DSGE Models and the Lucas Critique.

A Historical Appraisal.

Francesco Sergi
University of the West of England (UWE), Bristol

Economics Working Paper Series

1806
 DSGE Models and the Lucas Critique.
A Historical Appraisal
Francesco Sergi∗

Abstract
This contribution to the history of the economic thought aims at
describing how “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” (Lucas,
1976) has been interpreted through four decades of debates. This
historical appraisal clarifies how Lucas’s argument is currently under-
stood and discussed within the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) approach.
The article illustrates how two opposite interpretations of the Lu-
cas Critique arose in the early 1980s. On the one hand, a “theoretical
interpretation” has been championed by the real business cycle (RBC)
approach; on the other hand, an “empirical interpretation” has been
advocated by Keynesians. Both interpretations can be understood as
addressing a common question: Do microfoundations imply parame-
ters’ stability? Following the RBC theoretical interpretation, micro-
foundations do imply stability; conversely, for Keynesians, parameters’
stability (or instability) should be supported by econometric evidence
rather than theoretical considerations.
Furthermore, the article argues that the DSGE approach represent
a fragile compromise between these two opposite interpretations of
Lucas (1976). This is especially true for the recent literature criticizing
the DSGE models for being vulnerable to the Lucas Critique.
Keywords: DSGE models, Lucas Critique, microfoundations
JEL codes: B22

∗
University of the West of England Bristol. francesco.sergi@uwe.ac.uk.

1
Introduction
According to a standard narrative on the history of macroeconomics,
“Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique” (Lucas, 1976) had two conse-
quences.1 Firstly, it provided an ultimate criticism of the macroeconomet-
ric models à la Klein and Goldberger (1955). As Robert Hall puts it, this
macroeconometric approach—which was dominant in the 1960s—has been
“devastated by the theoretical and empirical force of the [Lucas] critique”
(Hall, 1996, 38).2 Secondly, Lucas (1976) sets in motion a new research
program for macroeconometric modeling. In The Rational Expectations Rev-
olution, Preston Miller claims for instance that “the Lucas Critique was fatal
and new approaches had to be developed” (Miller, 1994, xv). The quest for
new approaches has been supposedly achieved by today’s “New Neoclassi-
cal Synthesis” models, i.e. dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models (Smets and Wouters, 2005; Christiano et al., 2005). Such macroe-
conometric models are considered by most as not vulnerable anymore to the
Lucas Critique. This paper challenges this view, and emphasizes how the
debate on the interpretation and relevance of the Lucas Critique is still open
today. Besides, I argue that this should be understood as the historical result
of rival interpretations of Lucas’s original paper, and more specifically rival
understandings of the relation between the Lucas Critique and the idea of
microfoundations.3
Lucas (1976) addresses the following methodological question: How to
build macroeconometric models that provide reliable quantitative evaluation
of the effects of alternative rules for economic policy? Lucas’s answer is: in
order to provide a sound expertise, the model parameters must be “struc-
tural”, i.e their values must be “invariant” with respect to policy changes. In
short, parameters must be “stable”.4
The first claim of my paper is that most DSGE modelers consider that Lu-
cas (1976) describes stability of parameters as an inherent property of models
specifying aggregate relations as the result of optimizing, forward-looking in-
dividual agents—in short, microfounded models. In a nutshell, most DSGE
modelers consider that microfoundations of macroeconomic models imply pa-
1
A standard narrative is a widespread tale about the history of macroeconomics told by
practitioners in order to legitimize current standard approach to macroeconomics. For
a more comprehensive view see Sergi (2017b).
2
Goutsmedt et al. (2017) challenges this first claim of the standard narrative.
3
Section 1 clarifies that the word “microfoundations” should be understood in the very
specific sense of “Lucasian microfoundations”. For now, I will use the term microfoun-
dations generically, as it is current in the DSGE literature.
4
Note that we consider, hereafter, stability as the invariance of the parameters values
across periods, and not across data sets or estimation methods.

2
rameters stability—and, consequently, that microfoundations imply a sound
quantitative policy evaluation. For instance, a consumption function describ-
ing intertemporal optimization and therefore relying on parameters describ-
ing preferences (e.g. subjective discount factor, elasticities of substitution,
etc.) should be considered a priori as a stable relationship; conversely, con-
sumption functions relying on non-microfounded parameters—such as the
Keynesian marginal propensity to consume—are to be considered by defini-
tion as relationships vulnerable to the Lucas Critique.
Michael Woodford, a key figure in the New Neoclassical Synthesis, en-
dorses very clearly this view in his introduction to Interest and Prices:

a model [...] with clear foundations in individual optimization is

important, in our view, for two reasons. One is that it allows us to
evaluate alternative monetary policies in a way that avoids the flaw
in policy evaluation exercises using traditional Keynesian macroecono-
metric models stressed by Lucas (1976).

(Woodford, 2003, 13)

According to Woodford, microfoundations (“clear foundations in individual

optimization”) allow to escape the “flaw” of parameters’ instability, empha-
sized by Lucas (1976) in the case of “Keynesian” models. DSGE models are
also fashionable among central banks and other policy-making institutions,
and macroeconometricians responsible for building such models make a sim-
ilar claim: DSGE models are not vulnerable to the Lucas Critique because
they are microfounded. The following examples, drawn from technical re-
ports about DSGE models (from the Bank of Israel and the Swiss National
Bank), illustrate this argument:

Being micro-founded, the model enables the central bank to assess

the effect of its alternative policy choices on the future paths of the
economy’s endogenous variables, in a way that is immune to the Lucas
(1976) critique.

(Argov et al., 2012, 5)

[The DSGE] approach has three distinct advantages in comparison

to other modelling strategies. First and foremost, its microfoundations
should allow it to escape the Lucas (1976) critique.

(Cuche-Curti et al., 2009, 6)

3
 So it seems that, thanks to microfoundations, the “flaw” of old “Keyne-
sian” models has been eradicated once for all; nowadays, macroeconometric
DSGE models are robust to the Lucas Critique and reliable for quantitative
policy evaluation.
Yet, in a 2005 interview, Lucas himself argues, sibylline: “I think [the
Lucas Critique] has been tremendously important, but it is fading.” (Lucas
in Snowdon and Vane, 2005, 282). Does Lucas mean that his Critique is losing
importance either because all macroeconomists are aware of it, or, conversely,
because they forgot its importance? Charles Plosser—a key figure of the real
business cycle (RBC) approach in the 1980s—argues indeed that the current
DSGE approach forgot about the importance of the Lucas Critique:

In my view, the current rules of the game of New Keynesian DSGE

models run afoul of the Lucas critique—a seminal work for my gener-
ation of macroeconomists and for each generation since.

