January 17, 2024

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas

Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Mayorkas,

We are writing to urge you to take immediate action to strengthen enforcement of the
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA). This landmark law, which passed with
overwhelming bipartisan support, clearly signaled Americans’ refusal to allow products made by
the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) forced labor programs from entering the United States.
While we appreciate steps the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken to stem the
flow of these goods into our market, we remain deeply concerned that products tied to the CCP’s
ongoing genocide against Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR) continue to find their way into American households.

We believe that several factors seriously undermine the effective enforcement of the
UFLPA. The first of these is that companies transfer forced laborers from the XUAR to other
regions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), complicating DHS enforcement of the
presumptive ban on forced labor products from the XUAR. Thus, there is an urgent need to
expand the UFLPA Entity List to include numerous companies and entities located outside the
XUAR because of the affiliation to companies and entities in the region, particularly those
involved in the seafood, gold, and critical minerals industries.

The Committee is concerned about reports that PRC companies that have participated in
government-sponsored labor transfer programs have not yet been added to the UFLPA Entity
List. As explicitly stated in the UFLPA, the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force’s (FLETF)
enforcement strategy should include a list of entities that work to “recruit, transport, transfer,
harbor or receive forced labor.” The intent of the law and the UFLPA Entity List is to ensure that
the FLETF designates any company, entity, or industrial park that is engaged in, supports, or
benefits from labor transfers, regardless of whether they are in the XUAR or another province.
 The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
January 17, 2024
Page 2 of 9

For example, in a report by Outlaw Ocean Project, researchers exposed the extensive
labor-transfer program the CCP is using to force Uyghurs to work in coastal seafood processing
plants.1 Since 2018, at least ten large seafood companies along the PRC’s east coast have used
more than a thousand Uyghur workers associated with labor-transfer programs to ship at least
47,000 metric tons of seafood to over 160 U.S. companies, including major grocery chains.2 The
U.S. government has also purchased more than $200 million of tainted seafood goods from these
suppliers for American public schools, military bases, and federal prisons over the last five years.

Uyghur forced labor also pervades the U.S. gold and critical minerals markets. According
to a report by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, 1,482 U.S. companies maintain supply
chain relationships with at least 13 publicly listed PRC gold companies that have active mines
located in the XUAR.3 These American companies sell products ranging from children’s toys to
automobiles and telecommunications.4 As the UFLPA states, all minerals mined in Xinjiang are
presumed to have used forced labor and are therefore banned from importation into the U.S.
Many of the PRC gold suppliers in these companies’ supply chains further obfuscate their ties to
Uyghur forced labor by locating their headquarters outside the XUAR.5

Extensive mining and processing of critical minerals in the XUAR likewise compromise
U.S. supply chains, including for electric vehicle batteries and the defense industrial base. For
example, Akto Kebang Manganese Manufacturing company, which has extensive ties to the
global automobile industry, is closely involved with companies profiting from Uyghur forced
labor in the XUAR.6 Reporting also indicates that companies in this sector seek to obfuscate their
involvement with entities that process critical minerals potentially for illicit purposes such as
evading regulatory scrutiny, avoiding accountability for potential forced labor, or manipulating
public perception.7 Regarding the defense industrial base, the PRC has a “near monopoly” on
many rare earth minerals that are critical for weapons systems, to include the U.S. Global
Positioning System (GPS), precision-guided weapons, and radar systems.8 Many of these
minerals are mined in Xinjiang by companies and entities that pose forced labor risk.9

1
Ian Urbina, “The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish,” The New Yorker, October 9, 2023,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-uyghurs-forced-to-process-the-worlds-fish.
2
Urbina, “The Uyghurs Forced to Process the World’s Fish.”
3
Center for Advanced Defense Studies, “Fractured Veins: The World’s Reliance on Minerals from the Uyghur
Region,” October 11, 2023, https://c4ads.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/FRACTURED-VEINS-FINAL.pdf.
4
Center for Advanced Defense Studies, “Fractured Veins.”
5
Center for Advanced Defense Studies, “Fractured Veins.”
6
Laura Murphy, Kendyl Salcito, Yalkun Uluyol, and Mia Rabkin, “Driving Force: Automotive Supply Chains and
Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region,” Sheffield Hallam University, December 2022.
7
Laura Murphy, Kendyl Salcito, Yalkun Uluyol, and Mia Rabkin, “Driving Force.”
8
Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “De-risking Gallium Supply Chains: The National
Security Case for Eroding China’s Critical Mineral Dominance,” Center for Strategic & International Studies,
August 3, 2023.
9
Rodrigo Castillo and Caitlin Purdy, “China’s Role in Supplying Critical Minerals for the Global Energy
Transition,” Brookings Institution, July 2022.
 The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
January 17, 2024
Page 3 of 9

