Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53

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Research in Transportation Economics

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/retrec

Obstacles to the creation of successful bus rapid transit systems: The

case of Bangkok
Irene Wu, Dorina Pojani*
The University of Queensland, School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Management, St Lucia Campus 35 (Chamberlain), 4th floor, Brisbane, QLD,
4072, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Bangkok has failed in the implementation of its BRT system. The single line in operation since 2010
Received 13 July 2015 stretches only 15 km and transports merely 15,000 passengers daily. This article examines the reasons
Received in revised form why Bangkok has (so far) been unable to implement a full BRT system, unlike many counterparts in Asia,
14 March 2016
Africa, and Latin America, which have similar financial constraints. The authors' position is that there is
Accepted 18 May 2016
Available online 17 June 2016
as much to learn from failure as from success. BRT issues are placed in the broader context of urban
transport problems in Bangkok. The study indicates that the Bangkok BRT project was curtailed due to a
combination of reasons, which confirm the findings of prior studies on BRT planning and imple-
Keywords:
Bus rapid transit (BRT)
mentation worldwide. The crucial issues in this case were the weak and discontinued political leadership
Bangkok and the failure to manage competing modes, the primary of which is the automobile. Nonetheless,
Thailand creating a however limited BRT system was not a loss for Bangkok and extension plans could always be
Urban transport problems resumed in the future. Should another attempt be made at creating an integrated and large-scale BRT
Planning barriers system, local planners and leaders who care about the city's sustainable future must avoid repeating past
Implementation barriers mistakes and falling into past behavioral patterns. While this article focuses on a single case study, the
findings apply to a number of cities in similar geo-political and economic contexts.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction 116 km of trunk corridors and 446 km of feeder routes, moving

more than 2.5 million passengers daily (Pojani, 2014). The Latin
Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) is a low-cost bus-based alternative to American experience has been successfully transferred into many
metro and tram systems. A BRT system emulates the performance East Asian cities, which have implemented large-scale, integrated
and amenities of modern rail-based transit systems, including BRT systems. For example, the BRT system in Guangzhou e a city of
segregated rights of way, closed stations, and pre-board ticketing. eight million e covers 273 km and transports 800,000 passengers
However, it has major advantages over rail-based transit, including daily (ITDP, 2014b).
much lower construction costs, short implementation periods (one On the other hand, Bangkok e another city of eight million with
to three years after conception), accommodation of many route a metropolitan area of 14 million e has failed in the implementa-
permutations, and flexibility to adapt to a range of urban condi- tion of its BRT system. Before the emergence of BRT, Bangkok had a
tions. In the last few decades, BRT has become widely used for range of transport options including buses, paratransit, trains,
urban mass transit, especially in developing cities. More than 40 boats, and rail. While a BRT master plan was prepared since 2005,
cities on six continents have implemented BRT systems, and at least the first corridor did not open until 2010. Thereafter, the remaining
as many systems are either in the planning or construction stages five lines were cancelled. The single line in operation stretches only
(Wright & Hook, 2007; Pojani, 2014; Global BRTData 2016). 15 km, with no express services, and transports merely 1200 pas-
Cities in Latin America have been at the forefront of innovation sengers/hour/direction during the peak (ITDP 2014a; EMBARQ,
in BRT planning, with Bogota's TransMilenio being the most famous 2015). Daily it moves only 15,000 passengers e less than the low-
system worldwide. By 2011, the TransMilenio system encompassed capacity BRT systems of Paris and Johannesburg, which move up
to 70,000 daily passengers (EMBARQ, 2011). While vague promises
* Corresponding author. have been made to extend the BRT system, they have not materi-
E-mail addresses: xiaoxiao.wu@uq.edu.au (I. Wu), d.pojani@uq.edu.au alized so far.
(D. Pojani).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2016.05.001
0739-8859/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 I. Wu, D. Pojani / Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53 45

