Sison V Suntay

10/30/23, 11:36 PM PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 102
[No. L-10000. December 28, 1957]
Intestate estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,

deceased. TEOFILO SISON, claimant and appellant, vs.
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, respondent-administrator and
appellee.
1. ATTORNEY'S FEES; REASONABLE COMPENSATION

FOR COUNSEL FOR ADMINISTRATOR OF
INTESTATE ESTATE, How DETERMINED.—In
determining what would be reasonable compensation for
the attorney for an administrator or executor of the
intestate estate, the size and value of the decedent's
estate, as well as the services performed by counsel,
should be taken into consideration.
2. ID.; ID.; VALUE OF ESTATE, How DETERMINED.—The

rule in the valuation of property on eminent domain
proceedings is not applicable to the appraisal of the
decedent's estate. In the latter case, what is needed is a
mere approximate valuation of the estate's worth. For
such purpose, oral testimony and documents of sales of
similar property in the same town or neighboring localities
are competent evidence.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of

Bulacan. Perez, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Nicanor S. Sison for appellant.
H. B. Arandia for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Bulacan Court of First

instance denying appellant's claim for additional
professional fees.
"The matter before the Court" said the judge, "is the petition
dated December 29, 1954, filed by Atty. Teofilo Sison, asking for
770
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018b813b94bbf166b69d000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/17
770 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sison vs. Suntay
allowance and payment of his claim for attorney's fees in the

amount of P400,000.00 for services rendered as counsel for
respondent-administrator, Federico C. Suntay.
For a proper understanding of the claimant's claim, it is
pertinent to recite the back-ground of this case and the
circumstances under which Mr. Sison came to be engaged as
counsel for the respondent-administrator. On May 14, 1934, Jose
B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen, died in Amoy, Fokien, China, leaving
properties in the Philippines and in China and children in the
first marriage had with the deceased Manuela T. Cruz; namely,
Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora,
Emiliano and Jose, Jr., and a child named Silvano by the second
marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian, who survived the
deceased Jose B. Suntay.
The present intestate estate proceeding was instituted and
letters of administration issued to Apolonio Suntay and, when the
latter died, Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of
the estate. On October 15, 1934, the surviving widow filed in this
Court a petition for the probate of a last will and testament
claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines in
November, 1929, by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was
denied because of the loss of the said will and insufficiency of
evidence to establish its loss. Appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court from this- order and the latter Court held that there was
sufficient evidence to prove the loss of the will and the case was
remanded to this Court for further proceedings (63 Phil. 793). The
petition for probate was subsequently dismissed by this Court
because an attestingwitness who was in China could not come to
the Philippines. The war broke out.
After liberation, Silvino Suntay filed an alternative petition in
this case on June 18, 1947 praying for the probate of the will
which was allegedly executed by Jose B. Suntay in the Philippines
in November, 1929, or of the will allegedly executed by said
deceased in Amoy, Fokien, China on January 4, 1931. (Exhibit F,
pp. 2-15) Administrator Federico C. Suntay filed a motion thru his
lawyers, Attys. Roxas, Picazo and Mejia, asking for the dismissal
of this petition of Silvino Suntay. Administrator Federico C.
Suntay likewise filed thru his lawyers, Attys. Roxas, Picazo and
Mejia, his opposition to Silvino Suntay's alternative petition for
probate (Exhibit F, pp. 56-61).
The alternative petition for probate filed by Silvino Suntay was
heard before this Court, the hearing commencing on October 13,
1947 and was terminated on March 9, 1948, or almost seven
months from its commencement, and - in all the hearings,
administrator Federico C. Suntay was represented by his lawyers,

