Seeing God in Sufi Quran Commentaries
Seeing God in Sufi Quran Commentaries
Series Editors
Professor David Cook (Rice University) and Professor Christian Lange
(Utrecht University)
edinburghuniversitypress.com/series/esiae
Pieter Coppens
Typeset in Cambria by
Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire,
and printed and bound in Great Britain.
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
The right of Pieter Coppens to be identified as author of this work has been asserted
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and the Copyright
and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).
1 Introduction 1
Main Questions and Objectives 2
The Study of Sufism in its Circles of Influence: Some Notes on
Nomenclature 6
Sufism and ‘Orthodoxy’: Periphery and Centre? 10
History and Eschatology in Early Sufism 13
What is a ‘Sufi’ Qurʾan Commentary? Defining the Genre 16
Using Tafsīr as a Source for Intellectual History: Some Notes
on Method and Sources 19
Structure of the Work 23
8 Conclusion 256
Bibliography 267
Index 288
Figures
1.1 E
schatological scheme of Baghdadi Sufism 15
1.2 E
schatological structure and crossings of the prophets 24
3.1 I nteriorised gardens 119
8.1 E schatological structure and crossings of the prophets 259
Tables
1
Introduction
This study has two main objectives, which are complementary and
mutually inform each other. First, it aims to write a history of Sufi
conceptions of the hereafter in what Marshall Hodgson defined as
the ‘Islamic Earlier Middle Period’ (950–1250 ce).3 Second, it aims to
provide a better understanding of five Sufi Qurʾan commentaries hail-
ing from the same period. The complementarity of these two subjects
lies in the expectation that the vast and little-studied material that is
available in Sufi commentaries will prove to be a valuable source for
reconstructing Sufi conceptions of the hereafter in this period, while
simultaneously the case study of Sufi eschatology serves as a good
tool to learn more about the development and characteristics of this
genre of Qurʾan commentary in the same period.
As for the aspect of Sufi eschatology, the central point of interest in
this study is the boundary crossing from this world to the otherworld
and vice versa in the form of the vision of God. In his monograph on
the Islamic hereafter, Christian Lange contends that typical of Muslim
conceptions of the hereafter is that the boundary between the two
abodes is ‘rather thin and permeatable’ and frequently crossed, and
that ‘the otherworld is in a continuous and intimate conversation with
the world of the here-and-now’.4 In this study, I pursue the hypoth-
esis that this is also and even more the case for Sufi conceptions of
The study of tafsīr in general, and Sufi tafsīr in particular, has seen a
remarkable bloom in recent years, to the extent that one can now legit-
imately speak of a discipline of tafsīr studies within Islamic Studies.
While scholarly interest in tafsīr was historically largely determined
by its usability for reconstructing meanings of the Qurʾanic text, there
is now a strong trend for genuine interest in the works of tafsīr them-
selves as a literary genre and their function in their wider historical
contexts.61 In previous scholarship, as Görke and Pink state, ‘commen-
taries on the Qurʾan were usually consulted rather than studied’.62
Although in this study commentaries are indeed also used as consul-
tation for the case study of eschatology and the vision of God, we do
wish to generate new knowledge on the workings of the genre as well:
the works themselves have intrinsic value for our study.
Why use tafsīr as a source for intellectual history? In general,
the Qurʾan has been accepted as the single most important religious
source by all Muslims throughout Islamic history, regardless of sec-
tarian affiliation, region or era. Each of these sectarian affiliations,
regions and eras has produced its own works of tafsīr, reflecting the
most important viewpoints and deliberations on the Qurʾan from
their respective traditions and socioreligious milieus. Each work of
tafsīr represents an accumulated and communal understanding of the
(d. 412/1021) Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr and stretches all the way to Rūzbihān
al-Baqlī al-Shīrāzī’s (d. 606/1209) ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān.
It encompasses nearly all of the Sufi commentaries in between these
two that are known to us as integral texts: Abū’l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī’s
(d. 465/1072) Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt, Rashīd al-Dīn Maybudī’s (fl. second
half of the fifth/eleventh to first half of the sixth/twelfth century)
Kashf al-asrār wa-ʿuddat al-abrār and Shams al-Dīn al-Daylamī’s (d.
587/1191?) Taṣdīq al-maʿārif.71 Most of these sources are authored by
relatively well-known and well-studied figures in the history of Sufism,
who are generally recognised as important figures in the ‘formative’
and ‘classical’ periods of Sufism. Their commentaries have appeared
in at least one or more editions (unfortunately mostly uncritical edi-
tions) and have provoked some scholarly interest. Al-Sulamī is widely
recognised as an important collector and compiler at the end of the
formative period. Several of his works have been critically edited,
among which is his minor Qurʾan commentary, the Ziyādāt Ḥaqāʾiq
al-tafsīr.72 A critical edition of his major Qurʾan commentary is in prep-
aration and an uncritical edition is available.73 In addition, al-Qushayrī
and his Qurʾan commentary have seen warm scholarly interest. There
are two uncritical editions available of his Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt, as well
as a monograph on this tafsīr.74 On the life of Maybudī (d. early sixth/
twelfth century) and his non-tafsīr works precious little is known,
and very few studies are available. His voluminous Qurʾan commen-
tary has appeared in several printed editions, and has mainly been
studied by Annabel Keeler.75 The life and works of Rūzbihān al-Baqlī
are relatively well studied, several critical editions of his texts and
monographs being available.76 His ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq al-Qurʾān
is still awaiting a critical edition, but has been published uncritically.77
The exception to this relatively developed scholarly interest is
Shams al-Dīn al-Daylamī and his Qurʾan commentary. There is hardly
any biographical information available, and none of his works have
been critically edited and published thus far. Furthermore, for his
tafsīr we have to rely on manuscripts.78 He may be considered a minor
figure in the history of Sufism. He has certainly not made it into the
canon of great Sufi figures, neither in the biographical writings of
the Sufi tradition that he himself was part of, nor in the contempo-
rary academic study of Sufism.79 Still, it is worthwhile including him
and his commentary in this study. Making minor figures part of one’s
endeavour to understand the history of ideas in a certain era may
very well help to elucidate the broader intellectual contexts in which
the grander names flourished. One should understand not only the
pinnacles of higher culture to understand the thought of a certain era,
but also those we have come to consider as lesser figures.80
Notes
1 Sahl al-Tustarī, Tafsīr al-Tustarī, trans. Annabel Keeler and Ali Keeler
(Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2011), 260.
2 Ibid., 15.
3 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a
World Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 2:6–7.
4 Christian R. Lange, Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 11–12.
5 Steven T. Katz, ‘The “Conservative” Character of Mysticism’, in
Mysticism and Religious Traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983), 3–60; Steven T. Katz, ‘Mysticism and the
Interpretation of Sacred Scripture’, in Mysticism and Sacred Scripture,
ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7–67; cf.
Niklaus Largier, ‘Mysticism, Modernity and the Invention of Aesthetic
Experience’, Representations 105, no. 1 (2009): 37–60; Elliot R. Wolfson,
Through a Speculum that Shines: Vision and Imagination in Medieval
Jewish Mysticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997),
52–8.
6 Walid Saleh, The Formation of the Classical Tafsīr Tradition: The Qurʾān
Commentary of al-Thaʿlabī (d. 427/1035) (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 9, 14–15;
of a single study at this stage. This study may be considered a Baustein for
that grander purpose.
42 Lange, Paradise and Hell, 11.
43 Lange is, therefore, critical of the use of such terms as ‘hereafter’, ‘after-
life’, ‘afterworld’ or ‘world to come’, terms that all hint at a diachronic
understanding of the relation between dunyā and ākhira. He prefers to
use the term ‘otherworld’, to stress the aspect of Paradise and Hell being
‘everywhen’. Lange, Paradise and Hell, 11–12.
44 Karamustafa, Formative Period, 19. See also Karamustafa, ‘Eschatology
in Early Sufi Thought’.
45 Gerhard Böwering, The Mystical Vision of Existence in Classical Islam: The
Qurʾānic Hermeneutics of the Ṣūfī Sahl al-Tustarī (d.283/896) (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 1980), 145–6.
46 Ibid., 145–84.
47 Katz, ‘Mysticism and Interpretation’, 7.
48 Louis Massignon, Essay on the Origins of the Technical Language of
Islamic Mysticism, trans. Benjamin Clark (Notre Dame, IN: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1997); Paul Nwyia, Exégèse coranique et langage
mystique: nouvel essay sur le lexique technique des mystiques musulmans
(Beirut: Dar El-Machreq, 1970).
49 Goldziher, Koranauslegung, 180–262.
50 Ibid., 180.
51 Ibid., 180–262. Only the tafsīr of al-Qāshānī (d. 730/1329), which he
falsely attributes to Ibn al-ʿArabī, is given some space.
52 Of the authors treated in this study, only al-Sulamī and al-Qushayrī
show up in works of ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn. Maybudī ( fl. second half of
the fifth/eleventh to first half of the sixth/twelfth century), al-Daylamī
(d. 587/1191?) and Rūzbihān (d. 606/1209) are not mentioned for rea-
sons unclear. It may have been that they were simply not well known
enough as authors of tafsīr to make it into these works and not considered
‘canonical’. It may also be that their works were not considered tafsīrs
in the proper sense and excluded on normative grounds. The second
option is doubtful, however, since ṭabaqāt authors generally did not
exclude people for normative reasons, and would rather simply add their
normative objections to the lemma. A good example of this is al-Sulamī,
who is mentioned alongside a criticism of his tafsīr. Al-Suyūṭī mentions
al-Sulamī as ‘the shaykh of the Sufis and their scholar in Khurasan’, and
sources is that they are not genealogically part of the tafsīr tradition
as it developed in Nishapur and the larger Persia region, and do not
refer back to the same authorities. For a concise monograph on this
author and his Qurʾan commentaries, see Yousef Casewit, The Mystics
of al-Andalus: Ibn Barrajān and Islamic Thought in the Twelfth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), as well as Casewit’s
critical edition of his tafsīr: ʿAbd al-Salām b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Barrajān,
A Qurʾān Commentary by Ibn Barrajān of Seville (d. 536/1141): ‘Īḍāḥ
al-ḥikma bi-aḥkām al-ʿibra’ (Wisdom Deciphered, the Unseen Discovered),
eds Gerhard Böwering and Yousef Casewit (Leiden: Brill, 2015). To ʿAbd
al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (d. 561/1165), a tafsīr has also been attributed, but the
authorship is unclear (see Ateș, İşârî tefsîr okulu, 134–5). We have thus
left him out of this analysis. Godlas also mentions that a commentary by
a certain al-Darwājikī (d. 549/1154) was authored in the same period
(Godlas, ‘Ṣūfism’, 354–5). This is only available in manuscripts and noth-
ing is known about the author. Its study may be a worthwhile enterprise
for another time, but would complicate this particular study too much.
72 Only one manuscript copy of this tafsīr is currently known to exist, in
Sarajevo, probably dating to the seventh/thirteenth century. This has
been critically edited. See Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn
al-Sulamī, Ziyādāt Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr, ed. Gerhard Böwering (Beirut: Dar
El-Machreq, 1997).
73 The field is in dire need of a critical edition of this work, which is in prep-
aration by Gerhard Böwering. There is currently only one non-critical
printed edition, based on only one manuscript, from which the com-
mentary on Sūrah Yūsuf is missing. Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad b.
al-Ḥusayn al-Sulamī, Tafsīr al-Sulamī wa-hiya Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr, ed. Sayyid
ʿUmrān (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2001). This study largely relies
on this edition and refers to it in the notes. Prof. Böwering has generously
provided me with a preview of his critical edition of the commentary on
Sūrah Yūsuf, which is missing from the Sayyid ʿUmrān edition.
74 ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Hawāzim al-Qushayrī, Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt: tafsīr ṣūfī kāmil
li’l-Qurʾān al-karīm, ed. Ibrāhīm Basyūnī (Cairo: al-Hayʾat al-miṣriyya
al-ʿāmma li’l-taʾlīf wa’l-nashr, 1981–3). This is the oldest and most
authoritative edition to date, and the work that we will refer to in our
notes. A more recent edition is ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Hawāzim al-Qushayrī,
Tafsīr al-Qushayrī al-musammā Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt, ed. Saʿīd Quẓayfa
38
2
Sufi Qurʾan Commentaries:
The Rise of a Genre
Introduction
This chapter discusses the five main sources used in this study, and
what their compositions and exegetical methods teach us about
the development of Sufi tafsīr in the period under scrutiny. We will
elaborate on some of the issues raised in Chapter 1 concerning what
we understand to be a ‘Sufi’ commentary, what might be considered
the ‘Sufi’ exegetical method and how these Sufi commentaries relate
to general developments in the history of tafsīr until the seventh/
thirteenth century. The authors are placed into their broader circles
of influence and historical context. As explained in Chapter 1, to
understand how Sufi ideas were constructed, one has to look at the
full network of relations in the personal, linguistic, religious, social
and political spheres.
The period we are dealing with in this study is what Marshall
Hodgson defined as the ‘Islamic Earlier Middle Period’ (950–1250
ce).1 All of the authors in this study – al-Sulamī, al-Qushayrī, Maybudī,
al-Daylamī and Rūzbihān – fall within this period. They lived, studied,
authored and taught in the major Persian centres of learning: Nishapur,
Yazd, Herat, Shiraz and Hamadan. These cities were under Saljūq rule
for the larger part of the Islamic Earlier Middle Period. This period is
39
The city of Nishapur was one of the four great cities in the region
of Khurasan in north-western Persia, the others being Marv, Herat
and Balkh. It went through a period of great religious and cultural
flourishing and prosperity from the fourth/tenth to the sixth/twelfth
century. It was the market centre for a rich agricultural region as well
as a hub of industry and commerce, mostly ceramics and fine clothes.5
Its population in this period is estimated to have been between 30,000
and 40,000.6 At the beginning of the tenth century, it was under the
rule of the Persian Sāmānid dynasty. From the second half of the tenth
century, the Turkic Ghaznavids ruled the city, until the Saljūqs took
over the city in 428/1037 and made it their capital for six years. They
continued to rule it until the sacking of the old city by the Ghuzz in
548/1153. This meant the end of the city’s prominence in the region.7
Culturally, Nishapur was a Persian city with Persian as its main lan-
guage, but it also comprised an Arabic and Turkic presence.8
The social and political history of Nishapur under Sāmānid and
Ghaznavid rule mainly revolves around a number of patrician families
that ruled the city in relative autonomy. They ruled in a subtle power
balance with the higher external authorities, which in their turn pat-
ronised different factions according to their interests. These patrician
families were landowners, merchants and religious scholars, often all
three at once, and managed the city’s affairs largely by themselves.9
Under Saljūq rule, their autonomous position weakened due to fac-
tional strife and attempts by the Saljūqs to gain a stronger hold on the
city. This eventually led to the downfall of the city’s prominence.10
school was a legal necessity for the patrician families, since the social
order depended upon Islamic law. The Islamic legal order guaran-
teed them, as representatives and patrons of the religious order, a
sense of independence from the higher political authorities, who
were subject to the same law.14 However, this affiliation to a legal
school represented more than practical necessity. It was the basis for
group solidarity (ʿaṣabiyya) and it thus regularly led to factionalism
and political tensions within the city. The two camps sometimes even
clashed violently. In the eleventh century, the Saljūqs under Ṭughril
Beg (d. 455/1063) patronised Ḥanafism and gave preference to
Ḥanafīs in religious and government appointments. This culminated
in the violent persecution of the Shāfiʿīs, who followed the Ashʿarī
creed, starting around 439/1048. This persecution ended only when,
after the death of Ṭughril Beg, the Shāfiʿī Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092)
was appointed as vizier of Khurasan, and patronised the Shāfiʿī school
and Ashʿarī creed instead.15
The only segment of the religious scene that was not dominated
and patronised by the patrician families, and could perhaps even be
considered a countermovement, was the more populist and proselyt-
ising movement of the Karrāmiyya, who had their own distinct views
on credal matters, jurisprudence and asceticism. The poorer segments
of society that were not patronised by the patrician families seem to
have been more attracted to their preaching. With their militant social
activism and emphasis on poverty ( faqr), prohibition on working for
profit (taḥrīm al-makāsib) and reliance on God for sustenance (tawak-
kul), they profiled themselves as leaders of the oppressed poor as a
force against the trading class of the patricians and their religious
elite.16 Therefore, this movement had quite a strong mobilising power
among the lower classes and was thus able to play a significant role
on the political scene. They were patronised by the Ghaznavids for
some time and shortly held the influential position of raʾīs (leader)
around the year 1010 ce.17 Although the patricians were divided
among themselves by madhhab (school of law), and now and then
had violent clashes with each other, they tended to unite against the
common threat of the Karrāmiyya.18
Religious Education
It was also the Karrāmiyya who started with the practice of estab-
lishing khānaqāhs and madrasahs to institutionalise their commu-
nal life, missionary work and education. Only at the end of the tenth
century did other groups, notably the Sufis from the Shāfiʿī school,
start to establish similar institutions.19 These institutions flourished
especially in Nishapur. They were often built for famous teachers and
stayed within their families after their deaths, as was the case with
the madrasah built for al-Qushayrī’s teacher and father-in-law Abū
ʿAlī al-Daqqāq (d. 405/1015).20 The works of scholars were kept in
libraries inside these madrasahs.21
Islamic education was not strictly limited to these institutions.
A teacher–student relationship could develop outside the madrasah
as well. A thoroughly systematised curriculum with age restrictions
or required courses was not present. The person teaching was con-
sidered important more for the quality of the education than the
institutional environment. The teacher granted the student an ijāza
(licence) when a subject or text had been sufficiently studied. Linked
by this ijāza to a chain of oral authority, the student was himself then
certified to teach.22 By excluding people of low birth from obtaining
ijāzas, the patricians used this educational system to buttress their
own position and to keep monopolising the production, transmission
and dissemination of religious knowledge.23
Al-Sulamī did not quote Ibn Karrām once in his works, and did not
include him in his Ṭabaqāt al-ṣūfiyya.31 He was not unique in this.
Most of the Sufi authors of his time tended to ignore the Karrāmiyya,
which indicates they were not highly regarded by the Sufis and that
despite their renunciant tendencies they were not considered part of
the same mystical trend, as opposed to the Malāmatiyya.32
A popular narrative on the history of Sufism is that it developed
as a counterculture to, and often in conflict with, the religious estab-
lishment engaged in exoteric Islamic sciences which were perceived
as spiritually unsatisfactory, only to be moulded into the Islamic
mainstream by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111).33 The history
of Sufism in Nishapur brings nuance to this narrative and shows that
al-Ghazālī’s synthesis was rather the conclusion of a process of rec-
onciliation of traditions that had been going on for much longer, and
was probably quite deep-rooted in the formative period of Sufism.34
Many of the ʿulamāʾ (scholars) of Nishapur had Sufi affiliations and
many Sufis were teachers or scholars in religious institutions of learn-
ing.35 It was especially in the circles of Shāfiʿī learning that Sufism was
embraced.36
In the introduction to the work, there are some hints as to how al-
Sulamī conceived of a Sufi tafsīr and what he intended with this work.
It starts with a praise of God for making the ‘people of realities’ (ahl
al-ḥaqāʾiq) understand His speech. They have, he states, ‘reported on
the meanings of His speech from the subtleties (laṭāʾif ) of its secrets
and meanings, according to what God has disclosed to every one of
them’ and ‘spoken about the understanding of His book according to
its marvels that occurred to them’.53 However, he stresses that they
can have only a limited understanding of the Qurʾan’s realities due to
the greatness of the book and the one to whom it has been revealed,
that is Muhammad. He points out how the outward (ẓāhir) sciences
of the Qurʾan had developed, until nearly everything had been said,
but that no one had worked on understanding it according to its
reality (ʿalā ḥisāb al-ḥaqīqa), except for some unordered fragments
attributed to Ibn ʿAṭāʾ al-Ādamī and Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad, that he
is aware of. 54 He therefore felt the need to bring those together,
including sayings from other shaykhs of the ‘people of reality’ (ahl
al-ḥaqīqa) and organising it according to the order of the surahs in
the Qurʾan.55
He then quotes four sayings that explain the method of tafsīr
used by the ‘people of reality’. These sayings are typically used by
proponents of Sufi readings of the Qurʾan and have largely deter-
mined their hermeneutical terminology.56 Al-Sulamī does not further
elaborate on the meaning of these four sayings and its consequences
for his own work of tafsīr, nor does he explain why he mentions
them.57 The first is an account attributed to ʿAlī in which he is asked
whether any other revelation (waḥy) from the Prophet besides the
Qurʾan is available. His answer is no, ‘except for a servant who has
understood His book’, implying that a correct understanding of the
Qurʾan is a form of revelation.58 The second is a hadith in which
Muhammad states that the Qurʾan was sent down upon seven ‘let-
ters’ (aḥruf ), that every verse has an outer side (ẓahr) and an inner
side (baṭn), and that every ‘letter’ has a terminal point (ḥadd) and a
starting point (muṭṭalaʿ).59 The third is a saying attributed to Jaʿfar b.
