Mediterranean Fascism 1919-1945 (PDFDrive)

Mediterranean Fascism
1919-1945
A volume
in
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
of
WESTERN CIVILIZATION
Mediterranean Fascism
1919-1945
Edited by
CHARLES F. DELZELL
MACMILLAN
MEDITERRANEAN FASCISM, 1919-1945
Introduction, editorial notes, translations by the editor,

and compilation copyright© 1970 by Charles F. Delzell.
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1970 978-0-333-0343 7-8
All rights reserved. No part of this publication

may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form
or by any means, without permission.
First published in the United States 1970

First published in the United Kingdom by
The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1971
Published by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Associated companies inN ew York Toronto
Dublin Melbourne Johannesburg and Madras
SBN 333 03437 6
ISBN 978-1-349-00242-9 ISBN 978-1-349-00240-5 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-00240-5
Contents
Introduction Xl
I. FASCISM IN ITALY
I. The Birth of Fascism 1

Report of Inspector-General of Public Security,
G. Gasti, Regarding Mussolini 4
The Birth of the Fascist Movement 7
Program of the Italian Fascist Movement 12
Postulates of the Fascist Program 14
Fascist Agrarian Program 18
Mussolini's First Speech in the Chamber of Deputies 22
New Program of the National Fascist Party (PNF) 27
ltalo Balbo's Squadrismo 37
Mussolini's Speech Regarding the House of Savoy 38
Prelude to the March on Rome: Mussolini's Speech 40
2. The Path to the Totalitarian State 44

Mussolini's First Speech as Premier to the Chamber of
Deputies 45
Mussolini's First Speech as Premier to the Senate 51
Decree Establishing the Fascist Militia (MVSN) 52
Decree Regulating tJ.le Press 53
Mussolini's Coup d'Etat of January 3, 1925 57
Decree on Powers of the Head of the Government 62
Decree on Public Safety 64
The Exceptional Decrees: Law for the Defense of the
State 67
The Fascist Electoral Law of 1928 70
The Fascist Grand Council 75
Statute of the National Fascist Party 77
Mussolini's Doctrine of Fascism 91
3. The Corporative State 107

The Palazzo Chigi Pact 108
The Palazzo Vidoni Pact 110
Vlll CONTENTS
The Rocco Labor and Antistrike Law Ill

The Labor Charter 121
Law on Formation and Functions of the Corporations 126
Law Creating the Chamber of Fasces and of Corpo-
rations 129
4. Social, Economic, and Youth Programs 13 3

Law Creating the Dopolavoro Organization 13 3
Law Creating the National Organization for Mater-
nity and Child Welfare 134
Law Creating the Balilla Youth Organization 139
Law Creating Italian Youth of the Lictors 14 3
The Fascist Decalogue 145
Fascist Loyalty Oath Imposed upon Professors 147
The Fascist School Charter 148
5. Fascism, the Catholic Church, and the Jews 156

Treaty Between the Holy See and Italy 157
Concordat Between the Holy See and Italy 160
The Church and the Fascist-Type Corporative State:
Quadragesimo anno 167
Pius XI on Catholic Action: Non abbiamo bisogno 169
Manifesto of the Racist Scientists 174
Mussolini's Defense of Racist Policy 177
Provisions for the Defense of the Italian Race 17 8
6. The Day of the Lion 185

Fascism a Universal Phenomenon 186
The Stresa Conference 190
Mussolini Launches the War in Ethiopia 193
League of Nations Sanctions Against Italy 195
The Fascist Grand Council's Resolution 198
Mussolini Proclaims Victory in Ethiopia 199
Mussolini's Announcement of the Rome-Berlin Axis 201
Mussolini Reaffirms the Rome-Berlin Axis 202
Italy's Accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact 206
"Pact of Steel" Between Germany and Italy 208
Mussolini's Message to Hitler Regarding Italian Sup-
port 211
Hitler's Message to Mussolini 212
CONTENTS ~
Mussolini's Speech Declaring War 213

Three-Power Pact of Germany, Italy, and Japan 216
The Italian Ultimatum to Greece 217
7. Monarchist Coup d'Etat and Republican Fascism 221

Dino Grandi's Resolution at the Fascist Grand
Council 222
Marshal Badoglio's Continuation of the War 223
Marshal Badoglio's Proclamation of the Armistice 224
Instrument of Surrender of Italy 225
Tripartite Declaration of Moscow Regarding Italy 228
King Victor Emmanuel III's Announcement of With-
drawal 230
The Sforza Purge Law Regarding Fascist Crimes 2 31
Mussolini's Denunciation of the House of Savoy 235
The Verona Manifesto of Mussolini's Italian Social
Republic 2 37
Mussolini's Last Public Address 243
The Execution of Mussolini 254
II. FASCISM IN SPAIN
8. The Falange Espanola 257

Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera on the Foundation of
the Spanish Falange 259
Basic Points of the Falange 266
The Falangist Oath 272
The Twenty-Six-Point Program of the Falange 273
Jose Antonio's Statement Regarding the International
Fascist Congress 278
Jose Antonio's Instructions from Prison 280
9· The Civil War and Franco's Triumph 283

German and Italian Policy Toward the Spanish Civil
War 284
German-Nationalist Spain Protocol of March 20, 1937 285
German and Italian Policy Toward the Falange and
General Franco 287
Franco's Call for Unification of the Fighting Forces 289
Franco's Call for Unification of the Militias 293
X CONTENTS
Statutes of the Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de

las JONS 296
The Labor Charter 304
Law Regarding the Press 312
Order Restricting Meetings, Manifestations, and Pub-
lic Activities 314
Law Suppressing Masonry and Communism 316
Decree Regulating the Right of Association 317
German-Spanish Treaty of Friendship 318
Italian-German-Spanish Secret Protocol 322
Hitler-Mussolini Conference Regarding Vichy
France, Franco's Spain, and Greece 324
Ostracism of Franco's Spain by Potsdam Conference 329
III. SALAZAR'S PORTUGAL
10. The Clerico-Corporative Estado Novo 331

Political and Economic Doctrines of Salazar 333
Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic 338
Salazar's Views of World War II as Reported by the
German Minister in Lisbon 348
Select Bibliography 351

Index 357
Introduction
IN THE aftermath of World War I much of Europe found itself

engaged in a three-cornered ideological struggle, while the United
States withdrew into smug isolationism. Parliamentary and demo-
cratic liberalism, undergirded by commercial capitalism and agrari-
anism, was in serious crisis in a continent that was rapidly becom-
ing disrupted by the impact of industrialization and the problems
and frustrations brought about by modern "mass" society and
aggravated by the war. On the left it was challenged by Marxism,
which burst upon the political scene in totalitarian Communist garb
in Russia in November, 1917, and in milder democratic-socialist
forms elsewhere in Europe. On the right it was attacked by a
militantly ultranationalist and radical ideology that emerged as a
reaction to the threat (real or imagined) of Communism, the
frustrations of the war and peace settlement, the economic disloca-
tion, and the political breakdown of liberal parliamentary govern-
ment. Coming to be known as fascism, this radicalism of the right
manifested itself chiefly in three areas: the Mediterranean region in
its original and most authentic dress; in east-central Europe in a
somewhat mixed and often racist guise; and in Germany in a
strongly racist form and with dreams of unlimited conquest.
The fascistic movements pushed forward in three distinct waves
-from 1919 to 1923; from 1929 to the mid-1930's; and again from
19 39 to 194 3. Italy was the major beachhead of the first wave,
Benito Mussolini's Fascist party gaining political power by the end
of October, 1922. In Germany, Adolf Hitler's Nazis were frus-
trated in the Munich Beer Hall Putsch of November, 1923. The
coming of the Great Depression, however, served to resuscitate
Hitler's National Socialist movement and to stimulate a variety of
other fascistic movements throughout Europe. Finally, the years of
the Axis military offensive in World War II saw the temporary
imposition of other more or less fascistic regimes in many parts of
the Continent.
It is the Mediterranean region, and more precisely the Italian and

Iberian peninsulas, with which this documentary history is con-
xu INTRODUCTION
cerned. Mussolini's Italy was, of course, the country par excellence

of authentic fascism. In contrast to the very brutal National Social-
ism of Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's regime seemed to many
foreigners relatively moderate and respectable, at least until the last
half of the 1930's, when it, too, became bellicose and racist.
Mussolini's much-touted Charter of Labor and various socio-
economic innovations, along with several aspects of his political
mystique and Party-Militia-State structure, attracted a number of
willing imitators, especially in the Latin world (though Hitler's
movement also found converts in Spain and elsewhere).
Drawing much of his initial support from returning World War
I veterans who were outraged by "leftist" subversion, Mussolini
and his handful of backers soon organized blackshirted squadristi
(militiamen) to fight the "Reds" (and also the democratic liberals
and Catholics) and to impose their own peculiar brand of "law and
order." Hoodlums and semicriminal elements of the cities and
countryside were drawn to fascism by the opportunities for violent
action. Starting out with a program that was a curious blend of
republicanism, anticlericalism, and socio-economic reformism, the
Italian Fascists soon discovered that they could gain political power
much faster by working out opportunistic and cynical bargains
with such "established" power groups as the large landholders,
industrialists, Army, Monarchy, and Church. Many leaders of
these latter groups were inclined to pursue a misguided strategy:
they were willing to let the Fascist squadristi demolish the left-
wing labor and farm organizations, expecting that afterward the
Fascists could be "tamed" and brought into the existing political
"system." In due course the Fascist movement fused with the
prewar Nationalist party, thereby gaining new strength and a more
respectable philosophical foundation.
Meanwhile, the Fascists came to espouse a tightly regimented,
patriotic program of "national syndicalism" that would preserve
private property while at the same time eliminating free labor
unions and the threat of strikes and lockouts. In this way they
made a peculiar appeal not only to well-to-do conservatives but
also to a good many white-collar and lower-middle-class people
who stood in fear of Bolshevism and who were often the greatest
victims of inflation and other economic crises. Eventually Fascist
national syndicalism evolved into the so-called Corporative State,
which sought to regiment the dominant economic and political
institutions of Italy under the supreme control of the Fascist party.
INTRODUCTION XIIl
From the outset the Fascists made a concerted effort to recruit

and mobilize the youth into their movement. They achieved much
success, though this attraction subsided in later years as the move-
ment crystallized into a hierarchic and bureaucratic party. The
Fascists managed also to gain a substantial following from some of
the working class (though by no means all), to whom they offered
various social and psychological surrogates for their former eco-
nomic and political freedoms. There was, to be sure, considerable
resistance to the emerging Fascist dictatorship, and this was most
conspicuous among the ranks of the outlawed leftist political
parties and labor organizations, stifled journalists, and harassed
academicians and professional people. But eventually millions of
Italians were swept off their feet by the way in which Mussolini, a
most effective and charismatic orator, played on their emotions.
There was always a strong element of irrationalism in the Fascist
appeal. Mussolini, in his role as the infallible leader (Duce) of the
party, proved to be a consummate propagandizer of the "myths"
of nationalism and imperialism, evoking past glories like the Roman
Empire and utilizing such ancient symbols of authority as the fasci
of the Roman Republic. At first Fascism was presented to the
Italians for domestic consumption; but by the early 1930's Mus-
solini was openly extolling the desirability of Fascism "for export."
Soon Italian Fascism became synonymous with war, and Musso-
lini's fate came to be inextricably tied to that of Hitler.
Mussolini's "March on Rome" occurred in October, 1922. It was
not until three years later that he was in a position to nail down the
so-called totalitarian state. This came about in the wake of his
successful surmounting of the great Aventine crisis of the last half
of 1924-the brutal assassination of the reformist Socialist leader,
Giacomo Matteotti. The Duce's triumph was in no small measure
due to the ready availability of the Fascists' Blackshirt private
army. In establishing their own totalitarian Party-State, the Fascists
were to borrow many of the techniques of the Communist party of
Soviet Russia. And in their common hostility to democratic parlia-
mentary government, the Fascists and Communists often found
themselves appealing to the same kinds of alienated people. A good
many Fascists (beginning with Mussolini himself) came from the
ranks of left-wing Marxism and syndicalism; and when the Fascist
regime was overthrown in 1943-45 it was not hard for a certain
number of ex-Blackshirts to swing to left-wing political extremism.
The Fascists owed a good deal of their mystique and emphasis on
XIV INTRODUCTION
the creative role of violence to Georges Sorel's revolutionary

syndicalism and to the integral nationalism of Charles Maurras's
Action Franc;aise, both of which had emerged at the turn of the
century and proved quite influential, particularly in the Latin
world. 1 In a general sort of way and in diverse measure, they also
were indebted to the doctrines of Niccolo Machiavelli, Georg F.
W. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca,
Maurice Barres, and even William James, to name but the most
obvious. But theory was never the long suit of the Fascists; they
preferred activism. Theories could be rationalized later; in any
case, they must always remain subject to pragmatic change. Thus
Mussolini's ideology should be studied genetically; its platforms
changed considerably over the years. There were relatively few
"constants" except for nationalism and anti-Bolshevism. It was
always easier to pinpoint what fascism was opposed to than what it
stood for.
Spain saw the emergence of fascistic National Syndicalist and
Falangist groups in the early 1930's-in the midst of the Depres-
sion and the political extremism that erupted with the overthrow
of the Bourbon Monarchy in 1931. There were a good many
similarities between the blue-shined Falangist movement of Jose
Antonio Primo de Rivera and Mussolini's Blackshirts. One can
only speculate how the F alangist movement might have fared had
its attractive leader not been killed in 19 36. As it was, the F alangists
and their various ideological allies were rather speedily and cyni-
cally "subjugated" by General Francisco Franco and the old-line
army elements during the Civil War. Despite their setback, how-
ever, the Falangists continued to be a not inconsiderable political
force in Nationalist Spain-certainly until the defeat of the Axis
powers in 1945. But Franco was always determined to utilize the
Falange only to the degree that it suited his own political purposes,
and for a quarter of a century he has demonstrated how skillful he
can be at playing them off against the Monarchists.
1. Action Fran~aise was in many respects a kind of halfway station on

the ideological road to fascism. This protofascist movement emerged at
the turn of the century in hostility to the Dreyfusards and looked back
nostalgically to the pre-Revolutionary era when "forty kings in a thousand
years" had made France. Regarding it, see especially Eugen Weber, Action
Franfaise: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France (Stanford:
Stanford University, 1962); and Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism:
Action Franyaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism (New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1966).
INTRODUCTION XV
Portugal is a somewhat different case. In the wake of a series of

incompetent military dictatorships after the advent of the Republic
in 1910, that country's generals in 1928 invited a mild-mannered
professor of economics, Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, to take
unrestricted political power. He thereupon established a one-party,
clerico-corporativist regime labeled the Estado Novo (New State).
Though the title seemed to suggest a kind of Portuguese replica of
Mussolini's one-party Corporative State, Salazar's system drew
most of its inspiration not so much from the examples of twentieth-
century totalitarian dictatorship as from an earlier age. Like Maur-
ras's Action Fran<;aise, Salazar found inspiration in his own coun-
try's imperial and Catholic traditions. He also paid close attention
to the modern Church's social encyclicals-e.g., Rerum novarum,
issued in 1891 by Pope Leo XIII and updated forty years later by
Pius XL Salazar's regime was authoritarian and semifascist; it
stopped short of being totalitarian.
After the fall of the French Third Republic in June, 1940, there
was, to a limited degree, a kind of reverse flow of political ideas
from Portugal to France. At least some of the organizers of
Marshal Philippe Petain's Vichy regime-or, to be more precise,
his series of Vichy regimes-were impressed by certain features of
Salazar's clerico-corporative state as well as by Action Fran<;aise
and other models. Limitations of space in this volume, however,
preclude any insertion of documents that are illustrative of the
authoritarian and ramshackle Vichy regime of 1940-44 that ex-
tolled the traditional virtues of "Work, Family, Country." 2 Nor is
it possible here to include documentary examples of the numerous
right-wing radical movements and leagues that mushroomed in
France during the Depression years in conscious imitation of Mus-
solini's and Hitler's ideologies, and that gained renewed vigor in
Paris under the German occupation. 3
2. For an introduction to the complex history of the Vichy regime,

see especially Robert Aron, The Vichy Regime, 1940-44 (London: Putnam,
1958); and Rene Remond, The Right Wing in France from 1815 to
De Gaulle (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1966).
3. Such leagues included Marcel Bucard's Francistes; Pierre Taittinger's
Jeunesses Patriotes; Major Jean Renaud's Solidarite Franc;;aise; Jacques
Doriot's quite large Parti Populaire Franc;;ais; the Comite Secret d'Action
Revolutionnaire ("Cagoulards"); and numerous others. In the war years
the gulf between Vichy and Paris grew wider-at least until 1944, when
the Paris totalitarians managed to cross it and establish a measure of in-
fluence within the Vichy government.
XVI INTRODUCTION
Likewise, no attempt can be made in this book to discuss the

rather old-fashioned military dictatorship that General John
Metaxas established in Greece between 19 36 and 1941. His regime
was not fascist in the strict sense of the term.
Indeed, the label "fascism" should not be confused with old-
style royalist or military regimes. One of the noteworthy charac-
teristics of fascist regimes was that they had their own party
militia, and this often acted as a rival to the regular armed forces of
the state. Fascist dictatorships aspired to endure, in Hitler's grandi-
ose vision, for at least "a thousand years," whereas military dic-
tatorships were usually intended to be temporary affairs. More-
over, military dictatorships did not usually have their origins in the
problems of the new "mass" societies in the way that fascist
regimes did; after all, military dictatorships have come and gone
with frequency over the centuries.
It is important also to emphasize that fascism is a "post-liberal"
ideology. It presupposes the existence of a liberal political system
that has fallen into a state of crisis with the concomitant threat of a
left-wing revolution. Thus, it would be incorrect to label as "fas-
cist" the authoritarian, secular, and Westernizing regime of Mus-
tafa Kemal Atatiirk in Turkey after the overthrow of the Otto-
man Empire. The Young Turks had had insufficient time to get a
truly "liberal" system into operation prior to Mustafa Kemal's take-
over; nor was there any serious threat of a Communist victory.
In differentiating fascistic regimes from backward-looking au-
thoritarian systems it is important to keep in mind that demagogic
leaders like Hitler and Mussolini did not emerge from the tradi-
tional ruling classes. Instead they usually rose from a different and
humbler social stratum (though there were some exceptions, such
as the aristocratic Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera in Spain and Sir
Oswald Mosley in Britain). Moreover, they intended to create a
new ruling class. Yet in spite of the fact that fascist parties were
strongly "elitist" in theory, they did not always maintain high
selectivity; in Italy, for example, there was to be a considerable
influx of the masses as time went on. The fascists intended to
eliminate the existing "liberal" and "socialist" political parties and
replace them by a single-party system that often made use of some
form of the "corporative state." Ideally, there was to be an identity
of Party and State; in practice, however, friction sometimes
occurred.
In none of the Mediterranean countries did fascism become truly
INTRODUCTION xvii
"totalitarian," despite the fact that Mussolini coined the term.
Certainly the Duce's Italy was nowhere nearly so "totalitarian" or
"monolithic" as Stalin's Russia-or even Hitler's Germany (which
we now know had a surprising number of competing agencies and
contradictory sources of authority beneath the Fuhrer). This was
partly because of Mussolini's frequent deference to the machinery
of the state: "Everything in the State, nothing outside the State,
nothing against the State! " 4 And that, in turn, was probably the
result of the philosophical influence of the older, conservative
Nationalist party of Alfredo Rocco and Luigi Federzoni that
merged with the Fascists in 192 3. The chronic chaos of the
bureaucracy and the humanitarian, almost anarchistic tendencies of
the Italian people were also factors. Lastly and most obviously, the
failure to achieve complete totalitarianism in Italy was due to
Mussolini's inability to get rid of the House of Savoy and the
Church. King Victor Emmanuel III, to be sure, never made a
public show of hostility to the Duce for more than two decades,
but in July, 1943, he became the instrument for overthrowing
Mussolini, just as he had been the instrument for bringing him to
power in October, 1922. The Church, on the other hand, did find
itself occasionally at odds with the regime after the euphoria of the
Lateran pacts of 1929; this was true in the clash over Catholic
Action in 1931 and again when Mussolini announced the anti-
Semitic decrees in 1938. In the case of the Iberian countries, the
failure to achieve complete totalitarianism was even more apparent,
given the powerful position of the Church, the army, and other
conservative forces.
For many years three more or less "standard" interpretations of
fascism have dominated the scene: ( 1) the rather dogmatic asser-
tion of Communist spokesmen in the 1920's and early 1930's that
fascism was the inevitable and final stage of dying capitalism; (2)
the contention of liberal-conservatives (e.g., Benedetto Croce and
Friedrich Meinecke) that fascism was a moral sickness that sud-
denly afflicted an essentially healthy body politic and, once cured,
would not likely recur; and ( 3) the democratic-radical thesis (set
forth by Luigi Salvatorelli, Angelo Tasca, and others) that fascism
should be considered as one of several possible forms of political
and social organization that may emerge in modern mass society at
4. Speech of October 28, 1925, quoted in Opera Omnia di Benito Musso-
lini, ed. by Edoardo and Duilio Susmel (Florence: La Fenice, 1951-63),
Vol. XXI, p. 425.
xviii INTRODUCTION
a certain stage in its development and under certain crisis condi...

tions. To these three may be added various Catholic historiographi-
cal currents (e.g., Jacques Maritain and Augusto Del Noce); the
contention that fascism can be subsumed under the category of
"totalitarianism" (e.g., Hannah Arendt and Carl Friedrich); and a
variety of other interpretations stemming from the disciplines of
the social sciences (e.g., Erich Fromm and Seymour Lipset). The
author of this volume finds elements to commend themselves in
several of the categories mentioned above, and especially in the
democratic-radical one, but he is unwilling to restrict himself to
any single-track approach to the complex problem. This docu-
mentary collection, however, is not directly concerned with the
interpretations of fascism set forth by its critics; that is a topic for
another book. 5 Here the editor has generally chosen to let various
fascists speak for themselves.
As the title indicates, this study covers the years 1919 to 1945-
the classic "age of fascism" in the Mediterranean region. What
about fascism since that time? In Spain and Portugal a factitious
and attenuated form of the ideology managed to survive the shock
of World War 11-perhaps more because of the isolation of these
countries (and physical exhaustion in the case of Spain) than
through the positive achievements of their regimes. At this writing
in 1969 there seem to be signs of a decision to whittle away more
of the fa<;ade of fascism in both Iberian nations; but if past experi-
ence is a guide, the foreign observer will be well advised to wait
and see.
In Italy Mussolini came to a violent death in April, 1945, but his
movement had already largely fallen apart several years before.
There continues to be a small neo-fascist party (the Italian Social
Movement, MSI), but at least at this time it does not pose a major
threat. The factors that favored the growth of fascism after W odd
War I have not been operative in the same measure after the
second world conflict. In the latter case the transition to economic
reconstruction was facilitated by massive American assistance.
After W odd War II, moreover, it became increasingly clear that
capitalism had far more possibilities for renovation than anyone
5. Pioneering efforts in this field include Renzo De Felice, Le interpreta-

zioni del fascismo (Bari: Laterza, 1969); Ernst Nolte (ed.), Theorien iiber
den Faschismus (Cologne: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1967); and
Costanzo Casucci (ed.), ll Fascismo: Antologia di scritti critici (Bologna:
II Mulino, 1961).
INTRODUCTION xix
had thought possible back in 1919. Though Communism has re-
mained a powerful and subversive force since 1945, the currents
that prefer to use the label "Socialist" have generally become quite
democratic and no longer frighten the middle and upper classes in
the way they did half a century ago. Anti-Communism has become
"internationalized" by the Cold War and is no longer the monop-
oly of a particular rightist movement. Although parliamentary
government is still far from being robust in Italy, there is at least
greater popular participation in and control over government than
was possible fifty years ago. There has also been a shoring up of
free institutions thanks to the safeguards written into the new
Constitution of the Italian Republic, the development of European
"communities," and the security provided by NATO. Italy has
grown accustomed to the peace settlement of 1947; irredentism no
longer occupies center stage in her politics, and certainly no one
seriously proposes to revive imperialism. So far neither the Church
nor the army has shown much inclination to play ball with neo-
fascism in Italy, though the latter movement does enjoy some co-
operation from the dwindling remnants of monarchists.
Yet even if old -style Fascism with its Blackshirt militia and
identification of Party and State is not likely to return to power in
Italy in the foreseeable future, it would be foolhardy to say that
never again could some related form of nativist right-wing political
extremism find favor. This might occur under some combination
of circumstances such as the appearance of a magnetic new dema-
gogue, or mounting popular disgust with the inability of parlia-
mentary government to cope with housing shortages and to bring
about the renovation of political and educational institutions, or
soaring frustration with the inconveniences brought about by
spiraling strikes on the part of Communist-dominated organized
labor, or anger over the disruptive behavior of thousands of alien-
ated university students. The course of events in Greece since the
coup d' hat of the colonels in April, 1967, underscores the latent
danger of new manifestations of right-wing extremism in the
Mediterranean region.
It is the editor's hope that the documents in this volume will help
to guide the reader through the shifting and often far from
crystalline currents of Mediterranean fascism. Many of them have
been translated by the editor and are published here for the first
time in English. Headnotes and connecting narrative are designed
to place the selections in their historic context.
XX INTRODUCTION
For Mussolini's Italy the documents are arranged in seven chap-

ters. These include the period of the advent of fascism; the path to
totalitarianism; the emergence of the corporative state; the socio-
economic and youth programs; the relationship with the Roman
Catholic Church and later with the Jews; the increasingly aggres-
sive foreign policy; and finally the coup d'etat of July 25, 1943,
and the brutal epilogue of neo-fascism in the German-occupied
northern Italian Social Republic.
Spain presents a different problem. Here the materials are of
three types: documents that explain the nature of the Falange
party during the brief life of its founder, Jose Antonio Primo de
Rivera; speeches and decrees of Generalissimo Franco, who im-
posed his own will on the Falange during the Civil War; and
finally diplomatic agreements and reports that point up the often
difficult relationship between Nationalist Spain and the Axis
powers.
In the case of Portugal, where the clerico-corporativist regime of
Salazar was not brought into being by an already existent fascist
party, the documents are fewer in number. They consist of ex-
cerpts from the dictator's speeches setting forth his political and
economic philosophy, and key portions of the Constitution of
193 3 that laid the basis for his new corporative state (Estado
Novo).
The editor wishes to express his gratitude to Pilar Primo de
Rivera, sister of the founder of the Falange Espanola; Jesus Unciti,
director of Editora Nacional of the Spanish Ministry of Informa-
tion and Tourism; the United States Catholic Conference; the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the Bruce Publish-
ing Company; the Cambridge University Press; Giulio Einaudi
Editore; Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.; Giangiacomo Feltrinelli
Editore; Arnaldo Mondadori Editore; and others for kindly per-
mitting him to include in English translation certain documents and
excerpts that originally appeared elsewhere.
I
Fascism m Italy
1. The Birth of Fascism
AT THE end of the Great War Italy's liberal political system was sickly;
as a matter of fact, it had never been robust. After all, the country had
been unified for only half a century, and the newly established state
had been confronted by gargantuan problems-parliamentary inex-
perience, intense regional jealousies, hostility from the papacy, wide-
spread illiteracy (especially in the south), economic underdevelop-
ment, a high birth rate, and a tightly stratified social structure. Until
1912 the right to vote was restricted to a small proportion of the
population; thereafter a democratic franchise was put into effect for all
male literates over the age of twenty-one and for illiterates over the
age of thirty if they had seen military service. In the years just before
the war Catholics began to participate at last in national politics, now
that the Church was worried by the growth of Marxism.
By the turn of the century an industrial revolution had begun to
take place, particularly in the triangle bounded by Turin, Milan, and
Genoa. This led to the emergence of two Italian societies living side by
side in a state of uneasy tension. In the northern cities an industrialized
form of capitalism was becoming superimposed on a commercial and
agrarian society, while in the more feudalistic south the latter kind of
society continued to predominate. Concomitantly, anarcho-syndicalist
and socialist currents grew in strength, while landless peasants and
urban masses seethed with discontent and erupted in violence from
time to time.
After the death of Cavour in 1861 Italy's liberal politicians were
mostly third-rate, with the exception of Giovanni Giolitti, who domi-
nated the decade before World War I and instituted some significant
reforms, though remaining cynical about electoral procedures. King
Victor Emmanuel III, on the throne since the assassination of his father
in 1900, was indecisive, uncommunicative, and physically unimpressive.
In retrospect it is easy to see that liberal Italy sealed its fate when it
permitted itself to be dragged into the war in 1915 by a willful
minority that included the King and some of his ministers, the super-
heated patriot-poet Gabriele D' Annunzio, and the renegade socialist
Benito Mussolini. If Italy had stayed neutral, it is conceivable that in
2 FASCISM IN ITALY
due course she could have stabilized her democratic institutions. As it

turned out, however, Parliament receded into the background, while
the Council of Ministers ruled largely by decree. As the war dragged
on, neutralist-minded Socialists became ever more alienated, while the
restive Catholics displayed a growing lack of enthusiasm for the
struggle. The news of the Russian revolutions of 1917 caught the
imagination of millions of Italian workers, who naively thought that
Lenin's Bolshevist regime was simply Western-style Marxism "with a
dash of Tartar sauce." The great military debacle at Caporetto in the
fall of 1917 fanned the internal discontent of the country, though in
the end, upon the advent to power of Premier Vittorio Emanuele
Orlando, it reinforced the conservative nationalist groups.
In 1917 and 1918 Allied grain shipments and economic assistance
helped Italy pull through the struggle. Unfortunately, this aid quickly
terminated with the armistice. After World War I there was nothing
comparable to the Marshall Plan that was to save Europe from eco-
nomic and political chaos after the Second World War; instead, dis-
content soared. In the face of monopoly-minded industrialists who
paid low wages while reaping huge wartime profits, labor began to
organize in rapidly expanding labor unions. These engaged in a wave
of strikes that aggravated an already bad inflationary situation and
thoroughly alarmed the employers. On the large agricultural estates of
the lower Po Valley and elsewhere, landowners were disturbed by the
increasingly strident demands of migratory farm hands who were
being organized by both Catholics and Socialists. Everywhere newly
enfranchised industrial and farm workers were flocking into the two
"mass" parties-either the Socialists or the brand-new Catholic Popular
party (Partito Popolare Italiano), organized at war's end by the
Sicilian priest Don Luigi Sturzo. If these two parties could have agreed
to form a center-left coalition government, Italian democracy might
still have succeeded; but at this stage of history only a handful of
leaders in either party were that imaginative. The parliamentary elec-
tions of 1919, conducted for the first time under a system of propor-
tional representation, resulted in the new partiti di massa torpedoing
the elitist liberal parties that had· been manipulated by the old ruling
class.
Compounding the economic and political disaffection of the work-
ing people was a widespread psychological malaise. Returning service-
men were infuriated by the failure of "stay-at-homes" to appreciate
their wartime sacrifices. Their sense of frustration was augmented by
their resentment of Italy's inability to gather all of the Adriatic,
Mediterranean, and African plums she desired at the peace harvest.
The unwillingness of President Woodrow Wilson to concede her the
Adriatic port of Fiume was particularly galling to ultrapatriotic vet-
erans. To such people it seemed indeed that Italy had suffered a
"mutilated victory." Their fury was exploited by Gabriele D' An-
nunzio, who in a melodramatic, filibustering expedition seized Fiume
THE BIRTH OF FASCISM 3
from September, 1919, to December, 1920-an episode that further
fanned the flames of frustration and facilitated the growth of Fascism.
Italy had moved from the Great War into a kind of civil war that
was to last from 1919 to 1922. During the first two years of strife the
leftist political forces seemed to predominate, but after the failure of
the workers' sit-down strike in the northern metallurgical plants in
September, 1920, the forces of the Right gained the upper hand. The
Socialist party fell asunder. A separate Communist party was formed in
January, 1921, while right-wing Socialists split away to form Still a
third Marxist current. Whatever the danger of Communism's coming
to power may have been prior to 1920-21, it was virtually nonexistent
thereafter, though this was clearer in retrospect than at the time. As
many of the workers began to learn the bitter truth about conditions
in Soviet Russia, they became discouraged at the failure to achieve a
postwar utopia either there or at home. In the face of this disillusion-
ment, the initiative passed from the Marxists to frightened and deter-
mined reactionary forces on the radical right. And now that D'An-
nunzio was no longer in the limelight, Benito Mussolini, who had been
steadily sidling toward the right, was able to emerge as the principal
spokesman of this radical nationalist movement.
Born in 1883 in the village of Predappio in the notoriously "Red"
region of Romagna in the lower Po Valley, Mussolini was the son of an
anarchist blacksmith and religious-minded mother. He was named in
honor of Benito Juarez, leader of Mexico's social revolution. Five feet,
six inches tall, with jutting jaw and flashing eyes, Mussolini's pug-
nacious appearance suggested his revolutionary outlook. Largely self-
educated, intensely anticlerical, antimonarchist, and antimilitarist, the
young man got a job in 1902 as a substitute teacher in an elementary
school. Partly to avoid military service he spent the next two years as a
vagabond in Switzerland, working as a stonemason and absorbing some
of the elitist ideas expressed in the writings of Nietzsche, the sociolo-
gist Pareto, and the syndicalist Sorel. The latter's emphasis on the need
for overthrowing decadent liberal democracy and capitalism by the use
of violence, direct action, and the general strike made a deep impres-
sion on Mussolini, as did also his neo-Machiavellian ideas for manipulat-
ing the masses by appealing to their emotions.
Returning to Italy in 1904 with a speaking knowledge of French and
a smattering of German, Mussolini decided to serve his two-year term
in the army, after which he returned to teaching. Soon he joined the
Marxian Socialist movement and for a time in 1909 lived in the
Austrian city of Trent, where he was secretary of the local chamber of
labor. While there he wrote The Cardinal's Mistress, a bitterly anti-
clerical pamphlet that had to be withdrawn from circulation when he
made his truce with the Vatican. By 1910 Mussolini returned to F orli,
where he edited the weekly Lotta di classe. He was now one of Italy's
most prominent Socialists. In 1911 he bitterly denounced the "imperial-
ist war" to gain Tripoli, an action which earned him a five-month jail
4 FASCISM IN ITALY
term. After his release he helped expel from the ranks of the Socialist
party two "revisionists" who had supported the war, Ivanoe Bonomi
and Leonida Bissolati. For that he was rewarded in December, 1912,
with the editorship of the Socialist party newspaper Avanti! Its circu-
lation soon rose from 20,000 to 100,000.
The following document summarizes Mussolini's activities from
then until the formation of his Fasci di Combattimento. It is an excerpt
from a police report prepared for Premier Orlando in June, 1919, by
the Inspector-General of Public Security in Milan.
Report of Inspector-General of Public Security,

G. Gasti, Regarding Mussolini
(June 4, 1919)
BIOGRAPHICAL OBSERVATIONS (Mussolini)

PRoFEssoR BENITO M ussoLINI, son of the late Alessandro, born in
Predappio (ForB) on July 29, 1883; now residing in Milan at Foro
Bonaparte 38; revolutionary socialist; has a police record; ele-
mentary schoolteacher qualified to teach in secondary schools;
former first secretary of the Chambers of Labor in Cesena, Forli,
and Ravenna; after 1912 editor of the newspaper Avanti! to which
he gave a violent, suggestive, and intransigent orientation. In Oc-
tober, 1914, finding himself in opposition to the directorate of the
Italian Socialist party because he advocated a kind of active neutral-
ity on the part of Italy in the War by the Nations against the
party's tendency of absolute neutrality, he withdrew on the twen-
tieth of that month from the directorate of A vanti!
Then on the fifteenth of November thereafter he initiated publi-
cation of the newspaper ll Popolo d'ltalia, in which he supported-
in sharp contrast to Avanti! and amid bitter polemics against that
newspaper and its chief backers-the thesis of Italian intervention
in the war against the militarism of the Central Empires.
For this reason he was accused of moral and political unworthi-
ness, and the party thereupon decided to expel him.
Thereafter he . . . undertook a very active campaign in behalf
of Italian intervention, participating in demonstrations in the
souRcE: Translated by permission of Harcourt, Brace & World,

Inc., from Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il rivoluzionario, 1883-
1920 (© 1965 by Giulio Einaudi editore, Turin), pp. 730-735
passim.
piazzas and writing quite violent articles in Popolo d'ltalia. Called
into military service, he was sent to the zone of operations and was
seriously wounded by the explosion of a grenade.
He was promoted to the rank of corporal "for merit of war."
The promotion was recommended because of his exemplary con-
duct and fighting quality, his mental calmness and lack of concern
for discomfort, his zeal and regularity in carrying out his assign-
ments, where he was always first in every task involving labor and
fortitude. On December 25, 1915, in T reviglio he contracted a
marriage with his fellow countrywoman Rachele Guidi, who had
already borne him a daughter, Edda, at F orli in 1910.
He also had a mistress, the thirty-year-old Ida Irene Dalser, ...
by whom he had a son born in November, 1915, and legally
recognized by Mussolini on January 11, 1916. . . . After being
abandoned by Mussolini, [Miss Dalser] spoke badly of him to
everybody . . . .
PHYSICAL AND PsYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERisTics

Benito Mussolini is of strong physical build even though he has
been afflicted by syphilis. His robustness enables him to work
continuously. He rests until a late hour in the morning, leaves his
home at noon, but does not return again until 3 A.M., and those
fifteen hours, except for a brief pause for meals, are devoted to
newspaper and political work.
He is a sensual type, and this is revealed by the various relation-
ships he has contracted with women. . . . He is an emotional,
impulsive type, and these characteristics cause him to be suggestive
and persuasive in his speeches, although it cannot be said that he is
an orator, even though he speaks well.
Basically he is a sentimental type-a fact which results in much
sympathy and friendship for him. He is disinterested, generous
with the money that he has available, and this has given him a
reputation for altruism and philanthropy.
He is very intelligent, shrewd, cautious, reflective, a good judge
of men and of their strengths and weaknesses.
Quick friendships and dislikes come easily for him, and he is
capable of making sacrifices for friends, and is stubborn in his dis-
likes and hatreds.
He is courageous and bold; he has organizing ability, and is
6 FASCISM IN ITALY
capable of making quick decisions; but he is not equally tenacious

in standing by his convictions and proposals.
He is very ambitious. He is motivated by the conviction that
he represents a significant force in the destiny of Italy, and he is
determined to make this prevail. He is a man who does not resign
himself to positions of secondary rank. He intends to rate first and
to dominate.
Within the ranks of official socialism he rose rapidly from ob-
scure origins to an eminent position. He was the ideal editor of
Avanti! for the socialists. In that line of work he was greatly
esteemed and beloved. Some of his former comrades and admirers
still confess that there was no one who understood better than he
how to interpret the spirit of the proletariat, and there was no one
who did not observe his apostasy with sorrow.
This came about not for reasons of self-interest or money. He
was a sincere and passionate advocate, first of vigilant and armed
neutrality, and later of war; and he did not believe that he was
compromising with his personal and political honesty by making
use of every means-no matter where they came from or wherever
he might obtain them-to pay for his newspaper, his program and
line of action.
This was his initial line. It is difficult to say to what extent, later
on, his socialist convictions (which never did he either openly or
privately abjure) may have been sacrificed in the course of the
indispensable financial deals that were necessary for the continua-
tion of the struggle in which he was engaged. . . . But assuming
these modifications did take place . . . , he always wanted to give
the appearance of still being a socialist, and he fooled himself into
thinking that this was the case. . . .
According to my investigations, this is the moral figure of the
man-in contrast to the opinion of his former political comrades
and of those who belong to parties of "order" and regard him as
somebody who has sold out, is corrupt, and can be corrupted; and
in contrast to others who think he has remained firmly attached to
his socialist principles of an earlier period.
Soon after the armistice Mussolini sensed the political potentialities of

launching at home such a struggle as hitherto had been waged against
the foreign enemy. A civil war against neutralists and "Bolsheviks"
might well enable him to gain political power. With encouragement
from the syndicalist Michele Bianchi (later to become one of the
quadrumvirs of the Fascist March on Rome) and a few Arditi1
veterans like Captain Ferruccio Vecchi, Mussolini summoned a meet-
ing to take place in Milan on Sunday, March 23, 1919. The Industrial
and Commercial Alliance, located at Piazza San Sepolcro 9, made avail-
able its second-floor salon.
The audience of about 120 people consisted chiefly of Arditi and
Futurists2 from Milan, with a sprinkling of republicans, national-
syndicalists, and revisionist socialists. The meeting, which was presided
over by Captain V ecchi and included speeches by Mussolini, Filippo
Marinetti, and a few others, proclaimed the birth of the Fasci di
Combattimento (Combat Fascio). The term fascio derived from the
insignia that the lictors of ancient Rome carried (a bundle of rods with
ax blade protruding, symbolizing authority and discipline) as they
cleared the way for the chief magistrates in public. The so-called
"Fascism of the first hour" that was proclaimed on March 23 antici-
pated in large measure the official program that was to be published on
June 6. Mussolini spoke both in the morning and in the afternoon. In
his first appearance he made a threefold programmatic declaration. In
the afternoon he explained the position of the Fascist movement or1 a
variety of political and socio-economic points. 3 According to the
account in his own newspaper, Popolo d'ltalia, Mussolini spoke ner-
vously in short bursts, the audience paying rapt attention and inter-
rupting often with applause.
The Birth of the Fascist Movement

(Piazza San Sepolcro 9, Milan, March 23, 1919)
MussouNI's MoRNING SPEECH

First of all, a few words regarding the agenda.
Without undue formality or pedantry, I shall read to you three
declarations that seem to me to be worthy of discussion and a vote.
souRcE: Milan Il Popolo d'ltalia, Vol. VI, No. 83 (March 24,

1919); reprinted in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. by
Edoardo and Duilio Susmel (Florence: La Fenice, 1953), Vol.
XII, pp. 321-4 passim. My translation.
1. The Arditi were a daredevil military corps assigned to especially
hazardous tasks.
2. The Italian Futurist movement, made up of a small number of artistic,
literary, and political nonconformists, was launched in February, 1909, by
Filippo Marinetti (a friend of Captain V ecchi's). It extolled anticlericalism,
nationalism, militarism, and imperialist expansion.
3. Some of his ideas about national syndicalism derived from talks with
Alceste DeAmbris, head of the national-syndicalist labor union (Unione
Italiano del Lavoro ). DeAmbris was to be one of D'Annunzio's closest
economic advisers in Fiume.
8 FASCISM IN ITALY
Later, in the afternoon, we can resume discussion of our platform

declaration. I must tell you right off that we dare not bog down in
details; if we wish to act, we must grasp reality in its broad essen-
tials, without going into minute details.
FIRST DECLARATION
"The meeting of March 2 3 extends its greetings and its reverent

and unforgetful thoughts first of all to those sons of Italy who have
given their lives for the grandeur of the fatherland and the freedom
of the world, to the wounded and sick, to all the fighters and ex-
prisoners who carried out their duty; and it declares that it is ready
to give energetic support to claims of both a material and moral
nature that may be set forth by the servicemen's associations."
SECOND DECLARATION
"The meeting of March 2 3 declares that it is opposed to the

imperialism of other peoples at the expense of Italy, and declares
that it is opposed to any eventual Italian imperialism that works to
the detriment of other people. It accepts the supreme postulate of a
League of Nations, which presupposes the integrity of each nation
-integrity which, so far as Italy is concerned, must be realized in
the Alps and along the Adriatic through her claim to Fiume and
Dalmatia." ...
THIRD DECLARATION
"The meeting of March 23 pledges the Fascists to sabotage

m every way the candidates of neutralists in all the various
parties." . . .
MussouNI's AFTERNOON SPEECH
I shall dispense with the idea of delivering a long speech. We don't

need to place ourselves programmatically on a revolutionary foot-
ing because, in a historic sense, we already did so in 1915. It isn't
necessary to set forth too analytical a program.
If Bolshevism could prove to us that it guarantees a people's
greatness and that its regime is better than others, we wouldn't be
frightened by it. But it has now been demonstrated beyond a doubt
that Bolshevism has ruined the economic life of Russia. Over there,
every kind of economic activity, from agriculture to industry, is
completely paralyzed. Famine and hunger prevail. Not only that,
but Bolshevism is a peculiarly Russian phenomenon, to which our
Western civilizations, starting with that of the Germans, have been
resistant. We declare war against socialism, not because it is social-
ist but because it has opposed nationalism. Although we can discuss
the question of what is socialism, what is its program, and what are
its tactics, one thing is obvious: the official Italian Socialist party
has been reactionary and absolutely conservative. If its views had
prevailed, our survival in the world of today would be impossible.
It is clear that the Socialist party will not be able to assume leader-
ship of a program of renewal and reconstruction. We who have led
the attack against political life in these past few years are going to
expose the responsibilities of the official Socialist party.
It is inevitable that majorities become static, whereas minorities
are dynamic. We intend to be an active minority, to attract the
proletariat away from the official Socialist party. But if the middle
class thinks that we are going to be their lightning rods, they are
mistaken. We must go halfway toward meeting the workers. Right
at the time of the armistice I wrote that we must approach the
workers who were returning from the trenches, because it would
be odious and Bolshevik not to recognize the rights of those who
had fought in the war. We must, therefore, accept the demands of
the working classes. Do they want an eight-hour day? Tomorrow
will the miners and laborers who work at night demand six hours?
Sickness and old-age insurance? Worker control over industry?
We shall support these demands, partly because we want the
workers to get accustomed to responsibilities of management and
to learn as a result that it isn't easy to operate a business successfully.
These are our postulates, ours for the reasons that I said before
and because in history there are inevitable cycles whereby every-
thing is renewed and changed. If syndicalist doctrines maintain that
one can find among the masses the necessary leadership capable of
taking over the management of labor, we shall not object, espe-
cially if this movement takes into account two basic facts: the true
nature of the productive process and the reality of the nation.
As for economic democracy, we favor national syndicalism and
reject state intervention whenever it aims at throttling the creation
of wealth.
We shall fight against technological and moral backwardness.
There are industrialists who shun both technological and moral
innovations. If they don't find the strength to transform them-
selves, they will be swept aside. We must impress upon the
workers, however, that it is one thing to destroy, and quite another
10 FASCISM IN ITALY
to build. Destruction can be the work of an hour, but construction

may require years or centuries.
Economic democracy-this must be our motto. And now let us
turn to the subject of political democracy.
I have the impression that the present regime in Italy has failed.
It is clear to everyone that a crisis now exists. During the war all of
us sensed the inadequacy of the government; today we know that
our victory was due solely to .the virtues of the Italian people, not
to the intelligence and ability of its leaders.
We must not be fainthearted, now that the future nature of the
political system is to be determined. We must act fast. If the
present regime is going to be superseded, we must be ready to take
its place. For this reason, we are establishing the Fasci as organs of
creativity and agitation that will be ready to rush into the piazzas
and cry out, "The right to the political succession belongs to us,
because we were the ones who pushed the country into the war
and led it to victory!"
Our program includes political reforms. The Senate must be
abolished. But while we draw up this death certificate, let us add
that in recent months the Senate has proved itself to be much
superior to the Chamber. [A voice: "That doesn't take much!"]
True enough, but even that little bit is a fact. In any case, we want
to abolish that feudal organism.
We demand universal suffrage for both men and women; a
system of voting by list on a regional basis; and proportional repre-
sentation. New elections will produce a national assembly, and we
insist that it must decide the question of what form of government
the Italian state is to have. It will choose between a republic and a
monarchy; and we who have always been inclined toward republi-
canism declare right here and now that we favor a republic! We
are not going to . . . make a retrospective, historical indictment
of the monarchy, however. The existing system of political repre-
sentation cannot satisfy us; we want every distinct interest group
to be represented directly. Since I, as a citizen, can vote according
to my beliefs, then in the same manner I, as a professional man,
should be permitted to vote according to my occupational outlook.
It may be objected that such a program implies a return to the
corporations [guilds]. That is not important. The problem is to
organize occupational councils that will complement an authenti-
cally political system of representation.
But let us not dwell on details. Of all the questions to be re-
solved, the one that interests us most is that of creating a governing
class and endowing it with the necessary powers. For it is quite
useless to raise more or less urgent issues if leaders who are capable
of coping with them have not been produced.
Our program, upon examination, may be found to resemble
others. In particular, one may discover some premises that are
analogous to those of the official Socialists. But our position is
different in spirit, because it is based on the war and the victory.
This enables us to face everything boldly. I should even like to see
the Socialists assume power for a while, because it is so very easy to
promise paradise and so difficult to produce it. No government
tomorrow can demobilize all the soldiers in a few days, nor increase
the food supply when it doesn't exist. But in actuality we cannot
allow such an experiment; for, once in power, the official Socialists
would want to give Italy an imitation of the Russian phenomenon.
And to this all socialist thinkers are opposed, from Branting and
Thomas to Bernstein, because the Bolshevik experience, far from
abolishing classes, entails a ferocious dictatorship. We are strongly
opposed to all forms of dictatorship, whether they be of the saber
or the cocked hat, of wealth or numbers. The only dictatorship we
acknowledge is that of the will and intelligence.
Therefore, I hope that this assembly will agree to the resolution
that accepts the economic demands advanced by the national
syndicalists.
With this compass as our guide, we shall quickly succeed in
creating a number of Fasci di Combattimento. Tomorrow we shall
co-ordinate their activity simultaneously in all the centers of Italy.
We are not static people; we are dynamic, and we intend to take
our rightful place, which must always be in the vanguard.
In mid-April, 1919, the Fascists engaged in their first clash with Social-
ists, sacking the Milan offices of their newspaper, Avanti! By June 6
the Fascists decided the time had come to publish their own program
in Popolo d'Italia. The new statement was generally in line with the
March 2 3 announcement, though it now omitted all mention of the
League of Nations or of cosmopolitanism. It was also more outspoken
about the need for a National Constituent Assembly and national
councils of experts in labor, industry, transportation, and other fields.
Nowhere was there comment about the problem of education. Al-
though still quite radical (perhaps more so than Mussolini himself
would have liked), the June 6 program showed a tendency to shift to
the right. The 17 -point version printed below is the slightly revised
12 FASCISM IN ITALY
one that was circulated in the form of a manifesto in the summer of

1919.
Program of the Italian Fascist Movement
ITALIAN FASCI DI CoMBATTIMENTO

CENTRAL CoMMITTEE
MILAN-VIA PAOLO DA CANNOBBIO, 37-TELEPHONE 7156
Italians!
This is the national program of a movement that is soundly
Italian.
Revolution, because it is antidogmatic and antidemagogic;
strongly innovating because it ignores a priori objections.
We regard the success of the revolutionary war as standing
above everything and everybody.
The other problems-bureaucracy, administration, judiciary,
school system, colonies, etc.-we shall consider after we have
created a new ruling class.
Consequently, WE INSIST UPON:
For the political problem:

(a) Universal suffrage with a system of regional voting by list,
with proportional representation, and woman suffrage and eligibil-
ity for office.
(b) Reduction of the age of voters to eighteen years; and that
of eligibility for membership in the Chamber of Deputies to
twenty-five years.
(c) Abolition of the Senate.
(d) Convocation of a National Assembly to sit for three years,
its primary task to be the establishment of a new constitutional
structure for the state.
(e) Formation of National Technical Councils for labor, indus-
try, transportation, public health, communications, etc., to be
elected by either professional or trades collectivities, and provided
with legislative powers and the right to elect a Commissioner
General who shall have the powers of a Minister.

1920 (© 1965 by Giulio Einaudi editore, Turin), pp. 744-745.
For the social problem:
WE INSIST UPON:
(a) Prompt promulgation of a state law that makes compulsory
for all workers an eight-hour working day.
(b) Minimum wage scales.
(c) Participation of workers' representatives tn the technical
management of industry.
(d) Transfer to such proletarian organizations as are morally
and technically qualified for it the responsibility for operating
industries and public services.
(e) Prompt and complete satisfaction of the claims of the rail-
road workers and all employees in the transportation industry.
(f) Appropriate revision of the draft law regarding insurance
for sickness and old age, and reduction of the presently proposed
age eligibility from sixty-five to fifty-five.
For the military problem:

WE INSIST UPON:
(a) Creation of a National Militia, with short periods of train-
ing, and designed purely for a defensive role.
(b) Nationalization of all arms and munitions factories.
(c) A foreign policy calculated to improve Italy's position in
the peaceful competition of the civilized nations.
For the financial problem:

WE INSIST UPON:
(a) A heavy and progressive tax on capital which would take
the form of a meaningful PARTIAL EXPROPRIATION of all kinds of
wealth.
(b) Confiscation of all the properties belonging to religious
congregations and abolition of all the revenues of episcopal sees,
which at present constitute an enormous burden on the nation
while serving as a prerogative for a few privileged persons.
(c) Revision of all contracts for supplying war materiel, and
confiscation of 85 per cent of war profits.
During most of 1919 Mussolini remained the journalist, orator, and

theoretician of Fascism, leaving to others the task of organizing the
movement. In the elections in Milan on November 16 of that year
Mussolini was able to gain only 5,000 votes out of 270,000 cast. The
workers apparently despised him as a renegade.
When the second congress of the Fasci di Combattimento met in
14 FASCISM IN ITALY
Milan on May 24-25, 1920, Mussolini and Cesare Rossi emerged as the
leaders. Mussolini's inaugural speech, expressed in generic and flexible
terms, urged the Fascists to avoid becoming too conservative and
detached from the workers. For reasons of expediency he swallowed
his earlier republicanism, asserting that this problem must not be
viewed dogmatically; and in a brief interview he also backtracked on
the subject of the papacy. Such watering-down of antimonarchism and
anticlericalism proved too much for Marinetti, Captain V ecchi, and
several of the Futurists, who quickly pulled out of the Fascist move-
ment. Rossi also assumed a flexible stance that in effect pushed
Fascism further to the right. The congress approved his call for revi-
sion of the platform in anticipation of local elections, but postponed
discussion of the agricultural problem. The new program softened
some of the earlier planks. For example, talk of proportional repre-
sentation was dropped (the government of F. S. Nitti had already
granted it); nor was there any longer a demand to eliminate the Senate
and convene a National Constituent Assembly. Instead of calling for
confiscation of 85 per cent of war profits, the new program recom-
mended sequestration only of profits that were "left unproductive." It
also virtually repudiated the General Confederation of Labor, calling
instead for support of "those minority groups of the proletariat who
can harmonize defense of class with the national interest" -the first
clear step along the path that would lead to creation of strictly Fascist
labor unions.
Postulates of the Fas~ist Program

(May, 1920)
The Fasci di Combattimento do not intend-in the present histori-
cal situation-to become a new party. Thus, they do not feel tied
to any particular doctrinal form, nor to any traditional dogma.
The intangible, shifting, complex currents of thought as well as the
almost daily modifications of tactics that are necessitated by the
reality of the situation cannot be reduced to narrow, artificial
formulas.
The broad lines of the immediate tasks that confront the Fasci di
Combattimento can be sketched under the following major head-
ings: -Support for our recent national war. -Winning the peace.
-Resistance and opposition to the theoretical and practical de-
generations of politically oriented socialism.

1920 (© 1965 by Giulio Einaudi editore, Turin), pp. 746-748.
AGAINST PoLITICAL PARASITISM
With the hope of mobilizing all our national energies to win the
peace, the Fasci di Combattimento express their disgust for those
men and agencies of the political bourgeoisie who have shown that
they are incapable of handling domestic and foreign problems, that
they are hostile to every profound renovation and to every spon-
taneous recognition of popular rights, and that they are inclined to
make only those concessions that are dictated by calculations of
parliamentary advantage.
FoR A BouRGEOISIE OF LABOR
The Fasci recognize the very great value of the "bourgeoisie of

labor," which in all fields of human endeavor (from that of
industry and agriculture to that of science and the professions)
constitutes a precious and indispensable element for bringing about
progressive development and the triumph of national aspirations.
AGAINST THE DEGENERATIONS OF THE LABOR STRUGGLE
The Fasci di Combattimento, which are anxious to support the

moral improvement of the proletariat and to help in the establish-
ment of syndical organizations that will increase the self-conscious-
ness of labor, feel that it is their duty to maintain an attitude of
staunch opposition to those labor struggles in which strictly eco-
nomic goals are submerged and confused by considerations of pure
demagoguery.
THE PROBLEM OF THE KIND OF REGIME
For the F asci di Combattimento the question of what kind of

regime the country should have is subordinate to the present and
future moral and material interests of the nation, as understood
both in its present situation and in its historic destiny. Thus they
express no prejudice either for or against existing institutions.
OuR PosTULATES oF A FINANCIAL CHARACTER
(a) A heavy, extraordinary tax of a progressive character on

capital, which will assume the form of real but partial expropria-
tion of all the wealth, and which will be paid within a very short
period of time;
16 FASCISM IN ITALY
(b) The confiscation of all properties belonging to religious

congregations and the abolition of all the revenues of episcopal
sees, which at present constitute an enormous burden on the nation
while serving as a prerogative for a few privileged persons;
(c) Revision of all contracts for supplying war materiel, and the
confiscation of those excess war profits that are left unproductive.
THE F ASCI AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
The Fasci express their sympathy and intention of supporting

every initiative of those minority groups of the proletariat who
seek to harmonize the safeguarding of their class interests with the
interests of the nation. With respect to syndical tactics, they advise
the proletariat to make use of whatever forms of struggle assure
the development of the whole and the well-being of the various
producers, without any special prejudices and without any dog-
matic exclusiveness.
FoR AN EcoNOMY OF MAXIMUM PRODUCTION
In contrast to theological proposals for reconstructing the econ-

omy on a rigidly collectivist basis, the Fasci di Combattimento
assume a realistic position and do not express approval of any
particular form of self-management. Instead, they declare their
support for whatever system guarantees maximum production and
maximum prosperity, whether it be individualist, collectivist, or
something else.
OuR DEMANDS FOR SAFEGUARDING THE PROLETARIAT
(a) The prompt promulgation of a national law that will impose

an eight-hour day for all kinds of labor;
(b) Representation of workers in industrial management, but
restricted to matters regarding personnel;
(c) Transfer to such proletarian organizations as are morally
and technically qualified for it the responsibility for managing
industries and public utilities;
(d) Formation of National Technical Councils of Labor, com-
posed of representatives from industry, agriculture and transporta-
tion, intellectual labor, public health, communications, etc., to be
elected by the professional and trades bodies and endowed with
legislative powers.
FoR THE MILITARY PRoBLEM
The Fasci di Combattimento call for the institution of a National

Militia, with short periods of training and designed purely for a
defensive role; and for the immediate acceptance of all the demands
set forth by the associations of ex-soldiers and wounded veterans,
to whom we express in a clear-cut and tangible manner the father-
land's gratitude.
THE MEANS OF STRUGGLE OF THE FASCI DI CoMBATTIMENTO
Regarding tactics to be adopted in support of the above program,

the F asci Italiani di Combattimento reserve the right to make
contacts and agreements, as the situation requires, with all those
groups and parties who occupy the same ground in their fight
against demagoguery, bureaucracy, and plutocracy, and in favor of
creating all kinds of forces for national reconstruction.
A token of things to come in Fascist foreign policy was Mussolini's

success in getting the 1920 congress to approve his resolution calling
for effective implementation of the 1915 Secret Treaty of London,
annexation of Fiume, gradual withdrawal from the group of "Western
plutocratic nations," establishment of closer ties with erstwhile enemy
nations and with peoples of southeastern Europe, and support of the
nation's need for and right to colonies.
At first the Fascists were concentrated in Milan and a few other
cities. They gained ground quite slowly between 1919 and 1920; not
until after the scare brought about by the workers' "occupation of the
factories" in the late summer of 1920 did Fascism become really wide-
spread. The industrialists then began to throw their financial support
to it. Moreover, toward the end of 1920 Fascism started to spread into
the countryside, bidding for the support of large landowners, particu-
larly in the area between Bologna and Ferrara, a traditional stronghold
of the Left and scene of frequent violence. Socialist and Catholic
organizers of farm hands in that region, Venezia Giulia, Tuscany, and
even distant Apulia were soon attacked by squads of Fascists, armed
with castor oil, blackjacks, and more lethal weapons. The era of
squadrismo and nightly expeditions to burn Socialist and Catholic
political and labor headquarters had begun.
To enable the Fascists to take a clear-cut stand on agricultural prob-
lems, Mussolini ordered Gaetano Polverelli to prepare a report. By
way of guidelines he advised him that they must categorically reject
the socialist slogan of "land for the peasants" and proclaim instead that
land belongs not simply to him who works it but to him whose mone-
18 FASCISM IN ITALY
tary investment makes it flourish. The document was completed in

January, 1921.
Fascist Agrarian Program

(January, 1921)
BRoAD LINES FOR A SoLUTION
In tackling the agrarian problem, let us say first of all that in view
of the political nature and brevity of this present report, we cannot
and shall not make a theoretical, detailed exposition of our views.
. . . In any case, conditions in Italy vary greatly from region to
region. . . . We shall discuss the question in its broad political
aspects in order to chart our course of action during 1921. . . .
1. Land for him who works it can be a superficial, demagogic,
and harmful formula if promises are made to apply it with the
accompaniment of beating drums. In reality, the question is com-
plex, and the application of this principle requires very careful
preparation. Let us begin with the latifondo. It is impossible today
to divide up the latifondo, because we cannot divide up malaria or
divide up a desert that is characterized by lack of roads, drinking
water, irrigation ditches, farm equipment, livestock, capital, and
houses. . . . A few socialists . . . are in favor of the latifondo!
But we are against it, resolutely against it, for an infinite number of
reasons, and chiefly because we must provide greater opportunities
to a steadily increasing population.
But we declare that before land division takes place [the state]
must provide roads, drinking water, irrigation systems, public
safety, housing, and capital for the development of agriculture.
. . . Moreover, we must have a well-organized and well-
developed mutual credit system, with both small agencies and large
banks. Increased productivity, of which there has been too much
talk, will take place only after this transformation of the system of
agriculturalloans . . . .
The proper utilization of lands in the latifondi must be a slow,
gradual, and expensive process. If it were done tumultuously, it
would be disastrous. . . .

Inc., from Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, Vol. 1: La
conquista del potere, 1921-1925 (© 1966 by Giulio Einaudi
editore, Turin), pp. 736-740.
2. Large-scale farming. Generally speaking, large-scale indus-
trial enterprises are healthy. Only ignorance could confuse them
with the latifondo. Large-scale enterprises involve minimum ex-
pense and maximum income. . . . They cannot be divided with-
out increasing expenses and reducing income, and this would result
in serious social harm. Moreover, the large-scale type of undertak-
ing permits cultivation of marginal lands, with the utilization of
labor by old people, women, and children. Here, too, just as in the
case of the factories, it is a question of maturity. One cannot
improvise technical advantages. A co-operative can replace a large-
scale industrialized agricultural enterprise with no national harm
. . . only in those cases where such a new entity actually possesses
technical and administrative advantages. . . .
3. Breaking up of estates. Not only is a system of latifondi
harmful to the nation, so too is the breaking up of estates into
scattered bits. Anyone who has to travel to distant plots of land
scattered about the four points of the compass loses a great deal of
time. It is imperative for us to establish a legal limit to land division,
and to reform inheritance rights so as to facilitate compact plots of
land around a farmhouse by exchanging those that are scattered
about elsewhere.
4. Parliamentary and ministerial bankruptcy. The entire parlia-
mentary and ministerial program in this field is bankrupt because of
the incompetence of the deputies and ministers, the constant in-
spection and myopia of the bureaucrats, and the artificiality and
rigidity of measures taken.
We must decentralize, and above all we must not wait for Rome
to act; instead we must present to and impose upon Rome measures
which have their own logic and local usefulness. . . .
5. Opera Nazionale Combattenti [National Land Program for
Veterans] . Instead of creating colossal new central and regional
authorities to regulate agricultural policy, it would be better to
support the development and improvement of those that already
exist and especially the Opera Nazionale Combattenti, which is also
carrying out an agricultural policy. It has received many funds
from the Crown as well as from private sources for the promotion
of land cultivation, and it makes such funds available to war
veterans. It has more than 300 million lire of capital.
The work of the Opera is meritorious. We do not share the
views of those who assert that it has not accomplished very much.
Suffice to say that it must create everything ex novo and organ-
20 FASCISM IN ITALY
ize not only the farmers but also itself in every region. Obstacles
have arisen not only because of the cultural and political back-
wardness of the masses but also because of technological back-
wardness in Italy. . . .
As for rural co-operation in the south, everything has yet to be
done .. ..
But anyone who has a creative mind will set out with greater
determination to overcome these difficulties. . . . We oppose the
breakup and scattering of estates. There should be over-all quotas
for co-operatives and families, but not for individuals; otherwise a
new problem will arise for veterans who have large families.
In Italy it is important to build homesteads, because our people
do not have a historical background of individualism such as the
Anglo-Saxons; instead, they have the tradition of the clan. It is
impossible, therefore, to force a family to live in an isolated home.
The only solution is that of colonies. The Germans migrated to
South America and colonized it by means of organized platoons,
with an expert in charge and a Protestant pastor as well. Without
trying to copy the Germans, we have our own Roman tradition.
Cains Gracchus sent 6,000 proletarian soldiers into Africa to build
the colony of Giunonia, according to the historian Mommsen. We
must translate (unfortunately from German!) specialized studies
regarding the Roman colonies.
We must also decentralize the Opera and expropriate the estates
of public agencies. . . .
6. Against socialism and communism. The first characteristic
that we must give to our agrarian program is that of implacable
hostility to social-communist propaganda. Socialism and commu-
nism applied to the agricultural problem would end up in nationali-
zation of the lands-that is, in the collectivist transformation of all
Italy into a single administrative latifondo. There is no question but
that the social-communist party members have a vested interest in
nationalization, because they would not do the work and they
would furnish the cadres for the bureaucracy, making of them-
selves a parasitic caste of exploiters. But the notion that we must
create an enormous, incompetent, parasitical bureaucracy to ad-
minister Italian agriculture is terrifying. The disasters resulting
from state administration of the railroads and the postal system
should be sufficient warning! . . .
We must explain that the Soviet commissars in Russia have
carried out pitiless raids in the countryside, and have shot the
muzhiks who sought to defend themselves. Social-communism, in

short, tends to bring about privileged urban political organizations,
which the farmers have to pay for. A similar theory leads to this
choice: either the farmers rebel and starve out the cities, or else
they limit their work to their own subsistence needs. In either case,
communism is the father of famine.
In the south it would also lead to political separatism. That is
why when we give land to the farmers, they become our most
dependable and determined auxiliary forces in the struggle against
socialism and communism, regimes which we shall leave to the ants
and bees and to other lower forms of life.
AGRICULTURAL FASCI
Let us address ourselves to Homo rusticus, who is the best, healthi-

est, and most dependable type of Homo sapiens. But let us do it
with determination and through organized action. The problem
cannot be resolved by tourist expeditions.
We propose that an Agricultural Section be created within the
Fasci for the purpose of propagandizing, organizing, and looking
after the welfare of the farmers. . . .
We propose the organization of Agrarian Fasci (Fasci Colonici),
which will act on the basis of clearly established principles. . . .
The Fasci, which are opposed to social-communist misery, seek
the general prosperity of a people who in their two thousand years
of history and in their present-day life are too great to be com-
pared to primitive tribes on the steppes.
In May, 1921, Mussolini and 34 other Fascists were elected to the

Chamber of Deputies. Ostensibly they belonged to a pro-government
bloc of candidates that extended from the extreme right to various
gradations of democratic liberalism. Premier Giolitti had called the
election and given his blessing to this national bloc in the hope pri-
marily of cutting the strength of his opponents among the Socialist and
Popular patties who were making it impossible for him to govern
according to the prewar methods. But the results were not very
encouraging. Although the Socialists fell from 156 to 122 seats, the
new Communist party elected 16. The Populars gained 7 seats, increas-
ing their total from 100 to 107.
Giolitti has been roundly criticized for helping make possible Fas-
cism's first success at the polls. By bringing the Fascists into Parliament,
he had hoped to domesticate and absorb them. But Fascism was not a
political force of the old stamp that could be blandished and brought
into the liberal constitutional system. The Fascists had no intention of
22 FASCISM IN ITALY
becoming beholden to Giolitti, as the maiden speech of Mussolini in

the Chamber of Deputies on June 21, 1921, made clear. The address
revealed how greatly his views had shifted since March, 1919.
Mussolini's First Speech

in the Chamber of Deputies
(June 21, 1921)
[Signs of attention.] Honorable colleagues, I am not unhappy to
begin my speech from the benches of the extreme right. . . . Let
me tell you at once, with that supreme contempt I hold for all
labels, that in my speech I shall advocate reactionary theses. I am
not sure, therefore, just how parliamentary my speech will be in its
form; but in its substance it will be clearly antidemocratic and
antisocialist. [Approval from the extreme right.] And when I say
antisocialist, I also mean anti-Giolitti [laughter], because never so
much as in these recent days has there been so assiduous an ex-
change of loving feelings between the Honorable Giolitti and the
Socialist Parliamentary Group. . . .
And now to the argument. In the speech from the Throne,
Honorable Giolitti, you had the King say that all of the Alpine
frontier is now in our power. I challenge the geographical and
political accuracy of that assertion. Only a few kilometers from
Milan we still lack an Alpine frontier that could defend Lombardy
and the entire Po Valley. . . . And the policy of this Government
with respect to the Alto Adige is one of the saddest you can
imagine. . . . And I deplore the fact that in the speech from the
Throne no mention was made of the action carried out by Gabriele
D'Annunzio and his legionnaires. [Applause from the extreme
right.] . . .
In short, what is our foreign policy with respect to the vast,
smoldering mixture of disagreements which the peace treaty, or
rather the various treaties of nonpeace, have left in every part of
the world? . . . So long as Count Sforza is in charge of foreign
policy in the Giolitti cabinet, we cannot but be in the opposition.
[Comments.]
souRcE: Atti del Parlamento Italiano. Camera dei Deputati. Legi-

slatura XXVI, Sessione del 1921, Discussioni, June 21, 1921
(Rome: Tipografia della Camera dei Deputati, 1921), pp. 89-
98 passim. My translation.
And now I turn to domestic policies. Let me clarify the attitude
of Fascism toward the various parties. [Signs of attention.] I shall
begin with the Communist party. . . . I know the Communists. I
know them because some of them are children of mine . . . spiri-
tually speaking, of course. [Laughter; comments.] . . . And I
recognize with a candor that may appear cynical that I was the first
to infect these people, when I introduced into Italian socialism
something of Bergson mixed with much of Blanqui. . . . These
friends or enemies of mine. [Voices from the extreme left:
"Enemies! Enemies!"] All right, the matter is settled! Enemies of
mine. . . . So long as the Communists speak of dictatorship of the
proletariat, . . . of soviets and other absurdities, there can only be
combat between us. [Interruptions from the extreme left.] . . .
Our attitude toward the Socialist party is different. First of all,
we insist on distinguishing between the labor movement and the
political party. . . . We recognize that the General Confederation
of Labor did not share the attitude of hostility to the war that was
adopted by a large part of the Official Socialist party. . . . We
also recognize the fact that because of their daily contact with the
complex realities of economic life, the organizers of the General
Confederation of Labor are quite reasonable. [Interruptions from
the extreme left; comments.]
... If you present a bill for the eight-hour day, we shall vote
for it. [Comments from the extreme left; interruptions.] We shall
not oppose; indeed, we shall vote in favor of all measures intended
to improve our body of social legislation. Nor shall we oppose
experiments in co-operativism. But let me warn you at once that
we shall resist with all our strength any attempt at socialization,
collectivization, and state socialism! [Applause from the extreme
right . . . . ]
We deny that there are two classes; there are many more [com-
ments] ; we deny that all of human history can be explained by
economic determinism. [Applause from the extreme right.] We
deny your internationalism, because it is a luxury item [comments
from the extre1ne left], that can be enjoyed only by upper classes,
whereas the people are desperately attached to their native land.
[Applause from the extreme right.]
Furthermore, we assert-and on the basis of the most recent
socialist literature that you cannot deny [comments] -that the real
history of capitalism is only now beginning, because capitalism is
not just a system of oppression; it also represents a choice of values,
24 FASCISM IN ITALY
a co-ordination of hierarchies, a more amply developed sense of

individual responsibility. [Approval.] This is so true that Lenin,
after establishing factory councils, has abolished them and replaced
them with dictators. It is so true that after nationalizing commerce,
he has restored a system of free exchange. And you who have been
to Russia know that after having suppressed the bourgeoisie physi-
cally, he is today begging them to come back, because without
capitalism and its technical systems of production, Russia can never
get back on her feet again. [Applause from the extreme right;
comments.] . . .
And now I come to the Popular party. [Comments.] Let me
remind the Popolari that in the history of Fascism there are no
invasions of churches. . . . I confess that there have been some
beatings [comments], and there has been a burning, as a sacred act,
of one newspaper that defined Fascism as an association of crimi-
nals. [Comments; interruptions from the center; rumblings.] Fas-
cism does not preach and does not practice anticlericalism. And this
too we can say: Fascism is not linked to Freemasonry, which really
does not deserve the fear it seems to arouse among some members
of the Popular party. . . .
But let us come to specific problems. References have been made
here to the problem of divorce. Fundamentally, I am not in favor
of divorce because I believe that problems of a sentimental nature
cannot be resolved by juridical formulas. But I ask the Popolari to
consider whether it is fair for the rich to obtain divorces by going
to Hungary, while some poor devil has to drag a ball and chain all
his life.
We agree with the Popolari on the issue of freedom of the
schools. We are very close to them on the agrarian question,
because we think that it is useless to sabotage small property
holdings where these exist. Indeed, where it is possible to create
them, it is proper to do so; but in cases where that system is
unproductive, other forms of landholding should be adopted, even
more or less collectivist co-operatives. We are in agreement regard-
ing administrative decentralization, provided there is no talk of
federalism or autonomies, because under a system of provincial
federalism and everything that goes along with it, Italy would
revert to where she was a century ago.
But there is one problem that transcends all these . . . , the
problem of relations that may exist . . . between Italy and the
Vatican. [Signs of attention.] . . . I affirm here and now that
today the Latin and imperial tradition of Rome is represented by
Catholicism. [Approval.] . I believe and affirm that the uni-
versal idea that exists in Rome today is that which radiates from the
Vatican. [Approval.] ... I believe that if the Vatican were to
renounce once for all its dreams of temporal power-and I think it is
going to-profane or lay Italy would furnish the Vatican with
material aid for its schools, churches, and hospitals. . . .
I have now reached the last part of my speech, and I wish to
touch upon a very difficult question that, given the present situa-
tion, should arouse the attention of the Chamber. I refer to the
struggle, the civil war that is taking place in Italy. First of all, and
with regard to foreign opinion, it is necessary not to exaggerate the
extent of this struggle. . . . All the nations of Europe have had
some civil war. . . .
The function of the state is to provide us with a police force to
protect honest men from rogues, a well-organized judicial system,
an army ready for all eventualities, and a foreign policy in tune
with the nation's needs. All the rest-and I do not even exclude
secondary education-must be returned to the individual's private
initiative. . . .
The civil war is worsening because all the parties are tending to
organize militarily. A confrontation then ensues-something which
was not very dangerous when political parties were in a nebulous
state, but which has become much more 'dangerous now that
parties are clearly organized, led, and controlled. On the one hand,
it is now obvious that the working masses will be beaten. . . . On
the other hand, risk, danger, and a taste for adventure have always
been the duty and privilege of small aristocracies. [Approval from
the extreme right.] ... For us, violence is not a system, it is not a
form of aesthetics, and even less is it a sport. It is a hard necessity to
which we have had to submit. [Comments.] Let me say funher
that we are ready to disarm if you disarm as well. . . . I have
spoken clearly. I await an equally elevated and clear reply from
you. I have finished. [Very lively and repeated applause from the
extreme right; prolonged comments; many congratulations.]
A major stronghold of Fascism came to be the region between Bologna

and Ferrara, where ltalo Balbo and Dino Grandi were the movement's
most resolute leaders. Balbo was one of the main organizers of Fascism
on the military level; Grandi correctly appraised the significance of
recruiting and organizing labor. Until this time most of Italy's labor
organizations had been either Socialist or Catholic; henceforth Fascist
labor unions or syndicates also appeared.
Deplorable acts of violence increased markedly during the first six
26 FASCISM IN ITALY
months of 1921 in Emilia and Romagna, with Tuscany running a close

second. Things reached such a pitch in the summer that the new
premier, lvanoe Bonomi, helped persuade Mussolini that a truce must
be achieved. A "peace pact" w1th the Socialists and General Con-
federation of Labor was signed by the Fascists on August 3. But
Grandi and Balbo refused to recognize it, thereby precipitating a
serious split with Mussolini. The latter retaliated by resigning as a
member of the executive group of the Central Committee, though not
from the movement. Mussolini's resignation was rejected by the Fascist
National Council, which recognized that his rivals were all inexperi-
enced, but the price that was paid was Fascist denunciation of the
"peace pact" in November.
The true explanation for this repudiation was that the large land-
owners had intervened. Behind the efforts of the Fascists to organize
labor unions were the landowners, anxious to avenge the farm workers'
occupation of their lands and determined to put an end once for all to
the cry "Land for the peasants!" The new Fascist syndicates drew up
contracts that in effect favored the landowners and obliged the
workers to take a cut in pay. Thus agrarian reaction set in, perhaps
even more intense and shortsighted than that of the industrialists who
had already reacted in favor of Fascism. The punitive raids of the
squadristi increased in tempo. The movement was now making its
greatest strides-at the very time when the danger of socialist revolu-
tion was over and there was a possibility that the government might
even balance the budget.
The Fascist "movement" officially became the National Fascist Party
(Partito Nazionale Fascista, PNF) at the Rome congress of November
7-10, 1921. Despite the compound title, the conservative Nationalist
party (founded in 1910 by Enrico Corradini and others) was as yet
only informally associated with the Fascists; the complete merger of
these two parties did not take place until 1923 after Mussolini came to
power. In the weeks before the Rome conclave Mussolini had ex-
pressed preference for the label "Fascist Labor Party" and had hoped
to win support from the General Confederation of Labor; but by the
time the congress convened he was forced by the Grandis and Balbos
to drop the word "labor." Moreover, the party was not to be based on
a coalition of labor syndicates, as Mussolini had once envisaged, but
rather on an association of the fasci and their storm squads. Mussolini
was also overruled as to the location of the congress, the opposition
elements preferring not to let it be held in his stronghold of Milan.
The Rome congress was informed that there were now 2,200 fasci
and 320,000 members in the PNF, recruited chiefly from the land-
owners and middle classes. This figure compared with only 100 fasci
and 30,000 supporters in 1920. An analysis that was made of about half
of the members in November, 1921, revealed the following occupa-
tional breakdown: 18,084 landowners; 13,878 tradesmen; 4,269 manu-
facturers; 9,981 members of learned professions; 7,209 state employees;
14,988 private employees; 1,680 teachers; 36,847 agricultural laborers;
and 23,418 industrial workers. Probably most of the farm workers had
previously been identified with Socialist or Catholic "leagues" and
were forced into the fasci by the squadristi, while a good many of the
industrial workers were taken from the civil service, unemployed dock
workers, and districts under Fascist military occupation. The mass of
workers in the towns and even in the rural areas, though paralyzed by
fear, generally remained loyal to their Socialist or Catholic organi-
zations.
From the point of view of structure and style, the PNF represented
something new in comparison to traditional parties. It possessed a
military organization whose guiding figures in the early stages were
Balbo, Count Cesare Maria De V ecchi (an elderly monarchist land-
owner), and Emilio DeBono (an Italian army general who had gone
over to Fascism). The talent for military and revolutionary strategy
was to be seen in the importance the Fascists assigned to securing
control of such major railway junctions as Bologna, Verona, and
Alessandria.
It is clear from the text of the new Fascist program adopted in
November, 1921, at the Rome congress that the tenuous "sociahsm" of
1919 had given way to "integral" nationalism. 4 The abolition of "dema-
gogic" fiscal measures such as taxes on inheritances and bondholders
was called for, as were strikes in the public services. The program
advocated National Technical Councils with legislative powers along-
side Parliament. It demanded complete freedom for the Catholic
Church in the exercise of its spiritual office. It repudiated the League
of Nations and called for a large standing army instead of the short-
term militia that had been favored in 1919.
New Program of the

National Fascist Party (PNF)
(Adopted at the Third Congress in Rome,
November 7-10, 1921)
BASES
Fascism has now become a political party in order to tighten its

discipline and clarify its ''creed."
The Nation is not simply a sum of individual beings, nor is it an
Inc., from Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, Vol. I: La con-
quista del potere, 1921-1925 (© 1966 by Giulio Einaudi editore,
Turin), pp. 756-763.
4. "Integral nationalism" may be defined, in the words of Charles Maurras,
as "the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of
national integrity, and the steady increase of national power-for a nation
declines when it loses military might." Quoted in Carlton J. H. Hayes, The
Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1931), pp. 165-
166.
28 FASCISM IN ITALY
instrumentality of parties for attaining their own goals. It is rather

an organism made up of an endless series of generations whose
individual members are but transient elements. It is the supreme
synthesis of the material and immaterial values of the race.
The State is the juridical incarnation of the Nation. Political
institutions are effective instrumentalities to the extent that national
values find expression and security therein.
The autonomous values of the individual and those that are
common to most individuals-expressed through such organized
collective personalities as families, towns, corporations, etc.-are to
be promoted, developed, and defended, but always within the
context of the Nation, to which they occupy a subordinate place.
The National Fascist Party declares that at this moment in
history the dominant form of social organization in the world is
national society; and the essential law of life in the world is not the
consolidation of different societies into one single, immense society
called "Humanity," as internationalist-minded theoreticians be-
lieve, but is rather a fruitful and, let us hope, peaceful competition
among different national societies.
THE STATE
The State should be reduced to its essential function of preserving

the political and juridical order.
The State must grant legal powers and responsibility to a variety
of Associations, and must also confer upon such professional and
economic corporations the right to elect representatives to the
National Technical Councils.
Consequently, the powers and functions that now appertain to
Parliament must be restricted. Problems that concern the individual
as a citizen of the State, and concern the State as the organism for
achieving and defending the supreme national interests, fall within
the competence of Parliament; but problems that affect various
kinds of activity by individuals in their role as producers lie within
the competence of the National Technical Councils.
The State is sovereign. Such sovereignty cannot and must not be
infringed or diminished by the Church, and the latter, for its part,
must be guaranteed the broadest freedom in the exercise of its
spiritual mission.
With respect to the specific form of political institutions, 5 the
5. I.e., a republic or a monarchy.-Ed.

