Docsity Sample Judgement On Caa

sample judgement on CAA
Constitutional Law
Panjab University
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2nd UILS INTRA DEPARTMENT JUDGMENT WRITING COMPETITION TC-33
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF POCHINKI
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.1234 OF 2019
(Arising out of P.I.L. (civil) nos. 987 of 2019)
DECIDED ON 13/05/2020
1. ALL KAMESHKI STUDENTS UNION
...PETITIONERS
VERSUS
1. UNION OF POCHINKI
...RESPONDENTS
AUTHOR: ABC, CJ
BENCH: ABC (CJ), PQR (J), CT (J), RDX (J), SN (J)
Present:
1. Mr. XY, counsel for the petitioner in Writ petition no. 1234 of 2019
2. Attorney General of the State, Mr. XYZ for the State of Pochinki.
Page | 1

CONTENTS
S.NO(s). HEADING PAGE NO(s).
A. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………... 3
B. REFERENCE…………………………………………………... 3-5
C. ISSUES INVOLVED…………………………………………... 6-9
D. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES………………………………… 10-16
E. ORDER………………………………………………………… 16-17
Page | 2

JUDGMENT
ABC CJ.
INTRODUCTION
1. Not for nothing, the Father of our Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, had said, “No two leaves are
alike and yet there is no antagonism between them or between the branches on which
they grow.” Such a compassionate idea which embodies peaceful coexistence is inherent
in our magnificent Constitution. It reflects the source of its nourishment in the
Fundamental Rights, supplemented by various judicial precedents which place due
emphasis on active inclusiveness. It is in the lighted path of this truism, that essentiality
of equality among religions gains a new meaning. In this regard it is profitable to quote a
few lines by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, “Secularism does not mean anything irreligious or
atheism or even stress on material comforts, rather it lays stress on the universality of
spiritual values which may be obtained by a variety of ways”.
2. In the present case, our deliberations and focus on the said concept shall be from various
spectrums.
3. The overarching ideals of religious autonomy and liberty, equality for all sans
discrimination of any kind, recognition of identity with dignity and privacy of human
beings constitute the cardinal four corners of our monumental Constitution forming the
concrete substratum of our fundamental rights.
REFERENCE
4. This Writ Petition (Civil) No.1234 of 2019 was filed to declare the Citizenship
(Amendment) Act, 2019 as invalid and deport all the illegal immigrants who came to
Pochinki (mainly Kameshki) after 24th March, 1971.
5. Before entering the facts of the matter, it is useful to recapitulate the scope and ground of
the maintainability of the petition. As per the Article 32 of the Constitution of Pochinki
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read with Order XXXVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 the petition is admissible and
maintainable.
6. A PIL can be filed against the state for the violation of fundamental rights 1 under Article
32 of the constitution –therefore, the PIL is maintainable against Union of Pochinki. In
S.P Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors. 2, the 7- member bench of the Supreme
Court held that any member of the public having sufficient interest can approach the
Court for enforcing constitutional or legal rights of other persons and redressal of a
common grievance.
7. The present case has had a chequered history so far. Not only the constitutional validity
of an Act is under question on the ground of violating Article 14 of the constitution, but
the Nation’s commitment to jus cogens, especially in view of a vacuum in domestic laws
with respect to the issue of asylum seekers faces a serious impediment. We find that
sufficient public interest is involved in the present matter. Thus, the petitioner is allowed
to argue on the basis of merits of the case.
8. At the outset, it is necessary to state the facts in detail to appreciate the questions which
arise for determination before this court. The Citizenship Act, 1955 defines acquisition
and determination of Citizenship. Over the years, Ralivs and Galivs tribes from Mylta
infiltrated into Kameshki much to the chagrin of the natives of Kameshki who feared
adverse effect on demography, language and culture. Thus in 1978, the students and
youths of Kameshki started an agitation against the illegal migrants irrespective of their
religion. This resulted into Kameshki accord of 1985 that was signed between the
Government of Pochinki and leaders of the Kameshki Agitation. The leaders of the
agitation accepted 24th March, 1971 as the date after which anyone who came to
Kameshki would not be considered eligible for citizenship of Pochinki and would have to
be deported back to Mylta. In the meanwhile, influx of immigrants continued in
1
Sukhdev & Ors. V. Bhagatram & Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1331, P95.
2
AIR 1982 SC 149; ABSK Sangh (Rly) v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298.
Page | 4

