone de Beauvoir puts it, ‘One is not born, but is made a
woman.’
In addition, societies generally value ‘masculine’ characteristics more
highly than ‘feminine’ while at the same time ensuring that men and
women who do not conform to these characteristics are continuously
disciplined into ‘appropriate’ behaviour. For instance, a man who
expresses sorrow publicly by crying would be humiliated by the taunt,
‘Auraton jaise ro rahe ho?’ (Why are you crying like a woman?) And who
does not remember that stirring line of Subhadra Kumari Chauhan
—‘Khoob ladi mardani, woh to Jhansi wali rani thi’ (bravely she fought,
the Rani of Jhansi/She fought like a man). What does this line mean? Even
when it is a woman who has shown bravery, it still cannot be understood
as a ‘feminine’ quality—bravery is still seen as a masculine virtue, no
matter how many women or how few men display it.
There is nothing ‘natural’ about the sexual division of labour. The fact
that men and women perform different kinds of work both within the
family and outside has little to do with biology and more to do with
ideological assumptions. Only the actual process of pregnancy is
biological, all the other work within the home that women must do—
cooking, cleaning, looking after children and so on (in other words, the
whole range of work we may call ‘domestic labour’)—can equally be done
by men. But this work is considered to be ‘women’s work’. This sexual
division of labour extends even to the ‘public’ arena of paid work, and
again, this has nothing to do with ‘sex’ (biology) and everything to do with
‘gender’ (culture). Certain kinds of work are considered to be ‘women’s
work’, and other kinds, men’s; but more important is the fact that whatever
work women do gets lower wages and is less valued. For example, nursing
and teaching (particularly at lower levels) are predominantly female
professions and are also comparatively ill-paid in relation to other white-
collar jobs which the middle classes take up. Feminists point out that this
‘feminization’ of teaching and nursing is because such work is seen as an
extension of the nurturing work that women do within the home. So, while
on the one hand women are supposed to be physically weak and unfit for
heavy manual labour, that is precisely what they are made to do both in the
324
home and outside—carry heavy loads of water and firewood, grind corn,
transplant paddy, and carry headloads in mining and construction work.
But when the manual work that women do is mechanized, making it both
lighter and better-paid, then it is men who receive training to use the new
machinery and women are edged out. This happens not only in factories,
but even with work that was traditionally done by women within the
community; for example, when electrically operated flour mills replace
hand-pounding of grain, or machine-made nylon fishing nets replace the
nets traditionally handmade by women, it is men who are trained to take
over these jobs, and women are forced to move into even lower-paid and
more arduous manual work.
It is, thus, clear that the present subordination of women arises, not from
the unchangeable biological differences (sex), but from social and cultural
values, ideologies and institutions that ensure the material and ideological
subordination of women (gender). Thus, feminists question sex-
differentiated work, the sexual division of labour, and more fundamentally,
questions of sexuality and reproduction, as issues to be extricated from the
realm of ‘biology’—which is understood to be natural and unchangeable.
The feminist agenda is to relocate these issues in the realm of the
‘political’, which suggests that they can and must be transformed.
MALE/FEMALE IN THE NON-WEST

In this context, it is interesting to note that some scholars are of the
opinion that the strictly bipolar model of masculinity/femininity and the
devaluing of the feminine are characteristic only of modern Western
civilization. Even in Western culture, the two-sex model was entrenched
by law and the state only with the advent of modernity. Anne Fausto-
Sterling (2002: 469) points out that in Europe it was only by the end of the
Middle Ages that biological hermaphrodites (people born with one testis
and one ovary) were compelled to choose an established gender role and
stay with it. The penalty for transgression, she says, was often death. Until
this period, people’s sex was not necessarily fixed strictly into a two-sex
model. Fausto-Sterling, therefore, argues that sex is ‘a vast, infinitely
malleable continuum’ that defies the constraints of all fixed categories.
325
Pre-modern Indian cultures, too, had greater space for a variety of
sexual identities— eunuchs, for example, had a socially acknowledged
status in Indian society that they have lost in contemporary times. Again,
the Sufi and Bhakti traditions drew upon notions of androgyny and often
rejected the two-sex model. Take, for instance, this poem by a 12th-
century Shaivite poet, Basavanna, who wrote in Kannada (Ramanujan
1973: 29).
Look here, dear fellow,

I wear these men’s clothes only for you.
Sometimes I am man,
Sometimes I am woman…
Another Shivabhakta, Devara Dasimayya, writing two centuries earlier,

wrote (ibid: 110)
If they see breasts and long hair coming,

They call it woman,
If beard and whiskers They call it man.
But look, the self that hovers in between
Is neither man nor woman…
Such examples would be found in all Indian languages. In this context, a

thought-provoking argument is made by Ashis Nandy (1983). He notes
that pre-colonial Indian cultures accorded greater value to femininity. It
was with the coming of colonialism that the Western valorization of
masculinity became the norm. Nationalists, too, then played into this
understanding, and tried to resist the deriding of Indian culture as
‘effeminate’ by claiming to be as ‘masculine’ as the colonial masters—the
ideology of revolutionaries for example, was very masculinist. According
to Nandy, Gandhi was unique in attempting to focus on ‘feminine’ rather
than ‘masculine’ qualities as having the power to resist colonialism—that
is, he emphasized spiritual and moral courage over aggression and
violence (Nandy 1983).
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SEX/GENDER DISTINCTION IN FEMINIST THEORY
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The distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ has been made more complex
by feminist scholars over the years. Although the distinction continues to
be broadly accepted by all feminists, the initial understanding that ‘sex’ is
related to nature while ‘gender’ is related to culture has been reworked
considerably. Broadly, we can discern four main ways in which the
sex/gender distinction has been further developed in feminist theory.
First, scholars like Alison Jaggar (1983) argue that ‘sex’ and ‘gender’
are dialectically and inseparably related and that the conceptual distinction
that earlier feminists established between the two is not sustainable beyond
a point. In this understanding, human biology is constituted by a complex
interaction between the human body, the physical environment and the
state of development of technology and society. Thus, as Jaggar puts it,
‘the hand is as much the product of labour as the tool of labour’ (Jaggar
1983: 109–410). What is meant here is that two processes are involved:
human intervention changes the external environment and simultaneously,
changes in the external environment shape and change the human body.
This is true in two senses. One, in a long-term evolutionary sense, over the
millenia. That is, human bodies have evolved differently in different parts
of the globe, due to differences in diet, climate, and nature of work
performed.
Again, in a more short-term sense, it is now recognized that
neurophysiology and hormonal balances are affected by social factors like
anxiety, physical labour, level and kind of social interaction, just as much
as social interaction is affected by people’s neurophysiology and hormonal
balances. For instance, certain chemical changes in the body may produce
certain symptoms of stress that can be treated by drugs. But equally, high
stress levels can, in fact, be the reason for higher chemical imbalances, and
it may be possible to restore the body’s balance only by changing the
conditions in which it lives.
Consider this passage from Dorothy Dinnerstein (1976: 22):
… humans are by nature unnatural. We do not yet walk ‘naturally’ on our hind
legs, for example. Such ills as fallen arches, lower back pain, and hernias testify
that the body has not adapted itself completely to the upright posture. Yet this
unnatural posture, forced on the unwilling body by the project of tool-using, is
precisely what has made possible the development of important aspects of our
‘nature’—the hand and the brain, and the complex system of skills, language and
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social arrangements which were both effects and causes of hand and brain. Man-
made and physiological structures have thus come to interpenetrate so thoroughly
that we are what we have made ourselves, and we must continue to make ourselves
as long as we exist at all.
When we apply the understanding that biology and culture are

interrelated, to the sex/ gender distinction, the relevant implication is that
women’s bodies have been shaped by social restrictions and by norms of
beauty. That is, the ‘body’ has been formed as much by ‘culture’ as by
‘nature’. For instance, the rapid improvements in women’s athletic records
over the past two decades is an indication that social norms had shaped
biology and restricted women’s physical development. Feminist
anthropologists have also pointed out that in some ethnic groups there is
little physical differentiation between men and women. In short, we must
consider that there are two equally powerful factors at work— one, there is
a range of interrelated ways in which society produces sex differences, and
two, sex differences structure society in particular ways.
‘Sex’, in this view, is not an unchanging base upon which society
constructs ‘gender’ meanings, but rather, sex itself has been affected by
various factors external to it. There is no clear and unchanging line
between nature and culture.
A second kind of rethinking of sex/gender has come from radical
feminism, which argues that feminists must not underplay the biological
difference between the sexes and attribute all difference to ‘culture’ alone.
To do so is to accept male civilization’s devaluing of the female
reproductive role. This is a criticism of the liberal feminist understanding
that in an ideal world, men and women would be more or less alike. They
claim that on the contrary, patriarchal social values have denigrated
‘feminine’ qualities and that it is the task of feminism to recover these
qualities, and this difference between men and women, as valuable. Their
position on the sex/gender distinction is that there are certain differences
between men and women that arise from their different biological
reproductive roles, and therefore, women are more sensitive, instinctive
and closer to nature. Radical feminists such as Susan Griffin and Andrea
Dworkin, for example, believe that women’s reproductive biology, the
process of gestation and the experience of mothering, fundamentally
affects their relationship to the external world. Women are according to
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this understanding, closer to nature and share in nature’s qualities of
fecundity, nurturing and instinct. These qualities have been rejected by
patriarchal society but feminists should accept and revalue these qualities.
Carol Gilligan’s book, In a Different Voice (1993) is a significant
example of this viewpoint. Using a psychoanalytical point of view, she
argues that because the primary caregiver in childhood is invariably a
woman (the mother)—given the sexual division of labour— the process by
which men and women come to adulthood is different. Boys move into
adulthood learning to differentiate from the mother, while girls do so by
identifying with her. That is, in a sex-differentiated society, while all
infants identify with the mother, gradually boys learn that they are
‘different’ while girls learn that they are the ‘same’ as their mother. This
results, Gilligan argues, in women having a more subjective, relational
way of engaging with the world, while men have a more objective mode.
Women relate to others, while men learn to separate themselves. This
explains, for example, the difference in the nature of male and female
friendships. Gilligan’s focus in this work is the difference in the ways men
and women take moral decisions, and she comes to the conclusion that
women are less influenced by normative notions of what is right and
wrong, and more by other factors like empathy, concern, and sensitivity to
another’s predicament. Men, on the other hand, tend to take moral
decisions based on well-accepted notions of what society thinks is right
and wrong. Thus, Gilligan concludes that the basic categories of Western
moral philosophy—rationality, autonomy and justice—are drawn from and
reflect the male experience of the world. The female experience is
invisible here. To deny difference is, therefore, to agree with the
patriarchal negation of femininity as worthless.
Third, a more recent feminist position takes the opposite view from that
of radical feminists. While radical feminists argue that the sex/gender
distinction underplays sex differences, the school of post-modern feminist
thought holds that it over-emphasizes the biological body. Judith Butler
(1990: 6), for instance, argues that if ‘gender’ is symbolic of the cultural
meanings that the sexed body takes on, then gender cannot be said to
follow from ‘sex’ in any one way. According to her, ‘gender’ is not the
cultural inscription of meaning on a pre-given ‘sex’, rather, gender as a
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way of thinking and as a concept, produces the category of biological sex.
Butler, thus, suggests a ‘radical discontinuity’ between sexed bodies and
culturally constructed genders.
Butler further uses the term heterosexual matrix to designate the grid
produced by institutions, practices and discourses, looking through which
it appears to be ‘a fact of nature’ that all human bodies possess one of the
two fixed sexual identities, with each experiencing sexual desire only for
the ‘opposite sex’. From this viewpoint, the removal of this grid or
heterosexual matrix will reveal that sexuality and human bodies are fluid
and have no necessary fixed sexual identity or orientation. The
characteristic feature of this position is that it holds that the category of
‘woman’ does not exist prior to the thinking about it. Gender is something
that is constructed through relations of power, and through a series of
norms and constraints that regulate what will be recognized as a ‘male’
body and a ‘female’ body. Through such norms, a wide range of bodies are
rendered invisible and/or illegitimate, for instance, infants born with no
clear determining sexual characteristics, or eunuchs, or men and women
who choose not to follow the dress norms prescribed for their gender. All
these are either marginalized, criminalized or forced to fit into the existing
two-sex model in some way or the other. Most modern languages have no
way of speaking of a human who does not fit into either sex. What this
means is that language forces ‘reality’ into certain pre-given patterns and
prevents certain possibilities from being realized.
One of the most powerful languages determining ‘sex’ is that of the
biomedical sciences and feminist scientists have thoroughly criticized it.
Feminist scientists such as Ruth Bleier and Evelyn Fox Keller have argued
that a rigid sex/gender distinction restricts biological sex—that is, sex
defined as anatomical, hormonal or chromosomal—as something to be
studied by the biomedical sciences, while gender is to be studied by the
social sciences. Such an understanding takes for granted that while cultural
notions of gender may change, the body remains as an unchanging
biological reality that needs no further explanation. These scientists argue
that on the contrary, our perceptions and interpretations of the body are
mediated through language, and biomedical sciences function as a major
provider of this language.
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A startling study in the United States of intersexed infants (babies born
with both ovarian and testicular tissue or in whom the sex organs are
ambiguous) showed that medical decisions to assign one sex or the other
were made on cultural assumptions rather than on any existing biological
features. Thus, a baby might be made into a female but then still require
hormonal therapy all her life to make her stay ‘female’. In other words,
male and female are not only culturally different, they are not even
biologically stable features at all times (Kessler 1994).
Alison Jaggar discusses a similar study of children whose sex had been
incorrectly assigned at birth due to such ambiguity—when the ‘real’ sex of
the child emerged at a later stage, both the parents and medical
practitioners decided on surgery to confirm the sex attributed at birth. This
was invariably preferred to simply accepting that the child’s sex was
different from that attributed at birth. In other words, surgical intervention
to change ‘sex’ was thought to be easier than eradicating years of cultural
‘gender’ conditioning.
Nelly Oudshoorn’s (1994) work shows that scientists have understood
‘sex’ in different ways over centuries—from the ancient Greeks until the
late 18th century, male and female bodies were understood by medical
texts to be fundamentally similar. This ‘one-sex’ model of humanity, with
the woman as a lesser version of the male body, dominated biomedical
discourse for thousands of years. In the 18th century, biomedical discourse
began to emphasize differences between the sexes rather than similarities.
Every part of the human body was sexualized, and physiological ‘facts’
(for example, smaller brain size) were used to prove the lesser intelligence
of women, their passive nature and so on. The feminine ‘essence’ that
supposedly differentiated women from men, was sought to be located in
different parts of the body—in the 18th century, the uterus was thought to
be the seat of femaleness, in the 19th century, it was the ovaries. By the
20th century, the essence of femininity was understood to be located in
chemical substances called hormones.
The hormonal conception of the body is now one of the dominant modes
of thinking about the root of sexual differences. What Oudshoorn points
out is that the hormonal conception of the body, in fact, allows for the
possibility of breaking out of the tyranny of the binary sex-difference
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model. If bodies can have both female and male hormones, then maleness
and femaleness are not restricted to one kind of body alone. However, the
biomedical sciences have preferred increasingly, to portray the female, but
not the male, as a body completely controlled by hormones. In this
process, a clear nexus has emerged between the medical profession and a
huge, multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry. ‘Disorders’ in women
—such as the ageing of the skin, depression, menstrual irregularities—are
prescribed hormonal therapy. Such drugs are expensive, but even more
disturbing is the fact that it is in the interest of the pharmaceutical industry
that natural processes such as ageing are treated as diseases. Moreover,
depression, which has social causes, is treated with drugs as if it were a
purely physiological problem. If women can be made to feel that looking
old is ‘unfeminine’ or that their depression arises, not from their being
undervalued and overworked, but from something inside themselves, then
the profits of multinational drug companies are assured.
Therefore, the post-modern feminist position rejects the idea that
scientific facts about the body simply exist to be discovered. Rather,
scientific facts are deeply embedded in society and culture. ‘Sex’ itself is
constructed by human practices.
A fourth kind of rethinking of the sex/gender distinction comes from
locating ‘gender’ in a grid of identities—caste, class, race, and religion.
This would mean that the biological category of ‘woman’ does not
necessarily have shared interests, life-situations, or goals. This kind of
understanding has arisen from the political practice of women’s
movements all over the world, which has increasingly revealed that
‘women’ do not exist as a preexisting subject which can simply be
mobilized by the women’s movement. That is, women identify themselves
not only, and not even primarily, in terms of their gender, but as black, or
muslim, or Dalit, or peasant. So in many cases, women may be easily
mobilized in terms of their religion, for example, than by the women’s
movement.
In the case of India, a good example of this is the debate over the
uniform civil code. All religious communities have their own personal
laws which discriminate against women on matters of marriage, divorce,
inheritance, and guardianship of children. A demand for a uniform civil
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code that would give all women equal rights as citizens has, therefore,
been made by the women’s movement since 1937. However, in the
growing atmosphere of communalism since the 1980s, and the insecurity
felt by religious minorities, most sections of the women’s movement have
gradually shifted to the opinion that the position of women should be
improved by reforms within personal laws, rather than by forcing
communities to obey to the legislation passed by the state. The state no
longer has the legitimacy it had in the immediate post-Independence years,
its role in communal violence is increasingly suspect, and it cannot be seen
simply as an agent of progressive social change. Thus, what was a simple
feminist demand that all women should have equal rights has been
considerably transformed by the politics of religious identity.
Further, all politically active women do not necessarily act as feminists
—they may well be representing interests and structures of power which
feminist politics in India has sought to struggle against. Thus, we find
women active in Hindu right-wing politics and in anti-lower caste
movements like the agitation against the Mandal Commission report. In
other words, in this understanding, the feminist sex/gender distinction
must take into account other modes of constituting identity. Depending on
the context, even as feminists, we may have to privilege caste or class
identity over gender in some cases, just as we expect Marxists or Dalit
activists to privilege gender over class and caste in some contexts.
MASCULINITY
A significant body of scholarship that has emerged in recent years is
around the construction of ‘masculinity’. While feminist scholarship on
gender has focused on the construction of femininity and the female body,
it has increasingly begun to be felt that it is equally crucial to expose the
mechanisms by which the parallel construct of masculinity is sustained
under patriarchy. It is, therefore, necessary to understand how this
construct empowers men, how it restricts and disempowers those men who
cannot or do not obey the rules, or meet the expectations of masculine
behaviour—for example, old men, or homosexuals. The operation of
masculine norms and the discourse of masculinity also ‘feminizes’
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powerless men as a way of rendering them inferior—working class or poor
men, Dalit men, and so on.
Thus, the original sex/gender distinction made by feminists has been
made considerably more complex by the theory and practice of feminist
politics. This distinction, thus, continues to be crucial for any feminist
understanding of the subordination of women.
1. What do you understand by sexual division of labour? Do you think it has any
implications for citizenship rights of women?
2. Do you think it is liberating or constraining to believe that ‘gender’—both
masculinity and femininity— is the product of particular social, cultural and
economic formations? Explain why.
3. Use the Internet and interviews with appropriate people to explore the ways in
which non-Western and pre-modern cultures have blurred the sharp distinction
between ‘male’ and ‘female’. Can you think of contemporary practices that are
still prevalent that do this? (You must use your imagination to think of what
kind of people around you could have this kind of information.)
4. Imagine you had a three-year-old son whom you took to the doctor for some
reason, and discovered that the child was more female than male. Would you
prefer to now come to terms with the fact that you have a daughter, inform
everybody, change the way you dress and think of your child, or would you
prefer surgical intervention to retain your ‘son’ as a son? Does the latter option
seem easier, and why? What does this tell us about the supposedly
unchangeable ‘natural’ category of biology and, conversely, about the
supposedly changeable category of ‘culture’?
READING LIST
Barrett, Michele, Women’s Oppression Today (London: Verso, 1988).
Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble (New York and London: Routledge, 1990).
De Beauvoir, Simone, The Second Sex (London: Picador, 1988).
Dinnerstein, Dorothy, The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and
Human Malaise (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
Fausto-Sterling, Anne, ‘The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough’, in
Christine L. Williams and Arlene Stein (eds), Sexuality and Gender (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2002).
Gilligan, Carol, In a Different Voice: Psychology and Women’s Development (Harvard:
Jaggar, Alison, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1983).
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Kessler, Suzanne J., ‘The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management of
Intersexed Infants’, in Anne C. Hermann and Abigail Stewart (eds), Theorizing
Feminism (Basil Blackwell, 1994).
Oudshoorn, Nelly, Beyond the Natural Body. An Archaeology of Sex Hormones
(London: Routledge, 1994).
Ramanujan, A. K., Speaking of Siva (English trans.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973).
Tharu, Susie and Tejaswini Niranjana, ‘Problems for a Contemporary Theory of
Gender’, in Nivedita Menon (ed.), Gender and Politics (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1999).
Whitehead, Stephen M., Men and Masculinities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
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PART III
Ideologies
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CHAPTER 15
Liberalism
Ashok Acharya
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
A Brief History
Classical Liberalism
Contemporary Liberalism
The Foundations of Liberalism
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
Liberalism, like socialism, fascism, or nationalism, is a political ideology.
A political ideology explains our social reality, interprets it in a certain
way, evolves a set of interrelated principles, contests the nature of the
political, and prescribes appropriate action. There is, however, a closed
and rigid structure to ideology that does not leave much room for
flexibility of interpretations or contestations of received ideas. Both in
prescribing a set of beliefs and in setting an agenda for action, an ideology
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may not provide much space for creative interpretation that one may find,
for instance, in various ethical debates carried out in contemporary
political theory. Some variants of liberalism display this but in a minimal
way. Since liberalism also attests to, in a loose sense, a set of dispositions
and a way of life sustained by reason and human values, it is in many ways
more flexible than an ideology Indeed, liberalism itself offers an
intellectual climate and platform, made possible by its commitments to
freedom and toleration, for other ideologies to exist and function. As Alan
Ryan makes it clear, ‘(w)hatever liberalism involves, it certainly includes
toleration and an antipathy to closing ranks around any system of beliefs’
(Ryan 1993: 292).
A BRIEF HISTORY
Liberalism has a longer history than most political ideologies. It has
primarily evolved out of sustained struggles against hierarchically
organized social and political relations. In many ways, liberalism captures
the ideological map of various political struggles that human beings have
witnessed, roughly in the last 300 years. However, some claim that its
roots go back further in history Ancient Greece, we are told, kindled the
first spark of self-rule and has inspired generations of liberals. However,
liberty for the ancients was different from liberty for the moderns.
Benjamin Constant, a forerunner of liberalism, held that liberty for the
ancients ‘consisted in an active and constant participation in collective
power’, whereas for the moderns it consisted in ‘peaceful enjoyment and
private independence’. Whereas the ancients drew their happiness from an
active engagement in collective life within the political community for
which they were prepared to make sacrifices, individuals in the modern
world are ‘lost in the multitude’ and unsure of their influence in collective
decision making. The happiness of the modern individual derives more
from the comforts gained through civilizational progress, commerce, and
communication than finding fulfilment in collective projects (Constant
1988: 316). Constant offers us a powerful diagnosis of modernity, but the
contrast he draws between ancient and modern liberty pleads the
impossibility of resurrecting the liberal project from ancient roots.
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In some ways, the earliest liberals were the Protestant reformers who
challenged religious hierarchy and orthodoxy in the Church during the
16th century The Protestant reformers repudiated the authority of the
clergy in interpreting a ‘true’ religion that sought to establish a direct
communion between human beings and God. In creatively interpreting this
true religion, freed from the grip of the priests and resting instead on the
volition of the believers, the Reformation produced grounds for
discovering the autonomy of the individual—a fundamental moral
resource for later developments in liberal theory.
If the authority of the priests could be questioned, how could the kings’
power be spared? The competence of ordinary people to choose their own
path to salvation soon transformed into the ability to judge temporal or
secular matters. This coincided with calling into question the divine right
of monarchs and aristocratic privileges of feudal lords in the early modern
period. Much later, the spirit of liberalism expressed political struggles
against all forms of absolute authority, including regimes of oppression as
varied as fascist, communist, and autocratic.
Liberalism is usually divided into two phases: the classical and the
modern. How do we distinguish between the two, who were the
representative voices of each, and what are their distinctive features? Let
us examine them individually.
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM
Classical liberalism is usually associated with the work of John Locke,
besides Adam Smith and Thomas Paine, and other 20th-century thinkers
such as Friedrich von Hayek, Robert Nozick, and Milton Friedman. Its
chief distinguishing ideas are those of limited government, the rule of law,
the inviolability of private property, the freedom to enter into, and
maintain, contracts, and finally, the acceptance by individuals of their own
fates. In its 20th-century variant, classical liberalism as defended by
Hayek, Nozick, and Friedman is distrustful of progressive doctrines,
including those inspired by democratic means, values such as distributive
justice and all political arrangements, including the welfare state, where
the government acquires more power than required.
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It is to the credit of John Locke, however, that liberalism holds out one
of its most influential ideas: that the aim and justification of government is
to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens. These are natural
rights constituted in, and protected by, natural law, which are antecedent to
political society. Locke believed that the appropriate means by which the
government can provide this protection is a system of justice defined and
made possible by law. All citizens are equally subject to the authority of
the government, and citizens find it reasonable to accept the authority
because each is guaranteed the rights of life, liberty, and property.
Legitimate authority safeguards these rights and in the Lockean scheme, it
is perfectly justifiable to oppose political authority if it transgresses these
inviolable rights. What is particularly appealing in Locke’s thinking is the
idea that a government must be able to justify its authority to its citizens.
This justification rests on the protection of the rights of the citizens that the
system of justice upholds more than what could be hoped for under a
different arrangement.
Modern Liberalism
Modern liberalism is best illustrated in the views of John Stuart Mill,
besides those of Kant, Green, and Hobhouse. In very distinct ways,
modern liberalism establishes an affirmative relationship between liberty
(especially, the positive variant) and human progress. The modern liberal
believes man to be ‘a progressive being’ with an unlimited potential for
selfdevelopment, one which does not jeopardize a similar potential in
others. It seeks to qualify the sanctity of private property by admitting the
necessity of addressing certain social and economic ills that can be
remedied by the state. In attempting to do so, it does concede more
functions to the state than allowed for by the classical alternative. This
approach lays down and justifies, the value of distributive justice and
experiments such as the welfare state. It hopes for more from the
perfectibility of human beings and the liberal state, sustained by reason
and conviction in progress. The idea that both human beings and society
can be perfected by the use of reason was brought home most forcefully by
the Enlightenment. Jeremy Waldron (1993: 43) makes this point most
poignantly.
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The Enlightenment was characterized by a burgeoning confidence in the human
ability to make sense of the world, to grasp its regularities and fundamental
principles, to predict its future, and to manipulate its powers for the benefit of
mankind. After millennia of ignorance, terror, and superstition, cowering before
forces it could neither understand nor control, mankind faced the prospect of being
able to at last build a human world, a world in which it might feel safely and
securely at home.
Liberalism generally believes in the ability of individuals to make