Attys. Roxas,
771
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 771

Sison vs. Suntay
Picazo and Mejia. After the hearing was terminated, the parties
filed their respective memorandum. The memorandum for the
respondent-administrator Federico C. Suntay (Exhibit 2) was filed
by his lawyers, Attys. Roxas, Picazo and Mejia.
On April 19, 1948, Judge Pecson issued an order granting the
petition of Silvino Suntay (Exhibit F, pp. 75-93). On May 20, 1948,
respondent-administrator Federico C. Suntay filed thru his
lawyers, Attys. Roxas, Picazo and Mejia, a motion for
reconsideration and new trial asking that the order of April 19,
1948, issued by Judge Pecson, be set aside and a new trial had
(Exhibit F, pp. 148-222). Written opposition to this petition was
filed by Atty. Claro M. Recto for Silvino Suntay.
While the respondent-administrator's motion for
reconsideration and new trial was pending resolution, claimant
Atty. Teofilo Sison was engaged as counsel by said respondent-
administrator Federico C. Suntay in substitution of his former
lawyers, Attys. Roxas, Picazo and Mejia without any contract as
to the amount of his services, the agreement being that claimant
would be given a reasonable compensation. Atty. Sison filed a
reply to the opposition of Atty. Recto and appeared and argued
orally at the hearing of the motion for reconsideration and new
trial.
On September 29, 1948, Judge Pecson issued an order granting
the motion for reconsideration filed on behalf of the
respondentadministrator, reconsidering his order of April 19,
1948 and denying the alternative petition of Silvino Suntay
(Exhibit F, pp 275-294). Atty. Recto, counsel for Silvino Suntay,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the second order of Judge
Pecson and Atty. Sison filed a simple opposition to this motion.
The motion for reconsideration of Mr. Recto was denied and
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court from the order of Judge
Pecson of September 29, 1948. The corresponding brief was filed
with the Supreme Court by Atty. Sison on behalf of the
respondentadministrator Federico C. Suntay. The Supreme Court
finally rendered a decision dated July 31, 1954 affirming the
validity of the order of September 29, 1948. The motion for
reconsideration of the decision having been denied, the decision
became final. Claimant Teofilo Sison had also acted as counsel for
the respondentadministrator in the motion filed by Mr. Recto, on
behalf of Silvino Suntay, asking for the removal of respondent-

administrator as administrator, and this motion was denied.
Mr Sison had further rendered service as counsel for the
respondent-administrator in the approval of the latter's
accounting, in the motion to fix the fees of the administrator and
in the motion asking that the administrator be authorized to
mortgage this
772

Sison vs. Suntay
estate in the sum of P1 50,000.00 various times during the period

that claimant was respondent-administrator's counsel, he secured
from the latter sums amounting to P67,000.00 on account of his
services.
After the termination of the case in the Supreme Court,
claimant Mr. Sison made demands on respondent-administrator
Federico C. Suntay for the payment of his professional fees in the
sum of P400,000.00, but the latter refused to pay this amount
alleging that the amount of P67,000.00 which claimant Mr. Sison
had already received from the respondent-administrator as fees is
sufficient compensation for claimant's services. In view of the
refusal of respondent-administrator to pay the remaining claim of
P333,000.00 as attorney's fees, Mr. Sison filed a petition in this
case on December 29, 1954 asking for the annotation of the
charging lien and for the allowance and payment of his attorney's
fees of P400,000.00."
On the basis of the foregoing facts, and of others to be

mentioned, His Honor reached the conclusion that the
professional services rendered were not chargeable to the
estate * * * and that even if chargeable, the amount of
P67,000.00 already received by claimant constituted
sufficient compensation for his professional services.
Consequently he denied the claim, as already stated.
In coming to the first conclusion the judge noted that the
claimant's work in connection with the alleged will or wills
did not redound to the protection or benefit of the estate of
Suntay, because will or no will the estate continued to be
the same. There is something, however, to appellant's
argument that the parties had previously agreed in the
pre-trial conference,
"That claimant Atty. Teofilo Sison was engaged as counsel for

respondent-administrator in the latter's capacity as such judicial
administrator of this intestate estate on the matters set forth in
the motion of said claimant, under the circumstances alleged in

said motion, * * *."
Anyway, and this is conclusive, if the will had been

probated this intestate proceeding would have collapsed
and the heirs of the first marriage, instead of sharing in
the whole estate, would only divide one third of it among
themselves. And although it is true that the re-
773
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 773