(Plosser, 2012, 5)

A quick overview of the most recent articles in the DSGE literature mention-
ing Lucas (1976)—such as, for instance, Hurtado (2014); Lubik and Surico
(2010) or Chang et al. (2010)—confirms Plosser’s view: all these contribu-
tions claim that DSGE models are vulnerable to the Lucas Critique. Such
criticisms come from the inside of the DSGE approach, including the insti-
tutions using these models for policy analysis (for instance in the case of
Hurtado, 2014).

The very same existence of this debate within the DSGE approach is
surprising. How the “consensus” view on macroeconomics (the New Neo-
classical Synthesis) could still be in disagreement on such a crucial issue as
the soundness of policy evaluation with DSGE models? The purpose of this
article is to explain the reasons underlying this lasting and surprising dis-
agreement. My claim is that the current debate about DSGE models and
the Lucas Critique should be understood through a historical perspective—
namely, through the development, during the 1980s and 1990s, of two rival
interpretations of Lucas (1976). On the one hand, the RBC approach ad-
vocated for what I will call a “theoretical interpretation” of the Critique; on
the other hand, Keynesians championed what I will call an “empirical in-
terpretation” of the Critique. These interpretations were rival with respect
to their assessment of the following proposition: do microfoundations imply
parameters’ stability?5
5
This article scrutinizes a wide range of literature on the Lucas Critique, pertaining

4
 RBC approach argues that microfoundations do imply parameters’ stabil-
ity. This implies that a macroeconomic model pertains forcefully (logically)
to one of the following cases:

Table 1: The theoretical interpretation of the Lucas Critique

stability of parameters instability of parameters

microfoundations yes
no microfoundations yes

Note that the two alternative cases “no microfoundations-stability of pa-

rameters” and “microfoundations-instability” are logically empty sets. Thus
providing microfoundations is a sufficient condition to ensure the stability
of parameters and, hence, the soundness of a model for quantitative policy
analysis.
Conversely, following the empirical interpretation of the Critique, Keyne-
sians argue that microfoundations do not imply parameters’ stability. Hence,
a macroeconomic model could possibly pertain to any of the four following
cases:

Table 2: The empirical interpretation of the Lucas Critique

stability of parameters instability of parameters

microfoundations yes yes
no microfoundations yes yes

Thus, the parameters’ stability could not be determined by assessing the

microfounded character of the model—or, in other words, microfoundations
are not a sufficient condition for concluding that the model has stable pa-
rameters. Therefore, the Lucas Critique is an empirical issue: we should look
at parameters’ values, using statistical tests, to assess their stability.

Section 1 of this article shortly analyzes Lucas’s 1976 article and sub-
sequent works to illustrate how two possible interpretations of Lucas’s ar-
gument could arise from the original contribution. Section 2 analyzes the
theoretical and empirical interpretation of the Lucas Critique arising during
to different eras and approaches, aiming at illustrating the common ground of the
discussion and uncovering the points of contention. Therefore, note that the terminology
employed here constitute a reappraisal of the actual terms employed by different authors.

5
the 1980s. Section 3 illustrates how these two interpretations currently co-
exist within the DSGE approach, resulting in a fundamental disagreement
about the vulnerability of DSGE models to the Lucas Critique, and also a
disagreement about the potential solutions to this problem.

1 The Lucasian interpretation of the Critique

Lucas (1976) was formulated as a “critique” of what he perceived as the
dominant approach to macroeconometric modeling of its time. According to
Lucas, models in this approach, issued from the tradition of Klein and Gold-
berger (1955)—explicitly targeted by Lucas (1976, 19)—“provide no useful
information as to the actual consequences of alternative economic policies”
(ibid.). Lucas’s argument was based on questioning the “stability” of be-
havioral parameters in those models: their behavioral parameters (say, the
marginal propensity to consume) were supposed to be stable across time,
whereas they were drifting along with changes in economic policy.
This criticism was far from being new—as Lucas himself acknowledged
(ibid., 19, fn.3).6 What is new in the Lucas Critique is the diagnosis of the
problem. Indeed, Lucas is arguing that macroeconometric models à la Klein
and Goldberger (1955) are not structural because
the individual decision problem: “find an optimal decision rule
when certain parameters (future prices, say) follow arbitrary paths” is
simply not well formulated

(Lucas, 1976, 26).

According to Lucas, the individual decision problem will be “well formulated”

if it was derived, in an hypothetico-deductive perspective, from “microeco-
nomic theory”, i.e. neo-Walrasian general equilibrium approach. Lucas criti-
cizes the mainstream macroeconometric approach for relying on econometric
induction instead of using “microeconomic theory”:
6
The stability of parameters in macroeconometric models has been indeed a main con-
cern for econometricians since the 1930s. For instance, Ragnar Frisch (1938)’s critique
against Tinbergen’s first macroeconometric model for the League of Nations is based
upon the same argument: Frisch pointed out that the parameters used by Tinbergen
in his model were not invariant of changes in policy (relationships within the model
were not “autonomous” in Frisch’s words). Even if Frisch’s notion of “autonomy” of
macroeconometric models was quickly dismissed (Qin, 2014), econometricians still took
seriously the underlying issue—see for instance Tinbergen (1956, Chap. 5), Marschak
(1953, 8;25) and Haavelmo (1944, 27).

6
 [the] micro-economic role for theory [to rationalize individual
econometric relationship] abdicates the task of describing the aggre-
gate behaviour of the system entirely to econometricians.

(ibid., 23)

This leads inevitably macroeconometric models to produce predictions that

are contradictory with those made by “microeconomic theory”: the trade-off
between inflation and output is, for Lucas, the perfect illustration of such an
“obvious fallacy” (ibid.) with respect to theory.
In a nutshell, Lucas’s diagnosis is that the mainstream macroeconomet-
ric approach is not useful for policy evaluation because it is driven in the
first place by empirical concerns instead of being driven by theoretical rigor.
As a result, macroeconometric models lack of “microfoundations”, i.e. they
do not specify macroeconomic relationships in terms of individual decision
rules resulting from the hypotheses of the “microeconomic theory”. In Lucas
understanding, microfoundations consist in describing macroeconomic (ag-
gregate) phenomena as arising from individual (microeconomic) behavior.
The description of microeconomic behavior should rely on (i) intertemporal
optimization, (ii) endogenous, forward-looking expectations and (iii) market-
clearing (all the individual plans are compatible).7
The logical implication of Lucas’s line of argument is that macroecono-
metric models can perform policy evaluation if their behavioral equations are
microfounded. Hence, the Lucas Critique can actually be interpreted as a
methodological prescription: even if the initial question addressed by Lucas
(1976) is more likely to be resumed as “how not to build macroeconometric
models for policy evaluation” (i.e. as a “negative” prescription), the “how
to build it” question (i.e. a “positive” prescription) is clearly addressed in
the conclusions of the article. Lucas suggests indeed that macroeconomet-
ric microfounded models should be formalized as a system of two difference
equations:

yt+1 = F (yt , xt , θ(λ), t ) (1)

xt = G(yt , xt−1 , λ, ηt ) (2)

Equation (1) describes the law of motion of the economic system (yt being
the endogenous variables, xt the exogenous variables and θ(λ) a vector of
individual decision rules for a given set of behavioral parameters). Equation
7
Such “Lucasian microfoundations” must be distinguished from other “microfoundational
programs” (see Hoover, 2012). Hereafter I will simply use the term “microfoundations”,
in short, instead of “Lucasian microfoundations”.

