Philo Report
Philo Report
Philo Report
When we hear “commission” the first thing that comes into our mind is that-a fee paid to an agent or
employee for transacting a piece of business or performing a service.
When we came in law school, When we hear “commission”, we know that there’s a crime or damage done
An act of commission (doing something wrong) or omission (failing to do the right thing) that leads to an
undesirable outcome or significant potential for such an outcome.
They both come from
the decision to do something &
occur when individuals initiate some course of action
(DIFFERENCE) We have good reasons for the distinction between omissions and commissions:
omissions- may result from ignorance, and
commissions- usually do not; commissions usually involve more malicious motives and intentions than
the corresponding omissions; and commissions usually involve more effort, itself a sign of stronger
intentions.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a QUASI-DELICT and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Under this provision, it is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence the….
ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICTS
1. An act or omission by the one complained of (the respondent or defendant)
Omission is the failure to do what a person is supposed to do
Intentional torts Under Article 32- Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt,
or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation
of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Under Article 34- When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable
for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.; and
Culpa Aquiliana or Quasi Delict under Art. 2176
b) Under Article 33- In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Either of the 2 liabilities may be enforced subject to the condition or limitation under:
Article 2177 of the civil code w/c provides- Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.(n)
Where the party claiming payment for the damage done cannot recover twice for the same act .or
omission of the defendant.
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a
bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
due to a quasi-delict or “culpa aquiliana.’’ But said article forestalls a double recovery.”
Ex. if A was convicted of serious physical injuries through negligence under the Revised Penal Code, and
B, the injured party, was indemnified in the criminal case for the damages caused to him, the latter cannot
recover damages in a separate civil action for the same act or omission of A.
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989 charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
Respondent judge declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the
scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional.
(2) No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing
death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held
that no independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal
negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide,
not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability
of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employee.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.