meaningful choices and to be responsible for them. The importance that
liberalism attributes to individuals received the most robust intellectual
defence from Immanuel Kant who, influenced by Rousseau, formulated
the clearest case for individual autonomy. Kantian autonomy may be
understood as the condition in which individuals are free from external
determination such as coercion, threat or manipulation in taking actions to
implement one’s choices. In making such choices, an individual is also to
be free from internal influences such as passions or prejudices and,
instead, be guided by reason, understood in the final analysis as
conformity to unversalizable principles. Kant held that all human beings
are equal in their capacity for autonomy, that this capacity explains an
individual’s moral responsibility and human dignity, and that morality
requires that we respect everyone capable of autonomy. He thus expressed
the idea that individuals are entitled to equal respect, hindrance to which is
the denial of universal morality.
John Stuart Mill further reinforced liberalism by arguing that it is
morally impermissible to interfere with the actions of individuals even if
they are motivated by irrational or emotive considerations, provided the
actions in question do not harm others. As Mill argues, liberalism is
opposed to the coercion of even non-autonomous actions, so long as such
actions are compatible with the autonomous existence of others.
Disagreeing with Bentham’s utilitarianism, Mill opposed paternalistic
interference intended to benefit individuals. This opposition is based on
the liberal belief that individuals know best what is good for them, and
even if they are mistaken about this, it is better to allow them to make such
mistakes than impose an alien view about what is in their best interests.
Governments must adhere to the requirement of not imposing what they
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think is best for their citizens. This would promote, as Mill hoped and
justified, a diversity of ways of life.
What links both traditions—classical and modern—is an opposition to
absolute power, a distrust of political authority, and a whole-hearted
affirmation of the values of freedom and autonomy of individuals.
CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM
Locke, Kant, and Mill have been the three most important thinkers who
shaped the modern liberal tradition. Contemporary liberalism owes much
to them. However, if one has to single out one important political
philosopher of the 20th century whose influence has been the most
profound in liberal thinking, it is John Rawls. Two monumental treatises
written by Rawls—A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism
(1993)—have set the contemporary terms of debate and discussion on
liberalism and its values. Rawls revived the social contract tradition of
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, both redeployed and deepened Mill’s
vindication of liberty in a free society, and argued against conventional
judgements, especially those of utilitarianism, that treated individuals as
means towards attaining the collective good. A liberal state, according to
Rawls, must not only guarantee that all its citizens have an equality of
fundamental liberty rights, such as voting, and freedom of speech, religion
and association; it must also ensure that those who are least well-off are
assured as good a life as possible. Rawls asserts that freedom should never
be sacrificed on the grounds of an increase in material well-being. This is
why he gives priority to the equal enjoyment of liberty (the liberty
principle) over the principle that requires the welfare of the least well-off
to be taken care of (the difference principle). Overall, Rawls holds out an
account of egalitarian liberalism that is hospitable to redistributive
experiments of the liberal state.
A central trait of Rawls’ liberalism is its political view that citizens are
entitled to live in accordance with their own freely chosen values or ends.
Individuals are entitled to their own conceptions of what constitutes a good
life. A conception of the good is supposed to be internally determined by
the individual and not imposed from the outside by the larger society or
the state. The state is required to be neutral among the many conceptions
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of good that individuals choose. Neither can the state nor the larger society
pass judgements on how to lead a good life, which religion one must
adopt, or the values one must live by. A primary ambition of Rawls’ work
is to free the idea of what is right and just from the idea of what is good or
advantageous for an individual and in giving primacy to the former over
the latter—the priority of the right over the good. This allows Rawls to
depart from the utlititarian tradition by insisting, as he rightly does, that the
Utilitarian conception of good—say, the greatest good of the greatest
number—overrides both the moral separateness of persons and their self-
determining capacities.
Instead, he offers an account of rights that people have, defined by the
principles of justice, that is substantially independent of particular notions
of good, which are bound to be disputable. A paradigm case where notions
of good may prove contentious is religious controversy. No two persons
belonging to two different religions will ever agree on fundamental issues
of faith. Moral disagreements on what gives value to life will persist in a
free society and reasonable people will set these aside to evolve rules of
social cooperation. But the requirement to evolve rules of social
cooperation on the basis of a shared agreement flies in the face of deep and
persistent moral disagreements that divide a society on the bases of caste,
community, religion, ethnicity, language and other markers of identity.
How can we expect them to bury their differences? This is a central
problem in Rawlsian liberalism and in spite of his best efforts in later
works, Rawls has not been successfully able to defend his version of
liberalism from the attack of communitarians such as Alasdair MacIntyre,
Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer. The communitarians
would criticize Rawls, and the tradition of liberalism associated with him,
for overlooking the fact that people’s identities are constituted in large part
by their membership in different communities, for underestimating the
significance of shared values, and for wrongfully asserting the virtues of
individualism and universalism that are either hollow or impossible to
achieve. Defenders of the Rawlsian version of liberalism have usually
responded by upholding the worth of individual autonomy (that allows
individuals the freedom to change and shape their lives), the
unattractiveness of the idea that a state must use coercion to keep the
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community united, and a political morality that rises above the bias of
particular contexts.
The liberal-communitarian debate has evoked a rich body of scholarly
literature in recent times. The debate in its various forms has enriched
liberalism in a number of ways. Contemporary liberals are now less averse
to address questions of identity and cultural pluralism. Whereas in the past
it was commonplace for liberal theory and practice to neglect or override
claims of cultural difference made by identity groups in a plural society,
most versions of liberalism now exhibit moral sensitivity to issues of
diversity. Debating the principles of liberalism in diverse societies has now
come to mean endorsing multicultural values that have implications for
citizenship, the rights of groups, majority-minority relations, moral
obligations to protect and preserve cultures, and so on.
Responding to these challenges has meant undertaking the task of
broadening and enriching the conceptual repertoire of liberalism. If
liberalism in its earlier phase crystallized around the values of freedom and
a minimal state, the constellation of liberal values would now include a
range of diverse but interconnected concepts: freedom, rights, equality,
distributive justice, and pluralism. This raises the question of what
constitutes the theoretical foundations of liberalism.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM

Liberalism does not have a monolithic tradition. Some claim that there are
not one, but several liberalisms. An effort to discover a common core of
liberalism is hence likely to be futile and counterproductive. The richness
of liberalism lies in being able to draw upon multiple sources, including
those from rival ways of thinking. This being a given, it may be difficult to
agree on a set of values that lie at the core of liberalism. Yet, liberals try
delineating a common set of values and consider this enterprise well worth
their effort. John Gray (1998), for instance, suggests that what is common
to all variants of the liberal tradition is a distinctive modern conception of
man and society, which has several elements to it. In asserting the moral
primacy of the person against the claims of any social collectivity,
liberalism is individualist. It purports to be egalitarian by conferring on all
individuals the same moral status. In affirming the moral unity of the
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human species, liberalism is universalist. Finally, it is meliorist in
pronouncing that social institutions and political arrangements are
improvable (Gray 1998: xii). Is Gray’s analysis persuasive? Gray’s
interpretation, it might be said, blots out some significant transformations
that liberalism has undergone in the recent past. For instance, an insistence
on viewing liberalism as essentially individualist fails to notice and take
stock of the various ways in which liberal values have come to roost in and
negotiate with dissimilar values in different contexts. The argument here is
that there is no one way of claiming what a distinctive liberal way of life
is. Moreover, this argument cuts into liberal claims of universalism (that
we has already been discussed above) in the context of the communitarian
critique of Rawlsian liberalism.
Instead of harping on the common features of different strands of
liberalism that have existed, or continue to exist, across time and space, a
better mode to discover the foundational core of liberalism would be to ask
what a liberal society would look like. At least, a liberal society is an open
society where freedom for individuals and groups alike allows each
opportunity to flourish without fear of persecution. Since an open society
would promote the value of diversity or the different ways of life (or
conceptions of good) and because such diversity is best promoted by not
ordering diverse ways of life hierarchically, liberalism ought to place a
premium on the value of non-hierarchical pluralism that encapsulates a
political message against different forms of discrimination, oppression, or
domination.
CONCLUSION
Although liberalism has been on the ascendant since the end of the Cold
War and the demise of communism in Soviet Russia, prompting some to
even make the foolhardy claim of an end to ideology, the future of liberal
theory and practice will depend largely on how precisely it meets its
criticisms and shortcomings. However, as Alan Ryan (1993: 309) notes,
‘the way in which liberalism institutionalizes self-criticism [will] itself be
a guarantee of [its] progress’.
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1. Liberalism has evolved out of struggles to limit the arbitrary uses of political
authority. Discuss with examples.
2. How has the social contract tradition shaped the liberal spirit?
3. Do you agree that ‘liberalism is an ideology of the West, ill-suited for non-
Western contexts’? Discuss with cases from India and the West.
4. Why do most liberals now dispute the claim that faith in individualism lies at
the core of liberalism?
5. Would you say that a liberal society affirms moral and cultural diversity but
desires shared political values? Elaborate with examples in support of your
argument.
READING LIST
Constant, Benjamin, Political Writings (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1988).
Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1985).
Gray, John, Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy (London and New York:
Routledge, 1989).
———, Liberalism (Delhi: Worldview Publications, 1998).
Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991).
Parekh, Bhikhu, ‘Decolonizing Liberalism’, in Alexsandras Shtromas (ed.), The End of
‘Isms’? Reflections on the Fate of Ideological Politics after Communism’s Collapse
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971).
———, Political Liberalism. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy, 4 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993).
Ryan, Alan, ‘Liberalism’, in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Petit (eds), A Companion to
Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
Waldron, Jeremy, Liberal Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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CHAPTER 16
Socialism
Sunalini Kumar
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Responses to Inequality
The Problem: Capitalism
The Socialist Alternative
Socialist Schemes: Old and New
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
[Socialism is] a social order in which there is the maximum feasible equality of
access, for all human beings, to economic resources, to knowledge, and to political
power, and the minimum possible domination exercised by any individual or social
group over any others.
—Tom Bottomore
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The world has always been an unequal place, characterized by divisions
based on class, religion, race, gender, and ethnic origin, to mention a few.
In particular, the wide divide between the rich and the poor has been a
feature of every single era in recorded history, from the time humans
moved out of caves and established settled agricultural societies, to the
present. For thousands of years, individuals or groups who controlled the
prized resources of society, whether land, gold, slaves or ammunition have
dictated to the poor the conditions of their life and especially the
conditions under which they earned their living. Occasionally, religious
prophets and mass leaders have given voice to the misery of the people.
Indeed, Christianity first arose as a powerful social movement due to the
terrible living conditions of the poor under the Roman Empire. Ironically,
however, religion itself can perpetuate unjust and unequal social practices.
By the Middle Ages, in Europe, the Catholic Church became one of the
wealthiest institutions in history, extending its control over society through
elaborate hierarchical networks, making inequality appear divinely
sanctioned. In many parts of the world, too, religious, economic and
political power have historically joined hands to justify and sanction social
systems that make the dream of equality impossible.
RESPONSES TO INEQUALITY
From the Greek thinker Plato onwards, sophisticated theoretical defences
of inequality have been a part of the tradition of political thought. Rulers
and political philosophers alike have traditionally been in favour of some
form of inequality, citing reasons from the natural right of certain
individuals to rule over others (the theory of ‘divine right of kings’) to the
argument that economic inequality is essential to maintain law and order in
the society. It is only in modern times that equality as a principle and as an
ideal has become widely desired. A combination of historical events has
contributed to this development. In Europe, the waning of the power of the
Church after the Reformation in the 15th century, the gradual decline of
the hierarchical feudal system and the rise of a new class of merchant
capitalists who saw profit in a more egalitarian society were prime factors.
The Enlightenment of the 18th century, the growing power and changing
composition of parliaments in England and other places, and the rise of
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liberal political thought were important steps in the same direction. The
French and American Revolutions of the late 18th century were indeed
milestones—they made the fundamental equality of all human beings not
simply a cherished ideal but a principle that was eventually enshrined in
the constitutions of many nation-states. In the non-European world, the
decline of local empires and traditional forms of authority due to trade and
colonialism, and the systematic impoverishment of the local population
due to colonial extraction of wealth were the key reasons. A variety of
radical movements and anti-colonial liberation struggles arose in these
areas to speak in favour of economic and political freedom and equality.
Interestingly, while some anti-colonial movements borrowed their political
terminology from the nationalism and liberalism of the West, others drew
upon traditional, indigenous moral and ethical concepts in order to argue
for greater freedom and equality. In the United States, the appalling
existence of slavery and racial discrimination against African-Americans
in the southern states even after the adoption of the liberal American
Constitution fuelled the ‘Abolitionist’ movement of the 19th century. The
Abolitionists were committed to the abolition of slavery and to the
promotion of equality between the races, especially in the field of civil and
political rights. Interestingly, the Abolitionists allied with another group
demanding equality in 19th-century America— the suffragists—who
argued for equal voting and political rights for men and women.
Perhaps most important both as a cause and as a symptom of the modern
concern with equality is the fact that democracy, which is a principle of
political rule fundamentally based on the ideal of equality, has become the
preferred form of government in the modern age. In principle, democracy
confers equal political power to all through universal adult franchise, and
throws open the arena of politics to all regardless of the privileges of birth
or wealth. Today, with the overwhelming popularity and legitimacy of this
form of rule, even some of the most autocratic dictators are keen to convey
an impression of democracy to the world at large. Democracy, however,
addresses only one form of inequality—political inequality. The question
of other forms of equality, particularly economic equality, then remains
unanswered. Many thinkers recognize and bemoan the fact that democracy
can and does exist quite comfortably with extreme social and economic
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inequality. What are the consequences of this for equality? While it can be
argued that political rights are sacred and necessary in themselves
regardless of other conditions of life, it is equally true that without a
degree of economic and social equality, the political equality afforded by
democracy can become at best, limited and at worst, meaningless. As R.
H. Tawney (1931) wrote in his critique of the ‘religion of inequality’ that
permeates contemporary capitalist societies, giving rights to a desperately
poor man is like extending a dinner invitation to somebody who is in no
position to accept it! In our own country, despite the existence of a fully
functioning democracy since Independence, we have numerous cases of
socially and economically disadvantaged people being regularly denied
basic rights and a fair treatment in society.
THE PROBLEM: CAPITALISM

With the advent of the modern age in Europe there was hope that over a
period of time, the rigid feudal hierarchies characteristic of the medieval
age would be ‘flattened out’. The emerging economic system—capitalism
—with its emphasis on free market and free enterprise was in principle
accessible to every individual, regardless of whether the person possessed
any rank or status in society. In addition, capitalism seemed capable of
harnessing the natural resources of the world in order to end the scarcity of
resources and the continuous threat of famine and mass disease
characteristic of the pre-modern world. An early theoretical defence of
capitalism was provided by Adam Smith who argued famously that there
existed within capitalism, an ‘invisible hand’ capable of regulating demand
and supply at the micro level, and of allocating (scarce) resources at the
macro level. Thus, capitalism was a self-regulating economic system
capable of thriving without interference from ‘above’ (the state); it
performed the age-old economic tasks of managing demands, determining
supplies and avoiding waste and losses with optimal efficiency. The
principle of laissez-faire (or separation of state and market) advocated by
liberal and neoliberal economists and political scientists was based on this
assumption of efficiency within capitalism, and provided the basis for
government economic policy in the developed capitalist countries until the
end of the 19th century.
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The claims made in favour of capitalism by its advocates were not
without basis—the standard of living of millions of people in the modern
world has vastly improved compared to the subsistence societies of the
medieval age. Income and wealth generation are at levels that were
unimaginable in the pre-modern era. Modern societies, especially in the
developed world, are societies of mass consumption—food production is
higher than in any previously recorded time in history, and amenities that
seemed like remote luxuries until recently are accessible to a majority of
the working population. Scientific and technological research encouraged
by capitalism has transformed the face of the earth and fuelled hopes of
inventions that could permanently end scarcity in the near future.
However, capitalism has created entrenched inequalities of its own.
While it may have generated enviable working conditions and leisure
opportunities for white-collar workers (the managerial and corporate elite);
the majority of the proletariat (the blue-collar workers) have found
themselves crammed into factories and workshops for long hours,
performing repetitive and uncreative tasks required for mass production.
The difference in wage levels between the white-collar and blue-collar
worker is vast in most capitalist economies. Contrary to the dream of free
access to all, capitalism seems to have perpetuated historical and
hereditary hierarchies through the institution of private property, and those
individuals who have been historically disadvantaged have to a large
extent remained disadvantaged within the system. Also, throughout the
history of capitalism, a significant proportion of the adult working
population has remained unemployed even in successful capitalist
economies. Such a high rate of unemployment seems to be a structural
tendency and not merely accidental to capitalism, resulting in the creation
of a permanent class of unemployed individuals who are excluded from
the fruits of the economic system.
The challenge of ordering resources efficiently to end scarcity has also
remained a pressing one in capitalism. In the past two centuries, when
capitalism has been dominant, the world has witnessed unprecedented
economic crises—an explosive growth of world population, repeated man-
made famine and drought, wars and conflagrations over depleting natural
resources, especially over fossil fuels like oil. New diseases and epidemics
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have arisen to replace the ones conquered by modern medicine, and new
patterns of scarcity have emerged. Most distressingly, the world economy
has been beset by the cyclical crises—‘booms and busts’ that seem
endemic to capitalism. Periods of economic growth, rising incomes and
increased spending power among the population have been followed by
spiralling inflation, poverty and economic ‘slowdown’. These cycles of
inflation and recession have wreaked havoc on economically vulnerable
sections of the population, a fact that had become painfully clear to all by
the start of the 20th century. During the Great Depression of 1929, for
example, the American government was forced to resort to large-scale
destruction of goods (especially agricultural produce) in order to arrest
plummeting prices and looming recession. That this burning of food stocks
took place at a time when millions were starving was not simply tragic, but
a direct refutation of capitalism’s claim of efficient allocation of resources
and satisfaction of demands.
In the present world of advanced or ‘late’ capitalism, concentration of
wealth in the hands of a few at the cost of a decent life for the vast mass of
people has continued. Some argue that the world today is even more
unequal a place than ever before—in the United States, for example, the
foremost economic power of our times, by 1935, one-tenth of one per cent
of all the corporations in the United States owned 52 per cent of all
corporate assets—a pattern that has not significantly changed until today,
and one that is representative of capitalist economies everywhere. Over the
past century, as capitalism has expanded and become dominant in
underdeveloped economies, too, the consequences there have been severe.
Because of the impoverished condition of these countries due to the lasting
effects of colonialism, their governments are usually unwilling to spend
scarce resources on social security. Such social security measures
(employment generation and agricultural subsidies, for example) are
crucial to sustain vulnerable sections of the population during the difficult
transition to capitalism, and during the structural crises endemic to
capitalism. In the past few decades, under pressure from advanced
capitalist countries and from international banks and lending agencies like
the World Bank and the IMF, Third World countries have undertaken pro-
privatization and globalization programmes that involve even lower levels
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of social security. This has rendered the poor more vulnerable to cycles of
inflation and unemployment and has created new patterns of inequality in
underdeveloped countries. Capitalist production has also led to the
destruction of traditional livelihoods and traditional sources of food (like
subsistence farming) in the Third World, forcibly pulling people into the
‘market’ and making them dependent on expensive market-produced
goods.
Therefore, contrary to many of its claims, capitalism does not seem to
have provided an efficient, rational solution to the management of natural
and human resources. More importantly, it has been unsuccessful in
bringing about equality and freedom for all in society. Thus, the challenge
before us as we analyse the contemporary capitalist world is both
economic and ethical—how to order the resources of society according to
rational and efficient lines, and how to build a more humane and fair
society where freedom is not stymied by the lack of equality for all.
THE SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE

By the 18th century, as the Industrial Revolution dramatically transformed
the economies of Western Europe, making factory production dominant
and turning England into ‘the workshop of the world’, there began a mass
migration of labourers to towns to look for work in the mills. These
workers found themselves without the safety net afforded by the lord-serf
relationship of feudalism, or a new one provided by laissez-faire
governments. They were forced to sell their ‘labour power’ whenever there
was demand, working for long unregulated hours in crowded factories,
living in disease-ridden slums that were springing up everywhere, and
demonized as a scourge in popular opinion. It became apparent to all
sympathetic observers that capitalism was creating a new underclass of
impoverished workers—the urban ‘proletariat’. One of the earliest thinkers
to give detailed attention to the problem of inequality in modern
civilization wasJ eanJ acques Rousseau in his work, Discourses on the
Origin of Inequality (1754). Rousseau was not interested in capitalism
specifically, but in tracing the origin of what he termed moral or political
inequality between men through the ages. His ideas became one of the
influences of the French Revolution of 1789, which resulted in the
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formation of a French Republic composed of politically equal citizens, or
citoyens. The French Revolution, however, did not undertake any
thoroughgoing economic transformation, accepting by and large, capitalist
methods of production that were taking root in France.
By the end of the 1700s, several thinkers and reformers in France,
England and elsewhere in Europe began to specifically address to the
conditions of modern industrial capitalist society. This led to the
recognition of the structural inequality within modern capitalism, and to
the limitations of laissez-faire liberal states in providing a solution. The
search for alternatives to capitalism as an economic system and of classical
liberalism as its political counterpart gave rise to a distinct theoretical
approach. This theory was ‘socialism’, and may be identified by certain
central tenets. In particular, socialism involves an analysis of capitalism as
a system with an in-built tendency towards producing and deepening
inequality. Socialists seek radical equality, often devising comprehensive
programmes that reduce or completely remove economic inequalities
among human beings through collective, concerted action. Socialism is
against the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and, in particular,
it is against the institution of private property, summed up in the phrase
popularized by the socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon ‘What is property? It
is theft.’ The aim of socialism is human emancipation through the
enlightened management of society’s resources. Socialists argue that the
profit motive within capitalism makes owners of capital willing to sacrifice
all to the principle of efficiency. It also reduces workers to a collective
force called ‘labour’, robbed of their humanity and degraded into brute
instruments of production. In order to mitigate the continual chaos,
instability, and selfish individualism produced by capitalism, socialism
proposes a peaceful, planned system of economic production and
distribution that is perhaps best described by Marx and Engels’ (1968)
famous formulation— ‘from each according to his ability to each
according to his needs’. It is important to remember that socialism is not
simply a critique of capitalism, but also of mainstream liberal notions,
especially the central liberal tenet of liberty and of the meaning and status
of equality. Let us examine this critique.
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The liberal ideal of liberty describes freedom in purely ‘negative’ terms
as an inviolable sphere around the (bourgeois) individual, protecting him
from both society and the state. Liberal writers claim that since individual
liberty is the source of all progress, its enhancement must be the
paramount aim of society. To interfere with the freedom of the individual
(bourgeois) man is to infringe upon the rights of the individual and to
place dangerous obstacles in the way of social progress and prosperity.
Against this belief, the socialists argue that the legal protection of
unlimited acquisition of property by individuals amounts to the
exploitation of wage-labourers by the owners of capital. According to the
socialist view of freedom, man is a social animal, finding fulfilment in
collective living. Thus, instead of emphasizing the liberty of the abstract
individual that is the central category of liberal thought, socialists
emphasize ‘human emancipation’ that is premised on the manner in which
all human beings participate in social and economic life. In this context,
Karl Marx argues that a majority of individuals perform ‘alienated’ labour
under capitalist production; consequently human freedom is possible only
in the absence of ‘alienation’. As David McLellan (1970) explains, Marx’s
conception of freedom involves replacement of the worker of today
‘crippled by the life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation,
and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed
individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of
production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but
so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired
powers’. Genuine freedom as Marx described it, would become possible
only when life activity was no longer constrained by the requirements of
production or by the limitations of material scarcity. According to Marx,
the external world is part of man’s nature; hence it is crucial to establish
the right relationship between man and his environment. Thus, in the
socialist view, freedom is not an abstract ideal but a concrete situation that
ensues only when certain conditions of interaction between man and
nature, and man and other men are fulfilled.
There has also been a long-standing battle between socialists and
liberals over the meaning of the term equality. Some liberals believe that
radically egalitarian measures would result in oppressive uniformity of
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ideas and behaviour among the population. The 19th century writer Alexis
de Tocqueville expressed this fear in his classic text Democracy in
America (original French, 1835) when he warned against a society where
similarity of ideas and achievement are so highly prized that all forms of
excellence, or freedom of opinion disappear under a shroud of mediocrity.
Tocqueville believed that extreme democratic tendencies could result in a
tyranny of the homogenous majority, or in a society of small, helpless, and
unorganized individuals over whom despotism could be easily exercised.
The 19th century liberal, John Stuart Mill, felt much the same
apprehensions. Mill laid elaborate emphasis on the value of a good liberal
education in order to avoid what he believed were the less desirable
consequences of movements towards equality.
Liberalism now contains at least two well-established positions on
equality (see Chapter 4 on equality in this volume for more details). The
first position seeks to ensure maximum fulfilment of the capacity of each
individual. This is seen to be necessary either in the interest of justice, to
prevent social disaffection, or to make maximum use of human talents for
society as a whole. Notions of fair competition, equality of opportunity,
merit and desert dominate this discourse on equality. The purpose is to
encourage the able and provide upward mobility for the able few through a
vast apparatus of testing, examination and other merit-based barriers in the
fields of education and employment. The other view is best illustrated in
the movement for racial equality in America, and in similar movements
around the world seeking to reverse historic injustices. In this view, people
must be trained and prepared for opportunities, and the pool of capacities
of the entire population must be enlarged. This enhancement of
opportunities may take place at any point in the individuals’ life, in
education or employment, in recruitment or in training, and skill
development. This view on equality is more expansive than the previous
one, and has resulted in policies of reverse discrimination, preferential
treatment, affirmative action, and reservations. With the rise of the welfare
state in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the threat of socialist
revolution especially after the Russian Revolution of 1917, measures
towards greater equality have been incorporated into government policies
in liberal and social democratic states. Notwithstanding these
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developments, however, unease about complete equality remains at the
core of liberal thought and practice. In liberalism, privilege and success are
explained as a result of individual rather than social factors; this success is
defended through the notion of negative liberty. Consequently, lack of
privilege and success are also explained as a result of individual, rather
than social factors, thus relieving the state or society in general of any
responsibility to promote greater equality. By contrast, equality is not a
secondary value but the central organizing principle of all socialist
thought and practice. Socialists argue that the adoption of the above
egalitarian measures by liberal states have resulted in no major changes in
patterns of inequality; therefore, the point is to establish social and
economic institutions that fundamentally promote and preserve equality.
Apart from disagreements over individual concepts of liberty and
equality, liberals and socialists have also disagreed on the relationship
between the two. Liberalism is suspicious of ‘too much’ equality, fearing
that equality beyond a certain point becomes a menace to liberty, not only
in the realm of economic enterprise but also in other spheres. Unlike the
liberals who would defend the right to liberty even at the cost of equality,
and the democrats who would focus on political equality alone, socialists
seek to make the value of liberty conditional on the attainment of equality
for all. In a sense, socialism defends the equal right to liberty of all by
maintaining that without equality, the liberty of some will be premised
upon the lack of liberty for others. Further, socialists argue that since there
is no in-built mechanism within capitalist economies and laissez-faire
governments towards egalitarian measures, the solution is to plan an
egalitarian society in advance and put it into practice.
SOCIALIST SCHEMES: OLD AND NEW