Kameshki from Mylta. In 2016, the bill named Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 20163 was
passed in both the houses of the parliament. The purpose of the bill was to provide
Citizenship to the non-Galivs who came to Pochinki fleeing religious persecution from
Gatka and Mylta and were residing in different parts of Pochinki. Subsequently, the
Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2019 was introduced in the Parliament which leads to the
enactment of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 which came into effect in
November 2019 which allowed illegal immigrants who entered into Pochinki before
December 31, 2014 belonging to non-Galivs religions from Gatka and Mylta to acquire
Pochinki citizenship. The blatant exclusion of Galivs from the act along with the situation
in Kameshki caused nationwide protest to break out.
9. All Kameshki Student‘s Union, approached the Supreme Court to declare the Pochinki
Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 as constitutionally invalid and thus scrap it.
10. This court is presented with three issues:

First, whether the impugned act is violative of basic structure of the constitution?
Second, whether the impugned act is violative of the Kameshki Accord and is it
detrimental to the culture, language and land rights of the Kameshkians?
And third, whether the impugned act violates fundamental rights of the people of
Pochinki?
11. We place a great appreciation for each Counsel who appeared in the case and rendered
assistance to enable us to deal with this unusual matter in manner considered appropriate
for this nature.
(I) WHETHER THE IMPUGNED ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF BASIC STRUCTURE

OF THE CONSTITUTION
3
Annexure-1 of the amended proposition.
Page | 5

12. In their submissions the petitioners have pointed out that the Parliament cannot alter the
basic structure of the constitution like secularism, democracy, federalism, separation of
powers.
13. The petitioner contented that the basic structure also extends to ordinary legislation.
Furthering their cause on substratum of secularism, the petitioners pleaded that
secularism falls under the ambit of basic structure of the constitution through various
tests formulated on the same while concluding that the impugned act is destructive of the
doctrine.
14. Whereas the respondents have submitted that the doctrine of 'Basic Feature' in the context
of our Constitution, does not apply to ordinary legislation which has only a dual criteria
to meet, namely:
(i) It should relate to a matter within its competence;
(ii) It should not be void under Article 13 as being an unreasonable restriction on a
fundamental right or as being repugnant to an express constitutional prohibition.
15. While referring to the judgment made in Kuldeep Nayar v. Union of India.4 Wherein, it
was held that the doctrine of basic structure did not apply to ordinary legislation.
(II) WHETHER THE IMPUGNED ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE KAMESHKI

ACCORD AND IS IT DETRIMENTAL TO THE CULTURE LANGUAGE AND
LAND RIGHTS OF THE KAMESHKIANS?
16. The second limb of the argument of the petitioner is that the uncontrolled influx of illegal
migrants from Mylta to Kameshki has caused huge demographic changes in Kameshki.
Furthering their argument, the petitioners relied on various definitions of indigenous
people given by International institutions 5.The petitioners pressed upon the suffering of
4
AIR 2006 SC 3127.
5
Amended proposition page-13.
Page | 6