The Bangkok BRT was meant to complement the existing rail- center (Charoentrakulpeeti, Sajor, & Zimmermann, 2006). Although
based mass transit system (about 80 km), which, while popular, only 11% of the total space is dedicated to roads, the urban land-
has also failed to relieve congestion. Traffic conditions are onerous, scape is punctuated by elevated freeways and spaghetti junctions
with vehicular speeds as low as 10e15 km/h on some roads during and feels dominated by cars (Kenworthy, 1995).
rush hour. Both rich and poor spend substantial amounts of time However, public transport services are ubiquitous, if not always
and money sitting in traffic. The average one-way motorized convenient or comfortable. Bus, paratransit, train, and boat trans-
commute is 45 min (Chang-Hee & Suthiranart, 2003). Before the port have the largest role in meeting the daily travel needs of the
economic crisis of the late 1990s, traffic jams cost in Bangkok an poor in Bangkok (Tangphaisankun, Okamura, & Nakamura, 2009).
estimated $2.5 billion per year in lost work hours and wasted fuel. For squatters in exurban sites, paratransit is often the only means to
Some estimates in the mid-1990s indicated that nearly one million access jobs in the city. Middle-income individuals rely on private
people had respiratory impairments and air pollution caused up to cars or use urban rail systems (also taxis in the case of larger
5500 premature deaths annually (Eskenazi, 2006). This bundle of groups), while the wealthy use taxis and private cars or employ a
problems is sometimes referred to as “Bangkok syndrome” (Braun, personal driver (Bengtsson, 2006; Cherry, 2011; Choiejit &
2011). Teungfung, 2005; Jaensirisak & Paksarsawan, 2011). As in other
This article examines the reasons why Bangkok has (so far) been developing countries, women of all social strata rely on public
unable to implement a full BRT system, unlike many counterparts in transport more than men (Charoentrakulpeeti et al., 2006; Choiejit
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which have similar financial con- & Teungfung, 2005).
straints. The authors' position is that there is as much to learn from Mass transit arrived in Bangkok much later than in other East
failure as from success. While transportation policy reviews most Asian cities (Braun, 2011). Now, three main mass transit options are
often showcase “best practice,” an analysis of problematic cases can available to local residents, in addition to BRT. They have high
also help decision-makers to avoid newcomer costs and learn from quality but limited reach (Fig. 1). In total, rail transit covers less than
the mistakes of others (Marsden & Stead, 2011). The authors place 80 km (compared to nearly 310 km in Greater Tokyo e a region of
BRT issues in the broader context of urban transport problems in 37 million). In comparison to rail, the BRT system is rather modest.
Bangkok, which helps explain why this project failed. While this Moreover, while the BRT project was cancelled or placed on hold
article focuses on a single case study, which has been seldom indefinitely, the rail expansion plans for the next 25 years are very
analyzed in the academic literature, Bangkok's situation is certainly ambitious: more than 290 km of new lines have been planned
not unique. The findings apply to a number of cities in similar geo- (Cherry, 2011). Table 1 compares the coverage, ridership, and con-
political and economic contexts. struction costs of these systems.
The data for this study comes from three main sources: (a) The land use pattern and urban form e towards which the
published and unpublished reports, as well as newspaper articles government has taken a laissez-faire approach e adds to Bangkok's
(most in English but also some in Thai), on the Bangkok BRT system; congestion (Rujopakarn, 2003). With growing urbanization, the
(b) interviews with five highly knowledgeable informants (four city has sprawled along its radial axes with insufficient ring roads.
based in Bangkok and one in Guangzhou), who included transport However, jobs are denser in the center, concentrating traffic there
planners from practice and academia; and (c) personal observa- (Chang-Hee & Suthiranart, 2003; Choiejit & Teungfung, 2005;
tions of the authors. The interview questions were designed to fill Sirikijpanichkul & Winyoopadit, 2015). Bangkok includes many
the information gaps in the literature. (In discussing the findings, so-called superblocks, i.e., areas of land enclosed by major roads but
the names and positions of the interviewees have been withheld in not provided with an internal system of interconnected distributor
order to protect their privacy.) The article opens with a brief roads. Small, often dead-end access roads (soi) lead directly from
overview of the case study context. This is followed by the analysis, major roads to individual houses, with no hierarchical downscaling.
in which the key factors for success and failure of BRT systems This pattern produces wasteful cruising as vehicles cannot access
worldwide are compared against Bangkok's context in order to the interior of a block from any side but are forced to circle it.
identify the local barriers and pitfalls. On the positive side, jobs and home locations can be largely
chosen at will as prevailing policies permit both rich and poor, and
2. Study context: transport in Bangkok low- and high-income jobs to be located close by and throughout
the city. In parallel with the economic boom of the 1980s and early
Bangkok is a sprawling metropolitan area which covers nearly 1990s, the middle-classes tended to suburbanize along the main
1600 sq. km. With 12% of the national population and more than transport corridors, following a North American model. Now, a
half of the national GDP, Bangkok dwarfs Thailand's other urban portion of the residents, especially single professionals, are
centers in terms of political, economic, and social importance returning to the inner city and locating in high-rise housing near
(Cherry, 2011; UNDP, 2012). It has substantial poverty but also a transit (see World Bank, 2007; Kenworthy, 1995; Bengtsson, 2006;
large and growing middle-class. According to the National Statis- Charoentrakulpeeti et al., 2006; Cherry, 2011). By Western stan-
tical Office, the average household income is $1000/month. dards (though not by Asian standards) Bangkok's densities are
Despite lingering nostalgia for a long-gone canal city and river- high; in the center they approximate Tokyo's densities (Chang-Hee
based lifestyle (the lost “Venice of the East”), contemporary & Suthiranart, 2003).
Bangkok is a car-dominated city, which could be called the “Los
Angeles of the East” (Kenworthy, 1995). Ownership of motorized 3. Findings: why did the Bangkok BRT fail?
vehicles is among the highest in large Asian cities, including
wealthier ones. Based on 2005 data, about 75% of households own The following analysis employs a modified version of a theo-
at least one vehicle (car or motorcycle), and about half of all trips retical framework constructed by Lindau, Hidalgo, and de Almeida
are made by a private motorized mode. The city has 388 cars per Lobo (2014), which focuses on barriers to BRT planning and
1000 people e a lower level than in U.S. cities but higher than in implementation. This framework was selected because, among the
most neighboring capitals (World Bank, 2007; Braun, 2011). Be- several literature reviews of BRT that exist (see Deng & Nelson,
tween 1990 and 2005, car ownership grew 135%, while bus 2011; Hidalgo & Gutie
rrez, 2013; Wirasinghe et al., 2013; Heshner
patronage dropped by 5% annually (World Bank, 2007). Rates of car & Golob, 2008), it is the only one specifically structured around
use are high even for individuals who live relatively close to the barriers. The present authors have contracted the framework in the
46 I. Wu, D. Pojani / Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53

Fig. 1. Public transit map of Bangkok.

interest of brevity, and have also adapted it to include the keys to record can provide within a reasonable amount of time. Moreover,
both success and failure. Each section opens with a summary of the there are no single companies in the market that can provide all
main theoretical points derived from the available literature on BRT BRT elements from planning to implementation; BRT systems are
systems in developing countries, before moving to the discussion of not “turnkey.” Coordinating the variety of consultants that need to
Bangkok's case. be retained requires a certain level of bureaucratic sophistication
and oversight which not all local administrations in developing
3.1. Institutional and legislative framework cities possess. Once a BRT system is planned, implementation often
falls in the hands of local road building companies with no expe-
BRT planning and implementation involves policy areas that fall rience in this mode. However, some cities have successfully over-
under the purview of a range of city officials and stakeholders come these challenges by creating entirely new agencies to oversee
whose interests are not necessarily aligned (Lindau et al., 2014). the BRT planning and implementation process, with the capacity to
Where environmental licensing is required, bureaucratic delays can coordinate other departments and even overrule their decisions
compromise the project. Lack of adequate legislation that supports (Lindau et al., 2014; Wright & Hook, 2007).
BRT can be a barrier as well. Moreover, the in-house technical ca- In the case of Bangkok, an understanding of the institutional and
pacity in BRT planning and implementation is often very limited. A political framework related to urban transportation planning is
survey of transport professionals in Asia found that most had only crucial, as this is what drives what actually gets accomplished. One
heard of BRT in the last 10e15 years e although the concept has obvious problem with the institutional structure in Bangkok is the
been around for at least three decades (Buluran, Fillone, Fukuda, & plethora of agencies involved in transport planning e about a
Jaensirisak, 2013). Invariably, developing cities end up relying on dozen. These agencies report to three different ministries as well as
foreign consultancy services to plan their BRT systems (Hidalgo & to the prime minister's office but no one agency seems to possess
Graftieaux, 2008). But a booming BRT market demands more the hierarchical line of authority. Function overlaps are significant,
work than experienced consultants with a demonstrated track yet any collaboration between divisions requires the approval of
 I. Wu, D. Pojani / Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53 47

Table 1
Public transport options in Bangkok.