A second factor undermining enforcement of the UFLPA is Beijing’s increased

transshipment of forced labor products to the United States through third countries, including
U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) partners. According to CBP’s UFLPA Dashboard, other Asian
countries now outpace the PRC for the most detained shipments by value. This trend is evident
in the electronics sector, where goods detained from Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand since June
2022 were valued at $1.16 billion, $511.14 million, and $157.79 million, respectively, far
outpacing the PRC’s $5.24 million of detained goods. 10

In the apparel, footwear, and textiles sector Vietnam also surpasses the PRC for products
detained for UFLPA violations.11 Vietnam, among many other countries, extensively sources
cotton, yarn, and fabric from the PRC – where 90 percent of cotton originates in the XUAR12 –
to produce finished textile goods for export to the United States. According to the U.S.
International Trade Commission, these third-country exporters are likely a significant channel
through which Xinjiang-origin cotton enters the United States.13 Despite these concerns, between
June 2022 and September 2023, CBP detained an anemic $43 million in shipments of textiles,
apparel, and footwear despite total U.S. imports of $184 billion in this sector in 2022 and DHS
identifying cotton as a UFLPA priority enforcement sector.14 Given the massive volume of
imports in a sector flagged for priority enforcement, we would expect to see regular large-scale
detentions of these products. Instead, CBP’s average UFLPA reviews per month for textile and
apparel goods actually dropped in 2023 compared to 2022.15 These numbers also exclude
potential textile and other forced labor products shipped through the de minimis channel, a
classification not recorded by CBP, and a serious concern highlighted in the Committee’s “Fast
Fashion and the Uyghur Genocide: Interim Findings” report.16

The United States’ FTA partners in the Western Hemisphere are also transshipping
Uyghur forced labor goods into the U.S. market. For example, despite a strong yarn-forward rule
of origin provision granting duty-free benefits for apparel using yarn and fabric from member
countries of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States (CAFTA-DR) and U.S.-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) FTAs, CBP detained six shipments from Nicaragua for
testing positive for Xinjiang cotton in July 2023.17 These detentions occurred months after
Nicaragua signed an FTA with the PRC that included “raw materials for textiles,” raising

10
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Statistics,” accessed January 8, 2024.
11
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Statistics.”
12
Eric Davis and Fred Gale, “Shift in Geography of China’s Cotton Production Reshapes Global Market,” U.S.
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, December 5, 2022.
13
Laura T. Murphy, et al., “Laundering Cotton: How Xinjiang Cotton is Obscured in International Supply Chains,”
Sheffield Hallam University, November 2021.
14
Dylan Carlson and Marin Weaver, “Disentangling the Knot: Identifying U.S. and Global Exposure to Xinjiang
Cotton,” U.S. International Trade Commission Office of Industries, October 2022.
15
UFLPA Dashboard, accessed November 18, 2023.
16
Select Committee on the CCP, “Fast Fashion and the Uyghur Genocide: Interim Findings,” June 22, 2023.
17
Testimony of Kim Glas, Hearing on Exploitation and Enforcement: Evaluating the Department of Homeland
Security’s Efforts to Counter Uyghur Forced Labor, House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Accountability, October 19, 2023.
 The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
January 17, 2024
Page 4 of 9

concerns that CAFTA-DR exports of textiles and apparel to the United States may violate both
the UFLPA and CAFTA-DR’s yarn-forward rule of origin.18

To address these concerns, we urge DHS to aggressively step up enforcement of potential