the Kameshkians while stating that the influx of immigrants has created a crisis of
identity among the indigenous people.
17. While furthering their contentions the petitioners submitted that impugned act is violative
of the Sixth schedule of the Pochinkian constitution.
18. The petitioners contended that the impugned act is violative of Article 29 6 of the
Constitution. The court is provided with the case of Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Partap
Singh Daulta7, wherein it was held that right to conserve the language of citizens includes
the right to agitate for the protection of language. The petitioners went on to saying that
the impugned act is a planned move of the central government to make Kameshki a
dumping ground for the non- Galiv Myltans.8
19. The further submission advanced by the petitioners was that the state is unable to ensure
the safety and security of its inhabitants thereby resulting in a direct infringement of
Article 21 of Constitution. Attention of the court was invited to the case of Assam
Sanmilita Mahasangha &Ors. V. UOI & Ors. 9, wherein the Court observed that illegal
migration has resulted in periodic clashes between the citizens and migrants, leading to
loss of life and property, and thereby violating the constitutional rights of the
Kameshkians.
20. Further the petitioners contended the amendment violates Article 355 of the Constitution
and Clause (9) of the Kameshki Accord.
6
Article 29-Protection of interests of minorities:
(1)Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script
or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out
of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
7
AIR 1965 SC 183.
8
Amended proposition,P14.
9
Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors.V Union of India &Ors Writ Petition (civil) No. 562 of 2012 On December17,
2014.
Page | 7

21. For the second issue, the respondents had put forward a dual stance. The first being that
the Kameshki Accord is a mere political settlement between the leaders of student parties,
and Union of Pochinki and not a law as defined under Article 13(3) of the Constitution
and thus cannot be used to challenge the constitutionality of the Act which is well within
the competence of the Union.
22. And the second stance being that the act is not detrimental to the culture, language and
land rights of the indigenous people of Kameshki. The repository of this argument is that
on a closer look of the Sixth schedule of the Constitution the governor has power to make
certain acts made by the government non applicable in the state of Kameshki.10 Check on
education, health, culture, language and land rights of the indigenous people of
Kameshki. Therefore the Act cannot be declared unconstitutional as it does not violate
Article 29 and 30 of the Constitution.
(III) WHETHER THE IMPUGNED ACT VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

OF CITIZENS OF POCHINKI?
23. Petitioners argued with astuteness that the legislative mandate runs counter to the
command of Article 14. Key reliance was placed on Olga Tellis v. BMC & Ors. Etc. 11
wherein this Court stated that Article 14 is conferred to citizens and non-citizens alike.
To barter this right, would be to strangulate a sovereign democracy. Furthering their
argument the petitioners has submitted that this amendment act fails the test of reasonable
classification as set out in Article 14 of the Constitution
24. The petitioners thus contended that the impugned act amounts to an infringement upon
the excluded minorities’ fundamental right to equality.
10
Para 12, Schedule Sixth, The Constitution of Pochinki, 1950.
11
Olga Tellis v. BMC &Ors. Etc., AIR 1986 SC 180.
Page | 8

25. Placing reliance on the abovementioned articles and arguments, the petitioners pleaded
that all the illegal immigrants should be deported back.
26. The learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the right against deportation,
while keeping in mind the Constitutional guarantees under Article 14, 21 read with
Article 51 (c) of the constitution is not violative in any manner thereof. Further to support
their argument the attention of the court was brought to the case of NHRC v. State of
Arunachal Pradesh12, wherein the court held that: Our Constitution confers certain rights
on every human being and certain other rights on citizens. Every person is entitled to
equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. So also, no person can be
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
27. Reference was also given to Article 33(1) of the 1951 United Nation Convention on the
Status of Refugees.13 The respondent brought to the attention of this court various
international human right convention to adjudge whether the deportation of refugees falls
foul on the Union of Pochinki.
28. The UDHR, the ICCPR and the International Convention on Protection of All Persons
against Enforced Disappearances throw considerable light on the superseding
responsibilities of a state to protect the human rights of the refugees as well as the
citizens.
29. Furthermore, the respondents submitted that the equality clause which falls under the
prism of Article 14 does not forbid geographical classification, provide the difference
between the geographical units has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved.
12
NHRC v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1234.
13
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.
Page | 9