Sison vs. Suntay
jection of the will was prejudicial to the two heirs who

claimed under it, still that is a matter to be considered in
apportioning the amount of the professional fees among
such heirs—not a reason to deny compensation for services
beneficial to the other nine intestate heirs.
Wherefore on this aspect of the litigation our view is
that Atty. Sison rendered legal services for the benefit of
the intestate proceedings, and pursuant to his
understanding with the administrator should be paid
reasonable compensation.
Courts are agreed that the fixing of such compensation
is a difficult and delicate task.
Section 22 of Rule 127 provides that "an attorney shall'
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more
than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the
controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney." In amplification of
such rule this Supreme Court "has held that the following
are the circumstances to be considered in determining the
compensation of an attorney: (a) the amount and character
of the services rendered; (b) the labor, time, and trouble
involved; (c) the nature and importance of the litigation or
business in which the services were rendered; (d) the
responsibility imposed; (e) the amount of money or the
value of the property affected by the controversy, or
involved in the employment; (f) the skill and experience
called for in the performance of the services; (g) the
professional character and social standing of the attorney;
(h) the results secured; (i) and whether or not the fee is
absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an
attorney may properly charge a much 1 larger fee when it is
to be contingent than when it is not.
_______________
1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. III (1957 Ed.) pp. 644,
645 citing Haussermann vs. Rahmeyer, 12 Phil. 350; and others.
774

Sison vs. Suntay
According to American Jurisprudence the determination of

the attorney's reasonable compensation "depends largely
upon the circumstances of the particular case," its
importance and results, "the difficulties thereof, the degree
of professional skill and ability required * * * the
experience and professional standing of the attorney, * * *
as well as the amount or value involved or recovered." (5
American Jurisprudence 380)
We agree with the trial judge that "the claim of the
claimant is principally based on his services in connection
with the reconsideration and setting aside of the order of
Judge Pecson dated April 19, 1948 admitting to probate the
last will and the recording of the Chinese will of the
deceased Jose B. Suntay and for his services in connection
with the appeal taken from the order of Judge Pecson dated
September 29, 1948, reconsidering his Honor's order of
April 19, 1948 and denying the alternative petition of
Silvino Suntay."
We also agree that claimant "lays stress in having
secured the reversal of the order of Judge Pecson dated
April 19, 1948, because he alleges that if this order were
not reversed, 2/3 of the estate of the deceased Jose B.
Suntay would have gone to Silvino Suntay and the latter's
mother, whereas, with the deceased being declared as
having died intestate, the heirs participated equally in the
distribution of this estate which would be 1/10 share for
each one of the ten children."
But we cannot agree that the credit for such reversal
should go to the former counsel of the administrator
inasmuch as the resolution of Judge Pecson setting aside
his previous resolution "is in the main and principally
based on the arguments embodied in the motion for
reconsideration submitted by said former counsel."
Appellant denies this; and his assertion is not entirely
without foundation. Anyway it must be admitted that in
order properly to improve, develop and sustain such
arguments herein petitioner had to undertake the onerous
work of
775
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 775

Sison vs. Suntay
wading through the voluminous record of the expediente.