National Fascist Party subordinates its own attitude to the moral
and material interests of the Nation as understood in all aspects of
its historic destiny.
THE CoRPORATIONS
Fascism does not deny the historic fact of the development of

corporations, and it intends to co-ordinate this development in the
best national interest.
Corporations must be promoted for two basic purposes-as the
expression of national solidarity, and as the means for increasing
production.
Corporations should not submerge the individual within the
collectivity. They should not arbitrarily level his opportunities and
strength, but should instead develop and maximize these qualities.
The National Fascist Party intends to fight for the following
principles in behalf of the working and white-collar class:
1. The promulgation of a national law that specifies the eight-
hour day as the average legal working day for all wage earners
( salariati), with such possible exceptions as may be deemed advis-
able as a result of either agricultural or industrial requirements.
2. Social legislation that is brought up to date to conform to
present-day needs, and especially in order' to give agricultural,
industrial, and white-collar workers protection against accidents,
sickness, and old age, so long as this does not hamper productivity.
3. Labor representation in the management of all industries, but
restricted to personnel matters.
4. Assignment of managerial responsibilities in industries and
public services to those syndical organizations that are morally
worthy and technically qualified.
5. Encouragement of the system of ownership of small farms
wherever this is economically beneficial.
CARDINAL PRINCIPLES oF DoMESTIC PoucY
The National Fascist Party intends to improve and dignify the

level of political behavior so that public and private morality will
cease to be at odds in our national life.
The Party aspires to the supreme honor of becoming the Gov-
ernment of the Nation; and of restoring the ethical concept that
Government should administer public affairs not in the selfish
30 FASCISM IN ITALY
interests of parties and clienteles but in the supreme interests of the

Nation.
The prestige of the Nation-State must be restored. Therefore,
the State must not watch with indifference the unleashing of
arrogant forces that attack and otherwise threaten to weaken the
material and spiritual qualities of our national life. Instead, it must
act scrupulously as the custodian, defender, and promoter of our
national traditions, national feeling, and national will.
The citizen's freedom is limited in two ways. It must take into
account the freedom of other juridical persons, and it must recog-
nize the sovereign right of the Nation to live and develop itself.
The State must encourage the development of the Nation, not
by monopolizing but by promoting every activity that seeks to
bring about the ethical, intellectual, religious, artistic, juridical,
social, economic, and physical progress of the national collectivity.
CARDINAL PRINCIPLES OF FoREIGN Poucy
Let Italy reaffirm its right to complete historic and geographic

unification, even where this has not yet been achieved. Let it carry
out its role as a bulwark of Latin civilization in the Mediterranean.
Let it impose firmly and resolutely the authority of its law over the
peoples of various nationalities who have been annexed to Italy.
Let it give effective support to those Italians abroad to whom right
of political representation should be granted.
Fascism does not believe in the validity of the principles that
inspire the so-called League of Nations, because not every nation is
represented in it, and those that are in it do not enjoy equal status.
Fascism does not believe in either the validity or the usefulness
of a Red International, or a White one, or any other kind, since
these are artificial creations that attract small minorities of more or
less committed individuals in contrast to the great mass of people
who, in the course of the progress and setbacks in their lives, finally
bring about the kind of realignment of interest groups against
which all internationalist-type contrivances are doomed to failure,
as recent historical experiences have proved.
Our international treaties should seek through commercial ex-
pansion and political influence to bring about a greater diffusion of
italianita in the world. International treaties should be revised and
modified whenever they have become clearly inapplicable, and
they should be regulated according to the needs of the economy of
the nation and the world.
The State must develop Italy's colonies in the Mediterranean and
overseas by means of economic and cultural institutions and a
system of rapid communications.
The National Fascist Party proclaims its support of a policy of
friendly relations with all the peoples of the Near East and the Far
East.
The defense and development of Italy overseas should be as-
signed to an Army and a Navy that are adequate to the needs of
this policy and sufficiently strong in comparison to other nations.
Our diplomatic service should also be made aware of its responsibil-
ities and endowed with the requisite training, attitudes, and facil-
ities for expressing in both a symbolic and a material way Italy's
grandeur in the world.
CARDINAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL PoucY
AND OF NATIONAL EcoNOMIC REcONSTRUCTION
The National Fascist Party will take steps to bring about the
following things:
I. The true responsibility of either individuals or corporations
will be clearly publicized in cases of violations of labor agreements
that have been freely negotiated.
2. Officials in public administration will bear civil responsibility
for any acts of negligence on their part that cause injury to others.
3. Publicity will be given to incomes that are subject to taxation
as well as to the appraised value of inherited property, so that a
control will exist over the financial obligations of all citizens to the
State.
4. State intervention, which may be absolutely necessary to
protect certain branches of agriculture and manufacturing from
excessively dangerous foreign competition, will be of such a nature
as to stimulate the productive forces of the country rather than to
ensure parasitical exploitation of the national economy by pluto-
cratic groups.
The immediate objectives of the National Fascist Party include

the following:
1. Balancing the budgets of State and local public agencies, to be
achieved through rigorous economies in all parasitical and super-
fluous bodies, and through paring of expenditures that are not
absolutely necessary for the well-being of the recipients or for the
needs of society as a whole.
32 FASCISM IN ITALY
2. Administrative decentralization in order to simplify services

and facilitate reduction of the size of the bureaucracy-but we
resolutely oppose any form of political regionalism.
3. Rigid safeguarding of taxpayers' money, eliminating every
subsidy or special favor on the part of the State or any other public
agency to consortiums, co-operatives, industries, clienteles, and
other entities which even though they may be incapable of manag-
ing their own affairs are not indispensable to the nation.
4. Simplification of machinery for collecting taxes and distribut-
ing revenues. Instead of progressive and confiscatory taxation, the
principle of proportionality must apply, with no preference being
shown either for or against particular categories of citizens.
5. Opposition to the kind of financial and tax demagoguery that
discourages initiative and sterilizes the very sources of saving and
of national productivity.
6. Halting of the political practice of ill-conceived, "pork-
barrel" public works projects that are undertaken either for vote-
getting purposes or for alleged reasons of public need, and are
often unproductive because of their hit-or-miss location.
7. Preparation of an organic plan for public works to conform
to the nation's new economic, technical, and military needs, a plan
that will be undertaken primarily for the purpose of:
(a) Completion and reorganization of the Italian railroad

network in such a way as better to link the newly redeemed
regions to the trunk lines of the peninsula, as well as to improve
communications within the peninsula itself, and particularly those
lines that run north and south over the Apennines.
(b) Acceleration insofar as possible of the electrification of
the railways, and the general development of the country's water
resources by means of mountain reservoirs, which will also be of
help to industry and agriculture.
(c) Systematization and extension of the network of high-
ways, especially in the south, where this is the prerequisite to
solving innumerable economic and social problems.
(d) Establishment and enlargement of the system of maritime
communications between the peninsula, the islands, the eastern
shore of the Adriatic, and our Mediterranean colonies, as well as
between the northern and southern halves of the peninsula itself-
for the dual purpose of providing a supplement to our railroad
network and of encouraging Italians in the art of navigation.
(e) Concentration of expenditures and efforts in just a few
ports on the three seas, installing the most modern equipment in
them.
(f) Opposition and resistance to local particularisms, which
lead to dispersion of efforts especially in the field of public works
and are an obstacle to really great undertakings of national interest.
8. The return to private enterprise of those industrial plants

whose management by the State has proved unsatisfactory-espe-
cially the telephone and railway systems. In the case of the rail-
roads, competition should be encouraged among the major lines, in
contrast to local lines which can be operated in a variety of ways.
9. The termination of the monopoly for the post and telegraph
system so that private initiative can move into this field and
eventually replace state control.
CARDINAL PRINCIPLES OF SociAL PoLicY
Fascism recognizes the social utility of private property, which

involves both a right and a duty. This is the form of administration
that society historically has assigned to the individual for the
increment of his patrimony.
In contrast to socialist proposals for reconstructing the economy
along purely collectivist lines, the National Fascist Party takes the
position, based on historic and national realism, that there is no
single ideal form of agricultural and industrial economy. Instead it
declares its support of whatever economic pattern-individualistic
or otherwise-guarantees maximum production and prosperity.
The National Fascist Party is in favor of a regime that encour-
ages the growth of national wealth by spurring individual initiative
and energy (which constitute the most powerful and fruitful
element in economic production), and it absolutely repudiates the
motley, costly, and uneconomic machinery of state control, sociali-
zation, and municipalization. The National Fascist Party will there-
fore support any undertaking that seeks to improve productivity
and aims at eliminating all forms of individual and group para-
sitism.
The National Fascist Party will take steps:
(a) To discipline the disorderly struggles between classes and

occupational interests. It favors therefore the juridical recognition
34 FASCISM IN ITALY
of and the assignment of responsibility to the various organizations

of workers and employers.
(b) To enact and enforce in every way a law prohibiting strikes
in the public services. At the same time, arbitrational courts must
be organized, to consist of one representative for management, one
representative from the category of workers and white-collar em-
ployees, and one representative of the general public, since it is
they who pay the bill.
EDuCATIONAL PoLicY
The general goal of schools must be the education of those persons

who will be capable of guaranteeing the Nation's economic and
historic progress; of raising the moral and cultural level of the
masses, and of training the best elements in all the various classes so
as to ensure a continuous renewal of the governing groups.
To this end we urge the following measures:
1. Intensify the struggle against illiteracy through the construc-
tion of schools and access roads. Let the State take responsibility
for whatever measures are necessary.
2. Extend compulsory education through and including the sixth
elementary grade in those communes that are in a position to
provide the necessary schools, and for all those who, after taking
the "maturity examination," do not enter the middle school (scuola
media); compulsory education through and including the fourth
elementary grade in all the other communes.
3. Introduce a rigorously national character into the elementary
schools so that they will also provide Italy's future soldiers with
physical and moral training. Thus there must be rigid State control
over the curricula, the hiring of teachers, and the supervision of
their work, especially in those communes that are dominated by
antinationalist parties.
4. Freely operated middle schools (scuole medie) and univer-
sities, except for State control over the programs and the spirit of
instruction, and the State's duty to provide premilitary instruction
for the purpose of training officers.
5. Normal schools should be guided by the same criteria that
have been extablished for the schools to which the future teachers
are going to be sent. This implies a rigorously national program,
even in the institutes which train elementary teachers.
6. Professional schools and industrial and agricultural institutes
should be placed under an organic plan that will make use of the
financial contribution and experience of industrialists and agricul-
turalists, and that will exist for the purpose of increasing national
productivity and of creating a class of technicians standing midway
between the executors and the directors of production. To this
end, the State will have to integrate and co-ordinate various private
initiatives, and wherever these are lacking, substitute itself for
them.
7. A predominantly classical type of curriculum should be
offered in the lower and upper middle schools (scuole medie
inferiori e superiori). In the case of the lower ones, there should be
consolidations and reforms so that all students must study Latin.
French is no longer to be the only possible secondary language to
Italian. Instead, the possibility shall exist of choosing and adapting
the secondary language requirement in accordance with the needs
of specific regions, especially those along the frontiers.
8. Consolidate all forms of financial assistance for education,
scholarships, and the like, into one institute which will be con-
trolled and organized by the State and have the power to select the
most intelligent and ambitious pupils from the elementary grades
upward and assure them a superior education, and which may
overrule parental selfishness, if need be, and make available an
appropriate subsidy wherever this is necessary.
9. Financial and moral rewards should be given to teachers and
professors and also to Army officers (who are the military edu-
cators of the Nation) so as to ensure them self-respect and oppor-
tunities for improving their own skills, and to inspire them and the
public with a consciousness of the national importance of their
miSSIOn.
jUSTICE
There must be intensive support for both preventive and reforma-

tory measures in handling delinquency (reformatories, training
schools, mental hospitals for the criminally insane, etc.). Penalties
-which are the means whereby National Society defends itself
against lawbreakers-should have both a punitive and a corrective
function. With respect to the second of these, the penitentiary
system must be improved hygienically and renovated in a socially
useful manner-for example, by developing prison workshops.
36 FASCISM IN ITALY
Special magistracies must be abolished. The National Fascist

Party favors revision of the military penal code.
Court procedures must be expedited.
NATIONAL DEFENSE
Every citizen has the obligation of military service. Steps must be

taken to convert the Army into a kind of Nation in Arms, wherein
all individual, collective, economic, industrial, and agricultural
forces will be fully integrated for the supreme purpose of defend-
ing our national interests.
To this end, the National Fascist Party proposes the immediate
recruitment of an Army which, as the result of a fully perfected
system of training, will vigilantly exercise surveillance over our
newly won frontiers. And simultaneously, in hours of danger and
of glory, it will make sure that the men, means, and will power
which our Nation can draw from its uhlimited resources will be
kept ready, properly trained, and organized.
To these same ends, the Army, together with the school system
and various sports organizations, must seek to develop in the bodies
and minds of citizens, from childhood on, an aptitude and habit for
combat and sacrifice in behalf of the fatherland (i.e., premilitary
training).
ORGANIZATION
Present-day Fascism is:

(a) a political organism;
(b) an economic organism;
(c) a combat organism.
In the political field, it welcomes without sectarianism all those
who sincel'ely subscribe to its principles and obey its discipline. It
stimulates and develops individual talents and brings them together
in appropriate groups according to their aptitudes. It participates
intensely and constantly in every manifestation of political life,
thereby putting into effect whatever can properly be extracted
from its theories, while simultaneously reaffirming the integral
nature of all of them.
In the economic sector, it promotes the formation of professional
corporations-some purely Fascist, some autonomous-in accor-
dance with the requirements of time and place, so long as these are
in essential agreement with the Party's national policy that the
Nation must always stand above classes.
As regards organization for combat, the National Fascist Party
forms a single entity with its own squads, and these constitute a
voluntary militia in the service of the Nation-State, a living force
embodying and defending the Fascist Idea.
In February, 1922, Premier Bonomi decided to resign when he lost key

support among the moderate left over a minor issue. Giolitti would
have been the logical successor, but opposition from Sturzo of the
Popular party prevented this. Instead, Luigi Facta, a second-rate lieu-
tenant of Giolitti's, was chosen. He scarcely tried to maintain the
peace. The Fascists, for their part, accelerated their violence during the
spring and summer. For example, after a Fascist had been killed in a
brawl in Ravenna, Balbo took revenge, setting fire to one of the "Red"
buildings:
ltalo Balbo's Squadrismo

I [then] announced to [the chief of police] that I would burn down
and destroy the houses of all Socialists in Ravenna if he did not give
me within half an hour the means required for transporting the
Fascists elsewhere. It was a dramatic moment. I demanded a whole
fleet of trucks. The police officers completely lost their heads; but
after half an hour they told me where I could find trucks already
filled with gasoline. Some of them actually belonged to the office of
the chief of police. My ostensible reason was that I wanted to get
the exasperated Fascists out of the town; in reality, I was organizing
a "column of fire" . . . to extend our reprisals throughout the
province. . . . We went through . . . all the towns and centers
in the provinces of F orli and Ravenna and destroyed and burned
all the Red buildings. . . . It was a terrible night. Our passage was
marked by huge columns of fire and smoke.
Meanwhile in a speech delivered in Udine on September 20, 1922,

Mussolini, ever the opportunist, made a highly significant policy state-
ment. Posing as a defender of order, he indicated that the Fascists were
ready to renounce their republicanism and preserve the House of
Savoy if the King and the Army made no hostile move against what he
called the "Fascist revolution."
souRcE: ltalo Balbo, Diario 1922 (Milan: A. Mondadori, 1932),

pp.103, 109 (July28-30, 1922).Mytranslation.
38 FASCISM IN ITALY
Mussolini's Speech Regarding

the House of Savoy
(September 20, 1922)
In the speech that I am about to deliver I shall make an exception to
the rule that I have always followed-of limiting so far as possible
the demonstrations of my eloquence. Oh, if it were only possible,
as a poet has recommended, to strangle this verbose, prolix, endless,
democratic eloquence that has gotten us off the track so long! I am
sure, therefore, . . . that you would not expect from me a speech
that was not exquisitely Fascist-harsh, frank, tough, and cut to
the bare bones. . . .
Let us turn to another theme-discipline. I am in favor of rigid
discipline. We must impose on ourselves the most ironclad disci-
pline, because otherwise we shall not have the right to impose it on
the nation. And it is only through discipline of the nation that Italy
can make itself felt in the arena of other nations. Discipline must be
accepted, and when it is not accepted, it must be imposed. . . .
And now I come to the subject of violence. Violence is not
immoral. Violence· is sometimes moral. We deny the right of all
our enemies to complain about our violence, because compared to
what was committed during the unhappy years of 1919 and 1920,
and compared to what the Bolsheviks did in Russia, where two
million people were executed and another two million are languish-
ing in prison, our violence is child's play. On the other hand, our
violence is effective. . . . When our violence is effective in a
cancerous situation, it is most moral, sacrosanct, and necessary.
But, 0 my Fascist friends, . . . it is necessary that our violence
have specifically Fascist characteristics. The violence of ten against
one is to be repudiated and condemned. [Applause.] ... Vio-
lence must be adapted to the needs of the moment, not made into a
cult, a doctrine, or a sport. . . .
Another theme which may lend hope to our enemies is that of
souRcE: Delivered at the Teatro Sociale in Udine the morning of

September 20, 1922, at the convention of the Fasci Friulani di
Combattimento. Published in Il Popolo d'ltalia (Milan), Vol. IX,
No. 226 (Sept. 21, 1922); reprinted in Opera Omnia di Benito
Mussolini, ed. by Edoardo and Duilio Susmel (Florence: La
Fenice, 1956), Vol. XVIII, pp. 411-421 passinz. My translation.
the masses. You know that I do not worship the new divinity-the
masses. It is a creation of democracy and of socialism. . . . History
teaches that it is always minorities, small at the beginning, who
have produced profound upheavals in human society. We do not
worship the masses, even if they come endowed with every kind of
sacrosanct callus on their hands and brains. . . .
We have had to practice syndicalism, and we continue to do so.
Some say, "Your syndicalism will end up by becoming just like
socialist syndicalism; you will be forced by the logic of events to
embark upon class struggle." ... In actuality, our syndicalism
differs from that of others because we absolutely deny the right to
strike in the public services. We are in favor of class collaboration,
especially in a period like the present one of very acute economic
crisis. Therefore we are trying to imbue our own syndicates with
this truth, this theory. However, it is necessary to say with equal
frankness that the industrialists and employers must not blackmail
us, because there is a limit beyond which they can't go. . . .
And now I have come to the theme that is of the utmost impor-
tance at this moment. . . . It is a great fortune [for] our foreign
policy, it a great fortune that alongside an army that has very
glorious traditions, our National Army, there is also the Fascist
Army. Our ministers of foreign affairs must learn how to play
this card and throw it down on the green table and say: "Take
note of the fact that no matter what it costs, Italy no longer will
pursue a policy of renunciation and weakness!" [Prolonged ap-
plause . ... ]
. . . They ask us what is our program. . . . Our program is
simple. We want to govern Italy. . . . It isn't programs of salvation
that Italy needs. It is men and determination! [Applause.] ...
Let us take up the delicate and burning question of the regime .
. . . Is it possible-and here is the big question-for a profound
transformation of our political regime to take place without
tampering with the institution of monarchy? In other words, is it
possible for Italy to be renovated without jeopardizing the mon-
archy? And what is the over-all attitude of Fascism toward politi-
cal institutions?
Our attitude in the face of political institutions is not binding in
any sense. After all, perfect regimes exist only in the books of
philosophers. . . . Political forms cannot be approved or disap-
proved on permanent grounds, but must be examined in the light
of the relationship they have to the state of the economy and to the
40 FASCISM IN ITALY
spiritual outlook of a given people. Now, I really believe that

the regime can be profoundly altered without touching the mon-
archy. . . . Therefore, we shall not make the monarchy a part of
our campaign, for we have other more visible and formidable
targets. Moreover, we believe that a large part of the country
would view with suspicion any transformation of the regime that
went as far as that. We would probably stir up some regional
separatism, for it always works out that way. Today many are
indifferent toward the monarchy, but tomorrow they may well be
sympathetic and favorable, and find very respectable reasons to
attack Fascism if it has attacked that target.
I am basically of the opinion that the monarc.hy has no reason
whatever to oppose what one must already call the Fascist revolu-
tion. It can gain nothing, for by doing so, it would become a target,
and if it became the target, it is certain that we would surely not be
able to save it. . . .
One month later the Fascists held a huge party congress in the San
Carlo opera house in Naples. Mussolini and others advocated a "march
on Rome" to intimidate Facta's weak government and open the way
for Mussolini to become premier. Thereafter Mussolini hurried back to
his Milan newspaper office (where he would also be close to Switzer-
land in case things went wrong), leaving four quadrumvirs (ltalo
Balbo, General Emilio DeBono, Count Cesare Maria De V ecchi, and
Michele Bianchi, the young PNF secretary) to organize the "march."
Following are excerpts from Mussolini's speech at the San Carlo opera
house on October 24, 1922.
Prelude to the
March on Rome: Mussolini's Speech
(San Carlo Opera House, Naples, October 24, 1922)
Fascists! Citizens! ... We have come to Naples from every part
of Italy in order to carry out a rite of fraternalism and love. . . .
All of Italy is looking at our convention because-let me say it
without that false modesty which is sometimes the umbrella of
imbeciles-there does not exist in postwar Europe or the world a
souRcE: From Il Popolo d'ltalia (Milan), Vol. IX, No. 255 (Oct.
25, 1922); reprinted in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. by
XVIII, pp. 453-459 passim. My translation.
phenomenon that is more interesting, more original, more powerful
than Italian Fascism. . . .
Because of the extraordinarily grave situation confronting us, I
think it is desirable to spell out with maximum precision the terms
of the problem. . . . In short, we are at the point when either the
arrow shoots forth from the bow or the tightly drawn bowstring
breaks! [Applause.] You will recall that in the Chamber of Dep-
uties . . . I propounded a question which concerns Italy as well as
Fascism: legality or illegality? Victory by means of Parliament, or
through insurrection? Through what paths will Fascism become
the State? For we mean to become the State! ... To the ques-
tion, "Fascists, what do you want?" we have already replied very
simply: We want the dissolution of the Chamber, electoral reform,
elections in the very near future. We have asked that the State
abandon its grotesque attitude of neutrality toward the national
and antinational forces within it. We have asked for drastic finan-
cial measures, the postponement of the evacuation of Dalmatia, five
portfolios, and also the Commissariat of Aviation. We have asked
specifically for the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, Navy,
Labor, and Public Works. I am sure that none of you will think
these demands excessive; and I may add that by the terms of this
"!egalitarian" solution, I was to have no personal share in the gov-
ernment. And the reasons are quite clear if you but consider that
to keep Fascism in my grip I must have great freedom of movement
in journalism and in discussions.
What was the reply? Nothing! Worse still, they answered in a
ridiculous way. . . . They made a quick calculation of our forces
and talked of ministries without portfolio . . . and of assistant
ministries-all of which is contemptible. We Fascists have no
intention of getting into the government through the back door, of
selling our wonderful birthright for a miserable mess of ministerial
pottage! [Vigorous, prolonged applause.] For we take what can be
termed a historical view of the problem, in contrast to what can be
called a purely political and parliamentary one. . . .
Gentlemen, this problem . . . has to be faced as a problem of
force. Every time in history that strong clashes of interests and
ideas occur, it is force that ultimately decides the matter. That is
why we have gathered and powerfully equipped and resolutely
disciplined our legions-so that if a clash must decide the matter on
the level of force, victory will be ours. . . .
The rulers in Rome are trying to create misunderstandings . . .
42 FASCISM IN ITALY
and confront us with other problems-problems that go under

the heading of Monarchy, Army, and pacification. . . . [Let me]
now clarify once more the historic and political position of Fascism
with respect to the Monarchy. . . .
There can be no doubt that the unitary regime of Italian life rests
solidly on the House of Savoy. [Prolonged applause.] ...
Let me add that we don't want to deprive the people of their toy
(the Parliament). We say "toy" because a large part of the Italian
nation so regards it. Could you tell me, for example, why only six
out of eleven million voters bother to go to the polls? . . .
In the final analysis, what separates us from democracy is our
mentality, our method. Democracy holds that principles are fixed,
that they are applicable at all times, in all places, in all eventualities.
We don't believe that history repeats itself; we don't believe that
history follows a hard and fast itinerary; we don't believe that after
democracy there must ensue super-democracy! If democracy was
useful and profitable for the nation in the nineteenth century, it
may well be that in the twentieth century some other political
system will give greater strength to the national community.
["Fine!"] ...
As for the other institutions that personify the regime, that exalt
the nation-! am speaking now of the Army-the Army should
know that we-our bands of small numbers of brave men-de-
fended it when the ministers were advising its officers to go about
in civilian dress in order to avoid clashes! [Prolonged applause.]
We have created our own myth. That myth is a faith, it is a
passion. It isn't necessary that it be a reality. It is a reality by virtue
of the fact that it is a fist, that it is a hope, that it is a faith, that it is
courage. Our myth is the nation, our myth is the greatness of the
nation! ["Very good!"] And it is this myth, this grandeur, that we
want to translate into a comprehensive reality and subordinate
everything to it.
For us the nation is not just a territorial thing; above everything
else, it is a spiritual thing. There have been states that possessed
immense territories that did not leave behind the slightest trace in
human history. It isn't a mere question of numbers, because there
have been in history some very small, microscopic states that have
left behind memorable and imperishable documents in art and
philosophy.
The greatness of the nation is the complex of all these manly
virtues, of all these conditions. A nation is great when it translates
the strength of its spirit into reality. Rome became great when the
small, rural democracy slowly extended the rhythm of its spirit
throughout Italy, and then confronted the warriors of Carthage and
gave battle to them. It was the first war of history, one of the first.
Then, little by little, it carried the eagles to the far corners of the
earth. Nevertheless, the Roman Empire was and is a spiritual
creation, since it was the spirit of the Roman legionnaires that
ordered their physical arms to thrust out the spears. Now, there-
fore, we want the greatness of the nation to exist in both the
material and the spiritual senses.
And that is why we practice syndicalism. We do not practice it
because we believe that the masses, just because of their numbers,
their quantity, can create something lasting in history. We reject
this fable of low-class socialist literature. But the working masses
do exist within the nation; they are a great portion of the nation;
they are necessary for the life of the nation in both peace and war.
They cannot and should not be rejected. They can and should be
educated; their legitimate interests can and should be protected!
[Applause.]
There are some who say, "So you wish to perpetuate this state of
civil strife that torments the nation?" No . . . . We are in favor of
pacification. . . . On the other hand, we cannot sacrifice our
rights, or the interests and future of the nation, to the idea of
pacification (which we loyally propose) unless the other side
accepts this with corresponding loyalty. Peace with those who
really want peace. But with those who are a threat to us and
especially to the nation, peace can come only after victory!
And now, Fascists and citizens of Naples, I thank you for the
attention you have paid to my speech. Naples is providing a strong
and fine spectacle of strength, discipline, and austerity. It is good
that we have been able to come from every corner of the land to
get acquainted with you and see you as you are, a courageous
people who face up to life's struggle Roman-style . . . . And so, 0
standard-bearers of all the Fasci of Italy, raise your banners and
salute Naples, metropolis of the south, queen of the Mediter-
ranean! [ ... Loud, interminable applause. Everyone is on his
feet, applauding the Duce of Fascism, who moves off stage amid a
forest of banners and shouts of "Long live Italy! Long live Fas-
cism!"]
2. The Path to the Totalitarian State
ON OcTOBER 27, 1922, some 50,000 Blackshirts began to converge on

Rome, while others hurriedly seized prefectural buildings in surround-
ing provinces. In the capital many political leaders still misjudged the
nature of Fascism and assumed they could channel it into the liberal
constitutional system. Failure to perceive the true danger in time was
the main cause of what happened at the end of October. The Fascist
conquest of power did not require an authentic "revolution." Indeed,
when the news of the March on Rome reached the capital, the King
refused to sign the proclamation of martial law that his Council of
Ministers had prepared; instead he sought to entrust the task of form-
ing a new government to a team headed by the conservative ex-
premier, Antonio Salandra, and Mussolini. When the latter rejected
that formula, the King had an aide telephone the Fascist Duce, inviting
him to come down from Milan on the overnight train. Thus by the
time the Blackshirts actually sloshed their way down Rome's rain-
swept streets, their entry was a parade, not a battle.
Why did Victor Emmanuel III refuse to have a showdown? The
answer seems to be that, first of all, he doubted the determination of
Premier Facta to resist. Moreover, he was uncertain the Army would
back him in such a move. In addition, he feared the possibility of losing
his throne to an ambitious cousin, the Duke of Aosta, who enjoyed
great popularity because of his war record and could be sure of Fascist
backing if the King caused trouble. Finally, there was the influence of
Queen Mother Margherita, who beneath her attractive outward ap-
pearance was a woman of iron, completely reactionary, and by this
time ardently pro-Fascist.
The King was by no means the only person responsible for bringing
the Fascists to power. According to the memoirs of Marcello Soleri,
Minister of War in 1922, it seems that Premier Facta himself advised
the King not to sign the decree proposed by the cabinet, lest it pro-
voke the intervention of the Army against the Fascists. Facta had
started negotiations with one of the quadrumvirs, Michele Bianchi, in
the hope of bringing the Fascists into his government and avoiding
bloodshed. Giolitti too had embarked on negotiations with Mussolini,
through the prefect of Milan, and with the same purpose in mind. For
his part, Mussolini was quite ready to talk, as he did not wish to
preclude a parliamentary solution in the old style if that seemed the
most practical course of action. He was a man who never slammed any
door against himself.
On the morning of October 29 the thirty-nine-year-old Mussolini
arrived by wagon-lit in Rome. When he saw the King for the first time
that day, he deliberately wore his black shirt. "Excuse my dress," he
THE PATH TO THE TOTALITARIAN STATE 45
explained. "I have come from the battlefield." But a few hours later he
returned in more traditional attire, and on the thirtieth announced the
formation of a coalition cabinet. Retaining personal control of such
key portfolios as Interior and Foreign Affairs, the new president of the
Council of Ministers allowed a few misguided Liberals, Nationalists,
Populars, and Social Democrats to hold other ministries. (Mussolini
had only 35 Fascist party members in Parliament on whom to draw.)
Technically he had come to power by legal means, and his govern-
ment was a "compromise" arrangement. Despite the propagandistic
claims of the Blackshirts, the Fascist March on Rome was not yet a real
"revolution." That was to come after January 3, 192 5. As of October
30, 1922, the future was by no means clear. Yet some intimation of
what Premier Mussolini had in mind was revealed in the truculent
maiden speeches he delivered in the Chamber and Senate on Novem-
ber 16.
Mussolini's First Speech as Premier

to the Chamber of Deputies
(November 16, 1922)
GENTLEMEN! What I am doing now in this hall is an act of formal
deference to you, for which I ask no special sign of gratitude. . . .
To the melancholy zealots of super-constitutionalism I shall leave
the task of making their more or less pitiful lamentations about
recent events. For my part, I insist that revolution has its rights.
And so that everyone may know, I should like to add that I am here
to defend and enforce in the highest degree the Blackshirts' revolu-
tion, and to inject it into the history of the nation as a force for
development, progress, and equilibrium. [Lively applause from the
right.]
I could have abused my victory, but I refused to do so. I imposed
limits on myself. I told myself that the better wisdom is that which
does not lose control of itself after victory. With 300,000 youths
armed to the teeth, fully determined and almost mystically ready
to act on any command of mine, I could have punished all those
who defamed and tried to sully Fascism. [Approval from the right.]
I could have transformed this drab, silent hall into a bivouac for
my squads. . . . [Loud applause from the right; noise; comments;
souRcE: Atti del Parlamento italiano. Camera dei deputati. Sessione

1921-23. Legislatura XXVI. Discussioni (Rome: Tipografia
della Camera dei Deputati, 1923), Vol. IX, pp. 8389-8394. My
translation.
46 FASCISM IN ITALY
Modigliani: "Long live Parliament! Long live Parliament!" Noise

and shouts from the right; applause from the extreme left.] . . . I
could have barred the doors of Parliament and formed a govern-
ment exclusively of Fascists. I could have done so; but I chose not to,
at least not for the present.
Our enemies have held on to their hiding places; and they have
emerged from them without trouble and have enjoyed freedom of
movement. And already they are profiting from this by spitting
out poison again. . . .
I have formed a coalition government, not indeed with the object
of obtaining a parliamentary majority-which I can now get along
very well without [applause from the extreme right and extreme
left; comments] -but in order to rally to the support of this
suffocating nation all those who, regardless of nuances of party,
wish to save this nation.
From the bottom of my heart I thank my collaborators, ministers,
and undersecretaries. . . . And I cannot help recalling with plea-
sure the attitude of the laboring masses of Italians who have
strengthened the Fascist motto by both their active and passive
solidarity.
I believe that I also express the thought of a large part of this
assembly, and certainly the majority of the Italian people, when I
pay warm homage to the Sovereign who refused to take part in
futile, last-minute reactionary maneuvers, who averted civil war
and allowed the new and impetuous Fascist current, springing from
the war and inspired by victory, to flow into the weakened arteries
of the parliamentary state. [Shouts of "Long live the King!"
Ministers and many deputies rise to their feet for warm, prolonged
applause.]
Before attaining this position I was asked on all sides for a pro-
gram. Alas! It is not programs that are lacking in Italy; it is the men
and the willingness to apply the programs. All the problems of
Italian life, all of them I say, have been solved on paper. What is
lacking is the will to translate them into fact. Today the Govern-
ment represents this firm and decisive will.
What preoccupies us most, especially at this moment, is foreign
policy. I shall not deal here with all the problems, for in this field
too I prefer action to words.
The fundamental guidelines of our foreign policy are the follow-
ing things. Treaties of peace, whether good or bad, must be carried
out once they have been signed and ratified. A self-respecting state
can have no other doctrine. [Lively approval.] But treaties are not
eternal; they are not irreparable. They are chapters of history, not
its epilogue. Execution of them is the acid test. If in executing them
their absurdity becomes evident, this may be the new fact that
leads to a re-examination of the signatories' respective positions.
Thus, I shall place before the Parliament the Treaty of Rapallo, as
well as the agreements of Santa Margherita that derive from it.
. . . Let me now move on to establish another guideline of our
foreign policy-viz., the repudiation of all "revisionist" ideological
smoke screens.
We agree that there is a kind of unity, or better yet, an inter-
dependence in Europe's economic life. We agree that this economy
must be reconstructed, but we deny that the methods hitherto
adopted are working toward this end.
For the purpose of European economic reconstruction, bilateral
commercial accords, based on the broadest kind of economic rela-
tions among peoples, are worth more than the bureaucratic and
confused plenary conferences whose sad history everybody
knows. As far as Italy is concerned, we intend to follow a policy of
dignity and national self-interest. [Lively approval from the right.]
We do not indulge in the bad taste of exaggerating our power.

But neither do we intend by excessive and false modesty to
minimize it. My formula is simple: nothing for nothing. Whoever
wants to have concrete evidence from us of friendship must also
give us concrete evidence of friendship. [Approval from the right.]
Just as Fascist Italy has no intention of tearing up the peace
treaties, so, for political, economic, and moral reasons, she also has
no intention of abandoning her wartime allies. Rome is on the side
of Paris and London, but Italy must show the Allies that it is
embarking upon a courageous and severe examination of con-
science such as has not been faced from the armistice to the
present. [Lively approval.]
Does an Entente, in the real meaning of the word, still exist?
What is the Entente's position toward Germany, toward Russia,
toward a Russo-German alliance? What is Italy's position in the
Entente? ...
In the talks that I shall undertake with the prime ministers of
France and England, I intend to face clearly the whole complex
problem of the Entente and the resulting problem of Italy's position
within the Entente. [Lively applause.]
48 FASCISM IN ITALY
Either the Entente heals up its internal ills and contradic-

tions and becomes a tn;ly homogeneous bloc that is balanced and
equal in strength, and with equal rights and equal duties; or else its
end will have come, and Italy, resuming her freedom of action, will
loyally adopt another policy that will safeguard her interests.
[Lively approval.]
I hope that the first alternative takes place-for many reasons,
including the outbreak of new turbulence throughout the Eastern
world and the growing intimacy among the Russians, Turks, and
Germans. But in order for that to be, it is necessary once for all to
get away from hackneyed phrases. . . .
A foreign policy such as ours-a policy of national self-interest,
of respect for treaties, of equitable clarification of Italy's position
within the Entente-cannot be passed off as adventurous or im-
perialistic in the vulgar sense of the word. We wish to pursue a
policy of peace; but not one of suicide. . . .
As regards Austria, Italy will remain faithful to her pledges, and
will not overlook promoting agreements of an economic nature
also with Hungary and Bulgaria.
We feel that as regards Turkey, the Lausanne Conference must
recognize what is already an accomplished fact, and provide the
necessary guarantees for traffic through the Straits, for European
interests, and for the Christian minorities. The situation that has
resulted in the Balkans and in Islam must be watched carefully.
When Turkey obtains what is due her, she must not demand
more . . . .
As regards Russia, Italy feels that the time has now come to
consider in their present reality our relations with that state,
leaving aside its internal conditions in which, as a government, we
do not intend to interfere, just as we do not permit foreign inter-
vention in our affairs. We are therefore ready to examine the
possibility of a definitive solution. And with respect to the partici-
pation of Russia in the Lausanne Conference, Italy has argued in
favor of the most liberal position and does not despair of seeing it
triumph, though up to now Russia has been invited only to discuss
the question of the Straits.
Our relations with the United States are excellent, and it will be
my responsibility to improve them, especially in the field of a
desirable and close collaboration in economic matters.
. . . Our relations are cordial with the republics of Central and
South America, and especially with Brazil and Argentina, where
millions of Italians live, to whom must not be denied the possibilities
of sharing in local life, which by enhancing their importance will
not estrange them but link them more closely to the motherland.
As for the economic and financial problem, Italy will argue at the
forthcoming Brussels meeting that war debts and reparations are
indivisible. For this policy of dignity and national well-being we
must have in the [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] both central and
subsidiary agencies that are adequate for the new needs of national
life and the growing prestige of Italy in the world.
The guidelines of our domestic policy may be summarized in
these words: economy, labor, discipline. The financial problem is
basic. It is imperative to balance the budget with the greatest pos-
sible speed. We shall pursue a regime of austerity; we shall spend
wisely; we shall assist all the productive forces of the nation; we
shall put an end to all restrictions remaining from the war. [Lively
approval.] . . .
Whoever uses the word "labor" means the productive bour-
geoisie and the urban and rural working classes. We believe in no
special privileges for the former, and none for the latter; but rather
the safeguarding of the interests of all, so that they may be har-
monized with those of production and of the entire nation. [Loud
applause.]
The working proletariat, with whose status we are concerned,
though not with demagogic or blameworthy indulgence, has noth-
ing to fear and nothing to lose, but everything to gain from a
financial policy that preserves the solvency of the state and pre-
vents that bankruptcy that could make itself felt in a disastrous
way, especially among the poorest strata of the population. .
The Italian citizen who emigrates must know that he will be
carefully looked after by this nation's representatives abroad.
The increase of a nation's prestige in the world is proportionate
to the discipline that the country displays at home. There is no
doubt but that the domestic situation has improved, but not as
much as I should like. . . . The large cities and, in general, all our
cities are calm; acts of violence are sporadic and peripheral, but
they must come to an end. All citizens, regardless of party, must be
able to move about freely.
All religious beliefs must be respected, with particular considera-
tion for the dominant one, Catholicism. Fundamental freedoms
must not be impaired; respect for the law must be exacted at
whatever cost. The state is strong, and it intends to show its
50 FASCISM IN ITALY
strength against everyone, even against any eventual Fascist illegal-

ity, for this would be an irresponsible and impure illegality wholly
lacking in justification. [Lively applause.] I must add, however, that
nearly all Fascists have given complete support to the new order of
things.
The state does not intend to abdicate its authority before any-
one. Whoever defies the state will be punished. This explicit warn-
ing is addressed to all citizens. . . . You must not forget that apart
from the militant minority elements, there are forty million first-
rate Italians who are working to perpetuate the deep foundations of
our race, and who demand and have a right to demand that they
not be thrown into chronic disorder, the sure prelude to general
ruin. [Vigorous, prolonged applause.]
Since it is clear that sermons are not enough, the state will under-
take to prune and perfect the armed forces that guard it. The
Fascist State will organize perhaps one single police force, fully
equipped and with great mobility and high morale. When the
Army and Navy-which are most glorious and dear to every
Italian-are freed from the changeableness of parliamentary politics
and reorganized and strengthened, they will provide the nation
with the supreme reserve force for service both at home and
abroad. [Very loud applause. Shouts of "Long live the Army!"
Ministers and deputies on the right, center, and left rise and ap-
plaud vigorously at length.]
Gentlemen! Later communications will inform you of the Fas-
cist program in its details and as regards every ministry. So long as
it is possible for me, I do not want to govern against the Chamber;
but the Chamber must understand its special situation, something
which makes it liable to dissolution within maybe two days or
maybe two years. [Laughter. Applause on the right and extreme
left. Comments.]
We ask for full powers because we wish to assume full responsi-
bility. Without full powers, you know very well that it would be
impossible to achieve a single lira-1 repeat, a single lira-of econ-
omy. This does not mean we intend to exclude voluntary co-opera-
tion, which we shall accept cordially whether it comes from
deputies, senators, or competent private citizens.
All of us have a religious conception of our difficult task. The
country encourages us and is waiting for us. Let us not give it mere
words but deeds. We formally and solemnly pledge to rebalance
the budget; and we shall rebalance it. We intend to have a foreign
policy of peace but at the same time one of dignity and firmness;
and we shall have it. We propose to give discipline to the nation;
and we shall do so. Let none of our adversaries of yesterday, today,
or tomorrow deceive themselves as to our stay in power. [Laugh-
ter; comments; applause from the right.] That would be a childish
and foolish delusion, just as were those of the past. Our govern-
ment has a formidable base in the nation's conscience and is upheld
by the better and fresh Italian generations.
There is no doubt that in these recent days an enormous step has
been taken toward the unification of their minds. Once again the
Italian fatherland has found itself, from the north to the south, from
the continent to our numerous islands which will never again be
forgotten [applause], from the metropolis to the busy colonies of
the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Gentlemen! Don't shower the
country with any more useless chatter! Fifty-two members sched-
uled to speak on my remarks are too many! [Hilarity; comments.]
Instead, let us get to work with pure hearts and alert minds in order
to assure prosperity and grandeur to the fatherland. May God help
me bring my arduous task to a victorious end! [Very vigorous
applause from the right and other benches. . . . ]
Mussolini's First Speech

as Premier to the Senate
(November 16, 1922)
Honorable Senators! All of the first portion of the statements that I

read a short time ago to the Chamber of Deputies does not in the
least affect the Senate. ["Good!"] I must not use in front of the
Senate the necessarily harsh language that I had to employ before
the honorable deputies. [Vigorous, prolonged applause, joined in
also by the galleries.] Not only today but for several years, I can
safely say, I have regarded the Senate not as a superfluous institu-
tion. . . . Instead, I consider the Senate a bulwark of the state, a
reserve force of the state ["Fine!"], a necessary organ for the just
and sagacious administration of the state. [Vigorous, prolonged
applause.] . . .
souRcE: Atti parlamentari della Camera dei Senatori. Prima Ses-

sione 1921-23. Legislatura XXVI. Discussioni (Rome: Tipo-
grafia del Senato, 1923), Vol. IX, p. 3999. My translation.
52 FASCISM IN ITALY
After his first speech as premier, Mussolini won a vote of confidence

(306 to 116) from the Chamber of Deputies. Only the Socialists and
Communists voted compactly against him. Simultaneously he was
granted emergency powers to reform the tax structure, achieve econ-
omies, and reorganize public services. Yet even with these powers the
Fascists did not feel sufficiently safe to give up their privileged position
of being the only political party allowed to maintain a private army.
On January 13, 192 3, at the first meeting of the Fascist Grand Council
after the March on Rome, the problem arose of how to utilize the
Blackshirt action squads. Mussolini had no intention of abandoning this
instrument, which formed the real basis of his power. So he created a
permanent Fascist militia-the Volunteer Militia for National Security,
MVSN-by means of the following royal decree.
Decree Establishing the Fascist Militia (MVSN)

(January 14, 1923)
Art. 1: The Voluntary Militia for National Security is hereby
established.
Art. 2: The Militia for National Security will serve God and the
Italian fatherland, and will be under the orders of the Head of the
Government. With the help of the Armed Corps of Public Secu-
rity and the Royal Army, it will be responsible for maintaining
public order within the nation; and it will train and organize citi-
zens for the defense of Italy's interests in the world.
Art. 3: Recruitment will be voluntary, and all men between the
ages of seventeen and fifty who apply may be admitted . . . ,
provided that in the judgment of the president of the Council of
Ministers or of the hierarchical authorities designated by him they
possess the physical and moral prerequisites.
Art. 4: Organic and disciplinary norms for the formation and
operation of the Militia will be established by special regulations, to
be prepared in harmony with existing laws by the president of the
council. . . .
Art. 5: Nomination of officers and their promotion will be
effected by royal decree upon recommendation of the Ministers of
Interior and War.
Art. 6: The Militia for National Security offers its services free
of charge. The state will pay for service performed outside the
corps' commune of residence.
souRcE: Royal Decree No. 31, January 14, 1923, in the Gazzetta
Ufficiale del Regno, No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1923). My translation.
Art. 7: In case of partial or full mobilization of either the Army
or the Navy, the Fascist Militia is to be absorbed by the Army and
Navy, and in accordance with the obligations and military grades
of its various members.
Art. 8: Expenses for establishment and operation of the Militia
for National Security are to be charged to the budget of the
Ministry of Interior.
Art. 9: All parties whatsoever shall be forbidden to have forma-
tions of a military character after the present decree goes into
effect. Violators will be subject to punishment by law.
Art. 10: The present decree will be presented to Parliament for
enactment into law and will go into force on February 1, 192 3.
No mention was made in the decree of swearing allegiance to the

King; the militiamen would remain under the orders of Mussolini.
Thus there was introduced in Italy one of the politically armed forces
that were to be so typical of fascistic regimes. Indeed, such a party
army was one of the most significant differences between twentieth-
century fascistic dictatorships and previous authoritarian regimes.
Other dictators in the past had restricted freedom of the press or
condemned political foes into exile, and they had made use of the
regular army in carrying out their coups d'etat; but the Fascists and
Nazis secured power thanks in large measure to a military organization
of their own, especially prepared for the purpose and destined to
remain in existence side by side with the regular army. The presence
of the MVSN was one of the key factors that enabled Mussolini to
remain at his post during the great crisis of 1924. Membership in the
MVSN was 251,000 by 1927; by 1934 it was 461,000; and with the
impact of the Ethiopian War it grew rapidly to 763,000 in 1938.
Another portent of totalitarianism was a decree of July 15, 1923,
setting up fairly rigid control of the Italian press. After 192 5 these
regulations were tightened to such an extent that great newspapers like
La Surmpa of Turin and Corriere della Sera of Milan passed into Fas-
cist hands. The text of the decree follows.
Decree Regulating the Press

Art. 1: In addition to the conditions prescribed by Articles 36 and
37 of the edict on the press dated March 26, 1848, the managing
editor of a newspaper or other periodical publication must be
either the director or one of the principal regular editors of this
souRcE: Royal Decree No. 3288 of July 15, 1923, in Gazzetta

U fficiale, No. 15 9 (July 18, 192 3) . My translation.
54 FASCISM IN ITALY
newspaper or publication, and he must obtain the recognition of

the prefect of the province wherein the newspaper or publication is
printed.
Senators and Deputies may not serve as managing editors. Any-
one who has been sentenced on two occasions for crimes involving
the press is ineligible to be managing editor, and he will lose this
position if he has assumed it.
The decision of the prefect who refuses to recognize a managing
editor must be based upon evidence. An appeal from this decision
may be made to the Ministry of Interior. The decision of this
minister may be appealed on legal grounds to the Fourth Section of
the Council of State.
Art. 2: The prefect of a province is empowered, except where
penal action prevents it, to address a warning to the managing
editor of a newspaper or a periodical:
(a) If by means of false or tendentious news the newspaper or
periodical impedes the diplomatic action of the Government in its
foreign relations, or injures the national honor at home or abroad,
or creates unjustifiable alarm in the population, or disturbs public
order;
(b) If by means of articles, comments, notes, headlines, or illus-
trations it incites to crime or excites class hatred or disobedience to
the laws and orders of public authorities, or compromises the disci-
pline of public servants, or favors the interests of foreign states,
societies, or individuals to the detriment of Italian interests, or holds
up to opprobrium the King, the Royal Family, the Sovereign
Pontiff, the religion of the state, or the institutions and organs of
the state or of friendly powers.
This warning is to be issued by a decree resting upon evidence
and in accordance with the recommendation of a committee that
consists of the following people: a judge, who presides over it; a
substitute for the King's procurator in the court of the locality or
prefectural seat, appointed respectively by the first president and
by the procurator general of the Court of Appeal; and a repre-
sentative of the category of journalists, to be designated either by
the local press association or, in its absence, by the president of the
local tribunal. The committee will hold office for one year.
Art. 3: On the advice of the committee referred to above, the
prefect may cancel the recognition of a managing editor who has
received two warnings in one year.
The prefect may refuse to recognize a new managing editor
whenever the previous one has been dismissed or condemned for
any kind of press abuse twice in the space of two years to a penalty
depriving him of his liberty for a period of six months or more; or
whenever the newspapers or periodicals affected by the prefect's
decisions have assumed new titles in order to continue their publi-
cation.
The decisions of the prefect are subject to the recourse set forth
in Article 1.
Art. 4: Newspapers or other periodical publications printed in
contravention of the previous regulations may be sequestered.
The sequestration is to be carried out by police authorities with
no further need for special authorization.
Those who are guilty of abusive publication are to be punished
in accordance with the laws in force. . . .
Despite such measures as a Fascist militia and control of the press,

many citizens were still under the illusion that Fascism had not radi-
cally changed the political pattern of Italy. The monarchical institu-
tion, for example, remained intact. Some of the leading Fascists-
including the quadrumvir, De V ecchi-were royalists, as were all of
the adherents of the older National party which formally merged with
the Fascists in 1923 and thereby imparted a veneer of intellectual
respectability to the Partito Nazionale Fascista. Furthermore, during
the first year or two of his rule Mussolini still grudgingly accepted the
collaboration of Liberals and Populars in the cabinet. The representa-
tives of the latter party, to be sure, were excluded in April, 1923, after
left-wing Populars expressed reservations about the way Mussolini was
ruling, but the Liberals stayed in the government until the end of 1924.
Thus in the initial months it was still possible to speak of formal co-
operation between Fascism and some representatives of other parties-
"some representatives," because Mussolini quickly decided not to enter
into agreements with the parties as such. But this type of collaboration
was the reverse of what Giolitti and some of the older political leaders
had envisaged. It was not the traditional parties which were domesti-
cating and canalizing Fascism into the "system," but rather the Fascists
who were accepting for a little longer, and with ill grace, the co-
operation of the others. Meanwhile, they continued to employ violence
against the Socialists, Communists, and Populars-in short, against
anyone who was not Fascist. Local party bosses, the ras, acquired in
most places a pre-eminent position vis-a-vis the government-appointed
prefects. In this way the substance of things began to change rapidly
even though the form of things thus far was modified only in part.
Parliament was co-operative in these initial months; nevertheless
Mussolini was displeased to have but 35 Fascist party deputies at his
call. Determined to prepare the way for electing a Chamber that would
be unmistakably controlled by his own party, he had one of his lieu-
56 FASCISM IN ITALY
tenants, Giacomo Acerbo, draft a new electoral law. Enacted on

November 18, 1923, this bill provided that whichever list received the
largest number of votes would obtain two-thirds of the seats in the
Chamber. "Unproportional representation" would thus replace the
system of proportional representation that had come into operation in
1919 with such damaging effects upon the traditional forces. Fascism
now needed to obtain only a plurality in order to gain clear-cut
parliamentary control. Effective means existed to secure that result by
hamstringing the oppositionists and making it very difficult for voters
to carry out their electoral duty. In this manner, in the ensuing elec-
tions of April6, 1924, the Fascist (or "National") list got 64.9 per cent
of the votes and 374 seats. In spite of their general success, however,
the Fascists failed to gain a majority of the popular vote in the regions
of Piedmont, Liguria, Lombardy, and Venetia.
On May 30, 1924, Giacomo Matteotti, the young secretary of the
"revisionist" Unitary Socialist party, delivered a vigorous and well-
documented speech in the Chamber in which he denounced the abuses
perpetrated by Fascists during the election campaign and challenged
the official results. Suddenly on June 10 he was kidnapped by Fascist
gangsters in the center of Rome and brutally stabbed to death. Mat-
teotti's body was not found for several weeks. A tremendous storm of
indignation arose immediately; for the next six months Mussolini faced
a political crisis of the first magnitude. Temporarily he was visibly
shaken, for it was clear to everyone that, if not he himself, certainly
several officials close to him were implicated.
In protest against the political murder, a substantial minority of
deputies (mostly Socialists, Republicans, and Populars; the Commu-
nists only temporarily) withdrew from Parliament on June 27 to a
symbolic "Aventine of their own conscience." The leader of the
A ventinian secession was the liberal democrat, Giovanni Amendola.
He and his group viewed the problem as one of morality and sought to
bring about the moral isolation of the regime. They did not advocate
violent revolution; rather they hoped to persuade Victor Emmanuel III
to recognize his own blunder in bringing Mussolini to the premiership
and to exercise his constitutional prerogative of dismissing the prime
minister. But key Liberals like Giolitti and Salandra refused to join the
Aventine, which engaged in endless talk and newspaper editorials. The
King refused to take any action; he rationalized his behavior in later
years on the ground that there was no effective opposition majority in
Parliament. He was "blind" and "deaf," he declared, and the Chamber
and Senate had to be his "eyes and ears." The failure of the Sovereign
to be moved was the great reason why most of the political opposition
was to become increasingly antimonarchist as well as anti-Fascist. As
the weeks slipped by the A ventinians muffed their chances. By seced-
ing they had weakened Parliament and actually made it easier for
Mussolini to win his battle, for he did not have to expel the opposition
with force as Hitler was to do.
Prodded by such firebrands as Roberto Farinacci, the ras of Cre-
mona, M ussolini began to regain his composure and promised to clean
up the regime. At last on January 3, 1925, he was ready to launch the
counterattack. In an unusually bombastic speech before the Chamber
of Deputies he took personal "political, moral, and historical responsi-
bility for everything" that had happened. "Force is the only solution!"
he cried, and promised to "clarify" everything within twenty-four
hours.
Mussolini's Coup d'Etat of January 3, 1925

Gentlemen, the speech that I am about to deliver should not perhaps
be classified, strictly speaking, as a parliamentary address. . . . A
speech of this sort may or may not lead to a vote on policy. Let it
be known that in any case I do not seek such a vote on policy . . . .
I have had too many of them. ["Good!"]
Article 4 7 of the Statuto says: "The Chamber of Deputies has
the right to impeach the King's Ministers and to bring them before
the High Court of Justice [the Senate]." I ask formally whether
there is anyone, either in or out of this Chamber, who wants to
avail himself of Article 47? [Vigorous, prolonged applause . . . . ]
My speech therefore will be very clear and such as to bring
about absolute clarification. . . .
Gentlemen, it is I who raise in the hall the charges against myself.
It is said that I have created a Cheka. Where? When? How? No one
can answer! In Russia there has really been a Cheka, which has
executed, without any trial, between 15 0 and 160,000 people. . . .
In Russia there has been a Cheka which has systematically imposed
terror on all the bourgeois class and on individual members of the
bourgeoisie-a Cheka which is said to be the Red sword of the
revolution. But an Italian Cheka has never existed.
Thus far nobody has ever denied me three qualities: a certain
intelligence, much courage, and a sovereign disdain for filthy lucre.
[Vigorous, prolonged applause.] If I had created a Cheka, I would
have done so according to the criteria that I have always imposed on
that degree of violence which cannot be eliminated from history. I
have always said-and let those who have followed me through
these five years of difficult battle remember this-that violence, to
souRCE: Atti del Parlamento Italiano. Camera dei Deputati. Legi-

slatura XXVII. Sessione del 1924-25. Discussioni, January 3,
192 5 (Rome: Tipografia della Camera dei Deputati), Vol. III,
pp. 2028-2032 passim. My translation.
58 FASCISM IN ITALY
be effective, must be surgical, intelligent, and chivalrous. [Ap-

proval.] Now the acts of this so-called Cheka have always been
unintelligent, disorganized, and stupid. ["Very good!") ...
You certainly remember my speech of June 7 [ 1924]. You may
find it easy to recall that week of heated political passions when in
this Chamber the minority and majority were clashing every day,
to the point that some despaired of establishing the necessary
conditions for political and civil co-existence between the two
hostile parts of the Chamber. . . . I then delivered a speech that
completely clarified the atmosphere. I said to the opposition: I recog-
nize your right in principle and even in fact. You may disregard
Fascism as a historical experience; you may subject all the measures
of the Fascist government to immediate criticism.
I recall and I still have before my eyes the sight" of this part of the
Chamber, where everyone understood and felt that at that moment
I had uttered profound and living words and had established the
terms of that necessary co-existence without which no political
assembly of any kind is possible. [Approval.]
Now, after such a success ... , how could I, unless I were
struck by madness, think of committing a crime, or even giving the
slightest, silliest affront to a foe whom I had respected because he
possessed a certain crdnerie, a certain courage that at times re-
sembled my own courage and my own stubbornness in upholding
my points of view? [Lively applause.]
What should I have done? Some cricket-brains demanded of me
at that time cynical gestures that I did not feel like making because
they were deeply repugnant to my conscience. [Approval.] Or
should I have committed some act of force? What force? Against
whom? For what purpose? . . .
It was at the end of that month-that month which is marked
indelibly in my life-that I said: "I want peace for the Italian peo-
ple." I wanted to bring political life back to normalcy.
But what was the reply to this principle of mine? First of all,
there was the Aventine secession, an unconstitutional secession that
was clearly revolutionary. [Lively approval.] Then there followed
a press campaign that lasted through June, July, and August; a
filthy and wretched campaign that dishonored us for three months.
[Vigorous, prolonged applause.]
The most fantastic, most horrendous, most macabre lies were
widely published in all the papers! A veritable outbreak of necro-
philia took place. [Approval.] There were inquiries even into what
takes place underground in the grave. They invented lies; they
knew they were lying, but they went right on lying.
And I remained calm, tranquil in the midst of this storm, which
will be remembered with a deep sense of shame by those who come
after us. [Signs of approval.]
In the meanwhile, this campaign bore fruit. On September 11
someone sought to avenge the dead man and shot one of our best
people, a man who died in poverty. . . .
Nevertheless, I continued my effort at normalization. I repressed
illegal acts. It is no lie that today hundreds of Fascists are still in jail!
[Comments.] It is no lie that Parliament was reconvened regularly
at the prescribed date and that all the budgets were discussed no
less regularly. It is no lie that the Militia swore an oath of loyalty,
and that generals were appointed to all the zonal commands.
Finally, a question was raised that has been of great concern to
us-a request that the parliamentary immunity of the Honorable
Giunta 1 be lifted and that he resign and stand trial. The Chamber
was shocked. I understood the meaning of this feeling of revolt.
And yet, after forty-eight hours, I once more gave in, and relying
on my prestige and growing strength, I bent this riotous and reluc-
tant assembly to my will and said: "Let the resignation be ac-
cepted." It was accepted. But even that was not enough. I performed
one last gesture of normalization. I proposed a reform of the
electorallaw. 2
And how did they respond to all of this? They responded with
an intensified campaign. They said that Fascism is a horde of
barbarians encamped in the country, a movement of bandits and
marauders! They raised a moral question, and we are familiar with
the sad story of moral questions in Italy. [Lively signs of ap-
proval.] ...
Very well, I now declare before this assembly and before the
entire Italian people that I assume, I alone, full political, moral, and
historical responsibility for all that has happened. [Very vigorous
and repeated applause. Shouts of "We are with you! All with
you!"]
1. Francesco Giunta was vice-president of the Chamber of Deputies and

an ardent Fascist.-Ed.
2. The reform called for repeal of proportional representation and a
return to single-member constituencies.-Ed.
60 FASCISM IN ITALY
If more or less distorted phrases are enough to hang a man, then

bring out the gallows, bring out the rope! If Fascism has been
nothing more than castor oil and the rubber truncheon, instead of
being a proud passion of the best part of Italian youth, then I am to
blame! [Applause.] If Fascism has been a criminal association, then I
am the chief of this criminal association! [Vigorous applause . ... ]
If all the violence has been the result of a particular historical,
political, and moral climate, then let me take the responsibility for
this, because I have created this historical, political, and moral
climate with a propaganda that has gone forth from the interven-
tion until today.
In recent days not just the Fascists but many citizens have asked
themselves: Do we have a government? [Signs of approval.] Are
these men, or are they puppets? Do these men possess manly dig-
nity? And do they also have a government that possesses it? [Ap-
proval.]
I deliberately wanted things to come to this extreme point.
Enriched by my lifetime of experience, I tested out the party. And
just as one must beat certain metals with a hammer to determine
their temper, so I have tested the temper of certain men. . . . I have
tested myself. And note well that I would not have resorted to such
measures if the interests of the nation had not been at stake. But a
people does not respect a government that lets itself be despised!
[Signs of approval.] People want to see their own dignity reflected
in that of the government, and people, even before I said it, were
declaring: "Enough! We have gone far enough!"
And why have we gone far enough? Because the Aventine sedi-
tion has a republican background! [Lively applause; shouts of
"Long live the King!" ... ] This sedition on the part of the
Aventine has resulted in a situation in which any Fascist in Italy is in
danger of his life! In the two months of November and December
alone, eleven Fascists were killed. . . . And then three fires have
taken place in one month, mysterious fires, fires in the railway
system and yards in Rome, Parma, and Florence. . . . You see
from this situation that the sedition of the Aventine has had
profound repercussions throughout the country. For this reason,
the moment has come when we must say, "Enough!"
When two irreducible elements are locked in a struggle, the
solution is force. In history there never has been any other solution,
and there never will be.
THE PATH .TO THE TOTALITARIAN STATE 61
Right now, I make bold to declare that the problem will be re-
solved. Fascism, the Government, and the Party are completely
ready. Gentlemen, you have suffered from illusions! You thought
that Fascism was finished because I was restraining it, that it was
dead because I was punishing it and because I had the audacity to
say so. But if I were to employ the hundredth part of the energy in
unleashing it that I have used in restraining it, you would under-
stand then. [Vigorous applause.] But there will be no need for this,
because the Government is strong enough to break the Aventine's
sedition completely and definitely. [Vigorous, prolonged applause.]
Gentlemen, Italy wants peace, tranquillity, calm in which to
work We shall give her this tranquillity and calm, by means of
love if possible but by force if necessary. [Lively applause.]
You may be sure that within the next forty-eight hours after this
speech, the situation will be clarified in every field. [Vigorous,
prolonged applause; comrnents.] Everyone must realize that what I
am planning to do is not the result of personal caprice, of a lust for
power, or of an ignoble passion, but solely the expression of my
unlimited and mighty love for the fatherland. [Vigorous, pro-
longed and reiterated applause. Repeated shouts of "Long live
Mussolini!" The ministers and many deputies congratulate the
Honorable President of the Council. The meeting is ended.]
Mussolini's speech of January 3, 1925, was in effect a coup d'etat and

marked the beginning of a dictatorship that was to be riveted down by
skillfully spaced decrees until Italy found herself under what the Fas-
cists claimed to be a totalitarian state. Farinacci, who became PNF
secretary in February, 1925, played a significant role in these events.
All pretense at collaboration with non-Fascists was abandoned. In July,
Amendola, the leader of the Aventine, was brutally beaten; his injuries
resulted in death a few months later. Meanwhile, a series of attempts
on the life of Mussolini provided pretexts for the government to
suppress one political party after another, as well as the Masonic Lodge
and all opposition newspapers.
One of the most fundamental decrees was that of December 24,
1925: henceforth the president of the Council of Ministers was to be
"Head of the Government" (Capo del Governo) and no longer
accountable to Parliament. The Statuto of 1848 had not envisaged the
existence of a Head of the Government as distinct from the rest of the
Council of Ministers. Thus the decree marked the end of "responsible
parliamentary government" in Italy; only the King now had the power
to dismiss the Prime Minister. It also declared that henceforth no
question could be placed on the agenda for Parliament without the
62 FASCISM IN ITALY
prior approval of the Head of the Government. Thus Mussolini could

prevent all political debate in Parliament.
Decree on Powers
of the Head of the Government
(December 24, 1925)
Art. I: The executive power is exercised by His Majesty the King
through his Government. The Government consists of the Prime
Minister Secretary of State and the Ministers Secretaries of State.
The Prime Minister is the Head of the Government.
Art. II: The Head of the Government, who is Prime Minister and
Secretary of State, is appointed and dismissed by the King, and is
responsible to the King for the general policy of the Government.
The decree appointing the Head of the Government Prime
Minister is countersigned by himself, and that of his dismissal by
his successor.
The Ministers Secretaries of State are appointed and dismissed
by the King upon proposal of the Head of the Government Prime
Minister. They are responsible to the King and to the Head of the
Government for all the acts and measures enforced by their Min-
istries.
The Undersecretaries of State are appointed and dismissed by
the King upon the proposal of the Head of the Government in
agreement with the Minister concerned.
Art. Ill: The Head of the Government Prime Minister directs
and co-ordinates the work of the Ministers, decides whatever differ-
ences may arise among them, calls meetings of the Council of
Ministers, and presides over them.
Art. IV: The number, constitution, and responsibilities of the
Ministers are established by royal decree, upon proposal of the
Head of the Government.
The Head of the Government may be entrusted by royal decree
with the direction of one or more Ministries. In such cases, the
Head of the Government by his own decree may delegate to
souRcE: Law No. 2263 of December 24, 1925, "Attributions and

prerogatives of the Head of the Government Prime Minister
Secretary of State," in Gazzetta Ufficiale, No. 301 (Dec. 29,
1925). My translation.
the Undersecretaries of State a share of the responsibilities of the
Minister.
Art. V: The Head of the Government is a member of the
council for the guardianship of members of the Royal Family, and
exercises the function of Notary of the Crown.
He is, furthermore, by right, Secretary of the Supreme Order of
the Holy Annunciation.
Art. VI: No bill or motion may be placed on the agenda of either
of the two Chambers without the consent of the Head of the
Government.
The Head of the Government is empowered to request that a
bill, rejected by one of the two Chambers, shall again be voted
upon when at least three months have elapsed since the first vote. In
such cases the bill is voted upon by secret ballot, without previous
debate.
When, in submitting the bill for a second vote, the Government
also submits amendments to the bill, there may be debate only
upon the amendments, after which the bill will be voted upon by
secret ballot.
The Head of the Government is also empowered to request that
a bill, if rejected by one of the Chambers, be equally submitted to
the other Chamber and voted upon, after due examination.
When a bill already passed by one Chamber is passed by the
other with amendments, the debate in the Chamber to which it is
submitted a second time is limited to the amendments, after which
the vote on the measure will be by secret ballot.
Art. Vll: The Head of the Government, during his tenure of
office, takes precedence over the Knights of the Supreme Order of
the Holy Annunciation at public functions and ceremonies.
He will receive from the State Treasury an annual appropriation
to cover the expenses of his office, the sum being fixed by royal
decree.
Art. VIII: The Head of the Government may designate from
time to time the Minister who will substitute for him in case of
absence or impediment; this designation is made separately for each
gtven case.
Art. IX: Whosoever makes an attempt against the life, safety, or
personal freedom of the Head of the Government is to be punished
by a term of imprisonment of not less than fifteen years, and by life
imprisonment if he succeeds in his attempt.
64 FASCISM IN ITALY
Whosoever offends the Head of the Government in words or

deeds is to be punished by imprisonment or detention from six to
thirty months, and by a fine of from 500 to 3,000 lire. 3
Art. X: All regulations contrary to the present law are abro-
gated.
Soon the government was depriving Italians of their citizenship if they
committed an act abroad that was calculated to damage Italy's prestige.
The first victims of this decree were Professor Gaetano Salvemini of
the University of Florence and an emigre editor of the Popular party,
Giuseppe Donati. Another attempt on Mussolini's life in the spring of
1926 led to the abolition of local elective government organs. Finally,
after the firing on Mussolini's car in Bologna, the Duce proclaimed in
November, 1926, the "exceptional decrees" which nailed down totali-
tarianism. The decree of public safety of November 6, excerpts of
which are printed below, was of great importance. The deputies who
had withdrawn from the Chamber were now deprived of their parlia-
mentary status and driven from the Aventine into the catacombs.
Decree on Public Safety

(November 6, 1926)
TITLE vi: REGULATIONs PERTAINING TO PERsoNs WHo ENDANGER

SociETY
CHAPTER II: REGARDING SUSPECTS, PERSONS RELEASED

FROM PRISON • . • , ILLEGAL REPATRIATION,
AND EXPATRIATION
Art. 158-Whoever outside his own commune arouses susp1c1on

by his conduct, and cannot or will not identify himself to officers
or agents of the Public Security by producing an identity card or
some other trustworthy evidence, is to be taken before the local
Public Security authority. The latter, in case the suspicions prove to
be well founded, may require him to return to his home. . . .
Without need for further authorization, the Public Security can
souRCE: Royal Decree-Law No. 1848 of November 6, 1926, pub-

lished in Gazzetta Ufficiale, No. 257 (Nov. 8, 1926). My trans-
lation.
3. Modified by Law No. 2008 of November 25, 1926, regarding "Meas-
ures for the Defense of the State." Article I of this latter law declared:
"Whosoever makes attempts against the life, safety, or personal freedom
of the King or the Regent is to be punished by death. The same applies if
the attempt be made against the life, safety, or personal freedom of the
Queen, the Crown Prince, or the Head of the Government."
forbid anyone who has thus been sent home from returning
to the commune whence he was expelled.
Violators are to be arrested and punished by imprisonment
ranging from one to six months, and upon completion of their
sentence shall be conducted to their home.
Art. 159-The mayor must deliver to all persons who are fifteen
years of age or older and habitually reside in the commune . . .
an identity card conforming to the model that will be provided by
the Ministry of the Interior. The identity card must include a
photograph of the bearer and is valid for three years.
Art. 160-Whoever, for political reasons, leaves or tries to leave
the country without a passport or equivalent document is punish-
able by imprisonment of not less than three years and a fine of not
less than 20,000 lire.
Whoever in any way assists the preparation or execution of this
crime is liable to the same penalty.
. . . The use of firearms is permitted to prevent illegal crossings
of the frontier . . . .
CHAPTER III: REGARDING ADMONITIONS
Art. 166-The chief police officer of the district may, by

written and documented report, request the prefect to present an
admonition to idlers, habitual vagabonds . . . , pimps, vendors of
harmful drugs, . . . and whoever are singled out by public rumor
as being dangerous to the national order of the State. . . .
Art. 168-Such admonition is to be pronounced by a Provincial
Commission made up of the prefect, the royal procurator, the
superintendent of police (Quest ore), the provincial commander of
the Royal Carabinieri, and a high-ranking officer of the Voluntary
Militia for National Security who is designated by the comman-
dant of the zone involved. The commission is presided over by the
prefect. . . .
Art. 173-The Commission may require a person who is so
admonished to find employment and observe the laws, avoid doing
anything that might arouse suspicions in his regard, and not to
leave his domicile without first informing the local Public Security
authority.
Art. 174-The Commission may further prescribe that such
persons, no matter what their category, may not associate with
convicted or otherwise suspicious people, return home late at night,
leave home in the morning before a specified hour, carry arms,
66 FASCISM IN ITALY
habitually visit cafes, gambling places, or brothels, or attend public

meetings . . . .
CHAPTER V: REGARDING COMPULSORY DOMICILE (DOMICILIO COATTO)
Art. 184-If they present a danger to public safety, the following

persons may be assigned to compulsory domicile under police
supervision, with an obligation to work:
1. Those who have received an admonition;
2. Those who have committed or have shown a deliberate inten-
tion of committing any act calculated to bring about violent
disturbance to the national, social, or economic regulations of the
State . . . , or to impede the carrying out of the functions of the
State in such a manner as to injure in any way the national interests
either at home or abroad.
Art. 185-A sentence of compulsory domicile will last no less
than one nor more than five years, and will be carried out in either
a colony or a commune of the Kingdom other than the normal
residence of the sentenced person.
Art. 186-The sentence of compulsory domicile and the length
of same will be handed down by the Provincial Commission de-
scribed in Art. 168. The Commission may order the immediate
arrest of whosoever is proposed for such confinement. . . .
Art. 190-Whosoever is assigned to compulsory domicile may
be required to do the following things:
1. Not to leave the specified domicile without prior approval of
the authority charged with looking after his surveillance;
2. Not to retire at night or go out in the morning either later
than or earlier than the specified hour;
3. Not to possess or carry arms that belong to him, nor any
other instruments that may be considered offensive;
4. Not to frequent bad places, cafes, or other public locales;
5. Not to frequent public meetings, shows, or entertainments;
6. To conduct himself well and give no cause for suspicion;
7. To present himself on specified days, as well as at any other
summons, to the police authorities who are charged with his sur-
veillance;
8. To carry with him at all times his residence card and to show
it to police officers or agents whenever requested. . . .
Another decree, printed below, established the Special Tribunal for

the Defense of the State to adjudicate so-called political crimes.
Appointed by Mussolini, the Special Tribunal began hearings on
February 1, 1927. Cases were referred to it by specific recommenda-
tion of the Fascist head of the police. (Many more or less "political"
cases also continued to come before the regular courts, where the
accused could at least hope to get a fairer hearing.) Decisions of the
Special Tribunal could not be appealed. Some 720 audiences were held
between 1927 and 194 3; approximately 5,319 individuals were brought
to trial, and of these 5,15 5 were sentenced. All told, their prison terms
added to 28,115 years. There were 29 death sentences and 7 for life
imprisonment.
The Exceptional Decrees:

Law for the Defense of the State
(November 25, 1926)
Art. 1-Whoever commits any act aimed against the life, person,
or personal freedom of either the King or the Regent is punishable
by death.
The same penalty applies if the act is aimed against the life,
person, or personal freedom of the Queen, the heir to the throne,
or the Head of the Government.
Art. 2-Crimes specified in Articles 104, 107, 108, 120, and 252
of the Penal Code are equally punishable by death.
Art. 3-lf two or more persons conspire to commit one of the
acts referred to in the preceding articles, they are liable, by the
mere fact of conspiracy, to imprisonment ranging from five to
fifteen years.
The leaders, promoters, and organizers are liable to imprison-
ment ranging from fifteen to thirty years.
Whoever publicly or in the press incites to one of the crimes
referred to in the preceding articles or defends it is liable to im-
prisonment ranging from five to fifteen years.
Art. 4-Whoever reconstitutes, even under a different name,
any association, organization, or party that has been dissolved by
order of the public authority, is liable to imprisonment ranging
from three to ten years and, moreover, is subject to permanent
exclusion from public office.
Whoever is a member of such associations, organizations, or
parties is liable, for the mere fact of this participation, to imprison-
souRcE: Decree-Law No. 2008, November 25, 1926, published in

Gazzetta Ufficiale, No. 281 (Dec. 6, 1926). My translation.
68 FASCISM IN ITALY
ment ranging from two to five years, and permanent exclusion

from public office.
Whoever propagates by any means the doctrines, optruons, or
methods of such associations is liable to the same penalty.
Art. 5-Any citizen who, outside the national territory, spreads
or in any way communicates false, exaggerated, or tendentious
rumors or information regarding the internal condition of the state
in such manner as to lessen the credit or prestige of the state
abroad, or who practices actions of any kind that tend to prejudice
the national interests, is liable to imprisonment ranging from five to
fifteen years, and permanent exclusion from public office.
In such case, a sentence pronounced in contumacy carries with it
the loss of citizenship and the confiscation of property. The judge
may substitute sequestration for confiscation. In this case, he will
specify the duration of this action and the destination of the
revenue from said property.
The loss of citizenship does not apply to the wife or the children
of the sentenced person.
All alienations of property effected by the sentenced person
after the execution of the crime, as well as one year prior thereto,
are presumed to have been done to the detriment of the State;
therefore, these properties are to be included in the confiscation or
sequestration.
The effects of the sentence in contumacy as set forth in the
above clauses will terminate with the surrender or arrest of the
condemned person; and in such case, the properties are to be resti-
tuted in the condition in which they were found, except as regards
the rights legitimately acquired by third parties.
Art. 6-Wherever, in the case of crimes set forth in the present
law, the action is of attenuated gravity, or there are extenuating
circumstances that make it appropriate to modify the terms of
punishment set forth in the Penal Code, the judge is empowered to
substitute imprisonment ranging from fifteen to thirty years for
the death penalty; to substitute temporary for permanent exclusion
from public office; and to reduce the other penalties by not more
than one-half.
Whosoever helped, in whatever way, the commission of these
same crimes is subject to the penalties established by the present
law.
Art. 7-The crimes referred to in this law shall be brought
before a Special Tribunal, to consist of a president chosen from
among the general officers of the Royal Army, the Royal Navy,
the Royal Air Force, and the Voluntary Militia for National
Security, and five judges chosen from among the officers of the
Voluntary Militia for National Security who hold the rank of
consul. ... The Special Tribunal may operate, if necessary, in
more than one section, and the arguments may take place either at
the seat of the tribunal or in any other commune of the Kingdom.
The formation of this tribunal is to be ordered by the Minister
of War, who will determine its composition, seat, and the com-
mand under which it will function.
Whenever conditions envisaged by Article 559 of the Penal
Code for the Army apply, extraordinary tribunals may also be
established.
The provisions of the Military Penal Code regarding penal pro-
cedure in time of war shall apply in the procedure for crimes
covered under the present law. All powers that by the terms of
that code belong to the commander-in-chief are hereby conferred
on the minister of war.
Sentences of the Special Tribunal are not subject to appeal, nor
to any kind of impugnment except review.
The legal procedures for crimes covered under the present law,
and that are in effect on the day it is promulgated, are hereby trans-
ferred to the competency of the Special Tribunal that is described
in the first part of the present article.
Art. 8-Nothing is altered with respect to the powers conferred
on the Government by Law No. 2260 of December 24, 1925.
The present law goes into effect the day it is published in the
Gazzetta U fficiale of the Kingdom, and it ceases to be in effect
after the expiration of five years from that date, except as regards
the carrying out of sentences already handed down.
Within that same period of time the Government of the King
has the right to promulgate norms for the carrying out of the
present law, and for co-ordinating it with the Penal Code, the Code
of Penal Pn ): edure, the Military Penal Code, and other laws.
The Acerbo electoral law of 1923 was replaced by a very different law
on May 17, 1928, excerpts from which are printed below. The new
measure provided for only a single list, for which candidates were to
be nominated by the labor syndicates and other organizations. These
entities were to put forward 800 names-twice as many as the number
to be elected. From these the Fascist Grand Council would choose 400
and present this slate to the electorate for their approval en bloc. With
70 FASCISM IN ITALY
the advent of this law Italy formally moved away not only from the
parliamentary but from the constitutional system itself. Rubber-stamp
plebiscites superseded the liberal system of choosing between candi-
dates. Not even universal manhood suffrage was retained: to qualify to
vote in the plebiscites one had to present evidence of having paid dues
to a Fascist syndicate, a fact which automatically disqualified about
three million men.
The first elections under this new system were not held until March
24, 1929, one month after the announcement of the Lateran Pacts.
They produced 8,519,559 yes and 137,761 no votes. In Milan, however,
the negative response amounted to 6 per cent of the total, whereas the
national average was less than 2 per cent.
The Fascist Electoral Law of 1928

Art. 1-Electors must enjoy, through birth or origin, the civil and
political rights of the Kingdom. Persons who do not belong to the
Kingdom either through birth or origin may be electors if they
have obtained naturalization by Royal Decree and have sworn
allegiance to the King. . . .
Art. 2-All citizens may be electors who are twenty-one years
of age, or eighteen years provided they are married or widowers
with children, and attained these respective ages not later than May
31 of the year in which the revision of the electoral lists takes
place. They must furthermore meet one of the following require-
ments:
(a) Payment of dues to a syndicate under Law No. 563 of April
3, 1926, except when the voter is an administrator or member of an
organization or concern paying syndical dues in conformity with
the aforesaid law. In the case of holders of stock in limited and
unlimited companies, only registered shares which have been in his
possession for at least one year confer the right to vote;
(b) Payment of at least 100 lire per annum of direct taxes to the
State, province or commune, unless the voter has been for at least a
year the owner or beneficiary of registered bonds of the public
debt or of registered bonds of provincial or communal loans yield-
ing an income of 500 lire annually;
souRcE: Royal Decree of September 2, 1928, No. 1993, approving

Electoral Law No. 1019 of May 17, 1928, published in Gazzetta
Ufficiale, No. 118 (May 21, 1928). Printed in Benito Mussolini,
Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions (Rome: "Ardita," 1935),
pp. 182-194 passim.
(c) Receipt of a stipend, salary or pension, or other emolument
of continuous character, provided in the budget of the State,
province or commune, or any other body which is subject, by law,
to the supervision of the State, province or commune;
(d) Membership of the Catholic clergy, secular or regular, or
minister of another religion the exercise of which is admitted in the
State . . . .
Art. 44-The number of deputies for the Kingdom shall be 400.
The Kingdom shall form a single national constituency. . . .
Art. 46-The election of the deputies shall take place through:
1. the designation of candidates by the organizations mentioned
in Articles 4 7 and 51 ;
2. the nomination of candidates by the Fascist Grand Council;
3. approval by the electoral body.
Art. 47-The right to designate candidates belongs first to the
National Confederations of legally recognized syndicates, under
Article 41 of the Royal Decree of July 1, 1926, No. 1130. . . .
The organizations mentioned above shall designate a total num-
ber of candidates which is double the number of deputies to be
elected.
The distribution of this number among the various confedera-
tions is made in the table annexed to the present law.
The candidates shall be designated, for each confederation, by its
general or national council regularly elected and convoked in
accordance with the statutes.
The meetings called for the selection of candidates shall be held
in Rome. The persons who receive the largest number of votes at
these meetings shall be designated as candidates.
A notary shall draw up a record of the meeting and the result of
the voting. . . .
Art. 51-Candidates may also be designated by legally recog-
nized enti moralf! and by de facto associations having national
importance and pursui11g ends of culture, education, assistance and
propaganda, [provided that they are] recognized by royal decree
. . . subject to revision every three years.
The above-mentioned organizations may propose a total number
of candidates equal to one-half of the deputies to be elected. . . .
Art. 52-The period within which the organizations indicated in
Arts. 4 7 and 51 are to submit the names of their candidates to the
4. Incorporated charitable and educational bodies.-Ed.

72 FASCISM IN ITALY
Fascist Grand Council is set forth in the decree announcing the

elections. This period shall not be less than 20 nor more than 40
days from the date of publication of the decree just mentioned.
For each candidate put forward the organizations designating
him must furnish certificates of birth, citizenship and criminal
record, except in the case of ex-deputies.
The secretariat of the Fascist Grand Council, on receiving the
names of the proposed candidates, shall form a single list of candi-
dates in alphabetical order, indicating beside each name the organi-
zation proposing him. No attention shall be paid to the names of
candidates received after the expiration of the time limit fixed in
the decree calling the elections.
The Fascist Grand Council shall nominate a list of candidates,
choosing freely from the list of those designated and even else-
where if necessary, in order to include persons who have achieved
fame in the sciences, letters, arts and politics, and in the defense
services, who do not figure in the list of candidates.
A report on the deliberations of the Grand Council shall be
drawn up under the direction of the Secretary of the Grand
Council itself.
The list of nominated deputies bearing the emblem of the
"Lictors' Fasces," on the model prescribed for the emblem of the
State, shall be published free of cost in the Gazzetta U fficiale and
posted in all the communes of the Kingdom under the direction of
the Minister of the Interior.
Art. 53-The elections for the approval of the list of deputies
nominated shall take place on the third Sunday following the
publication of the list in the Gazzetta U fficiale of the Kingdom.
The vote shall be cast on ballots bearing the sign of the "Lictors'
Fasces" and the formula: "Do you approve the list of deputies
nominated by the Fascist Grand Council?" The vote shall be ex-
pressed beneath this formula by the word "Yes" or "No." ...
Art. 88-Should the list of deputies nominated not be approved,
the Court of Appeal of Rome, by a decree shall order new elec-
tions with competing lists of candidates, and shall set the date of
the elections not sooner than 30 and not later than 45 days from
the date of the decree. . . .
At the second election all associations and organizations having
5,000 voting members who are regularly registered in the electoral
lists may present lists of candidates.
In deciding with regard to the lists of candidates proposed there
shall be observed the rules and regulations established in the stat-
utes of each association or organization. The persons receiving the
largest number of votes at the meeting shall be proposed as candi-
dates. A public notary shall draw up a report of the meeting and of
the balloting. The report must also confirm that the meeting has
been regularly convened. . . .
Art. 100-The Court of Appeal in Rome, acting as a national
electoral office indicated in Article 83, upon receiving the acts
. . . , shall count the votes obtained by each list and proclaim the
result of the ballot.
All the candidates of the list which has received the majority of
votes are declared elected.
Places reserved for minority representation shall be distributed
among the other lists in proportion to the number of votes cast for
each.
For this purpose, the total number of votes obtained by all the
lists competing for the places reserved to the minority shall be
divided by the total number of such places. The resulting figure is
the minority quotient. The total number of votes received by each
list is then divided by the said quotient and the result represents the
number of places to be assigned to each list. The places eventually
remaining unassigned shall be distributed respectively to the lists to
which these last divisions have given the largest remainders and, in
case of equality of remainders, to the minority list which has re-
ceived the largest number of votes.
In each list the first on the list are declared elected within the
limits of the number of places assigned to the list. . . .
Art. 106-All provisions regarding parliamentary incompatibil-
ities are abrogated.
TABLE OF CANDIDATES
Number of candidates that each National Confederation of legally

recognized syndical associations may propose for each hundred
candidates presented by the Confederations:
1. National Confederation of Agriculturalists-12;
2. National Confederation of employees and workers in agricul-
ture-12;
3. National Confederation of Industrialists-10;
74 FASCISM IN ITALY
4. National Confederation of employees and workers in indus-

try-10;
5. National Confederation of Merchants-6;
6. National Confederation of employees and workers in com-
merce-6;
7. National Confederation of Persons Conducting Air and Sea
Transport Services-5;
8. National Confederation of employees and workers in Air and
Sea Transport Services-5;
9. National Confederation of Persons Conducting Transport
Services by Land, Lakes and Rivers-4;
10. National Confederation of employees and workers in Trans-
port Services by Land, Lakes and Rivers-4;
11. National Confederation of Credit and Insurance-3;
12. National Confederation of employees of Credit and Insur-
ance-3;
13. National Confederation of Professionals and Artists-20.
The law on the Fascist Grand Council of December 9, 1928 (supple-

mented by a decree of December 14, 1929), put the finishing touches
on the dictatorship. The Grand Council was instructed to keep always
on hand a list of names to be presented to the Crown for the posts of
Head of the Government and cabinet ministers; in this way the nomi-
nation passed from the hands of Parliament to the Fascist party. The
Head of the Government was simultaneously the Duce of the PNF; his
responsibility toward the King was only nominal, and was really effec-
tive only as regards the party. By this legislation, therefore, Italy
became a party-state, the PNF structure being superimposed on that of
the state. Under the new arrangement the party would have to be
dissolved and the Grand Council come out in open opposition to
Mussolini before the King could intervene. Among the constitutional
questions lying within the purview of the Grand Council were the
succession to the throne and the attributes and prerogatives of the
Crown. Though privately he was irritated, Victor Emmanuel accepted
this diminution of his power.
As things actually worked out, the task of the Grand Council con-
sisted merely of approving what had already been decided by the
Duce. Except for some debate over the racist decrees in 1938, the only
time the Grand Council played a significant role was the night of July
24/25, 1943, when it appealed to the Crown against Mussolini.
The Fascist Grand Council

(December 9, 1928)
Art. 1-The Fascist Grand Council is the supreme organ which co-
ordinates and integrates all the activities of the regime that emerged
from the Revolution of October, 1922. It possesses deliberative
powers in cases established by law, and is likewise empowered to
give advice upon all other political, economic, and social questions
of national interest whenever called upon to do so by the Head of
the Government.
Art. 2-The Head of the Government, Prime Minister Secre-
tary of State, is by right president of the Fascist Grand Council.
He may summon it whenever he deems it necessary and fix its
agenda.
Art. 3-The secretary of the National Fascist Party is also secre-
tary of the Grand Council. The Head of the Government may
delegate the secretary to preside over the meetings of the Grand
Council in his absence, or whenever he is prevented from attend-
ing, or in case of vacancy.
Art. 4-The quadrumvirs of the March on Rome are members
of the Fascist Grand Council for an indefinite period.
Art. 5-The following are ex officio members of the Grand
Council for the duration of their office:
1. The President of the Senate and the President of the Chamber
of Deputies;
2. The Ministers Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, In-
terior, Justice, Finance, National Education, Agriculture and For-
estry, and Corporations;
3. The President of the Royal Academy of Italy;
4. The Secretary and the two Vice-Secretaries of the National
Fascist Party;
5. The Commandant General of the Voluntary Militia for
National Security;
6. The President of the Special Tribunal for the Defense of the
State;
souRcE: Law No. 2693 of December 9, 1928, published in Gaz-

zetta Ufficiale, No. 287 (Dec. 11, 1928), as revised by Law No.
2099 of December 19, 1929. My translation.
76 FASCISM IN ITALY
7. The Presidents of the National Fascist Confederations and of

the National Confederations of the Fascist Syndicates of Industry
and Agriculture.
Art. 6-The appointment of the above-listed persons to the
Grand Council is recognized by royal decree upon the recom-
mendation of the Head of the Government. The appointment may
be revoked by the same method at any time.
Art. 7-The Head of the Government may, by decree, appoint
as members of the Fascist Grand Council, for a period of three
years and with the possibility of reappointment, those persons who
have, as members of the Government, or secretaries of the Na-
tional Fascist Party since 1922, or for other merits, deserved well
of the nation and of the cause of the Fascist Revolution. Such
appointments may be revoked by the same method at any time.
Art. 8-Eligibility for membership in the Grand Council is
compatible with that of Senator and Deputy.
Art. 9-No member of the Grand Council may be arrested,
unless he be taken in the very act of a crime, nor submitted to legal
or police proceedings, without the authorization of the Grand
Council.
Art. 10-The members of the Grand Council receive no re-
muneration. The State incurs no expense for the Grand Council.
The meetings of the Grand Council are secret. Its mode of proce-
dure is fixed by by-laws which the Grand Council approves.
Art. 11-The Grand Council deliberates upon:
1. The list of Deputies designated for election under the terms
of Art. 5 of Law No. 1019 of May 17, 1929 (cf. Art. 52 of the
electoral law No. 1993 of Sept. 2, 1929);
2. The statutes, regulations, and political directives of the Na-
tional Fascist Party;
3. The appointment and dismissal of the secretary, vice-secre-
taries, administrative secretary, and other members of the directory
of the Fascist Party.
Art. 12-The advice of the Grand Council shall be requested
upon all questions of a constitutional character. Proposed legisla-
tion on the following matters will be construed to have such
constitutional character:
1. The succession to the Throne, and attributions and preroga-
tives of the Crown;
2. The composition and functions of the Grand Council, the
Senate, and the Chamber of Deputies;
3. The attributions and prerogatives of the Head of the Gov-
ernment, Prime Minister Secretary of State;
4. The right of the Executive to issue rules having force of
law;
5. The nature of syndical and corporative organization;
6. The relations between the State and the Holy See;
7. International treaties involving alteration in the territory of
the State or of the colonies, or any surrender of territory.
Art. 13-The Grand Council, at the recommendation of the
Head of the Government, draws up and keeps up to date a list of
names to be submitted to the Crown, in the case of vacancy, for
the position of Head of the Government. . . .
Although the elitist principle was followed ostensibly by the PNF (as
was the case with the Communist party in Russia, whose example it
copied), this was not always scrupulously observed. Until 1932 there
were never more than one million party members (about 2.5 per cent
of the population); beginning in 1932-33 Mussolini packed the party
with a considerably larger number in order to bring about its "iden-
tification" with the nation. Civil servants and educators were coerced
into it, while thousands of others joined for reasons of job security or
avoidance of physical harm. Some cynics declared the initials really
meant Per Necessita Familiari (For Family Necessity). After the early
years of exaltation, "dry rot" and sycophancy set in by the late 1930's.
In June, 1943, membership in the PNF was 4,770,770-of whom
1,600,140 were in the armed forces.
The PNF statute that went into effect on November 12, 1932, is
printed below. It superseded that of December 20, 1929. Minor revi-
sions were made in later years.
Statute of the National Fascist Party

(November 12, 1932)
NATURE OF THE PARTY
Art. 1-The National Fascist Party is a civil militia, under the

orders of the oucE, in the service of the Fascist State.
Art. 2-The National Fascist Party is composed of Fasci di
Combattimento, which are grouped, in each province, into a Fed-
eration of Fasci di Combattimento.
The Secretary of a Federation of Fasci di Combattimento,
souRcE: Benito Mussolini, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions

(Rome: "Ardita," 1935), pp. 198-217.
78 FASCISM IN ITALY
whenever he considers it necessary, is authorized to organize the

Fasci di Combattimento into regional groups or sub-sections, each
directed by a Leader (Fiduciario) and by a Board of five members,
to one of whom will be entrusted administrative functions.
A Fascio di Combattimento cannot be formed or dissolved
without the authority of the Secretary of the National Fascist
Party.
In every provincial capital shall be established a University Fas-
cist Group.
Attached to each Fascio di Combattimento shall be formed a
Fascio Giovanile di Combattimento and a Women's Fascio. The
latter shall in its turn establish a group of girl Fascists.
Attached to the Federation of Fasci di Combattimento shall be
established the provincial associations of Schools, of Public Em-
ployment, of Railways, of Posts and Telegraphs, of Employees in
State Industrial Concerns, and the Section of District Doctors
belonging to the Association of Public Employment.
Art. 3-The Black Shirt is the Fascist uniform and must be worn
only on prescribed occasions.
The Fascist must wear the badge of the National Fascist Party.
Art. 4-The standard is the emblem of the Fascio di Combatti-
mento and is the symbol of Fascist faith.
The standard, which at official ceremonies is entrusted to a
standard-bearer, is entitled to an escort of five Fascists chosen
amongst those who took part in the March on Rome or have
served the longest in the Party, commanded by the Vice-Secretary
of the Fascio di Combattimento.
The standard of the National Directories of the National Fascist
Party and the standard of the Federation of Fasci di Combatti-
mento, to both of which military honors must be paid, are entitled
to an escort of Fascist Militia (M.V.S.N.) under the command of
an officer.
ORGANS AND HIERARCHY
Art. 5-The National Fascist Party through its collegiate organs

and its officers carries out its activities under the guidance of the
oucE and in accordance with the directions traced by the Grand
Council.
The hierarchy are:
1. The Secretary of the National Fascist Party;
2. The members of the National Directorate of the National
Fascist Party-the President of the Association of the Families of
the Fascist Fallen and of Fascists Wounded or Disabled for the
National Cause;
3. The Federal Secretary and the Federal Commander of the
Fasci Giovanili di Combattimento-the Vice-Secretary of the Uni-
versity Fascist Groups;
4. The members of the Federal Directorates-the Secretaries of
the University Fascist Groups-the Seconds-in-Command of the
Fasci Giovanili di Combattimento-the Regional Inspectors-the
Administrators of the Associations of the Families of the Fascist
Fallen. and of Fascists Wounded and Disabled for the National
Cause-the provincial Administrators of the Women's Fasci;
5. The Secretaries of the Fasci di Combattimento-the members
of the Directorate of the Fasci di Combattimento-the Adminis-
trators of the Regional Groups-the members of the Directorate
of the University Fascist Groups-the Commanders of the Fasci
Giovanili di Combattimento-the Administrators of the Sub-
Sections-the Administrators of the Fascist University Nucleus-
the Secretaries of the Women's Fasci.
The Collegiate organs are:
1. The National Directorate of the National Fascist Party;
2. The National Council of the National Fascist Party;
3. The Directorate of the Federations of Fasci di Combatti-
mento (Federal Directorate);
4. The Directorate of the Fasci di Combattimento;
5. The Board of the Regional Groups;
6. The Directorate of the University Fascist Groups;
7. The Board of the Sub-Sections.
A Fascist who was present at the foundation of the Fasci di
Combattimento (Piazza San Sepolcro, Milan, 23rd March 1919)
shall have precedence over other Fascists of his category.
Art. 6-Positions of authority, commands or other offices must
be entrusted to Black Shirts who have fought for or assisted the
Revolution or to Fascists who have risen from the Youth Organi-
zations.
THE CENTER
Art. 7-The National Directorate of the National Fascist Party,

presided over by the Secretary of the National Fascist Party, con-
sists of two Vice-Secretaries, an Administrative Secretary and six
members.
80 FASCISM IN ITALY
The nucE proposes to the King the nomination and dismissal of

the Secretary of the National Fascist Party. 5 The Secretary of the
National Fascist Party is a member of the Fascist Grand Council
and is also its Secretary; he can be summoned to take part in the
sessions of the Council of Ministers; he is a member of the Supreme
Council of Defense, of the Superior Council of National Educa-
tion, of the Administrative Council of the National Fascist Institute
of Culture, of the National Council of Corporations and of the
Central Corporative Committee; he is the President of the National
Union of Italian Reserve Officers, of the Administrative Commis-
sion of National Employment Bureaus, Vice-President of the Cen-
tral Board of University Activities, Secretary of the University
Fascist Groups and Commander of the Fasci Giovanili di Com-
battimento.
The Secretary of the National Fascist Party, basing himself on
the general instructions of the Grand Council of Fascism (set up
by the law of December 9, 1928-VII, No. 2693) the supreme body
issued from the Revolution, which co-ordinates and integrates all
the activities of the regime, imparts instructions for the work to be
carried out by the dependent organizations, reserving to himself
the fullest control.
He presides over the activities of the National Directorate of the
National Fascist Party and, subject always to his right eventually
to make necessary changes, lays down the regulations for the
setting up and working of the Departments, which are constituted
as follows:
Political Secretariat;
Administrative Secretariat;
Association of the Families of Fascist Fallen;
Fascist University Groups;
Fasci Giovanili di Combattinzento;
Women's Fasci;
Fascist Associations (Schools, Public Employees, State Rail-
ways, Posts and Telegraphs, Employees of the State Industrial
organizations) ;
National Olympic Committee;
5. Mussolini dismissed Farinacci from the secretaryship in April, 1926.