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
30. A democratic Constitution like ours is an organic document which adapts to its
surroundings. It is this sacrosanct which permits even an insignificant minority to find its
true identity.
31. The role of the judiciary gains more importance while answering questions pertaining to
classes of people who have been the brutalized subjects of prejudice, separation, hostility
and discrimination. The stunted growth of such classes is a disgrace and an abomination
to our Constitution.
32. It is in the light of these principles that the Court would proceed to adjudicate upon the
matter at hand.
33. It is pertinent to consider that seven of the thirteen judges in Kesavananda Bharati case14,
observed that parliament in the exercise of its amending power under Article 368, could
not alter the basic structure or framework of the constitution. The basic structure 15 has
been, thus, held to be a limitation on the amending power of the parliament. It provides a
touchstone to test the extent of parliament’s power to amend the constitution.16
34. Article 1117 of the Constitution – that deals with citizenship – contains no such express
limitation. Commentators have pointed to the width of these words to argue that in
matters of citizenship, Parliament has virtually unlimited power (apart from the usual
touchstone of the fundamental rights chapter).
14
Kesavananda Bharati v.State of Kerela, AIR1973 SC 1461 at 1903-4.
15
The “doctrine of basic structure” is essentially developed from the German constitution. See M.nagraj v. Union of
India, AIR 2007 SC 7.
16
I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861.
17
It gives to Parliament the right to “regulate citizenship by law”, and allows Parliament to make “any” provision
with respect to acquisition and termination of citizenship, and “all other matters” relating to citizenship.
Page | 10

35. What this argument ignores, however, is that express limitations are not the only manner
in which constitutional authorities are constrained. As noted in Kesavananda Bharati,
there also exist implied limitations that flow from the structure of the Constitution. When
– and how – do we discern implied limitations? A short answer will suffice: power under
the Constitution to do “x” is limited at the point at which doing “x” will frustrate or
destroy another, equally important constitutional principle. This principle was most
recently reiterated by the UK Supreme Court in Miller v. The Prime Minister18.
36. What is the implied limitation in the present case? The answer is the constitutional
principle of secularism. To put it in a single sentence: the principle of secularism acts as
an implied limitation upon Parliament’s power to legislate on citizenship. Parliament,
therefore, has all powers to prescribe conditions of citizenship except and insofar as such
conditions frustrate the Constitutional commitment towards preserving a secular polity.
37. Secularism envisages a cohesive society whereby the State does not interfere in religious
matters and in reciprocation, religious considerations are not be factored in for State
policy determination.
38. The court upholds the petitioners stance that basic structure also extends to ordinary
legislation as has been held by a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in Madras
Bar Association v. Union of India 19, wherein J.S. Kher, speaking for the majority, held
that “basic structure” was inviolable and that the rule would apply to all other legislations
(other than amendments to the constitution).
39. Same principle was followed in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v.
Union of India20 and L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors21.
18
[2019] UK SC 41.
19
AIR 2015 SC 1571.
20
AIR 1994 SC 268.
21
AIR 1997 SC 1125.
Page | 11

40. Before going into the analysis of the second issue it is pertinent to consider the form and
objective of Article 14.The concept of reasonable classification means a law must operate
alike on all persons similarly placed in similar circumstances. It involves putting persons
or things together in a class; and equality clause requires that the class thus formed must
not leave out any person or thing which falls within the class.
41. The Supreme Court in Dalmia22 points out that reasonable classification must satisfy two
conditions;
(1) It must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things
that are grouped together from others left out of the group and
(2) The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
statute in question.23
Reliance may be placed on Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal24 wherein

Gajendragadkar,J. has held that if either of the two criteria are not satisfied then the act is
liable to be struck down as unconstitutional. Applying the above principle, this court will
try to see whether the proposed classification by the act fulfils both the criteria to stand
the test of Article 14.The court intends to form three hypotheses and test them through
points of law as well as facts of the case.
(A)Geography
It is a settled principle of law that geography can be a basis for classification provided
there exists a rational nexus with the objects sought to be achieved by the act. Reliance
may be placed on Sarbananda Sonowal v Union of India25, where the Court had to deal
with Illegal Migrants Determination (Determination by Tribunal) Act (IMDT Act) and its
geographical exclusiveness regarding its applicability to state of Kameshki. The Court
has held that:
22
AIR 1958 SC 538.
23
Anwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal (1952) S.C.R. at pp 340-41; Om Prakash v. J&K (1981) A.SC.
1001; D.D. Joshi v. Union (1983) A.SC. 420.
24
AIR 1960 SC 457.
25
AIR 2005 SC 2920.
Page | 12

