CHAPTER 4.

CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

A. When the law does not distinguish, Courts should not distinguish.

REPUBLIC vs. YAHON

G.R. No. 201043 | June 16, 2014

FACTS: Sgt Yahon was married to respondent. A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to protect the
respondent from further abuses. In the TPO, Sgt Yahon was ordered to provide reasonable financial
spousal support to the respondent. In his failure to appear before the court with a counsel and with an
answer to the charges against him, the court has granted PPO for the respondent against Sgt Yahon. It
was also reiterated that Sgt Yahon should provide for the financial spousal support to his wife from his
retirement benefits. However, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center contended that half of
the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon cannot be given to the respondent as it is from a military institution.
The petitioner contended that money due to government employees is not liable to the creditors of the
said employees in the process of garnishment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court to provide
for the financial spousal support of respondent.

RULING: No. Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its
coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or
government.

It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement
legislation. In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of
certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support.
As these provisions were designed "to avoid sovereign immunity problems" and provide that "moneys
payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings," the
law is clearly intended to "create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue
valid orders directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession."

PEOPLE vs. JUDGE EVANGELISTA

G.R. No. 110898 | February 20, 1996

FACTS: Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. He filed a
petition for probation. However, the chief probation and parole officer recommended denial of private
respondent's application for probation on the ground that appealing the sentence of the trial, he had
already waived his right to make his application for probation.

The Regional Trial Court set aside the probation officer’s recommendation and thus granted private
respondent's application for probation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent's
application for probation despite filed by the private respondent.

RULING: Yes. Since private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after
P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect, it is covered by the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that
"the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal," Having appealed from the
judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed
his conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between meritorious
appeals (like his appeal notwithstanding the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction) and
unmeritorious appeals. But the law does not make any distinction and so neither should the
Court.

B. Exceptions in the Statute

DE VILLA vs. CA
G.R. No. 87416 | April 8, 1991

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilio De Villa was charged with violation of BP. 22 (Bouncing Check Law) when the
accused unlawfully and feloniously drawn and issued a check to Roberto Lorayes. The check was issued
at the time the accused had no sufficient funds. At the time of presentment, the check was dishonored
due to insufficient funds and despite the receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay the
respondent, Lorayes, the amount of the check or to make arrangement for the payment of the check
within 5 banking days after the receipt of the (Check) Notice.

Petitioner moved to dismiss which was denied. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by
the respondent court due to lack of merit. Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,
provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made
payable and dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the
coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against current accounts in foreign
currency.

ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign check drawn against a foreign account is covered by BP. 22.

RULING: Yes. The check was executed and delivered by the petitioner to private respondent in Metro
Manila (Makati). However, petitioner contends and argues that the check drawn against a dollar account
of a Foreign bank is not covered by BP. 22.

But it will be noted that when the law does not make any exception, the court may not except
something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it. The Bouncing Checks Law does not
distinguish the currency to which the violation extended and thus, foreign check is covered by the
law.

C. Rule on General and Special Terms

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES vs. GIMENEZ

G.R. No. l-14787 | January 28, 1961

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Central Bank 3 applications for refund of the 17% special excise tax in
the total amount of ₱ 113,343.99, based on section 2 of R.A. 601 which provides that foreign exchange
used for the payment of cost, transportation and incidental charges to the importation of stabilizers and
flavors shall be refunded to any importer upon satisfactory proof of actual importations.

The auditor of the Central Bank refused to pass in audit its claim for refund on the theory that toothpaste
stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under sec. 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Foreign Exchange used by the petitioner in the importation of Dental Cream
Stabilizers and Flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, so
as to entitle it to a refund.

RULING: Yes. The ruling of the Auditor General is wrong because he applied the principle of statutory
construction that "general terms may be restricted by specific words" The rule should be used if all the
items in the enumeration pertain only to one specific class. In this case, fertilizers and poultry feed do not
belong to the category of food products.

The law must be seen in its entirety. The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by a particular recital does not require the rejection of general terms
entirely. Since the law does not distinguish between "Stabilizers and Flavors", the court is not
authorized to make any distinction when the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish.