Muḥammad:
The last quote is again attributed to ʿAlī and similar to the first quote.
It again states that every verse of the Qurʾan has four meanings: an
outer meaning (ẓāhir), an inner meaning (bāṭin), a terminal point
(ḥadd) and a starting point (muṭṭalaʿ). The saying then further defines
these four: the outer meaning is recitation (tilāwa); the inner meaning
is understanding ( fahm); the terminal point is interpretation (ʿibāra),
allusion (ishāra) and the rulings of what is permitted and what is
not. The starting point is what God expects from the servant with
the verse. ʿAlī then concludes: ‘He has made the Qurʾan an interpre-
tation, allusion, subtleties and realities. Worship is for the hearing,
allusion for the intellect (ʿaql), the subtleties are for contemplation
(mushāhada), and the realities for submission (istislām).’61
His second work is Ziyādāt Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr (Additions to ‘The
Realities of Tafsīr’).62 Al-Sulamī wrote it, so he states in his introduc-
tion, after he finished Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr and realised he wanted to add
more material: ‘To this end I prepared a special book so that neither
the hearing of one listening nor the writing of one copying may be cor-
rupted.’63 Here again he quotes without further explanation from some
early Sufi authorities on hermeneutics of the Qurʾan, quite similar to
those mentioned earlier. For example, he quotes al-Junayd stating
that the Qurʾan comes in four meanings: outer, inner, truth (ḥaqq) and
reality (ḥaqīqa). According to a quote from Sahl al-Tustarī, the Qurʾan
consists of five parts: clear (muḥkam), ambiguous (mutashābih),
permitted (ḥalāl), forbidden (ḥarām) and similitudes (amthāl). The
believer with experiential knowledge of God (al-ʿārif bi’llāh), then, ‘acts
upon the clear, believes in the ambiguous, considers the permitted to
be permitted and the forbidden to be forbidden, and understands the
similitudes’.64 A quote by Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq even mentions nine differ-
ent approaches to reading the Qurʾan: truth (ḥaqq), reality (ḥaqīqa),
of Yazd.98 The city of Yazd in this time was nominally part of the Saljūq
dynasty, but the local lords, the Kākūyids, governed this part of west-
ern Persia in relative independence. Yazd flourished in this period
and it was an important centre for intellectual life.99 It is assumed that
Maybudī was the son of Jamāl al-Islām Abū Saʿd b. Aḥmad b. Mihrīzad
(d. 480/1087), a religious scholar and mystic of some standing. This
makes it probable that he grew up in a stimulating environment for
Islamic learning, and it is very likely that he travelled to other centres
of Islamic learning such as Herat, Marv or Nishapur to enhance his
knowledge in the various Islamic sciences.100
Only two of his works are still extant: Kitāb al-fuṣūl (Book of
Divisions), which is a short treatise on the virtues of officials of state
and religion, and his voluminous Qurʾan commentary Kashf al-asrār
wa-ʿuddat al-abrār (The Unveiling of Secrets and the Provision of
the Pious). Besides these, we know that he composed a collection of
forty hadith, the Kitāb-i arbaʿīn, which no longer survives.101 Given the
richness of Kashf al-asrār, his religious profile can be partly recon-
structed. He was a follower of the Shāfiʿī school of jurisprudence, but
unlike most Shāfiʿīs he did not follow the Ashʿarī school in credal
matters. He was inclined towards Ḥanbalism in this respect, which
becomes apparent in his treatment of such issues as the ‘direction’ of
God (which he considered to be ‘above’), the createdness of the Qurʾan
(which he believed to be uncreated in meaning, letters and sounds)
and the attributes of God (he believed that anthropomorphic refer-
ences to God in the Qurʾan should not be interpreted metaphorically,
but taken as they are without interpretation).102 If he indeed spent
time in Khurasan, it is probably there that he came into contact with
followers of ʿAbd Allāh al-Anṣārī (d. 481/1089). Al-Anṣārī, to whom
he refers as pīr-i ṭarīqat (the master of the path) in his commentary,
influenced him greatly in matters of creed and mysticism, and put a
stamp on his commentary.103
His approach to mysticism was, according to Annabel Keeler,
largely determined by the rise of a love-oriented form of Sufism
in Khurasan. This focus on divine love had been present since the
early times of Sufism, but it was during Maybudī’s lifetime that it
ecstasy. His preference for ecstatic utterances earned him the title
shaykh-i shaṭṭāḥ (Doctor Ecstaticus).140
I did not become occupied with this affair until after experiential
knowledge and divine wisdom had overwhelmed my heart … [and]
when I found that the pre-eternal Word had no limit in the outer and
the inner, and that none of God’s creation had reached its perfection
and the ultimate degree of its meanings – because underlying each
of Its letters is an ocean of secrets and a river of lights.141
Conclusion
Notes
1 Hodgson, Venture of Islam, 2:6–7.
2 Richard W. Bulliet, ‘The Political-Religious History of Nishapur in the
Eleventh Century’, in Islamic Civilization, 950–1150: A Colloquium
Published under the Auspices of the Near Eastern History Group, Oxford,
the Near East Center, University of Pennsylvania, ed. D. S. Richards
(London: Bruno Cassirer/Faber, 1973), 72.
3 For an introductory overview of Sufism in this period, see Hamid
Dabashi, ‘Historical Conditions of Persian Sufism during the Seljuk
Period’, in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 5: The Saljuq and Mongol
Periods, ed. J. A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968),
137–74. Though overstating the rivalry and opposition between ‘jurists’
and ‘Sufis’ – many Sufis were, after all, also jurists and vice versa – he
gives a proper description of some key figures and their relations with
their social and political environments.
4 The most important primary sources for the understanding of Nishapur
in this period are Taʾrīkh Naysābūr by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad
al-Ḥākim (d. 405/1015) and Siyāq li-taʾrīkh Naysabūr by Abū’l-Ḥasan
ʿAbd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī, both published in facsimile in Richard N. Frye,
The Histories of Nishapur (The Hague: Mouton, 1965). These are the
most important sources for the standard work by Richard W. Bulliet,
The Patricians of Nishapur: A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972) and the chapters
on Nishapur in Clifford E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids: Their Empire
in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 94–1040 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1963).
5 Bosworth, Ghaznavids, 153.
6 Ibid., 162.
7 EI2, s.v. ‘Nīshāpūr’, by E. Honigmann [C. E. Bosworth], 8:62–4; EIr, s.v.
‘Nishapur’, by C. E. Bosworth (accessed 13 November 2014).
63 Ibid., 19.
64 Ibid., 1.
65 Ibid., 2.
66 Wolfhart Heinrichs, ‘Contacts between Scriptural Hermeneutics and
Literary Theory in Islam: The Case of Majāz’, Zeitschrift für Geschichte
der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaft 7 (1991–2): 253. Quoted in
Saleh, Formation, 67.
67 Sulamī, Ziyādāt, 1.
68 Saleh, Formation, 16.
69 Al-Sulamī lived in a period in which the Shāfiʿīs of Nishapur were not yet
exclusively Ashʿarī in credal matters. It is not clear whether al-Sulamī
adhered to this creed, although he surely had scholarly connections
with the Ashʿarīs of his time. Berger, Sufik und Welt, 42.
70 Thibon, L’oeuvre, 128.
71 Melchert stresses that the terms ahl al-ḥadīth (people of hadith) and ahl
al-raʾy (people of reasoning) had not yet disappeared from the scene in
the tenth century, and that the process of absorbing local traditions was
still going on. Melchert, ‘Sufis and Competing Movements’, 243.
72 Böwering, ‘Commentary of al-Sulamī’, 50–1.
73 Ibid., 49–50.
74 The comparison with al-Ṭabarī is made by Böwering, ‘Commentary of
al-Sulamī’, 56; Böwering, Mystical Vision, 110. When one accepts the
opinion of Walid Saleh – which I do – that to understand the impact of
a commentary one must trace its influence on later commentaries, it is
indeed justified to compare al-Sulamī with al-Ṭabarī. All commentaries
under scrutiny in this study clearly relied on al-Sulamī’s commentary
as a source. Saleh, Formation, 11.
75 None of these early figures independently left behind a work of Qurʾanic
commentary that is known to us in its original form, and indeed probably
only al-Tustarī, al-Wāsiṭī and Ibn ʿAṭāʾ composed a work in the format
of the genre. Al-Sulamī’s works are our main source to reconstruct
them. An exception to this is the tafsīr of Sahl al-Tustarī (d. 283/896),
which has survived more or less independently, albeit in the form of
notes and additional narrations by his students. See Böwering, Mystical
Vision, 128–35. Paul Nwyia has reconstructed the tafsīrs of Jaʿfar and
Ibn ʿAṭāʾ based on al-Sulamī. See Nwyia, ‘Tafsīr mystique’, 181–230 and
Nwyia, Trois oeuvres, 23–182.
82
3
The Ultimate Boundary Crossing:
Paradise and Hell in the Commentaries
Introduction
83
Islam. The general tendency within the zuhd movement was to stress
that a pious person should strive for the hereafter by disentangling
themselves from this lower life and struggling against worldly desires
and aspirations. This roughly led to two attitudes, emphasising either
the punishment or the reward in the hereafter. The first attitude
emphasised the fear of Hell (khawf ) as a way to cultivate piety. The
second attitude focused on the longing for Paradise (rajāʾ). The third
and fourth attitudes took shape as a ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ antithesis to the
attitudes of these early zuhhād. Both take as axiomatic that an exag-
gerated fixation on either the enjoyment of Paradise or the punish-
ment of Hell distracts from what truly matters in the hereafter: God
Himself, His contentment, being near Him and the vision of Him. The
‘cold’ response did not deny the reality of the otherworldly reward
and punishment, but merely stressed that the true reward and pun-
ishment was to be either near to or far from God. The ‘hot’ response,
then, was a form of dhamm al-ākhira, an outright contempt of Paradise
and Hell, considering them something that veils the believer from
God.2 The fifth and sixth attitudes are related to trends of monism
in Sufi thought and conceive of an immanent Paradise and Hell. The
fifth attitude recognises Paradise and Hell in aspects of this-worldly
creation, in the macrocosm. The sixth attitude considers Paradise and
Hell to be immanent in the microcosm; they can be found within the
inner constitution of man. The seventh attitude consists of cosmologi-
cal speculation on themes such as the isthmus (barzakh), and finds its
most prominent proponent in Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240).3
Another, older, study on Sufi conceptions of the otherworld is
contained in La vie future selon le Coran by Soubhi El-Saleh. Rather
than analyse these conceptions thematically and classify them accord-
ing to their attitude towards the otherworld as Lange does, he takes
historical periods as the basis of his analysis. The central question for
him is how the Sufis perceived joy and torment: did they do away with
the concrete character of Qurʾanic descriptions of Paradise and Hell
or were they forced to recognise its reality to a certain extent? In the
first case, how did they do away with it, and in the second case, what
was the nature of this reality? He distinguishes five different periods:
(1) the first two centuries of Islam; (2) the third and fourth centuries;
(3) the fifth century; (4) the sixth and seventh centuries; and (5) after
the seventh century. In the first period, El-Saleh identifies two dif-
ferent ascetic trends, neither of which denied the reality of reward
and punishment: an asceticism in which the fear of punishment and
desire for recompense is equally dominant, represented by al-Ḥasan
al-Baṣrī (d. 110/728) and the mystics of Basra, and an asceticism in
which the accent is on the love of God as the essential motivation for
obedience rather than reward and punishment, represented by Rābiʿa
al-ʿAdawiyya al-Qaysiyya (d. 185/801). This second trend, although
considered secondary, certainly did not wholly deny the physical real-
ity of Paradise and Hell. In the second period, this focus on love for
God was further developed, with a whole new lexicon to describe it.
The idea became more abstract and the religious sciences became
separated into exoteric and esoteric. However, this did not lead to a
rejection of the exoteric sciences by mystics. They kept recognising
the physical reality of Paradise and Hell. In the third and fourth peri-
ods, this remained the dominant idea: Paradise and Hell are real, but
only secondary to the meeting with and contemplation of God.4 (The
fifth period El-Saleh considers to have been a period of decadence and
decline, in which nothing worth mentioning happened.)
In what follows, we combine the approaches of Lange and El-Saleh
and undertake a diachronic study of the attitudes found in the works
of tafsīr written by the five authors discussed in Chapter 2. All of them
were composed in what El-Saleh has defined as the second and third
periods, which are generally considered to be at the end of the forma-
tive, classical period of Sufi tafsīr.5
We will relate them to the six attitudes described by Lange, and the
chronological development as outlined by El-Saleh.
The men ‘whom neither trade nor commerce distract from the remem-
brance of God’ (Q 24:37) are described as people who are distracted
neither by this lower world nor by the hereafter and its rewards.
The interior gardens of intimacy with God and remembrance of Him
(basātīn al-uns wa-riyāḍ al-dhikr) are enough for them.8 Commenting
on Q 68:34 (‘Indeed, for those wary of God (muttaqīn) are the gardens
of bliss with their Lord’), he further states that who wards oneself
from sins is rewarded with the Garden. Whoever belongs to those
wary of God attains more than that: they will be unveiled and will
witness the Real (al-ḥaqq) in all states.9 Entering the Garden by His
mercy and gazing (naẓar) upon His noble face are among the gifts of
God.10 The sweetness of this gazing ‘continues to shine on their faces,
like the sun, when they return from visiting God to their homelands
[in Paradise]’.11 The friends of God (awliyāʾ) are especially entitled to
If one accepts these sayings as Jaʿfar’s, they would imply that the
focus on God rather than the enjoyments of Paradise was already
present at a quite early stage of Sufism, indeed earlier than (or at
least contemporary with) Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya (d. 185/801), who is
often associated with the introduction of this theme into Sufism.13
This combined with the absence of sayings on Hell makes one wonder
whether these sayings are perhaps indeed later than claimed. As
El-Saleh has pointed out, the early renunciants were known for their
emphasis on Hell and their fear of it, and it is only in the third century
that love mysticism appears.14 Based on this, it might indeed be likely
that the sayings attributed to Jaʿfar are rather a reflection of third-
century ideas being projected back onto him, rather than coming from
an authentic source.
From the Egyptian mystic Dhū’l-Nūn al-Miṣrī, only one long escha-
tological quote attributed to him is included.15 In the commentary
on Q 22:27, which deals with the hajj pilgrimage, he links the ritu-
als of the pilgrimage to several stages of death, the resurrection and
the hereafter. Dhū’l-Nūn equates the first stage of hajj, the intention,
with writing a will in the event of one’s death, in which the pilgrim
seeks the obedience to and contentment of God. After this, one travels
from dunyā to ākhira, a travel without return, on which the riding
camel is trust in God (tawakkul) and the provision is wariness of God
(taqwā).16 During travel the pilgrim must behave as if being carried
towards the grave. When entering into the state of ritual consecra-
tion (iḥrām), it is as if the pilgirm has died and been resurrected
from the grave, and is being called to stand between the hands of the
Globally, we can state that both the third and fourth attitudes
– namely the ‘cold’ and the ‘hot’ rejection of Paradise and Hell – are
present in Sahl’s tafsīr, and that the stress on the vision of and meet-
ing with God is equally dominant as in the sayings by Jaʿfar. Besides
these themes, Sahl introduces another theme: consuming the delights
of Paradise during this-worldly life.
Sahl’s tafsīr shows the same prominence of the themes of near-
ness to and vision of God as focal points of the hereafter that we have
observed in the sayings attributed to Jaʿfar. An example of this is the
commentary on Q 19:61, where the Gardens of Eden are explained
as ‘the visual beholding (muʿāyana) of God, in the sense of nearness
which He facilitated between Him and them’.20 This proximity to and
vision of God is apparently so intense that to be cut off from it even
for a moment after having come to know Him is similar to the punish-
ment of Hell:
Truly God, Exalted is He, has servants in Paradise who, if they were
veiled from the encounter (liqāʾ) [with their Lord] for a blinking of
the eye, would cry out for help against it, just as the inhabitants of
the Hellfire plead for help against the Hellfire. This is because they
have come to know Him (ʿarafūhu).21
Q 55:56 that, ‘Whoever restrains his glance in this world from the for-
bidden, and obscure matters, and from enjoyments and their beauty,
God gives him in the otherworld women restraining their glances
which He has promised.’45 This saying is also mentioned in Sahl’s
tafsīr.46 The pomegranate story is not mentioned by al-Sulamī at all.
Probably the idea of the physical consumption of paradisiacal objects
in this world had become too controversial by his time, to the extent
that he decided to omit it from his redaction. The discussion on this
issue must have taken place somewhere in the era between these
two authors, and must have been decided in favour of those arguing
against the idea. For example, Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936),
who lived in the era between Sahl and al-Sulamī, speaks about the idea
of consuming fruits of Paradise in this world in a negative manner in
his Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn. 47 However, the story of drinking the pure
drink of Paradise during prayer is mentioned by al-Sulamī. This was
probably not considered controversial since it is clear in the anecdote
that the drinking is imaginary and not physical.
has to wait a long time for death while fearing temptation in this
world, has to wait a long time for the reward in the grave while
hoping for abundant givings in the otherworld, and he has to wait a
long time for the resurrection while hoping for eternal dwelling in
the proximity of the Merciful and looking at Him.51
This narration is first of all important because it shows that for these
early Sufis, even the more sober-minded, the claim of seeing God in a
dream, and by this mode receiving wisdom from God, was apparently
not a strange thing. Both al-Junayd and al-Sulamī were not shocked
by such a claim to the point of censoring it from their corpuses or
problematising it in an added comment of their own.54 Second, it is
important for the notion that both this world and the Garden are
seen to keep humankind away from what really matters, expressed in
the rhetorical answer ‘You know what we want’. What it is that they
want, al-Sarī does not make explicit, but it is quite obvious that God is
implied. It is only a very small group of people who realise this, and
who attain this highest level.
Paradise. However, most of his sayings fall within the scope of both
the third and fourth attitudes, altogether making his response ‘tepid’
rather than ‘hot’ or ‘cold’. Commenting on Q 3:131, for example, he
‘coldly’ states that God in this verse commanded the normal people
(ʿawāmm) to be conscious of the Fire, to fear it and to leave sins for the
sake of it, while in another verse ‘He commanded the elect (khawāṣṣ) to
be conscious of Him and to look at none other than Him’.57 The reward
for the God-conscious he held to be the vision of God.58 The verse ‘We
have wronged ourselves’ (Q 7:23) comes to mean that people wrong
themselves ‘by being occupied with the Garden and desiring it, instead
of God’.59 The obligation that God gave to Adam (Q 20:115), according
to Ibn ʿAṭāʾ, was that he should not look at anything other than Him.