He was replaced by Augusto Turati until 1929; Giovanni Giuriati (1929-
31); and Achille Starace (1931-39). Thereafter such mediocrities as Ettore
Muti, A. Serena, Aldo Vidussoni, and Carlo Scorza held the post.-Ed.
National Dopolavoro Organization;
Press and Propaganda;
Historical Committee;
Archives.
On the proposal of the Federal Secretaries, he nominates the

Federal Directors, the Secretaries of the University Fascist Groups,
and the Administrators of the Women's Fasci.
Whenever, at his request, a Federal Secretary is removed, he has
the right to dissolve the Federal Directorate and to proceed to the
appointment of an Extraordinary Commissioner.
He controls the working of the non-central organizations, since
all their actions are imbued with the spirit of Fascism; he maintains
contact with the National Fascist Confederations of Employers
and Workers, the National Fascist Confederation of Professional
Workers and Artists, and the National Co-operative Organizations
and, whenever necessary, collaborates in the field of labor and
production; he maintains contact with the various organs of the
State, with the Presidency of the Senate, with the Presidency of
the Chamber of Deputies, with the General Command of the
M.V.S.N. (Militia), and with the Secretary General of the Italian
F asci abroad.
He has under his direct orders the National Italian Olympic
Committee and the National Dopolavoro Organization.
Subject to the decision of the DUCE he personally takes the Chair
at their meetings or appoints others to do so.
Art. 8-The members of the National Directorate of the Na-
tional Fascist Party are appointed and removed by the DUCE on the
proposal of the Secretary of the National Party.
The Vice-Secretaries of the National Fascist Party are members
of the Grand Council of Fascism and of the National Council of
Corporations, and are Vice-Commanders of the Fasci Giovanili di
Combattimento.
They assist the Secretary of the National Fascist Party and
substitute him in case of need.
The Administrative Secretary of the National Fascist Party is a
member of the Central Board of University Activities.
The National Directorate, summoned by the Secretary of the
National Fascist Party, will normally meet once a month in the
Littorio Palace, and whenever the Secretary of the National Fascist
Party may deem it necessary.
82 FASCISM IN ITALY
When the meetings of the National Directorate of the National

Fascist Party are ordered and presided over by the nucE, the
Minister of the Interior, the General Commandant of the M.V.S.N.
(Militia), and the Minister of Corporations shall take part.
At meetings presided over by the Secretary of the National
Fascist Party, the Under-Secretary of State for the Interior, the
Under-Secretary of State for Corporations, and the Chief of Staff
of the M.V.S.N. (Militia) have the right to be present.
As a general rule the decisions shall be published by means of the
Order Sheet (Foglio d'Ordine).
Art. 9- The National Council is composed of the Federal Secre-
taries and is presided over by the Secretary of the National Fascist
Party, who summons it with the previous authorization of the
DUCE.
It examines the activity of the National Fascist Party, and re-
ceives general instructions for execution.
Art. 10-The nucE summons to the General Meeting (Gran
Rapporto) the members of the Grand Council of Fascism, the
National Directorate of the National Fascist Party, the National
Council of the National Fascist Party, and the Federal Directors.
IN THE PROVINCES
Art. 11-Federal Secretaries are appointed and removed by the

nucE, on the proposal of the Secretary of the National Fascist
Party.
They carry out the orders of the Secretary of the National
Fascist Party.
They promote and control the activities of the Fasci di Com-
battimento of the province and exercise a political control over all
the institutions and organizations of the Regime.
They keep in touch with Senators and Deputies and with the
Commandant of the Militia.
They preside over the lntersyndical Committee and the Joint
Administrative Commission of the Provincial Employment
Bureaus.
They are members of the Board of University Activities in cities
where Universities or Higher Educational Institutes are established.
They preside over the Relief Organizations and the provincial
Dopolavoro.
They promote and regulate sport in the subordinate organi-
7.ations.
They convene the Federal Directorate at least once a month, and
at least once a year summon the Secretaries of the Fasci di Com-
battimento and with them examine and illustrate the problems
confronting the Fasci di Combattinzento and the political, moral
and economic problems of the province.
They control directly, or through their appointees, the keeping
of the registers of membership (Federal and of the Fasci di Com-
battimento) and of the archives.
They propose to the Secretary of the National Fascist Party the
names of the members of the Federal Directorate to the number of
seven.
The Federal Directorate has consultative functions; to each
member the Federal Secretary may entrust special duties in con-
nection with the various branches of the National Fascist Parry's
activities and those of dependent organizations.
Two of the members of the Federal Directorate will respectively
be delegated to conduct the Federal Secretariat (Federal Vice-
Secretary) in the absence of the Federal Secretary, and the Federal
Administrative Secretariat (Federal Administrative Secretary).
He (the Federal Secretary) may avail himself of the assistance of
Regional Inspectors, whom he appoints himself.
He is Federal Commandant of the Fasci Giovanili di Combatti-
mento.
He appoints the Political Secretary of each Fascio di Combat-
timento, and the latter, in turn, proposes to the Federal Secretary
the names of members of the Directorate of the Fascio di Combat-
timento, to the number of five.
The number of members of the Directorate of the Fascio di
Combattimento in the provincial capital is seven.
This number may, with the authorization of the Secretary of the
National Fascist Parry, be raised to nine if the membership (of the
Fascio di Combattimento) exceeds 20,000.
Art. 12-At the headquarters of the Federation of the Fasci di
Combattimento a register must be kept of those inscribed in each
Fascio di Combattimento.
The making out of membership cards is entrusted to the Federa-
tion of the Fasci di Combattimento under the personal responsibil-
ity of the Federal Secretary.
Art. 13-It is incumbent on the Political Secretary of the Fascio
di Combattimento and the leaders of district groups and sub-sec-
tions to know the political and moral antecedents as well as the
84 FASCISM IN ITALY
means of subsistence of each member, and to insist that even in

every day matters Fascist spirit and discipline be respected, report-
ing to the Federal Secretary whenever necessary those who fail in
their duties.
He is personally responsible for the correctness of the register of
membership.
The Political Secretary of the Fascio di Combattimento and the
leaders, on receipt of orders from the Federal Secretary shall call
together the Fascists on the opening of the Fascist year, to com-
municate and illustrate the program which they intend to follow,
and upon which discussion is permitted. In the course of the year,
they hold at least one other meeting, preferably on the anniversary
of the constitution of the Fascio di Combattimento concerned.
THE FASCIST LEVY
Art. 14-The Fascist Levy takes place on April 21st, Labor Day.
The Fascist Levy consists in the promotion of Balilla to the ranks
of the Avanguardisti, and of Avanguardisti to the ranks of the
Young Fascists, as well as of the latter to the National Fascist Party
and the Fascist Militia.
The arrangements for the Levy are agreed upon by the Secre-
tary of the National Fascist Party, the Under-Secretary of State
for the Education and Physical training of the young, the President
of the National Balilla Organization, and the Chief of Staff of the
Fascist Militia.
The Young Fascists who enter the National Fascist Party take
the oath before the Political Secretary of the Fascio di Combatti-
mento in the following form:
"In the name of God and of Italy I swear to carry out without
discussion the orders of the Duce and to serve the Cause of the
Fascist Revolution with all my might and if necessary with my
life."
DISCIPLINE
Art. 15-In the National Directorate of the National Fascist Party

is instituted the Court of Discipline, presided over by a Vice-
Secretary and composed of two full members, two supplementary
members chosen from the National Directorate and a Secretary,
appointed from time to time by the Secretary of the National
Fascist Party.
Only such cases will be deferred to the Court as the Secretary of
the National Fascist Party considers call for special examination.
The findings of the Court of Discipline will be submitted to the
Secretary of the National Fascist Party for his decisions.
Art. 16-In every Federation of Fasci di Combattimento is insti-
tuted a Federal Disciplinary Commission presided over by the
Federal Vice-Secretary and composed of five full members and
two supplementary members and a secretary, drawn from outside
the Federal Directorate.
These appointments are made by the Federal Secretary.
The Federal Disciplinary Commission may inflict the penalties
prescribed in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 19.
When the findings of the Federal Disciplinary Commission in-
volve the penalty of withdrawal of the membership card or expul-
sion, the proceedings will be referred to the Federal Secretary who,
where he considers that expulsion from the National Fascist Party
is advisable, submits a proposal to this effect to the Secretary of the
National Fascist Party in accordance with Article 21.
Art. 17-When the Disciplinary Commission has to try officers
or men of the Militia, Directors of the National Balilla Organiza-
tion, and Directors of the Syndical or Co-operative organizations,
the Federal Secretary will invite an officer or representative of the
said organization to form part of the Commission.
(a) When a Fascist, officer or man of the Fascist Militia, incurs
one of the disciplinary penalties prescribed by Article 19 of the
present Statute, the qualified Command takes analogous action.
Reprimands must be entered on the register sheets.
When a member of the Fascist Militia incurs one of the penalties
prescribed by the disciplinary regulations laid down by the Gen-
eral Command, which imply removal from the Militia, he must be
brought before the Federal Disciplinary Commission; whenever
"removal from the roll" is in question owing to lack of those
physical requirements or moral aptitudes called for in a member
of the Militia, the decision is without effect insofar as membership
of the National Fascist Party is concerned.
(b) When the Fascist Militia has to proceed against officers or
men who hold office in the National Fascist Party, the Federal
Secretary concerned will be consulted.
(c) When proceedings have to be taken against General
Officers or Consuls of the Fascist Militia-in permanent service or
on half pay-the General Command will be consulted.
86 FASCISM IN ITALY
(d) In disciplinary proceedings against higher (Primi Seniori and

Seniori) and lower grade officers-in permanent service or on half
pay-the Fascist Militia Command concerned (Group Command
or Legion) will be consulted.
(e) When the Fascist Militia authorities have pronounced a
decision which has subsequently been confirmed by the National
Fascist Parry, the delinquent's case may only be re-examined and
eventually modified by the Command concerned, with the prior
assent of the Federal Secretary.
Art. 18-The Fascist who fails in his duty through indiscipline
or lack of those qualities which constitute the traditionally Fascist
spirit will, except in cases of extreme urgency, be sent by the
Federal Secretary before the Federal Disciplinary Commission.
In cases of extreme urgency the Federal Secretary himself im-
poses the penalty.
DISCIPLINARY PENALTIES
Art.I9-Disciplinary penalties are as follows:

1. Reprimand;
2. Suspension for a definite period of time (from a minimum of
one month to a maximum of one year);
3. Suspension for an indefinite period of time;
4. Withdrawal of membership card;
5. Expulsion from the National Fascist Party.
Art. 20-The penalties referred to in Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of Article
19 are inflicted for disciplinary lapses which do not preclude
reconsideration.
When penal proceedings are opened against a Fascist for offenses
against personal honor, he is placed by the Federal Secretary in
suspension pending judgment.
Loss of his membership card is incurred by a Fascist who is
guilty of serious lapses of discipline or who shows that he does not
possess those qualities which make up the traditionally Fascist
spirit.
The punishment referred to in No. 5 of Article 19 is inflicted
upon traitors to the Cause of the Fascist Revolution and upon those
who have been sentenced for disgraceful crimes.
The Fascist who is expelled from the National Fascist Party
must be outlawed from public life.
His position is not susceptible of revision except in cases where
an error is shown to have been made by new facts or new evidence,
and then only upon the order of the nucE.
Art. 21-Disciplinary punishment must be accompanied by a
brief but clear statement of reasons and must be noted upon the
identification card of the person punished.
Upon this card must also be noted the expiration or revocation
of the sentence.
The person punished has the right of appeal to the Federal
Secretary in respect of punishments inflicted by the Federal Disci-
plinary Commission, and to the Secretary of the National Fascist
Party for punishments inflicted by the Federal Secretary, within
one month from the date of notification of the measure, which,
despite such appeal, becomes immediately effective.
He does not possess the right of appeal when the punishment has
been inflicted by the Secretary of the National Fascist Party,
except in cases where an error is revealed by new facts or new
evidence.
Expulsion from the National Fascist Party is inflicted directly by
the Secretary of the National Fascist Party or upon the proposal of
the Federal Secretary.
Art. 22-Fascists who hold public offices of particular impor-
tance cannot be subjected to proceedings or. disciplinary penalties
until they have left office.
Proceedings which it is proposed to take in regard to them will
be brought, informally, to the notice of the National Fascist Party,
and by the latter to the Government.
Disciplinary penalties may be inflicted upon Senators and Dep-
uties only by the Secretary of the National Fascist Party.
Art. 23-A Fascist who has been suspended from the Party is
obliged to abstain from all political activity and can take advantage
of no right accruing to him by reasoa of his Fascist membership.
Within twenty-four hours from the time of notification of the
sentence passed, he must deposit his membership card and badge in
the Secretarial Office of the Fascio di Combattimento in which he
is enrolled.
He is suspended from all offices or duties, unless instructions to
the contrary have been given.
The Fascist whose membership card is withdrawn or who is
expelled is obliged to resign from all offices, to relinquish all
charges, and to return, within twenty-four hours from the time of
notification of the sentence, his membership card and badge to the
88 FASCISM IN ITALY
Secretarial Office of the Fascio di Combattimento in which he was

enrolled.
Art. 24-The Federal Secretary, upon his own initiative, upon
the proposal of the political secretary of the Fascio di C ombatti-
mento, or upon the request of the person concerned, has authority
to reconsider the position of the Fascist who has been punished.
A Fascist who, after having suffered the loss of his membership
card, renders himself worthy of readmission has the right to claim
his previous standing as regards length of service.
Readmission must be ratified by the Secretary of the National
Fascist Party.
Art. 25-No punishment may be inflicted or proposed until the
charges have been notified and the defense carefully examined.
ADMINISTRATION
Art. 26-The Administrative Secretary of the National Fascist

Party administers the property of the National Fascist Party and is
responsible therefor.
He is responsible for the compilation of a balance sheet, which
he submits for examination by the National Fascist Party and for
approval by the Secretary of the National Fascist Party.
Supervision of the accounts of the National Fascist Party de-
volves upon a board of accountants composed of three members
elected each year by the National Directorate of the National
Fascist Party from among persons outside the Directorate.
Each year the board will present to the National Directorate of
the National Fascist Party its report.
The Administrative Secretary of the National Fascist Party is in
charge of the employment and supervision of personnel.
The Administrative Secretary of the National Fascist Party
approves the estimated and effective budgets of the Federations of
the Fasci di Combattimento and of subordinate organizations and
supervises the administration thereof through persons specially
designated by him.
Art. 27-The Federal Administrative Secretary is in charge of
the various property transactions of the Federation of the Fasci di
Combattimento and is responsible therefor.
He draws up the estimates and accounts, which he must present
annually for examination by the board of auditors and the Federal
Directorate, and for approval by the Administrative Secretary of
the National Fascist Party.
He provides, according to the instructions of the Federal Secre-
tary, for the Administration of the Federation of the Fasci di
Combattimento, and subordinate organizations (excluding theRe-
lief organizations) upon the basis of their respective estimated
budgets; for collections and payments within the various allot-
ments made in the budget, and in the case of possible extraordinary
expenditure he must consult the Federal Secretary, who will re-
quest the approval of the Administrative Secretary of the National
Fascist Party.
He is responsible for the accuracy of the accounting.
Supervision of the administration and accounting of the Federa-
tion of the Fasci di Combattimento and of subordinate organiza-
tions (excluding the Relief organizations) devolves upon a board
of three auditors appointed by the Federal Secretary from among
persons outside the Federal Directorate. As regards the Relief
organizations such functions are fulfilled by a board of auditors
composed of one accountant in the employ of the Prefecture and
two other members appointed by the Prefect.
The Federal Administrative Secretary makes provision directly
and through representatives appointed for that specific purpose for
surveillance and supervision of the administration of the Fasci di
Combattimento.
He is responsible for the discipline of subordinate personnel.
Art. 28-The National Directorate of the National Fascist Party
will at the opening of each Fascist year issue instructions regarding
the financing of the Federations of the Fasci di Combattimento and
subordinate organizations.
Art. 29-The Administrative Secretary of the Fascio di Com-
battimento has charge of and is responsible for the activities of the
Fascio di Combattimento.
He compiles the estimated and effective budgets which he must
present annually for examination by the Board of Auditors and the
Directorate of the Fascio di Combattimento and for approval by
the Federation of the Fasci di Combattimento.
He takes charge of obtaining membership cards from the Federal
Administrative Secretarial Office.
He is responsible for the custody of liquid funds in the bank
selected by him in agreement with the Federal Administrative
Secretary.
He takes charge of collections and payments upon the basis of
the estimated budget; he is responsible for the accuracy of the
90 FASCISM IN ITALY
accounting; he carries out the instructions of the Federal Adminis-

trative Secretary.
Supervision of the administration and accounting of the Fascio di
Combattimento devolves upon a board of three auditors appointed
by the Political Secretary of the Fascio di Combattimento from
among persons not members of the Directorate of the Fascio di
Co1nbattimento.
MEMBERSHIP CARDS
Art. 30-The membership card of the National Fascist Party is

issued gratuitously by the Political Secretary of the Fascio di
Combattimento to:
(a) Disabled War Veterans;
(b) Disabled Fascists;
(c) Families of Fallen Fascists;
(d) Members who are fathers of families of seven or more
children.
Art. 31-The Fascist Year begins on October 29th.
After the fusion of the Fascist and Nationalist parties in 1923, members
of the latter contingent made a vigorous effort to give a more con-
servative, "statist" tone to the ideology of Fascism. The most note-
worthy early such effort was the so-called Manifesto of the Fascist
Intellectuals, proclaimed on April 21, 1925, by Giovanni Gentile, a
distinguished nco-Hegelian philosopher who had served until 1924 as
Mussolini's first Minister of Education. His very rhetorical declaration
was signed by numerous figures of the cultural world, including Luigi
Pirandello and the poet Giuseppe Ungaretti.
Gentile's manifesto was too much for Benedetto Croce, a Liberal
Senator from Naples, to stomach. This eminent philosopher of history
(and former friend of Gentile's) penned a scathing Countermanifesto
on May 1, 192 5. Years later he recalled with satisfaction that almost
everyone remembered his reply long after they had forgotten the
contents of Gentile's declaration. Signed by dozens of Italy's leading
anti-Fascist intellectuals (e.g., Luigi Einaudi, Guido DeRuggiero, Luigi
Salvatorelli, and Guglielmo Ferrero), it was published in the national
press with the help of Amendola, leader of the Aventine. Croce ridi-
culed the "new religion" of Fascism as "an incoherent and bizarre
mishmash of appeals to both authority and demagogism, of professed
respect for the laws combined with violation of the laws, of reverence
for both ultramodern theories and moldy old notions, of fondness for
both absolutistic postures and Bolshevik tendencies, of unbelief alter-
nating with flirtations with the Catholic Church, of a loathing for real
culture mixed with a sterile reaching after culture that has no founda-
tion, of mystical mawkishness on the one hand and cynicism on the
other." 6
Though intensely irritated, Mussolini never dared to arrest the
renowned scholar, partly out of fear of foreign criticism; indeed, he
sought to make the rest of the world think that the dictatorship could
not be very brutal when a man like Croce was free to publish. The
latter's review, La Critica, which dealt with philosophy, history, and
literature, did manage to continue expressing publicly the editor's
judgments, the outward cultural format serving to mask the frequently
political substance. Thus if Croce jibed against the regimentation of
culture by Russian Communists or Nazi Brownshirts, his Italian
readers could discern that he also meant the pompous Blackshirt lictors
at home. It has been reported that whenever Croce left Naples to visit
other cities, his disciples welcomed him as the early Christians did St.
Paul. He became the major and virtually the only voice of freedom
and anti-Fascism within Italy during the next two decades.
Gentile was not the only intellectual to try to expound the philos-
ophy of Fascism in 1925. Alfredo Rocco, a Nationalist party juris-
prudent who espoused the organic state and became Mussolini's
influential Minister of Justice, set down on paper the theory of a su-
preme, totalitarian state directed by the intuitive genius of an all-power-
ful Duce. Finally it was Mussolini's turn himself. After he had been in
power a decade the editors of the new Enciclopedia ltaliana asked for
an authoritative article on Fascism. They invited Gentile to prepare it,
but when PNF leaders heard of this they were incensed, for it was
known that he had expressed hostility to Mussolini's Lateran Pacts
with the Church. They insisted that the Duce himself write the article.
Mussolini thereupon spent some three days reworking it, and the
second portion was entirely his own. It is in this section that the
"working ideology" of Fascism is stated most fully.
Mussolini's Doctrine of Fascism

(1932)
FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS
Like all sound political conceptions, Fascism is action and it is

thought; action in which doctrine is immanent, and doctrine arising
from a given system of historical forces in which it is insened, and
working on them from within. It has therefore a form correlated to
souRCE: Benito Mussolini, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions

(Rome: "Ardita," 1935), pp. 7-14. Footnote references deleted.
6. Published in II Mondo (Rome), May 1, 1925, and reprinted in Emilio
R. Papa, Storia di due manifesti: II fascismo e Ia cultura italiana (Milan:
Feltrinelli, 1958), pp. 92-97. My translation. By permission of Feltrinelli
Editore.
92 FASCISM IN ITALY
contingencies of time and space; but it has also an ideal content

which makes it an expression of truth in the higher region of the
history of thought. There is no way of exercising a spiritual
influence in the world as a human will dominating the will of
others, unless one has a conception both of the transient and the
specific reality on which that action is to be exercised, and of the
permanent and universal reality in which the transient dwells and
has its being. To know men one must know man; and to know
man one must be acquainted with reality and its laws. There can be
no conception of the State which is not fundamentally a concep-
tion of life: philosophy or intuition, system of ideas evolving
within the framework of logic or concentrated in a vision or a
faith, but always, at least potentially, an organic conception of the
world.
Thus many of the practical expressions of Fascism-such as
party organization, system of education, discipline-can only be
understood when considered in relation to its general attitude
toward life. A spiritual attitude. Fascism sees in the world not only
those superficial, material aspects in which man appears as an in-
dividual; standing by himself, self-centered, subject to natural law
which instinctively urges him toward a life of selfish momentary
pleasure; it sees not only the individual but the nation and the
country; individuals and generations bound together by a moral
law, with common traditions and a mission which, suppressing the
instinct for life closed in a brief circle of pleasure, builds up a
higher life, founded on duty, a life free from the limitations of time
and space, in which the individual, by self-sacrifice, the renuncia-
tion of self-interest, by death itself, can achieve that purely spiri-
tual existence in which his value as a man consists.
The conception is therefore a spiritual one, arising from the
general reaction of the century against the flaccid materialistic posi-
tivism of the nineteenth century. Anti-positivistic but positive;
neither skeptical nor agnostic; neither pessimistic nor supinely
optimistic as are, generally speaking, the doctrines (all negative)
which place the center of life outside man; whereas, by the exercise
of his free will, man can and must create his own world.
Fascism wants man to be active and to engage in action with all
his energies; it wants him to be manfully aware of the difficulties
besetting him and ready to face them. It conceives of life as a
struggle in which it behooves a man to win for himself a really
worthy place, first of all by fitting himself (physically, morally,
intellectually) to become the implement required for winning it.
As for the individual, so for the nation, and so for mankind. Hence
the high value of culture in all its forms (artistic, religious, scien-
tific), and the outstanding importance of education. Hence also the
essential value of work, by which man subjugates nature and
creates the human world (economic, political, ethical, intellectual).
This positive conception of life is obviously an ethical one. It
invests the whole field of reality as well as the human activities
which master it. No action is exempt from moral judgment; no
activity can be despoiled of the value which a moral purpose
confers on all things. Therefore life, as conceived ofby the Fascist,
is serious, austere, religious; all its manifestations are poised in a
world sustained by moral forces and subject to spiritual responsi-
bilities. The Fascist disdains an "easy" life.
The Fascist conception of life is a religious one, in which man is
viewed in his immanent relation to a higher law, endowed with an
objective will transcending the individual and raising him to con-
scious membership in a spiritual society. Those who perceive
nothing beyond opportunistic considerations in the religious policy
of the Fascist regime fail to realize that Fascism is not only a system
of government but also and above all a system of thought.
In the Fascist conception of history, man is man only by virtue of
the spiritual process to which he contributes as a member of the
family, the social group, the nation, and in function of history to
which all nations bring their contribution. Hence the great value of
tradition in records, in language, in customs, in the rules of social
life. Outside history man is a nonentity. Fascism is therefore
opposed to all individualistic abstractions based on eighteenth-
century materialism; and it is opposed to all Jacobinistic utopias
and innovations. It does not believe in the possibility of "happiness"
on earth as conceived by the economistic literature of the eight-
eenth century, and it therefore rejects the teleological notion that
at some future time the human family will secure a final settlement
of all its difficulties. This notion runs counter to experience which
teaches that life is in continual flux and in process of evolution. In
politics Fascism aims at realism; in practice it desires to deal only
with those problems which are the spontaneous product of historic
conditions and which find or suggest their own solutions. Only by
entering into the process of reality and taking possession of the
forces at work within it, can man act on man and on nature.
Anti-individualistic, the Fascist conception of life stresses the
94 FASCISM IN ITALY
imponance of the State and accepts the individual only insofar as

his interests coincide with those of the State, which stands for the
conscience and the universal will of man as a historic entity. It is
opposed to classical liberalism which arose as a reaction to abso-
lutism and exhausted its historical function when the State became
the expression of the conscience and will of the people. Liberalism
denied the State in the name of the individual; Fascism reasserts the
rights of the State as expressing the real essence of the individual.
And if Liberty is to be the attribute of living men and not of
abstract dummies invented by individualistic liberalism, then F as-
cism stands for libeny, and for the only liberty worth having, the
liberty of the State and of the individual within the State. The
Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no
human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. Thus
understood, Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State-a syn-
thesis and a unit inclusive of all values-interprets, develops, and
potentiates the whole life of a people.
No individuals or groups (political parties, cultural associations,
economic unions, social classes) outside the State. Fascism is there-
fore opposed to Socialism to which unity within the State (which
amalgamates classes into a single economic and ethical reality) is
unknown, and which sees in history nothing but the class struggle.
Fascism is likewise opposed to trade-unionism as a class weapon.
But when brought within the orbit of the State, Fascism recognizes
the real needs which gave rise to socialism and trade-unionism,
giving them due weight in the guild or corporative system in which
divergent interests are co-ordinated and harmonized in the unity of
the State.
Grouped according to their several interests, individuals form
classes; they form trade-unions when organized according to their
several economic activities; but first and foremost they form the
State, which is no mere matter of numbers, the sum of the indi-
viduals forming the majority. Fascism is therefore opposed to that
form of democracy which equates a nation to the majority, lower-
ing it to the level of the largest number; but it is the purest form of
democracy if the nation be considered-as it should be-from the
point of view of quality rather than quantity, as an idea, the
mightiest because the most ethical, the most coherent, the truest,
expressing itself in a people as the conscience and will of the few, if
not, indeed, of one, and tending to express itself in the con-
science and the will of the mass, of the whole group ethnically
moulded by natural and historical conditions into a nation, advanc-
ing, as one conscience and one will, along the self-same line of
development and spiritual formation. Not a race, nor a geographi-
cally defined region, but a people, historically perpetuating itself; a
multitude unified by an idea and imbued with the will to live, the
will to power, self-consciousness, personality.
Insofar as it is embodied in a State, this higher personality be-
comes a nation. It is not the nation which generates the State; that is
an antiquated naturalistic concept which afforded a basis for nine-
teenth-century publicity in favor of national governments. Rather
it is the State which creates the nation, conferring volition and
therefore real life on a people made aware of their moral unity.
The right to national independence does not arise from any
merely literary and idealistic form of self-consciousness; still less
from a more or less passive and unconscious de facto situation, but
from an active, self-conscious, political will expressing itself in
action and ready to prove its rights. It arises, in short, from the
existence, at least in fieri, of a State. Indeed, jt is the State which, as
the expression of a universal ethical will, creates the right to
national independence.
A nation, as expressed in the State, is a living, ethical entity only
insofar as it is progressive. Inactivity is death. Therefore the State is
not only Authority which governs and confers legal form and
spiritual value on individual wills, but it is also Power which makes
its will felt and respected beyond its own frontiers, thus affording
practical proof of the universal character of the decisions necessary
to ensure its development. This implies organization and expansion,
potential if not actual. Thus the State equates itself to the will of
man, whose development cannot be checked by obstacles and
which, by achieving self-expression, demonstrates its own infinity.
The Fascist State, as a higher and more powerful expression of
personality, is a force, but a spiritual one. It sums up all the mani-
festations of the moral and intellectual life of man. Its functions
cannot therefore be limited to those of enforcing order and keep-
ing the peace, as the liberal doctrine had it. It is no mere mechanical
device for defining the sphere within which the individual may
duly exercise his supposed rights. The Fascist State is an inwardly
accepted standard and rule of conduct, a discipline of the whole
person; it permeates the will no less than the intellect. It stands for a
principle which becomes the central motive of man as a member of
civilized society, sinking deep down into his personality; it dwells
96 FASCISM IN ITALY
in the heart of the man of action and of the thinker, of the artist
and of the man of science: soul of the soul.
Fascism, in short, is not only a law-giver and a founder of insti-
tutions, but an educator and a promoter of spiritual life. It aims at
refashioning not only the forms of life but their content-man, his
character, and his faith. To achieve this purpose it enforces disci-
pline and uses authority, entering into the soul and ruling with
undisputed sway. Therefore it has chosen as its emblem the
Lictor's rods, the symbol of unity, strength, and justice.
PoLITICAL AND SociAL DocTRINE
When, in the now distant March of 1919, I summoned a meeting at

Milan through the columns of the Popolo d'ltalia of the surviving
members of the Interventionist Party who had themselves been in
action, and who had followed me since the creation of the Fascist
Revolutionary Party (which took place in the January of 1915), I
had no specific doctrinal attitude in my mind. I had a living experi-
ence of one doctrine only-that of Socialism, from 1903-4 to the
winter of 1914-that is to say, about a decade: and from Socialism
itself, even though I had taken part in the movement first as a
member of the rank and file and then later as a leader, yet I had no
experience of its doctrine in practice. My own doctrine, even in
this period, had always been a doctrine of action. A unanimous,
universally accepted theory of Socialism did not exist after 1905,
when the revisionist movement began in Germany under the
leadership of Bernstein, while under pressure of the tendencies of
the time, a Left Revolutionary movement also appeared, which
though never getting further than talk in Italy, in Russian Socialistic
circles laid the foundations of Bolshevism. Reformation, Revolu-
tion, Centralization-already the echoes of these terms are spent-
while in the great stream of Fascism are to be found ideas which
began with Sorel, 7 Peguy, 8 with Lagardelle 9 in the "Mouvement
souRcE: Benito Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of
Fascism," in International Conciliation, No. 306 (Jan. 1935),
pp. 5-17, republished by courtesy of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace.
7. Georges Sorel (1847-1922), French theorist of syndicalism. Ed.
8. Charles Peguy (1873-1914), French Marxian socialist who became a
convert to Roman Catholicism. Ed.
9. Hubert Lagardelle ( 1874-1958), French theorist of revolutionary
syndicalism and editor of Le Mouvement Socialiste. Ed.
Socialiste," and with the Italian trade union movement which
throughout the period 1904--14 was sounding a new note in Italian
Socialist circles (already weakened by the betrayal of Giolitti)
through [Angelo] Olivetti's Pagine Libere, [Paolo] Orano's La
Lupa, and Enrico Leone's Divenire Sociale.
After the War, in 1919, Socialism was already dead as a doc-
trine: it existed only as a hatred. There remained to it only one
possibility of action, especially in Italy: reprisals against those who
had desired the War and who must now be made to "expiate" its
results. The Popolo d'ltalia was then given the subtitle of "The
newspaper of ex-servicemen and producers," and the word pro-
ducers was already the expression of a mental attitude. Fascism was
not the nursling of a doctrine worked out beforehand with detailed
elaboration; it was born of the need for action and it was itself
from the beginning practical rather than theoretical; it was not
merely another political party but, even in the first two years, in
opposition to all political parties as such, and itself a living move-
ment. The name which I then gave to the organization fixed its
character. And yet, if one were to re-read, in the now dusty
columns of that date, the repon of the meeting in which the Fasci
ltaliani di Combattimento were constituted, one would there find
no ordered expression of doctrine, but a series of aphorisms, antici-
pations, and aspirations which, when refined by time from the origi-
nal ore, were destined after some years to develop into an ordered
series of doctrinal concepts, forming the Fascists' political doctrine
-different from all others either of the past or the present day.
"If the bourgeoisie," I said then, "think that they will find light-
ning-conductors in us, they are the more deceived; we must stan
work at once. . . . We want to accustom the working-class to
real and effectual leadership, and also to convince them that it is no
easy thing to direct an industry or a commercial enterprise success-
fully. . . . We shall combat every retrograde idea, technical or
spiritual. . . . When the succession to the seat of government is
open, we must not be unwilling to fight for it. We must make
haste; when the present regime breaks down, we must be ready at
once to take its place. It is we who have the right to the succession,
because it was we who forced the country into the War, and led
her to victory. The present method of political representation
cannot suffice, we must have a representation direct from the
individuals concerned. It may be objected against this program that
it is a return to the conception of the corporation, but that is no
98 FASCISM IN ITALY
matter. Therefore, I desire that this assembly shall accept the

revindication of national trade-unionism from the economic point
of view. . . . "
Now is it not a singular thing that even on the first day in the
Piazza San Sepolcro that word "corporation" arose, which later, in
the course of the Revolution, came to express one of the creations
of social legislation at the very foundation of the regime?
The years which preceded the March to Rome were years of
great difficulty, during which the necessity for action did not
permit of research or any complete elaboration of doctrine. The
battle had to be fought in the towns and villages. There was much
discussion, but-what was more important and more sacred-men
died. They knew how to die. Doctrine, beautifully defined and
carefully elucidated, with headlines and paragraphs, might be lack-
ing; but there was to take its place something more decisive-Faith.
Even so, anyone who can recall the events of the time through the
aid of books, articles, votes of congresses, and speeches of great and
minor importance-anyone who knows how to research and weigh
evidence-will find that the fundamentals of doctrine were cast
during the years of conflict. It was precisely in those years that
Fascist thought armed itself, was refined, and began the great task
of organization. The problem of the relation between the indi-
vidual citizen and the State; the allied problems of authority and
liberty; political and social problems as well as those specifically
national-a solution was being sought for all these while at the
same time the struggle against Liberalism, Democracy, Socialism,
and the Masonic bodies was being carried on, contemporaneously
with the "punitive expedition." But, since there was inevitably
some lack of system, the adversaries of Fascism have disingenu-
ously denied that it had any capacity to produce a doctrine of its
own, though that doctrine was growing and taking shape under
their very eyes, even though tumultuously; first, as happens to all
ideas in their beginnings, in the aspect of a violent and dogmatic
negation, and then in the aspect of positive construction which has
found its realization in the laws and institutions of the regime as
enacted successively in the years 192 6, 192 7, and 192 8.
Fascism is now a completely individual thing, not only as a
regime but as a doctrine. And this means that today Fascism, exer-
cising its critical sense upon itself and upon others, has formed its
own distinct and peculiar point of view, to which it can refer and
upon which, therefore, it can act in the face of all problems, practi-
cal or intellectual, which confront the world.
And above all, Fascism, the more it considers and observes the
future and the development of humanity quite apart from political
considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor
the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of
Pacifism-born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of
cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its
highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility
upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it. All other trials
are substitutes, which never really put men into the position where
they have to make the great decision-the alternative of life or
death. Thus a doctrine which is founded upon this harmful postu-
late of peace is hostile to Fascism. And thus hostile to the spirit of
Fascism, though accepted for what use they can be in dealing with
particular political situations, are all the international leagues and
societies which, as history will show, can be scattered to the winds
when once strong national feeling is aroused by any motive-senti-
mental, ideal, or practical. This anti-pacifist spirit is carried by
Fascism even into the life of the individual; the proud motto of the
Squadrista, "Me ne frego," 10 written on the bandage of the wound,
is an act of philosophy not only stoic, the summary of a doctrine
not only political-it is the education to combat, the acceptance of
the risks which combat implies, and a new way of life for Italy.
Thus the Fascist accepts life and loves it, knowing nothing of and
despising suicide: he rather conceives of life as duty and struggle
and conquest, life which should be high and full, lived for oneself,
but above all for others-those who are at hand and those who are
far distant, contemporaries, and those who will come after.
This "demographic" policy of the regime is the result of the
above premise. Thus the Fascist loves in actual fact his neighbor,
but this "neighbor" is not merely a vague and undefined concept,
this love for one's neighbor puts no obstacle in the way of neces-
sary educational severity, and still less to differentiation of status
and to physical distance. Fascism repudiates any universal embrace,
and in order to live worthily in the community of civilized peoples
watches its contemporaries with vigilant eyes, takes good note of
their state of mind and, in the changing trend of their interests,
10. "I don't give a damn!"-Ed.

100 FASCISM IN ITALY
does not allow itself to be deceived by temporary and fallacious

appearances.
Such a conception of life makes Fascism the complete opposite
of that doctrine, the base of so-called scientific and Marxian Social-
ism, the materialist conception of history; according to which the
history of human civilization can be explained simply through
the conflict of interests among the various social groups and by the
change and development in the means and instruments of produc-
tion. That the changes in the economic field-new discoveries of
raw materials, new methods of working them, and the inventions
of science-have their importance no one can deny; but that these
factors are sufficient to explain the history of humanity excluding
all others is an absurd delusion. Fascism, now and always, believes
in holiness and in heroism; that is to say, in actions influenced by no
economic motive, direct or indirect. And if the economic concep-
tion of history be denied, according to which theory men are no
more than puppets, carried to and fro by the waves of chance,
while the real directing forces are quite out of their control, it
follows that the existence of an unchangeable and unchanging class-
war is also denied-the natural progeny of the economic concep-
tion of history. And above all Fascism denies that class-war can be
the preponderant force in the transformation of society. These two
fundamental concepts of Socialism being thus refuted, nothing is
left of it but the sentimental aspiration-as old as humanity itself-
towards a social convention in which the sorrows and sufferings of
the humblest shall be alleviated. But here again Fascism repudiates
the conception of "economic" happiness, to be realized by Social-
ism and, as it were, at a given moment in economic evolution to
assure to everyone the maximum of well-being. Fascism denies the
materialist conception of happiness as a possibility, and abandons it
to its inventors, the economists of the first half of the nineteenth
century: that is to say, Fascism denies the validity of the equation,
well-being = happiness, which would reduce men to the level of
animals, caring for one thing only-to be fat and well-fed-and
would thus degrade humanity to a purely physical existence.
After Socialism, Fascism combats the whole complex system of
democratic ideology, and repudiates it, whether in its theoretical
premises or in its practical application. Fascism denies that the
majority, by the simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human
society; it denies that numbers alone can govern by means of a
periodical consultation, and it affirms the immutable, beneficial, and
fruitful inequality of mankind, which can never be permanently

leveled through the mere operation of a mechanical process such as
universal suffrage. The democratic regime may be defined as from
time to time giving the people the illusion of sovereignty, while the
real effective sovereighty lies in the hands of other concealed and
irresponsible forces. Democracy is a regime nominally without a
king, but it is ruled by many kings-more absolute, tyrannical, and
ruinous than one sole king, even though a tyrant. This explains
why Fascism, having first in 192 2 (for reasons of expediency)
assumed an attitude tending towards republicanism, renounced this
point of view before the March to Rome; being convinced that the
question of political form is not today of prime importance, and
after having studied the examples of monarchies and republics past
and present reached the conclusion that monarchy or republi-
canism are not to be judged, as it were, by an absolute standard;
but that they represent forms in which the evolution-political,
historical, traditional, or psychological-of a particular country
has expressed itself. . . .
Fascism has taken up an attitude of complete opposition to the
doctrines of Liberalism, both in the political field and the field of
economics. There should be no undue exaggeration (simply with
the object of immediate success in controversy) of the importance
of Liberalism in the last century, nor should what was but one
among many theories which appeared in that period be put for-
ward as a religion for humanity for all time, present and to come.
Liberalism only flourished for half a century. It was born in 1830 in
reaction against the Holy Alliance, which had been formed with
the object of diverting the destinies of Europe back to the period
before 1789, and the highest point of its success was the year 1848,
when even Pius IX was a Liberal. Immediately after that date it
began to decay, for if the year 1848 was a year of light and hope,
the following year, 1849, was a year of darkness and tragedy. The
Republic of Rome was dealt a mortal blow by a sister republic-
that of France-and in the same year Marx launched the gospel of
the Socialist religion, the famous Communist Manifesto. In 1851
Napoleon III carried out his far from liberal coup d'etat and
reigned in France until 1870, when he was deposed by a popular
movement as the consequence of a military defeat which must be
counted as one of the most decisive in history. The victor was Bis-
marck, who knew nothing of the religion of liberty, or the prophets
by which that faith was revealed. And it is symptomatic that such a
highly civilized people as the Germans were completely ignorant of

the religion of liberty during the whole of the nineteenth century.
It was nothing but a parenthesis, represented by that body which has
been called "The ridiculous Parliament of Frankfort," which lasted
only for a short period. Germany attained her national unity quite
outside the doctrine of Liberalism-a doctrine which seems en-
tirely foreign to the German mind, a mind essentially monarchic-
while Liberalism is the logical and, indeed, historical forerunner of
anarchy. The stages in the achievement of German unity are the
three wars of '64, '66, and '70, which were guided by such "Lib-
erals" as Von Moltke and Bismarck. As for Italian unity, its debt to
Liberalism is completely inferior in contrast to that which it owes
to the work of Mazzini and Garibaldi, who were not Liberals. Had
it not been for the intervention of the anti-Liberal Bismarck at
Sadowa and Sedan it is very probable that we should never have
gained the province of Venice in '66, or been able to enter Rome in
'70. From 1870 to 1914 a period began during which even the very
high priests of the religion themselves had to recognize the gather-
ing twilight of their faith-defeated as it was by the decadence of
literature and atavism in practice-that is to say, Nationalism,
Futurism, Fascism. The era of Liberalism, after having accumu-
lated an infinity of Gordian knots, tried to untie them in the
slaughter of the World War-and never has any religion de-
manded of its votaries such a monstrous sacrifice. Perhaps the
Liberal Gods were athirst for Blood? But now, today, the Liberal
faith must shut the doors of its deserted temples, deserted because
the peoples of the world realize that its worship-agnostic in the
field of economics and indifferent in the field of politics and
morals-will lead, as it has already led, to certain ruin. In addition to
this, let it be pointed out that all the political hopes of the present
day are anti-Liberal, and it is therefore supremely ridiculous to try
to classify this sole creed as outside the judgment of history, as
though history were a hunting ground reserved for the professors
of Liberalism alone-as though Liberalism were the final unalter-
able verdict of civilization.
But the Fascist negation of Socialism, Democracy, and Liberal-
ism must not be taken to mean that Fascism desires to lead the
world back to the state of affairs before 1789, the date which seems
to be indicated as the opening year of the succeeding semi-Liberal
century: we do not desire to turn back; Fascism has not chosen De
Maistre for its high-priest. Absolute monarchy has been and can
never return, any more than blind acceptance of ecclesiastical

authority.
So, too, the privileges of the feudal system "have been," and
the division of society into castes impenetrable from outside, and
with no intercommunication among themselves: the Fascist con-
ception of authority has nothing to do with such a polity. A party
which entirely governs a nation is a fact entirely new to history,
there are no possible references or parallels. Fascism uses in its
construction whatever elements in the Liberal, Social, or Demo-
cratic doctrines still have a living value; it maintains what may be
called the certainties which we owe to history, but it rejects all the
rest-that is to say, the conception that there can be any doctrine
of unquestioned efficacy for all times and all peoples. Given that
the nineteenth century was the century of Socialism, of Liberalism,
and of Democracy, it does not necessarily follow that the twenti-
eth century must also be a century of Socialism, Liberalism, and
Democracy: political doctrines pass, but humanity remains; and it
may rather be expected that this will be a century of authority, a
century of the Right, a century of Fascism. For if the nineteenth
century was a century of individualism (Liberalism always signify-
ing individualism) it may be expected that this will be the century
of collectivism, and hence the century of the State. It is a perfectly
logical deduction that a new doctrine can utilize all the still vital
elements of previous doctrines.
No doctrine has ever been born completely new, completely
defined and owing nothing to the past; no doctrine can boast a
character of complete originality; it must always derive, if only
historically, from the doctrines which have preceded it and develop
into further doctrines which wiJI follow. Thus the scientific Social-
ism of Marx is the heir of the Utopian Socialism of Fourier, of the
Owens and of Saint-Simon; thus again the Liberalism of the eigh-
teenth century is linked with all the advanced thought of the
seventeenth century, and thus the doctrines of Democracy are the
heirs of the Encyclopedists. Every doctrine tends to direct human
activity towards a determined objective; but the action of men also
reacts upon the doctrine, transforms it, adapts it to new needs, or
supersedes it with something else. A doctrine then must be no mere
exercise in words, but a living act; and thus the value of Fascism
lies in the fact that it is veined with pragmatism, but at the same
time has a will to exist and a will to power, a firm front in face of
the reality of "violence."
The foundation of Fascism is the conception of the State, its

character, its duty, and its aim. Fascism conceives of the State as an
absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are
relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State. The
conception of the Liberal State is not that of a directing force,
guiding the play and development, both material and spiritual, of a
collective body, but merely a force limited to the function of
recording results: on the other hand, the Fascist State is itself
conscious, and has itself a will and a personality-thus it may be
called the "ethic" State. In 1929, at the first five-yearly assembly of
the Fascist regime, I said:
"For us Fascists, the State is not merely a guardian, preoccupied
solely with the duty of assuring the personal safety of the citizens;
nor is it an organization with purely material aims, such as to
guarantee a certain level of well-being and peaceful conditions of
life; for a mere council of administration would be sufficient to
realize such objects. Nor is it a purely political creation, divorced
from all contact with the complex material reality which makes up
the life of the individual and the life of the people as a whole. The
State, as conceived of and as created by Fascism, is a spiritual and
moral fact in itself, since its political, juridical, and economic
organization of the nation is a concrete thing: and such an organi-
zation must be in its origins and development a manifestation of the
spirit. The State is the guarantor of security both internal and
external, but it is also the custodian and transmitter of the spirit of
the people, as it has grown up through the centuries in language, in
customs, and in faith. And the State is not only a living reality of
the present, it is also linked with the past and above all with the
future, and thus transcending the brief limits of individual life, it
represents the immanent spirit of the nation. The forms in which
States express themselves may change, but the necessity for such
forms is eternal. It is the State which educates its citizens in civic
virtue, gives them a consciousness of their mission and welds them
into unity; harmonizing their various interests through justice, and
transmitting to future generations the mental conquests of science,
of art, of law and the solidarity of humanity. It leads men from
primitive tribal life to the highest expression of human power
which is Empire; it links up through the centuries the names of
those of its members who have died for its existence and in obedi-
ence to its laws, it holds up the memory of the leaders who have
increased its territory and the geniuses who have illuminated it
with glory as an example to be followed by future generations.
When the conception of the State declines, and disunifying and
centrifugal tendencies prevail, whether of individuals or of particu-
lar groups, the nations where such phenomena appear are in their
decline."
From 1929 until today, evolution, both political and economic,
has everywhere gone to prove the validity of these doctrinal
premises. Of such gigantic importance is the State. It is the force
which alone can provide a solution to the dramatic contradictions
of capitalism. . . . Fascism desires the State to be a strong and
organic body, at the same time reposing upon broad and popular
support. The Fascist State has drawn into itself even the economic
activities of the nation, and, through the corporative social and
educational institutions -created by it, its influence reaches every
aspect of the national life and includes, framed in their respective
organizations, all the political, economic and spiritual forces of the
nation. A State which reposes upon the support of millions of indi-
viduals who recognize its authority, are continually conscious of its
power and are ready at once to serve it, is not the old tyrannical
State of the medieval lord nor has it anything in common with the
absolute governments either before or after 1789. The individual in
the Fascist State is not annulled but r:ather multiplied, just in the
same way that a soldier in a regiment is not diminished but rather
increased by the number of his comrades. The Fascist State organ-
izes the nation, but leaves a sufficient margin of liberty to the indi-
vidual; the latter is deprived of all useless and possibly harmful
freedom, but retains what is essential; the deciding power in this
question cannot be the individual, but the State alone.
The Fascist State is not indifferent to the fact of religion in
general, or to that particular and positive faith which is Italian
Catholicism. The State professes no theology, but a morality, and
in the Fascist State religion is considered as one of the deepest
manifestations of the spirit of man; thus it is not only respected but
defended and protected. The Fascist State has never tried to create
its own God, as at one moment Robespierre and the wildest ex-
tremists of the Convention tried to do; nor does it vainly seek to
obliterate religion from the hearts of men as does Bolshevism;
Fascism respects the God of the ascetics, the saints and heroes, and
equally, God, as He is perceived and worshipped by simple people.
The Fascist State is an embodied will to power and government;
the Roman tradition is here an ideal of force in action. According
to Fascism, government is not so much a thing to be expressed in

territorial or military terms as in terms of morality and the spirit. It
must be thought of as an empire-that is to say, a nation which
directly or indirectly rules other nations, without the need for
conquering a single square yard of territory. For Fascism, the
growth of empire, that is to say the expansion of the nation, is an
essential manifestation of vitality, and its opposite a sign of deca-
dence. Peoples which are rising, or rising again after a period of
decadence, are always imperialist: any renunciation is a sign of
decay and of death.
Fascism is the doctrine best adapted to represent the tendencies
and the aspirations of a people, like the people of Italy, who are
rising again after many centuries of abasement and foreign servi-
tude. But empire demands discipline, the co-ordination of all forces
and a deeply felt sense of duty and sacrifice: this fact explains many
aspects of the practical working of the regime, the character of
many forces in the State, and the necessarily severe measures which
must be taken against those who would oppose this spontaneous
and inevitable movement of Italy in the twentieth century, and
would oppose it by recalling the outworn ideology of the nine-
teenth century-repudiated wheresoever there has been the cour-
age to undenake great experiments of social and political trans-
formation: for never before has the nation stood more in need of
authority, of direction, and of order. If every age has its own
characteristic doctrine, there are a thousand signs which point to
Fascism as the characteristic doctrine of our time. For if a doctrine
must be a living thing, this is proved by the fact that Fascism has
created a living faith; and that this faith is very powerful in the
minds of men, is demonstrated by those who have suffered and
died for it.
Fascism has henceforth in the world the universality of all those
doctrines which, in realizing themselves, have represented a stage in
the history of the human spirit.
3. The Corporative State
MussoLINI's ESSAY of 1932 on the doctrine of Fascism had almost

nothing to say about either the corporative state or economic au-
tarky. Yet in the period since the war he had become intrigued with
the possibility of harmonizing the interests of capital and labor with
the overarching interests of the state, and instituting a system of repre-
sentation that would rest on functional groupings organized in various
kinds of national syndicates instead of the old parliamentary system
based on geographical and numerical constituencies.
Such an idea was not new with Mussolini; it derived from two
currents of thought. On the one hand, there was the Catholic tradition
of corporativism, set forth in modern format by Leo XIII in his
encyclical of 1891, Rerum novarum, as an answer to the Marxist
challenge. The Catholic corporativists looked back with nostalgia
toward a revival of medieval guilds or corporations, and argued in
favor of class collaboration. They were willing to support the idea of
joint consultation between employers and workers, profit-sharing
schemes, and even part ownership. Thus the idea of a corporative state
was in the air and enjoyed some measure of respectability.
The second current that contributed to Mussolini's eventual espousal
of the corporative state was syndicalism, most cogently propagandized
by Georges Sorel at the turn of the century. Originally the Sorelian
syndicalists were not corporativists, but eventually some wound up in
that camp. In the beginning the syndicalists espoused class warfare,
stressed the importance of the myths of violence, sabotage, and the
general strike, and called for government based on labor syndicates
alone. In theory they rejected political parties and parliamentary insti-
tutions as well as the Marxist "dictatorship of the proletariat." Yet in
practice they organized politically. In Italy they infiltrated the Socialist
party until they were expelled in 1908. Thereafter they gravitated into
curious new stances. Some became Communists; others became arch-
nationalists. During the war some of these "national syndicalists"
became friendly with Mussolini. One of them, Edmonda Rossoni, had
spent some time in the United States. He conceived of a new kind of
syndical organization that would include not just labor unions but
parallel syndicates of the "producers" (i.e., capitalists). Capitalism and
private property would thus be preserved, though a laissez-faire econ-
omy and class struggle would be repudiated. National syndicalists came
to advocate governmental co-ordination of both capital and labor.
Labor must give up the right to strike; employers must renounce the
lockout; the state must crack the whip over both capital and labor and
adjudicate disputes by means of new labor courts. But in actual prac-
tice capital would be treated much more leniently than labor. This new
kind of national syndicalist corporative program was experimented

with by D'Annunzio and Alceste DeAmbris in Fiume in 1919-20.
A great deal of verbiage was to pour forth in Fascist Italy regarding
the corporative state, as efforts were made to amalgamate contra-
dictory traditions. Many of the corporative institutions that were
eventually launched were rationalizations of accomplished facts; many
of them had few real powers and served chiefly as a fa~ade to mask the
harsh features of contmuing class rule in Italy. Certainly they became a
bureaucratic hodgepodge that enabled Rome to surpass Milan in
population for the first time since 1875. Most critics are convinced that
the corporative system rested upon one very important pragmatic
consideration: it was a process designed to win the employers over to
Fascism. Though the corporative state did not save Italy from the
ravages of the Depression, it aroused much interest on the part of
foreigners in those years in what seemed to be an imaginative new
pattern of economic and political organization.
There were several stages in the development of the Italian corpora-
tive state. The first occurred on December 21, 1923, when Mussolini
called to his office in Rome's Chigi Palace representatives of the
employers' organization (Confindustria) and representatives of the
new General Confederation of Fascist Corporations (the Fascist labor
syndicates) to name a permanent committee to study the relationship
of capital and labor. The text of this Palazzo Chigi Pact follows.
The Palazzo Chigi Pact

(December 21, 1923)
The General Confederation of Italian Industry [ Confindustria]
and the General Confederation of Fascist Corporations,
acting for the purpose of
harmonizing their work by means of directives from the National
Government, which has repeatedly declared that it regards the
harmonious will to work by industrialists, technicians, and laborers
as offering the best means of increasing the prosperity of all classes
and the nation;
and recognizing
the complete accuracy of this political philosophy and the need for
the nation's productive forces to put it into effect;
souRcE: Resolution approved under the chairmanship of Mussolini

at the meeting of December 21, 192 3. Published in Alberto
Aquarone, L'organizzazione dello stato totalitario (Turin: Giulio
Einaudi Editore, 1965), Appendix No. 29, pp. 435-436. By per-
mission of Giulio Einaudi Editore, Turin. My translation.
THE CORPORATIVE STATE 109
do hereby declare
that the nation's natural resources, which are the prerequisite for its
political strength, can rapidly be increased; and that both laborers
and industrialists can avoid the damages and losses caused by work
interruptions if harmony between the various elements of produc-
tion assures the continuity and tranquillity of industrial devel-
opment;
and they do hereby affirm
the principle that syndical organization must not rest on the as-
sumption of an insoluble conflict of interests between industry and
labor, but must instead be based on the need to establish increas-
ingly cordial relations among the various employers, workers, and
their syndical organizations, and must assure to these productive
elements the best possible conditions for developing their respec-
tive functions and obtaining a fairer compensation for their work
-all of which will reflect the spirit of national syndicalism, even in
the negotiation of labor contracts;
and they do hereby agree
(a) that the Confederation of Industry and the Confederation
of Fascist Corporations should intensify their respective efforts
toward organizing industrialists and workers for the purpose of
mutual collaboration;
and (b) that a permanent Commission, consisting of five mem-
bers for each side, be appointed to supervise the fulfillment of the
above-mentioned principles both at the seat of government and in
outlying regions, and to co-ordinate the major bodies of the two
Confederations so that syndical activity will proceed in accordance
with the directives set forth by the Head of the Government.
Two years later (October 2, 1925) came the Vidoni Palace Pact. In
negotiating labor contracts henceforth, Gino Olivetti's Confindustria
agreed to deal only with the Fascist labor syndicates (Confederation of
Fascist Corporations) that were headed by Rossoni. The rival Socialist
and Catholic labor unions would be outlawed. The Fascist regime
would choose the officials of the Fascist labor syndicates rather than
permit the workers to do so, whereas the Confindustria would con-
tinue to be self-managed in large measure. In this way Mussolini in-
gratiated himself with the big industrialists who thus far had not
always been as pro-Fascist as the great landowners.
The Palazzo Vidoni Pact

(October 2, 1925)
The General Confederation of Industry recognizes in the Con-
federation of Fascist Corporations and its dependent organizations
the exclusive right to represent the various labor forces.
The Confederation of Fascist Corporations recognizes in the
Confederation of Industry and its dependent organizations the
exclusive right to represent the industrialists.
All contractual relationships between industrialists and employ-
ees must be negotiated by the dependent organizations of the
Confederation of Industry on the one hand and those of the
Confederation of Corporations on the other.
Consequently, factory shop-steward committees (internal com-
missions) are hereby abolished, and their functions are handed over
to the local syndicate which will exercise them only as regards the
corresponding industrial organization.
Discussions will begin within ten days to lay down broad guide-
lines that will be embodied in regulations.
During 192 5 political liberalism was largely scotched in Italy; in 1926

economic liberalism met a similar fate. On April 3 a very important
decree-law prohibiting strikes and lockouts was proclaimed. It was
drafted by Alfredo Rocco, the influential Nationalist party legal expert
who had become Mussolini's Minister of Justice and close adviser. By
this legislation the "syndical state" (though not yet the "corporative
state") came into existence. The state, acting as umpire, officially
recognized a pair of producers' and workers' syndicates in each of six
fields (industry, agriculture, commerce, maritime and air transport,
land and inland-waterway transport, and banking). In addition, there
was a syndicate of intellectuals. Each syndicate would assess dues upon
everyone in its category. They were placed under the control of a
newly created Minister of Corporations, and Mussolini was given this
portfolio to add to the many he already held. In due course some
sixteen labor courts were established.
souRcE: Alberto Aquarone, L' organizzazione dello stato totalitario

(Turin: GiulioEinaudiEditore, 1965),AppendixNo. 31,p.439.
By permission of Giulio Einaudi Editore. My translation.
The Rocco Labor and Antistrike Law

(April3, 1926)
CHAPTER 1: jURIDICAL RECOGNITION OF SYNDICATES

AND CoLLECTIVE LABOR CoNTRACTs
Art. 1-Syndical associations of employers and of workers, both

intellectual and manual, may obtain legal recognition when they
can prove that they comply with the following requirements:
1. In the case of associations of employers, that the employers
who have voluntarily registered as members employ not less than
one-tenth of the workers in the service of the concerns of the kind
for which the association has been formed. This rule applies for
each association within its district. In the case of employees' asso-
ciations, that the employees who have voluntarily enrolled shall
represent at least one-tenth of the total number of workers of the
category for which the association is organized. This rule applies to
each association within its district.
2. That the associations shall include among their aims not only
the protection of the economic and moral interests of their mem-
bers, but shall also aim to promote the welfare and education
(especially the moral and national education) ·of their members.
3. That the directors of the associations shall give proof of their
competence, good moral behavior, and sound national loyalty.
Art. 2-When the conditions prescribed in the previous article
exist, legal recognition may be given to associations of persons
independently exercising an an, trade, or profession.
Existing and legally recognized orders, institutes, and associa-
tions of artists, artisans, and professional men will continue to be
regulated by existing laws and regulations. However, such laws
and regulations may be revised by means of a royal decree issued
after consulting the opinion of the Council of Ministers in order to
harmonize them with the provisions of the present law.
The statutes of incorporated associations of artists and persons
exercising the liberal professions and recognized as public institu-
tions prior to the publication of the present law may also be revised
in order to harmonize them with the provisions of this law.
souRcE: Law No. 563 of April 3, 1926, published in Gazzetta

Ufficiale, No. 87 (Apr. 14, 1926). My translation.
Art. 3-The membership of the associations mentioned in the

preceding articles must include either employers or employees
alone.
Associations of employers and of workers can be brought to-
gether by means of central liaison organs with a common higher
organization. However, the representation of employers and em-
ployees shall always remain distinct; and in the case of associations
representing several categories of workers, each category must be
separately represented.
Art. 4-The recognition of the associations referred to in the
preceding articles is conferred by a royal decree upon the proposal
of the competent minister, acting jointly with the Minister of the
Interior, and after consultation with the Council of State. The
statute of the association is approved by the same decree, which is
published, at the expense of the association, in the Gazzetta U ffi-
ciale of the Kingdom.
The statute must set forth in detail the purposes of the associa-
tion, the mode of procedure following in the appointment of its
administrative officers, and the conditions laid down for the admis-
sion of members, one of which must be sound political conduct
from the standpoint of national loyalty.
The statute may provide for the establishment of vocational
schools, institutions for the economic assistance and moral and
patriotic education of members, and of institutions aiming at pro-
moting and improving national production, culture, or art.
Art. 5-Legally recognized associations possess juridical person-
ality, and before the law they represent all the employers, employ-
ees, artists, and professional men of the category for which they
are organized, regardless of whether or not there are any members
enrolled within the jurisdiction of the territorial division in which
they operate.
The legally recognized associations are entitled to levy annual
dues on all employers, workers, employees, artists, and professional
men whom they represent, whether they be registered members or
not, for an amount not to exceed in the case of employers, one
day's pay for each worker employed, and in the case of workers,
employees, artists, and professional men, one day's pay. At least
one-tenth of the sums thus collected must be set aside annually and
paid into a capital fund to guarantee the liabilities incurred by the
associations with reference to the collective contracts which they
have negotiated. This fund is to be administered in accordance
with the provisions of the regulation.
Employers are under obligation to report the number of em-
ployees to their associations not later than March 31 of each year.
Those who fail to report, or who file a false or incomplete report,
are punishable by a fine not to exceed 2,000 lire.
These dues are levied in accordance with the rules contained in
the laws on the collection of municipal taxes. The contributions of
employees are deducted from their wages or salaries and are turned
over to the associations.
Only regularly registered members participate in the activities of
the associations and in the election or nomination of administrative
officers.
Only legally recognized associations can appoint representative
of employers or workers to sit on all councils, guilds (corpora-
tions), or other bodies on which such representation is provided for
by law.
Art. 6- The associations may be communal, district, provincial,
regional, inter-regional, or national.
Recognition may also be granted, under the provisions of this
law, to federations or unions of several associations, and to con-
federations of several federations. The recognition of these federa-
tions or confederations carries with it the right to recognize each
association or affiliated federation. The federations or confedera-
tions exercise disciplinary powers over their member associations,
as well as over the individual members of same, these rights being
exercised in accordance with the rules laid down in their respective
statutes.
Legal recognition can be granted to only one association for
each class of employers, workers, artists, or professional men.
Similarly, legal recognition can be given to only one federation or
confederation of employers or workers or artists or professional
men, referred to in the preceding paragraph, for the class or classes
of employers or workers represented within the district assigned to
each.
If recognition be granted to a national confederation of all
classes of employers or workers in agriculture, industry, or trade,
or for all categories of artists or professional men, recognition
cannot be granted to federations or associations which are not
affiliated with the said confederation.
In no case can associations be recognized which, without the

prior authorization of the Government, have entered into disci-
plinary relations or have become affiliated with an international
association.
Art. 7-Each association is required to have a president or secre-
tary who directs and represents it, and is responsible for its activ-
ities. The president or secretary is elected or appointed in
accordance with the provisions laid down in the statutes.
The appointment or the election of presidents or secretaries of
national, inter-regional, and regional associations is not valid unless
it is approved by royal decree on the proposal of the competent
minister, in agreement with the Minister of the Interior. This
approval may, at any time, be revoked.
The statutes must determine the organ empowered to exercise
disciplinary powers over members and to expel them for unworthy
moral or political conduct.
Art. 8-The presidents or secretaries are assisted by boards of
directors elected by the members of the association in accordance
with the provisions laid down in the statutes.
Communal, district, and provincial associations are subject to the
supervision of the prefect and are under the trusteeship of the
Administrative Provincial Council (Giunta). They exercise their
respective powers in the manner and in accordance with the
measures to be determined in the regulations. Regional, inter-
regional, and national associations are subject to the supervision
and control of the competent minister.
The competent minister, in agreement with the Minister of the
Interior, may dissolve the boards of directors of associations and
concentrate all authority in the hands of the president or secretary
for a period not to exceed one year. He may also, in more serious
cases, appoint a commissioner to look after the administration
during the emergency.
In the case of associations affiliated with a federation or con-
federation, the decree recognizing the federation or confederation
and approving its statute may prescribe that the powers of super-
vision and control be exercised in all or in part by the federation or
confederation.
Art. 9-Similarly, in very serious cases, and in every case in
which the conditions prescribed in the preceding articles for secur-
ing the recognition are not fulfilled, a royal decree to be issued on
the proposal of the competent minister, in agreement with the
Minister of the Interior, after hearing the opinion of the Council of
State, may revoke the recognition.
Art. 10-Collective labor contracts drawn up by the legally
recognized associations of employers, workers, artists, and profes-
sional men are valid in respect to all employers, workers, artists,
and professional men belonging to the category to which said
contract refers and which the associations represent in accordance
with the provisions of Art. 5 of this law.
Collective labor contracts must be made in writing under pen-
alty of voidance. They are also held null and void if they fail to
state the period for which they are valid.
The central liaison organs provided for under Art. 3 of this law
can draw up, by agreement with the representatives of employers
and workers, general rules applicable to conditions of labor in the
concerns to which they refer. Such rules are valid for all the
employers and all the workers belonging to the category to which
said rules refer, and who are represented by the joint associations in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 5 of this law.
A copy of the collective contracts drawn up in accordance with
the provisions of the preceding paragraph must be deposited with
the local prefecture and published in the official posters of the
province, in the case of communal, district, or provincial associa-
tions; and filed at the Ministry of National Economy and published
in the Gazzetta U fficiale of the Kingdom, in the case of regional,
inter-regional, or national associations.
Employers and employees who fail to abide by collective con-
tracts and general rules to which they are parties are held civilly
responsible for such failure both toward the associations of
workers and toward the association of employers who negotiated
the said contract.
Other regulations relative to the negotiation and application of
collective labor contracts shall be issued by royal decree, on the
proposal of the Minister of Justice.
Art. 11-The regulations of the present law on the juridical
recognition of syndical associations are not applicable to associa-
tions composed of state, provincial, or municipal employees and
employees of other public welfare institutions, for which provi-
sions will be made by separate measures.
However, similar associations of officers, noncommissioned
officers, and soldiers of the Royal Army, Royal Navy, Royal Air
Force, and of the other armed bodies of the state, provinces, and
communes, as well as associations of magistrates of the judiciary

and administrative order, associations of professors of secondary
and higher institutions, associations of officers and employees of the
ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Colonies are pro-
hibited, under penalty of removal from rank and dismissal, and of
other disciplinary punishments to be established by special regula-
tions according to each individual case.
Art. 12-Associations of employers, employees, artists, and pro-
fessional men which are not legally recognized continue to exist as
de facto associations, regulated by existing laws, with the exception
of those referred to in the second paragraph of the preceding
article.
In these cases the regulations of the Royal Decree-Law of
January 24, 1924, No. 64, are applicable.
CHAPTER II-THE LABOR CouRTS
Art. 13-All disputes arising as to the regulation of collective

contracts, or of other existing regulations, or the request for new
conditions of labor, come within the jurisdiction of the Courts of
Appeal acting as Labor Courts. The president of the court shall
attempt to bring about conciliation before pronouncing his own
decision.
Disputes referred to in the above provisions can be settled by
arbitration, in accordance with the provisions of Art. 8 et seq. of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
No modification is made in the jurisdiction of the boards of
arbiters and of the provincial arbitration commissions for em-
ployers of private business concerns, as determined by the law of
June 15, 1893, No. 295, and by the Royal Decree-Law of Decem-
ber 2, 192 3, No. 2686, respectively.
Appeals against the decisions of such boards and commissions
and of other jurisdictional bodies on individual labor contracts,
insofar as they are subject to appeal under existing legislation, may
be made to the Courts of Appeal functioning as Labor Courts.
Art. 14-To enable the Courts of Appeal to act as Labor Courts,
a special section is established for each of the sixteen Courts of
Appeal. Each section is composed of three magistrates, viz., a sec-
tional president and two counselors of the Court of Appeal. Two
citizens expert in problems of production and labor and selected by
the first president in accordance with the regulations of the follow-
ing article may be added to this body from time to time.
On the proposal of the Minister for Justice acting jointly with
the Minister for Finance, a royal decree will enforce such modifica-
tions in the number of magistrates and in the staff of the chancel-
leries of the courts as are necessary to carry out the above
prov1s10ns.
Art. 15-Each Court of Appeal will draw up a panel of experts
on problems of production and labor, classified by groups and
subgroups, according to the several kinds of business activities
carried on within the jurisdiction of the court. This panel will be
revised every two years.
On the proposal of the Minister for Justice acting jointly with
the Minister for National Economy, a royal decree shall establish
the regulations for the preparation and revision of these panels and
shall fix the daily compensation and other indemnities for persons
who are called upon to exercise judiciary functions.
Each year the first president designates for each group and
subgroup the members of the panel who will be called on to act as
expert advisers in cases concerning the enterprises included in the
group or subgroup. Persons directly or indirectly concerned in the
disputes can never act as members of the judicial board.
Art. 16-The Court of Appeal, acting as a Labor Court for the
enforcement of existing contracts, shall deliv~r judgment according
to the regulations of the law on the interpretation and enforcement
of contracts, and in cases involving new conditions to be fixed for
labor it shall judge in accordance with equity, harmonizing the
interests of the employers with those of employees, and in every
case protecting the higher interests of production.
The formulation of new conditions to be fixed for labor shall
always specify the period of time during which they must be in
force, which regularly shall be the same as that fixed in the case of
agreements freely entered into.
The decisions of the court functioning as a Labor Court are
issued after hearing the verbal opinion of the public prosecutor.
The decisions of the Court of Appeal acting as a Labor Court
can be appealed against in the Court of Cassation on the grounds
set forth in Art. 517 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Rules of procedure to be promulgated by royal decree on the
proposal of the Minister of Justice will determine the special
procedure to be followed in taking cognizance of a case and in
enforcing the decisions of the court, in derogation, if need be, of
the ordinarv procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Art. 17-0nly associations which are legally recognized may
take action in disputes arising out of collective labor agreements,
and such action must be taken against legally recognized associa-
tions, where they exist; otherwise such action shall be argued by a
special administrator, appointed by the president of the Court of
Appeal. In the latter case, the voluntary interpleading of the inter-
ested parties in the proceedings shall be permitted.
When associations of employers or employees are affiliated with
federations or confederations, or when associations of employers
and associations of workers have formed central liaison organs,
action at law cannot be taken against them unless it can be shown
that the federation or the confederation or the central liaison organ
has attempted to bring about a friendly settlement of the dispute,
and that the attempt has failed.
Only legally recognized associations can sue in the court in the
name of all the employers or of all the employees of the category
for which they are formed, within the territorial jurisdiction as-
signed to them.
Judgments given in their regard are valid for all concerned and
are published, in the case of communal, district, and provincial
associations, in the official legal posters of the province, and in the
case of regional, inter-regional, or national associations in the
Gazzetta U fficiale of the Kingdom.
All the memoranda and documents relating to the proceedings of
the Court of Appeal functioning as a Labor Court, and all the
measures issued by it, are exempt from registration fees and stamp
taxes.
CHAPTER III-PRoHIBITION oF STRIKEs AND LocKouTs

Art. 18-The lockout and the strike are prohibited.
Employers who suspend work in their factories, enterprises, and
offices without justifiable reasons and for the sole object of com-
pelling their employees to modify existing labor contracts are
punishable by a fine of from 10,000 to 100,000 lire.
Employees and laborers who, in groups of three or more, cease
work by agreement, or who work in such a manner as to disturb its
continuity or regularity, in order to compel the employers to
change the existing contracts, are punishable by a fine of from 100
to 1,000 lire. In the proceedings the regulations of Articles 298 et
seq. of the Code of Penal Procedure are applicable.
When the persons guilty of the offenses covered in the above
paragraphs are more numerous, the leaders, promoters, and or-
ganizers are liable to imprisonment for not less than one year, nor
more than two years, in addition to the fines prescribed in the same
paragraphs.
Art. 19-Persons in the employ of the State and of other public
bodies or bodies performing essential public services who, in the
number of three or more, by preconcerted agreement, leave their
work or perform it in a manner likely to interfere with its con-
tinuity or regularity, render themselves liable to imprisonment for
a period of not less than one month and not to exceed six months.
The provisions of An. 298 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure
are applicable in the proceedings. The leaders, promoters, and
organizers are liable to imprisonment for a period of from six
months to two years and shall be barred from public offices for not
less than three years.
The administrators of public services or of public utility enter-
prises who, without justifiable motives, suspend work in their estab-
lishments, enterprises, or offices, are punishable by imprisonment of
from six months to a year and by a fine of from 5,000 to 10,000
lire, in addition to being barred temporarily from public offices.
When the action referred to in this article causes danger to
personal safety the penalty incurred is that of imprisonment for a
period of not less than one year. Should such action be the cause of
death to one or more persons, the penalty incurred is that of
imprisonment for a period of not less than three years.
Art. 20-Persons in the employ of the state and of other public
bodies, persons carrying on public services and services essential to
the public, and their dependents, who in the event of strikes or
lockouts fail to do all in their power to secure the regular working
or the resumption of a public service essential to the public, are
liable to detention for a period of not less than one month and not
more than six months.
Art. 21-When the stoppage of work by employers or the act
of leaving work or performing it irregularly by worker aims at
coercing the will or influencing the decisions of a department or
organ of the State, provinces, or communes, or of a government
official, the leaders, promoters, and organizers render themselves
liable to imprisonment for a period of from three to seven years
and to permanent debarment from public office, and the other
persons concerned in such offense are liable to imprisonment for a
period of from one to three years and to temporary debarment
from public office.
Art. 22-Employers and employees who refuse to carry out the

decisions of a Labor Court are punishable by imprisonment of
from one month to one year and by a fine of from 100 to 500 lire.
This does not affect the application of the regulations of common
law on civil responsibility for carrying out and executing the
sentences.
The directors of legally recognized associations who refuse to
carry out the decisions of the Labor Court are punishable by
imprisonment of from six months to two years and by a fine of
from 2,000 to 10,000 lire, in addition to dismissal from office.
Should failure to carry out the decisions of the Labor Court be
aggravated by strikes or lockouts on the part of the parties con-
victed, the provisions of the Penal Code on the relation between
guilt and punishment are applicable.
Art. 23-All regulations contrary to the present law are
repealed.
His Majesty's Government is authorized to promulgate by royal
decree whatever measures are necessary for putting this law into
effect, and for co-ordinating it with the provisions of the Royal
Decree of October 19, 1923, No. 2311, of the Law of June 15,
1893, No. 2686, to be revised as needed, and with all other national
laws.
As a kind of window dressing for the new system, Mussolini pro-
claimed a Labor Charter on April 21, 1927 (Fascist Labor Day). This
vapid document contained thirty aphorisms, promising the workers
such things as social insurance, vacations with pay, and extra com-
pensation for night work. At least some of the workers appeared
satisfied with these rromises that were partly designed to take their
minds off the loss o their right to strike. This Fascist Labor Charter
was to be widely imitated in Salazar's Portugal, Franco's Spain, and
elsewhere.
The Labor Charter

(April21, 1927)
THE CoRPORATE STATE AND ITs ORGANIZATION
Art. 1-The Italian nation is an organism possessing a purpose, a

life, and instruments of action superior in power and duration to
those· possessed by the individuals or groups of individuals who
souRCE: Promulgated by the Fascist Grand Council and published
in Gazzetta Ufficiale, No. 100 (Apr. 30, 1927). My translation.
compose it. The nation is a moral, political, and economic unity
integrally embodied in the Fascist State.
Art. 2-Labor in all its forms-intellectual, technical, manual,
organizing, and executive-is a social duty. By virtue of this fact,
and this fact alone, labor falls within the purview of the State.
When considered from a national point of view, production in its
manifold forms constitutes a unity, its many objectives coinciding
and being generally definable as the well-being of those who
produce, and the development of national power.
Art. 3-There is complete freedom of professional or syndical
organization, but only the syndicate legally recognized by the State
and subject to State control is empowered:
To legally represent the particular division of employers or
employees for which it has been formed;
To protect the interests of these as against the State or as against
other trade organizations;
To negotiate collective labor contracts binding upon all those
engaged in the branch in question;
To levy assessments and to exercise, in connection with the
branch, specified functions of public support.
Art. 4-Solidarity between the various factors of production is
concretely expressed by the collective labor contract, which con-
ciliates the opposing interests of employers and workers, subordi-
nating them to the higher interests of production at large.
Art. 5-The Labor Court is the organ through which the State
acts in settling labor controversies, whether these arise in connec-
tion with observances of rules or agreements already made or in
connection with new conditions to be fixed for labor.
Art. 6-Legally recognized professional associations guarantee
equality before the law to employers and employees alike. They
maintain discipline in labor and production and promote measures
of efficiency in both. The corporations constitute the unifying
organization of all the elements of production (capital and labor)
and represent the common interests of them all. By virtue of this
joint representation, and since the interests of production are
interests of the nation, the corporations are recognized by law as
organs of the State.
As they represent the joint interests of production, the corpora-
tions may enforce binding regulations for the discipline of labor
relations as well as for the co-ordination of production, whenever
they are empowered to do so by the affiliated associations.
Art. 7-The Corporate State regards private initiative in the

field of production as the most useful and efficient instrument for
funhering the interests of the nation. Since private enterprise is a
function of national concern, its management is responsible to the
State for general policies of production. From the fact that the
elements of production (labor and capital) are co-operators in a
common enterprise, reciprocal rights and duties devolve upon
them. The employee, whether laborer, clerk, or skilled workman,
is an active partner in the economic enterprise, the management
of which belongs to the employer who shoulders the responsibility
for it.
Art. 8-Professional associations of employers are required to
promote by all possible means the increase and improvement of
production and a reduction of costs. The organizations represent-
ing practitioners of the liberal professions or of the ans, and the
associations of State employees, should work together for funher-
ing the interests of science, letters, and the arts, for improving the
quality of production, and for realizing the moral ideals of the
corporate organization of the State.
Art. 9-State intervention in economic production arises only
when private initiative is lacking or insufficient, or when the politi-
cal interests of the State are involved. Such intervention may take
the form of supervision, of promotion, or of direct management.
Art. JO-In labor disputes involving groups, there can be no
recourse to the Labor Court until the corporation has exhausted its
efforts for conciliation. In disputes involving individuals in connec-
tion with applications or interpretations of collective contracts,
professional associations may employ their good offices to attempt
conciliation. Jurisdiction in such disputes belongs to the ordinary
Labor Courts supplemented by the referees appointed by the
professional associations concerned.
CoLLECTIVE LABOR CoNTRAcTs
Art. 11-Professional associations are required to regulate by

means of collective contracts labor relations between the em-
ployers and the employees whom they represent. The collective
contract is made between associations of primary grade, under the
guidance and with the approval of the central organizations, with
the provision that the association of higher grade may make
amendments in cases specified in the constitutions of the associa-
tions or by law. All collective labor contracts must, under pain of
nullity, contain precise rules on such matters as disciplinary rela-
tions, trial periods, amounts and manner of payment of wages, and
schedules of working hours.
Art. 12-The operation of the syndicates, the mediation of the
corporations, and the decisions of the Labor Court guarantee
correspondence between wages and the normal demands of living,
the possibilities of production and the yield from labor. The fixing
of wages is determined without reference to any general rule and is
entrusted to agreements between parties in the collective contracts.
Art. 13-Losses occasioned by business crises and by variations
of exchange must be equitably divided between the elements of
production (capital and labor). Statistics relating to conditions of
production and labor, to variations of exchange, to changes in
standards of living, as issued by the various governmental depart-
ments, by the Central Bureau of Statistics, and by the legally
recognized professional associations, and as co-ordinated and elabo-
rated by the Ministry of Corporations, will constitute the criteria
for adjusting the interests of the various branches of trade, and of
harmonizing the interests of the various classes among themselves
and with the higher interests of production in general.
Art. 14-Remuneration should be paid out in the form which
best fills the needs of employers and workers. When remuneration
is by piece rate and payments are made at intervals of more than a
fortnight, adequate weekly or fortnightly sums on account are
due. Night work, with the exception of ordinary regular night
shifts, shall be paid with a percentage over and above the wage
settled for day work. In cases in which work is paid at piece rate,
the rate must be such that a diligent workman, of a normal
working capacity, will be able to earn a minimum amount over and
above the basic wage.
Art. 15-The employee has the right to a weekly day of rest,
falling on Sundays. Collective labor contracts will apply this prin-
ciple so far as it is compatible with existing laws, and with the
technical requirements of the enterprise concerned; and within the
limits of these requirements, they will see that civil and religious
holidays are observed according to local traditions. Working hours
must be scrupulously and earnestly observed by employees.
Art. 16-After a year of uninterrupted service, the employee in
enterprises that function the year around is entitled to an annual
vacation with pay.
Art. 17-In concerns functioning throughout the year, the em-

ployee is entitled, in case of discharge through no fault of his own,
to a compensation proportional to his years of service. Similar
compensation is also due to his family or representatives in the
event of the death of a worker.
Art. 18-Transfers of ownership of concerns offering continu-
ous employment shall not put an end to the labor contract, and the
employees of such concerns retain all their rights and claims against
the new proprietors. Similarly, illness on the part of the employee,
provided it does not exceed a specified period, shall not put an end
to the labor contract. Call to service in the Army or Navy or
Volunteer Militia for National Security does not constitute valid
cause for dismissal.
Art. 19-Breaches of discipline on the part of employees and acts
disturbing to the normal operation of a concern are punishable,
according to the seriousness of the offense, by fine, by suspension,
or in grave cases, by immediate discharge without compensation.
The cases in which the employer may impose the respective
penalties of fine, suspension, or discharge without compensation
must be specified.
Art. 20-A newly hired worker is subject to a trial period, in the
course of which both parties have a right to cancel the contract,
the employee in such case being entitled to wages only for the time
of actual service.
Art. 21-The benefits and discipline attaching to the collective
labor contract extend also to home workers. Special rules shall be
issued by the State to assure proper hygienic conditions for home
labor.
EMPLOYMENT BuREAus
Art. 22-The State has exclusive power to determine and control

the factors of government employment and unemployment, since
these are indices of the general conditions of production and labor.
Art. 23-Employment bureaus are to be managed by the corpo-
rations through commissions having equal representation of em-
ployers and employees. It is compulsory for employers to hire
workers through these bureaus, freedom of choice being allowed
them among the various registrants, with preference being given,
however, to those who are members of the Fascist party and of the
Fascist syndicates, according to their seniority of registration.
Art. 24-The professional associations of workers are required
to exercise a process of selection among the workers with a view to
improving their technical capacity and moral standards.
Art. 25-Corporative organs shall ensure the observance of the
laws governing safety, accident prevention, and sanitation by the
individuals belonging to the affiliated associations.
WELFARE, EoucATION, AND INSTRUCTION
Art. 26-lnsurance is another manifestation of the principle of

collaboration. Employers and employees must bear proportionate
shares of such burdens. The State, working through the corpora-
tions and the professional associations, will strive to co-ordinate
and unify as far as is possible the agencies and the system of
msurance.
Art. 27-The Fascist State is working for:
1. improvements in accident insurance;
2. improvements and extensions of maternity insurance;
3. insurance against occupational diseases and tuberculosis as a
step toward insurance against all forms of disease;
4. improvements of insurance against involuntary unem-
ployment;
5. adoption of special forms of endowment insurance for young
workers.
Art. 28-The associations of workers are required to safeguard
the interests of those they represent in administrative and judicial
suits arising out of accident and social insurance. The collective
labor contracts shall establish, whenever this is technically feasible,
Mutual Sickness Funds, with contributions from employers and
employees, to be administered by representatives of both classes
under the general supervision of the corporations.
Art. 29-lt is the right and duty of professional associations to
give assistance to those they represent, whether members or non-
members. These associations should exercise the functions of assis-
tance directly through their own organs, and may not delegate
them to other bodies or institutes except for purposes of a general
nature which transcend the particular interests of the branch of
production concerned.
Art. 30-Training and education, especially technical training of
the workers they represent, whether these be members or non-
members, is one of the principal duties of the professional associa-
tions. These associations must work side by side with the Dopola-
voro1 institution and other educational institutions.
By the early 1930's corporativism was the one political topic that could
be discussed with some measure of freedom in Italy by university
groups and young people. Many such youths who resented the idea of
Mussolini's personal dictatorship felt that the evolution of the corpora-
tive system might lead to relaxation of the totalitarian regime. Some of
the "left-wing" corporativists even insisted on the need for proclaim-
ing a "war on capitalism." In the midst of such discussion, the
embryonic corporative system underwent further change by the Law
of February 5, 1934, which set up 22 corporations (or cycles of
economic activity-e.g., wines and textiles). Mussolini explained their
aim as twofold: "At home, to establish an organization which will
gradually and inflexibly reduce the distance between the greatest and
the least or nonexistent possibilities in life. This is what I call a higher
'social justice.' ... In relation to the outer world, the object of the
corporation is to increase constantly the global power of the nation to
further the ends of its expansion in the world." 2 In the estimation of
Marxist critics, Mussolini's corporative state was simply a smoke screen
for his aggressive foreign policy.
Law on Formation
and Functions of the Corporations
(February 5,1934)
Art. ]-Corporations, as provided for in Article VI of the Labor
Charter, in the Law of April 3, 1926, No. 563, and in the Royal
Decree of July 1, 1926, No. 1130, are instituted by decree of the
Head of the Government, upon proposal of the Minister for
Corporations and after consulting the Central Corporative Com-
mittee.
Art. 2-Corporations are presided over by a Minister or by an
Undersecretary of State, or by the secretary of the Fascist party,
to be appointed by decree of the Head of the Government, who is
the president of the National Council of Corporations.
Art. 3-The decree instituting a corporation determines the
number of members to be included in the board, and how many of
souRcE: Law of February 5, 1934, No. 163, published in Gazzetta

Ufjiciale, No. 32 (Feb. 20, 1934). My translation.
I. See pp. 133-134.
2. Speech of November 10, 1933, Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini,
XXVI, 379.
them should be designated by each of the associations affiliated with
the corporation.
The members designated shall be approved by decree of the
Head of the Government, upon proposal of the Minister for
Corporations.
Art. 4-In those corporations in which categories of different
branches of economic activity are represented, special sections may
be instituted, but the decisions taken by these sections shall be
approved by the corporation.
Art. 5-In questions concerning different branches of economic
activity, the Head of the Government may order the convocation
of two or more corporations together.
With regard to these questions corporations sitting jointly have
the same powers as, by the following articles, are attributed to
single corporations.
Art. 6- The Head of the Government by his decree, upon
proposal of the Minister for Corporations, after consulting the
Central Corporative Committee, is authorized to constitute Corpo-
rative Committees for the regulation of economic activity concern-
ing specified products. The Head of the Government may appoint
representatives of economic categories, of state administrations
concerned, and of the Fascist party, to be members of these
committees. Decisions taken by these committees are subject to the
approval of the corporations concerned, and of the General As-
sembly of the National Council of Corporations. . . .
Art. 8- ... The corporation draws up rules ... to regulate
economic relations and the unitary discipline of production. . . .
Art. 10-The corporation is given, within its own field of
competence, the power to fix salary scales for the work and
economic services of its producers, as well as prices of consumers'
goods offered to the public under privileged conditions.
Art. 11-Regulations, plans, and salary scales referred to in the
foregoing articles are subject to the approval of the General
Assembly of the National Council of Corporations, and become
compulsory when published by decree of the Head of the Govern-
ment, and are included as such in the official collection of laws and
decrees of the Kingdom. The infringement of these regulations,
plans, and salary scales is punishable according to rules applying to
Collective Labor Contracts.
Art. 12-The corporation gives advice on all questions involving
the branch of economic activity for which it is constituted, when-

ever advice is requested by the public agencies concerned. . . .
Art. 13-The attempt at conciliation in collective controversies
of labor is made by the corporation through a Board of Concilia-
tion composed of members of the corporation itself. In each
separate case the members of this board are selected by the presi-
dent of the corporation, with due regard to the nature and subject
of the controversy.
Art. 14-All provisions conflicting or incompatible with the
present law are abrogated. . . .
Art. 15-The com position of organs of the National Council of
Corporations will be modified by royal decree, upon proposal of
the Head of the Government, after approval by the Council of
Ministers.
Between 1934 and 1939 the moribund Chamber of Deputies prepared

to make way for a successor body, the Central Committee of Corpora-
tions, to consist of 824 members representing the 22 newly created
corporations or cycles of economic activity. In each corporation the
PNF, the employers, and the employees were represented. At last, on
January 19, 1939, this Central Committee of Corporations rechristened
itself the Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations (representing the
PNF and the corporations), whereupon the old Chamber of Deputies
committed suicide. Thus by the eve of World War II nothing was left
of the old parliamentary structure described in the 1848 Statuto
Albertino except the Senate. Nominally, Senators were still appointed
for life by the King; in reality, however, the Senate had become sub-
servient to Mussolini, who on one occasion had Victor Emmanuel
appoint forty Fascist Senators in a single decree.
After all the verbiage of the corporative state has been cut away, one
is left with two naked realities-the political dictatorship of the
National Fascist Party, and the pre-eminent position of employers over
employees (because capitalists remained largely self-organized,
whereas labor was regimented by the state). Ironically, the industrial-
ists began to desert Mussolini in these very years of the culmination of
the corporative state. There was too much bureaucratic bungling and
too much "proletarian" rhetoric by militants like Achille Starace,
party secretary from 1931 to 1939, to suit their fancy.
Law Creating the Chamber

of Fasces and of Corporations
(January 19, 1939)
Art. 1-The Chamber of Deputies shall be abolished at the termi-
nation of the XXIX Legislative Session. In its stead shall be insti-
tuted the Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations.
Art. 2-The Senate of the Kingdom and the Chamber of Fasces
and of Corporations shall collaborate with the Government in the
formulation of laws.
Art. 3-The Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations shall be
formed from the members of the National Council of the National
Fascist Party and from the members of the National Council of
Corporations, except in those cases of incompatibility specified in
Art.9.
Changes in the composition of the National Council of the
National Fascist Party and of the National Council of Corpora-
tions shall be set fonh by law.
Art. 4-The nucE of Fascism, Head of the Government, is, by
law, a member of the Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations.
Members of the Fascist Grand Council are also members thereof,
except in cases of incompatibility specified in An. 9.
Art. 5-The National Councilors who belong to the Chamber of
Fasces and of Corporations must possess the prerequisites set forth
in Art. 40 of the Constitution of the Kingdom, but the minimum
age limit is set at twenty-five years as of the day they are sworn in,
as specified in Art. 6.
The qualifications for National Councilor shall be set forth in a
decree by the nucE of Fascism, Head of the Government, to be
published in the Gazzetta U fficiale of the Kingdom.
Art. 6-The National Councilors, prior to being admitted to the
exercise of their functions, shall take an oath in plenary assembly,
according to the formula set forth in Art. 49 of the Constitution of
the Kingdom.
Art. 7-The National Councilors shall enjoy the prerogatives
souRcE: Law No. 129 of January 19, 1939, reprinted in Alberto

Aquarone ( ed.), L' organizzazione dello stato totalitario (Turin:
Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1965), Appendix No. 62, pp. 567-70.
By permission of Giulio Einaudi Editore. My translation.
previously established for Deputies by the Constitution of the

