2022 Last Minute Tips in Political Law

2022 LAST MINUTE TIPS IN POLITICAL LAW
By: Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
Q. Can the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendments to

the 1987 Constitution be held simultaneously with the next Barangay
elections in December 2023?
ANSWER: NO.
There is not enough time to sufficiently inform the general public of the proposed
amendments. This will violate the doctrine of fair and proper submission to the
people of proposed constitutional amendments.
In the case of Tolentino vs. Comelec (41 SCRA 702, 729) the Supreme Court held
that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time,
but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as
well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole."
There must be fair submission and intelligent consent or rejection. The people
must be "sufficiently informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine
manner."
Q. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted a law postponing the

local and national elections to some other date. Is this law constitutional?
Explain.
ANSWER: NO. The term of office of local and national officials like Senators and
members of congress is fixed by the 1987 Constitution, as follows:
(i) Senators, with a term of six years beginning at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following the day of the election, unless otherwise provided by law, eligible for
two consecutive reelections (Art. VI, Section 4);
(ii) Members of the House of Representatives, with a term of three years beginning
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election, unless
otherwise provided by law, eligible for two consecutive reelections (Art. VI, Section
7); and
(iii) Local officials, except barangay officials, with a term of three years, for a
maximum of three consecutive terms (Art. X, Section 8).
2022 Last Minute Tips in Political Law by Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 1|
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Congress cannot pass a law that will amend the Constitution. If a public office is
created by the Constitution with a fixed term, or if the term of a public office
created by Congress is fixed by the Constitution, Congress is devoid of any power to
change the term of that office. Thus, statutes which extend the term of an elective
office as fixed in the Constitution — either by postponing elections, changing the
date of commencement of term of the successor, or authorizing the incumbent to
remain in office until his successor is elected and qualified — are unconstitutional.
[Kida v. Senate, October 18, 2011]
Q. President Marcos signed into law Republic Act No. 11935 on October 12,
2022 moving the December 2022 barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
elections to the last Monday of October 2023. Can Congress legally extend the
term of elected barangay officials? Is RA No. 11935 constitutional? Explain.
ANSWER: Yes. The term of office of barangay officials is not fixed in the 1987
Constitution and is subject to a law to be enacted by Congress, to wit: “Local
officials, except barangay officials, with a term of three years, for a maximum of
three consecutive terms (Art. X, Section 8).
Congress previously enacted RA 11462 in 2019, to postpone the barangay elections.

Congress can again pass another law to postpone it further.
BILL OF RIGHTS
Q. The Philippine government placed the Greater Manila area (NCR+)

under ALERT LEVEL 3 in a bid to stop the skyrocketing cases of COVID-19.
UNVACCINATED PERSONS are not allowed to enter public places including
malls and public transport. Several businesses (like restaurants, bars, hotels,
and salons) are adopting their own measures of protection by requiring only
those fully vaccinated persons to enter their establishments and avail of their
services. Is there a violation of the equal protection clause? Explain.
A: There is NO Violation. This is “fair discrimination.” It is a valid exercise of

police power — lawful ends through lawful means. Here, the reason for the policy is
to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and protect the health and safety of Filipinos,
particularly the UNVACCINATED.
The means employed are also reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Restricting movements of
unvaccinated people will prevent the virus from spreading because it needs living
hosts to survive. If the mobility of unvaccinated people is regulated, then the virus
will have no hosts to infiltrate, and its spread can be contained.
Q. The Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) issued a

Resolution No. 9-2020 which imposed a ban on the deployment of Filipino
health workers to several destination countries in response to the growing
need for health workers here and abroad due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Some health workers argue that this POEA Resolution is a violation of their
right to travel. Are they correct? Explain.
A: The right to travel is not absolute. It may be restrained or burdened, through

the exercise of police power, to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the State. The temporary travel ban is consistent with the State's exercise of the
police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, safety, and general
welfare of the people. Public interest demands State interference on health matters,
since the welfare of migrant workers is a legitimate public concern. [AMCOW v.
GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, G.R. No. 207132. December 6,
2016.]
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.

Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion
of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's
constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local
or overseas. [Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) v. Drilon, 163
SCRA 386, 392 (1988)]
Q. Can a warrantless arrest be enforced for an offense penalized by a fine

only (like not wearing a helmet while driving a motorcycle)?
Answer: NO. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be
stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense. [Luz v. People, February 29, 2012]
Q: When a person is questioned by the police or MMDA enforcer for a

traffic violation on the roadside, is this considered as custodial investigation?
A: NO. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumpti

vely temporary and brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few
minutes. A motorist's expectations, when he sees a policeman's light flashing behind
him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions
and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then
be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on
his way. In this respect, the questioning as an incident to an ordinary traffic stop is
quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and
in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides
his interrogators the answers they seek.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the
motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. Since the motorist is only
subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not
at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of
his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as
the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. [Luz v. People, February 29, 2012]
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Q. An ordinance established a No Contact Apprehension Policy (NCAP)
whereby no physical arrest is made for traffic violations. Instead, closed
circuit-tv (CCTV) cameras were installed along intersections to take videos
and pictures of traffic violators (like those running a red light). The citation
with pictures of the traffic violation and a link to the video is sent to the
registered owner of the motor vehicle who is then asked to pay the fine no
matter who was driving. Recipients of citations can contest the charge by
showing that the car or its plates had been stolen, or the vehicle has already
been sold; but they may not defend by showing that someone else was driving.
The ordinance was challenged by transport groups and auto owners who say
that they have been fined even though someone else was driving their cars at
the time. They maintain that the NCAP Ordinance violates the equal
protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. Is the Ordinance
constitutional?
Answer: YES. There is no violation of the equal protection clause because the
ordinance applies to all traffic violators. There is also no violation of procedural due
process because the motorists are sufficiently informed as to the time, and nature of
the violation to help them contest or object thereto.
Petitioners cannot also argue that vicarious liability offends the substantive
component of the due process clause. Substantive due process depends on the
existence of a fundamental liberty interest, and no one has a fundamental right to
run a red light or avoid being seen by a camera on a public street. The interest at
stake is a fine for a traffic infraction, and the Supreme Court has never held that a
property interest so modest is a fundamental right.
The rationale for imposing liability for traffic violations on registered owners is to
stimulate joint responsibility upon both vehicle owners and drivers in maintaining
road safety. Due to this joint responsibility, vehicle owners are compelled to engage
only responsible drivers, to provide drivers with the necessary training and
oversight to comply with traffic rules and regulations, and to assist the government
in disciplining reckless drivers.
The Civil Code of the Philippines holds registered vehicle owners liable for the fault
or negligence of their drivers under the principles of vicarious liability, employer-
employee relationship, and respondeat superior. In fact, liability is imposed on the
owner of a vehicle under certain conditions, even though he was not in the vehicle
at the time of the negligence or was not actually driving the car himself (Article
2184, Civil Code).
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the
public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner. [Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Reynaldo Cuevas and
Junnel Cuevas (G.R. No. 143360, 5 September 2002)]
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Q. Congress enacted RA 10586 or the Anti-DUI Law which punishes drunk-
driving and authorizes police authorities to compel any driver to take a
"breathalyzer test", wherein the driver exhales several times into a device
which can determine whether he has been driving under the influence of
alcohol. The results of the test can be used, in any legal proceeding against
him. Furthermore, declaring that the issuance of a driver's license gives rise
only to a privilege to drive motor vehicles on public roads, the new law
provides that a driver who refuses to take the test shall be automatically
subject to a 90-day suspension of his driver's license, pending a post-
suspension hearing. Billy was arrested under the said law. He challenges the
constitutionality of the law on the ground that it violates his right to due
process and against self-incrimination. Resolve the objections and explain
whether the law is constitutional.
A: The law is constitutional. Requiring a driver to take a BREATHALYZER TEST

does not violate his right against self-incrimination, because he is not being
compelled to give testimonial evidence. He is merely being asked to submit to a
physical test. This is not covered by the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination. Thus, in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, it was held for this
reason that requiring a driver to take a blood-alcohol test is valid. As held in Mackey
v. Afontrya (443 U.S. 1), because of compelling government interest in safety along
the streets, the license of a driver who refuses to take the breathalyzer test may be
suspended immediately pending a post suspension hearing. The provision for a
post-suspension hearing, ensures that there is no denial of due process.
Q: Denmark S. Valmores is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist

Church, whose fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the
Sabbath as a sacred day. As such, he refrains from non-religious undertakings
from sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday. Prior to the instant controversy,
Valmores was enrolled as a first-year student at the MSU-College of Medicine.
However, in one instance, petitioner Valmores was unable to take his Histo-
Pathology laboratory examination. Despite his request for exemption, no
accommodation was given. As a result, Valmores received a failing grade of 5.
Valmores seeks to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum. Notwithstanding the
lapse of several months, no written or formal response was ever given by
Achacoso. He then brings his cause before the Court and prayed for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus against Achacoso. Will the petition prosper??
A: YES. The enforcement of the 2010 CHED Memorandum is compellable by

writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty by a tribunal, board, officer, or person. A plain reading of the
memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty imposed upon HEIs. Its
policy is crystal clear: a student's religious obligations take precedence over his
academic responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional guarantee of free
exercise and enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED imposed a
positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from
academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious obligations.
Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, HEIs do not possess absolute
discretion to grant or deny requests for exemption of affected students.
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Instead, the memorandum only imposes minimum standards should HEIs decide to
require remedial work. (Denmark S. Valmores v. Dr. Cristina Achacoso and Dr.
Giovanni Cabildo, G.R. No. 217453, 19 July 2017, J. Caguioa)
Q. Lee and Ilagan were common law partners. They had bitter arguments that
later turned into ugly scenes and violent quarrels. Ilagan, who was a big man
but very emotional and physically aggressive, would often hit and slap the
hapless female Lee. Thus, Lee filed a criminal case against Ilagan for
violation of RA 9262. Lee used as part of her evidence a sex video of Ilagan
with another woman, which she found in the memory card of their digital
camera. Lee reproduced the video for the purpose of using it as evidence in
other cases she intends to file against Ilagan. In turn, Ilagan applied for a
Writ of Habeas Data in the RTC to compel Lee to return the memory card and
enjoin her from reproducing and distributing the sex video. Should the writ be
issued?
ANSWER: No. Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in
life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction
and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video.
While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video — which he
fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for
public consumption — he failed to explain the connection between such interest
and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot
speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus
between one's privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial
in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a
habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case. [Lee v. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59
(2014)]
Q: An officer on duty received a call from a concerned citizen, who