Type Opening Construction Ridership Cost per trip Fare Ownership and operation Description
year cost (USD) (trips/day) (USD) (USD)

Suvarnabhumi Airport 2010 $770 million 56,000 $13,750 .45e1.35 Built and operated by State Railways
1 route
Rail Link (elevated rail) of Thailand (public) 29 km
8 stops
Bus Rapid Transit 2010 $75 million 15,000 $3750e5000 .30e.6 Built and operated by Bangkok Mass 1 route
e20,000 Transit System (private) 15 km
12 stops
25 buses
Metro (underground rail) 2004 $3.1 billion 220,000 $14,100 .3e1.2 Built by Mass Rapid Transit Authority 1 route
(public), operated by Bangkok Metro 20 km
Company (private) 18 stops
19 trains
Skytrain (elevated rail) 1999 $1.4 billion 450,000 $3100 .3e1.2 Built and operated by Bangkok Mass 2 routes
Transit System (private) 23 km
23 stops
Conventional buses 1960s n/a 3.5 million n/a .1e.3 Owned and operated by Bangkok Mass 135 routes
Transit Authority (public) and small 3500 public
operators (private) buses
at least 3500
private buses
Conventional trains historical n/a n/a n/a n/a Built and operated by State Railways n/a
of Thailand (public)
Paratransit (vans, motocycle-taxi, taxi, historical n/a n/a n/a .05e1 or Owned and operated by small private 280 routes,
songtael, silor-lek, tuk tuk) more operators (partly overseen by the at least 10,000
Bangkok Mass Transit vehicles
Authority (public)
Boats/Ferries historical n/a n/a n/a .2e.4 Owned and operated by small private 3 routes
operators

several committees (Braun, 2011; Bengtsson, 2006; Chang-Hee & later it emerged that the bid winner had various conflicts of interest
Suthiranart, 2003; UNDP, 2012; Daniere, 1995; Hossain, 2006; and the selection was corrupt. The investigation of the alleged ir-
World Bank, 2007). regularities in the procurement of buses delayed the BRT project
The track record of this setup has been rather poor. All considerably and hurt its image.
comprehensive urban transport studies e the first of which was In terms of technical capacity, the evidence is mixed. Some
prepared in 1975 e have remained on paper. Stand-alone mega- Bangkok transportation agencies appear to be under-staffed and
projects and uncoordinated, incremental planning have dominated under-budgeted and may experience difficulties in retaining qual-
the scene (Braun, 2011; Cherry, 2011; Rujopakarn, 2003; World ity personnel, who are lured away by higher salaries and prospects
Bank, 2007). Individual agencies charged with executing trans- in the private sector. The largest gap in the public sector is a lack of
portation plans have tended to cling to their own historic plans, expertise in transport planning and policy analysis as opposed to
agendas, missions, and priorities, as they do not have a duty to construction and engineering (Chang-Hee & Suthiranart, 2003). In
comply with interagency plans unless instructed to do so by a the case of BRT, some commentators have observed that the
higher authority (Braun, 2011; Chang-Hee & Suthiranart, 2003; concept was poorly understood even by its backers, who focused
Cherry, 2011; Daniere, 1995). more on hardware (i.e., BRT infrastructure) than software (i.e., BRT
For the BRT project to succeed, each agency involved in trans- management and promotion). On the other hand, the numerous
portation needed to break this path dependence and commit to highways as well as a few high quality rail transit systems imple-
implement the component for which it was responsible. For mented in the last few decades demonstrate that large trans-
example, road authorities needed to agree for one traffic lane to be portation projects can be carried out effectively in Bangkok,
dedicated to the BRT system (Satiennam, Fukuda, & Oshima, 2006), provided that there is institutional will.
while traffic police needed to agree to keep the BRT lane free of Transportation agencies performed in seemingly incompetent
other traffic. Also, it required Bangkok agencies (e.g., road or rail fashion throughout the BRT planning process also due to the
building agencies) to accept that part of their resources would be particular culture and values of their staff members. The large-scale
sacrificed. The clash of interests and competition among public implementation of a BRT system requires major changes in the
agencies needed to be settled either through the creation of a status quo, i.e., prioritization of public over private transportation.
coordinating agency (World Bank, 2007), which did not happen, or This philosophy and change of emphasis is at odds with the private
by political power, which pro-BRT politicians did not possess (see interests of the Thai bureaucratic elite, whose members belong to
next section). the car-owning middle and upper class. The same governing elite
Bidding procedures were another cause for delay and negative has ruled Thailand for much of its modern history. This elite is
publicity. In Bangkok, public agencies are required to set a ceiling composed of a small number of educated and essentially conser-
bidding price for tendered projects, which is kept secret; no bid vative members of the ruling class. Historically, powerful Bangkok
higher than the ceiling may be accepted. But often e especially politicians have acted in ways that would preserve their power,
during high inflation periods e all submitted bids are higher than privilege, and prestige even while adopting Western ways (such as
the ceiling in which case the entire process must be repeated industrialization or private motorization). The penetration of
(Daniere, 1995). In the case of BRT, a bid in 2007 for the provision of Western knowledge has been selective: typically, policies have
busses failed as no offers were received due to overly strict con- been embraced which facilitate economic growth, job creation, and
ditions. Some offers were finally submitted in a second round but the travel needs of the business class, whereas environmental
48 I. Wu, D. Pojani / Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53

