para 9,12,18,19 Praveen Saini Vs Reetu Kapur

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2018 SCC OnLine Del 6500 : (2018) 246 DLT 709 : (2018) 168
DRJ 121 : (2018) 1 RCR (Rent) 321
In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(BEFORE VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.)
Praveen Saini .…. Appellant

Mr. Anupam Srivastava, Ms. Monika Srivastava and Mr. Dhairya
Gupta, Advocates with appellant and his wife in person.
Versus
Reetu Kapur & Anr. .…. Respondents
Mr. Fanish K. Jain and Mr. Vikas Bapu Rao, Advocates.
RFA No. 21/2018
Decided on January 8, 2018
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. (Oral)
CAVEAT No. 9/2018
1. Since counsel for the caveator has entered appearance, the caveat
stands discharged.
RFA No. 21/2018 and I.A. No. 694/2018 (for stay)
2. As Court of law, considering the society that we live in today,
there are a flood of cases where each case seeks to out do the other
case so far as dishonesty is concerned. Dishonest litigants have no
qualms in going to the extremes of dishonesty not only to prejudice the
opposite side in litigation but also put the system of litigation itself to
question only because procedural matters and the system of
adjudication on account of pendency of heavy backlog is taking
considerable time of Courts. The present is a fit case on account of
complete and outright dishonesty of the appellant who is a tenant
refusing to vacate the tenant premises as also raising completely
unfounded defences, along with dismissal of the appeal it will also be
required that this Court not only gives directions for filing of an FIR
against the appellant under Section 209 IPC for filing a false claim in
Court, but also this court initiate Contempt of Court proceedings
because of the outright dishonest and false claim/defence set up by the
appellant. With these preliminary statements let us turn to the facts of
this Regular First Appeal filed under Section 96 of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (CPC).
3. This RFA is filed by the defendant in the suit impugning the
judgment of the trial court dated 25.9.2017 by which the trial court has
decreed the suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs/landlord under
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Order XII Rule 6 CPC so far as the grant of relief of possession of the
suit premises is concerned. The suit premises is the property situated
on a plot bearing No. 53, Block-B, Pocket-10, Sector-13, Dwarka, New
Delhi-110075.
4. The facts of the case are that a registered lease deed dated
14.7.2014 was entered into between the respondents/plaintiffs/landlord
with the appellant/defendant/tenant. As per this registered lease deed,
duly registered with the office of Sub-Registrar, Janakpuri, New Dehi,
the monthly rent was Rs. 1,12,000/- for the suit premises from
15.7.2014 till 14.6.2015, Rs. 1,34,000/- per month from 15.6.2015 till
14.5.2016 and Rs. 1,50,000/- per month from 15.5.2016 till
14.7.2017. Appellant/defendant was also liable to pay a fixed amount
of Rs. 1,000/- per month as water charges.
5. In terms of Clauses 3, 23, 31 and 35 of the registered lease deed
dated 14.7.2014, either of the parties to the same could terminate the
tenancy by giving a three months notice in writing without assigning
any reason.
6. Appellant/defendant was habitual in defaulting in the payment of
rent. The subject suit was filed on 2.2.2016 because as on this date a
sum of Rs. 4,99,800/- was due. It is also required to be noted by this
Court that from 2.2.2016 till date in January 2018, not a single rupee
has been paid by the appellant/defendant towards arrears of rent
except it is stated that for a period of four months rent at Rs. 82,000/-
has been paid as stated by the appellant/defendant and which period of
payment is stated to be of three months by the
respondents/plaintiffs/landlord. It is also stated on behalf of the
respondents/plaintiffs/landlord that in fact even for this period of 3/4
months the admitted rate of rent has not been paid but only an amount
of Rs. 82,000/- per month was paid.
7. Since the appellant/defendant failed to regularly pay the rent,
hence the respondents/plaintiffs/landlord was not interested in
continuing with the tenancy and therefore the tenancy was terminated
by serving a legal notice dated 5.10.2015 giving the notice of three
months time as required under Clauses 3, 23, 31 and 35 of the
registered lease deed dated 14.7.2014.
8. Appellant/defendant appeared in the suit and filed his written
statement. The case set up by the appellant/defendant was that the
registered lease deed dated 14.7.2014 entered into by him was signed
by him without going through the same on account of paucity of time
and actually as per this agreement the respondents/plaintiffs had
agreed to sell the suit property to the appellant/defendant.
Appellant/defendant pleaded total sale consideration of Rs.
2,50,00,000/- for selling of the suit property to appellant/defendant,
and of which a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- was said to be paid in cash at
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the time of entering into the agreement on 14.7.2014. The case of the
appellant/defendant was that he was required to pay the
respondents/plaintiffs as per his capacity from month to month basis
the total balance sale consideration of Rs. 2 crores within a period of
five years from 14.7.2014. Accordingly, it was pleaded that there was
no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties but the
appellant/defendant was a prospective purchaser of the suit property.
9. By the impugned judgment, trial court has decreed the suit under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC by referring to the admissions made by the
appellant/defendant in earlier judicial proceedings being a criminal
complaint case filed by the appellant/defendant against the
respondents/plaintiffs. In this criminal complaint filed under Section
200 Cr.P.C. before the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Dwarka,
Delhi, the appellant/defendant has clearly stated in para 2 that he is in
possession of the premises as a tenant from 8-9 years and that he has
been paying rent to the respondent/accused regularly. The relevant
para of the judgment of the trial court dealing with this aspect is para 8
and this para reads as under:—
“8. The most important document relied upon the plaintiffs to
show the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs
and defendant is rent agreement dated 14.07.2014. Defendant has
not denied the execution of this document, instead he has taken the
defence that the said document was got signed from him and
registered with the Sub-Registrar on the pretext that same is the
document with respect to the purchase of suit property. This defence
taken by the defendant is not tenable in view of the fact that when a
person is visiting the office of Sub-Registrar for execution of a
document for sale-purchase of a property for a consideration as high
as Rs. 2.50 crores, as per the defendant's own version in his written
statement, it is highly unimaginable that he has not taken care of
the fact that what documents are being executed. A person who is
investing such a huge amount for the purpose of purchase of a
property, he is presumed to be vigilant as to the contents of the
documents and also when same is executed and registered before
the Sub-Registrar. In his written statement defendant has stated
that he had made the payment of Rs. 50 lacs in cash at the time of
execution of agreement and also stated that he has made the total
payment of Rs. 70,50,000/- to plaintiffs till date but he has not
disclosed in his written statement how such a heavy payment which
is in cash has been arranged by him. He even has not produced any
document in respect of such heavy payment. There is even no
whisper of such document. Defendant was required to explain his
stand taken in the written statement but same has not been done.
The shallowness of his defence further found support from the
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documents which have been annexed alongwith the plaint as well as