Although Rousseau addressed the problem of inequality as described
above, his thought cannot be labelled ‘socialist’. François-Noël Babeuf, a
philosopher active at the time of the French Revolution is perhaps the first
socialist thinker of modern times. Babeuf established a ‘conspiracy of the
socialists’ and called himself the ‘Tribune of the People’ during the
Revolution. He was fiercely critical of the defence of the right to private
property in the Constitution of the French Republic drafted after the
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Revolution in 1793. In the absence of any thorough programme to address
economic and social inequality, the slogan of the Revolution—‘Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity’—was meaningless for Babeuf. Thus, he opposed the
manner in which the Revolution and liberal slogans about human
emancipation remained empty slogans without removing the primary
source of inequality in society, that is, the institution of private property.
Although Babeuf’s conspiracy was finally crushed, babouvisme (the
French term for Babeufism) with its emphasis on the revolutionary role of
the working class had a lingering influence on the socialist theory.
Henri de Saint-Simon who wrote at the start of the 19th century was
preoccupied with the challenges that the new century represented to him.
According to him, with the collapse of the hierarchical feudal order of the
previous era, there was a need to tackle the problem of inequality in
industrial capitalism. He hoped that Christianity could be reinterpreted
according to its original egalitarian principles for the modern age, and he
attempted this in his best-known work, The New Christianity (1825).
Saint-Simon’s followers—the Saint-Simonians—systematized his ideas
and identified the central elements of his socialism. These included the
abolition of all privileges at birth, the determining of rewards according to
the actual amount of work put in by the individual and the common
ownership of land, capital and all instruments of labour. Tom Bottomore, a
leading commentator on Karl Marx argues that Saint-Simon exercised a
significant influence on Marx’s thought, a fact that is not generally
acknowledged.
Charles Fourier, a French socialist of the 19th century shared with his
compatriot Rousseau the belief that modern civilization was rotten at the
core, and consisted of deceit, hypocrisy and parasitism. According to
Fourier, these were the products of the modern individualistic and
competitive system of production and could be remedied by an elaborate
plan for the reorganization of society according to rational principles of
production and distribution. This plan included the establishing of self-
contained units of cooperative workers called phalanxes composed of
between 400 and 2,000 men and women, each. Members should unite in
groups according to their tastes, which in turn according to Fourier would
be determined by the character of their ‘passions’—their deeply-held
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beliefs. By this arrangement, Fourier hoped that productivity would
increase, enough for people to be active producers from the age of 18–25,
and would enable them to live in leisure for the rest of their lives.
Fourier’s thought is an example of the elaborate and detailed schemes
for radical economic and social reconstruction imagined by socialist
thinkers of his day. The Welsh socialist Robert Owen who lived and wrote
in the late 18th and early 19th century is credited with not simply devising
collectivistic schemes but also with managing to actually implement them
in his lifetime. As mentioned above, the breakdown of old feudal relations
in 18th-century Europe and the rise of industrial capitalism created
precarious conditions for workers. Robert Owen was, in fact, a factory
owner himself; he decided to commit himself to life-long work among
factory workers of the small manufacturing town of New Lanark in
Scotland. He instituted a series of measures that were designed to
transform workers into a self-supporting, self-educating and self-governing
community. He initiated many practices that were later fought for, and
won by trade unions in the 19th and 20th centuries. In fact, most of the
measures that seemed so radical in Owen’s time are now a central part of
all capitalist welfare states. However, Owen was not simply a reformer of
capitalism; he roundly denounced private property. He proposed a
blueprint for socialist communes with communal living and working
arrangements and their supervision by qualified technicians.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels are credited with creating the most
prolific and influential theory of socialism yet. They made a self-conscious
effort to distinguish themselves from other socialists; to this end they
started referring to their work as ‘communist’ rather than merely ‘socialist’
which they dismissed as a vague and dilute body of thought, full of pious
outrage against capitalism and dimly-conceived utopian schemes for the
future. Rather than framing socialism in primarily ethical terms, Marx set
out to devise a systematic, scientific theory of socialism that would stand
the test of actual practice. He believed that the premises from which he
attempted to develop a truly scientific socialism were in his words, ‘not
arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can
be made only in the imagination’. Further, instead of speaking of the need
for building a socialist society as a conscious moral choice, Marx claimed
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that the advent of socialism was inevitable. He made this claim on the
basis of his ‘discovery’ of what he believed were the objective laws of
human society. According to scientific socialism, the ideal community
cannot be planned by thinkers or well-meaning reformers and put into
operation regardless of historical conditions; it must arise out of
revolutionary activity and will be successful only when historically
appropriate. In more specific terms, Marx and Engels argued that socialism
was a stage of historical development, destined to be achieved after a
worldwide revolution by the working class against the private property-
owning bourgeoisie—the chief beneficiaries of the contemporary capitalist
economy. The modern industrial proletariat according to Marx was
effectively excluded from the benefits of the capitalist society; hence it
was the class with the most compelling interest in the overthrow of that
society. He sought to create a rigorous practical doctrine that would help
the proletariat to develop confidence in the success of revolution as a
historical inevitability, and thus resist engaging in premature revolts.
Marx characterizes man as homo faber, or the ‘working species’. This
according to him meant that the material realm—the realm of production
and labour—is the most distinctive feature of human life. This was a
theme found in earlier Socialists like Fourier and Saint-Simon, too, and is
termed materialism, since in such a theory the most important phenomena
in human society are explained through an examination of the manner in
which human beings satisfy their material needs. According to Marx, the
specific manner in which the means of production (land, labour, capital,
enterprise) are organized in a society, gives rise to a particular mode of
production. Further, society can be viewed in terms of a distinction
between the ‘base’ and the ‘superstructure’. The ‘base’ consists of the
economic conditions of life including the ‘means of production’ and the
‘relations of production’. The ‘superstructure’ consisted of ‘the legal,
political, religious, aesthetic or philosophical’ aspects of life. While in
some of his writings Marx explores the influence of the superstructure
upon the base; his belief in materialism leads him to stress the determining
nature of the base within which the superstructure must always operate. In
simple terms, the political formation of the state and the entire edifice of
legal, cultural, social, and ethical systems in society are built upon the
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foundation of the mode of production, or the economic base. So, for
example, the institution of kingship or the medieval state was the
superstructural mode of political organization suitable to the feudal mode
of production; the laissez-faire state is the organization relevant to early
capitalism, the welfare state is the political form necessary for advanced
capitalism, etc. In Marx and Engels’ famous words, ‘The mode of
production of material life determines the general character of the social,
political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men
that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that
determines their consciousness’.
Marx’s belief in materialism led him to formulate a unique theory of
historical change which he termed ‘historical materialism’ and may be
defined thus: historical change takes place with changes in the base, which
are accompanied by changes in the superstructure. Thus, it was material
forces (the mode/means of economic production) rather than ideas that
were the real ‘motors’ of history. According to Marx, every stage in
human history contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. The
continual destruction of one stage and the rise of another occur due to the
fact that except the final stage of communism, every other stage in history
contains inherent contradictions. These contradictions deepen and express
themselves in many forms, primarily in the form of class struggle, until the
system itself collapses to be replaced by a new system.
Marx’s analysis of capitalism followed from the above theses; under
capitalism he argued, owners are forced into ceaseless competition with
each other and weaker capitalists are pushed out of the market. Bankrupt
owners join the ranks of the workers as their circumstances get more and
more impossible, and small-scale enterprises yield to large monopolies.
Society eventually comes to be divided into only two classes—the
bourgeoisie, in whose hands all capital comes to be concentrated, and the
proletariat, the wage earners who have no capital, no private property but
only their labour power to sell. This divide between two classes is the
overt manifestation of the contradictions unique to capitalism. The
‘classconsciousness’ of the proletariat is strengthened as workers are
concentrated in large factories and as their conditions of life grow worse
with every advance of capitalist production. Eventually, the capitalist
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system is overthrown through a workers’ revolution; and a ‘dictatorship of
the proletariat’ established to replace it. The dictatorship according to
Marx and Engels would itself be eventually replaced by a truly classless
communist society, since classes are a manifestation of the contradictions
chracateristic of pre-communist forms of economic production. Under
socialism, marginal differences of function and of income may remain but
they would not be the permanent differences of class. Further, there would
be no private property, and the state—which was viewed by Marx as an
instrument in the hands of the ruling class—would ‘wither away’. Only in
the final stage of human history would the individual be truly free, since
the principle of true equality would ensure that the freedom of some is not
premised on the unfreedom of others.
CONCLUSION
As must be clear from the discussion above, there is immense diversity
within socialist thought regarding the precise problem with capitalism and
the exact solution offered. Apart from the thinkers mentioned above, other
influential socialists include the Bolsheviks Vladimir Lenin, Rosa
Luxemburg and Leon Trotsky; the anarchist socialists Peter Kropotkin and
William Godwin; the ‘possibilists’, including, especially, Paul Brousse;
Marx’s interlocutors Ferdinand Lasalle and Mikhail Bakunin; the
‘revisionist’ socialist Eduard Bernstein; the Russian feminist-socialist
Alexandra Kollontai; the Zionist socialist Moses Hess; the syndicalists; the
Austro-Marxists, including Otto Bauer; and the Fabian socialists Sidney
and Beatrice Webb in England. Socialism and communism also found a
dedicated set of adherents in the non-Western part of the world, including
the powerful legacy of Mao Tse Tung in China, Fidel Castro in Cuba, M.
N. Roy and, more recently, communist leaders like Jyoti Basu and E. M. S.
Namboodiripad in India. To achieve their aims, some socialists have
placed their faith in a reformed state, others wish to abolish the state
altogether and establish self-governing communes; yet others speak of a
historical revolution. Writers have sought to make sense of this huge
variety of socialist theories by distinguishing between various schools of
socialism including ‘utopian’ socialism, ‘scientific’ socialism,
‘democratic’ socialism, ‘anarchist’ socialism, ‘organizational’ socialism,
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‘reformist’ socialism, etc. We must emphasize here that the above
categories of socialism, while useful for understanding the differences
between various types of socialist thought, are not absolute. Owen, for
instance, is classified by some (including Marx himself, as mentioned
above) as a utopian socialist; however, he also expressed great hope in
scientific principles; in particular as mentioned above, the supervision of
communes by technicians. On the other hand, Marxism sought to be
‘scientific’ but in fact, depended on certain concepts that were undeniably
moral or ethical in their origin. Marx stated that he wished to write not
about abstract individuals, but ‘real individuals, their activity and their
material conditions of life’. This is a deeply ethical humanist mission.
As already discussed, Marx and Engels sought to prove that the socialist
society is not a distant dream but a fact of the near future promised by the
scientific laws of historical development. This ‘fact’ never appeared in its
entirety anywhere in the world; however, the 20th century is marked by
attempts to establish socialism in substantial parts of the world. It was such
a socialist state—the USSR—that was officially established in 1917 in
Russia, an example of what has been termed ‘actually existing Socialism’.
It was one socialist state that came closest to achieving success in the face
of huge odds in a predominantly liberal, capitalist world; however, this
socialist experiment ended dramatically in 1991 with the collapse of the
USSR. While North Korea and Cuba remain communist to the present day,
the rest of the so-called ‘Eastern Bloc’ (a Cold War term for the
communist part of the world) has been absorbed into the global capitalist
system over the past few decades. Also, it was the widespread influence of
socialism among the intelligentsia and the masses alike that to a large
extent forced liberal capitalist states in the 19th and 20th centuries to
reform themselves. Arguably, the welfare state that was established in
England in the 19th century and spread to most of the world by the 20th
century was a response within liberalism to the popularity of socialist
ideas, and to the threat of socialist revolution. Policies influenced by the
socialist principle of substantive equality have improved the conditions of
life for millions of human beings in the contemporary world, whether they
live in formally liberal or socialist states.
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Socialism both as thought and practice remains an important critique of
the mainstream form of economic production in the modern world, and a
powerful reminder of the fact that the central liberal values of freedom and
equality can be rendered meaningless in the face of the structural
inequalities produced by capitalism. Socialism, as Bernard Crick reminds
us, is ‘both an empirical theory and a moral doctrine’. It is not an
ahistorical and abstract philosophical theory of equality but a specific
response to the economic and moral contradictions inherent in modernity
—the existence of severe economic inequality since the Industrial
Revolution along with liberal moral values. If one is truly committed to the
ideal of human emancipation, one cannot ignore the stinging critique of
contemporary society and the eloquent vision of a new society given by
socialism.
1. Compare the standard of living of the average CEO and the average factory
worker in terms of satisfaction of basic human needs, including food, clothing,
shelter and means of transportation and entertainment. Do you believe the vast
differences in basic conditions of life between various sections of Indian society
are justified? If not, what do you believe are the reasons for these differences?
If yes, how would you justify them?
2. Make a list of the major droughts/famines/economic crises that have taken
place in the twentieth century (e.g., the Great Bengal Famine, the Great
Depression). Do you believe these were caused entirely by ‘natural’ factors, or
could they have been prevented by better economic management of resources?
3. In the Indian Constitution, there exists a tension between the right to property
and the aim of the Indian state to redistribute wealth towards greater equality
for all (for example, through land reform). If you were to choose between
guaranteed liberty for a minority (including, especially, an unlimited liberty to
own property) and possible equality for the masses, what would you choose?
4. Which socialist states still exist after the collapse of the USSR? What is your
opinion on the ‘actually-existing’ socialist states in the contemporary world?
5. In the career of your choice, do you believe you will have the opportunity to
work in an organization that will provide creatively satisfying work for a
majority of its employees, along with an avoidance of extreme income
inequalities within the organization?
READING LIST
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Bottomore, T. (ed.), Karl Marx. Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956).
Cole, G. D. H., Socialist Thought: The Forerunners 1789–1850 (London: Macmillan,
1953).
Huberman, L. and P Sweezey Introduction to Socialism (New Delhi: Monthly Review
Press, 1968).
Marx, K. and F Engels, Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968).
McLellan, D., Marx Before Marxism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
Miliband, R., Socialism for a Sceptical Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1994).
Nanda, B. R., Socialism in India (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1972).
Saint-Simon, Henri de, The New Christianity (1825).
Tawney R. H., Equality (London: Unwin Books, 1931).
Wright, A., Socialisms: Theories and Practices (Oxford and New York: Oxford
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CHAPTER 17
Nationalism
Sunalini Kumar
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
The History of an Idea
Non-European Nationalism
Theoretical Questions
Analysis and Critique
Conclusion: The Future of an Idea
INTRODUCTION
When you pick up the world atlas, you will see that every single inch of
land in this world has been divided according to the principle of
nationalism. This fact may not strike you as particularly profound unless
you dwell on the fact that this was not always so. When we think of the
nation that we live in today, it seems to be a natural, ancient, and stable
political formation. However, the nation-state was not always the manner
in which a political community was organized—ancient Greece was
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composed of city-states, ancient India was composed of republics and
kingdoms, and since the Roman Empire, Europe has been ruled by
successive monarchs or dynasties in decentralized feudal kingdoms and
empires. In fact, nationalism is no more than 200 years old!
If nationalism is historically such a recent phenomenon, how did it
become such a powerful and universally accepted doctrine? How and
where did it arise and how did it spread around the world? What is the
connection between nationalism and the modern state? The first section of
this chapter answers these questions by outlining the major events and
factors in the historical journey of nationalism, especially its connection
with the modern state. There are several theoretical questions about
nationalism that arise, too. These include: What is the relationship of
nationalism with modern culture and capitalism? Is there a difference
between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ nationalism? Is nationalism an inherently
progressive or regressive political phenomenon? The second half of the
chapter seeks answers to these questions by examining the major
theoretical debates in this field. Unlike several concepts in liberal and
Marxist political theory, an in-depth theoretical study of nationalism has
been remarkably absent within mainstream political science. In fact, the
subject of nationalism has not existed as a distinct field of study, but has
been written about in diverse ways by thinkers within the social sciences in
general. There is also little agreement among writers on what exactly one
means by the term ‘nationalism’. The manner in which one answers the
questions we have raised above depends to a large extent on the definition
one adopts, the field of social science one is working within, and one’s
larger normative and philosophical orientation. We hope that through a
close study of the historical and theoretical aspects of nationalism, you will
get a clearer understanding of these questions, and arrive at possible
answers to them.
It will be useful to begin by defining nationalism as the belief that a
group of people are united by a common history, tradition, language, and
culture, and hence that they should establish a sovereign political
community of their own—the nation. The word ‘nation’, thus, refers to a
close-knit political community with a culturally, linguistically, ethnically
or even racially homogenous population, and a shared history. Although
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no country in the world today satisfies these criteria strictly, the idea of a
nation has been a powerful force in the history of most countries. The
terms ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are sometimes used synonymously; however,
they are two separate entities, as will become clear from the discussion
that follows. The confusion arises from one of the most fundamental
beliefs of nationalism—that every community of people that think of
themselves as a nation should also have a state of their own. Thus, the
hyphenated term ‘nation-state’. According to Hans Kohn, ‘Nationalism
demands the Nation-State; the creation of the Nation-State strengthens
nationalism.’ Max Weber argues, ‘One might as well define the concept of
nation in the following way: a nation is a community of sentiment which
would adequately manifest itself in a State of its own’. ‘Nationalism’ is
any ideology or movement that seeks to establish a particular nationstate,
or to consolidate its power. It is the belief that the nation is/must be the
primary focus of loyalty for individuals and groups within a state; that it
should be the sole object of people’s allegiance. It is also the sense of
loyalty required for people to live and work within the modern state, and to
even die for the state in wars and in internal law enforcement. The
historical study of nationalism clarifies in particular its relationship to the
modern state. Let us examine this history in detail.
THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA

Nationalism is commonly regarded by historians as having originated in
Europe, and more specifically in Western Europe, from where it spread to
other parts of the world. While nationalism, as mentioned above, arose in
the late 18th and 19th centuries, certain political and military events in
Europe began to create the conditions for the rise of nations as early as
14th century. These include the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the
Hundred Years War between the English and French kingdoms.
The most important factor for the rise of nationalism, however, was the
rise of the centralized modern state in Europe around the 16th and 17th
centuries (see Chapter 11 on the state). Nationalism has a structural
connection with the state, and could not have emerged prior to its
existence. Thus, it is important to first understand the rise of the state. The
modern state differs from pre-modern political formations because it
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embodies centralized, sovereign, undivided political power. In contrast, in
medieval Europe, political power was divided instead of being
consolidated in the hands of a single sovereign ruler or government.
Although monarchs and ruling dynasties existed, they shared power both
‘horizontally’ (with the Church) and vertically (with feudal governors or
‘vassals’). The horizontal division of power at the apex of the political
system existed because of the Church being as powerful as individual
rulers, and often even more powerful than them. The power of the church
had steadily grown ever since the adoption of Christianity by the Roman
Emperor Constantine in the 4th century ad. The adoption of Christianity as
the official religion of the Roman Empire meant the dissemination of
Church authority to the farthest corners of the Roman Empire (i.e. most of
the continent of Europe, and as far east as Turkey and Russia). By the 6th
century ad, there existed overlapping zones of authority between the
Catholic Church and individual rulers of kingdoms all across Europe.
While on the one hand, kings justified their rule over subjects by claiming
that they possessed divine sanction, the Church exercised political control
in the non-religious (secular) sense; for instance, in the power to tax
subjects. The presence of this uneasy alliance between religious and
political authority in medieval Europe meant that neither could emerge as
omnipotent, or all-powerful.
The ‘vertical’ check on the ruler’s power in medieval Europe was
provided by the feudal structure. Feudalism was a system of social
stratification which existed throughout medieval Europe. It consisted of
ties of obligation between superiors and subordinates which emphasized
the performance of one’s given duty (or one’s ‘station’) in accordance with
one’s place in the hierarchy. It is important to remember that the feudal
system functioned at both economic and political levels. In the largely
agrarian economies of medieval European kingdoms, an individual’s status
was primarily determined by his/her relationship to the main economic
asset—land. As a result there were vast inequalities in status between
landowners and landless tillers. These status inequalities were concretized
in feudalism through the economic hierarchy between ‘lords’ and ‘serfs’.
Similarly, at the political level, the feudal structure implied a complex
sharing of power vertically downwards from the monarch or emperor. The
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political hierarchy was expressed in distinctions between ‘lords’ and
‘vassals’. Each lord enjoyed jurisdiction over his vassal, who in turn
enjoyed jurisdiction over his vassal, and so on.
In pre-modern Europe, therefore, there were several factors that
prevented the formation of a centralized political community with a fixed
territory and population. Most importantly, as already discussed, the power
of the kings and monarchs was limited and was often only primus inter
pares (first among equals) when considered in relation to the Church and
feudal governors. The Church commanded people’s loyalty and obedience,
encouraging the development of an overarching Christian identity across
Europe that often overrode loyalty to individual rulers or kingdoms. Rulers
were forced to depend on their vassals to execute the basic tasks of
government—especially taxation and administrative control.
Technological impediments like lack of advanced transport and
communication networks made the sharing of political power not simply a
convention but a necessity for individual monarchs. Rebellion by vassals
remained an ever-present threat for individual rulers due to the latter’s
dependence on the former. The changing political equations between
various kings, lords and vassals due to war, conquest or secession meant
that the borders of medieval political communities could not be absolute.
Further, marriage alliances between royal families from different
kingdoms were often accompanied by large dowries and gifts of land and
territory, with the consequence that subjects of one king could suddenly
find themselves subjects of another king following a royal marriage! In the
absence of modern rules of residence and citizenship, subjects were also
free to move across kingdoms to live, work, or marry. As a consequence of
all these patterns of decentralization of politics, administration, law, and
culture, the daily life of populations within feudal kingdoms continued in
all its local diversity and peculiarity, largely unaffacted by changing
political scenarios. The speech, behaviour, and social practices of
populations across Europe were incredibly diverse, deriving more from
local customs and conventions rather than from a centralized authority.
This prevented the formation of any larger homogenized cultural identity
among populations across diverse territories, and such an identity is crucial
to modern nationalism.
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Gradually, political conditions changed and led to the weakening and
collapse of the feudal and religious forces in European society. One of the
most important factors in this change was the rise of Absolutist monarchs
(like the Tudor dynasty in England and the Bourbon dynasty in France).
They consolidated their political power with the help of the newly
emerging trading and merchant classes—the merchant capitalists, or the
mercantile bourgeoisie. Merchant capitalism and trade became rich
sources of wealth in early modern Europe, allowing monarchs to
considerably reduce their dependence on taxation from feudal agrarian
production, and thus reduce their dependence on vassals. Eventually,
capitalism came to replace feudalism almost entirely, resulting in the loss
of political power of feudal governors and allowing kings to exercise
‘absolute’ power over their kingdoms; hence the term ‘absolutist’. At the
same time, the religious reformation of the 15th century dealt a heavy
blow to the power of the Catholic Church. With the waning of both
vertical and horizontal challenges to their authority by the 16th century,
monarchs were able to establish direct, effective and comprehensive rule
over the entire population within their kingdoms. They strictly enforced
territorial boundaries, standardized population in the realms of religion,
education and language, maintained standing armies and introduced
stricter rules of residence and mobility for citizens, in order that they may
develop a sense of loyalty towards their respective rulers. Advancements
in transport, communication, and technologies of governance meant that
monarchs could achieve these political aims more effectively. These
developments had far-reaching consequences. Indeed, absolutism led to
the formation of the earliest form of the modern state—the absolutist state.
It is important to remember that Absolutist states resembled contemporary
states in many ways—they possessed sovereignty, centralized government,
and fixed territorial boundaries. However, they were ruled by what we
consider a pre-modern institution—the monarchy. The idea of ‘absolutism’
is best captured in the famous (or notorious!) statement by the absolutist
king, Louis XIV of France—‘I am the State’.
The doctrine of nationalism may be understood in the context of these
large-scale historical events. The standardization and fixing of territorial
boundaries and populations by absolutist kings had laid the objective
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foundation of nations; ‘nations’ being defined as a culturally,
linguistically, and ethnically homogeneous population united within a
state. As a subjective feeling, nationalism became the philosophy of the
emerging elites of Western Europe, the ‘bourgeoisie’. The bourgeoisie
(initially mercantile and later industrial capitalists) were important political
allies of the Absolutist kings in their rise to power. Ironically, they soon
became restless for greater political rights and representation, dominating
newly-established representative assemblies and parliaments across
Western Europe. This led to the famous tussle between king and
parliament in early modern Europe; the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in
England is a prime example. During this tussle, the idea of the ‘nation’
(derived from the Latin root ‘natio’, which pertains to birth, or origin)
became very significant as a sense of identity for the bourgeoisie. At a
time when familiar feudal social and political institutions were decaying
all across Western Europe, especially after the Industrial Revolution of the
18th century, nationalism united diverse sections of the bourgeoisie
through these historic upheavals. The ‘nation’ was used to refer to a
homogenous, ancient, close-knit political community that had
miraculously survived intact in the modern age, and that had to be revived.
This myth of ancient-ness was a powerful one, expressed especially
forcefully in ‘Romantic’ nationalism that arose later in Germany.
Nationalism, thus, arose as a powerful unifying force in the modern era,
allowing the bourgeoisie to speak in the name of a seemingly primordial
community called the ‘nation’ while bargaining for greater political power
within their respective modern states. So, how did nationalism become a
popular, or mass phenomenon? For the masses, nationalism served a
similar purpose (as discussed above in the context of the elites)—
opposition to political power. To simplify a complex picture, as absolutist
monarchs struggled to hold on to their power in the face of decreasing
support from the bourgeoisie, they resorted to increasingly desperate and
despotic forms of rule. As a response to this, the masses took to the streets
in protest, and there were successive waves of popular pressure on
absolutist states (for example, the French Revolution of 1789). We may
clarify here that while revolts, mutinies and uprisings against political
power have existed from time immemorial, by the 18th and 19th centuries
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in Europe, these popular revolts were increasingly expressed in
‘nationalist’ terms. Often, the leadership of the national movement would
remain in the hands of the elites, and the popular element would ebb and
flow. Occasionally, a local rebellion against a ruler or provincial governor
would be strategically utilized by the bourgeoisie in order to launch a full-
scale nationalist agitation against the monarch.
To summarize and conclude this section, as absolutist states transformed
into limited, or constitutional states, and finally to democratic states
towards the end of the 19th century, nationalism became a rallying call for
greater political power or rights for both the bourgeoisie and the masses in
the modern age. It is important to remember that the above is only a
simplified sketch; nationalism has differed vastly according to specific
historical, cultural, and geographical conditions in various parts of Europe
and elsewhere. For example, in France, the violent mass element was
stronger than it was in England. Hence, it was the mass political groups
that participated in the French Revolution rather than a Parliament that
created and popularized the idea of the French nation as an embodiment of
liberty in opposition to the excesses of absolutism. In many parts of
Europe, nationalism even among the elites arose as late as the 19th
century. The reasons for this phenomenon may be found in the different
geographical and cultural conditions and divergent processes of state
formation in these areas. In England, state formation had taken place under
relatively peaceful conditions due partly to its geographical and cultural
isolation from the rest of Europe; hence a distinctive English nation could
be shaped within the boundaries of the existing English state. However,
where large multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic empires had transformed into
states, the boundaries of ‘nations’ and ‘states’ did not always neatly
coincide. These empires initially became multi-national states, which
gradually broke up into individual nation states. The phenomenon of
nationalism was more conflict-ridden and often violent in these areas; one
clear example of this could be seen in the history of nations like Bosnia
and Herzegovina that were born from the debris of the old Austro-
Hungarian Empire. In these areas, nationalism arose to demand the
creation of the nation-state, rather than merely for the establishment of a
subjective sense of loyalty among the population of existing states. In the
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case of Germany, too, the nation-state of ‘Germany’ was created in the
19th century out of the princely republics that comprised the crumbling
Holy Roman Empire.
NON-EUROPEAN NATIONALISM
Within Europe, nationalism had spread from the elites to the masses by the
end of the 19th century. At this time, nationalism also began to spread
from Europe to other parts of the world. The salient factors in this regard
were trade and colonialism. As early as the 18th century, European powers
were engaged in securing lucrative trading outposts around the globe; by
the end of the 19th century this search became a ‘mad scramble’ for
colonies. As European powers opened up inner territories of Asia, Africa
and Latin America for their own profit and exposed the native populations
to the outside world, they ironically dug their own graves by fuelling
national liberation struggles in their colonies. As the historian Benedict
Anderson points out, the doctrine of nationalism was inadvertently
‘exported’ to Latin America, Asia and Africa by European colonial
powers! Just as popular revolts had opposed despotic rulers within Europe,
national liberation struggles in the colonies expressed popular frustration
at arbitrary and unjust colonial policies. Interestingly, the leadership of
national liberation movements was initially in the hands of the bourgeoisie
in the colonies, too—often foreign educated, professional middle classes—
who saw themselves as leaders of an indigenous nation opposing the
imperialist European nations. Gradually, the mass element began to enter
anti-colonial nationalism. In the Indian case, for example, historians have
argued that the importance of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was
precisely in effecting a transformation of Indian nationalism from the
limited, middle-class nationalism of the Indian National Congress in the
1890s and 1900s to a radical mass movement from the 1920s onwards.
The solidarity between various liberation struggles may have been an
additional factor in the demise of colonialism and the rise of non-European
nationalism. Anti-colonial nationalist movements benefited from
communication between colonized areas, which was ironically made
possible by colonialism itself. For instance, the defeat of an imperialist
power like Russia by a tiny Asian nation, Japan in 1904–1905, created a
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tremendous sense of confidence all over the colonized, non-European
world. Similarly, the non-cooperation movement launched by Gandhi in
India expressed solidarity with the anti-colonial khilafat movement in
Turkey. Further, after World War, the legitimacy of imperialism as a
principle of political rule had decreased considerably at an international
level. The growing success of Asian and African anti-colonial struggles
made imperialism an increasingly expensive enterprise both materially and
morally. Materially, colonies became not simply ungovernable, but also
unprofitable for many reasons. Morally, imperialism was opposed not
simply by nationalist leaders and masses in the colonies, but also by liberal
democratic governments that had been elected to power in Europe. Due to
a combination of the above factors, there was a wave of decolonization in
the colonized world after World War II, and by the third quarter of the
20th century, modern nation-states had been established in most of Asia,
Africa and Latin America.
THEORETICAL QUESTIONS
Nationalism and Modern Culture