And speaking of the arguments, we note that there was
oral debate of the motion to reconsider. No record exists of
what transpired therein. Yet supposing the same points
were touched, we must bear in mind that identical
arguments acquire different meaning and impact according
to the persuasive ability and personal prestige of the
lawyer expounding them; and in this connection it should
be noted that Teofilo Sison had been a successful
practitioner before he became a Governor, a Senator,
Secretary of the Interior and Justice of the Court 2of
Appeals, not to mention other high positions he now held.
We have no doubt that precisely because of those
qualifications, the administrator sought his services to
convince Judge Pecson "to reverse himself"—a task very
difficult indeed, partly because judges render their verdicts
only after mature deliberation, and partly because
3 of the
natural human reluctance to admit one's error.
It may be added that such a task appeared to be doubly
difficult by the opposition of the winning side, represented
by the brilliant and successful lawyer Claro M. Recto,
among whose many qualifications may be mentioned his
having worthily occupied a seat in this Supreme Court.
The legal controversy and appellant's services continued
on appeal, arguments were amplified and elaborated in the
appellant's brief of 104 pages, and appellee's brief of 237
pages both referring to a Record on Appeal of 384 pages.
Printed memoranda were later submitted.
The complexity and number of the issues is attested by
the fact that we had to meet in not less than four sessions
to arrive at a solution; with dissenting opinions at that.
_______________
2 And whatever may be said of legal training in political elective offices

one thing is certain: they develop the ability to gain a sympathetic ear,
thru a tactful approach.
3 To seasoned advocates, the tactical advantage involved by the
reversal on a question of fact is obvious.
776

Sison vs. Suntay
Having had before us the expediente, we can say that the

case for the administrator in opposition to the will had
been competently handled by herein claimant. That he has
been helped by an assistant in his office, cannot in any way
reduce the compensation he is entitled to receive from his
client; he has paid such assistant. He was not expected to
do everything personally; he could employ his assistants to
do research for him, under his supervision and
responsibility. The general does not do the fighting: he
directs and supervises. Yet nobody denies him credit for the
victory won in battle.
It is generally held that in determining what would be
reasonable compensation for the attorney for an
administrator or executor, the size and value of4 the
decedent's estate should be taken into consideration.
5 But
the services performed should be considered.
The value of the properties involved in the estate, says
appellant, is four million pesos (P4,000,000.00). Therefore,
he concludes "at 10% my attorney's fee should be
P400,000.00 from which P67,000.00 may be deducted; and
that entitles me to demand, as I demand P333,000.00
additional fees." He introduced the testimony of Marcelo
Balatbat, a real estate expert native of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
whose itemized statement of his appraisal of the intestate
assets reads as follows:
28 hectares of riceland in Hagonoy, Bulacan, P84,000.00

at P3,000.00 a hectare (t.s.n. pp. 37-64, April
16, 1955) ...........................................
11 hectares of cañaveral land in Hagonoy, 22,000.00
Bulacan, at P2,000.00 per hectare (t.s.n. p.
56 April 16, 1955) .........................................
666 hectares of fishpond in Hagonoy, 3,330,000.00
Bulacan, at P5,000.00 a hectare (t.s.n. pp. 34,
37, 41, 45, 54, April 16, 1955) .............
_______________
4 Fitzgerald vs. Elisenhauer 92 Mont. 582, 206 p. 685; Shufeldt vs.

Hughes 55 Wash. 246, 104 Pac. 253.
5 Reynolds vs. McMillan 63 111. 46; Patton vs. Pepper Hotel Co 153
Cal. 460, 96 Pac. 296.
777
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 777

Sison vs. Suntay
652.7 square meters of valuable commercial 371,000.00

lands at Sto. Cristo, Manila which is a
commercial district at P500.00 per square
meter and improvements thereon appraised
at P45,000.00 (t.s.n. pp. 35, 36 April 16,
1955) .............................................................
567.4 square meters of commercial lands at 97,740.00
Fundidor street, Binondo, Manila, at
P100.00 per square meter and the
improvements thereon appraised at
P40,000.00 (t.s.n. p. 30, April 16, 1955)
.............................
Distillery site with an area of 4,260 square 10,000.00
meters at Hagonoy, Bulacan, being a
residential lot without squatters, was
appraised at P1.50 per square meter (t.s.n.
p. 38 April 16, 1955)
................................................
Rialto Theatre air conditioned recently at 40,000.00
Hagonoy, Bulacan, with a land area of
3,546 square meters near the church of
Hagonoy, Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 38, April 16,
1955) ..............................................................
Big ricemill with a big concrete bodega with 70,000.00
a land of 5,194 square meters appraised at
(t.s.n. p. 38, April 16, 1955) .........................
Cockpit of strong materials with a land of 5,000.00
1,222.8 square meters (t.s.n. p. 39, April 16,
1955) ..........................................................
TOTAL APPRAISED FAIR MARKET P4,038,740.00
VALUE .............
The biggest item in the above list is the fishponds. We will