protection, urban livability, and transport sustainability concepts wanted to force the BMA to purchase 100 of its second-hand ve-
which benefit the masses, have been ignored (Bengtsson, 2006; hicles for the BRT system e although new, specialized vehicles were
Chang-Hee & Suthiranart, 2003; Daniere, 1995; Rujopakarn, 2003). essential for the new system. BMA for its part accused the bus
agency of being incompetent and debt-ridden and running sub-
3.2. Political leadership and commitment standard services on dilapidated vehicles in order to increase the
profits of robber barons who owned its shares e and therefore not
Highly successful BRT systems have typically benefited from the trustworthy to deal with BRT planning. These feuds delayed the
commitment of city leaders in either conceiving or leading their process for years.
planning and implementation. In turn, the success of these systems Finally, the general political instability of the country did not
has propelled the political career of their initial supporters. Other help the BRT project. Since WWII there have been at least 30 cab-
systems that have experienced difficulties in implementation have inets in Thailand. It was difficult for private operators to be
lacked the same level of political commitment from the high levels convinced to enter into legal agreements with a government which
of government (Mun ~ oz & Gschwender, 2008; Rizvi & Sclar, 2014; was seen as likely to undergo a coup between the signing of a
Gilbert, 2008; Wright & Hook, 2007). Strong and continual lead- contract and its execution. During the BRT planning process, in
ership is fundamental in many ways. First, it gives a clear signal to 2006, a military coup occurred which overthrew Prime Minister
the population that the project is auspicious. Second, it can unlock Thaksin and later banned his party e though he continued to in-
the resources for planning (Hidalgo & Graftieaux, 2008). Third, it fluence Thai politics. (BRT construction started after this event.)
helps mitigate the various risks and obstacles which a BRT project Moreover, the recent transport planning history of Bangkok is full
might encounter along the way. For example, the intervention of a of cases in which contractors have had to go to court a number of
powerful mayor or other political figure can significantly cut pro- times and/or incur large costs in response to the whims of ever-
cedural delays and expedite planning cycles, thus minimizing changing politicians. A notorious example is the Hopewell
planning fatigue, helping take advantage of momentum, and elevated road and train system by a Hong Kong investor, which was
maintaining project credibility. In short, top-down approaches take cancelled in the late 1990s leaving behind more than one thousand
less time and result in fewer conflicts between agencies; in other concrete pillars standing idle along the planned routes and was
words, they “get the job done” (Lindau et al., 2014; Hidalgo & hence dubbed the “Bangkok Stonehenge.” This is a discouraging
Graftieaux, 2008; Rizvi & Sclar, 2014). Nonetheless, if a project outlook for most operators (see Chang-Hee & Suthiranart, 2003;
hinges entirely on the support of a single individual, however Cherry, 2011; Daniere, 1995; Rujopakarn, 2003; Therakomen,
powerful, its implementation is not always successful. It always 2001).
faces the risk of being discontinued in case of electoral changes
(especially if the inauguration is rushed in order to fit within an 3.3. Management of competing modes
electoral cycle and the BRT starts operating before its full comple-
tion). In developing countries, it is not uncommon for an entire Competition and opposition to BRT arises mainly from two
public administration to be replaced with the arrival of a new modes: private motorized vehicles (cars and motorcycles) and
mayor or governor. Also, topedown processes have resulted in existing transit operators (bus and rail). Many developing cities
conflicts with stakeholders after a system is already in operation. have been planned primarily for car circulation. The private car
Public participation is key in ensuring that multiple stakeholders industry and individual motorists have come to expect national
are invested into a BRT project beyond a political mandate (Hidalgo government to pave and widen roads and construct flyovers and
& Graftieaux, 2008; Rizvi & Sclar, 2014). underpasses to accommodate their needs. In countries with do-
The creation of a BRT system for Bangkok was a pet project of mestic car industries, in particular, national governments tend to
Apirak Kosayaodhin, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration favor this approach too, because car and motorcycles sales bring
(BMA) governor who ruled between 2004 and 2008. He made BRT a substantial tax revenues (Lindau et al., 2014). Existing bus opera-
cornerstone of his political campaign. His support helped, but in a tors, ranging from subsidized private companies to semi-formal
sense also hurt BRT. A Democratic Party member, he was inspired driver-owners, tend to be conservative and unwilling to take the
by Bogota's TransMilenio (Hemachudha, 2014). (The Thai Demo- risk of investing in BRT (Gilbert, 2008). Where existing bus services
cratic Party has a conservative, liberal, and pro-market agenda, and are provided by myriad small enterprises (which compete on-the-
enjoys wide support in Bangkok.) But the members of the opposing road for passengers), these might oppose BRT as driver-owners
party, Thai Rak Thai Party, had heavily vested interests in auto- depend on their vehicle and route for their livelihood. BRT plan-
mobile and road businesses and were therefore opposed to BRT (as ners should find a way to incorporate them into a new capitalistic
well as to public transit in general). Thaksin Shinawatra, the Thai large-scale ownership structure (Mun ~ oz & Gschwender, 2008;
Prime Minister between 2001 and 2006, belonged to the Thai Rak Gilbert, 2008). Well-established rail transit industries might also
Thai Party. have active associations that promote their products and interests.
As a result, a number of subtle and overt tactics were employed Due to its higher image, rail-based urban transport tends to be a
to delay the BRT project, such as missing key meetings in which favorite mode of users and governments, especially in developed
decisions on funding allocation would be made, denying national countries, but also in developing ones, despite its implementation
funding, spreading gossip on the unsuitability of the plans, raising challenges and costs. BRT suffers from its indirect association with
unjustified safety concerns, and persuading locals that BRT would buses, which have a relatively bad image. However, the image effect
exacerbate traffic due to the loss of car lanes. The BMA entered a is mediated by previous usage experience of specific modes. If a
“tug of war” with another agency, the Office of Transport and Traffic positive experience is attributed a priori to an alternative, the im-
Policy and Planning (OTP), allegedly controlled by the Thai Rak Thai age is less dominant in people's preferences (Hensher & Mulley,
Party. BMA proposed a BRT plan with 12 routes covering 185 km 2014; Hensher, Mulley, & Rose, 2015; Mulley & Hensher, 2014). In
including covered and air-conditioned stations, while OTP prepared some cases, cycling lobbies too view BRT as their contestant for
its own plan with 9 routes (some overlapping with BMA's) covering scarce road space, rather than as a complementary mode (Lindau
380 km. Another turf war involved the public agency that runs the et al., 2014). Broad-based public participation, combined with ef-
conventional bus system, which claimed that the BMA was forts to raise the image of BRT, is a good antidote to the barriers
encroaching on its territory by taking over BRT planning. It also posed by competing modes. However, a successful BRT project is
 I. Wu, D. Pojani / Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53 49