However, Adam, in his lack of firmness mentioned in the same verse,
forgot this obligation and looked to the Gardens instead, thus being
disobedient.60 In addition, ‘Adam’s departure from the Garden, his
crying much, his need (iftiqār), and the emergence of the prophets
from his loins, were better for him than the Garden and the enjoyment
and luxury in it.’61 That the otherworldly vision of God was considered
the most important by Ibn ʿAṭāʾ also appears in several other sayings:
‘The complete blessing in this World is experiential knowledge, and in
the otherworld the vision.’62 When the believers of Q 18:31 are ‘rest-
ing on the benches’, they are constantly looking at their King.63
Abū Bakr al-Wāsiṭī (d. 320/932) also mainly showed interest in the
vision of God. In line with the conventional explanation, regarding
Q 10:26 he is quoted to have said that al-ziyāda is the glance (naẓar)
at God. The highest degree in the hereafter he holds to be the ‘carpet
of nearness’ (bisāṭ al-qurb) and witnessing (mushāhada) God is even
more elevated and majestic. The degree one reaches is determined by
the degree of one’s longing (shawq).64
All that is attributed to al-Shiblī (d. 334/945) is that he commented
upon Q 3:152 (‘Among you are those who want this world and among
you are those who want the otherworld’), saying: ‘Among you are
those who want this world for obedience, and among you are those
who want the otherworld for the Garden. But where is the desirer
(murīd) of God the Exalted?’ Being a desirer of God is then connected
to the moral quality of God-centred motivation in all of one’s acts:
‘The desirer of God the Exalted is the one who when they speak, speak
for God, and when they remain silent, it is for none other than God
the Exalted.’65 These quotes, selected by al-Sulamī, are significantly
more ‘cold’ than al-Shiblī’s sayings elsewhere, which represent a ‘hot’
contempt for the otherworld. For example, he likens Hell to sugar
when compared to being separated from God, and claims that he can
extinguish the fire of Hell by spitting on it.66 That al-Sulamī did not
include these sayings in his selection may mean that al-Sulamī did
not look favourably on these sayings and preferred a more moderate
understanding of Sufism in his selection.
Al-Sulamī relates several sayings from his teacher, Abū’l-Qāsim
al-Naṣrābādhī, himself a student of al-Shiblī. Commenting on a verse
that deals with almsgiving – ‘You will not reach piety until you give
from what is dear to you (Q 3:92) – he states that the Garden is what
should be given away and that ‘arrival’ at God (wuṣūl) can be reached
only by freeing oneself of the two abodes and what is in them.67
Commenting on a part of Q 16:21 – ‘Dead, not alive, and they do not
know’ – he is quoted to have said:
The people of the Garden are dead and do not know, because of their
being distracted by other than the Real (al-ḥaqq), and the people of
presence (ḥaḍra) are alive because they are in a state of witnessing
the Living (mushāhadat al-ḥayy).68
There are many passages that allude to the idea of Paradise and
Hell being a veil (ḥijāb) from God. Commenting on Q 2:82 ‘(And those
who believe and do good works, they are the companions of the
Garden, forever dwelling therein’), he quotes an unnamed Iraqi as
having stated that ‘works only make one reach something created like
itself, and the biggest veil of the knowers (ʿārifīn) is the Garden, and
distracting oneself by it from God is the biggest calamity (al-muṣība
al-ʿuẓmā), because the Garden emanated from “Be” (kun)’.69 The here-
after is only created, and thus ‘only’ a reward for one’s works, which
are created as well. The focus should only be on the true, intrinsic
reward, which is the Creator Himself.
Conclusions
It is related that the day on which the trumpet is blown, is the day
of the passing away of the spirits, and their parting from the bodies.
There are spirits that ascend to ʿIlliyyīn, and there are spirits that
go to Sijjīn. Those are set in birds which move in the Garden, [and]
take their refuge in the night to lanterns attached to the underside of
the [Divine] Throne, its attribute being praise (tasbīḥ), refreshment
(rawḥ) and comfort (rāḥa), and for some of them the witnessing
(shuhūd) and the vision (ruʾya), according to the merit that they held
in their this-worldly existence. And as for the spirits of the unbeliev-
ers, they are in the Fire, being punished according to their crimes.70
This quote is in its content not much different from Jaʿfar’s statement
on the same verse before him. We cannot then conclude that his omis-
sion of these quotes was because he disagreed with their approach to
mysticism or on the topic of the vision of God.
Furthermore, in other places he shows interest in the theme of
vision. When speaking of the good in this world and the good in the
otherworld as mentioned in Q 2:201, he states that the good in this
world ‘is the witnessing with the inmost selves (shuhūd bi’l-asrār),
and the good in the hereafter is the vision with eyesight (ruʾyat
al-abṣār)’.76 The topic of nearness appears now and then as well, for
example when al-Qushayrī states that ‘death is a joy for the believer,
and the message of nearness to Him is good news for him, because it
is a cause for being connected to God. Whoever loves to meet God, God
loves to meet him’.77 For al-Qushayrī, the ‘heavy punishment’ (ʿadhāb
shadīd) so often mentioned in the Qurʾan alludes to the humiliation of
the lowering of the veil between God and man (dhull al-ḥijāb).78 There
is no greater punishment than to be returned to creation after having
reached God, and to be veiled from God again.79
Moreover, a mild form of disregard for otherworldly recompense
appears every now and then. The best reward in the hereafter, states
al-Qushayrī, is to enter the Garden while being freed from it, and not
entering it imprisoned by it. He then quotes an anonymous source
not mentioned by al-Sulamī, stating that ‘the reward of this world and
the otherworld is absence [of the heart’s concern for] the two abodes
through seeing (ruʾya) their Creator.’80 True repentance is only made
for the sake of God, not out of fear of the Fire or desire for the Garden.81
Al-Qushayrī also uses Qurʾanic verses on taqwā (wariness of God)
to construct a hierarchy of ways to instil fear in different classes of
believers, a hierarchy that is typical for his combination of conven-
tional and ishārī hermeneutics. Into the generality (ʿawāmm), so
states al-Qushayrī, God instils fear through His acts (afʿāl) by remind-
ing them to protect themselves from (ittaqū) the Day of Judgement
and the Fire. The elect (khawāṣṣ), then, are subject to fear through
His attributes (ṣifāt), because they realise that God constantly sees
and witnesses them as is mentioned in Q 9:105 and Q 10:61. Into
the elect of the elect (khawāṣṣ al-khawāṣṣ), God instils fear only
through Himself, as reflected in the saying in Q 3:28 that ‘God warns
you of Himself’.82 The higher one’s level on the Sufi path, the more
God-centred one’s motivation becomes, and the less important oth-
erworldly recompense becomes for one’s fear and wariness of God.
To conclude, an important note should be made concerning
what constitutes a ‘Sufi’ approach to the Qurʾanic text, an issue we
have raised in the previous two chapters. Since al-Qushayrī does not
emphasise ishārī explanations of eschatological verses as much as
other authors and puts more stress on the conventional meanings, it
would be tempting to say that his approach to eschatology was less
With its ten volumes, Maybudī’s Qurʾan commentary is the most volu-
minous of the works under study. Whereas we have been able to
study the other works from cover to cover in order to reconstruct
their eschatological conceptions, here we can offer only a selective
reading of the vast material available in Maybudī’s tafsīr.84
Maybudī’s commentary shows a certain amount of ambiguity on
issues pertaining to the hereafter: several seemingly conflicting atti-
tudes coexist. On the one hand, he does not completely do away with
the attitude of the early renunciants towards the hereafter. He holds
both fear of Hell and hope for Paradise as being necessary. However,
he does show himself as critical of an isolated cultivation of these atti-
tudes. They should always come together and should be in balance.
In his commentary on Q 52:13, about the punishment of Hell, and
Q 52:17–18, about the reward of Paradise, he states that these verses
demand both fear and hope. God mentions the reward of Paradise
directly after the punishment of Hell as a signal to the believer that
From inside the court of Majesty comes the call of generosity with
the attribute of mercy: ‘O Muhammad! The work of your community
falls within three kinds: either they are believers, or they are know-
ers, or they are disobedient. If they are believers hoping for para-
dise, here then is Our paradise. If they are the disobedient hoping for
Our mercy, here then is Our mercy and forgiveness. If they are the
knowers hoping for vision, here then is Our vision.’98
eye to hear and see God directly. God then ultimately lifts the veil and
shows Himself. He will provide His servants with cups of wine and
will recite from the Qurʾan to them. This then, states Maybudī, is the
true samāʿ. This listening does not take place through the body or
the heart, but through the spirit ( jān). This is the only organ that is
capable of becoming truly solitary with God.104
The vision of God is the most important sensory experience in
the hereafter according to Maybudī. He describes it as the splendour
of the spirit (bahāʾ-i jān), as what makes the Garden good and makes
the poor person happy.105 Longing for this vision should lead to a
disregard for this-worldly matters: it is God’s rightful due that only
He be looked at with the eye of love.106 This vision in the hereafter
takes place by three different ‘eyes’. First, there is the vision by the
eye of the head, which sees the ‘light of bounty’ and is for pleasure.
The second vision is by the eye of the heart, which is for experiential
knowledge (maʿrifa) and sees the ‘light of proximity’. Third, one sees
God with the eye of the spirit through the ‘light of finding’ (wujūd);
this is for witnessing (mushāhada).107
In conclusion, we can state that Maybudī deployed all the attitudes
and grander themes present in al-Sulamī’s Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr. However,
to bring forward these themes he hardly used the material collected
by al-Sulamī. He found his own language to express these ideas, and
saw no need to stand on the shoulders of his predecessors to convey
them.
In al-Daylamī’s thought, the fourth, ‘hot’, attitude has clearly won over
the third, ‘cold’, attitude, which was dominant in al-Qushayrī and still
somewhat in balance in the works of al-Sulamī and Maybudī. In his
tafsīr, we see a further continuation, or even radicalisation, of the
theme of belittling the importance of reward and punishment as a
motivation for one’s belief and actions, focusing one’s otherworldly
aspirations fully on God. One should only call people to God, not to
Paradise or this world.108 He considers both this world and the other-
world a tribulation (ibtilāʾ) by God.109 One’s supplications should be
only for the face of God, not for this world or the otherworld.110 In his
renunciation of the hereafter, al-Daylamī makes a similar distinction
in levels of inner life as Maybudī. Through the Qurʾan’s summoning
of the people to ‘take heed’ (ittaqū), he establishes a hierarchy in
orientations on the hereafter. To ‘take heed’ is sometimes meant in
the sense of fearing God and sometimes in the sense of fearing the Fire
or the Resurrection. The knower (ʿārif ) is supposed to fear only God,
while the ordinary people (ʿawāmm) are called to fear the Fire and
the Day of Resurrection.111 Al-Daylamī therefore forbids his intended
audience, whom he apparently wishes to see on the level of the know-
ers, to worship God out of hope for Paradise or fear of Hell. The refuge
to God should not be motivated by thought of punishment, but of God
alone, and the escape to God should be from God alone.112 Those who
direct themselves towards this world turn away from the otherworld,
and those who direct themselves towards the otherworld turn away
from God. To direct oneself towards God alone one has to turn away
from this world and the otherworld altogether.113 The two sandals
that Moses is summoned to leave behind for his auditory meeting
with God in Q 20:12 are this world and the otherworld and what is in
them.114 He holds that the Garden is better than this world, and that
the contentment (riḍwān) of God is better than the Garden and all
that is in it. This is because riḍwān is an attribute of God and as such
is an instrument for reaching the greatest proximity by witnessing
(mushāhada) and eye-witnessing (muʿāyana) God.115
In his commentary on several verses that deal with the giving of
alms, he states that the true meaning of these verses is that to attain
God one should give away not only from one’s dunyā, but from one’s
ākhira as well. Commenting on Q 2:267 (‘Give away from the good
things that you have earned’), he states that God can only be attained
by giving away the best of what one has earned. Paradise is the best
one can rightfully attain by one’s pious acts. One can give it away by
removing the desire for it from one’s heart (qalb) and inmost self
(sirr), so that one does not love it and does not want it, and so that
one comes to see Paradise as enchainment and prison. To support
this idea al-Daylamī quotes Abū Yazīd al-Basṭāmī, who is said to have
The hearts have a desire, the spirits have a desire, and the selves
have a desire. All of those [desires] come together in the Garden. The
desire of the hearts is witnessing (mushāhada) and vision (ruʾya),
the desire of the spirits is nearness (al-qurb), and the desire of the
self is delight in comfort.127
the Fire, as long as the believer keeps in mind that God manifests His
attributes by the Fire.
Even the unbelievers who do end up in Hell experience a form
of kindness and generosity from God, according to Rūzbihān. In a
lengthy commentary on Q 7:50 in which the inhabitants of the Fire
call upon the inhabitants of the Garden to pour some water over them
and grant them some of what God has provided to them, which is then
refused, he states:
It is out of the kindness and generosity of God for His creation that
He lifts the veil from the Garden for the people of the Fire so that
they can bear the pains of the punishment by seeing the Gardens and
their inhabitants, and this is out of His hidden kindnesses.142
These two persons in their passionate love and witnessing did not
know the difference between the dawn and the dark night, and did
not notice the pains of the snow in the cold, and I claim to have love
for the Creator of creation, while I am heedless of this attribute [of
love].145
For the request of the inhabitants of the Fire to pour water over them
or to give them some of what God has provided them, Rūzbihān gives
a couple of explanations. He says it is a request to the people in the
presence (ḥaḍra) of God, who are capable of doing this. The water
symbolises God’s compassion (shafaqa), and their provision is the
station of intercession (maqām al-shafāʿa). Another possible meaning
he gives is that it is the water of mercy or the proximity (qurba) that
God has provided them. He also states it might mean that the people
in Hell are not able to cry anymore because they have run out of tears,
and ask for water to be able to cry again. He then quotes lines of
poetry, which seems to imply that the reason for their crying is being
separated from God:
O you who has left, my tears are exhausted from the separation,
Grant me some tears with which I can weep about you.146
near (maqām al-tadallī). In this world they have the vision (ruʾya)
of God in dreams, and in the otherworld eye-witnessing (ʿiyān
al-mushāhadāt).154
‘What is with God is better for the pious’ (Q 3:198), he states that the
witnessing of, nearness to and communion with God enjoyed by the
abrār who have reached the presence of God are better than what
the people who are wary of God (ahl al-taqwā) will enjoy of the bliss
of the Garden.160 Moreover, in other passages he stratifies Paradise.
He mentions different types of gardens for the generality (ʿumūm)
and for the elect (khuṣūṣ) from among the believers, each inhabiting
a different cosmological layer with a different reward. The Gardens
of Dominion (basātīn al-malakūt) are for the generality. The Garden
of the Elect is eye-witnessing the essence of omnipotence (muʿāyanat
dhāt al-jabarūt). They are in a constant state of communion (wiṣāl)
with their Lord.161 While the general believers in Paradise see God
only temporarily and are veiled from Him most of the time, the know-
ers and those inflicted by love of and longing for God are in an eternal
communion with God, and are in a constant state of unveiling. Both
groups receive the reward that their inner constitution is capable of
bearing. If the elite were to be cut off from God for the blink of an eye,
‘they would die in the Garden because of the vanishing of that state’.
The general believers, on the other hand, were they to remain in a
state of continuously witnessing God, ‘they would dissolve from the
force of the strength of His majesty and beauty’.162
Turning to the immanent conceptions of Paradise, these are sig-
nificantly more dominant in Rūzbihān’s commentary than we have
thus far seen in the other commentaries. In Qurʾanic passages that
deal with the gardens of Paradise, Rūzbihān links several attributes of
these gardens to Sufi stations (maqāmāt) and states (aḥwāl). Paradise
is thus to be found in the inner constitution of man, leading to a this-
worldly experience of Paradise by attaining certain stations and
states on the Sufi path. As Rūzbihān says, ‘So blessed be who has the
likes of these gardens in the abode of examination (dār al-imtiḥān).’163
Frequently in Rūzbihān’s commentary this interiorisation of Paradise
takes place in the form of this-worldly nearness to and witnessing
(mushāhada) of God. When experiencing these states of nearness and
witnessing, the believer is in ‘the gardens of witnessing’, ‘the gardens
of communion’ or ‘the gardens of nearness to and communion with
For the people of truth (ahl al-ḥaqq) there are gardens in their hearts
and minds in this world, and in their spirits and inmost selves. The
garden of the hearts is the garden of perfection (rawḍat al-itqān),
the garden of the minds is the garden of experiential knowledge
(bustān al-ʿirfān), the garden of the spirits is the garden of clear
proof (ḥadīqat al-bayān), and the garden of the inmost selves is the
paradise of eye-witnessing ( firdaws al-ʿiyān). Each of these gardens
has trees, fruits and flowers. The river of the garden of the hearts
is the water of eternal life, which flows in it by the characteristic of
[divine] manifestation (naʿt al-tajallī) from the springs of [divine]
unity (ʿuyūn al-waḥdāniyya), and it is not altered by the muddiness
of the human condition (kudūrāt al-bashariyya). It makes the hearts
alive through the light of certainty so that the death of ignorance
does not come to them. Its trees are the trees of faith, and its fruits
are the lights of certainty.
The river of the garden of the minds is from the milk of omnipo-
tence (albān al-qudra) from which God gives them to drink, to show
them the purity of the lights of His omnipotence, whose experiential
knowledge is inherited by His might. Its trees are wisdom and its
flowersareintelligence.
The river of the garden of the spirits is the river of the unveil-
ing of Beauty ( jamāl), whose spring is the sea of Majesty ( jalāl),
from which God gives to drink to make it good through the delight
of beauty and the vision of Majesty. Its trees are love (maḥabba),
its flowers are longing (shawq), and its fruits are passionate love
(ʿishq).
The river of the garden of inmost selves is the unveiling of
the holy essence (al-dhāt al-muqaddas) from the separation of His
endless emanation ( fayḍ).Godstrengthensitwithdrinkinguntilit
straightens in its communion (waṣl).Andthereitstreesareunifica-
tion (tawḥīd),itsflowersaresolitariness(tafrīd), and its fruits are
realisation (taḥqīq).
The companions of the hearts are the people of witnessing (ahl
al-shuhūd), the companions of the minds are the people of unveil-
ing (ahl al-kushūf), the companions of the spirits are the people of
drunkenness (sakr) and ecstasy (wajd), and the companions of the
inmost selves are the people of erasure (maḥw) and sobriety (ṣaḥw).
The people of the witnessing are the companionsofawareness[of
God](murāqaba), the people of unveiling are the people of stations
(maqāmāt), the peopleofecstaticfinding(wujūd) are the people of
states (aḥwāl), and the people of erasure and sobriety are the people
of uprightness (istiqāma).Soblessedbewhohas the likes of these
gardens in the abode of examination (dār al-imtiḥān).169
Conclusion
ies have in common in the passages that they did comment upon? The
one theme that clearly stands out is that of nearness to, meeting and
communion with, and the vision of God in the hereafter. This theme
was present from the earliest sources included by al-Sulamī, and
remains dominant in all works up to and including Rūzbihān. From
that we can conclude that of the six attitudes identified by Lange, in
our period and our sources the third and fourth attitudes stand out.
Paradise and Hell are not considered the main focus for the believer:
the true motivation should be nearness to, contentment with and
the vision of God. The attitudes of fear of Hell and hope for Paradise
typical of the early renunciants are scarcely found in our sources. A
God-centred Sufism that stresses the love and longing for God has
quite pervasively surpassed these earlier attitudes in the period of
our interest. Paradise only maintains its relevance as an abode of
meeting with and seeing God. With Rūzbihān as the exception, the
theme of Hell is virtually absent in the commentaries for the same
reasons. If it is mentioned, it is rather to stress that distance from God
and being veiled from Him is the true punishment. The authors are
only interested in both abodes of recompense when it is somehow
related to the meeting with and vision of God, or the lack thereof.
This has indeed become the most dominant attitude in the ‘classical’
period. The earlier renunciant attitudes from the formative period
have not even made it into al-Sulamī’s redaction, and thus have not
become part of the canon of ishārī tafsīr.
Another common theme, very much related to the former, is the
tendency to stratify the rewards of Paradise. In all commentaries we
have come across a variant of the division between general believers
and the elite, in which the general believers are distracted by the
physical pleasures of Paradise, while the elite realises that only God
matters. Especially from Maybudī onwards, this comes to the fore
very clearly. This may have something to do with the rise of more
hierarchical structures within Sufism around the same time, in which
the terminology of ʿāmm and khāṣs played an important role.172 This
stress on otherworldly nearness to and vision of God and the related
stratification of rewards in Paradise is not unique to Sufi approaches
Notes
1 Lange, Paradise and Hell, ch. 7; Lange, ‘Sufi’s Paradise and Hell’, 193–6.
2 Dhamm al-ākhira is our own term for this concept, derived from
dhamm al-dunyā, a common concept in Sufism. Christian Lange calls
this contemptus ultramundi, derived from contemptus mundi (Lange,
Paradise and Hell, ch. 7). Massignon holds that the idea that focusing
on the recompense of Paradise distracts from God is a theme that Islam
has borrowed from Hinduism (Massignon, Essay, 67).