take it first. Balatbat testified that fishponds in Hagonoy
are valued at P5,000.00 per hectare. He knew several
persons willing to purchase at such rate. Appellant
presented documents of sales of fishponds in Hagonoy and
neighboring towns at prices ranging from P3,000.00 to
P7,000.00 per hectare.
The trial judge however refused to be guided by these
documents because there was no showing that "the buyers
therein were not obliged to buy and the sellers were not
obliged to sell." He obviously thought of the special rule on
eminent domain proceedings. His was rather too
778

Sison vs. Suntay
strict a view. There is no taking of property here, and it is

not desired to determine what must be paid for it.
What is needed is a mere approximate valuation of the
estate's worth; and for such purpose, oral testimony and
the documents of sales of fisheries in the same town or
neighboring localities are competent evidence. It may be
assumed that such dealing happened in ordinary course
without any special reasons that may have increased or
decreased their prices. In fact, appellee's own witness
admitted having purchased a fishpond at P4,000.00 a
hectare in Sta. Helena, Hagonoy, in the same place where
380 hectares of fishponds belonging to the Suntay estate
are located.
Considering the circumstances, to appraise these
fishponds at P4,500.00 per hectare would be unfair to
neither side.
The next biggest items are the properties in Manila.
These were not mentioned in the appealed decision.
Balatbat appraised the lot in Sto. Cristo St., Binondo, at
P500.00 per square meter and the lot in Fundidor St.,
Binondo, at P100.00 per square meter. Such appraisal, we
do not hesitate to say, is quite conservative.
As to the ricemill, distillery and the cine, appellee
presented no good argument against Balatbat's estimate;
and the trial judge made no comment on the same.
There was at first doubt as to the valuation given by
Balatbat to the cañaveral and the ricelands, His Honor
having found it to be exaggerated; however, in the face of6
the heirs' written statement of November 14, 1955
(including herein appellee) that said lands had "a combined
total value of P105,000.00," thus corroborating the
estimates given by Balatbat, have to set them down at the
prices fixed by the latter. But the number of hectares must
be 13 hectares of cañaveral and 26.5 hectares of riceland.
Thus, at the prices herein set forth, the estate of Jose B.
Suntay should be assessed roughly at P3,695,000.00. It is
_______________
6 pages 40, 41 appellee's brief.
779
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 779