informed them that one male individual would be transpiring marijuana from
Kalinga into Isabela. Their hotline received a text message, stating that the
subject male person was wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red
ball cap, and was carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with
plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. A joint checkpoint was
organized.
The passenger jeepney arrived; the police officers flagged it down. The officers
approached the jeepney and saw Mr. S. They asked him if he was the owner of
the blue sack in front of him, which he answered in the affirmative. Said
officers then requested for him to open it. Upon complying, they saw 4 bricks
of suspected dried marijuana leaves. Mr. S was arrested. The laboratory
examination later revealed that it was indeed marijuana, a dangerous drug.
Mr. S was then charged with a violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165. Was there a
valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle?
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A: NO. Peace officers in warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles, are
limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual
inspection.” Extensive search of a vehicle is permissible only when "the officers
made it upon probable cause.”
In this case, the singular circumstance that engendered probable cause on the part
of the police officers was the information received through the RPSB Hotline from
an anonymous person. This does not suffice to create probable cause that enables
the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive search without a search
warrant.
In situations involving warrantless searches and seizures, "law enforcers cannot act
solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no
matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the
absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion. (People of the
Philippines v. Jerry Sapla, G.R. No. 244045, 16 June 2020, J. Caguioa)
Q: If the government expropriates a private land and does not pay just
compensation, can the landowner file an action to recover the property?
A: YES. In cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five
(5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This
is in consonance with the principle that "the government cannot keep the property
and dishonor the judgment." [Republic v. Lim, 462 SCRA 265 (2005)]
Q: If the government BUYS a private land and later abandons the project or
fails to implement the purpose of the project, can the landowner file an action
to recover the property?
A: NO. In expropriation, the Republic's acquisition of the expropriated property is

subject to the condition that the Republic will return the property should the public
purpose for which the expropriation was done did not materialize. On the other
hand, a sale contract between the Republic and private persons is not subject
to this same condition unless the parties stipulate it.
Hence, the parties are bound by their sale contract transferring the property
without the condition applicable in expropriation cases. [Republic v. Roque, Jr.,
805 SCRA 524 (2016)]
Q: The National Power Corporation dug underground tunnels underneath a

private property without the knowledge and consent of the landowners, who
continue to use and occupy the surface of the property. Is this considered
expropriation? Are the landowners entitled to just compensation?
A: YES. The underground tunnels impose limitations on the landowners’ use of the
property for an indefinite period and deprive them of its ordinary use. This is
expropriation. Thus, the landowners are entitled to the payment of just
compensation.
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Notwithstanding the fact that the NPC only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is
liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land.
This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the
owners of its normal beneficial use. [National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, 526
SCRA 149 (2007)].
Q. NGCP is a private corporation engaged in the business of transmitting

electric power from generating plants of power producers to distributors. In
order for it to construct and maintain the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV
Transmission Line Project, it sought to expropriate a part of the
Petrochemical Industrial Park pursuant to its general authority to exercise
the right of eminent domain under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511. But the subject
property is still owned by the government. Can the subject property be
expropriated? Explain.
A: Yes. The mere fact that a parcel of land is owned by the State or any of its
instrumentalities does not necessarily mean that such land is of public dominion
and not private property. If land owned by the State is considered patrimonial
property, then such land assumes the nature of private property.
When the subject property was classified by the government as an industrial zone, it
had been declared patrimonial. With the subject property expressly declared by law
to be an industrial and commercial estate that may be transferred or conveyed to
private persons so that business activities may be conducted therein, there is no
doubt that the subject property is patrimonial property. Thus, NGCP has the
authority to expropriate the subject property. [PNOC v. NGCP, G.R. No. 224936,
September 04, 2019, J. Caguioa]
Q: What is meant by inverse condemnation?
A: While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property
in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse
condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without
such formal proceedings.
Inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. [National Power
Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, 656 SCRA 60 (2011)].
Q. Six (6) department heads of the provincial government of Ilocos Norte

appeared before the House Blue Ribbon Committee as resource persons in the
investigation being conducted by the said committee with regard to the
alleged mis-use of the excise taxes collected from Tobacco companies in the
province.
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These resource persons (Ilocos 6) were cited in contempt and ordered
detained because they refused to provide answers to the questions of the
lawmakers (since most of them said they could no longer remember the facts).
These resource persons (Ilocos 6) then applied for a Writ of Amparo to protect
them from alleged actual and threatened violations of their rights to liberty
and security of person. Should the Writ of Amparo be issued?
A: NO. The privilege of the writ of Amparo is a remedy available ONLY to

victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar
nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private individual.
The writ of Amparo is designed to protect and guarantee the (1) right to life; (2)
right to liberty; and (3) right to security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of life. Petitioners thus failed to establish that their attendance at
and participation in the legislative inquiry as resource persons have seriously
violated their right to liberty and security, for which no other legal recourse or
remedy is available. Perforce, the petition for the issuance of a writ of Amparo must
be dismissed. [Agcaoli v. Hon. Rodolfo Farinas, GR No. 232395, July 3, 2017]
Q: Can a detained person apply for bail even before charges against him
are filed in court?
Answer: Yes. The rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him. (Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003)
The right to bail is available from the very moment of arrest (which may be before
or after the filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final
judgment (which means after appeal). No charge need be filed formally before one
can file for bail, so long as one is under arrest or detention. (Heras Teehankee v.
Rovira, G.R. No. L-101, Dec. 20, 1945)
Q: Is perpetual disqualification to hold any public office a cruel, unusual

and inhumane punishment?
A: NO. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally

aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect
of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment
regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the
whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel,
disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient
basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone,
make it cruel and inhuman. (Maturan v. COMELEC, March 28, 2017]
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
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Q. Can Congress pass a law abolishing the Court of Appeals?
A: While the law creating the Court of Appeals can be amended or repealed by
Congress, it cannot remove or shorten the tenure of incumbent Justices of the Court
of Appeals or transfer its workload and duties to the Supreme Court or any other
court without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may not be reduced by Congress. Neither
may it be increased without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.
[Section 30, Article VI, 1987 Constitution]
Justices may not be removed until they reach the age 70 except through
impeachment (for Supreme Court Justices) or administrative proceedings (for all
other Justices of appellate courts). All courts and court personnel are under the
administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The President may not appoint
any Judge or Justices unless he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar
Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court's supervision. Their salaries may
not be decreased during their continuance in office. They cannot be designated to
any agency performing administrative or quasi-judicial functions. The judiciary is
specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only independent of, but also
co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article
VIII, 1987 Constitution); [Bengzon vs. Drilon, (G.R. No. 103524) and In Re
Request of Retired Justices (A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA) jointly decided on April 15,
1992]
Q. Can Congress issue a subpoena to compel attendance of Justices of the