Kingdom.
National Councilors shall be entitled to an annual indemnity, to
be determined by law.
Art. 8-National Councilors shall cease to hold office upon the
termination of the functions exercised in the Councils which are
merging to form the Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations.
Art. 9-No one may simultaneously serve as National Coun-
cilor, Senator, or Academician of Italy.
Art. 10-The work of the Senate of the Kingdom and of the
Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations shall be divided into legis-
lative sessions (legislatures).
The termination of each legislature shall be set by royal decree,
upon proposal of the nucE of Fascism, Head of the Government.
The decree shall also announce the date for convocation of the two
legislative assemblies to meet in joint session for the purpose of
hearing the speech from the Throne, which event shall mark the
beginning of the ensuing legislature.
For the purpose of carrying out their normal legislative func-
tions, the two assemblies shall periodically be convened by the
nucE of Fascism, Head of the Government.
Art. 11-The President of the Chamber of Fasces and of Corpo-
rations shall be appointed by royal decree. The Vice-Presidents
shall likewise be appointed by royal decree.
The President of the Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations
shall appoint the other officials who are listed in the by-laws of the
Chamber.
Art. 12-The Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations shall
exercise its functions by means of a plenary assembly, a General
Budgetary Committee, and various other legislative committees.
Special committees may be formed for particular tasks.
Art. 13-The legislative committees shall be established by the
President of the Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations in accor-
dance with specific national needs. The President may convene
them at any time.
The President shall also create and convene committees en-
visaged in the second part of Art. 12.
Art. 14-The President and, at his request, the Vice-Presidents
of the Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations may participate in
the work of the committees and preside over them.
The Ministers, and at their request, the Undersecretaries of
State, may make interventions in them.
The provisions of the present article, as well as those in Articles
12 and 13, shall also apply to the Senate of the Kingdom.
Art. 15-Draft laws of a constitutional nature, as specified in
Art. 12 of Law No. 2693 of December 9, 1928-VII; those matters
specified in the last part of Art. 1 of Law No. 100 of January 31,
192 6- IV; and those legislative powers of a general character, bud-
getary proposals, and balance sheets of the State as well as of the
autonomous State enterprises and incorporated· administrative en-
tities of whatever type that are of national importance and are
subsidized directly or indirectly by the State Treasury, shall be
debated and voted upon by the Chamber of Fasces and of Corpora-
tions and by the Senate of the Kingdom in their respective plenary
assemblies, upon the basis of reports submitted by their respective
competent committees.
Similar discussion, as set forth in the paragraph above, shall take
place for whatever draft legislation the Government asks to have
considered by this method, or for whatever legislation may be
proposed by the respective plenary assemblies or by the commit-
tees with the authorization of the nucE of Fascism, Head of the
Government.
Voting shall always take place in open fashion.
Art. 16-Draft laws that are not considered in accordance with
the provisions of Art. 15 above shall be turned over to the legisla-
tive committees of the Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations and
of the Senate of the Kingdom for their exclusive examination.
Draft laws that have been approved shall be placed before both
assemblies by their respective presidents.
Within one month after the presentation of each draft law-a
time limit that may be extended by the nucE of Fascism, Head of
the Government-the text that has been debated and approved by
the legislative committees of the Chamber of Fasces and of Corpo-
rations and of the Senate shall be transmitted to the nucE of
Fascism, Head of the Government, who shall see to it that it is
submitted for the approval of the Sovereign and promulgated in
the usual manner established by law.
The introductory clauses in the law must indicate the fact that it
has received the approval of the legislative committees and of the
Chamber and the Senate. ·
The provisions thus promulgated have the force of law for all
purposes.
Art. 17-The method of discussion and approval, as specified in
Art. 16, may also be followed for the draft laws that are mentioned
in Art. 15, whenever the oucE of Fascism, Head of the Govern-

ment, shall request same for urgent reasons.
Art. 18-In case of emergency caused by war or for urgent
reasons of a financial or tax nature, it shall be permissible to
proceed by means of royal decree without observing the procedure
set forth under Art. 16.
The same procedure may be followed if the committees have not
completed their task within the prescribed time.
In such instances the provisions contained in the second and
succeeding clauses of Art. 3 of Law No. 100 of January 31, 1926-
IV, shall be applied.
Art. 19-The corporative regulations elaborated by the corpora-
tions and the collective agreements negotiated by the interested
associations, whenever they call for contributions of any sort or
denomination at the expense of the members of the categories in-
volved by these agreements and regulations, may be presented, at
the discretion of the oucE of Fascism, Head of the Government,
after the examination of the Central Corporative Committee, to the
Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations, in order that they be
submitted to the examination and approval of the competent legis-
lative committee or, if necessary, of joint committees.
In case the committee or joint committee should propose amend-
ments to the text that was elaborated by the corporations, approval
must be deferred to the plenary Assembly of the Chamber of
Fasces and of Corporations.
The definitive text shall be transmitted by the President of the
Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations to the DUCE of Fascism,
Head of the Government, who shall promulgate it by his own
decree, which is to be inserted in the Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi
e dei Decreti del Regno.
Art. 20-vVhenever the juridical provisions which are within the
competence of the Government as set forth by Law No. 100 of
January 31, 192 6-IV, reflect matters of a technical or economic
character falling within the specific purview of the corporations,
they must be preceded, except in cases of urgency, by the opinion
of the competent corporation or by the advisory committee set up
within it.
Art. 21-Any provisions that may be contrary to or incompat-
ible with those contained in the present law are hereby abrogated.
4. Social, Economic, and Youth Programs
DuRING THE first couple of years of Fascist rule, while Alberto De'
Stefani was Minister of Finance, the government generally pursued a
laissez-faire type of policy, returning the national life insurance pro-
gram and the telephone system to private hands and giving tax advan-
tages to bondholders and industrialists. In the spring of 192 5 this began
to change as the government embarked on an increasingly interven-
tionist kind of social and economic program. Count Giuseppe Volpi
took over the finance ministry, while Alfredo Rocco became a key
adviser to Mussolini in social and economic matters. Soon the Rocco
Labor Law and the Labor Charter (printed in Chapter 3) gave tangible
evidence of the new philosophy.
Some of the initial social legislation was conceived as a sop to the
workers who had lost their right to strike. This would appear to be the
case with one of the earliest programs, the much publicized National
Institution for Leisure Time (Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro ), which
was designed to provide workers with opportunities for playing bil-
liards, engaging in sports, going on cheap excursions, and other activ-
ities. Hitler's Germany was to introduce a similar program, Strength
through Joy (Kraft durch Freude). By 1940 membership in the Italian
Dopolavoro reached 4,612,294. The decree establishing this organiza-
tion on May 1, 1925, follows.
Law Creating the Dopolavoro Organization

(May 1, 1925)
Art. 1: The Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro [National Institution
for Leisure Time] is established in Rome with these aims:
(a) To provide healthy and profitable leisure-time activity for
the workers by means of institutions that develop their physical,
intellectual, and moral qualities;
(b) To promote the development of these institutions by pro-
viding them with necessary support and raising them to the legal
status of Ente Morale. 1
souRcE: Royal Decree-Law No. 582, May 1, 1925, published in

Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno, No. 846 (May 14, 1925). My
translation.
1. I.e., an incorporated educational or charitable body.-Ed.
(c) To co-ordinate all such associations and to equip them for

propaganda purposes and other common aims and interests;
(d) To publicize the advantages of these institutions, and to
make provisions for improving the qualities of life of the working
classes;
(e) To award certificates of merit to those members who have
proved themselves to be particularly deserving, or who have shown
noteworthy proficiency and activity in promoting the aims and
objects of the organization. . . .
Art. 5: The administration of the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro
is entrusted to the President, the Administrative Council, and the
Executive Committee. . . .
Art. 6: The Council of the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro is
appointed by royal decree, upon proposal of the Head of the
Government. . . . The President of the Council . . . is ap-
pointed by royal decree upon proposal of the Head of the Govern-
ment. . . .
Art. 12: The Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro is under the control
of the Ministry of National Economy. . . .
Another social program to be initiated in 192 5 was an agency devoted
to the protection of pregnant mothers and needy, orphaned, or emo-
tionally disturbed children. While it no doubt did useful work, it
found itself hard put to cope with the additional problems brought on
during the 1930's when Mussolini deliberately called for a higher birth
rate ("Win the battle of motherhood!") in order to provide man-
power for his armies and national expansion. Christmas Day of 193 3
was to be proclaimed the "Day of Mother and Child," and mothers
who could bear fourteen to nineteen children were personally received
by the Duce and given copies of Pius XI's Casti connubi. The decree-
law of December 10, 192 5, establishing the National Institution for
Maternity and Child Welfare follows.
Law Creating the National Organization

for Maternity and Child Welfare
(December 10, 1925)
Art. 1: An Ente Morale [i.e., an incorporated educational or
charitable body] is founded in Rome under the name of National
Institution for Maternity and Child Welfare. . . . The Institution
souRcE: Decree-Law of December 10, 1925, reprinted in Benito

Mussolini, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions (Rome: "Ardita,"
1935), pp. 251-264 passim.
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND YOUTH PROGRAMS 135
is placed under the control of the Minister for the Interior, who
shall approve the budget and the accounts.
Art. 2: The Institution is governed by a central Council com-
posed of 27 members as follows: two senators and two deputies
appointed by each Chamber for the duration of the legislature, and
23 members appointed by royal decree upon proposal of the Min-
ister for the Interior. . . . Members appointed by royal decree
remain in office four years and may be reappointed. . . .
Art. 4: The Institution, directly or in co-operation with its
provincial or communal organs in the measure provided by regula-
tions, attends to the protection of pregnant women; of deserted
mothers; of mothers in need; of needy children up to their fifth
year; of children who are physically and psychically abnormal; of
adolescents who are materially and morally deserted, or who are
addicted to vice or delinquency, up to the age of eighteen.
Through provisions of this nature the Institution co-operates in the
work already being done in other ways to protect mothers and
children, and gives support to existing enterprises.
The Institution helps to spread the knowledge of scientific
methods of prenatal hygiene and the care of children in their own
or in public homes; organizes dispensaries to help pregnant women
and attends to their health conditions with special regard to syphi-
lis; organizes schools of puericulture and popular courses on hy-
giene for mothers and children; by agreement with Provincial
Administrations and Institutions for the diseases of children, the
Institution shall also enforce laws and regulations for the protec-
tion of mothers and children; and shall promote the amendment of
existing measures when this is necessary for the physical and moral
training of the children.
Art. S: The Institution is vested with powers of control over all
public and private institutions for maternity and child welfare. . . .
Art. 6: In carrying out its task of co-ordination the Institution is
empowered to:
(a) Found institutions for the protection of maternity, create
funds in aid of mothers, open homes for needy and deserted
women who are nursing their children, and other institutions to
protect maternity and children, where the existing forms of relief
are inadequate to fill local requirements;
(b) Subsidize institutions which are not sufficiently provided
with funds;
(c) Co-ordinate all public and private institutions for assistance
to mothers and children, directing their activity in view of filling

the most pressing local needs, and if necessary, revising their consti-
tution and regulations, insofar as this is allowed for by existing
laws.
Art. 7: The Institution is provided with the following funds:
( 1) a yearly contribution of 8,000,000 lire from the Minister for
the Interior . . . ; ( 2) funds appropriated for the assistance of
indigent children on the budget of certain institutes . . . ; ( 3) a
percentage on the net profits of the "Monti di Pied" [government-
controlled pawnbroking establishments]; ( 4) a percentage on the
[annual] net profits [of certain banks]; ( 5) one-fourth of the
communal tax on the sojourn of travellers . . . ; ( 6) membership
dues; (7) legacies, donations, oblations or subsidies made directly.
In a speech at Pesaro in August, 1926, Mussolini announced the

revaluation of the currency. The lira was stabilized at the so-called
quota novanta (i.e., 90 lire would equal one British pound sterling,
whereas in 1921 the rate had been 100 lire to the pound). This new lira
di Pesaro proved to be overvalued, thus making it hard for Italy to
export her goods and contributing to the deflationary spiral that
pushed the country into the Depression a good two years ahead of the
Wall Street crash. Not until 19 36 did M ussolini devalue the currency.
Meanwhile, unemployment trebled between 1926 and 1930. By 193 2
some 1,150,000 were unemployed in a nation of 42,000,000 and at least
one-half of the total labor force was underemployed. The Duce's re-
sponse was to introduce a 12 per cent wage cut for public employees,
which only added to the deflationary trend.
As the storms of the Depression buffeted Italy, the government
began to talk about the virtues of national self-sufficiency, especially in
food production. Strutting before the newsreel cameramen, Mussolini
would bare his torso in the harvest fields and call for winning the
"battle of grain." He also stressed the need for draining the Pontine
marshes and bringing marginal lands into cultivation. From 1925 to
193 5 he managed to cut the country's wheat imports by 75 per cent,
but in those same years per capita consumption of wheat declined 21
per cent. In other words, while he was winning the "battle," Italians
were actually losing the grain. As a policy, autarky proved more
successful in the industrial than in the agricultural sector, for it was
easier to convince industrialists of the advantages of a cartel than to
satisfy absentee landlords about the benefits of intensive cultivation of
crops which the party judged necessary. Mussolini's program to raise
protective tariffs led to foreign retaliation, so that by 1932 Italian
exports were only 40 per cent of what they had been in 1929. During
the Depression foreign tourists no longer could come in great numbers,
a fact that further aggravated the imbalance of payments.
Though Mussolini lauded the virtues of rural life, he did almost
nothing in the way of agrarian reform, apart from draining a few
marshes (preferably those closest to Rome). The great latifundia were
left untouched. Tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and migrant workers
continued to eke out a living, and the legal status of the mezzadri
(sharecroppers) was lowered to that of ordinary workers in the social
hierarchy of the corporative state. Between 1926 and 1934 the real
wages of farm workers declined between 50 and 70 per cent. When
Fascism was overthrown in 1943 Italy had fewer peasant-owned farms
than before. Only a small portion of the rural population that wanted
to migrate to the cities was actually permitted to do so by the regime.
In this way the quasi-feudal agrarian system was propped up for
another generation. Serious land reform and release of surplus agricul-
tural farm hands had to await the advent of the Republic.
In industry the worst phase of the Depression was around 1932, with
textiles, a basic feature of Italy's economic life, the hardest hit.
Throughout the years of economic crisis the country saw an increasing
monopolistic tendency in industry, the "big fish" eating the "little
fish" with the government's blessing. Monopolistic industries rigged
prices, set production quotas, and generally behaved in cartel-like
fashion. In January, 1933, the government organized the Institute for
Industrial Reconstruction (IRI), a holding company that resembled
somewhat the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the United
States. The IRI provided subsidies to salvage banks and big businesses,
with the result that by 1940 the government held a 20 per cent interest
in Italian industries. Thus state capitalism was encouraged by Fascism
and became especially conspicuous in such categories as shipbuilding
and aviation industries and petroleum production. Cynics scoffed that
Fascism "socialized" the losses of businessmen while dividing the profits
among a small number.
In October, 1934, the government reduced the work week to forty
hours in order to spread out employment but did not increase the
hourly pay; thus workers took a net loss in income. Real wages in Italy
fell from 111.8 in 1925 (1913 = 100) to 100.5 in 1938. They were much
lower than wage levels in France, Germany, or Britain. No effort was
made to raise purchasing power as a means of combating the Depres-
sion, and Keynesian-type economics remained a mystery. In winter
months the PNF's National Solidarity program administered a dole
that was funded by contributions from employers and ordinary citi-
zens. During the bad winter of 1934-35 it amounted to fifty centesimi
a day, the equivalent of about five cents. (In Britain the daily dole was
about five times as much, while in New York City it was ten times
greater.) On the other hand, Mussolini's Italy did spend considerable
sums on highway construction and certain kinds of public works. All
sorts of governmental buildings-prefectures, post offices, and party
headquarters-were constructed, generally in a massive, unappealing
style.
With the advent of the Ethiopian War in 1935 a new chapter in the
economic history of Fascism began. By shunting the unemployed into
the armed forces, Mussolini managed to cut unemployment by some

300,000 during 1935-36. The first year of the Ethiopian conflict and
the initial phase of the League of Nations-imposed sanctions had the
effect of stimulating the Italian economy, but after 1936 the war
produced severe strains. The nation clearly could not sustain a pro-
longed military effort. Nevertheless, Mussolini dispatched Fascist Mili-
tiamen and other troops to help Franco in the Spanish Civil War after
July, 1936; they remained there until the spring of 1939. Immediately
thereafter came the war in Albania. Little wonder that by 1936 the
budget was badly out of balance and the government had to devalue
the lira. It also had to increase its revenues, imposing death taxes and
levying forced loans. Registration of bonds was required again for
purposes of taxation. By 1937 it was reported that the cost of living
had increased 20 per cent above the previous year. Meanwhile, there
was growing evidence of outright corruption in high places and
ubiquitous inefficiency in the bureaucracy. An ever increasing number
of financiers and industrialists began to lose confidence in Mussolini's
ability.
By 1938 another distinct shift in the government's social and eco-
nomic attitude was apparent. Radical Fascists gained the upper hand
and argued in favor of a more "proletarian" attitude against "pluto-
cratic capitalism." Achille Starace, the coarse and doctrinaire secretary
of the PNF in this period, was conspicuous in this regard. He per-
suaded Mussolini to join him in the denunciation of top hats, spats, and
butterfly collars. Hierarchs were also ordered not to use starch in the
collars of their black shirts, to stay out of night clubs, to stop drinking
real coffee, and to quit riding in first-class railway accommodations.
Genuine economic growth during the years of Fascism was quite
small. Whereas in 192 5 the national income was 115.1 billion lire, in
1938 it had risen to only 138.2 billion lire (measured in the same 1938
prices). On a per capita basis this meant that in 1925 one earned 2,923
lire and in 1938 but 3,201lire.
Fascism loved to extol the virtues of youth. The party's marching

anthem was "Giovinezza" (Youth), which competed with the mon-
archy's "Marcia reale." Like the Communist party in Soviet Russia,
Mussolini's PNF quickly saw the importance of inculcating its ideol-
ogy among the youth and of organizing a variety of youth groups that
would serve to train young people in national service and qualify them
for eventual membership in the party. For children under the age of
eight there was the Order of the Wolf, while those between eight and
thirteen could join the Balilla organization, named for a legendary boy-
hero who inspired nationalistic demonstrations in the eighteenth cen-
tury by hurling rocks at some Austrian police. Its symbols were the
musket and the book, and it successfully rivaled the Boy Scouts and
Catholic youth organizations. Boys between the ages of fourteen and
eighteen could go into the Avanguardisti, while those aged nineteen to
twenty-one could belong to the Young Fascists, which had separate
sections for boys and girls. After age twenty-one one was eligible to
seek admission to the party.
Following is the decree establishing the Balilla youth organization
for physical and moral training, headed by Renato Ricci until1937.
Law Creating the Balilla Youth Organization

(Apri/3, 1926)
ART. I: An Ente Morale 2 is founded in Rome under the name of
Opera N azionale Balilla, for the moral and physical training of the
young.
This institution is placed under the control of the Head of the
Government, Prime Minister. 3
ART. II: Children of either sex are entitled to assistance provided
for in the present law, until the age of eighteen. . . .
ART. 111: The institution achieves its ends through the organiza-
tions of the Balilla and Avanguardisti.
The organization of Avanguardisti shall more especially attend
to the training of the young in preparation for military service.
ART. IV: Children from the age of eight to fourteen belong to
the organization of the Balilla, children from fourteen to eighteen
to the organization of the Avanguardisti. ...
ART. VI: With regard to military service, young men who have
belonged to the corps of Avanguardisti for a term of four years
and have received a certificate of competence upon leaving the
corps, may benefit by privileges granted by existing laws to young
men who have followed courses of pre-military training. . . .
ART. vii: In order to complete the activity carried out by the
corps of Balilla and Avanguardisti, the National Balilla Institution
is empowered to:
1. found institutions for the assistance of youth, or promote
their foundation;
2. subsidize institutions not provided with sufficient funds, if
their object be similar to that of the National Balilla Institution;
3. promote the reform of the statutes and regulations of institu-
souRcE: Law No. 2247 of April 3, 1926, reprinted in Benito Mus-

solini, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions (Rome: "Ardita,"
1935), pp. 264-270 passim.
2. An incorporated educational or charitable body.-Ed.
3. In November, 1929, it was placed under the control of the Ministry of
National Education.-Ed.
tions empowered to award scholarships, so that examinations for

the award be made compulsory and that, in cases of equal merit,
preference be given to children and youths belonging to the corps
of Balilla and Avanguardisti. . . .
ART. IX: The Institution is provided with the following funds:
1. membership dues;
2. legacies, oblations, donations or subsidies made to the Na-
tional Balilla Institution;
3. a yearly contribution of one million lire from the Minister of
the Interior.
ART. x: The National Balilla Institution is governed by a Cen-
tral Council composed of a president, a vice-president and twenty-
three councilors, appointed by royal decree upon proposal of the
Head of the Government, Prime Minister.
The president is chosen from among officers of the Militia
ranking not below console generale (on active service or in the
special reserve) upon the advice of the General Commandant of
the Militia. The president and vice-president remain in office four
years and may be reappointed.
Members of the Central Council are: two representatives of the
Ministry of the Interior, one of whom is appointed by the Bureau
of Public Health; a representative for each of the following Min-
istries: Finance, War, Navy, Air Force, Education, National Econ-
omy, designated by their respective Ministers; a Militia officer of
superior rank designated by the General Commandant of the
Militia; a representative of the sporting federations designated by
the Italian Olympic Committee, and a representative of the Dopo-
lavoro institution.
Other members of the Council shall be chosen from among
persons especially competent in studies connected with the moral
and physical training of the young. . . .
ART. xn: A Provincial Committee may be formed in each Prov-
ince, composed of a president and ten councilors. . . .
ART. XIV: A Communal Committee may be formed in each
Commune, composed of a president and of as many councilors as
shall be decided by the Provincial Committee, in proportion to the
population of the Commune, with the approval of the Executive
Board of the National Balilla Institution.
Members of the Communal Committee are chosen by the Pro-
vincial Committee preferably from among persons residing in the
Commune. In Communes which possess secondary schools and
bodies of the Militia, a teacher of the local school and the officer
commanding the local Militia body are ex-officio members of the
Committee.
Committees hold their meetings in premises provided free of
charge by the Commune.
Members of the Central Committee may be withdrawn at any
moment by the Head of the Government, Prime Minister, upon
the proposal of the President, when they fail to carry out the task
assigned to them. .
ABSTRACTS OF REGULATIONS
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE ABOVE LAW
ART. I: The Militia of Avanguardisti and Balilla is intended to give

moral and physical training to the young, in order to make them
worthy of the new standard of Italian life. . . .
ART. m: The recruiting of Avanguardisti and Balilla, within the
age limits specified by the law, is voluntary.
In order to be allowed to join the organization, children require
the consent of their parents or guardians. After their sixteenth year
of age they shall also provide a certificate of good conduct. Admis-
sion is not limited in number.
ART. IV: The corps of Avanguardisti and Balilla are organized
on military lines. They shall march by three.
Bodies are formed as follows: Squadron, eleven boys and a
leader; Manipulum, three squadrons; Centurium, three manipula;
Cohort, three centuria; Legion, three cohorts.
In places where the number of cohorts is over three but under
six a single legion is formed. . . .
ART. x: In order to achieve the ends specified in the law, and in
Art. I of the present regulations, the Balilla institution shall:
1. teach the young the spirit of discipline and of military train-
ing, and give them:
2. premilitary training;
3. physical training through gymnastics and sports;
4. spiritual and cultural training;
5. professional and vocational training;
6. religious teaching.
souRcE: Royal Decree No. 6, January 9, 192 7, reprinted in Benito

Mussolini, Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions (Rome: "Ardita,"
1935), pp. 270-275 passim.
ART. XI: Discipline means respect and obedience to military

commanders and to persons who are entrusted with the civil and
military training of the Avanguardisti.
The first rank of the hierarchy is the capo-squadra, chosen from
among the Avanguardisti; he shall 'be looked upon as a comrade
whose advice and example are to be followed.
Leaders ranking higher than capo-squadra have the same rank as
officers of the Militia and shall be looked to by the Avanguardisti as
their natural educators and instructors.
ART. xn: Breaches of discipline on the part of Avanguardisti are
punished as follows: (a) oral reprimand, when the breach is merely
negligence in performing duties;
(b) written reprimand to be sent to parents or guardians when
the charge is continued negligence, or serious disobedience;
(c) suspension for a period ranging from one to three months
for infringement of rules of good manners, or in cases of continued
bad conduct;
(d) expulsion in cases which appear incorrigible and would set
bad examples.
Expulsion entails the loss of all privileges of assistance and relief
offered by the Institution to its members.
Oral reprimand is pronounced by leaders higher in rank than
capo-squadra; written reprimand is made by the officer highest in
rank in the Commune; suspension is ordered by the Communal
Committee and expulsion by the Provincial Committee. . . .
ART. xxvn: Physical training through gymnastics and sport is
given according to the official program for the secondary schools
of the Kingdom. It is supplemented by excursions, camping, games,
etc. Those who attend to the planning of these schemes should bear
in mind that physical training also influences the spiritual education
of the young.
Therefore the Avanguardisti and Militia are intended to train the
young to appreciate beauty and strength, since intellectual life can
only develop fully in a healthy and vigorous body. . . .
ART. xxx: The National Balilla Institution shall also train the
conscience and minds of these boys, since they are destined to
become the Fascist men of the future, from whose ranks national
leaders will be selected.
The National Balilla Institution is highly qualified to carry out
this task, since it has control over large groups of the young, whose
minds are readily formed by proper care and education.
ART. xxxi: In order to achieve this end the National Institution
may found schools for cultural training and centers of study and
propaganda.
The doctrine of Fascism, its logical development and its histori-
cal signifiance, shall be taught in these schools. . . .
ART. xxxvm: Religious instruction shall consist in the teaching
of Catholic ethics, Christian doctrine, the Old Testament and the
Gospels, and shall be imparted in such hours as specified in Article
XL. The form of worship is that practiced by the Roman Catholic
Church. . . .
In 1937, as a result of a feud between PNF Secretary Starace and

Renato Ricci, who headed Balilla, the latter organization was abolished
and Ricci dismissed. In its place emerged the Italian Youth of the
Lictors (Gioventu ltaliana del Littorio, GIL) as the co-ordinating
organization for all the youth forces of the regime except the Fascist
University Groups (GUF), which remained separate though also
under strict party control. GUF also directed the School of Fascist
Mysticism at Milan, one of the party's principal leadership schools. By
1940 some 8,500,000 youth belonged to GIL, while GUF enrolled
more than 100,000. The following decree established GIL.
Law Creating Italian Youth of the Lictors

(October 27, 1937)
Art. 1-The Gioventu Italiana del Littorio, which is the unitary
and totalitarian organization of all the youth forces of the Fascist
Regime, is hereby established within the framework of the Na-
tional Fascist Party, under the direct supervision of the Secretary
of the National Fascist Party, Minister Secretary of State, who is
the General Commandant of the organization.
The Gioventtl Italiana del Litttorio has as its motto: "Believe!
Obey! Fight!"
Art. 2-The Undersecretariat of State for Physical and Youth
Education, which was attached to the Ministry of National Educa-
tion by Royal Decree No. 1661 of September 12, 1929-VI, is
hereby abolished.
souRCE: Royal Decree-Law No. 1839, October 27, 1937, reprinted

in Alberto Aquarone ( ed.), L' organizzazione dello stato totali-
tario (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1965), Appendix 60, pp.
561-562. By permission of Giulio Einaudi Editore. My transla-
tion.
The Opera Nazionale Balilla, which was established by Law No.

2247 of April 3, 1926-IV, is hereby absorbed by the Gioventu
ltaliana del Littorio.
The powers that were conferred by laws and regulations upon
the president of the Opera Nazionale Balilla and the Ministry of
National Education as regards the Opera Nazionale Balilla are
hereby conferred upon the Secretary of the National Fascist Party,
Minister Secretary of State, General Commandant of the Gioventu
ltaliana del Littorio.
The institutions, schools, academies, and colleges belonging to
the Opera Nazionale Balilla are hereby transferred to the Gioventu
ltaliana del Littorio in their present actual and legal status.
All assets and liabilities of the Opera Nazionale Balilla and of the
Fasci Giovanili di Combattimento, as well as real estate which is
owned by the National Fascist Party and assigned for the purpose
of providing Fascist youth with barracks and summer camp facil-
ities, are hereby transferred to Gioventu ltaliana del Littorio.
Art. 3-The Secretary of the National Fascist Party, Minister
Secretary of State, is empowered by virtue of his title as General
Commandant to issue regulations regarding the organization of the
Gioventu Italiana del Littorio and its operation in the Kingdom, in
Italian East Africa, Libya, and the Italian islands of the Aegean
Sea.
Art. 4-Young people of both sexes between the ages of six and
twenty-one who are presently enrolled in such organizations as the
Young Fascists, A vanguardisti, Balilla, Sons of the Wolf, Piccole
ltaliane, Giovani ltaliane, and Giovani Fasciste henceforth belong
to the Gioventu Italiana del Littorio.
Young people who are enrolled in the organization of the
Gioventu Italiana del Littorio are bound by the following oath:
"In the name of God and of Italy, I swear to carry out the orders
of the Duce and to serve with all my strength, and if necessary
with my very blood, the Cause of the Fascist Revolution."
Art. S- The tasks carried out by the Gioventu ltaliana del
Littorio in behalf of the youth are the following:
(a) Training of a spiritual, athletic, and premilitary type;
(b) Teaching of physical education in the elementary and
middle schools, in accordance with programs to be worked out in
conjunction with the Ministry of National Education;
(c) Establishing and operating courses, schools, colleges, and
academies that are consonant with the aims of the Gioventu lta-
liana del Littorio;
(d) Providing of assistance of various kinds-chiefly through
camps, recreational facilities, and educational support, but also by
any other means that may be arranged by the Secretary of the
National Fascist Party, Minister Secretary of State, General Com-
mandant.
(e) Organizing trips and cruises.
The Gioventu Italiana del Littorio is further empowered to
establish and encourage the establishment of scholarships and ar-
range for their distribution. . . .
In the regimentation of Italian youth the regime copied not only the
Communist example of Soviet Russia but the Biblical Ten Command-
ments. Two versions of this Fascist "Decalogue," dated respectively
1934 and 1938, follow.
The Fascist Decalogue
1: 1934
1. Know that the Fascist and in particular the soldier, must not
believe in perpetual peace.
2. Days of imprisonment are always deserved.
3. The nation serves even as a sentinel over a can of petrol.
4. A companion must be a brother, first because he lives with
you, and secondly because he thinks like you.
5. The rifle and cartridge belt, and the rest, are confided to you
not to rust in leisure, but to be preserved in war.
6. Do not ever say "The Government will pay . . . " because it
is you who pay; and the Government is that which you willed to
have and for which you put on a uniform.
7. Discipline is the soul of armies; without it there are no
soldiers, only confusion and defeat.
8. Mussolini is always right.
9. For a volunteer there are no extenuating circumstances when
he is disobedient.
souRcE: Reprinted from The Political and Social Doctrines of

Contemporary Europe, ed. by Michael Oakeshott (Cambridge
University Press, 1941), pp. 180-1. By permission of the Cam-
bridge University Press.
10. One thing must be dear to you above all: the life of the
Duce.
II: 1938
1. Remember that those who fell for the revolution and for the
empire march at the head of your columns.
2. Your comrade is your brother. He lives with you, thinks with
you, and is at your side in the battle.
3. Service to Italy can be rendered at all times, in all places, and
by every means. It can be paid with toil and also with blood.
4. The enemy of Fascism is your enemy. Give him no quarter.
5. Discipline is the sunshine of armies. It prepares and illuminates
the victory.
6. He who advances to the attack with decision has victory
already in his grasp.
7. Conscious and complete obedience is the virtue of the
Legionary.
8. There do not exist things important and things unimportant.
There is only duty.
9. The Fascist revolution has depended in the past and still
depends on the bayonets of its Legionaries.
10. Mussolini is always right.
Mussolini's first Minister of National Education from 1922 to t924 was
Giovanni Gentile, the neo-Hegelian philosopher who was to compose
in 1925 the Manifesto of the Fascist Intellectuals referred to in Chapter
2. Mussolini was rather indifferent to Gentile's educational reforms of
1923 which gave universities somewhat more autonomy, allowed con-
siderable freedom to private schools, and stressed the infusion of
philosophy into almost every facet of the curriculum (and in history
in particular).
In the latter part of the 1920's various Fascist institutes were
founded-e.g., the National Fascist Institute of Culture in Rome, with
Gentile as its president; the Fascist University of Bologna; the Fascist-
oriented Faculty of Political Science at Peru~ia; a new Fascist Italian
Academy (1927), supposed to rival the Academie Fran~_;aise and to co-
ordinate all work in the arts and sciences. Its sixty "immortals" were
chosen by Mussolini and decked out with fine ostrich feathers.
Gioacchino Volpe, the leading Fascist historian of the Risorgimento
era, was secretary. Among the other notables were D'Annunzio and
Guglielmo Marconi.
Elementary education expanded during the Fascist era (but it would
have done so anyway). Illiteracy fi~ures continued to decline (but at a
slower rate). Efforts to "fascistictze" the Italian educational system
persisted and met with some success at the elementary and intermedi-
ate school levels, though more in the category of athletic and extracur-
ricular activities than in substantive courses, except for the peculiarly
vulnerable disciplines of history, economics, and political science.
Some of the Fascist innovations had merit so long as they were not
carried to excess-for example, increased attention to physical educa-
tion. Despite occasional pressure against law faculties and professors in
the fields of history and the social sciences, academic freedom gen-
erally survived pretty well in the universities. But in August, 1931, the
dictatorship interfered drastically with academic freedom when it
required every university professor to subscribe to the following oath.
Fascist Loyalty Oath Imposed upon Professors

(Novenzber 1, 1931)
Art. 18-Both regular professors (professori di ruolo) and tempo-
rary professors (professori incaricati) are required to take the
following oath:
"I swear to be loyal to the King, to his royal successors, to the
Fascist Regime, to observe loyally the Constitution and the other
laws of the State, to exercise the profession of teacher and to carry
out all academic duties with the aim of training upright and hard-
working citizens who are devoted to the fatherland and to the
Fascist Regime. I swear that I neither belong to nor shall belong to
associations or parties whose activities do not harmonize with the
duties of my profession."
Some 1,200 university professors (the overwhelming majority) sub-

scribed to the Fascist loyalty oath, much to the joy of Gentile, who
exulted, "The undisciplined intellectual disappears from our midst." 4
Probably most professors did so in order to avoid the financial ruin
they faced if they lost their posts in the middle of the Depression.
Some, of course, were either indifferent or felt that the oath would not
hamper presentation of subject matter in their own fields. Certain ones
adhered because the Vatican indicated its approval, explaining that an
oath "to the Fascist regime" was the equivalent of the expression
"Government of the State." 5 Only about a dozen refused to join in
this trahison des clercs and declared flatly that the oath was a violation
of both academic and political freedoms. They included some of Italy's
most internationally renowned savants (e.g., Gaetano De Sanctis,
souRcE: Decree-Law of August 28, 1931, "Dispositions Regarding
Higher Education," published in Gazzetta U fficiale (Oct. 8,
1931) and effective as of November 1, 1931. My translation.
4. Quoted in Daniel Binchy, Church and State in Fascist Italy (London:
Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 465.
5. L'Osservatore Romano (Dec. 4, 1931), cited in ibid., p. 465.
Lionello Venturi, and Giuseppe A. Borgese). Similar oaths were re-

quired in October, 1934, of members of the venerable and prestigious
Accademia dei Lincei; in that case there were ten nonjurors.
From the time of the Gentile educational reforms of 1923, and
especially in the mid-1930's, the PNF was interfering almost constantly
with the work of the Ministry of National Education in an effort to
achieve the party's goal of a school system that would be profoundly
Fascist both in spirit and in form. Textbooks in the elementary schools
were filled with such slogans as "Mussolini ha sempre ragione" (Musso-
lini is always right). Aping the Jacobins of the French Revolution, the
Fascists began to use a "revolutionary" Fascist calendar, with Roman
numerals marking the years since October 30, 1922. When the GIL
was created in 1937 it insisted on close collaboration with the schools
and arranged special athletic events on Saturdays (sabato fascista),
summer camps, and programs of party indoctrination. The culmination
of this effort to educate a "new Italian man" occurred on February 15,
1939, when the Grand Council approved the Fascist School Charter,
drawn up by Giuseppe Bottai, an idealistic young Catholic Fascist
hierarch who had recently become Minister of National Education. In
contrast to the thirty aphorisms of the Labor Charter of 1927, to
which it was often compared, the School Charter contained twenty-
nine points. It conceived of scholastic obligation as "national service,"
in the execution of which the schools, GIL, and GUF (Fascist Univer-
sity Groups) would work in closest harmony. Membership in GIL
now became obligatory for every student. The influence of the Nazis'
labor-service program (Arbeitsdienst) was apparent in Article 5. The
hostility toward co-education was also clear. Because of Italy's entry
into World War II sixteen months later, only a few provisions of the
charter were implemented; among these was Article 26, which, in
effect, established state control over the last private and parochial
schools. Bottai's School Charter is an important statement of the educa-
tional goals of Italian Fascism. Fortunately, the universities and inter-
mediate schools managed to maintain pretty high standards in spite of
frequent Fascist interference.
The Fascist School Charter

(February 15, 1939)
PRINCIPLES, GoALs, AND METHODS OF THE FASCIST ScHOOL
L-In the moral, political, and economic unity of the Italian nation
which is realized integrally in the Fascist State, the schools-which
souRcE: Approved by the Fascist Grand Council, February 15,
1939. Printed in Ministero dell'Educazione Nazionale, Dalla
Riforma Gentile alta Carta della Scuola (Rome, 1941). My
translation.
provide the essential foundation for the solidarity among all the
social forces from the family to the corporations and the Party-
shape the human and political conscience of the new generations.
By means of study conceived as forming a mature mind, the
Fascist schools bring into reality the principle of popular culture
that finds inspiration in the eternal values of the Italian race and its
civilization. And, through work, this principle is engrafted in the
actual crafts, arts, professions, sciences, and military life.
H.-Under the Fascist order, the periods for scholastic and
political education coincide. The schools, GIL, and GUF together
form a single instrument of Fascist education. The duty to attend
them constitutes the scholastic service, to which all citizens are
bound from early age to that of twenty-one years. This service
consists in attending the schools and GIL from the fourth to the
fourteenth year; it continues in the GIL until the twenty-first year
for those who no longer go to school. University students must
belong to the GUF. A personal record book, similar to the
worker's employment booklet, will attest to the fulfillment of
scholastic service; and both will be taken into account in the
evaluation of the individuals in offices and other type of work.
IlL-Studies will be arranged in accordance with the actual
physical and intellectual abilities of young people; these studies will
aim at their moral and cultural training, and at their political and
military preparation, in harmony with the goals of the GIL. The
only criterion for admitting young people to studies and allowing
them to go on in the schools is that given by individual talents and
capabilities. The state colleges will guarantee that capable but poor
people shall be able to continue their studies.
IV.-Physical education, which is provided in the schools by the
GIL, will encourage and favor the gradual growth and physical
strengthening of the young people, as well as their psychical
progress. The technique of such training shall aim at harmonious
development, efficiency, high moral standards, self-assurance, and a
strong sense of discipline and duty.
In the university system the GUF shall supervise the athletic and
military training of the young people.
V.-Work-which is protected by the State in all its forms,
whether intellectual, manual, or technical, as a social duty-con-
tributes, together with studies and physical training, toward shap-
ing character and intelligence.
Manual work shall have its place in the programs of all the
schools, from the elementary to the highest. Special periods of

work are to be organized and directed by the school authorities in
the workshops, fields, and on the sea, so that the social and produc-
tive consciousness that is characteristic of the corporative system
may be developed.
VI.-Study, physical exercises, and manual work provide the
schools with the means for testing talent. The main tasks of the
schools are to provide cultural and professional orientation so that
men capable of facing the actual problems of scientific research and
production may be trained according to reason and needs.
The principle of selection must go on continuously in the
schools, so that the special functions and responsibilities of the
various types of schools may be safeguarded.
VII.-There is a natural solidarity between family and schools;
they collaborate intimately and uninterruptedly to the end of
educating and orienting youth. Parents and relatives participate in
the life of the schools and learn there to know the common aims
and methods which help to strengthen children and young people
on the path of the traditional religion and destiny in Italy.
STRUCTURE oF THE FASCIST ScHooLs
VIII.-The Italian schools are characterized by the following "or-

ders":
(a) Elementary, consisting of:
1. Nursery school (scuola materna), two years;
2. Elementary school, three years;
3. Labor school, two years;
4. Artisan school, three years.
(b) Intermediate, consisting of:
1. Middle school (scuola media), three years;
2. Professional school, three years;
3. Technical school, two years.
(c) Superior, consisting of:
1. Classical lyceum, five years;
2. Scientific lyceum, five years;
3. Teacher-training institute, five years;
4. Technical-commercial institute, five years;
5. Institute for agricultural, industrial, land surveymg,
and nautical skills, four years.
(d) University, consisting of:
I. Faculties of jurisprudence, political science, eco-
nomics, and commerce;
2. Faculties of letters and philosophy, and of teacher
training;
3. Faculties of medicine and surgery, and of veterinary
medicine;
4. Faculties of mathematical, physical, and natural SCi-
ences, of statistical, demographic, and actuarial sci-
ences;
5. Faculty of pharmacy;
6. Faculties of engineering, mining engineering, and in-
dustrial chemistry;
7. Faculty of architecture;
8. Faculty of agriculture;
9. Schools for special purposes.
The courses of study leading to academic degrees shall last from

four to six years. Under exceptional circumstances certain courses
of study may be of shorter duration.
In addition to the regular teaching institutes in each faculty,
there may also be established for graduate students specialized
courses and schools.
Special "orders" of study and training include the following:
(a) Institutes for art instruction, consisting of:

1. Beginners' course in art, three years;
2. School of art, five years;
3. Institute of art, eight years;
4. Teacher-training course for design and applied art,
two years;
5. Art lyceum, five years;
6. Academy of art, four years;
7. Conservatory of music, from six to ten years;
8. Academy of dramatic art, three years.
(b) Institutes for the instruction of women, consisting of:
I. Women's institute, three years;
2. Women's teacher training, two years.
(c) Courses for training skilled workers. . . .
THE ELEMENTARY ORDER
IX.-[Describes the structure and functions of the nursery school

(ages four to six), elementary school (ages six to nine), and labor
school (ages nine to eleven).]
X.-The artisan school trains pupils from ages eleven to four-
teen in the labor traditions of the Italian family.
THE INTERMEDIATE ORDER
XL-The middle school, attended jointly by all those who intend

to pursue studies on the superior order, inculcates the first essentials
of humanistic culture for young people from the age of eleven to
fourteen, according to a rigorous principle of selection. . . . In its
programs, which are inspired by the most modern didactic prin-
ciples, the teaching of Latin is the means for moral and mental
training. Labor here will assume the form and method of produc-
tive labor.
XII.-The professional school is designed for young men from
the age of eleven to fourteen who intend to prepare for the kinds
of work typical of the great centers. . . . Labor, scientifically
organized, has a preponderant part here.
XIII.-The technical school, lasting two years, complements the
professional school by preparing students specifically for lesser
positions and specialized work in the great industrial, commercial,
and agricultural enterprises.
THE SuPERIOR ORDER
XIV.-The classical lyceum, five years in length, integrates the

teaching of ancient languages and literature with that of modern
languages and literature, and perpetuates and revives the high
humanistic tradition of our studies. . . . Scientific instruction will
be included to the degree that this corresponds with the aims of the
school.
XV.-The scientific lyceum, five years in length, associates
classical traditions with the values of present-day life in the forma-
tion of a modern humanism. Scientific instruction, conducted with
rigorous methodological order, is designed to develop habits of
scientific and technical research; and, by means of labor, to bring
about their practical application. Literary instruction will be car-
ried out by methods that are appropriate to the goals of this school.
XVI.-The teacher-training institute, five years in length, pre-
pares people to teach children. Its character is humanistic and
professional combined. . . . A year of practice teaching [follows]
four years of classroom work. . . .
XVII.-The technical-commercial institute, five years in length,
looks after the training of young people for office work in public
and private management. . . .
XVIII.-The professional institutes, four years in length, are
divided into four types: the training of experts in the fields of
agriculture, industry, land surveying, and nautical skills.
THE UNIVERSITY ORDER
XIX.-The university's goal is to promote the progress of science

in an order of high political and moral responsibility and to provide
the necessary scientific training for carrying out professional work.
Courses at the level of the graduate school will be strictly scientific.
. . . Athletic and military training and labor service will also
contribute to the education of the youth.
THE ORDER FOR INSTRUCTION IN THE ARTS
XX.-The figurative-art institutes bring intimately together in

their programs the techniques of the applied arts and the principles
of pure art. . . .
THE ORDER FOR GIRLs' ScHOOLS
XXI.-The destination and social mission of women, which are

quite distinct in Fascist life, have as their foundation different and
special educational institutes. The transformation of the coeduca-
tional schools will be brought about over a period of time as the
new directions of feminine work become defined in the corporative
order. The Order for Girls' Schools ... will prepare [girls]
spiritually for home management and for teaching in the nursery
schools.
CouRsEs FOR TRAINING SKILLED WoRKERS
XXII.-The courses for the training of skilled workers and the

improvement of their skills have the aim of providing and enlarging
the technical and productive capacity of the labor force with
respect to the needs of the national economy in the sectors of
agriculture, industry, commerce, credit, and insurance. The profes-
sional associations, one of whose principal duties is to provide

specialized instruction for their personnel, will take steps directly
to this end by means of appropriate agencies and under the over-all
supervision of the Ministries of National Education and of Corpo-
rations. Courses for workers may also be instituted by the PNF
and dependent organizations, by the Commissariat for War Pro-
duction, by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forests, and other
agenc1es.
TEACHERS
XXIII.-The training of teachers is the subject of special care and

provisions. Vocational training, theoretical knowledge, and clarity
of expression, whereby knowledge is acquired and transmitted, will
be brought together and refined in experimental didactical centers,
in educational laboratories and museums, in methodological insti-
tutes attached to the major universities, and in apprenticeship
courses for the training of teaching assistants.
The method of competition for teaching positions will be deter-
mined according to the type of school, discipline, and loca-
tion. . . .
ExAMINATIONS
XXIV.-In each order of schools those pupils who show sufficient

achievement will be ·promoted to the classes above them. [This] is
determined by the over-all judgment given in each subject by the
instructors at the end of the term. At the completion of each
course of study in the elementary, intermediate, superior, artistic,
and girls' orders, the pupils must take a comprehensive examination
( esame di licenza). The comprehensive examination in the superior
order is a state examination, administered by a committee made up
of the instructors from the particular school and with participation
of two representatives from the Ministry. . . .
XXV.-[Describes the manner of promotion from one grade to
another.]
THE NATIONAL AGENCY FOR

INTERMEDIATE AND SUPERIOR EDUCATION
XXVI.-The National Agency for Intermediate and Superior

Education, which is the agency for promoting, co-ordinating, and
controlling all of the nonstate schools in these two orders, has the
task of stimulating private initiative as well as that of the com-
munes, provinces, and other bodies; of promoting the creation of
schools that will respond to particular economic and cultural needs,
restrain the migration of students into the cities, and ensure that
these private and nonstate entities emulate the state schools in a
salutary manner.
TEXTBOOKS
XXVII.-The State will provide appropriate textbooks for all of

the schools in the elementary order. The textbooks of the inter-
mediate and superior orders that provide the direct and immediate
subject matter of their courses of study may not be printed
without the prior approval of either the manuscript or the proofs
by the Ministry of National Education.
THE SCHOOL YEAR
XXVIII.-The school year and the academic year are composed of

periods of classes alternating with periods of vacation. During the
vacation periods labor service will be assigned.
School hours may not exceed twenty-four per week in any
school except in the university order and in the order for instruc-
tion in the arts. . . .
EocuATIONAL AssiSTANCE
XXIX.-Measures for providing educational assistance will fulfill

on the level of political and social solidarity the intimate collabora-
tion that exists between the Party and the school.
5. Fascism, the Catholic Church, and the Jews
ONE oF the epochal events of the Fascist regime, and certainly its most
enduring legacy, was the signing of the Lateran Pacts with the Holy
See in 1929. These agreements were received enthusiastically by a large
segment of the population who were relieved that after half a century
of acrimony between Church and State, peace had at last been
achieved, thanks to the Vatican's recognition of the unified Italian
Kingdom. As has already been mentioned, Mussolini began to back-
track from his youthful anticlericalism even before the March on
Rome, and his first speech as Prime Minister ended with an invocation
for divine assistance. The Church, far more alarmed by political
extremism on the left than on the right, made friendly overtures
toward Mussolini's regime in 1923 by disavowing the anti-Fascist
stance of Luigi Sturzo, secretary of the Catholic Popular party. Resign-
ing his post, Sturzo went into exile, and the party rapidly disintegrated.
His friend and associate, Alcide De Gasperi, was to be arrested by the
Fascists and spend several months in jail in I927 before papal interces-
sion gained his release. He worked inconspicuously in the Vatican
library for the next sixteen years.
Meanwhile Mussolini pushed ahead with plans to win over the
Vatican. By agreeing to restore the crucifix to schools and courtrooms
and to schedule Masses for public functions (to say nothing of his
campaign against the Masonic Lodge), the Duce paved the way for the
appointment in February, I925, of a committee of laymen to review
legislation affecting ecclesiastical affairs. Working quietly, this group
presented a report at year's end. At the same time secret negotiations
got under way outside Parliament to solve the "Roman Question."
Despite occasional tension-such as the dispute between the Balilla
youth organization and the 100,000 Catholic Boy Scouts (Esploratori
Cattolici), which was resolved by virtually disbanding the latter in
I928-these negotiations went ahead fairly smoothly under the super-
vision of Cardinal Secretary of State Gasparri, Marchese Eugenio
Pacelli, and Pius XI himself. Some of the final sessions took place at
night in Mussolini's residence. At last the momentous agreements,
which included a political treaty settling the Roman Question, a reli-
gious concordat, and a financial convention, were signed on February
II, I929, by Cardinal Gasparri and Mussolini in the Lateran Palace.
Seminarists intoning the "Te Deum" competed with Militiamen on the
square in front who shrieked the Fascist cry "Eia, alala!" Important
provisions of the political treaty and the concordat are printed below.
FASCISM, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, AND THE JEWS 157
Treaty Between the Holy See and Italy (February 11,

1929; Effective June 7, 1929)
Art. 1-Italy recognizes and reaffirms the principle set forth
in Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Italy of March 4,
1848, whereby the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Religion is the
sole religion of the State.
Art. 2-Italy recognizes the sovereignty of the Holy See in the
field of international relations as an attribute that pertains to the
very nature of the Holy See, in conformity with its traditions and
with the demands of its mission in the world.
Art. 3-Italy recognizes full possession and exclusive and abso-
lute power and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the
Vatican, as at present constituted, with all its appurtenances and
endowments. Thus the Vatican City is established for the special
purposes and with the provisions laid down in the present Treaty.
The confines of the Vatican City are indicated on a plan which
constitutes the first appendix to the present Treaty of which it
forms an integral part. . . .
Art. 4-The sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction which Italy
recognizes on the part of the Holy See with regard to the State of
the Vatican implies that there can be no interference on the part of
the Italian Government therein, nor any other authority than that
of the Holy See. . . .
Art. 6-ltaly undertakes to furnish through agreement with the
agencies concerned, assurances to the Vatican City of an adequate
water supply within the territory.
It will also provide for communication with the Italian State
Railways by constructing a railroad station within the Vatican
City. . . .
It will provide moreover for the linking up, directly with other
States also, of the telegraph, telephone, radio-telegraph, radio-
telephone and postal services within the Vatican City. . . .
Art. 8-Italy, considering the person of the Sovereign Pontiff as
sacred and inviolable, declares that any and every attempt against
souRCE: Treaty and Concordat Between the Holy See and Italy:
Official Documents (Washington: National Catholic Welfare
Conference, 192 9), pp. 37-51 passim. English translation of the
official Italian text reprinted by courtesy of the United States
Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C.
him, as well as any incitement to commit such, to be punishable by

the same penalties as attempts against the person of the King or
incitement to commit the same.
Public offenses or insults committed in Italian territory against
the person of the Sovereign Pontiff, whether by deed or by spoken
or written word, are punishable by the same penalties as similar
offenses and injuries against the person of the King.
Art. .9-ln conformity with the provisions of international law,
all persons having a fixed residence within the State of the Vatican
are subject to the sovereignty of the Holy See. . . .
Art. 10-Dignitaries of the Church and persons attached to the
Pontifical Court, who will be designated in a list to be agreed upon
by the High Contracting Parties, even when not citizens of the
State of the Vatican, shall always and in every case, so far as Italy is
concerned, be exempt from military service, from jury duty and
from all services of a personal character. . . .
Ecclesiastics who, in the performance of the duties of their
office, are occupied in the execution of the acts of the Holy See
shall not be subjected on account of such execution to any hin-
drance, investigation or molestation on the part of the Italian
authorities.
Every foreigner invested with ecclesiastical office in Rome shall
enjoy the same personal guarantees as belong to Italian citizens by
virtue of the laws of the Kingdom of Italy.
Art. 11-The central corporate entities of the Catholic Church
are exempt from all interference on the part of the Italian State
(except for the provisions of Italian law concerning the acquisi-
tions of moral entities 1 ) and also from expropriation with regard
to real estate.
Art. 12-ltaly recognizes the right of the Holy See to send and
to receive diplomatic representatives according to the general pro-
visions of international law. . . .
Art. 17-Contributions of whatever kind due to the Holy See
from the other central organizations of the Catholic Church and
from the organizations directly managed by the Holy See, even
outside of Rome, as also those due to dignitaries, functionaries and
employees, even when not fixed, beginning with the first of Janu-
ary, 1929, shall be exempt in Italian territory from any tax what-
soever on the part of the State or of any other entity..
I. I.e., incorporated charitable or educational bodies.-Ed.

Art. 19-Diplomatic representatives and envoys of the Holy
See, diplomatic representatives and envoys of foreign nations to the
Holy See, and Dignitaries of the Church coming from abroad
directly to the State of the Vatican, if provided with passports
issued by the countries from which they come and viseed by papal
representatives abroad, may without any other formality proceed
through Italian territory to the State of the Vatican. The same
procedure will apply to these persons when, provided with a
regular papal passport, they leave the State of the Vatican for
abroad.
Art. 20-Merchandise coming from abroad and consigned to the
State of the Vatican, or to institutions or offices of the Holy See
which are located outside thereof, shall always be admitted at any
point on the Italian frontier or at any port of the Kingdom to pass
through Italian territory with full exemption from custom duties
and intercommunal taxes. . . .
Art. 22-At the request of the Holy See and on delegation of
power, which may be given by the Holy See either in single cases
or permanently, Italy will provide within her own territory for the
punishment of crimes committed within the State of the Vatican.
When, however, an individual who has committed a crime therein
takes refuge in Italian territory, he shall be dealt with forthwith
according to the provisions of Italian law.
The Holy See will hand over to the Italian State individuals who
have fled within the State of the Vatican charged with acts com-
mitted in Italian territory which are considered criminal by the
laws of both States. . . .
Art. 23-For the execution within the Kingdom of Italy of
sentences pronounced by tribunals of the State of the Vatican the
principles of international law will be applied.
On the other hand, sentences and decisions pronounced by
ecclesiastical authorities, which have to do with ecclesiastical or
religious persons in spiritual or disciplinary matters, and which are
officially communicated to the civil authorities, will have full
juridical efficacy immediately in Italy even so far as the civil effects
are concerned.
Art. 24-With regard to the sovereignty pertaining to it in the
field of international relations, the Holy See declares that it wishes
to remain and will remain extraneous to all temporal disputes
between nations, and to international congresses convoked for the
settlement of such disputes, unless the contending parties make a
joint appeal to its mission of peace; nevertheless, it reserves the

right in every case to exercise its moral and spiritual power.
In consequence of this declaration, the State of the Vatican will
always and in every case be considered neutral and inviolable
territory. . . .
Art. 26-The Holy See maintains that with the agreements
signed today adequate assurance is guaranteed as far as is necessary
for the said Holy See to provide, with due liberty and indepen-
dence, for the pastoral regime of the Diocese of Rome and of the
Catholic Church in Italy and in the world. The Holy See declares
the "Roman Question" definitively and irrevocably settled and,
therefore, eliminated; and recognizes the Kingdom of Italy under
the dynasty of the House of Savoy with Rome as the Capital of the
Italian State.
Italy, in turn, recognizes the State of the Vatican under the
sovereignty of the Supreme Pontiff.
The Law of May 13, 1871, No. 214, is abrogated, as well as any
other decree or decision contrary to the present Treaty.
Art. 27-The present Treaty will be submitted to the Sovereign
Pontiff and to the King of Italy for ratification within four months
from the date of signing and will become effective immediately on
the exchange of ratifications.
Rome, February 11, 1929.
Signed: PIETRO Cardinale GASPARRI.
Signed: BENITO MUSSOLINI.
Concordat Between the Holy See and Italy

(February 11, 1929)
Art. 1-ltaly, according to the terms of Art. 1 of the Treaty,
guarantees to the Catholic Church free exercise of spiritual power,
free and public exercise of worship, as well as jurisdiction in
ecclesiastical matters, in conformity with the provisions of the
present Concordat; and, where it shall be necessary for the carry-
ing out of their spiritual ministry, grants to ecclesiastics protection
on the part of its authorities.
souRcE: Treaty and Concordat Between the Holy See and Italy:
Official Documents (Washington: National Catholic Welfare
Conference, 1929), pp. 59-82 passim. English translation of the
official Italian text reprinted by courtesy of the United States
Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C.
In consideration of the sacred character of the Eternal City,
episcopal see. of the Sovereign Pontiff, center of the Catholic
world, and goal of pilgrimages, the Italian Government will take
precautions to prevent the occurrence in Rome of everything that
might be contrary to this sacred character.
Art. 2-The Holy See may communicate and correspond freely
with the Bishops, the clergy and the whole Catholic world, with-
out any interference on the part of the Italian Government.
Bishops, likewise, in everything that concerns their pastoral
office, may communicate and correspond freely with their clergy
and with all the Faithful. . . .
Art. 3-Students in theology, those preparing for the priesthood
who are in the last two years of study preliminary to theology, and
novices in religious institutes may, on their own request, put off
from year to year, up to the age of twenty-six, the fulfillment of
the obligations of military service.
Ordained clerics (in sacris) and religious who have taken their
vows are exempt from military service except in case of general
mobilization. . . .
However, even when general mobilization is ordered, priests
who are entrusted with the care of souls are exempt from the
obligation of answering to the call. . . .
Art. 4-Ecclesiastics and religious are exempt from jury duty.
Art. S-No ecclesiastic may be employed or remain in the em-
ployment or service of the Italian State or of any of the public
departments subordinate to the same without the express permis-
sion of his diocesan Bishop.
The revocation of this permission deprives the ecclesiastic of
power to continue exercising the duty of office assumed.
In any case apostate priests or those who have incurred censure
cannot be employed or retained in a teaching post, or in an office or
an employment in which they are brought into immediate contact
with the public. . . .
Art. ?-Ecclesiastics may not be requested by magistrates or
other authorities to give information regarding persons or matters
which may have come to their knowledge through the exercise of
their sacred ministry. . . .
Art. 9-As a general rule, buildings open for worship are exempt
from confiscation or occupation. . . .
Except in cases of urgent necessity, the police cannot in the
exercise of their duties enter buildings used for worship without
having given previous notice to the proper ecclesiastical author-

tty. . . .
Art. 11-The State recognizes the holy days established by the
Church. . . .
Art. 19-The selection of Archbishops and Bishops pertains to
the Holy See. Before proceeding to the [appointment] of an
Archbishop, a Bishop, or a Coadjutor with the right of succession,
the Holy See will communicate the name of the person chosen to
the Italian Government in order to be sure that the latter has no
objection from a political standpoint. . ..
Art. 20-Bishops before taking possession of their dioceses shall
take an oath of loyalty at the hands of the Head of the State
according to the following formula:
"Before God on the Holy Gospels, I swear and promise, as
becomes a Bishop, loyalty to the Italian State. I swear and promise
to respect, and to make my clergy respect, the King and the
Government established according to the constitutional laws of the
State. I swear and promise, moreover, that I shall not participate in
any agreement or take part in any discussion that might be injuri-
ous to the Italian State or detrimental to public order and that I
shall not permit my clergy to take part in such. Being mindful of
the welfare and of the interests of the Italian State, I shall endeavor
to ward off any danger that may threaten it."
Art. 21-The awarding of ecclesiastical benefices pertains to
ecclesiastical authority.
The competent ecclesiastical authority will communicate confi-
dentially to the Italian Government the names of those who are to
be invested with parochial benefices, and the investiture can have
no effect until after thirty days from the date of the said communi-
cation. . . .
Art. 22-Ecclesiastics who are not Italian citizens cannot be
appointed to Italian benefices. Moreover, the Bishops of the dio-
ceses and the rectors of parishes must speak Italian. . . .
Art. 24- The Exequatur, the royal Placet and all imperial or
royal appointments in the matter of filling benefices and ecclesiasti-
cal offices in the whole of Italy are abolished. . . .
Art. 28-In order that their consciences may be at ease, the
Holy See will grant full condonation to all those who hold ecclesi-
astical property as a result of the Italian laws by which the
patrimony of the Church was dispersed. . . .
Art. 29-The Italian State will reconsider its legislation dealing
with matters ecclesiastical, for the purpose of changing and reor-
ganizing it so as to bring it into harmony with the principles
envisaged by the Treaty made with the Holy See and by the
present Concordat. . . .
Art. 30-The management, both ordinary and extraordinary, of
property belonging to any ecclesiastical institute or religious asso-
ciation whatsoever will be carried out under the supervision and
control of the proper Church authorities without any interference
on the part of the Italian State and without the obligation of
converting the real estate into cash. . . .
Art. 34-The Italian State, desirous of restoring to the institu-
tion of marriage which is the foundation of the family, the dignity
that belongs to it according to the Catholic traditions of its people,
recognizes the civil effects of the sacrament of matrimony as
administered according to the regulations of the Canon Law.
The banns of marriage as defined above will be published both in
the parish church and in the city- or town-hall.
Immediately after the celebration of a marriage, the parish priest
will explain to the married couple the civil effects of the marriage,
reading the articles of the Civil Code which have to do with the
rights and duties of husbands and wives and will make a record of
the ceremony. Within five days he will send a complete copy of
this record to the municipal building in order that it may be
transcribed in the register of the civil authorities.
Questions having to do with the nullification of marriage and
with the dispensation of a marriage "ratum et non consummatum"
are reserved to the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical tribunals and
courts. . . .
As regards cases of personal separation, the Holy See is willing
that the same shall be judged by the civil judicial authority.
Art. 35-For the schools of secondary education maintained by
ecclesiastical or religious organizations, the policy of state examina-
tions remains in force, the candidates from these schools taking the
examinations on exactly the same conditions as are prescribed for
the candidates from schools maintained by the institutions of the
Government.
Art. 36-ltaly considers the teaching of Christian doctrine,
according to the form handed down by Catholic tradition, as the
foundation and capstone of public education. Therefore, Italy
agrees that the religious instruction now given in the public ele-
mentary school shall be further developed in the secondary schools
according to a program to be agreed upon by the Holy See and

the State.
This instruction is to be given by teachers and professors who
are priests or religious approved by ecclesiastical authority and
who will be aided by lay teachers and professors holding for this
purpose proper certificates of fitness and capacity, these certificates
to be issued by the diocesan Bishop.
Revocation of the certificate by the Bishop immediately deprives
the individual of the right to teach.
No texts will be adopted for this religious instruction in the
public schools except such as are approved by ecclesiastical au-
thority.
Art. 37-The directors of state associations for physical educa-
tion, for premilitary instruction, as well as the directors of the
A vanguardisti and the Balilla, in order to facilitate the religious
instruction and care of the youth entrusted to their charge, will so
arrange their programs that they will not interfere with the young
people's fulfillment of their religious duties on Sundays and holy
days of obligation.
The officials of the public schools will make similar provisions in
the matter of arranging the classes to be held on holy days. . . .
Art. 43-The Italian State recognizes the auxiliary organizations
of the "Azione Cattolica Italiana" inasmuch as these, according to
the regulations of the Holy See, carry on their activities indepen-
dently of all political parties and under the immediate direction of
the Hierarchy of the Church for the teaching and practice of
Catholic principles.
The Holy See takes occasion on the signing of the present
Concordat to renew its prohibition to all the ecclesiastics and
religious to enroll or take part in any political party.
Art. 44-If, in the future, any difficulty should arise with regard
to the interpretation of the present Concordat, the Holy See and
Italy will proceed with mutual understanding to an amicable
solution.
Art. 45-The present Concordat will be effective upon the
exchange of ratifications simultaneously with the Treaty made by
the two High Contracting Parties by which the "Roman Ques-
tion" is eliminated. . ..
Mussolini's star soared throughout the Catholic world. Humble Italian

peasants shed their customary indifference for public affairs long
enough to flock to church to pray for the pontiff who had "given back
God to Italy and Italy to God." The reconciliation doubtless contrib-
uted to the Duce's top-heavy triumph in the plebiscite of March 24,
1929. But news of the agreements shocked those laic foes of the dic-
tatorship who had clung to the hope that the Church might throw its
moral weight to their side of the struggle, or at least remain neutral.
To them it seemed as if Pius XI overstepped himself on February 13,
1929, when he referred glowingly to the Duce as "a man ... whom
Providence has caused us to meet." During the spring, objections to
ratification mounted from lay groups, while at the same time both the
dictatorship and the Vatican indulged in harsh polemics, much to the
bewilderment of outsiders.
The fears of a good many Fascists and other nationalists that the
King would become the "Pope's altar boy," and the converse fears of
Catholics that the Pope might end up the "King's chaplain" (to use
Mussolini's flippant phrases) led to sharp, even brutal clarification by
the Duce of the meaning of the pacts. On May 13 in a long speech in
the new, hand-picked Chamber of Deputies he claimed state control
over all education of youth. Finally he boasted of the "ethical charac-
ter" of the Italian State, which "is Catholic but also Fascist, indeed
above all else exclusively and essentially Fascist." 2
The Pope lost no time in flatly rejecting many of these claims. He
declared himself "intransigent about the Church's rights in the field of
education," and he noted pointedly that "education for conquest"
could only lead "to general conflagration." Harsh rebuttals and
counterrebuttals were hurled by the spokesmen of the rival authori-
tarian institutions. On June 6, the eve of the date fixed for the
exchange of ratifications, the Vatican published a long letter from the
Pope to Cardinal Gasparri in which he refuted many of the interpreta-
tions set forth by Mussolini. The Holy Father had the better of the
argument, and Mussolini was wise enough to recognize this. Next day,
swallowing his irritation, he drove to the Vatican to exchange ratifica-
tions in a ceremony that was not only correct but even amicable.
Most Catholics seemed to console themselves with the hope that the
Duce's intentions were honorable and that, on balance, the Church had
achieved most of its aims. As a result, civil authorities acceded to the
desires of churchmen whenever these did not flout the interests of
Fascism; by the same token, ecclesiastical authorities usually gave their
nihil obstat to the works of Mussolini and prudently glossed over all
but the most blatantly un-Christian aspects of Fascist doctrine and
practice. Yet the liberal Irish Catholic scholar Daniel A. Binchy was
correct when he wrote that the experiences with Fascist Italy and Nazi
Germany during the 1930's eventually "led Pius XI, although by
temperament inclined to sympathize with authoritarian government, to
2. Benito Mussolini, Scritti e discorsi (1929-1931) (Milan: Hoepli, 1934),

VII, 34 ff.
recognize in modern dictatorships the most formidable danger to

Christianity in our time." 3
The basic difference between the would-be totalitarian Fascist state
and the authoritarian Roman Catholic Church was clearly revealed in
an acrimonious dispute that simmered along from 1929 until it erupted
violently in the spring of 1931 over the status of the Catholic lay
organization Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action). This new dispute
was far more vehement than the one terminated by the Lateran Pacts.
Catholic Action had become prominent in Italy once more when the
Popular party disintegrated. In 1929 it possessed in Italy some 250
diocesan committees, 4,000 men's sections, and 5,000 Catholic youth
and university clubs. Determined to control all mass organizations,
Mussolini was extremely jealous of Catholic Action, which in many
rural areas was stronger than his PNF. He therefore sought a pretext
to eliminate it, even though Article 4 3 of the Concordat grudgingly
recognized its independence. Among other things, he suddenly accused
it in the spring of 1931 of harboring leaders of the outlawed Popular
party and of carrying on social work in competition with Fascist
syndical and welfare programs. There was some truth to these charges,
for Catholic Action, though in no sense an organ of the Populars, did
include within its ranks a great many veterans of the disbanded party,
and its membership swelled considerably after 1929-a development
that annoyed the Duce. Ramifications of the dispute extended into the
university and youth organizations. The newly created Fascist Univer-
sity Groups (GUF) attacked the Italian Catholic University Federa-
tion (FUCI), and on May 30 the government suppressed the latter.
Meanwhile, the Vatican newspaper L'Osservatore Romano skir-
mished with Mussolini's Popolo d'ltalia and chronicled many incidents
in which the dictatorship had interfered forcibly with Catholic associa-
tions, seizing their publications, illegally "inspecting" them, and en-
couraging violence against individual members. Pius XI's growing
displeasure with Fascist totalitarianism became more evident in public
statements, including the encyclical Quadragesimo anno, issued on
May 15, 1931, the fortieth anniversary of Leo XIII's Rerum novarum.
In it he expressed grave fears about not only Marxism and unbridled
laissez-faire capitalism but also the "exclusively bureaucratic and politi-
cal character" of the new Fascist syndical and corporative organiza-
tions which risked "serving !articular political aims rather than
contributing to the initiation o a better social order." The encyclical
made clear, however, that the Church's own system of corporativism
was acceptable. Quadragesimo anno was to carry much weight with
Portugal's dictator, Salazar, and other Catholic advocates of clerico-
corporativist regimes. Key excerpts from this encyclical follow.
3. Church and State in Fascist Italy (London: Oxford University Press,

1941), pp. 219-220.
The Church and the Fascist-Type

Corporative State: Quadragesimo anno
(May 15, 1931)
81. Now this is the primary duty of the state and of all good
citizens: to abolish conflict between classes with divergent inter-
ests, and thus foster and promote harmony between the various
ranks of society.
82. The aim of social legislation must therefore be the re-estab-
lishment of vocational groups. . . .
8 5. . . . In these associations the common interests of the whole
group must predominate; and among these interests the most im-
portant is the directing of the activities of the group to the
common good. Regarding cases in which interests of employers
and employees call for special care and protection against opposing
interests, separate deliberation will take place in their respective
assemblies and separate votes will be taken as the matter may
reqmre.
86. It is hardly necessary to note that what Leo XIII taught
concerning the form of political government can, in due measure,
be applied also to vocational groups. Here, too, men may choose
whatever form they please, provided that both justice and the com-
mon good be taken into account. . . .
91. Within recent times, as all are aware, a special syndical and
corporative organization has been inaugurated which, in view of
the subject of the present Encyclical, demands of Us some mention
and opportune comment.
92. The state here grants legal recognition to the syndicate or
union, and thereby confers on it some of the features of a monop-
oly, for in virtue of this recognition, it alone can represent respec-
souRcE: Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931, Encyclical Letter of

His Holiness Pius XI on Reconstructing the Social Order and
Perfecting It Conformably to the Precepts of the Gospel, in Com-
memoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Encyclical Re-
rum novarum, printed in Oswald von Nell-Breuning, S.J., Re-
organization of Social Economy: The Social Encyclicals Devel-
oped and Explained (Milwaukee: Bruce Publ. Co., 1936-37),
pp. 423-426 passim. Reproduced by permission of Bruce Pub-
lishing Company.
tively workingmen and employers, and it alone can conclude labor

contracts and labor agreements. Affiliation to the syndicate is
optional for everyone; but in this sense only can the syndical
organization be said to be free, since the contribution to the union
and other special taxes are obligatory for all who belong to a given
branch, whether workingmen or employers, and the labor-
contracts drawn up by the legal syndicate are likewise obligatory.
It is true that it has been authoritatively declared that the legal
syndicate does not exclude the existence of unrecognized trade
associations.
93. The corporations are composed of representatives of the
unions of workingmen and employers of the same trade or profes-
sion, and as true and genuine organs and institutions of the state,
they direct and co-ordinate the activities of the unions in all
matters of common interest.
94. Strikes and lockouts are forbidden. If the contending parties
cannot come to an agreement, public authority intervenes.
95. Little reflection is required to perceive the advantage of the
institution thus summarily described: peaceful collaboration of the
classes, repression of socialist organizations and efforts, the moder-
ating influence of a special ministry.
But in order to overlook nothing in a matter of such importance,
and in the light of the general principles stated above, as well as of
that which We are now about to formulate, We feel bound to add
that to Our knowledge there are some who fear that the state is
substituting itself in the place of private initiative, instead of limit-
ing to necessary and sufficient help and assistance. It is feared that
the new syndical and corporative institution possesses an exces-
sively bureaucratic and political character, and that, notwithstand-
ing the general advantages referred to above, it risks serving
particular political aims rather than contributing to the initiation of
a better social order.
96. We believe that to attain this last-named lofty purpose for
the true and permanent advantage of the commonwealth, there is
need before and above all else of the blessing of God, and, in the
second place, of the co-operation of all men of good will. We
believe, moreover, as a necessary consequence, that the end in-
tended will be the more certainly attained, the greater the contri-
bution furnished by men of technical, commercial, and social
competence, and, more still, by Catholic principles and their appli-
cation. We look for this contribution, not only to Catholic Action
(which has no intention of displaying any strictly syndical or
political activities), but to Our sons, whom Catholic Action imbues
with these principles and trains for the Apostolate under the
guidance and direction of the Church, of the Church, We say,
which in the above-mentioned sphere, as in all others where moral
questions are discussed and regulated, cannot forget or neglect its
mandate as custodian and teacher, given it by God . . . .
The growing friction between Pius XI and Mussolini's regime reached

its climax on June 29, 1931, when the pontiff issued the encyclical Non
abbiamo bisogno ("We have no need"), written in vigorous Italian
rather than in Latin in order to emphasize its urgency. He took elabo-
rate precautions to evade Fascist postal censorship; indeed, Mgr.
Francis Spellman of New York flew several hundred copies directly
from Vatican City to Paris. The text came out in newspapers abroad
before Italians read it on July 5 in L'Osservatore Romano (which,
incidentally, went on sale in the kiosks five hours earlier than usual and
thus escaped confiscation until the issue was almost exhausted). The
effect was electrifying. The Pope had flatly rejected the charge that
Catholic Action leaders were chiefly directors of the defunct Popular
party, and he complained bitterly about the Fascists' manner of dissolv-
ing Catholic organizations.
Pius XI on Catholic Action:

Non abbiamo bisogno
(June 29, 1931)
We must needs speak to you, Venerable Brethren, about events
which have recently occurred in this, Our Episcopal City of Rome,
and throughout Italy, that is to say, in the very territory of which
We are Primate-events which have had such a vast and such a
strong repercussion everywhere, conspicuously so in all of the
dioceses of Italy and throughout the Catholic World.
These occurrences are summarized in a very few and very sad
words. There has been an attempt made to strike unto death that
which was and that which always will be dearest to Our heart as
Father and as Shepherd of Souls; and We can, We even must,
souRcE: "Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on Catholic Action," in Six-
teen Encyclicals of His Holiness Pope Pius XI, 1926-1937
(Washington, D. C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference,
1938), pp. 1, 7-8, 15, 21-22, 24-25, 27, 30-31. Reprinted by
courtesy of the United States Catholic Conference, Washington,
D.C.
subjoin "and the way in which it was done offends Us still

more." . . .
Already on several occasions, Venerable Brethren, in the most
solemn and explicit manner and assuming entire responsibility for
what We were saying, We have protested against the campaign of
false and unjust accusations which preceded the disbanding of the
associations of the young people and of the university students
affiliated with Catholic Action. It was a disbanding which was
carried out in a way and with the use of tactics which would give
the impression that action was being taken against a vast and
dangerous organization of criminals. And the proceedings were
directed against young men and young women who are certainly
some of the best among the good and concerning whom We are
happy and paternally proud to pay them tribute still once more. It
is noteworthy that even among the officers of the law charged to
carry out these orders of suppression, there were many who were
ill at ease and showed by their expressions and courtesies that they
were almost asking pardon for doing that which they had been
commanded. We have appreciated the delicate feelings of these
officers, and We have reserved for them a special blessing.
However, in sad contrast to the manner of acting of these
officials, there were how many acts of mistreatment and of vio-
lence, extending even to the striking of blows and the drawing of
blood! How many insults in the press, how many injurious words
and acts against things and persons, not excluding Ourself, pre-
ceded, accompanied and followed the carrying into effect of this
lightning-like police order which very frequently, either through
ignorance or malicious zeal, was extended to include associations
and organizations not contemplated in the orders of the superiors,
such as the oratories of the little ones and the sodalities of the
Children of Mary. And all of this sad accompaniment of irrever-
ences and of violences took place in the presence of and with the
participation of members of a political party some of whom were
in uniform, and was carried into effect with such a unison of action
throughout all Italy and with such a passive acquiescence on the
part of the civil authorities and the police as to make one neces-
sarily think of some uniform directions received from some high
authority. It is very easy to admit, and it was also equally easy to
have foreseen, that the limits of these directions could and would
have almost necessarily been exceeded. . . . We cannot-We,
Church, religious, faithful Catholics (and not alone We)-We
cannot be grateful to one who, after putting out of existence
socialism and anti-religious organizations (Our enemies and not
alone Ours), has permitted them to be so generally readmitted, as
all see and deplore, and has made them even more strong and
dangerous inasmuch as they are now hidden and also protected by
their new uniform. . . .
And here We find Ourselves in the presence of a contract
between authentic affirmations on the one hand and not less au-
thentic facts on the other hand, which reveal, without the slightest
possibility of doubt, the proposal, already in great part actually put
into effect, to monopolize completely the young, from the ten-
derest years up to manhood and womanhood, and all for the
exclusive advantage of a party, of a regime based on ideology
which clearly resolves itself into a true and real pagan worship of
the state, which is no less in contrast with the natural rights of the
family than it is in contradiction to the supernatural rights of the
Church. To propose and promote such a monopoly, to persecute
for this reason Catholic Action, as has been done for some time
more or less openly or under cover, to reach this end by striking
Catholic Action in the way that has recently occurred, is truly and
actually to prevent children from going to Jesus Christ, since it
impedes them from going to His Church and even arrives at the
point of snatching them with violence from the bosom of both,
because where the Church is, there is Jesus Christ. . . .
A conception of the state which makes the young generations
belong entirely to it without any exception from the tenderest
years up to adult life cannot be reconciled by a Catholic with the
Catholic doctrine nor can it be reconciled with the natural right of
the family. It is not possible for a Catholic to reconcile with Catho-
lic doctrine the pretense that the Church and the Pope must limit
themselves to the external practices of religion, such as Mass and
the Sacraments, and then to say that the rest of education belongs
to the state. . . .
With everything that We have said up to the present, We have
not said that We wished to condemn the party as such. We have
intended to point out and to condemn that much in the program
and in the action of the party which We have seen and have
understood to be contrary to Catholic doctrine and the Catholic
practice and therefore irreconcilable with the name and with the
profession of Catholics. And in doing this, We have fulfilled a

precious duty of Our Episcopal ministry toward Our dear sons
who are members of the party, so that they can rest tranquil with
the proper consciences of Catholics.
We believe, then, that We have thus at the same time accom-
plished a good work for the party itself, because what interest and
success can the party have in a Catholic country like Italy in
maintaining in its program ideas and maxims and practices which
cannot be reconciled with a Catholic conscience? . . .
You Bishops of Italy know that no mortal man-not even the
head of a state or of a government-but the Holy Ghost-has
placed you there in places which Peter assigned to you to rule the
Church of God. These and so many other holy and sublime things
that concern you, Venerable Brethren, are evidently ignored or
forgotten by him who thinks of you and calls you, Bishops of
Italy, "Officials of the State," from which the very formula of the
oath, which it is necessary for you to make to the sovereign, clearly
distinguishes and separates you, for the oath especially states, "as is
convenient for a Catholic bishop." . . .
Everything is definitely promised in answer to prayer. . . .
And since from so many prayers We must hope for everything,
and since everything is possible to that God Who has promised
everything in answer to prayer, We have confident hope that He
will illumine minds to Truth and turn wills to Good, so that the
Church of God, which wishes nothing from the state that belongs
to the competence of the state, will cease to be asked for that
which is the Church's competence-the education and the Chris-
tian formation of youth-and this not through human favor, but
by Divine mandate, and that which therefore she always asks and
will always ask with an insistence and an intransigeance which
cannot cease or waver because it does not come from human desire
or design, or from human ideas, changeable in different times and
places and circumstances, but from the Divine and inviolable
disposition.
On July 9, 1931, the Fascist party declared that participation in

Catholic Action was incompatible with party membership; whereupon
thousands resigned from the religious society. On the other side of the
ledger, many Catholic Actionists turned in their PNF cards. The two
organizations sparred for another month or so before reaching a shaky
truce on September 2. This came in the wake of discreet negotiations
by Fr. Pietro Tacchi-Venturi, S.J., and after Mussolini agreed to shove
aside two of his most vocal critics of Catholic Action (PNF Secretary
Giovanni Giuriati and Carlo Scorza). The Duce was disturbed by
foreign criticism too and had no desire to bring about an Italian
Kulturkampf.
The chief terms of the compromise were that Catholic Action was
to be diocesan (not national) in character and under direct control of
the bishops (rather than under officers elected by the members), who
would not select its officers from among those who had belonged to
"parties hostile to the regime"; that the professional sections were to
have no syndical functions; and that youth organizations were to stay
out of sports. Superficially it seemed as if the dictatorship had tri-
umphed, but the Church could console itself that despite decentraliza-
tion, the society survived and remained independent. Both parties
greeted the settlement with unfeigned relief. To demonstrate his satis-
faction, Mussolini paid an official call to the Holy Father on the third
anniversary of the Lateran Pacts; they conversed for more than an
hour. Next month he had the coveted Collar of the Annunciation
bestowed upon Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli (the future Pius XII).
Anti-Semitism did not become a doctrinal part of Italian Fascism

until 193 8. In earlier years Mussolini had often expressed disgust for
Hitler's racism, and certainly numerous Jews had been conspicuous in
the Fascist party from the outset. Nor was anti-Semitism a feature of
Italian life in general in modern times. The 56,000 native members of
Italy's 26 autonomous Jewish "communities" in 1937 were well assimi-
lated in the nation's public and cultural life. The arrival of several
thousand refugees from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia in the
late 1930's scarcely posed a problem.
What, then, were the reasons for the sudden about-face by Musso-
lini? To some extent, the new racist program may have been stimu-
lated by a measure of "Social Darwinism" that was expressed by
certain propagandists during the conquest of Ethiopia. But the chief
consideration was Italy's growing ideological tie with Nazi Germany
after the announcement of the Axis in the autumn of 1936 and
Germany's annexation of Austria early in 193 8, which brought Hitler's
Reich to the Brenner Pass. Prodded by such racist fanatics as Giuseppe
Preziosi and Roberto Farinacci, Mussolini gave the go-ahead to racism
in Italy on July 14, 1938, when a curious "Manifesto of the Racist
Scientists" was published in the newspapers, setting forth ten allegedly
scientific bases for an "Aryan" racial policy in Italy. It was backed by
an anonymous group of university professors. Blatantly anti-Semitic
propaganda now began to be published in a new periodical, Difesa della
razza (Defense of the Race). The text of the racist manifesto follows:
Manifesto of the Racist Scientists

(July 14, 1938)
1. Human races exist. That human races exist is no longer an
abstraction in our mind, but corresponds to a phenomenal and
material reality that is perceptible through our senses. Almost
always this reality is represented by imposing masses of millions of
men possessing similar inherited physical and psychological charac-
teristics that will be passed on to the next generation. To say that
human races exists does not mean, a priori, that there are superior
and inferior human races, but only that there are different human
races.
2. Great races and little races exist. One must not only admit the
existence of major, systematic groups commonly called races and
categorized by certain characteristics; one must also admit the
existence of minor, systematic groups (as, for example, the
Nordics, the Mediterraneans, the Dinarics, etc.), characterized by a
larger number of common features. From the biological stand-
point, these groups constitute true races, the existence of which is
self-evident.
3. The concept of race is a purely biological one. It is therefore
based on considerations other than the concepts of peoples and
nations, which are founded essentially on historic, linguistic, and
religious considerations. However, the root of differences among
peoples and nations is to be found in differences of race. If Italians
differ from Frenchmen, Germans, Turks, Greeks, etc., this is not
just because they possess a different language and different history,
but because their racial development is different. There have been
shifting relationships among the different races that from very
ancient times have produced the various peoples. Thus, in some
instances, one race has exercised absolute dominion over others; in
some instances they have all become harmoniously fused; and in
other instances there continue to be different races that are entirely
unamalgamated.
4. The people of present-day Italy are of Aryan origin and their
souRcE: Published in ll Giornale d' Italia (Rome) and other Italian
newspapers, July 14, 1938, and reprinted in the appendix of
Renzo De Felice, Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo
(Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1961), pp. 611-612. By per-
mission of Giulio Einaudi Editore. My translation.
civilization is Aryan. The people of Aryan civilization have in-
habited our peninsula for several millennia. Very little has endured
of the civilization of the pre-Aryan peoples. The origin of present-
day Italians can be traced back primarily to elements of those same
races that have constituted and still constitute the perennially living
tissue of Europe.
5. It is a legend that great masses of men were transplanted in
historic times. After the invasion of the Lombards, Italy experi-
enced no other significant influx of people capable of influencing
the racial physiognomy of the nation. From this fact we may draw
the conclusion that, whereas the racial composition of other Euro-
pean nations has varied notably even in modern times, the racial
composition of present-day Italy, if examined in broad outline, is
the same as it was a thousand years ago. Thus, the absolute major-
ity of our present 44 million Italians are descendants of families
that have been inhabiting Italy for a millennium.
6. A pure "Italian race" is already in existence. This pronounce-
ment does not rest on a confusion of the biological concept of race
with the historic and linguistic concept of people and nations, but
on the very pure blood tie that unites present-day Italians with the
generations that have inhabited Italy for thousands of years. This
ancient purity of blood is the Italian nation's greatest title of
nobility.
7. It is time for Italians frankly to proclaim themselves to be
racists. It is on the basis of racism that all the work of the Regime
in Italy has thus far been accomplished. In the speeches of the
Head of the Government there have always been very frequent
references to the concepts of race. The question of racism in Italy
must be considered from a strictly biological standpoint, with no
philosophical or religious overtones. The concept of racism in Italy
must be essentially Italian, and its thrust is Aryan and Nordic. This
does not mean, however, the introduction into Italy of theories of
German racism as they now exist, nor does it mean that Italians and
Scandinavians are the same thing. It means only that Italians should
recognize a physical, and especially a psychological, model of the
human race, a model that because of its purely European character-
istics is entirely different from all the non-European races. This
means elevating the Italians to an ideal plane so that they will have
greater self-consciousness and responsibility.
8. It is necessary to draw a neat distinction between the Medi-
terraneans of Europe (Western) on the one hand, and Orientals
and Africans on the other. One must regard as most dangerous

those theories that argue in favor of an African origin for several
European peoples, and that would include even the Semitic and
Hamitic peoples in one common Mediterranean race by postulating
relations and ideological sympathies that are absolutely inadmissible.
9. The Jews do not belong to the Italian race. In general,
nothing has remained of the Semites who during the course of the
centuries landed on the sacred soil of our fatherland. Even the
Arab occupation of Sicily has left nothing apart from the memory
of certain names; and, in any case, the process of assimilation was
always very rapid in Italy. The Jews represent the only people that
have never been assimilated in Italy, and that is because they are
made up of non-European racial elements, entirely different from
the elements that gave rise to the Italians.
10. The purely European physical and psychological character-
istics of the Italians must not be altered in any way. Marriage is
admissible only within the context of the European races; and in
these cases one cannot speak of outright hybridism, as these races
belong to a common stock that differs only in certain character-
istics while being quite the same in a great many others. The purely
European character of the Italians will become altered if crossed
with any non-European race whatsoever that serves as a trans-
mitter of any civilization differing from the Aryans' millenary
civilization.
Fascist Italy's sudden shift toward anti-Semitism brought on a new

clash with Pius XI. In 1937 the pontiff had issued the encyclical Mit
brennender Sorge, expressing deep sorrow over Hitler's racist pro-
gram, and on occasion he had expressed relief that Italy was engaging
in no persecution of this kind. One can imagine his dismay, then, when
he read the racist manifesto of July 14, 1938. He censured these
heresies immediately and unequivocally. Anti-Semitism, by its denial
of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, struck at the
very roots of Christianity. "If there is anything worse than the various
theories of racialism and nationalism, it is the spirit that dictates them,"
he declared on July 21. Then he infuriated Mussolini by taunting him
over adopting policies that deliberately imitated Nazi Germany and
were in direct violation of the noblest traditions of the Roman Empire
which he supposedly was anxious to restore. The Duce was even more
furibund when the Pope bluntly explained to Belgian pilgrims on
September 3, "Spiritually we are Jews." 4 Mussolini's police sought to
4. Daniel Binchy, Church and State in Fascist Italy (London: Oxford

University Press, 1941), pp. 615-617.
confiscate several issues of L'Osservatore Romano and the Jesuit
periodical Civilta Cattolica in the midst of these recriminations. Then,
on September 18, in a speech in Trieste, Mussolini made a vigorous
pronouncement on the Jewish question.
Mussolini's Defense of Racist Policy

(Trieste, September 18, 1938)
With respect to domestic affairs, the burning question of the
moment is the racial problem. In this sphere, too, we shall adopt the
necessary solutions. Those who try to make out that we have
simply imitated, or worse, that we have been obedient to sugges-
tions, are poor fools whom we don't know whether to pity or
despise.
The racial problem has not broken out suddenly, as is thought
by those people who are accustomed to sudden awakenings be-
cause they are used to long, sluggish slumbers. It is related to our
conquest of the Empire; for history teaches that empires are won
by arms, but held by prestige. And prestige demands a clear-cut
racial consciousness which is based not only on difference but on
the most definite superiority.
The Jewish problem is thus merely one aspect of this phenome-
non. Our position has been determined by these incontestable
considerations of fact. In spite of our policy, ·world Jewry for the
last sixteen years has been an irreconcilable enemy of Fascism. In
Italy our policy has resulted in a veritable race on the part of
Semitic elements to assault our ship of state.
Nevertheless, Jews possessing Italian citizenship who have at-
tained indisputable military or civil merits in the eyes of Italy and
the regime will find understanding and justice. As for the others, a
policy of segregation will be followed.
In the end, the world will perhaps be more astonished by our
generosity than by our rigor; unless the Jews both abroad and here
at home, and especially their new and unexpected friends who
defend them from too many professorial positions, compel us to
change our course radically. . . .
Despite some resistance within the Fascist Grand Council from Giu-
seppe Bottai, a decree-law for the "Defense of the Italian Race" was
announced on November 17, 1938.
souRcE: Il Popolo d'ltalia (Milan), No. 261 (Sept. 19, 1938). My
translation.
Provisions for the Defense of the Italian Race