7
(2) represents the evolution of the exogenous variables, with λ a vector of pa-
rameters, including those describing policy rules (, η are i.i.d disturbances).
The Lucas Critique targeted models that use fixed behavioral parameters
θ, instead of using decision rules θ(λ), taking into account the evolution
of individual behavior in response to changes in the environment.8 For in-
stance, a model formalizing consumption behavior based on a fixed marginal
propensity to consume (agents consume a fixed share of their current in-
come) will ignore, according to Lucas, the fact that this marginal propensity
depends, for instance, on the preferences toward future consumption. There-
fore, marginal propensity to consume is not a “stable” parameter (or “deep
structural” in Lucas’s terminology)—while a subjective discounting factor is.
Lucas (1976) does not provide any empirical evidence to support its
claim—neither econometric tests nor statistical analysis of parameters’ in-
stability in Keynesian models.9 Thus, one could legitimately consider—and
the RBC approach will—that the Lucas Critique is a theoretical argument
of the kind “microfoundations imply parameters’ stability”.
However, if one takes a broader look at Lucas’s work, another interpreta-
tion of the Critique arises. Lucas and Thomas Sargent, in their famous “After
Keynesian Macroeconomics”, did emphasize very explicitly that the stability
of parameters should be “an empirical question, and not a theoretical one”:

[there is] a number of theoretical reasons for believing that the

parameters identified as structural by the methods which are in current
use in macroeconomics are not structural in fact. That is, there is
no reason, in our opinion, to believe that these models have isolated
structures which will remain invariant across the class of interventions
that figure in contemporary discussions of economic policy. Yet the
question of whether a particular model is structural is an empirical,
not a theoretical one.

(Lucas and Sargent, 1979, 56).

Moreover, they admit that the Lucas Critique was an argument driven by
“theoretical reasons” or “theoretical objections”, and therefore it can possibly
be refuted empirically (even if they do not think this will be the case):
8
Note that, according to Lucas, only changes in policy rules can be addressed with this
approach: evaluating discretionary policies is still “beyond the capability not only of
the current-generation models, but of conceivable future models as well” (ibid., 41-42).
9
Note that Lucas disagrees with this assessment, arguing that the three analytical ex-
amples developed in section 5 of his paper are “empirical evidences” (Letter from Lucas
to Stanley Fischer, 17/11/1981; Lucas Archives, Box 5, Folder: 1982 1/2).

8
 If macroeconometric models had compiled a record of parameter
stability, particularly in the face of breaks in the stochastic behavior
of the exogenous variables and disturbances, one would be skeptical as
to the importance of prior theoretical objections of the sort we have
raised.
(ibid.).

Later on, when introducing his collected works in Studies in Business

Cycle Theory, Lucas argues again:
this presumption [about policy-invariance] seems a sound one to
me, but it must be defended on empirical, not logical grounds, and the
nature of such a defense presumably would vary with the particular
application one has in mind.
(Lucas, 1981, 11-12)

This call for empirical work on the Lucas Critique has been indeed an-
swered by the new Classical macroeconometric approach (Lucas and Sargent,
1981). This approach aims indeed at implementing econometric procedures
for specification and identification of models that will abide by the theoretical
standards set by the Lucasian microfoundational program. More specifically,
as summarized by Lars Hansen and Sargent in their emblematic contribu-
tion, this line of work consists in “estimating agent’s decision rules jointly
with models for stochastic processes they face, subject to cross-equation re-
strictions implied by the hypothesis of rational expectations” (Hansen and
Sargent, 1981, 7-8). Using the above notation, the scope of new Classical
macroeconometrics is (i) to specify the decision rules θ(λ) (equation 1); (ii)
to identify the parameters λ that govern the exogenous process in the econ-
omy (equation 2); (iii) to identify the “deep” parameters of the decision rules;
and (iv) to run estimations for equations (1) and (2), with cross-equations
restrictions.10 The new Classical macroeconometric approach should be re-
garded as a consistent extension on empirical ground of the Lucas Critique
as a methodological prescription.

This section raised two crucial issues. Firstly, Lucas (1976) in itself is
presented as a theoretical argument; secondly, Lucas himself in later work
and, most prominently, the new Classical macroeconometric approach, tack-
led the issue raised by Lucas (1976) with empirical methods. This state of
affairs provides a background for the development of two rival interpretations
of the Critique during the 1980s.
10
For an extensive account about new Classical macroeconometrics see Sergi (2015) and
Sergi (2017a, Chap. 2).

9
2 Two rival interpretations of the Lucas Cri-
tique
2.1 The theoretical interpretation of the Lucas Critique
by the RBC approach
The RBC approach championed what I will call a theoretical interpreta-
tion of the Lucas Critique. This is to say, that Kydland, Prescott and the
other RBC macroeconomists interpreted Lucas (1976)’s argument as “micro-
foundations imply empirical stability”.
This interpretation is rooted in Kydland and Prescott (1977)—thought
this work precedes the development of RBC models (Kydland and Prescott,
1982)—where the authors endorse Lucas’s criticism of “standard” macroe-
conometrics:
Standard practice is to estimate an econometric model and then, at
least informally, to use optimal-control-theory techniques to determine
policy. But as Lucas (1976) has argued, since optimal decision rules
vary systematically with changes in the structure of series relevant to
the decision maker, any change in policy will alter the structure of
these rules.

(Kydland and Prescott, 1977, 474)

Moreover, Kydland and Prescott claim that models vulnerable to the Lu-
cas Critique (namely, macroeconometric models à la Klein and Goldberger,
1955) actually led to “bad” policy recommendations (namely, expansionary
monetary policy) and, finally, to “perverse” economic outcomes (namely, U.S.
1970s stagflation):11
[Thus, we found that] stabilization efforts have the perverse effect
of contributing to economic instability. [...] In effect the policymaker
is failing to take into account the effect of his policy rule upon the
optimal decison [sic] rules of the economic agents.

(ibid.)

Kydland and Prescott want to avoid such a fallacious misuse of macroe-

conometric models for policy analysis. Thus, they argue that models should
be used for policy evaluation only if they provide corroborated (“tested”)
predictions:
11
This is what Snowdon (2007) calls the “idea hypothesis”. For a discussion about this
interpretation of Lucas (1976), see Goutsmedt et al. (2015, 18-20).

10
 a tested theory12 of economic fluctuations [is] something which
is needed before policy evaluation is undertaken. The implication of
[our] analysis is that, until we have such a [tested] theory [of economic
fluctuations], active stabilization may very well be dangerous and it is
best that it not be attempted.