Sison vs. Suntay
immaterial that this claimant had stated in various

pleadings that this estate was worth one million. He
explained, quite plausibly, that he simply repeated
information received from the administrator and/or
statements made in the case before his connection
therewith. And the price at which some heirs disposed of
their shares may not be taken as the basis of computation,
because the sales had taken place during the war
emergency in 1942 or were affected by the uncertainties
resulting f rom the pending contest of the wills.
Hence, for the purpose of computing the claimant's
compensation, we could say that the litigation or the
intestate involved over three million and a half pesos, or
that his services to the intestate prevented the loss to it of
twothirds of such amount (P2,462,000.00).
The appellant insists on 10% of the value of the estate,
relying principally on Quintillan vs. Degala, 50 O. G. 5305
wherein this Court approved payment of P50,000.00 for
professional services in opposing two wills concerning an
estate of half a million pesos. But there was a contract for
contingent fees: 30% if successful, none if unsuccessful.
Here no such contract existed.
Although it is usual to insert in promissory notes or
mortgage deeds, a stipulation for payment of ten per cent
attorney's fees in case of litigation, still we doubt if the
same rate would be fixed where the amount involved ran
into hundreds of thousands or millions.
Philippine cases determining reasonably attorney's fees
awarded:
4% of the amount involved in Cu Unjieng E Hijos vs. The
Mabalacat Sugar Co., 54 Phil. 976;
5% in Yap Tico vs. Alejano-53 Phil. 986;
9% in Tan Tua et al. vs. Yu Biao Sontua et al.-56 Phil. 707;
10% in Phil. Engineering Co. vs. Green-48 Phil. 466;
12% in Manila Trading vs. Tamaraw Plantation Co.-47
Phil. 513; and De Guzman vs. Visayan Rapid Transit
Co., Inc.-68 Phil. 643;
30% in Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540;
5% of the amount recovered for client in Del Pan vs.
Velasco-6 Phil. 213.
780
Sison vs. Suntay
However, none of these litigations involved more than half

a million pesos. Conceivably7 a lower rate should apply
when a bigger sum is at issue .
Of course we recall at this point the recent quarrel
between the Harden spouses re their partnership funds
valued at P3,841,109.00 wherein the attorney for the wife
obtained fees of P384,110.00. But here again, as in the
Quintillan affair, a written contract bound the client to her
attorney. (100 Phil., 427)
The appellee brings to our attention an instance where
the attorney got P15,000.00 only after handling two cases
involving P1,182,952.00 (Delgado vs. De la Rama, 43 Phil.
419). This precedent, if applicable, could certainly clinch
this debate for the appellee; but we find three telling
circumstances which need no comment: (a) the attorney
withdrew from the case before its termination; (b) the client
lost; and (c) the attorney before filing suit, had sent to this
client a bill for services in the amount of P10,000.00 only.
Panis vs. Yangco (52 Phil. 499) is likewise invoked by
appellee because the attorney who handled the intestate
proceedings involving P210,640.21 was awarded
P15,000.00 only. It appears however that the attorney had
demanded that amount only. And then his services
consisted "merely in taking simple ordinary proceedings in
court, with no objection raised therein."
A fairly diligent search has uncovered several
representative cases in the United States fixing reasonable
professional fees for litigations of the million or half-million
class.
$21,000.00 was awarded in Re Faling 113 Or. 37, 231
Pac. 148 for procuring the rejection of pretended wills and
the probate of a true will disposing of a $500,000.00 estate;
$80,000.00 to attorney for the executor of an estate worth
about $2,000,000.00 for services less beneficial than those
rendered here by Atty. Sison; (Re Potts 209 N. Y.
_______________
7 Appellee would only pay 2.23%.
781
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 781