alongwith the application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. Defendant has
not given proper reply as to the nature of those documents. In his
reply to the application, he has merely stated that plaintiff has
manipulated and fabricated those documents to get a decree from
the Court. He has stated that no such document of tenant
verification has been executed by the defendant and has further
denied that defendant had applied for telephone connection
alongwith the copy of rent deed. But he is silent about the complaint
under Section 200 Cr.P.C. filed by him against the plaintiffs in the
Court of Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate and para no. 2 of the said
complaint states that “the complainant is in possession of property
bearing no. 53-B, Block-B, Pocket-10, Sector-13, Dwarka, New Delhi
-110075. He is a tenant of the accused for the last 8-9 years in the
above mentioned premises”. This document is a vital document and
despite the plaintiffs' specific averment in their application about
this complaint, defendant has not given any answer to the same. It
is a well settled principle of law that evasive reply and false
moonshine defence taken by the defendant can be read against him
for the purpose of deciding the application on admission under Order
12 Rule 6 CPC. In Earthtech Enterprises Ltd. v. Kuljit Singh Butalia
2013 (199) DLT 194 it has been held that “in P.P.A. Impex Pvt. Ltd.
v. Mangal Sain Mittal 166 (2010) DLT 84 (DB), the decree of
possession passed by the Single Judge, on an application under
Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code, has been upheld by the Division Bence
of this Court. In the said case, defendant had claimed an
independent right in the suit property pursuant to an agreement to
sell. As per the defendant his defence could have been substantiated
only during the trial and no decree on admission could have been
passed. Division Bench found the defence of defendant to be
moonshine. Division Bench observed thus “the courts are already
groaning under the weight of bludgeoning and exponentially
increasing litigation. The weight will unvaryingly increase if
moonshine defences are needlessly permitted to go to trial”.”
In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India (2000)
7 SCC 120 : (2000) 7 SCC 120 : AIR 2000 SC 2740, Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that “The object of the Rule is to enable the
party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief
to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is
entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this
Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment.
Where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the
former to succeed.”
“Even without referring to the expression “otherwise” in Rule 6 of
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Order 12 CPC, the Court can draw an inference in the present case
on the basis of an inference in the present case on the basis of the
pleadings raised in the case in the shape of the applications under
that Rule and the answering affidavit which clearly reiterates the
admission.
Admission generally arise when a statement is made by a party in
any of the modes provided under Section 18 to 23 of the Evidence
Act, 1872. Admissions are of many kinds; they may be considered as
being on the record as actual if they are either in the pleadings or in
answer to interrogatories or implied from the pleadings by non-
traversal. Secondly, as between parties by agreement or notice.
Since it has been considered that admission for passing the
judgment is based on pleadings itself it is unnecessary to examine
as to what kind of admissions are covered by Order 12 Rule 6 CPC”.
In Charanjit Lal Mehra a similar view has been expressed
inasmuch as it has been held that any admission can be inferred
from the facts and circumstances of the case without any dispute,
then in such a case in order to expedite and dispose off the matter
such admission can be acted upon.
In Surjit Sachdeva v. Kazakhstan Investment Services Pvt. Ltd.
66 (1997) DLT 54 (DB) it was held by Hon'ble High Court that
admission need not be made expressly in the pleadings. Even on
constructive admission, Court can proceed to pass a decree in
plaintiff's favour.
In Parivar Seva Sansthan v. Dr. (Mrs) Veena Kalra, (2000) 86 DLT
817, the Division Bench of this Court discussed the scope of power
under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that
any plea raised against the contents of the documents barred by
Section 91 & 92 of the Evidence Act or against statutory provisions
can be ignored while applying Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduce
hereunder:—
“Bare perusal of the above rules shows, that it confers very
wide powers on the Court to pronounce judgment on admission at
any stage of the proceedings. The admission may have been
made either in pleadings, or otherwise. The admission may have
been made orally or in writing. The Court can act on such
admission, either on an application of any party or on its own
motion without determining the other questions. This provision is
discretionary, which has to be exercises on well established
principles. Admission must be clear and unequivocal; it must be
taken as a whole and it is not permissible to rely on a part of the
admission ignoring the other part; even a constructive admission
firmly made can be made the basis. Any plea raised against the
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contents of the documents only for delaying trial being barred by

the Section 91 and 92 of Evidence Act or other statutory
provisions, can be ignored. These principles are well settled by
catena of decisions. Reference in this regard be made to the
decision in Dudh Nath Pandey (dead by L.R's) v. Suresh Chandra
Bhattasali (dead by L.R's), (1986) 3 SCC 360 : AIR 1986 SC
1509.
Therefore, the averments made by defendant in challenging the
contents of the rent agreement is not tenable since execution of the
same has been admitted.”
(underlining added)
10. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant for setting aside the
impugned judgment has argued as under:—
(i) The copy of the criminal complaint relied upon by the trial court
was not filed along with the suit as required under Order VII Rule
14 CPC since the copy of this criminal complaint was only filed
with the replication and therefore this document could not have
been looked into by the trial court without permission being
granted by the trial court.
(ii) It is then argued that the appellant/defendant had filed a
counter-claim and allowing of the application under Order XII
Rule 6 CPC amounts to rejection of the counter-claim without
deciding the same on merits although counter-claim has to be
tried like a suit and decided in accordance with law. It is argued
by the appellant/defendant that the counter-claim is for declaring
the rent agreement dated 14.7.2014 as null and void and for
refund of the amount of Rs. 70,50,000/- from the
respondents/plaintiffs and this had to be decided and therefore
existence of the counter-claim was a basis for dismissing of the
application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC filed by the
respondents/plaintiffs.
(iii) It is argued that the trial court has erred by the impugned
judgment in dismissing the counter-claim on the ground of lack of
payment of court fees because under Order VII Rule 11 CPC the
trial court should have put the appellant/defendant to notice with
respect to payment of the court fees and that the
appellant/defendant would have then paid the court fees for
deciding the counter-claim.
(iv) It was also argued that the trial court was not justified in
drawing a presumption against the appellant/defendant that the
appellant/defendant would have signed the lease agreement after
due notice.
11. At the outset, it is noted that this Court is proceeding on the
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basis that counter-claim is being heard on merits without payment of

court fees and appellant/defendant will now deposit the court fees on
the counter-claim within a period of one week as prayed. This
undertaking to pay court fees is given by the counsel on behalf of the
appellant/defendant who is personally present in Court.
Appellant/defendant must now make good the deficiency in court fees
within a week from today as undertaken by the appellant/defendant
who is present in Court. Registry will examine the same for being in
accordance with law.
12. On the aspect of admissions being binding, this Court would like
to straightaway refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram (1974) 1 SCC
242 because in this judgment the Supreme Court has laid down the
ratio that evidentiary admissions are different than judicial admissions.
Supreme Court has held that admissions which are made in judicial
proceedings are on a higher pedestal than evidentiary admissions made
in the form of correspondence etc. and that judicial admissions can be a
basis in themselves for deciding the claim. The relevant para 27 of the
judgment in the case of Nagindas Ramdas (supra) reads as under:—
“27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar the principle
that emerges is that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there
was some material before the Court, on the basis of which the Court
could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory
ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so
satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis
of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape
either of evidence recorded or produced in the case or, it may partly
or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in
the compromise agreement itself. Admissions if true and clear are by
far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or
judicial admission admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act,
made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the
case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admission. The
former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes
them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be
made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand
evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the rival as evidence
are by themselves not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”
(underlining added)
13. In my opinion the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Nagindas Ramdas (supra) squarely applies to the facts of
the present case because it is not disputed that the
appellant/defendant had in fact filed a criminal complaint against the
respondents/plaintiffs and wherein the factum of existence of tenancy
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was never disputed. In fact in this criminal complaint admittedly there

is not even a whisper that the appellant/defendant was a prospective
purchaser under an agreement to sell of the suit property with the
respondents/plaintiffs. Therefore, on the basis of such judicial
admissions, trial court was in fact justified in decreeing the suit under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC because there clearly existed a relationship of
landlord and tenant between the parties and that there was no
agreement to sell between the parties as contended on behalf of the
appellant/defendant and which plea in the written statement would
stand nullified in view of the judicial admissions made in the criminal
complaint filed by the appellant/defendant.
14. The argument urged on behalf of the counsel for the
appellant/defendant that the trial court could not have referred to the
criminal complaint which was filed with the replication, inasmuch as,
this criminal complaint was not filed with the plaint but only
subsequently filed with the replication, is an argument in my opinion
only of desperation. The provision of filing of documents are procedural
and it is not disputed that documents can be filed as of right till
framing of issues by virtue of Order XIII Rule 1 CPC. of course
permission of the court would have to be taken if the documents are
not filed with the plaint, however, in this case the permission granted
by the court has to be taken as having been impliedly given because
the trial court has duly considered the document being the criminal
complaint filed by the appellant/defendant against the
respondents/plaintiffs, and therefore this technical argument urged on
behalf of the appellant/defendant that the trial court could not have
looked into the criminal complaint filed by the appellant/defendant is
rejected.
15. I may also note at this stage that learned counsel for the
respondents/plaintiffs is also justified in referring to the fact that in the
reply to the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC
appellant/defendant with respect to that portion of the application
under Order XII Rule 6 CPC containing the factum with respect to
admission of the appellant/defendant that he is a tenant as stated in
the criminal complaint, this fact was not disputed in the reply to the
application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC that such a criminal complaint
was in fact filed.
16. The contention urged on behalf of the appellant/defendant that
the registered lease agreement dated 14.7.2014 is liable to be declared
as null and void because of the counter-claim and for consequent
dismissal of the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, is an argument
without merit for two reasons.
17. The first reason for rejecting the argument that the existence of
counter-claim would be a bar to allowing the application under Order
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XII Rule 6 CPC, is a misconceived argument because an agreement to