D. Rule on Ejusdem Generis

REPUBLIC vs. MIGRINO

G.R. No. 89483 | August 30, 1980

FACTS: The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the PCGG recommended that private
respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA No. 3019, as
amended, and RA No. 1379,as amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. According to petitioners,
the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he is a
“subordinate” of former President Marcos. Respondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates
contemplated in Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that
of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary,
are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate
as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent acted as a "subordinate" of Pres. Marcos within the
contemplation of E.O. No. 1.

RULING: No. Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis which
provides that, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent
but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned. The term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who
enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate
family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy,
agent, or nominee in E.O. 2.

PEOPLE vs. ECHAVEZ

G.R. No. 89483 | August 30, 1990

FACTS: Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court against 16 persons charging them with squatting, as
penalized in PD No. 772. Respondent Echavez dismissed the case on the grounds that 1) the accused
entered the land through stealth and strategy and not with the use of force, intimidation, or threat or taking
advantage of the absence of the owner (as described in the Presidential Decree); and 2) under the rule of
ejusdem genernis, the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree 771 penalizes squatting and similar acts also apply to
agricultural lands.

RULING: No. The lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the
same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the
decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, not to pasture lands.
 ALTA VISTA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB vs. CITY OF CEBU
G.R. No. 180235 | January 20, 2016

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City enacted an ordinance which provided that there shall be
paid to the Office of the City Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees or operators of theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses and other similar places of entertainment, an amusement tax at the rate of 30%,
golf courses and polo grounds at the rate of 20%, of their gross receipts on entrance.

Petitioner steadfastly refused to pay the amusement tax arguing that under the Local Government Code,
amusement tax can only be imposed on operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, or places where
one seeks to entertain himself by seeing or viewing a show or performance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 42 of such Ordinance imposing amusement tax to golf course was proper.

RULING: No. "Amusement places," as defined in Section 131(c) of the Local Government Code, "include
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to
entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performance." A golf course cannot be considered a
place of amusement. As petitioner asserted, people do not enter a golf course to see or view a show or
performance.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned." The purpose of the rule on ejusdem
generis is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words
as indicating the class and the general words as including all that is embraced in said class,
although not specifically named by the particular words.

E. Express Mention & Implied Exclusion Rule

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS

G.R. No. 169435 | February 27, 2008

FACTS: The municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era was in a boundary dispute when the former claimed
the middle and isolated northern portions of the latter’s territory, pursuant to RA 3753 which created the
Marcos town in the Province of Ilocos Norte, contending that the law requires that the land area
of a municipality must be compact and contiguous. Nueva Era, on the other hand, argued that
its entire land area has always been an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural
community, and thus the land being claimed by Marcos must be protected and preserved as part of
Nueva Era. On March 2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte declared the disputed
portions as part of Nueva Era’s territory since none of Nueva Era’s barangays were mentioned to
comprise the municipality of Marcos in RA 3753.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos may validly claim a portion of Nueva Era as part of its eastern
boundary pursuant to its creation by virtue of RA 3753.

RULING: No. Marcos cannot claim a portion of Nueva Era’s territory pursuant to its creation by virtue
of RA 3753. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. Since only the barrios of Dingras are named
in RA 3753, the territory of Nueva Era is therefore excluded. Moreover, only Dingras is specifically
named by law as source territory of Marcos.

F. Rule on Associated Words

 DRA. BUENASEDA vs. SECRETARY FLAVIER
G.R. No. 106719 | September 21, 1993

FACTS: This is a petition seeking to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive
suspension of petitioners. The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative
complaint filed with the Ombudsman by the private respondents (NCMH Nurses Association) against the
petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Solicitor General, in his comment,
stated that (a) “The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct
power to suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government
official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; and said
conditions have not been met in the instant case”. In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to
preventively suspend petitioners, respondents invoke Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative
complaints filed against said officials and employees.

RULING: Yes. When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the
suspension" of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to "suspension," as a punitive
measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the
word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or
with which it is associated.

G. Rule on Use of Negative Words

FULE vs. CA
G.R. No. L-79094 | June 22, 1988

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of CA, which affirmed the judgment of
the RTC, convicting petitioner of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law) on the
basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial
conference in the Trial Court. P-A The averred that CA erred in convicting the petitioner of the offense
charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts
made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in convicting petitioner.

RULING: Yes. By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction,
negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
merely directory. The use of the term "shall" further emphasize its mandatory character and means that
it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. And more importantly, penal statutes
whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the
government and liberally in favor of the accused.

The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his
counsel, as mandatorily required, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

H. Rule Use of “May” and “Shall”

BERSABAL vs. JUDGE SALVADOR

G.R. No. L-35910 | July 21, 1978
FACTS: An ejectment case was filed and ruled against the petitioner. Thus, she decided to appeal the
case in the respondent’s court. The respondent court ordered the originating court to transmit a copy of
the stenographic notes within 15 days and the parties to file their respective memoranda within 30 days.
The petitioner filed a motion that her party would file their memorandum within 30 days upon receipt of the
stenographic notes. The respondent court granted the motion. However, the respondent court dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the petitioner failed to submit her memorandum within the period provided
by the respondent court. Petitioner argued that she had not yet received a copy of the stenographic notes.
Thus, she filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court can dismiss the case on the mere failure of the petitioner to
file her memorandum.

RULING: No. RA No. 296 states that the parties may submit memoranda if requested. With the use
of the word “may”, the party has an option not to submit the needed memorandum since the word
is not mandatory but rather, discretionary. However, the Court pointed out that the respondent court
should not dismiss the appeal due to the failure of the petitioner to submit a memorandum but dismiss the
petition based on facts available to it. Thus, the Court set aside the decision of the respondent court and
ordered it to decide the case base on the merits of the case.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. DE SAHAGUN

G.R. No. 167982 | August 13, 2008

FACTS: Respondent Raidis Bassig submitted a Memorandum to then Intramuros Administrator Edda
Henson recommending that Brand Asia, Ltd. be commissioned to produce a video documentary for a
television program. A contract of service was executed. Henson was dismissed from the service by the
Office of the President upon recommendation of the PGAC which found that the contracts were entered
into without the required public bidding and in violation of R.A. No. 3019.

However, then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo disapproved the recommendation. He held that there was
substantial evidence to hold respondents administratively liable since the contracts awarded to Brand
Asia, Ltd. failed to go through the required procedure for public bidding under Executive Order No. 301.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 prohibits administrative investigations in cases
filed more than one year after commission,

RULING: No. The use of the word "may" clearly show that it is directory in nature and not
mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to
confer discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or
not to conduct an investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is not barred by
prescription.

I. Rule on Use of “Must”

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION vs. CA

G.R. No. 117188 | August 7, 1997

FACTS: Petitioner tried to register its By-Laws in 1988, but they failed to do so. They then discovered that
there were two other homeowners' organizations within the subdivision. Upon inquiry, it was discovered
that LGVHAI was dissolved for its failure to submit its by-laws within the period required by the
Corporation Code and for its non-user of corporate charter because HIGC had not received any report on
the association's activities.
Petitioner contended that LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of
the Corporation Code effectively automatically dissolved the corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of
the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.

RULING: No. The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this
case states:

Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. - Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1) month after
receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, adopt a code of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code.

Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imposition of duty which must be enforced. However, the
word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be consistent with an
exercise of discretion. If the language of a statute, considered as a whole with due regard to its
nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended to use the words "shall" and "must" to be
directory, they should be given that meaning.

J. Rule on Use of “And” and “Or”

ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION INC vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 172409 | February 4, 2008

FACTS: A complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims was filed against Roos before the NLRC. Jose
Martillos alledged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic in 1988 but was not made to sign any
employment contract by Roos. Roos contended that Martillos had been hired on several occasions as a
project employee and that his employment was coterminous with the duration of the projects.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Martillos. Roos filed an appeal however instead of posting the required
cash or surety bond within the reglementary period, Roos filed a motion for extension of time to
submit/post surety bond. The 2nd Division of the NLRC dismissed Roos’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction
stating that the bond is an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer and that
the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
mandatory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the appeal bond is substantial compliance with the NLRC rules.