Sison vs. Suntay
Suppl. 653) ; $50,000.00 for sustaining a will involving an

estate of about $1,000,000.00 (Re Ketcham 191 N.Y.S. 396);
$50,000.00 in U.S. vs. Equitable 283 U.S. 738 concerning
recovery of $1,100,000.00 for estate of incompetent;
$75,000.00 for defense of testamentary trust in one-
milliondollar estate (Re Duffil 188 Cal. 536, 206 Pac. 42);
$100,000.00 in bondholders' action recovering about
$2,000,000.00 (Brown vs. Pennsylvania 250 Fed. 513) ;
$75,000.00 in receivership of corporation having assets of
about $1,200,000.00 (Re New York Investors 79 Fed (2d)
182) ; $43,000.00 for unsuccessful efforts to resist
proceeding to liquidate insurance company having gross
assets of $1,000,000.00; $200,000.00 in stockholders' action
resulting in benefits of $900,000.00 (Murphy vs. North
American Light 33 Fed. Sup. 567) ; 8-½% of an actual
savings of $6,200,000.00 in a case that ended in a
settlement (Robers vs. Hill 34 Fed. Supp. 358) ; 18% of
$310,000.00 stock recovered for benefit of estate (Trautz vs.
Lamp 334 Mo. 1085, 72 S. W. (2d) 104) ; over $300,000.00
in stockholders' action resulting in recovery of between
three million and four million dollars (Hodgman vs.
Atlantic Ref. 8 Fed. (2d) 777). And on smaller amounts (up
to $356,000.00) the range is from 2% all the way to 33-½%
even 50% as the accompanying appendix shows.
In 39 Columbia Law Review 784, 813, 814, the result of
an investigation showed that attorney's fees allowed in
stockholders' derivative suits ranged between 20 per cent
and 33-1/3 per cent of the benefit to the corporation.
Bearing in mind all these precedents and variables, in
the light of the difficult situation of the intestate when it
engaged the prof essional skill and prestige of the claimant,
together with resultant benefits accruing to said intestate,
we the undersigned reach the conclusion that an additional
seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00) to the claimant
would be about as fair an award as the facts of the
litigation could warrant. That gives the lawyer a lump sum
of P142 000.00, which represents about 3.8 per cent of
782

Sison vs. Suntay
P3,695,000.00 (total value of the intestate) or 5.7% of

P2,462,000.00, the amount preserved (or won) for the
intestate through his services. As we have intimated,
Silvino Lim and Natividad Lim Billian should not be made
to contribute to this additional fee: they had pleaded for
approval of the wills and therefore were not benefited by

appellant's main accomplishment.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed order is revoked
and one is hereby entered allowing herein appellant the
above additional f ees in the amount of seventy-five
thousand pesos, with legal interest thereon f rom the day
this decision becomes final. Costs against appellee. So
ordered.
Parás, C. J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,

Labrador, Concepción, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Order revoked.
_______________
APPENDIX
Attorney's Fees. Percentage or Fractional Basis.
2% Landis vs. Aldrich (1880) 9 enforcing

mortgage for
$2,000
2% Warwick Iron Co. vs. Morton (1892) allowance for
148 Pa 72, 23 A 1065 services of
...................................................... plaintiff's
attorney in
enforcing
mortgage for
$15,000
3% Faile vs. Clyburn (1933) 169 SC 355, allowance to
168 SE 732 attorneys for
plaintiff's in
mandamus
proceedings,
settled for
$30,502
5% Central R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Pettus establishment
(1885) 113 US 116, 28 L ed 915, 5 S Ct of lien on
387 ............................. corporate
property
transferred to
another
5% William's Succession (1923) 156 La attorney for
704, 101 So 113 executor of
............................................................... simple estate
of $ 20,000
5% Re Rapid Transit Comrs. (1907) 117 based on

App. Div 160, 102 NYS 400 award to each
................................................... abutting owner
in eminent
domain
proceeding; not
to exceed,
however,
$1,000
783
VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 783

Sison vs. Suntay
7% National Bank vs. Dulaney

(1903) 96 Md 159, 53 A 944 allowance to
............................................. special attorney
for assignee for
creditors, based on
sale of assets in f
oreign country for
$194,847
10% Adams vs. Kehlor Mill. Co.
(1889; CC) 38 F 281 ................... setting aside
fraudulent
assignment,
involving $3,900
10% Standard Cotton Seed Oil
Co. vs. Excelsior Ref. Co. (1902) attorney for
108 La 74, 32 So 221 receiver who
.............................. realized $9,219 for
distribution to
creditors
10% Re Creighton (1913) 93
Neb 90, 139 NW 827 ................... allowance to
attorney securing
$94,000 for a
charitable trust
10% Rathbun vs. Globe Indem.
Co. (1921) 107 Neb 18, 184 NW allowance to
903, 24 ALR 191 plaintiff's attorney
..................................... in suit in which
plaintiff rec
overed $8,659 on
accident insurance
policy
10% Vanhooser vs. Cunningham
(1940) Tenn App 146 SW(2d) 840 of amount for
................................................ which land sold,
allowed to
attorneys for
plaintiffs and
defendants in
partition suits
18% Trautz vs. Lemp (1934) 334
Mo 1085 72 SW(2d) 104 based on recovery
.................................................. of stock valued at
$310,000 for
benefit of estate
20% Re Bignall (1881; DC) 3
McCrary 440) 9 F 385 recovery of
$22,000 for benefit
of bankrupt estate
30% Burn vs. Allen (1885) 15
RI 32, 23 A 35, 2 Am St Rep 844 recovery of
...................................................... judgment for $75
and collection of
same by
attachment and
execution
33 1/3% Frink vs. McComb (1894;
CC) 60 F 486 recovery of
...................................... $91,400 n an
important and
doubtful case
33 1/3% Re Munger (1915) 168
Iowa 372, 150 NW 447, Ann Cas of $2,000, the
1917 amount of
..................................................... settlement of
action for
wrongful death
784