(ibid., 487)

The important claim made here by Kydland and Prescott is that building
models for policy analysis is a two-step procedure: first, one must provide a
“tested” model of the business cycle; then, one can use this “tested” model for
policy evaluation. This distinction constitutes a crucial turn in the further
development of the RBC assessment of the Lucas Critique.13
The first step (“testing”) consists in building a model whose simulated
dynamic would correspond with observed time series of main aggregates.
Kydland and Prescott’s purpose in their 1982 seminal article is to complete
this first step, namely to build “a general equilibrium model” that would “fit
the U.S. quarterly data for the post-war period” (Kydland and Prescott, 1982,
1345). Consistently with the idea of a two-step work, Kydland and Prescott
original RBC model did not include any policy consideration: indeed, policy
and policy-makers are simply not formalized. Moreover, the same remark
applies to the two other seminal contributions of the RBC approach, namely
to Long and Plosser (1983) and to Black (1982).
However, as long as the model fits data, it is supposed to have been
“tested”: thus, it could be used in the second step of macroeconomic analysis,
i.e. policy analysis. Despite not having specified or tested any decision rule
linking individual private agents behavior to the policymaker choice (as did
the new Classical macroeconometric approach) Kydland and Prescott argue
very clearly that their 1982 model without policy is viable for policy analysis:

Models such as the one considered in this paper could be used to

predict the consequence of a particular policy rule upon the operating
characteristics of the economy.

(Kydland and Prescott, 1982, 1369)

12
Note that Kydland and Prescott use with no distinction the word “theory” to mean
“model”. On this issue, they follow Lucas (“I mean theory in the sense of models”,
Lucas, 1987, 2).
13
This distinction is actually quite close to the one set by Lucas himself, in order to provide
“scientific” expertise—contrasting with “ideology” (De Vroey, 2011). As pointed out by
De Vroey (2015, chap. 13) and as I will illustrate here, Kydland and Prescott departed
then from Lucas’s view about how to implement such a distinction.

11
The following argument supports their claim:

As we estimate14 the preference-technology structure, our struc-

tural parameters will be invariant to the policy rule selected even
though the behavioral equations are not.

(Kydland and Prescott, 1982, 1369)

This is the crucial argument illustrating Kydland and Prescott’s theoreti-

cal interpretation of the Lucas Critique. They argue that the “preference-
technology” structure is a sufficient condition for parameters stability (“in-
variance to policy”). This is to say, that the parameters characterizing pref-
erences and technologies in their model are a priori policy-invariant, stable
parameters.15 Thus, we can read Kydland and Prescott’s argument as a
claim that “microfoundations imply empirical stability”.
This claim is supposed to be “tested” indirectly, by illustrating the fit be-
tween model’s simulation and observations. Hence, there is no direct empiri-
cal investigation of the stability of the parameters characterizing preferences
and technologies. Moreover, the the “calibration” method pioneered by Kyd-
land and Prescott relies entirely on this conception of microfoundations as a
priori policy-invariant parameters. Indeed, as the values of such parameters
are supposed to be stable across time (and across policy regimes), these val-
ues can picked up once-for-all relying on different sources. This includes: (i)
a set of evidences produced outside the model (for instance in microeconomic
literature); (ii) a “plausible” value to the subjective judgment of the modeler;
(iii) a set of calibration values in other RBC models.16 Such a procedure
becomes meaningful only because microfounded parameters such as prefer-
ences and technologies are assumed a priori as stable. Thus, there is no need
to provide any direct empirical evidence about stability within the model. In
this sense, despite mentioning the importance of a “tested” theory, Kydland
14
Rather read “calibrate”.
15
Formally, referring to equations (1 − 2) above, Kydland and Prescott suggest that pref-
erences and technologies are parameters in the vector θ that are fixed and independent
from the policy components of λ. For instance, subjective discount factor β, describing
agent’s preferences toward the future, would be, by definition, a stable parameters, i.e.
invariant of, say, changes in monetary policy rules. This claim is obviously consistent
with core assumptions of general equilibrium approach, where preferences are always
given (exogenous and fixed).
16
An insightful comment about this is Kydland and Prescott’s later claim that “because
the language used in these business cycle models is the same as that used in other areas
of applied economics, the values of common parameters should be identical across these
areas and typically have been measured by researchers working in these other areas”
(Kydland and Prescott, 1991, 170, my emphasis).

12
and Prescott interpret the Lucas Critique as a theoretical proposition of the
kind “microfoundations imply stability”.
In a nutshell, the Kydland and Prescott (1982)’s interpretation of the
Lucas Critique relies on the two-step procedure which they had formulated
in their 1977 paper: (1) indirectly corroborating the policy-invariance of mi-
crofounded parameters (those characterizing preferences and technology, e.g.
elasticities), in a framework without policy; (2) using a model with these very
same parameters for policy analysis. Policy evaluation exercises in further
RBC literature follow this procedure. Contributions like Cooley and Hansen
(1989) and Greenwood and Huffman (1991) provide two illustrations.17 Coo-
ley and Hansen (1989) try to evaluate the effects on welfare of different levels
of inflation volatility (corresponding to different monetary policy), using a
calibrated RBC model with cash-in-advance transaction functions. Green-
wood and Huffman (1991) run a similar welfare analysis for different fiscal
policies. The most complete synthesis of this line of work is Chari et al.
(1995), addressing directly the question of optimal monetary policy rules.
All these authors addressed the policy evaluation following the Kydland and
Prescott assessment of the Lucas Critique: specifying microfoundations, i.e.
specifying preferences and technology, is a sufficient condition for escaping
the Lucas Critique. Therefore, models are built assuming that preferences
and technology are characterized by policy-invariant parameters, and their
values are calibrated using values of previous RBC models.

Note that, especially during the 1990s, such a theoretical interpretation

of the Lucas Critique was criticized inside and outside the RBC approach.
For instance, within the RBC approach, Danthine and Donaldson (1993, 17)
wonder “to what extent do the benchmark stylized facts used in the literature
depend upon the selection of time periods or variations in policy regimes”.
Outside the RBC approach, the criticisms are of course more radical. In
“Post-econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique”, Beth Ingram and Erich
Leeper argue that RBC models repeat “the ‘Keynesian’ errors that Lucas
(1976) noted in its influential critique” (Ingram and Leeper, 1990, 1). Ac-
cording to the authors, this is mainly due to two errors: first, the fact that all
RBC literature on policy evaluation uses parameters’ values for calibration
that are borrowed from previous RBC models, with no policy considerations;
second, the fact that RBC models don’t specify explicitly how individual
decision rules depends on policy. This criticism is a useful in uncovering the
theoretical interpretation of the Lucas Critique underlying the RBC models.
17
Another strain of works in RBC approach, which I will not analyze here, studies poli-
cies (tax policies or government spending) as additional sources of the business cycle
fluctuations (Braun, 1994; Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; McGrattan, 1994).