3 Lange, Paradise and Hell, ch. 7.
4 El-Saleh, Vie future, 91–111. See also Vakily, ‘Mystical Significance of
Paradise’, 407–11.
‘God-wariness’ and the verb as ‘being wary’. I believe these are closest
to the original meaning of the root letters, which have the connotation
of ‘to guard oneself from’ or ‘to be wary of’. For a discussion of the word
taqwā in the Qurʾan, see Erik S. Ohlander, ‘Fear of God (Taqwā) in the
Qurʾān: Some Notes on Semantic Shift and Thematic Context’, Journal of
Semitic Studies 50, no. 1 (2005): 137–52.
17 Sulamī, Ḥaqāʾiq, 2:20–1.
18 As Josef van Ess explains it in the context of al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857):
‘Das tawahhum führt ihn dazu, das Gericht zu fürchten und reuig
umzukehren; darum wird er sich im Jenseits nicht mehr zu fürchten
brauchen.’ Josef van Ess, Die Gedankenwelt des Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī
(Bonn: Selbstverlag des Orientalischen Seminars der Universität Bonn,
1961), 137–8.
19 For a detailed monograph on this tafsīr, see Böwering, Mystical Vision.
All English quotes from the Tafsīr al-Tustarī in this study are taken from
the translation by Annabel Keeler and Ali Keeler (Louisville, KY: Fons
Vitae, 2011).
20 Tustarī, Tafsīr al-Tustarī (trans. Keeler and Keeler), 120.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 121.
23 Tustarī, Tafsīr al-Tustarī (trans. Keeler and Keeler), 116.
24 Ibid., 114.
25 Ibid., 130, 149, 169.
26 Ibid., 181.
27 Ibid., 233.
28 Ibid., 171.
29 Ibid., 239.
30 Ibid., 156.
31 Ibid., 158.
32 Ibid., 176.
33 Ibid., 170. Ruʾyat al-janna most likely means the vision of God in
Paradise here. The Arabic is ambiguous, however, and might also mean
the vision of Paradise itself.
34 Tustarī, Tafsīr al-Tustarī (trans. Keeler and Keeler), 184–5, 258.
35 Ibid., 193.
36 Ibid., 185, 193.
37 It is only then that he, in one of two instances in the entire tafsīr,
51 Ibid., 2:202.
52 Ibid., 1:393.
53 Ibid., 1:322.
54 The claim to see God in a dream can be found in canonical hadith
literature and is not restricted to Sufism per se. See Pierre Lory, ‘La
vision de dieu dans l’onirocritique musulmane médiévale’, in Reason
and Inspiration in Islam: Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism in Muslim
Thought: Essays in Honour of Hermann Landolt, ed. Todd Lawson
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 353–63. However, these sometimes seem-
ingly anthropomorphic traditions were not always considered unprob-
lematic and were discussed and debated in special treatises. Some
of this material on seeing God in the form of a beardless young man
later made it into literature on problematic narrations, e.g. al-Suyūṭī’s
al-Laʾālī al-maṣnūʿa fī’l-aḥādīth al-mawḍūʿa and ʿAlī al-Qārī’s al-Asrār
al-marfūʿa, perhaps because of its too explicit anthropomorphism.
See Helmut Ritter, ‘Philologica II’, Der Islam 17, no. 1 (1928): 256–7;
Richard Gramlich, Der eine Gott: Grundzüge der Mystik der islamischen
Monotheismus (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1998), 136–7. We will
come back to this more profoundly in Chapter 5.
55 Carl W. Ernst, Words of Ecstacy in Sufism (Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
1985), 105–6.
56 Richard Gramlich, Abu l-ʿAbbās B. ʿAṭāʾ: Sufi und Koranausleger
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1995), 1–5.
57 Sulamī, Ḥaqāʾiq, 1:119.
58 Ibid., 2:297.
59 Ibid., 1:224.
60 Ibid., 1:449.
61 Ibid., 1:225.
62 Ibid., 1:371.
63 Ibid., 1:410.
64 Ibid., 1:289, 385.
65 Ibid., 1:123.
66 See Lange, Paradise and Hell, ch. 7.
67 Sulamī, Ḥaqāʾiq, 1:107. Similar quotes are attributed to al-Wāsiṭī and
Ibn ʿAṭāʾ.
68 Sulamī, Ḥaqāʾiq, 1:364.
69 Ibid., 1:65.
88 ‘Akthar ahl al-janna al-bulh’. See Abū Bakr Aḥmad al-Bayhaqī, Shuʿab
al-īmān, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Ḥāmid (Riyadh: Maktabat al-
Rushd li’l-nashr wa’l-tawzīʿ, 2003), 2:391.
89 Maybudī, Kashf, 8:250.
90 Maybudī, Kashf, 6:574–5; Chittick, Divine Love, 220.
91 Tabattul is a term hardly ever found in the handbooks of Sufism. It is
derived from Q 73:8: wa-tabattal ilayhi tabtīlan (and devote yourself to
Him with devotion). See Nwyia, Exégèse coranique, 54.
92 Maybudī, Kashf, 10:274. Translation from Keeler, Sufi Hermeneutics,
163–4.
93 For the sociopolitical implications of this Sufi tendency to establish
spiritual hierarchies, see Anjum, ‘Mystical Authority’, 71–81.
94 He derives this relationship from Q 79:40–1: ‘Who fears the stand-
ing before his Lord and forbids the lower self from caprice, surely the
Garden is the refuge.’
95 Again, he derives this relationship from a Qurʾanic passage. Q 9:72
reads ‘and good dwellings in the Garden of Eden; and contentment
from God is greater’.
96 Maybudī, Kashf, 2:42–3; Chittick, Divine Love, 174.
97 Maybudī, Kashf, 2:42–3.
98 Maybudī, Kashf, 3:311; Chittick, Divine Love, 96.
99 Maybudī, Kashf, 8:168–9; Chittick, Divine Love, 178-79.
100 Maybudī, Kashf, 7:152; Keeler, Sufi Hermeneutics, 167-68.
101 Maybudī, Kashf, 5:167; Keeler, Sufi Hermeneutics, 168.
102 Although not quoted explicitly by Maybudī, the tradition of samāʿ in
Paradise and David reciting from the Psalms goes back to Dhū’l-Nūn
al-Miṣrī. See Massignon, Essay, 144.
103 This pure wine is elsewhere described as ‘the wine of communion [with
God]’ (sharāb-i waṣl) (Maybudī, Kashf, 7:377). In my translation of waṣl
as ‘communion’ instead of the more common ‘union’, I follow the opin-
ion of Barbara von Schlegell, who warns of too excessive use of the term
‘union’ as translations for Sufi terminology. Von Schlegell, ‘Translating
Sufism’, 583–4.
104 Maybudī, Kashf, 8:249–50.
105 Ibid., 1:27; 7:377.
106 Ibid., 1:469.
107 Ibid., 7:377–8.
their Lord; and those who do not associate anything with their Lord}
(Q 23:57–9), which means they do not take as partners the Garden and
the Fire, this world, and the otherworld in the longing for it and the
fear of it, to His saying, the Exalted:{And those who give what they give
while their hearts are full of fear because of the return to their Lord}
(Q 23:60), which means they perform their works of obedience {while
their hearts}, meaning their interiors, are afraid of inclining towards
the acts of obedience, and see {that they return to their Lord} not to the
Garden or the Fire.’ Daylamī, ‘Tafsīr al-Daylamī’, fol. 98a (Q 23:1–11).
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid., fol. 146b (Q 83:15).
127 Ibid., fol. 95b (Q 21:102). This saying is also to be found in al-Sulamī’s
Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsīr. See Paul Nwyia, ‘Le tafsīr d’Ibn ʿAṭā (m. 309/921)
extrait des Ḥaqāʾiq al-tafsir de Sulamī’, in Trois oeuvres inédites de
mystiques musulmans: S̆ aqīq al-Balḫī, Ibn ʻAṭā, Niffarī, ed. Paul Nwyia
(Beirut: Dar El-Machreq, 1973), 96.
128 The Muʿtazilīs, arguing against the vision of God, would understand
ilā rabbihā nāẓira as ‘waiting for [the reward of] their Lord’ rather
than ‘gazing at’. Anthony K. Tuft, ‘The Origins and Development of
the Controversy over “Ruʾya” in Medieval Islam and its Relation
to Contemporary Visual Theory’ (PhD dissertation, University of
California, Los Angeles, 1979), 103–19.
129 Daylamī, ‘Tafsīr al-Daylamī’, fols 143b–145a (Q 75:22–3). Also in his
commentary on that other central Qurʾanic verse used as proof of oth-
erworldly vision, Q 10:26, he gives the conventional Ashʿarī position
that ziyāda is the vision of God with the eye in the hereafter. Daylamī,
‘Tafsīr al-Daylamī’, fol. 71a.
130 For a more detailed discussion of these different theological perspec-
tives on the issue of the vision of God, see Chapter 5.
131 Daylamī, ‘Tafsīr al-Daylamī’, fols 143b–145a (Q 75:22–3).
132 In his commentary on Q 6:101 he further confirms this view, stating
that who sees God in this world and does not die by what he saw, is
not capable of understanding, nor of expressing what he saw. Daylamī,
‘Tafsīr al-Daylamī’, fol. 48b (Q 6:101).
133 Ibid., fol. 78a (Q 12:108).
134 Ibid., fol. 143b–145a (Q 75:22–3).
135 Ibid., fol. 43b (Q 6:30). This question reappears in later periods of
132
an eye from the meeting with Him, life would be spoilt for the people of
the Garden.’ Baqlī, ʿArāʾis, 2:465–6.
163 Baqlī, ʿArāʾis, 3:305–6.
164 Ibid., 1:38; 2:68, 293, 316, 534.
165 Ibid., 2:7.
166 Ibid., 1:38.
167 For another example of interiorised gardens, see Baqlī, ʿArāʾis, 2:466.
168 Ibid., 1:38.
169 Ibid., 3:305–6.
170 Gerhard Böwering, ‘The Scriptural “Senses” in Medieval Ṣūfī Qurʾān
Exegesis’, in With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis
in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, eds Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Barry D.
Walfish and Joseph W. Goering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
348.
171 Lange estimates the amount of eschatological verses in the Qurʾan to
be around one tenth of the total, perhaps even more. Part of the trouble
in counting the verses that deal with Paradise and Hell, is that many
verses allude to them implicitly. See Lange, Paradise and Hell, 37–9.
172 See Anjum, ‘Mystical Authority’; Jonathan A. C. Brown, ‘The Last Days
of al-Ghazzālī and the Tripartite Division of the Sufi World: Abū Ḥāmid
al-Ghazzālī’s Letter to the Seljuq Vizier and Commentary’, The Muslim
World 96 (2006): 89–113.
173 See Aziz al-Azmeh, ‘Rhetoric for the Senses: A Consideration of Muslim
Paradise Narratives’, Journal of Arabic Literature 26, no. 3 (1995):
227–31; Lange, Paradise and Hell, ch. 5.
174 See Anjum, ‘Mystical Authority’.
175 For more sayings representative of this contempt for the hereafter, see
Lange’s description of the fourth attitude (Lange, Paradise and Hell, ch.
7).
176 ‘The conclusion seems inescapable that al-Dailamī was something of
a lone wolf; and this would account for the oblivion into which his
voluminous writings have fallen’ (Arberry, ‘Works of al-Dailamī’, 51).
177 A further in-depth study of Rūzbihān’s commentary – especially on
the concept of tajallī – may offer a better understanding of how Ibn
al-ʿArabī’s ideas related to ideas that already existed in his broader
environment.
4
The First Boundary Crossing:
Adam Descending
Introduction
135
(‘Go down as enemies to each other’) that ‘it does not befit who diso-
beys Us [God] to be in Our proximity’.12
The commentaries of the contemporaries to al-Sulamī and
al-Qushayrī in the school of Nishapur are most important for us to
understand how these two Sufi Qurʾan commentaries are placed
within their wider scholarly context. They generally do not offer
elaborate narratives on the nature of Adam’s sin, the deeper reasons
for the banishment, or its place within God’s greater plan for human-
kind; at least, it is not given as much attention as one would expect for
such a seemingly pivotal cornerstone of religious anthropology. They
deal mainly with ostensibly trivial questions such as what kind of tree
it was, how Satan was able to enter the Garden, whether the Garden
was in Heaven or on Earth, where Adam and Eve were sent down to,
and so on.
Al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058) mentions four prevailing opinions
about Adam’s act in his commentary al-Nukat wa’l-ʿuyūn.13 The first
is that Adam forgot the prohibition, as mentioned in Q 20:115. The
argument, then, is that prophets forgetting a prohibition is a form of
disobedience to God, because of their superior knowledge and high
rank. The second is that he ate from it while he was drunk and was
held responsible for it as if he was sober. The third is that he ate from
it wilfully and with knowledge of the prohibition. He indeed slipped
up (zalla) and he should indeed be blamed for wilful disobedience.
The fourth is the most remarkable explanation: Adam justified it to
himself by interpreting (taʾwīl) the prohibition falsely. He slipped up
because the evidence (dalīl) was covered up by Iblīs (Q 7:22). It should
not, therefore, be considered a major sin (kabīra), of which prophets
are free.14 Al-Māwardī himself is quite sure that indeed they did not
realise that it was an act of disobedience. Otherwise Adam would not
have done it, since he could not commit a major sin.15
Al-Thaʿlabī, in his commentary Al-Kashf wa’l-bayān ʿan tafsīr
al-Qurʾān, treats neither the issue of impeccability nor the issue of
predestination extensively. He only briefly states that God’s announce-
ment that He shall make a vicegerent on earth indicates that God pre-
destined Adam’s banishment from the Garden by his sin to fulfil this
Adam, you have sought your immortality (khulūd) from the tree, not
from Me, while immortality is through my power ( yad, lit. hand) and
might (mulk). So you have ascribed partners to Me, even though you
did not realise it. But I called [this to] your attention by expelling
you, so that you would not forget Me at some point.23
It is interesting to note how Ibn ʿAṭāʾ seemingly did not feel hindered
by notions of ʿiṣma at all, and could make the statement that Adam,
though unintentionally, had committed idolatry. As a Ḥanbalī, it is
likely that he adhered to a non-theological, strictly text-based form
of creed that did not problematise the idea that prophets could sin.
The result of the sin, the sojourn in this-worldly life, was something
explicitly negative for Ibn ʿAṭāʾ; he argued that joyfulness only befit-
ted humankind when returned to Adam’s original abode, namely
Paradise. Therefore, in this-worldly life, grief and weeping should be
dominant.24
Other approaches to the banishment seem to have been more
influenced by fundamental theological questions, and take the form of
a mystical theodicy. They are generally more positive in approach and
tend to see the descent to this-worldly life as something that elevated
rather than degraded humankind. For example, the early, more mysti-
cally oriented, authority Sahl al-Tustarī (contrary to the more zuhd-
oriented ones) dedicated a whole chapter in his Laṭāʾif al-qiṣaṣ to
the ‘subtleties’ involved in the Adam story.25 This maintains that the
subtlety of Adam’s banishment from Paradise for eating wheat from
a tree – a seemingly disproportionate punishment for a minor sin
perpetrated only once – is that it effectuated the divine decree that
Adam should be vicegerent on earth, although he himself wished to
stay in Paradise. Sahl compares this with Muhammad, who preferred
to stay in Mecca but had to leave for Medina because of the harshness
he encountered in Mecca. This was necessary in order to fulfil what
was decreed by God, to grant him power and elevate his words. The
sincere servant Adam could not, as it were, help his sin; ultimately,
it was God who wanted him to do it, to fulfil a certain aspect of His
divine decree. It was in this way that God granted the possibility of
repentance, forgave him and granted mercy. Also, unlike Satan, Adam
did not believe in the sin that he had committed and recognised his
mistake. Another reason that Sahl mentions for Adam’s banishment is
It might be that these sayings went too far beyond the boundaries of
the apparent meaning of the Qurʾanic text for al-Qushayrī, and that he
was not as fond of the themes of nearness and vision that dominate
al-Sulamī’s material.
It was the moment when humanity was able to see God as well as
hearing Him and, since vision is the mainspring of love, it was the
moment when the seed of human love for God was sown . . . In this
world, the spiritual vocation of the human being can be understood
as the fulfilment of the pact agreed in pre-eternity with God; it is to
return to that state of being with Him, cut off from all other.58
with the words of al-Anṣārī, one will be rewarded with the vision in
the hereafter: ‘The drinker of the wine of friendship (sharāb-i dūstī)
is promised the vision (dīdār). Whoever is truthful, attains what he
wishes.’61 Maybudī considers the vision of God in the hereafter to be
the ultimate outcome of Adam’s sojourn in this-worldly life. While in
this world, humankind can compensate for the lack of this vision by
remembrance (dhikr) of God:
His impudence and nearness reached the point that, when He com-
manded him to travel from Paradise to the earth, he said, ‘O Lord,
travellers do not go without provision. What will You give us on this
path as our provision?’ He said, ‘O Adam, your provision in that land
of exile will be the remembrance of Me. After that, on that day of
your return, your vision of Me is promised.62
Third, the angels desired to see God. Therefore, God gave them
Adam so that they would be able to see Him through him:
second from Paradise to this world. The command from God to Adam
and his spouse to live in the Garden (Q 2:35) Rūzbihān first interprets
as being in proximity ( jiwār) to God, so that they would not be sepa-
rated from Him. Only a few lines after that, he seemingly contradicts
this earlier interpretation by suggesting that dwelling in the Garden
was not in proximity ( jiwār) to God; that is, before they were placed
in the Garden, they were in proximity to God. By placing them in the
Garden, God removed them from proximity to Him. He states that
God actually wanted Adam and his spouse to sin, without specify-
ing why, or of what exactly the sin consisted. He therefore put them
in charge of themselves (wakkalahumā ilā anfusihimā) and removed
them from His proximity ( jiwār) by placing them in the Garden, so
that the sin could take place. God wanted to set apart the eternal
(qadīm) from the created (ḥadthān), and therefore made them take
their refuge in eating from the fruits of the trees of Paradise. Since
Adam and his spouse were ‘children of time’ (ṭiflā al-zamān) – that is,
part of the created realm and not divine – they were not entitled to
reside in the realm of might of the Merciful ( jabarūt al-raḥmān).87 He
quotes an earlier authority to support this idea: ‘Living in the Garden
is estrangement from God. He brought the created back to the created,
and He brought imperfection back to imperfection, to separate the
pre-eternal (azal) from the created (ḥawādith).’88
Before entering the Garden, Adam was afraid in his inmost self
(sirr) that he would be distracted from the delights of witnessing God
(ladhāʾidh mushāhadatihi) and communion (wiṣāl) with God, and
be veiled from the spirit of intimacy (rūḥ al-uns) and from looking
at the beauty of sanctity ( jamāl al-quds). God, therefore, comforted
him by stating that ‘you shall not be hungry therein, and not naked’
(Q 20:118). Rūzbihān interprets this to mean that Adam would not be
hungry in the sense of longing to witness God (mushāhada), because
in the Garden he also would ‘drown in the sea of communion with Us’,
and that he would not be naked from ‘the cloth of the light of elected-
ness’ (libās anwār al-iṣṭifāʾiyya). God promises Adam that he would be
forever clothed in the cloth of ‘chosenness’ (kiswat al-ijtibāʾiyya), that
he would not be thirsty of the water of nearness (zulfa), that he would
That tree is the tree of knowledge of fate (qaḍāʾ) and divine decree
(qadr). Who has knowledge [of that] has knowledge of what God
has hidden in it, [and] has arrived at the might of the kingdom (ʿizz
al-mulk) and of immortality (khuld) by the description of Lordship
(naʿt al-rubūbiyya) and independence (ḥurriyya).94
When ‘the cursed one’ (al-malʿūn) said to Adam and Eve ‘Shall
I point you to the tree of immortality and a power that does not
vanish?’ (Q 20:120), Satan was well aware that it was indeed the tree
of immortality and power (shajarat al-khuld wa’l-mulk) and that it
was forbidden to them. However, he wanted the tree to be touched,
to challenge Lordship (rubūbiyya) by its strength. He grieved because
he himself did not have the ability to do so, and saw the treasures of
the unseen being filled in it in the form of fruits. Therefore, he pointed
Adam to it, so that at least someone of the created beings would enjoy
this. But he mixed his will (irāda) with envy of Adam. Satan wanted
them to be shown those secrets (asrār) that would make the one who
knew them naked and intoxicated.95
Ultimately, it was God who wanted part of His secrets to be shown
to Adam. He thus gave Iblīs the ability to whisper to Adam, which
caused this secret to be unveiled to him. Adam’s rank was elevated
by his newly gained knowledge, while Iblīs was damaged by it.
Thus Iblīs did not obtain what he wanted; he had wished for Adam
to fall from his rank, but instead Adam’s rank was elevated and his
honour was increased. He himself lost his rank because of his envy
of Adam and became forever rejected (maṭrūd al-abad), whereas
Adam became forever accepted (maqbūl al-azal wa’l-abad).96 When
Satan tempted Adam to eat from the tree, he thought that he had put
Adam in ‘the haughtiness of eternal separation’ (al-firqa al-abadiyya).
He did not realise that Adam’s act would cause the exact opposite,
eternal communion (al-waṣla al-abadiyya), and that in reality the
tree was the tree of eternity (shajarat al-khuld), because the tree was
clothed in the lights of power (anwār al-sulṭāniyya) and the secrets
of divinity (asrār al-rabbāniyya).97 For the idea that Adam was actu-
ally elevated by eating from the tree, Rūzbihān finds support in the
Satan whispered to them because he wanted evil for them. That was
the cause of Adam’s elevation and his reaching the highest rank.
Adam had never done an act more complete than the sin (khaṭīʾa)
which disciplined him and positioned him on the station of realities
(maqām al-ḥaqāʾiq). What might have pervaded his inmost self (sirr)
from the angels’ prostration to him fell away from him, and made
him return to the blessing of the beginning, in being created by the
hand, until he returned to his Lord, by His saying: {We have wronged
ourselves}.98
In the Qurʾan it is stated that when Adam and his spouse both ate from
the tree, their private parts became apparent to them (Q 20:121).
According to Rūzbihān, this means that their inmost selves (asrār)
were unveiled to them after eating from the tree, which made them
obtain the divine secrets (al-asrār al-ulūhiyya). It was Satan, aiming
for the opposite, who guided them to this elevated state. To elucidate
this, Rūzbihān gives the comparison of a snake that walks towards a
treasure. Behind him is a human who tries to kill it. When he kills the
snake, he finds the treasure, thus reaching success through his enemy.
This, says Rūzbihān, is similar to the case of Adam and ‘the cursed
one’ (al-malʿūn; Satan):
Rūzbihān states that the ‘provision for a time’ promised to Adam and
his spouse in this world in Q 2:36 has the meaning of ‘the lights of the
manifestation of God (anwār tajallī al-ḥaqq) thronging to their hearts,
to comfort them for the lack of witnessing ( fuqdān al-mushāhada)’.102
By abandoning Paradise, they lost their witnessing of God. As a com-
pensation for that loss, they would receive some of the light from
the manifestation (tajallī) of God upon their hearts in this-worldly
existence.103
In his commentary on Q 20:117 (‘Let him [Satan] not remove you
from the Garden so that you suffer’), God says that His reprimand
comprises hunger, thirst and nakedness, because that is what the
lower self (nafs) truly fears. If they eat from the tree, God will tire
them in this-worldly life by the need to look after food, drink, clothing,
agriculture and so on, while ‘these punishments do not exist close
and near to Me’.104 It is a kindness and generosity from God that He
punishes Adam in this world (dunyā) for a sin that he committed in
His presence (ḥaḍra), while his fellow human beings are punished in
the otherworld (ākhira) for the sins they commit in this world. This
is something specifically for Adam, because the punishment in this
world is easier. It is only because God tested Adam with eating from
the tree that the secrets of the realities of His subjugation (ḥaqāʾiq
qahramānihi) are attainable for the people of experiential knowledge
(ahl al-maʿārif) from among the trustworthy (ṣiddīqīn).105
Concluding Rūzbihān
Conclusion
Let us now return to the two central questions that we posed in our
introduction. Have we found in our authors an answer to the question
of why Adam ‘had’ to descend from Paradise, in how they placed this
descent within God’s larger (eschatological) plan for humankind and
how they dealt with the questions of the predestination and theodicy
related to it? And what did our authors exactly hold to have been
Notes
1 English translation from Sands, Ṣūfi Commentaries, 70. Original quote
from Nwyia, Exégèse coranique, 178.
2 Not accidentally, some Christian theoreticians of the study of religion
and mysticism have taken the story as a paradigm for their theories.
For example, Mircea Eliade stated, based on Christian mysticism and his
observations of what he calls ‘archaic’ religion, that every religion, and
more specifically ‘primitive’ religion, has a notion of a fall, a sense that
something pivotal from a ‘time out of time’ (illud tempus) was lost at the
beginning of human history, resulting in a ‘nostalgia’ or ‘yearning for
Paradise’. One of the main purposes of mystic ecstasy, both in ‘primitive’
and ‘Judeo-Christian’ mysticism, then, is the return to Paradise. Mircea
Eliade, ‘The Yearning for Paradise in Primitive Tradition’, Daedalus 88,
no. 2 (1959): 264–6; Daniel P. Pals, Seven Theories of Religion (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 168. More theoreticians of mysticism
have shown interest in the fall of Adam as a key event for human-
ity, and as an explanatory model for mystical experience, mostly with
an implicit Christian theology. Zaehner, in a Christocentric approach
to non-Christian mysticism, uses the fall of Adam to come to a typol-
ogy of the phenomenon of mysticism itself. He holds that the doctrine
of the fall serves as an explanation for monistic mysticism, which he
defines as ‘realising the eternal oneness of one’s own soul’ and opposes
to the ‘mysticism of the love of God’ found in the monotheistic tradi-
tions. Robert C. Zaehner, At Sundry Times: An Essay in the Comparison
of Religions (London: Faber, 1958), 132; Robert C. Zaehner, Mysticism
Sacred and Profane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 191–2. For
a critique of Zaehner, see Ninian Smart, ‘Interpretation and Mystical
Experience,’ Religious Studies 1, no. 1 (1965): 75–87.
36 Ibid., 1:221.
37 Ibid., 1:221.
38 This is a recurring theme in Sufi literature. See Awn, Satan’s Tragedy,
90–6.
39 Sulamī, Ḥaqāʾiq, 1:221–2.
40 Ibid., 1:224.
41 Exegetes differ on the banishment of Satan, specifically on whether it
was from Paradise or from Heaven. The text of the Qurʾan is ambiguous
and both are mentioned in conventional tafsīr of Q 7:13. Sunnis gener-
ally consider it to be from Paradise, the Muʿtazila from Heaven. Fakhr
al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-kabīr (Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-turāth al-ʿarabī,
2008), 5:210.
42 Qushayrī, Laṭāʾif, 1:522.
43 Ibid., 1:83.
44 Ibid., 1:80.
45 Ibid., 1:75.
46 Ibid., 1:524.
47 Ibid., 1:80. This idea can also be found in conventional commentaries
from al-Qushayrī’s milieu. Al-Thaʿlabī quotes ‘one of the wise’ (ḥukamāʾ)
to have said: ‘God had made Adam leave the Garden already before He
made him enter it, by His saying: “I shall make a vicegerent on earth.”
Then his departure from the Garden by his sin shows that it was by fate
(qaḍāʾ) and decree (qadr) of God.’ Al-Thaʿlabī, Kashf, 1:176–7.
48 Qushayrī, Laṭāʾif, 1:81.
49 Ibid., 1:80.
50 Ibid., 1:81.
51 Ibid., 1:527.
52 Ibid., 1:523.
53 Martin Nguyen holds that the influence of al-Sulamī on Qushayrī’s com-
mentary is overstated by Suleyman Ateş, and that he depended much
more on other contemporary non-Sufi commentaries. For a detailed
case study of al-Qushayrī’s dependence on other commentaries and
his manner of quotation, see Martin Nguyen, ‘Letter by Letter: Tracing
the Textual Genealogy of a Sufi Tafsīr’, in Aims, Methods and Contexts
of Qurʾanic Exegesis, ed. Karen Bauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), 217–40.
54 It would be worthwhile taking up the task of tracing the intertextual-
ity between these two sources, and thus analysing the incorporation of
non-tafsīr literature into Maybudī’s commentary. In the preface to his
latest study, Divine Love, William Chittick mentions he has investigated
the matter, but without further elaborating on the textual evidence. His
conclusion is that Maybudī knew Samʿānī’s treatise, and that it is clear
that he incorporated passages of the treatise into his commentary from
Surah 17 onwards, without citing the source. Chittick, Divine Love,
xviii–ix.
55 Keeler, Sufi Hermeneutics, 132–9.
56 Maybudī, Kashf, 3:570–1.
57 Naṣr Allāh Pūrjavādī has convincingly shown how in Sufi thought the
theme of vision is intimately connected with the themes of passionate
longing (shawq) and passionate love (ʿishq). It is the vision of God that is
passionately longed for and that is loved. Naṣr Allāh Pūrjavādī, Ruʾyat-i
māh dar āsmān: bar-rasī-yi tārīkhī-yi masʾala-i liqāʾ Allāh dar kalām wa
taṣawwuf (Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāhī, 1996), 185–8.
58 Keeler, Sufi Hermeneutics, 139.
59 Maybudī, Kashf, 1:162.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 3:573.
62 Ibid., 1:163. Note the relation with Eliade’s theory of mystical experi-
ence as a recapturing of the paradisiacal state. Man is no longer in
Paradise and capable of seeing God. However, dhikr consists a substi-
tute to survive the time until the paradisiacal state of vision is restored.
Eliade, ‘Yearning for Paradise’.
63 Keeler, Sufi Hermeneutics, 136̧–7.
64 Maybudī, Kashf, 6:190.
65 Ibid., 6:190–1.
66 Al-Daylamī mentions that he treats the issue of Adam being created in
the form/image of God in detail in his work ʿUyūn al-maʿārif.
67 Daylamī, ‘Tafsīr al-Daylamī’, 17–18, 101.
68 Carl Ernst, who himself calls Rūzbihān’s works ‘at times admittedly
. . . convoluted and obscure’, quotes prominent figures as Jāmī (‘he has
sayings that have poured forth from him in the state of overpowering
and ecstasy, which not everyone can understand’) and Dārā Shikūh
(‘fatiguing’) to affirm this. Carl W. Ernst, ‘The Symbolism of Birds and
Flight in the Writings of Rūzbihān Baqlī’, in The Heritage of Sufism,
171
97 Ibid., 2:506.
98 Ibid., 1:423.
99 Ibid., 2:506.
100 Ibid., 1:44.
101 Ibid., 3:87.
102 Ibid., 1:45.
103 Ibid., 1:45.
104 Ibid., 2:505.
105 Ibid., 2:505.
106 Godlas, ‘Influences’, 87.
107 Baqlī, ʿAbhar, 13 (translation from Ernst, ‘Stages of Love’, 452).
108 Aḥmad al-Samʿānī, Rawḥ al-arwāḥ fī sharḥ asmāʾ al-malik al-fattāḥ,
ed. Najīb Māyil Hirawī (Tehran: Shirkat-i intishārāt-i ʿilmī wa farhangī,
1989), 206. Translation from Chittick, Divine Love, 153. See also
Maybudī, Kashf, 5:503; Keeler, Sufi Hermeneutics, 138.
5
Excursus: Embodying the Vision of God
in Theology and Sufism
Introduction
174
ing (liqāʾ) with God is alluded to in several verses dealing with the Day
of Judgement, for example Q 6:31, 9:77 and 18:105.8 Hadith literature
contains more explicit references in favour of a vision as a reward in
the hereafter.9 It is not exactly clear when the issue first became con-
troversial, and whether it has non-Islamic roots.10 Van Ess indicates
that the issue was already discussed by Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/746)
and his opponents, as well as by alleged anthropomorphists like
Muqātil b. Sulaymān (d. 150/767), and thus predates the rise of the
Muʿtazila.11 From the early fourth/tenth century onwards, with the
careers of al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935–6) and al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944),
and the late Muʿtazilī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), the formal dialec-
tic discussions by theological schools on the issue have reached us.
The positions of these different schools are fairly well documented,12
thus a brief overview suffices.
Three main issues have occupied theologians concerning the vision
of God: its theoretical possibility in both this world and the otherworld,
its actual occurrence and its modality.13 The main positions are divided
between the Muʿtazila and Jahmiyya on the one side of the spectrum,
from the viewpoint of categorically denying its possibility and occur-
rence, and the Ashʿarīs, Māturīdīs and Ḥanbalī traditionists on the
other side confirming its possibility in both abodes and its occurrence
in the hereafter, but differing on its modality. The general trend in
the Muʿtazilī and Jahmī schools was to deny the ocular vision of God
on grounds of the incorporeality of God: what has neither body nor
direction cannot be seen. The Jahmiyya refused the vision of God both
in the otherworld and this world, as well as in dreams. In addition,
they rejected the ascension of Muhammad and his subsequent vision:
Paradise was not yet created according to their theology and they held
God to be everywhere and nowhere, not in heaven.14 The Muʿtazilīs did
not base their reasoning on the Qurʾanic texts, but rather saw certain
Qurʾanic texts as being confirmation of the doctrine they had reached
through dialectic reasoning. It was rationally impossible to see God,
and thus were the Qurʾanic passages interpreted and understood.15
The Ashʿarīs, Māturīdīs and Ḥanbalī traditionists generally agreed
on the theoretical possibility of the vision of God in both this world
and the otherworld, and on its occurrence in the otherworld, but they
differed on its modality. For Ḥanbalī traditionists, texts of Qurʾan and
hadith in their apparent meaning sufficed to confirm the existence
of ruʾya (vision) in the hereafter for the believers, and its modal-
ity by the physical eye.16 The position of the Ashʿarīs was rooted
in the view of the traditionists, but added dialectical reasoning to
textual, philological and exegetical arguments (to a larger extent than
the Māturīdīs, who mostly relied on the latter). They deemed vision
theoretically possible in both this world and the otherworld, based
on the argument of existence: God exists and by definition every-
thing that exists can be seen.17 They stated that it only occurs in the
otherworld as a reward for the believers. On the modality of the
vision, they were more equivocal. Although early voices insisted on a
non-comprehensive physical vision with the eye, sometimes nuanced
by the clause ‘without mentioning how’ (bi-lā kayf), later thinkers,
among whom were Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Fakhr
al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), had more complicated positions on the
issue and proposed a ‘vision’ on an imaginary and cognitive level.18 It
would be a step too far to treat these arguments extensively here; for
now it suffices to conclude that there was still significant movement
and debate on the issue in the time frame that we are dealing with.19
Among the nussāk of the Sufis are those who speak about ḥulūl, that
the Creator is incarnated in creatures, and that it is possible that
he incarnates in a human, a wild animal and other individuals. The
people who say this, when they see something that they deem beau-
tiful they say: ‘We do not know whether God is maybe incarnated in
it.’23
Among them are those who presume that worship can bring
them to the point that they see God, eat from the fruits of the Garden
and embrace the beautifully eyed women (ḥūr al-ʿayn) in this
world.24
It is very likely that these passages refer to figures like Abū Ḥulmān
al-Dimashqī (d. c. 340/951), who claimed that God could be heard
and seen through creation; Abū Sulaymān al-Dārānī (d. 215/830),
physical eye or with the heart.40 However, his discussion of the issue
still concludes with a confirmation that he does not know ‘of a single
shaykh of this order – that is, not one who is recognized as a valid
authority – [who agrees] that God is seen in this world, or that any of
His creation has seen Him’.41 Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz and al-Junayd are
specifically mentioned as having written refutations on deluded Sufis
who claimed that God could be seen in this world.42
However, these authors did not have the last word on the matter.
A century after al-Muḥāsibī, Sufis indeed proposed a vision of God with
the heart by the manifestation (tajallī) of God’s light on it, or a vision of
God through creation rather than in creation, thus differing from the
understanding of the early ḥulūliyya. While these early understandings
still had a physical idea of the vision, later interpretations took it to be a
strictly contemplative vision through the ocular contemplation of crea-
tion.43 On vision by the heart, al-Shiblī (d. 334/946) stated in a line of
poetry that ‘When the eye does not see You, then still the heart does see
You.’44 Ibn ʿAṭāʾ (d. 309/922) said about Q 50:37 (‘who has a heart’) that
it signifies a heart that sees God.45 Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Niffarī
(d. c. 366/976–7) also endorsed the idea of a this-worldly vision of God.
In his work al-Mawāqif, direct this-worldly vision of God is described as
being the final station (mawqif) on the mystical path. To him, the latter
depends on the former: who does not see God in this world, will not see
Him in the otherworld.46 The vision of God is ultimately all that matters
to him, and the only thing that can save one from the Fire:
have really seen God in a form: the ‘vision’ was abstract. Rather, it was
meant as what Gramlich has called ‘Gott vor Augen haben’ (having
God in mind): the Sufi must expel from the heart everything other
than God, and totally direct all thought and ambitions, all of the heart,
towards God alone, thinking of and envisioning none other than God.51
It is as such a contemplative state of being totally directed towards
God, rather than a physical visionary experience.
Al-Qushayrī
ers shall see Him tomorrow when they are in paradise, although ‘No
being is like Him’.52
Al-Daylamī
a list of earlier Sufi authorities who stated that they had experienced
the vision of God by the heart in this world, and who testified of this
experience in their sayings and writings.66 Their claim of this experi-
ence is sufficient evidence for him of the possibility of this vision, and
because of their piety and sincerity naturally overrules the claims of
those denying it: experience has a higher epistemic value than ration-
ality for al-Daylamī.67
He differentiates between the speculative theologians
(mutakallimūn) and the philosophers ( falāsifa) on the one side and
the masters of taṣawwuf on the other. The last of these recognise
that the essence (dhāt) and attributes (ṣifāt) of God may be experien-
tially known by means of witnessing (mushāhada) and vision (ruʾya)
through the vision of the heart (baṣīrat al-qalb), while the first two
believe that in this-worldly life knowledge of God can be obtained
only through the intellect (ʿaql).68 He thus describes a typical episte-
mological conflict between mystical-experiential and rational ways
of knowing. One could argue that this is where he and al-Qushayrī
diverge. Al-Qushayrī did not as explicitly recognise the epistemic
value of mystical experience, or of the vision of God, as al-Daylamī.
Rūzbihān
With the writings of Rūzbihān the issue becomes even more complex.
From his autobiography, Kashf al-asrār, it becomes very clear that
he subscribed to the possibility of a this-worldly vision of God, or
at least of His attributes and actions in the form of a visual divine
manifestation (tajallī). Carl Ernst has even claimed that ‘vision (ruʾya)
is the most important general category for mystical experience in
Rūzbihān’s vocabulary’.69 It appears that for Rūzbihān, this vision –
imagining God in human forms – is neither just an abstract introver-
tive witnessing, nor a full vision with the physiological eye. Rūzbihān
may be the clearest example thus far of what Wolfson calls a cognitive
vision: God is perceived in an image and a form that is derived from
the images and symbols present in his own religious and cultural
environment. Rūzbihān himself claims that theological argumenta-
tion becomes irrelevant once overwhelmed by the ecstatic vision of
But it is not impossible (mustaḥīl), rather the vision with the outer
eye (ruʾyat al-ʿayn al-ẓāhira) is conceivable ( jāʾiz). The evidence of
that is the request of Moses for the vision of God when he said, ‘My
Lord show [Yourself] to me, [so] I [can] look at you.’ It is impossible
that the prophet who was spoken to and elected for the message and
the Book would ask something that is impossible, and attributing
ignorance [in religious matters] to him is unbelief (kufr). And just
as God is known without [specifying] how (bi-lā-kayf), he is also
seen without [specifying] how (bi-lā-kayf), and he is not ‘owned’ by
creatures because seeing Him is confirmed. And the vision of God
is conceivable in sleep, and in wakefulness with the heart, because
of the saying of the Prophet [Muhammad]: ‘Who sees God in one’s
sleep will not be punished by the Fire.’ And he said: ‘Make your
bellies hungry and make your livers thirsty, then you will see God
with your heart.’ That is possible in states (ḥāl), in ecstasy (wajd), in
intoxication (sukr) and sobriety (ṣaḥw).72
God has granted him with what he is capable of grasping and does
not disturb the purity of intimacy for him, and makes him see him-
self in the cloth of His action ( fiʿl) until his existence (wujūd) with
God remains, and takes the fortune of the vision of the attributes
(ruʾyat al-ṣifāt) from His beauty. Don’t you see how God forbade
Moses from seeing the unadulterated (ruʾyat al-ṣirf), and turned him
away from Him, only after the iltibās, by His saying when he asked
what he asked, ‘You shall not see Me, but look at the mountain.’ The
Prophet clarified the realities of iltibās by his saying: ‘I have seen my
Lord in the best form.’79
Rūzbihān is the only one who is explicit on the modality and form
by which he beholds God in his vision of His manifestations. In Kashf
al-asrār, he relates how God manifests to him according to two cat-
egories: either as a manifestation of His majesty ( jalāl) and wrath
(qahr), or of His beauty ( jamāl) and grace (luṭf).81 Although Rūzbihān
as an Ashʿarī would never state that God has an actual body, still
Conclusion
was generally upheld, none of the Sufis wished to claim the actual
occurrence of such a physical vision that had been disallowed even to
Moses. A contemplative vision, however, was considered conceivable,
to differing degrees. As we have seen, al-Qushayrī was very reluctant
to discuss the theme of vision, even in a contemplative mode. This
stands in stark contrast with the enthusiasm shown by al-Daylamī
and Rūzbihān. While in the case of al-Daylamī it remains somewhat
unclear whether God could be perceived in forms and images within
human categories of perception, or whether he meant an introver-
tive abstract vision, this is more explicit in the case of Rūzbihān: his
self-described visions clearly fall within the category of cognitive
contemplative vision.