Court of Appeals in its investigation in-aid of legislation, and cite them in
contempt should they refuse to appear?
A: NO. Congressional powers cannot be used to deprive the Supreme Court of

its Constitutional duty to supervise judges of lower courts in the performance of
their official duties. The fact remains that the CA Justices are non-impeachable
officers. As such, authority over them primarily belongs to the Supreme Court and
to no other.
The principle of separation of powers also serves as one of the basic postulates for
exempting the Justices, officials and employees of the Judiciary and for excluding
the Judiciary's privileged and confidential documents and information from any
compulsory processes which very well includes the Congress' power of inquiry in aid
of legislation. Such exemption has been jurisprudentially referred to as judicial
privilege as implied from the exercise of judicial power expressly vested in one
Supreme Court and lower courts created by law. [Agcaoli v. Hon. Rodolfo Farinas,
GR No. 232395, July 3, 2017]
Q. Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed a petition with the Supreme Court to

compel the House of Representatives to reorganize the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on the ground that it currently
has no member coming from the party-list representatives in the House.
Should the petition be dismissed or granted? Explain.
2022 Last Minute Tips in Political Law by Atty. Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr. 10 |
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A: The petition should be dismissed. Even assuming that party-list
representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common
nominees to the HRET, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with the Supreme Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article
VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the House that
they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET.
Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on
proportional representation of political parties in the HRET can the party-list
representatives seek recourse to the Supreme Court under its power of judicial
review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is
necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently,
petitioners’ direct recourse to the Supreme Court is premature.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not
absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may
not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated duty,
absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, ‘the doctrine of separation of powers
calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees
fit. Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA.
[Pimentel v. HRET, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002]
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Q: Sen. de Lima delivered a privilege speech on the floor of the Senate calling
a stop to the alleged extrajudicial killings committed in the course of the
crackdown on drugs, and urging her colleagues in the Senate to conduct
investigations of the alleged victims.
In response, President Duterte issued a number of public statements against

Sen. De Lima, including denunciations of her corruption and immorality. The
statements prompted her to initiate a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against President Duterte. May the incumbent President be haled
to court even for the limited purpose under the Rules on the Writ of Habeas
Data?
A: NO. Sen. De Lima argues that the rationale for Presidential immunity does not
apply in her case because the proceedings for the writ of habeas data do not involve
the determination of administrative, civil, or criminal liabilities. Again, we remind
that immunity does not hinge on the nature of the suit. In short, presidential
immunity is not intended to immunize the President from liability or
accountability.
The rationale for the grant of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that aside
from requiring all the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
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Further, a suit will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head
of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance, or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this
does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other
official, he remains accountable to the people, but he may be removed from office
only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. (De Lima vs.
Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, 15 Oct. 2019)
Q. The Rome Statute is the Treaty which established the International

Criminal Court. This was ratified by former President Noynoy Aquino and
concurred in by the Senate. Can the President, on his own, withdraw the
Philippines from the International Criminal Court and terminate our
country’s accession to this treaty? Explain.
A: NO. The president, as primary architect of foreign policy, negotiates and

enters into international agreements. However, the president's power is not
absolute, but is checked by the Constitution, which requires Senate concurrence.
Treaty-making is a power lodged in the executive, and is balanced by the legislative
branch. The textual configuration of the Constitution hearkens both to the basic
separation of powers and to a system of checks and balances. Presidential discretion
is recognized, but it is not _absolute. While no constitutional mechanism exists on
how the Philippines withdraws from, an international agreement, the president's
unbridled discretion vis-a-vis treaty abrogation may run counter to the basic
prudence underlying the entire system of entry into and domestic operation of
treaties.
When a treaty was entered into upon Congress's express will, the president may not
unilaterally abrogate that treaty. In such an instance, the president who signed the
treaty simply implemented the law enacted by Congress. While the president
performed_- his or her function as primary architect of international policy, it was
in keeping with a statute. The president had no sole authority, and the treaty
negotiations were premised not only upon his or her own diplomatic powers, but on
the specific investiture made by Congress. This means that the president negotiated
not entirely out of his or her own volition, but with the express mandate of
Congress, and more important, within the parameters that Congress has set.
In sum, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled
authority to withdraw from treaties or international agreements. Any such
withdrawal must be anchored on a determination that they run afoul of the
Constitution or a statute. Any such determination must have clear and definite
basis; any wanton, arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by
judicial review. [Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021]
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Q. In case the President and the Vice President both die simultaneously ---
who shall become acting President? How will the vacancy in their positions be
filled-up? Explain.
A: The Senate President shall be acting President.
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from