13
In extenso:

Frequently, RBC modelers transport the parameter values Kydland

and Prescott used in their model without policy to the new model with
policy. [...] Kydland and Prescott’s model assume that policy doesn’t
affect private decision rules. There is no policy evaluation to perform.
Alternatively, if policy does affect private behavior, then the parame-
ters Kydland and Prescott calibrate are reduced-form parameters for
some underlying model embedding monetary and fiscal policy. Thus, if
there is any policy evaluation left to perform, Kydland and Prescott’s
calibrated parameters must be functions of policy behavior and should
change systematically with policy. When RBC modelers evaluate al-
ternative policies, however, the calibrated parameters are held fixed.

(ibid., 3-4, their emphasis)

2.2 The empirical interpretation of the Lucas Critique

Conversely to Kydland and Prescott, many macroeconomists understood
Lucas (1976) as an invitation to investigating empirically—through econo-
metric tests or statistical analysis—the stability of parameters in macroe-
conometric models. This is what I will call the “empirical interpretation” of
the Lucas Critique. Following this understanding, Lucas’s argument would
not forcefully result in a theoretical reformulation of macroeconometric mod-
els (favoring microfoundations); to the opposite, Lucas’s argument primarily
imply an empirical, econometric footwork investigating the actual invariance
of parameters’. Depending on the results of such investigations, the need for
microfoundations could be either corroborated or rejected.

As we illustrated in details in Goutsmedt et al. (2017), the empirical

interpretation of the Lucas Critique was, during the 1980s, a common ground
to different generations of Keynesians and to time-series econometricians.
Note that the label “Keynesian” is generic and it covers indeed a wide
range of authors and modeling practices. As a first approximation of the
different groups that would be associated to this label, let consider that it
refers to two different generations, “old” and “young” Keynesians.
Old Keynesians developed during the 1950s and 1960s the kind of large
scale macroeconometric models à la Klein and Goldberger (1955) which were
directly targeted by the Lucas Critique. Prominent figures of this genera-
tion includes for instance Lawrence Klein, Franco Modigliani, James Tobin,
Robert Solow or Edmond Malinvaud. Overall, their reaction to the Lucas
Critique was of strong rejection, based on lack of empirical evidence. Old

14
Keynesians argued that the Lucas Critique was not a relevant argument,
so far that Lucas and new Classical did not show econometric evidence of
the instability of parameters in non-microfounded macroeconometric models.
However, old Keynesians did not directly engaged in empirical work about
the Lucas Critique, considering that the burden of proof rested on new Clas-
sical macroeconomists. Still, it is much clear that they interpret the Critique
as an empirical question.
The younger Keynesian generation shared with the old Keynesians the
same interpretation of the Lucas Critique as an argument that lacked of
empirical support. Alain Blinder is quite representative of this view when he
argues:
All you have to do in this country [...] right now is scream mind-
lessly, “Lucas critique!” and the conversation ends. That is a terrible
attitude. The Lucas critique may be correct, but I have seen no persua-
sive evidence in any sphere to indicate that it is empirically important.
The empirical case is yet to be made.

(Blinder in Klamer, 1984, 166)

However, this younger generation had a different approach to the de-

bate than the old Keynesians: they directly addressed the issue of param-
eters stability with their own empirical work (as Blinder, 1979 did). The
most insightful illustration of this approach is Olivier Blanchard’s “The Lu-
cas Critique and the Volcker Deflation” (Blanchard, 1984).18 In this pa-
per, Blanchard investigates two traditional macroeconomic relationships—
the Phillips curve and the term structure of interest rates—in a context of
change in policy regime—namely, the U.S. monetary policy after 1979.19 The
Phillips Curve and the term structure analyzed in the paper are those used in
macroeconometric models à la Klein and Goldberger (1955), both specified
with backward-looking expectations, so non-microfounded in the Lucasian
sense.20 The purpose of Blanchard’s empirical study is to find out if the pa-
rameters characterizing these relationships are stable despite the change in
policy regime. Results are obtained by first estimating the relations for the
period preceding the change in monetary policy, then by re-estimating the
same relation introducing additional years after the change. Fisher tests re-
veal instability in parameters’ for the term structure, but not for the Phillips
18
Similar studies are Englander and Los (1983) and Taylor (1984).
19
Paul Volcker’s appointment as chairman of the Federal Reserve in August 1979 brought
to a tightening of monetary policy and to a switch to inflation targeting as policy
objective.
20
The Phillips Curve is taken from the DRI model used by the U.S. Congress Budget
Office, and the term structure from the MPS model of the Federal Reserve Board.

15
curve: thus, the Lucas Critique is empirically relevant to the former, but not
to the latter.
Thus, Blanchard (1984)’s result suggests that, in some cases (e.g. the
term structure), the absence of microfoundations implies parameters insta-
bility. This kind of evidence provided an additional rationale for a Keynesian
line of work embracing Lucas’s microfoundations. This line of work is com-
monly labeled “new Keynesian economics” (Mankiw and Romer, 1991), and
it covers a wider range of modeling practices, all inspired from very different
seminal contributions.
A common ground to new Keynesians is that they accepted indeed to for-
mulate their models under the form of optimizing, forward-looking behavior
of the economic agents—abiding by Lucas’s principle of microfoundations.
Moreover, new Keynesians referred to the Lucas Critique as a justification
for their use of microfoundations. Early contributions to the new Keyne-
sian literature illustrate this view. Michael Parkin, the first author to label
his own work as “new Keynesian” (according to Gordon, 1990, 1115, fn. 2)
suggests that Lucas Critique is an important standard for assessing his work:

[My paper] extends earlier work on the microeconomic foundations

of sticky prices [...] Hence, this paper is able to go much further in
meeting the Lucas (1976) critique than earlier macromodels with price
(or wage) rigidities.

(Parkin, 1986, 200-201)

Ben Bernanke, another key figure in the new Keynesian approach, supports
that a “virtue” of a model consists in its robustness to the Lucas Critique:

[My model’s] virtue is that it permits estimation to be based on

the closed-form solution to a dynamic stochastic optimization prob-
lem, which leads to maximum efficiency in the use of the data. The
estimation procedure employed here is not vulnerable, as those in some
earlier studies are, to the criticisms made by Robert Lucas (1976).