Many writers have attempted to examine the precise connection between
nationalism and modern culture. These include Karl Wolfgang Deutsch
who argues in his work, Nationalism and Social Communication (1962)
that nationalism is an expression of cultural and social mechanisms
peculiar to modernity, such as modern communications. Ernest Gellner’s
Nations and Nationalism (1983) is an important attempt to understand the
role of cultural factors in nationalism, and vice-versa. In his now-famous
words:
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though
long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-
existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often
obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse…
Thus, Gellner argues that it is not nations that create nationalism but
rather, that nationalism creates nations, a fact that certainly seems to be
true for the history of most recent nation-states. In this process, according
to Gellner, the principle of nationalism exerts a homogenizing pressure on
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pre-modern cultures, exploiting them and transforming them to fulfil its
project of creating a homogenous ‘national’ culture. Nationalism also
obliterates obscure ‘little traditions’ and reinvents and homogenizes ‘great
traditions’ in order to create a basis for the modern nation. Gellner’s
analysis can be used by us to understand the rise of Hindu nationalism, or
Hindutva in India. Hindutva seeks to promote the development of a
(Hindu) Indian nation by the propagation of a homogenized Hindu ‘high’
culture that ignores diverse local, folkloric traditions in favour of a limited
set of upper-caste, Sanskritic traditions. This project of Hindutva is
expressed in the demand for a common national language (Sanskritized
Hindi), a common deity (Lord Ram) and a common place of worship for
all Hindus—the site of Lord Ram’s birth in the north Indian city of
Ayodhya. This last demand was expressed as the Ramjanmabhoomi
movement and culminated in the destruction of a mosque—the Babri
Masjid—that allegedly stood at the site of Ram’s birthplace. Interestingly,
there is also a continuous reference in the Hindutva discourse to a glorious
ancient past—the ‘Vedic Age’—as the origin/root of the Hindu nation. As
mentioned above, the idea of common origin or birth is a part of the
history of nationalism in Western Europe, too. In this aspect, Hindu
nationalism is strikingly similar to German ‘Romantic’ nationalism
mentioned above.
Gellner also seeks to demonstrate that nationalism has a structural
connection with the needs of modern industrial society. He argues that
‘The social organisation of agrarian society is not at all favourable to the
nationalist principle’. According to him, the need of modern industrial
economies for a mobile and interchangeable workforce requires complex
new skills and social formations beyond the resources of family and
kinship ties. Such skills according to Gellner ‘can only be provided by a
public education system and integrated by (preferably) a single language
and within a centralized political, economic, and educational system’; in
other words, within the modern nation-state. The universality of
nationalism in the contemporary world stems from the fact that it is the
only form of political organization that is appropriate to the social and
material conditions of modern society. Further, nationalism can unite
sections of the population that would compete fiercely otherwise for
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valued modern occupations—jobs and political careers. Thus, seen through
Gellner’s eyes, nationalism is a sine qua non of industrialization, because
it provides people with a powerful motivation for making painful changes
necessary for creating modern industrial societies. The cultural
homogeneity required by nationalism is also useful for industrial society in
many ways. Thus, to simplify Gellner’s thesis, nationalism is intrinsic to
both modernity and industrialization.
Nationalism and Capitalism

The relationship between nationalism and capitalism has been analysed by
the Marxists and non-Marxists alike. Marxists argue that during the four
centuries old development of capitalism, nationalism has to a great extent
arisen as an ally of capitalism, as a bourgeois ideology. For example,
Hobsbawm believes that nationalism is a symptom of capitalism at a
particular stage of its development. Nationalism unites the dominant
classes—the bourgeoisie—and creates a false sense of community between
them and the masses in the face of the latter’s impoverishment and
exploitation by capitalism (for more details, see Chapter 16 on Socialism).
Marxism believes that nationalism offers individuals an identity and a
means to belong to a community that seems egalitarian and unified, but
actually is not so. This is because all nations are characterized by deep
economic and social inequalities even today. Thus, Marxists would argue
that the unity in nationalist thought can be a mythical one, and does not
reflect the real conditions of human beings in the modern, predominantly
capitalist world. Benedict Anderson, an influential writer on nationalism
expresses this Marxist insight when he calls nations ‘Imagined
Communities’ (1983). According to Anderson (1983: 7), nations are
imagined because,
The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion … regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation
that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived of as a deep, horizontal
comradeship. Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past
two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to
die.…
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Nationalism: Western or Eastern
The question of whether there is a difference between Eastern and Western
nationalism is a thorny one, since Western thinkers on nationalism have
often used positive terminology to describe Western nationalism and
negative terminology for Eastern nationalism. For instance, according to
Hans Kohn (1945: 36), ‘Western nationalism was connected with the
concepts of individual liberty . the later nationalism in Central and Eastern
Europe and in Asia easily tended towards a contrary development.’
Edward Shils similarly believes that one can draw a clear demarcation
between the West and the East on the question of nationalism. Shils argues
that rather than the secular, rational reasons that draw people into politics
in the Western nations; the people of the East are drawn into politics
because of what he calls their ‘deep preoccupation with authority’. With
the collapse of traditional sources of political authority due to colonialism
in the East, the eastern individual longs for incorporation into a new,
alternative collectivity. According to Shils, nationalism in the Eastern
states can be understood as an expression of this overwhelming, irrational
need. Theorists also argue that since nationalism is imported into non-
Western states by colonialism, it tends to be a more artificial and unstable
phenomenon here, spawning dangerous tendencies towards violence and
extremism.
Nationalism: Progressive or Regressive

There has always existed a debate between those theorists who view
nationalism as a conservative, retrograde phenomenon and those who view
it as progressive and desirable. The dismissal of nationalism as a
regressive or even reactionary force has come from a diverse set of
political and ideological positions; Marxism, as mentioned above, has
traditionally been hostile to nationalism. For example, Rosa Luxemburg
(1971) believed that nationalism instils a sense of loyalty in the minds of
the working class towards the existing state, and towards the ruling classes
that are allied with the state. Luxemburg argued that even if the idea of the
‘right of nations to self-determination’ was relevant or meaningful to the
mass of the world’s population at some point, it had become meaningless
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or impossible under modern capitalist conditions. Many writers have
opposed nationalism for its narrow particularism and its capacity to
construct the myth of homogeneous identity. The great Indian poet and
writer Rabindranath Tagore remained deeply suspicious of nationalism
throughout his life for these reasons. Paul Gilroy in his book The Black
Atlantic (1993) reminds us that marginalization of diverse traditions and
experiences seems in-built into nationalism anywhere in the world.
Gilroy’s thesis is that racial immigration through slavery has been central
to the history of modern Western nation-states but this is a truth that has
been obliterated in the commonly held idea that all English people are
white, and that the English nation has survived intact from antiquity.
England is one of the most multi-racial, multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic and
even multi-national countries in the world today; yet some varieties of
English nationalism continue to draw on a small, homogeneous set of
medieval, white upper-class traditions as the foundation of the English
nation. Gellner’s analysis on nationalism and culture may be recalled here.
Support for nationalism has also come from diverse and sometimes
surprising quarters. The influential Marxist scholar Aijaz Ahmad
understands nationalism in a manner similar to Ernest Gellner when he
argues that nationalism may be a stage in the often painful transition of
traditional societies to modernity. As discussed above, Marxism views
nationalism as a bourgeois ideology that accompanies the rise of the
modern state. Marxists like Ahmad believe that the modern nation state is
a necessary historical stage in the ultimate establishment of a stateless,
classless society (for more details see Chapter 16 on socialism). Therefore,
Ahmad does not share the suspicion of nationalism that some other
Marxist thinkers display. Rather, he argues that nationalism may be seen
as a ‘cementing force’ in the transition of societies to modernity, and
ultimately to socialism. Especially for Third World states, nationalism is
viewed by many contemporary Marxist writers and activists as a powerful
and useful tool to resist the forces of global capitalism. Ahmad, for
instance, argues for the ‘actuality, even the necessity of progressive and
revolutionary kinds of nationalism’ in order to defend the interests of
weaker states in the international hierarchy of states. Most Third World
nationalism has its roots in anti-colonial struggle. Marxists who
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characterize the contemporary global economic system as ‘neo-colonial’
would argue thus: that just as nationalism can be used to oppose
colonialism, it can be employed to oppose neo-colonialism and
multinational corporations (MNCs). In India, for example, sections of
communist political parties have often supported even non-communist
national governments in their stand against MNCs. This nationalist
position, which stands directly opposed to the traditional pro-working
class, internationalist stance of Marxism, is justified on the basis of the
defence of weaker states against the moves of powerful Western
multinationals.
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

As regards the connection between nationalism and modern culture, the
idea common to the theories discussed above is that nationalism is the
‘religion of modernization’ or the ideological corollary to the material fact
of modernization. There is no doubt that nationalism has a structural
connection with modernization as is evinced by its rise two centuries ago.
Nationalism may have provided individuals from different classes with a
sense of identity and connection in the face of the massive economic and
political upheavals that accompanied modernity. However, it must be
emphasized that neither modernization per se, nor its connection with
nationalism is a straightforward phenomenon. First, nationalism often
works against modernization, as is the case with nationalist economic
opposition to international trade agreements, even where it can be
demonstrated that the new rules would foster industrial modernization in
the country. Gellner’s analysis also becomes somewhat untenable when we
consider nationalism in the developing world. Most Third World countries
today are composed of combinations of agrarian and industrial forms of
production. In other words, instead of having witnessed a neat transition
from agrarian to industrial society, Third World societies seem to
simultaneously contain all the ‘stages’ of historical development that
Gellner speaks of. Thus, the notion of a development from traditional to
agrarian society, and of nationalism as facilitating this process is
unsustainable given the contemporary nationalism of the Third World.
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Second, the distinction between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ nationalism
must be questioned. The tendency to view all ‘Eastern nationalisms’ as
somehow lacking in the healthy values associated with Western
nationalism, is very common in conventional literature. For instance, Shils
in the context of ‘Eastern’ nationalism argues that it contains ‘a deficient
trend of civility’. The distinction between cultural and political
nationalisms may be more useful. However, most scholars see western
nationalisms as political and eastern ones as cultural. This distinction
remains controversial, since some writers have argued the exact opposite
—whereas most European nations emerged ‘organically’ from indigenous
historical processes, colonized nations are highly artificial creations since
their boundaries have been constructed by the imperial powers. So, they
would argue that Western nations are cultural whereas Eastern nations are
political. For instance, the continuing ethnic conflict in many African
states may point to the fact that colonial rulers arbitrarily created their
boundaries with scant respect for local ethnic loyalties. As a result, many
ethnic and tribal communities were split between two nations. Conversely,
a huge diversity of ethnic groups were randomly bound together in the
confines of a modern nation-state, as a result of which there was a fierce
and often bloody conflict between groups for political power. This random
‘binding together’ of groups with little cultural or ethnic similarity could
be seen as the result of a conscious political action, which in turn may
arise from a political form of nationalism, writers have argued.
There is undoubtedly a contrast that can be drawn between traditional
political membership and modern citizenship; however, it is also true that
all nationalisms share some basic features, allowing, of course, for
historical and geographical differences. Therefore, to classify Eastern
nationalism as non-liberal, dangerous and impassioned and Western
nationalism as reasonable and cosmopolitan is inaccurate and misleading.
The ‘irrational’ element is a characteristic of Western nationalism as much
as of Eastern nationalism, as argued convincingly by theorists like Elie
Kedourie, Tom Nairn and Isaiah Berlin, among others. For instance,
Kedourie points to the revolutionary element in Indian nationalism, with
its worship of the goddess Kali as having the same roots as the irrational,
violent, spiritual, and collective elements in the Romantic nationalism of
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Europe.Also, the idea of a liberal, reasonable, cosmopolitan Western
nationalism that is devoid of any unhealthy values including resentment
and xenophobia may be a normative ideal rather than reality in Western
states. Paul Gilroy’s analysis of nationalism in Western states (discussed
above) may be useful to remember in this regard. In fact, the historian
John Breuilly believes that the welding of universalistic political discourse
with a particularistic ethnic one constitutes the fundamental principle of all
nationalisms. John Hutchinson provides a well-argued corrective to such a
simplistic distinction when he maintains that ‘cultural and political
nationalism represent two competing conceptions of the nation, each of
which feed off each other’.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AN IDEA

At the start of the 21st century, increasing economic globalization, mass
migration, and technological advancements like the Internet and mobile
phones seem to have dramatically ‘shrunk the planet’. The lifestyles of the
elites all over the globe are now strikingly similar; for many classes of
people, national identity has become irrelevant at the everyday level—
they use the same slang, travel in the same manner and even eat the same
food! Migration of human beings has increased manifold, with a huge
number of individuals seeking to live and work in countries far away from
their own. Writers argue that in the face of an increasingly globalized
world, old political formations like the nation will lose their earlier role
and relevance. David Beetham, for instance, argues that the very forces
that strengthened nationalism in the previous era will cause its downfall in
the coming one. Some writers believe that rather than national formations,
it is trans-national economic and political alliances that will set the agenda
for the world’s people in this, and in the coming centuries. In this context,
writers point to the example of the EU as proof of the decline of the nation
state. Europe being widely regarded as the birthplace of nationalism, the
formation of the EU on this very continent has led some writers to believe
that nationalism and other such ‘primitive’ ideologies will be overcome in
this new epoch. Many writers and political commentators believe that the
coming centuries will move in the direction of cosmopolitan, universal,
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global values, and the nationalist bloodbaths of the previous century will
be distant memories.
However, well into the 21st century, a decline of nationalism seems
nowhere in evidence. Nationalism as a political force seems alive and
well, expressed in myriad forms like cultural revivalist movements in the
East, debates on race and immigration all over the world, and most
recently, in the controversy over business process outsourcing (BPO) in
Western states. You may recall that opposition to outsourcing in Western
countries was conducted in nationalist language, with implicit elements of
xenophobia and racism against workers in Third World states. Further,
national ‘self-determination’ movements are active, whether in Kashmir,
in Palestine, or as witnessed in the recent liberation of East Timor from
Indonesia. Nationalism has been, and will in all likelihood continue to be,
at the core of many of the most bitter and important struggles well into the
21st century. The theorist Michael Billig, for example, argues that
nationalism as a phenomenon is too deeply and thoroughly ingrained in
modern life to study it narrowly in terms of particular social movements
and make sharp and sweeping distinctions between nationalisms. Billig’s
central claim is that if all states today are nation-states, then nationalism is
simply the ideology that maintains all nation-states as nation-states. In this
context Billig (1997) refers to the idea of ‘banal nationalism’—the
everyday, routine forms of nationalism practised by First World states—
from the restrictions on immigration to the widespread use of national
symbols such as flags and songs.
To conclude, it may be useful to understand nationalism as a universal
contemporary political phenomenon; not simply an occasional, spectacular
outpouring of patriotic sentiment, but as a part of the history of the modern
state. Nationalism has often joined hands with the democratic state and
liberal politics, as the experience of Third World leaders like Gandhi,
Nehru, and Kenyatta has shown. It can be a powerful transformative force
that can achieve miracles in large and impoverished societies, as expressed
in the idea of ‘nationbuilding’. Nationalism has especially been an ally for
post-colonial societies seeking to unite large and diverse populations and
fulfil difficult developmental goals within an unequal global capitalist
system. However, it has also become entwined with more dangerous
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ideologies like religious extremism of any sort, fundamentalism and even
fascism. To understand why nationalism can be healthy or regressive,
powerful or limited in its scope, one must remember above all the
historical contingencies that accompanied its rise, and in particular its
complex historical relationship with the modern state. The blending of the
universal and the particular, the banal and the spectacular, the routine and
the extraordinary, the reasonable and the irrational is what constitutes the
most striking feature of nationalism anywhere in the world, and perhaps
gives us a compelling explanation for the continuing power of this
ideology well into the 21st century.
1. The Indian state was formally created in 1947, when the British handed over
power to the Indians. However, the Indian national movement is much older: as
old as the late 19th century. Therefore, is India a state or a nation? Or, like
some European countries, is it a ‘multi-nation state’?
2. Read the quote by Benedict Anderson on page 266. Is India an ‘imagined
community’?
3. Are American, French or British citizens influenced by nationalism? Is there a
difference between nationalism in the West and in post-colonial states like
India? Do you find Michael Billig’s idea of ‘banal nationalism’ useful to
understand this issue?
4. Nationalism may not end with the creation of the nation-state. It may continue
even after Independence. Can you think of five examples from recent Indian
experience?
5. Is there a difference between nationalism, ‘patriotism’, ‘nation-building’ and
‘sub-nationalism’? Can you think of examples for each? Is there anything
common to all of the above?
READING LIST
Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Growth of
National Consciousness (London: Verso, 1983).
Anderson, P, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1996).
Berlin, I., The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays (New York: Farrar
Straus and Giroux, 2000).
Billig, M., Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1997).
Carr, E. H., Nationalism and After (London: Penguin, 1945).
384
Deutsch, K. W, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1962).
Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
Gilroy, Paul, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness (Harvard:
Hall, S., ‘The State in Question’, in G. McLennan, D. Held and S. Hall (eds), The Idea
of the Modern State (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1984).
Hobsbawm, E. J., Nations and Nationalism Since 1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge
Kedourie, E., Nationalism in Asia and Africa (New York: The World Publishing
Company, 1970).
Kohn, Hans, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1945).
Luxemburg, Rosa, The Accumulation of Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1964).
———, Selected Political Writings (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971).
Seth, S., Marxist Theory and Nationalist Politics (New Delhi: Sage, 1995).
Smith, A., Nationalism: A Reader, Vol I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
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CHAPTER 18
Secularism
Rajeev Bhargava
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Secularism: The Broad Definition
Political Secularism
Crisis for Secular States
Theocracy, States with Established Religions and Secular States: A Normative

Comparison
An Alternative Conception: Indian Secularism
Is Secularism a Christian and Western Doctrine?
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
Most doctrines or ideologies advocate something but also define
themselves in opposition to some other things. For example, feminism
advocates gender equality and justice. But it can also be understood in
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opposition to patriarchy, as a theory resisting institutionalized male
domination. Similarly, environmentalism advocates the protection of our
natural environment but it can also be viewed as against its destruction by
the wilful or negligent acts of human beings.
SECULARISM: THE BROAD DEFINITION

How, then, is secularism to be understood? The best way to understand the
animating principle of secularism is to see it in opposition to religious
hegemony, religious tyranny and religious and religion-based exclusion.
The goal of secularism, defined most generally, is to ensure that the social
and political order is free from institutionalized religious domination so
that there is religious freedom, freedom to exit from religion, inter-
religious equality and equality between believers and non-believers. Thus,
religion defines the scope of secularism. The very point of secularism is
lost either when religion disappears or if it purges itself from its
oppressive, tyrannical, inegalitarian or exclusionary features. If religion is
exhaustively defined in terms of these oppressive features, then the goal of
secularism is to eliminate religion altogether. However, since religion is
not necessarily tyrannical or oppressive, we might see the objective of
secularism as the reform of religion but from a vantage point that is non-
partisan. Secularism may then be seen not as intrinsically opposed to
religion but as advocating critical respect towards it.
But why call this religion-related doctrine ‘secularism’? The word
‘secular’ comes from the Latin word ‘saeculum’, meaning ‘this time’ as
distinct from some ‘other time’, say ‘time’ related to divinity. It also came
to mean ‘this world’, as distinct from some ‘other world’. In a deeply
religious context, where living in this world is usually considered lower
than living in some other world or where, in the last instance, freedom
means a permanent escape from this world, ‘this world’ and ‘this time’
have an inferior quality. A doctrine such as secularism must deny the
lowly quality of this world. But it need not be committed to its opposite
view, which dogmatically asserts the absence of another world. All it must
be committed to is the idea that living in ‘this world’ and ‘this time’ are
significant enough for all human beings and no matter which other mode
of being an entity might have, it undeniably exists in ‘this world’ and ‘this
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time’. Whatever else they might be, human beings and their material and
social worlds are this-worldly or secular and this is a significant enough
fact about them.
Secularism is committed first to the view that, whether or not they exist
elsewhere, all human beings exist on the secular plane. This view is
assumed, presupposed or actually believed by all human beings. If so, even
deeply religious people must accept that all human institutions including
those which focus on God are entangled with everything in ‘this world’
and in ‘this time’. Second, it presupposes that any human institutions in
this world can turn oppressive or inegalitarian. If this is true, and if we are
troubled about oppression, tyranny or hierarchy, then this concern must
manifest itself in relation to everything in ‘this world’ and ‘this time’,
including those institutions and practices that focus on some other world
or entity This is why some of the most religious and ‘other worldly’ people
were concerned about religious tyranny and oppression, particularly within
their own religion. Just think of Buddha, Jesus, Nanak, Kabir, Luther,
Gandhi or Phule. They were all motivated by internal religious reform.
Though not secular, they were, in an important sense, all part of a secular
struggle. In their own way and to different degrees, they at least had
affinities with secularists!
POLITICAL SECULARISM
I have defined secularism in rather broad terms, but still as a normative
doctrine. Political secularism is narrowly defined but is also normative. It
answers the question as to what should the appropriate relation between
state and religious institutions be, given the background that animates
secularism more generally, that is, to end religious hegemony, oppression
and exclusion. The broadest and perhaps the vaguest answer provided by
political secularism is that the two must be separated. Here, then, is the
first initial formulation: political secularism is a normative doctrine for
which the state should be separated from religious institutions to check
religious tyranny, oppression or hierarchy and to promote religious and
non-religious freedoms and equalities. Put schematically, it advocates the
separation of state and religious institutions for the sake of values, such as
the ones mentioned above.
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Political secularism does not come in one unique form. It is open to
many interpretations. Thus, there are many conceptions of political
secularism, depending on how the metaphor of separation is unpacked,
which values the separation is meant to promote, how these values are
combined and what weight is assigned to each of them. I shall return to
this point about different conceptions of secularism. However, to grasp its
structure, it is first important to contrast political secularism with doctrines
to which it is in one sense related and yet, opposed. Such anti-secular
doctrines favour not separation but a union or alliance between religion
and state. If political secularism advocates a state that separates itself from
religion (a secular state), then doctrines it opposes seek a union with
religion (theocracy) or an alliance with it (state with established religion).
Theocracy, States with Established Religions and Secular States: An