In the discussion of both theologians and Sufi authors, two exam-
ples keep appearing in the arguments of both advocates and adver-
saries of seeing God during this-worldly life: the request by Moses to
see God (Q 7:143) and Muhammad’s heavenly journey (Q 53:1–18).
It is to these two case studies that we turn in the next two chapters.
Notes
1 See Underhill, Mysticism, 279–97; Wolfson, Speculum, 52.
2 Wolfson, Speculum, 54.
3 Ibid., 52–5.
4 The Arabic mushāhada, which we translate as ‘witnessing’, is often
translated as ‘contemplation’ or ‘contemplative vision’.
5 Wolfson, Speculum, 58–9.
6 Ibid., 60.
7 Ibid., 60–1, 66–7.
8 See Claude Gilliot, ‘La vision de Dieu dans l’au delà. Exégèse, tradition
et théologie en Islam’, in Pensée grecque et sagesse d’Orient. Hommage
á Michel Tardieu, eds Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi et al. (Turnhout:
Brepols, 2009), 241–7; Tuft, ‘Controversy’, 6–16; Wesley W. Williams,
‘Tajallī wa-Ruʾya: A Study of Anthropomorphic Theophany and Visio Dei
in the Hebrew Bible, the Qurʾān and Early Sunnī Islam’ (PhD dissertation,
University of Michigan, 2008), 76–100.
9 Hadith literature on the question of ruʾya is a genre in itself, worthy of a
under ruʾyat Allāh. Shīʿī approaches on the issue are close to the Muʿtazilī
approaches. They are not presented in this overview, because of their
limited influence on Sufi thought in the period under scrutiny. For a
discussion of Shīʿī positions, see Georges Vajda, ‘Le problème de la vision
de Dieu (ruʾya) d’après quelques auteurs šīʿites duodécimains’, in Etudes
de théologie et de philosophie arabo-islamiques à l’époque classique, eds
Daniel Gimaret, M. Hayoun and J. Jolivet (London: Variorum Reprints,
1986), 31–54.
13 Gardet, Dieu, 338–40.
14 On the position of the Jahmiyya, see TG, 1:139; 2:186, 502, 504, 528, 535,
700–1; 3:49, 184; 5:220–1.
15 On the Muʿtazila, see Tuft, ‘Controversy’, 175–212; TG, 3:382, 472–4,
496; 4:9, 57; 5:398.
16 The Ḥanbalī traditionist Ibn al-Qayyim, in his work on eschatology Ḥādī
al-arwāḥ, states at the start of the chapter on the vision of God: ‘This
chapter is the most honourable, most significant and most important
chapter of the book, the most dear to ahl al-sunna wa’l-jamāʿa and the
most difficult for the people of innovation and error (ahl al-bidʿa wa’l-
ḍalāla).’ Thus he confirms both the centrality of the vision of God to
the Sunni eschatological imagination and the importance of the issue
in polemics between theological schools. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ḥādī
al-arwāḥ ilā bilād al-afrāḥ (Cairo: Maktabat al-Mutanabbī, n.d.), 195.
17 Gardet, Dieu, 339; Tuft, ‘Controversy’, 133–66.
18 For a discussion of al-Ghazālī, see Tuft, ‘Controversy’, 167–74. On
al-Rāzī, see Guy Monnot, ‘Vision de Dieu et bonheur de l’homme dans
le commentaire coranique de Fahr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’, in Autour du regard:
mélanges Gimaret, ed. Éric Chaumont (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 63–75.
19 For a more elaborate discussion of the complexity and evolution of these
dialectical discussions, I once again refer to Tuft, ‘Controversy’.
20 Karamustafa has satisfactorily described the link between Sufis and
the traditionists and schools of kalām. See Karamustafa, Formative
Period, 87–108. Some authors have pointed out that most Sufis pre-
ferred Ashʿarism to Muʿtazilism due to the former’s acceptance of
miracles (karāmāt), refuted by the latter. Also their emphasis on God’s
omnipotence and the limitation of reason made it more acceptable for
Sufis who preferred an epistemology of experience to rationalism. See
Ernst, Ruzbihan, 28; Melchert, ‘Sufis and Competing Movements’, 243;
198
6
Arinī: Declined at the Boundary?
Introduction
201
Moses leaves his people behind for a retreat of forty nights, giving his
brother Aaron temporary leadership over them (Q 7:142). The verse
reads as follows:
When Moses came to Our appointed time and his Lord spoke to him,
he said, ‘My Lord, show [Yourself] to me, [so] I [can] look at You.’
He said, ‘You shall not (lan) see Me, but look to the mountain. If it
remains in its place you shall see Me.’ When his Lord manifested
Himself to the mountain He made it into rubble, and Moses fell
unconscious. And when he stood up, he said: ‘Glory to You, I repent
to You, and I am the first of the believers.’8
Although theologians generally agreed that the verse implies that Moses
did not see God, they disagreed on the possibility of the vision. For oppo-
nents of the idea of a vision of God, this verse was used as a confirmation
of their dialectic conclusion that God cannot be seen. Proponents of the
idea had to find a way to interpret this verse in such a way that it did
not categorically rule out the vision of God. A number of issues gener-
ally concerned theological exegetes of this verse: the reason for God’s
refusal to show Himself to Moses; the meaning of the future negation
particle lan; the modality of God’s manifestation (tajallī) to the moun-
tain; the reason for Moses’s repentance and his declaration of belief.
The Muʿtazila saw an obvious confirmation of the impossibility
of seeing God in the verse. They were, however, confronted with the
question of how the impeccability of prophets should be reconciled
with the request from Moses. The Muʿtazilī exegete al-Zamakhsharī
(d. 538/1134) offers a fair representation of typical Muʿtazilī concerns
when explaining the verse in his Qurʾan commentary al-Kashshāf.
After having confirmed that Moses heard God’s created speech, a typi-
cal Muʿtazilī standpoint, he states that by his request arinī (show me)
Moses asked to be made capable of seeing God (ijʿalnī mutamakkinan
min ruʾyatika). On the question of how a knowledgeable and impec-
cable prophet could ask something that he knew not to be possible, he
responds that it was only a rhetorical question to reproach and silence
the insolent from among his people who had provokingly asked to see
God on several occasions (Q 2:55; 4:153).9
God’s manifestation, then a human in this life surely could not; (5) it is
possible that God would have left the mountain in its place; He would
not have linked something impossible to something possible; (6) that
God manifested to the mountain is a proof of the possibility of vision
in itself; (7) Moses could hear God directly; if hearing is possible, then
vision must be possible a fortiori; Moses asked God to see Him after
he had heard Him; by hearing Him he realised it was possible to see
Him as well.13
To understand how the Sufi commentaries are embedded in their
broader religious context, we must once again look at the major com-
mentaries written by the school of Nishapur. What becomes clear
from them is that no exegete would explain the verse in such a way
that any type of vision, either with the eye or with the heart, actu-
ally took place. Most of the aforementioned arguments appear in one
way or another in these commentaries as well. As al-Māwardī’s com-
mentary shows, Muʿtazilī ideas were still current in Nishapur and
the controversy over ruʾya had sociopolitical significance in the strife
between different scholarly factions and their patron networks. It was
not merely an intellectual issue.
Al-Thaʿlabī shies away from the explicit theological reasoning of
the commentators discussed above, and confines himself to implicit
theology by quoting a score of earlier exegetes who all stated that
the negation lan tarānī (You shall not see Me) applies only to this
world, but that God will be seen in the hereafter. Who sees God in this
world will die because the experience is too overwhelming to bear.
He lets Moses respond to God’s refusal in a way that resonates with
a Sufi motif of love and longing.14 Hearing the speech of God aroused
an uncontrollable yearning in Moses for the vision of Him: ‘I heard
Your speech and long to look at You. To look at You and to die is more
beloved to me than to live and not seeing You.’ 15 Here the visual is
given a higher rank in the sensory hierarchy than the aural. The audi-
tion of God is only a ‘prelude’, as it were, for the true enjoyment of the
lover of God: the vision of Him. The passion to reach this vision is so
strong that it is unbearable to wait until the hereafter, to the extent
that Moses was even ready to die for it.16
among the later generations’ depicts the meeting between Moses and
God as a meeting between lovers. The promises of lovers are a pleas-
ure even when broken.26
After that the focus shifts to the nature of Moses’s meeting with
his Lord and His speaking to Moses. As in the sayings of Jaʿfar, it
becomes clear that the other authorities also deem the absolute seclu-
sion of Moses from the rest of creation to have been necessary for him
to qualify for this auditory meeting. Abū Saʿīd al-Kharrāz points out
how God spoke to Moses only in the deepest of the night and made
him invisible for all other conscious beings so that the speech could be
exclusively for Moses. The speech of God, explains al-Qurashī, comes
to Moses through himself. Had He spoken to him ‘in the full scope
of His greatness’, that is through Himself instead of through Moses,
Moses would have been annihilated. Al-Qurashī thus shows great
similarity to Jaʿfar’s ideas on the matter.27 Al-Ḥusayn also describes
the process of seclusion from the rest of creation, of Moses transcend-
ing his human form and receiving God’s speech:
He [God] removed [the sense of] temporal and spatial order from
him, and he came to God according to what He invited him to, and
what He wanted him for, and what He placed upon him, and He
brought him forth from Himself, and made Himself apparent to him,
by taking away every pain, energy, challenge, difficulties and efforts.
When nothing remained for him by which he could be hindered,
he was lifted to the station of [face-to-face] encounter (muwājaha)
and conversation (mukhāṭaba), and He made his tongue loose for
request and demand.28
Al-Wāsiṭī also holds that Moses disappeared from his normal human
nature when receiving God’s speech and being in his immediate pres-
ence. When he realised the sweetness of God’s speech, he requested
His unveiling.29
Yet another quote by an unidentified authority similarly describes
how God singled Moses out from creation to receive his speech. This
unidentified author also makes it lead to the request of the vision,
which is then subsequently granted, albeit indirectly. Because of
this cannot be verified. The passage explains that only the hearts of
the knowers (ʿārifīn) that have attained experiential knowledge of
God, supported with the lights of God-granted miracles (karāma)
are capable of carrying and enduring the witnessing (mushāhada)
of God. This is a very exceptional state that human beings cannot
normally endure. The author therefore reassures his readers that the
hearts that have reached this state of witnessing God are in fact not
witnessing through themselves; it is through God Himself that they
endure the witnessing of God and it is God who carries their hearts at
that moment.31 This corresponds with Jaʿfar’s commentary in which
he states that to be able to see God one must first reach a state of
subsistence (baqāʾ) in God; something that is transient cannot reach
the subsistent. Here something similar is proposed: when the heart
witnesses God, the heart is under God’s complete control, such that
the heart is no longer an independent actor. It is God Himself who
witnesses God:
Subsequently, when those hearts have carried Me, and have endured
the witnessing of Me, then I am the one carrying Me, none other,
because through Me he carried Me, and through Me he endured the
witnessing of Me. There is no witnessing of God except for Him.32
Sufi commentary neatly follows the viewpoint that the vision was not
granted to Moses. But in the case of Maybudī this does not lead to a
sober understanding of the story either. He chooses to interpret the
story in the language of love mysticism: Moses became drunk from
the potion of love in his unique aural encounter with God.
Maybudī contrasts Moses’s meeting with his Lord with an ear-
lier meeting at the burning bush. The meeting at the burning bush
(Q 28:29) was a journey of seeking, while the meeting at this moun-
tain was one of joy. In this meeting, Moses came without a sense
of selfhood, having lost himself in his inmost self (sirr). Drunk from
the potion of love that he drank from the cup of sanctity, the words
‘Show [Yourself] to me’ boiled up inside him. Burning from having
heard God’s speech in a state of intimate speech (munājāt), still drunk
from ‘the wine of yearning’ (sharāb-i shawq), he finally exclaimed,
‘Show [Yourself] to me, [so] I [can] look at You.’ After this exclama-
tion, the angels rebuked him. They pointed out that a lowly creature
like Moses, a child of menstruating women, created from dust and
water, was not qualified to see his Lord. They claimed that there was
no chance for a created being to achieve communion (wiṣāl) with the
ever-existing God. The angels were then commanded to leave Moses
alone, since Moses could not really help having uttered this, having
lost all restraint in his state of being in love.41
Annabel Keeler has suggested in her study of Maybudī’s commen-
tary that the stories of Moses and Muhammad serve to establish a hier-
archy between the prophets: shortcomings and weaknesses of earlier
prophets are there to show the elevated rank of Muhammad.42 Keeler
mentions a set of quotes related to the vision of God to support this.
Maybudī states that in this life ‘lovers will have only a glimpse of the
lights of those secrets and a whiff of the perfume of those traces. Only
Muhammad had the capacity for direct witnessing (ʿiyān).’43 Other
servants, including Moses, have to wait for the hereafter: ‘Today there
can only be a witnessing of the heart (mushāhada-yi dil), tomorrow
there will be direct witnessing with the eyes (muʿāyana-yi chashm).’44
The true vision will come only after death and it is this hope that will
make death bearable for the believer: ‘Everyone hopes for something,
and the hope of the mystic is for the vision [of God] (dīdār). Everyone
loves life, and death is difficult for them, but the mystic needs death
for the sake of vision.’45
will and with whom You are content seeing You’.47 A last anonymous
quote, not mentioned by al-Sulamī, explains that Moses was allowed
only to speak with God, not to see Him, because vision is emanation of
the essence (ishrāq al-dhāt), while speech is merely one of His attrib-
utes. Humans have ways to attain His attributes, while God’s essence
is unattainable to them.48
Al-Daylamī disagrees with this and does not rule out a this-worldly
vision of God’s essence: ‘I hold that the vision of the essence [of God]
(ruʾyat al-dhāt) is not impossible for the servants. Impossible is to
have an encompassing vision, knowledge and its likes.’ So the vision of
God is possible, albeit in an imperfect way: the human faculties or the
human mind cannot encompass God. In favour of such a non-physical
vision of God’s essence, he mentions one quote from al-Sulamī’s com-
mentary that can be interpreted as an endorsement of a non-physical
vision by Moses, in a state of annihilation ( fanāʾ):
When the vision was requested, he said: ‘You shall not see Me in
your human condition (bashariyya).’ So he said: ‘Annihilate me and
my human condition.’ So He annihilated him, and God was without
parallel in His essence (dhāt), and He manifested Himself to Moses
in his unconscious condition . . . He annihilated him until he saw
Him, then He brought him back to His attributes.49
to Moses.’ I saw Moses as though he saw the Most high, and he fell
from the mountain, intoxicated, to the foot of the mountain.51
Had he not seen Him on the station of clothing (iltibās) in the vision
of every atom from the intellect (al-ʿaql) to the earth (al-tharā)
from the reflection of existence, he would not have found the way to
request the witnessing of the unadulterated (al-ṣirf). Therefore, the
vision (al-ruʾya) had become necessary.54
who also stated that the request of vision followed on from a vision of
God through creation. Rūzbihān quotes this saying verbatim:
God had made the mountain a reflection of His action ( fiʿl), and He
manifested (tajalla) Himself in terms of His attribute (ṣifa) to His
specific act ( fiʿl khāṣṣ), and subsequently to the mountain. Moses
saw the beauty of eternity ( jamāl al-qidam) in the reflection of the
mountain and fainted, because he reached his goal commensurate
with his state. Had He manifested Himself to Moses in His pure form
(ṣirfan), Moses would have become fine dust. And had He manifested
Himself to the mountain in His pure form, the mountain would have
burnt to the seventh earth. Rather, He manifested Himself to the
mountain in terms of the essence of greatness (ʿayn al-ʿaẓama) and
the sublimity of eternity (subuḥāt al-azaliyya).56
Moses could not bear the vision of God’s pure essence, and so was
diverted to a vision of the reflection of God’s attributes and acts. Even
that made him faint.
Rūzbihān offers more sayings like this, not only focused on Moses,
but making this a general rule for believers: some of the believers
have reached such a high state that they see none but God in creation,
from the throne to the earth (min al-ʿarsh ilā al-tharā). His beauty and
majesty are manifest in creation and reach the eyes through the heart.
He quotes ‘one of those madly in love’ as having said: ‘I did not look at
anything, without seeing God in it.’57 This comes close to the concept
Conclusion
how the commentators viewed the position of the prophets and their
aural and visual experiences as mystical models. Sūrat al-Najm is,
therefore, our case study in the next chapter.
Notes
1 Gramlich even made the statement that longing for the vision is the
very core of mysticism: ‘Dem Mystiker geht es um die Schau: er will Gott
sehen’ (The vision is the goal of the mystic; he wants to see God). To sup-
port this point he quotes al-Dārānī answering the question of what the
ʿārifīn want: ‘Bei Gott! Sie wollen nur das Sehen, warum Mose gebeten
hat!’ (By God! They only want to see that for which Moses prayed!).
Gramlich, Der eine Gott, 229. Böwering also mentions the vision of God as
a basic theme in Islamic mysticism (Böwering, ‘Scriptural Senses’, 353).
2 Michael Ebstein has made this suggestion in his reading of passages
on a this-worldly vision of God in the work of Dhū’l-Nūn al-Miṣrī.
Michael Ebstein, ‘Mystical Ascensions and the Hereafter in the Here and
Now: Some Notes on Eschatology in the Traditions Attributed to Dhū
l-Nūn al-Miṣrī’, paper delivered at the HHIT International Symposium
‘Crossing Boundaries: Mystical and Philosophical Conceptualizations of
the Dunyā/Ākhira Relationship’ (Utrecht University, 5 July 2013), http://
vimeo.com/84535394 (accessed 18 August 2014). See also Karamustafa,
‘Eschatology in Early Sufi Thought’.
3 See Böwering, ‘From Word to Vision’.
4 For example, al-Hujwīrī defends that hearing is a more important sense
than seeing, even in relation to God: ‘If it is said that vision of God is
better than hearing His word, I reply that our knowledge of God’s vis-
ibility to the faithful in Paradise is derived from hearing: it is a matter of
indifference whether the understanding allows that God shall be visible
or not, inasmuch as we are assured of the fact by oral tradition. Hence
hearing is superior to sight’ (Nicholson, Kashf al-maḥjūb, 393–4). See
also Gerhard Böwering, ‘From Word to Vision’, 207–9.
5 A transmission by Ibn ʿAbbās reads: ‘Intimate friendship (khilla) is for
Abraham, speech (kalām) for Moses, and vision (ruʾya) for Muhammad.’
Maybudī, Kashf, 9:724. As we shall see in the next chapter, this vision of
God by Muhammad was disputed by conflicting traditions.
