Deborah Avant The Ethics of Engaged Scholarship in A
Deborah Avant The Ethics of Engaged Scholarship in A
Deborah Avant The Ethics of Engaged Scholarship in A
in a complex world
Is it not in the interest of social science to embrace complexity, be it at some sacrifice of its
claim to predictive power?1
Imagine two worlds in which scholars engage to promote social betterment. The
two worlds are alike in all respects but for their epistemic conditions. In the first,
scholars have the possibility of sufficient, even if incomplete, knowledge and can
know well enough the causal models of the domains in which they operate. The
models are largely appropriate to the nature of the problems that arise and give
adequate guidance for policy and other interventions. The world they confront
is ergodic, with the past providing sufficient guidance to the future. They can
know at least approximately how decision-makers and target populations will
respond to their advice. They can also know, with relative certainty, about the
relevant scope conditions and salient contingencies that will have a bearing on
the impact of their interventions. Is this a caricature of how engaged scholars
approach their work? We think not, since a significant portion of mainstream
scholarship routinely speaks of the world as if it can be sufficiently known.
Now consider a second world characterized by the impossibility of sufficient
knowledge. Given inescapable uncertainty, scholars cannot ever know enough
to be sure of the causal mechanisms operating in a non-ergodic, complex and
unpredictable world. Many problems are ‘wicked’ rather than simple.2 A wicked
problem ‘is not well bounded, is framed differently by various groups and individ-
uals, involves large scientific to existential uncertainties, and tends not to be well
understood until after the formulation of a solution’.3 In this world, causal models
are always deficient in one way or another, but scholars cannot know precisely
* We would like to thank the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which funded the research upon which this
article is based. We are grateful to the scholars who generously shared with us their reflections on their public
engagement experiences and to Sevde Acabay-Oguc, Kelci Burckhardt and Audrey Elliott for their research
assistance with the collection of the reflections.
1
Albert O. Hirschman, Rival views of market society and other recent essays (first publ. 1986), quoted in Jeremy Adel-
man, ed., The essential Hirschman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), pp. 214–47 at p. 243.
2
Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a general theory of planning’, Policy Sciences 4: 2,
1973, pp. 155–69, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730; Kate Crowley and Brian Head, ‘The enduring chal-
lenge of “wicked problems”: revisiting Rittel and Webber’, Policy Sciences 50: 5, 2017, pp. 539–47, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11077-017-9302-4.
3
Robert Lempert, ‘Embedding (some) benefit-cost concepts into decision support processes with deep uncer-
tainty’, Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 5: 3, 2014, pp. 487–514 at p. 488, https://doi.org/10.1515/jbca-2014-9006.
6
James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, Has the business cycle changed and why?, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 17
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002), pp. 159–218 at p. 200, https://www.nber.
org/system/files/chapters/c11075/c11075.pdf. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in
this article were accessible on 5 Oct. 2023.)
7
Christina Romer, cited in Virginia Postrel, ‘Macroegonomics’, The Atlantic, April 2009, https://www.theat-
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/04/macroegonomics/307319.
8
Government-sponsored enterprises, namely the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (known colloqui-
ally as Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae).
9
David M. Herszenhorn and Steven R. Weisman, ‘Republican leader in US house confident in rescue plan’, New
York Times, 17 July 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/17/world/americas/17iht-17fannie.14558589.
html.
10
Lucy Elliot Keeler, ‘My garden beasts’, The Atlantic 112, 1913, pp. 134–41, https://www.theatlantic.com/maga-
zine/archive/1913/07/my-garden-beasts/645223.
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11
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The black swan: the impact of the highly improbable (New York: Random House, 2007).
12
John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the known (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1949).
13
Albert O. Hirschman, ‘The search for paradigms as a hindrance to understanding’, World Politics 22: 3, 1970,
pp. 329–43, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009600. See also discussion of Hirschman’s work in Ilene Grabel,
When things don’t fall apart: global financial governance and developmental finance in an age of productive incoherence
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017), ch. 2.
14
Sharon Welch, A feminist ethic of risk, 2nd edn (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2000).
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15
Douglass C. North, ‘Dealing with a non-ergodic world: institutional economics, property rights, and the
global environment’, Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 10: 1, 1999, pp. 1–12 at p. 3, https://scholarship.
law.duke.edu/delpf/vol10/iss1/2/.
16
George F. DeMartino and Ilene Grabel, ‘Irreparable ignorance, protean power, and economics’, International
Theory 12: 3, 2020, pp. 435–48, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971920000263; George F. DeMartino, The tragic
science: how economists cause harm (even as they aspire to do good) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022).