(Bernanke, 1983, 71)

Finally, it is important to note that the Keynesian empirical interpre-

tation of the Lucas Critique was shared during the 1980s by Christopher
Sims and LSE time-series econometricians. This approach resulted from
Sims (1980)’s claim that macroeconometric models should rather rely on hy-
potheses inducted from the econometric evidence than on a priori hypotheses
deduced from economic theory. Consistently with this view, Sims (1982)’s re-
ply to Lucas (1976) echoed old Keynesians arguments. Sims argues that the

16
Lucas Critique could not be hold as relevant a priori: the stability of parame-
ters must be investigated empirically; microfoundations cannot be considered
as implying stability. More specifically, Sims raised two objections against
the Lucas Critique: (i) changes in rules represent a very negligible aspect of
actual policy-making, so that the scope of the Critique is a very narrow one;
(ii) traditional macroeconometric models still perform very well for econo-
metric policy evaluation, and Lucas did not bring any empirical evidence
against them. LSE econometric tradition led by Denis Sagan and David
Hendry later developed Sims’s view about the Lucas Critique.21 Similarly to
the younger Keynesian generation, LSE econometricians directly engaged in
empirical investigation about the stability of parameters. Their works (see
especially Ericsson and Irons, 1995) rejected as well the relevance of Lucas’s
argument and developed an alternative, statistical definition of stability—
the notion of “superexogeneity” (Engle et al., 1983). This line of work is still
active today and criticizing the DSGE approach on the same ground, arguing
that

the use of the word ‘structural’ to describe an equation or a subset

of a model has been hijacked by followers of Lucas (1976) away from its
original meaning of invariant to shifts elsewhere in the system to mean
‘microfounded’. But rationalization in terms of optimizing behaviour
does not guarantee invariance, nor is it true that invariance always
fails in models where such microfoundations are lacking.

(Hendry and Muellbauer, 2018, 294)

3 The DSGE models and the Lucas Critique

The previous section discussed the two interpretations of the Lucas Cri-
tique arising in the 1980s. The RBC approach interpreted the Critique as a
theoretical argument: microfoundations (intended as specifying preferences
and technologies) were, a priori, a sufficient condition to perform quantita-
tive policy evaluation—in short, microfoundations imply a priori the empir-
ical stability of parameters. Conversely, the Keynesian approach interpreted
the Critique as an empirical argument about the stability of parameters;
consequently, they considered that only statistical observations and econo-
metric tests (and not theory) allow to distinguish between stable and un-
stable parameters and, eventually, to justify the use of microfoundations for
quantitative policy evaluation.
21
For an historical perspective on this approach, see Qin (2013, Chap. 4) and Spanos
(2014).

17
 My claim is that this two rival interpretations are still the underlying
framework of the current debate about the Lucas Critique within the DSGE
approach. In my introduction (cf. infra), I have already mentioned a num-
ber of contributions to this literature that are evidently consistent with the
theoretical interpretation of the Critique—as for instance, Argov et al. (2012,
5) arguing that “being microfounded [...] DSGE models are immune to the
Lucas Critique”. I will not comment further on this kind of argument.22
Conversely, the purpose of this section is to scrutinize the DSGE literature
emphasizing the vulnerability of these models to the Lucas Critique.
The current debate about DSGE models and the Lucas Critique is fre-
quently reviewed with different categories: Hurtado (2014) for instance
classifies the arguments into “theoretical” and “empirical” critiques; Inoue
and Rossi (2008) distinguish between “specification” and “identification” cri-
tiques. My paper already provided a historical perspective on these classifi-
cations, explaining how “theoretical” (“specification”) and “empirical” (“iden-
tification”) criticisms arose from two past interpretations of Lucas (1976).
Moreover, the decisive point made by this section is about the research per-
spectives which will be associated with two different kind of criticism. My
claim is that DSGE modelers sharing a theoretical interpretation of the Cri-
tique will support a “not-enough-microfoundations” perspective: providing
“more microfoundations” to DSGE models will solve the problem of their
vulnerability to the Lucas Critique. Conversely, DSGE modelers endorsing
the empirical interpretation of the Critique will back a “microfoundations-are-
not-enough” perspective: pragmatical, empirical choice of parameters and al-
ternative microfoundations—meaning “non Lucasian microfoundations”—are
the only viable solution to the problem. Thus, these different perspectives
would eventually develop divergent research paths for DSGE models, intro-
ducing a breakthrough in the “New Neoclassical Synthesis”.

3.1 Are DSGE models “enough” microfounded?

As already mentioned in the introduction, Plosser recently pointed out
how DSGE models are vulnerable to the Lucas Critique. According to
Plosser, this weakness results from the new Keynesian elements of DSGE
models, such as price and wage rigidities. Indeed, these elements lack of
microfoundations, as they are not specified in terms of optimizing individual
behavior:

When the real and nominal frictions of New Keynesian models do

22
In Goutsmedt et al. (2017, sect. 1) we made a similar point about the interpretation of
the Lucas Critique as “a syllogism”.

18
 not reflect the incentives faced by economic actors in actual economies,
these models violate the Lucas critique’s policy invariance dictum, and
thus, the policy advice these models offer must be interpreted with
caution.

(Plosser, 2012, 5)

Consequently, Plosser considers that, in order to preserve DSGE models from

the Lucas Critique, “we should work to give the real and nominal frictions
[...] deeper and more empirically supported structural foundations” (ibid.,
6).
Many contributions in the current debate will follow this argument, which
is inherited from RBC assessment of the Lucas Critique as we described it
in sub-section 2.1. I will illustrate this claim commenting four examples
(Lubik and Surico, 2010; Inoue and Rossi, 2008; Fernández-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramirez, 2007 and Chari et al., 2008). The core argument of these
contributions is that such a vulnerability result from unsatisfactory micro-
foundations of some parameters in the DSGE, especially price and wage rigid-
ity and monetary policy rules. This features are considered as not “enough”
microfounded, because they are not explicitly derived from an optimizing,
forward-looking behavior. As a consequence, the related parameters are not
stable. To solve the problem, one need to provide “more” microfoundations
to DSGE models.

Conversely to the RBC literature, DSGE modelers engaged directly in

producing empirical evidence about the relation between microfoundations
and stability. Lubik and Surico (2010) is a perfect illustration of this change
of attitude: the article challenges explicitly econometric tests of the Lucas
Critique in the 1980s and 1990s—such as Blanchard (1984) the “superexo-
geneity” tests (Ericsson and Irons, 1995)—as well as their more recent ver-
sions (Estrella and Fuhrer, 2003; Rudebusch, 2005). According to Lubik and
Surico, these tests are simply “not well formulated’, as they investigate only
the variation of the values of the parameters in reduced forms, relying on
Fisher tests. Thus, the results of the Fisher tests could be biased (the power
of the test being artificially high) if there is a increasing variability of error
terms of the reduced forms. Hence, Lubik and Surico suggest that a “proper”
test of the stability of parameters should first investigate the homoscedas-
ticity of residuals to ensure reliability of Fisher tests. In their paper, they
illustrate indeed that, in the case of non-microfounded models, this empirical
method of investigation comes to the result that “the Lucas critique is alive
and well” (Lubik and Surico, 2010, 179). This results corroborate then the
idea that microfoundations are a necessary condition for stability. Relying

19
on this proposition, Lubik and Surico argue that DSGE models equally fail
in escaping the Lucas Critique because they lack of microfoundations, as they
rely on “ad hoc” monetary policy rules:

A deeper issue is whether DSGE models that are used for policy
analysis are not themselves subject to the Lucas critique. Implicitly,
Lucas’s argument rests on the notion that the information set of eco-
nomic agents and their decision problems were not fully specified in
traditional macroeconometric models. Yet, with the use of ad hoc
monetary policy rules, that very issue surely comes up in DSGE mod-
els that do not include optimizing policy makers.