typically complemented by other policies to reduce car traffic, myriad private bus and van operators, had institutional goodwill
including enforcement of traffic rules, parking management, user and coordination been in place at the time of BRT planning.
fees, congestion pricing, limitation of licenses issued to other buses,
and upgraded urban amenities (pedestrian paths, signalized in- 3.4. Public participation
tersections, and the like).
In Thailand, until relatively recently public agencies have single- In successful projects, communication is used pervasively
mindedly focused on road construction. This trend has also been throughout the process with the leading team emitting a sense of
fueled by the funds that international agencies have poured into transparency and willingness to engage with the media, interest
Thailand for this purpose since World War II (Chang-Hee & groups, and the community (Rizvi & Sclar, 2014). At the same time,
Suthiranart, 2003). Initially this funding was necessary in order to participation activities (such as focus groups, workshops, and the
rebuild war-damaged infrastructure; later it became a symbol of like) can be a tool to educate the public. The public must be made
Thailand's stand as a “buckler to communism” (Cherry, 2011; aware of the outcomes of rational cost-benefit analyses of various
Eskenazi, 2006). In more recent times, close ties between Thai transit options. The user expectations must be realistic. In dense
and Japanese automakers have further strengthened car depen- developing cities, vehicles are likely to run at capacity during peak
dence (Kenworthy, 1995). Major roads continue to be built despite a periods; passengers should not be led to believe that they can al-
lack of evidence that they relieve the city's congestion ways ride seated in the BRT system (Mun ~ oz & Gschwender, 2008).
(Charoentrakulpeeti et al., 2006; Cherry, 2011). Participation of, and support from, all (or at least most) stake-
A focus on road building is coupled with high car ownership holders is also fundamental in ensuring that BRT projects do not fall
rates, as mentioned. Public policies have facilitated the rise in car prey of changing political winds. Partnerships with civil society
ownership in the last three or four decades. For example, in the organizations are also important to raise the image of BRT as a
1990s, car import duties were dramatically reduced (from 300% to sustainable transport mode, and to educate users on how to use the
25e50%) in order to benefit motorists and disregarding the needs of system once it is built. Existing bus operators must be involved
the poor. Until the mid-2000s, automobile fuel prices and highway from the initial stages of BRT planning as their unions might amass
tolls were subsidized by the government (Chang-Hee & serious opposition (for example by organizing bus strikes) (Gilbert,
Suthiranart, 2003; Charoentrakulpeeti et al., 2006). Congestion 2008; Mun ~ oz & Gschwender, 2008). Not involving the car lobby
charging in the form of HOT lanes has not been introduced might substantially hurt BRT planning and implementation. Not
although it appears to have considerable popular support (Vikitset, only need car industries and users to be invited to partake in
2011). The rate of parking provision (338 per 1000 jobs) exceeds the planning meetings but also compromises might have to be reached
average of European cities (Braun, 2011; Kenworthy, 1995). To make with them in order to make a BRT project palatable and minimize
matters worse, neglect and violation of traffic rules (including opposition. These include the widening of some roads in order not
illegal parking and illegal lane changing) are rampant. The combi- to decrease the car space after the introduction of BRT lanes, the
nation of these adverse factors was a major challenge for BRT provision of park-and-ride lots at suburban BRT stations, and the
planning and implementation. construction of additional flyovers or bridges to improve car access
In the last couple of decades, considerable financial resources (Lindau et al., 2014; Rizvi & Sclar, 2014).
have also been devoted to construct rail systems. Some commen- Historically, public participation levels in planning and politics
tators have noted that these investments have been favored have been low in Bangkok (and Thailand in general), while trans-
because they help Bangkok appear “modern” and keep up with portation planning has followed a top-down approach. This was the
world cities (Bengtsson, 2006; Rujopakarn, 2003). Other observers case for BRT as well. While literate and increasingly urbanized, the
have argued that rail has been chosen over BRT because, with Thai masses tend to be submissive, passive, and indifferent to na-
construction costs being higher, paybacks to local politicians are tional or local politics. Noninvolvement has its roots in a long-
higher as well. In 1997, the law banned transport concession established class system, Buddhist religious beliefs, widespread
holders from political involvement but some individuals have corruption, and the traditional patroneclient relationships which
found ways to circumvent this rule (e.g., by moving their assets are nearly universal in Thai economic activities (Bengtsson, 2006;
under another family member's name). The local population sees Daniere, 1995).
corruption as a prerequisite of public service and it is not surprised The involvement of stakeholders other than the general public
nor indignant by this behavior (Eskenazi, 2006). was low as well. For example, there were no negotiations with
Different mass transit systems in Bangkok act as competitors existing bus and paratransit operators who could have provided
rather than complements to each other. Thus they are stuck in a feeder services (see below). The cooperation of the traffic police,
loseelose situation in which neither party will take the initiative to which was paramount in ensuring the success of the BRT system,
improve the service for customers (i.e., by creating a comfortable was not sought at a sufficient level. Bangkok traffic police are
transfer zone to the other mode) for fear of being financially out- notoriously corrupt and even capricious and often their behavior
performed by their competitors (Braun, 2011). This toxic environ- adds to congestion instead of relieving it (Eskenazi, 2006). As a
ment was certainly detrimental to BRT planning. result of the failure to secure their commitment to BRT, the police
On the other hand, conventional buses are also heavily used (in was contentious; some observers have noted that the police turns a
nearly 40% of trips), although their quality is often substandard blind eye or even encourages drivers to spill over into the BRT lane
(e.g., 40% of public buses are not air-conditioned) (Cherry, 2011). during traffic jams.
High bus ridership levels suggest that there is substantial demand
for a quality system such as BRT. However, bus riders belong to the 3.5. Adequate funding and coordination
lower income portions of the population and are less likely to press
authorities with their demands (Braun, 2011). Local public au- Often cities need to find novel funding sources for new BRT
thorities have a monopoly position in bus transport: they operate systems. These include public-private partnerships and transfers
about a quarter of the conventional bus fleet and routes, and from regional or national levels of government. Property, fuel, and
oversee the rest of the bus system (Braun, 2011). While this is automobile taxes are other possible sources of funding. Value
generally seen as negative, it could have played in favor of BRT as it capture from joint development of transit and land use and Transit
would have allowed the public sector to manage the competition of Oriented Development offer much potential too to offset the costs
50 I. Wu, D. Pojani / Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53