(November 17, 1938)
CHAPTER ONE: PROVISIONS RELATING TO MARRIAGES
Art. 1-Marriage of an Italian citizen of Aryan race to a person

belonging to another race is prohibited.
Marriage contracted in violation of such prohibition is null and
void.
Art. 2-ln view of the prohibition set forth in Art. 1, the marriage
of an Italian citizen to a person of foreign nationality shall require
the prior consent of the Minister of Interior.
Violators are subject to imprisonment up to three months and a
fine of up to 10,000 lire.
Art. 3-ln view of the prohibition set forth in Art. 1, employees
of the civil and military administrations of the State, of the various
organizations of the National Fascist Party or those controlled by
it, of the administration of the provinces, communes, parastatal
bodies, syndical associations, and related agencies may not contract
marriage with persons of foreign nationality.
Except when the gravity of the case requires the application of
the penalties set forth in Art. 2, violation of the above-mentioned
prohibition will result in the loss of one's post of employment and
of seniority.
Art. 4-With respect to the application of Articles 2 and 3, non-
native-born Italians shall not be considered foreigners.
Art. 5-Upon a request to issue marriage banns, the official of the
civil state is required to ascertain, independently of the statements
of the parties involved, the racial and citizenship status of both
applicants.
Under the circumstances envisaged in Art. 1, he shall proceed
neither to issue marriage banns nor to perform the marriage.
Any official of the civil state who violates the provision of the
present article may be punished by a fine ranging from 500 to
5,000 lire.
Art. 6-A marriage performed in violation of Art. 1 shall have no
souRCE: Royal Decree-Law No. 1728, November 17, 1938-XVII,

published in Gazzetta Ufficiale, No. 264 (Nov. 19, 1938). My
translation.
civil legality, and therefore shall not be entered in the public
registers. . . .
Violators may be punished by a fine ranging from 500 to 5,000
lire.
Art. 7-The official of the civil state who has proceeded to tran-
scribe the relative documents pertaining to a marriage performed in
violation of the provisions set forth in Art. 2 is required to make an
immediate report of this fact to the competent authorities.
CHAPTER Two: ON MEMBERS oF THE jEWISH RACE
Art. 8-For all legal purposes:

(a) A person is a member of the Jewish race if born of parents
both of whom are of the Jewish race, even if he belongs to a
religion other than Judaism;
(b) A person shall be considered to be a member of the Jewish
race if he is born of parents one of whom is of the Jewish race and
the other of foreign nationality;
(c) A person shall be considered to be a member of the Jewish
race if born of a mother of the Jewish race and of an unknown
father;
(d) A person shall be considered to be a member of the Jewish
race if he subscribes to the Jewish religion, even if he is born of
parents of Italian nationality and only one of'them is of the Jewish
race; or if he is in any way enrolled as a member of a Jewish
community; or if he has in any other fashion made manifestations
of J ewishness.
A person born of parents of Italian nationality only one of
whom is of the Jewish race, and who belonged to a religion other
than Judaism as of October 1, 1938-XVI, is not to be considered to
be of the Jewish race.
Art. 9-Membership in the Jewish race must be declared and
entered in the public registers. All extracts from these registers and
relative certificates which pertain to members of the Jewish race
must make explicit mention of such entry. Similar mention must be
included in the documents pertaining to exemptions or authoriza-
tions by the public authorities.
Violators of the provisions of the present article are to be
punished by a fine of up to 2,000 lire.
Art.IO-Italian citizens of the Jewish race may not:
(a) Render military service in time of either peace or war;
(b) Exercise the functions of tutor or custodian of minors or

handicapped persons not of the Jewish race;
(c) Be owners or managers in any fashion of enterprises that
are declared to be related to the national defense . . . ; or of enter-
prises of any nature that employ more than one hundred people;
nor be assigned managerial functions in said enterprise, nor assume
in any manner the offices of administrator or auditor;
(d) Be the owners of lands which altogether have an appraised
valuation in excess of 5,000 lire;
(e) Be owners of urban buildings which altogether have a tax
value greater than 20,000 lire. Buildings for which a schedule of
taxes has not been prepared will have this established on the basis of
investigations carried out for the purpose of applying the extraor-
dinary tax on real estate property as set forth in Royal Decree-Law
No. 1743 of October 5, 1936-XIV.
On the proposal of the Minister of Finance and with the concur-
rence of the Ministers of Interior, Grace and Justice, Corporations,
and Foreign Exchange, a royal decree will specify the regulations
for carrying out the provisions set forth above in letters (c), (d),
and (e).
Art. 11-A parent who is of the Jewish race may be deprived of
his parental authority over his children if they belong to a different
religion from Judaism and if it is shown that he is imparting to them
an education that does not correspond to their religious principles or
to national ends.
Art. 12-Members of the Jewish race may not employ Italian citi-
zens of the Aryan race in their own households as servants.
Violators are to be punished by a fine of from 1,000 to 5,000
lire.
Art. 13-The following agencies may not employ persons of the
Jewish race:
(a) Civil and military administrations of the State;
(b) The National Fascist Party and the organizations sub-
ordinate to it or under its control;
(c) The administrations of provinces, communes, public insti-
tutions of assistance and welfare, and those incorporated bodies,
institutes, and enterprises, including those of transportation, ad-
ministered or supported with the help of the provinces, communes,
public institutions of assistance and welfare, or their trusts;
(d) The administrations of municipal enterprises;
(e) The administrations of parastatal incorporated entities,
however they may be formed or labeled, of National Opere, of the
various syndical associations and collateral bodies, and, in general,
of all incorporated bodies and institutes of public law, even those
with autonomous structures, which are subject to either inspection
or control by the State, or to whose maintenance the State provides
contributions of a continuing sort;
(f) The administrations of those enterprises auxiliary or di-
rectly subordinate to the incorporated entities referred to in letter
(e) above; or those which derive from it in major degree the neces-
sary means for attaining their specific goals; or corporations whose
capital is provided at least in half by State participation;
(g) The administrations of banks of national scope;
(h) The administrations of the private insurance companies.
Art. 14-The Minister of Interior, upon documented request of
the interested parties, may in individual cases declare the provisions
of Articles 10 and 11, as well as letter (h) of Article 13, inappli-
cable in the cases of:
(a) Members of families of those who fell in the Libyan War,
the World War, the Ethiopian War, and the Spanish Civil War,
and of those who fell in the Fascist cause;
(b) Persons who meet one of the following conditions:
1. Persons who were mutilated, disabled, or wounded, war
volunteers, and recipients of decorations for valor in the Libyan
War, World War, Ethiopian War, and Spanish Civil War;
2. Combatants in the Libyan War, World War, Ethiopan
War, and Spanish Civil War who have received at least the War
Cross for Merit;
3. Persons who were mutilated, disabled, or wounded in the
Fascist cause;
4. Members of the National Fascist Party in the years 1919,
1920, 1921, 1922, and the second half of 1924;
5. Fiumean legionaries;
6. Persons who have earned exceptional recognition, as de-
termined by Art. 16.
In the cases envisaged under letter (b) above, the benefit may
also be extended to members of the family of the persons listed
thereunder, even if they are deceased.
The interested parties may request that the decision handed
down by the Minister of Interior be entered in the public registers.
The decision of the Minister of Interior is not subject to any
gravamen, either of an administrative or of a jurisdictional nature.
Art. 15-With respect to the application of Art. 14, in addition

to the spouse, a family shall be considered to include ancestors and
descendants up to the second degree.
Art. 16-In order to evaluate the special merits referred to above
in Art. 14, (b), number (6), there shall be established in the
Ministry of Interior a committee made up of the Undersecretary of
State for Interior (who will preside), a Vice-Secretary of the
National Fascist Party, and the Chief of Staff of the Volunteer
Militia of National Security.
Art. 17-Foreign Jews may not establish permanent residence in
the Kingdom, Libya, or Aegean possessions.
CHAPTER THREE: TEMPORARY AND FINAL PROVISIONS
Art. 18-For a period of three months from the time the present
decree goes into effect, the Minister of Interior is empowered, after
consulting the appropriate administration, to exempt in special
cases from the prohibition set forth in Art. 3 those employees who
intend to contract marriage with a foreigner of the Aryan race.
Art.19-With respect to the application of Art. 9, whoever finds
himself in the conditions set forth under Art. 8 must report this to
the office of the civil state of the commune of residence within 90
days from the date the present decree goes into effect.
Whoever fails to fulfill such obligation within the prescribed
time, or furnishes inexact or incomplete data, will be punished by
imprisonment up to one month and a fine of up to 3,000 lire.
Art. 20-Employees of the agencies mentioned in Art. 13 who
are members of the Jewish race shall be discharged from service
within a space of three months from the date the present decree
goes into effect.
Art. 21-Regular employees of the State who are discharged from
service in accordance with Art. 20 are permitted to claim the re-
tirement benefits due them. . . .
Art. 22-Insofar as they are applicable, the provisions referred to
in Art. 21 are extended to the incorporated entities mentioned in
Art. 13, letters (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h) . . . .
Art. 23-No matter how they were made, all concessions of
Italian citizenship to foreign Jews after January 1, 1919, are re-
voked in every way.
Art. 24-Foreign Jews and those to whom Art. 23 applies who
began their sojourn in the Kingdom, Libya, or the Aegean posses-
sions after January 1, 1919, must leave the territory .. by
March 12, 1939-XVII . . . .
Art. 25-The provisions in Art. 24 shall not apply to Jews of
foreign nationality who, prior to October 1, 1938-XVI:
(a) were over sixty-five years of age;
(b) contracted marriage with persons of Italian citizen-
ship . . . .
Art. 26-The questions relative to the application of the present
decree will be resolved in individual cases by the Minister of
Interior after consulting those Ministers who may also be affected
and receiving the prior opinion of a committee appointed by
him. . . .
Art. 27-Nothing new is introduced with regard to public wor-
ship and activities by Jewish communities according to existing
laws, except for modifications that may become necessary in order
to coordinate these laws with the provisions of the present decree.
Art. 28-Any disposition that is contrary to . . . the present
decree is hereby abrogated.
Art. 29-The Government of the King is authorized to issue the
necessary provisions for the execution of the present decree. . . .
On November 15 another decree-law provided for the exclusion of all

persons of the Jewish race from "any office or employment in schools
of any kind or grade" attended by Italian students. An analogous
measure applied to Jewish membership in educational and academic
associations, and to enrollment in schools "attended by Italian stu-
dents." An exception was made, however, for "students of the Jewish
race who professed the Catholic religion": these could be registered in
Catholic-sponsored elementary and secondary schools. Moreover, Jew-
ish congregations could establish their own elementary and secondary
schools, and Jews were permitted to be enrolled in "universities or
institutes of higher education of the Kingdom . . . on a temporary
basis." On December 22 a decree-law called for the dismissal of all
Jews from the Italian armed forces and the Fascist Militia. But a touch
of humanity permitted officers and noncommissioned officers who
were so dismissed to retain their uniforms; the officers could also
continue to use the title of their rank. In addition, certain provisions
were made for pensions. Finally, over the protest of Pius XI, who
announced that it was a violation of the Lateran Pacts, Mussolini
forbade marriage between Jews and Gentiles. At least in comparison to
those who found themselves under the Nazi heel, the Jews in Italy
managed to get alons- tolerably well until 1943, thanks to the good will
of most of the citizenry and the discreet assistance given by the
Church. After the Nazis seized control of northern Italy in September,
1943, however, the plight of the Jews became desperate. Some 9,000
lost their lives from then until the liberation in 1945.
We know from the diary of Mussolini's son-in-law and Foreign
Minister, Count Ciano, that because of the renewed tension with the
Vatican, Fascist circles were worried about a speech Pius XI planned
to deliver on February 11, 1939. Unhappily, the pontiff died the day
before. The Duce tried in vain to obtam a copy of the undelivered
speech. Twenty years went by before it was made public. Actually
there was nothing explosive in it, but it openly deplored the persecu-
tion of the Church in Germany and contained some barbed references
to Mussolini's regime. The speech advised Italian bishops to "note well
not to forget that very often there are observers or informers (you can
call them spies and you will be telling the truth) who, because of their
own zeal, or for a task entrusted to them, listen to you in order to
denounce you although, of course, they have not understood the
slightest thing you have said, and if need be, will have understood the
opposite. " 5
On March 2, 1939, Cardinal Pacelli was elected Pope, as Pius XII. Of
aristocratic birth and manner, the new pontiff was a Roman of the
Romans, far more suave and cautious than either his predecessor or his
still more forthright successor, John XXIII. He made it clear that he
intended to follow a more conciliatory policy toward Germany and
Italy than had Pius XI. He forestalled a new clash with Mussolini in the
spring of 1939 by bringing the terms of the Catholic Action compro-
mise to their logical conclusion-abolishing the last vestiges of curial
supervision and substituting a three-man commission composed of
members of the diocesan hierarchy.
During and after the Second World War Pius XII took pride in
being called the "Pope of Peace." Unquestionably he tried to prevent
war in 1939, and failing that, to keep Italy neutral. But to do this he
was prepared to renew the appeasement policies that had characterized
diplomacy in the pre-Munich era. More recently Pius XII has come to
be criticized as the "Pope of Silence" as regards the apportionment of
responsibility for the war. For many years he had displayed consider-
able sympathy for the Italian variety of fascism-in contrast to his
unbending hostility to the Communist dictatorship in Russsia and his
irritation with Hitler's rule in Germany. But in the course of the
conflict, and especially after the turn of the military tide against the
Axis, Pius XII became visibly disenchanted with Mussolini's regime.
For several months before the coup d'etat of July 25, 1943, the Vatican
sought to build up the "dyarchy" by showing good will to the House
of Savoy. In the new era that was emerging, Mussolini's type of regime
no longer served the needs of the Church. The Vatican's twenty-year
flirtation with Fascism would be relegated to the archives of papal
history; for the foreseeable future Christian Democracy would serve as
the Church's political arm in Italy.
5. See Charles F. Delzell, "Pius XII, Italy, and the Outbreak of War,"
Journal of Contemporary History, II, 4 (1967), 137-161.
6. The Day of the Lion
"BETTER To live for one day as a lion than a thousand years as a lamb!"
the Duce cried out to his Blackshirts in September, 19 35. By that year
aggressive militarism and an activist foreign policy had become the
most obvious features of Fascism.
Mussolini had come to power with an ultranationalist program that
called for an end to the allegedly shabby treatment that Italy had
suffered at the peace table. Yet in the 1920's, with the notable excep-
tion of his high-handed bombardment of the Greek island of Corfu m
1923, Mussolini's foreign policy was relatively moderate. Old-line
professional diplomats ran the Foreign Office for the first three years,
though Mussolini held the ministerial portfolio personally from 1922
until September, 1929. In 1924 he reached an accommodation of sorts
with Yugoslavia over Fiume. That same year Italy was among the first
countries to establish "correct" diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union, despite the Duce's undisguised intentions to SUJ.>press the Italian
Communist party. With France there was always considerable jealousy
over naval strength and resentment of France's security arrangements
with the Little Entente countries of east-central Europe and with
Poland. Moreover, Mussolini was greatly annoyed by France's friendly
reception of Italian anti-Fascist refug-ees, who made Paris their princi-
pal center. 1 In 1925 he joined Britam as a guarantor of the Locarno
agreements, which stabilized the western frontier of Germany.
Whereas Mussolini manifested a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward
Weimar Germany, he became openly sympathetic in the late 1920's to
the "revisionist" aims of the other defeated countries, Hungary, Bul-
garia, and Austria. In the case of the latter state Mussolini subsidized
the Heimwehr (Home Defense Units), which under Prince Ernst von
Starhemberg became increasingly fascist in ideology.
A new phase of Italian foreign policy began in 1930. Although
relinquishing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from September, 1929,
until July, 1932, to Dino Grandi, Mussolini did not intend to give up
control over policy. In a speech in Rome in 1930 on the anniversary of
the Fascist advent to power, he declared that the struggle had moved
beyond the confines of Italy to the world arena. He called for re-
armament ("So long as guns exist they will be more beautiful than
pretty ... words"), for revision of treaties, and "peaceful" expan-
sion toward the Danubian basin.
Soon he was talking explicitly about "Fascism for export." Within
1. Regarding the two decades of anti-Fascist activities by the opposition

at home and abroad, see Charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian
Anti-Fascist Resistance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
another decade "all Europe will be Fascist." In 1932 the Duce told a
crowd in Milan, "The twentieth century will be the century of
Fascism"; for a third time in history Italy will direct human civiliza-
tion. Henceforth the Fascists provided secret subsidies to numerous
fascistic movements abroad. Feeling that Grandi was too docile to co-
ordinate this kind of policy, Mussolini took back for himself the
Foreign Ministry in July, 1932, and gave Grandi an ambassadorial
assignment in London. Mussolini remained Foreign Minister until 19 36,
when he handed it over to his ambitious son-in-law, Count Galeazzo
Ciano. Meanwhile he took command of the Ministry of War in July,
1933, and in November added the portfolios of Navy and Air. Thus he
personally controlled all the service ministries.
Hitler came to power in Germany at the end of January, 1933.
Though there had been some ideological links, the two dictators had
not yet met personally. Italy was still joined to Britain and France in
the Locarno pacts; moreover, she still favored keeping Austria out of
Germany's control. In the spring of 1933 Mussolini proposed a Four-
Power Pact with Britain, France, and Germany, his idea being that
they could co-operate as a consortium in deciding Europe's political
problems. But France was not happy with the idea, and the agreement
was never ratified. Its only significance was that it showed the Duce's
desire to have Italy play a big role.
On March 18, 1934, Mussolini delivered an important speech in
Rome wherein he openly proclaimed Fascism to be a "universal
phenomenon" and then went on to discuss Italy's relations with her
neighbors.
Fascism a Universal Phenomenon

(March 18, 1934)
COMRADEs! Today marks the second quinquennial assembly of the
regtme . . . .
In the period since 192 9 Fascism has changed from an Italian
phenomenon into a universal phenomenon. . . .
This is neither the place nor the time for a detailed examination
of our international relations. My quick "tour of the horizon" will
be limited to those states with which we have common boundaries,
and to problems of a rather general character.
Our relations with Switzerland are more than cordial. A treaty
souRcE: Speech by Benito Mussolini in Rome's Teatro Reale dell'
Opera on March 18, 1934, the occasion of the Quinquennial
Assembly of the Regime. Popolo d'ltalia (Rome), No. 67 (Mar.
20, 1934), reprinted in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed.
by Edoardo and Duilio Susmel (Florence: La F enice, 19 58),
Vol. 26, pp. 185-193 passim. My translation.
THE DAY OF THE LION 187
of friendship signed in 1924 will lapse next September, and we are
ready to renew it for the same period of time.
After the war we followed a friendly policy with Austria, based
on the defense of her integrity and independence. For a long time
we were alone in doing this; but when the situation assumed a
dramatic quality, others joined us. We intend to continue along
this line of policy. Austria is aware that she can count on us for the
defense of her independence as a sovereign state and that we shall
spare no effort to improve the condition of her people.
Our relations with Yugoslavia are normal-that is to say, diplo-
matically correct. It is possible to improve them because the eco-
nomic relations between our two countries are complementary.
The problem of Italo-Yugoslav relations should be faced only
when the necessary prerequisites for its solution have been clarified.
Our relations with France have improved from a general stand-
point, but reality impels me to emphasize that not one of the large
and small problems that have been on the agenda during the past
fifteen years has neared a solution. Nevertheless, a rapprochement
along moral lines has been brought about, and as regards some of
the most important questions concerning Europe, this is a favorable
element that we hope may lead to further developments.
During the last few days the President of the Council of Hun-
gary and the Chancellor of the Austrian Republic were the guests
of the Italian Government. The protocols we signed show what
has been accomplished. It is unnecessary to strain their interpreta-
tion. Friendly relations exist among Italy, Austria, and Hungary,
and since the war these have acquired greater justification and
foundation. Hungary, isolated and deprived even of the territories
that are absolutely Magyar, found in Italy a sense of comprehen-
sion and solidarity that is not just of recent origin and that has
clearly been expressed in many aspects of our foreign policy.
Hungary pleads for "justice" and the fulfillment of the promises
solemnly made during the period of the treaties. Italy has sup-
ported and continues to support this plea. The Hungarians are a
strong people who deserve to have, and will have, a better destiny.
The protocols, signed a few days ago in Rome, which lay down
the conditions for closer collaboration among Italy, Austria, and
Hungary, do not exclude further amplifications and more extensive
collaboration with other states. It is a question of breaking loose
from the realm of phrases and finally and resolutely entering into
the realm of facts.
The problems of a general character concern first of all the

League of Nations. The need for reform has almost universally
been accepted. It is clear that the proposed reform should be
undertaken after the conclusion of the Disarmament Conference,
because if the conference fails, the reform of the League of
Nations will no longer be necessary and it will be enough to record
its death. That the Disarmament Conference will fail, at least as
regards its original important objectives, is generally agreed. (In
fact, this is the only kind of peaceful agreement that has been
reached.) The states that are now armed will not disarm, while
those that are not armed will be able to arm themselves to a greater
or lesser degree for defensive purposes. The Italian Memorandum
has torn off the mask that concealed this problem in its crude
reality. If the armed states refuse to disarm, they will not be abid-
ing by the fifth section of the Versailles Treaty, and they cannot
logically oppose the practical application of that parity of rights
which was recognized for Germany in December, 1932. There is
no other alternative. It is a pure illusion, perhaps already confirmed
by facts, to pretend that a people like the Germans can be kept
eternally disarmed-unless one is going to make it his objective to
use force to prevent the eventual rearmament of Germany. But this
game would involve one supreme stake: war-viz., the lives of
millions of men and the destiny of Europe. We have put forward
the proposal that Germany, without further endless evasions,
should be allowed to arm to the degree that she requests as far as
effectives and defensive materiel are concerned, and that she should
also sign a convention along the lines proposed in the Italian
Memorandum, in order that among both the large and the small
powers of Europe an atmosphere of understanding may be re-
established, for without this, Europe is doomed to decline. . . .
This hurried survey of foreign policy should be linked, and I do
so immediately and logically, with Italy's military problem. Assign-
ing highest priority to financial retrenchment and making use of
the credit balances of the budget which resulted from the unusual
situation of 1928, the Fascist Government has considerably re-
duced military estimates for both last year and next year. But we
cannot go any further. Never at any time-and especially today,
on account of the paralysis of the so-called Conference on unat-
tainable Disarmament-was there such a categorical and imperative
duty for a nation that must remain alive to keep strong-and even
more so in the case of Italy, which must calmly develop the
internal, renovating work of the Revolution. It is necessary to be
militarily strong, not for aggressive purpose but in order to be able
to cope with any emergency. . . .
The military power of a state and the future and safety of a
nation are linked to the demographical problem, and this poses a
serious problem for all countries of the white race, including our
own. I must reaffirm once again, and in the most peremptory
manner-and it will not be the last time either-that numbers are
the indispensable prerequisite for leadership. Without numerical
superiority everything declines, crumbles away, and dies. . . .
The notion that an increase of population brings about a condition
of poverty is so idiotic that it does not even deserve the honor of
rebuttal. ...
The historical objectives of Italy have two names: Asia and
Africa. South and east are the cardinal points that should excite the
interest and determination of Italians. There is little or nothing to
do toward the north, and the same is true toward the west,
whether it be Europe or overseas. These two objectives of ours are
justified by geography and history. Of all the large Western
powers of Europe, Italy is the nearest to Africa and to Asia. A few
hours by sea and much less by air are enough to link up Italy with
Africa and with Asia. Let nobody misunderstand the meaning of
this century-old task that I assign to the present and to the future
Italian generations. It is not a question of territorial conquests-and
this should be heard by everyone, both near and far-but a natural
expansion that should lead to collaboration between Italy and the
people of Africa, between Italy and the Near East and the Middle
East . . . .
The aim we have in mind is the development and exploitation of
the still-countless resources of these two continents-and especially
Africa-and of bringing these areas more closely into the orbit of
world civilization. Italy is in a position to accomplish this task. Her
location in the Mediterranean, which is resuming its historic role of
uniting the East to the West, confers this right and binds Italy to
this obligation. We do not intend to claim either monopolies or
privileges, but we do claim and we intend to make clear that those
countries who arrived ahead of us, those who are satisfied and those
who are conservative, should not try to block on every side the
spiritual, political, and economic expansion of Fascist Italy. . . .
Anti-Fascism has ceased to exist . . . . But there is one danger
that can threaten the Regime, and this may be represented by what
is commonly called the "bourgeois spirit" -that is to say, a spirit of
satisfaction and adjustment, a tendency toward skepticism, com-
promise, an easy life and advancement. . . . I do not exclude the
existence of the bourgeois temperament, but I deny that those who
have it can be Fascists. The creed of the Fascist is heroism, that of
the bourgeois is egoism. There is only one remedy against this
danger, the principle of continual revolution. . . .
The fourth great historical epoch of the Italian people-which
future historians will label the Epoch of the Blackshirts-has
already begun. This epoch will see integral Fascists-that is to say,
those who are born, reared, and spend their lives in our climate,
and who are endowed with those virtues that confer upon a people
the privilege of leadership in the world. . . .
Despite the Duce's talk about-the "universality" of Fascism, his efforts

to organize a kind of Fascist "International" at a congress in Montreux,
Switzerland, in December, 1934, proved stillborn. Now that Hitler was
in power, a new fascistic Mecca had begun to supplant the old shrine at
Rome.
For a brief period in 1934 Mussolini acted as the principal champion
of Austrian independence in the face of a threat from Hitler's Nazis.
Ever since 1928 Mussolini had sought to make Austria an Italian satel-
lite. He had backed at first Prince Starhemberg's Heimwehr move-
ment, and later the dictatorship of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. The
Duce was entertaining Frau Dollfuss in Italy when Austrian Nazis
suddenly murdered her husband in his office in Vienna on July 25,
1934. After two days of fightins-, the Nazis called off their Putsch
when it was learned that Mussolmi had ordered Italian troops to the
Brenner Pass and that France and Czechoslovakia might also take
action. Hitler thereupon sought to disown any connection with the
conspiracy.
In the wake of that crisis Mussolini met with French and British
leaders in April, 1935, at the town of Stresa on Lake Maggiore.
The Stresa Conference

(Aprilll-14, 1935)
jOINT REsoLuTioN oF THE STRESA CoNFERENCE, APRIL 14, 1935

The Representatives of the Governments of Italy, France, and the
United Kingdom have examined at Stresa the general European
situation in the light of the results of the exchanges of views which
have taken place in recent weeks, of the decision taken on March
SOURCE: British White Paper, Cmd. 4880.
16 by the German Government, 2 and of the information obtained
by British Ministers during the visits recently paid by them to
several European capitals. Having considered the bearing of this
situation on the policy defined in the arrangements reached respec-
tively in Rome and in London, they found themselves in complete
agreement on the various matters discussed.
1. They agreed upon a common line of conduct to be pursued
in the course of the discussion of the request presented to the
Council of the League of Nations by the French Government. 3
2. The information which they have received has confirmed
their view that the negotiations should be pursued for the develop-
ment which is desired in security in Eastern Europe.
3. The Representatives of the three Governments examined
afresh the Austrian situation.
They confirmed the Anglo-Franco-Italian declarations of Feb-
ruary 17 and September 27, 1934, in which the three Governments
recognized that the necessity of maintaining the independence and
~ntegrity of Austria would continue to inspire their common pol-
Icy. . . .
4. As regards the proposed Air Pact for Western Europe, the
Representatives of the three Governments confirmed the principles
and procedure that should be followed as envisaged in the London
communique of February 3, and agreed to continue actively the
study of the question with a view to the drafting of a pact between
the five Powers mentioned in the London communique and of any
bilateral agreements which might accompany it.
5. In approaching the problem of armaments, the Representa-
tives of the three Powers recalled that the London communique
envisaged an agreement to be freely negotiated with Germany to
take the place of the relevant clauses of Part V of the Treaty of
Versailles, and took into careful and anxious consideration the
recent action of the German Government and the report furnished
by Sir John Simon of his conversations with the German Chan-
cellor on this subject.
It was regretfully recognized that the method of unilateral
repudiation adopted by the German Government, at a moment
2. On that date Hitler denounced the disarmament provisions of the

Treaty of Versailles and announced a program of compulsory military
service in Germany. Ed.
3. On March 20, 1935, the French Government had called for an extraor-
dinary meeting of the Council of the League. Ed.
when steps were being taken to promote a freely-negotiated settle-

ment of the question of armaments, had undermined public confi-
dence in the security of a peaceful order. . . .
6. The Representatives of the three Governments took into
consideration the desire expressed by the States, whose military
status was respectively determined by the Treaties of Saint-
Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly, to obtain the revision of this
status. . . . They agreed to recommend the other States con-
cerned to examine this question with a view to its settlement by
mutual agreement within the framework of general and regional
guarantees of security.
ANGLO-ITALIAN DECLARATION, APRIL 14, 1935

The Representatives of Italy and of the United Kingdom, the
Powers which participate in the Treaty of Locarno only in the
capacity of guarantors, formally reaffirm all their obligations under
that Treaty, and declare their intention, should the need arise,
faithfully to fulfil them.
FINAL DECLARATION OF THE STRESA CONFERENCE, APRIL 14, 1935

The three Powers, the object of whose policy is the collective
maintenance of peace within the framework of the League of
Nations, find themselves in complete agreement in opposing, by all
practicable means, any unilateral repudiation of treaties which may
endanger the peace of Europe, and will act in close and cordial
collaboration for this purpose.
The Stresa Front collapsed within a few months, partly because the
Anglo-German naval agreement of June, 1935, was negotiated behind
the backs of France and Italy, and partly because Britain insisted on a
policy of economic sanctions by the League of Nations to punish Italy
for invading Ethiopia. Italy's consequent isolation in the war against
Ethiopia was to be of major importance in inducing Mussolini to seek
the friendship of Hitler's Germany by sacrificing Austria to the
Fuhrer. Henceforth the Duce showed almost total lack of restraint in
matters of foreign policy.
A clash at the oasis of Wal Wal near the border of Italian Somaliland
in September, 1934, signaled the start of the Ethiopian crisis, though
Mussolini had decided early in 193 3 that he would soon undertake a
war of conquest. His primary motive was the naked desire for im-
perialist expansion in the only place that was still available. He sought
to justify his war with arguments that the African territory would
provide Italy with important raw materials and markets, an outlet for
her burgeoning population, and enable her to spread the blessings of
Roman civilization and religion; moreover, it would be justified re-
venge for the defeat Italy had suffered at Adowa in 1896.
In January, 1935, Mussolini was, in effect, given a green light by
France's Foreign Minister Pierre Laval, who was anxious to retain
Italian friendship in the face of the growing German danger. As a
gesture of good will Laval turned over some surplus Sahara wasteland
to be added to the sands of Italian Libya. Britain's Conservative gov-
ernment under Stanley Baldwin preferred to straddle the problem. On
the one hand, he wished to uphold the Covenant of the League of
Nations and preserve the independence of Ethiopia; on the other, he
wished to appease Mussolini. Matters were brought to a head on
October 2, 1935, when the Duce stepped out on the balcony of Rome's
Palazzo Venezia to proclaim all-out war against Ethiopia.
Mussolini Launches the War in Ethiopia

(October 2, 1935)
Blackshirts of the Revolution, men and women of all Italy, Italians
scattered throughout the world, across the mountains and across
the oceans, listen!
A solemn hour is about to strike in the history of the fatherland.
Twenty million men are at this moment gathered in the piazzas
throughout the whole of Italy. Never in the history of mankind
has there been seen a more gigantic demonstration. Twenty million
men: a single heart, a single will, a single decision. This demonstra-
tion is meant to show and it does show to the world that the
identity between Italy and Fascism is perfect, absolute, and un-
changeable. Only brains weakened by puerile illusions or be-
numbed in a crass ignorance can think the contrary, because they
do not know what this Italy of 1935, this Italy of the thirteenth
year of the Fascist era is.
For many months the wheel of destiny, under the impulse of our
calm determination, has been moving toward the goal. In these last
hours the rhythm has become faster and cannot now be halted.
Not only is an army marching toward its objectives, but 44,000,-
souRcE: Speech of Mussolini from the balcony of Palazzo Venezia

in Rome, October 2, 1935. Printed in Popolo d'Italia (Rome),
No. 236 (Oct. 3, 1935); reprinted in Opera Omnia di Benito
Mussolini, ed. by Edoardo and Duilio Susmel (Florence: La
Fenice, 1959), Vol. 27, pp. 158-160. My translation.
000 Italians are marching in unison with this army, because there is
an attempt to commit against them the blackest of all injustices, to
rob them of a place in the sun.
When in 1915 Italy united its lot with those of the Allies, how
many shouts of admiration and how many promises! But after the
common victory, to which Italy had brought the supreme contri-
bution of 670,000 dead, 400,000 disabled, and 1,000,000 wounded,
when it came to sitting around the table of the stingy peace, to us
were left only the crumbs from the sumptuous colonial booty of
others. For thirteen years we have been patient while a ring was
being tightened ever more rigidly about us to suffocate our over-
flowing vitality. With Ethiopia we have been patient for forty
years. Now, that's enough!
At the League of Nations, instead of recognizing the just rights
of Italy, they talk of sanctions. Now, until there is proof to the
contrary, I refuse to believe that the true and generous people of
France can associate themselves with sanctions against Italy. The
6,000 dead of Bligny, who perished in a heroic attack which drew
admiration even from the enemy, would turn in their graves. Until
there is proof to the contrary, I refuse to believe that the true
people of Great Britain want to spill blood and push Europe on the
road to catastrophe in order to defend an African country univer-
sally stamped as a barbarous country and unworthy of taking its
place with civilized peoples.
To sanctions of an economic character we shall reply with our
discipline, with our sobriety, and with our spirit of sacrifice. To
sanctions of a military character we shall reply with orders of a
military character. To acts of war we shall reply with acts of
war.
Let nobody delude himself that he can deflect us without first
having to defeat us. A people which is proud of its name and its
future cannot adopt a different attitude. But let it be said once
again in the most categorical manner, as a sacred pledge which I
take at this moment before all the Italians who are listening to me,
that we shall do everything possible to avoid a colonial conflict
assuming the character and bearing of a European conflict. This
may be the wish of those who see in a new war revenge for fallen
temples, but it cannot be our wish.
Never more than in this historic epoch has the Italian people
revealed the force of its spirit and the power of its character. And
it is against this people to which humanity owes the greatest of its
conquests, it is against this people of heroes, poets, artists, navi-
gators, and administrators that they dare to speak of sanctions.
Proletarian and Fascist Italy, Italy of Vittorio Veneto and of the
Revolution! To your feet! Let the cry of your decision fill the
heavens and be a comfort to the soldiers who are about to fight in
Africa, and let it be a spur to our friends, and a warning to our
enemies in all parts of the world-a cry of justice and a cry of
victory!
After much agonizing debate and under the prodding of Britain's chief
spokesman at Geneva, Anthony Eden, the Assembly of the League of
Nations voted to condemn Italy as the aggressor (only Austria,
Hungary, and Albania supported Italy). But afraid of taking all-out
measures against Mussolini lest such action lead to World War II, the
Baldwin government proposed only partial and mild economic mea-
sures under Article 16 of the Covenant, as the following resolution
made clear. Neither petroleum, steel billets, nor pig iron was included
in the list of items prohibited to Italy.
League of Nations Sanctions Against Italy

(October 11-19, 1935)
(a) PROPOSAL I, adopted by the Co-ordination Committee, Oc-
tober 11, 1935.
ExPORT OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR

With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the Members
of the League of Nations the execution of their obligations under
Article 16 of the Covenant, the following measures should be taken
forthwith:
1. The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations
which are enforcing at the moment measures to prohibit or restrict
the exportation, re-exportation, or transit of arms, munitions, and
implements of war to Ethiopia will annul these measures immedi-
ately.
2. . . . prohibit immediately the exportation, re-exportation, or
transit to Italy or Italian possessions of arms, munitions, and imple-
ments of war enumerated in the attached list.
souRcE: Sanctions Resolutions adopted by the Co-ordination Com-
mittee, First Session, October 11-19, 1935. League of Nations
Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 145, pp. 14-27 passim;
British White Paper, Cmd. 5071.
3. . take such steps as may be necessary to secure that arms,
munitions, and implements of war enumerated in the attached list,
exported to countries other than Italy, will not be re-exported
directly or indirectly to Italy or to Italian possessions.
4. The measures provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 are to apply
to contracts in process of execution.
Each Government is requested to inform the committee through
the Secretary-General of the League within the shortest possible
time of the measures which it has taken in conformity with the
above provisions. . . .
(b) PROPOSAL u, adopted by the Co-ordination Committee, Oc-
tober 14, 1935.
FINANCIAL MEASURES
The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations
will forthwith take all measures necessary to render impossible the
following operations:
I. All loans to or for the Italian Government and all subscrip-
tions to loans issued in Italy or elsewhere by or for the Italian
Government;
2. All banking or other credits to or for the Italian Govern-
ment ... ;
3. All loans to or for any public authority, person, or corpora-
tion in Italian territory . . . ;
4. All banking or other credits to or for any public authority,
person or corporation in Italian territory . . . ;
5. All issues of shares or other capital flotations for any public
authority, person, or corporation in Italian territory . . . ;
6. The Governments will take all measures necessary to render
impossible the transactions mentioned in paragraphs 1-5 whether
effected directly or through intermediaries of whatsoever national-
ity. . . .
(c) PROPOSAL m, adopted by the Co-ordination Committee, Oc-
tober 19, 1935.
PRoHIBITION oF IMPORTATION oF ITALIAN Goons

I. The Governments of the Members of the League of
Nations will prohibit the importation into their territories of all
goods (other than gold or silver bullion and coin) consigned from
or grown, produced, or manufactured in Italy or Italian posses-
sions, from whatever place arriving;
2. Goods grown or produced in Italy or Italian possessions
which have been subjected to some process in another country, and
goods manufactured partly in Italy or Italian possessions and partly
in another country will be considered as falling within the scope of
the prohibition unless 25 per cent. or more of the value of the
goods at the time when they left the place from which they were
last consigned is attributable to processes undergone since the
goods last left Italy or Italian possessions;
3. Goods, the subject of existing contracts, will not be excepted
from the prohibition;
4. Goods en route at the time of imposition of the prq,hibition
will be excepted from its operation . . . ;
5. Personal belongings of travellers from Italy or Italian posses-
sions may also be excepted from its operation. . . .
(d) PROPOSAL IV, adopted by the Co-ordination Committee, Oc-

tober 19, 1935.
EMBARGO oN CERTAIN ExPoRTS TO ITALY
. . . 1. The Governments of the Members of the League of

Nations will extend the application of paragraph 2 of Proposal No.
I of the Co-ordination Committee to the following articles as
regards their exportation and re-exportation to Italy and Italian
possessions, which will accordingly be prohibited:
(a) Horses, mules, donkeys, camels, and all other transport
animals;
(b) Rubber;
(c) Bauxite, aluminium and alumina (aluminium oxide), iron
ore, and scrap iron;
Chromium, manganese, nickel, titanium, tungsten, vanadium,
their ores and ferro-alloys (and also ferro-molybdenum, ferro-
silicon, ferro-silica-manganese, and ferro-silica-manganese alu-
minium);
Tin and tin-ore.
List (c) above includes all crude forms of the minerals and
metals mentioned and their ores, scrap, and alloys; . . .
The British-sponsored sanctions policy infuriated virtually all Italians

and brought to a sudden end the era of friendship between England
and Italy that had dated from the Risorgimento. On November 16,
1935, the eve of the application of the sanctions policy, the Fascist
Grand Council adopted the following resolution.
The Fascist Grand Council's Resolution

(November 16, 1935)
The Fascist Grand Council, assembled on the eve of the application
of the so-called sanctions against Italy, considers November 18,
1935, as a date of ignominy and iniquity in the history of the
world; it denounces the sanctions, never before applied, as a plan to
suffocate the Italian people economically and as a vain effort to
humiliate it, in order to prevent it from realizing its ideals and
defending its very justification for life.
The Fascist Grand Council praises the exemplary calm and the
tenacious discipline with which the Italian people shows itself fully
aware of the historic import of the present events, and invites it to
meet the sanctions with the most implacable resistance, mobilizing,
through the organs of the regime, all the moral energies and
material resources of the nation; it invites Italians to hang flags
outside their homes for twenty-four hours during Monday, No-
vember 18; it summons to Rome on December 1 the 94 provincial
women's committees of mothers and widows of those who fell in
the Great War, in order to co-ordinate and intensify the resistance
in which a supremely important part is assigned to the women of
Italy; it orders a stone record of the siege to be sculptured on the
buildings of the Italian communes, so that the enormous injustice
perpetrated against Italy, to which the civilization of all continents
owes so much, may remain on record through the centuries; it
sends the expression of its sympathy to those States which, by
refusing to adhere to sanctions, have aided the cause of peace and
interpreted the spirit of the peoples.
The Fascist Grand Council is convinced that the coming test will
reveal to the world the Roman virtue of the Italian people in the
Year XIV of the Fascist era.
souRcE: Resolution of the Fascist Grand Council, November 16,

1935, published in Il Popolo d'ltalia (Rome), No. 281 (Nov. 17,
1935); reprinted in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. by
27, p. 183. My translation.
In Italy Mussolini sought to pose as leader of a "war . of the poor,
the disinherited, the proletariat [against a] front of conservatism,
selfishness and hypocrisy." Hypocrisy there was, for in December,
1935, in the midst of the sanctions imbroglio, British Foreign Secretary
Sir Samuel Hoare and French Premier Laval secretly concocted a deal
that would have allowed Mussolini to obtain more than two-thirds of
Ethiopia (more than he had thus far conquered), leaving Ethiopia with
only a narrow corridor to the Red Sea.
When news of the Hoare-Laval pact soon leaked out, it inflicted a
lethal blow to the League. In France indignation was so great that the
Laval government fell, while in Britain widespread anger finally forced
Baldwin to ask for Hoare's resignation. Thereafter, Eden, the anti-
Italian apostle of collective security, became Foreign Secretary. Be-
latedly he tried to get oil added to the sanctions list and was on the
verge of success in March, 193 6, when suddenly Hitler occupied the
Rhineland, diverting everyor..e's attention from Ethiopia. Meanwhile,
Emperor Haile Selassie had to flee from his capital as Italian forces
under Emilio DeBono and Pietro Badoglio poured in from the north
while others under Rodolfo Graziani invaded from the south.
At last on May 9, 1936, Mussolini, in another balcony harangue,
proclaimed victory and gave King Victor Emmanuel III the additional
title of Emperor of Ethiopia. Soon that conquered state was consoli-
dated administratively with Eritrea and Italian Somaliland as "Italian
East Africa." For a few weeks Mussolini was at the pinnacle of his
popularity at home.
Mussolini Proclaims Victory in Ethiopia

(May 9, 1936)
Officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers of all the armed forces
of the State in Africa and in Italy, Blackshirts of the Revolution,
Italian men and women in the fatherland and throughout the
world, listen!
With the decisions that you will learn within a few moments,
decisions acclaimed by the Fascist Grand Council, a great event is
accomplished. The fate of Ethiopia is sealed today, the ninth of
May, in the fourteenth year of the Fascist era.
Our gleaming sword has cut all the knots, and the African vic-
tory will remain in the history of the fatherland complete and
souRcE: Speech of Benito Mussolini from the balcony of Palazzo

Venezia in Rome on May 9, 1936, printed in Il Popolo d'ltalia
(Rome), No. 131 (May 10, 1936); reprinted in Opera Omnia
di Benito Mussolini, ed. by Edoardo and Duilio Susmel (Flor-
ence: La Fenice, 1959), Vol. 27, pp. 268-269. My translation.
pure, a victory such as the legionaries who have fallen and those
who survive dreamed of and willed. Italy has her empire at last-a
Fascist empire because it bears the indestructible symbols of the
will and of the power of the Roman lictors, because this is the goal
that for fourteen years spurred on the exuberant and disciplined
energies of the young and dashing generations of Italy. An empire
of peace, because Italy desires peace, for herself and for all men,
and she decides upon war only when it is forced upon her by
imperious, irrepressible necessities of life. An empire of civilization
and of humanity for all the peoples of Ethiopia. That is in the
tradition of Rome, which, after victory, associated the different
peoples with her own destiny.
Here is the law, 0 Italians, which closes one period of our
history and opens up another like a vast pass that looks out on all
the possibilities of the future:
( 1) The territories and the peoples that belonged to the Empire
of Ethiopia are placed under the full and complete sovereignty of
the Kingdom of Italy.
(2) The title of Emperor of Ethiopia has been assumed for
himself and his successors by the King of Italy.
Officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers of all the armed
forces of the State in Africa and in Italy, Blackshirts, Italian men
and women!
The Italian people has created the empire with its blood. It will
fertilize it with its labor and will defend it with its arms against
anybody whomsoever. In this supreme certainty, legionaries, raise
up on high your insignia, your weapons, and your hearts, to salute
after fifteen centuries the reappearance of the empire upon the
fateful hills of Rome.
Will you be worthy of it? [The crowd erupts in shouts of
"Yes!"]
This answering cry is as a sacred oath that binds you before God
and before men for life and for death. Blackshirts, legionaries, the
salute to the King!
Mussolini's triumph went to his head; an impressionable victim of an

exaggerated case of Ducismo, he became overconfident of future
victories as well.
During the last two months of the Ethiopian War, Mussolini toyed
between restoring a semblance of good relations with Britain and
France or shifting over to Germany. In April and May the Duce and
Ambassador Grandi in London seemed to lean toward the former
strategy (which was also favored by Britain's new King Edward
VIII). But by June, Mussolini and his newly appointed Foreign
Minister, Count Ciano, decided in favor of Hitler. A mixture of envy
for the Fuhrer, combined with resentment toward the British, was
responsible. Evidence of the new policy was provided that month
when Mussolini advised Austria's Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg
(who had succeeded the murdered Dollfuss) to seek an understanding
with Hitler. The Duce sensed that the internal situation in Austria had
shifted against him during the preceding year or two. The fascism that
was to triumph in Austria was to be the German, not the Italian,
variety.
The process of Italo-German rapprochement was hastened by the
events of the Spanish Civil War, which broke out in the middle of
July, 1936. At once Mussolini furnished aerial support to General
Francisco Franco's rebels and eventually dispatched 70,000 Italian
"volunteers" (mostly members of the Fascist Militia) to assist them in
the field. For the Duce a victory by Franco would mean another
significant advance for the "universal doctrine" of fascism, further
encirclement of France, and a possibility of driving the British from
Gibraltar, thereby converting the Mediterranean into "Mare Nos-
trum." He even had visions of acquiring the Balearic Islands. Germany
also sent aid to Franco, though not to the extent that Italy did. 4
Thus it was hardly surprising that Foreign Minister Ciano headed to
Germany in October, 1936, for talks with Hitler. Since Austria was no
longer a bone of contention, the two Fascist powers could announce
their future co-operation. This Mussolini did on November 1 in
Milan's great cathedral square.
Mussolini's Announcement of the Rome-Berlin Axis

(Milan, November 1, 1936)
A great country during these last few days has earned exten-
sive sympathy from the masses of Italian people. I allude to
Germany.
The meeting at Berlin resulted in an agreement between the two
countries on certain questions, some of which are particularly
interesting in these days. But these agreements, which have been
included in special statements and duly signed-this vertical line
between Rome and Berlin is not a partition, but rather an axis
around which all the European states animated by the will to
collaboration and peace can also collaborate. Germany, although
souRcE: Il Popolo d'ltalia (Milan), No. 303 (Nov. 2, 1936). My

translation.
4. Regarding the Spanish Civil War, see especially Part II.
surrounded and solicited, did not adhere to sanctions. With the

Agreement of July 11 [between Austria and Germany] an element
of dissension between Berlin and Rome disappeared, and I may
remind you that even before the Berlin meeting Germany had
practically recognized the Empire of Rome.
It is not a matter for surprise that today we hoist the flag of anti-
Bolshevism. For this is our old flag; we were born under that sign;
we have waged war against that enemy and we conquered him by
means of our sacrifices and our blood. . . .
In September, 1937, Mussolini crossed the Alps for his first trip to the
German capital and his second personal visit with Chancellor Hitler
(whom he had first met in Venice in June, 19 34). The state visit was a
triumphal progress from Munich to Berlin and was climaxed on the
Maifeld, where Hitler assembled an enormous crowd of 800,000.
Wearing his own newly designed uniform, the Duce addressed the vast
assembly in German, but a sudden torrential rainstorm reduced the
carefully prepared text almost to a sodden rag as he tried to read it
faster and faster, to the great confusion of the crowd. Even so, Musso-
lini, if not the Germans, came away from the meeting in a state of
exaltation and henceforth was under the spell of the Fuhrer.
Mussolini Reaffirms the Rome-Berlin Axis

(Berlin, September 28, 1937)
Comrades! The visit that I am paying to Germany and her Fuhrer,
and the speech that I am about to make, represent an important
point in the life of our two nations and also in my own. The
demonstrations with which I have been received have deeply
moved me. My visit should not be measured by the same standard
as the usual diplomatic-political visits, and the fact that I have come
to Germany today does not mean that I shall be traveling some-
where else tomorrow.
I have come among you not merely as Head of the Italian
Government but above all in my capacity as the head of a national
revolution, which thereby wishes to give proof of its close connec-
tion with your revolution. Although the course of the two revolu-
tions may have been somewhat different, the goal they have sought
and reached is the same: the unity and greatness of the people.
Fascism and Nazism are two manifestations of that parallelism of
souRCE: ll Popolo d'ltalia (Milan), No. 271 (Sept. 29, 1937). My

translation.
historic positions that links the life of our nations, which have
achieved unification in the same century and by the same actions.
There are no secret intentions hidden behind my visit to Ger-
many. Nothing will be planned here to divide a Europe which is
already divided enough. The solemn confirmation of the fact and
stability of the Rome-Berlin Axis is not directed against other
states. We National Socialists and Fascists want peace, and we shall
always be ready to work for peace, a true and fruitful peace which
does not ignore, but solves, the questions that arise from the inter-
relationships of peoples. To the whole world, which is asking
tensely what the result of this meeting will be, war or peace, the
Fuhrer and I can answer with a loud voice: Peace!
Just as Fascism has for fifteen years given Italy outwardly and
spiritually a new countenance, so also has your revolution given
Germany a new countenance-new, even though it is based, as in
Italy, on the loftiest and most imperishable traditions that are
compatible with the necessities of modern life. I wanted to see for
myself this countenance of the New Germany. And, on seeing it, I
am now more than ever convinced that this New Germany-in her
strength, her justifiable pride, and her desire for peace-is a basic
element of European life.
I believe that the reason for much misunderstanding and distrust
among nations is that those responsible are not aware of the new
reality which is emerging. The life of nations, like that of indi-
viduals, is not something that is fixed once for all, but is subject to a
constant process of change. To judge a nation on the basis of
figures and descriptions or of writings of twenty or fifty years ago
is a mistake which may prove fatal. This mistake is often com-
mitted against Italy. If the national revolutions of Germany and
Italy were better known, many prejudices would disappear and
many points of conflict would lose their justification.
We have in common many elements of our Weltanschauung.
Not only have National Socialism and Fascism everywhere the
same enemies, in the service of the same master-the Third Inter-
national-but they have many conceptions of life and history in
common. Both believe in will as the determining power in the life
of nations and the driving force of their history, and therefore they
reject the teachings of so-called historical materialism and its politi-
cal and philosophical by-products.
Both glorify work, in its innumerable forms, as the sign of
human nobility. Both are based on the young people, whom we
train to discipline, courage, resistance, love of the fatherland, and

contempt for easy living.
The resurrected Roman Empire is the work of this new spirit
with which Italy is inspired. The German rebirth is also the work
of a spiritual force, of faith in an idea, in which at first only one
man believed-then a handful of pioneers and martyrs, then a mi-
nority, and finally an entire nation.
Germany and Italy follow the same goal in the sphere of
economic autarky. Without economic independence the political
independence of a nation is doubtful, and a nation of great military
power may become the victim of an economic blockade. We
experienced this danger in all its immediacy when fifty-two states,
!J.Ssembled in Geneva, decided upon criminal economic sanctions
against Italy. Those sanctions were carried out with extreme rigor
but did not attain their object, and even gave Fascist Italy an
opportunity of proving her powers of resistance to the world.
In spite of all the pressure put upon her, Germany did not take
part in the sanctions. We shall never forget this. On that occasion
there appeared, for the first time, and in the clearest manner, the
existence of a necessary solidarity between Nazi Germany and
Fascist Italy. What the world now knows as the Rome-Berlin Axis
was born in the autumn of 19 3 5, and has worked in the last two
years for the ever stronger rapprochement of our two peoples to
each other, as for the growing political strengthening of the peace
of Europe.
Fascism has its ethics, to which it intends to remain true, and
these ethics are identical with my own moral code: to speak clearly
and openly and, when one has a friend, to march with him to the
end.
All of the arguments advanced by our enemies are untrue.
Neither in Germany nor in Italy is there a dictatorship, but rather
organizations and forces which serve the people. No regime, in any
part of the world, has the approval of the people to the same extent
as the regimes of Germany and Italy. The greatest and the most
authentic democracies in the world today are the German and
Italian.
In other countries, under cover of the "inviolable rights of man,"
policy is governed by the forces of money, of capital, of secret
societies, and of political groups in strife with one another. In
Germany and Italy no private force can, in any way, influence the
policy of the state.
This community of Italo-German ideas has found its expression
in the struggle against Bolshevism, the modern form of the darkest
Byzantine arbitrary force, that unbelievable exploitation of the
credulity of the lower classes, that government of famine, blood-
shed, and slavery. Ever since the War, Fascism has fought with
utmost energy against this form of human degeneration which lives
on lies; it has fought with words and with arms. For when words
are not enough, and when threatening circumstances demand, arms
must be taken up.
We have acted in this way in Spain, where thousands of Italian
Fascist volunteers have fallen to save Western civilization, a civili-
zation which may still experience a rebirth if it turns its back upon
the false and lying gods of Geneva and Moscow and draws nearer
to the luminous truths of our revolution.
Comrades, my speech is almost finished. Outside our own fron-
tiers we and you are not making propaganda in the banal sense of
the word in order to gain converts. We believe that truth itself
possesses enough power to penetrate everywhere and that it will
ultimately be victorious. The Europe of tomorrow will be Fascist
by the logical force of circumstances and not by our propaganda.
It is twenty years since your great Fuhrer shouted to the masses
the rousing cry which was to become the war cry of the entire
German people: "Deutschland, erwache!" [Germany, awake!]
Germany has awakened. The Third Reich has come into being.
I don't know whether or when Europe will awaken, as was said
at the Nuremberg Party Congress; for secret, but to us well
enough known, forces are at work to turn a civil war into a world
conflagration. What is important is that our two great nations-
who together comprise an imposing, ever growing mass of 115
million people-stand together in a single, unshatterable determina-
tion. And today's gigantic demonstration is giving proof of this to
the world.
Less than two months later, in the protocol printed below, Fascist Italy
acceded to the Anti-Comintern Pact signed by Germany and Japan the
year before. This was a clear indication of their antipathy for Soviet
Russia.
Italy's Accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact

(Protocol Signed in Rome, November 6, 1937)
The Government of the German Reich, the Italian Government,
and the Imperial Japanese Government.
Considering that the Communist International continues con-
stantly to endanger the civilized world in the West and East, and
disturbs and destroys its peace and order,
Convinced that close co-operation between all States interested
in maintaining peace and order can alone diminish and remove this
danger,
Considering that Italy, which since the beginning of the Fascist
Government has combated this danger with inflexible determina-
tion and has eradicated the Communist International in its terri-
tory, has decided to take its place against the common enemy side
by side with Germany and Japan who, for their part, are animated
by the same desire to guard against the Communist International,
Have agreed as follows, in acc'ordance with article II of the
Agreement against the Communist International concluded on
November 25, 1936, in Berlin between Germany and Japan.
Art. 1: Italy accedes to the Agreement against the Communist
International together with the additional Protocol, concluded
between Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, a copy of
which is annexed.
Art. 2: The three Powers signing the present Protocol agree
that Italy shall be considered as an original signatory of the
Agreement and additional Protocol mentioned in the preceding
article, the signature of the present Protocol being equivalent to
the signature of the original text of the said Agreement and
additional Protocol.
Art. 3: The present Protocol is considered as an integral part of
the above-mentioned Agreement and additional Protocol.
Art. 4: The present Protocol is drawn up in the German, Italian,
and Japanese languages, each text being regarded as an original. It
comes into force on the date of signature. . . .
Done in triplicate at Rome, November 6, 193 7-in the XVI year
souRcE: Document No. 17, Documents on German Foreign Pol-

icy, 1918-1945, Series D (Washington, D. C.: Department of
State, 1956) I, 26-27.
of the Fascist era, i.e., November 6 of the 12th year of the Showa
period.
Is/ JOACHIM voN RIBBENTROP
CIANO
M. HOTTA
In March, 1938, Mussolini gave his approval to Hitler's sudden annexa-

tion of Austria. "Tell Mussolini I will never forget him for this!" was
the grateful and almost hysterical response of the Fiihrer. 5 Hence-
forth the balance of power in the Danubian basin began to shift in
favor of Germany. Italy was rapidly to become enslaved to the Reich.
Two months later Hitler visited Florence, Naples, and Rome. He
was unhappy to spend so much time with King Victor Emmanuel, as
protocol required of a visiting head of state. When he learned of
Hitler's annoyance, Mussolini consoled the German foreign minister:
"Tell the Fuhrer to be patient; I have had to be for sixteen years! " 6
The month of September saw Hitler's demands against Czechoslo-
vakia come to a head. At the desperate request of British Prime
Minister Chamberlain, Mussolini persuaded Hitler to agree to a four-
power conference at Munich. This was the Duce's greatest hour in
diplomacy; he was the only one of the Big Four able to converse in all
the languages. In Italy there were delirious cries of relief that Munich
had "saved" the world from war.
During the winter of 1938-39 both the British and the French
sought to woo Italy back into their fold, but they could not agree on
the bait. Mussolini remained contemptuous of their efforts. France is a
nation "ruined by alcohol, syphilis, and journalism," he told Ciano.
Early in 1939 he was encouraging Italian Irredentists to shout for
"Nice, Corsica, Tunis!"
Hitler tore up the Munich agreement and seized the rest of Czecho-
slovakia in March, 1939. Belatedly the British and French realized that
their policy of appeasement was not working. They now proceeded to
make a commitment to Poland and halfheartedly sought Stalin's cooper-
ation.
Annoyed by Hitler's failure to keep him fully informed of impend-
ing German moves, Mussolini responded in kind by suddenly invading
Albania on Good Friday (April 7). The war was quite unnecessary,
for Albania was already an Italian vassal. The plans for the invasion
had long been prepared, but the final decision was made on the spur of
the moment by Mussolini and Ciano. The announcement apparently
met with some faint opposition from Victor Emmanuel, but he
quickly gave in. Albania's King Zog, his American-born queen, and
5. Quoted in Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (rev. ed.; New

York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 431.
6. Quoted in Luigi Salvatorelli and Giovanni Mira, Storia del Fascismo
(Rome: Edizioni N ovissima, 1953), p. 8 31.
newborn child fled by donkey over the mountains into Greece. The
war soon ended in Italian victory but destroyed what was left of the
confidence Italy had earlier tried to inspire among the Balkan countries.
In May, 1939, Hitler's Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop
came to Milan to tighten the Axis into a full-fledged alliance. An
American newspaperman reported that Ribbentrop did not get a
friendly reception from the Milanese, a story that greatly incensed
Mussolini. By telephone he instructed Ciano to counteract this impres-
sion by concluding as quickly as possible a formal military alliance.
The youthful and none too clever Foreign Minister was caught unpre-
pared; he did not have a detailed draft treaty available. But Ribbentrop
did; it was the German text that was adopted with minor amendments.
By the terms of this "Pact of Steel" between "two regimes," Italy
found herself pledged to support Germany even in a war of aggression.
"Pact of Steel" Between Germany and Italy

(May 22, 1939)
The German Chancellor and His Majesty the King of Italy and
Albania, Emperor of Ethiopia, deem that the time has come to
strengthen the close relationship of friendship and homogeneity,
existing between National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, by
a solemn Pact.
Now that a safe bridge for mutual aid and assistance has been
established by the common frontier between Germany and Italy
fixed for all time, both Governments reaffirm the policy, the
principles and objectives of which have already been agreed upon
by them, and which has proved successful, both for promoting the
interests of the two countries and also for safeguarding peace in
Europe.
Firmly united by the inner affinity between their ideologies and
the comprehensive solidarity of their interests, the German and
Italian nations are resolved in future also to act side by side and
with united forces to secure their living space and to maintain
peace.
Following this path, marked out for them by history, Germany
and Italy intend, in the midst of a world of unrest and disintegra-
tion, to serve the task of safeguarding the foundations of European
civilization. . . .
souRcE: Document No. 426, in Documents on German Foreign

Policy, 1918-194), Series D (Washington, D.C.: Department
of State, 1956), VI, 561-564.
Art. 1-The High Contracting Parties will remain in continuous

contact with each other in order to reach an understanding on all
questions affecting their common interests or the general European
situation.
Art. 2-Should the common interests of the High Contracting
Parties be endangered by international events of any kind what-
soever, they will immediately enter into consultations on the mea-
sures to be taken for the protection of these interests.
Should the security or other vital interests of one of the High
Contracting Parties be threatened from without, the other High
Contracting Party will afford the threatened Party full political
and diplomatic support in order to remove this threat.
Art. 3-If, contrary to the wishes and hopes of the High Con-
tracting Parties, it should happen that one of them became involved
in warlike complications with another Power or Powers, the other
High Contracting Party would immediately come to its assistance
as an ally and support it with all its military forces on land, at sea
and in the air.
Art. 4-In order to ensure in specific cases the speedy execution
of the obligations of alliance undertaken under Article 3, the
Governments of the two High Contracting Parties will further
intensify their collaboration in the military field, and in the field of
war economy.
In the same way the two Governments will remain in continuous
consultation also on other measures necessary for the practical
execution of the provisions of this Pact.
For the purposes indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the two
Governments will set up commissions which will be under the
direction of the two Foreign Ministers.
Art. 5-The High Contracting Parties undertake even now that,
in the event of war waged jointly, they will conclude an armistice
and peace only in full agreement with each other.
Art. 6- The two High Contracting Parties are aware of the
significance that attaches to their common relations with Powers
friendly to them. They are resolved to maintain these relations in
the future also and together to shape them in accordance with the
common interests which form the bonds between them and these
Powers.
Art. 7-This Pact shall enter into force immediately upon signa-
ture. The two High Contracting Parties are agreed in laying down
that its first term of validity shall be for ten years. In good time
before the expiry of this period, they will reach agreement on the
extension of the validity of the Pact.
In witness whereon the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Pact
and affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate in the German and the Italian languages, both
texts being equally authoritative.
Berlin, May 22, 1939, in the XVIIth year of the Fascist era.
jsj JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP GALEAZZO CIANO
SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE PACT OF FRIENDSHIP

AND ALLIANCE BETWEEN GERMANY AND ITALY 7
At the time of signature of the Pact of Friendship and Alliance,

both Parties have reached agreement on the following points:
1. The two Foreign Ministers will reach agreement as quickly as
possible on the organization, headquarters and working methods of
the commissions for military questions and questions of war econ-
omy to be set up under their direction as provided for in Article
IV of the Pact.
2. In execution of Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Pact the two
Foreign Ministers will as quickly as possible take all necessary steps
to ensure continuous collaboration in the fields of the press, infor-
mation and propaganda in accordance with the spirit and aims of
the Pact.
For this purpose each of the two Foreign Ministers will assign to
his country's Embassy, in the capital of the other, one or more
specially qualified experts who, in direct collaboration with the
Foreign Ministry there, will continually consult on the steps which
are suitable for promoting the policy of the Axis and counteracting
the policy of opposing Powers in the fields of the press, informa-
tion and propaganda.
Berlin, May 22, 1939-in the XVIIth year of the Fascist Era.
jsj JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP GALEAZZO CIANO
The Italians had gained the erroneous impression that Hitler would not
take action for at least another three years. Mussolini also thought of
the pact chiefly as a way of increasing Italy's bargaining power with
7. The signed original of this secret protocol in the German Foreign

Ministry archives was, like the pact, printed with the German and Italian
texts on alternate pages. It was not bound with the rest of the pact, but
inserted loose in the volume.-Ed.
France. Before the Pact of Steel was finally signed in Berlin on May 22,
however, the Duce came to his senses sufficiently to warn Hitler that
Italy would not be ready for war until 194 3. Hitler had no intention of
being bound by Mussolini's timetable; the very next day, without
bothering to inform Rome, he told his generals to prepare for war
against Poland "at the earliest favorable moment."
On August 11 when Ciano conferred with Hitler at Salzburg he
suddenly realized the imminence of war. From then on the Italian
Foreign Minister had second thoughts about Hitler and began to doubt
the judgment of his father-in-law. The Italian government learned of
Hitler's Pact of Neutrality and Nonaggression with Stalin only two
days before it was signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939. Flabber-
gasted, Ciano conferred with the Duce and instructed officials to
prepare documents setting forth reasons why Italy could not go to war
at this juncture. On August 26 a deliberately long list of requests for
economic and military aid was dispatched to Berlin. "It's enough to kill
a bull, if a bull could read," Ciano wrote in his diary. Next day Musso-
lini sent the following message to Hitler regarding Italy's situation.
Mussolini's Message to Hitler

Regarding Italian Support
(August 27, 1939)
FUEHRER: I reply to your letter 8 delivered to me by the Ambassa-
dor. The world does not and will not know before the outbreak of
hostilities what the attitude of Italy is, and will learn instead that
Italy has concentrated her forces towards the frontiers of the great
democracies. On the French frontiers I have actually concentrated
seventeen divisions, plus twenty-seven Alpini battalions, plus the
frontier guards. Two new divisions are proceeding to Libya-a
weak point in our strategic dispositions-and these will bring up
the number of metropolitan divisions to six, plus four of Libyan
Arabs. These measures are more than a demonstration; they will
leave the French and British in a state of uncertainty, and will
confront them with a disposition of forces at least equal to theirs.
I see you are convinced that an immediate intervention by me in
souRCE: Document No. 350, Documents on German Foreign Pol-

icy, 1918-194S, Series D (1937-1945) (Washington, D.C.: De-
partment of State, 1956), VII, 353-354. Transmitted in cipher
by telephone to the Italian Embassy in Berlin at 4:30 P.M.,
August 27, 1939.
8. See Doc. No. 341 in ibid., dated 12:10 A.M., August 27, 1939, and de-
livered to Mussolini at 9 A.M. that day. It requested most of the things
referred to in Mussolini's reply.-Ed.
the first phase of the conflict, especially if-as you say, and as is
right-you will not be taking the initiative on the Western Front,
thereby bringing upon Italy the mass of Franco-British troops and
exhausting the limited Italian resources, might have serious reper-
cussions on the development of the war for you as well.
All that can be done from the psychological point of view to
underline Italian-German solidarity will be intensified by press,
radio, cinema and thorough propaganda.
I am prepared to send you the greatest possible number of
workers for your industries and agriculture compatible with my
present and prospective mobilization measures.
It is my desire to keep in closest contact with you, Fuehrer, in
order to co-ordinate the action of our two countries and make it
conform-in every field-to the requirements which will result
from the course of events.
MUSSOLINI
On September 1, the same day that Hitler launched the invasion of

Poland, he sent Mussolini the following telegram which, at German
insistence, was not made public for some time:
Hitler's Message to Mussolini

(September 1, 1939)
DUCE: I thank you most cordially for the diplomatic and political
support which you have been giving recently to Germany and her
just cause. I am convinced that we can carry out the task imposed
upon us with the military forces of Germany. I do not therefore
expect to need Italy's military support in these circumstances. I also
thank you, Duce, for everything which you will do in future for
the common cause of Fascism and National Socialism.
ADOLF HITLER
Mussolini was allowed to stay on the sidelines for a few months, and he
announced Italy's status as that of "nonbelligerency" rather than pure
souRcE: Document No. 500, Documents on German Foreign

Policy, 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. VII (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Department of State, 195 6), p. 483. It would appear
that this telegram was sent in response to a personal message from
Mussolini to Hitler, conveyed through Ambassador Attolico
early that morning. Ed.
"neutrality." All through the ensuing winter the Vatican put great
pressure on Italy to stay out of the war. At Christmas an unprece-
dented exchange of visits by the Pope and the House of Savoy took
place; Pius XII was doing his best to strengthen the "dyarchy" and
encourage the King to resist any move toward war.
On March 18, 1940, the Duce conferred with Hitler at the Brenner.
On that occasion he cast aside all discretion and told the Fuhrer that
Italy would indeed join in the conflict but would have to decide the
date. In a subsequent memorandum of March 31 to the King, Mussolini
explained that it would be "a war parallel to that of Germany to obtain
our objectives, which can be summed up in this phrase: liberty on the
seas; a window on the ocean." 9
Learning of this development and of the impending German blitz-
krieg in the West, the Pope dispatched warnings to the Low Countries,
and after their invasion he sent telegrams expressing his sorrow at their
being overrun. This precipitated a new clash with the Fascist regime.
Mussolini's envoy to the Holy See delivered a protest in person,
whereupon Pius XII raised his voice: "Whatever may happen, We
have absolutely nothing to be ashamed of, and We do not even fear
deportation to a concentration camp!" 10
But the efforts of the Vatican to keep Italy at peace failed. Seeing
Hitler's legions quickly overrun France, Mussolini was determined to
join the kill. Without bothering to inform the Fascist Grand Council,
and with no opposition from the King, the Duce summoned a vast
throng to the square in front of his Palazzo Venezia balcony on June
10, 1940, to hear the following announcement.
Mussolini's Speech Declaring War

(June 10, 1940)
Fighters on the land, on the sea, and in the air! Blackshirts of the
Revolution and the Legions! Men and women of Italy, of the
Empire, and of the Kingdom of Albania! Listen!
An hour that has been marked out by destiny is sounding in the
sky above our fatherland! [Lively acclaim.] The hour of irrevo-
cable decisions! The declaration of war has already been handed
[acclamations, loud shouts of "War! War!"] to the ambassadors of
Great Britain and F ranee. We are going onto the battlefield against
souRcE: Il Popolo d'ltalia (Milan), XXVII, 163 (June 11, 1940).

My translation.
9. I Documenti diplomatici italiani, Nona serie (1939-1943), III (Rome:
Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1958), 576-578.
10. Secretairerie d'Etat de sa Saintete, Actes et documents du Saint Siege
relatifs a la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, ed. by Pierre Blet, Angelo Martini,
Burkhart Schneider, Tome 1: Le Saint Siege et la guerre en Europe: Mars
1939-Aout 1940 (Vatican City, 1965), pp. 453-455.
the plutocratic and reactionary democracies of the West who at

every stage have hindered the march and have often threatened the
very existence of the Italian people.
Several lustrums of our most recent history can be summarized
in these words: promises, threats, blackmail, and at the end-to
crown it all-the ignoble siege carried out by fifty-two states of
the League of Nations.
Our conscience is entirely tranquil. [Applause.] Along with
you, the entire world is witness to the fact that our Italy of the
Lictors has done everything that was humanly possible to forestall
the storm that is now engulfing Europe; but everything was in
vam.
It would have been enough if the treaties had been revised and
modified in accordance with the changing needs in the life of
nations rather than being considered as untouchable for all eter-
nity. It would have been enough if the stupid policy of guarantees,
which turned out to be especially deadly to those who accepted
them, had not been undertaken. It would have been enough if the
proposal which the Fuhrer made on October 6 of last year at the
end of the Polish campaign had not been rejected.
But all of that now belongs to the past. If today we have decided
to face the risks and sacrifices of a war, it is because honor, our
interests, and our future firmly demand it, since a great people is
truly such only if it holds sacred its obligations and does not evade
the supreme tests that determine the course of history.
After having solved the problem of our land frontiers, we are
taking up arms in order to establish our maritime frontiers. We
want to break the territorial and military chains that are strangling
us in our own sea. A nation of 45 million souls is not truly free
unless it has free access to the ocean.
This gigantic struggle is only one phase of the logical develop-
ment of our revolution; it is the struggle of peoples who though
poor are rich in workers versus exploiters who cling fiercely to
their monopoly of all the earth's wealth and gold; it is the struggle
of young and fertile peoples against sterile ones who stand on the
verge of decline; it is the struggle between two centuries and two
ideas.
Now that the die has been cast and our determination has re-
sulted in burning our ships behind us, I solemnly declare that Italy
does not intend to drag into the conflict any of the other peoples
who border it on either land or sea. Switzerland, Yugoslavia,
Greece, Turkey, Egypt: take note of these words of mine. It is up

to them, and only to them, if these words will be scrupulously
maintained.
Italians! In a memorable meeting that took place in Berlin, I said
that according to the laws of Fascist morality, whenever one has a
friend, he stands by him to the end. ["Duce! Duce! Duce!"] We
have done that, and we shall do it with Germany, with her people,
and with her marvelous armed forces.
On the eve of this event of century-long importance, we turn
our thoughts to His Majesty the King and Emperor [the crowd
erupts in great applause at the mention of the House of Savoy],
who, as always, has interpreted the spirit of the fatherland. And we
salute by acclamation the Fuhrer, leader of our great ally, Ger-
many! [The people applaud at length at the mention of Hitler.]
Proletarian and Fascist Italy, strong, proud, and united as never
before, is on her feet! [The crowd shouts with a single voice:
"Yes!"] We have but one categorical and obligatory watchword
for everyone. Already it has soared across the Alps to the Indian
Ocean and has stirred our hearts: Victory! [The people erupt in
very loud applause.] And we shall win, in order that we may at last
give a long period of peace with justice to Italy, to Europe, and to
the world.
People of Italy! Rush to arms, and show. your tenacity, your
courage, your valor!
Despite the fact that he himself had been personally in charge of the
service ministries since 1933, Mussolini led his country into the war
quite unprepared. The Italian Army could not get across the French
frontier until June 21, a day before the armistice terms were signed by
Germany. Mussolini, who had hoped to obtain Nice, Savoy, Corsica,
Djibouti, and perhaps even Tunisia, was treated contemptuously by
the Germans and permitted (in the Franco-Italian armistice of June
24) to acquire only the border town of Mentone and the Red Sea port
of Djibouti.
After more or less giving up the idea of invading England, Hitler
instructed his Foreign Minister to sign a Three-Power Pact with Italy
and Japan on September 27, 1940. It called for a "New Order" in both
Europe and Greater East Asia. Article 3 bound them to assist one
another in case any of them were "attacked by a power at present not
involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict."
Clearly the United States was such a power. Soviet Russia was specifi-
cally excluded by Article 5, though the Kremlin may well have had
some doubts as to the candor of that promise.
Three-Power Pact of Germany, Italy, and] apan

The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, considering it as
the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the
world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by
and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in
Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein
it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of
things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the
peoples concerned.
Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend
co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may
be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own,
in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be
realized. Accordingly the Governments of Germany, Italy and
Japan have agreed as follows:
Art. 1-Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany
and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.
Art. 2-Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership
of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.
Art. 3-Germany, Italy and Japan agree to co-operate in their
efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one
another with all political, economic and military means when one
of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present
not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese
Conflict.
Art. 4-With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint
Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed
by the respective Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan will
meet without delay.
Art. 5-Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the aforesaid terms
do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present
as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.
Art. 6- The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon
souRcE: Document No. 118, Documents on German Foreign

Policy, 191'8-1945, Series D ( 1937-1945) (Washington, D.C.:
Dept. of State, 1960), XI, 204-205. The original text was drawn
up in English.
signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its
coming into force.
At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High
Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter
into negotiations for its renewal.
In faith whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their
respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed
hereto their Seals.
Done in triplicate at Berlin, the 27th day of September 1940-in
the XVIIIth year of the Fascist Era-, corresponding to the 27th
day of the 9th month of the 15th year of Showa.
Is/ JOACHIM v. RIBBENTROP
CIANO
KURUSU
By August, 1940, Italy's war machine was functioning a little better.

Mussolini's men managed to capture British Somaliland (the first
English colony to be stolen in a century). The Duce at the same time
asked Hitler to let Italian pilots share in the "honor" of bombing
London. Next month still other Italian forces, led by General Graziani,
moved from Libya some 70 miles into Egypt. Despite the critical needs
of the Battle of Britain, Prime Minister Churchill dispatched two badly
needed divisions to Suez. By late autumn General Wavell was able to
launch a counterattack that drove the Italians westward some 500
miles, halfway across Libya, with the loss of 130,000 prisoners of
war-so many that British army dispatches described them in terms of
so many acres.
Meanwhile, Mussolini was determined to spread the banner of
Fascist Italy in another sector. Egged on by Ciano, he ordered the
invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940, the anniversary of the March
on Rome. He informed Hitler only on the day it occurred. The Italian
ultimatum was cast in the following terms.
The Italian Ultimatum to Greece

(October 28, 1940)
The Italian Government has repeatedly noted how, in the course
of the present conflict, the Greek Government assumed and main-
tained an attitude which was contrary not only with that of
souRcE: Associated Press version, New York Times (Oct. 29,

1940), p. 4. The Italian Minister to Greece (Grazzi) delivered
the ultimatum to General Metaxas at 3 A.M., October 28. The
ultimatum expired at 6 A.M.
formal, peaceful, good neighborly relations between two nations

but also with the precise duties which were incumbent on the
Greek Government in view of its status as a neutral country.
On various occasions the Italian Government has found it neces-
sary to urge the Greek Government to observe these duties and to
protest against their systematic violation, particularly serious since
the Greek Government permitted its territorial waters, its coasts
and its ports to be used by the British fleet in the course of its war
operations, aided in supplying the British air forces and permitted
organization of a military information service in the Greek archi-
pelago to Italy's damage.
The Greek Government was perfectly aware of these facts,
which several times formed the basis of diplomatic representations
on the part of Italy to which the Greek Government, which
should have taken consideration of the grave consequences of its
attitude, failed to respond with any measure for the protection of
its own neutrality, but, instead, intensified its activities favoring the
British armed forces and its cooperation with Italy's enemies.
The Italian Government has proof that this cooperation was
foreseen by the Greek Government and was regulated by under-
standings of a military, naval, and aeronautical character. The
Italian Government does not refer only to the British guarantee
accepted by Greece as a part of the program of action against
Italy's security but also to explicit, precise engagements undertaken
by the Greek Government to put at the disposal of powers at war
with Italy important strategic positions on Greek territory, includ-
ing air bases in [Thessaly] and Macedonia designed for attack on
Albanian territory.
In this connection the Italian Government must remind the
Greek Government of the provocative activities carried out against
the Albanian nation, together with the terroristic policy it has
adopted toward the people of Ciamuria and the persistent efforts to
create disorders beyond its frontiers.
For these reasons, also, the Italian Government has accepted the
necessity, even though futilely, of calling the attention of the
Greek Government to the inevitable consequences of its policy
toward Italy. This no longer can be tolerated by Italy.
Greek neutrality has been tending continuously toward a mere
shadow. Responsibility for this situation lies primarily on the
shoulders of Great Britain and its aim to involve ever more coun-
tries in war.
But now it is obvious that the policy of the Greek Government
has been and is directed toward transforming Greek territory, or at
least permitting Greek territory to be transformed, into a base for
war operations against Italy.
This could only lead to armed conflict between Italy and
Greece, which the Italian Government has every intention of
avoiding.
The Italian Government, therefore, has reached the decision to
ask the Greek Government, as a guarantee of Greek neutrality and
as a guarantee of Italian security, for permission to occupy with its
own armed forces several strategic points in Greek territory for
the duration of the present conflict with Great Britain.U
The Italian Government asks the Greek Government not to
oppose this occupation and not to obstruct the free passage of the
troops carrying it out.
These troops do not come as enemies of the Greek people and
the Italian Government does not in any way intend that the
temporary occupation of several strategic points, dictated by spe-
cial necessities of a purely defensive character, should compromise
Greek sovereignty and independence.
The Italian Government asks that the Greek Government give
immediate orders to military authorities that. this occupation may
take place in a peaceful manner. Wherever the Italian troops may
meet resistance this resistance will be broken by armed force, and
the Greek Government would have the responsibility for the
resulting consequences.
The war in Greece went badly for the Italians, who were halted
within three weeks and pushed back into Albania. In November
Mussolini sought to make General Badoglio his scapegoat and relieved
him of command. (Badoglio was to get his revenge on July 25, 1943.)
By December Mussolini was in the embarrassing situation of having to
beg Hitler for assistance. The Germans, however, were unable to send
11. On May 6, 1941, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, said to
the House of Commons: "... In the early morning, at 3:00 o'clock, the
Italian Minister called on General Metaxas and presented him with an
ultimatum, which, he said, would come into force at 6:00. The ultimatum
contained this clause:-that Italy demanded certain bases in Greece. General
Metaxas said, 'What bases?' The Italian Minister said that he did not know.
Those were the cynical conditions in which the first attack on Greece was
made, before even the ultimatum expired, and those were the conditions in
which our guarantee first came into effect." (Parliamentary Debates, House
of Commons, 5th series, Vol. 371, col. 733.)
troops to the Balkans until the spring of 1941. The necessity of clean-
ing up that peninsula before invading Russia caused Hitler to lose five
precious weeks-enough to prevent him from capturing Moscow in
the first year of the war and, in effect, making his eventual defeat
almost inevitable.
Italy's armed forces performed poorly almost everywhere. On No-
vember 11, 1940, British sea and air power in the Mediterranean
knocked out three Italian capital ships at their Taranto base at the cost
of only two British planes and one pilot killed. Not content with that,
other British naval units struck the Italian fleet off Cape Matapan on
March 28-29, 1941, sinking three cruisers and two destroyers, and a
few weeks later another squadron bombarded Genoa in daylight. By
that spring the British had driven the Italians completely out of East
Africa and reinstated Emperor Haile Selassie on his throne.
In June 1941 Mussolini joined Hitler in the invasion of Stalin's
Russia. "We cannot count less than Slovakia. . . . The destiny of
Italy is intimately bound up with that of Germany," he told the Italian
commander. 12 And followmg the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in
December, both Axis powers declared war on the United States-once
again without opposition from the King and with no consultation of
the Grand Council.
By 1942 the situation was much worse. Hitler dispatched General
Erwin Rommel to fill the breach in Libya. His forces advanced that
summer from Tobruk into Egypt, and Mussolini crossed the Mediter-
ranean in anticipation of a victory parade in Cairo. But El Alamein was
as far as the Axis forces could get. The Duce had to sneak back to
Rome. In October the British launched an attack from El Alamein that
carried them triumphantly all the way to Tunisia, while the next
month Anglo-American troops landed in Morocco and Algeria. At the
same time the Red Army bitterly counterattacked at Stalingrad. Thus
the turning point of the war had been reached. Physically ill, the Duce
was rapidly losing prestige and power at home. All of his enemies
began to come out of hiding. In vain he tried to persuade Hitler to
make peace with Russia and concentrate his efforts against the "Anglo-
Saxons." Ciano dreamed of organizing an ltalo-Balkan peace bloc
against Germany. Never was there any co-ordinated military planning
between the two Axis powers-in contrast to the efficiency of the
Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff.
12. Quoted in F. W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler

and the Fall of Italian Fascism (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.
15-16.
7. Monarchist Coup d'Etat
and Republican Fascism
THE UNENDING series of military debacles abroad and the increasingly

heavy Allied aerial bombardment of the homeland led to profound
defeatism among the Italian people. The breakdown of the transporta-
tion system and the economy, along with the obvious poor health of
the Duce and his unwillingness to eliminate corruption m high places,
all served to augment the nation's despair. In February, 1943, Mussolini
tried to stem some of the criticism by "changing the guard" in his
Council of Ministers. Ciano was dismissed from the Foreign Office and
sent as ambassador to the Holy See; already he was conspiring with
certain party hierarchs to unseat his father-in-law. In March, 1943, a
great wave of strikes broke out in Turin and Milan, the first to take
place in Italy since the advent of the dictatorship. Communist infil-
trators did their best to impart an antiwar and political aura to them.
Within weeks three parallel and sometimes interlocking conspiracies
gained momentum. On the one hand, high Army leaders plotted to
replace the Duce with someone like Marshal Pietro Badoglio. Dissident
Fascist officials were anxious to put the government in the hands of
such men as Ciano, Grandi, and Bottai. Spokesmen of the clandestine
anti-Fascist parties hoped to restore free political institutions and end
the war; lvanoe Bonomi, an elderly ex-premier, was their titular leader.
All of these groups tried to persuade the King to take action and use
the regular Army to checkmate the Fascist Militia. But he remained as
silent and indecisive as he had been in 1922, in 1924, and in 1940.
The successful Allied invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943, accelerated
the political unrest; it was clear that the peninsula would be next. On
the nineteenth Mussolini and top Army leaders conferred with Hitler
at Feltre in Venetia. The military men made it clear to the Duce that
without vast military aid from Germany, Italy could not stay in the
war. But Mussolini was not capable of standing up to Hitler, who
contended that Germany could not divert such large-scale assistance.
On the same day hundreds of Allied planes bombed Rome's railway
yards. The terrifying raid made a profound impression on the citi-
zenry and at last frightened the King to the point of deciding to take
action. Mussolini meanwhile had bowed to pressure from PNF leaders
and scheduled a meeting of the Fascist Grand Council for the evening
of July 24-its first gathering since 1939. At what turned out to be an
all-night session, the Duce was confronted by a determined intraparty
revolt. Led by Ciano, Grandi, Bottai and others, 19 of the 26 hierarchs
expressed their lack of confidence in Mussolini and turned to the King.
Following is the text of the Grandi resolution:
Dino Grandi's Resolution at the Fascist Grand Council

(Palazzo Venezia, Rome, July 24-25, 1943)
THE GRAND Council, meeting at this hour of supreme trial, turns
its thoughts first of all to the heroic fighting men of every Service
who, side by side with the proud people of Sicily, in whom the
single faith of the Italian nation shines most brightly, are renewing
the noble traditions of hardy valor and indomitable spirit of self-
sacrifice of our glorious Armed Forces;
Having examined the internal and international situation and the
political and military conduct of the war,
It proclaims the sacred duty of all Italians to defend at whatever
cost the unity, independence, and liberty of our fatherland, the
fruits of the sacrifices and efforts of four generations, embracing
the period from the Risorgimento to the present day, and the life
and future of the Italian people.
It affirms the necessity for the moral and material unity of all
Italians in this grave and decisive hour for the destiny of our
country.
It declares that to this end it is necessary to revive forthwith all
the offices of State and to assign to the Crown, the Grand Council,
the Government, Parliament, and the Corporations the duties and
responsibilities prescribed by our statutory and constitutional laws.
It invites the Head of the Government to request His Majesty
the King-toward whom the heart of all the nation turns with
loyalty and confidence-to assume, for the honor and the salvation
of our fatherland, not only the effective command of the Armed
Forces, on land, sea, and in the air, in accordance with Article 5 of
the Statuto of the Realm, but also that supreme power of decision
which our laws ascribe to him, and which, throughout the nation's
history, has ever been the glorious heritage of our august dynasty
of Savoy.
The Grand Council adjourned about 2:30 A.M., Sunday, July 25. At
noon Mussolini requested to be received in special audience by the
King at 5 P.M. He arrived at the monarch's residence bearing docu-
ments designed to prove that the Council's vote was merely advisory.
souRcE: Benito Mussolini, Storia di un anno (ll tempo del bastone

e della carota), 2d ed. (Milan: Mondadori, 1944), pp. 83-84.
My translation.
MONARCHIST COUP D'ETAT AND REPUBLICAN FASCISM 223
But Victor Emmanuel had decided to exploit the Council's action and
regard it as a perfectly constitutional vote of nonconfidence. The
twenty-minute audience ended when the King informed the Capo del
Governo that he had decided to appoint Marshal Badoglio in his stead.
The Duce remonstrated; finally he murmured, "Then everything is
finished." The King promised the ex-dictator protection for himself
and family. As Mussolini stepped out of the royal villa, a captain of the
carabinieri moved forward and suggested he climb into a waiting
police ambulance to avoid a "hostile crowd." Falling into this trap,
Mussolini was driven to a nearby police barracks, not yet aware he was
under arrest. At 10:45 P.M. the Rome radio announced tersely the
replacement of Mussolini and then broadcast two proclamations, one
signed by the King, the other by Badoglio. The latter proclamation
follows.
Marshal Badoglio's Continuation of the War

(July 25, 1943)
Italians! By order of His Majesty the King and Emperor, I assume
the military government of the country with plenary powers.
The war continues. Although severely stricken in its invaded
provinces, in its destroyed cities, Italy remains loyal to its plighted
word, in proud defense of its thousand-year-long traditions.
Let all ranks close around His Majesty the King and Emperor,
who is the living image of the fatherland and an example for
everyone.
The charge given me is clear and precise. It will be scrupulously
executed; and whoever deludes himself into thinking that he can
impede its normal development, or attempts to disturb the public
order, will be struck down inexorably.
Long live Italy! Long live the King!
[signed] PIETRO BADOGLIO
Marshal of Italy
Caught unawares and bemused by the action of the Grand Council, the
Fascist Militia (MVSN) made no effort to resist the action of the King
and Badoglio.
The conspirators had the dual intention of removing Mussolini from
power and breaking away from Germany, but events quickly revealed
they had no rational plan for co-ordinating the two problems. They
had achieved the first without making coherent preparations for the
latter. Instead of clear-eyed, stouthearted statesmen, Italy found herself
souRcE: Il Messaggero (Rome), July 26, 1943. My translation.

led by mediocre, superannuated Machiavellians-seventy-two-year-old

Badoglio and seventy-four-year-old Victor Emmanuel III.
During the ensuing "45 days" of royal-military dictatorship in
Rome, the Germans were not at all fooled by Badoglio's pledge, "The
war continues." Hitler rapidly found the troops he had asserted at
Feltre were unavailable, and sent them pouring over the Brenner. The
Badoglio government miscalculated fatally in assuming that Italy
could sidestep the Allies' "unconditional surrender" formula and nego-
tiate a volte-face. The Allies, for their part, were unduly distrustful of
the Italians and did not realize how weak they actually were in the face
of the German build-up. Much precious time was lost before the
armistice was signed in Sicily on September 3 and proclaimed over the
radio by Badoglio the evening of the eighth, just as General Eisen-
hower's invasion forces were approaching the beachhead at Salerno.
Marshal Badoglio's Proclamation of the Armistice

(September 8, 1943)
The Stefani News Agency communicates under date of yesterday,
Septem her 8:
The Head of the Government, Marshal of Italy Badoglio, made
the following announcement over the radio this evening at 19:45
hours:
"The Italian Government, having recognized the impossibility of
continuing the unequal struggle against the overwhelming power
of the adversary, and with the intention of sparing the Nation from
further and graver disasters, has requested an armistice from Gen-
eral Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-American
Allied Forces.
"The request has been accepted.
"Consequently, every act of hostility against the Anglo-
American forces must cease on the part of Italian forces in every
location. They shall react, however, to possible attacks coming
from any other source."
September 8, 1943, marked the beginning of a new era in Italian

history, the war of national liberation. Expecting the Germans to seize
Rome at any moment, the King and Badoglio fled in panic that night,
leaving no clear instructions as to who was to take charge. They made
their way to Brindisi on the heel of the Italian boot; there they anx-
iously awaited the arrival of British advance units. For the next twenty
months Italy was divided in two parts: the Allies in control of the
souRcE: Il Messaggero (Rome), September 9, 1943. My transla-

tion.
south, with the King's government as their puppets; the Germans in
control of the north, with the rescued Mussolini as their creature.
One of the first things the Allies demanded of the royal government
was the signing of the so-called Long Armistice to supplement the
Short Armistice of September 3. The latter had omitted reference to
"unconditional surrender" and had restricted itself to military clauses;
the Long Armistice contained political and economic strictures, and in
its original version mentioned "unconditional surrender." After
remonstrances from Badoglio, the Allies eventually agreed to modify
some of this terminology, and Eisenhower tactfully handed him a
letter clarifying that the terms would be attenuated to the degree that
Italy "worked her passage" (Churchill's phrase) by helping in the war
against Germany. Despite these revisions there was no doubt that the
Allies controlled the destiny of the Italian people in the liberated zones.
As matters turned out, several clauses of the Long Armistice were
never implemented. Yet many misunderstandings continued, and there
were enough highhanded Allied actions to persuade many Italians to
credit the wildest rumors.
Instrument of Surrender of Italy

(Malta, September 29, 1943)
Whereas in consequence of an armistice dated September 3rd,
1943, between the United States and the United Kingdom Govern-
ment on the one hand and the Italian Government on the other
hand, hostilities were suspended between Italy and the United
Nations on certain terms of a military nature;
And whereas in addition to those terms it was also provided in
the said Armistice that the Italian Government bound themselves
to comply with other conditions of a political, economic and
financial nature to be transmitted later; . . .
1. (A) The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located,
hereby surrender unconditionally.
(B) Italian participation in the war in all Theaters will cease
immediately. . . .
2. The Italian Supreme Command will give full information
concerning the disposition and condition of all Italian Land, Sea
and Air Forces, wherever they are situated and of all such forces of
Italy's Allies as are situated in Italian or Italian occupied territory.
souRCE: U.S. Department of State, Treaties and Other Inter-

national Acts, Series 1604, Armistice with Italy, 1943 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 3-4, 7-12
passim.
3. . The Italian Supreme Command will take the necessary

measures to insure Law and Order, and to use its available armed
forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provi-
sions of the present instrument. . . .
4. Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces will within the periods to be
laid down by the United Nations withdraw from all areas outside
Italian territory notified to the Italian Government by the United
Nations and proceed to areas to be specified by the United Na-
tions. . . .
18. The forces of the United Nations will require to occupy
certain parts of Italian territory . . . .
22. The Italian Government and people will abstain from all
action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and will
carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United
Nations.
23. The Italian Government will make available such Italian
currency as the United Nations may require . . . .
25. (A) Relations with countries at war with, any of the United
Nations, or occupied by any such country, will be broken off. . ..
26. Italian subjects will pending further instructions be pre-
vented from leaving Italian territory except as authorized by the
Allied Commander-in-Chief and will not in any event take service
with any of the countries or in any of the territories referred to in
article 2 5 (A) nor will they proceed to any place for the purpose
of undertaking work for any such country. Those at present so
serving or working will be recalled as directed by the Allied
Commander-in-Chief. . . .
29. BENITO MUSSOLINI, his Chief Fascist associates and all per-
sons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous
offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the
United Nations will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered
into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by
the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with.
30. All Fascist organizations, including all branches of the Fas-
cist Militia (MVSN), the Secret Police (OVRA), all Fascist youth
organizations will insofar as this is not already accomplished be
disbanded in accordance with the directions of the Allied Com-
mander-in-Chief. The Italian Government will comply with all
such further directions as the United Nations may give for aboli-
tion of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and internment of Fascist
personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist
ideology and teaching.
31. All Italian laws involving discrimination on grounds of race,
color, creed or political opinions will insofar as this is not already
accomplished be rescinded, and persons detained on such grounds
will, as directed by the United Nations, be released and relieved
from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. The
Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as
the Allied Commander-in-Chief may give for repeal of Fascist
legislation and removal of any disabilities or prohibitions resulting
therefrom.
32. (A) Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of or specified
by the United Nations and any nationals of the United Nations,
including Abyssinian subjects, confined, interned, or otherwise
under restraint in Italian or Italian-occupied territory will not be
removed and will forthwith be handed over to representatives of
the United Nations. . . .
(B) Persons of whatever nationality who have been placed
under restriction, detention or sentence (including sentences in
absentia) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the
United Nations will be released under the direction of the United
Nations and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have
been subjected. . . .
37. There will be appointed a Control Commission representa-
tive of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing
this instrument under the orders and general directions of the
Allied Commander-in-Chief. . . .
43. The present instrument shall enter into force at once. It will
remain in operation until superseded by any other arrangements or
until the voting into force of the peace treaty with Italy.
Signed at Malta on the 29th day of September, 1943.
I sj Badoglio
Marshal PIETRO BADOGLIO
Head of the Italian Government
/s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
General, United States Army,
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force
In the face of unrelenting Allied pressure, Victor Emmanuel at last

consented to declare war on Germany on October 13, 1943. The Allies
thereupon recognized Italy not as an ally but as a "co-belligerent."
After much backing and filling, the Anglo-Americans eventually
equipped and trained an Italian Corps of Liberation and sent it into
battle in the final stages of the war.
Meeting in Moscow during the last part of October, 1943, the
Foreign Ministers of the Allied "Big Three" agreed upon an important
tripartite declaration calling for "negative and positive" measures to
stimulate the growth of Italian democracy. Because of British pressure,
no mention at all was made of the House of Savoy, though the ques-
tion of what to do with the monarchical institution that had been so
intimately bound up with the Fascist regime had become a burning
issue in Italy.
Tripartite Declaration of Moscow Regarding Italy

(October 30, 1943)
The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their
three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy
towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that
Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations shall be utterly
destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every oppor-
tunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon
democratic principles.
The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America and the
United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments
from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as
paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based
upon this policy.
In the furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign
Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following
measures are important and should be put into effect:-
1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made
more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those
sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.
souRcE: Annex 4 to the Protocols of the Conference, in U.S.

Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Vol. I: General (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 759-760.
2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of

the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to
the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist
political groups.
3. All institutions and organizations created by the Fascist
regime shall be suppressed.
4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the
administration and from the institutions and organizations of a
public character.
5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released
and accorded a full amnesty.
6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.
7. Fascist chiefs and other persons known or suspected to be
war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.
In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recog-
nize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the
time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set
out above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the
basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. The three Governments parties to this declaration will at the
request of any one of them consult on this matter.
It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to
operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose
their own form of government.
The resurgent anti-Fascist parties formed a Committee of National

Liberation in September, 1943. Most of the left-wing parties insisted on
the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and the abolition of the monarchy
as the prerequisite for political renovation and wholehearted Italian
participation in the war effort. All through the winter of 194 3--44 they
refused to accept posts in the government of the King and Badoglio. In
the spring, however, the situation changed in a sensational manner.
Palmira T ogliatti, the Communist party leader who had spent years in
exile in Moscow, returned to Italy and promptly announced that the
Communists were ready to enter the Badoglio government and con-
centrate on winning the war. The Anglo-Americans realized that it
would not do if only the Communists entered the government. In
order to make it possible for the other parties to join in a coalition
government, the British reluctantly agreed with the Americans that
pressure must be put on the King to withdraw from public life. At last
they forced him to issue a statement on April 12, 1944, promising to
step aside as soon as Rome should be liberated.
King Victor Emmanuel III's Announcement of Withdrawal

(April12, 1944)
The Italian people know that I have always been at their side in
difficult times and happy ones. They know that eight months ago I
put an end to the Fascist regime and brought Italy, notwithstand-
ing every danger and risk, to the side of the United Nations in the
struggle for liberation against Nazism.
The Italian Navy, Air Force and Army, obedient to my call,
during the past eight months have been fighting undauntedly
against the enemy, shoulder to shoulder with the Allied forces. The
Italian contribution to victory is and shall ever be more great. The
day will come when, our deep wounds healed, we shall once more
take our place as a free people among free nations.
Putting into effect what I have suggested to the Allied author-
ities and to my Government, I have decided to withdraw from
public affairs by appointing my son, the Prince of Piedmont,
Lieutenant General of the Realm. This appointment will become
effective by a formal transfer of power on the day on which the
Allied troops enter Rome. This decision, which I and my family
firmly believe furthers national unity, is final and irrevocable.
Rome was finally freed on June 4. The next day the King announced
the transfer of power to his son, Prince Humbert, as Lieutenant
General of the Realm. Premier Badoglio .was also compelled to step
down in the face of opposition from parties in the Committee of
National Liberation. He was succeeded by. lvanoe Bonomi, the elderly
chairman of the Rome committee. Bonomi retained the premiership
until the Germans were evicted from northern Italy in May, 1945.
After the liberation of Rome the process of purging the country of
the remnants of Fascism accelerated markedly. Count Carlo Sforza, a
distinguished diplomat of the pre-Fascist era and one of the most
prestigious of the returning exiles, drafted the following purge law.
Proclaimed on July 27, 1944, it provided the basis for epurazione.
souRcE: New York Times, April12, 1944.

The Sforza Purge Law Regarding Fascist Crimes

(July 27, 1944)
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW REGARDING FASCIST CRIMES

TITLE I: PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES
Art.l: All penal regulations that were designed to safeguard institu-

tions and political organs created by Fascism are hereby abrogated.
Sentences previously pronounced on the basis of such regula-
tions are hereby annulled.
Art. 2: Those members of the Fascist Government and those
Fascist hierarchs who are found guilty of having annulled constitu-
tional guarantees and destroyed the freedom of the people, of
having created the Fascist regime, and of having compromised and
betrayed the fate of the nation, thereby leading it to the present
catastrophe, shall be punished by life imprisonment, and by death
in cases of the gravest responsibility.
They shall be tried by a High Court of Justice, composed of a
president and eight members, to be appointed by the Council of
Ministers from high magistrates who are either in active service or
in retirement, and from other distinguished persons of unimpeach-
able rectitude.
Art. 3: Those who are found guilty of having organized Fascist
squads which carried out acts of violence or destruction, and those
who promoted or led the insurrection of October 28, 1922, shall be
punished in accordance with Article 120 of the Penal Code of
1889.
Those who promoted or led the coup d'etat of January 3, 1925,
and those who thereafter by relevant acts contributed to the
maintenance of the Fascist regime in power shall be punished in
accordance with Article 118 of the same code.
Whoever is guilty of committing other crimes for Fascist
motives, or who has taken advantage of the political situation
created by Fascism, shall be punished in accordance with the laws
that were in effect at the time.
souRcE: Legislative Decree-Law No. 159 of the Lieutenant Gen-

eralcy. Printed in Tommaso Fortunio, La legislazione defini-
tiva sulle sanzioni contro il fascismo (Rome: Nuove Edizioni
Jus, 1946), pp. 44-46. My translation.
Art. 4: The crimes that are covered in the preceding article shall
be judged, in accordance with their respective jurisdiction, by the
Courts of Assize, the Tribunals, and the praetors.
The Courts of Assize shall consist of two magistrates, as pre-
scribed by the Unified Text of legislative regulations defining the
structure of the Courts of Assize, and by five peoples' judges to be
chosen by lot from apposite lists of citizens of irreproachable moral
and political conduct.
Art. 5: Whoever in the period since September 8, 1943, has
committed or shall commit any criminal act of disloyalty toward
the State and its military defense, or by any form whatsoever of
intelligence, correspondence, or collaboration with the German
invader lends the enemy comfort or assistance, shall be punished in
accordance with the regulations of the Millitary Penal Code for
time of war.
The penalties prescribed for military personnel shall also apply
to nonmilitary personnel.
Military personnel shall be tried by military tribunals; nonmili-
tary personnel by civilian courts.
Art. 6: No one who is guilty of the crimes set forth in the
present decree and who has gone unpunished because of the con-
tinuing existence of the Fascist regime may invoke in his own
behalf the statute of limitations.
In the same manner, amnesties and indulgences that may have
been granted after October 28, 1922, shall not apply to crimes set
forth in the present decree, and if they have already been so
applied, the relevant declaratory documents are hereby rescinded.
The High Commissioner is hereby empowered to propose the
revocation of sovereign acts of clemency that may have been
granted hitherto.
Sentences pronounced for such crimes may be declared to be
juridically nonexistent if such decisions were influenced by a state
of moral coercion created by Fascism. Pronouncement in this
regard shall be entrusted to a section of the Supreme Court of
Cassation, as designated by the Minister Keeper of the Seals.
The dispositions of the present article shall not apply to those
crimes that are punishable by imprisonment for less than a maxi-
mum period of three years.
Art. 7: For crimes envisaged under the present title, the penalty
of imprisonment may be reduced by up to one-fourth, while the
death penalty and life imprisonment penalty may be replaced by
imprisonment for a period of not less than five years under the
following circumstances:
(a) If the guilty party assumed a hostile position with respect
to Fascism prior to the outbreak of the present war;
(b) If he has participated actively in the struggle against the
Germans.
If the broad, extenuating circumstances envisaged by the Penal
Code of 1889 should be found to exist, the penalties of death and
life imprisonment may be replaced by a period of imprisonment for
thirty years, and the other penalties may be reduced by one-sixth.
The guilty party may be declared exempt from punishment if he
has particularly distinguished himself with acts of valor during the
struggle against the Germans.
Art. 8: Whoever, for Fascist motives or in order to take advan-
tage of the political situation created by Fascism, has committed
acts of particular gravity which though perhaps falling short of
criminal acts are nevertheless contrary to the norms of rectitude
and political probity, shall be subject to temporary exclusion from
public office and even to deprivation of his political rights for a
period not to exceed ten years.
The provisions envisaged by the present article shall be applied
by Provincial Committees presided over by a magistrate and com-
posed of two other members chosen by lot from the peoples'
judges referred to in Article 4.
As regards members of the Legislative Assemblies or of agencies
or institutes that by their votes or actions contributed to the
maintenance of the Fascist regime and to making possible the war,
their dismissal from their posts shall be decided by the High Court
referred to in Article 2; and this shall be without prejudice to the
sanctions set forth in the present decree insofar as these are ap-
plicable.
Art. 9: Without prejudice to penal action, the property of those
citizens who have betrayed the fatherland by spontaneously and
actively placing themselves at the service of the German invaders
shall be confiscated to the advantage of the State.
In the case of penal action, confiscation shall be prounounced by
whatever judiciary authority hands down the sentence. In other
cases, it shall be pronounced by the competent tribunal for the
territory, upon request of the High Commissioner.
Art. 10: The dispositions of the Code of Penal Procedure,

insofar as they are applicable, shall be valid for anything that is not
covered in the present title.
By autumn, however, the purge ground almost to a halt in the face of

bureaucratic foot-dragging and a veto expressly imposed by Churchill
to prevent Sforza (who was vigorously antimonarchist) from being
given a cabinet position. Premier Bonomi was thus forced to restruc-
ture his government in December, 1944, without the participation of
either the Socialist or Action parties, both of which were thoroughly
angered by Churchill's interference. As a kind of political miasma
settled over Rome, the eyes of Italians began to turn, hopefully or
fearfully as the case might be, toward the Po Valley, where a powerful
Resistance force was preparing to launch its liberation offensive against
the Germans and their Fascist collaborators.
Mussolini was a prisoner atop the Gran Sasso in the Apennines when
the armistice was announced on September 8, 194 3. In the confusion
that occurred when the King and Badoglio fled from Rome, Hitler was
able to send Captain Otto Skorzeny and some ninety paratroopers in
gliders to swoop down and rescue the former dictator like a second
Andromeda. The sickly Duce was flown to Germany, where· in
humiliation he confronted the Fuhrer. The old Axis relationship was
finished; henceforth it was, at best, a "brutal friendship." When the
Duce intimated that he thought his own career had run its course,
Hitler snapped that if he wished to return to Italy he must head a pro-
Nazi government and place the "traitors of July 25" on trial. If Musso-
lini had refused, Hitler would have turned to someone even more
Germanophile, like Roberto Farinacci. Powerless, the Duce listened
apathetically to the harangue and acquiesced. Later Hitler sought to
cheer him by alluding to "secret weapons" that would assure ultimate
victory, and he referred him to his own quack physician for treatment.
The latter, according to Joseph Goebbels, found Mussolini suffering
from circulatory trouble and disordered bowels, "the typical ailment
of a modern revolutionary politician." 1
Quickly Hitler shunted Mussolini to Munich to broadcast a message
to his fellow countrymen. Somehow the old spellbinder mustered the
requisite quota of bombast on September 18 as he appealed to faithful
Blackshirts to renew Axis solidarity, regroup Italian armed forces
around the Fascist Militia, purge the "royalist betrayers" of the
regime, and destroy the "parasitical plutocracy" so that labor could
now become the "indestructible basis of the state."
1. Louis P. Lochner (ed.), The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943 (Garden

City: Doubleday, 1948), p. 470.
Mussolini's Denunciation of the House of Savoy

Blackshirts! Italian men and women! After a long silence my voice
reaches you again, and I am sure that you recognize it. It is the
voice that has summoned you on difficult occasions and that has
celebrated with you the triumphant days of our fatherland. I
waited a few days before addressing you because, after a period of
moral isolation, it was necessary for me to re-establish contact with
the world.
Long speeches are inappropriate on the radio, and in order to be
brief, I shall begin with July 25, the day in which the most incred-
ible of all the adventures of my adventurous life took place. . . .
[At this point Mussolini described at length his experiences since
July 25, 1943.]
While we recognize our responsibilities, we wish also to set forth
clearly those of others, beginning with the Chief of State, who,
having exposed himself but failing to abdicate-as the majority of
Italians had expected he would-can and must be called directly to
account. It is his dynasty which throughout the war-a war which
the King himself declared-has been the principal agent of defeat-
ism and of anti-German propaganda. His lack of interest regarding
the course of the war, and his prudent and not always so prudent
mental reservations have lent themselves to all kinds of profit by
the enemy. As for the heir to the throne [Crown Prince Humbert],
although he asked to take command of the armies of the south, he
has never appeared on the battlefield. Now I am more than ever
convinced that the House of Savoy intended to prepare and
organize the coup d'etat, even in its smallest details, with Badoglio
as an accomplice and executor, and with the complicity also of
certain pusillanimous and shirking generals and certain cowardly
Fascist elements. There can be no doubt but that the King author-
ized armistice negotiations right after my arrest, negotiations that
perhaps were already under way between the dynasties of Rome
and London. It was the King who advised his accomplices to trick
Germany in the vilest way, even denying that negotiations were in
progress after they had been concluded. It is the dynastic establish-
souRcE: Radio address from Munich. Printed in ll Carriere della

Sera (Milan), September 19, 1943. My translation.
ment which planned and carried out the demolition of Fascism, the
very Fascism that twenty years ago had saved it. . . .
In view of all these facts, it is not the regime that betrayed the
monarchy, but rather the monarchy that betrayed the regime. . . .
When a monarchy fails in its duties, it loses all reasons for further
existence. As for our traditions, they are far more republican than
they are monarchist. The unity and independence of Italy were
desired more by the republican current and its purest and greatest
apostle, Giuseppe Mazzini, than they were by the monarchists. The
State that we wish to erect will be national and social in the highest
sense of the word-that is to say, it will be Fascist by going back to
ourongms.
While waiting for the movement to develop until it becomes
irresistible, our postulates shall be the following:
1. Take up arms once more alongside Germany, Japan, and the

other allies. Only blood can cancel such a shameful page from the
history of the fatherland.
2. Set about reorganizing without delay our armed forces
around the Militia formations. . . .
3. Eliminate the traitors and particularly those who until 9: 30
P.M. of July 25 were members of the Party-and in some cases for
many years-and who have joined the ranks of the enemy.
4. Annihilate the parasitic plutocracies, and finally make of
labor the object of our economy and the indestructible foundation
of the State. . . .
Farmers, laborers, and white-collar workers! The State that will

emerge from this gigantic ordeal will be yours, and as such you
will defend it against anyone who dreams of an impossible return
to the past.
Our will, our courage, our faith will restore to Italy its good
face, its future, its possibility for life, and its place in the world.
More than just a hope, this must be a supreme certainty for all of
you.
Long live Italy! Long live the Republican Fascist Party!
Soon Mussolini and other top Fascists were sent back to northern Italy
to organize an "Italian Social Republic." Its capital was to be situated
at the resort town of Salo on the shore of Lake Garda, close to the
German communications line over the Brenner, so that Mussolini and
his entourage could be kept under close surveillance by SS General
Karl Wolff and Ambassador Rudolf Rahn. Knowing that he had lost
the support of most of the upper and middle classes, Mussolini desper-
ately sought to ingratiate himself with the northern working groups.
To this end, he refurbished some of the slogans he had expressed in his
socialistic youth; he also did his best to blame the corruption of the
regime's final years on profiteering "plutocrats" and minions of the
monarchy.
The signal was given to fanatic Militiamen to organize a brand-new
Partito Fascista Repubblicano (PFR); Alessandro Pavolini became its
secretary. This new Republican Fascist party held its first (and only)
congress in Verona in mid-November, 1943. There Mussolini un-
wrapped a demagogic, eighteen-point manifesto that sought to under-
cut Communist appeal to the working masses and at the same time not
alienate completely whatever support he could still elicit from the
propertied and lower-middle-class groups who in the past had loomed
so large in the political sociology of Fascism. In some respects the
Verona manifesto harked back to Mussolini's pre-World War I Marx-
ian views and to the 1919 republican edition of "Fascism of the first
hour."
The Verona Manifesto of

Mussolini's Italian Social Republic
(November 14, 1943)
In its first national report, the Fascist Republican Party:
Lifts its thoughts to those who have sacrificed their lives for
republican Fascism on the battlefronts, in the piazzas of the cities
and villages, in the limestone pits of lstria and Dalmatia, and who
should be added to the ranks of the martyrs of our Revolution, and
to the phalanx of all those men who have died for Italy.
It regards continuation of the war alongside Germany and Japan
until final victory, and the speedy reconstruction of our Armed
Forces which will serve alongside the valorous soldiers of the
Fuhrer, as goals that tower above everything else in importance
and urgency.
It takes note of the decrees instituting the Extraordinary Tri-
bunals, whereby party members will carry out their unbending
determination to administer exemplary justice; and, inspired by
Mussolini's stimulus and accomplishments, it enunciates the follow-
ing programmatic directives for Party actions:
souRcE: Printed in Attilio Tamaro, Due anni di storia, 1943-1945,

II (Rome: Tosi, 1949), 249-252. My translation.
WITH RESPECT TO DoMESTic CoNSTITUTIONAL MATTERS
1. A Constituent Assembly must be convened. As the sovereign

power of popular origin, it shall declare an end to the Monarchy,
solemnly condemn the traitorous and fugitive last King, proclaim
the Social Republic, and appoint its Head.
2. The Constituent Assembly shall be composed of representa-
tives of all the syndical associations and all the administrative dis-
tricts, and it shall include representatives of the occupied provinces
by means of delegations from those evacuees and refugees who are
in liberated territory. It shall likewise include representatives of the
combatants and the prisoners of war by means of the repatriation
of disabled personnel; representatives of Italians abroad; of the
courts, of the universities, and of every other body or institution
whose participation will contribute to making the Constituent
Assembly a synthesis of all the worthy elements of the Nation.
3. The Republican Constituent Assembly must ensure to citi-
zens, soldiers, workers, and taxpayers the rights to check up on and
make responsible criticism of the actions of the various public
administrations.
Every five years citizens shall be called upon to vote on the
appointment of the Head of the Republic.
No citizens who is arrested in flagrante or for preventive reasons
may be held more than seven days without an order from the
judiciary authority, and an order from the judiciary authority shall
also be required for searches in domiciles.
In the exercise of their duties the courts shall act with complete
freedom.
4. Both the negative electoral experience that Italy has already
gone through and the partially negative experience of a method of
nomination that proved to be too rigidly hierarchical make it
necessary to find a solution that will reconcile opposing needs. A
mixed system seems to be most advisable-for example, popular
election of the representatives in the Chamber, and appointment of
ministers by action of the Head of the Republic and the Govern-
ment; and elections of the Fascia in the Party, save for ratification
and appointment of the National Directory by action of the Duce.
5. There must be only one organization that shall have the task
of training people for political activity.
The Party, which is an order of fighters and believers, must
become an organism of absolute political purity, worthy of being
the custodian of the Revolutionary Idea.
Membership in the party shall not be necessary for any employ-
ment or task.
6. The religion of the Republic shall be the apostolic Roman
Catholic one. Every other cult that does not violate the law shall be
respected.
7. All those who belong to the Jewish race are foreigners. For
the duration of the war they shall be regarded as being of enemy
nationality.
IN FoREIGN Poucy
8. The essential goal of the Republic's foreign policy must be

the unity, independence, and territorial integrity of the fatherland
within the maritime and Alpine boundaries that were laid out by
nature, by the sacrifice of blood, and by history-boundaries
which are threatened by the enemy through invasion and through
the promises made by London to refugee governments.
Another essential goal shall consist of demanding recognition of
the need for living space that is indispensable for a population of 45
million in an area that is insufficient to feed them.
Such a policy, moreover, shall be carried out through the estab-
lishment of a "European Community," based on a federation of all
those nations which accept the following principles:
(a) Elimination from our continent of the centuries-old
British intrigues;
(b) Abolition of the internal capitalistic system, and struggle
against the world plutocracies;
(c) Development of the natural resources of Africa for the
benefit of both European peoples and the natives, and with abso-
lute respect for those people who-like the Egyptian Muslims in
particular-are already organized in civic groupings.
IN SociAL MATTERS
9. The Basis of the Social Republic and its primary object shall
be manual, technical, and intellectual labor in all of its mani-
festations.
10. Private property, which is the fruit of labor and of indi-
vidual savings and the integration of the human personality, shall
be guaranteed by the State.
11. In the national economy the State's sphere of action shall
embrace everything that because of its dimensions or functions lies
outside the private sector and falls within the collective interest.
Public utilities and, as a rule, munitions industries must be

managed by the State through government-controlled agencies.
12. In every enterprise (industrial, private, state, or government-
regulated) representatives of technicians and workers shall work
closely together (and with full knowledge on the part of manage-
ment) in the establishment of fair wages and in the equitable dis-
tribution of profits to provide reserve funds, rewards for capital
investment, and profit sharing by the workers themselves.
In certain enterprises this may take place by extending the
prerogatives of existing factory shop-steward committees; in
others, by replacing administrative committees with management
committees composed of technicians and workers along with a
representative of the State; and in still others, by means of para-
syndical co-operatives.
13. In agriculture, the proprietor's right of private initiative
shall be restricted whenever there is evidence of an absence of such
initiative.
The expropria~ion of uncultivated lands and of badly managed
farms may lead either to subdivision of these lands among the day
workers in such a way as to transform them into private farmers,
or to the establishment of co-operative farms of a para-syndical or
para-statal type, depending on the specific agricultural economic
need.
This is, in any case, already anticipated by existing legislation,
and the Party and syndical organizations are providing the neces-
sary impetus for the implementation thereof.
14. The right of private farmers, artisans, professional people,
and artists to carry on productive work for their individual families
and other groupings shall be fully recognized, save for their obliga-
tion to deliver to collection depots those quantities of produce that
are set forth by law, and to be checked as to the accuracy of such
deliveries.
15. Since housing is not only a right of property but a right to
property, the Party is inscribing in its program the creation of a
National Agency for People's Housing, which shall take over the
existing Institute, broaden its activity to the utmost, and supervise
the providing of housing to workers' families in every category
either by means of outright construction of new residences or by
gradual renovation of existing ones.
With respect thereto, the general principle is hereby affirmed
that rental payments shall constitute legal title of acquisition as
soon as the investor's capital has been reimbursed in just measure.
This agency shall requisition and distribute unused premises and
shall undertake temporary construction as its first task in resolving
the problems brought about by wartime destruction.
16. The fact that a worker is enrolled by the authorities in an
occupational syndicate shall not prevent his being transferred to
another syndicate if he should have the requisite qualifications. The
syndicates shall be combined in a single confederation that shall
include all workers, technicians, and professional men but shall
exclude those proprietors who are neither directors nor techni-
cians. It shall be entitled the General Confederation of Labor,
Technology, and the Arts.
Employees of state industrial enterprises and of public utilities
shall form occupational syndicates in the same manner as every
other worker. All the imposing social security measures that have
been put into effect by the Fascist Regime during the past twenty
years shall remain in effect. The Charter of Labor provided the
consecration of this program both in word and in spirit and shall be
the point of departure for further progress.
17. With regard to one of our most urgent current problems,
the Party believes that there must be no delay in instituting a
program of fair wages for the workers, to be achieved through
agreements that set up minimum national standards, and also
through prompt local readjustments. This is .even more urgent for
low-income and medium-income employees of both state and pri-
vate enterprises. In order for this measure to be effective and not
turn out to be harmful in the final analysis for all concerned, it will
be necessary that a portion of wages and salaries shall be paid in the
form of commodities, to be distributed at officially established
prices through co-operatives, factory commissaries, and an ex-
panded "Provvida" agency. Any store found guilty of violations
shall be requisitioned and placed under either para-statal or co-
operative forms of management.
Only in this way can there be stabilization of prices and mone-
tary values, and purification of market operations.
As for the black market, it is imperative that speculators-who
are on the same moral level with traitors and defeatists-shall be
brought within the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Tribunals and
made subject to the death penalty.
18. By means of this preamble to the work of the Constituent
Assembly, the Party is demonstrating that not only is it moving
toward the people, it is staying with the people. The Italian people,
for their part, must realize that there is only one way for them to
safeguard the achievements of yesterday, today, and tomorrow-

and that is by hurling back the enslaving invasion of the Anglo-
American plutocracies, who have shown in a thousand clear ways
that they intend to make even more difficult and miserable the lives
of Italians.
There is only one way to attain all of our social goals: Fight!
Work! Win!
On January 13, 1944, the Italian Social Republic announced the

"Premise for a New Italian Economic Structure." Socialization, this
document explained, would occur wherever necessary for national self-
sufficiency and in those sectors concerned with production of raw
materials, energy, and indispensable services. In these the state would
be financier and administrator, issuing bonds to reimburse the present
investors. Workers would share in the management of both national-
ized and private enterprises. Publicly financed ones would be run by a
management council elected by all the workers, clerks, and techni-
cians; privately financed enterprises would be run by councils in which
the workers would be equally represented with the stockholders. In
private shops, or where there was a single boss with at least fifty
workers, a three-member advisory council of workers, clerks, and
technicians would be instituted. Additional regulations set forth re-
sponsibilities of the factory head and methods for his removal.
The neo-Fascists sought to preserve and utilize the factory shop-
steward committees or "internal commissions" (which the Socialists
and Communists had re-established during Badoglio's "45 days") but
to put their own men in control of them. The left-wing parties quickly
disavowed such perverted committees and organized in their place new
underground "agitation committees." The Social Republic proved to
be as unsuccessful in achieving its socio-economic and political goals as
in recruiting voluntary military support. Actual socialization never got
beyond a few tentative beginnings, and the much discussed Constituent
Assembly never met.
The brutality of the neo-Fascist regime was made evident to every-
one by the Verona purge trial of January 8-10, 1944, at which
Mussolini, under pressure from Berlin, had his own son-in-law and
several other hierarchs found guilty and shot for their "traitorous"
action at the Fascist Grand Council meeting of July 24/25, 1943.
Meanwhile, in myriad ways the great majority of people in the
north made it clear they were surfeited with Mussolini's opportunistic
rhetoric and the dregs of society who followed him about in these last
months. Anxiously awaiting the arrival of liberation forces from the
south, thousands of northerners who were in danger of being con-
scripted into Nazi-Fascist military units and felt they had nothing to
lose joined the Armed Resistance which was developing in the moun-
tains and later in the cities, chiefly under the aegis of the Committees
of National Liberation. If caught by the enemy, as thousands of
resisters were, they could expect no mercy.
Hopes were high that the summer of 1944 would bring emancipation
to the north. Rome had been liberated in June, and Florence in August.
But thereafter the polyglot Allied forces, whose strength in Italy had
been greatly sapped in order to carry out what proved to be an
unnecessary invasion of southern France in August, 1944, bogged
down in the rugged Apennines short of Bologna. The Nazi-Fascists
carried out cruel combing operations against Resistance units that had
organized free "republics" in many narrow valleys. When the patriots
received word from Allied headquarters in November that it would be
necessary to hibernate for the winter, a great wave of despair swept
through their ranks. It was in the midst of this "letdown" on the part
of the anti-Fascists that Mussolini left Salo and traveled to his old
stronghold of Milan to deliver what turned out to be his last public
address on December 16, 1944. It proved to be one of his best oratori-
cal performances and aroused short-lived enthusiasm on the part of his
audience in the Lirico Theater. The Duce set forth his version of the
events of the preceding year and a half with skill and held out some
olive branches to those who were not strictly Fascist. The "single
party" upon which the Social Republic was founded must be pre-
served, he said, but alongside it might exist other groups with the right
of responsible, constructive criticism within the framework of the neo-
Fascist regime.
Mussolini's Last Public Address

(Milan, December 16, 1944)
Comrades! Dear comrades of Milan! I shaJl dispense with any
preamble and enter immediately into the heart of the subject
matter of my speech.
At sixteen months' distance from the tremendous date of the
unconditional surrender, imposed and accepted according to the
democratic and criminal formula of Casablanca, the evaluation of
events poses once more for us these questions: Who is guilty of
betrayal? Who has suffered or is suffering the consequences of this
treachery? . . .
The unconditional surrender announced on September 8 was
desired by the Monarchy, by Court circles, by the plutocratic
currents of the Italian bourgeoisie, by certain clerical forces, com-
bined for the occasion with Masonic ones, and by the General
Staffs which no longer believed in victory and which were headed
by Badoglio. As early as . . . May 15, the ex-King wrote in his
diary (which has recently come into our possession) that we must
"disengage" from the German alliance. Beyond a shadow of doubt,
soURCE: ll Corriere della Sera (Milan), December 17, 1944. My

translation.
it was the ex-King who ordered the surrender, and Badoglio who
carried it out. But in order to get to September 8, there first had to
be a July 25-viz., the coup d'etat and the change of regime.
The justification for the surrender-viz., the impossibility of
continuing the war-was denied forty days later, on October 13,
when war was declared against Germany. That declaration was no
mere symbolic act. From that time on there has been collaboration
between Badoglio's Italy and the Allies, carried on behind the lines
by labor units; while the fleet, which had been built in its entirety
by Fascism, passed completely into the hands of the enemy and
immediately began to operate with the enemy fleets. Thus, it was
not peace, but rather continuation of the war by means of so-called
co-belligerency. It was not peace, but rather the transformation of
the entire territory of the nation into one immense battlefield-and
that is to say, one immense field of ruins. It was not peace, but
rather the now predicted participation of Italian ships and troops in
the war against Japan.
From all of this it is clear that those who have suffered the
consequences of the betrayal are, first of all, the Italian people. It
can be declared that the Italian people did not commit treason
toward the German ally. Except for a few sporadic instances,
Army units melted away without offering any resistance to orders
coming from the German commands to disarm. Many Army units
that were located away from the fatherland, and many Air Corps
units, rallied at once to the side of the German forces-and this
was true of tens of thousands of men. All the formations of the
Militia, except for one battalion in Corsica, went over-every last
man of them-to the side of the Germans. . . .
. . . While a portion of the Italian people accepted the sur-
render as a result of either irresponsibility or exhaustion, another
portion lined up at once alongside Germany. It is time to tell our
Italian, German, and Japanese comrades that the contribution made
by Republican Italy to the common cause since September, 1943-
and despite the temporary reduction in size of the Republic's
territory-has been far greater than is commonly believed.
For obvious reasons, I cannot go into detailed statistics of the
total contribution made by Italy in both the economic and the
military sectors. Our collaboration with the Reich in soldiers and
workers is represented by this figure: 786,000 men on September
30 [ 1944]. This fact is incontrovertible, since it comes from
German sources. One should add to this the formerly interned
military personnel-that is to say, several hundred thousand men
involved in Germany's productive process-and other tens of
thousands of Italians who already were in the Reich, where they
had gone in recent years as free laborers in the factories and fields.
In the face of this evidence, Italians who live in the territory of the
Social Republic have the right, once and for all, to raise their heads
and demand that their effort be fairly judged in a comradely
manner by all members of the Tripanite Pact. . . .
On September 15 [ I 94 3], the National Fascist Party became the
Fascist Republican Pany. At that time there was no dearth of sick
and opportunistic elements-perhaps they were in a state of mental
confusion-who wondered if it would not have been wiser to
eliminate the word "Fascism," and to place the accent exclusively
on the word "Republic." I rejected then, just as I would reject
today, that useless and cowardly suggestion.
It would have been both cowardliness and an error to lower our
banner which had been consecrated by so much blood, and to
allow those ideas that are serving today as the password in the
intercontinental struggle to circulate almost as though they were
contraband. By treating this as a matter of expediency, we would
have suffered the consequences and been discredited in the eyes of
the enemy and especially in our own midst.
Thus by continuing to call ourselves Fascists, as we shall always
do, and by dedicating ourselves to the cause of Fascism as we have
done since 1919 until the present, we have given, in the wake of
recent events, a new thrust to action in both the political and the
social fields. Actually, more than a new thrust; one might better
say, a return to original positions. It is a matter of historical record
that prior to 192 2 Fascism had republican tendencies, and the
reasons why the insurrection of 1922 spared the Monarchy have
been explained.
From the social standpoint, the program of Republican Fas-
cism is but the logical continuation of the program of 1919-of
the achievements of the splendid years that took place between the
announcement of the Labor Chaner and the conquest of the
empire. Nature does not operate by leaps; and economics even
less so.
It was necessary first to build a foundation of syndical legislation
and corporative bodies before we could take the subsequent step
toward socialization. Even at the first meeting of the Council of
Ministers on September 27, 1943, I declared that "the Republic
would be unitary in the political field and decentralized in the

administrative one, and that it would have a very pronounced
social content in order to resolve the social question in at least its
most glaring aspects, and in order to stabilize the status, function,
and responsibility of labor in a truly modern national society."
In that same meeting, I carried out the first step designed to
achieve the broadest possible national harmony, by announcing
that the Government excluded the possibility of any rigorous
measures against anti-Fascist elements.
In October I drafted and revised what is known in Italian politi-
cal history as the Manifesto of Verona, which set forth in several
well-defined points the program not only of the Party but of the
Republic. That took place on November 15, just two months after
the reconstitution of the Fascist Republican Party.
That Manifesto of the National Assembly of the Fascist Repub-
lican Party-after offering a salute to those who have sacrificed
their lives for the Fascist cause, and reaffirming as its supreme goal
the continuation of the struggle alongside the powers of the
Tripartite Alliance, and the reconstruction of the Armed Forces-
set forth its eighteen-point program.
Let us look now at what has been done, what has not been done,
and above all why it has not been done.
The Manifesto began by demanding the convocation of a Con-
stituent Assembly. This has not been summoned, and it will not be
until after the war. I tell you with the utmost frankness that I
found it superfluous to convene a Constituent Assembly when the
territorial extent of the Republic, in view of the course of military
operations, cannot in any way be regarded as definitive. It seemed
to me premature to create a proper legal state with fully developed
institutions when there were no armed forces to defend it. A state
that does not have armed forces available is anything but a state.
In the Manifesto it was said that no citizen can be held more than
seven days without an order from the judiciary authority. That has
not always occurred. The reasons are to be found in the multi-
plicity of our own police agencies and those of our ally, as well as
in the activity of the outlaws who have sought to shift these
problems to the level of civil war based on reprisals and counter-
reprisals. Anti-Fascists have sought to play up certain episodes and
have distorted the facts with their usual false generalizations. But I
must say in the most explicit way possible that such methods
deeply disgust me, even if they are employed only occasionally.
The State, as such, cannot adopt methods that degrade it. For
centuries people have talked about the law of retaliation. Well, it
must be a law and not a more or less personal and arbitrary
action . . . .
Since the Party is in the process of becoming an "order of
fighters" through the creation of the Black Brigades, the Verona
postulate has the character of an inviolable and sacred pledge. In
that same Article V which states that a Party membership card is
not a prerequisite for any employment or post, a solution was
given to the problem that I shall label collaboration with other
elements in governing the Republic. In my telegram dated March
10 of the Year XXII [ 1944] to the heads of provinces, that
formula was used again and better defined. As a result, any discus-
sion of a multiparty system is completely inappropriate.
In the course of history, among the various forms in which the
republic has developed as a political institution among different
peoples, there have been many republics of a totalitarian type-
that is to say, with just one party. I shall not mention the most
totalitarian of them, that of the Soviets, but I shall recall one that
enjoys the sympathies of the high bonzes of the democratic gos-
pel-the Turkish Republic, which rests on a single party, that of
the people, and on a single youth organization, the Turkish
Hearth.
At a certain point in Italy's historical evolution it may develop
that there will be fruitful results if, alongside the single Party that
is responsible for the overall direction of the State, there may be
other groups present which, as Article III of the Manifesto of
Verona says, can exercise the right of review and responsible criti-
cism of the actions of the public administration. Groups which, on
the basis of their loyal, integral, and unreserved acceptance of the
trinomial of Italy, Republic, and Socialization, would have the
responsibility of examining the measures of the Government and of
local agencies, of reviewing the methods of application of these
measures, as well as the persons who are entrusted with public
offices and who must be answerable in their work to the citizen in
his composite role of soldier-worker-taxpayer.
The assembly of Verona set forth in Article VIII its postulates
regarding foreign policy. It was solemnly affirmed that the essential
goal of the Republic's foreign policy is "the unity, independence,
and territorial integrity of the fatherland within the maritime and
Alpine boundaries that were laid out by nature, by the sacrifice of
blood, and by history."
As regards territorial unity, I refuse-because I know Sicily and
our Sicilian brothers-to take seriously the so-called separatist

movements of despicable mercenaries financed by the enemy. Per-
haps this separatism has another motive-our Sicilian brothers may
want to break away from Bonomi's Italy in order to join up with
Republican Italy.
It is my profound conviction that as soon as the struggles are
behind us and the phenomenon of outlawry is liquidated, the moral
unity of Italians tomorrow will be infinitely stronger than it was
yesterday, because it will have been cemented by exceptional
sufferings that have not spared a single family. And when the soul
of a people is saved through moral unity, its territorial integrity
and its political independence are also saved.
At this point a word should be said about Europe and our
conception thereof. I shall not linger over the question of what is
Europe, of where it begins and where it ends from a geographical
standpoint. Nor shall I speculate whether an attempt at unification
today would have better success than previous ones. That would
lead me too far astray. I shall say here only that the formation of a
European community is desirable and perhaps even possible, but I
must say very explicitly that we do not feel we are Italians because
we are Europeans; rather we feel we are Europeans because we are
Italians. The distinction is not just a subtlety; it is fundamental.
Just as the nation is the result of millions of families who possess
their own physiognomy even though they also possess a national
common denominator, so in the European community every nation
must join as a well-defined entity in order to avoid letting the
community itself sink into internationalism of a socialist stamp or
vegetate in the generic, equivocal cosmopolitanism of Jewish and
Masonic stamp.
While some points in the Verona program have been outstripped
by a succession of military events, more concrete achievements
have been realized in the economic and social field. Here the
innovation has radical aspects. Points XI, XII, and XIII [of the
Verona Manifesto] are fundamental. Set forth in the "Premise for
a New Italian Economic Structure," they have found their practi-
cal application in the Law on Socialization. The interest aroused
throughout the world has been truly great, and today in all
quarters-even in that part of Italy dominated and tortured by the
Anglo-Americans-every political program contains the demand
for socialization.
Workers who at first were somewhat skeptical now understand
the importance of it. Its implementation is in progress. Its rhythm
would have been faster in other times. But the seed has been sown.
Whatever happens, this seed is bound to germinate. It is the
inauguration of that which eight years ago, here in Milan before
500,000 cheering people, I prophesied would be the "century of
labor," in which the laborer would emerge from the economic and
moral status of a wage earner to assume the role of a producer who
is personally involved in the development of the nation's economy
and prosperity.
Fascist socialization is the logical and rational solution that, on
the one hand, avoids the bureaucratization of the economy through
State totalitarianism and, on the other, overcomes the individualism
of the liberal economic system which, though it proved to be a
useful instrument for progress in the early phase of the capitalistic
form of economics, is today no longer suitable in the face of new
demands of a "social" character in the various national commu-
nities.
Through socialization, the best elements drawn from the ranks
of the workers will be able to demonstrate their talents. I am deter-
mined to continue in this direction.
I have already entrusted two sectors to the various categories of
laborers-viz., local administration and food distribution. These
sectors, which are very important and especially so under present
circumstances, are already completely in the hands of the workers.
Now they must show, and I hope that they will show, their
specific preparation and their civic-mindedness.
As you see, something has been accomplished during these
twelve months, in the midst of incredible and growing difficulties
brought about by objective circumstances of the war and blind
opposition from those elements who have sold out to the foe. . . .
In very recent days the situation has improved. The fence-
straddlers, those who were waiting on the side lines for the Anglo-
Americans to come, are in decline. What has happened in Bonomi's
Italy has brought them disillusionment. Everything that the Anglo-
Americans promised them has turned out to be a miserable propa-
gandistic trick. I think I am right when I declare that the people of
the Po Valley not only do not want the arrival of the Anglo-
Saxons; they scorn them. And they do not want to have anything
to do with a government which-even though it has T ogliatti as a
vice-premier-would bring back to the north the reactionary,
plutocratic, and dynastic forces-these latter already openly enjoy-
ing the protection of England. . . .
We intend to defend the Po Valley tooth and nail. [Shouts of
"Yes!"] We intend that the Po Valley shall remain republican

while we wait for all of Italy to become republican. [Enthusiastic
shouts of "Yes!" "All!"] If the day should ever come when the
entire Po Valley is contaminated by the enemy, the destiny of the
entire nation will be compromised. But I sense, I see, that tomor-
row a form of armed and irresistible organization will arise that
will render life practically impossible for the invaders. We should
make out of the entire Po Valley a single Athens! [The crowd
erupts in unanimous shouts of approval: "Yes! Yes!"]
From what I have told you, it is obvious that not only has the
enemy coalition not won; it will not win. The monstrous alliance
between plutocracy and Bolshevism was able to perpetrate its
barbaric war like the execution of an enormous crime, and it has
struck crowds of innocent people and destroyed what European
civilization created over a span of twenty centuries. But it shall not
succeed in destroying with its darkness the eternal spirit that built
these monuments.
Our absolute faith in victory rests not on motives of a subjective
or sentimental nature, but on positive and determined elements. If
we were to doubt our victory, we should have to deny the exis-
tence of Him who rules, according to justice, the destinies of man.
When we as soldiers of the Republic re-establish contact with
the Italians on the other side of the Apennines, we shall have the
pleasant surprise of finding more Fascism there than we left behind.
The disillusionment, the misery, the political and moral abjection
are exploding not only in the old phrase, "We were better off
. . . ," but in the revolts which from Palermo to Catania, and
from Otranto to Rome itself, are creeping through every portion
of "liberated" Italy.
The Italian people south of the Apennines have their spirits full
of burning nostalgia. Enemy oppression on the one hand and the
bestial persecution by the Government on the other cannot help
but give nourishment to the Fascist movement. It was easy to erase
the external symbols; to suppress the idea is impossible! [The
crowd shouts, "Never!"]
The six anti-Fascist parties are bustling to proclaim that Fascism
is dead, because they sense that it is alive. Millions of Italians are
comparing yesterday with today; yesterday, when the banner of
the fatherland was waving from the Alps to equatorial Somalia and
Italians were one of the most respected peoples on earth.
There is no Italian who does not feel his heart beat faster at the
sound of an African name, at the sound of a hymn that accom-
panied the legions from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, at the
sight of a colonial helmet. There are millions of Italians who from
1929 to 1939 lived through what can be called the epic poetry of
the fatherland. These Italians still exist; they are suffering, and they
still believe in and are ready to close ranks to resume the march in
order to reconquer all that was lost and is today garrisoned
between the dunes of Libya and the tropical fruit trees of Ethiopia
by thousands and thousands of casualties, the flower of innumer-
able Italian families who have not forgotten and are unable to
forget.
Already the signs signaling this resumption can be seen, espe-
cially here in this city of Milan, which is always in the forefront
and warlike, and which the enemy has savagely struck but not in
the least subdued.
Comrades! Dear Milanese comrades! It is Milan which must give,
and shall give, the men, the arms, the will, and the signal of
resurgence! [Applause . ... ]
Mussolini hoped that his reversion to some of the policies of "Fascism

of the first hour" would underscore the differences between the Social
Republic and the capitalistic southern kingdom which, according to
him, was subservient to Allied "plutocracies." The first socialization of
large industrial enterprises took place in February, 1945; in March the
program was extended to many steel, chemical, paper, and printing
establishments. Fiat, Montecatini, Alfa Romeo, and Acciaierie Lom-
barde were among the plants affected. Mussolini made no effort to
resurrect the corporative state.
The Duce's sudden renewal of interest in the proletariat met with
skepticism from most workers, who knew well that for two decades
Fascist economics had been geared far more to the well-beins- of
property owners than to that of themselves. Resistance leaders qmckly
warned workers of the "colossal fraud" of "socialization" and often
achieved resounding success. For example, when 32,67 6 Fiat employees
in Turin were asked to vote in March on nominations for shop-steward
committees and management councils, 31,450 abstained. There were
547 blank ballots, and 274 were nullified. Only 405 were valid. 2
By late March most Fascist hierarchs sensed that Allied forces would
break into the Po Valley at any time. Desperately hoping to stave off
at least some of the retribution they could surely expect, they sought
to dismantle some of the most vicious of their heterogeneous police
2. Raimondo Luraghi, Il movimento operaio torinese durante la resi-

stenza (Turin, 1958), pp. 268-270.
forces. But it was too late to make the Italian people forget the
terroristic aspects of the police state that had been operating alongside
the Germans. The insurrection and liberation occurred before the
"face lifting" could be finished.
On April 5 the Allies kicked off their final offensive. By April 14/15
they had blasted their way into the flatland sector between Imola and
Bologna. On the twelfth the supreme organ of the Resistance, the
Committee of National Liberation for Upper Italy (CLNAI), de-
nounced as war criminals all members of the Fascist directorate and
next day laid down guidelines for handling Nazi-Fascist r.risoners.
Mussolini left Salo for Milan on the evening of Apnl 18 and set up
headquarters in the prefectural palace. He did not yet know that SS
General Karl Wolff was trying to negotiate an armistice with Allied
representatives in Switzerland. In Milan many schemes raced through
his mind. One was an abortive effort to turn over political power to
the Socialist and Action parties in an effort to split the Committee of
National Liberation and save his own skin. The left-wing parties
immediately turned him down. Then, through an emissary, he sought
to win a guarantee from Resistance leaders that would allow him and
his henchmen, and their families, to retreat from Milan into the
northern V altellina. The response to this was curt: if the Duce wished
to surrender unconditionally, he must come to the CLNAI in the sole
place that it considered to be neutral, the palace of the archbishop in
Milan's Piazza Fontana. Only in that way might he gain assurance of a
regular trial.
The insurrection in Milan, the nerve center of the Armed Resis-
tance, took place between April 24 and 26. On the twenty-fifth the
CLNAI agreed upon various decrees, one of which established special
popular courts of assize, tribunals of war, and commissions of justice.
By implication it ordered Mussolini's execution, for Article 5 stated:
Members of the Fascist Government and the hierarchs of Fas-

cism who are guilty of suppressing the constitutional guarantees,
destroying popular liberties, creating the Fascist regime, com-
promising and betraying the fate of the country, and conducting
it to the present catastrophe are to be punished with the penalty of
death, and in less grave instances life-imprisonment.3
Those who organized Fascist squads that carried out deeds of violence
and those who led the "insurrection" of October 28, 1922, were to be
punished according to the Penal Code of 1889. Anyone guilty of
crimes against the state since September 8, 1943, would be punished in
accordance with the military laws of war in effect as of that time. The
accused might defend himself if he could prove that he had prevented
3. The decree is cited in Franco Catalano, Storia del CLN AI (Bari:

Laterza, 1956), pp. 413-419.
atrocities and destruction of national property. Or, if he had been
forced to collaborate with the foe as a result of grave threats to his
person or family, he could plead for leniency. Unquestionably this was
stern. "If the Liberation had occurred a year earlier," one of the key
CLNAI officials has observed, "the insurrectional movement would
have shown much greater generosity. But the ferocious Nazi-Fascist
repressions of the second half of 1944 had embittered the popular
mind." 4
At about 5 P.M. on April 25, Mussolini and a handful of his friends
arrived at Cardinal Schuster's palace in Milan. An hour later CLNAI
representatives appeared. Mussolini asked what dispositions they were
ready to make. Their answer was still the terse formula "Uncondi-
tional surrender." The ensuing conversation brought out the fact that
the Germans were negotiating with the Resistance and the Allies
without having notified Mussolini. The Duce thereupon jumped up,
sputtering, "Once too often Germany has stabbed Italy in the back!
The Germans have always treated us like slaves." Then he asked to be
excused so that he could speak with the German consul, promising to
return by 8 P.M.
Instead, he and his retinue decided to flee in a motor caravan,
heading for Switzerland. Unable to cross the border, he threw in his
lot once more with the Germans, hiding himself in a truck in one of
their convoys retreating up the western shore of Lake Como. On the
twenty-seventh the convoy was halted at Musso by a partisan road-
block. Mussolini and his faithful camp follower, Claretta Petacci, as
well as various other Fascists were soon recognized by the partisans
and taken prisoner. The Germans were allowed to continue on their
way. On the afternoon of the twenty-eighth, a Communist execution
squad came up from Milan. Ordering Mussolini and Signorina Petacci
suddenly to stand up before a garden wall in Giulino di Mezzegra, they
fired a burst of bullets into the victims. Their bodies and those of some
fifteen other Fascists were then hauled to Milan, the city that had seen
the birth of Fascism. Early on Sunday morning, the twenty-ninth, the
corpses of the Duce, wearing the uniform of a squadrist Militiaman,
and his mistress were laid out and then strung up by their feet in a
service station at Piazzale Loreto, the same square where a year before
the German Command had publicly executed fifteen resisters. An
infuriated mob repeatedly kicked and spat upon the swinging cadavers.
After this lugubrious display, the corpses of Mussolini and his mistress
were buried secretly near Milan. (Eventually in 1957 the Duce's body
was removed to the family vault in the cemetery of his home town of
Predappio.) The CLNAI deemed it expedient on April 30 to take note
of the violent and repulsive scene at Ptazzale Loreto and issue a public
statement that sought to put the affair into historic perspective.
4. Leo Valiani, Tutte le strade conducono a Roma (Florence, 1947),

pp. 338-340.
The Execution of Mussolini

The shooting of Mussolini and his accomplices, ordered by
the CLNAI, is the necessary conclusion of a historical era which
leaves our country still covered by material and moral scars, and
the conclusion of an insurrectional struggle which signified for the
fatherland the prerequisite for its rebirth and reconstruction. The
Italian people could not begin a free and normal life-which
Fascism for twenty years denied them-if the CLNAI had not
timely demonstrated its iron decision to carry out a judgment
which had already been pronounced by history.
Only at the price of this neat break with a shameful and criminal
past could the people have the assurance that the CLNAI is deter-
mined to pursue with firmness the democratic renovation of the
country. Only at this price can there and must there occur, in the
forms of strictest legality, the necessary purging of the residues of
Fascism at the end of the insurrectional phase.
Fascism itself is the only responsible element for the explosion of
popular hate, which on this single occasion has gone to excesses,
and which is understandable only in the climate willed and created
by Mussolini.
The CLNAI, just as it has known how to conduct the insurrec-
tion-admirable for its democratic discipline, which infused into all
the insurgents a sense of responsibility in this great historic hour-
and just as it has known how, without hesitation, to render justice
to those responsible for the ruin of the fatherland, intends that in
the new epoch which is now opened to the free Italian people such
excesses must not repeat themselves. . . .
The Committees of National Liberation redoubled their efforts to
discipline the partisans and the citizenry and generally achieved good
results. If there had been no CLN's to exercise authority, the situation
could have been much worse. Soon "people's courts of assize" replaced
the informal "military tribunals" of the first days. By June these were
superseded by "extraordinary courts of assize," approved by the Allied
Military Government. The number of Fascists and supposed Fascists
who were killed in northern Italy during the insurrectionary period
can only be guessed. In 1952 a Christian Democratic Minister of
Interior reported to Parliament that the figure was 2,344. One investi-
SOURCE: Statement by the Committee of National Liberation for
Upper Italy. Published in La Liberta (Milan), April 30, 1945.
My translation.
gator who felt sympathy for the other side has estimated 40,000. 5
Probably the truth lay in between.
The Armed Resistance had mobilized at various times between
September 8, 1943, and April 25, 1945, some 200,000 men and women.
Of these, probably one fifth lost their lives. The over-all casualties of
the northern patriots and of the Italian Corps of Liberation that was
formed in the south compared favorably with those suffered by the
Allies during the entire peninsular campaign. It was largely because of
this "other Italy" that a people who had been dazed and demoralized in
1943 could by 1945 regain much of their self-esteem; it was also largely
because of this "other Italy" that the nation could become a signatory
to a peace treaty in 1947 that was far more generous than Italians could
reasonably have expected in September, 1943.
The war had come to an end. So had Italian Fascism. As a matter of
fact, Fascism had been moribund at least since 1941-42, when it
became clear to the great majority of Italians that Mussolini's ideology
and alliance with Hitler meant endless, senseless wars which the
country had neither the resources for nor the desire to win. Those
industrial, agrarian, military, clerical, and other "fellow travelers" who
in earlier years had been happy to "use" Fascism to serve their own
purposes quickly began to sever their links with the increasingly
demagogic, "proletarian" latter-day Fascism, leaving only a hard core
of fanatics to stand by the sickly Duce after 1943. A civil war was
necessary to eliminate most of thts final residue of militant Blackshirts.
Relatively little of what Mussolini regarded as his greatest achieve-
ments have endured, apart from the Lateran Pacts with the Church
(which were maintained only with the help of Communist votes!), a
system of highways, some public works, and certain facets of his social
welfare system. The much-touted corporative state collapsed in July,
1943. Its only surviving traces are bits of largely unused machinery m
such fields as collective bargaining, in which national and compulsory
uniformities are now imposed in labor agreements and are made
binding even on those who have not participated in their negotiation.
There also continues to be frequent state intervention in the settlement
of labor disputes. The Institute for Industrial Reconstruction (IRI),
one of the Fascist innovations of the Depression era, has continued. So
has the tendency toward greater state participation in many key indus-
tries. One must concede, too, that a good many other remnants of
Fascist legislation, including that forbidding birth control, have
lingered on the books, despite frequent efforts of alert critics to
whittle away such anachronisms.
The House of Savoy, which under Victor Emmanuel III had so
closely tied itself to the Fascist regime, could not regain its prestige
even after the old man's abdication and the advent of young Humbert
II as "King of the May" in 1946. A national referendum on June 2,
1946, rejected the monarchy by a vote of 12,717,923 to 10,710,284.
5. Carlo Simiani, I giustiziati fascisti dell'aprile 1945 (Milan, 1949).

Rome and every province to the north voted solidly in favor of a

republican form of government.
The same elections produced a Constituent Assembly that drew up a
Constitution for the Italian Republic. It went into effect on January 1,
1948. Those left-wing parties which for a time had hoped that the
Committees of National Liberation could be preserved and integrated
into the political structure were disappointed. Instead, the pre-Fascist
parliamentary and administrative system was largely restored, but with
some noteworthy improvements. The Senate, for example, was to be
elective rather than appointive, and provision was made for regional
self-government instead of the excessively centralized pattern of pre-
Fascist and Fascist days. Women gained full voting rights with men.
Safeguards against a new dictatorship were to be found in a Supreme
Constitutional Court (modeled on the American system), and a High
Council of the Magistracy, as well as in a bill of rights (though some,
like the "right to work"-a phrase borrowed from the Soviet Consti-
tution of 1936 and signifying the right to "full employment"-were
more in the nature of aspirations than reality). A National Economic
and Labor Council and provisions for the use of the initiative and
referendum have proved to be less significant features of the new
constitutional system.
Deprived of her overseas possessions and most of her Slavic border
minorities (though not her German-speaking population in the Alto
Adige), the new Italy has repudiated Fascism's ultranationalism and has
become instead one of the most vigorous advocates of European eco-
nomic and political integration. As a result of this more enlightened
policy and of massive financial assistance from the United States in the
postwar years, Italy's standard of living and economy have reached
new highs, though a great disparity remains between north and south.
Whether or not the country can be equally successful in streamlining
its ponderous bureaucracy and modernizing and expanding its educa-
tional system is less clear at this time.
Italy will long be confronted by serious social and political prob-
lems. Alienation runs deep in the Italian psyche. In a country where
one fourth of the electorate votes Communist, where a much smaller
but stubborn minority of monarchists and neo-Fascists continue their
nostalgic dreams on the far right, and where the moderates are split
along clerical and economic lines, there is no likelihood of "consensus
politics." But if apathy and cynicism toward democratic, constitutional
government do not once again get the better of the citizenry, the
center-left political forces ought to be able to regroup and push ahead
with the reforms that are required to strengthen and stabilize Italian
democracy. Barring unforeseen international and economic crises, or
the appearance of some new charismatic leader, it does not seem likely
that the majority of Italians will easily turn again to the demagogic
pattern of Mussolini's Fascism.
II
Fascism m Spain
8. The Falange Espanola
IT WAs not until the early 1930's that authentically fascist movements
appeared on the scene in Spain, a country that was beginning to move
awkwardly from a feudalistic agrarian economy into the first stages of
a semi-industrialized society. The emergence of various extremist
movements of the radical right was brought about by the cumulative
impact of several developments during the preceding decade. These
included the Moroccan rebellion of the early 1920's and the resultant
military dictatorship in Spain; the pervasive economic depression that
began in 1929; the political ferment that overthrew King Alfonso XIII
in April, 1931, and inaugurated the anticlerical Second Republic; and
the growing schism within the Spanish revolutionary syndicalist move-
ment. The latter current had attracted considerable support in Cata-
lonia and other parts of Spain during the previous generation; and just
as had already been the case in Italy, its left wing was now moving
increasingly in the direction of Marxian communism, while its right
wing was assuming a nationalistic and fascist-like posture.
A clear example of this effort to persuade anarcho-syndicalists to
adopt a program of "national syndicalism" was to be seen in March,
193 1. At that time Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, a young Castilian postal
clerk and ex-student of the University of Madrid who had recently
spent some time in Germany, where he was impressed by Hitler's
National Socialist party (and even went so far as to affect Hitler's hair
style), founded a short-lived, anti-Marxist weekly paper entitled La
Conquista del Estado (The Conquest of the State). He called for the
creation of "military-type teams without hypocrisy before the rifle's
barrel." 1 Then, three months later, in Valladolid, a twenty-five-year-
old man of rural background (and a paid organizer of the sugar-beet
growers there), Onesimo Redondo Ortega, founded a somewhat simi-
lar group with a weekly newspaper, Libertad. Strongly clerical and
anti-Semitic, Redondo also found much to admire in Hitler's youth
movement, which he had observed at first hand at the University of
1. Historia de Ia Cruzada Espanola, ed. by Joaquin Arrar:is (Madrid,

1939-43), Vol. III, p. 423.
258 FASCISM IN SPAIN
Mannheim in 1930. Somehow he perceived the Nazi Fuhrer as the

embodiment of Christianity engaged in struggle with communism.
In September, 1931, Redondo and Ledesma combined their meager
forces under the somewhat boastful title Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-
Sindicalista (Juntas for the National-Syndicalist Offensive). The mem-
bers of the JONS (Jonsistas) belonged to the first revolutionary
organization in Spain to bear the label of national syndicalism. Borrow-
ing the red and black colors of the Anarchists and the yoked arrows of
the Catholic Monarchs, they proclaimed a sixteen-point program that
included such slogans as "Arriba!" and "Espana, Una, Grande y
Libre!" They denounced separatism and class war; called for Spanish
expansion into Gibraltar, Tangier, French Morocco, and Algeria; and
demanded the elimination of foreign influences in Spain. Unlike Hitler,
they assigned a high place to the Roman Catholic religion, which in
their eyes seemed to have the same "racial" significance for Spain that
"Aryan blood" did for Nazi Germany. But the Jonsistas made very
little headway. By mid-193 2 government hostility forced Redondo to
flee to Portugal and his newspaper to cease publication.
Meanwhile, more othodox right-wing groups became politically
active. In Navarre the ultraclerical, reactionary Comuni6n Tradicional-
ista of Carlist royalists, bitter enemies of the "illegitimate" Bourbon
dynasty against whom they had fought a series of civil wars in the
nineteenth century, organized a "traditionalist" militia known as the
Requetes. These medievalist-minded warriors stressed the virtues of
Catholic corporativism and perfervid regionalism.
Less hidebound but equally Catholic was the more broadly based
CEDA, whose initials stood for Spanish Confederation of Autonomous
Rightist Groups. Led by a middle-aged Salamanca lawyer, Jose Maria
Gil Robles, the "Cedistas" were deeply influenced by the Jesuits and
Catholic Action, a dedicated organization of the laity.
The CEDA brand of conservatism did not satisfy certain industrial-
ists and financiers in Bilbao and other cities who preferred to offer
financial encouragement to those who would promote a movement
more akin to Mussolini's Fascism. Their eyes came to rest on Jose
Antonio Primo de Rivera, the handsome, eldest son of the late General
Miguel Primo de Rivera, who had headed a military dictatorship in
Spain from 1923 until 1930 (in the wake of the army's setback in
Morocco). Born in Andalusia in 190 3, Jose Antonio was a restless,
romantic young marques who studied law but displayed equal interest
in poetry and foreign languages. The elitist theories of Jose Ortega y
Gasser and other contemporary conservative writers made a favorable
impression upon him. While his philandering father headed the gov-
ernment, Jose Antonio was content to remain on the sidelines, but
after the General's overthrow and death in 1930 the son turned increas-
ingly to politics. He concluded that his father's regime had been too
old-fashioned in its military and authoritarian garb. To be sure, King
Alfonso XIII had referred to the General as "my Mm:solini," and the
General had expressed admiration for Mussolini's dictatorship and in
THE FALANGE ESPANOLA 259
1926 had signed a treaty of friendship and arbitration with Italy. But
his conservative Union Patri6tica stopped short of becoming a clear-
cut fascist party. The son felt that his father had also failed to grasp
the wisdom of building a governmental system that would rest on the
political representation of national syndicates.
By early 1933 the aristocratic Jose Antonio was ready to organize an
elitist movement that would seek to achieve radical political and eco-
nomic reforms through what he called "totalitarian" means. He would
employ the ideological watchwords of nationalism to arouse the ideal-
ism and enthusiasm of Spanish youth. Hitler's advent to power in
Germany in January, 1933, further encouraged Jose Antonio to think
that fascism was the wave of the future. Supported by Bilbao bankers
and others, he gathered around him a handful of sefioritos who decided
to label their movement "F.E." and publish a weekly under that
heading. The initials could be interpreted to stand for either "Fascismo
Espaiiol" or "Falange Espanola" [Spanish Phalanx]. By the autumn of
193 3 the latter signification was chosen in order to stress the au-
tonomous nature of the Spanish movement and to avoid the kind of
confrontation with Republican authorities that had resulted in the sup-
pression of his newspaper El Fascio after one issue in March.
The official debut of this newest current of right-wing radicalism
took place on Sunday afternoon, October 29, 1933, in Madrid's Teatro
de Ia Comedia. Jose Antonio was the principal speaker before the well-
dressed audience of some 2,000 middle-aged and young men, among
whom was Ledesma. Additional thousands heard the speech by radio.
In his address the poetic young Falangist denounced the liberal demo-
cratic system and criticized the socialists for mistakenly adopting a
program based on materialism and class struggle. He called instead for
the creation of an intensely nationalistic "movement" that would
eliminate all political parties and organize a "totalitarian" state in Spain
that would be based on families, municipalities, and professions. The
movement must not shrink from violence, he declared, and it must seek
to renew Spain's imperial grandeur, surrounding it with a religious
aura. Many in his audience were disappointed that he did not deliver an
unqualified diatribe against the Republic or set forth a summons for
immediate dictatorship.
]ose Antonio Primo de Rivera

on the Foundation of the Spanish Falange
(Comedia Theater, Madrid, October 29, 1933)
No WHOLE paragraph of gratitude: simply, "Thank you," as befits
our terse, military style.
When in March 17 62 a man of ill omen called Jean Jacques
souRcE: Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, The Spanish Answer

(selected and translated, with an introduction by Juan Macnab
Rousseau published The Social Contract, political truth ceased to

be a permanent entity. In earlier, less shallow ages, States had his-
toric missions to perform, and justice and truth were written upon
their brows, and even upon the stars. Jean Jacques Rousseau came
to inform us that justice and truth were not permanent categories
of thought at all, but decisions of the will at any given moment.
Jean Jacques Rousseau supposed that each people as a whole
possessed a soul of its own, higher in rank than each of our indi-
vidual souls, and that this higher ego was endowed with an infal-
lible will, capable at any given moment of defining justice and
injustice, good and evil. This collective sovereign will was ex-
pressible only by suffrage-in which the majority conjecture pre-
vailed over the minority one in guessing what the higher will might
be. It follows that voting-the game of dropping little slips of
paper into a ballot-box-had the power to tell us at any given
moment whether there was a God or not, whether truth was true
or false, and whether our country ought to go on existing or would
be better advised to commit suicide.
As the liberal State followed this teaching faithfully, it ceased to
be the resolute executor of the country's destinies and turned into a
mere spectator of electoral struggles. The only thing that mattered
to the liberal State was that a certain number of gentlemen should
be seated at the voting tables, that the ballot should begin at eight
and end at four, and that the ballot-boxes should not be broken-
whereas to be broken is the noblest fate that can befall a ballot-box.
Thereafter, the liberal State must serenely abide by whatever
emerged from the ballot, as if it had no interest in the matter at all.
In other words, the liberal rulers did not even believe in their own
mission. They did not believe they were there for the performance
of an honourable task, but that anyone who thought the reverse
and intended to assail the State, by fair means or foul, has just as
good a right to say so and to do so as the guardians of the State
itself had to defend it.
Hence arose the democratic system, which is, first of all, the
most ruinous possible system for the squandering of energy. A man
Calder, from the Obras Completas de Jose Antonio Primo de

Rivera, ed. by Augustin del Rio Cisneros) (Madrid: Artes
Graficas Ibarra, S.A. [1964]), pp. 43-55. By kind permission of
the Servicio Exterior, Delegaci6n Nacional de la Secci6n Feme-
nina, Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S., Madrid.
endowed with gifts for the high function of governing, which is
perhaps the noblest of all human functions, was obliged to devote
eighty, ninety or ninety-five per cent of his energies to answering
routine opposition criticism, to making election propaganda, to
drowsing for hours on parliamentary benches, to flattering electors
and enduring their impertinencies-because it was from them that
he was going to get power-, to putting up with humiliation and
indignities from those who, by very reason of the quasi-divine
function of governing, were required to obey him; and then after
all this, if he had an hour or two left after midnight or a few
moments stolen from an uneasy repose, it was in that tiny period of
spare time that the man endowed with gifts for governing was able
to give serious thought to the basic functions of Government.
Later came the loss of the spiritual unity of peoples, for as the
system worked by the achievement of majorities, anyone who set
out to master the system had to obtain a majority of the votes. He
had to obtain it, if necessary, by stealing votes from the other
parties; and hence he must have no hesitation in calumniating them,
in heaping the vilest obloquies upon them, in deliberately falsifying
the truth, in not letting slip a single means of lying and vilification.
Thus, although Fraternity was one of the postulates displayed on
the title-page of the liberal State, there has never been a mode of
collective life in which wronged men, in mutual enmity, have felt
less fraternal than in the turbulent, unpleasant life of the liberal
State.
Finally, the liberal State brought economic slavery, for the
workmen were told, with tragic sarcasm: "You are free to work as
you choose: no-one can force you to accept these conditions or
those. However, as we are the rich, we offer you such conditions as
we think fit. As free citizens, you are not obliged to accept them
if you do not want to; but as poor citizens, if you do not accept
the conditions we impose, you will die of starvation surrounded by
the highest degree of liberal dignity." And so it came about that in
the countries possessing the most superb parliaments and the finest
democratic institutions, you had only to go a few hundred yards
outside the luxury quarters of big cities in order to find yourself
amid noisome slums, where workmen and their families lived
huddled together in well-nigh subhuman conditions. In the coun-
try, a farm-labourer's hours were sunrise to sunset in the broiling
heat, but owing to the free play of liberal economics he was lucky
if in the course of a year he got eighty days' employment at three
pesetas a day.
That is why socialism was born, and its birth was justified. We
are not going to balk at any truth: the workmen were bound to
defend themselves against that system, which gave them merely
promises of rights, and took no pains to provide them with a fair
living wage. Yet socialism, which was a legitimate reaction against
that liberal enslavement, went astray in three ways: first, it ac-
cepted the materialist interpretation of life; secondly, it adopted an
attitude of revenge; and thirdly, it proclaimed the dogma of the
class war.
Socialism-above all the socialism constructed in the passionless
frigidity of the study by the socialist apostles in whom the poor
working men believed, and who have been shown up for what
they really were by Alfonso Garda Valdecasas, 2-socialism, thus
understood, sees nothing in history but the play of economic
forces; everything spiritual is suppressed, religion is the opium of
the people, patriotism is a myth for the exploitation of the under-
dog. Socialism says all this. Nothing exists but production and
economic organization. Workmen, therefore, must wring their
souls well out, lest the least drop of spirituality should remain
within them.
Socialism does not aspire to reestablish a social justice that has
broken down through the faulty working of the liberal State;
rather, it aims at reprisal. The further the injustice of the liberal
system has gone in one direction, the further socialism seeks to
carry its own injustice in the other.
Finally, socialism proclaims the monstrous dogma of class war-
fare. It proclaims the dogma that warfare between the classes is
indispensable and occurs naturally in life, because there can never
be any appeasing agent. Thus socialism, which started out as a just
critique of economic liberalism, has brought us by a different route
to the same pass as economic liberalism: disunity, hatred, separa-
tion, forgetfulness of every bond of brotherhood and solidarity
between men.
Accordingly, when we, the men of our generation, look around
us, we find a world in moral ruin, a world rent asunder by every
kind of differences; and as regards what touches us most closely,
we find a Spain in moral ruin, a Spain rent by every kind of hatred
2. A professor of law and rightist member of the Cortes (parliament),

Valdecasas was one of the other two speakers at the Teatro de la Comedia
that day. Julio Ruiz de Alda, a well-known aviator, was the third orator.-
Ed.
and conflict. We have had to shed tears in the depth of our hearts
when we have travelled through the villages of this wonderful
country of Spain, those villages where you can still find people,
beneath the humblest exterior, possessing a rustic gentility which
never makes an extravagant gesture or uses a superfluous word;
people who live in an outwardly dry way, on an apparently arid
soil but one that astounds us by the fruitfulness that bursts forth
triumphant in corn and vine. When we have been through those
lands and seen those people, and known what sufferings they
endure at the hands of petty local overlords, and how they are
forgotten by every party group, divided, poisoned by underhand
propaganda, we could not but apply to all those folk the words
that the folk itself sang of the Cid, to see him roaming through the
land of Castile in his banishment from Burgos:
"Ah God, what a good vassal, had he but a good lord!"
That is what we ourselves have found in this movement which
starts today: the legitimate lord of Spain, but one like Saint Fran cis
Borgia, a lord whom death cannot take from us. And for that, it
must be a lord who is not at the same time a slave to an interest of
group or class.
The movement of today-which is a movement and not a party,
indeed you could almost call it an anti-party,-let all know from
the outset that it is neither of the Right nor of the Left. For at
bottom, Right means the aim of maintaining an economic organiza-
tion even if it is unjust; and at bottom, Left means the desire to
overthrow an economic organization, even if many good things
should go by the board at the same time. Afterwards, these ideas
are both decked out with a number of spiritual considerations. I
declare to all who listen to us in good faith: all those spiritual
considerations can find their place in our movement, but our
movement will on no account bind its destiny to the group or class
interest that lurks beneath the superficial distinction of Right and
Left.
The Patria is a complete unity, wherein all individuals and all
classes are integrated; the Patria cannot be in the hands of the
strongest class or the best-organized party. The Patria is a tran-
scendent synthesis, an individual synthesis, with ends of its own to
achieve; and what we seek is that this movement of today, and the
State which it brings forth, shall be the efficient, authoritarian
instrument which serves that unchallengeable, permanent, irrevo-
cable unity which is called the Patria.
And with that we already have the whole mainspring of our

future actions and our present conduct, for we ourselves should be
but one party the more, if we merely appeared in order to put
forward a program of concrete solutions. Such programs have the
advantage of never getting carried out. On the other hand, when
you have a fixed attitude towards history and towards life, that
attitude itself will provide the solution in any particular case, just as
love tells us when we should quarrel and when we should embrace,
though a genuine love has not the slightest "program" of either
quarrels or embraces.
These are the things that are demanded by our complete sense of
the Patria and of the State which is to serve the Patria:
That all the peoples of Spain, diverse as they are, shall feel
themselves brought into harmony in one irrevocable unity of
destiny.
That political parties shall disappear. Nobody was ever born a
member of a political party; on the contrary, we are all born
members of a family: we are all citizens of a Municipality: we all
work at a job. These are our natural units: the family, the munici-
pality and the profession; and if these are the realities of our lives,
what need have we for the intermediate, pernicious instrument of
political parties, which, in order to unite us in artificial groups, start
by disuniting us in our genuine realities?
We want less liberal verbiage and more respect for the deep
liberty of man. Man's liberty is respected only when he is regarded
as the corporeal envelope of a soul capable of damnation or of
salvation. Only when he is thus regarded can his liberty be said to
be truly respected, and still more so if that liberty is combined, as
we demand, in a system of authority, hierarchy and order.
We want all to feel they are members of a serious, complete
community. In other words, there are clearly many kinds of tasks
to be performed: some manual, some mental, others in the educa-
tional or social or cultural fields; but in a community such as we
seek, let it be stated from the outset, there must be no passengers
and no drones.
We want no song about individual rights of the kind that can
never be enforced in the homes of the hungry. Instead, let every
man, every member of the political community, simply by being a
member of it, be given the means of earning a just and decent
human livelihood by his work.
We want the religious spirit, which is the keystone in the finest
arches of our history, to be respected and supported as it deserves;
but that does not mean that the State should either interfere in
functions which do not belong to it, or-as it used to do, possibly
from motives other than those of authentic Religion-should share
our functions which it is the State's job to perform for itself.
We want Spain resolutely to recover the universal sense of her
own culture and history.
And we want one last thing. If in some cases this can only be
achieved by violence, let us not balk at violence. Who has said-in
speaking of "anything but violence" -that the supreme degree of
the moral values consists in amiability? Who has said that when our
feelings as human beings are outraged, it is our duty to be amiable?
Dialectic, yes, as the first instrument of communication. But there
is no dialectic admissible but that of the fist and the gun when the
outrage is against justice or our native land.
These are the things we think about the future State which it is
our job to build.
But our movement would not be fully understood if people

believed that it was merely a mode of thinking; it is not a mode of
thinking, it is a mode of being. We must not set before us political
construction and architecture alone. We have to adopt, towards
life as a whole and in each of our actions, an attitude that is human,
profound and entire. That attitude is the spirit of service and
sacrifice, the ascetic and military view of life. So let no one imagine
that this is a recruiting-station for the provision of benefices; let no
one imagine that we are assembled here to defend privileges. I only
wish that this microphone could carry my voice into every work-
ing man's home, to tell them this: Yes, we do wear collars and ties.
Yes, it would be possible for you to call us "sefioritos." But we
bring with us the will to fight for things which are of no interest to
"sefioritos" at all: we are here to fight, to get heavy but just sacri-
fices imposed on many people of our own classes, we are here to
fight for a totalitarian State whose wealth shall reach the humble as
well as the powerful. That is what we are like, because that is what
the sefioritos, the young gentlemen of Spain, always were like in
history. That is how they achieved the real rank of senores, of
gentlemen, because in distant lands, and in our own country too,
they were able to face death and shoulder the harshest duties, for
causes in which, as mere sefioritos, they would have taken no
interest at all.
I think the flag is hoisted. Now let us defend it cheerfully,

poetically. In face of the advance of revolution, some people think
that in order to unite everyone's wills the most watery solutions
should be proposed, and that in their propaganda they ought to
conceal everything that might arouse emotion or betray a thor-
oughgoing, energetic attitude. How wrong they are! Peoples have
never been stirred by any but poets, and alas for him who, when
faced with the poetry of destruction, cannot uplift the poetry of
promise!
In a poetical movement, we will uplift this fervent yearning of
Spain. Ours shall be the sacrifice, ours the renunciation, and ours
will be the victory, a victory which-need I say it to you?-we are
not going to win at the forthcoming election. At that election, vote
whichever way you think least bad. But that is not where our
Spain will come from, that is not our setting, that turbid, exhausted
atmosphere, like a tavern at the end of a crapulous night. That is
not where we belong. Yes, I believe I am to stand as a candidate;
but I do so without faith and without respect, and I say that now,
though it may lose me all my votes. I care nothing for that. We are
not going to that place to squabble with the habitues over the
insipid scraps of an unclean feast. Our place is outside, even if we
may pass through the other on the way. Our place is in the open air,
under the clear night sky, sword in hand and the stars above. Let
the others go on with their revelries. We outside, in vigilance tense,
fervent and secure, can already feel, in the glad quickening of our
inward parts, the brightness of the dawn.
The first issue of the newspaper Falange Espanola appeared in Decem-

ber, 193 3, and set forth the following basic points of the Falange.
Basic Points of the Falange

(In Falange Espanola, December, 1933)
The Spanish Falange firmly believes in Spain. Spain is not a terri-
tory, nor an aggregate of men and women. Spain is above all a
unity of destiny; a historical fact, an entity, real in itself, which has
performed world missions, and will have others still to perform.
souRcE: From Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, The Spanish

Answer (selected and translated, with an introduction by Juan
Macnab Calder, from the Obras Completas de Jose Antonio
Hence Spain exists, first, as something distinct from each of the

individuals, classes and groups that compose her; seGondly, as
something higher than each of those individuals, classes and groups,
or even than all of them put together.
Accordingly Spain, which exists as a distinct and higher reality,
is bound to have ends of her own. These ends are: continued
existence in unity, resurgence of internal vitality, and a preeminent
share in the spiritual tasks of the world.
In the achievement of these ends, Spain is faced with a great
obstacle. She is divided in three ways: by local separatisms, by the
strife between political parties, and by class warfare.
Socialism ignores or forgets the reality of Spain. It is unaware
that Spain is before all else a great unity of destiny. Separatists are
interested in whether a region speaks a language of its own, or has
racial features of its own, a climate of its own or special physical
geography. But it can never be said too often that a nation is not a
language, a race or a territory; it is a unity of destiny in the world
order. That unity of destiny was and is called Spain.
Under the sign of Spain, and united in the world order, the
peoples who compose Spain fulfilled their destiny. That spendid
unity created a world, and nothing can justify breaking it up.
The political parties ignore the unity of Spain, because they
envisage her from the viewpoint of a sectional interest. Some stand
on the Right, others on the Left: to take that attitude towards
Spain is to distort the truth. It is like a one-eyed, sidelong view.
That is not how things that are fair and bright should be looked at,
but with both eyes, face on: not from a partial, party standpoint,
which automatically distorts what it sees, but from the total stand-
point of the Patria, which when regarded as a whole corrects our
defects of vision.
Class warfare ignores the unity of the Patria, for it breaks up the
idea of national production as a whole. In the state of class struggle,
the employers set out to increase their earnings. The workmen do
the same, and each in turn tyrannizes over the other. When there is
not enough work to go round, the employers exploit the men;
Primo de Rivera, ed. by Augustin del Rio Cisneros) (Madrid:

Artes Graficas Ibarra, S.A., [ 1964]), pp. 59-68. By kind per-
mission of the Servicio Exterior, Delegaci6n Nacional de la
Secci6n F emenina, Falange Espanola T radicionalista y de las
J.O.N.S., Madrid.
when there is a surplus, or when working-class organizations are

very strong, the men exploit the employers. But neither workmen
nor employers realize the truth, that they are both partners in the
joint task of national production. Through not thinking of the
national production but only of the interest or ambition of each
class, both employers and workmen end by destroying and ruining
each other.
If the struggle and decadence arise from our having lost the
permanent idea of Spain, the remedy must lie in restoring it. We
must again conceive of Spain as a self-existing reality, above differ-
ences between peoples, above party strife, above class struggle.
Those who never lose sight of the higher reality of Spain will see
all political problems in a clear light.
Some think of the State as a mere guardian of order, a spectator
of the national life, which intervenes only when that order is dis-
turbed, but has no firm belief in any particular idea. Others aim at
dominating the State so as to use it, even to use it tyrannically, as
an instrument of their group or class interests.
The Falange wants neither of those things: neither the indiffer-
ent State, the mere policeman, nor the class or group State. It wants
a State which believes in the reality and high mission of Spain; a
State which will serve that idea by assigning to each man, class and
group the appropriate tasks, rights and sacrifices; a State of all
Spaniards, that is, one that acts solely in view of that permanent
idea of Spain, and never in subservience to class or party interests.
In order that the State may never belong to a party, political
parties must be abolished.
Political parties arise as the result of a false political organization,
namely the parliamentary system. In Parliament, a number of
gentlemen say they represent those who elect them. But most of
the electors have nothing in common with the elected: they do not
come from the same families, or the same municipalities, or the
same professional guilds. The only connexion between the people
and those who say they represent the people is a number of pieces
of paper dropped into a ballot-box every two or three years.
In order that this electoral machine may work, the life of towns
and villages has to be feverishly stirred up every few years. The
candidates shout, abuse one another, make impossible promises.
The factions get excited, insult one another, murder one another.
The most savage ill-will is whipped up during the election period.
Hatreds are born, which may last for ever and make the life of the
local community intolerable. But what do the victorious candidates
care for the life of the villages? They go off to the capital, to
display themselves in public, to get their names into the papers, to
spend ·their time discussing complicated affairs which the villagers
do not understand.
What need have the towns and villages of these intermediaries?
To take part in the life of the nation, why should every man have
to join a political party or vote for a party candidate? We are all
born in a family; we all live in a municipality; we all have an
occupation or profession. But nobody is born, or lives naturally, in
a political party.
The political party is an artificial thing, which links us to people
of other municipalities and other occupations with which we have
nothing in common, while it separates us from our neighbours and
fellow-workers with whom we really do live.
A genuine State, such as the Falange wants, will not be based on
the sham of the political parties, nor on the Parliament which they
engender. It will be founded on the authentic realities of life: the
family, the municipality, and the guild or syndicate.
Thus the new State will have to recognize the integrity of the
family as the social unit, the autonomy of the municipality as the
territorial unit, and the guild, syndicate or professional association,
as the genuine bases for the complete organization of the State.
The new State will not stand cruelly aloof from man's struggle
to live, nor allow each class to take whatever steps it can to shake
off the yoke of another class or to tyrannize over it. Since the new
state belongs to all, it will regard as its own the ends of every group
that composes it, and will watch over the interests of all as its own
interests. The first purpose of wealth is to improve the living
conditions of the many, not to sacrifice the many to the luxury and
profit of the few.
Work is the best claim to civil dignity. Nothing can deserve
more attention from the State than the dignity and welfare of
workers. Thus it will consider that its first obligation, cost what it
may, is to provide every man with work that will assure him not
merely sustenance but a decent human livelihood. It will not do
this as a charity, but as a duty. Hence neither the earnings of
capital-today frequently unjust-nor the tasks of labour will be
determined by the interest or power of the class that may have the
upper hand at any given moment, but by the overall interest of the
national production and by the power of the State. The classes will
not need to organize on a war footing in self-defence, because they

will have the assurance that the State will unflinchingly safeguard
their just interests.
But the syndicates and guilds will indeed have to organize-on a
peace footing-because, though today shut out from public life by
the artificial intervention of Parliament and the political parties,
they will then become direct organs of the State.
In a word: the present situation of strife considers the classes as
divided into two sides, with different and opposing interests; the
new point of view considers all who contribute to production as
interested in one and the same great common enterprise.
The Falange regards man as a combination of a body and a soul;
that is, as capable of an eternal destiny and as the bearer of eternal
values. Thus the maximum respect is paid to human dignity, to
man's integrity and his freedom. But that profound freedom en-
titles nobody to undermine the foundations of public social life. It
is not permissible that a whole people should be used as a field of
experimentation by the audacity or extravagance of any individual.
For all, the true freedom, which is achieved only by those who
form part of a strong, free nation. For nobody, the freedom to
disturb, to poison, to incite passions, to subvert the foundations of
all lasting political organization. Those foundations are Authority,
Hierarchy, and Order.
While the physical integrity of the individual is always sacred, it
is not in itself sufficient to make him a participator in the public life
of the nation. The individual's political status is justified only in so
far as he performs a function in the national life. Only the incapaci-
tated are exempt from this duty. Parasites, drones and those who
seek to live as non-paying guests on the efforts of others will not be
entitled to the slightest consideration in the new State.
The Falange cannot regard life as a mere interplay of economic
factors. It rejects the materialist interpretation of history. The
spiritual has been and is the mainspring in the life of men and
peoples.
The preeminent aspect of the spiritual is the religious. No man
can fail to ask himself the eternal questions about life and death,
creation and the beyond. These questions cannot be answered with
evasions: they demand affirmation or denial. Spain has always
replied with the Catholic affirmation. The Catholic interpretation
of life is, first of all, the true one; but historically, moreover, it is
the Spanish one. By her sense of Catholicity, of Universality, Spain
won unknown continents from the ocean and from barbarism. She
won them in order to incorporate their inhabitants into a world
enterprise of salvation. Accordingly, any reconstruction of Spain
must be in a Catholic sense.
This does not mean that persecutions against non-Catholics are
to arise again. The times of religious persecution are past. Neither
does it mean that the State is going to take direct charge of func-
tions which belong to the Church; nor that it will admit interfer-
ences or machinations of the Church which might harm the dignity
of the State or the national integrity. It means that the new State
will be informed by the Catholic religious spirit traditional in
Spain, and will concord with the Church the considerations and
protection which are her due.
The above is what the Spanish Falange wants. To obtain that, it
proclaims a crusade to all Spaniards who desire the resurgence of a
Spain that is great, free, just and genuine. Those who come to this
crusade will have to prepare their minds for service and for sacri-
fice. They must regard life as a militia: discipline and danger,
abnegation and renouncement of all vanity, envy, sloth and evil-
speaking; and at the same time they will serve that spirit in a cheer-
ful and sportsmanlike manner.
Violence can be lawful when used for an ideal that justifies it.
Reason, justice and the Patria will be defended by force when they
are attacked by force-or by guile. But the Falange will never use
force as an instrument of oppression.
For example, it is a lie to announce to the workmen that a Fascist
tyranny is approaching. All that the Falange signifies is union,
eager fraternal cooperation, love.
The Spanish Falange, fired by a love, secure in a faith, will
succeed in winning Spain for Spain, in the manner of a militia.
In Madrid on February 11, 1934, Ledesma's J onsistas, who at this stage

numbered some 300 and were composed chiefly of students and taxi
drivers, decided to merge with Jose Antonio's 2,000 Falangists. For the
next three years the movement was called the Falange Espanola de las
Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, and each local unit was
termed a J ons. The emblems, slogans, and national syndicalist ideology
of the Jonsistas were taken over in toto. Leadership came from a
jealous triumvirate composed of Ledesma, Jose Antonio, and the world-
renowned aviator Julio Ruiz de Alda. Jose Antonio momentarily
contented himself with supplying the enlarged movement with its
literary and aesthetic overtones, but by October his group managed by
a one-vote margin over the Ledesma faction in the National Council to
elevate him to the position of ]efe Nacional (national leader). Thus, in

a "democratic" way, a single leader was recognized. All the Falangists
were required to take the following oath.
The Falangist Oath