office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President
to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-
President shall have been elected and qualified.
The vacancy shall be filled up, as follows:
a. Congress shall convene 3 days after the vacancy in the office of both the
President and the VP, without need of a call. The convening of Congress cannot be
suspended.
b. Within 7 days after convening, Congress shall enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a VP. The special election cannot be postponed.
c. The special election shall be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60
days from the time of the enactment of the law.
d. The 3 readings for the special law need not be held on separate days.
e. The law shall be deemed enacted upon its approval on third reading.
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the
date of the next presidential election. In which case, the Senate President shall be
acting President until a new President is elected and qualified.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Q. The JBC has adopted an unwritten policy that First Level Court judges
must first earn 5 years of service before they are considered for promotion to
the RTC or higher courts. Is this unwritten policy required to be published to
be valid?
A: YES. The assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules
and regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy
involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven
competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it
would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Thus, it is but
a natural consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the
requirements to the judicial positions, so that they can comply. (Judge Ferdinand
Villanueva vs. the JBC, G.R. No. 211833, 07 April 2015)
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Q. Does the 5-year service policy for First Level Judges violate the equal
protection clause?
A: NO. Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing

recommended appointees does not constitute a violation of the equal protection
clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of years of service to
screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of years of
service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be
measured by experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment between
lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have served
less than five years, is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions. (Judge
Ferdinand Villanueva vs. the JBC, G.R. No. 211833, 07 April 2015)
Q. Using a clustering system, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five
to seven nominees each, for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. However,
President Aquino disregarded the clustering system and instead chose
nominees at random from all the clusters.
This was assailed by several petitioners who insist that President Aquino
could only choose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists
submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy, and no other; and any
appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a violation of the
Constitution. Is the clustering system of nominees adopted by the JBC
Constitutional? Explain.
ANSWER: NO. The clustering system of nominees is unconstitutional as it

impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the
chances for appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's
option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster; and
(2) once the President has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed from
considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. The said
limitations are utterly without legal basis and in contravention of the President's
appointing power.
The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the
President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom
he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount.
As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid. The President was not obliged to appoint one new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the
JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached
on the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom
the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice. [HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, ET AL. v. PRES. BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III, ET AL. G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017]
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Q. Does a supervening termination of a Build- Operate-Transfer Agreement
makes an instant petition which seeks to nullify the same moot and
academic?
A. YES. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners has been mooted by the termination of the BOT
Agreement of private respondents. A case or issue is considered moot and academic
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a
petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose
or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be
enforced. (Cervantes v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210805, 11 May 2021)
IX. NATIONAL PATRIMONY
Q: Does the Constitution prohibit service contracts or joint explorations of

our natural resources with foreign nationals or companies?
A: NO. But Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that such service
contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which
are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that
will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to
attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly
before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been
vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can
withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to
Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any. [Resident Marine Mammals of
the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes, 756 SCRA 513 (2015)]
Q. An alien or foreigner husband of a Filipina bought with his capital

funds a parcel of land in Boracay and also paid for the construction of a house
thereon. This property was registered under the name of the Filipina. Can the
alien husband claim any right of ownership over the said house and lot?
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A: NO. Being an alien, he is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private
and public lands in the Philippines. The Filipina wife acquired sole ownership of
both house and lot. This is true even if the alien husband provided the funds for
such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no
implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. He could not even claim ownership
over the house because it would countenance indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would
then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have. [Taina Manigque-Stone v. Cattleya
Land, September 5, 2016]
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
Q. What is the rule on conflict of interest for public officer?
A: Section 6 of the Code of Conduct of Public Officials states that “a public

official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times.”
The law adds: “When a conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in
any private business enterprise within thirty (30) days from his assumption of office
and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty (60) days from
such assumption.”
The law explicitly states that when a conflict of interest arises, an official has 60 days
to resign and/or divest his shares from the time he assumed office. Divestment is
mandatory if the official is a substantial stockholder “even if he has resigned from
his position.”
Q: Can active members of the AFP be designated or detailed to civilian

positions in the Bureau of Customs?
Answer: NO. Section 5(4), Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution states:
“No member of the AFP in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the government including
GOCC’s.” See also Executive Order 371 (September 28, 1989)
Q. Sec. 10, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman and
his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members, respectively, of
the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary,
which shall not be decreased during their term of office. Does this mean that
the Ombudsman and his deputies shall also have the same term of office like
all constitutional commissions, such that the successor to the positions of the
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Ombudsman and deputies should serve only the unexpired term of the
predecessor?
ANSWER: NO. It is only as to the rank and salary that the Ombudsman and
the deputies shall be the same with the chairman and members, respectively, of the
constitutional commissions. Harmonizing Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution
with Sec. 8 (3) of R.A. No. 6770, in any vacancy for the positions of Ombudsman and
the deputies, whether as a result of the expiration of the term or death, resignation,
removal, or permanent disability of the predecessor, the successor shall always be
appointed for a full term of seven years.
Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the

seven-year term of office of the first appointees for Ombudsman and the deputies is
not reckoned from 2 February 1987, but shall be reckoned from their date of
appointment. Accordingly, the present Ombudsman and deputies shall serve a full
term of seven years from their date of appointment unless their term is cut short by
death, resignation, removal, or permanent disability. [Ifurung v. Ombudsman, GR
No. 232131, April 24, 2018]
Q: What is the Doctrine of Administrative Condonation? Is this still

applicable?
A: The rule that public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefore. Note that this has no application to pending criminal
cases. (Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, Aug. 21, 1992). This Doctrine was already
abandoned by the Supreme Court in the case of Mayor Junjun Binay. But the effect
is prospective. [Carpio-Morales, vs. CA, November 10, 2015]
NOTE: The abandonment of the doctrine of condonation is prospective in

application, hence, the same doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired prior
to the ruling of the SC in Carpio-Morales v. CA and Binay Jr. on November 10, 2015.
The most important consideration in the doctrine of condonation is the fact that
the misconduct was done on a prior term and that the subject public official was
eventually re-elected by the same body politic. It is inconsequential whether the
said re-election be on another public office or on an election year that is not
immediately succeeding the last, as long as the electorate that re-elected the public
official be the same. [OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v MAYOR JULIUS CESAR
VERGARA G.R. No. 216871. December 6, 2017]
Q: Can the period of preventive suspension be credited to the imposed penalty