Exposition
There are at least three types of states to which a secular state can be
contrasted: (a) a theocratic state, (b) a state that establishes one religion,
and (c) a state that establishes multiple religions.
A theocratic state is one where a priestly order directly administers the
state by reference to what it believes are divine laws. In such states,
religious and political orders are identical. In contemporary times, the
Islamic Republic of Iran, as Ayatollah Khomeini aspired to run it, or the
state in Afghanistan run by the Taliban provide the best approximation of a
theocracy. If the Indian state was to be run by an elite class of Brahmins in
accordance with the Dharmashastras, then it would be theocratic. Such a
theocratic state must be distinguished from a state that establishes religion.
In such states religion is granted formal or legal recognition. There is an
official alliance between the state and religion. However, a priestly order
does not directly govern in such states. If so, there is a large measure of
institutional differentiation in such states, i.e. religious institutions are
distinct from political institutions. Likewise, religious personnel are
different from political rulers. The two institutions also perform different
functions. For example, the religious order or the Church is meant to
secure salvation. The political order exists in order to maintain peace and
order, primarily in temporal matters. This second-order disconnection
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between religious and political institutions, also referred in some contexts
as Church-state separation, goes hand in hand with an overall ideological
connection. For example, in the last instance, both sets of institutions share
common ends. The state is subordinate to religious ends even though it has
its own function, power structure, and internal norms. Because of this
primary firstorder connection of ultimate ends, there is an automatic third-
order connection at the level of law and policy. In such states, religion is a
natural object of law and policy. For example, the revenue collected by the
state is available for religious purposes. The state may enact law
compelling individuals to congregate for religious purposes.
States that establish religion are of two types. Some establish one
religion. For centuries, England, Scotland, and Germany established
Protestant Christianity. Italy and Spain promoted Catholicism. There are
many states in the world today with one officially recognized religion. For
example, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are Islamic states. In the second type,
a state establishes not one but many religions. With his policy of toleration
for all religions, Emperor Ashoka came closest to it. It may also have been
an aspiration of the Mughal emperor Akbar. Perhaps another example is
the 14th-century Vijayanagar kingdom that granted recognition not only to
Shaivites and Vaishnavites but also to the Jains.
Secular states are different from each of these three types of states. To
understand this difference at a more abstract and general level, let me
distinguish three orders of disconnection to correspond with the already
identified three orders of connection. A state may be disconnected from
religion first at the level of ends, second at the level of institutions, and
third at the level of law and public policy. A secular state is both non-
theocratic and against the establishment of religions. It establishes neither
one religion nor many. The first-order disconnection from religion
distinguishes secular states from both theocracies and states with
established religion. A secular state has its own secular ends. The second
order disconnection, Church-state separation, demarcates it from a
theocracy. Table 18.1. clarifies these distinctions.
Two points follow from this. The second order disconnection, what I
have called Church-state separation, is not a feature unique to secular
states. If so, it cannot be its defining attribute. Why? Because this is a
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feature secular states share with states with an established religion. Several
scholars do not fully recognize this. Many of them identify secular states
with Church-state separation. However, as I have shown above Church-
state separation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
existence of secular states. For a state to be secular, it must go beyond the
Church-state separation and have predominantly secular ends. In societies
without an established religion, the state must, in order to be secular,
refrain from establishing any religion. In societies where religion is
established, a state, in order to become secular, must disestablish
religion(s). It must withdraw privileges that the established religion had
previously taken for granted. In short, a secular state must follow a
principle of non-establishment (feature-a). (See Box 18.1 for a list of all
the features.)
Table 18.1
The second consequence of what is stated above is this: a non-theocratic

state is not automatically secular because it is entirely consistent for a state
neither to be directly inspired by divine laws nor to be run by priestly
order, but instead to have a formal alliance with one religion.
Amoral and Value-based Secular States

I mentioned that a secular state must have secular ends. However, these
ends themselves are of two kinds. The first kind are amoral. Amoral
secular states are so called because their entire purpose is to maximize
power, wealth, or both. They may have moral pretensions but really no
commitment to values such as peace, liberty, or equality. Usually, they are
imperial and autocratic. A good example of such a predominantly secular
state, despite the not infrequent allegation of its biased, Christian
character, was the British colonial state in India that was motivated almost
exclusively by power, wealth, and social order, but had a policy of
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tolerance and neutrality towards different religious communities. This is
not surprising, given that empires are interested in the labour or tribute of
their subjects, not in their religion. Such self-aggrandizing, amoral states
may or may not disconnect with religion at the third level, that is, at the
level of law and policy. They may have a hands-off approach to all
religions, purely for instrumental reasons. However, if it serves their
instrumental purpose, they may also connect with religion.
Values of a Secular State

Distinct from amoral states are value-based secular states. A fuller
discussion of such states requires a better articulation of their connection
with several important and substantive values. The first of these is peace,
or rather the prevention of a society from its regression into barbarism, not
an uncommon tendency where there exist two or more incompatible
visions of the good life (feature-b). The second is toleration, that is, the
state does not persecute or allow the persecution of anyone on grounds of
religion. This value may be seen by some to be superseded by the
discourse on rights, but in a certain context it has continuing relevance.
Why so? Because there are areas of society which remain beyond the reach
of the legal regime of rights. For example, we know that courts are
ineffective when overburdened with claims. To check this rot, out-of-court
settlements are encouraged. In the same way, it is sometimes better to
waive one’s rights and rely instead on a policy of live and let live. A
secular state must have room for this. Third, a secular state is
constitutively tied to the value of religious liberty that has three
dimensions. The first refers to the liberty of members of any one religious
group (feature-c). It is a brute fact that in most religious communities, one
or two interpretations of its core beliefs and practices come to dominate.
Given this dominance, it is important that every individual or sect within
the group be given the right to criticize, revise or challenge these dominant
interpretations. The second aspect of this important liberty in a secular
state (feature-d), is that it is granted non-preferentially to all members of
every religious community. It is entirely possible that non-preferential
treatment by the state of groups that accord religious liberty to its members
is also found in states respecting multiple establishments. But religious
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liberty is not part of the core principles of multiple establishments. States
with multiple establishments may not always secure religious liberties to
individual members of every religious group. However, such liberties are a
constitutive feature of a secular state. The third dimension of religious
liberty (feature-e), inconceivable in states with multiple establishments, is
that individuals are free not only to criticize the religion into which they
are born, but at the very extreme, to reject it and further, given ideal
conditions of deliberation, to freely embrace another religion or to remain
without one.
Religious liberty, when understood broadly, is an important value of a
secular state. To understand another crucial ingredient, it is necessary to
grasp the point that liberty and equality in the religious sphere are all of a
piece with liberty and equality in other spheres. It is not a coincidence that
the disestablishment clause in the first amendment to the American
Constitution institutes not only religious freedom but also the more general
freedom of speech, of peaceful assembly and political dissent. It is entirely
possible that a state respecting multiple establishments permits religious
liberty and equality but forbids other forms of freedom and equality. For
instance, a person may challenge the authority of the religious head of his
own denomination but not be free to challenge the authority of the state.
This is impossible in a secular state which is committed to a more general
freedom and equality. Thus, another critical value to which a secular state
is constitutively linked is the equality of free citizenship.
The value of equal citizenship has two dimensions, one active, the other
passive. To be a passive citizen is to be entitled to physical security, a
minimum material well-being, and a sphere of one’s own in which others
ought not to interfere. This lies at the root of the idea of the right to life,
liberty, material welfare and perhaps, education—crucial elements if
ordinary people are to lead their ordinary life with dignity. Any citizen of
the state must be entitled to these benefits. The benefits of citizenship—
resources that enable a dignified ordinary life—must be available to
everyone and there is no room here for discrimination on grounds of
religion (feature-f). This equal treatment is entailed by equal (passive)
citizenship. State agencies and the entire system of law must not work in
favour of one religious group. If the state works to protect the security and
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well-being of some individuals or groups but fails to secure these meagre
but important benefits to others then the principle of equal (passive)
citizenship is violated. Likewise, since citizenship is conditional upon
education, no one must be denied admission to educational institutions,
solely on grounds of religion (feature-g).
The active dimension of citizenship involves the recognition of citizens
as equal participants in the public domain (feature-h). Active participation
does not only mean the mere possession of the right to vote but also a right
to participate in public deliberation and to stand for public office. In
secular states, such active citizenship rights are available to everyone,
regardless of religion.
Box 18.1 Feature s of a Secular State
a. The principle of non-establishment of religion

b. Peace between communities
c. Religious liberty to any one religious group
d. Religious liberty granted non-preferentially to members of every religious
group
e. The liberty to embrace a religion other than the one into which a person is
born and to reject all religions
f. No discrimination by the state on grounds of religion to entitlements
provided by the state
g. No discrimination in admission to educational institutions on grounds of
religion
h. Equality of active citizenship: no discrimination on grounds of religion
These value-based secular states differ from one another in their

respective understandings of the relationship with religion at the third
level. Some are committed to disconnection but understand it differently.
Others have a more sophisticated relation with religion and may connect or
disconnect with religion depending entirely upon whether the values to
which they are committed to are promoted or undermined by one or the
other way of relating to religion.
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Let us briefly discuss states, which, guided by values, disconnect from
religion but possess different understandings of disconnection. One type of
secular state conceives disconnection at the third level in a wholly one-
sided manner. To disconnect is to exclude religion from its own affairs but
to have no limits on its own interventionist powers in the affairs of
religion. Such states exclude religion in order to control or regulate them
and sometimes even to destroy them. They may justify exclusion by
claiming that religion is false consciousness or obscurantist or
superstitious or they may do so in the name of a single value such as
equality. Such secular states are decidedly anti-religious. Examples may be
some communist states or the secular state in Turkey and the French state
in the 19th century. A second type of value-based secular state conceives
this third-level disconnection as mutual exclusion. Such a state maintains a
policy of strict or absolute separation. Here, religion is excluded from the
affairs of the state but the state, too, is excluded from the affairs of the
religion. The state has neither a positive relationship with religion, for
example, there is no policy of granting aid to religious institutions nor a
negative relationship with it; it is not within the scope of state activity to
interfere in religious matters even when the values professed by the state
are violated. This non-interference is justified on the grounds that religion
is a private matter, and if something is amiss within the private domain, it
can be mended only by those who have a right to do so within that sphere.
This, according to proponents of this view, is what religious freedom
means. Mutual exclusion is justified on the grounds of negative liberty and
is identical with the privatization of religion.
When a state is disconnected with religions at all three levels in this
particular way, then we may say that a wall of separation has been erected
between the two. For the wall of separation conception of secularism,
religion must be outside the purview of state and in this sense is privatized.
American political secularism exemplifies this model. This is also the
mainstream conception of secularism.
To summarize, we have distinguished three types of religion-centred
states and at least three types of secular states, the amoral self-
aggrandizing secular state, the anti-religious secular state and a state that
erects a wall of separation between religion and itself (see Table 18.2). We
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have suggested above that political secularism is a normative doctrine for
which the state should be separated from religious institutions to check
religious tyranny, oppression or hierarchy and to promote religious and
non-religious freedom and equalities. Given this, only one of the three
secular states appear to run in accordance with the principle of political
secularism. Some may even run contrary to these principles.
Table 18.2
CRISIS FOR SECULAR STATES

Let us turn now to the more urgent practical issue faced not only by people
in India but all over the globe. Secular states the world over appear to be in
crisis. This crisis afflicts not only secular political institutions but the very
doctrine of secularism itself. Both have been seriously questioned in
Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Turkey. In the last
two decades, Pakistan and Bangladesh have increasingly acquired
theocratic overtones. There has been a resurgence of Hindu nationalism.
Buddhist Sinhalese nationalism in Sri Lanka, and Sikh nationalism in
Punjab have both undermined the secular nature of Sri Lankan and Indian
states. Religiously grounded political movements arose in Poland and
protestant fundamentalism, too, have become a force in American politics.
In Western Europe as well, a challenge to the secular state appears to come
from both migrant workers of former colonies and intensified
globalization.
Secular states are questioned not only by politicians, civil society
groups, and clerics but also by academics. In India, critics have argued that
the conceptual and normative structure of secularism is itself terribly
flawed. There is something wrong with the ideal itself. Some claim that it
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is linked to a flawed modernization, that it is integrally connected with the
repressive structures of the nation state and an increasingly indefensible
conception of science and rationality. Others have argued that in a deeply
religious society, the demand that religion be excluded from public life and
be privatized is utterly impractical. Still others claim that it is tied to liberal
individualism which gives little importance to communities in the life of
religious people and, therefore, cannot protect the community-specific
rights of communities. These Indian critics have been joined more recently
by Western scholars who have drawn attention to the capacity of the
secular state to trivialize faith and be just to religious believers. Others
have argued that it is tied too closely to Protestantism and is neither as
impartial and as removed from religion nor as inclusive as it claims to be.
Indeed, it is deeply inimical to non-Protestant religions. If so, deep down it
is a conflict-generating ideology that threatens peace and by an
unacknowledged propensity to homogenize all faiths it also inhibits
diversity.
These are important criticisms that must be taken seriously. However,
the academic writing on secularism is unclear about which of the two
claims it is really making. When we criticize something, we may do so
either to altogether replace it by something very different or to rectify the
deficiencies that have crept in. It is not clear whether secular states are to
be junked or repaired. Clerics and religion-centred politicians clearly wish
to get rid of the secular state. But what do these academics want? Do they
want an alternative to secular states or alternative conceptions of
secularism? Let me assume that some of these academics want to replace
secular states with something else. The question is, what will replace
secular states and what ethical gains or losses might ensue as a result of
this replacement?
It was with the objective of answering these questions that I had earlier
distinguished different kinds of religious states and identified the
multiplicity of secular states. My interest was not in classification per se
but to fulfil our need to identify the most defensible version of secularism
that meets the challenge posed by whatever is valid in the objections raised
by the critics of secularism.
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THEOCRACY, STATES WITH ESTABLISHED RELIGIONS AND SECULAR
STATES: A NORMATIVE COMPARISON
Let us then assume that all modern societies value some version of both
freedom and equality. We shall ask a somewhat unsophisticated question:
How do each of the states mentioned above fare on an index of freedom
and equality? Let us take first states that establish a single religion.
Historically, such states, for example, the state that supported the Anglican
Church in England or the Catholic Church in Italy, fared poorly on an
index of freedom and equality. Such states recognized a particular version
of the religion enunciated by that Church as the official religion,
compelled individuals to congregate for only one Church, punished them
for failing to profess a particular set of religious beliefs, levied taxes in
support of one particular Church, paid the salaries of its clergy, made
instruction of the favoured interpretation of the religion mandatory in
educational institutions or in the media. In such cases, not only was there
inequality among religions (Christians and Jews) but also among the
churches of the same religion, and while members of the established
church may have enjoyed a modicum of religious liberty, those belonging
to other Churches or religions did not enjoy any or the same degree of
liberty. When members of the other church or religious groups possessed
strength or number, then such a multireligious or multiple-denominational
society was invariably wrecked by inter-religious or inter-denominational
wars. If they did not, then religious minorities were not tolerated and faced
persistent religious persecution. (Jews in several European countries till
the 19th century.) One exception to this, however, was the Millet system
of the Ottoman Empire which had Islam as the established religion but
three other religious communities—Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox
and Jewish—were treated as equals and given a respectable degree of
autonomy.
States with substantive establishments have not changed colour with
time. Wherever one religion is not only formally but substantively
established, the persecution of minorities and internal dissenters continues
today. One has only to cite the example of Saudi Arabia to prove this
point. Here the distinction between formal and substantive establishment is
important. In Saudi Arabia, Islam is both formally and substantively
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established. Britain has a formally established Church (the Anglican
Church), but this important exception apart, it is a secular state that grants
liberty and equality to all. It is important to dwell on this because in so
many recent critiques of secularism, a more accommodative stance
towards religion is recommended with an alarming neglect of some very
elementary facts about what such an alliance might entail. Consider the
situation in Pakistan where the virtual establishment of the dominant Sunni
sect has proved to be disastrous to minorities, including those who are
Muslims. For example, under Article 260 of the Pakistan Constitution,
Ahmedis have been deemed as a non-Muslim minority and forbidden from
using Islamic nomenclature in their religious and social lives. A whole
community has thereby been formally excluded by the state, both
symbolically and materially, from its own religion. Ahmedis have been
tried and convicted under the law for calling themselves Muslims or using
the word ‘mosque’ to designate their place of worship.
Pakistan has been taken only as an illustration. Surely the result would
be the same if a Hindu state was established in India. This would be a
threat not only to religious minorities, but also to the plural and tolerant
character of Hinduism itself and therefore to a large number of practising
Hindus. The ‘democratic’ state of Israel suffers from the same problem.
Once it was declared a Jewish state it can not but exclude from its scheme
of rights and benefits its own Arab citizens, leave alone other Palestinians.
It is, therefore, difficult to swallow the claim that in modern democratic
politics there is not much reason to fear a religious majority more than a
secular majority. Given the unfortunate, sectarian character of most
religions, the rule of religious majority is bound to be exclusionary. This is
not necessarily true of the rule of secular majority. It is also misleading to
give the argument that religious majorities are no worse than secular
majorities because different religious communities have lived together in
the past without coming into violent conflict. This claim is misleading
because the term ‘secular majority’ can mean many things. This statement
would be true if the secular majority in question consists of hard-nosed
absolutists. It would be false if the term referred to all those people who
wish not to use religion in all kinds of unprincipled ways. The statement
misses the point because peace between communities is entirely
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compatible with all kinds of exclusion from the domains of freedom and
equality. A fearful minority is willing to buy peace at any cost—something
that all of us painfully learnt again after the Bombay riots in 1992–93. If
what we have said above is true of states that establish a single religion,
regardless of whether they are democratic or not, then it is likely to be
even more true of substantive theocracies that are run by authoritarian
religious clerics.
What about states with multiple establishment of religions? Historically,
states of New York or the colonies of Massachusetts in the middle of the
17th century officially respected more than one religious denomination.
These states levied a religious tax on everyone and yet gave individuals the
choice to remit the tax money to their preferred Church. They financially
aided schools run by religious institutions but on a non-discriminatory
basis. They may have punished people for disavowing or disrespecting the
established religion, but did not compel them to profess the beliefs of a
particular denomination.
States with substantive establishment of multiple churches are better in
some ways than states with singular establishment. For example, such
states are likely to be relatively peaceful. Members of different
denominations are likely to tolerate one another. There may be general
equality among all members of a religion (though, historically this has not
always been the case: women and Blacks have been the usual victims).
The state grants each denomination considerable autonomy in its own
affairs. But states with the establishment of multiple churches have their
limitations. For a start, they may continue to persecute members of other
religions and atheists. Second, they are indifferent to the liberty of
individuals within each denomination or religious group. They do little to
foster a more general climate of toleration that prevents the persecution of
dissenters. Closed and oppressive communities can thrive in such contexts.
Third, they may not have legal provisions that allow an individual to exit
his religious community and embrace another religion or to remain
unattached to any religion whatsoever. Fourth, such states give recognition
to particular religious identities but fail to recognize what may be called
non-particularized identities, that is, identities that simultaneously refer to
several particular identities or transcend all of them. Fifth, such states are
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unconcerned with the non-religious liberties of individuals or groups.
Finally, such states are entirely indifferent to citizenship rights. States,
which establish multiple religions, face similar problems but are better
than states with multiple church establishments in one important respect.
There is peace and toleration and perhaps equality between all religious
communities.
Does this mean that all secular states are better from an ethical point of
view than religioncentred states? An affirmative answer here is too hasty.
Amoral secular states have no commitment to any values. Therefore, it is
likely that they would fare poorly on an index of freedom and inequality.
Their record at the very best will be deeply uneven. Anti-religious secular
states have a poor record in promoting or even protecting religious
freedoms. Indeed, states that fail to protect religious freedom, usually
trample upon other freedoms also. Over time, they also develop a
hierarchy between the secular and the religious. Thus, such states are also
likely to fare badly on the index of freedom and equality.
That leaves us with only one other type of secular state, one that erects a
wall of separation between itself and religion to protect freedom and
equality. Such a state, as must already be obvious, is likely to fare very
well on an index of freedom and equality. For example, it grants the right
to criticize, revise or challenge the dominant interpretations of the core
beliefs of their religion. Second, it grants this right non-preferentially to
every member of all religions. Finally, in such states individuals are free
not only to criticize the religion into which they are born, but at the very
extreme, to reject it and further, given ideal conditions of deliberation, to
freely embrace another religion or even remain without one. Such states
also grant equality of citizenship. All citizens are entitled to the same basic
benefits. They have a right to vote as also a right to participate in public
deliberation and to stand for public office. In this kind of secular state,
such active citizenship rights are available to everyone, regardless of
religion. Such a secular state embodies the values of classical liberal
democracy and might be called the mainstream conception of political
secularism.
When evaluating the relative merits of religious and secular states, it is
these models which must be kept in mind for comparison and not the
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routinely debunked, severely antireligious or self-aggrandizing secular
states. Little is to be gained from damning secularism, as Talal Asad does,
by citing the atrocities of Hitler and Stalin or crimes committed by
‘secularists’ such as Saddam Hussain or Ali Hyder. Nor is there any point
in deriding secularists for failing to realize that Sharon did not need to
invoke passages of the Torah to kill and terrorize the Palestinians.
Secularism, a value-based doctrine, is as committed to denouncing these
secular regimes as it is to berating religious states that violate principles of
liberty and equality. The more important and serious question is whether
this mainstream conception itself has serious problems.
Critique of Mainstream Secularism

Many criticisms that have been mentioned earlier draw our attention
precisely to this point. Let us go through some of these criticisms again.
First, mainstream liberal democratic secularism asks citizens to leave their
religious convictions behind in the private sphere as a condition of
entering the public sphere. This is what privatization of religion means.
For example, suppose a bill is coming up for discussion in the Parliament
and its supporters or opponents are debating on it in the wider public
domain. Mainstream secularists would want everyone not to justify their
support or opposition to the bill in terms of their religious beliefs.
Religious beliefs are sectarian they would say. A religious rationale can be
understood by people of the particular religion from which it is drawn but
is likely to remain incomprehensible to all others. If so, how can a
common agreement be reached on the precise justification for the bill? Is it
not a worthy goal that all citizens speak in a language that is understood by
everyone, that brings people together, rather than dividing them? The goal
of citizen solidarity is indeed worthy, but it is doubtful that the burden of
achieving it must be placed on every issue brought for discussion.
Sometimes a bad outcome is generated if you demand too much of a good
thing. If we continue to demand from religious persons that on every
single issue they speak in a language that everyone understands, and if this
means that they will have to disconnect from their religious conviction,
then the eventual result might be counterproductive. It may bring about
more division rather than solidarity. Moreover, to do so may result in the
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deprivation of the moral agency of persons. People may want to vote an
issue on the basis of their conscience. They may wish to bring their politics
in line with their morality. At least sometimes, this morality is inextricably
linked to their religion. For some people this is always the case. To ask
them to leave behind their religion is to force them to be disconnected
from their morality and conscience. It is to ask them not to act as moral
agents. But this is to disrespect them. Why grant respect to some people
but not to others? Is it not a violation of the principle of equal respect? If
this happens persistently, religious persons may form their own public
sphere whether resentment and prejudice might flourish, where identities
might get frozen. This will only create walls between citizens.
A second problem with mainstream secularism is that respect for a
religion is not grounded in the believers’, own point of view. It is the
perspective of an outsider rather than the one that flows from the inside.
Liberal secularists generally value autonomy but fail to understand that
some persons choose or endorse a life of discipline, a life that is restricted,
rule-bound and renunciatory. A religious life may be a life in which one
simply submits to the command of God.
Third, as already pointed out, mainstream secularism is sectarian. It
lives comfortably with protestantized and individualized religions but
lacks the resources to deal with or accommodate community-oriented
religions with a strong public presence. This insensitivity to groups make it
indifferent to community-specific rights. As said above, political
secularism is against religious domination and exclusion, but this
domination can take two forms. In the first, a small section dominates
members of its own religious community. This may be called intra-
religious domination. In the second, which may be called inter-religious
domination, members of one community dominate and exclude members
of another different religious community. Since it is indifferent to
communities more generally, mainstream secularism is blind to inter-
religious dominations.
Fourth, liberal secularism is a product of and is shaped by a Protestant
ethic. It is therefore bound with one particular religion. However, it
pretends to be universalist. This amnesia about its own religion thwarts its
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development as a transcultural ideal. This happens because of the pretence
that it is already transcultural.
Finally, mainstream secularism relies not just on reason to which no one
should have an objection to but a particular conception of reason that puts
a high premium on being totally disconnected with emotions, and which
encourages a dichotomous, either/or manner of thinking. Besides, its
alleged universalism makes it prone to being insensitive to contexts.
Mainstream secularists do not ask the question, given this context, of what
an appropriate relationship between religion and politics should be, but
rather the more general question of what their relationship should be at all
times and at all places. This also has a bearing on how they negotiate
values. Generally, they think of one or two supreme values and arrange
other values in some ranking order.
These are powerful and significant criticisms of the mainstream
conceptions of secularism. But do they constitute good reasons for
altogether discarding secularism? I do not think so. It is true that
community-oriented public religions have their own moral integrity, yet
frequently these very religions continue to be a source of severe
oppression and exclusion. States that are too closely aligned with these
religions turn a blind eye to or endorse these objectionable practices. Take
the religiously sanctioned custom within Hinduism that excludes women
from the affairs of their own religion. In several temples in India, women
are not permitted entry at the time of menstruation. At the Sabarimala
temple in Kerala, women between the ages of 15–65 are not permitted to
enter on the grounds that their very capacity to menstruate makes their
bodies impure. This is a severe violation of their religious freedom and
compromises the secular character of the Indian state. Or, consider the
religiously sanctioned law of evidence, Qanoon-e-Shahadat, in Pakistan
that holds on par the evidence of two women or two non-Muslims with
that of a single male Muslim, thereby establishing the intrinsic superiority
of Muslim men over women and minorities. Such inegalitarian laws are
inevitable in states aligned formally to a particular religion.
What does all this show? It demonstrates, first, that we must be sensitive
simultaneously to the moral integrity of liberal and non-liberal religious
ways of living as well as to religion-based oppression and exclusions.
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Second, that states that are strongly aligned to religions may be sensitive to
the moral integrity of non-liberal religions but not always to their
oppressions. Third, that a policy of non-interference (mutual exclusion)
typical of liberal secularism is self-defeating. In short, a conception of
secularism needs to be worked out that goes beyond liberal notions and
does justice to both these dimensions referred to above. It shows that if we
are concerned about religious and non-religious freedoms and inequalities,
then religion-centered states will remain inadequate for this task. However,
it also shows that available models of secularism also fall short of meeting
the very basic requirements or do they? Is there no conception of
secularism that meets the most significant religious objections but on
balance promote the basic values of freedom and equality? Does an
alternative model of secularism exist?
I believe it does. Such a conception can be culled out from the Indian
Constitution and the best constitutional practices of the Indian state.
Indeed, this conception may be called the sub-continental conception of
secularism, because it was worked out in the first half of the 20th century
well before the partition of India. Every new state professed to be secular
at the time of its formation and yet for reasons I cannot go into here, the
experiment was brief and failed. Though it is deeply contested and crisis-
ridden, it survives only in India. Because it survives and occasionally
works well in post-Independence India—I shall call this alternative
conception the Indian model of secularism.
AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION: INDIAN SECULARISM