RULING: No. The Court denies the petition. The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal
from the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed perfected upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond within ten (10) days from such decision.

It is well to recall too our pronouncement in Senarillos v. Hermosisima, etal.34 that the judicial
interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the
Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law
carried into effect.

K. Rule on Computation of Time

PNB vs. CA
G.R. No. 98382 | May 17, 1993

FACTS: To secure payments of his loans, private respondent mortgages two lots to petitioner bank. For
failure to pay the obligation, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the
highest bidder at the auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of
Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party.

The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12,
1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. The date March 28, 1969, falls on a Friday, while the dates
April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the
notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice
of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.

RULING: No. It must be conceded that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is
“week”. In Concepcion v. Andueta, the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time
consisting of seven consecutive days. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the
legal requirement of publication.

L. Function of Proviso

ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 109902 | August 2, 1994

FACTS: Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed
separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the
NLRC. The Labor Arbiter declared petitioners “regular project employees who shall continue their
employment as such for as long as such [project] activity exists”. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter’s
decision. It set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack
of legal and factual basis.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are considered “regular employees” as opposed to being only “project
employees” of National Steel Corporation.

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the proviso in the second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor
Code relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who fall within the definition
of said Article’s first paragraph, i.e. project employees. The familiar grammatical rule is that a
proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to
which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof, unless the clear legislative intent is to
restrict or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier
provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole. No such intent is observable in
Article 280 of the Labor Code, which has been quoted earlier.

CHAPTER 5. PRESUMPTIONS IN AID OF CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

A. Presumptions in General

B. Presumption Against Unconstitutionality

ARIS vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 90501 | August 5, 1991

FACTS: Private respondents protested the management's prolonged silence and lack of action on their
concerns. The management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents who had been
identified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most active participants in the rally, requiring them to
explain why they should not be fired for their behavior. Regardless of their explanation, private
respondents were fired for violating company rules and regulations, specifically those concerning security
and public order, as well as inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions .Private
respondents wasted no time in filing a complaint against petitioner with the NLRC of NCR for illegal
dismissal.

The petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715's amendment to
Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as amended), which permits execution of
reinstatement decisions made by labor arbitrators while an appeal is pending, and Section 2 of the NLRC
Interim Rules on Appeals under R.A. Implementing the same is No. 6715.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provision under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 is constitutional.

RULING: Yes. There is no fundamental, natural, or constitutional entitlement to the right to appeal.
It is a statutory privilege with statutory roots, making it only available when authorized or
stipulated by law. The law may then legitimately give restrictions, exclusions, or remedies to the
party that prevails in the occurrence. In Prior to R.A.'s Section 12 modification, No. 6716, Article
223 of the Labor Code, already permitted execution of NLRC judgements while an appeal was
ongoing with the Secretary of Labor and Employment. These clauses encapsulate the ambitions
of the workingman for acknowledgement of his contribution to the nation's social and economic
life, for the defense of his rights, and for the advancement of his welfare. Therefore, it is utterly
unfounded to claim that the challenged statute and its implementing rule are unconstitutional.

LIM vs. PACQUING

G.R. No. 115044 | January 27, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games
and Amusements Board to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to withdraw
such grant of authority, to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of
Manila, until the question of constitutionality of P.D. 771 is resolved.

ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 771 is constitutional.

RULING: No. There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree
revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. ADC
cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected
by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled out when all
jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged
violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty
920) years ago.

LIM vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 149276 | September 27, 2002

FACTS: Petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks. Check no. 464728 was
dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds. When petitioners reneged
on their promise to cover the amount of said check, the private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit
before charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa. The City Prosecutor issued a resolution
finding probable cause against petitioners and recommending the filing of an information for estafa with
no bail recommended.

Petitioners argue that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and imposition of
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. 818 s constitutional.

RULING: Yes. Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by
a laudable purpose, namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s
commercial & economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing
bouncing checks.

Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its
constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of a law
rests on those who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing
proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.

C. Presumption Against Injustice

SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 94723 | August 21, 1997

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING: