PART 2 Miguel Vs Sandiganbayan

Case Brief: Miguel vs Sandiganbayan
MAY 30, 2019 JEFF REY

G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
FACTS:
The antecedent facts, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials
of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao charging the petitioner, among others, with violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the
architectural aspect, the engineering design and the construction supervision and
management the proposed Koronadal City public market (project).
In its resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and
some private individuals for violations of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner
alone for Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the RPC
corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.
In the Information essentially said that petitioner committed the offense charged,
taking advantage of his position, and acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality. The Information was worded as follows:
INFORMATION FILED:
That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the petitioner, a high ranking public
officer in his capacity as former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
petitioner, a high ranking public Officer in his capacity as former Municipal
Mayor of Korondal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of
hid official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office,
taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with
the private individuals acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits and advantages to said accused, by inviting them to participate in
the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed Architectural &
Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and Management of the
proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of said
invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other
consultants from participating in said prequalification.
Prior to the arraignment, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to conduct reinvestigation and wherein the petitioner gave (10) days within
which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP. Despite the extension given, he failed
to submit his counter-affidavit.
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This prompted the prosecutor to declare the petitioner has waived his right to submit
counteravailing evidence and asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment. Petitioner
then asked an extension to file a motion to quash and/or reinvestigation, however it
was denied due to the already pending reinvestigation and his apparent failure to
submit a counter affidavit. Petitioner did not question this denial.
The petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases.
The OSP filed a Motion to Suspend the petitioner Pendente Lite. The petitioner filed
his “Vigorous Opposition” based on the “obvious and fatal defect of the information”
in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The
Sandiganbayan suspended the petitioner pendente lite.
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering
his suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of
unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through “manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.” He alleges that the
phrases “evident bad faith” and “manifest partiality” actually refers not to him, but to
his co-accused, rendering the information fatally defective. The petitioner bewails the
lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v.
Hon. Mariano, etc., et al., he claims that “nowhere in the records of the case can one
see any order or resolution requiring the petitioner to show cause at a specific date of
hearing why he should not be ordered suspended.” For the petitioner, the requirement
of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an
actual hearing to settle the “defect” in the information.
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the elements of the
offense under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of
ultimate facts. Also, the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was
conducted, the events preceding the issuance of the suspension order already satisfied
the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension hearing – i.e., basically, to determine the
validity of the information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to preliminary
investigation both by the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner moved for
a reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner was
charged constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 and Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code; and the petitioner already moved to quash the information, although
unsuccessfully, after he had been declared to have waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence in the reinvestigation by the OSP.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, is valid.
HELD:
Yes. The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid.
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and

the cause of the accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires that the information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute
the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and
its attendant circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged and for the court to pronounce judgment. The test of the
Information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms
and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly
charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the
complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense
charged as defined in the law.
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond
the standard of a person of common understanding in appreciating the import of the
phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality. A reading of the
information clearly reveals that the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality” was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the
petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals.
This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have SC believe that this elemental
phrase was actually omitted in the Information when, in his reaction to the OSP’s
comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the phrase’s
position, in relation with the other averments in the information. Given the supposed
ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase “acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality,” the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to
move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which
sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.
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Sidenote:
The issue #2 was whether or not the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing
renders invalid the suspension order against the petitioner. SC held that the pre-
suspension order is valid. The suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere
preventive measure that arises from the legal presumption that unless the accused is
suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or
do both, in the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the
law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. Suspension
under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall in no
case exceed ninety (90) days, the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the validity
of the information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the merits
of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or presence
of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however
unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and
sufficiently serves both the due process right of the accused and the mandatory nature
of the suspension required by law.

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PART 2 Miguel Vs Sandiganbayan

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Case Brief: Miguel vs Sandiganbayan

MAY 30, 2019 JEFF REY

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and

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