“For satisfying the test of Article 14, the geographical factor alone in making a
classification is not enough but there must be a nexus with the objects sought to be
achieved.”
The object of the Act is to facilitate granting of Citizenship to people of only two
religious communities who have migrated to Pochinki. The legislature is well within its
right to define the class based on geography. However, the object will not be satisfied if
only two nations are chosen as a class. Exclusion of other neighboring nations from the
classification renders the Act hit by the prohibition of Article 14 and hence, it is not
constitutionally tenable.
(B) Religious Persecution

Religious persecution is not limited to only two nations. The CAA ignores religious
asylum seekers from other countries, e.g., Rohingyas from Myanmar. Secondly, religious
persecution is not limited to the two religions alone. The CAA ignores “illegal migrants”
who entered India because they faced non-religious persecution – e.g., persecution based
on sexual orientation(LGBTQ+), atheists or political views, or race (such as Sri Lankan
Tamils).
Hence, there is no reasonable basis to classify only two religions as a separate group on
the presumption that only those religions face persecution. The criterion of intelligible
differentia is not fulfilled.
(C) Immigration to Pochinki

It is not only “illegal migrants” from Gatka and Mylta who may have faced religious
persecution in their countries. In neighboring countries like Nepal, Bhutan or Sri Lanka,
or countries that are not Pochinki’s neighbors but in which members of the specified
religious groups might still face persecution. Hence, only two countries cannot be singled
out as the dominant contributor of immigrants to India. Besides, reference may be made
to P Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu26 and Maneka Gandhi v Union of India27 where the
26
AIR SC 555.
27
AIR 1978 SC 597.
Page | 13

Courts have held that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in state action and ensures fairness
and equality of treatment. The Act is fraught with arbitrariness as it has intended to bring
in artificial difference between migrants of different Nations.
Hence, the Act is bound to fail the test of Article 14 of the constitution.
42. We find no as such conflict as raised by the respondents between rights of refugees and
fundamental rights of the citizens in general. Rather we find that both the concepts have
different faces and are to be dealt individually.
43. As Pochinki is not a signatory to the Refugee convention of 1951 or the Refugee protocol
of 1967, it is not legally bound to the principle of non-refoulment with respect to
refugees. However, Jean Allain in his article 28 has demonstrated that non-refoulement is a
peremptory norm of international law. No derogation from it is permissible. It means,
non-refoulment comes under customary international law and Pochinki is obligated to
abide by the principle.
44. Besides, Pochinki is a signatory to certain other international treaties which impose a
moral obligation on Pochinki with respect to asylum seekers. Some of such international
instruments are described below.
45. Pochinki has acceded to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1979.
Advisory issued by UNHRC has explicitly stated that the Covenant Rights must also be
available to all individuals regardless of nationality or statelessness. Similarly, Article 6
and Article 7 of the Covenant are applicable to the Galivs in Pochinki. They should be
read with Article 21 of the Constitution.
28
Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-- Refoulement', 13 Int'l J. Refugee L. 533 (2001).
Page | 14