(TCRP, 2003). The design of the network is also crucial, in terms of In Bangkok, the BRT line was built by the public sector and is
robustness (i.e., a simple network of as few and as clearly defined operated by a single private company e the same company which
lines as possible); stability (in terms of frequency, capacity, and operates the Skytrain (one of the elevated rail systems). A privately-
connectivity); and flexibility (i.e., demand-responsive service run system is consistent with values and practices that govern Thai
catering to customers in low density areas) (Mulley & Nelson, economy, one of the most market-oriented in the developing
2005). Experience has demonstrated that BRT is more successful world. However, the financial stability of the company is uncertain
if the entry to the system is restricted to prescribed private oper- given its poor track record: in the early 2000s, a few years after the
ators e possibly selected from the existing ones (i.e., the system has opening of the Skytrain it faced a huge debt (nearly $1 million)
a “closed” rather than “open” business structure) (Hidalgo & (Chang-Hee & Suthiranart, 2003). The BRT line has added to the
Graftieaux, 2008). However, the size of the operators must not be deficit. Its ridership is only 15,000 passengers/day whereas 50,000
excessively large since there are limits on the economies of scale passengers/day are needed for the system to break even. Planning
obtainable in transit services. Operators must be provided the right projections were certainly overly-optimistic, at up to 80,000 pas-
incentives to both provide frequent service even when it does not sengers/day. When BRT opened in 2010, fares were initially set at a
provide operational revenue (e.g., by not guaranteeing their income relatively low level and, a few years after operation, were further
by the public sector and by reviewing contracts periodically) and to reduced to a level close to that of conventional buses; adopting a
limit frequencies so that externalities (such as bus bunching) are low flat fare has also been proposed (Sirikijpanichkul &
controlled. Some roles and functions, such as the user information Winyoopadit, 2015). But these strategies offer little promise to
offices and the headway control system must be handled by a boost ridership.
public entity, at least initially until the BRT system runs smoothly.
Fare enforcement, on the other hand, should not be left solely with 3.6. Quality physical design
the police because this greatly complicates efforts to fight fare
evasion (Mun ~ oz & Gschwender, 2008). Inadequate funding for Typically, a well-designed BRT system has the following dozen
planning and implementation or very tight financial planning (to characteristics: (1) segregated busways or bus-only roadways over
avoid operational subsidies) can cripple any project. So can low the majority of the system's trunk or city center corridors; (2)
levels of service e i.e., crowded vehicles with 6e7 standees per location of the busway in the median of the roadway rather than the
square meter (Hidalgo & Gutie
rrez, 2013; Gilbert, 2008). Although curb lane; (3) an integrated network of routes and corridors; (4)
BRT is a flexible mode, which can be implemented in parts and can bypassing lanes at stations, which allow an arriving bus to pass
operate before all components are in place, its image can suffer those boarding passengers at the station, enable express routes to
considerably as a result of downgrades such as pavement quality, skip certain stations, and reduce travel times for some passengers;
station design, pickpockets, and so on. Road surface can deteriorate (5) convenient, comfortable, secure, and weather-protected sta-
quickly after a BRT system is in operation; therefore maintenance tions, designed to meet present and future demand; (6) articulated
provisions must be built into the financial plan (Gilbert, 2008). vehicles with level access between the platform and vehicle floor at
Funding is also needed in order to compensate the owners of land stations; (7) nodal stations and terminals to facilitate physical
or structures that stand in the right-of-way of the planned BRT integration between trunk routes, feeder services, and other mass
system. Land acquisition is normally not funded by multi-national transit systems; (8) pre-board fare collection and fare verification;
or national development banks. Therefore, cities must commit (9) fare integration between routes, corridors, and feeder services;
their own funding for this purpose. Negotiations with land and (10) distinctive marketing identity for the system by color, mark-
building owners tend to be strained and might end up in the courts; ings, and/or vehicle design; (11) clean vehicle technologies, which
while disputes await settlement, external donors or loaners might are increasingly available in developing countries; and (12) cour-
freeze their project funding (Lindau et al., 2014). BRT fares are teous and professional staff in uniforms (EMBARQ, 2011; Kühn,
typically set at affordable levels; therefore fare revenues are not 2002; Pojani, 2014; TCRP, 2003; Wright & Hook, 2007). The first
likely to cover the high purchase costs of land. Rising fares can lead BRT corridor, in particular, should serve high demand, congested
to a decrease in ridership. While BRT can operate without subsidies, locations. Ideally the project scope must be expanded to include
typically the public sector makes a large upfront investment, either critical issues such as parking, non-motorized transport, and station
directly (building the infrastructure) or indirectly (providing the area and corridor development (TOD). The physical integration with
road space, the stations, and the bus depots/terminals) (Gilbert, other modes is crucial. In cities that have rail systems in place, these
2008). Lack of subsidies can be a serious constraint in some case can serve as the backbone or major trunk corridor of the system.
(Mun ~ oz & Gschwender, 2008). Bicycle parking facilities and/or cycle-sharing pods can be provided
In the case of the Bangkok BRT, lack of financial resources for outside BRT stations. Ideally, the system should reach poor settle-
transportation was not necessarily the major reason that led to ments rather than merely covering the central area; but in reality,
failure. The Thai government has substantial resources to devote to these areas often have to depend on feeder services. The provision
improving transportation, much more than many other nations in of an extensive (and inexpensive or free) feeder system is crucial in
the Pacific Rim. The amounts spent on building and expanding ensuring a high level of connectivity (Gilbert, 2008). Existing routes
urban rail systems prove this point. However, land acquisition was a should be taken into account when designing the new system
major barrier to the implementation of a full BRT system in (Mun ~ oz & Gschwender, 2008). Sequential integration is preferable
Bangkok, in which 80% of land is privately-owned (Eskenazi, 2006). to the development of isolated corridors the integration of which is
In Thailand, when expropriation is sought and parties do not agree, deferred to a later stage. It is also important to have provisions in
more than four years may elapse before the case goes to the courts, place for the revision of the system once in operation in order to
after which there is no legal time limit for a final decision. If there is adjust routes as needed, construct new connections between cor-
sufficient will behind a proposed project, this lengthy procedure ridors, reduce parallel routes or traditional buses, and expand the
may be and was accelerated in the past for expressway projects and bus fleet if congestion occurs (Hidalgo & Graftieaux, 2008).
other public benefit projects (Daniere, 1995), but not for the BRT The Bangkok BRT, although limited, is of high quality (see
system. Expropriation faces cultural barriers too: in keeping with Kodukula, 2010). Buses have platform level boarding and distinc-
the Thai conflict-avoidance, public authorities are reluctant to evict tive colors, and they run on natural gas. Terminal stations are air
people from their homes even if the law permits it (Daniere, 1995). conditioned, and escalators, electronic displays, and smart cards are
 I. Wu, D. Pojani / Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53 51