General Azucarrera Don Pedro vs. De Leon, et al.
33 1/3% Linton's Succession (1879)
31 La Ann 130 allowance to attorney for

........................... executor, based on amount
recovered for the estate
33 1/3% Re Klein (1937) 162 Misc
589, 295 NYS 197 of $13,000 received in
.................................. settlement of death claim
50% Grant vs. Fletcher (1922;
DC) 283 F 243 complicated partnership
.......................... accounting resulting in
recovery of $356,000
50% West vs. Meillmier (1926;
172 Ark 485, 289 SW 321 procuring income tax refund
of $1,770
_________________
© Copyright 2023 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Sison V Suntay

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sison V Suntay

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sison V Suntay

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

10/30/23, 11:36 PM PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 102

[No. L-10000. December 28, 1957]

Intestate estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,

1. ATTORNEY'S FEES; REASONABLE COMPENSATION

2. ID.; ID.; VALUE OF ESTATE, How DETERMINED.—The

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Appeal from an order of the Bulacan Court of First

770 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

allowance and payment of his claim for attorney's fees in the

administrator Federico C. Suntay was represented by his lawyers,

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 771

behalf of Silvino Suntay, asking for the removal of respondent-

772 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

estate in the sum of P1 50,000.00 various times during the period

On the basis of the foregoing facts, and of others to be

"That claimant Atty. Teofilo Sison was engaged as counsel for

the motion of said claimant, under the circumstances alleged in

Anyway, and this is conclusive, if the will had been

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 773

jection of the will was prejudicial to the two heirs who

774 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

According to American Jurisprudence the determination of

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 775

wading through the voluminous record of the expediente.

2 And whatever may be said of legal training in political elective offices

776 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Having had before us the expediente, we can say that the

28 hectares of riceland in Hagonoy, Bulacan, P84,000.00

4 Fitzgerald vs. Elisenhauer 92 Mont. 582, 206 p. 685; Shufeldt vs.

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 777

652.7 square meters of valuable commercial 371,000.00

The biggest item in the above list is the fishponds. We will

778 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

strict a view. There is no taking of property here, and it is

6 pages 40, 41 appellee's brief.

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 779

immaterial that this claimant had stated in various

780 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sison vs. Suntay

However, none of these litigations involved more than half

7 Appellee would only pay 2.23%.

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 781

Suppl. 653) ; $50,000.00 for sustaining a will involving an

782 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

P3,695,000.00 (total value of the intestate) or 5.7% of

approval of the wills and therefore were not benefited by

Parás, C. J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,

Attorney's Fees. Percentage or Fractional Basis.

2% Landis vs. Aldrich (1880) 9 enforcing

5% Re Rapid Transit Comrs. (1907) 117 based on

VOL. 102, DECEMBER 28, 1957 783

7% National Bank vs. Dulaney

784 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

33 1/3% Linton's Succession (1879)

31 La Ann 130 allowance to attorney for

© Copyright 2023 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

You might also like