UFLPA violations by goods shipped from the PRC and indirectly through third countries. These
measures should include adding companies outside the PRC that profit from the use of Uyghur
forced labor to the UFLPA Entity List; exponentially increasing testing of goods at ports of entry
for UFLPA violations, including by expanding the use of isotopic and other testing; and better
publicizing CBP’s enforcement activities to deter would-be violators. CBP should also increase
its on-site inspections of production sites in CAFTA-DR and USMCA countries to conduct rule
of origin verification investigations, which have plummeted in recent years despite a massive
influx of yarns and fabrics from the PRC into the region.19

In addition, DHS should significantly enhance its collaboration with federal agencies that
have a level of responsibility and additional resources that could be helpful in your enforcement
activities. For example, the Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative could assist in identifying suspicious global trade patterns involving the PRC to
help target countries that are potentially serving as transshipment points and to identify specific
products potentially made with forced labor. DHS should also urgently expand its collaboration
with the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) “Trade Fraud Task Force,” which is responsible for
prosecuting and assessing penalties against violators of U.S. trade statues, including UFLPA. We
are concerned that DOJ has limited the authority of and woefully under-resourced this task force,
which is responsible for prosecuting cases across the estimated $163-$327 billion a year that
international trade crime (i.e. lack of rule of origin compliance, illegal importation of banned
good, etc.) costs the United States.

Substantially expanded national-level collaboration between DHS, DOJ, and other

interagency partners in prosecuting international trade crimes will be essential for effectively
enforcing the UFLPA. Without the deterrent effect of substantially increased levels of legal
actions against trade crime perpetrators, companies will continue violating the UFLPA at will.
The lack of prosecutions to date could explain why the United States imported $3.27 trillion in
goods in 2022, but CBP only collected $19.3 million in penalties that year. We applaud the
recent establishment of DHS’s Center for Countering Human Trafficking to help combat the
importation of goods produced with forced labor. Nevertheless, we view this as only a first step
and urge DHS to use this center to significantly enhance cooperation with DOJ’s Trade Fraud
Task Force and other interagency partners to increase criminal prosecutions against persons
profiting off the use of Uyghur forced labor, including in all UFLPA priority sectors as well as in
the critical minerals and seafood industries.

18
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Statistics.”
19
Testimony of Kim Glas, Hearing on Exploitation and Enforcement.
 The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
January 17, 2024
Page 5 of 9

Finally, given the complexity and urgency of these needed actions, we urge DHS to
appoint a top-level political official with the mandate to lead and coordinate its UFLPA
enforcement efforts.

A final factor undermining enforcement of the UFLPA is the de minimis provision in

U.S. trade law which presents serious challenges to DHS and CBP’s effective enforcement of the
UFLPA. Since the de minimis threshold was raised from $200 to $800 by the Trade Facilitation
and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 and with the rise of new online-only retailers, the scale of de
minimis imports arriving in the United States has surged from 150 million packages in 2016 to
720 million in 2021, of which more than half—440 million packages—were from the PRC. This
exponential growth continued in 2023, with de minimis shipments topping one billion. As
outlined in the Select Committee’s June 2023 report on PRC fast fashion companies, Shein and
Temu alone account for nearly 30% of all packages shipped to the United States daily under the
de minimis provision, and likely nearly half of all de minimis shipments to the United States
originate from the PRC. The investigation further found that PRC companies rely on the de
minimis provision to avoid bearing responsibility for compliance with the UFLPA and other
prohibitions on forced labor while relying on tens of thousands of PRC suppliers to ship goods
direct to U.S. consumers.

Assessing UFLPA compliance for de minimis shipments is challenging since packages

shipped via this provision include limited data and do not require a customs broker. According to
the Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee, transmitted data for de minimis
shipments “often does not adequately identify the entity causing the shipment to cross the border,
the final recipient, or the contents of the package.”20 CBP itself has attested to the challenges of
monitoring de minimis shipments for UFLPA compliance. As it stated in 2022, “[t]he
overwhelming volume of small packages and lack of actionable data limits CBP’s ability to
identify and interdict high-risk shipments that may contain narcotics, merchandise that poses a
risk to public safety, counterfeits, or other contraband”—presumably including goods made with
forced labor.21 CBP concluded that the massive volume of packages shipped via de minimis
amounts to “1 billion shipments with insufficient data to properly determine risk. That is an
unacceptable risk to the American people.”22