(Lubik and Surico, 2010, 192)

In a similar vein, “How Structural Are Structural Parameters?”

(Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez, 2007) tries to verify empirically:
“how stable over time are the so-called “structural parameters” of dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models?” (ibid., 3). The authors rely
this time on Bayesian methods and the simulation of a baseline DSGE model.
Their strategy is to compare the outcomes of two different simulations. In
the first one, the model is simulated but imposing, as a restriction, a fixed
value for each parameter. In the second type of simulation, drifts in param-
eters’ values are allowed. Comparing the resulting simulations, the second
type better correspond to the observed series of data.
This results lead the authors to conclude that the main source of instabil-
ity in DSGE parameters is the misspecification of the underlying economic
relationships in terms of optimal decision rules. According to the simulation
results, the most problematic parameters (those that are more likely to drift)
are those describing price adjustments. Thus, the lack of microfoundations
is a particular concern for the price-setting behavior specified in the model:

We consider our findings to be strong proof of the changing nature

of the nominal rigidities in the economy and of a strong indication
of model misspecification along the dimension of price and wage ad-
justment. Calvo’s price adjustment cannot capture the evolution of
the fundamentals that determine the pricing decisions of firms and
households.

(ibid., 32)

In a nutshell, the vulnerability of the DSGE models to the Lucas Critique is,
according to the authors, a consequence of the lack of microfoundations of

20
the price-setting behavior à la Calvo (1983), which specify no endogenous de-
cision about timing of price change. Indeed, the pricing mechanism described
by Calvo and universally used in modern DSGE models does consider that
economic agents are allowed to change their prices with a given, fixed proba-
bility β. According to Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007), this
mechanism does not abide by the microfoundations standards à la Lucas,
as β does not results from an optimization process. In further comments,
Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007, 33) also target (like Lubik
and Surico, 2010), the monetary policy reaction function à la Taylor (1993),
as not derived from an explicit optimizing problem of the monetary author-
ity. Thus, the Taylor rule (and its variations used in the DSGE literature)
relies on ad hoc sensibility parameters.
This explanation of the vulnerability to the Lucas Critique as a con-
sequence of the lack of microfoundations leads, logically, to support “more
microfoundations” for the DSGE models. As summarized by Inoue and Rossi
(2008), “the [unstable parameters] are the potentially misspecified features
that require further theoretical modeling efforts” (Inoue and Rossi, 2008,
2). Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) for instance argue that
state-dependent decision rules on price adjustment à la Caplin and Spulber
(1987) should be preferred over the Calvo pricing. Similarly, an explicit de-
cision rule for central banks, grounded on optimization under constraint of
some policy-target function should be developed as an alternative to Taylor
rules (ibid.).
“New Keynesian Models: Not Yet Useful for Policy Analysis” (Chari et al.,
2008) illustrates this view eve more explicitly than Fernández-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramirez (2007) and in Lubik and Surico (2010). Chari and co-authors
engage in a full-range attack against the full set of market imperfections and
rigidities that are distinctive of the DSGE approach. Their empirical strategy
consist in showing observational equivalence between different specifications
of the most important shocks and parameters on wages, prices and mark-ups.
This demonstration aims at concluding that these features are reduced-forms
and not “structural”—as a consequence, the related parameters are likely to
be unstable across policy regimes.
Shocks on wage-markup for instance are reduced forms and not structural
to the extent there is any way of distinguish between two possible causes: a
change in the value of leisure or a change in the bargaining power of workers.
Hence, according to the authors, the lack of information about the optimiza-
tion problem underlying markups is responsible for the vulnerability of DSGE
to the Lucas Critique. The more general conclusion is that DSGE models
are currently flawed because of the incautious addition of new Keynesian
features:

21
 Most of our disagreement stems from our different preferred tra-
ditions of model building and assessment. [...] The urge to improve
the macro fit leads researchers in the [new Keynesian] tradition to add
many shocks and other features to their models and then to use the
same old aggregate data to estimate the associated new parameters.
This tradition does not include the discipline of microeconomic evi-
dence; so free parameters commonly abound in New Keynesian mod-
els.

(Chari et al., 2008, 2)

Consequently, Chari and his co-authors suggest that the solution to the prob-
lem is to provide “more” microfoundations to the DSGE models, by going
back to a more rigorous theoretical justification of DSGE specification, in
obedience of the Lucasian microfoundational program (ibid., 24).

These four examples illustrated how the theoretical interpretation of the

Lucas Critique (“microfoundations imply stability”) constitutes an underlying
framework for a group of authors criticizing the DSGE approach. However,
even if the argument is similar to its 1980s counterpart, it relies today on
empirical evidences, directly investigating the stability of parameters. Con-
sistently with the theoretical interpretation of the Critique, this group of
authors suggests a way out that implies “more microfoundations”, meaning
a deeper theoretical specification of some features (rigidities, monetary poli-
cies).

3.2 Are microfoundations “enough”?

The second strain of literature about DSGE models and the Lucas Cri-
tique follows the empirical assessment of Lucas (1976): microfoundations do
not imply stability; the stability of parameters could only be assessed by
econometric testing. In the early DSGE literature, this line of argument
has been followed by Ireland (2004), who argues very clearly that, even in
DSGE models, the relation between microfoundations and stability should be
empirically investigated, and not simply postulated as in the RBC approach:

One great strength of the real business cycle model is that it is

supposed to be structural: it links the behavior of aggregate output
and employment describing private agents’ tastes and technologies—
parameters that ought to remain constant, even across periods when
monetary and fiscal policy regimes change. [In this paper], a hybrid
[DSGE] model can be used to test the hypothesis that these structural
parameters do, in fact, appear stable over time.

22
 (Ireland, 2004, 1215)

By comparing two periods (before and after the Volcker deflation), Ireland
illustrates that there is indeed a change in the value of different parameters
of his DSGE models, including those characterizing the preferences and the
technologies (Ireland, 2004, 1215-1216).
As in the previous sub-section, I will comment on four examples (Cogley
and Yagihashi, 2010; Estrella and Fuhrer, 2003; Hurtado, 2014 and Chang
et al., 2010) illustrating how this view is currently adopted in the debate
about the DSGE models and the Lucas Critique.