6 See Chapter 4, note 1. On the particular case of Moses as a mystical model,
see Georges C. Anawati and Louis Gardet, Mystique musulmane: aspects
224
52 Ibid., 22.
53 Baqlī, ʿArāʾis, 1:463–4.
54 Ibid., 1:462.
55 Ibid., 1:463. See also Sulamī, Ḥaqāʾiq, 1:239.
56 Baqlī, ʿArāʾis, 1:465.
57 Ibid., 1:466.
58 Carl Ernst explains malakūt as the ‘locus for his visionary encounters
with angels, prophets, and God’ and jabarūt as the ‘locus for experiencing
the wrathful and powerful manifestations of the Attributes of majesty’.
Ernst, Ruzbihan, 31.
59 Baqlī, ʿArāʾis, 1:466.
7
A Vision at the Utmost Boundary
Introduction
227
Paradise and Hell was not worth mentioning for Sufi exegetes: only
the journey to God mattered to them. In Sufism, the miʿrāj has tra-
ditionally functioned as a model for instruction to attain this near-
ness to and vision of God. The likes of al-Basṭāmī, al-Sulamī and
al-Qushayrī produced and collected texts that gave a mystical twist to
Muhammad’s ascent.3
In our analysis, we focus on one particular aspect of the miʿrāj
narrative: the vision of God. Böwering has distinguished four main
motifs relating to the vision of God in the ascension narrative, each
related to a different early Sufi authority. The first two motifs are
reminiscent of what we have encountered in the analysis of Moses’s
request for the vision. The first motif is the vision during the ascension
as a foretaste of the vision in the hereafter, which Böwering relates to
al-Wāsiṭī (d. 320/932). The second motif considers the vision during
the ascension not as a foretaste of the world to come, but rather
as the recapturing of the primordial vision of God at the Day of the
Covenant. Böwering relates this to Sahl al-Tustarī. The third motif is
the interiorisation of Muhammad’s vision in the individual mystic. He
relates this to Ibn ʿAṭāʾ (d. 309/922). The fourth motif, related to Jaʿfar
al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765), links the vision of God to the theme of love: the
visionary encounter is an encounter of mutual love and intimacy.4
The first two motifs especially show the relatedness of the theme
of vision in this context with the grander scheme proposed in our
introductory chapter: the vision of the miʿrāj is either a reactualisa-
tion of the primordial vision or an eschatological vision brought into
this-worldly life. Böwering’s classification also once again emphasises
the relatedness of the themes of love and vision. In what follows, we
will see whether this also holds true for the discussions on the miʿrāj
in the works of our commentators.
refer to an ascent (miʿrāj, lit. ‘ladder’) explicitly, nor do they reveal the
identities of the involved actors: they are merely referred to as ‘he’,
‘him’ or ‘His servant’. Detailed narrative of the night journey and the
ascension developed outside the Qurʾan, most notably in hadith lit-
erature.6 Only when the narrative was firmly established as part of
the Islamic faith was it read into these Qurʾanic passages in exegeti-
cal literature, in a process that Neuwirth has called ‘mythologising
exegesis’, a process that ‘dissolves the Qurʾanic statements into its
individual elements in order to construct out of these elements side-
plots and background images’.7 The identities of the subjects involved
in the opaque Qurʾanic narratives were thus a matter of speculation
in exegetical literature. As we shall see, several options coexisted for a
long time in tafsīr literature.
All of these verses are important in our analysis, but of special
significance are a couple of verses from Sūrat al-Najm that describe
a visionary encounter between two unidentified entities. We will
first have a closer look at the reception of these verses in the early
tafsīr tradition, how these early positions were disseminated in the
Nishapur school, and then compare these to our Sufi sources.8
at all. Maybudī deals with the matter only briefly in his conventional
commentary.14
However, it is different regarding the second mention of an
encounter, in Q 53:8–9. This passage mentions how someone draws
near and comes down, until he is ‘two bow-lengths away or even
closer’ (thumma danā fa-tadallā, fa-kāna qāba qawsayni aw adnā).
Who or what draws near and comes down, and towards whom or
what, does not become clear from the Qurʾanic passage itself and is
again the domain of exegesis. Commentaries give roughly four options:
Muhammad moved towards God; God moved towards Muhammad;
Gabriel moved towards Muhammad; or Gabriel moved towards God
(see Table 7.1).
These four options are already present among our sample of
earliest commentators. Ibn ʿAbbās mentions two opinions: either
Gabriel drew near to Muhammad or Muhammad drew near to
God. His personal preference is the first option.15 In the commen-
tary by Mujāhid, only the opinion of Gabriel drawing near to God
Table 7.2 ‘The heart did not belie what he/it saw’
Q 53:11–12 Muhammad Muhammad Muhammad Personal preference
saw God with saw God with saw Gabriel
the eye the heart
Early commentaries
Ibn ʿAbbās + + Muhammad saw
God with the heart
Mujāhid + + Not mentioned.
Cites Gabriel option
more often
Muqātil Raʾā min amri
rabbihī
School of Nishapur
Thaʿlabī + + +
Māwardī + + +
Wāḥidī + + + Muhammad saw
God with the eye
Sufi commentaries
Sulamī + +
Qushayrī + Muhammad saw
‘signs’
Maybudī II + + + Muhammad saw
God with the eye
Maybudī III
Daylamī + Muhammad saw
God with the eye
Rūzbihān + + Muhammad saw
God with the eye
and the heart
Table 7.3 ‘He saw him/Him at another descent, at the lote tree of the
utmost boundary’
Q 53:13–14 Muhammad Muhammad Muhammad Gabriel Personal
saw God with saw God with saw Gabriel saw preference
the eye the heart God
Early commentaries
Ibn ʿAbbās + + + Muhammad
saw Gabriel
Mujāhid
Muqātil +
School of Nishapur
Thaʿlabī + Muhammad
saw Gabriel
Māwardī + + +
Wāḥidī + +
Sufi commentaries
Sulamī
Qushayrī + Gabriel saw
God
Maybudī II + Muhammad
saw Gabriel
Maybudī III
Daylamī +
Rūzbihān + + Essentially
same vision
as first
Compared with the rich and varied material in his collected commen-
taries on Q 7:143, al-Sulamī’s commentary on the verses related to the
miʿrāj is not very extensive. This may be because he had already col-
lected the bulk of the material available to him in his Laṭāʾif al-miʿrāj
and saw no point in collecting all of them twice.25 What does catch the
eye is that the verses dealing with nearness and vision attract most
commentary in his discussion of Sūrat al-Najm. The commentary on
this surah is not at all used to discuss details of the isrāʾ and the
miʿrāj, nor to reflect on Muhammad’s visit to Paradise and Hell from
a Sufi perspective. Apparently all that mattered to the early Sufi com-
mentators quoted by al-Sulamī were the verses that the Sufis could
use to describe a moment of intimacy and nearness to God and, more
controversially, the vision of Him.
In the commentary on the second verse of Sūrat al-Najm (‘Your
companion has not strayed, nor erred’), a link to the theme of near-
ness and vision has already been established. Al-Sulamī quotes both
Ibn ʿAtāʾ and Jaʿfar as stating that Muhammad did not stray from
nearness to or vision of God for the blink of an eye.26 The two modes
of vision suggested in conventional tafsīr, of the eye and of the heart,
both return in al-Sulamī’s commentary. Sahl is quoted in support
of a vision of the heart: ‘He is right opposite in his witnessing of his
Lord, seeing Him with his heart.’27 Bundār b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 353/964)
also considers it to be a vision of the heart. Two words referring to
the heart – fuʾād and qalb – are not synonymous for him, however,
but are the separate layers of a spiritual organ. The fuʾād contains
the qalb: ‘The fuʾād is the vessel of the qalb. The fuʾād did not doubt
about what the foundation saw, and that [foundation] is the qalb.’28
According to Jaʿfar, the theme of vision is again related to the theme of
divine love. He shrouds the vision in mystery, a secret known only by
the two Lovers: ‘No one knows what he saw, except He who showed
and he who saw. The Beloved came close to the beloved, a confidant
for him, an intimate friend with him.’29 Only Ibn ʿAṭāʾ is quoted in
favour of a vision with the eye. He understands the verse according
to the reading with the shadda: ‘His heart did not belie what he saw
with his eyes.’ Not everyone is capable of this, according to Ibn ʿAṭāʾ;
sometimes someone is overwhelmed by what his eyes see, while his
heart cannot grasp it. However, Muhammad was capable of this.30
coming near to his Lord, moving into His world as the veils between
them are torn apart. Muhammad is described as a light in veils. ‘And
descended’ is an allusion to the beams of Muhammad spreading out in
God’s world after these veils have been removed:
He was a light in veils. When he went out of them [the veils], his
beams were spread there like the sun when it goes out from the
clouds. His body was close like the nearness of two bow-lengths.
Then what was left of the veils was lifted, and he became nearer and
closer.46
comments that God means to comfort His prophet by this verse. Ever
since Muhammad had seen the beauty and majesty of God ‘between
the two bow-lengths (qāba qawsayn)’, he states, ‘he was with his heart
in al-malakūt, with his spirit in al-jabarūt, with his inmost self (sirr)
in the witnessing of beginninglessness (mushāhadat al-qidam), and
with his mind (ʿaql) in the lights of His unseen longing for God’.53 The
overwhelming experience of seeing God made him impatient to see
Him again and to transgress the boundaries of created form for a new
ascension to two bow-lengths. In Rūzbihān’s commentary, we see the
same precondition for the possibility of the vision of God that we wit-
nessed earlier in several commentaries on the request from Moses:
Muhammad first has to overcome his human form to be able to reach
the state of seeing God. While God is embodied in Rūzbihān’s descrip-
tions of the vision of God, the viewer first has to be disembodied. In
Rūzbihān’s conception, once again the theme of vision is intimately
intertwined with the theme of passionate love. In Rūzbihān’s words,
God advises Muhammad to
(ghayb), he sees in a word play with the verb asrā, which he reads
as ‘kept secret’ instead of as ‘made travel by night’. He stresses how
Muhammad was singled out into the unseen for a secret meeting with
God in the night.56 The fourth allusion of the inmost secret (sirr), then,
Rūzbihān uses to describe the spiritual development of Muhammad
through several halting places (spiritual way stations), ultimately
leading to the halting place of unification (ittiḥād). This passage gives
a good impression of the spiritual progress that Rūzbihān strives for,
taking Muhammad’s ascension as the model:
‘He made His servant travel by night’, from the halting place of will
(irāda) to the halting place of love (maḥabba), and from the halting
place of love to the halting place of experiential knowledge (maʿrifa),
and from the halting place of experiential knowledge to the halting
place of divine unity (tawḥīd), and from the halting place of divine
unity to the halting place of solitariness (tafrīd), and from the halt-
ing place of solitariness to the halting place of annihilation ( fanāʾ),
and from the halting place of annihilation to the halting place of
subsistence (baqāʾ), and from the halting place of subsistence to the
halting place of acquiring [God’s] attributes (ittiṣāf),57 and from the
halting place of acquiring [God’s] attributes to the halting place of
unification (ittiḥād).58
to see God one first has to go beyond one’s human form: Muhammad
surpassed the forms of createdness (rusūm al-ḥudūthiyya). To illus-
trate this, Rūzbihān makes a cross-reference to Sūrat al-Najm, to the
verse ‘Then he came near and he descended’. In the context of this
verse, he describes Muhammad’s state of annihilation:
No form of createdness (rusūm al-ḥudūthiyya) remained with him
due to the appropriation of the created by the beginningless. He
came near to Him and then descended from Him, then annihilated in
Him, and between [Him and] his annihilation were the lengths of two
bows,61 the bow of pre-eternity (azal) and the bow of post-eternity
(abad), and between the two bows he disappeared into the unseen,
and his disappearance subsisted. He was on the same level or closer,
and made the unseen of his unseen (ghayb ghaybihi) disappear by
disappearance (ghayba), as if he was in the annihilation of annihila-
tion, and annihilation due to the annihilation of annihilation.
His name subsisted in the demonstrative pronoun (ism
al-ishāra) by His saying {subḥān alladhī asrā bi-ʿabdihi}, meaning:
he is with his halting place at the station of unification (ittiḥād)
upon the characteristic (waṣf) of servanthood (ʿubūdiyya), praised
be (subḥān) who is transcendent (subḥān) above being a halting
place for created beings, or of the mixture of divinity (lāhūtiyya)
with humanity (nāsūtiyya).62
intellect, his intellect his heart, and his heart his inmost self. He saw
God in all of his existence ( jamīʿ wujūdihi), because his existence
completely became one of the eyes of God. He saw God by all the
eyes, and he heard His speech from all the ears, and he came to
experiential knowledge of God by all the hearts, until his eyes, ears,
hearts, spirits and intellects were annihilated in God. God looked
towards God for the sake of him as a representative of him, because
the eyes of createdness had been annihilated in the eyes of God, and
the eyes of God had returned to God, so God saw God, and God had
experiential knowledge of God, and God heard from God as a mercy
from Him to him, and as a kindness to him, because He hears and
sees.64
Do you not consider the end of the verse, His saying: {innahu huwa
al-samīʿ al-baṣīr}. He heard the speech from Himself, and saw
Himself by Himself. He was in post-eternity Hearing, Seeing, but
here He hears and sees by the hearing and seeing of His servant and
the seeing of His servant.65
Conclusion
Let us now return to the main points raised in the beginning of this
chapter. We pointed out that while there is an abundance of studies
on the theme of the isrāʾ and miʿrāj in Islamic literature, there is a
relative silence on the aspect of the vision of God during that miʿrāj in
in the other case studies, al-Qushayrī, who prefers the option that
Muhammad saw Gabriel. He categorically denies the possible inter-
pretation that Muhammad had seen God during his heavenly journey,
not even by a contemplative vision with his heart. It appears to be the
case that the Sufi exegetes in favour of a divine vision optimally use
the existing difference of opinion on the issue in conventional tafsīr,
pushing the limits of the conventional intepretations to legitimise
their descriptions of the visionary experience of God by Muhammad.
They thus, strictly speaking, always remain within the boundaries of
conventional interpretations; these intepretations conditioned how
far they could go in their understanding of the vision of God. An excep-
tion to this is Rūzbihān, whose proposed mode of vision by unification
(ittiḥād) could not be anchored in conventional understandings of
the verses. Rūzbihān himself does not problematise this, however,
nor seek to reconcile his approach to the vision with the mainstream
positions.
Yet again we have witnessed the relative absence of an element of
genealogy in the commentaries. In Table 7.4, we can see how the com-
mentaries collected by al-Sulamī on the first verses of Sūrat al-Isrāʾ
and Sūrat al-Najm are not incorporated into the later commentaries of
al-Qushayrī, Maybudī and al-Daylamī, with very few exceptions. Only
Rūzbihān partly incorporates the sayings of al-Sulamī, more as a form
of recognition of his predecessor than as a functionally integrated
part of his own reflections.
This lack of genealogy also shows in the diversity of style and con-
tent in the commentaries. Like in the earlier case studies, the authors
do not offer uniform positions at all and although certain themes are
shared – for example, transcending above human forms to be able to
see God – all five authors bring their own specific concepts, models of
seeing, and accents to their discussion of the verses. Again the rela-
tive originality of Sufi tafsīr comes to the fore, as compared with its
conventional counterparts.
Notes
1 Even if we limit ourselves to scholarship from the last two decades the
interest is evident. See Brooke Olson Vuckovic, Heavenly Journeys, Earthly
Concerns: The Legacy of the Miʿraj in the Formation of Islam (London:
Routledge, 2005); Frederick Colby, Narrating Muhammad’s Night
Journey: Tracing the Development of the Ibn ʿAbbās Ascension Discourse
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2008); Christiane Gruber and Frederick Colby,
eds, The Prophet’s Ascension: Cross-Cultural Encounters with the Islamic
Miʿrāj Tales (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010); Ronald
P. Buckley, The Night Journey and Ascension in Islam: The Reception of
Religious Narrative in Sunnī, Shīʿī and Western Culture (London: I. B.
Tauris, 2013); Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, ed., Le voyage initiatique
en terre d’Islam: ascensions célestes et itineraires spirituels (Leuven
42 Ibid., 9:378–9.
43 Ibid., 5:501.
44 Daylamī, ‘Tafsīr al-Daylamī’, fol. 134a.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., fols 133b–134a.
47 Ibid.
48 This is an implicit reference to the Qurʾanic notion that God is ‘closer
to him than his jugular vein’ (Q 50:16), and that Muhammad should tell
people who ask him about God that He is close (Q 2:186). Based on these
verses, nearness is considered to be one of the attributes of God.
49 Daylamī, ‘Tafsīr al-Daylamī’, fols 133b–134a.
50 Ernst, Ruzbihan, 61.
51 Ibid.
52 ‘I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form’; ‘I saw my Lord with my eye
and heart’; ‘I saw my Lord upon the city market.’ Baqlī, Mashrab, 10, 105,
221–2, 256. These hadith are not considered to be canonical, but are
widespread in Sufi circles. See Murata, ‘God is Beautiful’, 202–6.
53 Baqlī, ʿArāʾis, 2:421.
54 Ibid.
55 The use of this term by Rūzbihān in his commentary is remarkable. In his
other works he shows no concern in explaining this term, and it seems
that it was not part of his usual technical vocabulary.
56 Baqlī, ʿArāʾis, 2:346–7.
57 Rūzbihān describes the station of ittiṣāf as follows: ‘When God manifests
Himself to the heart of the lover through the splendour of the attrib-
utes, the lover benefits by the condition of intimacy and taste (sharṭ
al-muʿāshara wa’l-dhawq) from the vision of some light of every attrib-
ute. He forms his character by it and he takes His attribute as his attrib-
ute after the created has gone into the beginningless and becomes lordly
(rabbānī), as God said: “And be lordly (wa-kūnū rabbāniyyīn)” (Q 3:79),
and as the prophet said, blessings and peace be upon him: “Form your
character according to the character of God.” And the knower said: “Ittiṣāf
only occurs together with the taste of selfhood (anāniyya), because the
human attribute has left and the attributes of Godliness have remained.”’
Baqlī, Mashrab, 89.
58 Baqlī, ʿArāʾis, 2:346–7.
59 Ittiḥād would be the only word in Sufism that truly signifies the unio
8
Conclusion
256
research: the study of both Sufi eschatology and Sufi tafsīr in the later
centuries; the need for critical editions of Sufi Qurʾan commentaries;
and possible theoretical and methodological advances.
Sufi Qurʾan commentaries have proved to be a useful and varied
source for the reconstruction of a (partial) history of Sufi eschatology.
It must be said, however, that the expectation that verses on Paradise
and Hell would provoke a lot of commentary, and could thus be com-
plementary to the scattered discussions in Sufi handbooks, was only
partly justified. Just as Sufi authors hardly included eschatological
ideas in their handbooks on Sufism, they also mostly skipped those
verses that deal with Paradise and Hell in their commentaries. When
they did comment on these verses, it was rather to make a point on
hierarchies of nearness and vision than to elaborate on understand-
ings of reward and punishment. The study of these commentaries has
thus mainly further corroborated the findings of El-Saleh and Lange,
that there is a relative disregard, and in some cases even contempt,
among Sufis for the rewards and punishments of Paradise and Hell –
without denying their physical reality – motivated by a God-centred
understanding of the hereafter.1 Early on in our study it was already
becoming clear that an analysis of Sufi eschatology would mainly
entail looking at the concepts of nearness to and vision of God. If our
authors were at all motivated by thoughts of reward or punishment,
what interested them was the reward of nearness to and vision of
God or the punishment of being cut off from God and veiled from the
vision. Fear of the physical punishments of Hell or hope for physical
rewards of Paradise were generally considered as a veil separating
the seeker from God. In some cases, motivation by way of reward
or punishment was even seen as a form of ascribing partners to God
(shirk).
We could not distinguish a clear linear historical development in
the Sufi ideas on eschatology. True, all five commentaries proved to
be very varied in style and content. However, it is difficult to explain
this difference and variety as a linear development that happened in
parallel with broader developments within Sufism. An example is the
stratification of the rewards of Paradise. As we have seen, this idea
that stresses passionate love (ʿishq) and longing (shawq) for God and
experiential knowledge (maʿrifa) of God; on the other, a tendency
that stresses good character and religious discipline. Most authors
are closer to the former trend than to the latter. Only al-Qushayrī is
not genuinely interested in the topic of the vision of God, in the same
way in which the themes of love and longing are not as pervasively
present in his work compared with the other works. He can thus be
considered a representative of the second trend, although he is not
always as sober in his style and content as he is generally perceived
to have been. Especially in the case of the request of Moses to see God,
which he considers not to have been granted, al-Qushayrī shows an
ecstatic side that is not typical of him, interpreting Moses’s request
as ensuing from passionate love and longing for God evoked by hear-
need to express his own thought only against the backdrop of earlier
discussions. Sufi tafsīr, in sum, seems to have been less ‘conservative’
in its nature than its conventional counterparts and to leave more
room for the individual author: there seems to have been more room
for innovation and subjective understandings of the verse.
Now, what is the way forward for the study of Sufi eschatology
and Sufi Qurʾan commentaries? For Sufi eschatology, a longue durée
history that also focuses on later periods would be a worthwhile and
promising enterprise. Lange’s overview does not reach far enough
into later periods and stops at approximately the thirteenth century
with figures like Rūmī, Ibn al-ʿArabī and al-Nasafī. El-Saleh even con-
siders the later periods irrelevant, adhering to a view of decadence
and decline in later Islamic history that has long been dominant in the
historiography of Islamic civilisation. This notion of a cultural decline
in later Islamic history is being more and more revised in Islamic
Studies, and it is only logical that later developments in Sufi eschatol-
ogy up to the present time should be reevaluated as well. As noted in
Chapter 1, there are still significant developments in later periods that
remain largely unexplored.3 For this goal, Sufi Qurʾan commentaries
of these later periods may prove to be a rich and useful source.
In order to include Sufi Qurʾan commentaries of the later periods
and to make longue durée comparisons of commentaries on specific
verses, more critical editions of Sufi works of tafsīr urgently need to
be published. This is a tremendous task that does not quite seem to
be in sync with the larger developments within Islamic Studies. It is
telling that the only critical edition available to me besides Böwering’s
edition of al-Sulamī’s Ziyādāt was an unpublished PhD dissertation
from Turkey. These critical editions should also lead to more in-depth
studies of the individual works of tafsīr and their authors. The cur-
rent study could only be undertaken because of the recent valuable
publications of such monographs within this specific period. The most
urgent task, in my opinion, is the publication of a critical edition of
Rūzbihān’s ʿArāʾis al-bayān, after which an in-depth study and mono-
graph on this rich source would become possible, comparable to the
works of Nguyen and Keeler.4 No other source in this study appeared
Notes
1 El-Saleh, Vie future, 91–111; Lange, Paradise and Hell, ch. 7.
2 Wolfson, Speculum, 58–61.
3 See Chapter 1, note 41.
4 Nguyen, Sufi Master; Keeler, Sufi Hermeneutics.
5 Calder, ‘Tafsīr from Ṭabarī to Ibn Kathīr’, 103–4.
6 Eric van Lit, for example, has been very innovative in his methodology
of reading the commentary tradition on al-Suhrawardī. With a highly
technical and at times quantitative method he has shown how textual
relationships over larger time spans can be reconstructed by a systematic
and almost mathematical comparison of form, style and textual content of
a sequence of commentaries on a shared text. Such innovations deserve
to be taken seriously by the field of tafsīr studies as well, and may give a
boost to our understanding of what Calder calls ‘a declaration of loyalty’
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288
Christianity and Christians, 41, 135–6, essence of God (dhāt), 93, 114, 118,
164n; see also mysticism, Christian 153–4, 163, 187, 189, 190, 214,
communion (waṣl or wiṣāl), 3, 103, 112, 218–20, 239, 244–6, 261; see also
114, 116, 118, 121, 129n, 155, 156, manifestation
157, 162, 163, 216, 217, 239, 241, essentialism, 6, 8, 11–12, 29
258 experiential knowledge (maʿrifa), 10,
constructivism, 4, 7, 10, 175 15, 23, 49, 50, 56, 67, 91, 92, 95, 98,
contemptus ultramundi, 98, 123n 104, 107, 112, 115, 116, 117, 118,
124, 148, 152, 154, 160, 182, 213,
al-Dabbāgh, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, 32n 236, 243, 245, 259
al-Daqqāq, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan, 43, 54, 55,
65, 69 fanāʾ (annihilation), 116, 147, 213,
al-Dārānī, Abū Sulaymān, 107, 158, 179, 217–18, 220, 222, 243, 261
223n Fire, 88–91, 95–9, 101, 102, 105, 106,
al-Darwājikī, 36n 108, 109–13, 131, 137, 182, 188,
Day of Judgement, 14–15, 23, 90, 98, 99, 284; see also Hell
101, 105–6, 113, 144, 177, 196n; foretaste, 16, 26, 115, 201, 215, 228
see also resurrection friend of God (walī/awliyāʾ), 1, 28n, 49,
Day of Resurrection see Day of 56, 62, 67, 86–7, 136, 217, 223n
Judgement friendship (dūstī), 136, 148–50, 223n
Day of the Covenant (rūz-i alast), 14–15,
25, 148, 163, 228 Gabriel, 229–38, 247–8, 251n, 252n
al-Daylamī, Shams al-Dīn, 18, 22, 33n, al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid, 17, 32n, 40,
37n, 39, 61–5, 68–70, 79–81n, 45, 55, 61, 73n, 130n, 143, 178,
104–8, 109, 113, 122, 130–2n, 151, 194n
170n, 184, 185–7, 192, 198–9n, al-Ghazālī, Aḥmad, 40, 55, 59
217–18, 225n, 230–4, 239–40, 243, Ghaznavids, 41, 42, 46
245, 247–9, 259, 260, 264 God
al-Dhahabī, Muḥammad Ḥusayn, 17, acts (afʿāl) of, 99, 189, 218, 220, 241,
34n 244, 261
dhāt see essence of God attributes (ṣifāt) of see attributes of
dhawq (taste), 1, 254n, 265 God
Dhū’l-Nūn al-Miṣrī, 52, 75, 87–8, 124n, encounter (liqāʾ) with, 3, 15, 26, 89,
129n, 198n, 223n 90, 112, 188, 201–26, 227–55
Dunyā, 14, 33n, 87, 93, 105–6, 108, 113, essence (dhāt) of see essence of
123, 130n, 132n, 143, 159, 196n, God
256, 260 experiential knowledge (maʿrifa) of
see experiential knowledge
ecstatic Sufism, 47, 57, 66, 67, 68, 78n, friend (walī/awliyāʾ) of see friend of
93, 94, 97, 118, 162–4, 170n, God
187–8, 208, 215, 219, 222, 259; see knower (ʿārif) of see knower
also wajd longing for see longing (shawq)
eisegesis, 17, 120 love for see love, passionate (ʿishq)
Eliade, Mircea, 162, 164n, 170n, 175 meeting with (liqāʾ)
El-Saleh, Soubhi, 13–14, 84–7, 257, nearness to see nearness
263 seeing see vision
Enlightenment, 8–10 wariness of (taqwā), 86, 87, 99, 102,
Ernst, Carl, 7, 128n, 153, 170, 172n, 187, 113–14, 124–5n, 151, 283
189, 191, 226n, 240 Godlas, Alan, 18, 35n, 36n, 37n
eschatology, 2, 5, 13–16, 19, 21, 24–5, Goldziher, Ignaz, 4, 16–17, 27n
31–3n, 83–134, 143, 174, 194n, Gramlich, Richard, 28n, 184, 197n, 212,
256–7, 263 223n
hadith, 11, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 58, Ibn ʿAbbās, 180, 223n, 230–4, 238, 251n
64, 66, 76, 107, 127n, 130, 133, Ibn al-ʿArabī, 17, 32n, 33n, 84, 123,
138, 140, 165n, 166n, 171n, 177, 132n, 133n, 134n, 183, 221, 258,
178, 180–1, 186, 191, 192n, 193n, 263, 264
198n, 203, 229, 240, 253n, 254n, Ibn ʿAṭāʾ al-Ādamī, 48, 52, 76n, 94–5,
255n 107, 141–2, 144, 149, 182, 198n,
hajj, 55, 87–8 217, 228, 235, 236, 249
ḥāl see state Ibn Barrajān, ʿAbd al-Salām, 35–6n
al-Ḥallāj, Manṣūr, 47, 94, 168n Ibn Ḥabīb, 45
halting place (maqām) see station Ibn Ḥanbal, Aḥmad, 193n, 198n
Hamadan, 39, 62–4, 80n Ibn Karrām, 45
al-Hamadhānī, ʿAyn al-Quḍāt, 40 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 168n, 194n,
Ḥamdūn al-Qaṣṣār, 44, 73n 205, 251
Ḥanafism and Ḥanafīs, 41–2, 45, 46, 52, Ibn Qutayba, 60
54, 73n ijāza, 43, 46, 51, 52
Ḥanbalism and Ḥanbalīs, 11, 58, 60, Ikhwān al-ṣafāʾ see Brethren of Purity
78–9n, 94, 140, 142, 177–8, 194n, iltibās, 189–90, 219, 246
205, 237 incarnation and incarnationists see
al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, 85, 141, 167n, 207, indwelling
238 indwelling, 65, 179, 182, 191, 240, 243,
hearing see audition 255n
heaven (samāʾ), 111, 139, 148, 163, al-Iṣfahānī, Abū Nuʿaym, 40
169n, 177, 242 ishāra (allusion) see tafsīr by allusion
heavenly journey see miʿrāj ʿishq see love [for God]
Hell, 3, 13–14, 32n, 33n, 70, 83–91, Islamic Earlier Middle Period, 2, 24, 39,
96–7, 100, 102, 105, 108–11, 256
120–3, 124n, 126n, 132n, 133n, Islamic Studies, 11, 19, 35n, 263–5
134n, 143, 180, 227–8, 235, 257–8; Ismāʿīlism and Ismāʿīlī (bāṭinī), 17, 77n,
see also Fire 165n, 186
Herat, 39, 40, 58, 78 isrāʾ see night journey
hereafter, 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 16, 23–6, isthmus see limbo
32n, 33n, 70, 83–134, 144, 150, ittiḥād, 116, 240–6, 248, 254n, 255n,
162, 163, 188, 195, 201, 256, 261
259–60
hierarchies in, 5–6, 13, 93, 99, 100–4, jabarūt, 10, 62, 114, 130, 155, 172, 221,
105, 121–2, 129n, 257 226, 241
reward in, 3, 13, 84–6, 90, 91, 93, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, 49, 52, 56, 68, 75n,
95–104, 107, 112–14, 121–2, 76n, 86–7, 89, 98, 144, 149, 162,
131n, 143, 150, 177, 178, 186, 209–11, 213n, 217, 228, 235, 236,
257 249
punishment in, 3, 13, 84–5, 91, Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad, 48, 75n
97–101, 104–12, 121, 123, 133n, Jahannam, 111, 112, 133n
186, 257–8 Jamāʿī-Sunnism see Sunnism and Sunni
al-Ḥīrī, Abū ʿUthmān, 46 Islam
historicism, 4, 10, 27n James, William, 9
Hodgson, Marshall, 2, 39, 63 jihad, 180
al-Hujwīrī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī, 13, al-Jīlānī, ʿAbd al-Qādir, 36n
183,199n, 203, 223n, 255n jinn, 148
ḥulūl and ḥulūliyya see indwelling Judaism and Jews, 41, 135, 202; see also
humankind, 3, 15, 25, 93, 94, 123, mysticism, Jewish
135–7, 140–3, 146, 148, 150, 152, al-Junayd al-Baghdādī, 46, 47, 49, 52, 55,
160, 162, 163, 166n 92, 93–4, 101, 182, 198–9n
mysticism, 4, 6–10, 16, 30n, 164n, 174, predestination, 25, 136, 138–9, 160–1,
223n, 255n, 261 166n
Christian mysticism, 28, 164 primordial covenant see Day of the
Islamic mysticism, 7–10, 47, 51, 52, Covenant
53, 223n Protestantism, 8–9
Jewish mysticism, 171n, 174, 265 proximity see nearness (qurb)
love mysticism, 59, 87, 124n, 150,
162, 214, 216, 222, 236 Qarmatianism (qarmaṭa), 17, 77n
visionary mysticism, 65, 68 al-Qāshānī, ʿAbd al-Razzāq, 33n
qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ (tales of the prophets)
Najm al-Dīn Kubrā, 81n, 123, 221 qurb, qurba see nearness
Nasafī, ʿAzīz-i, 32n, 263 al-Qushayrī, Abū’l-Qāsim, 13, 17, 18,
Nasr, Seyyid H., 11 22, 33n, 34n, 39–40, 43, 44, 54–7,
al-Naṣrābādhī, Abū’l-Qāsim, 46–7, 54, 59–60, 65, 67, 68, 69, 77n, 82n,
96–7, 249 97–100, 104, 128n, 132n, 139,
nearness [to God] (qurb), 3, 14, 23–5, 146–8, 160, 161, 162, 167n, 169n,
89, 93, 95, 98–9, 101, 104, 105, 107, 174, 184–7, 192, 203, 214–15,
111, 112–16, 121–3, 138–9, 143–6, 219, 221, 222, 228, 230–4, 236–7,
148, 150, 154–5, 162–4, 227–8, 247–9, 250n, 255n, 258–9
232, 235–6, 238–40, 254n, 257–8
Neoplatonism, 16, 176 Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya, 85, 87, 124n, 126n
night journey (isrāʾ), 3, 126n, 193n, Radtke, Bernd, 29–30n, 73n
196n, 227–30, 235, 237, 238, 239, al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn, 178, 194n
242, 246; see also miʿrāj Religious Studies, 6, 265
night prayer, 1, 6, 91,110 renunciation (zuhd) and renunciants
Nishapur, 24, 36n, 39, 40–6, 47, 51, 52, (zuhhād and nussāk), 17, 34n, 42,
53, 54, 55, 58, 74, 76n, 236; see also 44, 45, 53, 83–4, 85, 87, 88, 94, 97,
tafsīr, Nishapuri School of 100, 102, 103, 105, 107, 121, 124n,
Niẓām al-Mulk, 42, 55, 71n, 72n 141, 142, 162, 167–8n, 179, 180,
normativity, 5, 11, 12, 17, 27n, 33n 186, 191, 195n
nussāk see renunciation and renunciants resurrection, 87, 93, 105; see also Day of
Nwyia, Paul, 16–17, 74–5n, 76n, 135–6 Resurrection
Rippin, Andrew, 27n
orientalists, 7, 28–9n rubūbiyya see Lordship
orthodoxy, 6–7, 10–13, 30, 31n, 53 Rūdbārī, Abū ʿAlī, 101
Rūzbihān al-Baqlī al-Shīrāzī, 18, 22, 33,
Paradise 37, 39, 65–8, 69, 81n, 82n, 109–23,
banishment from, 3, 14, 23, 25, 123, 132–3n, 134n, 151–60, 160–4,
135–73, 201, 214, 239, 260 170–2n, 183, 184, 187–91, 192,
fall from, 14, 163, 164n, 165n; see also 218–21, 222, 230–4, 240–6, 247–9,
banishment from Paradise 254–5n, 258–61, 263–4
fruits of, 92, 108, 117–18, 126n, 141,
155, 157, 179 Safi, Omid, 9, 29n
primordial, 3, 14–15 Sahl see al-Tustarī
rewards in see hereafter Saleh, Walid, 21, 27n, 51
People of Blame see Malāmatiyya Saljūqs, 39, 41–2, 58, 63, 66, 71n, 80n
perennialism, 6, 7, 10, 27n, 174–5 salvation, 6, 109, 132n, 133n
Persia, 24, 36n, 39–41, 58, 59, 65, 191 samāʿ see audition
Persian language, 59, 60, 66, 68, 79n al-Samʿānī, Aḥmad, 143, 160, 163,
philosophers (falāsifa), 11, 65, 186, 187 170n
poetry, 57, 111, 128n, 132–3n, 182, Sāmānids, 41
225n, 239 Sands, Kristin Zahra, 18, 75n
al-Sarrāj, Abū Naṣr ʿAbd Allāh, 13, 126n, 167n, 206–7, 229, 231, 232, 233–4,
180–1, 195n, 199n, 203, 237, 255n 237
Schimmel, Annemarie, 8 ṭabaqāt al-mufassirīn (biographies of
al-Shāfiʿī, Muḥammad b. Idrīs, 198n Qur’an commentators), 17, 33–4n,
Shāfiʿism and Shāfiʿīs, 11, 41–7, 52, 54, 77n, 79n
55, 57, 58, 71, 73n, 76n, 143 tajallī see manifestation
shariah, 57, 59 taste, 1, 3, 6, 103, 163, 202, 238, 254n,
al-Shiblī, Abū Bakr, 47, 52, 95–6, 138–9, 256; see also foretaste
145, 182, 198n taqwā see God, wariness of
Shīʿism and Shīʿīs, 41, 45, 71n, 165n, tawakkul (reliance on God), 42, 87
194n al-Thaʿlabī, Abū Isḥāq Aḥmad, 45, 74n,
Shils, Edward, 12 138, 139–40, 166–7n, 169n, 206,
Shiraz, 39, 66 224n, 231–4
sidrat al-muntahā see lote tree of the theodicy, 25, 136, 142, 160, 168n
utmost boundary this-worldly life, 3, 5, 14–16, 25, 84, 89,
al-Simnānī, ʿAlā al-Dawla, 17 103, 112, 113, 115, 126n, 135–6,
Sirhindi, Aḥmad, 32n 141–3, 148–51, 159, 161–3, 187,
Smith, Margaret, 9, 196 192, 201, 228, 229, 256; see also
soteriology see salvation Dunyā
state (ḥāl), 3, 16, 26, 66, 86, 102, 103, traditionism and traditionists (ahl al-
109, 112, 113, 114–19, 149, 159, ḥadīth), 3, 4, 51, 52, 60, 73n, 166n,
163, 188, 189, 210, 212, 210–22, 177, 178, 194n, 205, 237
239, 240, 243–4, 261 Transoxania, 41, 43, 45
station (maqām), 103, 111, 112, 115, Ṭughril Beg, 42, 55
145, 153, 158, 189, 211, 212, 219, al-Tustarī, Sahl, 1–2, 6, 15, 49, 52, 76n,
241, 244, 246, 254n 78n, 88–92, 108, 126n, 142, 148,
al-Sulamī, Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, 17, 18, 150, 198n, 228, 235, 249
21–2, 24, 33n, 34n, 36n, 39, 40,
44, 45, 46–53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, Underhill, Evelyn, 9
60, 64, 65, 67, 68–70, 75–7n, 82n, unification see ittiḥād
83, 85–97, 98, 99, 104, 121, 124n, unveiling (kashf, mukāshafa), 15, 18, 66,
131n, 139, 143–6, 147, 148, 149, 102, 112, 114, 116–17, 118, 149,
160, 161, 162, 168n, 169n, 184, 185, 211; see also veil (ḥijāb)
203, 208–14, 215, 217, 218, 219,
221–3, 224n, 228, 230, 235–6, 243, veil (ḥijāb), 63, 96, 99, 104, 107, 110,
246–9, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263 113, 153, 163, 180, 245, 257; see
al-Sulamī, Abū ʿAmr Ismāʿīl, 46 also unveiling
Sunnism and Sunni Islam, 11, 40, 53, vision of God (ruʾya), 23, 90, 97, 98, 99,
55, 71n, 98, 138, 165n, 169n, 186, 107, 108, 112, 113, 115, 116, 125n,
194n, 207, 215 154, 163, 178, 181, 183, 186–90,
al-Suyūṭī, Jalāl al-Dīn, 17, 33–4n, 77n, 193–4n, 195n, 197n, 199n, 203–6,
79n, 127n, 251 218, 219, 223n, 239, 265
cognitive vision, 175–6, 178, 183, 187,
al-Ṭabarī, 52, 60, 76n 192, 260–1
tafsīr contemplative vision, 175–6, 178,
as a genealogical tradition, 4, 19, 181, 182, 184, 185, 192, 248,
20–1, 35–6n, 69, 161, 169n, 175, 260–2
225, 248–9, 253n, 256, 262–3, 264 introvertive vision, 175–6, 183,
by allusion (ishāra), 17–18, 20, 49, 53, 260–1
56, 57, 69, 97, 103, 115, 116, 120, ʿiyān and muʿāyana (eye-witnessing),
149, 159, 214, 222, 242, 261 16, 89, 103, 105, 112–14, 117, 183,
Nishapuri School of, 74n, 137, 139, 196, 203, 210, 216, 238