of suspension?
A: It depends on whether it is pending investigation or pending appeal.
Preventive suspension pending investigation is merely a preventive measure, a

preliminary step in an administrative investigation. It is not a penalty. Thus, the
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period within which one is under preventive suspension pending investigation is
not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension—service of the preventive
suspension cannot be credited as service of the penalty. [QUIMBO v. GERACIO
G.R. No. 155620, 9 August 2005]
Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually part of the service of the penalty.
Thus, the period when an employee was preventively suspended pending appeal
shall be credited to form part of the penalty of suspension imposed. Such
preventive suspension is punitive in nature and the period of suspension becomes
part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. [Yamson v. Castro, July 20,
2016]
Q: Will the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal stay the

execution of a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case?
A: No. Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases do

not stay the execution of the penalty imposed. This is pursuant to Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman which explicitly states that an appeal
shall not stop the decision from being executor. No vested right is violated because
pending appeal the appellant is considered as preventively suspended and will be
paid backwages in case he wins in his appeal. (Facura, et al., v. CA, GR No. 166495,
Feb. 16, 2011)
Q: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an

interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule?
A: No. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because

the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from
exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.
The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of a
permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.
Term limitation is triggered after an elective official has served his three terms in
office without any break. Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary
incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term
limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a

suspension as a penalty, may prevent an office holder from exercising the
functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive
suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time
within a term. All these instances will not interrupt the term for purposes of
applying the 3-term limit rule. (Aldovino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836, 23
December 2009)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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Q: Do review centers for professional licensure examinations enjoy
academic freedom?
A: NO. Under Article XIV Section 5(2), academic freedom shall be enjoyed in
all institutions of higher learning. A review center is not an institution of higher
learning. It does not offer a degree-granting program. A review course is only
intended to “refresh and enhance the knowledge of competencies and skills of
reviewees.” (Review Centers Association v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180046, April 2,
2009).
Q. Is the right to counsel available in administrative proceedings?

A: NO. There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution stating that a party in a non-
litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel. The assistance of a
lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable. A party in an administrative inquiry
may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and
of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Hence, the administrative body
is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is
not an absolute requirement. [First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff Cudia vs. The
Superintendent of the PMA, G.R. No. 211362, 25 February 2015.]
Q. Is the right against self-incrimination available in administrative

proceedings?
A: Yes. In the case of Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1064, the Supreme Court
held that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth may result in the
forfeiture of property, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness
stand without encroaching on his right against self-incrimination. In the case of
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345, the same rule was followed
since the proceedings could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice
medicine.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Q. Are the voters of a city which used to be a component city of a province

entitled to vote in a plebiscite for the division of said province, even after the
city has been converted into a highly urbanized city (HUC)?
A: A: NO. HUCs, as conceptualized in our local government laws, are essentially

cities that have attained a level of population growth and economic development
which the legislature has deemed sufficient for devolution of governmental powers
as self-contained political units. As such, these cities are intended to function as
first-level political and administrative subdivisions in their own right, on par with
provinces. For this reason, Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides that
“cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, x x x shall be independent of
the province.”
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This constitutionally mandated independence from provincial units is explicitly
declared in Section 29 of the Local Government Code and manifests itself
throughout said code in three forms: first, exclusion from participation in provincial
elections; second, direct Presidential supervision over HUCs and their local chief
executives; and third, other special distinctions provided in the Code. Hence, it can
no longer be considered as a “political unit directly affected” by the proposed
division of the province; and perforce, the qualified voters of the HUC are properly
excluded from the coverage of the plebiscite. (Del Rosario v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
247610, 20 Mar. 2020)
Q. The Province of Palawan insists that the Camago-Malampaya gas

reservoirs are within its territorial jurisdiction. This is because, it argues, the
area is located within the continental shelf of the Municipality of Kalayaan,
over which the province exercises territorial jurisdiction. Is the Province of
Palawan entitled to a 40% share of the Camago-Malampaya gas project?
A: NO. A local government unit's territorial jurisdiction refers only to its land area.
Thus, its 40% share only pertains to the proceeds from the use and development of
natural resources found only in its land area.
The Constitution does not define a local government unit's territorial jurisdiction in
relation to its entitlement to an equitable share in the utilization and development
of the natural wealth. It does, however, mandate that the shares shall be within
their respective areas and in the manner provided by law.
Article X, Section 1 of the Constitution does "not require that every portion of the
Philippine territory be made part of the territory of a local government unit."70 It
asserts that a local government unit's territory only pertains to its land area and not
to its waters. [Republic v. The Province of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, January 21,
2020]
Q: Do LGU’s have an inherent power to tax?
A: NO. LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such
power might be delegated to them either by the basic law or by the statute. Under
the 1987 Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute,
the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory
limitations and guidelines. Under the 1987 Constitution, where there is neither a
grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist
although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. (Ferrer v.
Bautista, G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015)
For sure, fiscal decentralization does not signify the absolute freedom of the
LGUs to create their own sources of revenue and to spend their revenues
unrestrictedly or upon their individual whims and caprices. Congress has subjected
the LGUs’ power to tax to the guidelines set in Section 130 of the LGC and to the
limitations stated in Section 133 of the LGC.
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The concept of local fiscal autonomy does not exclude any manner of intervention
by the National Government in the form of supervision if only to ensure that the
local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with the national goals. [Gov.
Mandanas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 199802, July 3, 2018]
Q: Who determines the legality or propriety of a local tax ordinance or