17
These reflections and details on the ethical engagement curriculum and research are available online at https://
www.sieethicalengagement.com.
18
Bruce W. Jentleson and Ely Ratner, ‘Bridging the Beltway–ivory tower gap’, International Studies Review 13: 1,
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Even scholars who mostly inhabit the ivory tower engage indirectly with the
public sphere by addressing contemporary events at arm’s length in refereed publi-
cations. A further step is taken into the public sphere when scholars comment on
contemporary events through various media channels and writing outlets aimed at
public or policy audiences. An additional degree of engagement takes place when
scholars participate in policy-adjacent conversations—for example, by giving
public testimony, participating in think tank events, or contributing to public
commissions and think tank reports. More direct forms of engagement include
consulting with policy-makers and practitioners, either on a one-off basis or via
ongoing relationships, including those that involve the co-creation of applied
research. Finally, scholars are most directly engaged when they are embedded in
policy-making bodies, whether through termed fellowships or longer appoint-
ments to positions in government and other institutions.
We initially surmised that the nature of the challenges posed by uncertainty
could intensify over the different types of engaged scholarship. Scholars who
choose to remain in the ivory tower might think that they can sidestep the problem
of uncertainty. But they cannot know how their published research will be picked
up, interpreted, and used by advocates and decision-makers beyond the academy.
It may be simplified for use in public debate by those with agendas contrary to that
of the scholars generating the work. Network analysis of human rights advocacy
might, for example, be used by governments looking to track activists and repress
rights campaigns. Such risks can be amplified by media engagement and policy-
writing, in which scholars seek to bring public attention to their research in hopes
of affecting public discourse and policy decisions. Those who engage with the
media cannot know how people with their own agendas will interpret, repackage
and even exploit the scholarship on which their engagement is based.
Researchers giving testimony in policy-making forums, participating in think
tank events and reports, and providing arms-length consulting encounter parallel
challenges that might be intensified by having the ear of decision-makers who
sometimes wish to infer from research the findings that support their preconcep-
19
Stephen M. Walt, ‘International affairs and the “public sphere”’, Foreign Policy, 22 July 2011, https://foreign-
policy.com/2011/07/22/international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere; Jeremy Shapiro, Who influences whom?
Reflections on US government outreach to think tanks, commentary, Brookings, 4 June 2014, https://www.brook-
ings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/06/04/who-influences-whom-reflections-on-u-s-government-outreach-to-
think-tanks.
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20
The issue of unreasonable time constraints forcing scholars to reach judgements prematurely, based on
inadequate data and analysis, was raised almost universally by engaged economists whom George DeMar-
tino surveyed. George F. DeMartino, The economist’s oath: on the need for and content of professional economic
ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). See also William R. Allen, ‘Economics, economists, and
economic policy: modern American experiences’, History of Political Economy 9: 1, 1977, pp. 48–88, https://
doi.org/10.1215/00182702-9-1-48.
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22
Barma and Goldgeier, ‘How not to bridge the gap’, p. 1773.
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fiscal-resiliency-deeply-uncertain-world-role-semiautonomous-discretion.
26
Naazneen H. Barma, The peacebuilding puzzle: political order in post-conflict states (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2017). See also George F. DeMartino, Ilene Grabel and Ian Scoones, ‘Economics for an
uncertain world’, unpublished paper (2023).
27
Séverine Autesserre, The frontlines of peace: an insider’s guide to changing the world (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2021); Deborah Avant, ‘Introduction’, International Security Studies Forum Roundtable 14-2 on Autesserre,
Frontlines of peace, H-Diplo, 21 Oct. 2022, https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/10965072/h-
diplo-issf-roundtable-14-2-avant-autesserre-frontlines-peace; Bruno Latour, Reassembling the social: an introduc-
tion to actor network theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
28
The ethical engagement curriculum is available at https://www.sieethicalengagement.com.
29
W. Brian Arthur, Complexity economics: a different framework for economic thought, Santa Fe Institute Working
Paper #13 (Santa Fe, NM: Santa Fe Institute, 2013), p. 1, https://www.santafe.edu/research/results/working-
papers/complexity-economics-a-different-framework-for-eco.
30
W. Brian Arthur, Complexity and the economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 19, emphasis
added.
31
Arthur, Complexity and the economy, p. 1.