I swear to give myself always to the service of Spain.
I swear to have no pride other than that of the fatherland and of
the Falange and to live under the Falange in obedience and joy,
impetuousness and patience, gallantry and silence.
I swear fidelity and submission to our leaders, honor to the
memory of our dead, and imperturbable perseverance amid all
vicissitudes.
I swear, wherever I may be, in order to obey or in order to
command that I shall respect our Hierarchy from the first to the
last rank.
I swear to reject and give no ear to any voice of either friend or
foe who might weaken the spirit of the Falange.
I swear to preserve above all the idea of unity: unity among the
lands of Spain, unity among the classes of Spain, unity within the
individual man and among the men of Spain.
I swear to live in holy brotherhood with all members of the
Falange and to lend every assistance and eliminate every difference
whenever this holy brotherhood requests that I do so.
In November, 1934, the Falange adopted a Twenty-Seven-Point Pro-

gram that was drawn up by Ledesma and given a laconic style by Jose
Antonio. As had often been the case in Mussolini's Italy, doctrines
were devised to rationalize what already had developed in practice.
The manifesto set forth principles regarding national unity and empire,
the latter point being left rather vague. Some Falangists implied that
"empire" meant only cultural influence and diplomatic leadership,
while others (including Jose Antonio in private conversations) ex-
pressed the hope of annexing Portugal. Point 6 proclaimed the State as
the "totalitarian instrument to defend the integrity of the fatherland."
The ninth paragraph called for "vertical" national syndicalism. 3 Other
souRcE: Victor Fragoso del Toro (ed.), La Espana de ayer: Re-

copilaci6n de textos hist6rico-politicos, I (Madrid: Editora
Nacional, 1965), p. 380. By permission of the publisher. My
translation.
3. In a speech at the Circulo Mercantil in Madrid on April 9, 1935, Jose
Antonio made it clear that a single system of "vertical" national syndicates
was preferable to Mussolini's "parallel" syndicates of employers and work-
points set forth the need for agrarian and industrial reforms, social
justice and education. The most controversial item was Point 25 per-
taining to the Church. Most of the Falangists of this period hoped to
prevent the Church from encroaching upon the state's prerogatives.
Point 27 forbade any further modification of the movement's label; but
in the summer of 1937, as will be seen, Generalissimo Francisco Franco
was to insist that the movement merge with the reactionary Carlist
militia forces and add the word "Tradicionalista" to the title in Point
26, so that it would read: Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las
Juntas Ofensivas Nacional-Sindicalistas. Point 27 thereupon was
dropped. This revised version of 1937 is printed below.
The Twenty-Six-Point Program of the Falange

(1937)
NATION-UNITY-EMPIRE
1. We believe in the supreme reality of Spain. The strengthen-

ing, elevating, and magnifying of this reality is the urgent collec-
tive goal of all Spaniards. Individual, group, and class interests must
inexorably give way in order to achieve this goal.
2. Spain has a single destiny in the world. Every conspiracy
against this common unity is repulsive. Any kind of separatism is a
crime which we shall not pardon.
The existing Constitution, to the degree that it encourages
disintegration, weakens this common destiny of Spain. Therefore
we demand its annulment in a thundering voice.
3. We have the determination to build an Empire. We affirm
that Spain's historic fulfillment lies in Empire. We claim for Spain a
pre-eminent position in Europe. We can tolerate neither interna-
tional isolation nor foreign interference.
As regards the countries of Hispanic America, we favor unifica-
tion of their culture, economic interests, and power. Spain will
souRcE: Falange espanola tradicionalista y de las Juntas ofensivas
nacional-sindicalistas, Vicesecretaria de Educaci6n popular,
Fundamentos del Nuevo Estado (Madrid: Ediciones de la Vice-
secretaria de Educaci6n Popular, 1943), pp. 5-10. My transla-
tion.
ers. "Vertical" syndicates will not require so bureaucratic a structure, he
declared, and "will be able to function organically-in the way the Army
does, for example-without any need for forming parallel committees of
soldiers and officers." Quoted in Fragoso del Toro (ed.), La Espana de
ayer, II (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1965), p. 136. The unions of present-
day Spain continue to be organized as "vertical syndicates."
continue to act as the spiritual axis of the Hispanic world as a sign

of her pre-eminence in worldwide enterprises.
4. Our armed forces-on land, sea, and in the air-must be kept
trained and sufficiently large to assure to Spain at all times its
complete independence and a status in the world that befits it. We
shall bestow upon our Armed Forces of land, sea, and air all the
dignity they merit, and we shall cause their military conception of
life to infuse every aspect of Spanish life.
5. Spain shall once more seek her glory and her wealth on the
sea lanes. Spain must aspire to become a great maritime power, for
reasons of both defense and commerce.
We demand for the fatherland equal status with oth~rs in
maritime power and aerial routes.
STATE-INDIVIDUAL-LIBERTY
6. Our State will be a totalitarian instrument to defend the

integrity of the fatherland. All Spaniards will participate in this
through their various family, municipal, and syndical roles. There
shall be no participation in it by political parties. We shall im-
placably abolish the system of political parties and all of their
consequences-inorganic suffrage, representation of clashing
groups, and a Parliament of the type that is all too well known.
7. Human dignity, integrity, and freedom are eternal, intangible
values.
But one is not really free unless he is a part of a strong and free
nation.
No one will be permitted to use his freedom against the nation,
which is the bulwark of the fatherland's freedom. Rigorous disci-
pline will prevent any attempt to envenom and disunite the Spanish
people or to incite them against the destiny of the fatherland.
8. The National-Syndicalist State will permit all kinds of private
initiative that are compatible with the collective interest, and it will
also protect and encourage the profitable ones.
EcoNOMY-LABOR-CLAss SmuGGLE
9. Our conception of Spain in the economic realm is that of a

gigantic syndicate of producers. We shall organize Spanish society
corporatively through a system of vertical syndicates for the
various fields of production, all working toward national economic
unity.
10. We repudiate the capitalistic system whieh shows no under-
standing of the needs of the people, dehumanizes private property,
and causes workers to be lumped together in a shapeless, miserable
mass of people who are filled with desperation. Our spiritual and
national conception of life also repudiates Marxism. We shall re-
direct the impetuousness of those working classes who today are
led astray by Marxism, and we shall seek to bring them into direct
participation in fulfilling the great task of the national State.
11. The National-Syndicalist State will not cruelly stand apart
from man's economic struggles, nor watch impassively while the
strongest class dominates the weakest. Our regime will eliminate
the very roots of class struggle, because all who work together in
production shall comprise one single organic entity. We reject and
we shall prevent at all costs selfish interests from abusing others,
and we shall halt anarchy in the field of labor relations.
12. The first duty of wealth-and our State shall so affirm-is to
better the conditions of the people. It is intolerable that enormous
masses of people should live wretchedly while a small number
enjoy all kinds of luxuries.
13. The State will recognize private property as a legitimate
means for achieving individual, family, and social goals, and will
protect it against the abuses of large-scale finance capital, specu-
lators, and money lenders.
14. We shall support the trend toward nationalization of bank-
ing services and, through a system of Corporations, the great public
utilities.
15. All Spaniards have the right to work. Public agencies must
of necessity provide support for those who find themselves in
desperate straits.
As we proceed toward a totally new structure, we shall maintain
and strengthen all the advantages that existing social legislation
gives to workers.
16. Unless they are disabled, all Spaniards have the duty to
work. The National-Syndicalist State will not give the slightest
consideration to those who fail to perform some useful function
and who try to live as drones at the expense of the labor of the
majority of people.
LAND
17. We must, at all costs, raise the standard of living in the

countryside, which is Spain's permanent source of food. To this
end, we demand an agreement that will bring to culmination

without further delay the economic and social reforms of the
agricultural sector.
18. Our program of economic reforms will enrich agricultural
production by means of the following:
By assuring a minimum remuneration to all agricultural pro-
ducers.
By demanding that there be restored to the countryside, in order
to provide it with an adequate endowment, a portion of that which
the rural population is paying to the cities for intellectual and
commercial services.
By organizing a truly national system of agricultural credit
which will lend money to farmers at low interest against the
guarantee of their property and crops, and redeem them from
usury and local tyrants.
By spreading education with respect to better methods of farm-
ing and sheep raising.
By ordering the rational utilization of lands in accordance with
their suitability and with marketing possibilities.
By adjusting tariff policy in such a way as to protect agriculture
and the livestock industry.
By accelerating reclamation projects. By rationalizing the units
of cultivation, so as to eliminate wasted latifundia and uneconomic,
miniscule plots.
19. Our program of social reforms in the field of agriculture will
be achieved:
By redistributing arable land in such a way as to revive family
farms and give energetic encouragement to the syndicalization of
farm laborers.
By redeeming from misery those masses of people who presently
are barely eking out a living on sterile land, and by transferring
such people to new and arable lands.
20. We shall undertake a relentless campaign of reforestation
and livestock breeding, and we shall punish severely those who
resist it. We shall support the compulsory, temporary mobilization
of all Spanish youth for this historic goal of rebuilding the national
commonwealth.
21. The State may expropriate without indemnity lands of those
owners who either acquired them or exploited them illegally.
22. It will be the primary goal of the National-Syndicalist State
to rebuild the communal patrimonies of the towns.
NATIONAL EDUCATION-RELIGION
2 3. It shall be the essential mission of the State to attain by

means of rigorous disciplining of education a strong, united
national spirit, and to instill in the souls of future generations a
sense of rejoicing and pride in the fatherland.
All men shall receive premilitary training to prepare them for the
honor of being enlisted in the National and Popular Army of
Spain.
24. Cultural life shall be organized so that no talent will be
undeveloped because of insufficient economic means. All who
merit it shall be assured ready access to a higher education.
25. Our Movement incorporates the Catholic meaning-of
glorious tradition, and especially in Spain-of national recon-
struction.
The Church and the State will co-ordinate their respective
powers so as to permit no interference or activity that may impair
the dignity of the State or national integrity.
NATIONAL REVOLUTION
26. The Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las JONS de-

mands a new order, as set forth in the foregoing principles. In the
face of the resistance from the present order, it calls for a revolution
to implant this new order. Its method of procedure will be direct,
bold, and combative. Life signifies the art and science of warfare
( milicia) and must be lived with a spirit that is purified by service
and sacrifice.
Jose Antonio's sensitivity to what was politically expedient was re-

vealed late in 1934 when rumors spread that he would attend the
International Fascist Congress in Montreux, Switzerland, promoted by
the Italians. In a statement released to the press on December 18, he
flatly denied this.
Jose Antonio's Statement Regarding the International

Fascist Congress
(December 18, 1934)
The news that Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, Leader of the
Falange Espanola de las JONS, is preparing to attend a certain
International Fascist Congress that is to be held in Montreux is
totally false. The Leader of the Falange was invited to attend;
however, he flatly turned down the invitation in order to make
clear the genuinely national character of the Movement, which has
no intention of giving the appearance of possessing an international
leadership.
Moreover, the Falange Espanola de las JONS is not a fascist
movement. 4 It has certain similarities with fascism in the essential
points that possess universal validity, but every day its own pecu-
liar qualities are becoming clearer, and it is convinced that by
pursuing this path it will achieve its most fruitful possibilities.
Although Jose Antonio refrained from employing the label "fascist" to

describe his movement, he continued to display in his office an auto-
graphed photo of Mussolini, with whom he had conversed for half an
hour in Rome in October, 1933, and during the Italo-Ethiopian War he
stoutly defended the Italian cause. Yet this born aristocrat seems to
have had no real personal respect for the Duce, and he told some
friends that Mussolini had neither constructed a new juridical system
nor achieved a revolution but had merely created a myth that the
Spanish Falange could exploit to its own profit. 5 Jose Antonio's con-
tacts with Nazism were somewhat less formal, confined chiefly to a
brief vacation trip to Berlin in the spring of 1934. He was received by
only minor officials. Although he seems to have been impressed by
some of the economic and nationalist programs, his general reaction
was negative.
In mid-January, 1935, Jose Antonio strengthened his position as
"single Leader" of the Falange by persuading the party's Junta Politica
to expel Ledesma, who faded away into the labyrinth of the Spanish
postal system until he was shot during the Civil War. Jose Antonio
souRcE: Quoted in Fragoso del Toro (ed.), La Espana de ayer,
II (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1965), p. 79. By permission of the
publisher. My translation.
4. Italics in the original.-Ed.
5. Stanley Payne, The Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 77. Payne's book is the major study of
the Falange.
then managed to get his own close friend, a lawyer named Raimondo
Fernandez Cuesta, appointed secretary general of the party. By this
time the Falange had become a proper fascistic party, with the typical
salute, and blue shirts as the uniform. The hierarchic structure of the
party differentiated between "first-line" and "second-line" members.
The former numbered only 5,000 at the beginning of 1935 and be-
tween 8,000 and 10,000 a year later. Jose Antonio, the ]efe Nacional,
was also Jefe de Ia Primera Linea. Most of the first-line members
belonged to the Blue Shirt Militia, which trained on Sundays and
engaged in street fighting whenever this was deemed useful. Jose
Antonio sought to maintain the Militia's poetic spirit by reading Kip-
ling's "If" to them through a megaphone. 6 Two thirds of the party
members were under the age of twenty-one, students making up the
largest component, with professional men, white-collar workers, and
some ordinary laborers also conspicuous. There was a very small
women's section organized by Jose Antonio's sister Pilar. The Falangist
hymn was "Face to the Sun," inspired by a poem by the Cuban Martf.
On March 21, 1935, the first issue of the Falangist newspaper Arriba!
appeared in Madrid.
Spain's worsening political crisis reached a new stage in the parlia-
mentary elections of February 16, 1936. At that time a newly formed
Spanish Popular Front coalition won political control, to the great
alarm of rightist groups. In this election-the only one in which it
participated-the Falange mustered 40,000 votes throughout the coun-
try; of these, 5,000 were obtained in Madrid ( 1.2 per cent of the total)
and 4,000 in Valladolid (4 per cent of the total). Jose Antonio himself
gained 7,000 votes in Cadiz but lost the seat he had held in the Cortes
since 1933. Not a single Falangist was elected to the new Cortes. Thus
the party was more isolated than ever. As street fighting intensified in
Madrid, the Popular Front government suddenly outlawed the Falange
on March 14 and arrested Jose Antonio, who was to spend the remain-
ing few months of his life in jail.
In the spring of 1936 General Emilio Mala and other military men
fomented plots against the Popular Front as word spread of new moves
to grant political autonomy to the Basque country and other regions of
Spain. By May they persuaded the underground Falangist Militia to
help them against the workers' fighting groups. Jose Antonio was
worried, however, lest the Falange be exploited as a tool and later
discarded by the Army, as the following instructions issued from his
prison cell in Alicante on June 24 made clear.
6. Hugh Thomas, "Spain," inS. J. Woolf (ed.), European Fascism (New

York: Random House, 1968), p. 292.
Jose Antonio's Instructions from Prison

(June 24, 1936)
To ALL TERRITORIAL AND PROVINCIAL CoMMANDS:

URGENT AND MosT IMPORTANT
There has come to the attention of the Jefe N acional the existence
of numerous machinations in favor of more or less confused sub-
versive movements in various provinces of Spain.
The majority of the leaders of our organization, as was to be
expected, have kept headquarters informed of whatever projects
they have undertaken, and have restricted themselves in the field of
political action to carrying out instructions of their superior com-
mands. However, some of them, carried away by an excess of zeal
or by dangerous ingenuousness, have hastened to outline plans for
local action and to compromise the participation of our comrades
in certain political enterprises.
In most cases such action by comrades in the provinces has come
about because they felt that the military status of those inviting
them to conspire made them trustworthy. This makes it necessary
to explain matters a bit more clearly.
The respect and esteem of the Falange for the Army has been
proclaimed so often there is no need to reiterate it here. Ever since
the announcement of the 27 Points we have said that it is our
aspiration that a military conception of life, in the style of the
Army, should infuse all Spanish existence. Moreover, on recent and
memorable occasions, the Army has seen its dangers shared by our
comrades.
However, admiration and profound respect for the Army as an
essential organ of the fatherland does not mean that we must
conform to every single idea, word, or project that any soldier or
group of soldiers may profess, prefer, or cherish. Especially in the
field of politics, the Falange-which detests flattery because it
considers it the ultimate scorn for the one being flattered-regards
itself as being no less qualified than the average soldier. The politi-
cal training of soldiers is apt to be full of the noblest sort of
soURCE: Text in Fragoso del Toro (ed.), La Espana de ayer, II

(Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1965), pp. 398-401. By permission
of the publisher. My translation.
ingenuousness. The isolation from politics that the Army has
imposed on itself has generally had the effect of placing military
men in a condition of dialectical defenselessness against the charla-
tans and ambitious elements within the parties. It is generally
acknowledged that a mediocre politician can win much standing
among soldiers by simply manipulating in a cynical way some of
the most common qualities of military psychology.
For that reason, the political schemes of soldiers (excluding, of
course, those elaborated by a handful of well-educated people in
the Army) are not apt to be very relevant for the times. These
schemes almost always start out with a basic error-that of believ-
ing that Spain's ills are the result of simple mismanagement of
internal order, and that these can be corrected by handing over
power to the above-mentioned charlatans who lack any conception
of history, any genuine training, and any real desire to set the
fatherland on the path to fulfillment of its destiny.
The participation of the Falange in any of these premature and
ingenuous schemes would be a very grave undertaking and, even in
case of victory, would bring about its complete demise. The reason
for that is simply this: almost everyone who looks to the Falange
for this kind of enterprise views the Falange not as a coherent body
of doctrines nor as a force that intends to gain full control of the
State, but simply as auxiliary shock troops, a k~nd of assault force, a
youthful militia whose destiny tomorrow will be to pass in review
before the supremely self-centered elements who have come to
power.
Let all comrades consider up to what point it is offensive for the
Falange to propose to take part as supernumeraries in a movement
that does not intend to install the National-Syndicalist State or to
launch the vast task of reconstructing the fatherland sketched out
in our 27 Points but intends rather to reinstate a conservative,
bourgeois mediocrity (of which Spain has experienced too many
examples) that will only be adorned, for greater scorn, with the
choreographic accompaniment of our Blue Shirts.
Since such a prospect certainly holds no attraction to any true
militant, the present circular orders everyone in the most categori-
cal and unmistakable terms to do the following:
1. No matter what position he holds in the hierarchy, every
leader who is asked by a military or civilian element to take part in
a conspiracy, uprising, or similar thing must confine himself to this
response: "I cannot take part in anything, nor permit my comrades
to take part, in the absence of an express order from the central

headquarters. Consequently, if the top leadership of the movement
in question is interested in obtaining the help of the Falange, it
must propose this directly to the Jete Nacional and work out an
understanding directly with him or with someone whom he has
specifically designated."
2. No matter what position he holds in the hierarchy, any leader
who agrees to local pacts with military or civilian groups without
the express approval of the Jete Nacional will be expelled from the
Falange at once, and his expulsion will be publicized in every way
possible.
3. As the Jete Nacional insists on being personally assured of the
fulfillment of this order, he instructs all territorial and provincial
leaders with the greatest care to write to him in the provincial
prison of Alicante, where he is now located, communicating to him
their complete adherence to what is set forth in this circular and
furnishing him with a detailed repQrt of the towns to which JONS
has transmitted this order. In directing such letters to the Jete
N acional, the territorial and provincial leaders will not sign their
own names but use only the name of their respective province or
provmces.
4. A delay of more than five days in carrying out these instruc-
tions, counting from the date on which they are received, will be
considered a grave offense against the duties of co-operation within
the Movement.
What Jose Antonio feared was precisely what happened within a few
months after General Francisco Franco and the Army gained the
upper hand. In the meantime, Jose Antonio was convicted by a
"people's court" and shot on November 20, 1936. Now that he was
safely out of the way, he could be made the official martyr and patron
saint of the emerging Franco dictatorship-a system which in all likeli-
hood Jose Antonio would have opposed had he remained alive. After
the Civil War the body of Jose Antonio was reinterred with ceremony
in front of the high altar of Philip II's Escorial; and more recently it
has been transferred to the "Valley of the Fallen" shrine in the
Guadarrama mountains northwest of Madrid. Thus the cult of the
"martyr" of the Spanish "Crusade" was given a new lease on life. On
innumerable church walls in Spain are to be seen the commemorative
words "Jose Antonio Presente."
9. The Civil War and Franco's Triumph
THE CiviL War that broke out in the middle of July, 1936, was to drag
on for almost three years, costing the lives of hundreds of thousands
and producing all sorts of international repercussions. A day after the
uprising of Army units in Spanish Morocco on July 17, one of the
principal Army conspirators, General Francisco Franco, was flown in
from the Canary Islands. His first decision was to take steps to obtain
aerial transport planes from Italy and Germany so that he could move
his 32,000 men across the Straits of Gibraltar. From northern Spain
General Emilio Mola sent out similar pleas. Hitler's decision to aid the
rebels was forthcoming on July 26; Mussolini's the next day. It was
this decisive intervention by Germany and Italy that prevented the
Republican government from quickly putting down the rebellion.
Before the end of July German and Italian planes were facilitating the
airlift to the mainland, and within six weeks all of southwestern Spain
was taken. By September Franco's units were within 40 miles of
Madrid.
But the capital remained under the control of the Republican
(Loyalist) government, which hastily organized defenses with the help
of workers' committees and militias. At first, not a single Communist
was in the Loyalist government; liberal Republicans dominated it. But
after September, 1936, when the left-wing Socialist, Francisco Largo
Caballero, became premier, effective power tended to shift to his
faction and to the Communists. "International brigades," made up of a
broad spectrum of foreign anti-Fascist volunteers (including a good
many Italians) but largely co-ordinated by the Comintern, soon ap-
peared on Spanish battlefields. The Russians sent in numerous political
advisers as well as some material and technical aid. By the spring of
1937 Communist forces also gained the upper hand in Barcelona over
the autonomous Catalan republican government, hitherto controlled
by the anarcho-syndicalists. The latter hated the Communists as bit-
terly as they did Franco's Insurgents, the Roman Catholic Church, and
the capitalists.
Franco's Insurgents received even greater support from abroad than
did the Republicans. For both Mussolini and Hitler (who had forged
their Axis in October, 1936) there were obvious advantages to be
gained by supporting Franco, as the following political analysis by the
German ambassador in Rome made clear in the middle of December.
German and Italian Policy Toward the Spanish Civil War

(December 18, 1936)
The interests of Germany and Italy in the Spanish troubles

coincide to the extent that both countries are seeking to prevent a
victory of Bolshevism in Spain or Catalonia. However, while
Germany is not pursuing any immediate diplomatic interests in
Spain beyond this, the efforts of Rome undoubtedly extend toward
having Spain fall in line with its Mediterranean policy, or at least
toward preventing political cooperation between Spain on the one
hand and France and/ or England on the other. The means used for
this purpose are: immediate support of Franco; a foothold on the
Balearic Islands, which will presumably not be evacuated volun-
tarily unless a central Spanish government friendly to Italy is set
up; political commitment of Franco to Italy; and a close tie be-
tween Fascism and the new system of government to be established
in Spain.
. . . In connection with the general policy indicated above,
Germany has in my opinion every reason for being gratified if
Italy continues to interest herself deeply in the Spanish affair. . . .
The struggle for dominant political influence in Spain lays bare
the natural opposition between Italy and France; at the same time
the position of Italy as a power in the western Mediterranean
comes into competition with that of Britain. All the more clearly
will Italy recognize the advisability of confronting the Western
powers shoulder to shoulder with Germany-particularly when
considering the desirability of a future general understanding be-
tween Western and Central Europe on the basis of complete
equality. In my opinion the guiding principle for us arising out of
this situation is that we should let Italy take the lead in her Spanish
policy. . . . Anyone who knows the Spaniards and Spanish condi-
tions will regard with a good deal of skepticism and also concern
for future German-Spanish relations (perhaps even for German-
souRcE: Political Report of German Ambassador Hassell in Rome

to German Foreign Ministry, December 18, 1936. Document
157 in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-194),
Series D, Vol. III (Germany and Spanish Civil War, 1936-
1939) (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1950), pp.
170-173 passim.
THE CIVIL WAR AND FRANCO'S TRIUMPH 285
Italian cooperation) any attempt to transplant National Socialism
to Spain with German methods and German personnel. It will be
easier for Latin Fascism, which is politically more formalistic; a
certain aversion to the Italians on the part. of the Spaniards, and
their resentment against foreign leadership in general, may prove to
be a hindrance, but that is a matter for the Italians to cope
with. . . .
By January, 1937, Mussolini dispatched some 44,000 Fascist "volun-

teers," co-ordinated by General Mario Roatta, to aid Franco. In the
middle of March some of these Italian Fascists suffered a humiliating
defeat at Guadalajara, some 30 miles northeast of Madrid, at the hands
of Republican forces. Among the latter were a number of Italian anti-
Fascist exiles who had formed a volunteer "Garibaldi" battalion. The
psychological impact on Mussolini of this reversal was great. Not only
did he decide to increase substantially the number of his troops in
Spain; a few weeks later his agents assassinated Carlo Rosselli, the
talented and highly articulate democratic socialist leader of the anti-
Fascist emigre organization Justice and Liberty, who had rushed across
the Pyrenees with the fighting slogan "Today in Spain, tomorrow in
Italy! " 1
At the same time that Mussolini's Italy was raising its stakes in the
Spanish Civil War, Hitler's Germany was concluding a protocol with
the Franco regime.
German-Nationalist Spain Protocol of

March 20, 1937
PROTOCOL
136/73560-61
TOP SECRET SALAMANCA, March 20, 1937.
zu Pol. I 1648g Rs.
The German Government and the Spanish Nationalist Govern-

ment, convinced that the progressive development of the friendly
relations existing between them serves the welfare of the German
souRcE: Document 234 in Documents on German Foreign Policy,

1918-1945, Series D, Vol. III (Germany and Spanish Civil War,
1936-1939) (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1950),
pp. 256-257.
1. See Charles F. Delzell, Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist
Resistance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), Ch. IV.
and the Spanish peoples and will be an important factor for the
maintenance of European peace, which is close to both their hearts,
are agreed in their desire to lay down even now the guiding
principles for their future relations, and for this purpose have come
to an understanding on the following points:
1. Both Governments will constantly consult with one another
on the measures necessary to defend their countries against the
threatening dangers of Communism.
2. Both Governments will constantly maintain contact with one
another in order to inform each other concerning questions of
international policy which affect their joint interests.
3. Neither of the two Governments will participate in treaties or
other agreements with third powers which are aimed either di-
rectly or indirectly against the other country.
4. In case one of the two countries should be attacked by a third
power, the Government of the other country will avoid every-
thing that might serve to the advantage of the attacker or the
disadvantage of the attacked.
5. Both Governments are agreed in their desire to intensify the
economic relations between their countries as much as possible. In
this manner they reaffirm their purpose that the two countries shall
henceforth cooperate with and supplement one another in eco-
nomic matters in every way.
6. Both Governments will treat this protocol, which becomes
effective at once, as secret until further notice. At the proper time,
they will regulate their political, economic, and cultural relations in
detail by special agreements in accordance with the principles laid
down above.
Done in duplicate in the German and Spanish languages.
For the German Government:
For the Spanish Nationalist Government:
FAUPEL FRANCISCO FRANCO
In the early autumn of 1936 Franco's rebels chose Salamanca to be the

seat of their government, the "Junta de Defensa Nacional." Thus far
the Falange had no official status with the Junta; it was simply an
autonomous civilian force helping the rebel effort. Furthermore, it was
virtually leaderless for several weeks, because the Republican govern-
ment had arrested not only Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera but Fer-
nandez Cuesta and Ruiz de Aida, and had executed Ledesma. By this
time Onesimo Redondo had also met a violent death. In desperation,
the Falangist National Council met in Valladolid on September 4 to
choose a successor to Jose Antonio. The choice fell on Manuel Hedilla,
an ex-mechanic without formal education who had been a provincial
leader in Santander. The new party Jefe established his headquarters
alongside the Junta in Salamanca on October 1.
General Franco took a dim view of Hedilla and the other second-
string Falangists, but by early 1937 he perceived the need for some
kind of official ideology such as Falangism that would buttress the
Army's unimaginative regime. He sensed too that the Army and he
might reap political and military benefits if he gained control of both
the Falange Blue Shirt militia (whose membership had swollen during
the war to perhaps 126,000) and the 22,000-strong Requete militia of
the ultra-clerical, Carlist Traditionalists, dedicated foes of liberalism,
Masonry, and the Jews. Franco's views in this regard were greatly
reinforced by advice he received from his brother-in-law, Ramon
Serrano Sufier, who arrived in Salamanca in March, 1937, after escap-
ing from a Republican jail. Shrewdly political and much more fascistic-
minded than Franco, Serrano Sufier was ambitious to take over the
Falange and convert it into a "state party" that would do his bidding
and at the same time be acceptable to the Army and the Church. He
envisaged a "New State" that would be dominated by this single,
authoritarian party and rest on the juridical and socio-economic base
of corporativism.
By mid-April, 1937, it was clear to observers in Salamanca that a
political crisis was imminent. Although both Nazi Germany and
Fascist Italy felt closer ideologically to the Falange than to the old-
fashioned Army types that surrounded General Franco, they preferred
to hedge, as the following report of April 14 from the German
ambassador in Salamanca shows.
German and Italian Policy Toward

the Falange and General Franco
(April14, 1937)
On April 11 [ 19 37] I had a conference with General Franco
lasting more than two hours, in the course of which he expressed
his views on some questions of domestic policy, the future form of
government, and the military situation.
Franco's starting point was that even before the outbreak of
fighting the conviction had prevailed in wide circles in Spain that
the country was not making any progress with the old parlia-
souRcE: Letter of German Ambassador Faupel in Salamanca to

German Foreign Ministry, April 14, 1937. Document 243 in
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D,
Vol. III (German and Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939) (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Department of State, 1950), pp. 267-270 passim.
mentary system. The Falange, which in its ideas leaned heavily on

the National Socialist and Fascist model, had only a year ago been
very weak numerically. Only after the beginning of the Nationalist
movement led by Fran co had the Falange, with considerable assis-
tance from Nationalist-minded officers, obtained a great number of
adherents and thereby its present importance. But after the death
of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, regarding whose death there is in
Franco's opinion no doubt, the Falange lacked a real leader. Young
Primo de Rivera, although he had as yet had little experience, had
been a leader because of his intelligence and energy. His successor,
[Manuel] Hedilla, was a completely honest person, but by no
means equal to the demands imposed on the leader of the Falange.
Hedilla was surrounded by a whole crowd of ambitious young
persons who influenced him instead of being influenced and led by
him.
As for the leaders of the monarchist parties, Franco spoke
against [Manuel Fal Conde)2 in particular. . . .
Regarding his attitude toward the Falange and the monarchist
parties, Franco told me that he wished to fuse these groups into one
party, the leadership of which he himself would assume. To my
objection that the leadership of a party would take up a very great
deal of his time . . . , Franco replied that he, as head of the new
unity party, intended to form a Junta, probably consisting of four
representatives of the Falange and two representatives of the mon-
archist groups. The core of the unity party would be formed by
the Falange, which had the soundest program and the greatest
following in the country.
I discussed this development yesterday with our Landesgruppen-
leiter and the representation of the Fascio at the Italian Embassy;
the latter, not inaccurately, described the situation in these words:
"Franco is a leader without a party, the Falange a party without a
leader." If in his attempt to bring the parties together Franco
should meet with opposition from the Falange, we and the Italians
are agreed that, in spite of all our inclination toward the Falange
and its sound tendencies, we must support Franco, who after all
intends to make the program of the Falange the basis of his internal
policy. The realization of the most urgently needed social reforms
is possible only with Franco, not in opposition to him.
I then directed the conversation with Fran co to the rumor which
2. Leader of the Carlist Requetes.-Ed.

has been circulating here for several weeks regarding an impending

regency. . . . Franco told me that for Spain the return to the
monarchy was absolutely out of the question for the foreseeable
future . . . .
When Falangist disorders in Salamanca presented him with a conve-

nient pretext to intervene, Franco suddenly made the following speech
from his balcony on the night of April 18. Paying lip service to the
historic merits of both the Traditionalist and the Falangist forces, he
called for the unification of their militias under his own leadership.
Franco's Call for Unification of the Fighting Forces

(April18, 1937)
In the sacred name of Spain, and in the name of all who through
the centuries have died in behalf of a great, united, free, and uni-
versal Spain, I now address myself to our people:
We are confronted by a war that every day is taking on more of

the character of a crusade, of a transcendental struggle of historic
grandeur on the part of whole peoples and civilizations-a war in
which Spain once again has been selected by history to serve as the
field of tragedy and honor in order to bring peace to today's
enraged world.
What started out on July 17 [ 19 36] as our own civil war has
today turned into a conflagration that is going to illuminate the
future for centuries.
At this time, with a clear conscience and a firm sense of my
mission in behalf of Spain and in accordance with the will of the
Spanish fighters, I demand of everyone but one thing: Unity.
Unity, in order to bring the war speedily to an end; unity, in
order to undertake the great new task of peace, crystallizing in the
New Spain the thought and style of our National Revolution.
This unity which I call for in the name of Spain and in the
sacred name of those who have given their lives for her does not
mean a mere conglomeration of forces, or a governmental concen-
souRcE: Falange espanola tradicionalista y de las Juntas ofensivas

nacional-sindicalistas, Vicesecretaria de Educaci6n Popular,
Fundanzentos del Nuevo Estado (Madrid: Ediciones de la Vice-
secretaria de Educaci6n Popular, 1943), pp. 11-18. My transla-
~ion.
tration of political factions, or a sacred union of more or less

patriotic type. There is nothing inorganic, fleeting, or temporary in
what I am calling for.
I demand unity in our march toward a common goal-unity
both internally and externally, both in faith and in doctrine, both
as regards the forms to be manifested to the outside world and in
those to be manifested to ourselves.
. . . The Movement that we are leading today is precisely
that-a movement, not a program. And as such, it is in process of
elaboration and subject to constant revision and improvement to
the extent that is realistically possible. Far from being rigid or
static, it is a flexible thing. As a movement, it has consisted of
several stages.
The first of these we might label the ideal or normative. We are
referring to all the centuries of struggle in behalf of the Spanish
Reconquista, which sought to consolidate one unified, imperial
Spain under the Catholic Monarchs, Charles V, and Philip II. That
Spain, united for the purpose of defending and extending through-
out the world a universal and Catholic idea, a Christian Empire,
was the Spain which gave inspiration to so many other subsequent
developments that sought to recover this sublime and perfect
moment in our history.
The second chapter we shall call the historic or traditionalist
one. How many sacrifices have been made during the eighteenth,
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries to recover possessions that
were lost along the paths marked out for us by the imperial, Catho-
lic tradition of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries!
Our greatest effort to reviye that happy moment of Spain took
place during the civil wars of the last century. And the clearest
evidence of this is to be seen in the struggle of an ideal Spain
(represented by the Carlists) against a bastard Spain, a Frenchified
and Europeanized Spain of the liberals. The spiritual treasures of
sixteenth-century Spain were kept alive and localized in the rugged
terrain of Navarre.
And the third chapter is what we shall term the present or
contemporary one. And it, in its turn, has contained a variety of
sacred, heroic efforts toward unification, culminating in our own.
The first phase of this third chapter was the regime of Don
Miguel Primo de Rivera-a period of transition between the Pro-
nunciamiento of the nineteenth century and the organic con-
ception of those movements that our present-day world labels
"fascist" or "nationalist."
The second phase-which was extremely fruitful because it was
dominated by young people who opened their pure eyes to the best
in our past while remaining in the spiritual atmosphere of the
present-saw the formation of the group known as the JONS
(Juntas Ofensivas Nacional-Sindicalistas). And this was quickly
broadened and integrated by fusion with the Falange Espanola.
And leadership of this was assumed by the great national figure
Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, who continued thereby to give new
vigor and contemporary relevance to his father's noble efforts, and
also to influence other groups that were more or less related to
Catholics and Monarchists . . . and motivated by noble and patri-
otic sentiments.
That was the status of our movement within the sacred tradition
of Spain when July 17 [ 1936] erupted-a historic moment of
fundamental importance, in which all these phases and personalities
consolidated themselves for the joint struggle.
Above all, the Falange Espanola de las JONS, whose martyrs are
no less holy and powerful than those of ancient times, has captured
the support of masses of our young people. . . . From Navarre
burst forth the movement that had been steadfastly mounting
strength for more than two centuries-a Spanish tradition that was
not in the least parochial or regional, but rather a universal,
Hispanic, and imperial tradition which had been preserved amid
those indestructible crags, waiting for the opportune moment to
intervene and spread out, bringing with it an irrevocable faith in
God and a deep love for our fatherland.
Other forces and elements that were represented in a variety of
organizations and fighting forces (Milicias) also gave their support
to the struggle.
All of these recruits for the Movement of July 17 (the decisive
date in the final struggle of our history) are now enrolled in the
military cadres of our glorious Army. And in the political and civic
sector they are enrolled in comparable groups.
. . . We are determined, before God and the Spanish nation, to
conclude rapidly this work of unification! A work of unification
that our people have demanded of us, and a mission that God has
entrusted to us.
To bring this to fruition, we intend to do two things. First, we
shall maintain the spirit and style that the world demands of us in
this hour and that the genius of our fatherland offers to us, strug-
gling faithfully against all kinds of bastardy and arribismo. We
need militiamen, soldiers of the faith, not politicasters or debaters.
Second, our heart and our will demand a resolute spirit among the
fighting men at the front and the youth of Spain.
We do not want an old and corrupt Spain. We want a State in
which the pure tradition and substance of our ideal Spanish past is
manifested in new, vigorous, and heroic forms which the youth of
today and tomorrow will bring to our people in this new imperial
dawn.
And now let me address myself to those nations which because
of shortsightedness and materialism sell out their press to the gold
of the Reds and listen to the criminal propaganda broadcast by the
Reds, traffic in the products of theft, and shake hands with robbers
and assassins. Let me tell them that the greatest enemy of their
empires, the greatest danger for their countries, no longer consists
of those neighbors who once fought nobly against their frontiers,
or those who are now reappearing in international life with un-
equaled power and demanding a place in the exploitation of the
world. Now there is a greater danger that has come into existence
-and this is destructive Bolshevism, Russian Communism, a revo-
lution on the march-an enemy that, wherever it becomes en-
trenched, is hard to overthrow. It brings empires to disintegration,
destroys civilizations, and creates those great human tragedies
which, like the one in Spain, the world looks upon with indiffer-
ence and shows no desire to understand.
Red propaganda invokes democracy, liberty of the people, and
human fraternity, and charges Nationalist Spain with being an
enemy of these principles. Against this purely verbal and formal
democracy of the liberal State that everywhere is falling apart;
against this liberal State with its fictions of parties, electoral laws,
and balloting, its excess of formulas and conventions which, by
confusing means with ends, overlook the true democratic sub-
stance; against these shams, we who have abandoned such doc-
trinaire concerns now propose instead an effective democracy that
brings to the people what truly interests them-viz., a feeling that
they are being governed by integral justice, not only as regards law
and order but in social and economic matters; a sense of moral
freedom in the service of a patriotic creed and an eternal ideal; and
economic freedom, without which political freedom is just a
mockery.
Liberalism's exploitation of Spaniards will now be replaced by a
rational participation by everyone in the activities of the State, to
be achieved through family, municipal, and functional groupings
of a syndical sort.
We shall create justice and public order, without which human
dignity is impossible. We shall form powerful armed forces on sea,
land, and in the air that will conform to the heroic virtues that so
often have been demonstrated by Spaniards. And we shall revive
the classical university, which by continuing its glorious tradition
and spirit, its doctrine and morals, will again provide light and
guidance to the Spanish peoples.
This is the profile of the New State; this is what we made known
to you in October of last year, and which we are going to bring
about with firm step and no vacillation. This is what is common to
the majority of Spaniards who are not poisoned by materialism or
by Marxism. This is what figures in the creed of the Falange Es-
panola. This is what surrounds the spirit of our traditionalists. This
is the common element of those people who, after burying a falla-
cious liberalism, have oriented their politics along the road of
authoritarianism, increased patriotism, and social justice. This is
what our Spanish history contains, a history that is so rich in
effective freedoms set forth in its popular charters, statutory laws,
and corporations.
This is what is treasured in the Catholic doctrine that is pro-
fessed by the entire nation. . . .
Spaniards everywhere, lift up your hearts! Up with Spain!!!
Long live Spain! !!
The next evening Franco and his henchmen inflicted the coup de
grace. A decree drawn up by Serrano Sufier proclaimed the unification
of Falangists and Requetes as the official party of the Spanish "New
State." The party label henceforth was Falange Espanola Tradiciona-
lista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, more conve-
niently abbreviated to FET y de las JONS. Point 27 of the earlier
program which had forbidden any such fusion was quietly dropped at
this juncture.
Franco's Call for Unification of the Militias

(Apri/19, 1937)
Efficient government . . . demands regimentation of both

the individual and the collective activities of all Spaniards toward a
common destiny.
souRcE: Boletin Oficial, April 20, 1937; reprinted in Falange es-

panola tradicionalista y de las Juntas ofensivas nacional-sindica-
This truth, which the good sense of the Spanish people has
perceived so clearly, is incompatible with the strife of parties and
political organizations. . . .
Now that the war has reached an advanced stage and the hour of
victory nears, it is urgent to undertake the great task of peace and
to crystallize in the New State the thought and· style of our
National Revolution. . . .
The unification which I am demanding in the name of Spain and
in the sacred name of those who have sacrificed their lives for
it-both heroes and martyrs-and to whom we shall always look
with fidelity, does not mean a conglomeration of forces or a mere
governmental concentration, or a temporary union. . . . We must
avoid the creation of an artificial party, but rather bring together
all our recruits in such a way as to integrate and synthesize them
into a single national political entity that will link State and Society
and guarantee the political continuity and loyalty of the people to
the State. . . .
In Spain, as in other countries where there are totalitarian
regimes, traditional forces are now beginning to integrate them-
selves with new forces. The Falange Espanola has attracted masses
of young people by its program, its new-style propaganda, and has
provided a new political and heroic framework for the present and
a promise of Spanish fulfillment in the future. The Requetes, in
addition to possessing martial qualities, have served through the
centuries as the sacred repository of the Spanish tradition and of
Catholic spirituality, which have been the principal formative
elements in our nationality-and whose eternal principles of moral-
ity and justice shall continue to inspire us.
Because of all the foregoing,
I order that
Art. 1: The Falange Espanola and the Requetes, together with
all their existing services and units, shall be integrated, under my
leadership, into a single political entity of national character which
henceforth shall be named the Falange Espanola T radicionalista y
delasJONS.
The principal mission of this organization (which shall stand
listas, Vicesecretaria de Educaci6n Popular, Fundamentos del

Nuevo Estado (Madrid: Ediciones de la Vicesecretaria de Edu-
caci6n Popular, 1943), pp. 18-23. My translation.
midway between our Society and State) is to communicate to the
State the feelings of the people and to convey to it their thought as
expressed in political and moral virtues, hierarchic service, and
brotherhood.
Everyone who possesses a membership card in either the Falange
Espanola or the Comunion Tradicionalista on the date of publica-
tion of this decree shall be regarded as an original and rightful
member of the new organization, and other Spaniards who seek to
join may do so after proper admission.
All other political organizations and parties are hereby dissolved.
Art. 2: The guiding organs of the new national political entity
shall be the Chief of State (] efe del Est ado), a Secretariat or Politi-
cal Junta, and the National Council.
It shall be the task of the Secretariat or the Political Junta to
draw up the internal constitution of the body, the purpose of which
shall be to assist the fefe in preparing the organic structure of the
State and to assist in every way the work of the government.
Half of its members (who will initiate its tasks) will be desig-
nated by the Chief of State; the other half will be elected by the
National Council.
In a manner to be established by appropriate decrees, the
National Council shall acquaint itself with whatever great national
problems the Chief of State submits to it.
While steps are being completed for the definitive organization
of the totalitarian New State, measures shall also be taken to satisfy
the strong national yearnings of members of the Falange Espanola
Tradicionalista y de las JONS to participate in the organisms and
services of the State and impart new rhythm to them.
Art. 3: The fighting forces of the Falange Espanola and of the
Requetes shall be fused into a single National Militia, but shall
preserve their external emblems and banners. Other fighting forces
that have won honor in the war shall also be incorporated therein.
The National Militia shall serve as an auxiliary of the Army.
The Chief of State shall be the Supreme Commander of the
Militia. A general of the Army shall serve as the immediate com-
mander, and he shall have two military assistants, who shall come
respectively from the Militias of the Falange Espanola and the
Requetes.
To preserve the purity of its style, two political counselors shall
be named to the headquarters.
Done at Salamanca, the 19th of April, 193 7.
In view of the military realities most rank-and-file Falangists prudently

swore allegiance to Franco. But a number of balky party leaders,
including Hedilla, refused and had to be arrested. Sentenced to solitary
confinement and life imprisonment in the Canary Islands, Hedilla was
transferred to Majorca after the war.
Falangism had become a tool of the military dictatorship. Power
now rested securely in the hands of Franco, Serrano Suiier, and the
military hierarchy, almost none of whom were old-line Falangists.
Indeed, Franco stood much closer to the Spanish tradition of the
caudillo, of the successful military leader and of old Miguel Primo de
Rivera, then to the Falange. But the party could be used to checkmate
monarchists, prelates, and bankers. In various interviews with corre-
spondents in the summer and fall of 1937 Franco spoke of his intention
of setting up a "totalitarian" state based upon a single-party movement.
He kept open the possibility of a postwar monarchical restoration, but
insisted that it would have to be a very different kind of monarchy
from that which had collapsed in 1931. In reply to questions whether
his new regime would resemble those in Italy and Germany, he an-
swered affirmatively to the extent that Spain's New State would
reinforce the principle of hierarchy, exalt patriotic love of country,
practice social justice, and promote the well-being of both the middle
and the working classes. At the same time, however, he stressed that
Spain would not be blindly imitative, and he insisted that most of the
modern formulas that characterize totalitarian regimes were already
present in Spain's ancient traditions. All Spaniards would participate
by means of the single totalitarian party in the municipal and syndical
functioning of the New State.
On August 4, 1937, Franco gave his approval to the revised Statutes
of the FET y de las JONS. Among the innovations were thirteen
"special services," which tended to parallel the bureaucratic structure
of the state and provide a measure of training for service therein. Party
approval was necessary for appointments at the local and provincial
levels of the bureaucracy. The statutes printed below bear the date
July 31, 1939, and include a few changes in the functioning of the
Jefatura Nacional that the conclusion of the war made possible.
Statutes of the Fa lange

Espanola Tradicionalista y de las ]ONS
(July 31, 1939)
In the Statutes of the Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las
JONS that were approved by my decree of August 4, 1937, provi-
sion was included for making whatever modifications of the consti-
souRcE: Decree by the Jefatura Nacional of July 31, 1939, printed

in Boletin Oficial of August 4, 1939; reprinted in Falange
espanola tradicionalista y de las Juntas ofensivas nacional-sindica-
tution and functioning of organs might be desirable at war's end
and with the advent of peace. Together with some other changes
that experience has suggested, I now proceed to approve the re-
vised text of the above-mentioned Statutes. . . .
CHAPTER I: GENERAL REGULATIONS
Art. 1: The FET y de las JONS serves as the militant inspirational

Movement and basis of the Spanish State. Through its determina-
tion and creed, it assumes the task of restoring to Spain a deep and
indestructible sense of singleness of purpose and faith. Confident of
its Catholic and imperial mission as the protagonist of History, it
establishes the basis of an economic regime that will rise above
interests of individuals, groups, and classes, and will foster the
multiplication of goods for the service of State, Social Justice, and
Christian personal freedom.
The FET y de las JONS provides the disciplined means
whereby the people, united and orderly, are linked to the State,
and the State inculcates upon the people the virtues of service,
fraternity, and hierarchy.
For the attainment of all these goals and the heroic establishment
of the State, it integrates into one single force the Comuni6n
Tradicionalista (which stands as the guarantor of historic continu-
ity) and the Falange Espanola de las JONS (which is the vocation,
form, and style of the National Revolution).
The FET y de las JONS constitutes a permanent guardian of
the eternal values of the fatherland that have been courageously
defended in three civil wars, exalted by voice and blood of the new
generation on October 29, 1934, and definitively redeemed by the
Army and the popular Militia on the historic occasion of July 17,
1936.
Art. 2: The emblem of the FET y de las JONS shall consist of
five intersecting arrows, with a yoke resting on the intersecting
point.
Art. 3: The Movement constitutes one single legal personality
with one single patrimony. Any authorization for the acquisition
of properties shall be done for the benefit of this patrimony. . . .
listas, Vicesecretarfa de Educaci6n Popular, Fundamentos del

caci6n Popular, 1943), pp. 22-37 passim. My translation.
A special Regulation shall set forth the norms to govern the

economic activities of the various organs of the FET y de las
JONS.
Art. 4: The FET y de las JONS shall consist of the following
elements and organs: (1) the members; ( 2) the local F alanges; ( 3)
the Provincial Governing Bodies [J efaturas] ; ( 4) the Regional
Inspectorates; (5) Services; (6) Militias and Syndicates; (7) Na-
tional Inspectorates; ( 8) National Delegates; ( 9) General Secre-
tary of the Movement; ( 10) Political Junta; (11) President of the
Political Junta; (12) National Council; (13) the Caudillo or Na-
tional Head of the Movement.
CHAPTER II: REGARDING MEMBERS
Art. 5: Members are divided into two categories-militants and

adherents.
Militants are those who, in accepting resolutely the discipline of
all organs of the Movement and declaring their willingness to
consecrate themselves to the fulfillment of its ends, possess any of
the following attributes:
(A) Those who belonged as of April 20, 1937, to one of the
two integral forces of the Movement, or who have been admitted
directly by the Political Junta prior to the publication of the
Statutes that were approved by decree on August 4, 19 37.
(B) The generals, fefes, officials, and classes of the National
Armed Forces of land, sea, and air who were either on duty or
called into service during the war.
(C) Those who attain this status by personal decision of the
Caudillo or by recommendation from the Provincial Jefaturas for
reason of outstanding service to the National Cause, either in
preparation for the Military Uprising or during the war.
(D) Those who attain this status by virtue of provisions m
Art. 7.
Art. 6: Militants enjoy all the rights and obligations conferred
upon them by the present statutes and regulations. An official
booklet, approved by the J efatura, will confirm their status.
Art. 7: Upon application, adherents may be admitted by the
General Secretary, the provincial Jefes, and the local Jefes.
Adherents shall serve in the FET y de las JONS without any of
the rights or status of members thereof. Prior to the expiration of
five years, the appropriate provincial Jefe must decide clearly the
status of the adherent, either raising him to the category of militant
or excluding him from the Organization. An appeal from this deci-
sion may be made to the General Secretary.
Whenever an adherent demonstrates that he has given important
service to the fatherland during the war, his status shall be decided
within fifteen days. If the provincial Jefe does not then grant him
the status of militant, the adherent may appeal to the General Secre-
tary if endorsed by twelve militants or if the petition is accom-
panied by a statement from either the commander of the combat
unit or the civil authorities.
Those who exercised political roles in the Central Administra-
tion prior to July 17, 193 6, must make application directly to the
General Secretary.
Art. 8: All members must subscribe to the formula of adherence
and oath set forth by the National Jefatura of the Movement.
Members of the FET y de las JONS shall pay the specified
progressive quota. . . .
CHAPTER III: REGARDING LocAL ORGANIZATIONS
Art. 11: In order to constitute a local Falange, a minimum of

twenty militant members and authorization from the provincial
J efatura are required. .
CHAPTER IV: REGARDING PROVINCIAL jEFATURAS

AND REGIONAL INSPECTORATES
Art. 18: The Caudillo shall designate a Jefatura for each province,
to be headed by only one militant.
These Jefes, who possess full authority and responsibility, shall
have the responsibility of transmitting to the local Falanges in their
provinces the decisions of the National Jefe of the Movement, and
of seeing that these are fully carried out, and of inspecting the
services of their geographical zone. . . .
CHAPTER v: REGARDING SERVICES
Art. 22: The National Jefatura of the Movement will create those
services which it considers to be appropriate for the division of
labor and the co-ordination of the energies of the FET y de las
JONS in the work of national resurgence.
A delegate, freely appointed and dismissed by the national fefe,

shall head each National Service. Each service shall create what-
ever sections are necessary for the fulfillment of the National
Syndicalist program.
Art. 23: Without prejudice to the powers bestowed upon the
national Jefe by the preceding article, the following services shall
exist: (I) External; (2) National Education; (3) Press and Propa-
ganda; ( 4) Women's Section; ( 5) Social Work; ( 6) Syndicates;
( 7) Youth Organization; ( 8) Veterans' Organization; ( 9) Ex-
Prisoners' Organization; (1 0) Justice and Rights; ( 11) Communi-
cation and Transportation; ( 12) Treasury and Administration;
( 13) Information and Investigation.
There shall also be a National Inspector of Education and
Religious Assistance. . . .
CHAPTER VI: REGARDING THE MILITIA
Art. 27: Both in war and in peace the Militias represent the ardent
spirit of the FET y de las JONS and its manly determination to
serve the fatherland as a vigilant guardian of its principles against
all domestic enemies. Not just a part of the Movement, it is the
Movement itself and is involved in heroic military action in its
behalf.
Art. 28: The Supreme Command of the Militias is held by the
Caudillo, who may delegate his prerogatives to a Jefe who shall
have direct responsibility.
The hierarchic structure of the Militias shall be set forth in a
special Regulation.
CHAPTER VII: REGARDING THE SYNDICATES
Art. 29: The FET y de las JONS will create and maintain appro-
priate syndical organizations for regulating labor, production, and
distribution. In each instance, the leaders of these organizations will
come from the ranks of the Movement, and they will be co-ordi-
nated and instructed by its Jefaturas in order to guarantee that the
syndical organization conforms to the national interest and is
infused with the ideals of the State.
Art. 30: The National Delegation of Syndicates will be en-
trusted to only one militant, and its internal organization shall be of
vertical and hierarchical structure in the manner of a just, disci-
plined, and creative Army.
CHAPTER VIII: REGARDING THE PoLITICAL juNTA
Art. 31: The Political Junta, Delegation of the National Council

and permanent organ of government of the FET y de las JONS,
shall consist of a President who is freely appointed by the Caudillo;
a Vice-President and ten National Councilors, five of whom are
appointed by the Council upon recommendation of the Caudillo,
and the other five appointed directly by the Council.
Vacancies that occur shall be filled by the Caudillo from mem-
bers of the National Council. . . .
Art. 32: The duties of the Political Junta include:
1. The study and presentation of problems of interest to the
broad advancement of the Movement.
2. The presentation to the national ]efe of those proposals and
initiatives that he deems suitable in all respects.
3. Tendering advice to the national ]efe regarding whatever
items he submits to them.
4. Examination of the budget and control of finances.
Whenever it is deemed necessary, the Political Junta may re-
quest oral or written information from any militant regarding
matters in his competence.
Art. 33: The Junta shall meet at least once a month and when-
ever summoned by the national Jefe of the Movement or by its
President.
CHAPTER IX: REGARDING THE NATIONAL CouNCIL
Arts. 34 and 35 ..a The Council shall consist of: (1) The national
]efe, who is President thereof; (2) the Secretary General; (3) the
Ministers; ( 4) the President of the Cortes; ( 5) the Vice-Secretary
General; ( 6) the Vice-Secretaries of the Movement; ( 7) the Jefe
in immediate command of the Militias; ( 8) the militants of the
Movement who have occupied the positions of President and Vice-
President of the Political Junta, Secretary General, and Vice-
Secretary General of the FET y de las JONS; (9) the President of
the Institute of Political Studies; (10) the National Delegates of
the FET y de las JONS; (II) the provincial Jefes of the Move-
3. Modified and revised by Decree of November 23, 1942.

ment in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Seville, Malaga, Bilbao,

Saragossa, and Valladolid; (12) the militants whom the Caudillo
designates because of merits or services, but not to exceed one
hundred in number.
Vacancies may be filled freely at any time by the national
]efe . ...
Art. 39: The National Council of the FET y de las JONS shall
be acquainted with:
1. Basic policies regarding the structure of the Movement.
2. Basic policies regarding the structure of the State.
3. Guiding policies for syndical organization.
4. All great national questions that the Jefe of the Movement
submits.
5. Great questions of an international nature.
The Council shall make recommendations whenever the Jefe of
the Movement requests same.
Art. 40: The Caudillo shall secretly designate his successor, who
will be proclaimed by the Council in case of his death.
Art. 41: The Council must meet every year on the seventeenth
of July and whenever it is convened by the Caudillo . . . .
CHAPTER X: REGARDING THE GENERAL SECRETARY
Art. 43: The Caudillo shall freely appoint the General Secretary
whose duties and powers are to:
1. Transmit all orders of the national ]efe and Political Junta to
any of the organs of the Movement.
2. Inspect and direct, upon orders of the national/efe, the work
of the Provincial Jefaturas and Services.
3. Maintain discipline and propose to the Supreme Commander
those measures which he regards as appropriate for the activity of
the Movement but which do not transcend the competence of
either the National Council or the Political Junta.
4. Maintain documentary order and consistency in the work of
the FET y de las JONS.
5. Act as secretary at meetings of the National Council and the
Political Junta, and carry out its decisions.
6. Participate as a Minister in the tasks of Government. . . .
CHAPTER XI: REGARDING THE PRESIDENT OF THE PoLITICAL JuNTA

Art. 46: It is the function of the President of the Political Junta,
who shall be freely appointed and dismissed by the national /efe, to
supervise the work of the Junta. . . .
CHAPTER XII: REGARDING THE NATIONAL ]EFE oF THE MovEMENT
Art. 47: The national Jefe of the FET y de las JONS, who is
Supreme Caudillo of the Movement, personifies all the values and
all the honors thereof. As Author of the Historic Era wherein
Spain is gaining the possibility of achieving its destiny and thereby
the deepest aspirations of the Movement, the Jefe assumes in
plenary fashion the most absolute authority.
The Jefe answers before God and before History.
Art. 48: It is the Caudillo's right to designate his successor, who
shall receive from him the same honors and obligations. The
manner of succession, foreseen in the present Statutes, shall be
regulated in its details by the National Council.
CHAPTER XIII: REGARDING REVISION AND

INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES
Art. 49: These Statutes may be modified by.the National Council

upon recommendation of the national Jefe, but in urgent cases the
l efe may carry out this action by himself.
Their interpretation and doctrine shall always be in the power of
the Caudillo, who is the only person who may determine the
modalities of circumstance, rhythm, and timing for giving everlast-
ing recognition to our Absent Ones, the builders and continuers of
the Spanish Tradition, and to all those who have given their lives
for the glory of Spain.
Additional disposition: The new National Council is approved
by this Decree.
Done at Burgos, the 31st day of July, 1939, Year of the Victory.
FRANCISCO FRANCO.
When Fernandez Cuesta arrived in rebel territory as a result of an

exchange of prisoners in the fall of 19 37, Franco decided to let him
become party secretary again. But his authority in the Movement was
never more than nominal, for Franco and Serrano Sufier always kept
real power in their own hands. When the Generalissimo formed his
first regular cabinet on January 30, 1938, he designated Serrano
(scornfully called the cufiadisimo, or "most high brother-in-law" by
his rivals) to be both Minister of Interior and ] efe N acional for Press
and Propaganda in the party. All the other ministerial posts were as-
signed to non-Falangists.
Meanwhile, the urgency of social and economic reforms in the New
State was apparent. The German and Italian representatives in Sala-
manca had long pleaded with Franco to give attention to such matters.
The Italian Fascists were especially anxious that he draw up a Charter
of Labor along the lines Mussolini had followed in Italy in 1927. Before
this document was completed, however, Franco's government an-
nounced the formation in January, 1938, of a Ministry of Syndical
Organization, consisting of five national services: Syndicates; Jurisdic-
tion and Housing of Labor; Social Security; Emigration; and Statistics.
Provision was made for a Central Syndical Council of Co-ordination to
superintend the work of national syndicalist centers in each province.
Within a few months Labor Magistrates were also instituted to adjudi-
cate disputes. Needless to say, appointments to all levels of this
bureaucratic mechanism were tightly controlled from above. Further-
more, two important sectors-banking and agricultural production-
were left outside the purview of the syndical structure. The former
could look to the Ministry of Economics for protection, the latter to
the Ministry of Agriculture. National syndicalism was never integrated
with the legislative branch of government in Spain to the extent that it
was in Italy, where Mussolini in 1939 finally converted the lower house
of parliament into the Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations.
After lengthy consideration of three drafts, a Spanish Labor Charter
was announced at last on March 9, 1938. Left-wing Falangists were not
entirely pleased with the final version, which reflected a strongly
paternalistic and regulatory attitude toward labor. The syndical struc-
ture that went into effect did not represent the workers but controlled
them in the interests of the state and employers. This system con-
trasted markedly with the original Falangist theory which had looked
upon the syndicates as dynamic revolutionary organisms to promote
national economic reformation.
The Labor Charter

(March 9, 1938)
PREAMBLE
Reviving the Catholic tradition of social justice and the lofty sense
of humanity that inspired the laws of the Empire, The State-
souRcE: Decree of March 9, 193 8, published in the Boletin Oficial

of March 10, 1938, and in English translation by the Spanish
which is national by reason of being an instrument wholly at the
service of the entire Nation, and syndical in so far as it represents a
reaction against nineteenth century capitalism and communistic
materialism-embarks upon the task of carrying out, with a disci-
plined constructive and soberly religious demeanor, the revolution
that Spain is achieving to ensure that Spaniards may once more
possess, for good and all, their Country, Bread and Justice.
To attain this end and at the same time put into practice the
motto of the unity, greatness and freedom of Spain, it enters the
social field with the determination that the common wealth shall be
at the service of the Spanish people and that the country's econ-
omy shall be subordinated to that policy.
Basing itself on the postulate that Spain is one and indivisible as
regards her destiny, it hereby declares its aim to make Spanish
industry-in the fellowship of all its components-one and indi-
visible, so that it may minister to the needs of the country and
uphold the instruments of its power.
The recently established Spanish State, in these declarations of
what is to be the inspiration of its social and political economy, is
putting faithfully into a concrete form the desires and demands of
all who are fighting in the trenches and who compose, through
their honor, valor and labor, the most progressive aristocracy of
this era in the nation's history.
Be it known, therefore, to all Spaniards; who are united in
sacrifice and in hope, that WE DECLARE:
I. WoRK FOR ALL
Firstly. Work is man's participation in production by means of the

willingly given exercise of his mental and manual abilities, accord-
ing to his personal vocation, that he may live a more seemly and
comfortable life whilst assisting in the development of the national
economy.
Secondly. Work, being essentially personal and human, cannot
be lowered to the merely material idea of a merchandise, nor be
made the subject of any transaction incompatible with the self-
respect of him who lends it.
Thirdly. The right to work is a consequence of the duty to do
Press Services, Ltd., 99 Regent St., London, W. 1, The Labour

Charter for Franco's Spain (n.d.).
so that God demands of man for the fulfilment of his individual

ends and the prosperity and greatness of his country.
Fourthly. The State values and exalts work-the fertile expres-
sion of man's creative spirit; and, as such, will protect it with all the
force of the law, showing it the greatest consideration and making
it compatible with other individual, family and social ends.
Fifthly. Work, being a social duty, will be universally de-
manded in some form or other of all Spaniards who are not cripples
as it is deemed a tribute all must pay to the wealth of the country.
Sixthly. Work is one of the noblest attributes of rank and honor
and is sufficient justification for demanding the assistance and
guardianship of the State.
Seventhly. Service is that work which is given with heroism,
disinterestedness and abnegation with the object of helping to-
wards the supreme good which Spain represents.
Eighthly. All Spaniards have the right to work. The satisfaction
of this right is one of the main concerns of the State.
II. HouRs AND CoNDITIONS oF WoRK
Firstly. The State undertakes to exercise constant and effective

action in defense of the worker, his living and his work. It will set
proper limits to the working hours to prevent them being excessive
and will grant labor every safeguard of a defensive and humani-
tarian order. It will specially prohibit night work for women and
children, regulate home-work and free married women from the
workship and the factory.
Secondly. The State will keep Sunday as a day of rest, as a
sacred condition for the lending of labor.
Thirdly. Without loss of pay, and taking into account the
technical requirements of the industry, the law will enforce the
recognition of the religious holidays tradition demands, civil holi-
days which have been so declared and attendance at such cere-
monies as the national leaders of the movement may ordain.
Fourthly. July 18th, the date of the beginning of the Glorious
Rising, having been proclaimed a national holiday, will be cele-
brated as the Feast of Homage to Labor.
Fifthly. Every worker will have a right to paid yearly holidays
in order to enjoy a deserved rest, and the necessary machinery to
ensure the better fulfilment of this order will be prepared.
Sixthly. The requisite institutions will be created so that, in their
leisure hours, the workers may have access to all means of culture,
happiness, health, sport and volunteer training.
III. REMUNERATION AND SECURITY
Firstly. The minimum basis of payment for work shall be suffi-

cient to provide the worker and his family with a worthy, moral
living.
Secondly. Family subsidies will be established through suitable
bodies.
Thirdly. The standard of living of the workers will be raised
gradually and inflexibly in proportion as the higher interests of the
nation permit.
Fourthly. The State will fix rules for regulating work, in ac-
cordance with which relations between workers and employers
will be arranged. The principal contents of the said relations will
be both the giving of labor and its remuneration and the reciprocal
duty of loyalty, assistance and protection in the employers and
faithfulness and obedience on the part of the workers.
Fifthly. Through the Guild the State will be at pains to learn
whether economic and all kinds of conditions in which work is
being done are fair to the workers.
Sixthly. The State will see to the security and continuity of
work.
Seventhly. The employer shall inform his personnel of the
progress of production sufficiently to stre~gthen their sense of
responsibility in the same, and in the terms to be laid down by
law.
IV. THE ARTISAN
The artisan, who is a living heritage of a glorious guild past, will be

fostered and efficiently protected, as being a complete embodiment
of the human person in his work and representing a form of
production equally distant from capitalist concentration and gre-
garious Marxism.
V. AGRICULTURAL WoRK
Firstly. Regulations for agricultural labor will be adapted to its

special characteristics and the seasonal variations which Nature
ordains.
Secondly. The State will pay special attention to the technical
education of the agricultural producer, thus enabling him to per-
form all the work demanded by each unit of development.
Thirdly. The prices of the chief products will be regulated and
fixed in such a way as to ensure a minimum profit in normal condi-

tions to the agricultural employer, and consequently such as to
make him pay his laborers wages that will enable them to improve
their living conditions.
Fourthly. The aim will be pursued of giving every peasant
family a small holding of family land sufficient for its own ele-
mentary needs and to provide work during periods of unem-
ployment.
Fifthly. Rural life will be enhanced by the improvement of
peasants' dwellings and of the sanitary condition of the villages and
hamlets of Spain.
Sixthly. The State will guarantee to tenants continuity in culti-
vating their land by means of long term contracts to safeguard
them against unjustified eviction and to ensure for them the extinc-
tion of debt for any improvements they may have made in the
period. The State aspires to find ways and means to cause the land
to pass, on fair terms, into the hands of those who work it directly.
VI. TOILERS OF THE SEA
The State will look after the toilers of the sea with the utmost
solicitude, giving them proper institutions to prevent depreciation
of their wares and helping them to acquire the necessary equip-
ment for carrying on their profession.
VII. LABOR MAGISTRACY
A new Labor Magistracy will be created based on the principle

that this function of justice is a matter for the State.
VIII. CAPITAL AND ITS RoLE
Firstly. Capital is an instrument of production.

Secondly. The Enterprise (employer or Firm), as a producing
unit, will arrange the members composing it in such a way that
those of an instrumental nature shall be subordinate to those of a
human category, and all alike to the common good.
Thirdly. The head of the Firm will take on himself its manage-
ment, and be responsible to the State for the same.
Fourthly. After allotting a fair interest to capital, the profits of
the Firm will be firstly applied to the reserves necessary for its
sound position, the improvement of production and the betterment
of working conditions and the living of the workers.
IX. CREDIT FOR DEVELOPMENT
Firstly. Credit will be so ordered that, besides attending to its task

of developing the country's resources, it may assist in creating and
supporting the small farmer, fisherman, industrialist and business
man.
Secondly. Honorable conduct and confidence, based on skill in
work, will comprise effective security for the granting of credit.
The State will implacably suppress all forms of usury.
X. SociAL INsuRANCE
Firstly. Savings will give the worker the certitude of being pro-
tected when in misfortune.
Secondly. There will be an increase in the social insurances
against old age, disablement, maternity, work accidents, profes-
sional sicknesses, consumption and unemployment, the ultimate aim
being the establishment of total insurance. A primary aim will be to
devise means for providing a sufficient pension for superannuated
workers.
XI. PROTECTION AND PRODUCTION
Firstly. National production constitutes an economic unit at the

service of the Country. It is the duty of every Spaniard to defend,
improve and increase it. All factors combining in production are
subordinate to the supreme interest of the Nation.
Secondly. Individual or collective acts that in any way disturb
normal production or attempt to do so, will be considered as crimes
of treason against the Country.
Thirdly. Unjustifiable slackening in output will be the subject
of appropriate punishment.
Fourthly. In general the State will not be a business concern,
except to compensate for the absence of private initiative or when
the higher interests of the nation so require it.
Fifthly. The State itself, or through the Guilds, will prevent all
unfair competition in the field of production as well as such activ-
ities as obstruct the normal establishment or development of the
national economy, but will encourage, on the other hand, all initia-
tive that tends to its betterment.
Sixthly. The State recognizes private initiative as being a copi-
ous source for the economic life of the Nation.
XII. PROPERTY AND THE FAMILy
Firstly. The State recognizes and protects private property as a

natural means for fulfilling individual, family and social functions.
All forms of property are subordinate to the supreme interests of
the nation, whose interpreter is the State.
Secondly. The State assumes the task of multiplying and putting
within the reach of all Spaniards those forms of property vitally
bound up with the person, the family health, the ownership of land
and the instruments or goods of labor for daily use.
Thirdly. It looks on the family as the prime natural unit and
foundation of society and, at the same time, as a moral institution
endowed with an inalienable right superior to any positive law. As
a greater safeguard to its preservation and continuance, the im-
munity of family patrimony from attachment will be recognized.
XIII. PRINCIPLES OF THE ORGANIZATION
Firstly. The National Guild organization of the State finds its

inspiration in the principles of Unity, Totality and Hierarchy.
Secondly. All factors of economy will be incorporated, by
branches of production or services, in vertical Guilds. The liberal
and technical professions will be similarly organized as the law may
prescribe.
Thirdly. The vertical Guild is a corporation by public law,
which is formed by combining into one single organism all ele-
ments that devote themselves to fulfilling the economic process
within a certain service or branch of production, arranged in order
of rank, under the direction of the State.
Fourthly. The officials of the Guilds will necessarily be chosen
from the active members of the Spanish Traditionalist Phalanx
[Falange].
Fifthly. The vertical Guild is an instrument at the service of the
State through which it will chiefly carry out its economic policy. It
is the duty of the Guild to know the problems of production and
propose solutions subordinating them to the national interest. The
vertical Guild may intervene through specialized bodies in the
regulation, supervision and fulfilment of the conditions of work.
Sixthly. The vertical Guild may initiate and maintain bodies of
investigation, moral, physical and professional education, savings
and assistance, as well as other bodies of a social character of
necessity to the elements of production.
Seventhly. It will establish employment bureaux to find work
for the worker properly adapted to his ability and merits.
Eighthly. It is a duty of the Guilds to supply the State with exact
data to work out the statistics of their production.
Ninthly. The law of Guild organization will decide the way in
which the existing economic or professional associations shall be
incorporated.
XIV. PROTECTION oF THE SPANISH WoRKER
The State will issue the opportune measures to be taken for pro-
tecting national labor in our territory; and through Labor Treaties,
with other Powers, it will see to the protection of the professional
position of Spanish workers residing abroad.
XV. RESTORATION OF SPAIN
On the day of the promulgation of this Charter, Spain is engaged in

a heroic military struggle, in which at the cost of heavy sacrifice
she is saving the riches of the soul and the civilization of the world.
To the generosity of the Youth in arms and of Spain herself,
national production with all its component factors must respond.
In this Charter of rights and duties we therefore set down as
most urgent and necessary those of the elements of production
which co-operate with their just and resolute contribution to the
restoration of the soil of Spain and the foundations of her power.
XVI. FuTURE oF THE CoMBATANTs
The State undertakes to incorporate in the posts of work, honor

and command to which they have a right as Spaniards and which
they have won like heroes, the young men who are fighting.
The FET y de las JONS was permitted to take over administration of

social services in Spain through its Women's Section (Secci6n Feme-
nina), a branch that had been established in 1934 by Jose Antonio's
younger sister, Pilar. During the Civil War Falangist women helped
the Army units in a variety of practical and cultural ways. By 1939
their membership had increased to more than half a million. After the
end of hostilities Pilar reorganized the section on a permanent basis.
Unmarried women were usually expected to spend six months in
service, supervising more than one thousand youth centers and pro-
moting health services, physical education, and the like.
Despite Franco's "shotgun marriage" of Falangists and Requetes, the
two factions in the FET remained suspicious, and their youth groups
never combined. The Carlists were unhappy to see the old-guard

Falangist, Fernandez Cuesta, given the secretaryship of the new
party, 4 and they felt some reservations about the Ministry of Syndical
Organization. On the other hand, they gained lasting satisfaction from
the promulgation of clerical laws in 193 8 that gave the Church com-
plete educational rights, tied the state to Roman Catholicism, and
rigidly circumscribed other religious groupings. Within a matter of a
few weeks the Jesuits were fully reinstated in Spain, despite muttering
from some Falangist quarters. The role of the Catholic Church was to
be far more omnipresent in Franco's Spain than it was in Mussolini's
Italy.
The police-state nature of Spain was quickly made clear by various
decrees drawn up by Serrano Suiier, the Minister of Interior. For
example, on April 22, 1938, the following law set forth strict censor-
ship and regulation of the press.
Law Regarding the Press

(April22, 1938)
. . . Art. 1: The State is responsible for the organization, super-

vision, and control of the national institution of the periodic press.
It shall be the responsibility of the Ministry entrusted with the
National Press Service to establish the apprbpriate regulations.
Art. 2: In the exercise of this function, the State shall:
1. Regulate the number and extent of periodical publications.
2. Intervene in the naming of the managerial personnel.
3. Regulate the profession of journalism.
4. Supervise the activity of the press.
5. Have the power of censorship. . . .
6. Take whatever measures are necessary on the basis of the
principle set forth in Art. 1 of this law.
Art. 3: Should the exercise of the power mentioned first in the
preceding article lead to property damage without there having
souRcE: Published in Boletfn Oficial, May 1, 193 8; reprinted

in Falange espanola tradicionalista y de las Juntas ofensivas
secretaria de Educaci6n Popular, 194 3), pp. 40 3-411 passim. My
translation.
4. He held the post from December, 1937, until August, 1939, at which
time Franco made him ambassador to Brazil.
been prior provocation by the injured party, the State shall arrange
for proper reparation in a manner to be determined.
Art. 4: The above-mentioned functions shall be exercised by
means of central and provincial agencies. The central agencies shall
be the corresponding Ministry and the National Press Service.
In each province there shall be established a Press Service,
dependent upon the National Service of the same name and subject
to the respective Civil Government. . . .
Art. 8: The director of each periodical bears responsibility for
it. He must be inscribed in the Official Register of Publishers,
which will be maintained by the National Press Service, and to
hold his position he must have the approval of the Ministry.
Art. 9: The publishing enterprise bears joint responsibility for
the director's actions, whether of commission or omission. . . .
Art. 10: In the case of signed articles, the responsibility of the
signer in no way exempts the director of the periodical from
responsibility for publishing the article. . . .
Art. 20: The punishments for directors and enterprises to be
decreed by the Ministry of Interior may range, according to the
gravity of the case, among the following:
(a) Imposition of a fine.
(b) Dismissal of the director.
(c) Dismissal of the director, accompanied by the cancella-
tion of his name in the Register of Publishers.
(d) Confiscation of the periodical.
Art. 21: The punishments set forth in the preceding article,
except for the last named, shall be handed down by the Ministry.
The penalties set forth in sections (b) and (c) of the said article
must be preceded by a hearing of the party involved.
An appeal against these may be made within fifteen days to the
Head of the Government, who shall resolve the matter without
further right of appeal.
Art. 22: Confiscation-which may take place only in cases of
grave offense against the Regime and after repeated violation of
condemned actions which clearly demonstrate backsliding on the
part of the enterprise-shall be decided by the Head of the Gov-
ernment in a special decree that is not subject to appeal.
I decree the present Law, in Burgos, this 22nd day of April,
1938, the Second Triumphal Year.
FRANCISco FRANCO The Minister of the Interior,
RAMON SERRANO SUNER
Both sides employed wholesale terrorism to maintain internal security

during the Civil War. In the first months of the conflict the Republi-
can forces got rid of their most conspicuous foes, who ranged from
reactionaries to anarchists. Executions carried out by them almost
certainly numbered in the tens of thousands, but as they steadily lost
control of territory their purge slowed down markedly. For the
Nationalists, on the other hand, the purge intensified as they seized
control of more land. A minimum estimate of the political executions
on the Nationalist side is 40,000 to 50,000; the true figure may well be
double or triple that. Recent estimates put the number of· deaths
among Nationalist soldiers at about 70,000 out of approximately 1,000,-
000 who were mobilized. Italians accounted for 2,000 of these fatalities,
Germans 300, and Moorish mercenaries about 15,000. On the Republi-
can side military deaths were more numerous, possibly exceeding
100,000. Of these perhaps 10 per cent were non-Spanish personnel,
mostly in the International Brigades.
When the war came to an end on April 1, 1939, Franco's victory was
total. No doubt it could be attributed as much to the internal friction
and lack of efficiency that characterized the Popular Front government
as to the military strength of Franco's forces. The Caudillo's chief
personal contribution had been to bring about and preserve political
unity within his camp and to focus the energies of the Nationalists on
attaining military victory. He managed to establish a Nationalist politi-
cal community that was sufficiently broad and syncretistic to include
all groups who were hostile to the Popular Front; and by not fully
identifying himself with any specific political sector, Franco was able
to act as arbiter over this hodgepodge of forces. Nevertheless, it was a
dictatorship. And as Franco transferred his government to Madrid and
extended his writ over the whole nation, he issued a series of orders
that sharply reduced the possibility of effective opposition. The fol-
lowing decree of July 20, 1939, restricting meetings, manifestations,
and public activities was typical.
Order Restricting Meetings,

Manifestations, and Public Activities
(July 20, 1939)
The hierarchic principles of the Regime have imposed the necessity
of submitting to discipline and regulation certain types of initia-
souRcE: Printed in Boletfn Oficial, July 21, 1939; reprinted in

Falange espanola tradicionalista y de las Juntas ofensivas
secretaria de Educaci6n Popular, 1943), pp. 399-400. My trans-
lation.
rives, the timing and permission for which must be approved by the
top political leadership of the State. To this end, and mindful of
clarifying regulations handed down previously in this regard, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. The holding of meetings and manifestations shall require
authorization from the Minister of the Government. This must be
requested in ample time, through the Civil Governor of the prov-
ince, and must set forth the purpose of the action, the names of
speakers who are supposed to speak, and the themes they are to
discuss. The Civil Governors will forward these petitions to the
Ministry with due information.
2. Exempted from the requirement of ministerial authorization
are:
(a) Meetings held by legitimately established associations in
accordance with their statutes, but this shall not prejudice the
government's right to restrict the exercise of this right of asso-
ciation.
(b) Processions of the Catholic faith.
3. Such public acts as commemorations, inaugurations, dedica-
tions, homages, and analogous things also require ministerial au-
thorization. . . .
A long-anticipated shake-up in the cabinet occurred on August 9, 1939,

bringing the Falange even more tightly under the control of Franco,
Serrano Sufier, and the Army generals. Serrano Sufier, who was the
primary political genius of the regime, continued as Minister of In-
terior and also assumed the presidency of the FET Junta Politica.
Fernandez Cuesta was relieved of the party secretaryship and ap-
pointed ambassador to Brazil. Brigadier General Mufioz Grandes was
named Secretary General of the FET and director of the Militia,
thereby preventing that force from becoming independent of the
Army. The old military hierarchy was absolutely determined to fore-
stall the emergence in the New Spain of any armed force comparable
to the Nazi proletarian storm troopers (Sturm Ahteilung) that Hitler
had brutally purged on June 30, 1934.
The screws of the Spanish police state were still being tightened
eleven months after the end of hostilities, as may be seen in a decree
dated March 1, 1940, which outlawed Masonry and Communism. The
latter ideology was given so loose a definition as to include not only
Stalinists and Trotskyists but Anarchists as well.
Law Suppressing Masonry and Communism

(March 1, 1940)
Among the many factors that have exercised a pernicious influence
and contributed to the decadence of Spain, mocking our healthy
popular reactions and military heroism, perhaps none has been
more important than the various secret societies and international
forces of a clandestine type. Among these Masonry occupies the
principal post, but there also figure on the fringes of public life a
wide range of generally subversive organizations which, even if
they fall short of being specifically secret societies, are nevertheless
related to Masonry and borrow its methods, and which are assimi-
lated and unified by Communism. . . .
Consequently, I order the following:
Art. 1: It shall be a crime, punishable according to the provi-
sions of this law, to belong to Masonry, Communism, and other
clandestine societies referred to in the following articles. The
Government may add to said organizations whatever branches or
auxiliary agencies it deems necessary and apply to them the provi-
sions of this law as duly modified.
Art. 2: The above-mentioned organizations are dissolved and
prohibited by law. Their properties are hereby declared confis-
cated and placed at the disposition of the responsible political
authorities.
Art. 3: All propaganda that exalts the principles and pretended
benefits of Masonry, Communism, or similar ideas that are hostile
to religion, the fatherland and its basic institutions, and against
social harmony, shall be punished by suppression of the periodicals
or entities that subsidize them and by confiscation of their prop-
erties, and with the penalty of long imprisonment for the principal
guilty person or persons and of shorter imprisonment for those
who co-operated.
Art. 4: Masons are those who have entered into Masonry and
have . not been expelled therefrom, or have not denounced it or
souRcE: Boletfn Oficial, March 2, 1940; reprinted in Falange

espanola tradicionalista y de las Juntas ofensivas nacional-sindica-
listas, Vicesecretaria de Educaci6n Popular, Fundamentos del
caci6n Popular, 1943), pp. 393-398 passim. My translation.
explicitly broken all ties therewith. . . . For the purpose of this
law, the propagators, leaders, and active collaborators in Soviet,
Trotskyite, Anarchist, and similar goals or propaganda are to be
considered Communists. . . .
FRANCISCO FRANCO
A few months later the regime issued another decree designed to close
what few loopholes remained. It prevented the formation of any as-
sociation that fell outside certain tightly supervised categories.
Decree Regulating the Right of Association

(January 25, 1941)
The vigilance which the Public Authorities must maintain with
respect to the so-called right of association requires that, until such
time as there can be established definitive regulations of a wide-
ranging nature, certain norms must be set up to supplant present
deficiencies and clarify doubts that have arisen on the basis of legal
texts whose force derived from constitutional principles that today
have been abolished. . . .
Therefore, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, I
declare that:
Art. 1: Beginning with the publication of the present Decree in
the Boletin Oficial del Estado, no associations may be formed
without approval of the Ministry of Gobernaci6n.
The following are exempted from this requirement:
1. Associations which have for their sole and exclusive object
gain or profit, and which, for that reason, are regulated by provi-
sions of Civil Law or Commercial Law.
2. Catholic associations that have exclusively religious aims.
3. Institutes or corporations that exist or function by virtue of
special laws.
4. Co-operative associations registered with the Ministry of
Labor.
souRcE: Boletin Oficial, February 6, 1941; reprinted in Falange

espanola tradicionalista y de las Juntas ofensives nacional-sindi-
calistas, Vicesecretaria de Educaci6n Popular, Fundamentos del
caci6n Popular, 194 3), pp. 400-40 3 passim. My translation.
5. Associations subject to syndical legislation and to the disci-

pline of the Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de las JONS...
FRANCISCO FRANCO
General Mufioz Grandes did not last long as Secretary General of the
FET. His retirement was announced on March 15, 1940. No immediate
successor was designated by Franco, who really had little need to name
one, for Serrano Sufier continued to be the dominant figure in the
party. The Caudillo's brother-in-law added the post of Minister of
Foreign Affairs to his already impressive list of responsibilities on
October 16, 1940. This appointment enabled him to assist Franco in the
delicate and difficult talks with Hitler a few weeks after Germany's
stunning defeat of France.
The relationship between Nationalist Spain and Nazi Germany had
been ostensibly cordial since the outbreak of the Civil War, but Hitler
was less than happy with the way Franco seized control of the Falange,
and he was even less pleased when Franco failed to pledge public
support to Germany during the Munich crisis. By April, 1939, however,
Spain had made amends to the extent to adhering to the Italo-German
Anti-Comintern Pact. Moreover, at German insistence, a five-year
Treaty of Friendship was signed at Burgos on March 31, 1939, by
Ambassador Eberhard von Stohrer and the then Spanish foreign min-
ister, General Gomez Jordana. By this pact the two countries promised
to maintain constant touch with each other and also with Fascist Italy
in order to exchange information regarding questions of international
policy affecting their common interests. In case one of the two
signatories became involved in warlike complications with a third
party, the other promised to avoid any political, military, or economic
action that might be disadvantageous to its partner.
German-Spanish Treaty of Friendship

(Burgos, March 31, 1939)
The German Chancellor
and
The Chief of the Spanish Government
In view of the community of interests of their Governments, the
affinity of their political views, and the bonds of lively sympathy
existing between their peoples,
filled with deep satisfaction over the fact that their friendly
association has thus far proved so successful,
souRcE: Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series

D, Vol. III (Germany and Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939)
(Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1950), Doc. 773, pp.
884-886.
and convinced that the development and consolidation of their
mutual relations will serve the welfare of both peoples and, in
addition, will constitute an important factor in the preservation of
high spiritual values and the maintenance of the peace,
are agreed in their desire to affirm their common purposes
through the conclusion of a treaty. . . .
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties will constantly maintain contact
with each other in order to inform each other concerning questions
of international policy affecting their common interests.
Should their common interests be jeopardized by international
events of any kind, they will enter into consultation without delay
regarding the measures to be taken to safeguard these interests.
ARTICLE 2
The High Contracting Parties are aware of the dangers facing their
countries through the aspirations of the Communist International
and will consult constantly as to measures that seem appropriate
for combating them.
ARTICLE 3
In the event that the security or other vital interests of one of the
High Contracting Parties should be externally threatened, the
other High Contracting Party will grant the threatened party its
diplomatic support in order to contribute to the best of its ability
toward eliminating this threat.
ARTICLE 4
In view of the close friendship in which Germany as well as Spain

is bound with Italy, both the High Contracting Parties will be
mindful in the execution of the agreements made in articles 1 to 3
above of assuring also the collaboration of the Royal Italian Gov-
ernment.
ARTICLE 5
Neither of the High Contracting Parties will enter into treaties or
other agreements of any kind with third powers which are aimed
directly or indirectly against the other High Contracting Party.
The High Contracting Parties agree to inform each other regard-
ing treaties and agreements affecting their common interests which

they have previously concluded or will in the future conclude with
third countries.
ARTICLE 6
In case one of the High Contracting Parties should become in-
volved in warlike complications with a third power, the other High
Contracting Party will avoid anything in the political, military, and
economic fields that might be disadvantageous to its treaty partner
or of advantage to its opponent.
ARTICLE 7
The High Contracting Parties will in special agreements arrange
for measures which are calculated to promote the fostering of
comradely relations and the exchange of practical military experi-
ence between their armed forces.
ARTICLE 8
Both High Contracting Parties shall make it their special concern

to extend and promote their cultural relations. The implementation
of this principle is reserved for special agreements.
ARTICLE 9
The High Contracting Parties are agreed in their desire to intensify
economic relations between their countries as much as possible and
affirm their intention of having Germany and Spain supplement
each other and cooperate in economic matters in every way.
The implementation of these principles shall be reserved for
special agreements.
ARTICLE 10
This treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall

be exchanged at Berlin as soon as possible.
The treaty shall remain in full force for a period of 5 years from
the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification.
If 6 months before the expiration of the aforesaid period no
notice of termination has been given, the treaty shall remain in
force for 5 more years and in a like manner continue in the follow-
ing periods of time.
In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty.
Done in duplicate in the German and Spanish languages at
Burgos on March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and thirty-nine.
EBERHARD VON STOHRER
GOMEZ JORDANA
There was closer affinity between Franco's regime and Mussolini's

Italy than with Hitler's Germany if for no other reason than their
common religious and Latin background. It was not surprising, there-
fore, that when Italian Foreign Minister Ciano visited Spain in 1939 he
expressed enthusiasm at the way it was developing ideologically. He
felt that Serrano Sufier was molding the Falange along the lines of the
Italian Fascist party. Franco, for his part, supported Mussolini's last-
minute efforts to dissuade Hitler from going to war with Poland.
When these efforts failed and World War II broke out, Franco
quickly proclaimed Spanish neutrality. He knew well that after three
years of bloodletting his country was in no shape to embark upon a
new struggle. His sense of caution was strengthened, moreover, by the
fact that a substantial number of Spanish officers expressed respect for
the French Army and many upper-class Spaniards felt ties of friend-
ship for England. In addition, Franco was influenced by the cautious
attitude of the Portuguese government of Salazar, with which he held
close bonds. (That semifascist regime had supported the Spanish
Nationalists throughout the Civil War and had signed a treaty of
friendship and nonaggression in March, 1939.) In September of that
same year Salazar, who had healthy respect for British sea power,
prudently adopted a policy of neutrality that was not unfriendly
toward England.
During the so-called phony war in the winter of 1939-40 contacts
between Madrid and Berlin were minimal. The situation changed
sharply when the Germans launched their blitzkrieg into the Low
Countries and defeated France in June, 1940. Very few Spanish mili-
tary and political leaders were anxious to see Hitler's Germany achieve
so decisive a victory as to gain complete domination of western
Europe. The Spanish ambassador in Paris, who served as go-between
for the French leaders in their armistice negotiations, tried to persuade
the Germans not to station occupation forces throughout France. As
things turned out, the Germans confined their direct control to
northern and western France. Although the coastal zone of German
occupation extended all the way to the border town of Hendaye on
the Bay of Biscay, Hitler let the conservative Vichy regime control
southeastern France, includit'S" rnost of the Pyrenees frontier.
This decisive shift in the European balance of power forced Spain to
change her diplomatic positic- abruptly. Shiftmg from strict "neu-
trality" to "nonbelli_:--erency" in favor of Hitler, she opened ports to
German submarines and started talks with German military planners
regarding the possibility oi a combined assault against the British
citadel of Gibraltar, the loss of which had been stirring Spanish resent-
ment for more than two centuries. Falangist talk of imperialist expan-
sion greatly intensified as the possibility of Spain's moving in on the
overseas possessions of France in northwest Africa seemed suddenly
within reach. Serrano Suiier, who for more than a year had been the
chief architect of a policy of collaboration with the Axis, was elevated
to the post of Foreign Minister in October, 1940. Not only did he
sympathize ideologically with the Axis powers, he felt that it was
imperative for Spain to negotiate the best possible deal with Hitler in
order to safeguard her own future. But Franco was not willing to go as
far as Hitler wanted him to go in assisting Germany in the struggle
against Britain. Concerned always with Spain's self-interest and pain-
fully aware of his country's economic weakness, Franco held Hitler at
bay throughout a day of hard bargaining at Hendaye on October 23.
While agreeing in principle to support the German effort against Eng-
land, Franco made this hinge upon massive shipments of foodstuffs and
weapons from the Reich, as well as upon German agreement to
Spanish annexation of French Morocco and much of Algeria. Franco's
demands so infuriated Hitler that he later growled to his aides that he
would rather have all his teeth pulled than go throus-h such haggling
again. In the end, the Fuhrer made a vague promise to ship Spain
whatever was necessary. A secret protocol was signed by the respec-
tive foreign ministers providing for Spanish participation in the war,
but implementation was left dependent on working out numerous
details. Italy became a signatory to the pact too.
Italian-German-Spanish Secret Protocol

(Hendaye, October 23, 1940)
The Italian, German, and Spanish Governments have agreed as
follows:
1. The exchange of views between the Fuehrer of the German

Reich and the Chief of the Spanish State, following conversations
between the Duce and the Fuehrer and among the Foreign Min-
isters of the three countries in Rome and Berlin, has clarified the
present position of the three countries toward each other as well as
the questions implicit in waging the war and affecting general
policy.
souRcE: Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series

D (1937-1945) (Washington, D.C.: Department of State,
1960), XI, 466-467; cf. Document 221, n. 4, p. 377. The text of
the Protocol is in the form modified by Ciano at Schonhof,
where he met with Ribbentrop on November 3-4, 1940.
2. Spain declares her readiness to accede to the Tripartite Pact
concluded September 27, 1940, among Italy, Germany, and Japan
and for this purpose to sign, on a date to be set by the four Powers
jointly, an appropriate protocol regarding the actual accession.
3. By the present Protocol Spain declares her accession to the
Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Italy and Germany and
the related Secret Supplementary Protocol of May 22, 1939.
4. In fulfillment of her obligations as an ally, Spain will inter-
vene in the present war of the Axis Powers against England after
they have provided her with the· military support necessary for her
preparedness, at a time to be set by common agreement of the three
Powers, taking into account military preparations to be decided
upon. Germany will grant economic aid to Spain by supplying her
with food and raw materials, so as to meet the needs of the Spanish
people and the requirements of the war.
5. In addition to the reincorporation of Gibraltar into Spain the
Axis Powers state that in principle they are ready to see to it, in
accordance with a general settlement which is to be established in
Africa and which must be put into effect in the peace treaties after
the defeat of England-that Spain receives territories in Africa to
the same extent as France can be compensated, by assigning to the
latter other territories of equal value in Africa, but with German
and Italian claims against France remaining unaffected. [Type-
written footnote on the document at this point reads: "The origi-
nal text reads: 'thus protecting any German claims to be made
against F ranee,' and was corrected as above by the hand of his
Excellency Minister Ciano."]
6. The present Protocol shall be strictly secret, and those pres-
ent undertake to preserve its strict secrecy, unless by common
agreement they decide to publish it.
Done in three original texts in the Italian, German, and Spanish
languages.
For the Italian For the German For the Spanish
Government: Government: Government:
G. CIANO J. VON RIBBENTROP R. SERRANO SUNER
A few days after his talks with the Spanish officials at Hendaye and
with the Vichy leaders, Marshal Petain and Pierre Laval, at Montoire,
Hitler traveled to Florence on October 28. There he reported to
Mussolini on the nature of these conversations and discussed with the
Duce the new problem of Greece-for on that very day Italy, some-
what to Hitler's annoyance, had dispatched an ultimatum to Athens

that resulted in war. The excerpts from the document that follows set
forth Hitler's views as to the best way of handling the interlocking
problem of French Morocco, Gibraltar, and Spain.
Hitler-Mussolini Conference Regarding Vichy France,

Franco's Spain, and Greece
(Florence, October 28, 1940)
[Hitler] then spoke about his conversation with Franco. The
latter certainly had a stout heart, but only by an accident had he
become Generalissimo and leader of the Spanish state. He was not a
man who was up to the problem of the political and material
development of his country. The Spaniards, moreover, seemed to
have no feeling for the limits to their own strength and would be
easily inclined to begin undertakings which they then could not
carry through. In the negotiations with Germany they had, on the
one hand, requested her to assume very concrete obligations, such
as, for instance, the delivery of grain, gasoline, etc., but had al-
ways been very vague about what they would do. Thus they had,
for example, reserved entirely for their own decision the important
question of the time of Spain's entry into the war. If, on the other
hand, they complained that nothing precise and concrete had been
promised them in response to their colonial demands, this was so if
only because in case such assurances became known, the danger of
a secession of Morocco would be very great. Since Franco had
declared, however, that he needed such assurances to justify to his
people Spain's entry into the war, publication of these assurances
was surely to be expected, and particularly because reticence was
hardly one of the outstanding qualities of Spanish official quarters.
In this connection the Fuehrer repeated the promise already
made to the Duce in the last conversation at the Brenner Pass [ Oc-
tober 4, 1940], that he would on no account conclude peace with
France if the claims of Italy were not completely satisfied. Natu-
rally he could not give Spain such an assurance, for then Africa
souRcE: Document 246, Document on German Foreign Policy,

1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945) (Washington, D.C.: Depart-
ment of State, 1960), XI, 420-421. The meeting took place in
Florence's Palazzo Vecchio in the presence of German Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop and Italian Foreign Minister Ciano.
would secede from France and it would take severe battles to
reconquer it and to protect the Spanish Zone.
The Foreign Minister [Ribbentrop] then explained the technical
development of the negotiations with the Spaniards and the present
situation, and presented the Spanish text of the secret protocol,
which the Spaniards had promised ultimately to sign. At the same
time he described in particular the difficulties that Serrano Suiier
had made with regard to point 5, that is, the formula envisaged for
the solution of the colonial problem.
. . . In reply to a question by the Duce as to what should be
done with Spain, the Fuehrer replied that the Spaniards claimed for
themselves French Catalonia, a rectification of the Pyrenees fron-
tier, Oran, French Morocco, enlargement of the territory of Rio
de Oro to the twentieth degree of latitude and enlargement of
Spanish Guinea. The Foreign Minister [Ribbentrop] observed that
the Spanish demands were as unreasonable as the German and
Italian demands were modest, and he referred again to the protocol
which had been previously submitted and stressed its extremely
confidential nature. Only six statesmen and their closest assistants
knew of it. He then once more informed the Duce regarding the
significance of the colonial formula in point 5 of the protocol and
the difficulties that Serrano Suiier had made in this connection.
To a question from the Duce as to what the Spaniards should be
given, the Fuehrer replied that they could not get any more than a
substantial enlargement of Spanish Morocco. At the same time he
stressed the fact that Germany had to have bases on the African
coast and that he would prefer to lay claim to one of the islands off
the coast of Africa for this purpose. If this were not possible, bases
would have to be found on the African coast.
As far as Spanish accession to the Tripartite Pact and the
German-Italian Alliance was concerned, it could not be announced
until the military preparations for the protection of Spain were
concluded. At a remark from the Duce to the effect that the
announcement of possible agreements between Italy, Germany,
and Spain might be very dangerous to Petain's position, the For-
eign Minister [Ribbentrop] again stressed the need for secrecy, but
emphasized that if something should nevertheless leak out, it would
be better if nothing too definite had been awarded the Spaniards
and they had merely received vague promises. The Spaniards
themselves had told him that because of their current food imports
from the British Empire, they were perhaps even more interested
than the Axis Powers in keeping it secret. They also knew that
upon its becoming known that they had joined the Axis, Churchill
would not hesitate to attempt the seizure of the Spanish islands and
bases in the Atlantic.
To a question from the Duce as to the exact time of the inter-
vention of the Spaniards in the military operations, the Fuehrer
replied that Franco had been very vague here and had stated only
that he would intervene when the military preparations were
completed.
The Fuehrer then spoke again of Gibraltar and stated that,
according to studies by German experts, the operation, if well
prepared and executed with lightning speed, could go off well with
very few troops and certain prospects of success. According to the
Spaniards, they had already put the Canary Islands in a condition
of defense. They could, moreover, be supported by heavy bat-
teries, by dive bombers, long-range guns, and special troops.
To a question from the Duce as to whether it would not be well
if the English found out that they could no longer put hope in
Spain, the Fuehrer replied that, in his opinion, the announcement
of Spain's joining the Axis must be postponed until it was abso-
lutely certain that the English could not land in Spain and on the
islands. The Duce mentioned in this connection that it would
perhaps also be advantageous to the internal situation in Spain if
the firm alignment with the Axis Powers could be announced. The
Fuehrer then proposed that the three Foreign Ministers make all
the preparations with Spain that were necessary for her entry into
the war, as well as settle all other details still pending, and that a
meeting then take place in Florence between the Fuehrer, the
Duce, and Fran co, at which the participation of Spain in the
Tripartite Pact and the German-Italian Alliance could be an-
nounced with full publicity. . . .
As autumn gave way to winter the reluctance of Spain to enter the

war increased. England had not collapsed in the face of the German
aerial blitz, and Italy's invasion of Greece turned out to be a near-
fiasco. Though German diplomats and military leaders did their best to
talk Franco into joining actively in the war, they were met with one
excuse after another by the wily Spaniard, who always kept his price
high.
In the spring of 1941, in the wake of impressive German victories in
Yugoslavia and Greece (where Hitler had come to the aid of Musso-
lini), Franco showed more interest in coming to terms with Hitler.
This was indicated by the addition of two Falangists to his cabinet
and the appointment of Jose Luis de Arrese as Secretary General of
the FET. But by this point Hitler had become less concerned with
moves in the western Mediterranean and was instead focusing his
attention on the imminent invasion of Russia, to take place on June 22.
The abrupt termination of Hitler's neutrality and nonaggression
pact with Russia eliminated a major stumbling block to closer associa-
tion between Germany and Franco's staunchly Catholic and anti-
Communist regime. The early German victories on the eastern front
suggested that Hitler would soon be master of all Europe. Though
refraining from an outright declaration of war, Franco quickly an-
nounced that a "Blue Division" of 20,000 Falangist volunteers would
fight alongside the Germans in northern Russia, defending "Christian
Europe" from "Asiatic Communism." Upon learning of this, the
jealous Mussolini, who had not been informed of the German-Spanish
agreement, expressed his irritarion to Count Ciano. 5
Germany failed to knock out Russia before the end of 1941. What
was worse, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United
States into the war. Though Hitler was now anxious once more to
enlist Spain's full participation in the war, Franco showed more reluc-
tance than ever. Instead, he and Salazar formed an "Iberian Bloc" in
February, 1942, to co-ordinate the foreign policies and safeguard the
neutrality and independence of the two peninsular nations. This asso-
ciation became the most enduring aspect of Franco's foreign policy.
In the late summer of 1942 (coinciding with the German stalemate
at Stalingrad and the American naval victories in the Pacific) Franco
found it expedient to make a drastic shake-up in the political composi-
tion of his government. Since the very beginning of the dictatorship
there had been hostility between Falangist extremists and the more
conservative Army and royalist groups. The former were pro-Nazi,
while the latter favored neutrality. A clash between Falangist and
Carlist youths in Bilbao in August furnished Franco with the excuse to
move. He removed Serrano Sufier as Foreign Minister, along with
several of the latter's leading Falangist appointees, and for good
measure dismissed two leading Army officers who had held the minis-
tries of War and Interior. The political era of the cuiiadisimo had
come to an end. The dismissal of Serrano Sufier was widely interpreted
as a shift away from the Axis by Franco. This it was to some degree. It
was also an effort to impr:we the internal balance of the regime.
In November, 1942, American and British forces landed in French
Morocco and Algeria. President Roosevelt gave prior assurances to
Franco that he would not intervene against him if Spain made no
hostile move against Allied forces in North Africa. Franco thereafter
began to hedge with the Axis even more. Under Allied pressure he
reduced the sale of tungsten and pyrites to the Central Powers.
5. The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943, ed. by Hugh Gibson (Garden City:

Doubleday, 1946), p. 370 (June 25, 1941).
Italy's overthrow of Mussolini and change of sides in the late

summer of 1943 led to new internal pressures in Spain to "de-fascisti-
cize" the Franco regime, lest Spain become the target of Allied
intervention. On October I Franco referred to Spain's position as
neutrality, not "nonbelligerency," and the Blue Dtvision was with-
drawn from Russia. Meanwhile, leading Spanish generals signed a
carefully worded letter to Franco, reminding him of the way in which
he had been chosen Generalissimo and asking if he did not agree that it
was now appropriate to restore the monarchy. The Caudillo proceeded
to talk to them individually, explaining that the American pledge of
November, 1942, meant that his regime could feel secure, and that it
would be unwise to restore the monarchy in the midst of such
economic misery and uncertainty on the international scene. The
Army leaders bowed to his arguments then and for the next two years.
Thus Franco and his Movement were still seated firmly in the saddle
when the war came to an end in May, 1945.
The defeat of Hitler's Germany signaled the end of the formally
"fascistic" period of the Spanish dictatorship. As early as 1942 one
could discern a tendency by Franco to minimize overt identification
with Fascism and the Axis powers, and in the course of the next year
his regime made a gesture in the direction of constitutionalism by
restoring a national assembly, the Cortes, to represent heads of families,
syndicates and professional associations, municipalities, the Falange,
and the government. All candidates had to be either nominated or
appointed by state organs, and the right to vote was tightly circum-
scribed. The Cortes was accorded the nominal right to approve new
legislation, but all measures had to originate in the executive branch.
Thus far the Cortest has never rejected a bill sent to it for approval.
Another step in the "liberalization" of the regime occurred in July,
1945, with the promulgation of a "Fuero de los Espafioles," a kind of
Spanish bill of rights. In principle it conceded most civil liberties, but
in actual practice freedom of speech and dissent was negated by
Article 33, which declared, "The exercise of the rights recognized
[herein] may not attack the spiritual, national, and social unity of
Spain."
At the same time Falangist influence and overt monarchist sentiment
in the cabinet were reduced by a new shake-up. Arrese was dismissed
from his post as Minister and Secretary General of the "Movement," as
the FET had commonly come to be called, and his place was left
vacant. Control of propaganda was transferred from the party to the
Ministry of National Education. The outstretched-arm salute was also
abolished. Several "neutral" technical specialists were brought in, and a
strong appeal was made to Catholic opinion by the appointment of a
leader of Catholic Action, Alberto Martin Artajo, to replace Jose Felix
de Lequerica y Erquiza at the post of Foreign Minister. The amount of
money provided for the Falange organization was cut significantly in
1945, and its leaders were advised to tone down their political propa-
ganda. Greater emphasis was to be given to the allegedly "Catholic"
nature of Falangism, and its earlier appeals to violence and imperialism
were muted. Party ideologues even found, on occasion, nice things to
say about liberal systems of government. National syndicalism, how-
ever, was to be preserved.
Franco was clearly anxious to eliminate insofar as possible pretexts
for the victorious anti-Fascist Allies to intervene in the Iberian penin-
sula-a course of action which Soviet Russia in particular was advocat-
ing in 1945. Though President Harry Truman and Prime Minister
Clement Attlee declined to go that far, they agreed with Premier Stalin
at the Potsdam Conference on August 2 to bar the existing Spanish
government from membership in the United Nations.
Ostracism of Franco's Spain by Potsdam Conference

(August 2, 1945)
SECTION X [regarding admission to the United Nations]
The three Governments feel bound, however, to make it clear
that they for their part would not favor any application for
membership put forward by the present Spanish Government,
which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers,
does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close
association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications
necessary to justify such membership. . . .
In 1946 the United Nations voted formal censure of Franco's regime

and advised members to withdraw their ambassadors from Madrid. By
year's end France formally closed her border with Spain, so that the
Iberian nation was left almost completely ostracized for some years
except for the continuing friendship of Salazar's Portugal and Juan
Peron's Argentina.
Spain's political developments since the end of World War II go
beyond the scope of this study. It is enough to say here that as a result
of both external and internal developments, the Generalissimo not only
pulled through the immediate postwar crisis but was able to continue
to rule his restive nation during the 1950's and 1960's. Most notable
among those factors were the Cold War, which caused the United
States to adopt a conciliatory policy toward Franco and eventually to
facilitate Spam's entry into the United Nations, and the dictator's own
skill in retaining the loyalty of both the Army and the Church while
playing off the Monarchists against the Falangists.
After having promised several times to restore the monarchy, the
seventy-six-year-old Franco at last proposed to his hand-picked Cortes
on July 22, 1969, that Prince Juan Carlos de Borb6n y Borb6n, the
thirty-one-year-old grandson of Alfonso XIII, be crowned upon the
souRCE: Text in New York Times, August 3, 1945, p. 8.

retirement or death of the Caudillo. Thus Franco passed over Juan

Carlos' relatively more liberal father, the long-exiled Don Juan, just as
he ignored the two very conservative Carlist contenders, Prince Xavier
de Borb6n Parma and his son, Carlos Hugo. The Cortes gave its over-
whelming approval to the nomination, whereupon Juan Carlos swore
that he would be loyal to "His Excellency the Chief of State"
(Franco), uphold "the Fundamental Laws," and give his "fidelity to
the principles of the National Movement" (which is still the only
legally permitted political organization in Spain and is strongly repre-
sented in the Cortes). By that action the King-designate pledged to
perpetuate the regime that Generalissimo Franco had molded over a
period of thirty-three years-a regime which in the autumn of 1969
seemed to be anxious to shed more of its Falangist coloration. Ironi-
cally, Franco chose the thirty-sixth anniversary of the founding of the
Falange to announce widespread cabinet changes that appear to reduce
the role of the Falangists in favor of men both from the "Opus Dei"
organization of the Roman Catholic laity and from the ranks of rather
liberal-minded "technocrats" who favor Spanish participation in the
European Common Market. The announcement of these cabinet
changes on October 29, 1969, set off clashes between the police and
young Falangist demonstrators in front of Madrid's Teatro de la
Comedia, where Jose Antonio had founded the Movement.
Only time will tell whether the political future of Spain will work
out in the way that Franco desires.
III
Salazar's Portugal
10. The Clerico-Corporative Estado Novo
PoRTUGAL wAS the first state in the Iberian peninsula to come under a
semifascistic regime. Unlike Mussolini's Italy, however, the dictator-
ship did not come about through the triumph of a pre-existent fascist
party. In the case of Portugal both the fascistic party and the Party-
State came into being after the advent of the dictatorship. Although
the Portuguese Party-State expressed respect and admiration for Mus-
solini's Italian dictatorship, it found most of its inspiration in the type
of integral nationalism espoused by Charles Maurras's Action Fran<;:aise
and in the clerico-corporativist philosophy set forth in the papal
encyclicals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Portuguese
authoritarian system was to serve as a model for at least some aspects of
Franco's regime in Spain, Petain's Vichy France, and Getulio Vargas's
dictatorship in Brazil.
Despite the diminutive size of the homeland, Portugal has managed
(albeit with increasing difficulty since the outbreak of colonial wars in
1961) to hang on to the fourth largest empire in the world. Prior to
World War II industrialization was slight, and the nation's 7,700,000
people made their living chiefly by fishing and producing wine, cork,
and olive oil. Illiteracy, which in the years of World War I character-
ized 65 per cent of the population, did not decline significantly until
after the second world conflict; it is now less than 25 per cent. For
centuries Portugal has benefited from commercial and security links
with Britain.
In 1910 a revolution in Lisbon overthrew the liberal monarchy of
the House of Coburg-Braganza and established an anticlerical republic
which promptly separated Church and State along the lines followed in
France five years earlier. Between 1910 and 1927 there were a score of
attempts at revolution and some forty-three cabinets. Controversy
over Portugal's decision to enter the war in 1916 on the side of the
Entente added to the chronic political instability. In the peace settle-
ment Portugal was given a scrap of German East Africa to add to
Mozambique. But this did not prevent the republic from falling into
disrepute as economic troubles mounted.
On May 28, 1926, the existing government was overthrown by an
332 SALAZAR'S PORTUGAL
Army movement led by General Manuel de Oliveira Gomes da Costa;

Parliament was dissolved, and parties and trade unions were broken up.
Two months later, however, General Antonio Oscar de Fragoso
Carmona deposed the ineffectual Gomes da Costa, who was allowed to
go to the Azores in honorable exile. In February, 1927, insurrection
against the military dictatorship broke out in Oporto and Lisbon.
Officially described as "communist," it was inspired by intellectual
reformers. After some heavy fighting it was suppressed.
At last in March, 1928, General Carmona was elected President of
the Republic; he was to retain the position until his death in 1951. His
first task was to find a financial expert who could straighten out the
economy. The general turned to Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, a pro-
fessor of economics at the University of Coimbra. Born in 1889 at
Santa Comba Dao in northern Portugal, Salazar was the son of a village
innkeeper and peasant mother. He studied to become a priest, then
turned to law, and finally switched to economics. Always a staunch
Catholic, he studied closely the socio-economic philosophy set forth in
Rerum novarum and other encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII and his suc-
cessors-and most notably Pius XI's Quadragesimo anno of May, 1931.
He also paid attention to the writings of such French Catholic sociolo-
gists as Frederic LePlay, Albert de Mun, and Rene de la Tour du Pin.
As a young man at Coimbra he was attracted by a movement preach-
ing "Integralismo Lusitano," a nationalist movement influenced by and
analogous to the Action Fran~aise of Charles Maurras. In 1921 Salazar
was one of three on a Catholic Center party list to be elected to
Parliament, but after attending the opening session he became so dis-
gusted that he returned to his university post. On April 27, 1928,
Salazar accepted President Carmona's invitation to become Minister of
Finance but insisted on being granted extraordinary powers. Critics
have often described Salazar as more of an accountant-bookkeeper
than economist, and have argued that under his leadership the eco-
nomic welfare of the people as a whole was held back. They do not
deny, however, that his old-fashioned methods of strict accountancy
and economy straightened out the financial muddle and eliminated
some of the graft.
Before long this unmarried, frugal, and abstemious man became the
dominant figure in Portugal. Aspiring to bring about a national revolu-
tion, he took a major step in that direction on July 30, 1930, when he
announced the formation of the National Union (Uniao Nacional).
This was to be the only party permitted by the government. Some
observers have likened it more to the political organization of Marshal
Joseph Pilsudski in Poland than to Mussolini's Fascist party. It did not
have to play a combative role in bringing Salazar to power; indeed, its
first congress was not held until 1934, and its second was delayed until
after World War II.
On July 5, 1932, Salazar was asked by President Carmona to assume
the premiership; for all practical purposes he became dictator. Later he
assumed for several years the posts of Minister of War and Minister of
THE CLERICO-CORPORATIVE ESTADO NOVO 333
Foreign Affairs as well. Salazar made no attempt to eliminate the
figurehead Chief of State. Unlike Mussolini, Salazar never affected a
uniform, and he made no effort to emulate the oratorical or charis-
matic qualities of the Italian Duce. He never left the country except on
a very few occasions to cross the border into Spain to confer with
General Franco; nor did he ever visit any of Portugal's vast overseas
possessions. His political and economic ideas were set forth quietly
over the radio and in the press. The following extracts from various
pronouncements by the Portuguese dictator give some impression of
his philosophy.
Political and Economic Doctrines of Salazar
STATE AND REGIMES
The State. The State has the right to foster, harmonize and
control all national activities, without destroying them, and its
duty is to educate the youth in the love of their country, in disci-
pline and those vigorous exercises which will prepare and incline it
for a fruitful activity and for all that may be required of it by the
honor and interests of the Nation. . . .
Power of the State. No one in Portugal would maintain the
omnipotence of the State with regard to the mass of mankind,
which is merely the raw material of great political achievements.
No one here would think of regarding the State as the source of
morality and justice without submitting its rules and decisions to
the decrees of a higher justice. No one here would dare to proclaim
might as the source of all right, without regard for individual
conscience and the legitimate liberties of the citizen and the pur-
pose inherent in the very existence of a man. . . .
State and Government. There can be no strong State without a
strong Government.
The Sovereignty of the Nation. To take power out of the hands
of party cliques; to place above all individual interests the interests
of all, the interests of the nation; to keep the State from the
clutches of audacious minorities but to maintain it in permanent
touch with the needs and aspirations of the nation; to organize the
souRcE: Excerpts from Salazar, Prime Minister of Portugal, Says

. . . , a compendium of quotations published ca. 1940 in Lisbon
by the Secretariat of National Propaganda, pp. 23-28, 47-48,
52-54, 57, 59-62 passim.
nation from top to bottom in all the different manifestations of its

collective life, from the family to the administrative bodies and
moral and economic corporations; to incorporate all this in the
State, which will thus become its living expression: this is to make
the sovereignty of the nation a real and living thing.
Regimes. All new regimes, lacking experience and even tradi-
tions, must be of slow and laborious growth. To apply new and
different principles to old societies accustomed to live under an-
other system, and especially with another spirit, is always a difficult
task which even appears impossible to those who are in a hurry,
and who feverishly demand that tomorrow's work should be done
today. . . .
Three Fallacies. Many said: Let us abandon the common weal to
political passion, to the whims of the greatest number-Life sub-
ordinated to politics-that was the Democratic formula. There
were others who cried: Let us produce wealth without care or
method so that everyone in the end shall benefit-economic values
were held higher than those of life under the Liberal regime.
Another group demanded: Let us divide among ourselves the
present wealth and that which may be created in our time-Social-
ism subordinated economic life to social. The fallacy of these
systems was amply demonstrated by the constant party warfare,
the injustice of Liberal economic life, the devastation worked by
Socialism. . . .
The Representative System. The families, the parishes, the town-
ships, the corporations, which include all citizens, with their
fundamental legal rights, are the bodies which compose the Nation,
and, as such, must participate directly in the constitutions of the
supreme organs of the State: this, more than any other, is the true
expression of the representative system.
Parliaments. I foresee that parliaments in the future, even if they
do not become purely political bodies, without any legislative
character, will be obliged to approve only the general outlines of
the more important laws, leaving to the Executive, as responsible
for the work of administration, far wider powers than the control-
ling power which it at present possesses.
Corporative Chambers. The formula which seems best and
which will perhaps be the formula of the future, is that the
Government should legislate, in consultative collaboration with the
Corporative Chambers, possibly with the assistance of a Council of
legal experts. . . .
Newspapers. Newspapers are the spiritual food of the people,
and, like all foods, must be controlled. . . .
PoLITICAL EcoNOMY
... Political Economy. We wish to advance towards a new
political economy, working in harmony with human nature, under
the authority of a strong State which will protect the higher
interests of the Nation, its wealth and its labor, both from capitalist
excesses and from destructive Bolshevism.
The State and Economy. One cannot hope to constitute a strong
and well-balanced State without coordinating and developing the
national economy, which today more than ever must form part of
political organization. This is perhaps the greatest practical consti-
tutional change that must be effected in all civilized nations. . . .
The State and Wealth. The State must not be the owner of the
wealth of the nation nor allow itself to be corrupted by it. That it
may be the supreme arbiter of all the interests of the nation it is
imperative that it should not be a slave to any of them. . . .
Class Strife. We do not accept the strife of the productive classes
as a historical fact nor as the principle underlying economic and
social organization. The ultimate interests, both of individuals and
groups, tend towards identity of national interests. But the immedi-
ate interests of workmen and employers, and sometimes of the
workmen among themselves, often clash in actual life; all the more
reason not to allow the discord to grow, all the more reason to
reconcile opposing interests, to the advantage of both parties and
with a view to normalize the economic life of the nation.
Communism. Communism is the synthesis of all the traditional
revolts of matter against spirit, of barbarism against civilization. It
is the "great heresy" of our age. . . .
Corporativism. Through corporative organization the economic
life of the nation is an element of political organization. . . .
Syndicates. The professional syndicate is, through the homoge-
neity of interests within its sphere of production, the best basis for
the organization of labor and the support, the fulcrum of the
institutions which seek to raise and educate it and to protect it
against injustice and adversity.
There can be no syndicate where there exists no corporative
spirit, the consciousness of the value of labor in conjunction with
production, an understanding of the necessity of cooperating with
all the other factors with a view to the advancement of the econ-
omy of the nation. Where these qualities do not exist but only the
spirit of class strife, there can be no true syndicate but only a
revolutionary association using its strength in the service of dis-
order.
OuR NATIONALISM
Spirituality. From a civilization which is scientifically returning

to barbarism we are irremissibly sundered by the spirituality which
is the source, the soul, the life of our history. . . .
Portugal. It is a rare or unique thing in Europe and in all the
world to be eight hundred years old, especially if the condition
should be laid down that in the country in question the people, the
nation, the State should have remained the same. Almost from the
beginning, by the achievements of the first kings, our frontiers in
the Iberian Peninsula were defined and fixed. Wars there were
many, but there was no invasion or confusion of races or annexa-
tions of territory or changes of dynasty or alteration of frontiers:
from first to last the leaders of the nation had the same Portuguese
blood in their veins. . . .
Our Originality. One day it will be recognized that Portugal is
governed by an original system, suitable to her history and geog-
raphy, which are very different from all others; and we wish it
might be understood that we have not eschewed the mistakes and
vices of a false liberalism and a false democracy in order to fall into
others which might be even worse, but rather to reorganize and
strengthen the country in the principles of authority, of order, of
the national traditions, reconciling these with those eternal truths
which are, happily, the heritage of mankind and the crown of
Christian civilization. . . .
The Nation. Nothing against the Nation, everything for the
Nation.
Like a great family or a great concern, the nation, for the
protection of its common interests and the attainment of its collec-
tive aims, requires a head to control it, a center of life and action.
The Nation cannot be identified with a political party, a party is
not the same as the State, and the State in international life is not a
subject but a collaborator and associate.
The man who becomes a nationalist belongs to no political
party, no group or school: he makes use of materials according to
their usefulness for the reconstruction of the country; his great, his
only concern is that they should serve and become a part of the
national system.
Nationalism. None of us, nationalists and lovers of our country,
professes an aggressive nationalism of exclusiveness and hatred;
rather, if we are attached to the idea of country, it is because our
hearts and intellects instinctively tell us that the national sphere is
still the best for the life and interests of humanity. . . .
There exist undoubtedly in the world political systems with
which Portuguese nationalism has some resemblance and points of
contact, most of which, indeed, are confined to the corporative
idea; but in actual practice, and especially in the conception of the
State and in the organization of the political and civil support of
the Government, the differences are very marked.
We have not failed to consider every foreign experiment, every
series of facts occurring in any part of the world, with a view to
extracting useful lessons from them. But the chief source of our
instruction, the source of the inspiration of the main lines of our
political structure, has been our history and traditions, the tem-
perament and, in a word, the actual life of the Portuguese. From
this source we seek to draw what of the past remains or should
remain living and fruitful, and from the present that which seems a
sure gain and the aspirations that are rendered legitimate by the
general progress and by a better understanding of justice.
Without misgiving we make Portuguese nationalism the inde-
structible basis of the New State; first, because it is the clearest
lesson of our history; secondly, because it is an inestimable factor in
social progress and education; thirdly, because we are a living
example of how the spirit of patriotism, displayed by us on every
continent, has served the cause of humanity.
The nationalism of the New State is not and can never be a
doctrine of aggressive isolation, either of ideas or political theory,
since, like all our history indeed, it has its roots in life and in
friendly cooperation with other nations. We consider it as far
removed from individualistic Liberalism, which had a foreign ori-
gin, and from the internationalism of the Left, as from all other
theoretic or practical systems which have sprung up abroad in
reaction to them. . . .
On February 22, 193 3, Salazar's government promulgated a Constitu-

tion for what he now labeled the Portuguese New State (Estado
Novo). Approved by a plebiscite on March 19, the Constitution went
into effect on April 11. It provided for a Head of State (President of

the Republic) elected directly for seven years; 1 a premier and council
of ministers appointed by the President and responsible to him alone; a
National Assembly elected by heads of families possessing a certain
degree of education; a Corporative Chamber rer,resenting not only
functional groupings (as in Italy) but also "moral,' cultural, and other
interests (eventually comprising twelve sections) and exercising advi-
sory powers. Half the members of the National Assembly would be
chosen by economic guilds or corporations; the other half would be
elected by educated heads of famdies in geographical constituencies.
Commumty of economic interests would be sought throu~h the peace-
ful co-operation of all the forces of production; the guiding economic
principle would be self-managed functional groupings that would seek
to avoid the pitfalls of excessive state intervention, such as had oc-
curred in Italy. Only one political party (the National Union) would
be permitted. Until the end of Wor1d War II no opposition candidates
presented themselves at elections to either the Presidency or the Na-
tional Assembly. Private property would be preserved and ownership
of small farms encouraged. There would be no free trade unions, and
strikes and lockouts would be forbidden. Labor courts would adjudi-
cate disputes. In general, the system curbed the working classes while
leaving the employers substantially free to run their businesses as they
wished. These latter points were spelled out in greater detail in the
Statute of National Labor, proclaimed on September 23, 1933. Its 52
articles were modeled on the Italian Charter of Labor of 1927 (though
not going quite as far in degree of state control) and on the papal
encyclical Quadragesimo anno of 1931. Excerpts from the new Consti-
tution of the Estado Novo follow.
Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic

(1933)
PART 1: ON THE FuNDAMENTAL GuARANTEES
CHAPTER I: ON THE PORTUGUESE NATION
Art. 4. The Portuguese nation is an independent State. Its

sovereignty recognizes in the internal sphere morality and law as
the only limitations; in the international field it recognizes only
souRcE: Approved by the National Plebiscite of March 19, 1933,

and brought into force on April 11, 1933. Certain amendments
were made in 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1945, and 1951. Quoted
from Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (Lisbon:
S.N.I., 1957), pp. 3-44 passim.
1. In 1959 direct election of the President was abolished. The powers of
the Corporative Chamber were upgraded significantly by making it a sub-
stantial part of the electoral college that formally chose the President.
those limitations which are derived from conventions or treaties

freely entered into, or from customary law freely accepted. It is
the duty of the nation to co-operate with other states in preparing
and adopting measures making for peace among people and for the
progress of mankind.
Portugal advocates arbitration as a means of settling international
disputes.
Art. 5. The Portuguese State is a unitary and corporative re-
public. . . .
Art. 6. It is the duty of the State:
I. To promote the unity and establish the juridical order of
the nation by defining and enforcing respect for the rights and
guarantees of morality, justice or the law, in the interest of the
individual, of families, and local autonomous and public or private
bodies;
II. To co-ordinate, stimulate and direct all social activities in
order to promote a proper harmony of interests within the lawful
subordination of private interests to the general good;
III. To strive to improve the conditions of the least favored
social classes, endeavoring to secure for them a standard of living
compatible with human dignity;
IV. To protect public health.
CHAPTER II: ON CITIZENS
... Art. 8. Portuguese citizens shall enjoy the following rights,

liberties and individual guarantees: . . . [some 20 are enumer-
ated] . . . .
Paragraph 1. The enumeration of the above rights and guaran-
tees shall not exclude any others derived from the Constitution or
the law, it being understood that citizens should always exercise
them without injuring the rights of third parties, or damaging the
interests of society or moral principles.
Paragraph 2. Special laws shall govern the exercise of the free-
dom of expression of opinion, education, meeting and of associa-
tion. As regards the first item, they shall prevent, by precautionary
or restrictive measures, the perversion of public opinion in its
function as a social force. . . .
Paragraph 3. Imprisonment without formal charge is permitted
in cases of flagrante delictu and in cases of the following actually
committed, prevented or attempted crimes: those against the safety
of the State; . . .
CHAPTER III: ON THE FAMILY
Art. 12. The State shall ensure the constitution and protection
of the family as the source of preservation and development of the
race, as the first basis of education, discipline and social harmony,
and as the foundation of all political and administrative order
through family grouping and representation in parish and on town
councils. . . .
CHAPTER IV: ON CORPORATIVE BODIES
Art. 16. It is the duty of the State to authorize, unless otherwise

provided by law to the contrary, all corporative, collective, intel-
lectual or economic bodies, and to promote and assist their
formation.
Art. 17. The principal aims of the corporative bodies, referred
to in the preceding article, shall be scientific, literary or artistic, or
physical training, relief, alms, or charity; technical improvement or
solidarity of interests. . . .
CHAPTER V: ON THE FAMILY, CORPORATIVE ORGANIZATION
AND AUTONOMOUS BODIES AS POLITICAL UNITS
Art. 19. It is the particular privilege of families to elect the

parish councils.
This right is exercised by the head of the family.
Art. 20. In the corporative organization, all branches of the
nation's activities shall be represented through their association in
the corporative organizations, and it shall be their duty to partici-
pate in the election of town councils and provincial boards and the
constitution of the Corporative Chamber.
Art. 21. Under the political organization of the State the parish
councils shall elect the town councils which in turn shall elect the
provincial boards. Local autonomous bodies shall be represented in
the Corporative Chamber.
CHAPTER VI: ON PUBLIC OPINION
Art. 22. Public opinion is a fundamental part of the policy and

administration of the country; it shall be the duty of the State to
protect it against all those influences which distort it from the
truth, justice, good administration, and the common weal.
Art. 23. The function of the press is of a public nature and for
that reason it may not refuse to insert any official notices of normal
dimensions on matters of national importance sent to it by the
government.
CHAPTER VII: ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
Art. 24. Civil servants are for the service of the community and
not for that of any party or association of private interests; it is
their duty to respect the authority of the State and cause others to
doso . . . .
Art. 26. Planned interruption of public services or of those of
interest to the community shall involve the dismissal of the
offenders, without prejudice to any other liability at law...
CHAPTER VIII: ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER
Art. 29. The economic organization of the nation must provide

the maximum production and wealth for the benefit of society, and
shall create a collective existence from which shall flow power to
the State and justice to its citizens. . . .
Art. 31. It shall be the right and duty of the State to co-ordinate
and control economic and social life with the following objects:
I. to establish a proper balance of the population, of profes-
sions, of occupations, of capital and of labor;
II. to protect the national economic system from agricultural,
industrial and commercial ventures of a parasitic nature, or those
incompatible with the higher interests of human life;
III. to secure the lowest price and the highest wage consistent
with fair remuneration for other factors of production, by means
of improved technical methods, services and credit;
IV. to develop the settlement of the national territories, to
protect emigrants and to regulate emigration.
Art. 32. The State shall encourage those private economic activ-
ities which are the most profitable, relative costs being equal, but
without detriment to the social benefit conferred and to the protec-
tion due to small home industries.
Art. 33. The State may only intervene directly in the manage-
ment of private economic ventures when it has to finance them and
for the purpose of securing a larger measure of social benefit than
would otherwise be the case. . . .
Art. 34. The State shall promote the formation and develop-
ment of the national corporative economic system, taking care to
prevent any tendency among its constituent bodies to indulge in
unrestricted competition with each other, contrary to their own
proper aims and those of society, and shall encourage them to
collaborate as members of the same community.
Art. 35. Property, capital and labor have a social function in the
field of economic co-operation and common interest, and the law

may determine the conditions of their use or exploitation in ac-
cordance with the community aim in view. . . .
Art. 37. Only economic corporations which are recognized by
the State may conclude collective labor contracts, in accordance
with the law, and those made without their intervention shall be
null and void.
Art. 38. Disputes arising out of labor contracts shall be the
concern of special tribunals.
Art. 39. In their economic relations with each other, neither
capital nor labor shall be allowed to suspend operations with the
object of imposing their respective claims. . . .
CHAPTER IX: ON EDUCATION, INSTRUCTION AND NATIONAL CULTURE
Art. 42. Education and instruction are obligatory and are the
concern of the family and of public or private institutions in co-
operation with the same.
Art. 43. The State shall officially maintain primary, secondary
middle and high schools, ,and institutions for advanced education.
Paragraph 1. Elementary primary instruction is obligatory and
may be given at home, or in private or state schools.
Paragraph 2. The arts and sciences shall be encouraged and their
development, teaching and dissemination favored, provided that
respect is maintained for the Constitution, the authorities and the
co-ordinating functions of the State.
Paragraph 3. The instruction provided by the State, in addition
to aiming at physical fitness and the improvement of intellectual
faculties, has as its object the formation of character and of profes-
sional ability as well as the development of all moral and civic
qualities, the former according to the traditional principles of the
country and to Christian doctrine and morality.
Paragraph 4. No permission shall be required for the teaching of
religion in private schools. . . .
CHAPTER X: ON THE RELATIONS OF THE STATE
WITH THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE REGIME OF WORSHIP
Art. 45. The Catholic religion may be freely practiced, in public

or in private, as the religion of the Portuguese N arion. The
Catholic Church shall enjoy juridical personality and may organize
itself in conformity with canon law and create thereunder associa-
tions or organizations, the juridical personality of which shall
equally be recognized. The relationship between the State and the
Catholic Church shall be one of separation, with diplomatic rela-
tions maintained between the Holy See and Portugal by means of
reciprocal representation, and concordats or agreements entered
into in the sphere of the Padroado (Patronage) and where other
matters of common interest are, or need to be, regulated.
Art. 46. The State shall also ensure freedom of worship and
organization for all other religious faiths practiced on Portuguese
territory, their outward manifestations being regulated by law, and
it may grant juridical personality to associations constituted in
conformity with the creeds in question.
These provisions shall not apply to creeds incompatible with the
life and physical integrity of the human person and with good
behavior, or to the dissemination of doctrines contrary to the
established social order. . . .
CHAPTER XII: ON NATIONAL DEFENSE
Art. 54. Military service shall be general and compul-

sory. . . .
Art. 55. The law shall regulate the general organization of the
nation in wartime in accordance with the principle of a nation in
arms.
Art. 56. The State shall promote, encourage and assist civil
institutions whose aim is to teach and discipline young persons in
preparation for the fulfilment of their military and patriotic duties.
Art. 57. No citizen may hold or obtain employment from the
State or local autonomous bodies unless he has fulfilled the duties
to which he is liable under military law. . . .
PART II: ON THE PoLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE
CHAPTER I: ON SOVEREIGNTY
Art. 71. Sovereignty is vested in the nation; its representatives

are the Head of the State, the National Assembly, the Govern-
ment, and the Courts of Justice.
CHAPTER II: ON THE HEAD OF THE STATE
SECTION 1: On the election of the President of the Republic and of

his Prerogatives
Art. 72. The Chief of the State is the President of the Republic
elected by the Nation.
Paragraph I. The President is elected for a term of seven

years. . . .
SECTION II: On the Attributes of the President of the Republic
... Art. 82. The acts of the President of the Republic must be
countersigned by the President of the Council and by the appro-
priate Minister or Ministers; in default of this they shall be non-
existent.
Counter-signatures are not required for:
I. the appointment and dismissal of the Council of Ministers;
II. messages addressed to the National Assembly;
III. the message of resignation from office.
SECTION 111: On the Council of State
Art. 83. The President of the Republic shall perform his func-
tions in conjunction with the Council of State, composed of the
following members:
I. the President of the Council of Ministers;
II. the President of the National Assembly;
III. the President of the Corporative Chamber;
IV. the President of the Supreme Court of Justice;
V. the Procurator General of the Republic;
VI. ten public men of outstanding ability, appointed for life
by the Chief of State. . . .
CHAPTER III: ON THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE CORPORATIVE

CHAMBER
SECTION I: On theNational Assembly

Art. 85. The National Assembly shall be composed of one
hundred and twenty Deputies, elected by the direct vote of the
citizen electors, and its mandate will continue for a period of four
years, which may not be prolonged save in the case of events
which make the convocation of the electoral colleges impos-
sible. . . .
Paragraph 2. Nobody may be a member of the National Assem-
bly and of the Corporative Chamber at the same time. .
SECTION II: On the members of theNational Assembly
Art. 89 . ...
Paragraph 2. The National Assembly may withdraw the man-
dates of those deputies who express opinions opposed to the exis-
tence of Portugal as an independent state, or who in any way
instigate the violent overthrow of social and political order. . . .
SECTION m: On the Attributes of theNational Assembly
Art. 91. The functions of the National Assembly are:
I. To make, interpret, suspend and revoke laws; . . .
sEcTioN IV: On the activities of the National Assembly and of the
promulgation of Laws and Orders
Art. 94. The National Assembly shall be in session for a period
of three months, beginning on November 25th of each year. . . .
Art. 9S. The National Assembly shall meet in full session and its
decisions shall be taken by absolute majority vote provided there is
a quorum . . . .
Art. 97. The right to introduce legislation is vested equally in
the government, and in any member of the National Assem-
bly; ...
Art. 98. Bills passed by the National Assembly shall be sent to
the President of the Republic for promulgation as law within the
fifteen days following . . . .
sECTION v: On the Corporative Chamber
Art. 102. There shall be a Corporative Chamber, equal in length
of term with the National Assembly, composed of representatives
of local autonomous bodies and social interests, the latter being
those of an administrative, moral, cultural and economic order; the
law shall designate those bodies on which such representation falls,
the manner of their selection and the duration of their man-
date . . . .
Art. 103. It is the duty of the Corporative Chamber to report
and give its opinion on all proposals or draft bills and on all inter-
national conventions or treaties submitted to the National Assem-
bly, before discussion thereof is commenced by the latter. . . .
Art. 104. The Corporative Chamber shall function in plenary
sessions or in committees and sub-committees. . . .
CHAPTER IV: ON THE GOVERNMENT
Art. 107. The Government consists of the President of the

Council of Ministers, who may conduct the affairs of one or more
ministries, and the Ministers; ...
Art. 108. The President of the Council shall be responsible to
the President of the Republic for the general policy of the govern-
ment and shall co-ordinate and direct the activities of all the
Ministers, who shall be responsible to him politically for their acts.
Art.109. It shall be the duty of the Government:
I. to countersign the acts of the President of the Republic;
II. to draw up decree-laws and, in cases of urgency, to ap-

prove international conventions and treaties;
III. to draw up decrees, regulations and instructions for the
proper carrying out of laws;
IV. to superintend public administration as a whole . . . .
Art. 112. The Government depends exclusively upon possessing
the confidence of the President of the Republic, and its continu-
ance in office shall not depend upon the fate of its draft bills, or
upon any vote of the National Assembly. . . .
Though calling itself "new," Salazar's authoritarian Estado Novo

rested on the experience of Portugal's past. It did nothing to irritate
the Army, the Church, or vested economic interests. Its institutions
were intended to be in harmony with the principles of nationalism and
clerico-corporative government. The Estado Novo fell short of deify-
ing the state as "totalitarian," since it insisted that it must bow to the
tenets of social justice and recognize that its powers were limited by a
superior moral law. The actual implementation of the Estado Novo
moved rather slowly; ostensibly it was encouraged to develop from
below rather than be imposed from above.
Opposition to the regime persisted. One of the most significant
rebellions occurred after the announcement of the Labor Charter of
1933. Led by the clandestine General Confederation of Labor and the
Communists, it was harshly suppressed on January 18, 1934, and its
leaders imprisoned. In 1937 there was an attempt to assassinate the
dictator.
Meanwhile, the first elections under the new constitution were held
on December 16, 1934. The small electorate was permitted to choose
only candidates put forward by the National Union; no others were
allowed on the ballot. The first National Assembly of the Estado Novo
met on January 10, 1935. Next month President Carmona was elected
for another term. He and his successors confirmed Dr. Salazar in the
premiership for what turned out to be an uninterrupted 36 years.
When the Spanish Civil War broke out in July, 1936, Salazar
sympathized at once with General Franco's Insurgents and ordered the
strengthening of Portugal's armed forces. At the same time he substan-
tially accelerated tendencies toward "fascistization" of the regime.
Loyalty oaths were imposed on the civil service and the teachers. A
20,000-strong Portuguese Legion (Legiao Portuguesa), with special air
and naval "brigades" as well, was created as a militia for men over the
age of eighteen. Trained by reserve officers, it was formally committed
to a "heroic ethic," a "revolutionary mystique," and to the "defense of
the spiritual patrimony of the Nation" as well as to the "defense of the
corporative order." Contrary to some expectations, it was not dissolved
at the end of World War II. About the same time a compulsory green-
shirred State Youth Movement ( Mocidade Portuguesa) was estab-
lished, with a parallel organization for girls. At first it embraced the
entire school and university population; later it was made compulsory
only for those between the ages of seven and fourteen. The youth
movement and the Portuguese Legion had their special uniforms and
Roman salutes. Participation in the Mocidade and Legiao was helpful
to one's political advancement. Repressive police organizations also
proliferated and eventually included such entities as the Guardia
Nacional Republicana, the Policia de Seguran9a Publica, the Guardia
Fiscal, and the dreaded secret International Police for the Defense of
the State (PIDE).
During the Spanish Civil War, Portugal provided one of the main
routes whereby supplies could reach Franco from Germany and else-
where. This channel remained open until April, 1937, when the British
government persuaded Salazar to permit the stationing of a British
control along the frontier of Spain. By that time, however, Franco was
able to get his foreign supplies directly through his own ports on the
northern coast of Spain. The British did their best to preserve their
traditional alliance with Portugal, for the latter had become of great
strategic importance, situated as it was athwart the routes from Africa
and the Mediterranean. As soon as Franco achieved victory in Spain,
Salazar concluded a nonaggression pact with his regime (March 18,
1939), but in the next breath (May 22 and 26) reaffirmed the long-
standing alliance with Britain. Portugal thus demonstrated her desire to
maintain friendly relations with both the fascistic and the democratic
powers.
In May, 1940, Salazar's government negotiated a concordat with the
Holy See. The Roman Catholic Church was reconfirmed in its posses-
sion of most of the property it had held prior to the separation of
Church and State in 1910. Religious instruction was restored to state
schools, private church schools were allowed, and church marriages
were to be recognized. On the other hand, divorce continued to be
permissible in Portugal.
In the summer of 1940 after the German blitzkrieg destroyed the
French Third Republic, Salazar was pleased to observe that Marshal
Henri Philippe Petain, the father figure of Vichy France, paid con-
siderable attention to the Portuguese experience in designing the
clerico-corporative institutions of his short-lived regime.
Some idea of Salazar's views with respect to the early phase of
World War II may be discerned in the following extract from a dis-
patch sent to Berlin by the German minister in Lisbon in November,
1940, a few weeks after Hitler had conferred with Generalissimo
Franco in an effort to persuade Spain to join the war on the side of the
Axis.
Salazar's Views of World War II as Reported by

the German Minister in Lisbon
(November 14, 1940)
Minister President Salazar received me today for the first time since
my return from my official journey2 for a prolonged conversation.
He acknowledged with admiration the description I gave him of
German morale and stated that he had time and again received the
same picture, lastly from Minister Nobre Guedes in Berlin. He
considers Spain's territorial demands to be fully justified, but in
repeating previous statements pointed out the unsatisfactory food
situation of the country, which would be aggravated to catastroph-
ic proportions by the anticipated English blockade, and which
made it advisable to put off Spain's entry into the war as long as
possible. He did not think that America would enter the war after
Roosevelt's election and presumed that the present state, which he
characterized ironically as intervention pacifique, would be main-
tained. He ruled out the possibility of American occupation of
Portuguese islands, unless the front of the Axis Powers should be
moved further westward. On the basis of the reports of the
[Portuguese] Ambassador in London (group garbled), who is here
now, he characterized England's will to resist as solid and not likely
at this time to be broken by German air attacks alone, to which the
population moreover had become adapted. He believes however
that the continued weakening of the country as regards shipping
space and port installations, is the decisive factor. A victory by
England was in any event no longer possible. At the conclusion of
the cordial conversation Salazar said that he was following our
struggle with sympathy and expressed satisfaction that the two
countries were linked by the same ideology.
As it turned out, Generalissimo Franco declined to declare war on any

of the Allies, though he did agree to send a volunteer Falangist "Blue
souRCE: Telegram, November 14, 1940, to German Foreign Office

from Baron Oswald von Hoyningen-Huene, the German Min-
ister in Lisbon, Document 332, printed in Documents on German
Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945) (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Department of State, 1960), XI, 571-572.
2. To Berlin, where he had reported to Ernst von Weizsaecker, State
Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry.-Ed.
Division" to fight in Russia after June, 1941. And, as has been observed
in Chapter 9, Franco and Salazar formed an "Iberian Bloc" in Feb-
ruary, 1942, to co-ordinate their foreign policies and safeguard the
neutrality and independence of their nations. Both countries were
developing healthy respect for Anglo-American naval and air power,
and Portugal had just lost her East Indian island of Timor to Japanese
occupation. She was not to reoccupy it until October, 1945.
After the Italian coup d'etat of July 25, 1943, overthrew Mussolini's
Fascist regime, the new government of King Victor Emmanuel III and
Marshal Pietro Badoglio made use of Lisbon as a secret meeting place
to negotiate armistice terms with the Anglo-Americans. By the autumn
of that year Salazar clearly recognized that the war had turned in favor
of the Allies; thus, on October 13 he conceded to Britain the right to
use Portuguese bases in the Azores for air and naval patrol of the
North Atlantic. This privilege was shared by United States ships and
planes. Salazar termed his new policy "collaborative neutrality."
When he learned of the death of Adolf Hitler at the end of April,
1945, Salazar dispatched a telegram of condolence to the new German
chief of state, Admiral Karl Doenitz, whom Hitler had named for the
post. But on May 6, just before Germany's capitulation, Portugal
severed diplomatic relations with the Reich in the hope thereby of
ingratiating herself with the triumphant Allies.
Salazar now began to muffle some of the more blatantly fascistic
overtones in his propaganda line, and he made the Portuguese Legion
less conspicuous. Governing in a slightly less authoritarian manner, he
sometimes permitted opposition candidates to announce themselves-
though in practice they were usually "persuaded" to withdraw their
candidacies before the actual voting day. Despite such gestures toward
the Western democracies (which in return agreed to let Portugal be an
original signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949),
it was not until 1955 that Portugal could gain admittance to the United
Nations.
The presidential election of 1958 marked the end of Salazar's "liberal-
ization." That year General Humberto da Silva Delgado led a surpris-
ingly strong opposition campaign for the presidency against Americo
Deus Thomaz and received 23 per cent of the votes. Salazar reacted in
January, 1959, by abolishing the system of direct elections for the
presidency and substituting an electoral college wherein the Corpora-
tive Chamber, whose functions had been increased since the war,
would play a substantial role. Seven years later General Delgado was
found murdered just across the border in Spain.
Meanwhile, the year 1961 saw the beginning of protracted guerrilla
warfare in Portugal's African colonies, a running sore which sapped
what little vigor remained in Salazar's regime. Portugal became the
target of much criticism from most of the members of the United
Nations.
At last on September 27, 1968, an incapacitating stroke brought an
end to Salazar's forty years of authoritarian rule. 3 President Deus

Thomaz aprointed Dr. Marcello Caetano to be Salazar's successor. A
professor o law and former member of the cabinet, Caetano faced the
difficult task of deciding how far he dared go in dismantling the
harshest features of the clerico-corporativist dictatorship at home and
its empire overseas without simultaneously arousing too much hostility
from the Army, bankers, and other vested interests. After his first year
in office it seemed fairly clear that Caetano intended to move slowly
toward a semi-liberal regime. In the parliamentary elections of Octo-
ber 26, 1969, democratic oppositionists were allowed to put up candi-
dates, though only the National Union enjoyed official sanction as a
party. The voters gave a strong endorsement to Caetano, and one
month later he announced the abolition of the secret political police
(PIDE) which, under Salazar, had penetrated almost every sphere of
public and private activity. If present trends continue, Portugal under
Caetano may shift to a freer, growth-minded economic philosophy in
contrast to Salazar's frugal, nationalistic policies. To what extent
Portugal is ready to shed the remainder of her semifascistic political
trappings remains to be seen.
3. Salazar died on July 27, 1970, without ever knowing that he had been
replaced as Premier.-Ed.
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Spain
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Index
Academic freedom, 147 Bianchi, Michele, 6, 7, 40, 44
Accademia dei Lincei, 148 Bill of Rights, 256
Acciaierie Lombarde, socialization of, Birth control, 255
251 Birth rate, Mussolini on, 134
Acerbo, Giacomo, 56 Bissolati, Leonida, 4
Acerbo electoral law (1923), 69 Blanqui, Louis Auguste, 23
Action Fran~aise, xiv, 331, 332 Blackshirts. See Squadristi
Africa, Italy's attitude toward, 189 Blue Shirt Militia (Spain), 279, 287. See
Agrarian issues, 18-21, 24, 136-137, 276 also Falange Espanola
Agrarian reform, 137 Bolshevism, 8, 96, 105, 205, 292
Albania, 138 Bonomi, lvanoe, 4, 26, 37, 221, 230, 234
Amendola, Giovanni, 56, 61, 90 Borgese, Giuseppe A., 148
Alfa Romeo, socialization of, 251 Bottai, Giuseppe, 148, 177, 221
Alfonso XIII, King of Spain, 257, 258 Bourbon dynasty, 258
Allied Military Government, 254 monarchy (Spain), overthrow of, xiv
Allies, 225, 327 Boy Scouts. See Catholic Boy Scouts
Anglo-German naval agreement (1935), Brazil, 331
192 Britain, 195-197, 207, 220, 228-229, 326,
Anti-Comintern Pact, 205-207 347,349
Anti-Semitism, 173-184. See also Jews Bulgaria, 48, 185
Aosta, Duke of, 44
Arbeitsdienst (Nazi labor-service pro- Caballero, Francisco Largo, 283
gram), 148 Caetano, Marcello, 350
Arditi, 7 Calendar, revolutionary fascist, 148
Arendt, Hannah, xviii Capitalism, 275
Armed Resistance. See Resistance forces Capo del Governo. See Head of the
Armistice, between Italy and Allies, Government
224-227 Cardinal's Mistress, The (Mussolini), 3
Army (Italian), xii, 42. See also Militia; Carlos Hugo de Bourbon Parma, 330
Italian military forces Carmona, Antonio 6scar de Fragoso,
Army (Spanish), uprising of, 283 332
Arrese, Jose Luis de, 327, 328 Casti Connubi (Pius XI), 134
Arriba! (Madrid), 279 Catholic Action (Spain), 328. See also
Artajo, Alberto Martin, 328 Azione Cattolica Italiana
Asia, 189 Catholic Boy Scouts, 156
Atatiirk, Mustafa Kemal, xvi Catholic Church, xii, 27
Attlee, Clement, 329 and Fascist state, 156-173
Austria, 48, 185, 187, 190 Jonsistas' view of, 258
Avanguardisti, 138, 139-142 and marriage, 163
Avanti!, 4, 6, 11 participation in Italian politics, 1
Aviation industry, 137 Portuguese Constitution on, 342-343
Aventinian secession, 56, 60, 61 and religious education, 163-164, 347
Axis, Rome-Berlin, 173 in Spain, 312
Azione Cattolica ltaliana, 164, 166, 234 Catholicism, 24, 25, 49, 105, 270-271
Catholic Popular Party, 2, 37, 55, 156
Badoglio, Pietro, 199, 221, 223, 224, 225, Caudillo. See Franco, Francisco
229, 230 Cavour, Camillo Benso di, 1
Balbo, Italo, 25, 26, 27, 37, 40 CEDA (Spanish Confederation of Au-
Baldwin, Stanley, 193, 199 tonomous Rightist Groups), 258
Balearic Islands, 201 Central Bureau of Statistics, 123
Balilla Youth Organization, 138, 139- Central Committee of Corporations, 128
143, 156 Chamber of Deputies, 52, 128-129, 165
Balkans, 208, 220 Chamber of Fasces and of Corporations,
Barres, Maurice, xiv 128, 129-132
Bergson, Henri, 23 Chamberlain, Neville, 207
358 INDEX
Charter of Labor. See Labor Charter Depression, the, xi, 136

Cheka, Mussolini on, 57, 58 De Ruggiero, Guido, 90
Church and State, 28, 156--173. See also De Sanctis, Gaetano, 147
Catholic Church De' Stefani, Alberto, 133
Churchill, Winston, 217, 234 De Vecchi, Cesare Maria, 27, 40, 55
Ciano, Galeazzo, 184, 186, 201, 207, 211, Dictatorship, safeguards against, 256
217, 220, 221, 321 Difesa della razza (Defense of the
Civilta Cattolica, 177 Race), 173
Civil War, Falange view of, 274-275 Divenire Sociale (Leone), 97
Salazar on, 335 Doenitz, Karl, 349
Clergy. See Ecclesiastics Dole, the (Italian), 137
Coburg-Braganza, House of, 331 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 190
Collar of the Annunciation, 173 Donati, Giuseppe, 64
Collective bargaining, 255 Don Juan de Borbon y Borbon, Prince,
Colonization and colonialism, 20, 31, 349 330
Committee of National Liberation for Duce, II. See Mussolini
Upper Italy (CLNAI), 252-254
Committees of National Liberation, 229, East Africa, 199, 220
230,242,252,254,256 Ecclesiastics, 158-159, 161-162
Communism, xi, 335 Economy
Communist Manifesto, 101 Italian, 136-138
Communists Portuguese Constitution on, 341-342
Italian, 3, 52 Eden, Anthony, 195, 199, 219n
Portuguese, 346 Education, 125-126
Spanish, 283 elementary, 146
Communion Tradicionalista, 258 Falange view of, 277
Confindustria, 108--109 Portuguese Constitution on, 342
Conquista del Estado, La, 257 Edward VIII, King of England, 201
Constituent Assembly, 256 Einaudi, Luigi, 90
Constitution for the Italian Republic Eisenhower, Dwight D., 224, 225
(1948), 256 El Fascio, 259
Corporations, 29, 126-128, 335 Employment Bureaus, 124-125
Corporative State, 107-108, 255 Enciclopedia ltaliana, 91
Corriere della Sera (Milan), 53 Eritrea, 199
Cortes (Spanish national assembly), 328 Esploratori Cattolici. See Catholic Boy
Countermanifesto (Croce), 90 Scouts
Courts. See Labor Courts; Supreme Estado Novo (Portuguese New State),
Constitutional Court 337, 346
Critica, La (edited by Croce), 90 Ethiopia, conquering of by Italy, 199-
Croce, Benedetto, xvii, 90 200
Cuesta, Raimundo Fernandez, 279, 286, Ethiopian War (193 5) , economic con-
303, 312, 315 sequences of, 137-138
Currency, Italian, devaluation and re-
valuation of, 136 "Face to the Sun" (Marti), 279
Czechoslovakia, 207 Facta, Luigi, 37, 40, 44
Faculty of Political Science (Perugia),
Dalser, Ida Irene (mistress of Mus- 146
soHni), 5 Falange Espanola, xiv
D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 1, 2-3, 22, 108, and the Army, 280-282
146 basic points of, 267-271
DeAmbris, Alceste, 7n, 108 founding of, 259-266
DeBono, Emilio, 27, 40, 199 German and Italian policy toward,
Decalogues. See Fascist Decalogues 287-289
De Gasperi, Alcide, 156 loss of power in Franco's regime, 327,
De la Tour du Pin, Rene, 332 328-329
Del Noce, Augusto, xviii and Requetes, 311-312
Delgado, Humbero da Silva, 349 role of women in, 311
Democracy, 100-101 statutes revised (1939), 296-303
De Mun, Albert, 332 taken over by Franco, 296
INDEX 359
Falange Espanola (Cont.) Fascists, and Catholic Action (Cont.)
troops sent to Russia, 327 program of, 12-13
Twenty-Six Point Program of (1937), terrorism by, 17, 25, 37
273-277 and working class, xiii
Falange Espanola de las Juntas de and youth, xiii
Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, S.Pe also National Fascist Party
271 Fascist State, 95-96
Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de Fascist University (Bologna), 146
las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional- Fascist University Groups (GUF), 143,
Sindicalista (FET y de las 148, 149, 166
JONS), 293 Federzoni, Luigi, xvii
Falangist Oath, 272 Ferrero, Guglielmo, 90
Family, the, Portuguese Constitution on, Fiat, socialization of, 251
340 Florence, liberation of, by Allies, 243
Farinacci, Roberto, 56, 61, 80, 173, 234 Four-Power Pact, 186
Fasci, xiii France
Fasci di Combattimento, 4, 11, 13, 77-79, Mussolini and, 185, 187, 207
82-90 Third Republic, fall of, xv, 347
Fasci Giovanile di Combattimento, 78-- Franco, Francisco and Allies, 327-328
81, 83 and Army uprising, 283
Fasci Italiani di Combattimento, 97 chooses successor, 329-330
Fascia, 7 and Falange, xiv, 282
Fascism, xi German and Italian policy toward,
appeal of, in Italy, xii 287-289
attitude toward Catholic Church, 24 and Hitler, 318, 322
class in society, 23-24 and Mussolini, 321
Communists, 23-24 and Salazar, 327
divorce, 24 sends troops to aid Germans in Russia,
Socialists, 23 327
birth of, 1ff. on unification of forces, 289-295
Catholic view of, xviii wins Spanish Civil War, 314-315
Communist view of, xvii Fran co-Italian armistice (1940), 215
democratic-radical view of, xvii Freedom
end of, in Italy, 255 Falange view of, 270, 274
explanation of, 91-106 Portuguese Constitution on, 339-340
and Jews, 173-186 restrictions on, 314--315, 317-318
liberal-conservative view of, xvii Friedrich, Carl, xviii
and naziism, 202-203 Fromm, Erich, xviii
as "universal phenomenon," 186-190 "Fuero de los Espaii.oles" (Spanish bill
Fascist Crimes, purge law on, 230-234 of rights), 328
Fascist Decalogues, 145-146 Fiibrer. See Hitler, Adolf
Fascist dictatorship, resistance to, xiii. Futurists and Futurism, 7, 14, 102
See also Resistance forces
Fascist electoral law (1928), 70--74 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 102
Fascist Grand Council, 52, 69, 74-77, Gasparri, Pietro, 156
177, 198, 221-222 Gazzetta Ufficiale, 69, 72, 112, 115
Fascist March on Rome, xiii, 7, 44, 45 General Confederation of Fascist Cor-
Fascist Revolutionary Party, 96 porations, 108--109
Fascist School Charter, 148-155 General Confederation of Italian In-
Fascists, and Catholic Action (Azione dustry. See Confindustria
Cattolica Italiana), 172 General Confederation of Labor
conquest of power, 44 (Italy), 14
contrasted to Socialists, 11 General Confederation of Labor (Por-
defeat and punishment of, 252-253 tugal), 346
dismantle some police, 251-252 Gentile, Giovanni, 90, 146
educational goals of, 148-155 German-Spanish Treaty of Friendship
election to Chamber of Deputies, 21 (1939), 318-321
gains of, 17 Germany, 188, 203-205, 215-217, 219-
power, redistribution of, 62-64 220
360 INDEX
Germany (Cont.) Industry (Italian)

annexation of Austria, 173, 207 Mussolini's attitude toward, 9, 136, 137
evicted from northern Italy, 230 socialization of, 251
fascism in, xi types of industries: See individual
and Spain, 285-286, 321-323, 326-328 listings
Gil Robles, Jose Maria, 258 Institute for Industrial Reconstruction
Giolitti, Giovanni, 1, 21, 22, 37, 44, 55, (IRI), 255
56,97 "lntegralismo Lusitano," 332
Gioventu ltaliana del Littorio. See Ital- "Integral nationalism," 27
ian Youth of the Lictors International Fascist Congress (1934),
"Giovinezza" (Fascist party marching 277-278
anthem), 138 International Police for the Defense of
Giulino di Mezzegra, 253 the State (PIDE) (Portugal),
Giunta, Francesco, 39 347, 350
Giuriati, Giovanni, 80, 173 Italian Academy (1927), 146
Goebbels, Joseph, 234 Italian Catholic University Federation
Gomes da Costa, Manuel de Oliveria, (FUCI), 166
332 Italian Corps of Liberation, 228, 255
Gomez Jordana, 318 Italian-German-Spanish Secret Protocol
Governing class, 11 (1940)' 322-323
Grandi, Dino, 25, 26, 185-186, 200-201, Italian military forces, 215, 217, 219, 220.
221-222 See also Militia; Army (Italian)
Graziani, Rodolfo, 199 Italian race, defense of, 178-183
Greece, 217-219 Italian Socialist Party. See Socialist
Guardia Fiscal (Portugal), 347 Party (Italian)
Guardia Nacional Republicana (Portu- Italian Social Republic, 236-242
gal), 347 Italian Somaliland, 199
Guidi, Edda (daughter of Mussolini), 5 Italian Youth of the Lictors, 143-146,
Guidi, Rachele (Mussolini's wife), 5 148, 149
Italy
Head of the Government, 61, 74-77, civil war in, 3, 25, 43
222-223 Communists, 3, 52
Hedilla, Manuel, 287, 296 divided, 224-225
Hegel, Georg F. W., xiv and Germany, 223-224
Heimwehr (Home Defense Units), 185 present-day, 256
High Council of the Magistracy, 256 surrender of, 225-227
Hitler, Adolf, xi, 186, 199, 202, 207-208, tripartite declaration of Moscow on,
210-211, 212, 326-328 228-229
aids Spanish rebels, 283
death of, 349 James, William, xiv
and Franco, 318-322,326-328 Japan, 205-207, 216-217
origins of, xvi Jesuits, 312
Hitler-Mussolini Conference (1940), Jews, xvii, 173-184, 238
323-326 John XXIII (Pope), 184
Hoare, Samuel, 199 J onsistas, 271
Hoare-Laval pact, 199 Jose Felix de Lequerica y Erquiza, 328
Holy See, 156-164. See also Catholic Juan Carlos de Borb6n y Borb6n,
Church; Vatican Prince, 329-330
Humbert, Prince of Piedmont, 230, 255 Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindical-
Hungary,48, 185,187 ista (JONS), 258, 271
Justice and Liberty (Italian anti-Fascist
"If" (Kipling), 279 emigre organization), 285
Illiteracy, decline of, 146
Industrialists (Italian), xii, 109 Kipling, Rudyard, 279
and Mussolini, 138 Kraft durch Freude, 133
government interest in, 137
industrial revolution, 1 Labor Charter (1927) (Italian), xii,
monopolies, 137 120-126, 148, 338
INDEX 361
Labor Charter (Spanish), 304-311 Masonic Lodge, 61, 156
Labor Courts, 116-118, 121-123 Masonry and Communism, suppression
Labor-management relations, 122-123, of, 315-316
255 Matteotti, Giacomo, xiii, 56
Labor unions Maurras, Charles, xiv, 27, 331, 332
beginnings of, 2 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 102
elimination of, by Fascists, xii Meinecke, Friedrich, xvii
Fascist, 25 "Me ne frego," 99
leftist, resistance to fascism, xii Metaxas, John, 219n
Lagardelle, Hubert, 96 Mezzadri, 137
Land reform, 137 Migrant workers. See Mezzadri
Landholders, xii Military service, 36, 343
Lateran pacts (1929), xvii, 70, 91, 156- Militia (Italian), 50
164, 255 Ministry of Corporations, 123
Latifondo (landed estates), 18, 19, 20. Ministry of Syndical Organization
See also Agrarian issues; Agrarian (Spain), 304
reform; Land reform Mit brennender Sorge (Pius XI), 176-
Latin language, 35 177
Lausanne Conference, 48 Mola, Emilio, 279, 282
Laval, Pierre, 193, 199, 323 Monarchy, xii, 39-40, 54, 55, 102-103
League of Nations, 8, 11, 27, 188, 194 Montecatini, socialization of, 251
sanctions against Italy, 195-197 "Monti di Pied," 136
Ledesma, Ramos Ramiro, 257-258, 271, Morocco, Spanish, 283
278, 286 Mosca, Gaetano, xiv
Leftist political parties, resistance to Mosley, Oswald, xvi
Fascism, xiii Motherhood, 134
Lenin, Nikolai, 24 Munoz Grandes, 315, 318
Leone, Enrico, 97 Mussolini, Benito
Leo XIII (Pope), 107, 167,332 achievements of, 255
LePlay, Frederic, 332 aids Spanish rebels, 283, 285
Liberalism, parliamentary and demo- arrest of, 223
cratic, xi, 94, 101, 102, 103, 260- attempts on life of, 64
261 attitude toward Hitler, 201
Liberal party, 55 and Azione Cattolica, 166
Libertad, 257 background of, xvi, 3-5
Libya (Italian), 193 on "bourgeois spirit," 190
Lipset, Seymour, xviii capture of British Somaliland, 217
Lira di Pesaro, 136 character of, 5-6
Lisbon, 349 charisma of, xiii
Locarno pacts, 185-186 on church and state in Italy, 165
Lotta di classe, 3 congress at Montreux, 190
Loyalty Oath for Professors, 147 death of, xviii, 252-254
Lupa, La, 97 declares war (1940), 213-215
on democracy, 42
Machiavelli, Niccolo, xiv doctrine of fascism, 91-106
Manifesto of the Fascist Intellectuals
drags Italy into World War I, 1
(Gentile), 90, 146
election to Chamber of Deputies, 21
Manifesto of the Racist Scientists
(1938), 173-174 emerges as leader of Fascists, 14
March on Rome. See Fascist March on Fascist party of, xi
Rome foreign policy, 185, 200-201, 239
Marconi, Guglielmo, 146 and Hitler, 202, 210-212, 213, 221
Margherita, Queen Mother, 44 and House of Savoy, 235-236
Marinetti, Filippe, 7, 14 invades Albania, 207
Maritain, Jacques, xviii on Jewish policy, 177, 238
Marriage, and race, 178, 183 last public address, 243-251
Marshes, draining of, 136 loss of prestige, 220, 221
Marxism, xi. See also Bolshevism; Com- and the poor, 199
munism; Socialism rescued by Hitler, 234
362 INDEX
Mussolini, Benito (Cont.) Pacelli, Eugenio Cardinal. See Pius XII

signing of Lateran pacts, 156 Pact of Steel, 208-210
on social issues, 239-242 Pagine Libere (Olivetti), 97
tries to regain power, 237 Palazzo Chigi pact, 108-109
victory in Ethiopia, 199-200 Pareto, Vilfredo, xiv, 3
on violence, 38 Parliament, 41, 42, 61
war in Ethiopia, 192-195 Partiti di massa, 2
Muti, Ettore, 80 Partito Fascista Repubblicano (PFR),
237
National Constituent Assembly, 11 Partito N azionale Fascista (PNF). See
National Economic and Labor Council, National Fascist Party
256 Partito Popolare Italiano. See Catholic
National Fascist Institute of Culture Popular Party
(Rome), 146 Party and State, xvi
National Fascist Party, 26-37 Party bosses, local. See Ras
economic reconstruction, 31-33 Pavolini, Alessandro, 237
education, 34-35, 48 Pawnshops. See Monti di Piet:l
financial policy, 31-33 Peguy, Charles, 96
foreign policy, 30-31, 46-47 Penal Code of 1889, 252
on justice, 35-36 Per Necessita Familiari, 77
on militia, 31 Petacci, Claretta (Mussolini's mistress),
organization of, 77-90 253
program of, 27-37 Petain, Henri Philippe, xv, 323, 331, 347
social policy, 33 Petroleum production industry, 137
National Institution for Leisure Time. Piazzale Loreto, 253
See Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro Pilsudski, Joseph, 332
Nationalism, Salazar on, 336-337 Pirandello, Luigi, 90
Nationalist party, xii, xvii Pius XI (Pope), 134, 156, 332
National Organization for Maternity and anti-Semitism, 176-177
and Child Welfare, 134-136 on Azione Cattolica ltaliana, 169-172
National party, 55 death of, 184
National self-sufficiency, 136, 242 and Mussolini, 165-166
on social organization, 167-168
National-syndicalist labor union, 7n Pius XII (Pope), 156, 173, 184, 213
National Technical Councils, 27, 28 Plebiscite of 1929, 165
National Union (Uniao Nacional) Poland, 212, 332
(Portugal), 332, 338, 350 Police state. See individual organizations
Navigation, 32 Policia de Seguran~a Publica (Portu-
Nazis, Munich Beer Hall Putsch, xi gal), 347
Nietzsche, Friedrich, xiv, 3 Political parties, Falange view of, 268-
Nitti, F. S., 14 269
Non abbiamo bisogno (Pius XI), 169- Polverelli, Gaetano, 17
172 Pope, the, Mussolini on, 157-158, 161.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, See also individual popes
349 Popolo d'ltalia, ll, 4, 5, 7, 11, 96, 97, 166
Portugal, xv, 321, 331, 346, 349
Olivetti, Angelo, 97 Constitution of (1933), 337-346
Olivetti, Gino, 109 Portuguese Legion (Legiao Portuguesa),
Opera Nazionale Combattenti (Na- 346-347
tional Land Program for Veter- Predappio, 253
ans), 19 Press censorship, 53-55, 312-313
Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro, 133-134 Preziosi, Giuseppe, 173
Orano, Paolo, 97 Price-rigging, 137
Order of the Wolf, 138 Primo de Rivera, Jose Antonio, xiv,
Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 2 258-259,271,278,279,282,287
Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 258 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 258
Osservatore Romano, L', 166, 169, 177 Primo de Rivera, Pilar, 279
Ottoman Empire, xvi Private enterprise, 33, 122
INDEX 363
Property Savoy, House of, xvii, 37, 42, 213, 228,
private, xii, 27 5 255-256
and family, 310 School of Fascist Mysticism, 143
Public safety, 64-66 Schools, structure of, 150-155
Public works, 137 Schuster, Cardinal, 253
Purge trial (Verona), 242 Scorza, Carlo, 80, 173
Purges. See Fascist crimes Selassie, Haile, 199, 220
Senate, the, 51,128,256
Quadragesimo anno (Pius XI), 166--169, Serena, A., 80
332, 338 Serrano Sufier, Ramon, 287, 293, 303,
Quota novanta, 136 312, 315, 318, 321, 322, 327
Sforza, Carlo, 22, 230, 234
Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei De- Sharecroppers. See Mezzadri
creti del Regno, 132 Shipbuilding industry, 137
Racism, 173 Sicily, Allied invasion of, 221
Rahn, Rudolf, 237 Skorzeny, Otto, 234
Railroads, 32 Social classes, 94
Ras, 55 Social Contract, The (Rousseau), 260
Redondo, Ortega, Onesimo, 257-258, Socialism, 94, 96, 100, 262
286 Socialist party (Italian), 2, 4, 9, 107, 234
Referendum of 1946, 255-256 Socialists, 52
Religion, Falange view of, 277. See also Social welfare, Spanish Labor Charter
Catholicism on, 309-311
Repressive measures, 64-66, 67-69. See Soleri, Michele, 44
also Freedom, restrictions on Sorel, Georges, xiv, 3, 96, 107
Republicans, 283 South America, 48-49
Requetes, 258, 287, 311-312 Sovereign pontiff. See Pope, the
Rerum novarum (1891) (Leo XIII), xv, Soviet Constitution of 1936, 256
107, 332 Soviet Union. See Russia
Resistance forces, 234, 242, 251, 252, 255 Spain
Revolution, 277, 331 beginning of Fascist movement in,
Ricci, Renata, 139, 143 xiv, 257
Roatta, Mario, 285 Falange view of, 262-263, 267-268,
Rocco, Alfredo, xvii, 91, 110, 133 273-274
Roman Empire, xiii, 43, 204 Franco on, 290-292
Roman Question, 156 and Germany, 318ff
Roman Republic, xiii, 101 liberalization in, 328
Rome, liberated by Allies, 230 ousted from U.N., 329
Rome-Berlin Axis, 201-205 Portuguese government, a model for,
Rome Congress (1921), 26 331
Rommel, Erwin, 220 Second Republic, 257
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 327 during World War II, 321-323, 326-
Rosselli, Carlo, 285 329
Rossi, Cesare, 14 since World War II, 329-330
Rossoni, Edmonda, 107, 109 Spanish Civil War, xiv, 138, 201, 283,
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 259-260 284-285, 314, 346-347
Ruiz de Alda, Julio, 262n, 271, 286 Spanish Confederation of Autonomous
Russia, xi, 48, 185, 220, 228-229, 283 Rightist Groups. See CEDA
Spanish Popular Front, 279
Salandra, Antonio, 44, 56 Special Tribunal, 67-69
Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira Spellman, Francis, 169
biographical information, 332-333 Squadrismo, 17, 37
death of, 349-350 Squadristi, xii, 26, 27, 252
establishes Estado Novo, xv, 166 Stalin, Joseph, 207, 329
political and economic doctrines, 333- Stampa, La (Turin), 53
337 Starace, Achille, 80, 128, 138, 143
in World War II, 347-349 Starhemberg, Prince Ernst von, 185, 190
Salvatorelli, Luigi, xvii, 90 State, the, 95, 104-106
Salvemini, Gaetano, 64 authority of, 50
364 INDEX
State (Cont.) Vatican, the, 156, 213. See also Catholic
Falange view of, 269, 274 Church
function of, 25, 28 Vatican City, 157
Portuguese Constitution on, 343-346 Vecchi, Ferruccio, 7, 14
Salazar on, 333-334 Veneto, Vittorio, 195
State capitalism, 137 Venturi, Lionello, 148
State Youth Movement (Mocidade Por- Versailles Treaty, 188
tuguesa) (Portugal), 346-347 Vichy regime (1940-44), xv, 321, 331
Statuto Albertina (1848), 128 Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy,
Stresa Conference, 190-192 xvii, 1, 44, 45, 56, 128, 199-200,
Stresa Front, 192 207,221,224,228,229-230
Strikes and lockouts, 34, 118-120, 221 Vidoni Palace Pact, 109-110
Sturm Abteilung (Storm Troopers), 315 Vidussoni, Aldo, 80
Sturzo, Don Luigi, 2, 37, 156 Volpe, Gioacchino, 146
Supreme Constitutional Court, 256 Volpi, Giuseppe, 133
Syndicalism, 107 Volunteer Militia for National Security,
Syndicalist movement (Spanish), 257 52-53
Syndicates, 111-116 Von Ribbentrop, Joachim, 208
Von Schuschnigg, Kurt, 201
Tacchi-Venturi, Pietro, 173 Von Stohrer, Eberhard, 318
Tariffs, 136 Voting rights, women's, 256
Tasca, Angelo, xvii
Tenant farmers. See Mezzadri Wages, farm workers', 137-138
Terrorism (Spain), 314 Wavell, Archibald P., 217
Textiles (Italian), 137
Weimar Germany, 185
Thomaz, Americo Deus, 349, 350
Three-Power Pact (1940), 215-217 Welfare, 125
Togliatti, Palmiro, 229 Wolff, Karl, 237, 252
Totalitarian (term coined by Musso- Women, right to vote, 256
lini), xvii Work
Tourism, 136 Falange view of, 269
Trade-unionism, 94. See also Labor Spanish Labor Charter on, 305-308
unions "Work, Family, Country," xv
Treaties, between Holy See and Italy, Working classes, 242
157-164 Working people, post-World War I
Truman, Harry, 329 malaise, 2
Turkey, 48 Work week, forty hour, 137
World War I, xi, 2
Unemployment, 136 World War II, xi, 255
Ungaretti, Giuseppe, 90
Union Patri6tica, 259 Xavier de Borb6n Parma, Prince, 330
Unity, Italian, 102
Unitary Socialist party, 56
United Nations, censures Spain, 329 Young Fascists, 138-139
United States, xi, 48, 220, 228-229, 327, Young Turks, xvi
349 Youth, 138-139
Universal suffrage, 10, 12 Youth movements, 346-347
Yugoslavia, 185, 187
V aldecasas, Alfonso Garda, 262
Vargas, Getulio, 331 Zog, King of Albania, 207
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION
Edited by Eugene C. Black and Leonard W. Levy
ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL HISTORY OF THE WEST

Morton Smith: ANCIENT GREECE *
A. H. M. Jones: A HISTORY OF ROME THROUGH THE FIFTH CENTURY
Vol. I: The Republic
Vol. II: The Empire
Deno Geanakoplos: BYZANTINE EMPIRE *
Marshall W. Baldwin: CHRISTIANITY THROUGH THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
Bernard Lewis: ISLAM TO 1453 *
David Herlihy: HISTORY OF FEUDALISM
William M. Bow sky: RISE OF COMMERCE AND TOWNS*
David Herlihy: MEDIEVAL CULTURE AND SOCIETY
EARLY MODERN HISTORY

Hanna H. Gray: CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE RENAISSANCE*
Florence Edler de Roever: MONEY, BANKING,
AND COMMERCE, THIRTEENTH THROUGH SIXTEENTH CENTURIES *
V. J. Parry: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE *
Ralph E. Giesey: EVOLUTION OF THE DYNASTIC STATE *
J. H. Parry: THE EUROPEAN RECONNAISSANCE: Selected Documents
Hans J. Hillerbrand: THE PROTESTANT REFORMATION
John C. Olin: THE CATHOLIC COUNTER REFORMATION*
Orest Ranum: THE CENTURY OF LOUIS XIV *
Thomas Hegarty: RUSSIAN HISTORY THROUGH PETER THE GREAT*
Marie Boas Hall: NATURE AND NATURE'S LAWS
Barry E. Supple: HISTORY OF MERCANTILISM*
Geoffrey Symcox: IMPERIALISM, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY, 1550-1763 *
Herbert H. Rowen: THE LOW COUNTRIES *
C. A. Macartney: THE HABSBURG AND HOHENZOLLERN DYNASTIES
IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES
Lester G. Crocker: THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
Robert and Elborg Forster: EUROPEAN SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1789-1848
Paul H. Beik: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
David L. Dowd: NAPOLEONIC ERA, 1799-1815 *
Rene Albrecht-Carrie: THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

John 8. Halsted: ROMANTICISM
R. Max Hartwell: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION *
Mack Walker: METTERNICH's EUROPE
Douglas Johnson: THE ASCENDANT BOURGEOISIE*
John A. Hawgood: THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848 *
NATIONALISM, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM, 1850-1914
Eugene C. Black: VICTORIAN CULTURE AND SOCIETY
Eugene C. Black: BRITISH POLITICS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Denis Mack Smith: THE MAKING OF ITALY, 1796-1870
David Thomson: FRANCE: Empire and Republic, 1850-1940
Theodore S. Hamerow: BISMARCK'S MITTELEUROPA *
Eugene 0. Golob: THE AGE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE *
Roland N. Stromberg: REALISM, NATURALISM, AND SYMBOLISM:
Modes of Thought and Expression itt Europe, 1848-1914
Melvin Kranz berg: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY *
Jesse D. Clarkson: TSARIST RUSSIA: Catherine the Great to Nicholas II*
Philip D. Curtin: IMPERIALISM*
Massimo SaJvadori: MODERN SOCIALISM
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Jere C. King: THE FIRST WORLD WAR*
S. Clough, T. and C. Moodie: ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE:
Twentieth Century
W. Warren Wagar: SCIENCE, FAITH, AND MAN:
European Thought Since 1914
Paul A. Gagnon: INTERNATIONALISM AND DIPLOMACY BETWEEN THE WARS, 1919-1939 *
Henry Cord Meyer: WEIMAR AND NAZI GERMANY*

Michal Vyvyan: RUSSIA FROM LENIN TO KHRUSHCHEV *
Charles f. Delzell: MEDITERRANEAN FASCISM, 1919-1945
Donald C. Watt: THE SECOND WORLD WAR*
* In preparation

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Mediterranean Fascism

Introduction, editorial notes, translations by the editor,

All rights reserved. No part of this publication

First published in the United States 1970

ISBN 978-1-349-00242-9 ISBN 978-1-349-00240-5 (eBook)

I. The Birth of Fascism 1

2. The Path to the Totalitarian State 44

3. The Corporative State 107

The Rocco Labor and Antistrike Law Ill

4. Social, Economic, and Youth Programs 13 3

5. Fascism, the Catholic Church, and the Jews 156

6. The Day of the Lion 185

Mussolini's Speech Declaring War 213

7. Monarchist Coup d'Etat and Republican Fascism 221

II. FASCISM IN SPAIN

8. The Falange Espanola 257

9· The Civil War and Franco's Triumph 283

Statutes of the Falange Espanola Tradicionalista y de

III. SALAZAR'S PORTUGAL

10. The Clerico-Corporative Estado Novo 331

Select Bibliography 351

IN THE aftermath of World War I much of Europe found itself

It is the Mediterranean region, and more precisely the Italian and

cerned. Mussolini's Italy was, of course, the country par excellence

From the outset the Fascists made a concerted effort to recruit

the creative role of violence to Georges Sorel's revolutionary

1. Action Fran~aise was in many respects a kind of halfway station on

Portugal is a somewhat different case. In the wake of a series of

2. For an introduction to the complex history of the Vichy regime,

Likewise, no attempt can be made in this book to discuss the

a certain stage in its development and under certain crisis condi...

5. Pioneering efforts in this field include Renzo De Felice, Le interpreta-

For Mussolini's Italy the documents are arranged in seven chap-

1. The Birth of Fascism

due course she could have stabilized her democratic institutions. As it

Report of Inspector-General of Public Security,

BIOGRAPHICAL OBSERVATIONS (Mussolini)

souRcE: Translated by permission of Harcourt, Brace & World,

PHYSICAL AND PsYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERisTics

capable of making quick decisions; but he is not equally tenacious

Soon after the armistice Mussolini sensed the political potentialities of

The Birth of the Fascist Movement

MussouNI's MoRNING SPEECH

souRcE: Milan Il Popolo d'ltalia, Vol. VI, No. 83 (March 24,

Later, in the afternoon, we can resume discussion of our platform

"The meeting of March 2 3 extends its greetings and its reverent

"The meeting of March 2 3 declares that it is opposed to the

"The meeting of March 23 pledges the Fascists to sabotage

MussouNI's AFTERNOON SPEECH

I shall dispense with the idea of delivering a long speech. We don't

to build. Destruction can be the work of an hour, but construction

one that was circulated in the form of a manifesto in the summer of

Program of the Italian Fascist Movement

ITALIAN FASCI DI CoMBATTIMENTO

For the political problem:

souRcE: Translated by permission of Harcourt, Brace & World,

For the military problem:

For the financial problem:

During most of 1919 Mussolini remained the journalist, orator, and