First, it is important to emphasize that current debates about the DSGE

models does not exactly address the same question than their 1980s Key-
nesian ancestors.23 While the latter wanted to demonstrate that non-
microfounded parameters could be stable, the current debate address the
opposite question: are microfounded parameters of DSGE models not sta-
ble? The resulting argument is that (Lucasian) microfoundations are not
“enough” for ensuring stability. “Are DSGE Models Approximating Invariant
to Shifts in Policy?” (Cogley and Yagihashi, 2010) illustrates this evolution:
the article does not reject the empirical relevance of the Critique, to the
extent it admits that shifts in non-microfounded parameters do occur. How-
ever, it suggests that, even if parameters are not stable, their changes do not
introduce a relevant bias in the quantitative policy evaluation (measured by
the value of a loss function for the policymaker). Consequently, the authors
conclude that a complete specification of microfoundations is quite unnec-
essary, because policy evaluation is “approximately” invariant of change in
policies. This conclusion follows the empirical interpretation of the Lucas
Critique, furthermore adding a pragmatic argument about the actual feasi-
bility of the Lucasian methodological prescription: “we merely hope to put
the Lucas critique in perspective and to reiterate Milton Friedman’s precept
that the best (in this case, an unattainable ideal) should not be an enemy of
the good” (ibid., 29).
In a similar vein, “Monetary Policy Shifts and the Stability of Monetary
Policy Models” (Estrella and Fuhrer, 2003) starts by accepting the vulner-
ability of non-microfounded models to the Lucas Critique as an empirically
23
I will not comment here about few contributions, like for instance Rudebusch (2005),
sharing the very same motivation and providing the very same results than those pre-
sented in section 2.2. Similarly, I will not address some recent works by time-series
econometricians in the line of Ericsson and Irons (1995), such as Juselius and Franchi
(2007): these works are external criticisms of the DSGE approach, and I am interested
here into the debates within the DSGE literature.

23
relevant argument. But it rejects the idea that this argument can provide
any evidence that microfounded models are robust to the Critique:

But just as the backward-looking models cannot be known to be

subject to the Lucas critique a priori, neither can these optimizing
models be known to be stable across policy regimes a priori.

(ibid., 95)

The aim of the article is then to provide an empirical test of the Lucas
Critique, as in the Keynesian literature analyzed in sub-section 2.2. However,
this empirical test will not concern non-microfounded models, but DSGE
models, supposed to be firmly microfounded:24

In this paper, we present evidence that shows that some monetary

policy models from the recent literature, based on optimization and
rational expectations, may be less stable in the face of monetary regime
shifts than their better-fitting backward-looking counterparts.

(ibid.)

The authors claim that their results lead to the conclusion that microfounded
DSGE models shows instability of parameters, to the extent the parameters
values are drifting along with changes in policy regimes. In one word, DSGE
models behave just as the traditional macroeconometric models criticized by
Lucas (1976).
Similar conclusions are suggested in “DSGE Models and the Lucas Cri-
tique” (Hurtado, 2014). Hurtado provides evidences that most of the pa-
rameters in a benchmark DSGE model (Smets and Wouters, 2005), includ-
ing those characterizing preferences and technologies, are actually not stable
across time. To illustrate more clearly that this implies DSGE vulnerabil-
ity to the Lucas Critique, Hurtado assess the DSGE performance in policy
evaluation compared with traditional macroeconometric approach: do the
Smets-Wouters model give a better policy advice than an “old-style” Phillips
Curve? The test is run with 1970s’ data, a persuasive manner to compare the
claim about an “econometric failure on a grand scale” (Lucas and Sargent,
24
“By uncovering the structural parameters that characterize these fundamental behav-
iors, and by explicitly modeling expectations (usually assuming rational expectations),
one may capture the (presumed) dependence of agents’ behavior on the functions de-
scribing policy” (ibid., 94).

24
1979, 6) with the claim about DSGE robustness to the Lucas Critique.25
The result of this comparison confirms that microfounded DSGE and tradi-
tional macroeconometric models display the same weakness in terms of policy
evaluation:

in terms of parameter invariance and its effect on econometric pol-

icy evaluation, the estimated DSGE model would not have done a lot
better than the old-style Philips curve. [...] the lesson that policy-
makers would have drawn from Smets-Wouters are not fundamentally
different from those they were extracting from their reduced-form mod-
els.

(Hurtado, 2014, p18-19)

Finally, “Labor-market Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and the Lucas Cri-

tique” (Chang et al., 2010) aims at dismissing especially the Lucasian micro-
foundations as a necessary condition for policy evaluation. Following the new
Keynesian assessment of the Lucas Critique, the authors run an empirical test
of the stability of microfounded parameters in DSGE models, such as prefer-
ences and technologies, supposed to be policy-invariant. The result, as in the
previous contributions scrutinize infra, is that “preference and technology pa-
rameter estimates are not invariant with respect to policy changes” (Chang
et al., 2010, 1). The explanation of this vulnerability of DSGE models to
the Lucas Critique addresses the representative agent hypothesis, a core as-
sumption in current interpretation of Lucasian microfoundations. According
to the authors, the “aggregative function”, i.e. the way of aggregating indi-
vidual behaviors, is likely to be changing along changes in policy. Hence, the
microfoundational program built upon the representative agent hypothesis
is the reason of the observed instability: “We demonstrate that the repre-
sentative agent model that abstracts from cross-sectional heterogeneity can
potentially mislead fiscal policy predictions” (ibid., 28). Even if this result
could be interpreted as an argument in favor of “more” microfoundations,
the authors are quite in the line of the new Keynesian assessment of the Lu-
cas Critique, arguing, that the solution of more microfounded models with
heterogeneous agents is not “always possible” (ibid.).
25
“I will run a pseudo-real-time exercise, looking at the policy advice that a policymaker
from the 1970s would have derived from the estimation of the Smets-Wouters model,
and comparing that to the performance of an old-style Phillips Curve estimated using
ordinary least square (as a representation of a worst-case scenario for the technology
available to this hypothetical policymaker)” (Hurtado, 2014, 15).

25
Conclusion
This articles addressed the surprising disagreement within the “New Neo-
classical Synthesis” about the vulnerability of DSGE models to the Lucas
Critique. All the DSGE modelers involved in this debate claim that their
contributions are not a pledge for abandoning DSGE models, but rather an
encouragement to developing them: “We do not want our work to be inter-
preted as a sweeping criticism of the estimation of DSGE models, because
it is not. [...] We ourselves have been engaged in this research agenda and
plan to continue doing so.” (Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez, 2007,
34); “Trying to perfect DSGE models [...] should be a top priority for the
profession” (Hurtado, 2014, 20-21). However, when considered from our his-
torical perspective, such good intentions are not likely to be a sufficient basis
for actually solving the issue. Indeed, this article showed how the contem-
porary debate inherited from the rival interpretations of the methodological
prescription presented in Lucas (1976). These divergent interpretations bring
inevitably to two divergent solutions for building models for policy evalua-
tion: on the one hand, those following the theoretical interpretation of the
Critique put emphasis on developing “more” microfounded DSGE models; on
the other side, microfoundations of DSGE models will not be enough for those
endorsing the empirical interpretation of the Critique. DSGE models seem to
be, for the moment, stuck in the middle of these conflicting methodological
perspectives.

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