The distinctiveness of Indian secularism is not always recognized. Many
scholars believe that it is simply a Western idea on Indian soil, that like the
mainstream Western model, it erects a wall of separation for the sake of
two values, religious liberty and equality of citizenship, construed
individualistically. On a partial reading this would be true. The state in the
Indian Constitution appears to possess all the features (features-a to h) of a
secular state. Feature-a is implied by Article 27 that rules out the public
funding of religion and Article 28(1) under which ‘no religious instruction
is to be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of
state funds’.
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Articles 25, 27 and 28 guarantee religious liberty and meet the
conditions specified by features-b, c and d. Under Article 25(1), ‘all
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to
freely profess, practise and propagate religion’ (feature-c and d). The
phrase ‘freedom of conscience’ is meant to cover the liberty of persons
without a religion (feature-e). Under Article 27, ‘no person is compelled to
pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in
payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular
religion or religious denomination.’ Finally, under Article 28(3), ‘no
person attending any educational institution … shall be required to take
part in any religious instruction or to attend any religious worship that may
be conducted in such institution’.
Equality of citizenship is guaranteed by Articles 14, 15(1) and 29(2) of
the Indian Constitution. Article 15(1) states that the state shall not
discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them (feature-f). Article 29(2) declares that no
citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution
maintained by the state on grounds only of religion, race, etc. (feature-g).
Articles 16(1) and (2) of the Indian Constitution affirm an equal
opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or
appointment to any office under the state. They further affirm that no
citizen, on grounds of religion or race can be discriminated against in
respect of any employment or office under the state. The clause on
universal franchise as well as Article 325 declare a general electoral roll
for all constituencies and states, that no one shall be ineligible for
inclusion in this roll or claim to be included in it on grounds only of
religion, etc. These embody the value of equal active citizenship. Thus,
feature-h is specified in the articles on equality of active citizenship.
The implications of accepting that the state in the Indian Constitution is
meant to possess features-a to g are not always spelt out. First, the
Constitution rules out theocracy and the establishment of religion. Second,
the Indian state is not meant to be merely tolerant (in the sense specified
above). Indian secularism must not be confused with a generally professed
Hindu tolerance. It is frequently claimed that Indians have a natural,
traditional affinity with secularism. In view of our traditional obsession
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with subtle and not so subtle hierarchies, this claim must be taken with a
pinch of salt. Of course, this should not detract from the important point
that tolerance, even within a hierarchical framework, forms an important
background condition for the development of modern secularism. All the
elements discussed above can certainly be found within traditional India
and helped in the formation of Indian secularism.
There are important ways, however, in which Indian secularism departs
from the mainstream version. Six features make Indian secularism
distinctive. First, its multi-value character. Indian secularism is tied not
only to the individualistically construed values of religious and non-
religious liberty and equality but also to peace, toleration and to non-
individualistically construed values of liberty and equality. It has a place
not only for rights of individuals to profess their religious beliefs but for
the right of religious communities to establish and maintain educational
institutions crucial for the survival and sustenance of their distinctive
religious traditions (Article 26, Article 30[1]).
The acceptance of community-specific rights brings us to the second
feature of Indian secularism. Because it was born in a deeply multi-
religious society, it is concerned as much with inter-religious domination
as it is with intra-religious domination. Unlike the mainstream conception
that provided benefits to minorities only incidentally (Jews benefited in
some European countries such as France not because their special needs
and demands were taken care of, but rather because of a change in the
general climate of the society). In India, however, even community-
specific political rights (political reservations for religious minorities) were
almost granted and were withheld in the last instance only for contextual
reasons. In fact, it is arguable that a conceptual space is still available for
them within the Indian Constitution.
Third, the Indian model is committed to the idea of principled distance,
poles apart from one-sided exclusion, mutual exclusion and strict
neutrality or equidistance. As seen above, for mainstream Western
secularism, separation means mutual exclusion. The idea of principled
distance unpacks the metaphor of separation differently. It accepts a
disconnection between state and religion at the level of ends and
institutions but does not make a fetish of it at the third level of policy and
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law. (This distinguishes it from all other models of secularism—moral and
amoral—that disconnect state and religion at this third level.) How else
can it be in a society where religion frames some of its deepest interests?
Recall that political secularism is an ethic whose concerns relating to
religion are similar to theories that oppose unjust restrictions on freedom,
morally indefensible inequalities, inter-communal domination and
exploitation. Yet, a secularism based on principled distance is not
committed to the mainstream Enlightenment idea of religion. It accepts
that humans have an interest in relating to something beyond themselves
including God and that this manifests itself as individual belief and feeling
as well as social practice in the public domain. It also accepts that religion
is a cumulative tradition as well as a source of people’s identities. But it
insists that even if it turned out that God exists and that one religion is true
and others false, then this does not give the ‘true’ doctrine or religion the
right to force it down the throats of others who do not believe it. Nor does
it give a ground for discrimination in the equal distribution of liberties and
other valuable resources.
Similarly, a secularism based on principle distance accepts that religion
may not have special public significance antecedently written into and
defining the very character of the state or the nation but it does not follow
from this that it has no public significance at all. Sometimes, in some of its
other versions, the wall of separation thesis assumes precisely that. As
long as religion is publicly significant, a democratic state simply has to
take it into account. Indeed, institutions of religion may influence
individuals as long as they do so through the same process, by access to
the same resources as anyone and without undue advantage or unduly
exploiting the fears and vulnerabilities that frequently accompany people
in their experience of the religious.
Principled Distance
But what precisely is principled distance? The policy of principled
distance entails a flexible approach on the question of inclusion/exclusion
of religion and the engagement/ disengagement of the state, which at the
third level of law and policy depends on the context, nature or current state
of relevant religions. This engagement must be governed by principles
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undergirding a secular state, i.e. principles that flow from a commitment to
the values mentioned above. This means that religion may intervene in the
affairs of the state if such intervention promotes freedom, equality or any
other value integral to secularism. For example, citizens may support a
coercive law of the state grounded purely in a religious rationale if this law
is compatible with freedom or equality. Equally, the state may engage with
religion or disengage from it, engage positively or negatively but it does so
depending entirely on whether or not these values are promoted or
undermined. A state that intervenes or refrains from interference on this
basis keeps a principled distance from all religions. This is one constitutive
idea of principled distance. This idea is different from strict neutrality, i.e.
the state may help or hinder all religions to an equal degree and in the
same manner, that if it intervenes in one religion, it must also do so in
others. Rather, it rests upon a distinction explicitly drawn by the American
philosopher, Ronald Dworkin between equal treatment and treating
everyone as an equal. The principle of equal treatment, in the relevant
political sense, requires that the state treat all its citizens equally in the
relevant respect, for example, in the distribution of a resource or
opportunity. On the other hand, the principle of treating people as equals
entails that every person or group is treated with equal concern and
respect. This second principle may sometimes require equal treatment, say
equal distribution of resources but it may also occasionally dictate unequal
treatment. Treating people or groups as equals is entirely consistent with
differential treatment. This idea is the second ingredient in what I have
called principled distance.
I said that principled distance allows for differential treatment. What
kind of treatment do I have in mind? First, religious groups have sought
exemptions from practices in which states intervene by promulgating a law
to be applied neutrally to the rest of society. This demand for non-
interference is made on the ground either that the law requires them to do
things not permitted by their religion or prevents them from doing acts
mandated by it. For example, Sikhs demand exemptions from mandatory
helmet laws and from police dress codes to accommodate religiously
required turbans. Elsewhere, Jews seek exemptions from air force
regulations to accommodate their yarmulkes. Muslim women and girls
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demand that the state not interfere in their religiously required chador.
Jews and Muslims seek exemption from Sunday-closing laws on the
ground that this is not required by their religion. Principled distance allows
then that a practice that is banned or regulated in one culture may be
permitted in the minority culture because of the distinctive status and
meaning it has for its members. For many republican or liberal theories
this is a problem because of their simple, somewhat absolutist morality
that gives overwhelming importance to one value, particularly to equal
treatment or equal liberty. Religious groups may demand that the state
refrain from interference in their practices but they may equally demand
that the state interfere in such a way as to give them special assistance so
that these groups are also able to secure what other groups are able to
routinely get by virtue of their social dominance in the political
community. It may grant authority to religious officials to perform legally
binding marriages, to have their own rules or methods of obtaining a
divorce, its rules about relations between ex-husband and ex-wife, its way
of defining a will or its laws about post-mortem allocation of property,
arbitration of civil disputes, and even its method of establishment of
property rights. Principled distance allows the possibility of such policies
on the grounds that it might be unfair to hold people accountable to an
unfair law.
However, principled distance is not just a recipe for differential
treatment in the form of special exemptions. It may even require state
intervention in some religions more than in others, considering the
historical and social condition of all relevant religions. For the promotion
of a particular value constitutive of secularism, some religion, relative to
other religions, may require more interference from the state. For example,
suppose that the value to be advanced is social equality. This requires
undermining, in part, caste hierarchies. If this is the aim of the state, then it
may be required of the state that it interferes in caste-ridden Hinduism
much more than say Islam or Christianity. However, if a diversity-driven
religious liberty is the value to be advanced by the state, then it may have
to intervene in Christianity and Islam more than in Hinduism. If this is so,
the state can neither strictly exclude considerations emanating from
religion nor keep strict neutrality with respect to religion. It cannot
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antecedently decide that it will always refrain from interfering in religions
or that it will interfere in each equally. Indeed, it may not relate to every
religion in society in exactly the same way or intervene in each religion to
the same degree or in the same manner. To want to do so would be plainly
absurd. All it must ensure is that the relationship between the state and
religions is guided by non-sectarian motives consistent with some values
and principles.
Consider laws that interfere with Hinduism for evaluating these. The
relevant consideration is not whether they immediately encompass all
groups but whether or not they are just and consistent with values under-
girding secularism. Three reasons exist for why all social groups need not
be covered by these laws. First, they may be relevant only to Hindus. Take
the abolition of child marriage and devadasi dedication or the introduction
of the right to divorce. Here, before deciding whether it was necessary to
enact a special provision for Hindus, the legislature took into account their
social customs and beliefs. Similar laws for Muslims were simply
redundant. Second, laws in liberal democracies require legitimacy; the
consent of at least the representatives of communities is vital. If consent
has indeed been obtained from the representatives of only one community,
it is sometimes prudent to enact community-specific laws. It is wise to
apply the general principle in stages, rather than not have it at all. Finally,
‘it is perfectly within the competence of the legislature to take account of
the degree of evil which is prevalent under various circumstances and the
legislature is not bound to legislate for all evils at the same time.
Therefore, an act passed by the legislature cannot be attacked merely
because it tackles only some of the evils in society and does not tackle
other evols of the same or worse kind which may be prevalent’ (AIR,
1952, Bom. 84, The State of Bombay vs. Narasu Appa). Thus, if the
legislature acting on these considerations, wanted to enact a special
provision with regard to, say, bigamous marriages among Hindus, it
cannot be said that the legislature was discriminating against Hindus only
on the ground of religion (AIR, 1952, Bom.84, The State of Bombay vs.
Narasu Appa). The Indian courts have frequently followed this line of
reasoning. They have defended a policy if they found that its purpose is the
eradication of a social evil traceable to religious practices, even if the
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policy was targeted at specific communities. It has argued that so long as
the state has taken gradual steps towards social welfare and reform and has
not introduced distinctions or classifications that are unreasonable or
oppressive, equality before law is not breached. A state interfering in one
religion more than in others does not automatically depart from
secularism. Indian secularism rejects the assumption that ‘one size fits all’.
Box 18.2 Secularism in the Indian Constitution
Feature A—Article 27 and Article 28(1)

Features C, D and E—Articles 25, 27 and 28
Feature F—Article 15(1)
Feature G—Article 29(2)
Feature H—Articles 16(1) and (2), Article 325
Articles that support the individualist, wall of separation thesis

Articles 15, 16, 25, 29(2), 325, 27, 28(1) and 60
Articles that depart from the individualist, wall of separation

thesis
Articles 30(1), 30(2), 17, 25(2), 25(2)(B)
Fourth, it is marked by a unique combination of active hostility to some

aspects of religion (a ban on untouchability and a commitment to make
religiously grounded personal laws more gender-just) with active respect
for its other dimensions (religious groups are officially recognized, state-
aid is available non-preferentially to educational institutions run by
religious communities, no blanket exclusion of religion as mandated by
Western liberalism). This is a direct consequence of its commitment to
multiple values and principled distance. The Indian model accepts the
view that critique is consistent with respect, that one does not have to
choose between hostility and respectful indifference. In this sense, it
inherits the tradition of the great Indian religious reformers who tried to
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change their religions precisely because it meant so much to them. Fifth, it
breaks out of the rigid interpretative grid that divides our social world into
the modern Western and the traditional, indigenous non-Western. Indian
secularism is modern but departs significantly from mainstream
conceptions of Western secularism. Sixth, it is committed to a different
model of moral reasoning that is highly contextual and opens up the
possibility of different societies working out their own secularisms. In
short, it opens out the possibility of multiple secularisms.
This point needs more elucidation. In moral and political theory, broadly
two views exist on moral reasoning. One form of reasoning about moral
issues is acontextual. It has a list of moral values that are arranged in a
hierarchy so that one value is supreme and others subordinate to it. If there
is a conflict, then the value considered supreme overrides every other
value. A crude version of this is sometimes found in the construction of
situations in Hindi films. Some of you might have seen the film Shakti in
which a police officer, played by Dilip Kumar is faced with a value-
conflict of impartially upholding the law of the land and being partial to
his only son at the receiving end of the law. The police inspector has an
unambiguous preference for the value of impartiality and no place
whatsoever in his moral world for even the most elementary partiality
towards his son. When the conflict arises, it is clear to him what is required
of him. He upholds the law and arrests his own son. He does so not
through a process of contextual reasoning but because of his prior
commitment to a supreme moral value. He has no wish to understand the
point of view of his son, the feelings of his wife or the reasons why the
illegal act was committed. He is committed to an Absolutist morality and
he applies it mechanically to everyone in every situation. As I said, this is
a caricature of the kind of moral reasoning to which the mainstream
conception of secularism is committed, but broadly it gets the picture right.
The alternative model of reasoning is more nuanced. It simply has to be,
if every value is not to be ordered before hand. Let me take an example.
Suppose that there is an important meeting on human rights violations to
be held outside India. It is important for the participant not only personally
but because of its larger social significance. Suppose also that a day before
the person’s departure her father falls ill. Now, there is a value conflict.
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Both are important. For those who follow acontextual reasoning, one of
these values must be supreme. If issues of social significance are more
important then the participant must attend the meeting no matter what
happens to her father. The contextualist—and I imagine most of us fall in
this category—reasons differently. If the illness is life-threatening, then the
participant should abandon the trip. If it is major but not necessarily a life-
threatening one, the participant may ask another family member or a friend
to take care of her father. She may herself curtail the visit from five to
three days and so on. Alternatively, if her own presence at the meeting is
not that vital and the job she is meant to do can be performed by someone
else who is willing to be a last-minute replacement, then the participant
may not decide to go even when the illness is not life-threatening. When
we reason in this manner in the face of a clear instance of conflict between
two or more values, we are sensitive to the concrete situation at hand, and
if possible we try to find a balance between both because, after all, it is not
unreasonable to hope to fulfil both these value-based desires.
Contextual secularism is contextual not only because it captures the idea
that the precise form and content of secularism will vary from one to
another context and from place to place but also that it embodies this
second model of contextual moral reasoning. This, it does because of its
character as a multi-value doctrine. To accept that secularism is a
multivalue doctrine is to acknowledge that its constitutive values do not
always sit easily with one another. On the contrary, they are frequently in
conflict. Some degree of internal discord and, therefore, a fair amount of
instability is an integral part of contextual secularism. For this reason, it
forever requires fresh interpretations, contextual judgements and attempts
at reconciliation and compromise. No general a priori rule of resolving
these conflicts exist; no easy lexical order, no pre-existing hierarchy
among values or laws that enables us to decide that, no matter what the
context, a particular value must override everything else. Almost
everything then is a matter of situational thinking and contextual
reasoning. Whether one value overrides or is reconciled with another
cannot be decided before hand. Each time the matter presents itself
differently and will be differently resolved. If this is true, then the practice
of secularism requires a different model of moral reasoning than the one
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that straightjackets our moral understanding in the form of well-delineated,
explicitly stated rules. This contextual secularism recognizes that the
conflict between individual rights and group rights or between claims of
equality and liberty or between claims of liberty and the satisfaction of
basic needs cannot always be adjudicated by a recourse to some general
and abstract principle. Rather, they can only be settled case by case and
may require a fine balancing of competing claims. The eventual outcome
may not be wholly satisfactory to either but still be reasonably satisfactory
to both. Multi-value doctrines such as secularism encourage
accommodation—not the giving-up of one value for the sake of another
but rather their reconciliation and possible harmonization, i.e. to make
each work without changing the basic content of apparently incompatible
concepts and values.
This endeavour to make concepts, viewpoints and values work
simultaneously does not amount to a morally objectionable compromise.
This is so because nothing of importance is being given up for the sake of
a less significant thing, one without value or even with negative value.
Rather, what is pursued is a mutually agreed middle way that combines
elements from two or more equally valuable entities. The roots of such
attempts at reconciliation and accommodation lie in a lack of dogmatism,
in a willingness to experiment, to think at different levels and in separate
spheres, and in a readiness to take decisions on a provisional basis. It
captures a way of thinking characterized by the following dictum: ‘why
look at things in terms of this or that, why not try to have both this and
that. In this way of thinking, it is recognized that though we may currently
be unable to secure the best of both values and therefore be forced to settle
for a watered-down version of each, we must continue to have an abiding
commitment to search for a transcendence of this second best condition.
Such contextual reasoning was not a typical of the deliberations of the
Constituent Assembly in which great value was placed on arriving at
decisions by consensus. Yet, the procedure of majority vote was not given
up altogether. On issues that everyone judged to be less significant, a
majoritarian procedure was adopted. It is frequently argued against Indian
secularism that it is contradictory because it tries to bring together
individual and community rights, and that articles in the Indian
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Constitution that have a bearing on the secular nature of the Indian state
are deeply conflictual and at best ambiguous. This is to misrecognize a
virtue as a vice. In my view, this attempt to bring together seemingly
incompatible values is a great strength of Indian secularism. Indian
secularism is an ethically sensitive negotiated settlement between di-verse
groups and divergent values. When it is not treated as such, it turns either
into a dead formula or a façade for political manoeuvres.
IS SECULARISM A CHRISTIAN AND WESTERN DOCTRINE?

What then of the claim that secularism is a Christian, Western doctrine and
therefore, is unable to adapt itself easily to the cultural conditions of, say,
India, infused as they are by religions that grew in the soil of the
subcontinent. This necessary link between secularism and Christianity is
exaggerated, if not entirely mistaken. It is true that the institutional
separation of the Church and the state is an internal feature of Christianity
and an integral part of Western secularisms. But as we have seen this
Church-state disconnection is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
the development of secularism even in societies with Church-based
religions. It is clearly not a necessary condition for the development of all
forms of secularisms. Moreover, as I have argued, the mutual exclusion of
religion and the state is not the defining feature of secularism. The idea of
separation can be interpreted differently. Nor are religious integrity, peace
and toleration (interpreted broadly to mean ‘live and let live’), uniquely
Christian values. Most non-Christian civilizations have given significant
space to each. Therefore, none of them are exclusively Christian. It follows
that, even though we find in Christian writings some of the clearest and
most systematic articulation of this doctrine, even the Western conception
of secularism is not exclusively Christian.
One might say, secularism is not just a Christian doctrine, but is it not
Western? The answer to this question is both yes and no. Up to a point, it
is certainly a Western idea. More specifically, as a clearly articulated
doctrine, it has distinct Western origins. Although elements that constitute
secularism assume different cultural forms and are found in several
civilizations, one cannot deny that the idea of the secular first achieved
self-consciousness and was properly theorized in the West. One might then
416
say that the early and middle history of secularism is almost entirely
dominated by Western societies. However, the same cannot be said of its
later history. Nationalism and democracy arrived in the West after the
settlement of religious conflicts, in societies that had been made
religiously homogeneous, or had almost become so (with the exception of
the Jews, of course, who continued to face persistent persecution). The
absence of deep religious diversity and conflict meant that issues of
citizenship could be addressed almost entirely disregarding the religious
context; the important issue of community-specific rights to religious
groups could be wholly ignored. This had a decisive bearing on the
Western conception of secularism. However, for non-Western societies
such as India, the case is different. Both national and democratic agendas
in countries such as India had to face issues raised by deep religious
difference and diversity. In India, nationalism had to choose between the
religious and the secular. Similarly, the distribution of active citizenship
rights could not be conceived or accomplished by ignoring religion. It
could be done either by actively disregarding religion (as in all political
rights) or by developing a complex attitude to it, as in the case of cultural
rights, where it had to balance claims of individual autonomy with those of
community obligations, and claims of the necessity of keeping religion
‘private’ with their inescapable, often valuable presence in the public. By
doing so, Indian secularism never completely annulled particular religious
identities.
In addressing these complex issues, the idea of the political secularism
was taken further than had been evolved in the West. Mainstream theories
or ideologies in modern, Western societies have take little notice of these
features. Hence, they are struggling to deal with post-colonial religious
diversity of their societies. The later history of secularism is more non-
Western than Western. And by implication, the history of secularism must
include the history of other non-Western societies that have sought to
install and maintain secular states. To discover its own rich and complex
structure, Western secularism can either look backward, to its own past or
else look sideways, at Indian secularism that mirrors not only the past of
secularism, but in a way, also its future. Doing so will certainly benefit the
secularisms of many Western societies. For example, French secularism
417
needs to look beyond its own conceptions of laicité in order to take into
account its own multi-cultural and multi-religious reality. It cannot
continue to take refuge in claims of exceptionalism. A good hard look at
Indian secularism could also change the self-understanding of other
Western secularisms, including a very individualist, American liberal
secularism.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, I have argued that secularism is opposed to institutionalized
religious domination. Political secularism is a doctrine with a narrow
scope. It asks whether the relationship between the state and religion be, if
religious domination is to be, prevented and freedom and equality are to be
promoted. According to political secularism, only a separation of state and
religion can fulfil this purpose. Thus, political secularism defends a secular
state and opposes all forms of religion-centred states, i.e. theocracies and
state that establish religion(s). However, political secularism is equally
opposed to amoral and anti-religious secular states. There is a tendency in
the literature to equate political secularism with a unique version
developed largely in the West, which I have called the mainstream
conception. I have argued that this mainstream conception is ridden with
problems. The crisis of secularism the world over is also due to the internal
problems of this mainstream version. One should not be too pessimistic
about political secularism, however. An alternative version was developed
in the subcontinent and was eventually enshrined in the Constitution of
India. This model I have claimed has several distinctive features and
largely avoids the problems faced by the mainstream conception. It is not
sectarian, not linked to one specific religion or culture and has
transcultural potential. Because it exemplifies the idea of multiple
secularisms, there is, I have claimed, much to be learnt from it.
1. How important are religious beliefs and practices for people? Do you think
some of them come into conflict with our mundane everyday life?
2. Do you think some religious beliefs are morally objectionable, or that some
religious organizations thwart freedom and inhibit democracy? If so, what
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action should be taken against them?
3. Why has secularism acquired a bad name in some societies?
4. Can you imagine a state which provides an ethically sound alternative to both
religious-centered and secular states?
5. Does the practice of the state in India conform to the secular principles
enshrined in our Constitution? Discuss some examples that violate these
principles. Can you explain why this violation takes place?
6. Can you think of any example of state action which supports the idea of
principled distance?
7. Do you feel that Indians developed a model of secularism that was not an
imitation of the Western conceptions?
8. Is there anything wrong in borrowing from other cultures?
9. Let us assume that you accept the Indian model of secularism. Do you think it
applies only to the state and not to civil society and the wider public sphere? Or
does it have wider application?
READING LIST
Bhargava, Rajeev (ed.), Secularism and its Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1998).
Bhargava, Rajeev, ‘Political Secularism’, in B. Honnig, J. Dryzek and A. Phillips (eds),
A Handbook of Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
Chandhoke, Neera, Beyond Secularism: The Rights of Religious Minorities (Delhi:
Connolly, William, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1999).
Dubey Abhay Kumar (ed.), Beech Behas Mein Secularwaad (in Hindi) (New Delhi:
Vani and CSDS, 2005).
Jacobsohn, Gary, The Wheel of Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
Madan, T. N., Modern Myths, Locked Minds: Secularism and Fundamentalism in India
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
Mahajan, Gurpreet, Identities and Rights: Aspects of Liberal Democracy in India
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Pantham, Thomas, ‘Understanding Indian Secularism: Learning from its Recent
Critics’, in Rajendra Vora and Suhas Palshikar (eds), Indian Democracy (New Delhi:
Sage, 2004).
Srinivasan, T. N. (ed.), The Future of Secularism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2007).
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PART IV
Political Arguments
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CHAPTER 19
Affirmative Action
Ashok Acharya
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Justice and Social Disadvantage
Defining Affirmative Action
Affirmative Action in India
The Limits of Affirmative Action
INTRODUCTION
In our everyday lives we confront a range of situations that compel us to
engage in notions of fairness. In responding to such situations we often
complain ‘this (or that) isn’t fair.’ Very often, our complaints regarding
particular injustice(s) implicitly contain a conception of justice that we
may or may not articulate. In some cases we may also realize that our
conceptions of justice may not match with that of our friends or
neighbours. Disagreements about conceptions of fairness may easily arise
where the focus or subject of justice is debatable and there is no one
correct, legitimate response to be had. Certain issues are contentious and
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offer multiple perspectives, and every perspective competes for our
attention. Should the private lives of politicians be subject to public
scrutiny? Should the state subsidize poor farmers? Should the state provide
for free primary education? Should the state grant employment
opportunities to every single adult? Should colleges and universities set
aside a certain quota of their seats for members of a certain group? Such
situations are innumerable, but within the ambit of justice let us turn our
attention to a matter related to distribution of resources that gets debated
very hotly, not just in our society, but elsewhere, too. Consider the
following example.
Tanya and Rekha apply for admission to a prestigious medical college.
Both are required to write an entrance examination. In the entrance
examination, Tanya performs better than Rekha and is placed above the
latter. If we care to compare their social backgrounds we get to know that
Tanya hails from an upper-caste, middle-income family, whereas Rekha is
a Dalit from a more modest rural background. The college decides to
factor in the comparative backgrounds of the candidates but has to decide
that due to limited seats only one of them, not both, can be offered
admission. On the one hand, the college knows that Tanya has fared better
than Rekha in the entrance exam and on the other, it recognizes that
Rekha’s lower rank in the merit list can be explained by her relative social
disadvantage. We must ensure equal opportunity to both. Given that we
are committed to giving them fair opportunities to realize their dreams of
pursuing a career in medicine, how do we go about being ‘fair’? The case
compels us to engage some of our moral intuitions with the help of which
we can then determine how we go about being fair.
It is not easy to resolve the problem of choosing between Tanya and
Rekha. Both cases engage us differently and evoke different responses.
Consider Tanya’s case first. For anyone who thinks that merit must prevail
in the allocation of scarce goods, in this case a seat in a prestigious
medical college, will naturally be tempted to argue that because Tanya’s
relative rank is higher than Rekha’s, the seat must go to the former. One
may go on to add that the system of education rests on the principle of
merit which, if compromised, will lead to a state of injustice. Here, we
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need to say something on how precisely merit promotes justice and how
we should go about defending it.
One way of doing so is to subscribe to the widespread belief that the
highest positions in the society should go to the talented or the best
qualified. Rewarding excellence is one way of being just to individuals
who may be engaged in a free competition. In the long run, it could be
argued, this promotes efficiency in the system. Many argue that when it
comes to certain professions, they are best served only if these professions
are run by the talented. For example, you would trust a doctor who you
know is efficient and can provide you with the best treatment. You
wouldn’t risk being diagnosed by one who has questionable skills. If every
profession—medicine, education, sports, art, or administration—similarly
rewards the best qualified, society will be more efficient. The idea is that
the educational or the health system acts much like a market, and that it
need not be hindered or regulated by another agency, say the state. In
terms of this argument, then, denying Tanya that seat would amount to
injustice.
The same argument will hold that Rekha needs to perform better in
order to claim what Tanya is legitimately entitled to. Rekha’s
circumstances can be explained as her bad luck, something that she may
not have chosen but something that she has to bear with. However, things
may not be as simple as that. Rekha’s bad luck, on another account, may
owe to a variety of factors which constrain her from being as good as
Tanya. Rekha may not have had the same opportunities that Tanya, for
instance, had. Some account of justice must compel us to address the
unequal circumstances that these two aspirants for a medical seat may find
themselves in. One way of addressing this inequality is to conceive of a
plan whereby we correct Rekha’s disadvantage by helping her secure the
coveted medical seat. Central to this conception is the argument built on a
strong moral intuition that a society cannot be just if it does not address
issues of inequality and disadvantage.
JUSTICE AND SOCIAL DISADVANTAGE