available (Fig. 2). These features are important in Bangkok, a city (Eskenazi, 2006). Bicycle parking at stations is also not provided;
with a large middle-class and high auto ownership rates, in which however, cycling rates are minuscule in Bangkok.
expectations in terms of public transport are elevated. Expectations Finally, urban design interventions around BRT stations, such as
have also been raised by the rail systems built in the last couple of tree planting and installation of shading devices is insufficient. This
decades. However, two major drawbacks of the BRT route are that: is important in order to encourage access on foot. Reaching BRT
(a) it operates in mixed traffic in crowded portions of the center; stations (or any public transport stations) requires some amount of
and (b) for a good part, it runs through a low-demand area in which walking. Compared to other Asian cities, Bangkok residents, espe-
securing the right-of-way was less-controversial. Both these factors cially middle and upper class ones, are averse to walking, even for
defeat the purpose of BRT. Due to a lack of highly qualified con- short distances. Walking trips account for 10e15% of the commute
sultants, city officials were never presented with a workable design e an atypically low figure for Asia (Braun, 2011). Bangkok's hot and
running through congested city center corridors. humid climate that causes perspiration and foul smells, which lo-
In contrast, right-of-way problems were overcome in the case of cals frown upon, plays a large role in reducing travel by foot
rail systems, which were able to amass public support. For example, (Bengtsson, 2006). Paltry conditions of sidewalks and pathways
the Skytrain is entirely elevated while the metro is underground. around some transit stations compound the problem (Townsend &
Earlier studies in Bangkok have found that street users find Zacharias, 2010; Prasertsubpakij & Nitivattananon, 2012).
elevated transport infrastructure overpowering (Bengtsson, 2006),
while passengers inside vehicles enjoy the city view from above 3.7. Image promotion
(Eskenazi, 2006). But implementing an entirely elevated BRT sys-
tem might not be feasible nor desirable. Land expropriation for BRT Image is a difficult characteristic to define but it includes such
right-of-way purposes is a difficult but not impossible endeavor in things as shiny, modern vehicles bearing special logos, an easy-to-
Thailand, as mentioned (Chang-Hee & Suthiranart, 2003). understand route structure with clearly posted maps and other
Another physical design weakness of the BRT system is that wayfinding devices, and readily available information on- and off-
feeder modes and backbone modes are poorly integrated. Only two line. Also a good image has to do with smooth project imple-
BRT stations are integrated with rail stations. Due to bureaucratic mentation (i.e., minimization of disruptions due to construction
inertia and rigidity, existing small bus operators, including para- works) and a good startup. In promotional messages, transit users
transit operators, have not been rerouted to provide feeder services need to hear that their primary needs, such as travel time and/or
(Satiennam et al., 2006). Many would-be passengers are now un- cost, are properly articulated, acknowledged, and prioritized rather
able to access BRT stations simply due to distance. Among existing than superseded by more abstract (albeit very important) concerns
passengers, nearly 40% access stations through another motorized such as pollution and safety. Bus systems, including BRT, have a
mode (Chalermpong & Ratanawaraha, 2015). This problem is lower image than rail. They are perceived as a lower-quality mode
common for all mass transit modes in Bangkok (Prasertsubpakij & and stigmas related to the general quality of the ride persist. This is
Nitivattananon, 2012). The provision of park-and-ride lots around owed to lack of marketing efforts more than any intrinsic disad-
some stations might have appealed to residents as the lack of car vantage of BRT compared to rail (Hidalgo & Gutie
rrez, 2013; Kühn,
parking is considered a major inconvenience of driving in Bangkok 2002; Mun ~ oz & Gschwender, 2008). Users are often unaware that
e although, as mentioned, parking provision is relatively high advanced BRT systems can carry as much passenger volume as rail;

Fig. 2. BRT vehicles approaching a station.