In short, the de minimis provision has created a major avenue for goods made by forced
labor—as well as fentanyl, counterfeit products, and other unsafe goods—to enter the U.S.
market. Moreover, we do not believe CBP pilot programs to collect additional data on de
minimis shipments will adequately stem the flow of these goods into the United States. Under
existing statute, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to “prescribe exceptions” to de

20
Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee, “Government Issue Paper: Next Generation Facilitation
Subcommittee E-Commerce Task Force,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, June 2023.
21
Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee, “Government Issue Paper: E-Commerce,” U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, June 2022.
22
Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee, “E-Commerce.”
 The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
January 17, 2024
Page 6 of 9

minimis exemptions if deemed “necessary for any reason to … prevent unlawful importations.”
We therefore request DHS’s written assessment of the potential effect on UFLPA enforcement
efforts of altering de minimis eligibility for textile and apparel and other high-risk items,
including determining whether exceptions to de minimis treatment are warranted for certain high-
risk items to prevent unlawful importations.

In addition to the requests contained in this letter, we respectfully request that you
provide written responses to the following questions no later than March 1, 2024:

1. Whether any of the following 29 entities have been involved in using Uyghur forced
labor and meet the criteria for being placed on the UFLPA Entity List. In the event you
determine any of the below entities do not meet the criteria for designation, please
elaborate on your reasoning for each case:
a. Chishan Group Co., Ltd.
b. Qingdao Lian Yang Aquatic Product Co., Ltd.
c. Qingdao Tianyuan Aquatic Foodstuff Co., Ltd.
d. Rizhao Jiayuan Foodstuff Co., Ltd.
e. Rizhao Meijia Aquatic Foodstuff Co., Ltd.
f. Rizhao Meijia Keyuan Foods Co., Ltd.
g. Rizhao Rirong Aquatic Products Food Co., Ltd.
h. Rizhao Rongxing Food Co., Ltd.
i. Rongcheng Haibo Seafood Co., Ltd.
j. Rongcheng City Xinhui Aquatic Co., Ltd.
k. Shandong Haidu Ocean Product Co., Ltd.
l. Yantai Longwin Foods Co., Ltd.
m. Yantai Sanko Fisheries Co., Ltd.
n. Baiyin Nonferrous Group Co., Ltd.
o. China Baowu Iron and Steel Group Co., Ltd.
p. China Daye Nonferrous Metals Mining Co., Ltd.
q. China Molybdenum Co., Ltd.
r. Jiuquan Iron and Steel Group Co., Ltd.
s. Lingbao Gold Group Co., Ltd.
t. Shandong Gold Group Co., Ltd.
u. Western Mining Co., Ltd.
v. Xinjiang Baodi Mining Co., Ltd.
w. Xinjiang Nonferrous Metal Industry Group Co., Ltd.
x. Xinjiang TBEA Group Co., Ltd.
y. Zhaojin Mining Industry Co., Ltd.
z. Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd.
aa. TBEA Co. Ltd.
bb. Western Region Gold Co., Ltd.
cc. Akto Kebang Manganese Manufacturing Co., Ltd.
 The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
January 17, 2024
Page 7 of 9