Most societies that advance the cause of social justice often have a sizeable
presence of disadvantaged members. Some societies have endured a long
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record of injustices perpetrated against certain communities or groups.
Since such groups have suffered significant social disadvantages, social
justice requires that such disadvantages be taken account of in any
meaningful redistributive strategy adopted by the state. The challenge is to
rectify historical injustices towards certain groups. Before the state can get
on with the task of choosing an appropriate distributive paradigm to offset
social disadvantages, it will need to know more about the nature of
disadvantages and how and why these must be used as inputs for the
proposed distributive strategies. Addressing social disadvantages can be a
tricky affair. Sometimes our moral intuitions can educate us of certain
disadvantages that individuals may face, and at times we may need to learn
from our history to get a fair sense of how particular groups have suffered
injustice in the past. Social justice does invoke some universal principles
but cannot ignore empirical realities and hence must adopt context-ualized
approach.
In our own society, caste, or jati—a defining feature of the Hindu social
order, but one that permeates in some measure other religious groups as
well—is a unique identity. The caste system thrives on a belief in
hierarchy, fixed occupations, endogamous marriage norms, and prescribed
codes of ritual and social distance to be maintained between the caste
groups. Significant inequalities and inequities of power, wealth, and status
are all reflected in the caste hierarchy of India. Although the nature of
interaction and attitudes between and among castes is rapidly changing in
recent times due to the impact of modernization, education, and
industrialization, the traditional framework of varna hierarchy still holds
good in broadly classifying and hierarchically organizing the thousands of
castes that exist in our society. Those at the lowest rung of the caste
hierarchy, the Dalits, have suffered centuries of injustice. The
manifestations of this injustice exist in myriad forms of discrimination that
some lower castes, especially the Dalits, have faced and continue to face in
matters of allocation of scarce social goods. But discrimination is not the
only symptom; the question of injustice relates as much to different forms
of oppression, exploitation and domination that exist as brute social
realities. Parallels of caste injustice can be drawn with racial injustice in
other contexts. African-Americans in the United States, for example, have
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roughly undergone the same fate as the Dalits in India. An appropriate
conception of social justice has to respond to these challenges.
Let us be clear about one thing, however. In seeking to redress the
disadvantages that may accrue to particular groups owing to persistent
patterns of injustice, the social justice approach is likely to capture a
certain notion of compensation. The idea of compensation does not strictly
try to offset only particular forms of injustice; it seeks, above all, to try
securing an outcome that promises some necessary goods such as
increased happiness, equality of resources, and so on. There is a need, of
course, to ensure whether or not the historical patterns of injustice have
contributed to present structural inequalities. A compensatory approach,
moreover, does not much worry about whether or not to apportion blame
to a particular group for having perpetrated injustice. On the other hand, it
concedes that since the injustice is an undeniable social fact, some positive
programmes need to be introduced to alleviate the ensuing disadvantages.
We can have various such programmes. We could, for instance, introduce
policies aimed at land reforms in contexts where ownership of land is
monopolized by say, a dominant caste, or provide the basic necessities at a
subsidized rate to the disadvantaged groups, or increase the chances of
members of the disadvantaged groups to get jobs or admissions in sectors
where they might be under-represented. These policies are intended to
temporarily reapportion resources and opportunities in society.
DEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Affirmative action, or reservations as we understand in India, is an idea
that is deeply contested. It addresses questions of justice about
disadvantages that persons of certain groups face. Some argue that
affirmative action as a policy is designed to remedy injustices that a few
identifiable groups have suffered. Others argue that in correcting the
injustices, the policy generates a different kind of injustice. Amongst both
its supporters and critics, the idea evokes passionate reactions. A deep
moral disagreement exists in society on this issue as is evident from our
own experiences—both past and present—in addressing the practice of
reservations.
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Affirmative action usually entails a state’s preferential policy towards
particular groups. However, not all preferential policies can be justifiably
adjudged as affirmative action. Although the rationale for affirmative
action varies from place-to-place, it largely seeks to address structural
inequalities between different groups in societies. In a positive sense,
broadly speaking, it invokes ideas of fairness toward disadvantaged groups
and of redressal for unjust inequalities by way of temporarily redistributing
or reallocating scarce goods.
Preferential policy, though used as a substitute for affirmative action, is
a broader term and may include either considerations of fairness, political
accommodations of groups, or claims of distinct groups in particular
territories. For instance, preferential policies may be designed to politically
satisfy dominant ethnic majorities or minorities such as the ones for
Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Bumiputeras in Malaysia, Marathas in
Maharashtra, Assamese in Assam, or whites in South Africa. The political
justifications for this may vary across time and space. A powerful majority
or a minority in each of these cases may use the political mandate,
democratically or otherwise, to entrench the groups’ relative position in
the society, sometimes to the exclusion of others. Affirmative action is not
concerned with these instances or the logic behind them.
In contrast to preferential policy, affirmative action may be defined as a
formal effort to provide increased employment and educational
opportunities for underrepresented and disadvantaged groups at a level
sufficient to overcome past patterns of discrimination and present
structural inequalities. As a policy it seeks to ensure inclusion of
disadvantaged groups that were hitherto excluded from full participation in
citizenship. Once this is achieved, its rationale ceases to exist. In aiming to
ensure justice for historic deprivations and to secure inclusion into full
citizenship rights, affirmative action may need to be both forward and
backward-looking.
There can be different forms of affirmative action, though. There are
both weaker and stronger versions. In its least controversial form,
affirmative action refers to positive procedures that employers may use to
ensure that their pool of candidates is represented in some larger body
where the chances of recruiting a candidate from the deprived sections is
426
enhanced. Such procedures may be designed to make certain that the
possibility of bias or discrimination is significantly reduced. A stronger
form than the present one may include strategies aimed at providing the
necessary skills to target groups so that more members may succeed in job
competitions. However, the strongest form of affirmative action is quotas
or what we understand by the rubric of reservations. In the latter case, we
set aside a certain percentage of jobs or seats in educational institutions to
be filled in by members belonging to the underprivileged groups. Usually,
the weaker forms of affirmative action do not generate political
controversy, as do the stronger versions like quotas.
The starting point for any analysis for affirmative action is usually non-
discrimination. The principle of non-discrimination holds that all persons
are to be treated with equal consideration. Because differences between
individuals based on religion, race, caste, sex, language, and ethnicity are
morally arbitrary and irrelevant for purposes of public policy, the state
should ensure non-discrimination while distributing goods and
opportunities. Equipped with this kind of a logic that is blind to
differences, the state seeks to protect each citizen equally. As is evident,
the principle allows for individuals to be treated in a just manner without
any reference to their identities. However, since a certain degree of
discrimination has played its part in the denial of opportunities to certain
segments of the society, the principle may allow for a more favourable
treatment of some members as is evident in the weaker versions of
affirmative action.
At another level, the idea of equal opportunity aims to create on the one
hand, a level playing field by guarding against discrimination, and on the
other, to create formal access to conditions favourable to realizing the full
development of human potential. The second part of the reasoning
incorporates imperatives to equalize conditions of existence that go
beyond merely providing formal access to social goods and opportunities.
This calls for enabling the disadvantaged to acquire relevant skills that
increase their chances of success.
The classic statement that justified the policy of affirmative action by
drawing on a robust version of equality of opportunity is that of Lyndon B.
Johnson, the former President of the United States, who argued that the
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policy of formal, legal equality for blacks is not enough. He said: ‘You do
not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate
him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, “you are free
to compete with all the others,” and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair. Thus, it is not enough just to open the gates of
opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those
gates….’ In making the worse-off walk through the gates of opportunity,
we surely need a stronger formulation of the equal opportunity argument,
one that recognizes their collective disability.
The group-disadvantage argument makes the case for the strongest
version of affirmative action, viz., quotas or reservations. When we speak
of disadvantaged groups, we are referring to the objective and experiential
conditions of disadvantages that are fairly concentrated and cumulative in
the group. Here, we are referring to groups that suffer from being very
worse-off, in addition to having had to endure being at the lowest rung of
the society for generations.
The Dalits in India, who roughly comprise 16.5 per cent of the
population, are in a sense the worst-off group that has occupied the lowest
rung in the social hierarchy for centuries. According to recent estimates,
the literacy rate among the Dalits is woefully short of the national average
—about 36 per cent compared to the general literacy rate of around 55 per
cent. A vast majority of Dalits—approximately 80 per cent—lives in rural
areas, and almost 50 per cent of them are landless agricultural labourers.
Their present lot compounds historical factors of exclusion, centuries of
sub-human existence, and a clear statement of lack of self-respect. Clearly,
any redistributive strategy, including affirmative action, cannot in the
Indian context wish away the reality of these complex, enduring, structural
inequalities. Keeping in mind these normative considerations, the
Constituent Assembly set about the task of devising a complex array of
affirmative action policies for the Dalits to offset their concentrated and
cumulative disadvantages.
If we follow the group-disadvantage reasoning, we may concede the
requirement of quotas for the most disadvantaged but may shy away from
extending identical benefits to the less-deserving cases of groups whose
objective conditions may not require such strong remedies. Since we are
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discussing the idea of group disadvantage we must open our line of inquiry
further and ask whether the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) ought to be
treated at par with the Scheduled Castes (SC), for instance? It is
undeniable tha Dalits are a severely disadvantaged group but the same
cannot be established for OBCs, or at least most of them. This raises the
issue of whether a stronger version of affirmative action is equally
applicable to both, or if different strategies appropriate for each should be
implemented.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN INDIA

The colonial policy of ensuring representation rights to different
communities is a crude precursor to affirmative action policies in post-
Independence India. Two principles ground the colonial policy of equal
representation in political offices and jobs that led to communal or
representational quotas: (a) the policy of balance between competing
communities, or interests; and (b) the policy to divide the nationalist front
by creating differences. The constitutional scheme of preferences that
came to fruition during 1947–50 was, on the contrary, based on the policy
of social justice (Beteille 1991: 205–6). As a democracy in search of both
formal and substantive equality, India had to address on an urgent basis the
cause of the historically disadvantaged groups. Whereas the requirements
of formal equality meant the equal protection of law against discrimination
on morally invidious grounds, the requirements of substantive equality
meant recognizing the needs of the more disadvantaged. Both these
commitments—one to individuals stripped of their differences, and the
other to groups—run parallel in the Constitution. At a broader level, they
complement each other very much like the contents and provisions of the
fundamental rights and the directive principles. Some rights have inscribed
onto them reasonable limits and restrictions.
Articles 15(4) (added by the 1st Amendment to the Constitution), 16(4),
46, 330, and 332 form the crux of the affirmative action policies in India’s
Constitution. Art. 335, which since the Constitution came into effect has
been a subject of controversy and differing interpretations of the judiciary,
qualifies the affirmative action provisions by adding a rider that claims of
SCs and STs for federal and provincial jobs are to be taken into
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consideration ‘consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of
administration’.
Broadly, three types of preferences are sanctioned by the Constitution.
First are reservations—in the sense used here they denote a broader
category than affirmative action—which cover (a) special representation
rights of SCs and STs by way of reserved seats in legislatures, and (b)
quotas in government jobs and educational institutions. The reservation
device is also used to a lesser extent in ‘the distribution of land allotments,
housing, and other scarce resources (Galanter 1991: 43). Second,
preferences target a few groups—SCs, STs, and women—with regard to
the provision of certain expenditures, services, and ameliorative schemes
such as scholarships, grants, loans, land allotments, health care, and legal
aid. In the course of fulfilling its developmental goals and mandate,
antipoverty measures including rural development schemes, also target
some of the usual beneficiaries of affirmative action. Third, certain
preferences take the form of special protections that safeguard vulnerable
groups from oppression and exploitation, like measures to prohibit forced
labour, and others.
In explicitly stating such sweeping and enabling affirmative action
provisions, the Constitution, thus, seeks to strike a balance between formal
and substantive equality. From the above account it is partially clear,
however, that the state’s moral commitments are more towards SCs and
STs than what it loosely defines as backward classes generally. It ought to
be noted here that the founders of the Constitution did not give a
comprehensive view of social backwardness and who merits inclusion in
it. This was left to the future governments to define and identify for
preferential policies. But otherwise in its dual commitments to both
individuals and groups, the Constitution brings into sharp focus the tension
between individuals and groups as proper objects of state policies
including those of affirmative action.
During India’s constitutional deliberations, equal citizenship for lower
caste members meant assuming responsibility to initiate positive policy
initiatives to offset historic disadvantages faced by them. Such initiatives
underscored the need for affirmative action policies for SCs and STs.
Since the early 1990s, by a revision to the initial list of group beneficiaries,
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affirmative action policies have been extended to include OBCs as well.
As affirmative action in India is constitutionally mandated and exists by
way of quotas, the extension involves numerical goals in filling
educational seats, government, and public sector jobs from the listed group
beneficiaries—SCs, STs, and OBCs.
The Indian experience is heavily weighted towards the recognition of
backward identities needing affirmative action benefits. Since the writing
of the Constitution, the motif of compensatory justice has provided the
moral staple for understanding the theory and practice of affirmative action
in India. However, notions of justice have evolved over a period of time in
judicial parlance and normative discourse. From the 1960s till date one
notices a gradual evolution of affirmative action justifications—from non-
discrimination to equal opportunity to some form of equal outcome
approach. The equal outcome approach is the current metric of both
proposing and evaluating the fairness of affirmative action policy.
THE LIMITS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Affirmative action policies are rife with moral and political controversies.
Those who oppose such policies do so for several reasons. At one extreme
are those who are not attracted by the moral appeal of social justice. For
them, affirmative action policies are one form of discrimination
substituting another. Critics of this line of reasoning call these policies
reverse discrimination, mandated by the state but clearly unjust as these do
not differ in any morally relevant way from past discrimination against the
same groups in whose favour the state now justifies them. It must be
noted, however, that this criticism originates from a procedural conception
of justice intent on protecting a narrow conception of equality between
individuals without reference to their social moorings or any robust vision
of a just society. The critics eschew any collective moral responsibility that
social justice enjoins the larger society with.
Believers in a narrow conception of equality steer close to a market
logic where merit makes up for a compelling case in determining who gets
what. Such critics would dismiss Rekha’s case as illegitimate and instead
argue for Tanya’s claim to admission. In the market argument, a bad hiring
practice is inefficient in the long run and in a competitive market system,
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the market advocates would argue, policy makers should not address
practices of discrimination. The efficiency of an enterprise will depend on
its hiring practices. If employers discriminate and, as a result, hire less-
qualified workers, their business will falter and those who hire the best
will advance. Note that all forms of discrimination are treated at par in this
argument, both those that employers may display and those that the state
may mandate. However, there is one problem with this criticism. What if
employers find discrimination profitable? Would discrimination be
warranted then? The implications of this may be very disturbing, to say the
least. There are problems, then, with how far the market can have a say in
ordering principles for society.
But what about merit? This calls for some serious debate, as this is a
recurring theme in discussions of affirmative action. Interpretation of this
principle is not straightforward. What do we understand by merit? Who
defines it? How much of weight should we give to it? These are questions
that cannot be easily settled. The matter gets complicated when bias
toward groups or their unfavourable stereotyping gets in the way of clear-
headed thinking. Merit is generally considered to include such things as
intellect, skill, and competence that one achieves unaided and through
one’s own effort. What counts as any of these—intellect, skill or
competence—is generally judged by the society. And not all societies can
agree on the fundamental parameters that create these values. Within
societies too, we find that there are no neutral ways of deciding what
constitutes merit. A certain sense of arbitrariness creeps into the act of
description, and usually the prevailing cultural norms shape the meaning
of merit. In the context of a caste society, if the usual achievers belong to
the higher castes, they would have an authoritative say in how the
principle actually is defined. In the absence of a culturally neutral
definition of the principle, we run into problems of interpretation.
However, there is more than this. Many organizations also find it difficult
to give a scientifically coherent view of what comprises merit; whether
skills and competence are completely to be attributed to the efforts of
individuals, and how precisely to measure a person’s efficiency or
contribution. Short of this requirement then, we may suggest that the
principle has some arbitrariness built into it, and as such may need to be
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used with care and circumspection in making arguments. That being said,
however, we do not wish to jump into the obvious conclusion that merit
counts for nothing. It does, but its cause is better served if we strive to
produce its content more democratically and less arbitrarily.
Second, some criticisms of affirmative action do object to the social
costs of such policies. These critics might believe in the legitimacy of a
social justice approach but would argue that such strategies are wrong-
headed, perpetuate and exacerbate existing social divisions, and the less-
deserving or the better-off members of the target groups generally corners
the benefits accruing from these. An oft-repeated criticism of the policies
is that although these are ‘temporary’ measures, they tend to not only
persist but also expand in scope. In other words, the politics of affirmative
action overtakes its philosophy. Any political system that once introduces
these positive programmes, finds itself saddled with it forever. This is
because the political system produces electoral incentives for political
parties to persist with, and at times expand in scope, the policy mandate.
This creates a negative effect: the society undergoes an increase in group
polarization with the consequence that the nonbeneficiary groups produce
adverse reactions ranging from violence to backlash in the political arena.
A cause for constant worry is that among the target groups, the benefits
have generally gone disproportionately to the better-off members. The
crux of the argument is that the designated disadvantaged groups—the
SCs, the STs, and the OBCs—are not homogeneous entities. They are
marked by heterogeneity in the sense that economically not all members of
the groups—and there are obvious differences between groups as well—
share similar status. There is some potency to the plea that the
economically better-off members of the groups in question, called ‘the
creamy layer’, ought to be excluded from the beneficiary class. This
position is even conceded to by some defenders of affirmative action.
Some of the above criticisms highlight the harm that affirmative action
inflicts on the society. Part of the problem in responding to these criticisms
is not having access to the relevant facts. In our own society, for instance,
we have not had a caste census since 1931 and there is no system in place
that periodically and comprehensively monitors the effects of
redistributive strategies, including those of affirmative action.
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There is one criticism, however, that suggests how these policies inflict
harm on the groups themselves by a process of stigmatization. This view
argues how apparently benign policies that draw upon the benevolent
consent of the higher castes can promote notions of caste inferiority among
the beneficiaries. However, on the other hand, there are contrary reports to
suggest that instead of demeaning, affirmative action has been responsible
in empowering and mobilizing the Dalits far more effectively than before.
Clearly, the arguments against affirmative action are many and some of
them do confirm that arguments aside, the fact of social costs cannot be
wished away. Even defenders admit that the social and political costs of
affirmative action are at times too heavy to ignore. But with all its costs
and imperfections, it will be imprudent to abandon the imperative of
distributive justice. Jettisoning affirmative action is equivalent to turning a
blind eye to the cause of social justice, which requires us to politically
commit ourselves to take responsibility for past injustices. Affirmative
action is, indeed, justified but only in morally compelling cases.
1. The idea that disadvantaged groups require some form of compensatory justice
is a backward-looking argument. Discuss with examples.
2. What characteristics must a group have to be considered as disadvantaged?
3. Can affirmative action be defended on grounds that it will promote a more just
society in the future?
4. ‘One of the biggest costs of affirmative action is that the policy causes political
divisions in a society’. Would you agree? Support your argument with
examples.
5. How would you mediate in a conflict between defenders and opponents of
affirmative action? With what arguments?
READING LIST
Beteille, Andre, Society and Politics in India: Essays in Comparative Perspective
(London: The Athlone Press, 1991).
Cohen, Marshall, Thomas Nagel and Thomas Scanlon (eds), Equality and Preferential
Treatment. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
Galanter, Marc, Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India (Delhi:
434
Kumar, Dharma, ‘The Affirmative action Debate in India,’ Asian Survey, XXXII(3),
1992: 290–302.
Mandal Report, Reservations for Backward Clases: Mandal Commission Report of the
Backward Classes Commission (Delhi: Akalank Publications, 1980 [1991]).
Rosenfeld, Michel, Affirmative Action and Justice (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1991).
Shah, Ghanashyam, ‘Social Backwardness and Politics of Reservations,’ Economic and
Political Weekly. XXVI(11–12), 1991: 601–610.
Young, Iris Marion, Justice and the Politics of Difference. (Princeton: Princeton
435
CHAPTER 20
Freedom of Speech and the Question of

Censorship
Aarti Sethi
CHAPTER OUTLINE
Introduction
Speech and the ‘Lesser Harm’ Hypothesis
Freedom of Expression and the Search for Truth
Freedom of Speech and its Relation to Self-government
Free Speech and Tolerance
The Autonomy Defence of Free Speech
What Do We Do with Hate Speech?
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the question of the freedom of speech and
expression, juxtaposed against the question of restrictions on expression,
or censorship. The chapter begins with a broad overview of the main
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theoretical arguments that have been made in support of freedom of
expression. It then goes onto to examine the relationship between speech
and harm, and the case for censorship.
Free speech is a bit of a puzzle in contemporary society. While on the
one hand, almost everyone seems to agree that freedom of speech and
expression are important and they enjoy unprecedented legal protection
which does not extend to any other class of acts in society, at the same
time there is no real agreement amongst philosophers, lawyers, legislators,
and citizens as to why it is important, and how much freedom is too much
freedom. Further, most liberal democracies must also deal with the
consequences of incendiary and hateful speech which compromises the
dignity and safety of citizens. Therefore, while the legitimacy of liberal
democracies crucially hinges on the degree of freedom of expression
allowed to citizens, the media and so on, there are also claims of justice
that must be met which demand that citizens be protected from certain
kinds of speech.
Some states, while continuing to uphold the freedom of expression,
however also legislate what is fit for citizens to watch, hear, see and read.
In India for instance, the Central Board of Film Certification, requires that
all films must receive a censor certificate and this has often lead to films
being censored which are deemed to be obscene, or liable to ‘hurt the
sentiments’ of particular communities. Often, censorship is also seen to
operate as an expression of power and the refusal to allow the circulation
of certain expressions that question dominant power structures.
In this chapter, we will look at the knotty question of free speech and
censorship. We will attempt to understand why and how people have
defended the right to freedom of speech and expression, and think through
situations that might require this right to be curtailed.
But first we will try and understand the grounds upon which a case may
be made to protect freedom of expression, namely, what in the right to
freedom of speech/expression singles it as worthy of the special treatment
it enjoys in most liberal democracies.
In the first section of this essay we will look at some of the arguments
that have been made in order to construct a ‘free speech principle’. A free
speech principle would need to be different from a general liberty principle
437
in that it would have to demonstrate that speech, or that class of
expressions, which we deem to be speech (such as writing, music, film,
journalism and so on), constitutes a separate category which deserves
greater, different, or special protection. Such a principle would have to
identify qualities possessed by speech which justify this treatment.
A robust conception would also have to take into account protected
speech, i.e. speech which cannot be restricted under clauses like the First
Amendment in the United States Constitution or under Article 19(2) in the
Indian Constitution, and protect not just ‘good’ speech, but also speech
which is untrue, false, trite, and sometimes downright dangerous (such as
racist speech or speech directed at sexual minorities or religious
communities.).
And finally, a free speech principle would not need to assert that no
restrictions on speech are admissible under any circumstances. But that
stronger justification should be provided if the consequences of an action
require the restriction of speech, than if this were not the case.
One mode of arguing in favour of free speech would be to link it with
the achievement of other values we hold dear such as individual liberty,
democracy, tolerance and so on. The problem with this argument is that if
it could be established that the achievement of these other values would be
served better through the restriction, rather than promotion of speech,
speech becomes difficult to defend. Another set of arguments, therefore,
ask for speech to be valued not because it has favourable consequences in
the achievement of other values, but that it be valued for qualities intrinsic
to itself. Such an argument would make the claim that free speech is a
desirable value/good in itself, which does not need to be justified by
invoking principles external to it.
SPEECH AND THE ‘LESSER HARM’ HYPOTHESIS