sell, assuming for the sake of arguments, even if parties have entered
into the same, this agreement to sell does not give a right to a
prospective purchaser to on that basis stay in the suit premises unless
the agreement to sell encompasses the doctrine of part performance
contained in Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. With
effect from 24.9.2001 Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was
amended whereby an agreement to sell in the nature of part
performance will only be looked into if there is a written agreement
which not only should be duly registered but it should be stamped with
the stamp duty of 90% value of the sale consideration. Admittedly, this
Court does not have before it any registered agreement to sell falling
within the scope of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act for the
appellant/defendant to claim benefit of continuing to remain in the
possession of the suit premises. Trial court could have admittedly
decreed the suit for possession because even if the appellant/defendant
for the sake of arguments is taken not to be a tenant, yet the
appellant/defendant still would have no legal right, title or interest to
continue in the suit property. Of course I hasten to add that the
appellant/defendant is a tenant under the registered lease agreement
dated 14.7.2014 and that appellant/defendant cannot dishonestly shy
away from this fact, and as stated in the discussion hereinafter.
18. The contention of the appellant/defendant in the written
statement as also in the counter-claim was that he did not read the
registered lease deed dated 14.7.2014 entered into by him with the
respondents/plaintiffs on account of paucity of time and good faith. It is
pleaded by the appellant/defendant that respondents/plaintiffs
committed a fraud upon the appellant/defendant by getting a
registered lease deed signed instead of an agreement to sell.
19. In my opinion, this defence and counter-claim filed by the
appellant/defendant would be barred by the provisions of Sections 91
and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Once a contract between the
parties is contained in a written document, then only that document
and nothing else can be looked into to prove the terms of the
document. No parol evidence is permissible to look into the contents of
the documents. Appellant/defendant does not dispute that he did
execute the registered lease deed dated 14.7.2014, of course with the
contention that he did not read it on account of paucity of time and
thus the respondents/plaintiffs are said to have perpetuated a fraud
upon him. No doubt the First Proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act
allows a person who is a party to a document to question the document
on the ground of fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution
etc, however, this Proviso is only applicable in totality of the facts of a
particular case where fraud as required by law is found to be sufficiently
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pleaded. The object of the First Proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence

Act is to give benefit of those cases where a person has been defrauded
or intimidated or there is want of due execution in execution of the
document. Surely saying that the appellant/defendant himself did not
read the registered lease deed dated 14.7.2014 on account of paucity
of time and good faith cannot be equated to a fraud being perpetuated
by the respondents/plaintiffs because fraud is defined in Section 17 of
the Indian Contract Act, 1872 requiring that there must exist deliberate
false representation with intent to deceive or concealment of facts with
intent to deceive. When appellant/defendant pleads he did not read the
registered lease deed dated 14.7.2014 on account of paucity of time
then there is no pleading of fraud as defined by Section 17 of the
Contract Act. If such type of defences as urged by the
appellant/defendant are allowed to be urged for being accepted by the
First Proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act, then the purpose of the
Legislature in having exceptions to Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence
Act in limited circumstances will in fact result in wiping off from the
Statute books Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. I refuse to allow,
in the facts of the present case, appellant/defendant to succeed on the
contention that the appellant/defendant would have the benefit of the
First Proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act because there is a
registered lease deed between the parties and that the registered lease
deed is admittedly signed by the appellant/defendant, and the
registered lease deed was further signed by appellant/defendant before
the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration and for registering of the
lease deed, and that the appellant/defendant never had at any point of
time prior to the filing of the written statement and counter-claim ever
claimed that any fraud was perpetuated upon the appellant/defendant
that actually instead of an agreement to sell a registered lease deed
was got signed by the appellant/defendant and finally there is no
pleading of fraud as required by Section 17 of the Contract Act.
20. Another extremely important aspect for the appellant/defendant
to be denied the benefit of any exception or the Proviso to Section 92 of
the Evidence Act is that the registered lease deed dated 14.7.2014 is
witnessed by the father of the appellant/defendant and it is not
disputed before this Court on a query being put by counsel for the
appellant/defendant that the father of the appellant/defendant did in
fact sign as a witness to this lease deed dated 14.7.2014. Thus this
admission will deny the appellant/defendant entitlement to claim that a
fraud was played upon him, even assuming a case of fraud as per
Section 17 of the Contract Act is pleaded though actually it is not so
pleaded.
21. A reading of the above facts show that the appellant/defendant
is one such dishonest person to whom this Court must be unsparing
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with respect to decision not only for dismissal of this appeal, but also
that harshest of steps be initiated against the appellant/defendant for
gross abuse of the process of law.
22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this appeal is dismissed with
costs of Rs. 10,00,000/-. Costs shall be paid by the
appellant/defendant within a period of six weeks from today. I am
entitled to impose actual cost by virtue of provision Punjab High Court
Rules and Orders (as applicable to Delhi) Chapter VI Part I Rule
15 read with the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi (2011) 8 SCC 249. Out of the
total costs of Rs. 10,00,000/-, a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- will be paid by
the appellant/defendant to the respondents/plaintiffs including by
noting that the trial court has not awarded any costs in favour of the
respondents/plaintiffs and against the appellant/defendant. The
balance amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- will be deposited by the
appellant/defendant with the website www.bharatkeveer.gov.in within a
period of six weeks from today.
23. I may note that the power to impose costs in terms of Section
35 CPC is on account of costs incurred by a party, but there is no
provision in CPC for imposition of costs on a person for initiating a
completely false litigation and claim, abusing the process of law and
causing gross wastage of judicial time. With respect to the abuse of
judicial process and with respect to filing of false claims since the issue
is not covered by Section 35 CPC, the same would therefore be covered
by Section 151 CPC under the inherent powers of this Court. I have,
therefore, imposed costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- to be deposited with the
website www.bharatkeveer.gov.in, in exercise of inherent powers of this
Court under Section 151 CPC.
24. In addition to dismissing of this appeal, this Court directs the
Registrar General of this Court to file a complaint with the concerned
Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 209 IPC as against the
appellant/defendant for having filed a false claim in a Court of law of
the appellant/defendant not being a tenant but being an alleged
prospective purchaser under an agreement to sell. This criminal
complaint should be filed by the Registrar General of this Court as
against the appellant/defendant within a period of six weeks from
today. The concerned Metropolitan Magistrate, in accordance with law
will thereafter proceed on the criminal complaint filed by the Registrar
General of this Court under Section 209 IPC. I also further clarify that
respondents/plaintiffs herein will be entitled to be a party to the
complaint and seek to prosecute such complaint jointly or severely.
25. Contempt of this Court is defined in Section 2 of the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971. Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act reads as
under:—
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“2. Definitions.
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -
(a) “Contempt of court” means civil contempt or criminal
contempt”
(b) “Civil contempt” means willful disobedience to any
judgement, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a
court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court.
(c) “Criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by
words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any
other act whatsoever which-
(i) Scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to
lower the authority of, any court, or
(ii) Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due
course of any judicial proceeding, or
(iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends
to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other
manner.
(d) “High Court” means the High Court for a State or a Union
territory and includes the court of the Judicial Commissioner in
any Union territory.
26. Where ever an action of a person results in scandalizing the
Court or tends to lower the authority of the Court or prejudices or
interferes with the due course of judicial proceeding or obstructs the
administration of justice, criminal contempt arises. In my opinion,
besides the appellant/defendant being directed to be proceeded against
under Section 209 IPC, since a completely false and dishonest claim is
set up by the appellant/defendant clearly tending to interfere with the
due course of judicial proceedings having the effect of obstructing the
administration of justice requiring the respondents/plaintiffs/landlord to
get back possession of a tenanted premises from a recalcitrant tenant,
accordingly notices of criminal contempt of Court are issued against the
appellant/defendant. Appellant/defendant is present in Court, he is
directed to accept the same. Accordingly, on the criminal contempt
notice being issued, proceedings will now commence as against the
appellant/defendant for committing Criminal Contempt of Court and
with respect to criminal contempt as against the appellant/defendant
the matter be placed before the Roster Bench hearing criminal
contempt petitions. Notice of contempt is returnable for 13th March,
2018. Criminal complaint besides being against the
appellant/defendant will also be against the wife of the
appellant/defendant, namely Smt. Neelam Saini and who has filed the
present appeal as attorney holder of the appellant/defendant and Smt.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neelam Saini is also personally present in Court and who is also

directed to accept notice of criminal contempt.
27. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with the aforesaid
observations and also by issuing directions as aforesaid.
———
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SCC Online Web Edition, © 2024 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.

Page 1 Tuesday, January 16, 2024

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Praveen Saini .…. Appellant

documents which have been annexed alongwith the plaint as well as

contents of the documents only for delaying trial being barred by

basis that counter-claim is being heard on merits without payment of

was never disputed. In fact in this criminal complaint admittedly there

XII Rule 6 CPC, is a misconceived argument because an agreement to

pleaded. The object of the First Proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence

Neelam Saini is also personally present in Court and who is also

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