revenue measure?
A: It is the Secretary of Justice who shall determine questions on the legality and
constitutionality of ordinances or revenue measures. The appeal must be filed
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the tax ordinance. The Secretary of
Justice has sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal to issue a ruling;
otherwise, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction (RTC). The appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance. (Sec. 187 R.A. 7160)
ELECTION LAW
Q: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the

election of a political party president?
A: YES. The COMELEC's jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes

has already been settled by the Court in Kalaw v. COMELEC (1987) stating that the
COMELEC's powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
"include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts."
The Court also declared in Palmares vs. COMELEC (1989) that the
COMELEC's power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties. (Atienza v. COMELEC, GR No.
188920, February 16, 2010)
Q: If the name of a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy had

been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included
or printed in the official ballots on election day, should the votes cast for such
nuisance candidate be considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide
candidate?
A: The votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment,
particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the
legitimate candidate, are not stray but must be counted in favor of the legitimate
candidate. The voters’ constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made
their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the votes
cast for the nuisance could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate.
(Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012 )
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Q: Pichay was convicted of Libel by final judgment and his sentence of
imprisonment was reduced to payment of fine. Is he disqualified from running
for public office?
A: YES. Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code for his conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude. A crime still involves moral turpitude even if the penalty of
imprisonment imposed is reduced to a fine. Thus, Pichay made a false material
representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and
he was never a valid candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives, the votes cast for him were considered stray votes. [Ty-Delgado v.
HRET, G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014]
Q: Salvador, who belonged to a local political party, was a mayoralty

candidate in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija in 2010. Salvador spent a total of
P449,000.00 in the 2010 election, when the maximum expenditure allowed by
law is P275,667.00. Salvador now argues that under R.A. 7166, he was allowed
to spend P5.00 per voter (instead of P3.00 per voter) since he received no
support from his party although he was a member thereof. Is Salvador guilty
of overspending?
ANSWER: YES. The law is clear — the candidate must both be without a
political party and without support from any political party for the P5.00 cap
to apply. In the absence of one, the exception does not apply. Thus, his limit is
P3.00 per registered voter. To allow Salvador’s contention is to deviate from the
intention of the legislature in enacting the law, as the same would find all
candidates on equal footing, whether member of a political party or not.
[SALVADOR v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 230744, September 26, 2017]
Q: Maturan failed to file his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures

(SOCE) in the 2010 elections. Accordingly, the COMELEC imposed upon him
an administrative fine, which he paid immediately. Likewise, for his 2013
candidacy, Maturan does not have a SOCE on record. Maturan argues that by
virtue of the withdrawal of his candidacy on 12 May 2013, just a day before the
elections, he is not required to file his SOCE. He again filed a certificate of
candidacy in the 2016 elections. The COMELEC disqualified him. Is the
COMELEC correct?
A: YES. The COMELEC is correct. In Pilar v. Commission on Elections (July

11, 1995), the Supreme Court held that every candidate, including one who lost or
withdraws his candidacy, is required to file his SOCE pursuant to Section 14 of R.A.
No. 7166. Good faith is not a defense.
Failure to file the SOCE shall constitute an administrative offense for which the
offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine. For the commission of a
second or subsequent offense the offender shall be subject to perpetual
disqualification to hold public office. [Maturan v. COMELEC, March 28, 2017)
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PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Q. Distinguish the right of innocent passage with the freedom of transit

passage.
A: Under the UNCLOS right of transit passage, vessels enjoy the right of
unimpeded, continuous and expeditious transit through international waters
without delay and while refraining from threats or use of force against the
sovereignty of the coastal nation. Innocent passage is for travel within territorial
waters while transit passage is for any zone. Innocent passage applies only to ships
while transit passage applies to aircrafts as well. In transit passage, military
vessels are also allowed which are not allowed in innocent passage.
Q: What constitutes perfidy? Is it prohibited? Give examples.
A: Perfidy consists of acts is inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him

to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of
International Law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that
confidence. It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to
perfidy. The following acts are examples of perfidy:
a) The feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or of a surrender;

b) The feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or sickness;
c) The feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and
d) The feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems or uniforms of the
United Nations or of neutral or other States not Parties to the conflict.
Q: What are ruses of war? Are they prohibited? Give examples.
A: Ruses of war are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce
him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of International Law applicable in
armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the
confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law.
Ruses of war are legal. The following are examples of ruses of war:
a) The use of camouflage;
b) Decoys;
c) Mock operations;
d) Misinformation.
Q: What is the principle of “Non-Refoulement”?
A: It is a customary principle of international law which prohibits the expulsion

or return of refugees to their state of origin. Article 31 of the UN Charter states:
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1. No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Q: Who is a refugee?
1. The person must be outside their country of origin or habitual residence.

2. The person must have a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of: race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, membership of a particular social group
3. The person must be unable or unwilling to avail of the protection of their own
State for reasons of such persecution. (Article 1A of the 1951 Convention On
Migrants and Refugees)
Q. The US government introduced Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems

(LAWS) which uses drones and robots to launch air strikes against enemy
targets in war-torn countries. These drones and robots cannot distinguish
between military and civilians. They only follow specific orders formulated
thru algorithms and computer programs. Will the use of these unmanned
drones and robots constitute a violation of the Geneva Convention or any
principle of international law?
A: Yes. Under the Geneva Conventions, it is prohibited to employ weapons or

methods of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary losses or excessive suffering.
Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants in order to spare civilian population and property. Neither the civilian
population as such nor civilian persons shall be the object of attack. Attacks should
be directed solely against military objectives.
Q. Will the use of these unmanned drones and robots constitute a

violation of the Geneva Convention or any principle of international law?
A: Yes. Under the Geneva Conventions, it is prohibited to employ weapons or

methods of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary losses or excessive suffering.
International Humanitarian Law prohibits indiscriminate attacks. Indiscriminate
attacks strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
They are not directed at a specific military objective or they employ a method or
means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective. (Protocol
I, Art. 51[2], Geneva Conventions)
Q. The United States of America and other European countries have

openly supplied weapons to Ukraine – which is currently in a state of war with
Page
Russia. Is this a violation of the Principle of Neutrality. Can Russia consider
that supplying arms might be an act of war by the United States? Explain.
A: No. When the states joined together to outlaw war in 1928 and reaffirm that
commitment in the UN Charter in 1945, they created a New World Order in which
might is no longer right and in which states can provide weapons and other support
to a state unjustly attacked so that it can defend itself.
The end of impartiality means that states are permitted to supply weapons or other
support to Ukraine. Doing so violates no legal duty of neutrality. States would
become parties to the international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine if,
and only if, they resort to armed force against Russia. Indeed, providing assistance
to Ukraine supports the international legal order by allowing Ukraine to defend
itself against a war of aggression.
Q. Russia has recently launched a series of devastating missile attacks at

Ukraine’s power infrastructure, which have hit at least half of its thermal
power generation and up to 40% of the entire electricity generating and
distribution system. Is this considered a war crime? Explain.
A: An attack against infrastructure used by civilians might be a war crime, but

not necessarily. The Law on Armed Conflict (LOAC) does permit attacks on
infrastructure but only if certain prerequisites are observed.
The most primary of all the LOAC rules is the principle of distinction, that is, the
prohibition on directing attacks against civilians or civilian objects. But an object
may be civilian-owned and used by civilians yet still be directly attacked as a lawful
target under certain circumstances.
First, the object must be shown to be a military objective. Military objectives,

insofar as objects are concerned, include “any object which by its nature, location,
purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose total or
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage.”
Second, electric power stations are generally recognized to be of sufficient

importance to a State’s capacity to meet its wartime needs of communication,
transport, and industry so as usually to qualify as military objectives during armed
conflicts. Indeed, attacks on electrical systems have long been a part of modern
war.
To justify the attacks under LOAC, the following questions must be answered in the
affirmative --- is there evidence that Ukraine’s electrical system in this instance is of
sufficient importance to qualify as a military objective? Does it make “an effective
contribution to military action”? Would its “partial destruction…neutralization”
offer “a definite military advantage”?
Page

2022 Last Minute Tips in Political Law

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2022 Last Minute Tips in Political Law

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2022 LAST MINUTE TIPS IN POLITICAL LAW

By: Enrique V. dela Cruz, Jr.

Q. Can the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendments to

Q. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress enacted a law postponing the

Congress previously enacted RA 11462 in 2019, to postpone the barangay elections.

Q. The Philippine government placed the Greater Manila area (NCR+)

A: There is NO Violation. This is “fair discrimination.” It is a valid exercise of

Q. The Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) issued a

A: The right to travel is not absolute. It may be restrained or burdened, through

Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.

Q. Can a warrantless arrest be enforced for an offense penalized by a fine

Q: When a person is questioned by the police or MMDA enforcer for a

A: NO. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumpti

A: The law is constitutional. Requiring a driver to take a BREATHALYZER TEST

Q: Denmark S. Valmores is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist

A: YES. The enforcement of the 2010 CHED Memorandum is compellable by

Q: An officer on duty received a call from a concerned citizen, who

A: NO. In expropriation, the Republic's acquisition of the expropriated property is

Q: The National Power Corporation dug underground tunnels underneath a

Q. NGCP is a private corporation engaged in the business of transmitting

Q: What is meant by inverse condemnation?

Q. Six (6) department heads of the provincial government of Ilocos Norte

A: NO. The privilege of the writ of Amparo is a remedy available ONLY to

Q: Is perpetual disqualification to hold any public office a cruel, unusual

A: NO. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally

Q. Can Congress issue a subpoena to compel attendance of Justices of the

A: NO. Congressional powers cannot be used to deprive the Supreme Court of

Q. Senator Aquilino Pimentel filed a petition with the Supreme Court to

In response, President Duterte issued a number of public statements against

Q. The Rome Statute is the Treaty which established the International

A: NO. The president, as primary architect of foreign policy, negotiates and

A: The Senate President shall be acting President.

ARTICLE VII, SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from

The vacancy shall be filled up, as follows:

A: NO. Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing

ANSWER: NO. The clustering system of nominees is unconstitutional as it

IX. NATIONAL PATRIMONY

Q: Does the Constitution prohibit service contracts or joint explorations of

Q. An alien or foreigner husband of a Filipina bought with his capital

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Q. What is the rule on conflict of interest for public officer?

A: Section 6 of the Code of Conduct of Public Officials states that “a public

Q: Can active members of the AFP be designated or detailed to civilian

Unlike the constitutional commissions in Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, the

Q: What is the Doctrine of Administrative Condonation? Is this still

NOTE: The abandonment of the doctrine of condonation is prospective in

Q: Can the period of preventive suspension be credited to the imposed penalty

A: It depends on whether it is pending investigation or pending appeal.

Preventive suspension pending investigation is merely a preventive measure, a

Q: Will the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal stay the

A: No. Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases do

Q: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an

A: No. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because

A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a

Q. Is the right to counsel available in administrative proceedings?

Q. Is the right against self-incrimination available in administrative

Q. Are the voters of a city which used to be a component city of a province

A: A: NO. HUCs, as conceptualized in our local government laws, are essentially

Q. The Province of Palawan insists that the Camago-Malampaya gas