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We are not suggesting that causal logic is of no use, but that the domain in
which it provides adequate guidance is not always well defined in advance, and
so the use of causal models can mislead. In the excitement of modelling causality
with an eye to confronting an important policy challenge, it is easy to lose sight
of the fact that our models necessarily engage assumptions and are therefore
always fallible. Scholars should thus foreground humility and alert stakeholders to
uncertainty about the assumptions they employ. Among twentieth-century social
scientists, perhaps no one better grasped the point than Albert O. Hirschman. As
the epigraph that begins this paper demonstrates, Hirschman warned of the poten-
tially problematic fallout from the social science hunt for, and implementation of,
comprehensive programmes of social engineering in what he understood to be an
ineluctably complex social world.
38
Dani Rodrik, Straight talk on trade: ideas for a sane world economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017):
pp. 159, 163 (emphasis in original); cf. Frank H. Knight, Risk, uncertainty, and profit (Boston and New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), ch. 7; Shackle, Epistemics and economics.
39
Louis Menand, The metaphysical club: a story of ideas in America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001),
p. xi.
40
Other scholars who have contributed much to our understanding of the performative force of social science
narratives include Albert O. Hirschman and, more recently, J. K. Gibson-Graham, and Stephen Resnick and
Richard Wolff.
41
Robert Shiller, ‘A failure to control animal spirits’, Financial Times, 12 May 2009, https://www.ft.com/
content/453e55ca-0c0c-11de-b87d-0000779fd2ac. See also George F. DeMartino, ‘The economic crisis and
the crisis in economics’, in Martha Starr, ed., Consequences of economic downturn: beyond the usual economics (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 25–44.
42
Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds, Counterfactual thought experiments in world politics: logical, methodological,
and psychological perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 3–4.
43
For a more detailed examination of the role of fictional counterfactuals in the hunt for causality in economics,
see George F. DeMartino, ‘The specter of irreparable ignorance: counterfactuals and causality in economics’,
Review of Evolutionary Political Economy, vol. 2, 2021, pp. 253–76, https://doi.org/10.1007/s43253-020-00029-w.
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It is hard to overstate just how fundamental is the shift that Leamer’s claims
represent. Today’s epistemically self-aware economists are projecting an image
of economics as a far humbler intellectual enterprise that seeks to promote social
betterment in a world that defies adequate understanding. Leamer and others
warn us against expecting social science wizards to know the unknowable, or to
control the uncontrollable.
Engaged scholars and practitioners have begun to put this advice into practice.
One community of practitioners is leading the way—those engaged in what
is called Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty, or DMDU.45 DMDU
foregrounds the epistemic problem we have explored here. It presumes deep
uncertainty regarding the nature of the systems that drive events in the world (and
how those diverse systems interact), the models that are constructed to map those
systems, the agents who will be affected by policy choices and how those agents’
values will evolve over time, and the innumerable contingent factors that condi-
tion the world in which any policy decision will take effect. It therefore steers
clear of the standard approaches by which engaged scholars often seek to inform
decision-making. DMDU rejects the ‘predict then act’ model that characterizes
standard policy advocacy, which seeks to find the optimal policy given a probabi-
listically knowable future. Instead, it looks to discover policies that are apt to be
‘robust’ across a very wide range of possible futures. The strategy involves testing
particular policy proposals via simulations against many thousands of possible
future worlds, each characterized by adjustments in the inputs, parameters and
44
Edward E. Leamer, Macroeconomic patterns and stories (Heidelberg: Springer Berlin, 2009), p. 3 (emphasis in
original).
45
The reader interested in learning about this approach should consult Vincent A. W. J. Marchau, Warren E.
Walker, Pieter J. T. M. Bloemen and Steven W. Popper, eds, Decision making under deep uncertainty: from theory
to practice (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019) and the website for the Society for Decision Making Under
Deep Uncertainty, https://www.deepuncertainty.org.
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Conclusion—fourth-world pedagogy
We are advocating here for the fourth world, in which scholars and decision-
makers recognize that they confront deep uncertainty. As our interviews with
engaged scholars and our discussion of recent literatures and strategies reveal, we
46
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Skin in the game (New York: Random House, 2018).
47
The concept of the blasé self appears in Andrew Linklater, The problem of harm in world politics: theoretical inves-
tigations (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 226.
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48
It is striking how much Hirschman anticipates the recent turn in economics away from theorizing the econ-
omy as an essentially simple, self-contained system towards recognizing it as an adaptive, complex system. See,
for example, Wolfram Elsner, ‘Complexity economics as heterodoxy: theory and policy’, Journal of Economic
Issues 51: 4, 2017, pp. 939–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2017.1391570.
49
Wendell Berry, The way of ignorance: and other essays (Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005).
50
DeMartino, The tragic science.
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