52 I. Wu, D. Pojani / Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53

have operating speeds comparable to light rail (some even com- rendered them ineffective within a few years. The current BRT
parable to top metro systems); provide a safer environment for project was burdened by this poor image from the beginning
travelers than cars or motorcycles; and offer substantial net bene- (Hossain, 2006; Satiennam et al., 2006). Promoters needed to show
fits to low- and middle-income groups (but not necessarily to very- that modern BRT systems are far superior to the simple segregated
low-income groups) in terms of travel time reductions and vehicle lanes of the past, perhaps by christening the system with a more
operating cost reductions e while costing a fraction of rail systems, memorable name rather than simply “Bangkok BRT” (Kodukula,
especially in Asia (EMBARQ, 2011; Heshner & Golob, 2008). Part of 2010).
the BRT image-promotion efforts involves the management of Some commentators have argued that a stress on the reliability
negative publicity on part of the media. The media are not neces- of BRT has little appeal in a time-rich and cash-poor city like
sarily in favor or against BRT; rather, they are keen on encouraging Bangkok, in which punctuality is irrelevant (Shannon & Lockshin,
snappy debates on hot topics such as traffic congestion, which in- 2000), and that Thai drivers are stoic and unnerved by slow-
crease readership or viewing rates. Therefore, any voices opposing moving traffic (Chang-Hee & Suthiranart, 2003). But a few studies
BRT are guaranteed to find media space to echo their opinions. have revealed that the time wasted in traffic is a major annoyance,
Opposition typically arises from competing modes, as discussed especially for middle- and higher-income individuals (Eskenazi,
above, but also retail shop owners installed along a BRT route, who 2006; Tangphaisankun et al., 2009; Sirikijpanichkul &
fear that loss of on-street parking will negatively impact their Winyoopadit, 2015). BRT promotion efforts should have capital-
turnover. On the other hand, real estate owners and developers ized on the liberation from driving stress that BRT can provide.
might view BRT quite positively, hoping that it will lead to Finally, the BRT image was tainted by the timing of its opening
increased construction opportunities and higher property values. (29 May 2010). The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration made an
BRT promotion efforts need to capitalize on their support (Lindau effort at user education by distributing 200,000 copies of a BRT
et al., 2014). handbook at stations and field offices. However, the launching
In Bangkok, the BRT planning process proceeded bumpily for coincided with the school opening, a particularly congested period.
more than five years, stalling more than once. This lengthy process When BRT buses began to circulate it became clear that motorists
brought about planning fatigue and a sense of ineffectualness. The were entirely unfamiliar with the concept and did not understand
media announced a number of times that the project would be that one lane was off-limits to them. The project also started on the
terminated. Rather than creating positive momentum and popular wrong foot because the bus drivers were not properly trained at
excitement around the project, newspaper coverage fed on the first, causing bus bunching, delays, and even minor accidents.
disputes between political parties and treated BRT as a political By the time the BRT opened, Governor Apirak who had pushed
game. These reports tarnished the BRT image. for its creation had stepped down and was embroiled in dealing
In addition to failure to manage the BRT coverage by the media, with corruption charges (he was later found not guilty). His suc-
BRT promotion efforts were feeble and not grounded in an under- cessor, Governor Sukhumbhand Paribatra (also from the Demo-
standing of Thai socio-cultural attitudes and preferences. For cratic Party), made it clear that the BRT was an inherited project for
example, the governor's support for BRT rested on its lower costs which his administration did not care much. Soon after the inau-
compared to rail. However, the prospect of public savings was guration, in September 2010, the other planned BRT lines were
insufficient to convince the populace to embrace the concept. cancelled.
Similarly, highlighting the environmental benefits of public trans-
port, even of an advanced system like BRT, had little impact as most 4. Conclusion
people in Bangkok appear to be aware of pollution but accept it as
part of urban living (Eskenazi, 2006). The Bangkok BRT project was curtailed due to a combination of
Due to its lower fares, the BRT line could serve the needs of the reasons, which confirm the findings of prior studies on BRT plan-
mass of poor Bangkok residents better than the rail transit systems, ning and implementation worldwide. The institutional setup was
which charge much higher fares. However, any promotions focused too complex to coordinate and implement this type of project. Local
on equity were counterproductive in terms of attracting the transportation agencies were cast in past roles and purposes which
growing middle-class (and thus turning BRT into a mainstream they were unable and/or unwilling to change. The selection of the
option). In Bangkok, the combination of high car ownership rates, first corridor (a route mostly running through a low-demand pe-
the strong association between cars and social status, and the ripheral location) was rather ineffective. While the project had the
importance of appearances and “saving face,” has led to a situation support and commitment of a high-level politician, he was unable
where members of the elite are embarrassed to be seen riding to amass the necessary political pull and popular goodwill to push
public transport. Even within a 500 m radius of a BRT station, only a the project forward within a short time before the novelty effect
small percentage of households are regular users (Chalermpong & wore off. Partly this owes to feeble promotional efforts targeting
Ratanawaraha, 2015). This suggests that BRT planning should have potential users and stakeholders, but also to opposition based on
been accompanied by the creation of a “transport brand” which political affiliation rather than concern for the city. After Governor
was attractive to the upper and middle-classes (see Shannon & Apirak's departure from office, the project lost momentum. It was
Lockshin, 2000). implemented in a very partial way and along a lower density route.
Existing buses in Bangkok are associated with extreme However, the barriers to BRT in Bangkok were not all equally
discomfort, especially if they are not air-conditioned, due to the important. The crucial issues in this case were the weak and dis-
city's tropical climate. Also, middle-class individuals have a notion continued political leadership and the failure to manage competing
that buses are full of “bad people” (Bengtsson, 2006; Eskenazi, modes, the primary of which is the automobile.
2006; Charoentrakulpeeti et al., 2006). Therefore, BRT promotion Nonetheless, creating a however limited BRT system was not a
efforts should have stressed that the system's buses and stations loss for Bangkok. The single BRT line helps 15,000 passengers to
would be comfortable, temperature-controlled, and ventilated. avoid the daily traffic grind while travelling in comfort. Although
Also, the provision of security at BRT stations should have been limited for a large city like Bangkok, the BRT line is of good quality.
highlighted. Its extension plans could always be resumed in the future. As
Some of the dislike for BRT had historical roots. Bangkok mentioned, one of the major BRT advantages is its flexibility to
introduced exclusive bus lanes in the 1980s but lax enforcement adapt to changing times. Should another attempt be made at
 I. Wu, D. Pojani / Research in Transportation Economics 60 (2016) 44e53 53

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