46. The Principle of Non-refoulment29 is implicit in the Article 21 of the constitution.

Reliance may be placed on Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v Union of India And Ors 30
wherein the Gujarat High Court has held that Non-Refoulment is encompassed in Article
21, so long as the presence of refugee is not prejudicial to the law and order and security
of Pochinki. Also it was held that “In view of directives under Article 51(c) and Article
253, International law and treaty obligations are to be respected when they are not
inconsistent with domestic law.” Hence, this court concurs Gujarat High Court’s view
about non refoulment. The court wishes to refer to NHRC v State of Arunachal Pradesh
& Anr,31 wherein it was held that the Constitution confers certain rights on every human
being and certain other rights on citizens. No person could be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. The State is bound
to protect the life and liberty of every human being, he be a citizen or otherwise.
Refugees residing in Pochinki are similarly, entitled to protection under Article 21. This
protection can be infringed only through a procedure established by law, which is the
Foreigners Act, 1946. According to the said act, in view of national security punitive
action under the same may be resorted to. Hence, without having established, that the
Galivs or in this case refugees belonging to any other religious community are a threat to
national security, a demand for deportation not only vitiates the various International
covenants but also violates the Article 2132 of the constitution.
47. Blanket claims of the petitioner that the impugned act is violative of articles 21, 29 and
355 of the constitution seem baseless and show poor understanding of law.
48. As far as the petitioners claim in context of schedule six of the constitution that the
constitutional safeguards have not necessarily guaranteed them their share of special
rights which have uprooted the indigenous people from their lands is concerned, the court
views this specific claim on humanitarian basis.
29
Vishakha vs. State of Rajasthan 1997 (6) SCC 241.
30
(1999) CriLJ 919.
31
AIR 1996 SC 1234.
32
Malvika Karlekar v. Union of India ; Crl. WP No. 243 of 1988.
Page | 15

49. The court acknowledges the fact that the Kameshkians have suffered huge loss of culture,
language and land rights due to the influx of illegal immigrants. This suffering is majorly
due to the fallacious enforcement of schedule six which was framed solely for the
purpose of safeguarding cultural and land rights of the people. Under the schedule six,
provisions are provided for appointment of Commissions by Governor to make inquiries
and reports to keep the check on education, health, culture, language and land rights of
the indigenous people of Kameshki. However, the harsh reality is that such provisions are
being barely adhered to and being faintly followed. In view of the reasoning thus cited,
this court believes that the cultural and land rights of the people of Kameshki are being
flouted because of the faint implementation of the sixth schedule.
ORDER
 We hold that the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 is unconstitutional based on the
principle of basic structure of which secularism is a part and Right to Equality enshrined
under Article 14 the Constitution. It is this richer and more substantive vision of equality
and equal treatment that demonstrates the unconstitutionality of the CAA in starkest
terms. Each of the three “conditions” under the CAA – country of origin, religion, and
date of entry into Pochinki – are effectively beyond the control of the individuals the law
is targeted at. A person cannot choose which country they were born in, which religious
community they were born into, and when persecution forced them to flee into Pochinki.
But the CAA takes the category of migrants and divides them precisely on these three
bases. This is why it goes against the basic tenets of equality.
 The government must come up with strict and efficient policies to track down the
commissions set up under the schedule 6 in the tribal areas of Kameshki, Manipur etc and
formulate a policy to provide constitutional safeguards to indigenous people.
 The Government may come with a coherent National refugee policy to deal with the
refugee and asylum seeker crisis.
Page | 16

The Reference is answered accordingly.
In view of the above findings, the Writ Petition is allowed.
……………..……..…………………CJ.
(Mr. ABC, CJ.)
New Delhi;
May 13, 2020.
Page | 17


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF POCHINKI

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.1234 OF 2019

(Arising out of P.I.L. (civil) nos. 987 of 2019)

1. ALL KAMESHKI STUDENTS UNION

BENCH: ABC (CJ), PQR (J), CT (J), RDX (J), SN (J)

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S.NO(s). HEADING PAGE NO(s).

C. ISSUES INVOLVED…………………………………………... 6-9

D. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES………………………………… 10-16

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10. This court is presented with three issues:

(I) WHETHER THE IMPUGNED ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF BASIC STRUCTURE

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(II) WHETHER THE IMPUGNED ACT IS VIOLATIVE OF THE KAMESHKI

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(III) WHETHER THE IMPUGNED ACT VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

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ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES

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Reliance may be placed on Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal24 wherein

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(B) Religious Persecution

(C) Immigration to Pochinki

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46. The Principle of Non-refoulment29 is implicit in the Article 21 of the constitution.

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The Reference is answered accordingly.

In view of the above findings, the Writ Petition is allowed.

(Mr. ABC, CJ.)

May 13, 2020.

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