Let us begin from the least influential philosophically, but one that
nonetheless enjoys some currency in popular understanding of the power
of speech, succinctly summed up in the adage, ‘sticks and stones can break
my bones, but words can never harm me’, or what Fredrick Schauer calls
the ‘lesser harm principle’. The argument states that speech should be free
and unregulated not because there are especial benefits to be had from its
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circulation; rather, speech, unlike actions, does not have the power to do
any real damage to its recipients.
However, neither law nor philosophy can afford to, and indeed do not,
ignore the very real consequences that accrue from speech and expression.
This is especially true of misogynist or racist speech. Words are important
and powerful and no clear boundaries can be drawn between speech and
when speech takes the form of action. We will return to the question of
just how powerful words are at several points in this discussion, but for
now it leads us to another, this time extremely influential and cogent,
defence, made by J. S. Mill in On Liberty.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH

J. S. Mill in his essay, On Liberty remarks:
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the
contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person,
than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind…. If the
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth:
if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.
In this lively and immensely readable essay, J. S. Mill made what
remains as one of the most persuasive defences of the liberty of discussion,
that without free expression society as a whole would remain bereft of the
truth. It is only through the free exchange of ideas and opinions between
dissenting individuals that the truth or falsity of an opinion can be
ascertained. Mill’s position may be read as assuming that ‘truth’ is a stable
coherent concept which can be discovered, he, however, had interesting
things to say about truth and his own position on truth is a lot more
complicated, as we shall see, than it appears on first reading.
Mill makes his argument in two parts, which relate to the ‘truth’ of an
utterance. The first relates to whether an utterance is true. If it were, to
deny it a hearing would mean that the truth would be lost forever. And if
an utterance were false, the truth would no longer remain a ‘living truth’
but become a moribund ‘dead dogma’ because it would not require
constant justification, through arguments in its defence.
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However, Mill also makes the observation that to adjudicate upon the
truth-value of a statement is itself a fraught exercise because the
adjudicators ‘have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and
exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing
to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their
certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty, and clearly no one can
presume to have absolute certainty. It is only through free and open
discussion and the constant tussle between individuals holding divergent
opinions, ideas, and beliefs that the truth can be arrived at. And finally,
Mill notes that ‘The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is,
that all the argument is on one side. There are no objections, and no
answers to objections. But on every subject on which difference of opinion
is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of
conflicting reasons.’
There are no certainties in social life, according to Mill, and matters can
thus be resolved only when every opinion has an equal chance of being
heard. There is a second related argument that Mill makes, which is
closely related to the search for truth argument that privileges diversity:
…only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human
intellect, a chance of fair play to all sides of the truth. When there are persons to be
found, who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any
subject, even if the world is in the right, it is always probable that dissentients have
something worth hearing to say for themselves, and that truth would lose
something by their silence.
The most obvious problem with Mill’s argument is that often truth may
not be the only, or indeed even the primary, desirable outcome in a given
situation. Other considerations, such as justice, or maintaining peace, or
individual privacy might far outweigh the value placed on what is ‘true’.
States are often loath to reveal ‘sensitive information’ relating to military
matters, and courts often rule against the exposure of the private lives of
celebrities. Therefore, often precisely because something is true, requires
that it not be made public.
Mill also seems to assume that all individuals share an equal capacity to
speak freely and that they will understood each other in the same language.
By language here is meant not really English or Hindi or French, but a
shared set of understandings of the values, codes, and norms through
440
which people make sense of the world and their place in it. Often, the
bitterest contests in society are between individuals and groups whose
perception of the world do not share the same rules, and therefore cannot
make sense to each other. The conflict between customary law (norms
developed by communities over time, often unwritten, based on patterns of
usage, such as rights to inheritance, pasture-lands, water and so on) and
constitutional law is one such instance. The latter and its understanding of
private property, often come into conflict on the question of community
rights over the usage of natural resources such as land, forests, and water.
Communities are often faced with situations in which they are unable to
translate a claim on resources, into a language that can be acknowledged
as such in the courtroom. Constitutional law and community understanding
are based on differing views of the world and sometimes there is no easy
way to translate between worlds. Indeed, ‘life’, ‘property’, ‘freedom’,
might mean different and incommensurable things, and one ‘truth’ which
everyone might agree on might be difficult, even impossible to find, even
through discussion.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

Another argument, which relates to the ‘social’ dimensions of free speech,
that is, which views free speech as deserving of protection because through
it important social objectives are met, is made by Alexander Meiklejohn.
According to him, freedom of speech and expression are important
because they are crucial for the functioning of a democratic system of
government. Besides, popular discourse and literature in which the press is
hailed as the ‘fourth estate’, invoke this argument, where the vibrancy of a
democracy is seen as relating crucially to the freedom of the press.
The interesting fact in Meiklejohn’s argument is that he focuses not so
much on the speaker’s right to speak, but the listener’s right to hear. The
basis of a democratic government is citizens’ consent. It is only through
the free exchange of ideas and a free press that citizens will be exposed to
the ideas, opinions and views which they require in order to participate
effectively in democratic decision making, and hold government
responsible for its actions. Only when citizens are able to hear all sides of
441
an argument can they effectively make up their mind, and this is only
possible when ‘public speech’ enjoys untrammelled protection.
The problem, of course, arises in the event that the goal of democracy is
in restricting rather than promoting free speech. For instance, the
government in power might refuse to allow political campaigning during
elections on the grounds that the opposition is spreading false information.
Also, what would happen to speech which served no democratic purposes
at all but was merely fun, enjoyable, and pleasurable? Further, Eric
Barendt asks, would incessant advertising campaigns qualify for
protection? Could it not be argued that they hinder rather than promote
democracy? The huge advertising budgets of Coke and Pepsi mask the
public from the ongoing conflict between these companies and the rights
of local communities over water resources (such as the ongoing struggle in
Plachimada in Kerala).
The question of the relationship between different classes of people in
society and the function of speech brings us to the next argument, which
links freedom of speech and expression to the capacities for tolerance
within society.
FREE SPEECH AND TOLERANCE

In The Tolerant Society (1986), Lee Bollinger attempts to arrive at a free
speech principle which begins not with trying to establish the benefits that
flow from it per say, but the relationship between its reception and other
values; in this case what he terms tolerance, in society. His treatment of
the issue thinks through ‘free speech in relation to our dealings with social
behaviour in general.’ On this view a defence of free speech may be
constructed by invoking its function in inculcating an ethic of tolerant
listening.
Bollinger recognizes that speech can be harmful. However, this
recognition does not lead him to demand that speech be regulated; rather
that recognition of the very real harms that speech can effect and to
nonetheless, ‘let the injury pass’ countermands the widespread societal
impulse of excessive punishment. Free speech allows us to develop the
‘virtue of magnanimity’.
442
There is a further social benefit to be had from the free circulation of
diverse, and often contentious views. In the societies in which we live,
everyday life is necessarily an encounter with enormous diversity. People
hold different views, opinions, beliefs, and practise different ways of
living, not all of which can comfortably accommodate each other. For
Bollinger, free speech performs the function of a ‘zone of tolerance’ in
which individuals are forced to confront and tolerate views not in keeping
with their own.
Tolerating free speech makes us more receptive to the idea that things
do not always go our way, and no one has the right to impose their way of
living on anyone else. We may not agree with someone’s life choices,
indeed we might have very strong objections to them, but we do not have
the right to impose our ideas of what is right on them. For Bollinger,
tolerating speech performs the important task of teaching us this.
It is not hard to see why there have been several criticisms of
Bollinger’s thesis. David Richards notes that given that tolerance is the
‘central normative term’ in Bollinger’s argument, it is necessary for him to
provide, at the outset, a critical theory of tolerance. In its absence the
contention that the toleration of speech creates the conditions for a general
increase of tolerance levels in society, leaves several questions
unanswered. Why, for instance, does the toleration of speech have this
special attribute, why not the toleration of actions? Tolerating the right of
all adults to choose their sexual orientation and partners (currently
criminalized as ‘sexual acts against the order of nature’ under Section 377
of the Indian Penal Code) might go a long way in promoting a more
inclusive society in India. Furthermore, why value tolerance at all? Surely,
it can be argued, there are some things, which no democratic society
should tolerate such as racist, misogynist or casteist speech? And finally,
could it not be argued that excessive speech can sometimes lead to less
rather than more tolerance? We know, for instance, that the February 2002
genocide in Gujarat was preceded by widespread propaganda on the part
of politicians and leaders from the Hindu Right which, it could be argued,
helped in no small way to create conditions wherein a massacre could have
occured.
443
Clearly then, it seems from the above, that it is difficult to construct a
robust free speech principle by invoking the positive consequences of free
speech and the negative effects of restrictions, because this leaves free
speech vulnerable when it can be argued that there are benefits to be had
from restrictions.
The autonomy defence of free speech seeks to rescue it from the tenuous
terrain where consequentialist defences, i.e. defences which argue from the
positive outcomes or consequences of free speech, often leave it stranded,
by grounding a defence of free speech in the idea of individual autonomy.
A convincing autonomy argument would be able to ‘free’ free speech from
the burden of demonstrating desirable results. If successful, it would also
be able to protect free speech as a value in itself, restrictions on which
would require stronger justifications than if it were merely a condition for
the attainment of other values.
THE AUTONOMY DEFENCE OF FREE SPEECH

The autonomy defence of free speech asserts that freedom of speech must
enjoy state protection because restrictions on the same would violate the
autonomy of individuals. While ‘autonomy’ is a difficult conception to pin
down, and different formulations will deploy it differently, a sufficient
conception for our purposes here is one that underpins liberal philosophy
in general. An autonomous person is one who is a self-governing, rational
individual, who takes responsibility for the beliefs he/she holds.
In ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’ (1972), Thomas Scanlon
employs this notion of autonomy, which he terms the ‘Millian principle’.
For Scanlon, freedom of speech and expression are important because
restrictions on them seriously compromise individual autonomy. To be
autonomous a person must be able to view oneself as sovereign in deciding
what to believe and what not to believe. He/she must be able to weigh
competing opinions and courses of action and come to independent
decisions based on his/her own judgement and discretion. An autonomous
person, therefore, will not accept another’s pronouncements on the merit
of an issue, without exercising his/her own independent judgement on the
issue in hand. This extends even to views and opinions which are aimed at
444
persuading the person to believe in something which is untrue and
dangerous.
The powers of the state thus must be restricted to those that citizens will
be willing to accept, while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous
and rational. Restrictions on speech do not meet this requirement because
they undercut the capacity of people to decide matters for themselves.
Scanlon’s Millian principle states that though there are certain harms
which would not occur but for certain acts of expression, these harms
cannot justify legal restrictions on these acts of expression. These include
harms to individuals because they come to hold untrue beliefs as a result of
expression (such as people believing the world is flat because a book says
so), and the negative consequences of acts which are performed by people
because certain acts of expression lead them to believe these acts were
worth committing (such as someone robbing a bank because they heard
someone saying that robbers would go to heaven).
An autonomous individual cannot allow the state to withhold certain
views because it is the individual’s prerogative to decide whether these
views are to be believed or not. And, while the state might outlaw certain
kinds of actions as harmful and prosecute people who commit them (such
as murder), it cannot restrict their advocacy (such as encouragement to
kill) because the decision on whether the law ought to be followed or not,
again devolves onto individuals.
Thomas Nagel (1995) invokes an idea of autonomy similar to Scanlon’s
in his defence of free speech. He notes that recognition of individual
sovereignty over reason and beliefs requires that a person must be
permitted to discuss his/her views and elicit reactions. Further, it also
requires that he/she should not be ‘protected against exposure to views that
might influence him in ways others deem pernicious, but that have the
responsibility to make up his own mind about whether to accept or reject
them’.
Susan J. Brison (1998) points out that Scanlon’s claim that an
autonomous individual will refuse to allow another to decide on her behalf
because she will take responsibility for her beliefs, may be countered by
the reasoning that false information, by making people believe that a group
is inferior or unworthy, might compromise autonomous decision-making
445
capacities. Second, she argues that not all speech is processed rationally.
Indeed, the socialization of young men and women into occupying
differential power roles in society is the result of processes which are not
rationally mediated. And finally, Scanlon’s argument that autonomous
rational agents would not be willing to grant government the power to
legislate speech may be countered with the claim that rational agents
might, indeed, ask for such regulation precisely through a rational
evaluation of the harms that certain speech acts can effect. We might
decide that the consequences of certain speech are so harmful that we do
not wish their circulation in our society. The recent government ban on
cigarette advertisements on television could be viewed in this light.
WHAT DO WE DO WITH HATE SPEECH?

The question of speech becomes even more problematic when we enter the
realm of what has been termed ‘hate speech’, that is, speech directed at
certain people or communities with the intent to cause harm by asserting
their natural inferiority (such as racist speech), or speech that by its nature
asserts the domination of one group of people over another (such as
pornography, or misogynist speech). This would also include speech,
which while ascribing certain negative traits or characteristics to groups
and individuals also asks others to take actions meant to cause harm to this
group.
In terms of demands for the legal regulation of hate speech, the initiative
came from America and Europe in the context of racist speech. In India,
concerns have centred on inflammatory speech directed at religious
minorities, and this question has acquired greater urgency after the Gujarat
genocide in 2002 in which there was widespread propaganda against the
Muslim community by ideologues of the Hindu Right.
Hate speech requires us to address a number of critical questions that
have to do with the relationship between language and harm. The first
assumption in hate speech regulation is, of course, that speech can cause
harm. Further, this harm is akin to, or must be treated as being at par with,
physical harm or injury.
The link between the capacity of words to hurt, which are of an almost
physical nature, pervades much of the literature on hate speech. For
446
instance, in Words that Wound (1993), Richard Delgado argues that racist
speech leaves deep psychological wounds on its victims. By perpetuating
social stereotypes of inferiority, racist speech leads to feelings of self-
hatred, humiliation and isolation in its victims. By linking achievement
and merit with skin colour, it also leads to the internalization of feelings of
inferiority in those it addresses. Delgado points to several arenas in which
racist speech causes minority groups to suffer, such as children’s
scholastic achievements, parenting skills on the part of single mothers, and
problem in the workplace. For Delgado, racist speech is inflected with the
desire to cause harm. He goes further and notes that Black Americans are
more prone to high blood pressure, hypertension and stroke as compared to
their white counterparts, and this probably has to do with the physiological
manifestations of stress caused by racial abuse.
People are more likely to cause harm to those they believe are inferior
and less powerful than themselves and racist speech also creates the
conditions in which certain groups are more vulnerable to violence than
others. The legal regulation of racist speech, for Delgado and others who
demand it, is recognition of the capacity for words to wound, and an
assurance to its victims that attacks on the equal worth of all members will
not be tolerated in a free and democratic society. For Delgado, while
speech causes identifiable harm, speech and the harmful actions it leads to
are nonetheless different order of things. Another way of thinking about
the relationship between speech and harm is to complicate the relationship
between ‘speech’ and ‘action’ which have traditionally been seen as
separate. Noted philosopher J. L. Austin (1975) complicates this
distinction by introducing the idea of the ‘speech act’, i.e. an action that is
enacted through speech.
Austin refers to two kinds of speech acts: illocutionary and
perlocutionary. An ill-ocutionary speech act is one that both describes and
does—that is utterance is equal to the performance of the act. When the
judge in a courtroom hands down a verdict saying, ‘I pronounce you
guilty,’ or a minister officiates at a wedding ceremony with the words, ‘I
now pronounce you man and wife,’ they are performing illocutionary
speech acts where there is no time lag between saying and doing. As he
says the words, he does the action.
447
A perlocutionary speech act, on the other hand, is one where there is a
temporal lag between the utterance and the consequences of the action it
encapsulates. For instance, when I ask you, ‘Can you bring me the book on
the table?’ I am asking you to perform a certain action (which is an action
in itself), the results of which will be demonstrated after the utterance.
Rae Langton (1993), the feminist theorist, invokes the Austinian schema
in her discussion and defence of Catherine Mackinnon’s argument calling
for laws against trafficking in pornography. Langton argues that
pornography does not simply advocate the subordination of women (the
consequences of which are felt later), but it is the subordination of women
and must therefore be viewed, for purposes of regulation, as violent action,
not merely as violent speech. While not explicitly invoking Austin, Andrea
Dworkin and McKinnon, too, identify the capacity of words to effect
actions in themselves. Therefore, for Dworkin, pornography is the theory
of subordination, which translates into the practice of rape. The problem
with this position, Judith Butler (1997) argues, is in assuming the stability
of language where a statement always does what it says; it bestows on
individuals a sovereignty, which in actuality only belongs to the state. It is
only the state, which has, through the language of law, an illocutionary
power to always make language mean precisely what it says.
Let us return to our example of the illocutionary speech act to
understand this better. Let us assume you and I disagree over something I
say. You say I am guilty of misconduct and I say you misunderstood the
import of what I was saying. Things come to a head, we both threaten each
other with dire consequences and since we cannot resolve this dispute
amongst ourselves, we approach the court. The court considers the
evidence, and decides that there was no misunderstanding; that my words
did indeed have the effect you claim they did, and prescribes suitable
punishment. The judgement by the court does not only redress a harm
done unto me, but it also ‘fixes’, in perpetuity, the import of what I said.
The court decides once and for all, not just what I said, but what my
speech meant. And because it is backed by the coercive power of the state,
the court is the only institution in society which has the sovereign authority
to decide the consequences of language.
448
Hate speech is a purely legal category. It is the law that defines certain
kinds of speech as hate speech. The category of hate speech thus cannot
exist without the state deeming it to be so, and it produces, through
legislation, speech that does what it says: victimization, de-gradation, and
subordination. When this category of hate speech is applied to the things
people say to each other, the law produces subjects who have the
llocutionary linguistic power of the state. The state then re-enters this
arena as the neutral arbiter of speech between citizens, without recognition
of the power of the state in prefiguring the arena of speech acts in society.
Butler’s work provides us with a way to reflect on speech and the
ethical questions that surround speech acts, which moves outside the
juridical framework presumed in liberal theory, where the state is the sole
arbiter of what is publicly speakable or otherwise, and so defines in this
way the effects of language itself. It might help us to negotiate the liberal
conundrum where the state’s commitment to a liberal order is precisely
why it cannot allow certain speech acts which attack the normative
foundations of this order. It also cautions us against turning to the state too
easily for solutions particularly where the state itself is imbricated in the
configurations of power in society. In India, therefore, Section 153A of the
Indian Penal Code, which prohibits the promotion of enmity between
groups, has been used against Taslima Nasreen, in relation to her book
Amar Meyebela (My Girlhood) for offending the sentiments of some
Muslims, and against M. F. Hussain for his depictions of a nude Saraswati
(for offending the sentiments of some Hindus), while Praveen Togadia’s
incendiary language prior to and during the Gujarat genocide did not invite
legal restriction.
In Butler’s formulation, the subject of hateful speech can render the
skeins of language itself vulnerable. We see this, for instance, in the usage
of the words ‘nigger’ and ‘queer’ for the black and queer community as
instances of the appropriation and re-signification of language. In India,
one of the most powerful instances of such appropriation is the use of the
word ‘Dalit’ which literally means ‘oppressed’, as a self-descriptive term.
Words that are used with the intent to harm, are appropriated to mean their
opposite. Words can and do wound, but they can also be re-signified and
appropriated, their potential to hurt turned into affirmations of strength.
449
When we think of speech this way it allows us to be open to non-
juridical forms of intervention which in recognizing the power of speech
and the complicated terrains in which it operates in society, do not flatten
out complications by nominating the state as the only arbiter with the
power to decide what can and cannot be said.
CONCLUSION
We need to recognize that speech and speech acts have a real impact on
people’s lives, and it is because they cannot be dismissed that we need to
consider with a great deal of seriousness how best they may be governed.
Are all kinds if speech pemissible? Should the speech that incites violence
and hatred be curtailed? Who decides what is violent and hateful, and on
what grounds? What if silence can be seen on some occasions to be as
injurious, or as productive, as speech? Can silence be regulated? What is
the difference between mere utterance and considered speech? How is the
content of this difference arrived upon? Should different norms, rules, and
regulation apply to private and public instances of speech?
Each one of these is an open question, and it is difficult, if not
impossible to arrive at answers that will satisfy all of us, or even some of
us, all the time. Much depends on context, the identity of the speakers and
the listeners, and the history of what has been said before. The choice of
when to privilege speech, when to emphasize the virtue of coded forms of
speech, and when to pass over things in silence, are matters that require us
to take into account various intersecting ethical and pragmatic constraints.
Sometimes there are no satisfactory answers.
All we can safely say is, by and large, if something erroneous, mistaken,
untrue, dangerous, hateful or injurious is said, then that utterance can
always be responded to by various acts of counter-speech. However, the
silent prejudice, the unspoken hatred, and the inaudible threat can never be
challenged. It is the absence of challenge towards such sentiments that
allows them to accumulate prestige and grow in stature, until they threaten
to overcome the very foundations of an open, tolerant, and democratic
polity. For this reason alone, the risks of the freedom of speech may be
seen by many committed to an open society to be preferable to the safety
of regulated expression.
450
1. Should a liberal democratic society allow the airing of racist, sexist and
misogynist views in the national media?
2. If we were to extend the definition of speech to all forms of expression, how
would we think of the place a body like the Central Board of Film Certification
occupies in society?
3. Can you elucidate examples of cultural subversion and the re-signification of
derogatory speech from popular culture?
4. Is it possible to think of the freedom of expression and its relationship to the
right to information?
5. What, in your view, is the importance of freedom of speech and expression in a
multi-cultural, democratic society?
READING LIST
Austin, J. L., How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 1975).
Barendt, Eric “Why Protect Free Speech?”, Freedom of Speech, Oxford University
Press, USA; reprint edition (December 10, 1987).
Bollinger, Lee C., The Tolerant Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
———, ‘The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics’, Columbia Law Review, 90(4),
1990: 979–1003.
Brison, Susan J., ‘The Autonomy Defense of Free Speech’, Ethics, 108(2), 1998: 312–
39.
Butler, Judith, ‘Sovereign Performatives in the Contemporary Scene of Utterance’,
Critical Enquiry, 23(2), 1997: 350–77.
Delgado, Richard, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and
the First Amendment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).
———, ‘Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
calling’, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Spring 1982.
Langton, Rae, ‘Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts’, Philosophy and Public Affairs,
22(4), 1993: 293–330.
Meiklejohn, Alexander, Free Speech and its Relation to Self Government (New York:
Harper Brothers Publishers, 1948).
Mill, J. S., ‘On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion’, in On Liberty and Other
Essays, new ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Nagel, Thomas, ‘Personal Rights and Public Space’, Philosophy and Public Affairs,
24(2), 1995: 83–107.
Richards, David, ‘Toleration and Free Speech’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17(4),
1998.
451
Scanlon, Thomas, ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’, Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 1(2), 1972: 204–226.
452
Copyright © 2008, Rajeev Bhargava and Ashok Acharya
Published by Dorling Kindersley (India) Pvt. Ltd., licensees of Pearson Education in
South Asia.
No part of this eBook may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the
publisher’s prior written consent.
This eBook may or may not include all assets that were part of the print version. The
publisher reserves the right to remove any material present in this eBook at any time, as
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ISBN 9788131706251
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453
Table of Contents
Title Page 2
Contents 3
The Editors and the Contributors 13
Preface 16
PART - I WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY AND WHY
21
DO WE NEED IT?
Chapter 1. What Is Political Theory? 22
Chapter 2. Why Do We Need Political Theory? 43
PART - II CONCEPTS 70
Chapter 3. Liberty 71
Chapter 4. Equality 96
Chapter 5. Justice 118
Chapter 6. Rights 137
Chapter 7. Democracy 161
Chapter 8. Citizenship 195
Chapter 9. Power 220
Chapter 10. Sovereignty 234
Chapter 11. State 249
Chapter 12. Civil Society 272
Chapter 13. Property 297
Chapter 14. Gender 322
PART - III IDEOLOGIES 336
Chapter 15. Liberalism 337
Chapter 16. Socialism 347
Chapter 17. Nationalism 366
Chapter 18. Secularism 386
PART - IV POLITICAL ARGUMENTS 420
Chapter 19. Affirmative Action 421
Chapter 20. Freedom of Speech and the Question of Censorship 436
Copyright 453
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PART - I WHAT IS POLITICAL THEORY AND WHY DO WE NEED IT?

1. What Is Political Theory?

The Distinctiveness of Theory?

Cosomologies and Common Sense

Points for Discussion

2. Why Do We Need Political Theory?

The Big Questions of Human Life

The Emergence of Western Modernity

Explaining Human and Non-human Nature

The Difference Between the Human and Non-human Worlds

Decline of Political Theory?

Little Theories, Grand Theories

Cosmologies and Political Theory

History of Political Thought and Political Theory

Points for Discussion

Evolution of the Concept

Classification: Negative and Positive Liberty

Liberty and Other Concepts

The Concept of Liberty in India

Points for Discussion

Evolution of the Concept

In Conclusion: The Politics of Equality

Points for Discussion

The Issue of Distributive Justice

John Rawls: Justice as Fairness

Limitations of Rawls’ Theory of Justice

Justice, Capabilities, and Freedom: Amartya Sen’s Extension of John Rawls’

Feminist Accounts of Justice

Points for Discussion

Papiya Sengupta Talukdar

The Idea of Rights

Some Recent Debates on Rights

Points for Discussion

Direct Participatory Democracy

Key Debates in Democratic Theory

Points for Discussion

What Do We Mean by Citizenship?

Historical Development of the Concept of Citizenship

T. H. Marshall: Equal and Universal Citizenship

Limits of Liberal Citizenship: Uniformity and Generality

The Search for Alternatives

New Contexts and Changing Concerns: Multiculturalism and Globalization

Points for Discussion

Authority, Legitimacy and Hegemony

Feminist Theories of Power

Points for Discussion

Historical Evolution of Sovereignty

The Changing World and the Concept of Sovereignty

Points for Discussion

What Is the State?

The Modern State

What the State Is Not: Civil Society and the Nation

Justifying the State

The State of Nature and the Social Contract

The Neutral State: Liberalism

The Class State: Marxism

The Patriarchal State: Feminism