2. The UFLPA Entity List is meant to deter entities from using forced labor. There are
multiple groups advocating for more companies to be added to the list, yet there are only
41 entities currently on the list. Why is CBP not more robustly using this enforcement
tool, and what reforms might be necessary to improve the tool’s effectiveness?
3. Despite nearly two billion dollars’ worth of shipments from third countries being
detained for UFLPA violations, why has DHS not listed a single company outside the
PRC on the UFLPA Entity List? What additional tools or resources does CBP need to
expand its capacity to monitor shipments from third countries?
4. DHS has never provided a list of entities that meet the threshold for inclusion on the
UFLPA Entity List as described in UFLPA Section 2(d)(2)(B)(iv). According to the DHS
website, DHS has “not identified additional exporters” that meet the threshold for
inclusion on the risk. Meanwhile, civil society and the private sector have identified
multiple companies that meet this threshold. Why has DHS not created “a list of entities
that exported products” from Xinjiang as mandated in the UFLPA?
5. What is DHS’s plan to designate additional companies, entities, and industrial parks that
have either participated in or benefited from state-sponsored labor transfers? According
to information reviewed by the Committee, dozens of industrial parks and companies that
have taken part in labor transfer programs have not yet been designated.
6. How does CBP prioritize different sectors for UFLPA enforcement and how are those
determinations made? What level of attention have targeted sectors received in terms of
enforcement, respectively?
7. Given textile and apparel’s identification as a UFLPA priority enforcement sector, why is
CBP enforcement for this sector astonishingly low relative to its volume of imports and
declining?
8. Why is isotopic testing not being aggressively expanded, and what impact would CBP
expect an expansive isotopic testing program to have on finding and stopping UFLPA
imports of textiles and apparel? Why is CBP only utilizing one isotopic testing company,
and has CBP sought competitive bids for isotopic testing to ensure it is receiving good
value?
9. What forms of testing is CBP using to ensure UFLPA compliance outside of isotopic
testing? Are there other forms of testing that might be more effective for enforcement?
10. In addition to testing at ports upon arrival, is DHS using isotopic testing for garments at
U.S. retail to determine origin? If not, what barriers exist for DHS to conduct isotopic
testing on products at retail?
11. How many companies has DHS investigated to date for profiting from Uyghur forced
labor under the UFLPA or U.S. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act?
What is DHS’s plan to expand prosecution under these laws?
12. Since the PRC joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, how many people have
been sentenced to prison for committing international trade crimes involving companies
or entities located in the PRC like AD/CVD, country of origin, undervaluation, and
misclassification, and how much money was recovered?
 The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
January 17, 2024
Page 8 of 9

13. Due to the complexity of trade crimes that are often both national and international in
nature, does DHS believe its Center for Countering Human Trafficking is adequately
resourced to serve as the full-time, national-level dedicated unit of expert agents needed
to fully investigate and prosecute trade-related crimes across jurisdictions? If it doesn’t,
why not?
14. What if any collaboration exists between DHS and DOJ’s Trade Fraud Task Force
regarding UFLPA enforcement? What are the barriers to expanded collaboration and
enforcement actions between these two agencies?
15. Since by the time cases are prosecuted, many manufacturing industries go out of
business, what are concrete actions HSI and DOJ could take today to expedite legal
proceedings to stem job loss in U.S. manufacturing industries?
16. What if any collaboration exists between DHS and/or CBP and the U.S. Intelligence
Community on issues related to the UFLPA, particularly on issues relating to tracking
rare earth and critical minerals mined and processed in-whole or in-part in Xinjiang?
Does the FLETF maintain access to secure facilities to access and action relevant
intelligence reporting? How many CBP and FLETF employees maintain security
clearances? Would additional Intelligence Community resources and expertise help CBP
and DHS efforts to expand UFLPA enforcement?
17. How is CBP enforcing UFLPA for de minimis shipments and how many de minimis
shipments have been detained for violating UFLPA since June 2022? What percentage of
UFLPA non-compliant goods shipped via de minimis does CBP believe it is detaining?
18. Can CBP calculate how much fentanyl is entering the United States via de minimis?
19. What new tools, funding, or authorities does CBP require to improve enforcement of the
UFLPA?
20. Congress has been alerted that FLETF does not maintain its own funding line. As the
FLETF Chair, what resources does DHS need to fully implement a robust and efficient
UFLPA Entity List process? How many additional FTEs does DHS need to support the
UFLPA Entity List process?
21. What additional financial resources do other FLETF members need to fully implement
statutory requirements for the expansion of the UFLPA Entity List?

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and
the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to “investigate and submit policy
recommendations on the status of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic, technological, and
security progress and its competition with the United States” under H. Res. 11.

To make arrangements to deliver a response, please contact Select Committee staff at

(202) 226-9678.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter and for your prompt reply.
 The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
January 17, 2024
Page 9 of 9

Sincerely,

___________________________ _____________________________
Mike Gallagher Raja Krishnamoorthi
Chairman Ranking Member
House Select Committee on the CCP House Select Committee on the CCP

CC: The Honorable Merrick Garland, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice